

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

**1961–1963
VOLUMES X/XI/XII**

**AMERICAN REPUBLICS;
CUBA 1961–1962; CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS AND
AFTERMATH**

**MICROFICHE
SUPPLEMENT**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1961–1963**

Volumes X/XI/XII

**American Republics;
Cuba 1961–1962;
Cuban Missile Crisis
and Aftermath**

**Microfiche
Supplement**

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a

IV Preface

defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this microfiche supplement, which was compiled in 1990–1992, meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This supplement is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series for the years 1961–1963. The subseries presents in 25 print volumes and 5 microfiche supplements a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Kennedy's administration. The record of U.S. policy toward Cuba and its international ramifications, including the events and policy discussions attending the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962 and volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath. *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume XII presents the record of U.S. foreign policy toward Argentina, Brazil, British Guiana, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, and Peru as well as documentation on U.S. involvement in the establishment of the Alliance for Progress and U.S. policies regarding Latin American security issues.

The microfiche publication presents additional documents that supplement the printed record on policies with respect to Cuba. The publication also includes documents on U.S. policies toward Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela that deserve to be published in the *Foreign Relations* series but because of space limitations cannot be included in the printed volume. Of particular importance are 1960 documents on the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation that were not included in the 1958–1960 Cuba volume, notes based on meetings of President Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the missile crisis, additional intelligence on the missile crisis and aftermath, and the formal appraisal of the Bay of Pigs operation by the CIA Inspector General including the internal commentary that it generated within the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. In preparing the documentation in this microfiche regarding policies toward Cuba, the editors benefited from unprecedented access to the records of the CIA as well as from the assistance of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. The preparation of the other portions of this microfiche documenting aspects of U.S. policy toward 11 Western Hemisphere nations was carried out prior to the expansion of access for State Department historians in CIA records developed in cooperation with the CIA History Staff. That portion of the microfiche therefore does not reflect the range of intelligence activities and information comparable to that presented with respect to Cuba.

The editors had complete access to all the retired records and papers in the Department of State including certain intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the Cuba supplement.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also had access to the papers of President Kennedy and other White House foreign policy records at the John F. Kennedy Library. The records maintained and preserved there include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies. Department of State historians also had full access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and his major assistants.

The Central Intelligence Agency currently provides access for Department historians to high-level and working-level intelligence documents from those records still in the custody of that Agency. Department historians' access is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of

Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. The development of this access arrangement coincided with the research of many of the volumes for the 1961–1963 triennium. The documents included here for volumes X and XI reflect this expanded access to intelligence records, which was undertaken with the invaluable cooperation of the Central Intelligence Agency History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. The research of documents for the microfiche supplement for volume XII was completed before such expanded access was achieved. The editors decided to proceed to publication with what documentation had already been acquired rather than delay the supplement's publication further beyond the 30-year line.

The List of Sources (pages 1–11) lists the files consulted both in government repositories and in private collections for the print volumes and the microfiche supplement.

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series

In preparing each volume of the *Foreign Relations* series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in a microfiche supplement or in bibliographical notes.

*Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for the
Microfiche Supplement to Foreign Relations, 1961–1963,
Volumes X, XI, and XII*

The research for print volumes X and XI was completed in 1996. The research for volume XII and the American Republics compilations in the microfiche supplement was completed in 1992. The principles of selection followed by the editors for the print volumes are described in the prefaces of those volumes. The volumes may be used without this supplement, but the supplement should be used in conjunction with the printed volumes.

The documents selected for this microfiche publication by the editors of volumes X and XI provide additional details on the major issues covered, as well as selected documents of less than major significance not chosen for inclusion in the print volumes. This supplement also includes several lengthy attachments to printed documents for which there was no space in the respective volumes. The microfiche supplement to volume XII is different in that it includes the primary selections for U.S. policy toward countries that were not included in the print volume. The Office of the Historian determined that the documentary record of certain episodes in U.S. relations with and policies taken during the Kennedy Presidency toward Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela were important for a complete and accurate record of policies with regard to the Western Hemisphere and would be adequately available to users of the *Foreign Relations* series published in a microfiche supplement. The determination by no means implies that these 11 nations were any less important to the United States and its interests abroad. It means only that in the Kennedy Presidency foreign policy problems and episodes elsewhere in the hemisphere were more urgent and took more of the President's time and attention and that of his advisers. For this reason the editors decided to focus on publishing the documentary record of these events and policies in the print volume. The documents assembled in this fiche publication regarding policies for the 11 countries were compiled as if they were to be published in printed form. They have, however, not been edited or annotated in any way.

The List of Documents, which includes for each document a title, date, participants (for memoranda of conversation), from/to information, classification, number of pages, and source citation, as well as a one-sentence summary, is part of this printed guide and appears on the first two microfiche cards. The printed guide also includes Lists of Sources, Abbreviations, and Persons.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute,

reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. Although the Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, it does monitor the overall process and makes recommendations on particular problems that come to its attention. The Advisory Committee did not review this microfiche supplement.

Declassification Review

The final declassification review of this microfiche supplement resulted in the decision to withhold 1 percent from volume X (no documents denied), 2 percent from volume XI (2 documents denied), and 1 percent from volume XII (4 documents denied). The remaining documents, together with the documents published in the printed volumes, provide an accurate account of the foreign policy issues confronting, and the policies undertaken by the U.S. Government concerning Cuba and the American Republics during this period.

The former Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information, which was superseded by Executive Order 12958 on April 20, 1995, and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of the federal agencies, particularly the National Archives and Records Administration, for their cooperation in granting access to their records. They also thank officials at the John F. Kennedy Library, in particular Suzanne Forbes, and the officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library of the National Archives and Records Administration, the History Staff at the Central Intelligence Agency, especially Mary McAuliffe, Vivienne Manber at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and other officials of specialized repositories who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Louis J. Smith did the research for the supplement to volumes X and XI, and he and Charles S. Sampson selected the documents through the Cuban missile crisis. Edward C. Keefer selected the documents beginning with November 1962 through to the end of 1963. W. Taylor Fain III did the research for volume XII, and he, Edward C. Keefer, and David W. Mabon made the selections for the individual compilations. Taylor Fain selected documents for Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela; Edward Keefer selected documents for El Salvador

X Preface

and Honduras; and David Mabon selected documents for Guatemala. All editors worked under the general supervision of then Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Vicki E. Futscher prepared the List of Documents.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

July 1998

Contents

Preface.....	III
List of Sources	1
List of Abbreviations	12
List of Persons	23
Summary of Print Volume X.....	31
Summary of Print Volume XI.....	50
List of Documents.....	66

List of Sources

Department of State

Decimal Central Files. Through January 1963 the Department of State continued to use the decimal central files system. All the following Central File records are part of Record Group 59 and are located in National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland.

- 152: special missions to Central and South America
- 601.6111: diplomatic representation between the United States and Soviet Union
- 611.12: U.S. relations with Mexico
- 611.1231: U.S. boundaries with Mexico
- 611.12322: U.S.-Mexico, diversion of international waters
- 611.12323: U.S.-Mexico, international waterways
- 611.14: U.S. relations with Guatemala
- 611.16: U.S. relations with El Salvador
- 611.18: U.S. relations with Costa Rica
- 611.21: U.S. relations with Colombia
- 611.24: U.S. relations with Bolivia
- 611.25: U.S. relations with Chile
- 611.31: U.S. relations with Venezuela
- 611.37: U.S. relations with Cuba
- 611.3722: U.S. blockade of Cuba
- 611.61: U.S.-Soviet Union political relations
- 712.00: political affairs and conditions in Mexico
- 712.5621: sale of naval vessels to Mexico
- 714.00: political affairs and conditions in Guatemala
- 714.5622: sale of aircraft to Guatemala
- 715.00: political affairs and conditions in Honduras
- 715.04: Honduras' flag
- 715.11: chief executive of Honduras
- 715.5: Honduras' defense affairs
- 716.0: political affairs and conditions in El Salvador
- 716.02: recognition of the Government of El Salvador
- 718.00: political affairs and conditions in Costa Rica
- 721.11: chief executive of Columbia
- 721.5-MSP: U.S. military assistance to Columbia
- 722.00: political affairs and conditions in Ecuador
- 722.5-MSP: U.S. military assistance to Ecuador

722.58: visits of Ecuador military
724.00: political affairs and conditions in Bolivia
725.00: political affairs and conditions in Chile
725.5–MSP: U.S. military assistance to Chile
731.00: political affairs and conditions in Venezuela
737.00: political affairs and conditions in Cuba
737.5211: U.S. intelligence activities in Cuba
737.56311: U.S. bases in Cuba
737.56361: Soviet bases in Cuba
760.551: Eastern European military personnel
761.00: political conditions in the Soviet Union
782.56311: U.S. bases in Turkey
811.10: U.S. economic relations with the Western Hemisphere
815.16: land ownership in Honduras
816.10: El Salvador financial matters
818.00: economic conditions in Costa Rica
818.10: financial matters in Costa Rica
818.13: Costa Rica's monetary system
818.18: Costa Rican immigration and emigration
818.235: Costa Rican sugar
822.10: economic conditions in Ecuador

Central Files: In February 1963 the Department of State changed its decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. The following Central Files are located in Record Group 59 at National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.

AID (US) BOLIVIA: U.S. economic assistance to Bolivia
POL COL: general political affairs in Colombia
POL COSTA RICA-CUBA: general Costa Rican-Cuban relations
POL CUBA: general policy towards Cuba
POL CUBA-USSR: Soviet Union-Cuba relations
POL EL SAL: general political affairs in El Salvador
POL GUAT: general political affairs in Guatemala
POL GUAT-US: general U.S.–Guatemalan relations
POL 2 GUAT: general reports on Guatemala
POL 12 CHILE: political parties in Chile

POL 14 CHILE: elections in Chile
POL 15 GUAT: Government of Guatemala
POL 15 HOND: Government of Honduras
POL 15-1 COSTA RICA: head of state of Costa Rica
POL 15-1 US/KENNEDY: documentation relating to President Kennedy
POL 17 COL: U.S. diplomatic and consular representation with Colombia
POL 23 COL: internal security in Colombia
POL 26 HOND: coups in Honduras
POL 27 CUBA-US: military operations between the United States and the Soviet Union
POL 30-2 CUBA: Cuban exile political activities
POL 32-1 MEX-US: Mexican territorial disputes with the United States
POL 33-1 MEX-US: Mexican-U.S. rivers
POL 36 CUBA: travel control to and from Cuba

Lot Files: These are the special decentralized files of the policymaking level of the Department of State, including the Executive Secretariat, overseas Foreign Service posts, and U.S. special missions. The following Lot Files are located in Record Group 59 at National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.

ARA Files: Lot 62 D 24

Files of the Special Assistant, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs for 1961.

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 63 D 402

Files of the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs for 1961.

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 65 D 256

Files of the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs for 1962.

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501

Files of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for 1964 including top secret material from 1961-1963.

Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272

Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1966, including transcripts of his telephone conversations.

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INR/SEE Files: Lot 90 D 321

Latin American files of the Office of Soviet and East European Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for the years 1960–1985.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, as well as certain correspondence of the Secretary of State, for 1953–1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163

Exchanges of correspondence between the President with the leaders of the Soviet Union, 1961–1964, the so-called “Pen Pal” correspondence. Also contains drafts of messages and memoranda to the President and Secretary of State about the correspondence.

President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149

A chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversations with foreign visitors for 1956–1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192

Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961–1969, including texts of speeches and public statements, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations.

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330

Memoranda of the Secretary’s and Under Secretary’s conversations for 1961–1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147

Records of the Secretary of State's staff meetings, 1961–1963, and additional ad hoc meetings, reports, papers, and memoranda of Chester Bowles' telephone conversations.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1945–1961, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438

Principal Department of State lot file on the Cuban missile crisis, October 1962–January 1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Also contains background material from 1961 and 1962, including documentation on Operation Mongoose.

S/S Files: Lot 70 D 265

National Security Council meetings, policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961–1965, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316

Department of State copies of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM's) and related materials.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council files, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State/JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328

Records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1959–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410

Official and personal files covering the years 1958–1973. Includes files dealing with Johnson's tenure as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1961–1966.

U.S. Mission to the United Nations Files

NYFRC 84–84–001/002, Secret and Top Secret records of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations with extensive material on the post-missile crisis negotiations.

Central Intelligence Agency

Cuban Files, Job 80–D0167R

DCI Files: Job 54–00499R

Files of the History Staff.

DCI Files: Job 85–00664R

Files of the History Staff, an extensive collection dealing with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

DCI Files: Job 91–00741R

Files of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80–B0176R

Files of Allen W. Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 1953–1961.

DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B1285A

Files of John C. McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965.

DDI Files: Job 79–R1012A

The Deputy Directorate for Intelligence's registry of National Intelligence and Special Intelligence estimates.

DDI Files: Job 80–R01386R

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence.

DDI Files: Job 89–T01385R

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence.

DDO/DDP Files: Job 64–00352R

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans covering 1960.

DDO/DDP Files: Job 67–01083R

Chronological files of C. Tracy Barnes, 1959–1964.

DDO/DDP Files: Job 78–01450R

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans covering 1961.

DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 52–00679R

Files of the Covert Collection Staff of the Western Hemisphere Division, including materials prepared for the Taylor Committee and records of Special Group meetings relating to Cuba.

DDO/WH Files: Job 73–00853R

Files dealing with liaison between the Western Hemisphere Division and the Department of State, 1955–1966.

HS/HC Files: Job 84–00499R

Central Intelligence Agency History Staff's source collection.

ODDI Registry NIEs and SNIEs: Job 79–R01012A

Copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimate.

O/D/NFAC Files: Job 80–R1386R

Files of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence.

Department of Defense

Office of the Historian, Historian's Office, Secretary of Defense's Cable Files

Telegrams to and from the Secretary of Defense as maintained by the Office of the Historian, Department of Defense.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Herter Papers

Records of Christian A. Herter for 1957–1961.

Project Clean Up Records

Project Clean Up collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, H. Romer McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster.

White House Office Files

Several White House office collections, including files of the Office of the Staff Secretary, and Project Clean Up, and files of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name series, Dulles–Herter series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW Diaries), National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administrative Series, and International File.

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

National Security File, Country File, Cuba

Rusk Appointment Books

Vice Presidential Security File

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

National Security Files:

Brubeck Series

Chester V. Clifton Series

Countries Series: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Venezuela, USSR

Meetings and Memoranda Series: National Security Council Meetings, Executive Committee Meetings, Standing Group Meetings, National Security Action Memoranda

Regional Series

President's Appointment Books

President's Office Files: Countries

Presidential Recordings

Staff Memoranda

Papers of George Ball

Papers of Roger Hilsman

Papers of Robert F. Kennedy

Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Papers of Theodore Sorensen

National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Lemnitzer Papers

Papers of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1959–1960; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1961–1962.

Taylor Papers

Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1955–1959; Military Advisor to the President 1961–1962; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1964.

United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

USUN Files: NYFRC 84–84–002

Files of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1950 to date.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548

Records of the Policy Planning Staff for 1957–1961.

S/S Files: Lot 67 D 396

Master file of Guidelines for Policy and Operations prepared by S/P from November 1961 to May 1966.

Task Force on Latin American Files: Lot 61 D 298

Minutes of the Task Force on Latin America for 1961.

Record Group 323, JFK Collection

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470

Files of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 1961–1968.

OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896

Principal file on the Cuban missile crisis as maintained by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. Includes files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Contains some background documents from the pre-crisis period.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382

General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1961.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 3501

General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464

Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for 1961.

OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542

Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 77–0131

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreign Policy Files, 1962–1972

Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

Allen Dulles Papers
Stevenson Papers

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Bowles Papers

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Area Files

Bumpy Road Materials: Papers of Admiral Arleigh
Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–1961.

List of Abbreviations

AA, aircraft artillery
AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
AAM, air-to-air missiles
Abn Div, Airborne division
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACSI, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AEW, Aircraft Early Warning Station
AEW&C Det, Airborne Early Warning and Control Detachment
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFB, Air Force Base
AFCIN, Air Force Intelligence
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
A-4D, Skyhawk, U.S. single engine turbojet attack aircraft
AFP, Alliance for Progress
AFTF, Air Force Task Force
AG, Attorney General
AID, Agency for International Development
AJOC, Alternative Joint Communications Center (Air Force)
AJR, Asociación de Juventud Rebelde (Association of Rebel Youth)
ALTCOMLANT, Alternate Commander, Atlantic (Navy)
Amb., Ambassador
ammo, ammunition
amphib, amphibious
ANG, Air National Guard
AR, American Republics
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CCA, Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CMA, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/RPA, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARC, American Red Cross
Armd Cav Regt, Armored Cavalry Regiment

ARS, aerial reconnaissance and security
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASW, Anti-Submarine Warfare
AWOL, absent without leave

BLT, Battalion Landing Team
Bn, battalion
Brig Hq., Brigade Headquarters
BW/CW, Biological Warfare/Chemical Warfare

CA, Central America
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CAP, Combat Air Patrol
CCA, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
CEF, Cuban Expeditionary Force
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CF, Central Files of the Department of State
CGCONARC, Commanding General, Continental Army Command
CGUSACARIB, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Caribbean
CGUSARLANT, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Atlantic
CGUSCONARC, Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command
ChiCom, Chinese Communist
CI, counter-intelligence; counter insurgency
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCAFLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Atlantic
CINCARIB, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Caribbean
CINCARLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Atlantic
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCONAD, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command
CJTF, Commander, Joint Task Force
CMA, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
CMC, Commandant, United States Marine Corps

CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
C.O., Commanding Officer
COAS, Council of the Organization of American States
COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of Nations
COMAFTASKOR, Commander, Air Force Task Force
COMANTDEFCON, Commander, Antilles Defense Command
COMCARIBSEAFRON, Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier
COMFAIRJAX, Commander, Fleet Air, Jacksonville, Florida
COMINT, Communications Intelligence
COMJTF, Commander, Joint Task Force
COMKWESTFOR, Commander, Key West Forces
COMNAVBASE GTMO, Commander, Naval Base, Guantanamo
COMNAVTF, Commander, Naval Task Force
COMOR, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
COMSECONDFLT, Commander, Second Fleet
COMSTS, Commander, Sea Transportation Service
COMTAC, Commander, Tactical Air Command
CONAD, Continental Air Defense Command
Contel, Consulate telegram
CONUS, continental United States
COSAC, Commanding Officer, Strategic Air Command
CRC, Consejo Revolucionario Cubano, Cuban Revolutionary Council
CTC, Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos, Confederation of Cuban Workers
CTG, Commander, Special Task Group
CVA, attack aircraft carrier
CW, chemical warfare

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DD/P, Office of the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
DEFCON(s), Defense condition(s)
Dels, Delegations
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Dept, Department of State

Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DIO, District Intelligence Officer
DIRNSA, Director, National Security Agency
Div, Division
DLF, Development Loan Fund
DO, destroyer
DOD, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State
DR, Directorio Revolucionario, Revolutionary Directorate
DRE, Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, Student Revolutionary Directorate
DTG, date-time group (date and exact time on telegrams)
DZ, drop zone

ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECLA, United Nations Council on Latin America
ELINT, electronic intelligence
Embdes, Embassy despatch
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EMC, electronic countermeasures
ETA, estimated time of arrival
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EW, early warning
ExCom, Executive Committee
Eyes Only, document to be read only by individuals with a need-to-know

FA, Field Artillery
FAA, Federal Aviation Agency
FA Bn, Field Artillery Battalion
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMF, Fleet Marine Force
FMFLANT, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
fol, following

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FonOff, Foreign Office

FRC, Federal Records Center

FRO, Frente Revolucionario Democrático, Democratic Revolutionary Front

FROGS, Free Over Ground tactical rockets (Soviet luna rockets)

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

G-2, Army General Staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional level or higher

GA, United Nations General Assembly

GNP, gross national product

GOA, Government of Argentina

GOB, Government of Brazil; Government of Bolivia

GOC, Government of Cuba; Government of Chile; Government of Colombia; Good Offices Committee

GOCR, Government of Costa Rica

GOE, Government of Ecuador

GOES, Government of El Salvador

GOF, Government of France

GOG, Government of Guatemala

GOH, Government of Haiti; Government of Honduras

GOJ, Government of Jamaica

GOM, Government of Mexico

GOT, Government of Turkey

GOV, Government of Venezuela

govt, government

GSA, General Services Administration

GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Gtmo, Guantanamo

Guat, Guatemala

GUS, Government of the United States

HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

HMG, Her Majesty's Government

IA, Inter-American

IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

IADB, Inter-American Development Bank
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB, Inter-American Development Bank
ILA, International Longshoreman's Association
ILO, International Labor Organization
IL-28, Soviet jet light bomber
Inf Bde, Infantry Brigade
info, information
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IRBD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
Ironbark, special information handling channel for intelligence generated by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
JTF, Joint Task Force
JURE, Revolutionary Junta

KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines
KOMAR, Soviet missile carrying patrol boat
kts, knots, one nautical mile per hour
KW, kilowatt

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LA, Latin America
LAAM, light antiaircraft missile
LAFTA, Latin American Free Trade Association

LANTCOM, Atlantic Fleet Command

lat, latitude

LCI, landing craft, infantry

LCT, landing craft, tank

LCU, landing craft, utility

LCVP, landing craft, vehicle, personnel

LICROSS, League of International Red Cross Societies

long, longitude

LOU, Limited Official Use

LPH, Landing Platform Helicopter

LS, Division of Language Services, Department of State

LSD, landing ship, deck

LST, landing ship, tank

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAG, Marine Aviation Group

MAP, Military Assistance Program

MAR, Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucion, Movement
To Recover the Revolution

MarCorps, Marine Corps

MATS, Military Air Transport Service

MC, memorandum of conversation

MDC, Movimiento Democratico Cristiano, Christian Demo-
cratic Movement

MEB, Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF, Marine Expeditionary Force

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MFM, Meeting of Foreign Ministers

MIG, Soviet-made fighter aircraft

MLF, multilateral force

mort., mortar

MP, Member of Parliament (British)

MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile

MRP, Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, People's Rev-
olutionary Movement

MSTS, Military Sea Transport Service

MTB, motor torpedo boat

mtg, meeting

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NAD, Naval Air Detachment

NAS, Naval Air Station
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NavAide, Naval Aide
NDU, National Defense University
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State
niact, night action, telegram indicator requiring immediate
action
Nic, Nicaragua
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
nm, nautical miles
Nofor, no foreign distribution
NORAD, North American Air Defense Command
NPIC, National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO, National Reconnaissance Office
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NSF, National Security Files
NY, New York
NYFRC, New York Federal Records Center

OAD, Organization of American States
OARS, Ocean Area Reconnaissance Satellite
OAS, Organization of American States
OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
OCI, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency
OD, operating directive
OECD, Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Planning
ONE-OCI, Office of National Estimates/Office of Current
Intelligence
OP, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; operations plan
OPLAN, operations plan
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PAA, Pan American Airways

PACOM, Pacific Command
PC, Patrol Craft, Submarine chaser
P.L.-480, Public Law 480, Food for Peace
PM, Prime Minister; paramilitary
PNG, persona non grata
POE, port of embarkation
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State
POW, prisoner of war
Pres, President
PSP, Partido Socialista Popular, Popular Socialist Party (Cuban Communist Party)
PT, motor torpedo boat

R, resolution; Republican
re, regarding
recco, reconnaissance
reps, representatives
res, resolution
RLT, Regimental Landing Team
RPA, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
RPM, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

SA, Sterling Area
SA-2, Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM)
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAR, search and rescue
SATS, short airfield for tactical support
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCCS, Special Consultative Committee on Security (OAS)
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SecNav, Secretary of the Navy
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his party to Washington

SIGINT, Signals Intelligence
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
S/O, Operations Center, Department of State
Sov, Soviet
S/P Policy Planning Council/Staff
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SS-4, Soviet medium-range ballistic missile
SS-5, Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile
SSM, surface-to-surface missile
Stat., United States Statutes at Large
SW, surface warfare
SYG, Secretary General of the United Nations

TAC, Tactical Air Command
TAD, Tactical Air Defense
TAF, Tactical Air Force
TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TCS, Tactical Control Squadron
telcon, telephone conversation
TF, Task Force
TFS, Tactical Fighter Squadron
TG, Task Group
T/O, Table of Organization
T/O&E, Table of Organization and Estimates
Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TRS, Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
U-2, U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
UAR, United Arab Republic
UDT, Underwater Demolition Team
UDU, Underwater Demolition Unit
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNESCO-ECLA, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization-Economic Commission for Latin America
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNMIS, United Nations Mission

UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UR, Unidad Revolucionario (Cuban political movement)
urtel, your telegram
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USDel, United States Delegation
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USRO, United States Mission to European Regional Organization in Paris
USS, United States Ship
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USSTRICOM, United States Strike Command
UST, United States Treaties and other International Agreements
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
UW, unconventional warfare

VOA, Voice of America
VS, Search Plane; Shore-based Search Squadron

WH, White House
W/T, wireless transmitter
WNRC, Washington National Records Center

List of Persons

- Alessandri Rodríguez, Jorge**, President of Chile
- Allende Gossens, Salvador**, Senator (Socialist Party, Chile) and candidate of the Frente de Accion Popular for President in the 1964 elections
- Amory, Robert**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- Anderson, Admiral George W.**, USN, Chief of Naval Operations until August 1, 1963
- Arosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio**, President of Ecuador November 1961–July 1963
- Attwood, William**, Ambassador to Guinea March 29, 1961–May 27, 1963
- Ball, George W.**, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February–December 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State
- Barnes, C. Tracy**, Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Action, Central Intelligence Agency
- Battle, Lucius D.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary March–May 1962
- Beerli, Colonel Stanley W.**, Chief of Air Operations, Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Bell, John O.**, Ambassador to Guatemala after November 10, 1961
- Berbaum, M. Maurice**, Ambassador to Ecuador
- Berle, Adolph A.**, Chairman of the Department of State Task Force on Latin America
- Betencourt, Rómulo**, President of Venezuela
- Bissell, Richard M., Jr.**, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until February 1962
- Bohlen, Charles E.**, Ambassador to France after September 4, 1962
- Bowles, Chester A.**, Under Secretary of State, January–December 1961; thereafter Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs
- Brubeck, William H.**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State, August 1961–May 1962; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary, May 1962–July 1963
- Bundy, McGeorge**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations until August 1961

Burris, Colonel Howard L., Military Aide to Vice President Johnson

Burrows, Charles R., Ambassador to Honduras

Bustamante, Sir Alexander, Premier of the British Colony of Jamaica after April 10, 1962; Prime Minister of independent Jamaica after August 6, 1962

Cabell, General Charles P., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until January 1962

Carroll, Joseph F., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from April 1962

Castro Ruz, Fidel, Prime Minister of Cuba

Castro Ruz, Raul, Minister of the Armed Forces of Cuba

Chase, Gordon, National Security Council Staff member

Chayes, Abram J., Legal Advisor, Department of State from February 1961

Clark, Rear Admiral John E., Commander of Special Task Group 81.8

Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Clifton, General Chester V., USA, Military Aide to President Kennedy

Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director for Intelligence after April 23, 1962

Coerr, Wymberley DeR., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Cole, Charles W., Ambassador to Chile after September 22, 1961

Cottrell, Sterling J., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State after January 1963

Craig, Brigadier General William H., Department of Defense Project Officer for Operation Mongoose until June 1962

Crimmins, John H., Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until February 1962; thereafter Director of the Office

- Dearborn, Henry**, Counselor at the Embassy at Bogota
- Decker, General George H.**, Army Chief of Staff
- de Gaulle, General Charles**, President of France
- Dennison, Admiral Robert L.**, USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic
- Dillon, C. Douglas**, Secretary of the Treasury
- Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States after March 1962
- Donovan, James B.**, New York lawyer involved in efforts to secure the release of prisoners captured at the Bay of Pigs
- Dulles, Allen W.**, Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961
- Dungan, Ralph A.**, Special Assistant to the President
- Durán Neumann, Julio**, Senator (Radical Party, Chile) and candidate of the Democratic Front for President in the 1964 elections
- Earman, J. S.**, Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence until April 1962
- Echandi Jiménez, Mario**, President of Costa Rica until May 8, 1962
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States until January 20, 1961
- Elder, Walter**, Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence from April 1962
- Esterline, J. D.**, Chief of Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Finletter, Thomas K.**, Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- FitzGerald, Desmond**, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Fomin, Aleksandr S.**, Counselor to Soviet Embassy in the United States
- Freeman, Fulton**, Ambassador to Colombia after May 4, 1961
- Frei Montalva, Eduardo**, Senator (Christian Democrat party, Chile) and Christian Democratic candidate for President in the 1964 elections
- Gilpatric, Roswell L.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1961
- Glenn, Edmund S.**, Language Services, Department of State

Goodwin, Richard N., Assistant Special Counsel to the President until November 1961; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Gray, Major General David W., Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division, Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gromyko, Andrei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Guevara de la Serna, Major Ernesto (Che), Cuban Minister of Industry

Hamilton, Fowler, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, September 30–December 20, 1961

Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large, February–December 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs December 1961–April 1963; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1963

Harris, Brigadier General Benjamin T., Department of Defense Project Officer for Operation Mongoose from June 1962

Harvey, William K., Chief of Task Force W, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency; Project Officer for Operation Mongoose

Hawkins, Colonel Jack, Chief of Paramilitary Operations, Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Helms, Richard M., Chief of Operations, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until February 1962; thereafter Deputy Director for Plans

Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1961

Howard, Lisa, correspondent, American Broadcasting Company

Hurwitch, Robert A., Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until February 1962; Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, February–June 1962; Special Assistant for Cuban Affairs, June 1962–June 1963; Deputy Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Department of State, January 1963–August 1963

Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States until November 22, 1963; thereafter President

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

- Katzenbach, Nicholas deB.**, Assistant Attorney General 1961–1962; thereafter Deputy Attorney General
- Kaysen, Carl**, member, National Security Council Staff, June–December 1961; thereafter Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Kennedy, John F.**, President of the United States until his assassination on November 22, 1963
- Kennedy, Robert F.**, Attorney General of the United States from January 1961
- Kent, Sherman**, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- King, Colonel J. C.**, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Kohler, Foy D.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union from September 1962
- Komer, Robert W.**, member, National Security Council Staff
- Kuznetsov, Vasiliy V.**, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Lansdale, Brigadier General Edward G.**, Deputy Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense until May 1961; thereafter Assistant for Special Operations; also Chief of Operations for Operation Mongoose after November 1961
- Lechin, Juan**, Vice President of Bolivia
- Legere, Colonel Lawrence J.**, Assistant to the President's Military Representative
- LeMay, General Curtis**, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
- Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.**, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to September 1962
- Lleras Camargo, Alverto**, President of Colombia until August 7, 1962
- López Arellano, Oswaldo**, Head of the Military Junta of Honduras after October 4, 1963
- López Mateos, Alfonso**, President of Mexico
- Lundahl, Arthur C.**, Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency
- McCloy, John J.**, Presidential advisor and Chairman of the Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Negotiations Over Cuba at the United Nations
- McCone, John A.**, Director of Central Intelligence from November 1961

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister until October 20, 1963

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 1961

Manley, Norman, Premier of the British Colony of Jamaica until April 10, 1962

Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until April 1961; Ambassador to Mexico from May 1961

Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until May 1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Mendelevich, Lev I., Head, Latin American Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikoyan, Anastas I., First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Miró Cardona, José, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

Morales-Carrion, Arturo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from February 1961

Muccio, John J., Ambassador to Guatemala until November 10, 1961

Murrow, Edward R., Director, United States Information Agency

Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs January 1961–November 29, 1963; thereafter Secretary of the Navy

O'Donnell, P. Kenneth, Special Assistant to the President

Orlich Bolmarcich, Francisco José, President of Costa Rica after May 8, 1962

Parrott, Thomas A., Executive Secretary, Special Group, National Security Council

Paz Estenssoro, Victor, President of Bolivia

Perelta, Azurcha, Colonel Enrique, Head of the Military Junta of Guatemala after March 31, 1963

Plimpton, Francis T.P., Deputy Representative to the United Nations and the Security Council

Rivera Carballo, Julio Adalberto, President of El Salvador after July 1, 1962

Roa Garcia, Raul, Cuban Minister for External Relations

Rostow, Walt W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until December 1961; thereafter Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 1961

San Roman, Jose Perez, Commander of the Cuban Expeditionary Force Brigade

Scali, John, correspondent, American Broadcasting Company

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President

Scott, Joseph W., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Shoup, General David M., Commandant of the Marine Corps

Smith, Bromley, Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council until August 1961; thereafter Executive Secretary

Somoza Debayle, General Anastasio, Commander in Chief of the National Guard of Nicaragua

Somoza Debayle, Luis, President of Nicaragua until May 1963

Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Counsel to the President

Stephansky, Ben S., Ambassador to Bolivia, June 14, 1961–October 15, 1963

Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 1961

Strom, Carl W., Ambassador to Bolivia until May 8, 1961

Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, Chairman of the Cuba Study Group, April–June 1961; President's Military Representative, July 1961–October 1962; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Telles, Raymond, Ambassador to Costa Rica after April 6, 1961

Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until July 1962; Ambassador at Large, Department of State, after October 3, 1962

Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Valencia, Guillermo León, President of Colombia after August 7, 1962

Vance, Cyrus R., General Counsel of the Department of Defense, January 29, 1961–June 30, 1962; Secretary of the Army after July 5, 1962

Velasco Ibarra, José Maria, President of Ecuador until November 7, 1961

Villeda Morales, José Ramón, President of Honduras until October 4, 1963

Wheeler, General Earle G., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

White, General Thomas D., Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 1961

Williams, Murat W., Ambassador to El Salvador after January 17, 1961

Wilson, Donald, Acting Director of the U.S. Information Agency

Woodward, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, July 1961–March 1962

Ydigoras Fuentes, General Miguel, President of Guatemala until March 31, 1963

Yost, Charles W., Deputy Representative to the United Nations Security Council

Zorin, Valerian, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations

Summary of Print Volume X

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962. Parenthetical citations are to the numbered documents in the text. Volume X, published in 1997, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

By the time John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency on January 20, 1961, U.S.-Cuban relations had become locked in a state of mutual hostility. The final act of the Eisenhower administration with regard to Cuba was to sever diplomatic relations. (2, 4, 6, 7, 8) The Kennedy administration expanded upon and continued this policy by seeking to isolate, contain, undermine, and overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. The Castro government was seen in Washington as a client of the Soviet Union, with the dangerous potential of fostering Communist subversion and spreading Soviet influence throughout Latin America.

Background

Following his election in November 1960, President Kennedy had been briefed in general terms about the CIA covert plan to support an attempt by Cuban émigrés to overthrow the Castro government. The plan was authorized by President Eisenhower and developed by the CIA during 1960. (See *Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume VI*) On January 19, 1961, President Eisenhower met with President-elect Kennedy, and briefed him on various foreign policy concerns. Eisenhower made reference to the small force of Cuban émigrés that was being trained by the CIA in Guatemala, and recommended that the effort be continued and accelerated. Eisenhower added that, in his opinion, the United States could not allow the Castro government to continue to exist in Cuba. (22)

CIA Invasion Plan and Its Critics

The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed several members of the new administration on the CIA's Cuba project on January 22, and the JCS met with President Kennedy on January 25 to discuss the implications of the proposed covert operation against Cuba. (24, 26) General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, advised the President that time was working

against the United States in Cuba, where Castro was tightening police state controls. Existing U.S. plans, he stated, called for the establishment of a government in exile, the introduction of anti-Castro guerrilla forces into Cuba, and subsequent support of the guerrilla forces by U.S. military forces. Plans were ready, he told the President, for such action. (26) On January 27, however, the Joint Chiefs provided Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara an assessment of the CIA's plan to overthrow the Castro government in which they stated that the plan "does not assure the accomplishment of the objective nor has there been detailed follow-up planning to exploit that plan if it succeeds or for any direct action that might be required if the plan is found to be inadequate." (28)

McNamara and General Lemnitzer took up the JCS concerns in a meeting with the President on January 28, attended by a number of other concerned officials. (30, 31) During the meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicated that the Department of State saw grave political dangers for the U.S. position throughout the Western Hemisphere if the Kennedy administration approved overt military action not authorized and supported by the Organization of American States. As a result of the January 28 meeting at the White House, President Kennedy requested a reassessment of the existing plans for an effort to overthrow the Castro government, the first of several reassessments required by the President.

Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer expressed skepticism about the CIA plan following the January 28 meeting. Both agreed that the plan required careful study. (32) On February 3, the JCS submitted to McNamara a military evaluation of the CIA Para-Military plan, which was then focused on introducing a Cuban émigré brigade around the port of Trinidad. (35) The JCS judged that the Trinidad beach-head offered the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the stated objective. But they noted: "Since the success of this operation is dependent on the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute the operation is made." The JCS concluded that, if significant local support for the assault forces developed within the first 2 days, "timely execution

of the plan has a fair chance of ultimate success." They noted, however, that their information regarding the capabilities of the proposed assault force came from second and third hand sources. In order to advise the President properly, they felt that a team of military officers should be dispatched to Guatemala to assess the preparations.

The JCS evaluation was discussed by President Kennedy and his closest advisers on February 8. (40) Kennedy focused on a fall-back option incorporated in the planning for the invasion. That option stipulated that if the invasion failed in its initial phase to unseat the Castro government, the invaders could fade into the Escambray mountains and join other guerrilla groups fighting against Castro. The fall-back option was specifically cited in the February 8 meeting and made the invasion proposal more palatable for the President. But he still pressed for alternatives to a full-fledged invasion supported by U.S. planes, ships, and supplies. It became increasingly clear in the course of the numerous reviews of the plan prepared for the President that he was leery of a proposal that threatened to draw the United States openly into war. But he was eager to see the Castro government overthrown, and did not want to have [illegible in the original] the political embarrassment of disbanding the Cuban [illegible in the original] army and being accused of throwing away perhaps the last good opportunity of preventing Cuba from being lost to Communist control.

CIA officials contended that the Agency's plan was sound. On February 17, Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of Plans of the CIA and the motive force behind the planning for the invasion, prepared a memorandum that argued for the program planned by the CIA for a landing in force in the Trinidad area. He noted that Castro's position in Cuba was becoming stronger every day, and contended that soon it would be impossible to unseat him without drastic and politically untenable actions such as an all-out embargo or the use of overt military force. (46) Bissell argued his position in a meeting at the White House on February 18. He was opposed by Secretary of State Rusk, who contended that it would be better to delay any action and attempt to build up OAS support. (48) The President required further work on the plan.

Revised Invasion Plans

Reevaluation led to significant changes in the invasion plan. On March 10, the JCS submitted an evaluation prepared by three officers who went to Guatemala to inspect the combat-capability of the émigré army. Their findings were generally positive in terms of equipment, training, and morale. The small army of approximately 1,000 men would be heavily out-numbered, however, and the logistics specialist concluded that logistic preparations were not adequate. Nonetheless, the team concluded that the invasion army could be ready to fight by April 1. (56) Bissell followed with a memorandum on March 11 that argued that it would be “infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April.” (58) At a meeting at the White House on March 11, however, President Kennedy indicated that, although he was willing to take the chance of going ahead, he could not endorse a plan that involved the United States so openly. He directed the development of a plan where U.S. assistance would be less obvious. (59)

Working under intense time pressure, the CIA produced a plan on March 15 targeted upon a sparsely populated area of swampland along the south coast of Cuba at a place called the Bay of Pigs, approximately 100 miles west of Trinidad. The change of target was necessary in order to encompass an airstrip adequate for B-26 bombers, so that air support for the invasion would seem to come from within Cuba. The plan relied on a landing begun under cover of darkness, and completed in the early hours after dawn. (61) The JCS evaluated the prospects for the success of a landing at the Bay of Pigs and concluded that, although prospects for the Trinidad plan were better, the Bay of Pigs alternative was considered “feasible.” They noted, however, that “inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace.” (62) At a meeting on March 15, President Kennedy directed that the entire landing operation should be completed before dawn, so that the ships could be well away from shore by dawn, and the operation could be represented as a domestic guerrilla uprising. (65) The revisions of this plan, code-named Zapata, were completed by the CIA on March 16, and the President approved the revised plan,

but reserved the right to call it off up to 24 hours prior to the landing. (66)

During a meeting at the White House on March 29, a tentative date for the invasion was set for April 10. President Kennedy asked whether, in the event the invasion failed, the invading force could melt into the surrounding countryside and function as guerrillas, as had been assumed with earlier versions of the plan. Bissell replied that in the event of failure at the Bay of Pigs the entire invading force would have to be withdrawn. (74) On April 4, Senator William Fulbright was invited to a meeting to discuss the plan. Senator Fulbright spoke out against the enterprise but the President's other advisers in the meeting supported it. (80) On April 6, the time for the invasion was rescheduled for April 17, with the President retaining the option of canceling the operation 24 hours before it began. (84)

The JCS issued instructions on April 7 to Admiral Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, concerning destroyer escort and combat air patrol to protect the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF), which was preparing to sail for Cuba. (85) Dennison, in turn, issued his Operation Order for the operation on April 10 to Rear Admiral John E. Clark, who commanded Special Task Group 81.8 (STG 81.8), which was assigned to support the CEF. (87) Clark was instructed: "DD's [destroyers] will not be used to support the landing operation and will not close within 20 miles of the objective area." With those limitations, and similar instructions concerning the necessity to avoid involving U.S. air cover in open combat with Castro's air force, the CEF was left to fight essentially alone, with only cover from the B-26 bombers of the small émigré air force, launched from a base in Nicaragua in support of the landings.

President Kennedy's lingering doubts concerning the success of the Cuban invasion force were largely allayed by a telegram on April 13 from Marine Colonel Jack Hawkins, the principal military adviser assigned to help prepare the Cuban brigade in Guatemala. Hawkins expressed no doubts when asked to evaluate the brigade's chances: "My observations the last few days have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions but also the ultimate objective of Castro's over-

throw." He described the brigade leaders as very confident, and added: "I share their confidence." (98) Based on the confidence of the CIA officials managing the operation, President Kennedy allowed it to go forward as scheduled.

The Invasion

On April 15, a preliminary air strike was launched against Cuban airfields by B-26 bombers bearing the markings of the Cuban Air Force. The object of this attack by the Cuban émigré air force was to destroy Castro's air force on the ground before the invasion was launched. (103) This air strike only partially succeeded, and it had the effect of removing much of the element of surprise from the subsequent invasion. A critical decision affecting the possibility of success for the Bay of Pigs operation was taken on April 16 when President Kennedy decided, on the basis of advice from Secretary of State Rusk, that the air strikes scheduled for the morning of April 17 to support the invasion, would have to be postponed until the airfield at the Bay of Pigs could be secured and the strikes launched from there. CIA Deputy Director General C.P. Cabell, along with Richard Bissell, protested the decision to McGeorge Bundy, who told them that they would have to discuss the matter with Rusk. Secretary Rusk explained the political considerations underlying the decision and offered to let them speak directly to the President about the matter. The CIA officials decided that there was no point in pressing the matter that far. (108) The second strike against Cuban air fields, planned to eliminate the remainder of Castro's air force, did not take place as planned. When the invasion began at the Bay of Pigs on the morning of April 17, the Cuban Government still had the air power to cripple it.

The invasion of Cuba by the Cuban brigade at the Bay of Pigs was in trouble almost from the beginning. After Action reports by Grayston Lynch and William Robertson of the CIA, who were directly involved in the invasion, provide a graphic picture of the breakdown of the invasion, after initial, limited success on the morning of April 17. (109, 110) The lack of effective air support left the Cuban brigade, and the supporting transports of the CEF easy prey for the remaining planes of the Cuban Air Force. T-33 jet training

planes were particularly effective against the B-26 bombers of the CEF's air force when they appeared over the beach. Meanwhile, the instructions from the JCS to Admiral Dennison were to keep fleet units well off the Cuban coast, and to provide an air cap for CEF shipping only when it was outside Cuban territorial waters. (111) As a result, the CIA had to report to the JCS at 10:17 a.m. on April 17 that two of the ships of the CEF, the *Rio Escondido* and the *Houston*, had been sunk, and that a third, the *Blagar*, was under heavy attack. (112) By the afternoon of April 17, the CIA reported that the *Barbara J* and the *Atlantico* were also under attack off the coast of Cuba, and that the *Barbara J* was on fire. (116) Much of the necessary supplies and ammunition for the Cuban brigade were lost in the ships sunk at the Bay of Pigs. The remaining vessels of the CEF fled out to sea, and were only regrouped with difficulty.

Reports from the Cuban brigade ashore constituted a steady stream of pleas for air cover, ammunition, and supplies to ward off mounting pressure on the beachhead from Castro forces, supported by tanks and jets. During the morning hours of April 18, messages from the brigade commander became increasingly desperate. "Request jet support or cannot hold." "Have no ammo left for tanks and very little left for troops." "Enemy just launched heavy land attack supported by tanks. Cannot hold for long." "Red Beach wiped out. Request air strikes immediately." (125) By that afternoon, the brigade commander radioed that without jet cover his force could not survive: "Please don't desert us. Am out of tank and bazooka ammo. Tanks will hit me at dawn. I will not be evacuated. Will fight to the end if we have to." (135)

During the early morning hours of April 19, an assessment of the disaster occurring at the Bay of Pigs took place at the White House. After the meeting with the President, the JCS sent instructions to Admiral Dennison to furnish U.S. air cover by six unmarked jet fighters over the CEF forces during the period 0630 to 0730 local time. The U.S. fighters were not authorized to attack ground targets, but were given latitude to destroy the Cuban Air Force if it appeared and engaged. (140) The air cover would permit CEF transport aircraft to fly in desperately needed supplies,

and to attack the tanks and ground forces mustered by Castro around the beachhead. Unfortunately, the order sent to the CEF air base in Nicaragua also stipulated local time for the strike by CEF bombers, but local time in Nicaragua was one hour earlier than at the Bay of Pigs. (150) The CEF planes passed over Admiral Clark's Task Group just as he was preparing to put the authorized air cover into the air. The Navy jets followed the CEF bombers to the beachhead as quickly as possible, but by the time they arrived, jets from Castro's air force had already broken up and driven off the CEF attack. That represented the last opportunity to try to salvage the Bay of Pigs invasion. Ironically, intelligence reports subsequently indicated that Fidel Castro himself was leading the tank column pressing the attack on the Cuban brigade. (236) Instead, the morning of April 19 concluded with a last desperate signal from the brigade commander at the Bay of Pigs: "Out of ammunition. Men fighting in water. If no help given Blue Beach lost." (146)

The Taylor Study Group

The collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion forced the Kennedy administration to take responsibility for an embarrassing and damaging failure, while U.S. Naval forces off the Bay of Pigs scrambled to try to rescue as many survivors from the Cuban brigade as possible. (151, 156, 177) The failure was followed by a determined effort in Washington to find out what went wrong. President Kennedy asked General Maxwell D. Taylor, retired Army Chief of Staff, to head a committee composed of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, to investigate the failure, and to make recommendations concerning future U.S. capability of conducting similar operations. Taylor's Cuban Study Group conducted an intensive investigation, which involved gathering information and interviewing key participants across a period of a month and a half following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The interviews offered detailed insight into the lack of adequate planning, coordination, and oversight which helped to undermine the operation. (169, 174, 175, 176, 187, 193, 199, 200, 201, 209, 210, 221)

The Study Group met with President Kennedy on May 16 to give him a preliminary report concerning the investigation. (218, 219) The Study Group submitted its formal report to the President on June 13. (229–234) The Group found in its conclusions that, contrary to the President's much-quoted statement to the press in taking responsibility for the collapse at the Bay of Pigs, this failure was not in fact an orphan, but had a variety of fathers. The Study Group felt that before the operation became the responsibility of the Kennedy administration, it should have been canceled by the Eisenhower administration or converted into an amphibious operation under the direction of the Department of Defense. When it was presented to the Kennedy administration as a well-advanced project, those in charge of the operation "did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the Government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions." In approving the operation, the Group noted, the President and his senior officials were "greatly influenced by the understanding that the landing force could pass to guerrilla status, if unable to hold the beachhead." That projection proved to be false. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not do an adequate job in assessing the military feasibility of the operation for the President, and gave the impression of approving the Zapata plan, despite reservations. And the Group concluded that it was a mistake to try to run the operation from Washington, rather than entrusting responsibility to a commander closer to the point of combat. (233)

Reassessment of Cuba Policy

While the Taylor Study Group was conducting its investigation into the causes of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy administration reassessed its Cuba policy in light of the failure. The process began on April 20 with a grim Cabinet meeting in which the President and his advisers took stock of the shambles of their effort to unseat Fidel Castro. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles attended and recorded: "The President was really quite shattered . . . Here for the first time he faced a situation where his judgment had been mistaken, in spite of the fact that week after week of conferences had taken place before he

gave the green light." The mood in the Cabinet was "almost savage" Bowles observed, "as everyone appeared to be jumping on everyone else." (158) The cabinet meeting was followed on April 22 by an angry NSC meeting. Bowles recorded that Robert Kennedy took the lead in the meeting, "slamming into anyone who suggested that we go slowly and try to move calmly and not repeat previous mistakes." The atmosphere, Bowles noted, "was almost as emotional as the Cabinet meeting two days earlier, the difference being that on this occasion the emphasis was on specific proposals to harass Castro." (166) The upshot was a series of decisions by President Kennedy which spoke of his desire to find a new approach to undermine Castro's control of Cuba, and prevent the spread of the Cuban revolution to Latin America. The President asked for a reassessment of U.S. support for guerrilla activities in Cuba. He instructed the Departments of State and Defense to study the question of training Cuban soldiers within the United States armed forces. He authorized the creation of an interdepartmental study group to consider an increase in U.S. assistance to Latin American countries for internal security and counter-guerrilla activities, and, in the same vein, directed that the possibility of creating a Caribbean Security Agency be studied, to provide a pool of forces to counter Cuban subversion. (167) The effect of the President's directives was to put in train a comprehensive review of Cuba policy.

The policy review culminated in a paper prepared for the National Security Council on May 4 by an Interagency Task Force. (202) The paper, entitled "Cuba and Communism in the Hemisphere," formed the basis for an NSC discussion on May 5. (204) The result of the discussion was an NSC Record of Action that outlined Cuba policy in the wake of the Bay of Pigs failure. The fundamental object of policy was listed first: "Agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action." Among the agreed measures was the conclusion that the United States should not take military action against Cuba for the present, "but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the

future." It was noted that the President was concerned to receive timely intelligence concerning Cuban military capabilities, and the enhancement of those capabilities by military assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, "so that U.S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level." The President directed the CIA to make a detailed study of "possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba," and he agreed that relations with the Cuban émigré Revolutionary Council "should be improved and made more open." No separate Cuban military force could be organized in the United States, but Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. And it was agreed that the United States "should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of the other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro." (205) Castro may have won the battle of the Bay of Pigs, but the Kennedy administration was determined that he would not win the war to introduce and expand Communist influence and control in Latin America.

Operation Mongoose

The reassessment of Cuba policy begun in May eventuated in the authorization by President Kennedy on November 3, 1961, of the development of a new program designed to undermine the Castro government in Cuba. The program was codenamed Operation Mongoose. Overall control of the operation was entrusted to a new group established for the purpose, called the Special Group (Augmented), a slightly expanded version of the NSC 5412 Special Group, which oversaw covert operations. The Special Group (Augmented) consisted of regular Special Group members McGeorge Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, augmented by Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor. Although Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara were not regular members of the group, they occasionally attended meetings. President Kennedy appointed Taylor as chairman of the group, but Robert Kennedy was the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the President. Air Force Brigadier General

Edward Lansdale was appointed Chief of Operations and coordinated the CIA's Mongoose operations with those within the Departments of State and Defense. Within the CIA, the Mongoose operation was run by Task Force W, under the direction of William Harvey, with overall guidance from Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented). (270)

Initial discussions within the Special Group (Augmented) on the scope and direction of Operation Mongoose led to decisions confirmed by the President on November 30. (272, 275, 278) The decisions confirmed Lansdale's role as Chief of Operations, and provided the green light from the President to go ahead with the operation as conceived on November 3, "in order to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime." The first review of progress on the project was set for two weeks from the date of the November 30 memorandum of decision. In a meeting on December 1, called to discuss Mongoose plans, Attorney General Kennedy stressed that the President had reached a decision to accord higher priority to the Cuba problem. General Lansdale reported that he had surveyed all of the resources available for the project. He concluded that there were sizable active and potential resources available, but there was "a very difficult job ahead." He stressed the importance of coming to an agreement as to the future of Cuba after Castro, so that appeals to potential resistance groups could be geared to a positive long-range program. (280)

A measure of the Kennedy administration's renewed determination to eliminate Castro was the reauthorization of assassination attempts on the Cuban Premier. Efforts had been made to assassinate Castro before the Bay of Pigs invasion in coordination with underworld figures from the Mafia, but those efforts had been suspended during the reassessment of Cuba policy following the Bay of Pigs. (337)

During the course of his summary remarks to the National Security Council on January 18, 1962, concerning foreign policy and national security problems, President Kennedy said: "The time has not yet come when we must force a solution to the Cuban problem." (290) On the same day, however, General Lansdale circulated a program review of the "Cuba Project" to the Special Group (Augmented) which stated: "The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans over-

throw the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.” (291) The Mongoose Operation, as outlined by Lansdale in this document, looked to the development of a “political action organization” in being in key localities in Cuba to facilitate a popular uprising against Castro when it occurred. Lansdale noted that the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation had eroded severely the confidence of the Cuban resistance movement in United States competence and intentions, and that confidence would have to be reestablished. Lansdale anticipated that the revolt, when it came, would come from “an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both.” He added that it would be a major goal of the project to bring this about. For the initial phase of the project, Lansdale called upon the agencies which were involved—State, Defense, CIA, and USIA—to draw up plans to begin to move toward the goal of fomenting revolt in Cuba. On January 19, Attorney General Kennedy met with Lansdale and the Mongoose operations officers in the CIA and Defense to stress the importance of the project. He said that the project carried “the top priority in the United States Government—all else is secondary—no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared.” The Attorney General quoted the President as saying that “the final chapter on Cuba has not been written.” (292)

On February 20, Lansdale circulated a second review of planning for the Mongoose operation in which he noted: “Time is running against us.” The Cuban people, he noted, felt helpless and were “losing hope fast.” Accordingly, Lansdale outlined a program of action which he felt it was essential to push forward according to a timetable he outlined. The timetable called for preliminary action on the project to begin in March, leading to guerrilla operations in August and September, followed by open revolt during the first two weeks of October. A decision critical to the success of such a program was still to be made, and Lansdale urged the Special Group (Augmented) to consider it: “If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban

revolt?" (304) That was the fundamental question which confronted the Kennedy administration throughout the Mongoose exercise.

Phase I

The Special Group (Augmented) considered Lansdale's proposed plan on February 21, discussed it again with McNamara on February 26, and finally concluded on March 1 that it was essential to conduct an initial intelligence collection program before deciding whether to proceed with the operational proposals outlined by Lansdale. A target date of the end of May was established for a review of the situation in light of the intelligence efforts. A decision as to the next phase would be made at that time. (309) On March 14, this decision was confirmed in guidelines for Operation Mongoose approved by the President. The guidelines stipulated that the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area." Political, economic, and covert actions were authorized "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention." Those rather cautious guidelines were prefaced, however, by an initial assumption which stated that: "In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention." That stated assumption, in guidelines drafted by General Taylor and approved by the President, makes it appear that the Kennedy administration had decided, by mid-March, to intervene militarily in Cuba to ensure the overthrow of the Castro government. That impression is reinforced later in the guidelines by an instruction to the JCS to "continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention." A handwritten covering memorandum by U. Alexis Johnson, dated March 16, found attached to a copy of the guidelines in Department of State files, throws a different light on the guidelines, however. Johnson, who attended the meeting at which the President approved the guidelines, wrote: "The President also expressed skepticism

that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action. It was clearly understood no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed." (314) Despite the stated assumption at the outset of the guidelines, the President clearly still had not decided whether to use U.S. military force to overthrow Castro.

On March 21, the intelligence community produced NIE 85-62, entitled "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba." The intelligence estimate concluded, in part, that, while there was active resistance in Cuba, it was "limited, uncoordinated, unsupported, and desperate," and that the Cuban regime, "with all the power of repression at its disposal, has shown that it can contain the present level of resistance activity." The estimate also concluded: "The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. They are grumbling and resentful, but apparently hopeless and passive, resigned to acceptance of the present regime as the effective government in being with which they must learn to live for lack of a feasible alternative." (315)

The intelligence appreciation outlined in NIE 85-62 was viewed as far too negative by Lansdale and others, such as Richard Goodwin of the White House staff, who were involved in the Mongoose exercise. They saw evidence of cracks in the Castro government in Castro's denunciation, on March 26, of Cuban Communist Party leader Anibal Escalante and other Communist "militants". (320) They looked for opportunities to exploit the apparent divisions in Castro's ranks. (334, 339) The intelligence available at the time of the review of Phase I of Operation Mongoose on July 25, suggested, however, that Castro was in the process of consolidating his control over Cuban society. Cuba faced a significant economic crisis, but the Soviet bloc countries were expected to carry Cuba through the crisis, and to continue to contribute to the military build-up in Cuba which was making Castro's position increasingly secure. (349)

In his assessment of Phase I, submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) on July 25, Lansdale took issue with the intelligence appreciations and argued that there were enough able-bodied and motivated Cubans inside Cuba and

in exile to initiate a successful revolt against Castro. But he added that they would require strong support from the United States, and he expressed the concern that “time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba.” In Lansdale’s opinion, it was time for the United States to do more than “watch and talk”. If the anti-Castro Cubans did not receive clear leadership from the United States, Lansdale’s feeling was that “they will make other plans for the future.” Lansdale outlined four options for Phase II of Operation Mongoose: the first called for the cancellation of the operation, the second for the application of all pressures on the Castro regime short of the use of U.S. military force, and the final two contemplated the use of military force by the United States. (360)

Phase II

The Special Group (Augmented) responded to Lansdale’s suggestions by instructing him to produce an outline plan of action based upon an enhanced version of the second option, calling for all actions which could be undertaken to undermine the Castro government, short of U.S. military intervention. Lansdale was instructed, however, to try to keep the “noise level” to a minimum. (367, 378) Lansdale submitted an outline plan for Phase II to the Special Group (Augmented) on August 14. (374) In a memorandum to the President on August 17, General Taylor noted that the Special Group (Augmented) had reviewed the results of Phase I, the intelligence gathering phase of Operation Mongoose, and, while not yet satisfied with the level of intelligence achieved, the group was prepared to recommend that the President approve the operational plans outlined by Lansdale for Phase II. The operation would continue to focus on the need for additional intelligence concerning the possibility of a successful revolt against Castro. But it was judged to be time to move forward with efforts designed “to hurt the local regime as much as possible on the economic front and work further to discredit the regime locally and abroad.” The group felt that the new course of action would create added difficulties for the Castro government, and would increase the visibility of its failures, but added “there is no reason to hope that it will cause the overthrow of the regime from

within." With the clear understanding that Phase II would still limit Operation Mongoose to activities short of anything likely to draw the United States into active military operations against Cuba, President Kennedy on August 20 gave his approval to proceed. (380)

Toward the Missile Crisis

By August, Operation Mongoose had taken on a new sense of urgency as evidence mounted that the Soviet Union had sharply increased military shipments to Cuba. (382, 383, 390) At an August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), CIA Director McCone expressed his concern that the Soviet Union would underwrite its investment in Cuba by installing medium-range ballistic missiles on the island. (371) On August 23, President Kennedy considered the new evidence of Soviet bloc activity in Cuba and issued a series of directives incorporated in NSAM No. 181. One of those directives stipulated that Operation Mongoose Plan B plus should be developed "with all possible speed." In addition, the President directed that a study be made of the various alternatives which could be adopted to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack upon the United States. And he called for another study of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion "or other action beyond Mongoose B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis." (385, 386)

Aerial photography established on August 29 that the Soviet Union was building surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba. The introduction of surface-to-air missiles raised the stakes in Washington, where there was concern that the purpose of the anti-aircraft missiles might be to protect the subsequent introduction of ballistic missiles. (395) On August 31, McGeorge Bundy assessed for President Kennedy the increased threat that Soviet medium-range missiles would pose for the United States. (401) President Kennedy issued a warning on September 4 that the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, such as surface-to-surface missiles, would raise the gravest issues for the United States. (411)

In an effort to assess Soviet intentions, Theodore Sorensen, the President's Special Counsel and close adviser, met

with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on September 6 for a discussion of outstanding tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dobrynin conveyed a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy assuring the President that “nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in relations between our two countries.” Sorensen replied that the President felt that recent Soviet actions in Cuba had already caused a significant problem, and that the Chairman’s message seemed, therefore, “hollow and tardy.” Sorensen added that the President took the Soviet military buildup in Cuba as a “deliberate and personal affront” and “could hardly be expected to take a very accommodating attitude in the months ahead.” (415)

On September 11, the Soviet Union warned that any attack by the United States on Cuba or upon Soviet ships bound for Cuba would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. (422) Meanwhile, those tasked with responsibility for Operation Mongoose worked on such assigned tasks as developing post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. (424, 425) At a press conference on September 13, President Kennedy dismissed speculation concerning the possibility of an imminent invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. Military action by the United States against Cuba would be triggered, Kennedy stated, only if Cuba posed a threat to any other nation in the hemisphere, or if Cuba became an offensive military base for the Soviet Union. (429) On September 19, the intelligence community produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate on “The Military Buildup in Cuba.” (433) The estimate concluded that the Soviet military buildup was essentially defensive in nature, designed to protect Cuba against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceived to be the danger that the United States might attempt to overthrow the Castro government. It was considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would run the risk of attempting to establish a base for offensive weapons, such as medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. CIA Director McCone, who was in France on a honeymoon holiday, questioned that conclusion, and reiterated his concern that the Soviet Union was introducing ballis-

tic missiles into Cuba. (420) On September 21, President Kennedy instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to ensure that military contingency plans with regard to Cuba were kept up-to-date, taking into account the additions to Cuban armaments resulting from the continuous influx of Soviet equipment and technicians. (434)

That same afternoon, Admiral Anderson, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, issued a directive to his command to be prepared to conduct an air and naval blockade of Cuba on command from "higher authority." (435) Also on September 21, the first credible report of the arrival of what appeared to be Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles was received in Washington. Intelligence analysts checked this report against available photography and other reports and, by September 28, developed the hypothesis that MRBM sites were under preparation in Pinar del Rio province. The Joint Staff made arrangements to brief the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this dangerous development on Monday, October 1. (436) By the end of September 1962, therefore, it was clear that Cuba was on the verge of becoming a more difficult and dangerous problem for the Kennedy administration. It remained to be determined whether the President would respond to that emerging threat by authorizing the use of US military force to move the plans to contain, destabilize, and overthrow the Castro government beyond those envisioned and authorized under Phase II of Operation Mongoose.

Summary of Print Volume XI

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath. Parenthetical citations are to the numbered documents in the text. Volume XI, published in 1997, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Discovery of the Missiles

Before October 1, 1962, U.S. intelligence suspected a Soviet military buildup in Cuba, but it did not know definitively whether these arms included strategic weapons capable of threatening the United States. On October 5, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone predicted that the Soviet military buildup in Cuba “would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles].” McCone stated this was more a “probability” than a “possibility.” Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy disagreed, doubting that the Soviet Union would mount such a brazen challenge. (9) President Kennedy approved a U-2 reconnaissance flight over Cuba to obtain evidence about the development of MRBM sites on the island. The flight, which took place on October 14, provided the first proof of the existence of Soviet MRBM missiles in Cuba. (16) At 8:45 a.m. on October 16, McGeorge Bundy informed Kennedy of the photographs of the missile sites, and the President immediately called a meeting of his principal advisers for 11:45 that morning. At this meeting the administration began its response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the cold war.

Initial Deliberations

During that morning meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested that there were two alternatives: a quick unilateral military strike at the missile sites or alerting U.S. allies and the Soviet Union to the fact that the placement of the missiles could lead to war. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave a preliminary estimate of the military options. At the conclusion of the meeting the President asked his advisers to meet with him again that evening, stressing

that the missiles had to be taken out. Other related issues for decision were whether to strike targets other than the missile sites and whether to invade the island. (18)

At the evening meeting, Rusk, McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Maxwell Taylor raised doubts about the efficacy of strictly military actions, pointing to the political fall-out in Latin America and noting that air strikes were unlikely to be completely effective. Despite these reservations, the discussion of the U.S. response still focused on a military riposte. (21) Kennedy's advisers met again on the morning and afternoon of October 17 and raised the possibility of warning both Castro and Khrushchev to remove the missiles. If the response was negative, then the United States would use the military air strike option. McNamara and Taylor both counseled against this idea since it would give time for the missiles to become operational. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson seconded this view. By the evening of October 17, the military option still held sway, although Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen argued strongly for a diplomatic approach, while Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin supported the idea of a blockade coupled with a declaration of war. (23)

By the morning of October 18, Kennedy and his advisers began to explore the idea of blockading Cuba because of the expected negative reaction by U.S. allies to a military solution. Still, the President remained noncommittal about the blockade. He constantly queried his advisers about allied reactions to air strikes. (28) Also on October 18, the Central Intelligence Agency reported sensitive intelligence, based on U-2 flights and its best Soviet source, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, that mobile medium-range ballistic missiles were already operational and fixed intermediate-range missiles near Havana would be operational by December. (30)

U.S. policy remained far from finalized when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko called at the White House at 5 p.m. on October 18. Gromyko defended the Soviet Union's supplying arms to Cuba without mentioning the missiles and accused the United States of planning to invade the island. Kennedy responded that the arms supply had had a serious negative impact in the United States. The President

pointedly told Gromyko that the United States was basing its policy on the Soviet assertion that the arms supplied to Castro were defensive (Kennedy did not inform Gromyko that he knew about the offensive weapons). Following the meeting, the President's advisers met at the State Department and following that with the President at the White House to discuss options. Although they reached no decision, they were becoming increasingly interested in the blockade as the preferred option. (29)

Meetings on October 19 began at 11 a.m. and lasted until 7 p.m. Discussion centered on the legal aspects of a blockade, which most participants now agreed was a promising option, although for international legal reasons it was to be called a quarantine. Discussion of a military strike continued, however, with Taylor commenting that a blockade meant the abandonment of an air strike. Early in the afternoon, the participants formed two working groups to present alternatives to the President: a blockade scenario and a paper on the military option. Drafts of these reports were discussed at 4 p.m. meetings. McNamara now pointed out that the United States would probably have to give up its missile bases in Italy and Turkey in return for a negotiated removal of the Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. (31) When the meetings ended the two alternatives were still open.

The two options were submitted to the President at the 2:30 p.m. meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on October 20. McNamara pushed for the blockade, advising the President that to succeed they probably would have to accept withdrawal of U.S. missiles in southern Europe. The pros and cons of the blockade were discussed for 2 hours as were those of the air strike scenario, which at this point was still supported by Bundy, Taylor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Attorney General noted that a blockade coupled with an air strike was very attractive to him. McCone opposed the air strikes, but admitted that a blockade did not seem to be a sufficient response. The President expressed his concern that whichever option was chosen, the Soviet Union would respond with a blockade of Berlin. After further discussion, Kennedy was prepared to go with the blockade, but wanted preparations for an air strike completed for either October 21 or 22 just in case. At the close of the NSC meeting,

the participants considered how the blockade plan could be incorporated into the President's address to the nation. (34)

On October 21, the NSC thoroughly vetted the President's speech, reviewed military contingency plans, and discussed diplomatic measures. The President rejected UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's suggestions for a proposed summit meeting and a neutralization of Cuba or return of Guantanamo as means of easing the Soviet decision to dismantle the missiles. (38)

The Quarantine

At 6 p.m. on October 22, U.S. representatives in Washington and Moscow delivered a letter from the President to Khrushchev stating that the Kennedy administration knew about the missiles and other offensive weapons introduced into Cuba by the Soviet Union and stating that the United States was determined to remove this threat to hemispheric security. (44) Attached to the letter was a copy of the President's address to the nation, given 1 hour later, announcing the quarantine of Cuba and calling on the Soviet Union "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace."

On the evening of October 23, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to open up an informal channel to the Russians. Although the Attorney General told the Soviet Ambassador that he was not operating on instructions from the President, Dobrynin could have only believed that the Attorney General spoke with the approval of his brother. Robert Kennedy emphasized the administration's sense of betrayal at Soviet duplicity. (53) The next day, Khrushchev responded by accusing the United States of violating the UN Charter and all the norms of freedom of the seas. He reiterated the standard Soviet line that all the weapons being supplied to Cuba were defensive. (48) Ignoring this self-serving explanation, President Kennedy asked Khrushchev to instruct Soviet vessels headed to Havana to observe the terms of the quarantine, which would go into effect at 9 a.m. on October 24. (52) Khrushchev refused to comply, stating on October 24 that he considered the blockade "an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear war." (61) As Soviet ships approached the

quarantine line, the Kennedy administration had some sobering moments, but by the afternoon of October 24, the Soviet ships began to turn back. (58)

In a long letter of October 26, Khrushchev repeated that the missiles were strictly defensive and accused the United States of “proclaiming piratical measures” in establishing the blockade. Khrushchev suggested that if Washington would promise not to invade Cuba and remove the blockade, the Soviet Union would declare that its ships bound for the island were not carrying arms. (84) The letter bore Khrushchev’s personal style and the Kennedy administration was encouraged. In addition, there were hints from a Soviet intelligence official, Alexandr Fomin, to John Scali of ABC news that the Soviet Union would accept a public pledge not to invade in return for dismantling the missiles. (80, 85)

The Crisis Averted

On October 27, Khrushchev agreed to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba but only in return for the United States removing its MRBMs from Turkey. The letter from Khrushchev, which the Kennedy administration deemed to have been drafted by committee, also insisted upon mutual pledges by the United States and the Soviet Union to respect the inviolability of Cuban and Turkish borders. (91) Initial discussion by the Executive Committee suggested that the proposed trade was unacceptable. (92, 94) How far was the Kennedy administration prepared to go to remove the missiles from Cuba? There had been preliminary discussion about a possible trade of Italian and Turkish missiles. (56) Recent statements by former Soviet participants in the crisis suggest that Robert Kennedy planted the idea of a missile trade in Dobrynin’s mind at a meeting on the evening of October 26, but no first-hand record of this meeting has been found. Significantly, while most of the President’s advisers opposed a missile trade at an Executive Committee meeting on October 27, the President suggested that a trade, especially if the Turks took the initiative, would be better than an attack on Cuba. (90)

At the suggestion of Llewellyn Thompson, Ted Sorensen, and Robert Kennedy, the President deliberately ignored Khrushchev’s letter of October 27 on the Turkish MRBMs

altogether and responded to the letter of October 26. Kennedy responded on October 27 that the first issue to be dealt with was the removal of Soviet missiles and offensive weapons systems from Cuba. If this was done and properly verified, he promised to lift the quarantine and pledged not to invade Cuba. (95) To make matters worse, a U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba and its pilot was killed. On the evening of October 27, Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin that time was running out. If the Soviet Union did not remove the missiles, the United States would do it. Robert Kennedy stated there “would be dead Americans but their also would be dead Russians.” Dobrynin asked what Kennedy was offering. The Attorney General mentioned the non-invasion pledge. When Dobrynin asked about the Turkish missiles, Robert Kennedy said there could be no quid pro quo—no deal—since it was a NATO question and NATO would not act under threat. The Attorney General added, at the President’s instruction, that the missiles would be removed within 4 or 5 months. In his report to Rusk, Robert Kennedy crossed out this passage, (96) but as he confirmed later in *Thirteen Days*, he did make the statement to Dobrynin. Rusk has subsequently suggested that, in the last resort, the Kennedy administration was prepared to trade missiles. In his memoir, *As I Saw It*, Rusk recalled that Kennedy approved a plan to have the UN arrange the missile trade, if necessary. (99)

However, these plans were not required. On October 28, Khrushchev replied positively to the President’s letter of October 27, saying that instructions had been given to Soviet officials in Cuba to dismantle and crate up for return to the Soviet Union the “arms which you described as offensive.” (102) Khrushchev also informed Kennedy that First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov would go to New York to negotiate a solution “aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.” Kuznetsov arrived the following day and began negotiations with Stevenson, John J. McCloy, and Secretary General U Thant, to establish procedures to verify the removal of the missiles and to end the blockade. (112) There was a storm cloud, however: Fidel Castro insisted that he would never accept United Nations verification on Cuban soil. (123)

Verification of Removal of the Missiles

The Khrushchev letter of October 28 lightened the tension in Washington immensely, but there were still serious problems. Kennedy insisted on continuing low-level air reconnaissance over Cuba until the Soviet Union made good on its promise to allow UN verification. (130, 131) The President was adamant that the withdrawal of the missiles must be verified, a suspected Soviet submarine base eliminated, and Cuba “demilitarized.” (138, 139)

Fomin asked Scali for patience and understanding from Kennedy. (137) Perhaps the missiles could be inspected at sea. McCloy and Stevenson received this same message from their Soviet counterparts at the United Nations. Stevenson informed Kennedy on November 3 that although the Russians might agree to ground inspection, the Cubans would not. Kennedy then insisted that Soviet IL-28 bombers in Cuba must also go. (138)

McCloy met Kuznetsov in Stamford, Connecticut, on November 4. The Soviet negotiator rejected the bombers as offensive weapons. He offered verification of all 42 Soviet missiles at sea but insisted upon a guarantee against a U.S. invasion of Cuba and a prohibition of U.S.-backed subversion against Castro in return. As for the submarine base, Kuznetsov stated it was only a fishing port. (142) In their correspondence on November 3 and 5, Kennedy and Khrushchev jousted over verification. Khrushchev argued that the bombers were not offensive, and furthermore they constituted a new demand. He challenged the President to get on with the deal. (140, 145)

Kennedy began to realize that ironclad verification in Cuba was impossible. John McCone sensed that the tide was running against full verification and submitted a strong dissent. He predicted that Castro would survive, and with bombers and Komars (Soviet missile boats), could threaten the rest of Latin America. To make matters worse according to McCone, the Soviet SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) in Cuba with their ability to shoot down U-2s could provide blanket cover for the reintroduction of offensive missiles. (146)

The dangers of verification became obvious on November 5 when during a meeting with Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy was interrupted by a call from his brother, the Presi-

dent, informing him that a U.S. plane flying reconnaissance over Cuba had been fired upon. Robert Kennedy stressed to Dobrynin that any "arrangements that were made were dependent upon there not being any incidents in the air above Cuba." (144)

In New York on November 6, Stevenson and McCloy learned that Soviet ships would be taking the missiles out of Cuba starting on November 6 and 7. Asked if they would also remove nuclear weapons as well, Kuznetsov replied that if there were nuclear weapons in Cuba they would be removed with the missiles. (151)

With Soviet ships departing with the missiles that day, the Kennedy administration had to work out an ad hoc means of verification. U.S. officials concluded that the best method was for U.S. Naval ships to pull along side departing Soviet ships to verify and take photographs. (152, 153) At the Executive Committee meeting on the evening of November 6, the participants dissuaded the President from taking too hard a line with Khrushchev. Instead they persuaded Kennedy to concentrate on the issue at hand, verification of the missiles' removal, saving the bomber issue for later negotiations. (154) Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev of November 6 nonetheless contained a strong objection to Khrushchev's view that the bombers were not offensive weapons and therefore not subject to the understanding of October 27–28. (155)

At the next Executive Committee meeting, it was clear that the President had been won over. He agreed to delay action on the bombers until the missiles were out. (158) At the United Nations, Stevenson and McCloy received instructions outlining the minimum deal the United States would accept: MRBM, IRBMs, bombers, and nuclear weapons must leave. The United States was prepared to accept Soviet assurances that there would be no submarine base in Cuba. (159)

On November 8, Kuznetsov informed Stevenson and McCloy that the 42 missiles were out of Cuba completing the Soviet part of the understanding. The warheads would also go and the Soviets now expected the United States to fulfill its part of the bargain. (163) The next day Stevenson suggested to Washington a plan for settling outstanding issues, which included calling off the quarantine, a formal U.S. pledge in the UN Security Council against invasion

of Cuba in return for Soviet removal of the bombers with verification at sea, and a formal Soviet assurance to the Security Council that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba. Soviet compliance would be verified by Latin American diplomats in Cuba. The Soviet Union and Cuba would also agree not to reintroduce offensive weapons, and the United States would agree to call off subversion and sabotage against Cuba. Under Secretary of State George Ball did not like Stevenson's plan, which he characterized as a "guarantee" for Castro with "no obligations," but he passed it to the President without written comment. (167, 168)

The Bomber Crisis and the Non-Invasion Pledge

Ball had his own plan for resolving the bomber crisis, which he recommended to the President. Earlier Ball had agreed with McGeorge Bundy that the bombers should be downgraded to a U.S.-Cuban problem, not a U.S.-Soviet issue. (164) Ball now suggested that the United States accept the Soviet Union's contention that it could not control Castro and thus eliminate the issue of the IL-28s from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. dialogue. (169) Ball's idea seemed the right course when Khrushchev gave his "gentleman's word" in a letter of November 12 to Kennedy that the bombers would be removed, "not now but later." Khrushchev could not resist, however, pointing out that without air cover the bombers could be shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, regular artillery, or fighters. How could the President consider these defenseless planes as a threat? (171)

The Kennedy administration deliberated whether to accept Khrushchev's "gentlemen's agreement." The President leaned that way. Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin that if the Soviet Union gave the order to remove the bombers and they were out within 30 days, the United States would immediately lift the quarantine. (172, 173) McCone objected and warned that even stripped of missiles and bombers Castro remained a serious threat. (174) Any chance that the issue would be resolved immediately was eliminated by Khrushchev's letter of November 14 insisting that 30 days was not enough time for withdrawal of the IL-28s. Khrushchev suggested that if the United States stopped overflights of Cuba—something Kennedy was unprepared to

do—he would announce the withdrawal of the bombers. (176) In a November 15 letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy admitted that the bombers deal was only a matter of timing, but the issue of verification remained unresolved, especially in light of unconfirmed reports of weapons stored in caves. Kennedy demanded safeguards against the reintroduction of strategic weapons and worried that “trouble” might spring from Cuban sources. (181)

At the Executive Committee meeting on November 16, Kennedy vowed that the United States would continue to overfly Cuba in the face of Cuban threats to shoot down reconnaissance planes. The President accepted in principle McCone’s warning that SAMs must not be allowed to shield a new Soviet military build up. McCloy then presented Stevenson’s assessment that the U.S.-Soviet negotiations at the United Nations were deadlocked. The Soviets could not deliver on-site inspections because of Castro’s insistence on receiving in return a non-invasion pledge. The President suggested that perhaps the deadlock could be resolved informally with a public statement promising no invasion of Cuba—provided there was no military threat or civil war—while the United States continued unobtrusive overflights. Kennedy envisioned a solution without a clear, formal agreement. (185)

U.S. and Soviet negotiators met on the evening of November 19 at the Soviet compound in Locust Valley on Long Island for a discussion marked by recriminations and reproaches. McCloy stated that the President must say something about the bombers in his press conference of November 20. If there was no agreement on them, then there was no agreement on offensive weapons. The United States would not sign a non-invasion pledge—that would make it a treaty requiring Senate confirmation—but it would make a “solemn declaration” in the United Nations. Kuznetsov replied that the Soviet Union would remove the bombers, but only in conjunction with settlement of other issues including overflights. McCloy shot back that there was no stopping overflights until there was adequate verification. Furthermore, if U.S. reconnaissance planes were attacked, they would return fire. (191) At the Executive Committee meeting the morning of November 19, the same showdown state of mind pre-

vailed. After the meeting, Ball informed McCloy that his Soviet counterparts should be informed that if there were no deal [illegible in the original] the IL-28s the Soviet Union could expect a more drastic and extended quarantine. (192, 193)

Under this pressure the Soviet Union retreated. Fomin assured Scali that the procedure for verification of missiles could be used for bombers and that Soviet IL-28 technicians were returning to the Soviet Union. If the United States lifted the blockade and gave the Soviets a draft of a non-aggression pledge, the two sides had a deal. (195) Fomin's promises were followed by a November 20 letter from Khrushchev who agreed to remove the bombers with their technicians within a month or sooner. (196) The United States then lifted the quarantine and the crisis that began on October 16, 1962, was finally over. There was general agreement on November 20 that since Khrushchev had not insisted on a formal non-invasion pledge, he should not be given one. (197) McCloy called Ball to register his belief that since the Soviet Union had come through for the United States, they should get a non-invasion declaration. (199) Ball discussed it with McGeorge Bundy who stated that 42 missiles and 30 bombers did not constitute much of a concession. When the United States got real verification, Cuba would get a non-invasion pledge. (200)

At the Executive Committee meeting on November 21, Kennedy agreed to abandon U.S. demands for ground inspection in Cuba, but he would not relinquish the right to invade Cuba in the event of civil war, in response to Cuban fostered guerrilla subversion directed against Latin American, or if offensive weapons were reintroduced into Cuba. Kennedy was not prepared to "build up Castro with a no invasion pledge." (201) Instead the President informed Khrushchev that he need have "no fear of invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course." (202) Kennedy then drafted language with Ball for a very cautious and qualified pledge not to invade Cuba. (204)

The "Understanding" on Cuba

At this point the Kennedy administration faced a crossroads. Either it could extend negotiations with the Soviet

Union on UN verification and the non-invasion pledge or it could move to rapidly conclude the matter. (205) Former President Eisenhower and McCloy favored a quick wrap up on Cuba, relying on overflights and other intelligence resources to verify. Neither one held out much hope for the effectiveness of UN inspection of Cuba. McCone remained opposed to any non-invasion pledge. (209)

The administration initially tried negotiations. McCloy and Stevenson met with Mikoyan, the "hardest bargainer in [the] Kremlin's stable of tough negotiators." Mikoyan made the case for Castro's role in the negotiations, insisted on reciprocity of inspections, and objected that the draft U.S. non-invasion pledge was only an intention, not a commitment. Clearly, Mikoyan was not considering a quick resolution. (213)

The President was unprepared to make concessions that would pave the way for a formal settlement. As he told the Executive Committee on November 29, he would rather have Soviet troops in Cuba than give Castro a non-invasion pledge. At this same meeting, the President authorized the continuation of Mongoose Operations (a special program of intelligence operations directed at Cuba), but restricted it to intelligence gathering. (216, 217) In his meeting with Mikoyan, who had just returned from a long and unpleasant visit to Cuba, Kennedy gave no ground. (218, 219)

At the Executive Committee meeting on December 3, Stevenson and Ball explained the three issues holding up negotiations in New York: the manner in which the United States expressed its intention to continue overflights, U.S. insistence on preservation of peace in the Caribbean, and the no-invasion undertaking. As the President put it, he was "not going to rat on an agreement with the Russians, but we are not going to tie on to a no-invasion pledge in a way which allowed Castro to operate from an invulnerable base." (222)

McCloy and Stevenson argued for concessions to allow them to conclude the negotiations. (227, 228) McCone spoke against such a course. (224, 229) It was generally agreed within the administration that the United States should not accept just any agreement, but should hold out for a good one. (230) The chances for a formal resolution dimmed.

Nevertheless, the President authorized Stevenson and McCloy to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union on the basis of a joint report to the Security Council, but on terms that the Soviet Union was not likely to accept. (243) The Soviet negotiators rejected this last U.S. offer on December 14, stating that the non-invasion pledge was too qualified, that reference to overflights was included, and that there was no provision for Cuban participation. The Soviets countered with a plan to send the Kennedy and Khrushchev letters of October 27 and 28 to the Security Council. (253, 256) The Kennedy administration responded with a plan to send the letters plus the White House and Presidential press statements of October 27 and November 20. If the Soviets rejected this, then either a joint or separate letters to the Secretary General should be sent saying that despite progress made, the United States and Soviet Union could not resolve their differences. (257) There was no resolution. The United States and the Soviet Union decided on a joint letter to the Secretary General admitting their inability to agree. (259, 263) The long and drawn out negotiations for a mutually acceptable agreed resolution to the Cuban missile crisis ended in failure. There was no specific set of obligations and procedures, just Soviet removal of the missiles and the bombers and a promise of a gradual scaling down of Soviet military personnel in Cuba in return for a lifting of the quarantine, the indication that U.S. missiles would eventually be removed from Turkey, and limited assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. In the end, there were no formal U.S.-Soviet understandings to end the Cuban missile crisis.

Covert Operations Against Cuba

The remainder of the volume covers 1963 in which U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Cuba is only one of a number of themes. Other major issues include increased covert operations against Cuba including more extensive and efficient use of refugees and exiles, tighter economic pressure against Cuba, and exploration of a possible rapprochement with Castro. The Kennedy administration used the natural breaking point of the end of the missile and bomber crises to reorganize its covert operations against Castro by disbanding Operation Mongoose and placing day-to-day responsibility

for covert and overt operations under a Department of State Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. (261)

The Kennedy administration began 1963 with an internal debate over covert operations against Cuba. Should it try to isolate and then actively seek the overthrow of Castro or should it isolate Cuba and seek reduction of Soviet presence as a more limited goal? Debate also ranged over tactics. Should the United States apply increasing degrees of pressure or merely press Castro as opportunities presented themselves? (270, 272) In mid-April, the Cuban Coordinator, Sterling Cottrell, recommended a more intensified covert program against Cuba without resolving the broader questions. (318) McGeorge Bundy suggested that the United States faced three options: confrontation with Castro to force a non-Communist solution, gradual pressure to achieve limited ends, or accommodation. (320) The overriding problem, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, was that Castro was gaining strength within Cuba. As McCone saw it, present covert operations could slow Castro down, but would not hurt him critically. (323) On May 28, the issue came to a head at a meeting of the Standing Group of the NSC. McGeorge Bundy stated that the United States did not have the ability to overthrow Castro. McCone countered that increasing economic hardship on Cuba would cause the Cuban military to overthrow him. McNamara wondered just which economic denial and covert policies would accomplish Castro's demise. Robert Kennedy suggested that the United States had to do something, even if it did not believe that it would cause Castro's fall. (344) On June 8, the Central Intelligence Agency submitted an intensified covert plan that assumed that the United States would not invade Cuba, but which was designed to apply maximum pressure to prevent Castro from consolidating his rule and to encourage dissident Cuban elements to eliminate his control and reduce Soviet influence. The President approved, but he had no illusions that Castro would soon be out of power. (346, 348)

Possible Rapprochement With Cuba

As the Kennedy administration was increasing covert operations against Castro, it was also considering the possibility of a rapprochement with him. McGeorge Bundy had

tentatively raised the issue in early 1963. (261) McCone also suggested to the President in mid-April 1963 that better contacts with Castro could possibly turn him away from the Soviets. (315) Later in April 1963, Bundy raised the issue again and suggested that although it seemed contradictory, accommodation still was compatible with more anti-Castro options. (320) It was Kennedy's two-track ploy.

One of the problems with the policy of accommodation was how to contact Castro. Lawyer James B. Donovan, who was negotiating the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, was one channel, (310, 330) 238); journalists were another (332). Obviously the policy was extremely controversial and held very closely. Although he earlier raised it as a possibility, McCone came to believe it was a "bad idea" and "dangerous politically." McCone worried that Rusk favored it. (351) McGeorge Bundy agreed that the time was not yet right for détente with Castro, but he saw no harm in keeping channels open. (356)

The most definite attempt to contact Castro came at the initiative of former Ambassador to Guinea, William Attwood, who used his personal contacts with Cuban UN representative Carlos Lechuga to raise the issue. (367, 372, 374) On November 12, 1963, President Kennedy authorized Attwood's tentative talks with Dr. René Vallejo, Castro's aide and physician, but the two men did not get together. (377) Kennedy's assassination delayed the process. White House officials suggested that the Attwood channel was now less promising since Lyndon Johnson probably ran a greater risk of appearing "soft" on Castro if the talks become known publicly. (378) Nevertheless, Castro was still interested and White House officials favored continuing the dialogue. (383, 384) When President Johnson learned of these talks in mid-December, apparently for the first time, he was "somewhere between lukewarm and cool" on the idea. (387, 388) The initiative lost momentum.

Soviet Troops in Cuba and Cuban Exiles

The major cause of U.S.-Soviet friction over Cuba in 1963 was U.S. concern with reducing the thousands of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. In January 1963, Kuznetsov promised Kennedy that they would be withdrawn in time.

(266) In late February, Dobrynin told Thompson that “several thousand” troops would be withdrawn later in the month. (286, 287) McCone held that the Soviets were in Cuba to stay no matter how many incremental withdrawals they made. (299, 314) By mid-1963, the CIA reported that 12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops were still in Cuba. Although there was no indication of reintroduction of Soviet strategic weapons, Castro was gaining political strength. (347) By October 1963, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that 5,000 to 8,000 Soviet military troops were in Cuba. (370) Gromyko assured a skeptical Kennedy that only specialists remained. (371) McCone assured the President in mid-November that the Soviets were gradually withdrawing but leaving their equipment for the Cubans. (375)

The use of Cuban exiles and refugees against Castro is the last principal theme of 1963. Rusk opposed the hit-and-run tactics of U.S.-sponsored exile groups as an unnecessary and complicating factor in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. Rusk wanted to control exile groups more effectively. Over McCone’s opposition, he convinced the President to do so. (302, 303, 304) The United States discouraged exile raids from U.S. territory, but was less able to control raids from outside the United States. (365, 366)

When he became President, Johnson did not reexamine U.S. policy toward Cuba. He remained committed to Kennedy’s concept of non-invasion as long as certain conditions were met. If anything, Johnson wanted a more effective covert and economic denial program against Cuba. (381, 388–390) Although U.S.-Cuban relations would prove difficult and antagonistic during Johnson’s years, they never reached the drama and tension of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

List of Documents

No.	Document Description
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Bolivia

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| 1 | Telegram 430 from La Paz, February 9, 1961. Transmits text of Bolivian communiqué on U.S.-Bolivian agreement on U.S. military assistance for Bolivian economic development and internal security. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.247/2-961. |
| 2 | Memorandum from Schlesinger to Kennedy, March 3, 1961. The crisis in Bolivia. No classification marking. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Latin America. |
| 3 | Memorandum from General Lemnitzer to McNamara, JCSM-236-61, April 13, 1961. Bolivian request for a bilateral agreement. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Bolivia, 1961, 000.1—. |
| 4 | Memorandum from Hilsman (INR) to Woodward (ARA), July 18, 1961. Latin American and U.S. concern for Bolivian stability and security. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 724.00/7-2461. |
| 5 | Memorandum of conversation, July 21, 1961, between Rusk and Bolivian Ambassador Andrade. Bolivian Government request for \$11 million emergency economic assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. |
| 6 | Memorandum of conversation, October 18, 1961, among Rusk, Andrade, and Fitzgerald (ICA). Bolivian request for emergency assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. |
| 7 | Memorandum from Hamilton (ICA) to Dungan, June 28, 1962. Transmits for Kennedy's approval a joint U.S.-IADB program of development assistance for Bolivia. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Box 32. |

No.	Document Description
8	Memorandum from Dungan to President Kennedy, July 6, 1962. Transmits a memorandum to approve announcement of the U.S. commitment of assistance to Bolivia; handwritten note that Kennedy approved. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Bolivia, 1961–1962.
9	Memorandum from Hansen (BOB) to Dungan, July 19, 1962. Concerns about the Bolivian aid commitment. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Bolivia, 1961–1962.
10	Memorandum from Topping (S/P) to Rostow, July 30, 1962. Observations concerning the Alliance for Progress and Bolivia. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Bolivia.
11	Memorandum of conversation, November 15, 1962, between Rusk and Andrade. Exchange of views during Andrade's farewell call. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 724.00/11–1562.
12	Memorandum of conversation, April 24, 1963, between Kennedy and Ambassador Sanchez de Lozada. Exchange of views during presentation of credentials. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.
13	Memorandum from Major General Lansdale to McNamara and Gilpatric, June 3, 1963. Report on visit to Bolivia. Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.
14	Memorandum from Read (S/S) to McGeorge Bundy, July 20, 1963. Transmits memorandum on the situation in Bolivia. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.
15	Memorandum from Cottrell (ARA) to the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), July 31, 1963. The internal security threat in Bolivia and contingency planning. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.

No.	Document Description
16	Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. General exchange of views. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
17	Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Bolivian-Chilean relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
18	Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Alliance for Progress; U.S. aid to Bolivia; development assistance; petroleum. Confidential. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, Paz Visit, 10/63.
19	Memorandum of conversation, October 23, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Cuban subversion. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
20	Memorandum of conversation, October 23, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Communist propaganda. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
21	Memorandum of conversation, October 23, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Alliance for Progress; U.S. assistance. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
22	Memorandum of conversation, November 20, 1963, between Kennedy and Ambassador Henderson. Discussion of Henderson's mission to Bolivia. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General, 8/63–1/64.

Chile

23	Memorandum of conversation, February 20, 1961, between Rusk and Ambassador Mueller. Financial assistance to Chile. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.5–MSP/2–2061.
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No.	Document Description
24	Memorandum from Achilles to Berle, April 13, 1961. Chilean attitude toward Cuban problem; aid to Chile Christian Democratic Party. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Task Force on Latin America Files: Lot 61 D 298, Chile.
25	Memorandum of conversation, April 17, 1961, between Dillon and Agriculture Minister Casanueva. Chilean economic adjustment and planning for the future. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.25/4-1761.
26	Memorandum of conversation, June 2, 1961, between Barall and Chargé Soto. Difficulties in programming U.S. assistance for Chilean reconstruction. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.5-MSP/6-261.
27	Memorandum of conversation, October 10, 1961, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Martinez. Recent political changes in Chile; Alliance for Progress; economic development; land reform; Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, October-December 1961.
28	Instructions for Moscoso Mission, undated. Two-phased proposal of conditional U.S. financial assistance to Chile. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1962.
29	Telegram 746 from Santiago, March 8, 1962. Text of agreement worked out with Chilean cabinet re U.S. loans to Chile. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1962.
30	Telegram 58 to Santiago, July 20, 1962. Reiteration of U.S. hard line with respect to Chile's economic problems and programs. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, July-October, 1962.
31	Letter from Charles W. Cole to Edwin M. Martin, July 23, 1962. Crucial points in U.S.-Chile economic relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.25/7-2362.

No.	Document Description
32	Memorandum from Belcher to Edwin M. Martin, July 25, 1962. Ambassador Cole's position on the situation in Chile. Confidential. DOS, CF, 725.00/7–2562.
33	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Current situation in Chile; Alliance for Progress. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.
34	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Problems and importance of American investment in Chile. Limited Official Use. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.
35	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Cuban problem. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.
36	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. U.S. military assistance programs; Chilean relations with Bolivia. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.
37	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Press reports about Chile. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.
38	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Chile and Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Chile, December 1963.
39	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Alessandri. Text not declassified. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, November–December 1962.

No.	Document Description
40	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, between President Alessandri and President Kennedy. Communists in international organizations. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, November–December 1962.
41	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. U.S. aid; relationship of EEC with LAFTA. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.
42	Memorandum of conversation, January 24, 1963, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Muller. Farewell call on the President. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.00/1–2463.
43	Telegram 37 to Santiago, July 24, 1963. Text not declassified. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 12 CHILE.
44	Memorandum of conversation, August 19, 1963, between President Kennedy and Senator Duran from Chile. Political situation and upcoming election in Chile. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, July–November 1963.
45	National Intelligence Estimate 94–63, October 3, 1963. “The Chilean Situation and Prospects.” Secret. 25 pp. CIA, ODDI Registry, Job 79–R01012A.
46	Memorandum of conversation, November 14, 1963, among Belcher, Thompson, Richardson, Carlisle, and others. Chilean Presidential election of 1964 and implications for U.S. strategy and policy. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 14 CHILE.

Colombia

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| 47 | Memorandum of conversation, February 17, 1961, among Rusk, Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría, and U.S. and Colombian officials. Exchange of views on matters of mutual interest. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. |
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No.	Document Description
48	Memorandum of conversation, February 25, 1961, between Lleras Camargo and Adolf A. Berle, Jr. General exchange of views including: economic conditions; Caribbean crisis; Government of Haiti; Cuba; Mexico. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 721.11/2–2561.
49	Memorandum of conversation, March 23, 1961, between Rusk and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría. U.S. military and financial assistance to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
50	Memorandum from Mulliken to Carwell, June 8, 1961. Meeting with Colombian Ambassador on coffee price stabilization. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.21/6–861.
51	Telegram 3 to Bogota, July 3, 1961. Letter from Rusk to President Lleras expressing gratification for President's initiative on the Cuban problem. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, 1961.
52	Telegram 145 to Bogota, August 28, 1961. Instructions for meeting with President Lleras and Foreign Minister Turbay regarding action program on Cuba outlined earlier by Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/8–2861.
53	Memorandum of conversation, September 25, 1961, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Turbay. Lleras Plan to test Cuba's willingness to remain in the Inter-American system. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, 1961.
54	Memorandum from Woodward to Acting Secretary, September 27, 1961. Urgent need for internal security aid to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.5–MSP/9–2761.
55	Memorandum of conversation, October 6, 1961, between Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría and Coerr. Colombian request for additional internal security aid. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.5–MSP/10–661.
56	Telegram 234 from Bogota, October 12, 1961. State of siege declared throughout Colombia by President Lleras. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/10–1361.

No.	Document Description
57	Telegram 315 to Bogota, November 1, 1961. Announcement that President Kennedy has signed determination to furnish internal security aid to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/11-0161.
58	Memorandum of conversation, December 17, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Lleras. Developments in the Dominican Republic; planning for Foreign Ministers meeting on Cuban problem. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, January 1962.
59	Memorandum of conversation, June 8, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Freeman. Alliance for Progress results in Colombia. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
60	Memorandum of conversation, June 26, 1962, among U. Alexis Johnson, President-elect Valencia and other U.S. and Colombian officials. Review of relations between the two countries. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.21/6-2662.
61	Airgram A-145 from Bogota, September 5, 1962. Transmits September 4 memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Freeman and President Valencia on the violence problem in Colombia. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/9-562.
62	Memorandum of conversation, September 18, 1962, between Rusk and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría. Farewell call of Ambassador; Colombian request for \$60 million balance-of-payments loan and counterpart release. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
63	Memorandum of conversation, September 27, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría. Farewell call of Ambassador; Coffee Agreement; Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, July-September 1962.
64	DOS Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Colombia, December 1962. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121.

No.	Document Description
65	Memorandum of conversation, February 1, 1963, among DOS officials. Colombian political and economic problems. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL COL.
66	Airgram A-731 from Bogota, May 10, 1963. Political contingencies—extra-legal changes. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 23 COL.
67	Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1963, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Uribe Botero. Presentation of Ambassador's credentials; Colombian budgetary difficulties. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 17 COL-U.S.

Costa Rica

68	Despatch 576 from San Jose, April 6, 1961. Status of relations with current Costa Rican Government. Secret. 11 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/4-661.
69	Memorandum of conversation, April 17, 1961, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Escalante. Costa Rican land reform program. Official Use Only. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Costa Rica, January–August 1961.
70	Despatch 625 from San Jose, April 25, 1961. President Echandi's current attitude toward U.S. aid. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/4-2561.
71	Telegram 519 from San Jose, May 18, 1961. Reasons for delay in presenting credentials by new U.S. Ambassador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/5-1861.
72	Despatch 360 from San Jose, January 24, 1962. President Echandi's concern over 1962 U.S. sugar allocation. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.235/1-2462.
73	Despatch 440 from San Jose, March 2, 1962. Costa Rica's fiscal difficulties and request for U.S. assistance, with a copy of a letter from the Central Bank to President-elect Orlich. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/3-262.

No.	Document Description
74	Despatch 442 from San Jose, March 5, 1962. U.S. efforts to encourage economic planning in Costa Rica. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/3-562.
75	Memorandum from Woodward to Moscoso, March 7, 1962. Costa Rican financial difficulties. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/3-762.
76	Memorandum of conversation, April 24, 1962, between Foreign Minister-designate Oduber and Edwin M. Martin. Economic policies of incoming Orlich administration. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.13/4-2462.
77	Memorandum of conversation, April 24, 1962, between Foreign Minister-designate Oduber and Edwin M. Martin. Orlich government's attitude toward other Central American States. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 810.18/4-2762.
78	Memorandum of conversation, April 30, 1962, between Figures and Moscoso and other U.S. officials. Costa Rican financial situation and possibility of U.S. assistance to rectify it. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/4-3062.
79	Letter from Telles to Edwin M. Martin, May 31, 1962. End of year assessment: DOS failure to act on Embassy recommendations and lack of confidence Department has shown in Embassy; Orlich visit to Washington; Costa Rican fiscal and budgetary problem; U.S. policy in dealing with Figueres. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/5-3162.
80	Airgram A-191 from San Jose, June 4, 1962. Meeting between President Orlich and Minister of Economy Hess and Ambassador Telles on seriousness of Costa Rica's current financial crisis and President's hope for U.S. assistance. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/6-362.
81	Airgram A-46 from San Jose, July 23, 1962. Country Team recommendation for fiscal assistance to GOCR. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/7-2362.

No.	Document Description
82	Memorandum of conversation, August 13, 1962, among Ambassador Facio, former Ambassador Esquivel and Edwin M. Martin. Serious budget deficit in Costa Rica; coffee conference in New York. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 718.00/8–662.
83	Memorandum of conversation, August 13, 1962, between Ambassador Facio and John W. Fischer. Costa Rican budgetary problem. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/8–1362.
84	Memorandum of conversation, September 13, 1962, among Edwin M. Martin, Ambassador Facio, and other Costa Rican and U.S. officials. U.S. assistance in Costa Rican budget crisis. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 811.10/9–1362.
85	Circular Airgram CA–6669, December 19, 1962. Approved Plan of Action toward Costa Rica from December 1962 to October 1963. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/12–1962.
86	Memorandum of conversation among President Kennedy, President Orlich, and other U.S. and Costa Rican officials. Requests for U.S. aid: Project financing, National Industrial Corporation; education, health and fiscal problems. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, President's Trip—San Jose, March 1963, Memcons.
87	Airgram A–7 from San Jose, July 6, 1963. Report of President Orlich first public criticism of U.S. for slow processing of GOCCR loan applications. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15–1 COSTA RICA.
88	Memorandum of conversation, July 31, 1963, between Foreign Minister Oduber and Cottrell. Text not declassified. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL COSTA RICA–CUBA.

Ecuador

89	Despatch 419 from Quito, February 2, 1961. U.S. economic assistance policy toward Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 822.10/2–661.
90	Telegram 447 to Quito and 553 to Lima, February 25, 1961. U.S. concerns over possible arms race between Ecuador and Peru. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.58/2–2161.

No.	Document Description
91	Memorandum of conversation, April 18, 1961, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Chiriboga. Review of relations and security in Latin America. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 720.5-MSP/4-186.
92	Memorandum of conversation, May 2, 1961, between Foreign Minister Chiriboga and A.A. Berle. Chiriboga's concern over pro-Communist forces in Ecuador. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.00/5-261.
93	Despatch 673 from Quito, May 9, 1961. U.S. military relationship with Ecuador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.5-MSP/5-961.
94	Telegram 211 to Quito, undated. DOS response to request from Ecuadorean military officers for equipment to assist in maintaining internal security. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador.
95	Memorandum from McGhee to Woodward, November 9, 1961. Anatomy of the revolution in Ecuador. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.
96	Memorandum from Woodward to McGhee, November 17, 1961. Response to McGhee's November 9 memorandum on the anatomy of the Ecuadorean revolution. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.
97	Memorandum of conversation, November 24, 1961, between Rusk and Ambassador Plaza. Attitude and needs of the new Government of Ecuador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
98	Memorandum of conversation, November 28, 1961, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Plaza. New Government in Ecuador; U.S. aid. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

No.	Document Description
99	Memorandum from McClintock to Rostow, December 15, 1961, transmitting a memorandum from Woodward to McGhee and Ramsey, which attaches a memorandum from Woodward to McGhee. Preliminary analysis of recent Ecuadorean revolution. Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.
100	Memorandum of conversation, January 10, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Ponce. Presentation of credentials; discussion of upcoming Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, January 1961–March 1962.
101	Memorandum for the record, February 6, 1962. Text not declassified. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings With the President, Box 6, 12/1/61–6/30/62.
102	Memorandum of conversation, July 23, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena and other U.S. and Ecuadorean officials. U.S. assistance to Ecuador; situation in Ecuador; situation in Peru. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April–August, 1962.
103	Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena. Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April–August, 1962.
104	Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1962, between President Arosemena and Acting Secretary Ball and U.S. and Ecuadorean officials. Financial and economic situation in Ecuador. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April–August, 1962.
105	Memorandum of conversation, July 25, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena and U.S. and Ecuadorean officials. Economic problems and reform in Ecuador. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

No.	Document Description
106	Memorandum from Brubeck to Dungan, January 24, 1963. Transmits a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 722.00/1-2463.
107	Telegram 17 from Quito, July 11, 1963. Announcement of five-man military junta ouster of Arosemena government. Confidential. 9 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.
108	Memorandum of conversation, July 17, 1963, between Rusk and Ambassador Ponce. Informal discussion of new regime and future of Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November 1963.
109	Circular telegram CA-73 to certain American Republic posts, July 18, 1963. U.S. withholding recognition new Government in Ecuador until junta indicates intention to return to civilian government and several other Latin American countries have recognized Ecuador. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November 1963.
110	Circular telegram 170 to certain American Republic posts, July 26, 1963. U.S. plan to recognize Ecuadorian junta by July 31 if several other Hemisphere countries do so by then. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.
111	Memorandum of conversation, August 7, 1963, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Ponce. Farewell call of departing Ecuadorean Ambassador (the new Foreign Minister); Alliance for Progress; subversion of Communist activities in Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.

El Salvador

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| 112 | Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, January 25, 1961. Overthrow of the Junta Government in El Salvador by the Salvadoran Army. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.00/1-2561. |
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No.	Document Description
113	Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, February 9, 1961. Recommendation to recognize new Government in El Salvador on February 15. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.02/2–961.
114	Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, February 11, 1961, transmitting a memorandum from Rusk to the President. Recommendation that no formal statement be made by the President or the Department at time of recognition of Salvadoran Government. Confidential. 1 pp. DOS, CF, 716.02/2–1161.
115	Telegram 321 to San Salvador, February 13, 1961. Transmit text of note of recognition of Salvadoran Government. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 716.02/2–1361.
116	Telegram 651 from San Salvador, April 13, 1961. Need for direct financial support and moral encouragement for new regime. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 816.10/4–1361.
117	Telegram 391 to San Salvador, April 15, 1961. DOS authorization to commend Directorate's determination to improve standard of living, promote social reform, and develop economy. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 816.10/4–1361.
118	Memorandum of conversation June 9, 1961, between Ambassador Lima and Ball. Salvadoran political situation and need for U.S. financial assistance. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 716.00/6–961.
119	Telegram 502 from San Salvador, April 29, 1962. Report on elections. Official Use Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.00/4–2962.
120	Memorandum from Moscoso to President Kennedy. Alliance for Progress in El Salvador. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Salvador, 1961–64.
121	Airgram CA–6720 from San Salvador, December 20, 1962. Plan of Action for El Salvador to July 1, 1963. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 611.16/12–2062.

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| 122 | Memorandum of conversation, March 20, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Rivera. Salvadoran political and economic situation and plans; support for Alliance informational activities; U.S. cotton policies; loan projects; Peace Corps; communism in El Salvador; travelers to Cuba. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL EL SAL. |
| 123 | Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, July 22, 1963. El Salvador—long- and short-term prospects for political stability. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Salvador, 1961–64. |

Guatemala

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| 124 | Telegram 459 from Guatemala City, April 20, 1961. Report on exchange of views of current situation at a meeting with leading members of the American Community. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4–2061. |
| 125 | Despatch 494 from Guatemala City, March 31, 1962. U.S. interests and the Guatemalan political scene following recent demonstrations. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/3–3062. |
| 126 | Telegram 496 from Guatemala City, April 19, 1962. Danger of a Communist takeover in Guatemala discussed with President Ydigoras. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 714.00/4–1862. |
| 127 | Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to McGhee, April 26, 1962. Reasons to keep the President from getting involved in Guatemalan situation for the time being. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4–2662. |
| 128 | Memorandum from Katherine W. Bracken to Edwin M. Martin, April 26, 1962. Current situation and possible contingencies in Guatemala. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4–2662. |
| 129 | Airgram A-142 from Guatemala City, September 11, 1962. Transmits guidelines for policy and operations in Guatemala. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, CF, 611.14/9–1162. |

No.	Document Description
130	Memorandum of conversation, November 28, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Alejos. Unrest in Guatemala and concern over Castro threat. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guatemala, September–December 1962.
131	Telegram 385 from Guatemala City, December 18, 1962. Review of attempted “Air Force” revolt and MAP deliveries. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 714.5622/12–1762.
132	Memorandum from Dungan to President Kennedy, January 22, 1963. Transmits attached background paper on Guatemala. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Guatemala, Security, 1961–63.
133	Memorandum for the record, January 22, 1963. Meeting at the White House to discuss the situation in Guatemala and Arévalo’s candidacy. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/1–2263.
134	DOS Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Guatemala, February 1953. Secret. 23 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 396.
135	Memorandum of conversation, March 20, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Ydigoras. Relations with Cuba; elections; Belize; domestic reforms. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15–1 US/KENNEDY.
136	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to U. Alexis Johnson, March 27, 1963. Background information on March 25 siege imposed by President Ydigoras. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL GUAT.
137	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 24, 1963. Transmits memorandum summarizing the first 3 weeks of the Peralta regime in Guatemala. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 2 GUAT.
138	Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, July 31, 1963. Guatemalan request for U.S. mediation in British Honduras (Belize) dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guatemala, April–July 1963.

No.	Document Description
139	Telegram 123 to Guatemala City, September 24, 1963. Concern over failure of Peralta regime to begin to solve the main economic and political problems facing Guatemala. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL GUAT-US.
140	Telegram 254 to Guatemala City, November 27, 1963. Guatemalan plans for return to constitutional government. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 15 GUAT.

Honduras

141	Telegram 657 from Tegucigalpa, March 13, 1961. President Villeda Morales informed about threats to stability of his government. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/3-1361.
142	Telegram 705 from Tegucigalpa, April 3, 1961. Embassy assessment of President Villeda Morales' anti-Communist position. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/4-361.
143	Telegram 768 from Tegucigalpa, April 21, 1961. President Villeda Morales proposal to break relations with Cuba on April 22. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, 715.00/4-2161.
144	Letter from Ambassador Burrows to Katherine W. Bracken, January 24, 1962. Thoughts that OCI's reporting requirements reveal a distorted view of the situation in Honduras. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/1-2462.
145	Telegram 64 from Tegucigalpa, August 13, 1962. Country Team response to criticism and assumption in circular telegram 230. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.5/8-1362.
146	Telegram 51 to Tegucigalpa, September 11, 1962. Instructions for meeting with President and Foreign Minister to convey U.S. concern over implications for foreign investment, public and private, in Honduras agricultural development as result new agrarian reform law. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 815.16/9-1062.

No.	Document Description
147	Telegram 68 to Tegucigalpa, September 20, 1962. Transmits considerations pertinent to U.S. policy on assistance to American private interests abroad and problems arising from provisions of Honduran agrarian reform law. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 815.16/9–1962.
148	Memorandum of conversation, October 4, 1962, between Foreign Minister Alvarado and Edwin M. Martin. Honduran agrarian reform; request for assistance. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.04/10–462.
149	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, November 7, 1962. Visit of President Villeda Morales to the U.S. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.11/11–762.
150	Memorandum of conversation, November 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials. Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962–September 1963.
151	Memorandum of conversation, November 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials. Honduran agrarian reform and United Fruit Company. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962–September 1963.
152	Memorandum of conversation, November 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials. The Swan Islands. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962–September 1963.
153	Memorandum of conversation, December 4, 1962, among Ambassador Burrows, Jasper Baker (United Fruit Company), Edward M. Rowell, and John W. Fisher. Honduran agrarian reform and United Fruit Company. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.04/12–462.

No.	Document Description
154	Memorandum of conversation, September 30, 1963, between Cottrell, and Ambassador Dávila and Finance Minister Bueso. Possible coup in Honduras. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
155	Telegram 84 to Tegucigalpa, 134 to Guatemala City, 69 to Managua, 143 to Panama, 111 to San José, and 81 to San Salvador, September 30, 1963. Rumors about impending coup in Honduras. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
156	Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, October 1, 1963. U.S.-Honduran dispute over the Swan Islands. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, Honduras, 1961-1964.
157	Telegram 74 to Managua and 86 to San Salvador, October 2, 1963. Joint declaration by four American Republics presidents re impending coup. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
158	Memorandum of conversation between Foreign Minister Perdomo, Finance Minister Bueso, and Ambassador Dávila, and Cottrell and other U.S. officials. Request for U.S. assistance in holding back ongoing coup. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
159	Telegram 94 to Tegucigalpa, October 4, 1963. Instructions re contact with members of former Villeda government and question of recognition. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, 10/1-5/63.
160	Telegram 101 to Tegucigalpa, 96 to San Salvador, 80 to Managua, 123 to San José, October 4, 1963. Eventual recognition of Honduran Government and restoration of normal relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
161	Telegram 135 to San José, October 8, 1963. Personal message from President Kennedy to Villeda Morales. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
162	Telegram 126 to San Salvador, 106 to Managua, 159 to San José, October 17, 1963. Return to civilian constitutional government in Honduras. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

No.	Document Description
163	Telegram 159 to Tegucigalpa, October 26, 1963. Contacts with Lopez. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
164	Telegram 258 from Tegucigalpa, October 27, 1963. Conclusions from October 25 conversation with Lopez. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
165	Telegram 268 from Tegucigalpa, October 30, 1963. Analysis of position of military regime; policy considerations confront U.S.; Embassy course of action recommendations. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
166	Telegram 171 to Tegucigalpa, October 31, 1963. Approval of recommendations in telegram 268 from Tegucigalpa with specific comments. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
167	Memorandum for Bromley Smith, November 1, 1963. Meeting among President Kennedy and other government officials on the current situation in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, 10/18–11/23/63.
168	Telegram 194 to Tegucigalpa, November 18, 1963. Return to civilian constitutional government. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

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169	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, April 3, 1961. Upcoming visit of Premier Manley of Jamaica. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961–62.
170	Memorandum of conversation, April 19, 1961, between President Kennedy and Premier Manley. West Indian Federation; U.S. assistance; bauxite, immigration, and aviation; sugar quotas. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961–62.
171	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, May 28, 1962. Visit of Premier Bustamante of Jamaica. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961–62.

No.	Document Description
172	Jamaican Scope Paper, undated. Independence; OAS membership; defense treaty; U.S. aid; sugar; bauxite; immigration. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
173	Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Premier Bustamante, and other U.S. and Jamaican officials, June 27, 1962. Economic situation in Jamaica; future of the Caribbean; West Indies; independence; emigration; migratory workers; sugar; tobacco production; AID project. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
174	Memorandum from Moscoso to McGeorge Bundy, July 12, 1962. Aid program in Jamaica. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
175	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, July 19, 1962. Establishment of an Embassy at Kingston, Jamaica. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
176	Strategy Statement for Jamaica, February 15, 1963. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.
177	Plan of Action for Jamaica beginning June 1, 1963. Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.
178	Memorandum of conversation, June 14, 1963, between Prime Minister Bustamante and President Kennedy and other U.S. and Jamaican officials. Jamaican quota; Jamaican development plan; Cuban refugees. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.

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- 179 Letter from Edward G. Cale to Thomas C. Mann, February 14, 1961. Transmits paper entitled "The Tactical Handling of Relations With Mexico." Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/2-1461.

No.	Document Description
180	Memorandum from Coerr to Ball, April 11, 1961. Mexican oil import problem. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 59, TFLA Subject and Chron Files: Lot 61 D 298, Box 9.
181	Memorandum from Melville E. Osborne to Coerr, May 6, 1961. Mexico and the Castro problem. Confidential. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 59, TFLA Subject and Chron Files: Lot 61 D 298, Box 9.
182	Memorandum from Edwin E. Vallon to Jamison, June 6, 1961. Mexican request for 10 minesweepers. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 712.5621/6–661.
183	Memorandum from Vallon to Braddock, July 26, 1961. Mexican request for purchase of naval vessels (20 minesweepers). Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 712.5621/7–2661.
184	Memorandum from Robert F. Woodward to U. Alexis Johnson, July 31, 1961. Politico-economic discussions with Mexico. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/7–3161.
185	Memorandum of conversation, October 19, 1961, between Foreign Minister Tello and Under Secretary Bowles. Berlin question; Troika (UN). Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/10–1961.
186	Telegram 1744 from Mexico City, December 17, 1961. Report on discussion with President Lopez Mateos. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, January 1961–May 1962.
187	Memorandum of conversation, February 16, 1962, between Rusk and Ambassador Carrillo. Geneva Disarmament Conference and salinity of Colorado River water. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 397.5611–GE/2–1662.
188	Memorandum from McGhee to Woodward, March 7, 1962. Transmits memorandum entitled “The Salt Water Problem of the Mexicali and San Luis Valleys.” No classification marking. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12322/3–762.

No.	Document Description
189	DOS Policy Directive PD/ARA-3.1, March 15, 1962. Mexico's protest on salinity of Colorado River water. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Department and Agencies Series, DOS Policy Directives.
190	Despatch 1347 from Mexico City, April 27, 1962, transmitting April 26 memorandum of conversation between Foreign Minister Tello and Ambassador Mann. Mexican proposals re Chamizal and Ojinaga dispute. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.1232/4-2762.
191	Memorandum from Ambassador Mann to Edwin M. Martin, May 19, 1962. Salinity of Colorado River water. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12323/5-1962.
192	Memorandum from Roger Hilsman to Edwin M. Martin, June 13, 1962. Mexico and the Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 712.00/6-1362.
193	Memorandum of conversation, June 29, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Minister Tello. Flow of private capital. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
194	Memorandum of conversation, June 29, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Foreign Minister Tello. Salinity problem. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
195	Memorandum of conversation, June 29, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos and Foreign Minister Tello. Communism in Latin America. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
196	Memorandum of conversation, June 30, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Foreign Minister Tello. Salinity problem on the lower Colorado River and other problems. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/6-3062.

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197	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, July 10, 1962. Status of salinity problem on lower Colorado River and Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, General, June to September, 1962.
198	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, December 14, 1962. Sale of minesweepers to Mexico. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 712.5621/12–1462.
199	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, January 11, 1963. Status report on negotiations for settlement of Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.1231/1–1163.
200	Memorandum of conversation, February 15, 1963, between Ambassador Carrillo Flores and Robert M. Sayre. Current bilateral problems between the United States and Mexico. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33–1 MEX–US.
201	Memorandum from Brubeck to Dungan, February 27, 1963. Status report on Chamizal negotiations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32–1 MEX–US.
202	Memorandum of conversation, February 28, 1963, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Carrillo Flores. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River and transit of Latin Americans through Mexico. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, General, March–June 1963.
203	Telegram 2494 to Mexico City, March 6, 1963. President's response to news conference question on Chamizal. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 32–1 MEX–US.
204	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 29, 1963. Solution of the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River; recommendations of the DOS. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32–1 MEX–US.
205	Memorandum of conversation, April 18, 1963, between Ambassador Carrillo Flores and Sayre. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33–1 MEX–US.

No.	Document Description
206	Memorandum from Edwin Martin to Acting Secretary Ball, May 22, 1963. Settlement of the Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
207	Memorandum of conversation, May 23, 1963, between Ball and Ambassador Carrillo Flores. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
208	Memorandum from George Ball to President Kennedy, May 24, 1963. Settlement of the Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
209	Memorandum from Edwin Martin to Chayes, June 20, 1963. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
210	Telegram 504 from Mexico City, August 21, 1963. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
211	Telegram 508 to Mexico City, September 5, 1963. Transmits September 5 memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Ambassador Carrillo Flores re Chamizal dispute; salinity problem; Cuba; President Lopez Mateos' trip to Europe. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
212	Memorandum of conversation, October 11, 1963, among Rusk, Udall, and other U.S. officials. Colorado River salinity problem. Limited Official Use. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.

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| 213 | Memorandum of conversation, March 31, 1961, between Foreign Minister Falcon Briceño and Thomas C. Mann, and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Venezuela's urgent need for financial assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 731.5-MSP/3-3161. |
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214	Memorandum of conversation, May 5, 1961, between Perez Guerrero and Bowles and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Request by the Special Financial Mission from Venezuela for U.S. assistance with its economic development program. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 331.
215	Memorandum of conversation, June 22, 1961, between President of the Chamber of Deputies Caldera, Ambassador Mayobre and Rusk and Ingersoll. Political situation in Venezuela. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 731.00/6–2261.
216	Memorandum from Battle to Swank, October 16, 1961. Transmits memoranda of conversation, between Rusk and Foreign Minister Salcon-Briceño. Perez Jimenez extradition case; Cuban Problem. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 331.
217	National Intelligence Estimate No. 89–61, November 21, 1961. "The Situation in Venezuela." Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.
218	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Community development–housing/slum clearance project. Limited Official Use. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
219	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Oil imports problem. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
220	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Military assistance. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

No.	Document Description
221	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Refinancing Venezuelan external debt. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
222	Memorandum from Hilsman to Edwin M. Martin, May 29, 1963. Venezuela and the Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 8 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, Venezuela, 1961–1962.
223	Memorandum of conversation, August 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and Minister of Defense Briceño and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Venezuelan defense requirements. Confidential. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Venezuela, 1962, 000.1–381.
224	Memorandum of conversation, August 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and Minister of Defense Briceño and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Smuggling of arms into Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Venezuela, 1962, 000.1–381.
225	Memorandum from Clint E. Smith to the Latin American Policy Committee, September 21, 1962. Plan of action for Venezuela to March 2, 1964. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 611.31/9–2162.
226	Memorandum of conversation, February 19, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Petroleum issues. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.
227	Memorandum of conversation, February 19, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Balance of payments. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.

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| 228 | Memorandum of conversation, February 20, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Flight of capital from Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963. |
| 229 | Circular airgram CA–10071 from Moscow, March 18, 1963. Cuban propaganda and subversive activities in Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963. |
| 230 | Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, April 30, 1963. Highlights of General Lansdale’s report on Communist insurgency in Venezuela. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963. |
| 231 | Telegram 446 to Caracas, November 21, 1963. President Betancourt’s briefing of LA chiefs on Cuban arms cache. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, October–November 1963. |

Cuba

November–December 1960

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| 232 | Briefing papers used to brief President-elect Kennedy, November 18. Covert action program to replace Castro government. Secret. 6 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 64–00352R, Box 4, US Govt–President, Memoranda, Letters, Reports re CIA Relations with President and Cabinet. |
| 233 | Memorandum from Joseph W. Scott to Livingston Merchant, December 6. Transmits memorandum recommending a program of covert action to remove the Castro regime. Top Secret. 9 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov. 1960–Jan. 20, 1961. |
| 234 | Notes of a Special Group meeting, December 29. Overall plan for covert actions in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Special Group Meetings—Cuba. |

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| 235 | Paper prepared in the CIA, January 1961. Mission and concept of operation for action against Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee. |
| 236 | Briefing paper for Secretary of State-designate Rusk, January 1961. Presidentially authorized program to replace current Cuban Government with one suited to democratic ideals of Cuban people and compatible with long-range U.S. interests. Secret. 28 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba Task Force. |
| 237 | Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to McCone, January 2. Material for January 3 policy meeting on Cuba. Secret. 9 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–Jul 1961. |
| 238 | Memorandum from Barnes to the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, January 17. Joint Planning Committee on Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960–Jan 29, 1961. |
| 239 | Memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Merchant, January 18. December 6 plan to overthrow the Castro regime. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960–Jan 20, 1961. |
| 240 | Memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Rusk, January 27. Recommendations from meeting on the Task Force on Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961. |
| 241 | Memorandum for the record, January 30. Briefing on strike force in Cuba, tactical plan for its use, and intelligence on the target. Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol 10, Chpts 5 & 6. |

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| 242 | Memorandum from Chester L. Cooper to the US. Intelligence Board, February 11. Transmits a memorandum from Abbot Smith to Allan Dulles on probable international reactions to certain U.S. courses of action against the Castro regime. Top Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, General Maxwell Taylor Committee on Cuba, 28 Jan–21 May 1961. |
| 243 | Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to Rusk, February 16. Proposed transfer of Cuban trainees from Panama Canal Zone to the United States. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961—. |

March 1961

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| 244 | Memorandum from Barnes to the Deputy Director (Plans), March 1. Courses to take in immediate future in the Cuba project. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO, DDP Files: Job 67–01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–Jul 1961. |
| 245 | Notes of a Special Group meeting, March 2. Guatemala involvement in Cuba project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs—Cuba. |
| 246 | Notes of a special Group meeting, March 8. Operational developments during the past week on the Cuba project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs—Cuba. |
| 247 | Memorandum from Barnes to Chief, WH–4, March 10. Transmits a checklist prepared by DCI on the Cuba project. Secret. 5 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67–01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–Jul 1961. |
| 248 | Memorandum prepared by Barnes, March 16. Reasons to pursue the “Z” plan versus the original “E” plan. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67–01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–Jul 1961. |

No.	Document Description
249	Memorandum from Barnes to Chief, WH-4, March 21. Checklist of points raised by DCI on Cuba project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
250	Information report No. TDCS-3/469,582, March 27. Status report on opposition groups in Escambray region of Las Villas province. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, Jan 1961-.

April 1961

251	Telegram 3811 to the CIA from Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 16. Strategic targets on D-day and timing of missions. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I.
252	Telegram 4681 from CIA to <i>Balgar</i> , April 17. Instructions for ships participating in Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II.
253	Telegram 4292 to CIA from Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 18. Report of unsuccessful attacks; request for approval later attack and use of contract crews. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I.
254	Telegram 7123 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 18. Approval of use of cargo aircraft to deliver napalm bombs and beach resupply schedule. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I.
255	Telegram 4455 from Agency personnel in Nicaragua to CIA, April 19. B-26 bombing schedule. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I.
256	Telegram 7237 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 19. Navy air support and cover granted for 1 hour. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II.

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| 257 | Telegram 7238 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 19. Message to brigade re U.S. logistic support. Secret. 1 p. CIA/DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II. |
| 258 | Notes by General Eisenhower of April 22 meeting with President Kennedy. Failure of Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961–69, Augusta-Walter Reed Series, Cuba (2), Box 1. |
| 259 | Chronology of Bay of Pigs operation from January 1960 to April 19, 1961, dated April 23. Top Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee. |

May 1961

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| 260 | Memorandum from Jacob D. Esterline to the Chief, WH/4/PM, May 2. Straightening out dates of strike force concept for the Taylor Committee. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 85–00664R, Box 2, vol III, Part III. |
| 261 | CIA memorandum, May 3. Detailed statement of the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-day air strike. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee. |
| 262 | Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to the Deputy Director (Plans), May 8. Propaganda, paramilitary, political, intelligence and budget actions to be taken resulting from Cuban invasion. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67–01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–Jul 1961. |
| 263 | Memorandum, May 24. Special Group consideration of the strike force concept. Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–99679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II. |
| 264 | Memorandum for the record, May 26. Post D-day supply drops review. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 85–00664R, Box 4, Vol I. |

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June 1961

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| 265 | Memorandum from Allen Dulles to General Taylor, June 1. Summary of November 18, 1960, briefing of President-elect Kennedy on planned covert actions in Cuba. No classification marking. CIA, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B01285A, General Maxwell Taylor committee on Cuba, 28 Jan-21 May 1961. |
| 266 | Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, June 26. "Implications of Delivery of Soviet MIG Aircraft to Cuba." Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, May 1961-. |

July 1961

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| 267 | Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to the Chief, Covert Action Staff, July 3. Possible funding of Cuban Revolutionary Council. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961. |
| 268 | Draft memorandum for the files, July 17. Salient points of Woodward's July 14 report to Scott on a July 12 meeting at the White House. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961—. |
| 269 | Memorandum from Woodward to Bowles, July 20. Transmits memorandum for the Special Group on the program of covert action directed at the Castro regime. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961. |
| 270 | Memorandum from Woodward to Johnson, July 26. Transmits a memorandum for the Special Group on internal action operations against Cuba. Secret. 8 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961. |

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| 271 | Memorandum from Coerr to Johnson, August 2. Transmits a memorandum for the Special Group on program of covert action directed at the Castro regime. Secret. 13 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 4, August 3, 1961. |
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| 272 | Memorandum, September 6. Report on Castro's instructions to Dorticos re contact with American Embassy in Belgrade during Belgrade Conference. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical files, Cuba, August 1961–. |
| 273 | Memorandum for the record, September 8. Meeting among Ball, Woodward, Bissell, Goodwin, et al., re policy with respect to the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78–01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba. |

October 1961

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| 273A | Survey Report by CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick, October 1961. Survey of the Cuban Operation with Annexes. 216 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files, Job 85–00664R. |
| 274 | Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to Chief, WH–4, October 6. Confirmation of requests re Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78–01450R, Box 1, Area Activity–Western Hemisphere–Cuba. |
| 275 | Memorandum to Park F. Wollam, October 6. Transmits paper entitled “What Would Happen If Castro Died?” Secret. 8 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 73–00853R, Box 1, WH Division Liaison with Department of State. |
| 276 | Memorandum for the Special Group, October 12. Cuban program report. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961. |

November 1961

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| 277 | Memorandum, November 4. Recommendations on subsequent actions in Cuban operation. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78–01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba. |
| 278 | Notes on conversation, November 9, between President Kennedy and Tad Sulz. Sulz' visit to Cuba and meeting with Castro; assassination of Castro. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 233, JFK Collection. |

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278A	Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to CIA Director Dulles, November 24. Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
<i>December 1961</i>	
278B	Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to CIA Director McCone, December 1. Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278C	Memorandum prepared by CIA Deputy Director Cabell, December 15. Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
<i>January 1962</i>	
278D	Analysis by CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, January 18. Report on the Cuban operation. 188 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278E	Letter from CIA Director McCone to President of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Killian, January 19. Forwards Kirkpatrick's survey of the Cuban operation and comments of other CIA officials. 1 p. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278F	Memorandum from CIA Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Barnes to Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, January 19. Survey of the Cuban operation. 5 pp. Secret; Eyes Only. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278G	Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Barnes, January 22. Response to Barnes' January 19 memorandum commenting on Kirkpatrick's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

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| 278H | Memorandum from the staff officers of the CIA Office of the Inspector General to CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick, January 26. Kirkpatrick's Cuban survey and the Deputy Directory of Plans analysis of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85–00664R. |
| 278I | Memorandum from CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell to CIA Director McCone, January 27. Barnes memorandum on the IG Survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Secret; Eyes Only. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85–00664R. |

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| 278J | Memorandum from Allen W. Dulles to CIA Director McCone, February 15. IG's survey of the Cuban operation. 3 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85–00664R. |
| 278K | Letter from CIA Director McCone to Allen W. Dulles, February 19. Survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85–00664R. |
| 279 | Program review by Brigadier General Lansdale, February 20. "The Cuba Project." Top Secret. 26 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62–4/62. |

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| 280 | Memorandum from General Lansdale to the Special Group (Augmented), March 13, 1962. Institutional planning for Operation Mongoose. Top Secret. 15 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 482, Mongoose. |
| 281 | Memorandum from Barnes to Dulles, March 13. Cuban operation, July–September 1960. Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67–01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–June 1962. |

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| 282 | McCone's notes for discussion with Helms and Harvey, March 16. Operation Mongoose. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. |
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April 1962

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| 283 | Memorandum of discussion between Rusk and McCone, April 10. Rusk report on confidential discussion with Brazilian Foreign Minister Dantas concerning Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962. |
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May 1962

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| 284 | Memorandum for the record, May 17. Review of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. |
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June 1962

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| 285 | Memorandum for the record, June 25. Special Group (Augmented) decision on new SNIE on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. |
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July 1962

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| 286 | Notes of Special Group (Augmented) meeting, July 12. Operation Mongoose. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. |
| 287 | Memorandum for the record, July 20. Review of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962. |

August 1962

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| 288 | National Intelligence Estimate No. 85-2-62, August 1. "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba." Secret. 13 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebook, 12 Jan 63. |
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| 289 | Memorandum from William Harvey to McCone, August 8, with attached Operation Plan. Operation Mongoose future course of action. Top Secret. 19 pp. CIA Files: Job 84–00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 841, 7 Aug 62–15 Aug 62. |
| 290 | Memorandum from Harvey to Carter, August 14. Operation Mongoose—assassination of Fidel Castro. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91–00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. |

September 1962

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| 291 | Telegram 72756 from McCone, September 4. Soviet military assistance to Cuba confirmed. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962. |
| 292 | Telegram 73741 from McCone, September 6. Confirmation of nine SAM sites in Cuba; Latin American Ambassadors asked to convene meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers to discuss Cuban developments. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962. |
| 293 | Telegram 18314 to McCone, September 7. Support for frequent reconnaissance missions; develop joint policies for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean and South American states. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights. |
| 294 | Telegram 74587 from McCone, September 8. Twelve SAMs confirmed and MIG–21 cited. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962. |
| 295 | Telegram 19372 to McCone, September 10. Appearance of secrecy measures being deployed in Cuba to cover Soviet offensive capability. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA: Job 80–B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights. |

No.	Document Description
296	Carter diary entry, September 10. Intelligence objectives behind overflights of Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop.
297	Telegram 75341 from McCone, September 11. Exile group attacks two outward bound cargo ships from Cuba; BNE statement re Soviet motivations for MRBM installation. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.
298	Telegram 21493 to McCone, September 13. Release of exiled Cuban prisoners; humanitarian support for Cuba; installation of defensive equipment. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.
299	Carter diary entry, September 14. Special Group (Augmented) meeting on low-level reconnaissance over Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
300	Telegram 23209 to McCone, September 16. Soviet Cuban buildup including possible MRBMs. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.
301	Telegram 77871 from McCone, September 18. Review of SNIE 85-3 regarding Soviet buildup in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.
302	Telegram 78480 from McCone, September 19. Transmits conclusions of SNIE approved by USIB on September 19. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.
303	Telegram 25591 to McCone, September 20. Comments on telegram 78480 transmitting SNIE conclusions. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.

No.	Document Description
304	Memorandum for the file, September 24. Discussion with the Attorney General on proposed Donovan negotiations for release of Cuban exile prisoners held by Castro. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.
305	Memorandum of meeting with the President, September 25. Proposed Donovan negotiations for release of Cuban exile prisoners held by Castro. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.
306	Memorandum of conversation between McCone and Eisenhower, September 26. Proposed Donovan project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.
307	Notes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting, September 27. Mongoose balloon plan; Rostow paper on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 91–00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
308	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Donovan and McCone, September 29. Plans for Donovan mission to Cuba to gain release of Cuban exile prisoners. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

October 1962

309	Memorandum for the record, October 2. Results of Gilpatric meeting at the White House on Cuban trade. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 000.1—092.
310	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 2. Communist bases in Cuba. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
311	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 2. Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Confidential. 8 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

No.	Document Description
312	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 3. Communist infiltration in Cuba. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
313	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 3. Communist infiltration in Cuba. Confidential. 8 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
314	Memorandum from Sloan to Gilpatric, October 8. Release of Cuban prisoners. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA files: FRC 65 A 3591, Cuba 1962, 00.1 (383.6 Cuba).
315	Summary memorandum of discussions with Congressional leaders, October 8. Donovan project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80—B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.
316	Memorandum for the record, October 9. Summaries of meetings with the President and Vice President on the Donovan project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80—B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.
317	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Acting DCI Carter, October 13. Bundy's view of situation involving Donovan project and further responsibilities therefor. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80—B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.
318	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 15. Contingency planning for Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
319	Memorandum for the record by General Carter, October 17. Summary of October 16 NSC meeting with the President re latest U-2 photography indicating deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80—B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.

No.	Document Description
320	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 16. Medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
321	Memorandum from Carter to the Special Group (Augmented), October 16. Operation Mongoose/Sabotage Proposals. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.
322	Memorandum for the record, October 16. Meeting at the White House on Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Memos for the Record.
323	Memorandum of conversation between Carter and Hilsman, October 16. Failure of U.S. intelligence (with the exception of McCone) to predict development of Soviet missiles in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.
324	Paper prepared by Sorensen, October 16. Questions U.S. should be prepared to answer in case Soviet missiles in Cuba cause the United States to initiate an armed attack that might lead to nuclear war. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, 1961–64, Cuba, General, 1962.
325	Memorandum from Dillon to the President, undated. Outlines Dillon's views on need to eliminate offensive weapons from Cuba and course of action to do so. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. III.
326	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 17. Five courses of action proposed at White House meeting evening of October 16. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
327	Gilpatric's handwritten notes of meeting, October 17. Preferred course of action. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.

No.	Document Description
328	Gilpatric's handwritten notes of meeting, October 17. U.S. position on missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.
329	Memorandum for the file, October 17. Conversation between McCone and former President Eisenhower on Cuban developments. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
330	First State Strategic Paper, undated. Possible courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 14 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962.
331	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 18. Courses of action in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
332	Standing Committee Paper, undated. Plan I—Limited one-time Strike against MRBM sites. Top Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, General and Historical Information 8/31/62-10/19/62.
333	Standing Committee Paper, undated. Option II—Blockade. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subjects Files 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, Standing Committee 9/62-10/62.
334	Standing Committee Paper, October 18. Option III—Invasion. Top Secret. 9 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. I.
335	Memorandum by McCone, October 18. Problems the USIB should address at next meeting on possible courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.

No.	Document Description
336	Joint Evaluation prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 18. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (5 Sept–19 Oct 1962).
337	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 19. CJCS summarized previous evening's meeting at the White House on reaction to photographic pictures of Cuban missile sites in Cuba; JCS position for meeting with the President; debrief on morning meeting at the State Department. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
338	Memorandum from McCone to USIB members, October 19. Transmits probable decision among principals to initiate a limited blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–31 December 1962.
339	Handwritten notes of meeting made by McCone, October 19. Possible courses of action in Cuba. No classification marking. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–31 December 1962.
340	Memorandum prepared by McCone, October 19. Actions against the Soviet-Cuban military threat. Top Secret. 6 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–31 December 1962.
341	Paper prepared in the White House, October 19. The defense of Berlin if Cuba is blockaded. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 10/15–23/62.

No.	Document Description
342	Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 19. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (5 Sept–19 Oct 1962).
343	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 20. Various courses of action in response to Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
344	Supplement 1 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 20. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 8 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct–22 Oct 1962).
345	Paper, October 20. I—Air Strike Scenario. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. I.
346	Memorandum of conversation among the President, Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, General Taylor, McCone, October 21. Possible military courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.
347	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 21. Debrief of meetings with the President on possible air strikes against Cuba, President's speech, and blockade of Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
348	Telegram 6830 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Certain Military Commands, October 21. Possible reactions to initiation of blockade operations against Cuba and instructions to review applicable general war plans. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 10/16/62–10/21/62.

No.	Document Description
349	Circular telegram 700 to all Latin American posts, October 21. Instructions for Ambassadors following the President's nationwide TV statement on Soviet offensive nuclear capability in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10–2262.
350	Memorandum of discussion between the President and McCone, October 21. Conclusions of McCone's discussion with former President Eisenhower on military procedures to follow in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.
351	Supplement 2 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 21. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct–22 Oct 1962).
352	Memorandum for the record, November 14. Report on Acheson's mission to Paris, October 22–24. Secret. 21 pp. CIA Files: Job 84–00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A, 29 May 72.
353	Excerpt from Ambassador Bruce's diary, October 21–25. Acheson's meetings in London. No classification marking. 10 pp. DOS, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327.
354	Memorandum for the file, October 22. Briefing of Vice President Johnson on October 21. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.
355	Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, October 22. Possible initiatives and courses of action around the world as the Cuban crisis develops. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961–64, Cuba—Subjects, General & Historical Information, 10/20/62–10/25/62.

No.	Document Description
356	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 22. Briefing by General Carroll (Director DIA) on the MRBM sites in Cuba and U.S. responses to a missile attack. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
357	Memorandum for the record, October 22. Daily White House Staff Meeting on October 22 on Cuban crisis. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.-Nov. 1962.
358	Telegram 6848 from the JCS to CINCLANT, October 22. Instructions to prepare for the blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 10/22/62.
359	Circular telegram 706 to selected ARA diplomatic posts, October 22. Transmits text of letter from President to respective chiefs of state about the U.S. response to the Cuban missile crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-2262.
360	Telegram 1199 from Bonn, October 22. Briefing of Adenauer on Cuban crisis. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.3722/1-2261.
361	Memorandum of conversation between Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Merchant, October 22. Meeting to deliver President's October 22 letter on Cuba. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-262.
362	Telegram 221822Z to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, October 22. Transmits letter from the President to General Norstad explaining U.S. actions in Cuban missile crisis and importance of NATO alliance. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2262.
363	Memorandum from Acting Director of the Office of National Estimates Smith to McCone, October 22. Soviet reaction to certain U.S. moves. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.
364	Telegram from White House Situation Room to the Department of State, October 22. Transmits letter from President to Prime Minister Macmillan for Department's information and action. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UK-Cuba.

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| 365 | Telegram 222308Z from the White House to Rusk, October 22. Transmits text of Macmillan letter to Kennedy re Soviet build up in Cuba to the Department. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10–2262. |
| 366 | Supplement 3 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 22. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct–22 Oct 1962). |

October 23, 1962

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| 367 | Circular telegram 726, October 23. Instructions to meet with highest available official to persuade government to which accredited to take actions to prevent Soviet Bloc military equipment from reaching Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10–2362. |
| 368 | Memorandum for the record, October 23. Daily White House staff meeting, Bundy presiding re handling of crisis actions. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.–Nov. 1962. |
| 369 | Notes from transcripts of JSC meetings, October 23. Low-level reconnaissance; U.S. reaction to possible U–2 shootdown; blockade of Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |
| 370 | Memorandum of meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 23. Intelligence report, blockage, possible military actions, firing on a U–2, air intercept capability, and low-level flights. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01265A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962. |
| 371 | Memorandum for the file, October 23. Meetings with Senators Russell, Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson to notify them of administration policy and get their positions. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01265A, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962. |

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| 372 | Memorandum from Acting Director of the Office of National Estimates Smith to McCone, October 23. Effect on Cuba of a Blockade covering all goods except food and medicines. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62–11/12/62. |
| 373 | List of issues raised at Rostow group meeting, October 23. Strategic guidelines, missile trade-off, offensive nature of missiles in Cuba, Soviet personnel in Cuba, inspection issue, initiative thinking, Cuban objectives, Tobin–Greenfeld paper, systematic review of possible contingencies. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. II. |
| 374 | Memorandum from Katzenbach to Attorney General Kennedy, October 23. Proclamation re Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Misc. Papers Regarding Cuba, 20 Oct.–25 Oct. 1962. |
| 375 | NSC Executive Committee Debriefing, October 23. Blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 75 D 165, NSC Debriefings 1962. |

October 24, 1962

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| 376 | Supplement 4 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 24. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962). |
| 377 | Telegram 987 to Moscow, October 24. Transmits regulation of Secretary McNamara re submarine surfacing and identification procedures used by U.S. quarantine forces in vicinity of Cuba for transmittal to Soviet Government. Unclassified. 2 pp. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 23–24, 1962. |

No.	Document Description
378	Telegram 1205 from Bonn, October 24. Briefing Chancellor on U.S. courses of action in Cuba and Chancellor's reaction. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2462.
379	Memorandum for the record, October 24. Daily White House staff meeting covering Navy preparations for intercepts, Nitze Berlin-NATO Subcommittee, Rostow subcommittee, duty officer assignments. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.–Nov. 1961.
380	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 24. Debrief on ExComm meeting; ship movements; advantages of planes ready at airfields in Florida. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
381	Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, October 24. Report 1 of Planning Subcommittee: Blockade and future planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Planning Subcommittee, 10/62–11/62.
382	Telegram from General Norstad to McGeorge Bundy, October 24. Transmits letter to the President reporting on Norstad's trip to London. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Kennedy, John F.
383	Telegram 1458 from USUN to Rusk, October 24. Message from U Thant to President Kennedy re U Thant message to Khrushchev expressing concern over Soviet ships challenging the U.S. quarantine. Confidential. 2 pp. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 23–24, 1962.
384	Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk and Ball, October 24. Discussion of Cuba in the UN Security Council. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.
385	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, October 24. Briefing information for a call to the President from Macmillan; possible next steps on the political track. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).

No.	Document Description
386	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24. Timing for interception of ships at sea. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
387	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Cleveland and Ball, October 24. Stevenson's position on U.S. statement before the United Nations. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
388	Supplement 5 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 24. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962).
389	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, October 24. Khrushchev message to the President; interception of ships at sea. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
390	Circular telegram 743 to all diplomatic and consular posts, October 24. Guidance for U.S. officials at home and abroad for public and private discussions of Soviet bases in Cuba. Confidential. 13 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2462.
391	Memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Ball, October 24. Response to Khrushchev message; possible interception of tanker at sea on the morning of October 25. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
392	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24. President's concern over challenging ship at sea; possible message for U Thant to give to sent to Khrushchev. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

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| 393 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24. No action planned during night of October 24–25; message to Khrushchev through U Thant. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |
| <i>October 25, 1962</i> | |
| 394 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, October 25. Report on Stevenson's conversation with U Thant on message to Khrushchev to hold off Soviet ships for discussion of situation. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |
| 395 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and McGeorge Bundy, October 25. Response to Khrushchev message. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |
| 396 | CIA memorandum prepared for the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 25. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memos Series, Excom, Vol. I, Mtgs 1–5. |
| 397 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, October 25. Report on first intercept at sea; response to Khrushchev message. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |
| 398 | Memorandum for the record, October 25. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion on Soviet Bloc shipping headed for Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Group, Oct–Nov 1962. |
| 399 | Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 25. Soviet acceptance of quarantine; procedures for boarding ships; reconnaissance flights; air blockade. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |

No.	Document Description
400	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 25. Additional paragraph for response to Khrushchev letter from Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
401	Memorandum from Klein and Legere to McGeorge Bundy, October 25. Meeting of the Nitze subcommittee on Berlin–NATO. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Germany, Berlin.
402	Memorandum from Kitchen to Nitze, October 25, enclosing memorandum from Raymond Garthoff to Rostow. Concern over the course and outcome of the Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 092 Jan—.
403	Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, October 25. Soviet strategy in UN discussions of Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).
404	Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, October 25. Report No. 2 of Advance Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).
405	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 25. Changes in draft message to U Thant. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
406	Paper prepared by Dillon's group, October 25. Scenario for airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Air Strike, Cuba.
407	Paper prepared in the Department of State, October 25. Political path including three political actions for consideration by the Executive Committee. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Action.
408	Executive Committee record of action, October 25. Military situation; political situation; military recommendations, message to U Thant. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1–5.

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| 409 | Memorandum for the record, October 29. Summary of Cooper's activities during his mission to London, October 21–25. No classification marking. 7 pp. CIA Files: Job 84–00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A, 29 May 72. |
| 410 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Cleveland, October 25. Request that Stevenson come to Washington for discussions with the President and Rusk. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |
| 411 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Ball, October 25. Report on Stevenson's planned trip to Washington. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |

October 26, 1962

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| 412 | Supplement 6 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 26. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962). |
| 413 | Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, October 26. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6–10. |
| 414 | Memorandum for the record, October 26. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion on press leaks, boarding of the <i>Marucla</i> , telegram from Lord Russell to the President. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct–Nov 1962. |
| 415 | Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 26. CJCS debrief on meeting at the White House the previous evening; blockade issues; air reconnaissance; MRBMs. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |

No.	Document Description
416	Memorandum for the file, October 26. Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee including intelligence briefings and discussion of operational problems. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
417	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 26. Planning for Cuba, status of quarantine, political measures, negotiation with U Thant. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. I, Meetings 1-6.
418	Rough notes of Rostow committee meeting, October 26. Three courses of U.S. action—political, military, and economic—to pursue concurrently. Top Secret. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.
419	Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, October 26. Khrushchev's conversation with W.E. Knox, President of Westinghouse Electrical International, in Moscow on October 24. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, General, Vol. VI(A), 10/26-27/62.
420	Memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 26. Forward planning thoughts on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, vol. II.
421	Memorandum from Komer to Rostow, October 26. Forward planning on Cuba vs. Cuban MRBMs. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, vol. II.
422	Memorandum from Kitchen to U. Alexis Johnson, October 26. Rostow subcommittee memorandum on negotiation. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Negotiations.
423	Telegram 936 from Rome, October 26. Italian Government position on withdrawal of Jupiter missile installations from Italy. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter—Cuba.

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| 424 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between Nitze and Ball, October 26. U.S. missile installations in Turkey. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |
| 425 | Telegram 587 from Ankara, October 26. Embassy assessment of removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for Soviet removal of missiles in Cuba. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2662. |

October 27, 1962

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| 426 | Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 27. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962). |
| 427 | Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, October 27. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6–10. |
| 428 | Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 27. Briefing by General Carroll and Hughes of DIA; Soviet military personnel in Cuba; OPLANs 312 and 316; U–2 lost over Cuba; President’s message to Khrushchev; Jupiter missiles in Turkey; retaliation for U–2 shot down over Cuba; photographic verification of nuclear weapons in Cuba; reconnaissance. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |
| 429 | NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27. Soviet ships moving toward Cuba, size of quarantine zone, Soviet public statement, draft message to Khrushchev. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meeting, vol. V, Meetings 6–10. |
| 430 | Telegram 1970 from Paris, October 27. De Gaulle position on U.S. actions in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/1–2762. |

No.	Document Description
431	Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, October 27. Report No. 4 of Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV(B).
432	Memorandum of conversation between Georgi Kornienko and Richard H. Davis, October 27. Transmittal of text of letter from Stevenson to Secretary General U Thant re delimitation of "interception area" in the waters around Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 381, Jan-Oct.
433	Memorandum from Kitchen to Nitze, October 27. Transmits memorandum from Raymond Garthoff on Khrushchev's proposal for a Turkey-Cuba trade-off. Secret Attachment. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962.
434	Memorandum prepared by Raymond Garthoff, October 27. The military significance of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2762.
435	Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, October 27. Khrushchev's proposal for trade-off of missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2762.
436	Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to Rusk, October 27. Probable Soviet response to U.S. retaliation against an SAM site. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2762.
437	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27. Reconnaissance missions; message to U Thant; U-2 overflying the USSR; letter from the President to Khrushchev; military planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10.
438	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27. Call up of air reserve squadrons; message for U Thant; calling up U.S. ships and adding POL to list of prohibited goods; message from General Nors-tad; message to Finletter. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10.

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October 28, 1962

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| 439 | Supplement 8 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 28. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962). |
| 440 | Telegram 1234 from Bonn, October 28. Chancellor Adenauer's views on what actions United States should take now. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2861. |
| 441 | Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 28. Request for meeting with the President; MRBM sites operational; Khrushchev message (Moscow radio broadcast) that Soviets will stop building bases and dismantle equipment. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |
| 442 | Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, October 28. Transmits Rostow subcommittee October 27 paper on negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol IV(B). |
| 443 | NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 28. Khrushchev message; blockade; air reconnaissance missions; public statement on Soviet decision to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba; press relations; reply to Khrushchev. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excon Meetings, vol. I, Meetings 6–10. |
| 444 | Debriefing by U. Alexis Johnson, October 28. Current situation in Cuban missile crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 75 D 265, NSC Debriefings 1962. |
| 445 | Telegram 1517 from USUN, October 28. Stevenson and Yost conversation with SYG on situation following latest Khrushchev letter to the President. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2861. |

No.	Document Description
446	Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Alphand, October 28. Latest developments in Cuba including Khrushchev's recent letter. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
447	Telegram 7065 from JCS to CINCLANT, CINCONAD, and CINCSAC, October 28. Instruction not to relax alert procedures despite latest Soviet proposal. Top Secret. 1 p. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 25-31, 1962.
448	Letter from U Thant to the President, October 28, enclosing text of Secretary General's reply to Castro. Comments on President's spirit of cooperation and concern for peace. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.
449	Supplement 9 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 28. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).

October 29, 1962

450	Memorandum for the record, October 29. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion of quarantine developments; Presidential TV statement; Berlin; AID in FY 64; aerial reconnaissance of Cuba by UN; critique of crisis. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct-Nov 1962.
451	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 29. Current intelligence on Cuba; establishment of Coordinating Committee; quarantine and aerial reconnaissance; air reserves call-up; UN arrangements for verification; agenda for new Coordinating Committee. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16.

No.	Document Description
452	Memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 29. Report on Planning Group meeting and proposal for a U.S.-Soviet summit. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. I.
453	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 29. Jupiter missile deal; UN inspection and surveillance; U.S. readiness posture. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
454	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Rusk, October 29. Quarantine inspection at sea; UN weapon inspections in Cuba; disarmament. No classification marking. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, (McN Working Papers)
455	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 29. UN developments; IRC inspections; on-site inspections; lifting of U.S. quarantine; inspection system; political developments. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11–16.
456	Telegram 909 from Rio de Janeiro, October 29. General Albino to visit to Havana to talk with Castro. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10–2962.
457	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, October 29. Post mortem on Cuba. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. IV(B).

October 30, 1962

458	Memorandum for the record, October 30. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion of aerial surveillance; communications with Latin America; Executive order on shipping restrictions to Cuba; press leaks; press speculation re intelligence gathering; Cuban exiles; Adenauer visit; Nitze Subcommittee. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Box 25, Chairman's Staff Meetings.
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No.	Document Description
459	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 30. Current intelligence; U-1 flights; press restrictions; Executive order on Cuban shipping; Cuban exiles. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16.
460	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 30. Briefing by DIA re October 29 photography of missile sites in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
461	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, October 30. Points to consider in current negotiations on the removal of Soviet offensive capabilities from Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, OASD/ISA Files; FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 381 Jan-Oct.
462	Memorandum from McCone to the Attorney General, McNamara, Rusk, and General Taylor, October 30. Information on intelligence collecting infiltration and guerrilla warfare teams. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62.
463	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, October 30. Guarantees from Cuba with respect to subversive activities. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-3062.
464	List of Outstanding Issues prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, October 30. List covers: theory of operation; short-term verification requirements; long-term verification requirements; political arrangements. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV(b).

October 31, 1962

- 465 Memorandum Prepared for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 31. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 8 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6-11.

No.	Document Description
466	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 31. DIA briefing on latest photographs; State instructions for UN negotiations; reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
467	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 31. Inspection procedures; President's press conference; draft instructions to UN Mission; reconnaissance missions; quarantine. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11–16.
468	Memorandum of conversation between Llewellyn Thompson and Zhukov, October 31. Summit meeting; Soviet Cuban policy; quarantine; verification measures; Indian-Chinese dispute; test ban treaty. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. IV(B).
469	Circular telegram 807, October 31. U Thant discussions with Castro re verification measures. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10–3162.
470	Memorandum from Stevenson to McCloy, Ball, and Gilpatric, October 31. Next steps in Cuban crisis. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.
471	Telegram 1153 to USUN, October 31. Instructions for New York negotiations on Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Department of Defense, OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct 25–31, 1962.
472	Memorandum prepared by McCone, October 31. A history of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba with a September 11 attachment entitled "Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba." Top Secret. 11 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01258A, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 September–31 December 1962.
473	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 31. U Thant-Castro talks; aerial surveillance; quarantine; USIA broadcasts to Cuba; discussions with Russian officials. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11–16.

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| 474 | Memorandum of meeting of NSC Executive Committee, October 31. Report of photographic evidence of movement of missiles in Cuba; discussion in New York. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-31 December 1962. |
| <i>November 1962</i> | |
| 475 | Telegram 1585 from USUN, November 1. Summary of U Thant's preliminary report of his visit to Cuba. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Psalm Documents. |
| 476 | Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, November 1. Cuban Crisis Negotiations: the situation in Cuba; Soviet Bloc shipping to Cuba; 2 annexes. Top Secret. 13 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6-11. |
| 477 | Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, November 1. Debrief of Executive Committee meeting November 1; reconnaissance flights; preparations for operation against Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |
| 478 | Telegram 1606 from USUN, November 2. Encloses text of letter and enclosure Stevenson sent to Mikoyan re U.S. list of offensive weapons. Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963. |
| 479 | Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, November 2. The situation in Cuba; Bloc developments; Bloc military status; Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba; and one annex. Top Secret. 9 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6-11. |
| 480 | Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, November 2. Situation in light of Mikoyan talks and Castro speech. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Actions. |

No.	Document Description
481	Telegram 1177 to USUN, November 2. Transmits questions to clarify in conversations with the Soviets. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84–84–001, Incoming Telegrams, 1953–1963.
482	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Gilpatric, November 3. Status of IL–28s in Cuba; planned high-level flights over national waters. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
483	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and McCloy, November 3. Status of IL–28s in Cuba; notification to Soviets of unacceptable IL–28 activity in Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
484	Memorandum from General Joseph Carroll to McNamara, General Taylor, and the Director of the Joint Staff, November 3. Status of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.
485	Memorandum for the record, November 3. NSC Executive Committee meeting including discussion of hidden missiles in Cuba; Cuban SAM program; effect of quarantine; overflight program; inspection arrangements; no invasion guarantee. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B1258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.
486	NSC Executive Committee record of actions, November 3. Low-level sorties over Cuba; inspection arrangements. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17–24.
487	Draft instruction to USUN for consideration by the Executive Committee, undated. Inspection arrangements for Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba.

No.	Document Description
488	Memorandum from Llewellyn E. Thompson to Rusk, November 3. Notes of a conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson on November 3 re verification arrangements. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II.
489	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 3. Presidential instruction on present negotiations on Cuba; progress on inspection negotiations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.
490	Memorandum from Cline to McCone, November 3. Time factors in construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962.
491	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 5. Aerial reconnaissance missions; McCloy-Kuznetsov discussions at UN. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.
492	Memorandum of NSC Executive Committee meeting by McCone, November 5. Overflights of Cuba; inspection procedures; reciprocal UN inspections. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, Box 6, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
493	Paper by George B. McManus, November 5. Demise of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
494	Telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5. Guidance for procedures for adequate verification that USSR has removed offensive equipment from Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-562.
495	Draft letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev, November 5, enclosing draft telegram to USUN. List of weapons in Cuba that the United States considers to be offensive. Secret. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Subjects File, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62.

No.	Document Description
496	Memorandum from McNaughton to Nitze, November 5. U.S. “anti-invasion” guarantee in the Cuban settlement. Top Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical Files, Cuba, November 1962.
497	Memorandum from Forrestal to Bundy, November 5. Comments on Presidential instructions on Cuban negotiations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. V(A).
498	Telegram 1642 from USUN, November 6. Report of 3½ hour meeting Stevenson and McCloy had with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich. Secret. 4 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84–84–001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953–1963.
499	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 6. Approved letter to Khrushchev; IL–28 bombers; broadcasts to Cuba; air reconnaissance mission; refugee reports on Soviet missiles hidden in Cuban caves. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17–24.
500	Memorandum of telephone conversation among Gilpatric, Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, November 6. Preparations for meeting with Kuznetsov: SAM activations; aerial inspection; IL–28s; verification; re-introduction of arms assurance. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
501	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings; November 7. General Wheeler visit to Army units in the field; briefing by DIA; reconnaissance; OPLAN 316. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
502	Memorandum for the record, November 7. Briefing of former President Eisenhower at Gettysburg on Cuban developments. Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

No.	Document Description
503	Memorandum from Nitze to the NSC Executive Committee, November 7. Suggested course of action if a U.S. surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961–64, Cuba—Subjects, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62–11/23/62.
504	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, November 7. Recommended U.S. reaction to hostile attack of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962.
505	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 7. Current intelligence; Naval checking of Soviet ships; reconnaissance missions; surveillance; unresolved issues. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17–24.
506	Telegram 1684 from USUN, November 8. Report on meeting between Yost and Wellborn and Morozov and Mendelevich to clarify aspects of alongside inspection of outgoing Soviet vessels and ICRC procedures. Top Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84–84–001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (TS, Exdis, etc.)
507	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 8. Press release; long-term surveillance requirements; courses of action in event a U.S. reconnaissance plane is shot or destroyed; ways to keep pressure on Castro; aerial reconnaissance mission. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17–24.
508	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, November 8, covering a memorandum from Hurwitch to Martin. Approach to Castro through Carlos Lechuga. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–862.
509	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 9. Surveillance requirements. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

No.	Document Description
510	Telegram 1703 from USUN, November 9. Meeting between Ruegger and Borsinger (ICRC) and McCloy and Yost re Cuban consent to proposed inspection operation. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–962.
511	Telegram 1709 from USUN, November 9. Kuznetsov allegations that three Soviet ships sailing from Cuba to USSR were improperly searched by U.S. vessels. Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84–84–001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953–1963.
512	Telegram 1710 from USUN, November 9. Report of follow-on conversation between McCloy and Kuznetsov based on telephone conversation between McCloy and Gilpatric re Kuznetsov allegations that U.S. vessels improperly searched Soviet ships. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84–84–001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953–1963.
513	Memorandum for the record, November 13. Record of November 10 meeting between Rusk and McCone re the future of Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.
514	Memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, November 10. Recent Cuban developments: analysis of low-altitude photography and verification of cargoes on Soviet ships. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62–11/12/62.
515	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 12. Blockade; disengaging Soviets from Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
516	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 12. U.S. forces state of readiness; current intelligence summary; political situation; negotiations with Russians at UN; form of assurance against U.S. invasion of Cuba; reliability of refugee reports; arrangements to ensure that Soviet offensive weapons cannot be secretly introduced into Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NFS, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17–24.

No.	Document Description
517	Memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, November 12. Suggested DOD position on Ball memoranda to the President. Top Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962.
518	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, November 12. Draft of proposed statement prepared for UN Security Council re "no-invasion" guarantee with respect to Cuba in the event the IL-28s are removed and satisfactory on-ground verification is achieved. Top Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI(A).
519	Memorandum of Executive Committee meeting by McCone, November 12. Military equipment in Cuba; aerial surveillance; Cuban refugee report re number of missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1961.
520	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 12. Khrushchev's reply to Kennedy November 6 letter; safeguards against offensive weapons in Cuba; aerial reconnaissance missions for November 13. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NFS, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 25-32A.
521	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, November 13. Chief JCS debriefing of November 12 and 13 Executive Committee meetings; UN negotiations; courses of action in Cuba crisis; Khrushchev's letter. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
522	Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk and Ball, November 13, enclosing a draft Cuban contingency paper. Courses of action if Soviets stall on removal of IL-28s from Cuba. Top Secret. 13 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Psalm Documents.
523	Memorandum for McNamara, November 13. Quarantine operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files, Black Book, Cuba, Vol. III.

No.	Document Description
524	Memorandum for the record, November 13, prepared by Colonel Julian J. Ewell, covering a JCS paper entitled "Assessment of Increased Conventional Military Capabilities of Cuban and Soviet Units in Cuba." Secret. 10 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.
525	Telegram 1762 from USUN, November 13. Summary of 4-hour conversation between U.S. and Soviet negotiators on UN inspection and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11–1362.
526	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Gilpatric and Ball, November 14. Status of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on UN inspection and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. No classification marking. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272.
527	DOD/ISA draft paper, November 14. "Some Lessons From Cuba." Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI (A).
528	Telegram 1781 from USUN, November 14. Status of present U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1462.
529	Memorandum for the NSC Executive Committee from Nitze, November 14. Relationship of Cuban objectives to present decisions. Top Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).
530	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 15. Talking paper for discussion with the President. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
531	Telegram 1795 from USUN, November 15. Mission comments on UN working paper on safeguards and verification. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.663.61/11–1562.
532	Telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. Transmits verbatim text of Soviet and Cuban proposed protocol. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11–1562.

No.	Document Description
533	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 16. Aerial surveillance; status of UN negotiations; long-term verification; policy re invasion of Cuba; daily aerial reconnaissance; courses of action in event surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25–32A.
534	Memorandum of meeting of Executive Committee of the NSC by McCone, November 16. Discussion of intelligence briefing by McCone; report on recent communications by Rusk; removal of IL–28s; high-level reconnaissance flights; Soviet military strength in Cuba; and four actions for CIA. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.
535	Telegram 1288 to USUN, November 16. Comments on UN working paper on safeguards and verification. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1662.
536	Telegram 1833 from USUN, November 16. Report of Yost meeting with SYG on U.S. difficulties with UN working paper: verification of withdrawal, safeguards against introduction of nuclear weapons, and assurances against invasion. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1662.
537	Telegram 1835 from USUN, November 16. Proposed text of letter and draft declaration for early submission to Soviets at UN in effort to move toward agreement on all outstanding points. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1662.
538	Memorandum from J.J. Ewell to General Taylor, November 16, covering a draft memorandum for the President in response to a request for further information on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.
539	Letter from Rusk to McCloy, November 17. Guidance for McCloy's meeting with Kuznetsov on November 18. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1762.

No.	Document Description
540	CIA memorandum prepared for the Executive Committee of the NSC, November 19. The situation in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA—Cuba.
541	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 19. Summary of weekend intelligence; McCloy-Kuznetsov latest talk; high-level reconnaissance flights; Presidential press statements; review of political and military actions. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25–32A.
542	Telegram 2645 to Paris; 1203 to Bonn, November 19. Transmits text of personal message from Kennedy to de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
543	Memorandum for members of the NSC Executive Committee from Brubeck, November 19. Transmits three INR papers entitled: “Soviet-Cuban Reactions to U.S. Retaliation for Attack on U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft”; “Prospects for Overthrowing Castro From Within”; and “Negotiations on Cuba: The Advantages of Stalemate.” Secret. 18 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926 Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).
544	Cuba Contingency Plan, November 20. Consisting of three parts: “Advice to NATO and OAS Governments regarding possible Cuban developments and U.S. action”; “Overflights and responses”; “Additional steps to be taken in the event IL–28s not removed.” Top Secret. 13 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Vol. VI (B), 11/16/72–11/20/62.
545	Telegram 1862 from USUN, November 19. Probable course negotiations with USSR will take to wind up current Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–1962.
546	Telegram 1865 from USUN, November 19. Concerns on draft Presidential statement forwarded to Stevenson by Johnson on November 17. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 373.56361/11–1962.

No.	Document Description
547	Memorandum of meeting of the NSC Executive Committee by McCone, November 19. Cuban contingency plan of November 19; proposed messages to de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan; proposed resolution to OAS; President's press conference. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A.
548	Telegram Polto 577 from Paris, November 20. Report on Ball presentation on Cuba situation to the NAC. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-2062.
549	Memorandum for the record, November 21. Daily White House staff meeting: Public opinion on Cuba; Latin Americans position re Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Group, Oct-Nov 1962.
550	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 21. UN negotiations with the Russians; aerial reconnaissance plan. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32A.
551	Memorandum for the record, November 21. Report of telephone call to Kuznetsov from McCloy re draft of proposed U.S. declaration assuring against the invasion of Cuba. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, IA, October/November Meetings.
552	Letter from McCone to McGeorge Bundy, November 22. Non-invasion of Cuba pledge. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI (B), 11/21/62-11/30/62.
553	Memorandum from Cleveland to Ball, November 22. Transmits three drafts of the two main versions of the non-invasion pledge still under discussion. Top Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, General, Cuba, Vol. VI (B), 11/21/62-11/30/62.
554	Memorandum from Sorensen to President Kennedy, November 22. Wrapping up the Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961-64, Cuba-Subjects, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62-11/23/62.

No.	Document Description
555	Telegram 1942 from USUN, November 25. Kuznetsov-McCloy telephone conversation re Soviet questions about proposed U.S. declaration. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–2562.
556	Telegram 1953 from USUN, November 26. Reports on meeting with Secretary General about latest Cuban developments. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF 737.56361/11–2662.
557	Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 28. U.S.-Soviet meeting re U.S. draft declaration. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/1–2862.
558	Letter from Henry S. Rowen to Fred S. Hoffman, November 28. Expresses appreciation for Rand Corporation's quick response to DOD request for estimation of the threat posed by Soviet IRBMs if stationed in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962.
559	Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, November 29. Bloc military forces; bloc shipping to and from Cuba; Cuban internal situation; Soviet position. Top Secret. 7 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 60 D 438, OA—Cuba.
560	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 29. Refugee reports of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba; New York discussions with Mikoyan; longer-range plan to keep pressure on Castro; overflights of Cuba; press interest in post-mortem of Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25–32A, 11/12/62–12/4/62.
<i>December 1962</i>	
561	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, December 2. Refutation of Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson's dissension from the Executive Committee consensus. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba 1961–1963.
562	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Ball, December 3. Request by McCloy to wrap up negotiations with Kuznetsov. No classification marking. 1 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

No.	Document Description
563	Memorandum of meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC by McCone, December 3. Stevenson's report on the three areas of disagreement with the Soviets, and McCone's expression of concern over Soviet conduct in Cuba to the President at a later meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
564	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, December 3. Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, 1961-1963.
565	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Ball, December 3. McCloy report of 5-½ hour conversation with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelovich. No classification marking. 5 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
566	Telegram 2104 from USUN, December 4. Transmits verbatim text of Cuban draft declaration. Secret. 5 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC: 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.
567	Telegram 2106 from USUN, December 4. Report of afternoon meeting with Soviets. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-462.
568	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, December 5. Letter from the President to Stevenson as possible solution to the Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.
569	Letter from the President to Stevenson, December 5. Expresses regret over statements in the press by Alsop and Bartlett and support for Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. Princeton University, Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, John F. Kennedy.
570	Memorandum of Executive Committee meeting by McCone, December 6. Intelligence briefing; Mikoyan visit to Cuba; UN negotiations; U.S. actions in event of Cuba-supported insurgency or civil war in Cuba; position paper. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.

No.	Document Description
571	Telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6. Transmits modifications in U.S. draft statement on Cuba for presentation to Soviet negotiators. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF 737.56361/12–662.
572	Telegram 1512 to USUN, December 6. Transmits draft U.S. statement on Cuba for presentation in Security Council. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12–662.
573	Memorandum from Bromley Smith to members of the NSC Executive Committee, December 6, covering an FBI report on Mikoyan's briefing of the Soviet delegation in New York. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, NSC Executive Committee.
574	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, December 6. Outcome of President's letter of support to Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.
575	Draft telegram to USUN, December 6. Instructions for negotiations with the Soviets. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12–662.
576	Memorandum from Gilpatric to the Secretary of the Army, December 8. Future plans for Cuban Volunteer Inductee Program. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 72 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program.
577	NSC Executive Committee record of action, December 10. UN negotiations on Cuba; broadcasts by Cuban refugees. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meeting, Vol. III, 33–37, 12/6/62–12/17/62.
578	Telegram 2291 from USUN, December 12. Transmits changes to shorten the draft text before submitting joint report to Kuznetsov. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12–1262.
579	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, December 17. Planning for contingencies of uprisings within Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (A), 12/62.

No.	Document Description
580	Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk, December 18. New Soviet proposal for settlement of Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/12-1862.
581	Telegram 2416 from USUN, December 19. Discussion of Soviet proposal at luncheon at Soviet Mission. Secret. USUN Files: NYFRC: 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings.
582	Note from General Clifton to General McHugh, December 20. Transmits McCone's request that the President see the attached memorandum. Rising world sugar prices and the effect on Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. III.
583	Memorandum from General Taylor to McNamara, December 26. Reassessment of the alert posture for forces committed to Cuban operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962.
584	Memorandum from L.J. Legere to McGeorge Bundy, December 28. Alert posture for forces committed to Cuban operations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (A), 12/62.
585	Telegram 2541 from USUN, December 31. U.S.-Soviet discussion on latest Cuban developments including U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.5661/12-3162.

January 1963

586	Telegram 2558 from USUN, January 2. Transmits verbatim text of Soviet letter to UN Secretary General. Confidential. 3 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.
587	Telegram 2587 from USUN, January 4. U.S.-Soviet discussion on U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. 3 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.
588	Telegram 2600 from USUN, January 4. Confirmation of changes made in U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.

No.	Document Description
589	Memorandum of telephone conversation among, Rusk, Ball, and U. Alexis Johnson, January 5. Release and transport of prisoners and Americans in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
590	Telegram 2617 from USUN, January 5. Arrangements for signature of U.S. draft of joint letter. Confidential. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.
591	Memorandum for the record, January 7. Meeting between McCone and James B. Donovan re outstanding issues in Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-01258A, Box 2, Memos for Record.
592	Memorandum for the record, January 9. Leadership meeting on January 8. Attached DCI Briefing on latest overview of Cuban developments. Top Secret. 5 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings With the President, 1 January–31 March 1963.
593	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, January 9. Briefing memorandum for Kuznetsov's call on the President January 9. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 033.1161/1-963.
594	Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Kuznetsov and other U.S. and Soviet officials, January 10. U.S.-Soviet relations. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
595	Memorandum for the record, January 12. Discussion during a meeting with the President of Cuban aerial reconnaissance. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January–31 March, 1963.
596	Memorandum from McCone to McGeorge Bundy, January 15. McCone's views on surveillance of the Soviet ship <i>Simferopol</i> . Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. III.

No.	Document Description
597	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 15. Progress report of Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs: Pan American/Prisoner exchange package; the Brigade; future policy toward Cuba; press interest. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
598	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 17. Progress report of the Cuban Coordinating Committee: the Brigade; the Miami Office; OAS resolutions. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
599	CIA Current Support Brief, January 19. "The Cuban Economy in 1961 and 1962 and Prospects for 1963 through 1965." Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label.
600	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 21. Transmits three draft papers of the Cuban Coordinating Committee for use by the Executive Committee. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
601	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy, January 21. Topics for President's discussion before NSC at January 22 meeting including President's personal judgment of the events in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 508, 1/22/63.
602	Talking Paper for the Chairman of the JCS, January 24. Papers for NSC Executive Committee meeting on January 25: U.S. policy toward Cuba, the use of the OAS, U.S. policy toward the Cuban Brigade. Top Secret. 5 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, NSC Actions, 19 Nov. 62-28 Feb. 63.
603	Memorandum from Cottrell to the NSC Executive Committee, January 25. Future of the Cuban Brigade. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/1-2463.
604	Memorandum from Cottrell to the NSC Executive Committee, January 25. Current problems concerning Cuba. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 737.00/1-2463.

No.	Document Description
605	Memorandum from Helms to Cottrell, undated. Reaction in the Cuban exile community and Brigade to the Attorney General's no air support statements. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/1–2563.
606	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 28. Latest developments at the Department of State on Cuba: Donovan's trip to Cuba, the Brigade, intelligence problems, Cuban Coordinating Committee meetings. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
607	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 30. Latest developments in Cuba situation: the Brigade, psychological program, planning, meetings. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
608	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, January 30. Cuba shipping. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220.
<i>February 1963</i>	
609	Memorandum from McCone to General Taylor, February 1. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Memos for the Record, Box 2.
610	Circular telegram 1365 to all Latin American diplomatic posts, February 5. Message over U.S. concern over Cuban shipping question to convey to host government officials. Confidential. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense Cable Files, Cuba, 1963.
611	Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to McNamara, February 5. Cuba shipping restrictions. Confidential. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, Foreign Policy History Files: FRC 330277–131, Chron File—Cuban Affairs.
612	Report prepared for the Executive Committee, February 5. Soviet Forces in Cuba. Top Secret. 12 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. IV, 34–42.

No.	Document Description
613	Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence, February 6. Current status of Soviet military forces and equipment in Cuba. No classification marking. 9 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.
614	Memorandum for record, February 6. Meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC re Cuban situation including overflights, incoming Soviet ship. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963.
615	Memorandum from President Kennedy to McNamara, February 11. Request for views on reconnaissance flight instructions. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 1896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963.
616	Memorandum for the record, February 14. Daily White House staff meeting: Soviet troops in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Feb 1963.
617	Aide-Mémoire from the Soviet Government to the U.S. Government, February 18. Notification of Soviet withdrawal from Cuba of several thousand Soviet personnel before the middle of March. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, General, 1/63-3/63.
618	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, February 18. Cuban Coordinating Committee progress report: contingency planning, the Brigade, American prisoners, Cuban subversive training of Latin Americans, action in the UN. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII(B), 2/63.
619	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to General Taylor, February 19. Transmits the President's request for ways and means to shorten the 18-day lead time in contingency planning for an invasion of Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. VII(B), 2/63.

No.	Document Description
620	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Hilsman and Ball, February 20. Numbers of weapons in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
621	Memorandum for the U.S. Intelligence Board, February 21. Transmits approved report entitled "Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba." Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963.
622	Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 85–2–63, February 21. "Reactions to U.S. Low-level Overflights of Cuba." Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.
623	Memorandum from McCone, February 27. Transmits background paper on U–2 overflights of Cuba from August 29 to October 14, 1962. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis, Miscellaneous.
624	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, February 26. Progress report of the Cuban Coordinating Committee. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B) 2/63.
625	Memorandum of discussion among McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson and McCone, February 28. Situation in Cuba and U.S. long-range plans for dealing with Castro and the Soviet presence in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2.

March 1963

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| 626 | Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McCone, March 6. State Department changes to McCone's February 27 memorandum on U–2 overflights of Cuba, August 29–October 14, 1962. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV. |
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No.	Document Description
627	Memorandum from McCone to U. Alexis Johnson, March 7. Reply to the State Department's memorandum commenting on McCone's February 27 memorandum on U-2 overflights of Cuba, August 29–October 14, 1962. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.
628	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 9. U.S. air surveillance of Cuba. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL 31–1 CUBA–US.
629	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the National Security Council, March 11. Background material for March 13 meeting of the NSC. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509.
630	Telegram 2241 from Moscow, March 11. Report on conversation between Trevelyan and Khrushchev concerning concessions Soviets made to the United States in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 17–1 UK–USSR.
631	Memorandum for the record, March 13. Discussion between McCone and the President on latter's final meeting with the Stennis Committee on criticisms directed toward the CIA during the Cuban missile crisis. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January–31 March 1963.
632	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, March 13. McCone's report on Cuban intelligence prior to the October crisis. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 38, Miscellaneous.
633	Telegram 2321 from Moscow, March 17. Meeting between Kuznetsov and Kohler re President's private communication to Khrushchev. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL CUBA–USSR.
634	Memorandum from FitzGerald to McCone, March 19. Outline of a program to exacerbate and stimulate disaffection in the Cuban Armed Forces. Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 91–00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.

No.	Document Description
635	Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, March 27. "Soviet Response to Two Attacks on Their Freighters Off Cuba." Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exiles—3/63.
636	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 27. Cuba Coordinating Committee. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, VII CC, 3/63.
637	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 27. Secret raid by L-66 exile group. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
638	Telegram 2422 from Moscow, March 27. Transmits text of note from Soviet Government re attack on Soviet cargo vessel in Cuban port. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
639	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 28. Activist exile groups. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
640	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 29. Cuba Coordinating Committee—latest developments. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII CC, 3/63.
641	Current Intelligence Memorandum, March 29. Movement of SAM launch sites in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV.

April 1963

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| 642 | Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 1. Transmits memorandum from Hurwitsch to the Attorney General on actions and recommendations to prevent pin-prick raids against Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 30-2 CUBA. |
| 643 | Memorandum from Gordon Chase to Dungan, April 2. Cuban exiles. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exiles 4/63. |

No.	Document Description
644	Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group, April 2. Propaganda inciting Cubans within Cuba to attack Soviet troops. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General Vol. VIII (A), 4/1–4/20/63.
645	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 3. Alpha 66 raid of March 17–18; the press conference held by Cubans in Washington; the San Jose Conference. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
646	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Greenfield, April 3. Report out of La Paz on a conversation between Donovan and Castro, which would lead to coexistence between Castro and the United States if Castro met certain conditions. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
647	Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, April 5. Analysis of possible causes and motives behind Khrushchev's message passed to the Attorney General on April 3. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US–USSR Files, 1963.
648	Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, April 6. Memorandum of conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson, April 6. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US–USSR Files, 1963.
649	Memorandum for the record by McCone, April 10. Executive Committee of the NSC meeting including: Donovan negotiations; aerial surveillance. 3 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI McCone Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April–30 June 1963.
650	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, April 11. U–2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—.

No.	Document Description
651	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 12. Time to begin long-range planning aspects for Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group, 4/63–5/63.
652	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, April 13. Miro Cardona statement. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba II.
653	Memorandum for the record by L.J. Legere, April 15. Daily White House staff meeting, including: Miro Cardona statement. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, March–April 1963.
654	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, April 17. Rusk's speech before American Society of Newspaper Editors; Miro resignation; support to CRC. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (D), 4/1–4/20/63.
655	Paper prepared by the CIA, April 17. "Prospects for and Limitations of a Maximum Covert Action Program Against the Castro Communist Regime." Top Secret. 11 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0131, Book I—Special Group.
656	Memorandum from Sherman Kent to McCone, April 19. Comments on proposed new covert policy and program toward Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 91–00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.
657	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, April 19. Low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
658	Memorandum from Hurwitch to the NSC Standing Group, April 19. Special Report on Cuba for meeting of April 23. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).

No.	Document Description
659	Annex 3 to printed Document 320, revised April 18. Current Situation: Internal Economic Situation; Internal Political Situation; Soviet Forces in Cuba. Secret. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
660	Annex 6 to printed Document 320, undated. Economic Restrictions: Shipping; Civil Aviation Trade; Strategic Commodities. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
661	Annex 7 to printed Document 320, undated. Exile Problems: The Cuban Revolutionary Council and Dr. Miro Cardona; Alpha 66 and Similar Pin-Pricked Raids; The Cuban Brigade; Resettlement of Cuban Exiles. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
662	Tab 7 to printed Document 320, undated. Military Contingency Planning—CINCLANT OPLANS for Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
663	Research memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, April 19. Effects of loss of Cuban sugar on free world sugar market. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 50, Cuba—Standing Group.
664	Memorandum from FitzGerald to McCone, April 22. Effects of the curtailment of exile hit and run raids. Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.
665	Memorandum from Kent to McCone, April 22. CIA Office of National Estimates study entitled "Cuba a Year Hence." Secret. 17 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
666	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Martin and Ball, April 24. President's concern about the Cuban Revolutionary Council. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

No.	Document Description
667	Memorandum from McNamara to the Chairman of the JCS, April 24, enclosing revision of DOD–State paper entitled “U–2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans.” Top Secret. 11 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1903, 000.1—.
668	Paper prepared by Joseph Califano, April 25. Covert intelligence collection, hit and run raids, sabotage, and resistance activities. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0131, Sabotage/Destruction.
669	Memorandum from McCone to the Special Group, April 25. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April–30 June 1963.
670	Memorandum prepared by McCone, April 25. Cuban Policy: Various aspects of the Cuban problem and discussion at Standing Group. Secret. 12 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
<i>May 1963</i>	
671	Memorandum from Helms to McCone, May 1. Interview of U.S. newswoman with Castro indicating possible interest in rapprochement with the United States. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
672	Memorandum from Cottrell to Martin, May 2. Lisa Howard’s interview with Castro. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 15–1 CUBA.
673	Memorandum from the Deputy Director of USIA to McGeorge Bundy, May 4, advocating that a high-U.S. Government official make a statement expressing U.S. views of post-Castro Cuba and enclosing proposed statement. Confidential. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63.
674	Paper prepared by the CIA, May 6. “Cuban Supply and Demand of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products.” Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.

No.	Document Description
675	Paper prepared by the CIA, undated. List of additional covert actions against Cuba. Secret. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.
676	Memorandum from General Taylor to McNamara, May 10. U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Miscellaneous 63-65.
677	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Brubeck, May 15. U-2 flights, Cuba—contingency plans. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights, Contingency Plans.
678	Memorandum for the record prepared by McCone, May 15. Review with Rusk about the Castro trip to Moscow. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memoranda for the Record.
679	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, May 24. Lifting of the NOTAM over Cuba and non-resumption of PanAm Flights to Havana. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Lifting of NOTAM re Cuba, 5/63-6/63.
680	Memorandum from Joseph Califano to Vance, May 27. Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, which discussed U.S. policy on Cuban exiles in the United States. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files.
681	Memorandum from Bromley Smith to the NSC Standing Group, May 27. Transmits paper entitled "The World Price of Sugar." Secret. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group, 5/28/63.
682	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, May 27, enclosing a memorandum entitled "Possible Soviet Initiatives To End U.S. Aerial Reconnaissance Over Cuba." Top Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.

No.	Document Description
683	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, May 28. U.S. policy toward exile unity and enclosing a May 22 statement by Edwin Martin before a Senate Subcommittee on the same subject. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 5/63–6/63.
684	Memorandum from Kent to McCone, May 29. Implications of Castro's visit to the Soviet Union. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
<i>June 1963</i>	
685	Memorandum from Helms to McCone, June 5. Reported desire of the Cuban Government for rapprochement with the United States. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
686	Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group, undated. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. Secret. 7 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–131, Misc. 63, 64, 65.
687	National Intelligence Estimate 85–63, June 14. "Situation and Prospects in Cuba." Secret. 19 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.
688	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, June 15. U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 38/1–35752/63 15 June 63.
689	Diplomatic note from the Czech Ambassador to Rusk, June 24, transmitting a note of protest from the Cuban Government to the U.S. Government. No classification marking. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63–8/63.
690	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kaysen and Ball, June 24. U–2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba in response to Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

No.	Document Description
691	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, June 24. U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba in response to Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
692	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kaysen and Ball, June 24. U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
693	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCone and Ball, June 25. Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
694	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ed Martin and Ball, June 25. Response to the Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

July 1963

695	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 2. Recent events in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.
696	Memorandum of conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, July 3. Travel restrictions to Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
697	Memorandum from Bromley Smith to the NSC Standing Group, July 9. Transmits paper prepared by the Department of Agriculture entitled "Contingent Plan for Increasing World Production of Sugar." Confidential. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.
698	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 12. Progress report on Cuba including reply to Cuban note on overflights; Cuban refugees in Miami; Kennedy doctrine. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.

No.	Document Description
699	Proposed statement, July 12. U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.
700	Proposed statement by President Kennedy on July 26, undated. U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. Confidential. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.
701	Memorandum prepared by McGeorge Bundy, July 16. NSC record of actions at July 16 meeting. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.
702	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, July 22. U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive, 1963, 000.1—.
703	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 23, 1963. Cuban protest note; free world shipping to Cuba. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.

August 1963

704	Memorandum from General LeMay to McNamara, August 1, with two appendices. U.S. action in event of Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships. Top Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1963, Rules of Engagement.
705	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, August 9. Pending Cuban items: expropriation of American Embassy in Havana; reply to Cuban note on overflights; American students in Cuba; the Cuban amendment; contingency planning for further Cuban immigration. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. XI (A), 8/63.
706	Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group, August 12. 3 pages of source text not declassified. Secret. WNRC, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 131, Book II—Special Group.

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September 1963

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| 707 | Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, September 1963. Exile raids—extent of knowledge within the Executive branch. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63–9/63. |
| 708 | Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to McCone, September 17. 4 pages of source text not declassified. Secret. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63–9/63. |
| 709 | Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, September 19. Cuba and the IMF. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. XI (B), 9/63. |
| 710 | Memorandum from McCone to the Chairman of COMOR, September 27. High-level photographic coverage of Cuba. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963. |

October 1963

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| 711 | Memorandum from Colonel Haig to Vance, October 2. Meeting of the NSC Standing Group: the situation in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–131, Misc. 63, 64, 65. |
| 712 | Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, October 4. Highlights of Chase's visit to Guantanamo Base October 1–2. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, Guantanamo Base, 8/16/63–10/4/63. |
| 713 | Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, October 21. Reappraisal of previous proposals for support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–131, Misc. 63, 64, 65. |
| 714 | Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, October 21. Draft State–Defense contingency plan for a coup in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—. |

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| 715 | Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, October 21. Proposal for air strikes against Cuban targets. Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0131, Sabatoge/Destruction. |
| 716 | Memorandum from General Carroll to McNamara, October 24. Transmits a DIA–CIA assessment of status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963. |
| 717 | Memorandum from J. Larocque to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 25. Transmits information report on interview with Fidel Castro. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files; FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963. |

November 1963

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| 718 | Memorandum for the record, November 14. Minutes of the meeting to review the Cuban program. Secret. 7 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–30 November 1963. |
| 719 | Special National Intelligence Estimate 85–3–63, November 15. “The Effects of Hurricane Flora on Cuba.” Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. |
| 720 | Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, November 29. Cuban contingency planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba, Contingency Planning. |

December 1963

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| 721 | Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, December 2. Transmits talking points for Rusk’s December 2 meeting with President Johnson on Cuba. Top Secret. 9 pp. DOS, S/S Files; Lot 66 D 501, Cuba. |
| 722 | Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, December 2. Attendance at the meeting with President Johnson scheduled that day. Top Secret. 1 p. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63–3/65. |

No.	Document Description
723	Memorandum, December 9. Suggestion for additional administration statements on Cuba to stimulate anti-Castro action on the part of dissident elements in the Cuban Armed Forces. Secret. 3 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Vol. 2.
724	Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson, December 11. Amendment of NSAM 220 governing foreign flag shipping in the Cuba trade. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220.
725	Memorandum prepared in the CIA, December 12. Current U.S. policy with respect to Cuba. Secret. 8 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba Meetings, 12/63–3/65.
726	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, December 12. Possible courses of action in controlling arms shipments between Cuba and Latin America. Secret. 2 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Vol. A (Gordon Chase File), 11/63–5/64.
727	Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, December 12. Transmits paper entitled “Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of the Use of Force)” for discussion at the NSC Standing Group meeting December 13. Top Secret. 11 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U–2 Flights—Contingency Plans.
728	Special report prepared by the CIA, December 13. “Fidel Castro’s Growing Military Power.” Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label.
729	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, December 15. Discussion of further possible measures the U.S. can take against Castro that stop short of invasion and blockade in preparation for the President’s meeting with State, Defense, and CIA officials December 19. Top Secret. 23 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63–3/65.

No.	Document Description
730	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to holders of NSAM 220, December 16. Amendment to NSAM 220 relating to U.S. Government shipments by foreign-flag vessels in the Cuban trade. No classification marking. 1 p. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings 12/63–3/65.
731	Briefing notes prepared for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, December 18. "The Situation in Cuba." Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba Meeting—12/19/63.
732	Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 85–4–63, December 18. "Soviet Transfer of the Surface to Air Missile System to Cuba." Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.
733	Memorandum for the record prepared by General Carter, December 19. Transmits FitzGerald's memorandum for the record of a meeting with President Johnson on Cuba on December 19. Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November–31 December 1963.
734	Memorandum from General Carroll to McNamara, December 20. Transmits a DIA/CIA assessment of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.

American Republics

Bolivia

1. Telegram 430 from La Paz, February 9¹

La Paz, February 9, 1961

Priority.

Re Department's A-62.

Notes to be exchanged 6 p.m. today. FONMIN issuing following communiqué for morning papers.

"Governments of Republic of Bolivia and USA today entered into an agreement whereby US will provide GOB with military equipment, materials, services and other assistance valued at \$1,000,000 for its armed forces. This assistance is for purpose improving capacity armed forces maintain internal security and assist in economic development of Bolivia through such activities as construction roads and maintenance communications and river transportation.

Agreement was effected by exchange notes between their Excellencies, The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Republic of Bolivia and the Ambassador of USA."

Strom

¹ Transmits text of Bolivian communiqué on U.S.-Bolivian agreement on U.S. military assistance for Bolivian economic development and internal security. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.247/2-961.

2. Memorandum from Schlesinger to Kennedy, March 3¹

March 3, 1961

SUBJECT

The Crisis in Bolivia

Bolivia has, of course, been in a chronic state of mild crisis since at least 1943. There is reason to believe now, however, that it may be today on the brink of a serious political convulsion, and that the convulsion may lead to a Communist take-over. Because crisis is endemic in Bolivia and because Cuba, Brazil and Venezuela have been obvious claimants for priority attention, the Bolivian situation has probably not received full consideration in Washington. Ambassador Strom requested on February 24 that he be recalled to Washington for consultation. I agree with Ambassador Strom that a top-level review of our Bolivian policy is imperative.

I. *Why the Crisis?*

The *immediate* crisis is posed by the fact that the government apparently does not have the ready cash to meet the March 1 payrolls in the railroads and mines. If the workers are not paid, they will very likely go on strike, thereby paralyzing the economy. The government will be greatly tempted to turn to the printing-presses in order to meet its wage bills. This will mean a resumption of inflation. At the same time, the physical stock of the railroads has been deteriorating for some time; so that even without a strike, the railroad system is on the verge of collapse. The breakdown of the railroads would aggravate the inflation by leading to hoarding and speculation in foodstuffs. A further incentive toward inflation is the desire to relieve the heavy burden of internal debt. As troubles multiply, President Paz Estenssoro would probably resign, turning the government over to his Vice President, the left-wing opportunist Juan Lechin. With Lechin in control, Bolivia might well go the way of Cuba.

The *long-term* crisis is caused by (a) Bolivia's continuing economic stagnation and (b) the rise of Communist activity in the last two years and the penetration of the formerly anti-Communist governing party, the MNR, by Communists and fellow-travelers.

¹ The crisis in Bolivia. No classification marking. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Latin America.

II. What should the United States do?

1. *We can't pull out of Bolivia.* I understand that there is some low-level State Department sentiment in favor of handing the Bolivian mess over to Lechin and the USSR. It is said that the Bolivians have become so confident that we will bail them out whatever they do that they will never take the necessary measures for their own salvation. It is further contended that no underdeveloped country will ever take us seriously unless sometime, somewhere, we let a government go when it declines to follow our advice.

The objections to such a policy seem to me overwhelming. Letting nations go Communist in order to punish them may not necessarily work out as we expect. After Cuba, we simply cannot let another Latin American nation go Communist; if we should do so, the game would be up through a good deal of Latin America. Moreover, Bolivia, as a Communist enclave in the center of the continent, would be a base for subversion and revolution in Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay. And the relinquishment of Bolivia to the Communists would of course lead to political clamor in the United States; one can already imagine the speeches in Congress on the theme "Who lost Bolivia?"

2. *We can't take over Bolivia.* Bolivia is in a proud and nationalistic mood. Any attempt on the part of American officials to run the Bolivian government—even to the limited extent to which, say, we ran the Greek government in 1946–50—would probably encounter widespread hostility and stir anti-US feeling not only in Bolivia but through the continent.

3. *The present government is not a reliable instrument of pro-democratic policy.* President Paz Estenssoro in his private conversations with the Ambassador and myself has taken a strong anti-Communist line. This line is consistent with his past record and with that of the MNR party. The MNR and the Communists have been traditional enemies; the Communists played a leading role in the agitation which led in 1946 to the overthrow and hanging of the first MNR President Villaroel. However, Paz has cut himself off (or allowed himself to be cut off) from the MNR moderates. He appears to have lost the energy and authority he displayed in his first term as President (1952–56). When he returned to office in 1960, he had the personal strength to consolidate a political base of his own, which might even have included previously anti-MNR groups. But he has allowed his potential strength to crumble away. Today he seems to be an unhappy prisoner of the MNR left wing and the left-wing trade unions. The political and economic measures which we consider necessary to save Bolivia would be resisted by these groups; and though Paz agrees intellectually with many of the proposed measures, he seems unwilling to back them publicly or practically. As for the MNR itself, it has changed from an idealistic national movement into a tough and often brutal political machine.

4. *No more reliable instrument is in sight.* The only alternative to Paz is Lechin, a personable demagogue of Trotskyite background whose political tactic has always consisted of being farther to the left than anyone else. Lechin is not a Communist; no Communist would have visited Formosa, as Lechin recently did, and made complimentary remarks about Chiang Kai-shek. But he is a skilled anti-US agitator; his political base is on the extreme left; and he would put up less resistance than Paz to the Soviet embrace. As for the opposition to Paz on the right, it is demoralized and fragmented.

5. *All choices are thus unappetizing.* Yet the critical fact remains that the loss of Bolivia would be a catastrophe, and that the future of Bolivia may well determine whether the other Andean nations adopt the path of non-Communist or Communist revolution. The best hope, it seems to me, is for the US to attempt to create the conditions which would drive Paz to take an anti-Communist line and at the same time give him some confidence that an anti-Communist line would be successful. The key to this, I believe, lies in attempting what we have not thus far attempted in Bolivia—a serious effort at economic development—and combining this with a shrewd and tough politico-diplomatic offensive.

III. *Past US policy in Bolivia*

During the fifties, the US gave more grant aid to Bolivia than to any other Latin American country—about \$150 million (plus another \$30 million of credits). However, this aid has not produced a great deal in the way of economic stimulus or even of visible result. A good deal of it—around \$18 million a year—has had to go for direct budgetary support—that is, for paying the running expenses of the Bolivian government. The total Bolivian budget is about \$35 million per annum (in other words, less than that of the University of California or of a good-sized American city); and of this the US in recent years has been paying about one-third.

One reason why US aid to Bolivia has produced so little economic development is because the State Department in the fifties was under the spell of the International Monetary Fund and accepted its view that stable prices were more important than economic growth. No doubt the ruinous Bolivian inflation of 1953–56 had to be stopped. But deflation is not necessarily the sovereign tonic for economic development. If the IMF had controlled US economic policy in the 19th century, our economic growth would have been materially slowed down. Brazil, fortunately from the viewpoint of its economic growth, was able to defy IMF pressure for deflation in those years. Bolivia was too weak and too ignorant to do so. The result was a policy—insisted upon by the US as well as by the IMF—which stopped both inflation and growth. As Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told the House Foreign Affairs

Committee, "We had to tell the Bolivian Government that they couldn't put their money into it (the development program) and we weren't going to put ours into it."²

Because of this decision to pursue stabilization at the expense of development (and also because of the decline in her own tin production and in world tin prices), Bolivia has remained in a condition of economic stagnation. Its economic base is entirely inadequate, not only for the structure of social welfare erected by the Revolution, but even for tolerable living. Just before my visit, Paz responded to a teachers' strike by declaring a state of siege. I inquired what teachers were being paid. The pay *per month* of school teachers in Bolivia, depending on their category, ranges from \$21.20 to \$33.28—out of which they have not only to feed and clothe their families but even buy textbooks.

During these years, in other words, American assistance to Bolivia has been mainly consumed in keeping the drowning government's head above water without enabling it to make much progress toward the shore. As President Siles, who faithfully carried out the stabilization program in 1956–60, put it, "The United States has given me just enough rope to hang myself." To this day, the Bolivian government does not have a comprehensive plan for economic development.

However, a Planning Commission has been established; and, in collaboration with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA—headed by Raul Prebisch, the most eminent Latin American economist), it is preparing a general development plan. I understand that the first draft will be ready in April and that they hope to have a final version by July.

This plan could provide what has been lacking for so long—a framework of action in which the US, instead of dribbling away its aid in meeting the daily expenses of government, could begin to contribute to economic growth. This plan seems to me the key to our future policy. If the proposed plan is not adequate, we should try to help the Bolivians draft a workable plan. If the plan is adequate, then we should back it—and we should back it generously enough to do the job.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the USSR has offered Bolivia credits up to \$150 million for development projects. For years, for example, Bolivians have wanted a tin smelter. Such a tin smelter would be uneconomic for a number of reasons, but it would satisfy national pride, and the USSR is ready to provide one.

Paz told me that he would turn down the Soviet proposal if there were political strings attached, but that he could not do so if it came

² House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mutual Security Act of 1960: Hearings, 86 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 847.

without political conditions. If the Soviet loan should go through, then the USSR will get credit for a series of visible economic monuments, while we have gotten very little credit for our invisible support of the Bolivian budget.

IV. *Recommendations*

1. We should send to La Paz as quickly as possible a top US development economist to vet the Bolivian plan and forecast the relations between US aid and the Bolivian economy for the duration of the plan. Someone like Edward S. Mason or Lincoln Gordon of Harvard, or someone on Al Wolf's Ford Foundation staff, should be asked to undertake this job. The result should be a realistic plan which would give some hope of ending the present state of stagnation.

2. We should be prepared to back the plan sufficiently to make it work. If in 1952 we had decided to invest \$150 million in Bolivian development instead of using the same amount of money over the next eight years to keep Bolivia on the dole, the Bolivian situation would undoubtedly be much more manageable today. The sums required for Bolivian development are not great, especially when compared to the amounts we have poured into Asian countries less immediately essential to our security. Probably \$125–150 million would be sufficient to do the job of modernizing the mines and railroads, improving the transport system, and inducing a migration of peasants from the high plain to the more fertile lowlands.

3. The plan should be designed so that our assistance would be tied to performance in various sectors. Of course this raises the old question: Suppose they fail to perform, do we pull out? The only answer to this is a major political and diplomatic effort to make sure they perform. What we really require is a combined politico-economic plan, with explicit economic conditions and implicit political conditions, reinforced by a stern and resourceful diplomatic determination to see that our conditions are met. The success of such a plan obviously requires an adroit and aggressive Ambassador.

I understand that Ben Stephansky is scheduled for the assignment. From everything I hear, Stephansky sounds excellent. As a liberal opponent of Communists and fellow-travelers, Stephansky could talk to Paz in Paz's own language and help serve him to bolder action. At the same time Latin American political leaders with whom Paz has had fraternal relations—like Betancourt of Venezuela and Haya de la Torre of Peru—should also be encouraged to persuade him to take stronger positions.

(I might add a word about our present Ambassador, Dr. Carl Strom. He is 61 years old and, as befits a former Professor of Mathematics, his manner is old-fashioned and academic. However, this is deceptive.

He is shrewd, canny and subtle; and the fact that he has served successfully in Korea, Cambodia and Bolivia shows the confidence the State Department has had in him. I would hope that he might be transferred to a more tranquil post.)

4. We should negotiate a military assistance agreement with the Bolivian Army. In the main, such agreements seem to me bad in Latin America; but in this particular case an agreement would strengthen the government against the possibility of a revolt by the armed miners. I believe it would help Paz to recover his freedom of action.

5. Much of the success of this operation would depend on skilled and tactful technical assistance on the local level. Bolivia might well be a place where the Peace Corps could make an important and early contribution (assuming careful screening and training of the young people sent to Bolivia).

6. Above all, the US Government must confront the problem of Bolivia and, if it decides (as it must) that Bolivia must be saved, think through with care and precision the requirements of salvation.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

3. Memorandum from General Lemnitzer to McNamara, JCSM-236-61, April 13¹

April 13, 1961

SUBJECT

Bolivian Request for a Bilateral Agreement (U)

1. In a memorandum for the Director, Joint Staff, 1-10328/60, of 16 December 1960, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), forwarded a proposal of the Government of Bolivia for a Permanent Military Assistance Agreement and requested recommendations on the feasibility and advisability of the United States entering into such an agreement.

2. Military assistance for internal security is presently being furnished Bolivia as a result of a Presidential determination. Under the present law, this determination must be made annually.

¹ Bolivian request for a bilateral agreement. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Bolivia, 1961, 000.1.

3. Bolivia is a land-locked republic of about three million people. The country is one of the most highly mineralized areas of the world and its economy is based on mining. However, it is an exceedingly poor country, having one of the lowest standards of living in Latin America. The strength of the Bolivian ground forces is 16,400 men, including a standing army of 11,500 men and Carabineros of 4,900 men, according to latest intelligence information.

4. US Ambassador Strom, in May 1960, indicated that the Bolivian Armed Forces have demonstrated a capacity to contribute to the economic and social welfare of the country. In reply to a query, CINCARIB expressed the opinion that the United States can depend on pro-US orientation of the Bolivian Armed Forces and that the present Bolivian administration can administer a military assistance agreement.

5. Recent events in Cuba have made abundantly clear the necessity for the United States to assist friendly Latin American countries in preserving their internal security. In many countries, the only thing which prevents a rapid takeover by the communists is the military. It is, therefore, in the national interest of the United States to support and, when necessary, fund programs connected with civic action and the maintenance of internal security.

6. Authority for the Civic Action Program is provided in Section 105 b (5) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. Commanders of unified commands and selected US Diplomatic Missions have been advised of the current Civic Action Program in a joint State-Defense-ICA message. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently indicated their support of these programs in JCSM-110-61, dated 28 February 1961.

7. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that.

a. Because of the geography, military potential of the country, and the economic situation, Bolivia cannot make a meaningful external military contribution to the common defense of the Western Hemisphere. Bolivia's contribution to hemispheric defense generally is limited to internal security and the defense of its national boundaries. A permanent bilateral military assistance agreement which would envisage the commitment of Bolivian forces outside of Bolivia is, therefore, not advisable.

b. It is advisable for the United States to participate in an agreement with the Government of Bolivia which would contain provisions for military assistance to facilitate the maintenance of internal security and in furtherance of civic action programs.

c. Policy and authority exist to permit assistance in the furtherance of a civic action program in Bolivia.

d. It is legal to enter into a Permanent Military Assistance Agreement with Bolivia; however, funding for internal security is subject to annual Presidential determination.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that.

a. Bilateral negotiations should be undertaken immediately with the Government of Bolivia on a Military Assistance Agreement to cover internal security and civic action programs.

b. Until authority is granted to provide military assistance to Bolivia for internal security other than by Presidential determination, such assistance be continued by annual Presidential determination.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**4. Memorandum from Hilsman (INR) to Woodward (ARA),
July 18¹**

July 18, 1961

SUBJECT

Latin American Concern for Bolivia: An Opportunity for the US

The Bolivian regime of Paz Estenssoro is kept in power by US assistance. Even with a more generous level of aid promised under a new development program, there is no assurance the regime can survive. Most likely replacements are a Castro-type regime or an Army dictatorship that might give way to extreme leftists. US concern that order be maintained in the country is shared by the governments of Bolivia's neighbors, especially Argentina and Brazil. The concern of these governments points to the possibility that they might be brought to cooperate in shoring up the Paz regime and that they might strengthen the prospects for stabilizing and developing the Bolivian society by their participation in the aid programs.

The Paz Estenssoro regime is so weak that it almost certainly will be unable to carry out a redevelopment of the Bolivian economy. The government's lack of authority, and widespread social unrest expose the Paz regime to extremist pressures supported by the promise of Soviet aid. The achievement of hoped-for economic viability and social order awaits a generation of training, discipline, and investment to

¹ Latin American and U.S. concern for Bolivian stability and security. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 724.00/7-2461.

bring the illiterate and unskilled population into the modern world. Meanwhile, the planned level of US aid may be sufficient to keep Paz in power, but even this is uncertain unless moderate forces can be strengthened and the extremists' hope of Soviet support discouraged.

The United States has gradually come to assume almost sole responsibility for Bolivia in recent years. The country is, however, also of direct concern to the neighboring governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Some of these governments may take a philosophic view of Soviet domination of the regime in Cuba, but all are undoubtedly opposed to establishment of a Castro-type regime in Bolivia.

The neighboring governments have in recent weeks voiced their concern over the rapidly deteriorating political and economic situation in Bolivia, following renewed crises in that country. During a visit to Bolivia in late May, Argentine President Frondizi expressed to President Paz his concern over extremist inroads, agreed to provide food supplies on credit to Bolivian tin mine commissaries, and discussed prospects for expansion of trade and transportation between the two countries. During June both Brazilian President Quadros and Peruvian Prime Minister Beltran expressed to Ambassador Stevenson their strong concern over the Bolivian situation.

In view of the weakness of government authority in Bolivia and the desire of the neighboring governments to prevent an extremist takeover with Soviet support, these governments may well be open to becoming more involved in Bolivian affairs. They may be receptive to US efforts to seek their assistance in preventive measures to strengthen the Paz regime and the moderate forces in Bolivia.

Building upon the evidences of their concern, the US could seek the active cooperation of Bolivia's neighbors beginning with the negotiations connected with the IA-ECOSOC conference scheduled to be held on August 5. This cooperation could occur within the framework of a program for economic operations on a number of fronts, and would doubtless have to be accompanied by assurances of US willingness to back selected projects either directly or indirectly. The various neighbors might participate in a program with elements like these:

- 1) Argentina: development of Bolivian highways, railroads, petroleum resources; supply of food in substitution of existing US supplies;
- 2) Brazil: development of railroads and petroleum resources; agricultural promotion;
- 3) Peru: railroad and hydroelectric development; intensive social stabilization measures in the Puno area adjacent to the Altiplano;
- 4) Chile: promotion of Bolivian industrial development.

The question of Bolivia's integration into the proposed Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) could also be considered, as well as a program for technical aid from leading industrial countries in Latin America.

The recent US sponsored multilateral arrangement with West Germany and the Inter-American Bank to aid the Bolivian tin mining industry and the recent US-British talks concerning aid to the Bolivian railroads enhance the opportunity for South American participation. Aside from their interest in Bolivia as a regional problem, the South American governments, especially those of Argentina and Brazil, would welcome the prestige of association with an international consortium including the Western European states. Certainly, should one of these governments move to join in the effort to stabilize and reorganize Bolivia, the others would hasten to assert their position by taking an active part in the operation.

The immediate effect to be expected through the cooperation of neighboring governments in economic aid to Bolivia would be public and concrete evidence that these leading South American governments intend to stand by the Paz regime. This affirmation of support through plans for economic aid would encourage moderate forces in Bolivia and throw a block in the way of groups agitating for a Castro-type solution. Over the long run, it might be hoped that aid from neighboring countries, especially Argentina and Brazil, would serve to develop the southern and eastern regions of Bolivia and to integrate Bolivia into the South American economy.

5. Memorandum of conversation, July 21 between Rusk and Bolivian Ambassador Andrade¹

July 21, 1961

SUBJECT

Bolivian Government's Request for \$11 million Emergency economic Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Victor Andrade
WST/B—Robert W. Weise, Jr.

Ambassador Andrade said he did not wish to take much of the Secretary's time and that the principal purpose of his visit was: 1) to inquire about the status of the GOB's memorandum handed Adlai Stevenson, and 2) to acquaint the Secretary with the urgency of the Bolivian situation. He described briefly how the Bolivian revolution had been conceived, inspired and executed; that it was an independent Revolution; that it was the desire of President Paz to maintain the independence of this movement, free from Communist domination; how communist-inspired and pro-Castro elements were endeavoring to gain control of the Government and had in fact made substantial inroads into the labor movement to now alarming proportions; and finally how the Bolivian Government on June 7, 1961 undertook decisive steps to round up and arrest the principal Communist labor leaders of the country—some thirty-five in all—through a declaration of a "state of siege". This action, Ambassador Andrade said, involved grave risks for the Bolivian Government, since it already was confronting a serious economic crisis in which it was, in part at least, dependent upon financial assistance from the United States.

During the visit of Adlai Stevenson to La Paz on July 16, 1961, Ambassador Stevenson was handed a memorandum from the Bolivian Government in which the latter made application for an emergency loan of eleven million dollars to cover Bolivia's critical needs pending the re-establishment of social peace and the stabilization of the tin industry under the so-called "triangular operation" in which the USG, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-American Development Bank will participate. Ambassador Andrade said his Government was very much concerned as to what consideration was being given to this memorandum of the GOB, since the "state of siege" would end in fifty

¹ Bolivian Government request for \$11 million emergency economic assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

days and the Bolivian Government would have to determine what steps it would take next in meeting the immediate social and political crisis.

The Secretary informed Ambassador Andrade that careful and serious consideration was being given to the GOB memorandum; that although the USG was prohibited under the mutual security legislation from financing the internal debts of any country, we were studying ways in which the US could assist Bolivia in meeting its present crisis in areas where our assistance would contribute to economic progress and long-range development.

6. Memorandum of conversation, October 18 among Rusk, Andrade, and Fitzgerald (ICA)¹

October 18, 1961

SUBJECT

Bolivia's Request for Emergency Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Andrade
Dr. Fitzgerald—ICA
Mr. Turnage—ARA/REA
Mr. Weise—ARA/WST

The Ambassador opened the discussion saying that during his visit to La Paz last September he had been asked by President Paz to see the Secretary of State and to convey to him the urgency of the Bolivia situation. The Ambassador referred to the visit of the Thorp Mission to Bolivia last March and to the Bolivian Government's request for an emergency loan of \$11 million submitted to Ambassador Stevenson during his visit to Bolivia last June. He said that the United States Government had responded to these requests by authorizing loans of \$2.6 million to COMIBOL for working capital, \$10 million to YPF for equipment (\$4 million of which is contingent upon the increase in local gasoline prices), and \$2 million for the rehabilitation of the Bolivian railways (subject to the GOB arriving at a satisfactory arrangement with the former British management).

¹ Bolivian request for emergency assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

The Ambassador said that the future outlook for Bolivia was good and that with the increase in world tin prices, the prospect for an upswing in mineral exports, the expansion of domestic agricultural production now being realized, and the encouraging reports of Gulf Oil Company on Bolivia's petroleum reserves, it now appeared that Bolivia was on the verge of economic recovery.

Despite these encouraging signs, the country's internal financial situation was still desperate, and given the extreme political pressures to which President Paz is being subjected from the extreme left and Communist elements, it is most important that the Bolivian Government be able to buy time to prevent imminent collapse. The Ambassador said President Paz wished the Secretary to have this background against which to assess the urgency of the requests set forth in the President's two letters to President Kennedy.

The Secretary then asked the Ambassador what the prospects were for bringing order into the Bolivian labor movement. The Ambassador replied that considerable progress had been made. He said that the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 had brought about drastic changes in the social order and that organized labor in Bolivia had taken advantage of its newly gained position of power by demanding a voice in and veto over the decisions of management. The Government of President Paz, the Ambassador said, has been trying to operate in a democratic framework and to be responsive to democratic procedures without compromising the social democratic structures and processes. He said that labor procedures are being changed and that the situation is improving, but that all abuses could not be corrected overnight. The Ambassador cited as an example the current chauffeurs and teamsters strike in which labor demanded that it continue to have the right to name the municipal and national Director General of the Bolivian traffic police and violently opposed the Government's proposal to incorporate the Traffic Police into the National Police Organization (Carabineros). Andrade claimed that the Government had now won the first round in this fight and that the GOB would hereafter name the directors of traffic police.

The Secretary then said that the Department had received President Paz's two recent letters to President Kennedy, one of October 4, 1961 setting forth an emergency development program, and one of October 6, 1961 requesting an emergency credit. The Secretary said that these two letters were being carefully studied by the appropriate offices in the U.S. Government concerned with economic aid, that it was expected that some conclusions would be reached quickly. The Department of State, the Secretary said, would see that these matters are expedited.

The Secretary then asked Dr. Fitzgerald when it might be expected that an answer could be given to President Paz, to which Dr. Fitzgerald

replied that he thought it would be possible to get some initial reaction within two weeks on major parts of the program. Ambassador Andrade said there already had been long delays in getting action on the promised assistance. In the case of the Bolivian railways there was an urgent need for interim financing. The GOB was trying to get the IBRD to undertake a study of the Bolivian transportation systems with a view toward obtaining long-term financing from IDA for rehabilitation of the Bolivian railways. In the meantime the GOB was negotiating with the private British management to resume operation of the railways for an interim period of two years. Dr. Fitzgerald responded by saying that the U.S. Government was awaiting a reply from the Bolivian Government as to steps being taken to fulfill conditions requisite for U.S. assistance to the railways.

The Secretary thanked Ambassador Andrade for his visit, assured him that prompt consideration would be given to President Paz's letters and that President Kennedy would respond as soon as he had had an opportunity to study the new proposals.

7. Memorandum from Hamilton (ICA) to Dungan, June 28¹

June 28, 1962

SUBJECT

U.S. Assistance Commitment to Bolivia

The President's approval of the attached memorandum is requested. It represents a joint commitment on the part of the United States Government and the Inter-American Development Bank to undertake an immediate program of development assistance for Bolivia. This proposed commitment is an outgrowth of the recent report of the OAS Wise Men entitled "Measures Designed to Speed Economic Development in Bolivia Under the Alliance for Progress". The external financial assistance proposed, although somewhat less than that recommended by the Wise Men, is consistent with their recommendations.

The Wise Men conclude that while Bolivia currently lacks an adequate development plan, the urgent political and economic problems

¹ Transmits for Kennedy's approval a joint U.S.-IADB program of development assistance for Bolivia. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Box 32.

of Bolivia require an immediate program of positive and helpful action. In response to the Wise Men's recommendations, the Bolivians have requested the Inter-American Development Bank to organize a consortium to provide the needed external financial assistance. The attached memorandum summarizes the negotiations and discussions with the Bolivian Ministers of Economy and Rural Affairs currently in Washington for this purpose, the Inter-American Development Bank and ourselves. As indicated in paragraph 4 of the attached memorandum, the Bolivian Government has accepted the self-help measures recommended by the Wise Men. Their intentions in carrying out the self-help measures are contained in a confidential letter which is attached, and will be made conditions of our assistance.

Economic development and growth will enable the Bolivian government to fulfill the promise of its 1952 Revolution which brought to power a political movement with broad support among the workers and peasants. The landed and feudal oligarchy was divested of power, land was distributed to the peasants, large estates eliminated, universal suffrage introduced, the army subordinated to the government, and the extreme contrast between wealth and poverty eliminated. Bolivia's social reforms are far in advance of those of most Latin American countries although the people have yet to experience any significant economic advantage from those changes.

Despite prior U.S. aid of some \$220 million, Bolivia has suffered economic stagnation since its revolution in 1952. The main reason why American aid has not shown a more favorable impact on the economy is that it was largely offset by the deficits of the central government and its state-owned enterprises. These deficits were partly the result of certain outside factors such as the large decline in mineral prices and export earnings following the end of the Korean war and the steady increase in the cost of imported equipment and materials. But these deficits were also the result of mismanagement by the Government as reflected in the retention of large numbers of workers in excess of production needs and the refusal of the Government to raise the prices of goods and services as in the cases of the state-owned petroleum entity, the state airline and the state railroads to cover rising costs.

The deficits that resulted were directly or indirectly covered by American aid and there was little left for new investment and development. Similarly, in the private sector the denial to employers of the right to fire excess employees created a climate which discouraged investment either foreign or domestic. Consequently American aid to date has been barely sufficient to keep the Bolivian economy from collapsing.

The approach proposed in the attached memorandum is aimed at overcoming these defects by continuing and expanding the attack

started last year on some of these basic causes of economic stagnation. It is a concentrated effort to move away from primarily providing budget support for a stagnant economy to a dynamic development program. The key to this approach is the loan provided for studies which will lead to feasible and loanable economic development projects.

While certain aspects of the U.S. assistance commitment are yet to be determined, for example, the level of budget support in fiscal year 1963, the total U.S. commitment is estimated at \$78 million. Of this sum, approximately \$37 million will be spent for direct procurement in the United States. The balance of \$41 million will be used for the purchase of Bolivian currency for local expenses. These dollars will be placed in a segregated account and used solely for the import of essential commodities from the United States. It is estimated that this \$78 million will be disbursed over a period of approximately two and one-half years. An IDB commitment of \$21.4 million of which \$10 million is from the Social Progress Trust Fund is made for same period.

The announcement of a specific dollar commitment for development loans is a political and psychological necessity. Special Presidential missions by Messrs. Thorp and Egger, President Kennedy's letter to President Paz of May, 1961 (copy attached), together with the Wise Men's recommendations for commitments of \$109 million have heightened Bolivian expectations of receiving substantial assistance from the United States. This is further complicated by June 4th La Paz press announcements of a new U.S. assistance commitment of \$80 million. The frustration of these expectations by the lack of a specific U.S. dollar commitment would surely be interpreted by the Bolivians as a disavowal of previously expressed intentions. The specific commitment for development loans is tied to projects found feasible which provides safeguards for U.S. loan funds.

The political implications of not going forward with the proposed program would be serious indeed. The Bolivian situation continues to be extremely precarious. President Paz is under intense pressure from the Communists and the extreme left within and outside his MNR party to accept Bloc aid offers. His Government's declining popular acceptance was demonstrated in the June 3rd congressional elections. In the circumstances President Paz and his ministers have suffered acute disappointment that the Alliance has not proved to be the rapid panacea they anticipated. The present mission to Washington of the Ministers who have negotiated the Joint AID-IDB Agreement was announced as intended to establish "whether the Alliance is fact or fiction". The Ministers' return empty-handed to Bolivia would be exploited by the Communists to claim the Alliance is long on words but short on deeds. Similar charges would probably be made by Paz'

own Ministers. This would not only be a severe political blow to Paz which would make his efforts to work with us more difficult but could undermine his confidence in President Kennedy's May 14, 1961, pledge to support Bolivia's long-range development.

The Bolivian Ministers have been in Washington since early May and hope to return to Bolivia on Friday. For this reason I hope this matter can be brought to the President's attention today. Before any public announcement of this commitment is made, I will inform the appropriate Congressional committees.

Fowler Hamilton

Attachments:

1. Draft letter from Ministers of Economy and Rural Affairs, Government of Bolivia.
 2. Letter from President Kennedy to President Paz dated May 14, 1961.
 3. Draft Memorandum entitled "Measures to Speed Economic Development in Bolivia Under the Alliance for Progress" dated June 18, 1962.
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8. Memorandum from Dungan to President Kennedy, July 6¹

July 6, 1962

The attached memorandum requests your approval for the announcement of the \$80 million commitment to Bolivia. The proposed program has been under negotiation for several months and the Bolivian negotiators are standing by here in Washington waiting for a decision.

The proposed program is based on a plan submitted by Bolivia and reviewed favorably by the nine Wise Men. It is essentially a political program as have been the some \$220 million which have gone into Bolivia since 1952. It is different in that, for the first time, the Bolivians have agreed to a more rational review of their own budget and a better administration of AID funds.

¹ Transmits a memorandum to approve announcement of the U.S. commitment of assistance to Bolivia; handwritten note that Kennedy approved. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Bolivia, 1961–1962.

Approximately \$41 million of the \$80 million would go for the generation of local currency but the dollar account is tied to U.S. procurement. In this case, this is not a subterfuge and there will probably be a very small gold drain.

I recommend that: (1) you approve this proposed program and (2) announcement of it be delayed until after the Foreign Aid debate is completed in the House.

Ralph A. Dungan

Attachment

9. Memorandum from Hansen (BOB) to Dungan, July 19¹

July 19, 1962

SUBJECT

Bolivian Aid Commitment

1. The proposed \$80 million commitment to Bolivia should be viewed as a "test" of whether:

a. The Bolivian Government is capable of effectively utilizing a higher level of grant and loan funds to deal with current and pressing economic and political problems;

b. The Bolivian Government is able to take the prerequisite steps to create within this 2½-year period the conditions for a substantial step-up in development financing; and

c. The U.S. can responsibly commit itself and invest its funds in Bolivia without making a mockery of the development concepts of the Alliance for Progress.

2. The hard facts of the Bolivian situation indicate that this commitment is a high-risk undertaking.

Paz Estenssoro evidently lays complete reliance on a U.S. commitment of this nature to bolster his attempt to achieve effective control

¹ Concerns about the Bolivian aid commitment. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Bolivia, 1961–1962.

of the MNR—a party which has become so institutionalized in the government structure that it has a vested interest in the major malfunctions which meaningful reforms must eradicate—a party which is increasingly repressing those few remaining elements in the country upon which progress may ultimately depend.

Economically, the ineffectiveness of the government is apparent; it has not developed a capacity to absorb and follow through on the technical assistance made available; political interference with the economic mechanism is rampant; and hostility to development of the private sector is pervasive. Nonetheless, some changes in the COMIPOL, railroads and utility price sectors are slowly and painfully being pursued.

The breaking of the vicious circle of political fragmentation and economic stagnation by means of the \$80 million commitment and import aid is being looked to by the Estenssoro MNR group and U.S. and international agencies as the chief means of altering the situation favorably.

3. With this political and economic situation as background, the question will be whether this additional U.S. aid will provide the leverage to Paz to gain sufficient party control and general political initiative to move toward the realignments and reforms he professes to seek, or whether in spite of his efforts and our commitment and immediate financial support he is only able or willing to use this support to finance the *status quo*.

4. To make this a credible test of both Bolivian capabilities and the effectiveness of our own actions, it is essential that we have some agreed set of standards by which to measure performance in both areas. The presently contemplated “conditions” are not specific or sufficiently detailed to provide a yardstick to determine whether the Bolivian Government is taking actions adequate to merit accelerated inputs of development resources, and, on our part, we have not adequately spelled out the uses to which our financial assistance will be put or the targets we seek.

5. With regard to the U.S.-IDB commitments:

a. The IDB does not have detailed and specific conditions for the elements of its \$21.4 million commitment.

b. Neither the U.S. nor the Bolivians have any concrete projects investigated or enumerated for the \$3 million grant for public works. We do not know whether the public works program will be additive to the current public works projects in the national budget nor whether these projects will be designed for termination.

c. The commitment of unspecified budget support is not based upon any general understandings with regard to budgetary ceilings and relationships to expected sources and magnitudes of receipts.

d. The development loan of \$6 million for feasibility studies does not contain a determination of the priorities of studies—nor is its use linked to supplying services to the domestic lending institutions we are financing with other portions of the commitment.

e. With regard to the \$10.4 million in loans to the existing three government banks, plus the unspecified funds to the proposed development bank, neither the “Wise Men” report nor the Tannenbaum report set forth the specific reforms required before these institutions may receive support, nor is there an agreed mechanism or chosen instrument for determining the actions which must be taken to make these institutions eligible.

6. With regard to the Bolivian undertakings:

a. The confidential Bolivian letter does not indicate a timetable for actions to be taken, and the “Economic Policy” paper attached thereto describes virtually no tangible undertakings of policy or programs which will form a basis for judgment as to Bolivian performance, e.g., magnitude and scope of customs and tax reform, support of private sector, etc.

7. Moreover, the current memorandum of understanding does not touch upon three specific matters which are being pressed currently in La Paz by Ambassador Stephansky: (a) the chartering of the proposed industrial bank (awaiting Presidential signature for six months and a crucial element in private investor confidence); (b) acceptance by the Bolivians of the customs improvement plan proposed by the UK expert (which is conceived to bring forth increased receipts which could offset external budget support); and (c) more specific undertakings in regard to public utility rates so that a constructive plan of power capacity expansion can go forward, with special attention to the current emergency power shortage in La Paz.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8. The current agreement is so “open-ended” on both sides that unless a major effort is made to follow up with specific requirements and agreed upon programs, this commitment will be subject to charges of bad faith on both sides.

9. A major negotiation should be undertaken in La Paz immediately to provide a program basis of immediate action on an agreed timetable.

10. As an instrument to effectuate this procedure, it is recommended that with Presidential approval of this commitment a special letter be sent from the President, to be delivered by the Ambassador, to the President of Bolivia (draft attached) which would provide more specific terms of reference for the ensuing negotiation and provide

leverage for the Ambassador in extracting specific undertakings from the President of Bolivia.

K.R. Hansen
Assistant Director

Attachment

10. Memorandum from Topping (S/P) to Rostow, July 30, 1962¹

July 30, 1962

TO

Walt W. Rostow, Counselor

THROUGH

Howard Wiggins, Policy Planning Council

FROM

J.L. Topping, S/P: SSO

SUBJECT

Observations Concerning the Alliance for Progress and Bolivia

During the course of my examination of the Bolivian scene and our strategy there, I have noted several factors which handicap or confuse our efforts, which for various reasons have not been included in the paper. They are given in somewhat random fashion below, in the thought that you may find some of them useful.

1. Dealing with Bolivia seems to generate an exceptional amount of emotional heat among the majority of the American officials involved, with consequent reduction of objectivity. Some, from what I believe to be a combination of this emotional bias plus a personal conviction that they must make an emphatic presentation to offset the influence of those with contrary views and overcome inertia, frequently take a stand which might be summarised as a conviction that the United States has committed or promised financial and technical aid, and therefore we must give it to Bolivia regardless of the soundness or completeness of the proposed project, and with little consideration for the course of political developments in Bolivia. This drifts into the

¹ Observations concerning the Alliance for Progress and Bolivia. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Bolivia.

personality cult when it maintains that we must support President Paz at all costs—that only he can control the situation and work well with us.

2. The other extreme, also strongly held and forcefully presented from time to time in the past, now appears more frequently as a personal conviction which influences the officers actions negatively. This holds that in general Bolivian politicians and government functionaries are [*1½ lines not declassified*] somehow second-rate and undeserving of help because they are lacking in skills. This is the attitude which Ambassador Stephansky sometimes refers to as “The Ray Hill approach”.

3) Both (1) and (2) are inaccurate and disappointing. It should be possible to rely on most American officials concerned with Bolivia, and certainly the senior ones, to take an objective, dispassionate approach in their analysis, coupled with a full measure of sympathy for the Bolivians and their situation, without going overboard. Unfortunately, they seem to be scarce both in Washington and the field.

4) I formed the distinct impression that all of the senior members of the staff of our Embassy in La Paz are disturbed about the presentations which the Ambassador makes of the Bolivian situation. They seem to feel that the situation is more delicate and explosive than he indicates, that disorder and violence are always just beneath the surface, that the MNR is now paying only lip service to the ideal of political freedom of expression, and that the leftist extremists are in greater control of the government than he acknowledges. The staff is making every effort to be loyal and to follow the Ambassador's guidance, and there has been no open and final disagreement that I know of. But there is considerable tension, a great deal of privately expressed worry and concern, and at least one officer has managed his transfer as a result.

5) Particularly in the field, there is the basic problem reported on by Jack Cates as to what the Alliance for Progress really is, and what its terminal goals are.

6) Both in Washington and in the field, there seems to be a lack of appreciation of the extent of U.S. power to affect Bolivian developments, and of the size of our presence there.

7) There is a lack of forward thinking. Many officers involved seem too deeply focused on short-term objectives, without realising it. They talk in terms of immediacy, and of projects which have been unnecessarily delayed, when in truth there is virtually no project that is “ready to go”. Engineering and feasibility studies are incomplete, being worked on, or not begun. With our best efforts, it will be many months before we can actually make the dirt fly.

8) There is a remarkable diffusion and confusion of external agencies interested in Bolivia, both American and international. Some of

them now seem working at cross purposes. Pronounced improvement in coordination and cooperation should be possible. As one step, I would suggest that our Economic Counselor undertake that task as a primary responsibility, with an assistant if necessary. We have been perhaps too sensitive about offending the feelings of UN agencies operating in Bolivia, whose work has been spotty. UN representatives in Bolivia expressed dissatisfaction with the state of coordination with American activities, and a desire to improve it. The same situation exists in Washington. There is no central coordination or over-all authority, and our efforts are handicapped thereby.

9) Attitudes and emphasis sometimes seem based on a feeling that we didn't really mean our commitment to assist Bolivia, and that if things are prolonged it may go away. Not everybody involved in the Bolivian program has the desired drive and determination. There is need for convincing presentation and forceful action.

11. Memorandum of conversation, November 15, between Rusk and Andrade¹

November 15, 1962

SUBJECT

Farewell call of Bolivian Ambassador Victor Andrade on Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Andrade
Mr. Duke
Mr. Weise

During his farewell call on the Secretary, Ambassador Andrade stated that he had become increasingly concerned over the drift to the left within the MNR party in Bolivia and the failure of his government to act decisively on the Cuban issue. Andrade said that following the visit of the Bolivian Foreign Minister to the United States in early October, the Foreign Minister announced in La Paz that he had "fired" Andrade as Bolivian Ambassador to the United States. This announcement was untrue, Andrade said, since he had submitted his resignation

¹ Exchange of views during Andrade's farewell call. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 724.00/11-1562.

on October 2, 1962 in protest to certain things he felt were wrong within his Government. He said he particularly deplored the vacillation of his government in confronting pro-Castro and communist elements both within Bolivia and their threat to the hemisphere.

Andrade said that for some time communist and pro-Castro elements had been making great headway in Bolivia and were extending their control over the MNR party organization, while at the same time subverting the true objectives of the Bolivian revolution. Since Fellman's appointment as Foreign Minister in January 1962, Andrade said that he has had real differences with Fellman over the conduct of both internal affairs and foreign relations. Andrade said that when the Foreign Minister was in the United States last month he had had a show-down with the Foreign Minister over these differences. He remarked that the Secretary may have noticed that he, Andrade, had not participated in any of the meetings of the Latin American Foreign Ministers in New York or Washington and claimed that his abstention was the result of his break with Fellman over the Cuban issue and the attempt by the Government to assume a neutralist position at a time when the security of the hemisphere was being threatened by Communist aggression. He said that under these circumstances, Bolivia had no business flirting with extra-Hemispheric ideas and that he felt it was the duty of his Government to come out "clean and squarely" in support of the United States position in the OAS.

The Secretary remarked that we had appreciated the courageous stand of Emilio Sarmiento on October 23, 1962 when he voted with the overwhelming majority of the OAS membership in favor of the OAS resolution on the Cuban issue. To this Andrade replied that Ambassador Sarmiento had consulted him as to what action he should take in absence of instructions from his Foreign Office and that he, Andrade, had told Sarmiento that he should re-enter the OAS and vote in favor of the U.S. resolution.

Andrade then voiced further differences he had had with his Government. He said that he felt that President Paz was in an extremely weak and vulnerable position with respect to the left wing of the MNR party. He said that during his visit to La Paz in August 1961 he had expressed his objections to President Paz over the use of the Bolivian Government's reserve fund (under the control of the Ministry of Government) for pay-offs to members of the Central Obrero Boliviano (COB). Andrade said that such use of Government funds was not only illegal, but was being used to buy-off the very elements which support Castroism and Communism in Bolivia and are subverting the Bolivian revolution and its economic objectives by creating chaos and anarchy within Bolivia. Andrade said the President dismissed his objection by saying that this was a matter of concern to Andrade's imagination.

Andrade said that after he returns to Bolivia (around December 5) he would direct his efforts toward realigning the moderate forces within the MNR and channeling the Bolivian revolution into its true historic nationalist pattern. He said he intended to enter the political arena, and if it appeared that he could succeed he would play an active part in the presidential campaign in 1964. He emphasized that he had no intention of splitting the MNR party, such as Walter Guevarra had done in 1960, but would work from within toward the realignment of those forces which would be strong enough to confront the Left Sector and prevent a left-wing take-over of the party mechanism in the convention preceding the Presidential elections. He said that politics are played “rough and dirty” in Bolivia and that he had no illusions as to the difficulties which lay ahead of him. He felt, however, a real sense of duty in contributing to the elimination of “thugs and gangsters” who now threaten to control the MNR party.

The Secretary wished the Ambassador well and assured him that we would be pleased to see him should the Ambassador return to the United States for a visit on some future occasion.

12. Memorandum of conversation, April 24, between Kennedy and Ambassador Sanchez de Lozada¹

April 24, 1963

SUBJECT

Presentation of Credentials

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada of Bolivia
Ambassador Duke, U/PR
Taylor G. Belcher, ARA/WST

After an exchange of pleasantries regarding the Ambassador’s former service in Washington and his pleasure at being reassigned to what he referred to as his “second country”, the Ambassador brought up the subject of the proposed Paz visit. Sanchez de Lozada expressed his President’s regret that internal problems in Bolivia prevented him

¹ Exchange of views during presentation of credentials. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4-7/63.

from coming to Washington as had been tentatively planned and he now hoped that it might be possible to arrange a visit sometime in September or October when the internal situation would have clarified. President Kennedy said that he was certain that something could be arranged and indicated that Ambassador Duke should look into the question of the visit schedule. The President went on to inquire about the existing situation in Bolivia. The Ambassador replied that he considered that despite the ever present unrest due to the impoverished condition of many of the people of his country, and despite the efforts of the Communists who did have influence in certain fields, particularly the mine unions, the situation was basically stable. This was due in large part, he said, to the major social changes which the Bolivian revolution had effected. The fact that almost 200,000 new land owners had been created by the Bolivian agrarian reform program made for a solid base of support for the MNR regime in the countryside.

Although the situation was under control, the Ambassador said that with the country in a crucial pre-electoral period it was necessary to do everything possible to move ahead rapidly with the new \$80 million development program in order to show that the Alliance for Progress was in fact moving ahead in Bolivia. The President asked what was holding up the program and Mr. Belcher said that basically it was a question of completing the necessary feasibility and engineering studies in order to be able to give final approval to the development projects. For this purpose a sizeable feasibility loan had been made and the engineering studies were being carried out. Some of them would be completed in the very near future although the major construction projects could probably not get under way until next year. The Ambassador said that during the recent visit of the Foreign Minister the question of moving the AID programs forward had been discussed and it had been agreed that the Ambassador and officials of State and AID would work closely together to ensure that the program moved as fast as possible.

As the meeting broke up the question of a possible Autumn visit came up again and the President told the Ambassador that he was sure that something could be arranged and that Mr. Duke would look into it.

13. Memorandum from Major General Lansdale to McNamara and Gilpatric, June 3¹

June 3, 1963

SUBJECT

Visit to Bolivia

At the invitation of General Andrew P. O'Meara, CINCARIB, I accompanied him on his 26–31 May visit to Bolivia. It gave me an unusual close-up view of one of your senior commanders at work and of one of his twenty country problems.

The trip took us not only to such centers as La Paz and Cochabamba, but also into the remote frontier region of northeast Bolivia, along the borders of Brazil and Peru, where imaginative Civic Action projects are in progress. While much of what was learned and done on the trip is being reported through normal channels by CINCARIB and the Country Team in La Paz, including a harder fix on stories we heard of a current border crossing by Communist guerrilleros, some personal comments might be of interest.

Highlights. Reflecting on what I saw and heard as a newcomer, in little more than five long and full days, my impressions can be summed up as follows:

a. Bolivia is a land of the vexing paradox for the U.S. Its people are warmly friendly towards us (the smiles and waved hands of the children reminded me of the Philippines), yet it has fallen in love with Marxism (of both the Lenin and Trotsky versions). Again, Americans are most excited by Bolivian pioneering over the Andes *eastward* into nearly empty but fabulously promising country; Bolivians are most aroused by looking *westward* towards the Pacific, longing for a seaport. Perhaps this is because of the basic paradox; a land of wide-open spaces, Bolivia has hidden its capital city of La Paz down in a crevice, almost as though it wanted its leaders to become moles.

b. "Civic Action" is making a dramatic change in the psychological climate, both for military and civilian Bolivians. The vividly brutish portrayal of the military as monsters inflicting pain on the lowly Indian, as seen in the huge mural in the Presidency, must be striking an increasingly false note to Bolivian viewers. The Civic Action program is stressing the public service role of the Bolivian military, in much the same manner as the U.S. military were the pathfinders, engineers, and guard-

¹ Report on visit to Bolivia. Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.

ians in the opening of our own West. The Bolivian people are starting to respond, most favorably.

c. Although nearly unspoken, U.S. policy has moved down the Left fork of the political road in Bolivia, mostly because hardly a trace remains of the Right fork. On this Left fork, we now look upon President Paz as being on the right edge, opposed to Vice President Lechin on the left edge—so we have moved in with Paz. Yet, there is the beginning of a path off towards objectives more in harmony with U.S. beliefs, which richly deserves stronger U.S. help in development. The beginning of this path is in the cadastral ideas proposed by Julio Sanjines, director of Civic Action, who wants to convince unbelieving campesino settlers that they really own their own land by including an aerial photo showing property boundaries with each title deed given in Civic Action settlements. A slight shift of emphasis in the Civic Action program, to stress the rights and responsibilities of the individual Bolivian, might well give us the dynamic key we have lacked (spoken of as a missing “political mystique” in the Country Team briefing). Our present in-country resources in the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, U.S. military, AID, and USIS could target in on land ownership by the campesino, as a base to be rapidly broadened into such political objectives as individual liberty, free elections (in the U.S. sense), and the rule of law (rather than militia bands).

d. It is probable that Bolivia serves the Communists as a Switzerland—a transit area to other Latin American places for people, funds, and matériel. There is merit in John Stutesman’s idea of fuller lateral reporting between U.S. Country Teams, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. The activities of European Bloc Communists, let alone Cuban Communists, seemed to be notorious even out in the villages of the boon-docks.

e. On this trip, General O’Meara showed considerable skill as a U.S. cold war commander. He spotted cold war essentials and acted on them firmly, with a balanced sensing of the political, psychological, economic, and military factors involved, while being warmly human in his encouragement of those Bolivians who are moving towards our objectives. I believe his visit, particularly his traverse into remote areas, did much to bolster the U.S. position in Bolivia.

f. The U.S. Country Team in La Paz has made a remarkably fine start in the closely-integrated teamwork required for a cold war win—in its Civic Action program. I trust that Washington departments and agencies will continue their strong backing of this integrated effort. It is making a vital difference.

Nationalism. The present Bolivian government is generating much enthusiastic nationalism among the people, presumably to create national unity. One was good to see and hear—the singing of the national anthem on all public occasions (every man, woman, and child

joined in to sing this lustily and proudly). The other is fraught with problems for us—a Bolivian drive to regain a seaport on the Pacific.

The seaport issue arose early and stayed with us throughout the visit. Knowing that the Bolivians had an Army and Air Force, but no Navy, it was a surprise to see a Bolivian Admiral standing with Bolivian military commanders to greet us when we arrived at the La Paz airport. He was the newly promoted Brigadier General Ronant Monje Roca, Commander, Bolivian River and Lake Force. Later in the trip, General Monje (he doesn't call himself Admiral—yet) gave me a souvenir banner of his River and Lake Force. It shows the ocean rather than a river or lake, and bears the slogan: "Volveremos al mar por la fuerza del derecho!" ("We shall return to the sea by force of law"). In Army schools and installations, on blackboards, on signs, similar slogans such as "The Sea is our Destiny!" were everywhere. At an Air Force luncheon, General Ayala pointedly called my attention to a large mural showing Bolivia reaching the Pacific.

It is evident that a highly emotional drive is on to obtain a Pacific seaport for Bolivia. If the U.S. makes a mis-step and appears to be opposed to this move, the Communists will seize this patriotic issue for their own—and have Bolivia handed them on a silver platter. If present legal moves to obtain a seaport fail, and Bolivian tempers flare, we may yet see two of our Latin American friends at war with each other. Chile is currently working hard to make its northern coastal area an integral and patriotic part of Chile. Somebody surely has lifted the lid of a Pandora's Box in Bolivia.

Civic Action. A major purpose of the trip was to take a look at Bolivia's Civic Action program. It was well worth the long journey.

The marked success of this program seems to stem from exceptional Bolivian leadership and from equally exceptional joint U.S. military-civilian teamwork in support. Bolivian leadership is mostly in the person of one man, Mr. Julio Sanjines, Director, Civic Action Office USAID, although a number of other Bolivian military and civilians have caught the fire of enthusiasm for this program. Sanjines attended West Point (when I asked him who his best friend was in the U.S., he named Lt. Colonel Jack Cushman, whom he identified as a West Point classmate now on the Secretary of the Army's staff—actually, Cushman has transferred to Vietnam), apparently quit a career in the Bolivian Army to become a successful businessman, and recently was made a Lt. Colonel in the Bolivian Army (although he only went by his civilian status when travelling with us). Sanjines is a real "operator," in the best sense of the word.

A story will illustrate, mostly as told me by Sanjines. The miners of Achacachi, dominated by Communists and with their own armed militia, have borne a long and bloody hatred for the Bolivian military.

Achacachi is a dry and dusty place, noted for its shortage of water. It was picked for a Civic Action well-drilling project. Rather than announce this early, as a politico would be tempted to do, Sanjines moved into Achacachi with a crew of engineers, including Army men in civilian clothes, and made a quietly unobtrusive survey for potential water sources; the survey showed promising sites. The well-drilling crews and equipment were readied and put on a standby basis in La Paz, alert to move on signal. Sanjines then had a leading La Paz newspaper (owned by Sanjines, Clarence Boonstra informed me) send reporters to Achacachi to ask the people how they would like a Civic Action project to provide fresh water to the city. The people interviewed replied: "All the government ever does is talk, not act," "The Army is worthless and would never do anything for us," and similar comments. Sanjines met with town officials, told them of the proposed project, and was invited to give it a try. He signaled La Paz, the Army engineers (in uniform) and equipment showed up promptly and went to work, completing the new water works in record time. The La Paz newspaper then publicized the Civic Action triumph, complete with earlier scoffing interviews. It made quite a convincing story.

A large delegation from Achacachi met us at the La Paz airport. They shouted rousing cheers for the Bolivian Army, for U.S. aid, and for General O'Meara. He walked around and shook hands with each of the happily grinning miners, then at their insistence had his picture taken with them. When I followed suit, shaking hands, they enthusiastically insisted on a picture with the U.S. Air Force too, so our Air Force Mission and aircraft crew folks joined me for a group picture with these miners. The moral, of course, is that this is a sharp contrast to their attitude towards the Bolivian and U.S. military just a short while ago.

The whole range of the Bolivian Civic Action program, in public works, in public health, in public education, in agriculture, and in the colonization of the empty areas of eastern Bolivia, has been reported elsewhere by others. Thus, I will not repeat details here. However, it is timely to note two striking features. One is that there is a really dedicated effort being given to Civic Action, particularly by the Bolivian military; the military finished its share of building public schools ahead of time and is being assigned the building of more from the yet uncompleted share of Bolivian civilian agencies; when I asked about an old USAF T-13, the only aircraft stationed at the frontier town of Riberalta, the Bolivian Air Force proudly told me they used it for Civic Action, to bring sick and injured to the hospital from remote jungle farms (the rear cockpit has been altered from a one-seater and now takes four passengers); General Monje stressed that a major mission of his River and Lake Force will be Civic Action.

The second striking feature of Civic Action in Bolivia is the fine teamwork evident between civilians and military, both Bolivian and U.S. CINCARIB seems to have made a special effort to get U.S. military advisors and equipment into places where they count; AID, particularly Alexander Firfer, has backed Civic Action projects aggressively with plans, funds, advice, matériel, and other help. At the colonization project at Santa Ana (500 families—from the Altiplano—2,000 persons—settled so far in this extremely productive area), it was deeply stirring to note the catchy, enthusiastic teamwork under Walter Gonzalez, Alto Beni Project Engineer (for the Corporacion Boliviana de Fomento); his team included the Bolivian 2nd Engineer Battalion advised by U.S. Army Engineers (now putting finishing touches on a 3,000 meter long airfield runway hacked out of the jungle and eager to extend the highway now connecting La Paz on into further fertile areas of the Alto Beni), Bolivian and U.S. civilians (including young Peace Corps Americans helping start nuclei of settlers), Bolivian and U.S. Air Force personnel helping with some airlift, and an unusual U.S. Army doctor, Captain Lavern G. Borg, providing support to a medical team from the Middle American Research Unit (which arrived on 24 March 1963 and has since eradicated the main reservoir of infection of “Pinta disease”—which depigments the skin—among the Mosestenean Indians who live at Santa Ana, and who were warned by the Communists that the doctors would be bad for them; Borg’s dramatic treatment of the chief’s brother, who had turned blue, has made him a revered person locally). The Washington officials who backed his concept of combined teamwork can be deservedly proud.

Propaganda. The U.S. Military Mission officers told me that they were getting strong support from USIS in the psychological battle with the Communists in Bolivia, especially in material for use with the Bolivian military. I noticed evidence of this in the military schools we visited, USIS comic books being particularly dog-eared from much reading, and was impressed most favorably by the skilled use made of this material in Cochabamba by Lt. Colonel Hector Aranda, both in the Bolivian Special Forces Center of Instruction which he commands and in his classes on Counterinsurgency at the nearby Command and General Staff College. Lt. Colonel Malcolm Nurnberg, who commands the U.S. Air Force Mission to Bolivia, gave me details of how Mission aircraft carry out constant distribution of USIS matériel, each flight in-country carrying hundreds of pounds for delivery at every stop made.

However, the Communists are a strong, entrenched, persistent enemy in this psychological battle. At times, their work has a quaint touch to it. Two examples during our visit illustrate the Communist work. The first was at a new school-house built by the Bolivian military for the colonization project at the little settlement named Puerto Rico.

The school's teacher, Miss Justa Chamairo, had requested a U.S. flag for the school. Thus, there was a ceremony in the school-house, with General O'Meara presenting a U.S. flag and with Alex Firfer presenting a handsome Alliance for Progress metal plaque—both received with warm gratitude. The pupils crowded into the one-room school, after a lusty singing of the Bolivian national anthem, were called upon by the teacher to give recitations (with gestures). The oldest girl pupil proudly recited, in Spanish, a poem circulated by the Communists about the labor martyrs of Chicago, apparently dated to the Haymarket Riots. (Sanjines inquired, then hastily explained that it was the only poem about the U.S. the girl could find—she intended to honor the visit of the Norte-Americanos!)

The second example was at the colonization project at Santa Ana. The 500 families in this fine Bolivian-U.S. jungle settlement, where reading matter is scarce, are the target of a special Communist propaganda effort, according to Walter Gonzales, the project engineer. He commented that truck drivers, in the transport union, were smuggling in loads of Communist literature with the regular supplies they hauled from Caranavi. U.S. Country Team members accompanying us on the trip immediately ordered delivery of USIS material to the Santa Ana settlers. I trust that this effort will be continued as thousands of new settlers arrive; it would be a macabre joke if the U.S. and Bolivian governments helped these people get a fresh start in life—and the Communists then taught them how to live it, the Communist way.

Relations. As in other countries, I was alert in Bolivia for signs of the human spirit breaking through the international barriers. Comments already have been made above about the warmly friendly attitude of the Bolivian people towards us. Also, I noted that U.S. personnel at all places visited seemed to be working in close friendship with their Bolivian associates. This was particularly evident in an evening get-together at the home of Colonel Truman Cook, Chief of the U.S. Military Group. Beyond this, there are some further significant stories.

On the orbital space flights of Astronaut Gordon Cooper over South America in May, the Bolivian campesinos toiled to construct huge signs on the mountains above La Paz, in the hope that Cooper would read them. The signs were made of 50-gallon oil drums, filled with kerosene—all brought up the mountain by hand—and lighted at night when Cooper was due to orbit above. One sign read: "Cooper in Orbit." The second read: "Man of the Century." Lt. Colonel Nurnberg of our Air Force Mission said that the Mission had a surprise visit, after Cooper's successful flight, by a big delegation of Bolivian youngsters from the La Paz Model Airplane Club—bearing a huge bouquet of flowers for the U.S.

Relaxing in the evening with local Bolivian officials in Cobija, I made mental notes on two USAF officers whom the Bolivians seemed

to hold in special affection. One was Lt. Colonel Louis McAdory who accompanied us, who was welcomed with enthusiastic bear hugs, and upon urging danced the La Quaca with a local girl. The other was in La Paz, but really introduced to me in Cobija from the many local Bolivians asking anxiously: "Where is our friend, Zorro of the Andes? Why didn't you bring him with you?" Upon inquiry, I learned that "Zorro of the Andes" is Lt. Colonel Ed Fox. Those who know Latin temperaments will understand the esteem associated with Zorro.

Air Travel. There was a marked change in the air travel to and from Panama this time over my recent trip to Venezuela. National and PanAm gave me luxury treatment, as if they knew of my previous report. I hope other U.S. officers benefit, too.

Note: I have omitted a number of events, such as border crossing by Communist guerrillas, which are being reported through normal channels. Also, I spent a day in Panama visiting CINCARIB schools and units, as well as the Inter-American Police Academy, and am passing along items of special interest—such as Project Pista—separately.

This was a well-planned trip, with a full schedule for every hour, to permit a good look at known developments for which U.S. officials making the trip had assigned responsibilities. It made sense, but was quite different from my usual approach to an area. An operational look would dig below surface into such matters as:

[text not declassified]

b. How do we put some effective bare-knuckles into our psychological operations? There's a tough, scrappy nature just below the surface of the Bolivian campesino, so do we just want to make friends with him or do we want to have him aroused to action on our side with much of that energetic devotion he put into the carbineros? Isn't it time to tip off this resourceful campadre that he can start helping on our side, as quickly as he realizes it is his own? (This is worth an executive look by practical realists, with a view towards getting more meaningful results. Bolivia reminded me too much of Laos, where we did a technically beautiful psychological operation, but the Communists just kept going for the jugular. Who can forget the Laos election of May 1958, when the people of Laos fell in love with candidates helped by U.S. airdrops of bulldozers, food, and other matériel—and the people voted for Pathet Lao candidates, simply because some of the best candidates on our side were out "doing good" for the people with our help—and forgot to ask the people to vote for them? Are we going to have this all over again in Bolivia?)

c. How much of a transit, staging, resupply or safe area is Bolivia to the Communists? (If I were a responsible U.S. official in Lima, I would be pressing my counterpart in La Paz to get me a hard-fix on

whether or not the Communist guerrilla leader Blanco actually had found a safe-haven in Bolivia; from Rio, I would ask La Paz to tell me about Communist passengers of local airlines who fly to Brazilian towns near the Bolivian border, which can be crossed with no questions asked). Jose Arze Murillo, Minister of Government of Bolivia, has asked for U.S. help in tracking down facts about the Communist situation in Bolivia; [2 lines not declassified]. At the same time, lateral reporting and tips to potential leads between U.S. agencies in several countries seem well worth an executive look; with eyes up on Cuba, a lot might be going on underfoot locally of real significance. Also, the U.S. military might well find it timely to get in on the 30 May opportunity opened by the Bolivian Minister of Government, to help create an effective counter-intelligence capability in the Bolivian military. The NCO School at Cochabamba appeared to be a most tempting haven for a Communist aparat, yet I was unable to get any fix for lack of information: there must be other such invitations to the Communists among the Bolivian military, which we have been thwarted from exploring before 30 May 1963. [1½ lines not declassified]

(While time and program didn't permit a full exploration of the three topics noted above, with General O'Meara and U.S. officials in La Paz, I believe you will find them sympathetic towards further development somewhat along the lines indicated).

14. Memorandum from Read (S/S) to McGeorge Bundy, July 20¹

July 20, 1963

SUBJECT

The Situation in Bolivia

In reference to Mr. Bromley Smith's oral request to Mr. Martin today, I am forwarding herewith a memorandum on the situation in Bolivia.

D. Rowe (for)
Benjamin Reed
Executive Secretary

¹ Transmits memorandum on the situation in Bolivia. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4-7/63.

Enclosure

SUBJECT

The Situation in Bolivia

In our discussions with Ambassador Stephansky during his recent consultation the developments reported in La Paz telegrams 93 and 99, dated July 19, were foreseen. Our planning, based on the Ambassador's conversations with President Paz and the recommendations resulting therefrom, has provided for financial assistance, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and for equipment. The question of possible need for United States personnel did not arise. Under our contingency planning a special fund of \$4,000,000 has been set up, and in response to an emergency request received yesterday \$325,000 has been authorized for two projects to assist in the mining area.

The Ambassador's analysis to date has not indicated that armed intervention was likely to be required in the confrontation which we have expected as a result of President Paz' apparent decision to enforce labor discipline in the mines. While we are not surprised that General Barrientos has suggested that Special Forces might be needed to back up the Bolivian Armed Forces (Embassy telegram 93) we should not take his *démarche* too seriously until we have had a further report and recommendation based on Ambassador Stephansky's forthcoming conversation with President Paz.

In the event President Paz decides that he requires more than money and technical assistance we would wish to consider his request in the multilateral framework of the OAS. We would be most reluctant to act unilaterally. With regard to a possible OAS response, we must recognize there may be certain problems arising out of Bolivia's withdrawal from the Council, aside from those deriving from the inherent reluctance of many members to "interfere" in the affairs of a neighboring state.

We will be awaiting the Ambassador's recommendations as well as General O'Meara's comments in response to Stephansky's messages. It should be noted that the Ambassador stopped in Panama last week for consultation with the General.

**15. Memorandum from Cottrell (ARA) to the Special Group
(Counter-Insurgency), July 31¹**

July 31, 1963

TO

Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)

THROUGH

M—Governor Harriman

FROM

ARA—Sterling J. Cottrell

SUBJECT

The Situation in Bolivia

As stated in the Bolivia Internal Defense Plan approved by the Special Group on May 16, the major internal security threat is the danger of an extreme left wing takeover that would place in power a sector of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) which is heavily infiltrated by communists. This MNR left sector is headed by Vice President Juan Lechin.

The Department's contingency planning foresaw the development of the present show-down between management and labor in the Bolivian state mining corporation (COMIBOL). Our planning is based on conversations Ambassador Stephansky held with President Paz, and on the Ambassador's recent consultation in Washington. This show-down, brought about by our insistence that the Bolivian Government should carry out reforms which would allow the COMIBOL management, among other things, to move men and equipment without union interference, also has important political implications related to the main internal security threat. The struggle for power in Bolivia today is chiefly between the MNR center forces supporting President Paz and the MNR left sector and communist forces supporting Lechin. The COMIBOL management of labor reforms will tend to weaken the mining unions which form Vice President Lechin's major base of support, thereby lessening the possibility of his winning the MNR nomination for President late this year and subsequently being elected in June 1964. Thus the Vice President is opposing these reforms with all means at his disposal.

¹ The internal security threat in Bolivia and contingency planning. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4-7/63.

Under our contingency planning a special fund of \$4 million has been set up. In response to emergency requests, \$325,000 has been authorized for projects to assist in the mining area, \$65,000 has been authorized to aid Bolivian military movements in connection with the crisis and \$118,000 of police riot control equipment is being airshipped to Bolivia (most of the shipment has already arrived in La Paz). In addition, funds are being made available from the regular A.I.D. public safety program for the supply on an emergency basis, of arms, communications, and transportation equipment to outlying police units. We have sent two special public safety advisers to Bolivia on TDY to look into possible further matériel as well as organizational needs. We are also considering a special factory rehabilitation program; which would allow the GOB to offer a solution to problems in the manufacturing field, thereby lessening the likelihood of a solidarity move by these workers with the mine unions. Certain *[less than 1 line not declassified]* programs designed to influence the direction of these developments are in operation and others are awaiting approval.

A threatened general strike did not occur this past weekend, since negotiations are under way between the mine workers and the mining corporation management. If an agreement is not reached, the miners have indicated a general strike may be called over the Bolivian independence holidays which begin on August 5.

Union leaders have threatened to seize quantities of ore and export it themselves, and they have made threats to destroy mining machinery and equipment. The unions wish to settle the dispute on the basis of certain wage increases and job reclassification. The mining corporation management, backed by the Bolivian Government, has insisted that the mine unions accept the entire COMIBOL reform program, that is, cut costs, increase production, and end union interference in management decisions. In the meantime, the management has informed the unions that the large Catavi mine, where the strike began, will be removed from the \$38 million Operation Triangular rehabilitation program which is sponsored by the United States, West Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank, unless a satisfactory agreement is reached.

Our Ambassador informs us that the situation remains explosive although negotiations between management and labor (i.e., between the Government and the Lechin-communist group) are continuing. On July 29 the first of what may be growing armed clashes between Paz and Lechin forces took place. A group of Catavi armed miners attacked a pre-Paz peasant militia group and killed its leader. The peasants had been sent by Paz to the mining area for a show-down, and apparently were attacked while sleeping. The miners outnumbered the peasants three to one. Paz has plans to send larger peasant and miners militia

groups loyal to him to the mine areas. They are to be used in an attempt to break up a miners strike if it occurs, and to prevent a march on the capital. The GOB first plans to use the militias in a confrontation with the Lechin forces, since use of the armed forces might cause a violent reaction in other sectors in the country. Meanwhile the Bolivian Army commander has stated publically that the Army will take action if necessary.

We are not averse to seeing a violent confrontation between Paz and Lechin forces since this will tend to place them in irreconcilable positions from which they will find it difficult to retreat, and we believe that Lechin's political standing will suffer in the event of such clashes. However, it is still by no means certain that a violent confrontation in the form of a general strike and/or widespread armed clashes will occur. The Communist Party reportedly is split on whether or not to support a violent confrontation with Paz forces, since many leaders believe Paz would win. At present, leaders who wish to avoid a violent show-down appear to be in control of the Party. Nevertheless, major communist labor leaders at the mines do not always follow Party instructions. Lechin in the meantime is in Rome at his Ambassadorial post, apparently waiting to judge developments.

Meanwhile, the Bolivian Government has taken steps to prepare for violence. Troops are on the alert and units have been strategically located in the mining areas. A top Bolivian Air Force official has suggested that Bolivia might consider calling on the aid of the United States special forces if the situation should deteriorate. It is not now planned to send such special forces. Were the situation to indicate the desirability of sending special forces, this would require a decision at the highest level of government and would involve consultations with the Organization of American States.

At present it appears that the GOB and the armed forces are fully capable of handling any foreseeable crisis. Nevertheless, it is always possible in a backward and disorganized nation like Bolivia, which is only now developing in its people a feeling of national patriotism, that a crisis of this nature could develop beyond the ability of the government to control it. The Embassy has made plans for the possible evacuation of dependents and others if events should make this necessary.

16. Memorandum of conversation, October 22, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials¹

Part I (of 3)

October 22, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz of Bolivia: Latin America—Importance; Chinese Communist Appeal; Military *Coups*

PARTICIPANTS

Bolivia

President Victor Paz Estenssoro
Minister of Foreign Relations José Fellman Velarde
Minister of National Economy Alfonso Gumucio Reyes
Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada
Mr. José Paz, President of Bolivian Oil Enterprise (YPFB)
Mr. Jorge Paz, President Paz' uncle
Mr. Raul Vivado (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President
Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin
Ambassador Ben S. Stephansky
Ambassador-designate Douglas Henderson
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
Mr. Ragnar Arnese, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, AID
Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs,
Department of State
Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)
Mr. Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

President Kennedy welcomed President Paz and described the importance we attach to Latin America as one of the most critical areas in the world today. For many years our efforts were directed primarily towards Europe. It is regrettable that just at the time we began to make a greater effort in Latin America, we ran into serious balance of payments problems of our own. Of course, the major burden of the Alliance for Progress effort falls upon the Latin American nations themselves. Nevertheless, within the limits of available resources, we want to help Latin America to achieve the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

President Paz agreed concerning the current importance of Latin America. He said it was to be hoped that with the beginning of improve-

¹ General exchange of views. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

ment in US-Soviet relations opportunities to devote resources to assistance to underdeveloped areas in the world would increase.

President Paz said he was concerned at two political developments in the hemisphere. The first is that the Chinese Communist thesis of violence is proving to be very appealing in Latin America.

President Paz described the military *coups* that have taken place in Latin America as a second motive for concern. Actually, he said, the Communists welcome military *coups*. These *coups* are generally against relatively progressive and democratic governments. This suits the Communists because the counter to a military government is not a democratic, progressive government, but a radical one.

President Kennedy noted that we have broken relations with Honduras and the Dominican Republic. He said that in the Dominican Republic we think perhaps we can achieve something akin to the Peruvian situation, with the government promising to hold elections at a specified time. While the Dominican situation could become a full dictatorship, it still has a civilian facade. President Kennedy inquired whether our policy should be to ignore such regimes or to work toward the restoration of constitutionality in these countries.

President Paz remarked that US influence was decisive in these cases as it had been in the case of the overthrow of Trujillo. However, the problem is not simply one of holding elections. The real solution lies in achieving basic structural change to alter situations of injustice which prevail under the anachronistic social systems in some countries. Democratic government in most Latin American countries is a short-term solution which has no real viability without structural change. He drew attention to Bolivia's past history of 166 revolutions in a period of 130 years but noted by contrast that despite severe economic problems, there has been political stability in the country since the revolution of 1952. Bolivia's experience is not a recipe appropriate for all countries since each must achieve changes in its own way. President Paz noted that President Belaunde of Peru is seeking his own way toward change at the present time. Belaunde is concerned with how to achieve changes without violent reactions.

President Kennedy inquired about the *coup* in Ecuador. President Paz said that Ecuador was a less clear case than the rest. Other factors were present, including the discredit into which Arosemena had fallen, which made the Ecuador case different. The case of Bosch in the Dominican Republic was a much better illustration of the kind of problem he had been describing. The danger of a *coup* against Betancourt is a further illustration. The problem is, he said, that the Communists believe in the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and regard themselves as the antithesis of the military and therefore as the beneficiaries of military *coups*. President Paz said that Bolivia has always been

extremely sensitive to influences from neighboring countries. He said this added to Bolivia's concern because of the danger of contagion.

Foreign Minister Fellman noted that consideration is being given to holding a meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider the problem of military *coups*. He said Bolivia would attend an MFM for this purpose if held. Given the possibility that an MFM will not be held, he said consideration is being given to a meeting of those democratic countries, including Bolivia, willing to attend. While Bolivia believes in nonintervention, it also believes the countries in the hemisphere can take some action to deal with this problem in line with the Rio Treaty.

President Kennedy asked President Paz what kind of resolution hemisphere countries could approve which would be adequate to cover the last six military *coups* in Latin America, all of which have been somewhat different. Also, should the resolution provide that diplomatic relations should not be re-established until elections are actually held or should it permit relations when elections are scheduled? The Foreign Minister responded that no such resolution can refer to past *coups* but what seemed desirable was a general resolution to sever diplomatic and commercial relations whenever a military group seizes power.

President Kennedy inquired about Brazil, which seems involved in a continuing crisis. President Paz said he thought the Brazilian situation was very serious and that this was also Tito's impression. President Kennedy agreed that Tito had thought the Brazilian situation was very dangerous.

17. Memorandum of conversation, October 22, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials¹

Part II (of 3)

October 22, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz of Bolivia: Bolivian-Chilean Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Bolivia

President Victor Paz Estenssoro
 Minister of Foreign Relations José Fellman Velarde
 Minister of National Economy Alfonso Gumucio Reyes
 Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada
 Mr. José Paz, President of Bolivian Oil Enterprise (YPFB)
 Mr. Jorge Paz, President Paz' uncle
 Mr. Raul Vivado (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
 Under Secretary George W. Ball
 Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President
 Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin
 Ambassador Ben S. Stephansky
 Ambassador-designate Douglas Henderson
 Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
 Mr. Ragnar Arnesen, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, AID
 Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs,
 Department of State
 Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)
 Mr. Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

The Foreign Minister said Bolivia was concerned that in 1962 Chile received six times the military assistance that went to Bolivia. The Foreign Minister said Bolivia did not want more military assistance but felt it desirable that military assistance to the two countries be in proportion. He said he believed the disproportion in this assistance contributed to the lack of progress toward a solution of the unfortunate conflict between Chile and Bolivia.

The Foreign Minister noted that Bolivia has two serious problems with Chile—the problem of the Lauca River and that of access to the sea. Mr. Fellman said he believed that the exertion of U.S. influence at an appropriate moment—and he wished to emphasize that he had said at an appropriate moment—would be a critical factor in achieving a

¹ Bolivian-Chilean relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

solution. He said the dispute with Chile is a factor making for unrest in that part of the continent. He said that Bolivia was willing to go half-way to seek a solution and hoped that it might count on U.S. support at the right moment.

The President inquired how far from agreement the Foreign Minister felt he was and what evidence there was that Chile was ready to make concessions. The Foreign Minister said that the two countries were not far from an acceptable solution on the Lauca River problem. However, on the problem of Bolivian access to the sea, which he described as closely related to the Lauca problem, the two countries were much farther apart. He said that on the access problem Bolivia only asks Chilean fulfillment of a commitment made in 1946 and reiterated in 1950 when Chile proposed negotiations looking toward satisfying Bolivian aspirations for her own sovereign access to the sea in return for non-territorial compensation.

On the matter of military assistance President Kennedy said we have only committed about \$57 million in the whole Hemisphere in the past year. We have continued this program, with some reluctance, on the grounds that the military would certainly be getting some matériel from somewhere in any case, and we have given special emphasis in this program to civic action.

Mr. Martin explained that in total Chile has received more military assistance than Bolivia. However, much of this was provided Chile prior to 1961 when our program was geared toward continental defense and much of it has been for assistance to the Chilean Navy. Since 1961 our military assistance program has been reoriented away from continental defense. In fact FY 1963 military aid furnished Chile was no greater on a per capita basis than that provided Bolivia, whereas Bolivia received more economic aid per capita than any other Latin American country. Mr. Fellman referred to reports that economic aid to Chile last year was higher per capita than aid to Bolivia. Mr. Martin said such a calculation would have had to include our earlier extraordinary assistance to Chile for rehabilitation of areas of earthquake devastation.

President Kennedy said that even given this explanation, we would certainly bear in mind the Bolivian concern about our military assistance program. He did not know whether the time would ever come when the United States could be helpful in restoring good relations between Bolivia and Chile. However, he assured the Foreign Minister of our desire to be helpful should the time come when it is generally believed that we can be.

President Paz interjected that he would not want the Foreign Minister's statement that Bolivia was not seeking more military assistance to be taken as absolute, since most of the military assistance for Bolivia goes into a very effective civic action program.

18. Memorandum of conversation, October 22, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials¹

Part III (of 3)

October 22, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz of Bolivia: Bolivia—The Alliance for Progress; US Aid Programs; COMIBOL; Petroleum; Tin Smelter

PARTICIPANTS

Bolivia

President Victor Paz Estenssoro
Minister of Foreign Relations José Fellman Velarde
Minister of National Economy Alfonso Gumucio Reyes
Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada
Mr. José Paz, President of Bolivian Oil Enterprise (YPFB)
Mr. Jorge Paz, President Paz' uncle
Mr. Raul Vivado (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President
Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin
Ambassador Ben S. Stephansky
Ambassador-designate Douglas Henderson
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
Mr. Ragnar Arnese, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, AID
Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs,
Department of State
Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)
Mr. Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

President Kennedy invited President Paz' views on the situation in Bolivia, particularly in the mines. President Paz said that the rehabilitation of the nationalized mines is a prerequisite to Bolivian development. This has required that the Government impose its authority on the mine union extremists. He said the Government had been successful in this effort. However, with the Communist union leadership brought to heel, the rehabilitation effort must enter a new phase involving a technical approach to administrative reform.

The Bolivian Government has a suggestion for the beginning of this phase. Heretofore the Governments of the United States and West Germany and the Inter-American Development Bank, partners in the

¹ Alliance for Progress; U.S. aid to Bolivia; development assistance; petroleum. Confidential. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, Paz Visit, 10/63.

Triangular Operation for the rehabilitation of the state mines, have sought to deal with this problem through an Advisory Group in Bolivia. The difficulty is that, in addition to acting in a purely advisory capacity, the Advisory Group is made up of a heterogeneous group of technicians without a sense of organizational responsibility and loyalty. These people are rather like international civil servants. They have been recruited as individuals for a relatively brief period and will then move on to other employment. The Bolivian Government believes that an effective beginning of the administrative reform phase could be made by contracting a business firm to administer a group of the COMIBOL mines. This might be on the basis of a fixed fee with a bonus for production increases. This would have to be accomplished by means of a contract under which the business firm would administer the mines for the Government. There can be no question of denationalization, which is not to be considered. It would be well to begin with a limited group of mines. This would be a step toward decentralization of the vast state mining enterprise and would provide a test of the effectiveness of the arrangement. If it is successful, further efforts can be made in the same direction. If not, other approaches will have to be tried. In response to President Kennedy's question, President Paz said that the problem of achieving more efficient production in the mines had originally been one of labor discipline but that this problem has been overcome and the problem now is one of effective management.

President Kennedy inquired whether an American firm contracted for this purpose would be resisted as exploiters; would it be preferable to get a Canadian, German, French or other firm? President Paz said either alternative would be acceptable. He said that just as the trade union leaders have not received support in their resistance because the Government had allowed attitudes to mature and a consensus to develop before acting, so there is now a consensus for more efficient operation of the mines. President Kennedy said we would examine this proposal and be in touch with the President concerning it after his talks with the Inter-American Bank and others.

President Paz said the matter of the mines was the most important problem; however, there are others. He said the Minister of Economy would be talking to the World Bank and to Mr. Moscoso about some problems connected with roads.

President Paz then drew attention to the problem of petroleum. He said the Bolivian Government had pursued a very realistic petroleum policy. Bolivia has opened her doors to private capital in this field, and a number of private companies are at work. The Gulf Petroleum Company has found oil. At the same time the Bolivian Government wants to preserve the state petroleum company (YPFB) to supply the

internal market while allowing Gulf to produce for export. Certain problems have arisen because YPFB must conduct exploration in order to be able to supply the domestic market. Failing that, significant amounts of foreign exchange will have to be spent for petroleum imports.

President Kennedy inquired about the status of Gulf's offer to loan \$5 million to YPFB and the question of whether Gulf can sell natural gas to companies engaged in production for export. With regard to the latter problem, he said large companies operating internationally do have a problem of precedents inasmuch as actions taken in one place affect their situation elsewhere. He hoped that something could be worked out to permit Gulf to begin exporting because this will provide important new foreign exchange earnings. President Paz expressed confidence that a solution to the problem with Gulf would be worked out. He said the Government was preparing a decree which they would be showing to Gulf. The Government believed that it would be appropriate to permit Gulf to make sales directly to new companies entering Bolivia to produce for export and which would be consumers of large quantities of natural gas. President Paz said that Bolivia needs the loans both from the United States Government and from Gulf.

President Kennedy said he understood that we would be able to make our decision on the basis of the DeGolyer-McNaughton report which will be submitted next month and that meanwhile the Bolivian Government will be talking with Gulf in the hope of working something out.

President Paz observed that any loan from the United States Government to YPFB had psychological impact out of all proportion to its financial magnitude. He said such a loan, because of its great psychological value, would be very helpful in connection with a Government agreement with Gulf.

The Minister of Economy introduced himself as the expert in negotiations with the United States. He said he did not know why this should be so, since he speaks no English, but he has been successful in these negotiations and over the past years U.S. aid has come to help the Bolivian economy. He described Bolivia's situation as one great mining camp with very limited work opportunities in other fields. President Paz is anxious to provide new job opportunities. Thanks to U.S. help, Bolivia has contracted for engineering studies of the roads on which her future depends. Naturally the inauguration of projects such as road construction takes time. This means that there is an anguishing delay between the first consideration of these projects and their actual inauguration. U.S. officials in the field are great friends of Bolivia and are doing all they can, but there are many delays in the program which create problems. The Bolivian Government believes

the program should be accelerated to permit the Government to meet the promises it has made to its people. Mr. Gumucio pointed out the interim help obtained in the form of a public works program last year, though small, had been very helpful. He said that interim help of the same character was badly needed to cover the next 18 months or so because the Alliance is not fully under way. Its machinery is still being built.

On the other hand, the Peace Corps, of which the Minister said he had originally been very skeptical, has been a genuine success. Americans are present in the villages and jungle areas of Bolivia sharing the day-to-day life of the Bolivian people. Civic action programs also have been successful. Nevertheless there remains a requirement for activity to fill the waiting period and the Alliance should be more flexible with fewer rigid requirements for an endless series of feasibility and other studies.

President Kennedy remarked that he believed Mr. Moscoso had heard this before. Mr. Moscoso said we are doing better in Bolivia. For example, in August we signed \$17 million in loans. There are delays but they are not greater than elsewhere nor are they unusual given the extremely difficult problems posed by Bolivian topography. It is true that the new roads under construction are the hope of the future. This is demonstrated by the important impact of the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Highway. However, there will soon be not this one but seven or eight roads from the highlands to the eastern lowlands. Naturally there are difficulties. We are using aerial photography for surveys and bad weather delays completion of these studies. On the other hand, activity is under way. Contracts for the construction of the first of these roads should be let in about six months. The El Alto road should be contracted out next April or May and the El Alto warehouse construction in four or five months. The latter was delayed for lack of a decision as to where it should be located. El Alto Airport is about finished, although we must now consult with the FAA on a possible runway extension since Panagra says it believes an extension will be required in order to permit jet service. Mr. Moscoso observed that elections are in the offing in Bolivia and that perhaps with their advent we shall see a more rapid utilization of public works monies the United States has already made available. In any case, it seems clear that such action would help in the situation the Minister described.

President Kennedy asked whether it was Mr. Gumucio's feeling that feasibility studies were not required. The Minister said he had been working in the engineering field for some 24 years, although not an engineer, and was well aware of the necessity for feasibility studies. On the other hand, he believed that if given the funds he could have the feasibility studies done in half the time presently required. He said

these delays have serious effects. For example a road study project under way last year has now become bogged down and if the problem is not resolved it will be necessary to lay off some 300 or 400 workers, each of whom has several mouths to feed. President Kennedy suggested that we look into the problem of this road very carefully.

President Paz said that with regard to the Alliance it is apparent that at the outset the United States lacked the machinery to implement its new approach to Latin America just as the Latin American countries lacked machinery for taking full advantage of it. Nevertheless, both sides are improving. There is great concern, however, at the attitude of the U.S. Congress toward the Alliance. The history of the Alliance might be summarized as follows: First, President Kennedy's speech launching the Alliance; then delays in its implementation; finally, action which has led to popular belief in the Alliance. This confidence in the Alliance is in the interest of Latin American governments and of the United States Government. However, if Congressional cuts are made in Alliance funds, the effect will be very disillusioning. The President said he agreed completely and hoped President Paz would express himself in exactly these terms to the Congressional leaders with whom he would be in contact. He noted that some success has been achieved in restoration of Alliance funds and we shall continue to attempt to obtain the funds needed.

President Paz referred to Bolivia's long-standing desire for a tin smelter. He said Bolivia was asking that the United States finance a study of the feasibility of a Bolivian tin smelter. This would require no new funds. One million dollars remain of monies previously authorized for feasibility studies. The Bolivian Government would like to devote these funds to contracting a United States firm to study the feasibility of a tin smelter. President Paz added that the political effect in Bolivia of mentioning a tin smelter in the joint communiqué would be very great. Mr. Moscoso pointed out that we already have a flotation research project under way seeking to improve methods of treating Bolivian ores. The Bureau of Mines has sent a man to Bolivia in connection with this project. President Kennedy asked to be informed when the results of that study might be expected in order that this matter might be considered further. He expressed his appreciation for this opportunity of talking with President Paz and looked forward to the opportunity to continue the discussion on the following day.

19. Memorandum of conversation, October 23, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials¹

Part I (of 4)

October 23, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz of Bolivia: Cuban Subversion

PARTICIPANTS

Bolivia

President Victor Paz Estenssoro
Minister of Foreign Relations José Fellman Velarde
Minister of National Economy Alfonso Gumucio Reyes
Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada
Dr. Carlos Serrate Reich, Private Secretary to President Paz
Under Secretary for Foreign Relations Luis Alberto Alipaz
Mr. Jorge Paz, President Paz' uncle
Mr. José Paz, President of Bolivian Oil Enterprise (YPFB)
Mr. Raul Vivado (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President
Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin
Ambassador Ben S. Stephansky
Ambassador-designate Douglas Henderson
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
Mr. Ragnar Arnesen, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, AID
Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs,
Department of State
Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)
Mr. Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

After the Presidents had agreed on the text of the joint communiqué, President Kennedy asked Mr. Martin to discuss the matter of the control of travel to and from Cuba. Mr. Martin described the high priority we give to efforts directed at controlling Cuban subversion in Latin America. A key measure for the control of Cuban subversion is travel control. He noted that many governments have constitutional problems in controlling the travel of their citizens. At the same time, the difficulties have been somewhat lessened by success in isolating Cuba through a reduction in channels of communications. At present, the only regular direct air service between Cuba and other hemisphere

¹ Cuban subversion. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

countries is Cubana Airlines' Mexico-Habana flight. The Mexican Government has agreed to cooperate with any hemisphere government which requests Mexico to seek to control the travel to Cuba of the nationals of the other country by requiring such documentation as the other government considers necessary. In the face of this situation, Castro is making every effort to establish alternate means of communications. So far, he has not been successful. It will be recalled that the group of American students who managed to make their way to Cuba earlier this year were obliged to travel by an extremely circuitous route which involved long delays. This is an example of the kind of difficulty Castro is experiencing in this regard. We assign importance to efforts to control this travel because it is clear that people undergoing training in Cuba prior to the missile crisis are now ready to return to their own countries where they can make the kind of violent trouble we now see in Caracas. These people will return with subversive skills such as the manufacture of Molotov cocktails and other explosive devices. We have seen a recent increase in bomb-throwings in Colombia and are now beginning to see some of the same sort of thing in Ecuador.

President Paz said the Bolivian Government was interested in preventing or reducing the movement of students who go to Cuba not for academic study but for subversive training. He said his Government had some proof that training in guerrilla tactics is going on. However, the movement of these trainees goes on not only via Mexico but via Arica. He pointed out that Bolivian citizens do not need travel documents to go to Arica and that Cuban air service exists between Arica and Habana.

Mr. Martin said that it was our understanding that the only regular air service with Cuba is that from Mexico and it would seem likely that irregular flights from Arica would make stops in Mexico because of the difficulties of flying non-stop.

President Paz said Bolivia would take up this matter with Mexico but he believed the Arica air link was of importance. President Kennedy said we would certainly want to look into the Arica problem and be in further touch with the Bolivian Government about it. It would seem, however, that if each government in the hemisphere required its citizens to have passports with visas for Cuba in order to travel there, control would be greatly simplified.

There was some mention of Cuban flights to Brazil. Mr. Martin said we are watching those very carefully and that they have proved to be occasional flights undertaken with some other excuse. So far, there is no regular air service between Cuba and Brazil.

The Foreign Minister emphasized that it is in Bolivia's own interest to stop the flow of Bolivian youth to Cuba and gave assurances Bolivia would take the measures necessary for this purpose.

President Paz said that the traditional enemies of the MNR have been political rightists. This has changed rapidly. Opposition from the right is being eliminated or reduced to ineffectiveness, whereas increasingly the enemies of the revolution are those of the extreme left. This political development is one reason for Bolivian Government action on this travel problem. While there is no terrorism in Bolivia now, there may be tomorrow.

20. Memorandum of conversation, October 23, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials¹

Part II (of 4)

October 23, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz of Bolivia: Communist Propaganda

PARTICIPANTS

Bolivia

President Victor Paz Estenssoro
 Minister of Foreign Relations José Fellman Velarde
 Minister of National Economy Alfonso Gumucio Reyes
 Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada
 Dr. Carlos Serrate Reich, Private Secretary to President Paz
 Under Secretary for Foreign Relations Luis Alberto Alipaz
 Mr. Jorge Paz, President Paz' uncle
 Mr. José Paz, President of Bolivian Oil Enterprise (YPFB)
 Mr. Raul Vivado (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
 Under Secretary George W. Ball
 Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President
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 Ambassador-designate Douglas Henderson
 Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
 Mr. Ragnar Arnesen, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, AID
 Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs,
 Department of State
 Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)
 Mr. Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

¹ Communist propaganda. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

President Paz remarked that, interestingly enough, a significant amount of communist propaganda reaches Bolivia via United States universities. President Paz agreed that this material was being sent by student groups rather than by the universities themselves. He could not identify the groups sending the material but said it reached Bolivian universities, where communists are quite strong, as second-class mail.

President Kennedy said we would want to look into the matter, and President Paz agreed to furnish more specific information about U.S. sources. President Kennedy inquired whether Bolivia receives substantial quantities of propaganda from the Soviet Union and Cuba. President Paz said the volume of such propaganda was large but that it did not reach its addressees. He said the Government had a problem akin to that of the United States with its agricultural surpluses in trying to handle this propaganda material. President Kennedy inquired about the effectiveness of USIS and the Voice of America. President Paz said local radio programs produced by USIS in Bolivia, such as the very useful "Cronica", were more effective in Bolivia than the Voice.

21. Memorandum of conversation, October 23, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials¹

Part III (of 4)

October 23, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz of Bolivia: US Aid Program; COMIBOL; Alliance for Progress

PARTICIPANTS

Bolivia

President Victor Paz Estenssoro

Minister of Foreign Relations José Fellman Velarde

Minister of National Economy Alfonso Gumucio Reyes

Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada

Dr. Carlos Serrate Reich, Private Secretary to President Paz

Under Secretary for Foreign Relations Luis Alberto Alipaz

Mr. Jorge Paz, President Paz' uncle

Mr. José Paz, President of Bolivian Oil Enterprise (YPFB)

Mr. Raul Vivado (Interpreter)

¹ Alliance for Progress; U.S. assistance. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

United States

President Kennedy

Under Secretary George W. Ball

Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President

Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin

Ambassador Ben S. Stephansky

Ambassador-designate Douglas Henderson

Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress

Mr. Ragnar Arnesen, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, AID

Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs,

Department of State

Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)

Mr. Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

President Kennedy suggested that the discussion return to some of the items considered in the previous day's conversation. He asked Mr. Moscoso what had been worked out in the interim.

Mr. Moscoso said it had been agreed in July that AID would send an engineer to look into the matter of road no. 2 when requested to do so by the Bolivian Government. Now that Mr. Gumucio has made the request, an engineer will be sent immediately. The problem of a management contract for a group of state (COMIBOL) mines had been discussed with President Paz and Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank. The Bank has the names of a number of management firms, one of which will be agreed upon with Dr. Bedregal, the President of COMIBOL, when he comes to Washington. It has been generally agreed that President Paz' idea of utilizing this firm for a limited number of mines is very good.

Mr. Moscoso added that financial controls in COMIBOL are also necessary. There is no requirement that the firms that have been involved in discussions of this matter to date should be used, but some firm of good reputation should be selected not only to train COMIBOL people in financial control procedures but actually to keep COMIBOL accounting up to date in the interim period. The need for improved financial controls has been agreed upon with Dr. Bedregal but there are disagreements over how much improvements should cost and with regard to personnel to be trained. AID and the IDB are willing to finance the training of COMIBOL employees in financial control techniques for the one-year period considered necessary.

President Paz said he would like to make one clarification with regard to Minister Gumucio's remarks of the day before. The Bolivian Government thinks that regulations—not persons—impede progress. No one could seek to be more helpful than U.S. officials like Mr. Moscoso. However, the problem is to establish which requirements are really necessary and which others can be dropped in the interest of speed and flexibility.

In this connection President Paz said he did not consider the Lleras-Kubitschek proposals concerning the Alliance as a solution. Implementation of their proposals would only involve new delays. Ultimately the decisions must be made by the United States. Dr. Paz said he had told Kubitschek as much when he was in La Paz. Moreover, he said, in any organizational structure controlled by the Latin Americans, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are going to take the lion's share of Alliance help without regard for the problems of the smaller countries. The Bolivian Government definitely prefers to deal bilaterally with the United States with regard to the Alliance.

Mr. Moscoso said we had thought it desirable that Latin Americans be more involved in the Alliance. He expressed the opinion that the CID could, if organized, make recommendations on procedures as to how to accelerate the Alliance effort. He noted that it was precisely in response to a request to Dr. Lleras and Mr. Kubitschek for recommendations on such procedures that they had produced their report recommending the CID. On the other hand, he noted that AID is improving its procedures. Regional administrators now have authority to approve loans up to \$2.5 million and he would like to redelegate that authority to the field.

President Paz said this was a notion Bolivia had favored for some time. The people in the field know the problems and are capable of dealing with them. Referral to Washington inevitably involves delays because Washington is dealing with the problems of the world.

President Kennedy wondered how many of the delays were due to statutory limitations, how many were the result of Congressional caprice, and how many had been created by the country involved. Mr. Moscoso noted that long lists of statutory criteria must be satisfied for the approval of a single project and someone must certify on each point that we are not violating the law. Some of our requirements are related to our serious balance of payments problem.

President Kennedy inquired about Bolivia's balance of trade with the United States. President Paz said Bolivia imports from the United States about ten times its exports to the United States. It was observed that the difference is made up of loans, direct investments, and sales to Europe.

President Kennedy said it was precisely on the basis of situations like this that he had made the point to Congress that Latin American trade is so oriented that the dollar loss involved in the Alliance effort is much less significant than in the case of Europe.

President Paz said Bolivia was experiencing some difficulty in the use of dollar aid. Not only do existing documentation requirements involve delays but purchases of certain items in the United States are significantly more expensive than elsewhere. Tires, vehicles, milk and milk products are prominent examples. This has a cost-of-living effect

which creates certain problems. He said a memorandum had been left with Mr. Moscoso on this subject. President Kennedy said that the problem is that in the last eight or nine years the U.S. has lost in the neighborhood of \$15 billion. This creates tremendous pressure for cuts in the aid program and a retrenchment in our military security efforts. Moreover, if the loss were to continue at this rate it would seriously jeopardize the entire exchange system of the Western world.

Minister Gumucio said Bolivia expected to resolve difficulties on use of dollars by working with AID, although flexibility in the application of the procedures would be needed to avoid a sharp impact on prices.

President Paz said that Bolivia is now sending some 5,000 tons of tin ore a year to Wah Chang in Texas City. It seems that Wah Chang is not in good financial condition. As a result Wah Chang is unable to make advances on ore shipments. The transactions with them thus turn out to be less advantageous than those with the British smelters. These advances on ore shipments are extremely important because there is a six-month delay before final settlement for ores shipped to the smelters. As a result the Bolivian Government has a need to finance the maintenance of this ore pipeline. A similar problem is the financing of the Bolivian sugar harvest. At present counterpart funds are used to finance the harvest but this immobilizes funds which otherwise might be used for development purposes for which they are badly needed. The Bolivian Government has tried to interest Grace in financing this harvest because Grace is the sugar distributor in Bolivia, but Grace is not willing to substitute its financing for the present system of counterpart financing. Mr. Moscoso said that these are essentially commercial banking problems and we are exploring the possibilities of interesting U.S. banks in doing this financing. It may be possible to use the investment guaranty to encourage this. We are also talking to the International Monetary Fund about these problems.

President Paz said he would like to endorse Mr. Gumucio's remarks in the previous meeting concerning the need to fill the gap between the present and the full-scale work on large projects. Last year's \$3 million for public works had been very useful and very visible. Mr. Moscoso said that we were prepared to look at projects of this kind. He suggested that an effort be made to combine public works projects with the layoff of surplus workers from COMIBOL.

President Paz said that this could be done to some extent but not completely. The fact is that miners tend to be miners for life and are not easily transferred to other employment. A much better device for absorbing excess COMIBOL workers is the expansion of private mining activities on the basis of credits from the Mining Bank. He agreed that U.S. funds were available for the bank, once prerequisites have been met, and acknowledged that responsibility for the delay was on the Bolivian side.

22. Memorandum of conversation, November 20, between Kennedy and Ambassador Henderson¹

November 20, 1963

SUBJECT

Ambassador Henderson's Mission to Bolivia

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Douglas Henderson

The President inquired about President Paz and we discussed generally President Paz' helpful attitude toward the Alliance for Progress.

I told the President that I had recently been in New York and Pittsburgh discussing the possibility of private investment in Bolivia with American businessmen. The President inquired about business attitudes after the Argentine action on American oil investment. I said that the American businessmen with whom I had spoken generally took the view that the Bolivian climate for private investment could be distinguished from the Argentine situation. We also spoke briefly of the privileged position of some American private investors in foreign countries, particularly in the extractive industries.

The President then inquired about the living conditions in La Paz connecting this with the possibility of a visit by him to Bolivia as well as to Chile and Peru early in 1964. He also inquired about whether a visit to one of the three countries would affect his reception in another. I said that no American President to my knowledge had ever visited Bolivia and that he would be sure of a very hospitable reception there. I suggested that he should consider visiting Bolivia first and then going to Peru before visiting Chile, since Chilean-Bolivian relations at the present time are strained.

The President authorized me to say to President Paz he remembered his commitment to visit Bolivia and that he is considering the possibility of such a visit shortly.

¹ Discussion of Henderson's mission to Bolivia. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General, 8/63-1/64.

Chile

23. Memorandum of conversation, February 20, between Rusk and Ambassador Mueller¹

February 20, 1961

SUBJECT

Financial Assistance to Chile

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Chilean Ambassador Walter Mueller
Mr. Fausto Soto, Minister, Chilean Embassy
Mr. Samuel O. Lane, WST
Robert M. Phillips, WST

In the course of a courtesy call on the Secretary, the Chilean Ambassador mentioned the credits which the Chilean financial mission had recently negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and United States official and private lending institutions. He also said that he had discussed with Under Secretary Ball the pending request for appropriation of \$100 million for Chilean reconstruction and had expressed the hope that this would be made available as soon as possible.

The Secretary said we were experiencing something of a legislative log jar, largely because many important domestic bills were being considered, but we hoped to be able to act promptly in presenting the appropriation request for Chilean reconstruction. He asked what progress Chile was making towards meeting the housing problem, and also what was being done in the agricultural sector.

The Ambassador briefly outlined the operation of the *Caja Central* which had been set up to encourage the growth of private savings and loan associations as a means to encourage private investment in housing. He pointed out that Chile was carrying on an extensive agricultural colonization scheme which involved substantial elements of agrarian reform. He went on to mention Chile's new 10-year development plan and also expressed the idea that the same amount of economic development assistance now being extended to the underdeveloped countries could do much more if there were better coordination among the various lending agencies, both United States and international. The Ambassador considered that it was particularly desirable

¹ Financial assistance to Chile. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.5-MSP/2-2061.

that project credits be made available to cover all costs, including local currency costs, and that the International Cooperation Administration's participant training programs should be related to the needs of development projects.

The Secretary, commenting that coordination was desirable but not always easily achieved, suggested that perhaps the coordination of credits from a number of sources could be best effected by the recipient country. For our part, he added, we were studying a plan for more effective integration of the activities of United States official lending institutions.

24. Memorandum from Achilles to Berle, April 13¹

April 13, 1961

SUBJECT

Chile

Perhaps the principal cause of the equivocal Chilean attitude toward the Cuban problem is the political fragmentation of the country. You recall that Alessandri, the rightist candidate, was elected with only 32 per cent of the popular vote, and largely due to the number of competing leftist candidates. Of the three parties supporting his Government, the largest (Radicals) has both rightist and leftist factions, and gives the Government only conditional support. Related to this situation is the desire of the Government and Alessandri not to rock the boat by doing anything which would cause avoidable controversy or criticism, particularly from the left. The Chilean government has shown itself not only unwilling to take any stand against Castro, but similarly unwilling to take measures against domestic communists or international communist meetings or visits in Chile.

Alessandri, furthermore, is both extremely stubborn and reluctant to take advice from anyone.

While we should continue, of course, to work on the Chileans along the usual lines in Santiago, here, and in the UN, I doubt that we can expect much improvement in the Chilean attitude except (1) as part of a general improvement in Latin American opinion, or (2) from some

¹ Chilean attitude toward Cuban problem; aid to Chile Christian Democratic Party. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Task Force on Latin America Files: Lot 61 D 298, Chile.

development in direct Cuban-Chilean relations, such, for example, as in the discovery of incriminating documents in the Cuban Embassy as happened in Peru and El Salvador.

In the longer run and less directly, we have our assistance in Chilean earthquake reconstruction to work with. The best approach here will be one of flexibility in permitting the Chileans to use our aid along lines which will contribute to social and economic development in the devastated areas rather than simple reconstruction. We will also want to keep urging the Chilean Government to get on with the implementing of the Act of Bogotá. The Government should be receptive, since apparently the principal losses which the rightist parties suffered in the March elections to the Popular Action Front were in areas where the need for land reform is greatest.

Probably the principal group to which we should give attention is the Christian Democratic Party. In the March elections it increased its strength in the Senate from 2 to 5, while it slipped in the Chamber from 25 to 23. Party leaders have recently concluded that while it is gradually gaining strength, the prospects of single-handedly electing a president in the foreseeable future are dim, and that they should therefore develop alliances with other groups, including the Conservatives (largely clerical) and the Radicals (anti-clerical). Party President Eduardo Frei is expected here before long and will be worth cultivating. This will have to be done discretely to avoid ruffling Alessandri.

Two things which are applicable in Chile should be of wider application: One is that the lack of unity and drive on the part of coalitions might well be remedied, with significant concrete political benefits by active political action to implement the Act of Bogotá. The other is that we should presumably include Christian Democratic parties, at least in some countries, among those popular parties whose development we wish to encourage.

25. Memorandum of conversation, April 17, between Dillon and Agriculture Minister Casanueva¹

April 17, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dillon
Manuel Casanueva, Minister of Agriculture of Chile
Luis Mackenna, Central Bank of Chile
C. R. Harley
A. M. Rosenson

TIME & PLACE

April 14, 1961, Copacabana Palace Hotel, Rio de Janeiro

Minister Casanueva thanked the Secretary for the opportunity of speaking to him. He said Chile is now going through a process of economic adjustment and planning for the future. Inflation has been brought under control. The cost of living last year rose only between 5% and 6% and the exchange rate has been kept steady for the last two years.

The Minister expressed his pleasure with the Kennedy plan for economic development and technical assistance which, in its broad outlines, accords closely with the Chilean Government's thinking on these subjects. Chile has formulated a 10-year plan for economic and social development which is directed toward an improvement in the standard of living of the Chilean people. This plan is the result of careful studies made by the Chilean Development Corporation in collaboration with the Ministries of Agriculture and Economy and other Chilean Government agencies and with the help of the FAO, Point IV and ECLA.

The Minister expressed his thanks for the help received from the United States for rehabilitation from the effects of last year's earthquake. The earthquake affected not only the area immediately involved but the whole Chilean economy and resulted in a loss equal to total investment in Chile in a year, or about \$500 million.

Minister Casanueva then referred to the \$100 million credit now being considered by the U.S. Congress. He said it was important that this credit be used not only for construction but also for economic development; the two are inextricably linked. He hoped that it would be possible for our Congress to enact this legislation before May 21st, on which date the President of Chile goes before Congress with his

¹ Chilean economic adjustment and planning for the future. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.25/4-1761.

annual message. As in other democratic countries, the Chilean Government has an active political opposition, including opposition from the extreme left and Communists. Should the U.S. Congress fail to appropriate the money by that date, the Administration of President Alessandri would be subject to severe criticism from these elements. Therefore, it is very important that in his message to the Congress President Alessandri be able to announce the granting of the credit.

The Minister then said that the Chilean Government had under consideration two programs in the field of agriculture: (1) "colonization", involving the sub-division of large tracts of land both public and private, which are being inadequately utilized; and (2) assistance to small agricultural proprietors at the lower income levels. He said that they have applied for assistance on the first program from the Inter-American Development Bank, to be made available from the Bogota funds, and expect to submit an application on the second program.

The Minister said that among other less important problems was a request for a \$5 million credit from the Export-Import Bank for the purchase of agricultural equipment. Such a loan would be used in much the same way as the \$5 million which the Central Bank had previously received from the Export-Import Bank to assist small and medium-sized businesses to purchase industrial equipment.

The Secretary said that he was happy to have the opportunity to speak to the Minister and to obtain the Chilean point of view. He said he had the greatest respect and admiration for President Alessandri's program of development and stabilization. The Chilean achievement has indeed been remarkable.

The Secretary added that he hopes it will be possible for the legislation on the \$100 million to be enacted by May 21st. He said he would pass on the information given him by Minister Casanueva to the State Department and others in Washington, with a view to expediting action. This information provided a good reason for the Executive Branch to prod the Congress into somewhat faster action. However, he intimated that there should be no insuperable obstacle in the way of obtaining the funds by that date. In fact, he would have ventured the opinion that the bill would be through Congress by June 1 in any event.

As regards the small pending loan application with the Export-Import Bank which the Minister had mentioned, the Secretary said he would take this matter up with Mr. Linder and ask him to look into it.

Referring to the Minister's remarks regarding Chile's programs in the field of agricultural development, the Secretary said that the U.S. Government is very much interested in this field and that these are just the type of programs that the Bogota funds were intended for. Hence, there is every reason to believe that Chile's applications in the

IDB for this purpose will receive careful attention from the Bank as soon as it receives its share of the Bogota funds. He reminded his listeners, however, that these funds are not to be used for the purchase of land, which the Minister assured the Secretary was well understood.

Alexander M. Rosenson

26. Memorandum of conversation, June 2, between Barall and Chargé Soto¹

June 2, 1961

SUBJECT

Difficulties in Programming U.S. Assistance for Chilean Reconstruction

PARTICIPANTS

Deputy Assistant Secretary Barall, ARA
Chilean Chargé d'Affaires Fausto Soto
Mr. Jorge Burr, Minister Counselor, Chilean Embassy
Mr. Jose Zabala, Attaché, Chilean Embassy
Mr. Joseph Carwell, Acting Director, WST
Robert M. Phillips, WST

After expressing his Government's warm appreciation for the generosity of the U.S. in appropriating the \$100 million for Chilean reconstruction and rehabilitation, Mr. Soto asked Mr. Zabala to explain some of the difficulties which had arisen between representatives of the Chilean Government and the United States Operations Mission concerning the proposed utilization of this assistance. Mr. Zabala said the GOC was having a hard time adjusting to the views of the USOM that "rehabilitation" should be narrowly defined and that emphasis should be placed on the concentration of projects in order to achieve maximum public impact. He also feared that the strict administrative requirements of the USOM might delay the execution of agreed projects.

Mr. Barall pointed out that the USOM's position was not necessarily an unreasonable one. In the interest of our aid programs in Chile and elsewhere, ICA had to be guided by the intent of Congress as established not only in the law but also in the legislative history. We

¹ Difficulties in programming U.S. assistance for Chilean reconstruction. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.5-MSP/6-261.

expected, nevertheless, to be fairly flexible with regard to defining “rehabilitation,” so long as it could be shown that effective use was being made of the money and that it was not diverted to unrelated projects outside the devastated area. Concerning the concentration of projects, past experience had demonstrated that our Congress wanted our development assistance devoted to durable, easily identifiable projects rather than to a number of scattered, small projects which might involve funds from various sources. Basically, what the USOM wanted, in the interest of Chile and other aid-recipient countries, was to be able to show our Congress that our assistance was being effectively utilized.

Mr. Barall went on to state that we expected to know within the next week the terms and conditions to be offered to the GOC for this loan, and we hoped that these would be considered advantageous. We intended to do everything possible to expedite the necessary administrative procedures, and for this purpose ICA was appointing a well-qualified man who would work full time on this program. Being a separate piece of legislation, the loan was not subject to the administrative requirements of the Mutual Security Act, and this should expedite matters.

Mr. Carwell stated that our Ambassador at Santiago would be instructed to negotiate the corresponding bilateral agreement.

Mr. Soto expressed appreciation for this information and said he would leave with us an aide memoire. [Attached to this aide memoire, dated June 2, are copies of a memorandum of a meeting held on May 5 between representatives of the GOC and USOM, and a letter from the USOM Housing Division to the Ministry of Public Works dated May 16. These documents were cited by the Chileans as illustrating the difficulties mentioned by Mr. Zabala.]

**27. Memorandum of conversation, October 10, between
President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Martinez¹**

October 10, 1961

SUBJECT

Interview—President Kennedy and Chilean Foreign Minister Carlos Martinez Sotomayor

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Wymberley DeR. Coerr,
Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American
Affairs
Mr. F. van Reigersberg, LS
interpreter

Sr. Carlos Martinez Foreign Minister
Ambassador Walter Muller

1. Recent Political Changes in Chile

The Foreign Minister explained to the President the significance of the entrance of the Radical Party into President Alessandri's Administration. Together with the Conservatives and Liberals, the Administration now has more than 60% of Congress behind it. The Radical Party is of the "democratic left" and has tenets very close to those of President Kennedy. The Alessandri Administration fully endorses the Alliance for Progress, and new Radical support means added support for the Alliance.

2. Alliance for Progress

The President said the US is prepared to give important help to Latin America during the next ten years, towards economic and social development. But it will be necessary to show the Alliance is a joint effort, with sacrifices from both sides, if the Congress and the American people are to support the Alliance.

The Foreign Minister described the new Chilean Ten-Year Development Plan, and told how it coincides with the President's ideas. Commissions comprised of Congressional representatives of the three Administration parties are currently studying planned legislation in agrarian reform, tax reform, customs revision, and administrative reorganization.

¹ Recent political changes in Chile; Alliance for Progress; economic development; land reform; Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, October–December 1961.

3. *Economic Development*

Under the Chilean Ten-Year Plan, per capita income would increase 25% in the decade. The Foreign Minister hopes this can be increased, as the people expect rapid social and economic progress and their patience is running short. He thanked the President for the favorable position taken by the US regarding a possible IBRD-sponsored consortium, which would aid the GOC in the Ten-Year Plan.

4. *Land Reform in Chile*

The Foreign Minister explained the program would be in stages, beginning with the GOC dividing public lands for distribution to the peasants. Second, the government would expropriate private lands which were not being utilized to the optimum. However, division of large estates must not lead to small, uneconomic holdings. Agricultural villages will be built complete with schools and credit institutions. Agrarian reform must be for the purpose of implementing social change, as well as improving the economic situation.

5. *Cuba*

According to the Foreign Minister, the US-sponsored invasion attempt had been a serious mistake, lowering US prestige. Opposition in Cuba to Castro seems to be increasing, for both political and economic reasons. More and more internal troubles will weaken Castro and eventually bring his downfall. It would be a serious error to take collective measures through the OAS.

The President asked the Minister's opinion on whether measures similar to those taken at San José against the Dominican Republic could be taken by the OAS if executions in Cuba continue.

The Foreign Minister believes the two situations are different. Nevertheless, if executions were to continue, consultations might be held very privately at the Foreign Minister level to determine if sanctions would be appropriate and, if so, their extent.

28. Instructions for Moscoso Mission, undated¹

undated

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MOSCOSO MISSION

In response to requests made by the Government of Chile for U.S. assistance to meet its current foreign exchange crisis and support its Ten-Year Economic Development Plan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Goodwin is authorized to commit the United States to a two-phased proposal of conditional U.S. financial assistance set forth below.

First, an offer of \$80 million for development and capital projects partly within the Government of Chile's budget, conditional on Chile's putting into effective operation a stabilization plan agreed with the IMF and supported by IMF standby credits. These project loans would be provided by AID in the amount of \$50 million and by the EXIM Bank in the amount of \$30 million.

Second, an offer to help establish and through a long-term commitment of U.S. funds provide substantial financial assistance for a consortium organized to make available the external resource requirements of Chile's Ten-Year Economic Development Plan contingent on Chile's acceptance of the following conditions:

- acceptance and effective operation of a stabilization plan as outlined in the first phase of the U.S. assistance proposal.

- agreement with the U.S. or other mutually acceptable consortium manager on the plan as it may be modified in IBRD and Wise Men review.

- enactment of tax reform legislation to minimally increase public revenue to 16% of GNP.

- enactment of agrarian reform legislation that fulfills the pledge of Article 6, Title I of the Charter of Punta del Este.

If the Chileans indicate that they will not be able to accept the conditions without some indications of the amount of funds the United States would be willing to commit to their long term development plan, Mr. Goodwin will—at that time—inform them that funds in the rough order of magnitude of approximately 50% of the needed external resources can probably be provided by the U.S. if the rest is obtained from other countries and financing institutions.

If the Government of Chile accepts this two-phased offer of conditional U.S. assistance, Mr. Goodwin is authorized to invite the Government to send to Washington as soon as possible a Chilean

¹ Two-phased proposal of conditional U.S. financial assistance to Chile. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1962.

financial delegation to develop and agree with the IMF on a stabilization plan.

29. Telegram 746 from Santiago, March 8¹

Santiago, March 8, 1962

Priority. For Hamilton and Woodward. From Moscoso and Goodwin.

Following is text of agreement worked out with Chilean cabinet and which will be presented to Alessandri tonight.

1. The Government of the United States undertakes to extend to Chile loans up to \$80 million for high priority economic and social development projects. The loans will be made available to Chile by the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Export-Import Bank. The loans will be available, subject to prior approval of each project in 1962 with no more than \$40 million being made available before September 10.

2. The Government of Chile, for the achievement of its program of stabilization recognizes the need of reaching an agreement with the IMF which will permit it to draw at that time on standby credits from this Agency, simultaneously establishing the conditions under which other agencies or countries may be disposed to participate in the formation of the consortium destined to complete the financing of the external resources necessary for the public sector of the National Development Plan. The stabilization agreement will be concluded no later than September 10, 1962.

3. The Government of the United States also undertakes to participate in a consortium of international lending agencies and national governments which is to be constituted for the purpose of making long-term loan commitments to help finance specific projects approved pursuant to Chile's long-term development *plan, after approval of such a plan by the nine-man panel of experts of the OAS* which we understand will be finished by July 1962. For that purpose, the Government of the United States undertakes to make loan commitments of approximately

¹ Text of agreement worked out with Chilean cabinet re U.S. loans to Chile. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1962.

\$350 million to help finance the first five years of the public sector of Chile ten-year development plan subject to the following conditions:

That the loan commitments made by the United States Government for specific projects in the public sector in any year shall not exceed 50 percent of the sum of the loan commitments for projects in the public sector made in that year by all members of the consortium including the United States;

That the long-term loan commitments by the Government of the United States shall be contingent upon annual review by the panel of experts of the OAS for determination as to whether the Government of Chile is implementing its development plan satisfactorily and carrying forward with sufficient speed the necessary social and structural reforms. The Government of the United States will be relieved of its obligation to extend loans for specific development projects pursuant to this understanding whenever the Government of the United States determines, on the basis of this annual review, that the Government of Chile is not implementing its development plan, including its stabilization program, or is not carrying forward adequately its necessary social and structural reforms within the spirit and concept of the Alliance for Progress. The considerations which will be taken into account for this purpose by the Government of the United States will include the following:

A. Whether the Government of Chile has enacted necessary tax reform legislation and has taken the necessary administrative measures to attain the level of tax revenues necessary for the financing by the Government of Chile of at least 80 percent of the total costs of the public sector development projects being implemented as estimated in Chile's ten-year plan submitted to the panel of experts of the OAS, and to improve adequately the equity with which the tax burden is distributed among the different income groups of Chile.

(B) Whether the Government of Chile has enacted necessary agrarian reform legislation and has vigorously implemented that legislation. This would include the question, in particular, of whether a land tax has been enacted and has been so enforced as to encourage better land utilization and/or the voluntary sale of land by the owners of large tracts whenever they find that the possession of large holdings does not offer significant productive advantages.

4. It is understood that the loan commitments by the United States Government for future fiscal years are subject to Congressional appropriation of the funds required and Congressional approval of the necessary commitment authority.

30. Telegram 58 to Santiago, July 20¹

July 20, 1962

From Martin for Ambassador. Embtel 23 and 66.

I should like to repeat basic assumptions behind relatively hard line we take with respect to Chile's economic problems and programs.

First, it is not just a stubborn insistence upon carrying out the letter of the Moscoso-Goodwin agreement, important as this is in our relations with other Latin American countries, with our Congress, and in the end, I believe, to our future relations with the Chileans themselves.

Nor are we, as it may sometimes seem, trying to convert Alessandri to anti-Americanism, even though, if he continues his do-nothing posture, this might help us with the Chilean people.

Nor are we, finally, insisting upon withholding aid until Alessandri's Government takes certain measures, trying to employ our aid merely as a club to secure actions by the GOC that might please us in the abstract.

As I see it, the measures which we have discussed with the Chileans, and which in general have commended themselves to other outside observers of the Chilean scene, are measures which must be taken not only for the long-term benefit of the Chilean people but also, and most importantly, because of the contribution they will make to the success of the kind of center political forces that we (and we hope Alessandri) want to win the 1964 election. Failure to take such measures may save some political difficulties this year but it would only be at the expense of creating much more serious difficulties in succeeding years because the fundamental problems will not have been tackled. This is the basic politico-economic calculation which we seem to have so much difficulty in getting across to Alessandri.

The withholding of aid (other than that pre-September tranche agreed upon in March) is not just to secure enactment of these various measures but reflects our belief that without them our money, whatever the amount, cannot create the kind of political and economic climate in Chile which is essential to the achievement of the goals for Chile of the Alliance for Progress and of the US and, we believe, the Alessandri Government. There are too many demands on our funds and they are secured with too much political blood, sweat, and tears here for us to

¹ Reiteration of U.S. hard line with respect to Chile's economic problems and programs. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, July–October, 1962.

be able to make them available where there is a substantial risk that they will not contribute proportionately to these shared objectives.

I want also to make clear that this is not just a Chilean policy but one which is being followed with considerable vigor everywhere.

I hope that you and your mission will continue to do everything possible to make this basic United States attitude toward our relations with Chile in connection with the Alliance for Progress widely understood within and outside the Government. Only if it is understood, could there be any possibility of a meeting of minds between the President and Alessandri, and thereby a fruitful visit.

On possibility Alessandri visit Washington we still considering various aspects question, and need your reaction following considerations. There appears at present to be substantial danger Alessandri would see in invitation opportunity exert pressure directly on President Kennedy to relieve Alessandri from necessity taking various self-help and reform measures contemplated in Moscoso-Goodwin understandings. Invitation might accordingly encourage Alessandri resist recommendations made by his advisers as well as by foreign advisers for measures necessary in Chile's own interest as well as for purpose reaching agreement with IMF.

If Alessandri were to come to Washington without prior performance in affecting minimum tax and fiscal reform and land reform measures and without having reached agreement with IMF, he would find no receptivity his efforts persuade Washington agencies waive conditions Moscoso-Goodwin understanding. On contrary we would expect Alessandri to receive a stiff lecture on necessity taking measures he so far has shunned. Any communiqué could only reflect this need. Accordingly visit might prove counterproductive for Alessandri's political position at home, particularly assuming Chilean press build-up in expectation dramatic results his visit.

On other hand, we recognize that invitation to Washington might stimulate Alessandri to exert sufficient leadership to obtain IMF agreement and passage some reforms in order provide atmosphere for constructive conversations here. Likelihood this possibility presumably would be increased if Alessandri could be convinced our firmness in holding to conditions Moscoso-Goodwin understanding.

On balance, we are reluctant encourage Alessandri visit in view our conclusion invitation would decrease rather than strengthen his determination take necessary internal measures. On other hand, we might be willing propose to President Kennedy that visit be scheduled only on understanding firm date will not be set until after those measures have been taken. However, will be extremely difficult to attempt arrange visit during remainder this year and particularly prior US election due heavy Presidential schedule. Therefore this message FYI

only and not for discussion outside Embassy, in order avoid raising false hopes.

Ball

31. Letter from Charles W. Cole to Edwin M. Martin, July 23¹

July 23, 1962

Dear Ed:

This letter attempts to set forth the most urgent and crucial points in the present situation as regards U.S.-Chile relations. It represents only my own views, though I believe that a good many of the Embassy staff would agree with all or part of it. I wrote this letter before receiving Deptel 58 but found that communication of no real help on any of the major points. I am sending copies to Ted Moscoso, Walt Rostow and Mac Bundy, in the hope that they will be interested. I want to cover three important matters.

1. As I have indicated in various telegrams, I think that President Alessandri and the Government of Chile have a good deal of justice on their side when they ask for a fairly firm indication as to the dollars they may actually expect to receive from us in 1962 and 1963 under the Moscoso-Goodwin agreement and a reasonably clear estimate as to the timing.

The way things have worked out, it has become clear that the PL 480 component of the \$120 million of the Moscoso-Goodwin can not amount to more than \$20 or \$21 million at the very best. Quite probably it will be as small as \$14 million and will not be all received in 1962 in any case. As to the \$40 million CORFO loan, the difficulties on matching with U.S. imports and with the exchange rate seem to me to indicate that not all of it, either, can be received in 1962. As to the second tranche of \$40 million, what with the Ex-Im Bank situation and with the first tranche slow-down, I would guess that not more than \$2 or \$3 million could get to the Government of Chile in 1962, if any.

So, because of restrictions, legalisms (probably necessary), new developments, etc., it has worked out as with an insurance policy. The big print insures you and the fine print uninsures you. And there has

¹Crucial points in U.S.-Chile economic relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.25/7-2362.

been a lot of fine print. If we have to make the Government of Chile accept a shortfall of 50% or 60% on Moscoso-Goodwin, it seems to me that to enable them to plan and budget we really owe them a pretty firm commitment on amounts and timing. Further, by so much as we fall short on the \$120 million, by that much we drive them to expand Central Bank credit and thus make more difficult the IMF agreement which we are urging.

So let us do two things. First, let us give them the best estimates possible on amounts and timing, as mentioned above. Second, let us figure out just what we can do in the way of stand-by and balance of payments support when they do make an agreement with the IMF and tell them about it. I believe that firm information on this score will lead the Government of Chile to conclude such an agreement.

The second step is the more necessary because of the way things have worked out. The second tranche of \$40 million under Moscoso-Goodwin was designed as bait to encourage the Government of Chile to agree with the IMF. It is now apparent that they can receive little or nothing of this second tranche for budget support. There is no bait left. The situation is so bad that they may well be driven to believe that an IMF agreement is impossible and there is no use trying for it. If we could tell them that stand-bys, etc. amounting to x million dollars (say \$85 million) would be available after the agreement, we would recreate the bait and encourage them at least to try.

2. I think that the Policy Planning memorandum, "Our Alliance for Progress Strategy in Chile", of May 25 struck at the main point of the problem here in a most effective and persuasive way. If we are to prevent a victory of the FRAP, if we are to improve stability and prosperity here, if we are to make even a partial success of the Ten-year Plan, we must maintain the forward momentum that has developed.

Despite discouraging developments on the exchange and budgetary fronts, and despite the 1960 earthquake, it is clear that Chile has been moving forward. It seems evident that from January 1, 1961, to June 30, 1962, production has been increasing at a rate equal to and probably greater than the 5½ % called for by the Ten-year Plan. At the same time, real wages have been definitely rising, unemployment has been declining, labor strife has decreased markedly. And all this in the face of exchange and financial difficulties and uncertainties.

It seems to me that we simply have to keep aid flowing and to prevent the taking of deflationary or restrictive steps, for a slow-down could be economically and politically disastrous. We are pushing them hard on devaluation. We want to be sure that at the same time we help them to maintain and increase the forward movement of the last eighteen months we also see to it that devaluation does not produce inflation, strikes and unrest.

3. In the last year I have talked with a number of distinguished economists of American or worldwide repute who have grave doubts about the IMF and its policies as regards underdeveloped countries. I find myself joining them in wondering whether the IMF orthodoxy is adequate for the situation of a country like Chile. A lot of competent observers think that when the history is written, the Argentine debacle will be laid at the IMF door, and we know what IMF-type stabilization did to Bolivia.

I sit here every day pushing the Government of Chile hard to reach an agreement with the IMF and realizing that the Government of the United States is hiding behind the IMF and wondering in my heart if IMF has the right prescription for Chile. You and I are going to feel a little odd if Chile lapses into economic chaos and the FRAP takes over and makes another Cuba out of Chile. We will feel even worse if it is recognized by everybody in 1965 or 1966 either that Chile could not possibly have lived with the terms set by the IMF or that, having accepted them, they were quite the wrong medicine.

Can't somebody with real economic depth and an understanding of underdeveloped countries (Ed Mason, Carl Kaysen, Willard Thorp) be gotten quickly to take a hard look at the IMF and see if we don't want either to get it to modify and liberalize its views or stop using it as a substitute for policies developed and approved by the State Department itself?

I feel the case and the plight of Chile are of the utmost importance. Right now Chile looks to me like the only country south of Colombia where stability and democracy can possibly be maintained and where the Alliance for Progress can possibly succeed. Let's stop worrying because the Chilenos don't do things our way, because they are short on follow-through, because they are too political, etc., etc., and look at the larger picture of the Hemisphere and the next decade.

As ever,

Charles W. Cole

cc: Teodoro Moscoso
Walt W. Rostow
McGeorge Bundy

32. Memorandum from Belcher to Edwin M. Martin, July 25¹

July 25, 1962

TO

ARA—Mr. Martin

THROUGH

ARA—Mr. Goodwin

FROM

WST—Mr. Belcher

SUBJECT

Ambassador Cole's Position on Chilean Situation

The following is a summary of Ambassador Cole's analysis of the situation in Chile and his position as to what US policy should be in view of that situation, for your background information during the Ambassador's consultations.

Our basic objective at this juncture is to prevent the victory of a FRAP candidate in the 1964 elections. Since the FRAP forces do not have a majority, their chances of victory depend on obtaining support of either the Christian Democrats, or the Radicals. [illegible in the original] the chances of defeating the FRAP are almost assured if the Radicals, Christian Democrats, and the far right unite. While less certain, in a three-way race between FRAP, Christian Democrats, and Radical-Liberal-Conservative forces, the latter probably would win.

The chances of achieving a coalition of the parties to the right of the FRAP are more likely if affairs in Chile are going [illegible in the original] well. Also, the chances of the victory of a Radical candidate, if supported only by Liberals and Conservatives, are more likely under these conditions. [illegible in the original] *our policy to avert crisis, to insure progress, and to create an* [illegible in the original] lack of progress will only strengthen the FRAP and make it more likely that the Christian Democrats or Radicals will join it.

The Department's policy seems to be to provide minimal assistance just sufficient to keep the Alessandri Government from collapsing, and to cut such [illegible in the original] further if the Government does not do what we want in the way of reforms and [illegible in the original] to come through on stabilization and reform, it still would be necessary

¹ Ambassador Cole's position on the situation in Chile. Confidential. DOS, CF, 725.00/7-2562.

for us to continue aid to Chile. We are going to have to continue to give aid to prevent the situation deteriorating in a fashion that would strengthen the left.

We must seek to keep the Radicals in the Alessandri Government, and seek to prevent a joining of either Radicals or Christian Democrats with the FRAP. Therefore we should help the Chilean Government in avoiding the following developments:

1. Economic deterioration in general.
2. Exchange and budget crises.
3. Failure to advance with the Ten-Year Plan.
4. Lack of visible indications of economic and social improvement.
5. Inflation, with accompanying labor troubles and disorders and declining real wages.
6. Anything that creates a sense that the present Government (and therefore *any* government of the Right Center) cannot cope with Chile's problems.
7. Anything that creates an atmosphere of general discouragement.

In general, then, our aid policy should be designed to prevent the developments listed above. Our aid therefore should not be minimal. In fact it probably should be more massive than planned. In addition, it must not be slow in coming, have too many strings attached, or be continued with too many pressures.

At the present moment, the political situation is serious and [illegible in the original]. President Alessandri feels he is not receiving the assistance promised him in March, a feeling justified by the serious reduction in the PL-480 agreement, and the delay in providing the AFP loan through CORFO. Alessandri wants to see President Kennedy, to explain the political problems arising from economic difficulties. The Embassy recommends that Alessandri be invited to visit the US at the earliest opportunity, and that we provide direct balance of payments support to Chile, insisting on a devaluation simultaneous with announcement of such support.

The Ambassador also believes that relations between the Chilean Government and the IMF are at an extremely crucial stage. If we can inform Alessandri just exactly how much he can expect to receive from the US this year and next, from the Moscoso-Goodwin understandings, Alessandri will then be able to make budget plans and calculate what adjustments must be made in order to reach agreement with the IMF. If Alessandri does not know how much he can count on the US providing, he will be unable to move on the IMF problem. We should, therefore, tell Alessandri how much he will receive from the PL-480 agreement, from the CORFO loan, and from the second \$40 million tranche. The latter implies resolving the issue of whether the Export-Import

Bank will furnish \$30 million only for imports from the US; the GOC always has maintained that this does not help it in its budget problem.

Finally, in viewing our problems with Chile it must be remembered that there is an inherent difficulty in Chile's democratic system for the Executive to get action through the Congress. Many of the delays and compromises affecting reform measures (and the 1960 earthquake recovery measures) have not sprung from willful neglect on the part of the Alessandri Administration, but from the need to obtain parliamentary support. There is a similar misunderstanding in Chile regarding the role of the Executive in the U.S., and a tendency to expect too much too rapidly.

**33. Memorandum of conversation, December 11, among
President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other
officials¹**

Part I (of 5)

December 11, 1962

SUBJECT

Current Situation in Chile, and the Alliance for Progress

PARTICIPANTS

CHILE

President Alessandri
Foreign Minister Martinez
Finance Minister Mackenna
Senator Angel Faivovich
Ambassador Walter Muller
Budget Director Sergio Molina
Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Ambassador Charles Cole
Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
Mr. Herbert May, ARA
Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS
Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS

¹ Current situation in Chile; Alliance for Progress. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.

At President Kennedy's invitation, President Alessandri made a general review of the Chilean situation, covering political and economic developments in the first four years of his administration. While much has been accomplished, the national development program will require foreign assistance. United States policies on credits have created certain difficulties, but new approaches on credit administration have been introduced. The Alliance for Progress has awakened the enthusiasm of the people, the Government of Chile supports the Alliance, and it is complying with the Charter of Punta del Este. The interest and efforts of the Chilean Government in fulfilling the commitments of Punta del Este are evident, and it is hoped that assistance of the nature and scope suggested by the OAS Ad Hoc Committee of Experts will be forthcoming, to enable Chile to continue its progress.

President Alessandri described the agricultural sector of Chile, commenting on much erroneous information about Chile's agrarian problems. While better land distribution is a goal, particularly important is the adjusting of farm prices in relation to industry; the latter sector has been favored in past development programs.

President Alessandri mentioned certain difficulties in implementing the Alliance for Progress. A particular problem is the United States procedure on development loans, which requires Chile to carry out investment projects, with reimbursement after construction. Another problem is in the foreign exchange field, with the United States restricted account system. While \$160 million has been authorized in aid, the Chilean Government has only received \$84 million.

Mr. Moscoso said that a remedy was being developed on the development loans, in order to adopt a system of program financing on a revolving fund basis, as opposed to project financing. On restricted accounts, he commented that a modification of present procedures was being studied, but that the burdensome questionnaire required from shippers was a measure introduced to control the United States balance of payments problem.

President Kennedy said that the United States balance of payments position required certain controls, including these forms. The United States was faced with either stopping aid or providing it under certain controls. A letter of credit procedure could be used to remedy part of the difficulty to which President Alessandri referred, and these difficulties could be worked out on the ministerial level.

President Alessandri stated that he did not see insurmountable economic or social problems over the next two years, and predicted that there would be no economic or social factors that could bring an electoral setback for the democratic parties (in the 1964 elections). He thanked President Kennedy for the cooperation extended by the United States, and praised the 100 members of the Peace Corps now in Chile.

34. Memorandum of conversation, December 11 among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials¹

Part II (of 5)

December 11, 1962

SUBJECT

Problems and Importance of American Investment in Chile

PARTICIPANTS

CHILE

President Alessandri
Foreign Minister Martinez
Finance Minister Mackenna
Senator Angel Faivovich
Ambassador Walter Muller
Budget Director Sergio Molina
Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
Ambassador Charles Cole
Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
Mr. Herbert May, ARA
Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS
Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS

President Kennedy assured President Alessandri that the United States has every desire to assist Chile's progress, in cooperation with other countries and international agencies. The United States also is concerned that Chile makes maximum use of available help, in its economic and social development. While the United States is making every effort to obtain more funds for Latin America, we have heavy commitments elsewhere. It is hoped, therefore, that Western Europe will play a larger role in the future in aid to Latin America.

Another source of capital is private investment. While there are obvious political problems involving American copper companies in Chile, President Kennedy expressed the hope that Chile would maintain a climate which would encourage private capital.

President Alessandri replied that American investments, particularly in copper, warranted special consideration. The problem is not that these companies have reduced their investment, but whether they

¹ Problems and importance of American investment in Chile. Limited Official Use. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.

will see fit to increase investments. While he always had had due respect for private capital, such capital should adjust its interests to those of the country where it operates. Profit must not be the only consideration; the company's activities must be consistent with the good of the community.

As much as President Alessandri desires an agreement with the copper companies for new investment, certain of their demands tend to obstruct such an agreement. President Alessandri thought, frankly, that President Kennedy and the Department of State should take particular note of the problem. The companies at present enjoy far more safeguards than under the Government of President Ibañez; there is a special law governing relations between the companies and the Government of Chile; and, there is the Copper Department.

President Alessandri said the companies now ask that he accept certain changes, which would amount to using his powers to reduce the regulatory powers of the Government of Chile. Such a proposal would be used by certain elements in the Congress as proof that Chile is a dependency of the United States. The companies are asking the government for a 20-year guarantee on taxes and insisting on a five-year amortization period. These requests can be exploited by Marxist opposition, to claim that the Alessandri administration is a tool of United States imperialism.

President Alessandri said he has every intention of meeting the requests of private investment, but uniting private interests with the public good. He commented that the situation of the American telephone company was another issue on which the Department of State was inaccurately informed. This, he said, could be discussed by members of his party, and also would be discussed with IT&T officials in New York.

President Alessandri said that the problem is to meet the needs of the companies, but in a way that will not make a political controversy detrimental to the company and Democracy. The problem is not only of money and must be considered from the political standpoint as well. He is not personally opposed to the requests of the American companies, but they are not practicable.

President Kennedy expressed his understanding of the political vulnerability of the American copper companies, and said that the United States Government could not afford to appear to endorse all their wishes. He emphasized his concern with capital flight in Latin America, noted the serious financial situation in Brazil, and repeated that some way must be found to induce the copper companies to reconsider their large investment plans. The precise way of reconciling the companies' interests with the Government of Chile's was, of course, a matter involving President Alessandri's judgment. But, an environment must be created that will attract private capital to Chile.

President Alessandri said that no other administration has been so disposed as his, to meet the companies' interests. However, the companies seem to increase their requests with every new guarantee given. His task is to persuade the companies to modify their demands within the framework of the legal guarantees they now have. President Alessandri again expressed his understanding of the importance of additional capital for Chile, but thought it would be highly useful for the companies to be made aware of the views of President Kennedy's administration and of the Department of State on these questions; namely, that in view of the political problems, the companies should adjust their position. While Chile needs to apply every resource for development, there are political problems, and businessmen must be brought to see the need for considering that aspect. President Alessandri suggested the desirability of having the Department of State explain to the copper companies that the political problems cannot be ignored, and thought that once this was done, the prospects of an early solution would be enhanced.

President Kennedy replied that even in the United States, private capital often goes its own way, despite arguments about the national interest. We would like to see an increased flow of investment to Latin America, our interest not being that of Anaconda or any other company, but the good of Chile. Our aim is stability for Chile, and have tried to make these issues clear to the companies. The fact remains, however, that private capital is quite sensitive to conditions, preferring for example to go to Europe if investment there yields more than the 4% from United States bonds, and investment decisions are based on private interests. We can only hope that negotiations will persuade capital to remain in Chile. The Alliance for Progress is not for the benefit of the private companies, but is aimed at bringing economic development and preserving freedom. One way to do this is to stimulate private investment. Therefore, an effort should be made to convince the copper companies that they have a sound future in Chile.

President Alessandri again expressed his full agreement with such views, but added that he merely wanted to stress the origins of the existing problem. He and former Finance Minister Eduardo Figueroa had agreed to many of the requests of the companies, but he could not entertain hopes of congressional approval. Given the great need for investment in Chile, he was only desirous of obtaining a quick solution and was not concerned with questions of fractions of profits. However, he does need the support of the Chilean Congress, and must work with the Congress (for the sake of preserving democratic institutions) in seeking the best solution.

35. Memorandum of conversation, December 11, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials¹

Part III (of 5)

December 11, 1962

SUBJECT

The Cuban Problem

PARTICIPANTS

Chile

President Alessandri
 Foreign Minister Martinez
 Finance Minister Mackenna
 Senator Angel Faivovich
 Ambassador Walter Muller
 Budget Director Sergio Molina
 Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
 Ambassador Charles Cole
 Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
 Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
 Mr. Herbert May, ARA
 Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
 Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS
 Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS

President Kennedy brought up the subject of Cuba, noting that while Castro has lost a great deal of prestige, the Castro regime would continue to present problems for some time to come, judging from Minister Guevara's recent speech pledging support for "popular liberation movements". The support of the OAS in the recent crisis showed that the problem was not a struggle between the US and Cuba, but rather a hemispheric problem and a challenge to the sovereignty of all the American countries. We should not allow the image that the problem is a struggle just between Cuba and the US to be maintained; anything that can be done to demonstrate our determination to oppose collectively the purposes of communism will increase the security of our nations.

President Alessandri said that the Chilean position always has been clear and could be no cause of problems in US-GOC relations. Chile, of course, is greatly attached to legal principles, in both domestic and

¹ Cuban problem. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.

foreign matters. At the Santiago meeting of consultation of Foreign Ministers, the Rio Treaty was a subject of serious discussion, concerning its precise scope. Differences of view arose as to the legal scope of the Treaty. But the recent situation in Cuba, which led to President Kennedy's action, was in flagrant violation of Article VI of the Treaty, which Chile could not countenance; appropriate instructions were issued immediately to the Chilean Embassies.

President Alessandri agreed that Castro's prestige has suffered. He had spoken with Senator Allende (note: Chilean Socialist Senator, and potential Popular Front candidate), stressing that the present Cuban situation constituted a threat warranting application of the Rio Treaty, and that Chile would proceed in a manner consistent with her responsibilities.

Both Presidents agreed that the free press has exaggerated the importance of Castro and Castroism, in many instances. President Kennedy noted the anticipated demonstrations on his Mexican visit, which never materialized. He said the problem is not "Castro", but rather difficult domestic problems which provide a breeding ground for the extreme left. In this connection, it would be a severe blow to see communism win an important election in a democratic country, when we have said that communism can remain in power only by building a wall.

President Alessandri said that exaggeration on the part of the press often creates fear, both inside and outside a country. As for Castro and the communists, a strong campaign against them is putting them on the defensive. He does not fear for the future. However, a democracy is at a disadvantage since its enemies take advantage of the right of free expression. Furthermore, it is always an easy matter for a dictatorship to use resources for propaganda, and therefore can organize anti-administration activities in the country concerned. The problem is to find ways to combat this propaganda. It is of the utmost importance that the press turn from a defeatist approach (on Chilean affairs).

36. Memorandum of conversation, December 11, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials¹

Part IV (of 5)

December 11, 1962

SUBJECT

US Military Assistance Programs, and Chilean Relations with Bolivia

PARTICIPANTS

Chile

President Alessandri
Foreign Minister Martinez
Finance Minister Mackenna
Senator Angel Faivovich
Ambassador Walter Muller
Budget Director Sergio Molina
Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
Ambassador Charles Cole
Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
Mr. Herbert May, ARA
Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS
Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS

President Kennedy raised US MAP to Latin America in general, asking if President Alessandri wished to make any comments about the possibility that our military aid was stimulating an arms race, thus creating an additional financial burden on the recipient countries.

President Alessandri assured President Kennedy that he had no criticism whatsoever to make on this subject, and could only express his appreciation for US help in this field. He had to request US help, after certain disturbances. While he had repeatedly advocated disarmament in Latin America, other countries, while expressing agreement in principle, had responded in practice by increasing their armed forces. The US had reassured the Chilean armed forces by extending a helping hand, so there is no cause for reproach, but rather for gratitude.

President Alessandri then referred to Chilean relations with Bolivia. The present Bolivian Government originated in a popular movement, which disbanded the army after assuming power, and provided for

¹ U.S. military assistance programs; Chilean relations with Bolivia. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.

local militia. When President Paz began having severe economic and unemployment problems, the local militia became centers of opposition to the administration. The Government then began to rebuild the regular army, and asked the U.S. for help, which the U.S. granted. Help also came from Argentina, which assured President Alessandri that its shipments were only defensive weapons.

Thus the Bolivian army began to grow in power, and from that point on any interpretation of events is largely a matter of conjecture. There may have been a desire to offset the army's growing influence by regrouping the militia. But it was in this atmosphere that the Lauca River dispute arose.

President Alessandri said that while the Lauca had been the subject of attention by both governments for 20 years, good relations always had prevailed. But, as soon as the GOC opened the first sluice gate on the Lauca project on an experimental basis, Chile was accused of violating Bolivia's sovereignty. It was against the resulting dispute that the Bolivian army and militia were regarded as constituting a possible threat to Chile's security. After an exchange of notes, the Argentine Government agreed to stop arms shipments to Bolivia.

President Alessandri repeated that in no way was he criticizing U.S. military aid. It had been of great help to Chile, and the destroyers which he hoped to obtain from the U.S. would certainly be of great service. He did note later that, while concurring with military assistance to countries who request it, in view of present relations with Bolivia, any strengthening of Bolivia's military potential would mean additional pressure and possible aggression against Chile.

37. Memorandum of conversation, December 11, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials¹

Part V (of 5)

December 11, 1962

SUBJECT

Press Reports about Chile

PARTICIPANTS

CHILE

President Alessandri
 Foreign Minister Martinez
 Finance Minister Mackenna
 Senator Angel Faivovich
 Ambassador Walter Muller
 Budget Director Sergio Molina
 Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy
 Ambassador Charles Cole
 Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
 Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
 Mr. Herbert May, ARA
 Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
 Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS
 Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS

During the discussion about Cuba, President Alessandri said that Chile has been the subject of much unfair publicity in regard to hemispheric problems; much has been said and written, domestically and externally, that distorts the facts of the Chilean situation. Alarmist propaganda is given out by certain interest groups within the country attacking domestic policies, and tends to weaken the cause of democracy. The opposition groups in Chile fear any success of the Alessandri Government which may produce good results. Therefore, they manufacture propaganda against the Government, aimed at lowering its prestige and placing obstacles in the way of foreign aid.

President Alessandri recognized that the United States stands for complete freedom of the press, as does Chile (and England). But the press of the United States and England is poorly represented [illegible in the original] by those correspondents who apparently are either [illegible in the original]. He already has spoken with Embassy repre-

¹ Press reports about Chile. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.

sentatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and has instructed his own ambassadors to talk about the dangers involved in this situation. The Chilean correspondent of the *London Economist*, for instance, is a Communist or linked with the Communists and consistently distorts the situation in Chile. The same applies to the *Time* correspondent.

President Kennedy said that *Time* has not always been friendly to the administration here either. However, President Alessandri's visit was highly successful in that it provided an excellent opportunity for the visiting Executive to tell a story that needs to be told, particularly to the press and therefore to the people of this country. This would clarify many things about Chile and dramatize the progress that is being made, notably through the tax and agrarian reforms now under way. President Kennedy suggested that the Chilean Government might benefit by designating a full-time press attaché in Washington. He emphasized again his understanding of the peculiarities of the press, and invited President Alessandri to attend his own press conference the next day.

38. Memorandum of conversation, December 12, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials¹

December 12, 1962

SUBJECT

Chile and Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

CHILE

President Alessandri
 Foreign Minister Martinez
 Senator Angel Faivovich
 Finance Minister Mackenna
 Ambassador Walter Muller
 Ambassador Sergio Gutierrez
 Ambassador Manuel Trucco
 Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

UNITED STATES

Acting Secretary Ball
 Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
 Ambassador Charles Cole
 Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS
 (Interpreter)

¹ Chile and Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Chile, December 1963.

Mr. Ball started the meeting after the Chilean luncheon by reviewing the current situation in Cuba. The U.S. had determined that the Soviet missiles had been dismantled and removed, and the IL-28 aircraft were being returned to the USSR. While some four or five thousand military technicians had left, some 12,000 still remained. The U.S. does not know whether the latter would also leave, but this would be demanded by the U.S. in negotiations with the USSR. The outcome of those negotiations is uncertain. The continued presence of those forces, equipped with sophisticated weapons and antiaircraft surface-to-air missiles, has to be regarded as a serious danger. While the weapons are defensive, they represent a serious Soviet commitment to Cuba. The cost of Soviet military matériel in Cuba has been estimated at \$1 billion, which is a serious commitment indeed.

Mr. Ball continued that the first phase of the Cuban crisis has been overcome, and the U.S. is "substantially satisfied" with the removal of weapons of aggression. But the situation will not be over completely until the Soviet forces leave, and Castro ceases to be a threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere. Since the Soviet record is one of deception, U.S. surveillance must continue. While Khrushchev had promised the removal of offensive weapons and adequate safeguards, the latter have not been forthcoming, as the Soviets are adamant in opposition to on-site inspection. The Soviets may have no choice because Castro himself probably has told them that inspection is out of the question. Thus, the U.S. has no choice but to continue systematic surveillance of Cuba, through regular, high-altitude flights. The U.S. hopes that the first phase of the Cuban crisis will be over in a few weeks, when negotiations with the Soviets are completed.

Mr. Martin emphasized that this would still leave the problems of Soviet ground forces and Castro. On the latter, there are no encouraging signs. Recent Cuban radio broadcasts have been as vitriolic as ever, especially against Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and, interestingly enough, Peru. Minister Guevara's recent speech clearly indicated his objective is to propagate guerrilla warfare in this hemisphere, and for some reason he singled out Peru.

President Alessandri strongly indicated that the GOC's position had been well-known, clear and "eminently juridical". The GOC interpreted recent Cuban developments as a violation of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and the GOC gave its warmest support to the OAS resolution of October 23. Now it was up to the OAS, and not to any one country, to apply the provisions of the Treaty. He described how he personally had acted at the time of the OAS resolution, to avoid possible harmful delay by the GOC.

Mr. Martin expressed the gratitude of the U.S. for that quick response. He apologized for the speed with which the entire matter

had been handled, but emphasized that no other procedure would have worked so effectively. He said that now Cuba has to be watched very carefully; Castro has collaborated with the Soviets on one risky venture, and there is no reason to believe it could not happen again.

[text not declassified]

President Alessandri asked Mr. Martin what he should say if questioned by the press on Cuban-Chilean relations. Mr. Martin replied that this was a decision that only the GOC could make. The interests of the Chilean people were paramount, but Chile also should take into consideration its position in the hemisphere and its obligations within the OAS.

President Alessandri replied, somewhat humorously, that he had hoped for a briefer answer, but that he would emphasize that Chile's position on Cuba has been made very clear and that the issue now has become one which the OAS will have to handle.

Mr. Martin said that if it were thought that a break in relations between Chile and Cuba could be helpful, it should be considered very seriously. The matter also could be discussed in the OAS. The issue is a hemispheric one, and not a dispute between the U.S. alone and Cuba. The U.S. often has stressed the danger of Soviet Embassies in unstable, underdeveloped countries, because of their espionage and subversive activities. By the same token, a Western embassy could play a very useful role in a Communist country such as Cuba. President Alessandri indicated his agreement.

Foreign Minister Martinez said that an example of Chilean-U.S. cooperation was when Chile joined with Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay in requesting the Cuban Government to accede to removal of the IL-28 aircraft. If Chile can play such a valuable role in the future, it would welcome the opportunity to contribute to the security of the hemisphere. It is important that the dialogue between Chile and Cuba remain unhampered, to permit the flow of information of value to the hemisphere.

Mr. Martin agreed, but emphasized that this could not be done publicly and that the utmost secrecy is vital.

President Alessandri asked what the positions of Brazil and Mexico were, regarding Cuba.

Mr. Martin said that Mexico seems to have a position similar to Chile. The U.S. believes that if a general decision regarding Cuba were taken by the OAS, the Mexican Government would agree. In Brazil, the situation is not quite as clear. Brazil still thinks that it can help Cuba to re-enter the inter-American community, and build up Castro as a true Latin American revolutionary.

Mr. Ball commented that Brazil's position was very ambivalent. President Alessandri agreed with that statement, ending the meeting by saying there could be no doubt as to Chile's position on this matter.

**39. Memorandum of conversation, December 12, between
President Kennedy and President Alessandri**

December 12, 1962

[Text not declassified. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, November–December 1962.]

**40. Memorandum of conversation, December 12, between
President Alessandri and President Kennedy¹**

Part II (of 3)

December 12, 1962

SUBJECT

Communists in International Organizations

PARTICIPANTS

Chile

President Alessandri

Sr. Alfonso Echeverria, (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy

Fernando van Reigersberg, LS, (Interpreter)

President Alessandri said he was very concerned about the question of Communists and "fellow-travelers" who work for international organizations. The Chilean Ambassador in Venezuela has reported that six or eight of the 14 Chilean international civil servants stationed in Carácas or working out of Carácas offices are Communists or sympathizers. Asked by President Kennedy as to what organizations are

¹ Communists in international organizations. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, November–December 1962.

involved, President Alessandri replied that all United Nations agencies were included, and at times the OAS. He singled out ECLA as a nest of Communists, and also mentioned FAO, UNESCO, and the ILO.

President Alessandri said that Chilean opposition politicians constantly are referring to statistics published by these organizations, as being extremely accurate. He said this is not true, since the international Communist movement is interested in casting disrepute on development efforts, and its agents will twist figures around to serve their purposes.

President Kennedy indicated his grave concern with this matter, stating he would inform Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin and ask him to investigate. The question raised was serious enough to warrant close scrutiny. The US also is interested in the movement of students to and from Cuba.

President Alessandri indicated there was nothing the GOC could do to keep its citizens from traveling freely throughout the world. He knows that over 150 Chilean technicians are in Cuba, however.

Many of them might later be hired by international organizations. Since the international civil servants form a small, close group, this group could play a very dangerous role. He said the number of Communists in these international organizations is constantly increasing, and the heads of the agencies do not seem to be concerned.

President Kennedy assured President Alessandri that he was very much interested in his remarks, and the US would look into the situation. The US also was concerned about student travel to Cuba, and hoped additional and more specific information about this could be obtained from Chile. He noted that at times it is difficult to make clear distinctions between Communists and other groups, and any information that would be of assistance on this would be very helpful.

41. Memorandum of conversation, December 12, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials¹

Part III (of 3)

December 12, 1962

SUBJECT

US Aid, and Relationship of EEC with LAFTA

PARTICIPANTS

Chile

President Alessandri
 Foreign Minister Martinez
 Finance Minister Mackenna
 Senator Angel Faivovich
 Ambassador Walter Muller
 Ambassador Sergio Gutierrez
 Budget Director Sergio Molina
 Sr. José Zabala, CORFO, N.Y.
 Sr. Alfonso Echevarria, (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy
 Ambassador Charles Cole
 Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
 Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
 Mr. Herbert May, ARA
 Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
 Mr. Taylor G. Belcher, WST
 Mr. John Robinson, LA/VC
 Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS, (Interpreter)
 Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS-(Interpreter)

While awaiting release of the joint communiqué, Mr. Moscoso told President Alessandri that the question of the use of counterpart funds had been taken up, following an unofficial request received one week before. He was able to say that \$20 million would be released immediately, which hopefully would relieve pressures on Central Bank credit ceilings. Additional funds would be available for 1963, including \$10 million from the Treasury Stabilization Fund. Mr. Moscoso suggested it would be desirable for this information not to be made public, but hoped that advance knowledge of this assistance would be helpful to President Alessandri in dealing with Congress (on tax reform). The Treasury funds would be available *pari passu* with those of the IMF.

¹ U.S. aid; relationship of EEC with LAFTA. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.

Mr. Moscoso commented that the tax reform bill would be of urgent significance in this connection.

After approval of the communiqué, President Kennedy mentioned the possibility of the Latin American countries making a joint representation on behalf of LAFTA to General De Gaulle, perhaps through Messrs. Kubitschek and Lleras Camargo. This would be a direct approach separate from what the US alone or together with Latin America might say. De Gaulle is, of course, more interested in Africa than in Latin America, because of close former ties. So, the Latin American approach should be to stress the community of interests with Latin America, cultural affinities, and so on. A country-by-country approach would be too dispersed and weak. The best procedure would be to bring all of Latin America together through representatives such as Messrs. Kubitschek and Lleras Camargo.

**42. Memorandum of conversation, January 24, between
President Kennedy and Ambassador Muller¹**

January 24, 1963

SUBJECT

Farewell Call of Ambassador Muller on the President.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Walter Muller of Chile
Angier Biddle Duke
Taylor G. Belcher, Director, West Coast Affairs.

Ambassador Muller opened the conversation by referring to his regret at having to leave Washington after a very satisfactory and pleasant tour of duty. In reply to the President's question, he said that he was returning to take up his private business again after an absence which in some ways had been too long. He had undertaken the assignment as Ambassador for a maximum of two years and had hoped to be able to get back to his personal affairs sooner but that the advent of the Alliance for Progress and the prospects of a visit by President Alessandri had persuaded him to stay on. He said he felt the Alliance program was now well started as far as his country was concerned

¹ Farewell call on the President. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.00/1-2463.

and that with the very successful completion of the Presidential visit, he could leave in good conscience.

The President asked the Ambassador for his views regarding the situation in Chile in the next two years, particularly leading up to the elections. The Ambassador stated his belief that the Left Wing in Chile had suffered serious reverses as a result of the recent events in Cuba and that he had heard on good authority that Senator Allende was no longer confident of winning the election as the candidate of the Popular Front. The President expressed gratification upon hearing this opinion but emphasized how much more important it was that we weaken the appeal of the Left in Chile through the effective carrying out of the reforms that were now beginning in Chile. He added that he well understood, from U.S. experience, how difficult it was to institute tax reforms. The Ambassador spoke at some length regarding those measures which had already been taken emphasizing particularly the successful housing programs already carried out by CORVI and Mr. Belcher mentioned the recently concluded IDB loan to the Trade Unions in Valparaiso and Vina del Mar for low-cost housing.

The President expressed his hope that the Ambassador would continue to interest himself in Chilean-U.S. relations and the Ambassador responded that the President could be assured that he would be a vocal, unpaid Ambassador of the U.S. in Chile. The President reiterated his continued deep interest in Latin American progress, saying that Europe enjoyed the luxury of the limelight attention, but that in many ways Latin America was much more important to us, more important than Africa, for example.

After an exchange of pleasantries during which the Ambassador was able to say goodbye to Mrs. Kennedy, the Ambassador took his leave.

NOTE: During a brief conversation prior to his meeting with the President, while discussing the political situation in Chile, Ambassador Muller made the interesting comment that Eduardo Frei Montalva, as leader of a Christian Democratic centered coalition "would not make a bad president". He added that he could not foresee any possibility of the Christian Democrats joining with the FRAP in the 1964 elections. More likely was the possibility of the recently announced PDC-Padena coalition becoming a focal point for dissident Radicals and Socialists.

43. Telegram 37 to Santiago, July 24, 1963

July 24, 1963

[Text not declassified. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 12 CHILE.]

44. Memorandum of conversation, August 19, between President Kennedy and Senator Duran from Chile¹

August 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting between Senator Duran of Chile and the President

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Mr. Ralph Dungan, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary, ARA

Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS Interpreter

Chile

Senator Duran

Ambassador Sergio Gutierrez

The President indicated his pleasure at having this opportunity to meet Senator Duran and asked for his estimate on the outcome of the forthcoming elections in Chile.

Senator Duran explained that three main groups are vying for the Presidency: the Socialist-Communist group should poll approximately 600,000 votes; the Christian Democratic party (whose vote has been increasing these past years) should be able to poll about 450,000 votes; and the Conservative-Liberal-Radical Front vote is expected to reach 1 million.

The President inquired into the political significance of a close election. In that case the Senator felt that Congress would make the final decision. The Radical Party controls from 57 to 59 percent of the vote in Congress and would therefore select the Radical candidate.

¹ Political situation and upcoming election in Chile. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, July–November 1963.

Asked by the President whether he would care to speculate on the Christian Democrat reaction to this possibility, the Senator replied that it was still premature to forecast any definite trend. However, the Christian Democratic Party has begun flirting with the Socialist-Communist group. Specifically, he referred to the election of the President of the University of Chile, in which the Christian Democrats had supported the FRAP candidate who defeated Sr. Escobar, the Democratic Front candidate, by only eight votes. Senator Duran also criticized the Christian Democratic Party of campaigning on an allegedly strong Catholic position, while constantly justifying Castro. The uninformed, but pious, Chilean electorate could interpret this as a Catholic endorsement of Castro-like reforms.

The President expressed amazement and inquired into the rationale for such a policy.

The Senator called attention to the “opening-to-the-left” attitude of the Christian Democrats. However curiously, instead of trying to woo the Socialists away from the Communists, they are trying to attract the Communist group (sic). The Communist party is in a difficult position and needs help. It might, therefore, support a Christian Democratic candidate in the next election, if it believes he can win.

The President indicated interest in Chile because a Communist candidate and the Communist party do not often appear on the ballot. The U.S. would look with favor upon the election of a democratic candidate who would carry out Alliance for Progress reforms in the future.

Senator Duran indicated that if Alliance for Progress projects and programs continue to be carried out at the present level of intensity, or if they are accelerated even further, he will hold a strong political position by the time the next elections take place. He indicated that the three parties supporting him, although sometimes divided as to procedure and strategy, agreed to give him *carte blanche* in his campaign and to present him to the electorate not as a Democratic Front candidate, but as a “national candidate.”

The President stated that he considered the development of Latin America the primary goal of American foreign policy today. The Senator expressed his concern about the fact that after signing the limited nuclear test ban treaty, the Soviet Union may intensify its subversive efforts even more and especially in Latin America.

The President wished Senator Duran much success in his forthcoming trip to Europe, hoping that he would convince European Governments to do their share in Latin America’s development and also expressed his best wishes for the next year’s election.

Senator Duran indicated his grief over the death of the President’s third child, and thanked him for giving him an opportunity to exchange views.

45. National Intelligence Estimate 94-63, October 3¹

October 3, 1963

THE CHILEAN SITUATION
AND PROSPECTS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the situation and prospects in Chile with particular reference to the September 1964 presidential election.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Chile has a longstanding tradition of respect for constitutional order and civil liberties. It has accomplished a considerable political evolution by electoral means. Its human and material resources are adequate to provide a decent living for its rapidly growing population. Nevertheless, for half the population real wages have been declining since 1950, and a large portion of the population is ill-housed, ill-clothed, and ill-fed. (*Paras. 1-6, 17, 18*)

B. Consequently increasing popular dissatisfaction has been expressed in a steadily leftward political trend. In the presidential election of 1958, Salvador Allende, the nominee of FRAP,² failed of election because a minor candidate diverted from him a small part of the leftist vote. These election returns raised apprehension that the 1964 presidential election might bring to power a government under strong Communist influence, if not control. (*Para. 7*)

C. Subsequent congressional and municipal elections have shown that the leftward trend in Chile is continuing, but that the present beneficiary of this trend is not FRAP, but rather the Christian Democratic Party. This hitherto minor left-center grouping is attracting the votes of frustrated reformists who see little hope in the traditional political parties and are antagonized by the communistic tendency of FRAP. (*Para. 9*)

D. The outcome of the 1964 presidential election cannot be predicted a year in advance. The political situation is extremely fluid. Allende's candidacy now appears less dangerous than in 1958. The campaign of Durán, the candidate of the coalition of the traditional parties, has failed to gather momentum. On present showing, Frei, the

¹ "The Chilean Situation and Prospects." Secret. 25 pp. CIA, ODDI Registry, Job 79-R01012A.

² *Frente de Acción Popular*, a coalition of the Communist and Socialist parties.

Christian Democratic candidate, appears to be the leading contender. (*Paras. 10–16, 36*)

E. If Durán should be elected, the Chilean government's policies and performance would remain much as they have been under Alessandri. The government would profess reformist purposes, but the effectiveness of its reform measures would be limited by its need to placate various vested interests. Frei would strive to transform the economic and social structure of Chile, but he would be resisted by the vested interests. (*Paras. 8, 37–38*)

F. If, through the defeat of Allende, the Communists and Allende Socialists should be frustrated in their once-lively expectation of achieving power by electoral means, the Chilean Communists probably would not turn at once to revolutionary violence. The *Carabineros* and the military would almost certainly be able to cope with any attempt at either urban or rural insurgency. The Communists would prefer to preserve their present legal status and bide their time, trusting that conservative political influences will continue to prevent effective social reform and that the cumulative frustrations and resentments of the masses will eventually bring them to power. (*Paras. 42–44*)

I. THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND

1. Chile's rapidly growing population now numbers about eight million. Racially and culturally, it is one of the most homogeneous in Latin America.³ About 95 percent of the population are at least nominally Roman Catholic. About 80 percent of the adult population are literate. Three-fourths of the people live in the central one-third of the country, a fertile area with a climate like that of California. (See map.) About 60 percent live in urban communities. Almost all participate in the money economy.

2. Chilean national unity is impaired, however, by strong class distinctions. The upper class—large landholders, and commercial and industrial magnates—conforms to the pattern of conspicuous consumption familiar elsewhere in Latin America. It is able to maintain this style of living in part through the avoidance of direct taxes. These magnates have had to share political power with a rapidly growing middle class, one of the largest in Latin America, now about 40 percent of the population. Within this middle class there are divergencies of interest between independent professional and business men on the

³ The *Chilenos* (90 percent of the population) are of predominantly Spanish stock, but, except in the upper class, most have some Indian admixture. The only considerable group of unassimilated Indians are the Araucanians of south-central Chile, who were not finally subdued until 1887. In the same general area there is also a considerable native-born community of German origin and culture.

one hand and white collar employees on the other. These politically effective social elements have defended and promoted their respective interests without much regard for the generally deplorable lot of the lower class.

3. Chile's regressive tax system and chronic inflation have borne heavily upon the lower class—and, to a lesser degree, upon the white collar employees of the lower middle class. Since 1950 the real wages of unskilled and unorganized workers have declined. Although some organized workers, such as the employees of the US mining companies, live relatively well, an estimated half of all industrial workers are ill-fed and ill-housed. The employment and housing problems are rendered increasingly acute by the high rate of population growth (2.5 percent per annum) and by the migration of peasants to town in search of economic and social betterment.

II. THE POLITICAL TRADITION AND TREND⁴

4. Chile has a longstanding tradition of respect for constitutional order and civil liberties. Resort to force in politics has been rare.⁵ Election results are normally accepted. Consequently, it has been possible to accomplish a significant political evolution by electoral means. In contrast to the executive domination characteristic of most Latin American countries, in Chile the legislative and judicial powers are respected and effective. A highly competent national constabulary, the *Carabineros*, is normally able to maintain law and order without the intervention of the military.⁶

5. The upper class monopoly of political power was broken by the presidential election of 1920, but the political predominance of the middle class was not consolidated until the period 1938–52. In the elections of 1938, 1942, and 1946, the largely middle class Radical Party won the Presidency with the support of the Communists and sometimes with that of the Socialists as well. This period of Radical administration illustrates the Chilean adage, "Elect with the left, rule with the right." Once elected, Radical Presidents usually followed moderate policies and often appointed conservatives to cabinet positions. The Radicals enlisted conservative support for their program of rapid industrialization by tacit agreement not to press for agrarian reform. The Communists received three cabinet positions as a reward for their support in

⁴ For a description of the principal Chilean political organizations and pressure groups, see Annex A.

⁵ This generalization is not true for the period 1924–38, which was marked by disturbances attributable to economic dislocations and to the strains inherent in the transition from upper class to middle class political predominance.

⁶ For a summary description of the Chilean armed forces, see Annex B.

the election of 1946, but, when the Party proceeded to foment industrial and agrarian unrest, the Radicals combined with conservatives to pass legislation outlawing it. In general, as upper middle class Radicals have prospered, politically and economically, their interests have come to coincide with those of the upper class.

6. The Radicals' program of rapid industrialization failed to live up to expectations, and the distortions which it introduced into the economy resulted in uncontrolled inflation. Consequent popular distress and dissatisfaction defeated the Radical candidate in the presidential election of 1952. The winner of that election was a nationalistic and demagogic "strongman" without party affiliation, General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo.⁷ The voters who elected him evidently desired a strong *patrón* who would enforce order and relieve distress without reference to any ideology. During Ibáñez' administration, however, real wages continued to decline and unemployment became a serious problem. In their disillusionment and despair, lower class voters began to turn to the ideological left for salvation.

7. Leftist candidates won a majority of the popular vote in the presidential election of 1958. Salvador Allende, the Socialist candidate of a leftist coalition including the Communists,⁸ failed of election because a minor candidate diverted from him a small part of the leftist vote. This fortuitous circumstance permitted the conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri,⁹ to win the Presidency. Nevertheless, the 1958 election returns foreshadowed the possibility that a coalition including the Communists might come to power by electoral means in 1964.

8. In the face of this threat, and in keeping with his campaign promises, Alessandri has striven to increase production, reduce unemployment, curtail inflation, and carry out moderate agrarian and tax reforms. To obtain needed congressional support, he took Radicals into his cabinet; they stipulated that sufficient reforms must be undertaken to provide a good record for a Radical candidate to run on in the presidential election of 1964. The administration's reform program, however, has been hindered and watered down by the resistance within the government coalition, whose controlling members are not by nature enthusiasts for reform. Although some progressive measures have been

⁷ Although the legal proprieties were observed, Ibáñez had ruled Chile as virtually a military dictator, 1926–31, first as Minister of War, then as elected President.

⁸ The *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP). See Annex A.

⁹ Although the candidate of the Conservative and Liberal parties (see Annex A), Alessandri had a good reformist name. His Liberal father had been Chile's outstanding proponent of reform, twice elected to the Presidency (1920–25, and 1932–38) with Radical support.

adopted, the administration has not accomplished enough to arrest the leftward trend in Chilean politics.¹⁰

THE COMPOSITION OF THE CHILEAN CONGRESS

NOTE: 20 Senate seats, distributed as shown in parentheses below, and all Chamber seats will be subject to election in March 1965.

<i>Party</i>	<i>Senate</i>	<i>Chamber</i>
Conservative	4 (2)	17
Liberal	10 (5)	28
Radical	13 (7)	39
Christian Democratic.....	4 (1)	23
National Democratic.....	— —	12
Socialist	7 (3)	12
People's Vanguard.....	1 —	—
Communist.....	4 —	16
Independent.....	2 (2)	—
	<u>45 (20)</u>	<u>147</u>

9. The congressional election in 1961 and the municipal elections in early 1963 have shown that the leftward trend in Chile is continuing. The municipal elections show also, however, that at present the principal beneficiary of this trend is not FRAP, but the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). In the Chilean political spectrum, this reformist offshoot of the Conservative Party stands generally to the left of the Radical Party, but it is explicitly anti-Communist. Its present emergence as the strongest single party in Chile has coincided with a decline in the voting strength of the Conservative and Liberal parties, and also of PADENA,¹¹ the non-Marxist member of FRAP. The PDC is increasingly attracting the votes of frustrated reformists who see little hope in the traditional parties and are antagonized by the communistic tendency of FRAP. This trend is likely to continue, and to make the Christian Democratic Party a formidable contender in the presidential election of 1964.

¹⁰ The resignation of the Radical cabinet members in September 1963 will reduce the pressure for reform within the Alessandri administration. Although the Radicals remain disposed to support further reforms, not much more is likely to be accomplished before the 1964 election.

¹¹ *Partido Democrática Nacional*. See Annex A.

Party Electoral Strength, 1961 and 1963

	1961 Congressional Elections ^a		1963 Municipal Elections ^b	
		Percent		Percent
<i>Democratic Front (FD)</i>				
Radicals (PR)	296,704	22.0	427,842	21.60
Liberals (PL)	221,361	16.5	259,683	13.11
Conservatives (PUC)	197,151	14.7	225,075	11.36
Democrats (PD)	—	—	19,409	1.00
Totals	715,216	53.2	932,009	47.07
<i>Popular Action Front (FRAP)</i>				
Communists (PCCh)	157,451	11.7	254,178	12.83
Socialists (PS)	149,420	11.1	224,071	11.32
National Democrats (PADENA)	95,282	7.1	101,427	5.12
People's National Vanguard (VNP)	—	—	3,101	.15
Totals	402,153	29.9	582,777	29.42
<i>Christian Democrats (PDC)</i>	213,559	16.5	452,843	22.86
<i>Independents</i>	—	—	12,759	.65

^a The Democratic Front was not yet operative in the 1961 elections but the totals of the parties now comprising it are listed together for comparison with the 1963 totals.

^b In Chile, as elsewhere, municipal elections are normally dominated by local factors. In 1963, however, the national party organizations fought them on national political issues, as a demonstration of party strength in anticipation of the 1964 presidential contest. The estimate of a strong trend toward the PDC does not depend solely on these 1963 returns, but is confirmed by other current indications.

III. THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

10. Although the 1964 presidential election, to be held in September, is still a year off, the three principal candidates have already been designated. They are Senator Julio *Durán* Neuman, a Radical, for the Democratic Front (a coalition of the traditional political parties); Senator Salvador *Allende* Gossens, a Socialist, for the Popular Action Front (FRAP); and Senator Eduardo *Frei* Montalva for the Christian Democrats. A minor candidate, independent rightist Jorge *Prat* Echaurren, is also in the race.

11. *Durán*, 45, is a wealthy lawyer and financier. His nomination was dictated by the inner circle which controls the machinery of the

Democratic Front parties. Although his platform professes reformist purposes, he is hardly credible as a champion of reform. For this reason, he has little appeal for independent voters, or for the reform-minded elements of the Democratic Front parties. Moreover, many of the Conservatives, an explicitly Catholic party, may be alienated by the fact that he was once a Mason. For these reasons, many voters who would otherwise have supported the Democratic Front are likely to switch to the other candidates.

12. Disgruntled elements within the Democratic Front now privately contend that Durán cannot win and that President Alessandri should be substituted for him as the Front's presidential candidate. The trouble with this proposal is that the constitution does not allow an incumbent President to succeed himself. To amend this provision in the midst of a presidential campaign would antagonize many voters. Even if the substitute were not Alessandri, but, for example, the generally popular former President Gabriel González Videla, the displacement of Durán would antagonize his supporters and might destroy the Front. It could split the conservative vote between two rival candidates, ensuring the defeat of both. In addition, because the Communists hate and fear González Videla, who outlawed them in 1948, they might decide to support Frei covertly if González Videla became the Democratic Front candidate. For these reasons, and for lack of an adequate substitute candidate, the party managers are presently disposed to stick with Durán.

13. *Allende*, 55, is running for the third time as the nominee of FRAP. Originally a moderate Socialist, Allende, as a candidate, has adopted a strongly pro-Castro and pro-Soviet line. Some of his Socialist followers are more vehemently revolutionary than are the Communists. (The Communists' present policy, called the *vía pacífica* is to pursue their ends by strictly political means, with special care to avoid the suppression which they suffered from 1948 to 1958.) Allende's identification with Castroism and communism is likely to antagonize some independent voters and to cause further defections from FRAP. Already most members of PADENA have broken away, two groups declaring themselves for Frei and another for Durán. On the other hand, Allende is an established political figure with considerable personal prestige, a factor not involved in the municipal elections. Moreover, he may gain the support of leftist Radicals unwilling to support either Durán, a plutocrat, or Frei, a Catholic.

14. *Frei*, 52, a well-known and attractive personality, is certain to benefit from the existing disarray within the Democratic and Popular Action fronts. Although his party won only 23 percent of the vote in the municipal elections, as compared with 29 percent for the FRAP parties and 47 percent for the parties of the Democratic Front, the tide

appears to be running strongly in his favor. He will probably outrun Allende in the presidential election. He may even be able to surpass the vote which the Conservative, Liberal, and Radical party machines will be able to deliver for Durán.

15. *Prat*, 45, is a strong rightist without organized party support. He is likely to attract votes which would otherwise have gone to Durán, or to Frei. Prat recognizes that he might thus bring about the election of Allende; he says that, if this result seems likely, he will withdraw his candidacy. In that event he would probably throw his support to Frei, since he supported the PDC in the municipal elections.

16. The Chilean constitution provides that, if no presidential candidate receives a majority of the popular vote, the Congress (the Senate and Chamber in joint session) shall choose between the two leading contenders. This choice normally devolves upon Congress, as it almost certainly will in 1964. Hitherto, Congress has always chosen the candidate with the greater popular vote. The present Congress, which will hold office until the congressional election in 1965, is composed of 111 representatives of the Democratic Front, 52 representatives of FRAP, 27 Christian Democrats, and two independents. It would almost certainly prefer Durán, but would probably elect Frei if he were to lead in the popular vote. It would not be likely to elect Allende unless he were to lead the poll by a clear margin.

IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

17. Chile's political future will depend to a very considerable extent upon the ability of its economy to increase output and productivity and thereby to provide adequate levels of living for the rapidly expanding population. Chile's basic resources are adequate for this purpose, but only if they are more rationally utilized, and if there is a more equitable distribution of the national income. Since the war Chile's economic growth has lagged behind much of the rest of Latin America. Between 1950 and 1960, GNP increased by an average of 3.5 percent per year, but this represented only about a 1 percent increase *per capita*. Nevertheless, the real wages of urban blue collar and rural workers declined over the same period. These workers and their families make up somewhat more than half of the Chilean population.

18. Chile's extensive natural resources include the world's largest known deposits of nitrates and medium-grade copper ore, and large deposits of high-grade iron ore. The country has sizable deposits of medium and low grade coal, but lacks coking coal. A large but little exploited hydroelectric power potential exists near the largest concentration of population. Petroleum reserves in the South are probably adequate to meet domestic requirements. The amount of arable land, if properly utilized, is more than adequate for Chilean needs. The

country has extensive forests, and its rich fishery resources have barely been tapped. The largely homogeneous population and a relatively well-developed educational system provide human resources that are also considerably above the Latin American mean.

19. Many of Chile's economic problems stem from the shortcomings of its agriculture. A large proportion of the best Chilean agricultural land is organized in large holdings; much of it has been underutilized. At the other end of the scale there are many tiny properties inadequate to provide more than a bare subsistence living. Agriculture as a whole has suffered from technical backwardness, inadequate investment, and poorly developed distribution and marketing facilities. As late as the early 1940s Chile was a net exporter of agricultural commodities, but now it must spend an increasing share of its foreign exchange earnings on agricultural imports, over half of which consists of foodstuffs that could be produced domestically. While agriculture accounts for only 12 percent of GNP, it employs about 30 percent of the country's labor force. Thus labor productivity is low and the cash income of the rural laborer is substantially below the national average. Between 1950 and 1960 agricultural production grew at an average rate of 1.8 percent, less than the annual average population growth of 2.5 percent.

20. Industrial development has had the solicitous attention of successive Chilean Governments for most of the present century, and has since 1938 received the principal emphasis in Chilean economic policy. The objective has been to provide employment opportunities for workers who could no longer be absorbed in agriculture, and to help conserve foreign exchange. Industry was assisted in various ways, including high tariffs, easy credit, and exchange policies favoring imports of raw materials and foodstuffs for the expanding industrial labor force. Favoritism for industry intensified the urban-rural imbalance and increased pressures from other sectors of the Chilean economy. Neglected agricultural interests, penalized by low farm prices, fought to maintain their relative freedom from taxes. Lacking incentives for investment in farm production, large landholders increasingly clung to unproductive estates primarily as a hedge against inflation. Organized labor secured periodic wage adjustments to compensate for steady rises in the cost of living—due in large part to increased food costs. As a consequence, industry was allowed to raise its prices to re-establish working capital and profit levels reduced by increased wage bills. The result of this combination of the drive for industrialization and concessions to pressure groups has been unbalanced growth, declining productivity, and inflation that has ranged from 15 to as high as 80 percent per annum.

21. There has been a considerable growth in industry since the war and it now accounts for over one-quarter of GNP and provides 75

percent of Chile's consumer goods. Industry has not, however, realized the hopes originally held out for it. It is heavily dependent upon imported capital equipment and raw materials, and, far from relieving the balance of payments, has been a continuing burden upon it. Because much of Chilean industry is monopolistic and inefficient, it is handicapped in competing for foreign markets, and inflates the internal price structure. The limited size of the domestic market, so long as it is coupled with depressed living standards for nearly half the population, makes it difficult for industry to achieve economies of scale. In these circumstances Chilean industry has virtually exhausted the opportunities for substituting its own products for imported consumer goods and lacks the capital and know-how to compete with imported heavy industrial products. Industry has not been able to absorb more than a fraction of the annual additions to the labor force.

22. The inability of industry and agriculture to provide employment opportunities for the growing labor force has led to the development of a large service sector, which accounts for over 50 percent of GNP and about one-third of the labor force. Commercial activities make substantial contributions to GNP, but the balance of the service sector—particularly government and personal services—has become a reservoir for surplus labor and is highly inefficient. Successive national governments, committed to a policy of full employment and extensive welfare services, have increased public expenditures to support a growing bureaucracy and other service sector activities. Although underemployment as well as unemployment have been reduced by the upturn of the economy since 1960, both persist as serious basic problems.

23. Inflation has been a major Chilean problem since the last century. It became particularly acute after World War II, despite recurrent efforts by the government since 1956 to curb it. The expanding role of the government in the economy has been a major cause of inflation as revenues, largely dependent on foreign trade, have failed to keep pace with the rising level of government expenditures. Inflation has been fed by easy credit policies and the success of politically influential groups in repeatedly securing relaxation and subsequent abandonment of stabilization programs. Other basic causes of inflation have been the slow growth of Chilean agriculture, a long term worsening of the terms of trade over the past 25 years, and an official policy of annual wage increases to offset rises in living costs. In the year ending 1 July 1963, the cost of living index rose 45 percent, and even sharper rises have occurred during the past decade.

24. The persistent balance of payments problem has been aggravated rather than aided by efforts to protect both agriculture and industry and by substantial flights of capital. As a result Chile has not been able to accumulate a sizable foreign exchange reserve to cushion the

impact of sharp variations in earnings from mineral exports, which provide over 85 percent of export income. Despite continued expansion in the output of the mining sector, net deficit on current account totalled \$186 million in 1960 and \$225 million in 1961. In 1962 the Alessandri administration was able to reduce the deficit to \$115 million by imposing severe restrictions on imports and by devaluing the *escudo* in October. Large-scale foreign financial assistance has been necessary, however, to prevent a serious curtailment of economic activity. The US, the principal source of outside assistance, has committed some \$570 million since 1958 in support of the present administration's programs.

25. Foreign private investment by Europeans and Japanese is increasing, but US direct private investment (est. \$800 million) accounts for 70 percent of all foreign investment in Chile. The US investment is located principally in mining and public utilities, activities in which foreign capital is particularly vulnerable to political attack in Latin America. Because the mining industry is isolated from the main stream of Chilean life—located in geographically remote areas and employing relatively few workers—it has made little contribution to local technology or the modernization of business outlooks and management. These companies are threatened by proposals for nationalization and are subjected to discriminatory treatment such as the new tax boosts which, in 1961, caused the two big US copper companies to postpone plans for large new investments to expand production.

26. The Alessandri administration announced in 1960 a 10-year development plan which would need to be supported by an estimated \$8 billion investment, including \$1.3 billion of foreign capital. The plan envisages an overall annual growth in GNP of 5.5 percent through increased investment in various fields with particular emphasis upon economic infrastructure—roads, ports, power, irrigation, and housing. The plan has been criticized for its failure to address itself to the basic problems of rural-urban imbalance, to take much cognizance of Chile's increasingly urgent social problems, and to provide for the self-help measures called for under the Alliance for Progress.

27. Chilean efforts, since October 1962 to carry out a new stabilization plan essential to the 10-year plan's success are being supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US has provided financial assistance for both programs.¹² Much of the substantial aid Chile has received from other official Western sources has also been

¹² The IMF standby agreement allows drawings up to \$40 million in balance of payments aid during 1963. The US aid includes a \$35 million program support loan from AID; a \$15 million balance of credits payment from the Export-Import Bank; and a \$10 million exchange agreement with the US Treasury Department.

committed during the Alessandri administration.¹³ However, Chile still faces a major problem in financing its development program because of its limited ability to service additional external borrowings on conventional terms. At present over one-quarter of the country's free exchange earnings go to service existing convertible currency obligations, estimated at close to \$1 billion. Debt service will take \$110 million in 1963 and \$109 million in 1964, and is manageable only because much of the new external assistance coming from AID and IDB is on "soft" terms.

28. Under urging from the foreign sources of needed credits and from domestic advocates of reform, the Alessandri administration has initiated agrarian and tax reform proposals, in accordance with the Alliance for Progress, some of which have been passed while other portions continue to face serious congressional opposition. The administration has made considerable progress in housing and school construction, which has had a salutary social effect but does nothing to produce needed foreign exchange. It has not been able to correct the underuse of land, which would increase productivity and improve Chile's payment situation. Although a modest agrarian reform law has been passed, its implementation has been impeded by the political power of the large landholders.

29. At present, the Chilean economy looks healthy, with sales, employment, mining, construction, and agricultural output at high levels. This stems principally from the large budgetary and balance of payments support from the IMF, Ex-Im Bank, and IDB, and developmental assistance made available by the Alliance for Progress. At the same time, the political-economic obstacles to growth and stability still persist. Any government coming to power will have to contend with the vested interests which control agriculture, finance, and industry. These interests have successfully resisted much of the present government's attempts at structural economic reform, and it can be expected to fight strongly any more far-reaching encroachments on their traditional privileges. Elements of the Right have come to realize that inflation will not generate lasting economic growth and that some rationalization of the country's economic structure is necessary. Nevertheless, the conservatives continue to dispute with one another and the rest of the population how far and how fast the reforms which would achieve this rationalization should be implemented. The present government can be expected to pursue sufficiently disciplined fiscal-monetary poli-

¹³ This includes a loan of over \$50 million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); loans of \$97 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); International Development Association (IDA) loans of \$19 million; and Development Assistance Commission (DAC) country assistance of \$173 million.

cies, and a token rate of reform enactment, to qualify for continued US and IMF support. But after September 1964, the direction the economy will take will depend heavily upon the ideology of the new President, and his success—or lack of success—in pushing through economic and social reforms.

V. FOREIGN RELATIONS

30. Successive Chilean administrations, including Alessandri's, have in general sought to maintain close and cooperative relations with the US, the major source of new investment capital and the country's most important single trading partner. Underlying this general policy, however, there is a widespread nationalistic concern to assert Chile's dignity and independence in foreign relations. This nationalistic sentiment finds expression in a tendency to criticize US policies and actions, and to pursue divergent policies on particular occasions.

31. Many factors contribute to Chile's nationalistic sensitivity and its anti-US manifestations. The Communists, of course, and many Socialists also, do their utmost to foment and exploit such sentiments expressly in order to impair US-Chilean relations. They attack as Yankee economic imperialism not only such targets as the US mining companies, but also the Alliance for Progress. But economic nationalism is also characteristic of the Chilean middle and upper classes. The latter, in addition, resent the self-help and reformist terms of the Alliance for Progress. There is a widespread tendency to consider that Chile's economic difficulties result from US control of copper mining, Chile's major export industry.

32. The status of the US-owned copper mining companies is likely to continue to cause serious difficulties in US-Chilean relations. The Chilean economy depends heavily on the export earnings of these copper mines. Their development has been beneficial to Chile, and particularly to their Chilean employees, as well as profitable to the investors. Nevertheless, there is agreement across the entire political spectrum, from Communists to Conservatives, that the copper companies should be made to contribute more to Chile. The question is how to derive more income and employment from the industry. Moderates recognize that the companies already pay more taxes and labor benefit than any other enterprise in the country. Moreover, they know that punitive measures only discourage new company investment that is needed to support Chile's Ten-Year Plan of Development. Only the most radical elements favor outright nationalization, for which Chile would not be able to pay promptly, if at all, thus jeopardizing its international credit. An approach which has considerable support would be to "Chileanize" the companies by insisting on 1) incorporation under Chilean law with Chilean capital participation; 2) use of

more Chilean managers and top-echelon technicians; 3) greater government control over copper production and sales; and 4) an increase in the amount of copper refined in Chile.

33. Although Chile gave prompt and unequivocal support to the US during the missile base crisis of October 1962, it is one of the five Latin American countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. The Alessandri administration defends this position on juridical grounds. Its chief reason appears to be fear of the strength shown by the pro-Castro FRAP in the presidential election of 1958 and a desire not to inject such an emotional issue into the election of 1964. It has also found it beneficial to exchange Chilean agricultural products for Cuban sugar.

34. Chile maintains diplomatic relations with only one other Communist country, Yugoslavia, but permits the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Communist China to maintain small commercial or cultural (propaganda) missions in Chile. This permission reflects the official and popular view that Chile must develop new trade wherever it can. There is a persistent popular belief that the Communist countries could absorb far larger amounts of Chilean copper. Despite the best efforts of these missions, however, Chile's trade with Communist countries so far remains negligible.

35. Chile's territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Bolivia and Peru during the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) leaves a residue of underlying tension in Chile's relations with those countries. It is this factor which has rendered so intractable Chile's dispute with Bolivia over the waters of the Rio Lauca. Chile's relations with Argentina are normally cordial, despite a minor unresolved boundary dispute.

VI. CONTINGENT POLITICAL PROSPECTS

36. The outcome of the 1964 presidential election cannot be predicted a year in advance. The political situation is extremely fluid, with dissatisfaction rife within both the Democratic Front and the Popular Action Front, and with an apparent trend toward the Christian Democrats, who, however, start from behind. The electoral campaign, as it develops, may produce further political fragmentation and realignments, or may produce a rallying effect. In these circumstances, we shall briefly consider post-election prospects in contingent terms.

37. If Durán should be elected to the Presidency in 1964, the Chilean Government's policies and performance would remain much as they have been under Alessandri, but without the benefit of Alessandri's personal prestige and sincerity. The administration would profess reformist purposes, but its reform measures would be watered down by its need to placate various vested interests. It would be interested in economic development, and any accomplishments on that line might produce some social amelioration.

38. If Frei should be elected to the Presidency, he would be dependent, at least initially, on the cooperation of a Congress not under his control. It is likely, however, that the same trend which had brought him to the Presidency would give him a sympathetic Congress in 1965. There is no doubt that Frei would strive to transform the social structure of Chile through the constitutional enactment of a far-reaching agrarian reform and a steeply progressive income tax, and through increased government planning and participation in the economy. Frei would be generally sympathetic toward the self help and social goals of the Alliance for Progress, but selective with respect to the participation of foreign private capital in Chilean economic development. He would move toward the "Chileanization" of the US-owned mining companies. In all this he would, of course, be strongly resisted by the affected vested interests.

39. If Allende were to be elected, he would face a hostile majority in Congress, at least until the congressional election in 1965. In return for patronage, however, some Radicals might be induced to collaborate with him in Congress. The Christian Democrats also might support him on some issues.

40. In office, Allende would be likely to moderate his extremism, at least initially, in order to obtain Radical and PDC support and also to avoid provoking a military reaction. The military commitment to a non-political role is not unconditional, as was demonstrated during the turbulent years, 1924-1932. If Allende should impatiently attempt to override Congress, the military would almost certainly intervene to preserve constitutional order. If he should too abruptly seek to impose his personal control on the military establishment, there might also be a reaction. Otherwise, the military and the *Carabineros* would be likely to support the duly elected regime.

41. Despite the tactical moderation indicated above, an Allende administration would be strongly nationalistic and therefore, in effect, anti-US. It would, of course, endeavor to gain control of Congress in the 1965 election and move administratively to gain secure control of the armed forces as soon as practicable. It would seek to consolidate leftist and nationalist support by presenting a program of radical social reform and economic statism, and by increasing demands on the US copper mining countries and other foreign interests. In this it could count on the sympathy of some Radical and Christian Democratic elements. In the name of the independent foreign policy, it would also seek to expand relations with Cuba and other Communist countries.

42. If, through the defeat of Allende, the Communists and Allende Socialists should be frustrated in their once-lively expectation of achieving power by electoral means, they might consider abandoning the *vía pacífica* and seek to foment a proletarian revolution in Chile. The odds

are against their doing so. Despite peasant grievances, there is at present no significant potential for rural insurgency in Chile. The landlords and the *Carabineros* have the rural situation under close control. There is greater danger of a revolutionary explosion in the slums of the urban proletariat, but this too could almost certainly be controlled by the *Carabineros* and the military.

43. In these circumstances, the Chilean Communists' post-election strategy would probably be to preserve their legal status and bide their time, trusting that conservative political influences would continue to prevent effective social reform and that the cumulative frustrations and resentments of the masses would eventually enable them to come to power, by election or by revolution. In the meantime, the Communists would, of course, continue their efforts to exacerbate social tensions in Chile and to disrupt US-Chilean relations.

44. It is hardly likely that any Democratic Front administration could satisfy the rising popular demand for social reform. The political effect of increasing popular dissatisfaction could be a continuation of the current trend toward the Christian Democratic Party, with PDC gains in the congressional elections of 1965 and 1969 and the election of a Christian Democratic president in 1970. It is equally possible, however, that the increasingly embittered lower classes would turn to the far-left for leadership, as the Communist hope and expect they will.

Annex A

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRESSURE GROUPS

I. POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITIONS

A. The Democratic Front (*Frente Democrática*—FD)

1. The Democratic Front, composed of Chile's three traditional parties, the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Radicals, was formally organized in October 1962, in order to regularize the existing informal collaboration of those parties in support of the Alessandri administration and to present a single joint candidate in the 1964 presidential election. These traditional parties, originally formed to contend against each other, have common interests in opposition to the rising new parties of the Left and realize that they must combine to have any hope of coping with the leftward trend in Chilean politics. Because Radical participation was indispensable, the Conservatives and Liberals had to agree to support a Radical candidate in 1964.

2. Despite this community of interest, there are tensions and conflicts within the Front, not only among the three constituent parties, but also within them. These tensions have been accentuated by the withdrawal of the Radicals from the cabinet in September 1963.

3. The Conservative Party (*Partido Conservador Unido*—PCU) represents primarily the landed aristocrats who ruled the republic in its earliest years and still exercise great social and political influence, no matter what party is in power. They determine party policy. The party's voting strength is provided by their tenants. It polled 11 percent of the vote in the 1963 municipal elections. Every member of the party is required to be a practicing Catholic.

4. The Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*—PL) was founded in 1842 by aristocratic youths who were inspired by the tenets of contemporary French liberalism and desired to modernize Chile in those terms. It has come to represent primarily the well-established commercial, industrial, and banking interests, upper middle class professional men, and some substantial landholders. The party polled 13 percent of the vote in the 1963 elections.

5. The Radical Party (*Partido Radical*—PR) was founded in 1862 by dissident Liberals advocating more radical political reforms. It became primarily the political vehicle of the rising middle class, although it includes also some elements of organized labor. It has developed the most pervasive party organization in Chile, with particular strength in the small towns, and was for years the largest single party in the country. It is still a close second, with 22 percent of the vote in the 1963 municipal elections.

6. Despite its elaborate organization, the Radical Party is no longer a cohesive political grouping. It is led by a right-wing minority which controls the party machinery, but the bulk of the membership are centrists and there is a small but vigorous left wing. The center and left-wing Radicals are uncomfortable in coalition with the Conservatives and Liberals, but so far the party organization has held the Party together and there have been no important defections.

7. Inasmuch as most Radical party functionaries are not independently wealthy, as are most Conservatives and Liberals, access to patronage is vital to the party. This consideration contributed to the party's decision to collaborate with the Liberal-Conservative Alessandri administration. The same consideration would move it toward accommodation with any other party in power—with the Christian Democrats, for example, or even with FRAP. Already there are some indications of Radical collaboration with FRAP to stop the Christian Democrats.

B. The Popular Action Front (*Frente de Acción Popular*—FRAP)

8. The Socialist Worker Party was organized in 1912 as a means of proletarian protest against the status quo. From it are derived both the Communist Party and Socialist Party. These parties participated with the Radicals in forming the first Popular Front (1938–1941). They

formed the Popular Action Front in 1951, primarily as a device which would permit the outlawed Communist Party to continue political activity, to the advantage of Socialist candidates. A more recent adherent to the Front is the National Democratic Party (PADENA), formed in 1960.

9. The Popular Action Front, composed mainly of extremist elements, is far from harmonious. Although the Socialist party leadership, often seems more militantly revolutionary than the Communists, many Socialists have serious misgivings about close association with the Communists, on both ideological and practical political grounds, and conflicts between the two elements occasionally flare up. The National Democrats, a radical, but non-Marxist, middle class party, have had even greater misgivings about political association with the Socialists and Communists.

10. The Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de Chile*—PCCH) was organized in 1922 as a branch of the Third International. The party was severely suppressed during the Ibáñez dictatorship (1926–1931), reached the peak of its political influence in the 1946 coalition with the Radicals, and was again outlawed, 1948–1958. It has since regained strength, and with 20 members in Congress it is probably the most influential Communist party in South America.

11. The contrast between the political success which the party has enjoyed when pursuing popular front tactics and the suppression which it has suffered whenever it turned to subversive agitation and violence has led the PCCH to adopt a policy called the *via pacífica*—the pursuit of revolutionary ends by peaceful political means. The party's overriding concern appears to be to retain its present legal status. It has refused to send members to Cuba for guerrilla warfare training, as the Socialists have done. It strongly supports the Soviet line in the Sino-Soviet controversy.

12. The Communist party leadership is of middle class origin; the party draws its support chiefly from industrial labor and lower middle class elements. There are estimated to be about 30,000 disciplined party members. The party polled 254,000 votes in the 1963 elections, nearly 13 percent of the total vote. It was the only party except the Christian Democrats to make a perceptible gain in strength.

13. The Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*—PS) is an amalgamation of socialist splinter groups formed in 1933 following suppression during the Ibáñez dictatorship. The party is beset by strident factionalism. One leader, Salvador Allende, the presidential candidate, is outspokenly pro-Soviet and pro-Castro; another, Raúl Ampuero, the party secretary, is unenthusiastic about Castro and frequently critical of the USSR. The party membership and political support are drawn from the same elements as the Communists'; there is latent competition

between the two parties on this account. Separation of the Socialists from the Communists would isolate the latter and reduce Communist capabilities. The Socialists polled 11 percent of the vote in the 1963 elections.

14. The National Democratic Party (*Partido Democrático Nacional*—PADENA), organized in 1960, is an agglomeration of radical middle class elements that had supported Ibáñez for the presidency in 1952. PADENA's bitter opposition to the traditional political parties brought it into the Popular Action Front, but its members feel increasingly uncomfortable in company with the Allende Socialists and the Communists, especially considering the party's losses in the 1963 elections, in which it polled only 5 percent of the vote. Since then most of the party's members have defected. Others may follow suit, or the party as a whole may withdraw from FRAP.

C. The Christian Democrats (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*—PDC)

15. In 1938 some young Conservatives, having failed to persuade their elders to adopt a more progressive program based on the papal social encyclicals, splintered off to form a Catholic party with some appeal to organized labor. In 1949, other Conservatives, inspired by the contemporary Christian Democratic movement in Europe, also broke away. The appeal of this second group was primarily to middle class Catholics. The Christian Democratic Party was formed by the fusion of these two movements in 1957.

16. The new party occupies the middle ground between the conservatism of the traditional parties on the right and the extremism of FRAP on the left. It is a credibly reformist party, but within a Christian and democratic context. Its phenomenal growth in recent years demonstrates the strong attraction of this position to independent, reform-minded voters who see little hope in the traditional parties and are repelled by the communistic tendency of FRAP. In the 1963 election the PDC polled 453,000 votes (23 percent), to become the largest single party in Chile. This trend is likely to continue as the party exerts a strong attraction, not only on independent voters, but also on the reform-minded elements of the traditional parties and the more moderate elements in FRAP.

17. The PDC's program calls for a revolutionary transformation of Chilean society, to be accomplished through constitutional processes. It advocates a more far-reaching agrarian reform than that proposed by the Alessandri administration, a redistribution of wealth through a steeply progressive income tax, and increased government planning and participation in the economy. It welcomed the Alliance for Progress with enthusiasm, but is cool toward US emphasis on the role of private capital. As do all other Chilean parties, it prefers intergovernmental

financial assistance to foreign private investment. The PDC does not advocate nationalization of the US-owned copper mining companies, but calls for their eventual “Chileanization,” beginning with local refining of all Chilean copper and more government participation in the determination of copper sales policies.

II. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS EXERTING POLITICAL INFLUENCE

18. *Economic Interests*. No matter what political party was in power, vested economic interests have continued to exert powerful political influence through personal relationships and through representative organizations.

a. The *National Agricultural Society*, founded in 1838, is composed by large land holders. It is by law represented on the boards of directors of such public institutions as the Central Bank, the Production Development Corporation, and the National Labor Relations Board. The Society includes Liberals as well as Conservatives, inasmuch as success in business is customarily demonstrated by the purchase of a landed estate. Its influence is exerted against any change in the pattern of land tenure or any significant increase in land taxes.

b. The *Central Chamber of Commerce*, organized in 1958, is predominantly Liberal in political coloration. It opposes state intervention in the economy, resists wage increases as inflationary, and advocates increased production as the cure for inflation. It is less influential than the Agricultural Society because there is not a united front among business groups regarding economic policies.

c. The *Society for Industrial Development*, organized in 1883, advocates state intervention in the economy to protect domestic industries and to encourage foreign private investments not competitive with local interests. It includes Radicals as well as Liberals and was a powerful influence behind the Radical program of rapid industrialization, 1938–1952.

19. *Organized Labor*. The Chilean movement is not a strong political pressure group. Only about 500,000 workers (20 percent of the labor force) are organized. Furthermore, the law discriminates between white collar and blue collar unions, imposing restrictions on the latter. The white collar unions have gained substantial benefits for their members through their association with the Radical Party. They have not been concerned with the interests of manual laborers. Lack of savings and the prevalence of unemployment have reduced the militancy of the workers in recent years and their willingness to heed a strike call.

20. The political affiliations of most industrial labor unions have been a hindrance to labor unity and effectiveness as a pressure group. Union leadership is more often used to serve party purposes than to advance the economic interests of the members. In consequence, the

members are increasingly unresponsive to the leadership. For example, the Communists have captured "control" of the principal Chilean labor confederation, CUTCh,¹⁴ but some members have refused to respond to Communist orders to strike. Nevertheless, the Communists are able to make political propaganda purportedly in the name of Chilean labor.

21. *Student Organizations.* All of the major political parties have formally organized youth groups; many current political leaders first achieved prominence as heads of university student associations. The oldest and most important of these is the student federation at the University of Chile (FECh),¹⁵ which was long controlled by Radicals or Communists. In 1955 the Christian Democrats wrested control of the FECh from the Communists. Since then they have gradually gained control of the student federations at Chile's seven other universities. While PDC-led student organizations occasionally criticize US policies, the strong anti-US animus which prevailed under Communist leadership is no longer evident. The prevalence of PDC influence among the students has been an important factor in the support which the party has received from new voters in recent years.

22. *The Church.* Historically, the close identification of the Roman Catholic Church with the Conservative Party has provoked a considerable anticlerical reaction among Liberals and Radicals, not to mention Socialists and Communists. Church and State were finally separated in Chile in 1925. Nevertheless, the Church retains a pervasive influence in Chilean society.

23. In September 1962 a revolutionary change in the attitude of the Church in Chile was marked by the issuance of a pastoral letter in which the hierarchy, led by Cardinal Silva Henríquez, cited the poverty and distress of the lower classes, charged the propertied classes with large responsibility for these conditions, and called for a genuine reform of the social structure. The pastoral letter may not convert many magnates, but it has tended to restore the credit of the Church among the general population and it may have had considerable bearing on the striking success of the Christian Democratic Party in the 1963 municipal elections.

24. Although the PDC is no longer an exclusively Catholic party (as are the Conservatives), it now has the support of an estimated 80 percent of the Catholic clergy. This clerical support may tend to alienate some potential recruits of Liberal, Radical, and Socialist antecedents, but on the whole it will probably prove to be advantageous.

¹⁴ *Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile*, ostensibly representing 400,000 organized workers.

¹⁵ *Federación de Estudiantes de Chile*.

Annex B

THE ARMED FORCES AND INTERNAL SECURITY

1. The Chilean military forces are distinguished in Latin America for a proud military tradition dating from the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) and for continuing high discipline, morale, and military efficiency. Their equipment, however, is in serious need of modernization. The armed forces which they watch with particular sensitivity, as a standard of comparison, are those of Peru and Argentina. To avoid the costs of rearmament, in view of the urgent requirements of economic development, the Chilean government occasionally proposes an arms limitation agreement under OAS auspices, but such proposals have met with no response.

2. The Chilean Army numbers 26,000 men; the Navy, 13,500; and the Air Force, 7,300. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of public order and internal security is assigned to the *Carabineros*, a national constabulary numbering 23,000 men.

3. The *Carabineros* are a highly professional force. They thoroughly patrol the country and are generally respected by the people: the development of any insurgency would be unlikely to escape their notice and counteraction. Although fairly well equipped with small arms, they are somewhat hampered by a lack of adequate transportation and communications equipment.

4. Normally, the *Carabineros* have been able to cope with threats to public order and internal security. If and when situations arise requiring the intervention of the military, the Army assumes command. Although there is some inter-service jealousy between the Army and the *Carabineros*, their cooperation on such occasions has been reasonably good.

5. The rank and file of the Army is composed of conscripts, but on entrance into service they are carefully screened for reliability. Recent and planned US-sponsored equipment and training programs are designed to improve the Army's counterinsurgency capability. In the Air Force, a fighter-bomber and a helicopter unit have received similar specialized training.

6. The Chilean military forces are proud of their role as the ultimate guardians of constitutional order and their corollary tradition of nonintervention in politics in support of party interests. They would almost certainly uphold the authority of any duly elected government, unless, in their judgment, the government itself had moved to subvert the established constitutional order. It is notable, however, that they did overthrow the constitutional government in 1924, in circumstances involving a radical departure from the previously long-established

political norm and a general economic collapse. Military intervention in politics can happen in Chile, though not without strong provocation.

46. Memorandum of conversation, November 14, among Belcher, Thompson, Richardson, Carlisle, and others¹

November 14, 1963

SUBJECT

Chilean Presidential Election 1964, and Implications for US Strategy and Policy

PARTICIPANTS

Taylor G. Belcher, WST
Herbert B. Thompson, WST
Ralph W. Richardson, WST/C
Lois Carlisle, RAR
[text not declassified]

The rough agenda of the meeting was per the attached questions. The following are views of various participants in the meeting and do not particularly reflect any consensus.

1. *The importance of issues*

In 1958 Alessandri emphasized creating more jobs and lowering prices.

The [less than 1 line not declassified] opinion poll of early 1963 clearly shows that domestic economic issues are the main preoccupations of the public: price controls; cost of living; Government control over key sectors of the economy, etc.

2. *What is the problem facing the Department?*

We have to determine whether the constellation of forces behind Durán is in our interest. [1½ lines not declassified]

3. *Issues versus Personalities*

These factors are inter-related. The candidate's personality is interpreted by a voter in terms of whether that candidate can be expected to deliver on an issue (credibility). Also involved are party machinery and party discipline.

¹ Chilean Presidential election of 1964 and implications for U.S. strategy and policy. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 14 CHILE.

4. *Increased Voters*

A reasonable assumption is that a large proportion are young. Another assumption then is that the Liberals and Conservatives can expect to attract a relatively smaller proportion of the new vote and probably that “more” will go further left than the Radicals. This leads to the assumption that the Radical-Democratic Front platform will have to be farther left, if it is to stand a chance of attracting new independent voters.

5. *The Independent Vote*

We should be careful in trying to apply election results from the municipal elections. Possibly a better means of measuring potential strengths of the four candidates would be to divide the electoral population into blue collar, white collar, students, etc., and guess which candidate is the stronger in each sector.

6. *The Durán Candidacy*

Durán obviously is in trouble. The major factor affecting him is Alessandri's unclear position. If Alessandri were to make it absolutely clear he is not available for re-election and if he were to clearly show he endorses Durán (this need not be open, but could be done quietly but still clearly) Durán's chances would increase a great deal.

[text not declassified]

There are serious problems here. For one, Alessandri may have dark designs involving Prat's candidacy. [1½ lines not declassified]

7. *Are the Socialists Committed to Allende?*

The Socialists are locked and trapped into supporting Allende. The only way this would change would be if the Communists took the initiative and dropped Allende.

We need to take the Allende campaign seriously. [text not declassified]

8. *Dumping of Candidates*

From history, it appears that no major candidate ever has dropped out of a campaign. If this is correct, dumping Durán would have a tremendous impact on the Front and would weaken its chances of continuing with a new candidate.

It may well be that Liberals and Conservatives are going on supporting Durán, knowing that he cannot win but realizing that if he folds up many Radicals will swing to Allende. We should keep in mind the recent Chilean analysis that it was Bossay's candidacy in 1958 which denied Allende victory, not the Cura of Catapilco. Durán could fill the same function in relation to Frei versus Allende.

9. *Does Frei Need an Ally to Win?*

Yes, [less than 1 line not declassified] he needs more strength. However, the PDC line is that the party is drawing from party strength on

left and right and is the leader in attracting independent voters. That combination gives the PDC its chance to win.

It is interesting that within the week some Radicals are reportedly wondering whether they might make a deal with Frei. We have given up our ideal of a Christian Democrat-Radical combination. [2 lines not declassified]

[text not declassified]

11. *Durán Campaign*

[1½ lines not declassified] If it does roll, the Conservatives and Liberals are going to stay with him since they have no other place to go. [1½ lines not declassified]

12. *Significance of Last Two Elections*

The Ibañez and Alessandri elections show the public wants a change from the status quo. [1½ lines not declassified] The party with the best image of "change" is the PDC.

Colombia

47. Memorandum of conversation, February 17, among Rusk, Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría, and U.S. and Colombian officials¹

February 17, 1961

SUBJECT

Various matters of mutual interest to Colombia and the United States

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, Ambassador of Colombia
José Camacho Lorenzana, Minister of Colombia
Mr. Mann, Assistant Secretary, ARA
Mr. Moskowitz, WST/CO

1. *Military Assistance.*

By appointment, under instructions from his President, Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría, accompanied by Minister Camacho, called on the Secretary to discuss matters of mutual interest. The Ambassador first mentioned the desire of his Government to have the military assistance it was receiving from the United States reoriented to place greater emphasis on internal security training, as the most effective contribution Colombia could make to hemispheric defense would be in the form of maintaining internal peace and stability within Colombia. The Colombian military and police should be trained to cope with internal violence, banditry, and guerrilla warfare. Colombia was interested in a revision of the existing military assistance agreements with the United States. President Lleras felt that the contemplated assistance (the proposed \$1,670,000 "special package" plan) would fall short of Colombia's needs.

The Secretary replied that the Department had been studying the matter of internal security assistance to friendly Latin American Governments and mentioned that the United States was at the point of implementing our assistance to Colombia in connection with eradicating the violence problem there. It was pointed out that implementation of the proposed assistance to Colombia would best determine what additional assistance, if any, was needed.

¹ Exchange of views on matters of mutual interest. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

2. Problem of Coffee.

The Ambassador suggested that the United States could make a significant contribution toward easing the coffee problem by using 10 percent of its contemplated \$500 million Social Development Fund to set up a coffee buffer stock to help stabilize coffee prices.

The Secretary replied that the suggested use of \$50 million for such a purpose would be very difficult. He mentioned the problems the United States Government had with our own agricultural commodity surpluses, and said it would not be possible to justify our subsidization of surplus agricultural commodities of other countries.

3. Problem of Sugar.

The Ambassador said that Colombia was not a major sugar exporter and did not expect to become one in the future; but wanted to diversify its economy somewhat by expanding its sugar production and hoped to be able to supply the United States market with 50 thousand tons annually. The Ambassador mentioned that at his recent luncheon conference with United States Congressmen of the House Agriculture Committee he had stressed the unfavorable impact on Latin American opinion of the United States continuing to import sugar from the dictatorial Dominican Republic while democratic countries friendly to the United States did not have quotas under United States sugar legislation.

The Secretary referred to the difficulties involved in changing sugar legislation and mentioned the fact that President Eisenhower had asked Congress to eliminate the Dominican windfall but had been turned down. He mentioned the need to take into account future purchases from Cuba, when a democratic regime is restored in that country, and the growing demand by United States domestic sugar producers against expanding imports.

4. Prospect of Loans to Colombia for Low Cost Housing.

The Ambassador said that President Lleras felt that one of the most important and urgent social development needs of Colombia was that of low cost housing in the major cities. President Lleras has hoped for credit assistance for housing from the United States, but the DLF line of credit to Colombia is predicated on the formation of new financial institutions in Colombia which would require legislative action by the Colombian Congress, thus further delaying the badly needed housing program. He said Colombia has existing housing institutions which are functioning well and President Lleras feels an immediate start should be made in low cost housing through these institutions.

The Secretary indicated his awareness of the importance of the housing problem in Colombia. Mr. Mann remarked that a joint DLF/Exim Bank mission was in Colombia at the present time looking into the matter.

5. Cuban Problem.

The Ambassador brought up this subject, indicating his Government's awareness of the hemispheric proportions of the Cuban problem. He mentioned the Ecuadoran Foreign Minister's attempted mediation efforts and the Colombian Foreign Minister's reply to the Ecuadoran gesture. He said his Government feels that an attempt should be made to ask the Cuban Government to submit itself to the discipline of the Inter-American system and that, failing in this, multilateral measures might be adopted to deal with this problem. He emphasized the importance of considering the position of the two key major Latin American countries, Mexico and Brazil.

The Secretary stated that we were not so much concerned by the Cuban revolution as an internal phenomenon as we were by its extra-continental implications. While we deplore the dictatorial methods of the Castro regime, what really disturbs us is its alliance with international Communism, its past efforts to overthrow other governments in the Caribbean and the professed aspirations of its leaders to foment subversive revolutions against those governments it considers unfriendly.

48. Memorandum of conversation, February 25, between Lleras Camargo and Adolf A. Berle, Jr.¹

February 25, 1961

In accordance with an arrangement made at dinner the night before, we met in President Lleras Camargo's office this morning at 9:30 a.m. We had covered some of the background in very general conversation previously and I had presented President Kennedy's personal greetings to the President at that time. Therefore, we started right in.

I said that my first hope was to develop our thinking regarding the lines of the program outlined by President Kennedy. We were studying the possibility of its presentation, rather than in the grand manner, as a hemispheric program. I said I thought that the first task was to find a philosophical common denominator, building around that rather than around money and economics, necessary as these were.

¹ General exchange of views including: economic conditions; Caribbean crisis; Government of Haiti; Cuba; Mexico. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 721.11/2-2561.

The President promptly agreed. I said that we were in a situation in which the attempted mystique of the Communists had to be met by something more definite than occasional expedients. It was clear that the time was ready for such an attempt. President Kennedy had captured the imagination of the great sector of the Latin American public opinion, and especially of the youth, and a philosophical statement would probably be of great importance. That could, of course, be supported by the practical structure, but the emphasis ought not to be on money or material accomplishments as it had been before.

We discussed a little philosophy of the good life and the good in the world and especially the necessity for free, individual development but within the framework of a society which made it possible.

The President pointed out that, in fact, economic conditions in much of Latin America, and notably in Colombia, were improving. Comparison of the standard of living today with that of twenty years ago showed the extent of the improvement. But, as men became liberated a little from their previous bonds, their perspectives grew, they wanted more. This was natural and had always been so in history. This was complicated by the fact that a very large increase in population (Colombia claimed the largest annual increase in the hemisphere—3.8%) meant that the economic necessities were going to be very great. I observed that the same thing was true in the United States.

Then we tackled the Caribbean crisis. I said that we considered that this was not merely a Cuban, but also a Caribbean crisis because it seemed as though three powers were coming to grips. We had information indicating that the Dominican Republic might explode as soon as the Dictator, Trujillo, realized he would not get a share of the Cuban sugar windfall. He had had meetings with Castro, who was in touch with him, and the Cuban propaganda machine had abruptly stopped attacks on the Dominican regime, though it had bitterly attacked both the Colombian and Venezuelan Governments, as well, of course, as ourselves. Trujillo agents in Moscow were apparently endeavoring to make some sort of deal with the Soviet Union; we considered that they might be quite egotistical enough to use them whatever their ultimate intent. No one could guarantee timing on such matters, the crisis could come up in April. In answer to the President's question, I told him that it might be a variety of bloodbath or class war designed to make a left wing dictatorship—of course with Trujillo as the Dictator. As soon as that happened, we considered that there would be great danger from the Castro side who would at once wish to take over as enemies or friends as the case might be.

I then said that the Government of Haiti was increasingly unstable. We ourselves were doubtful how long it would last. The Duvalier regime—whatever might be Duvalier's personal intention—was

increasingly a regime of a group with arms or force in their hands moving more or less at will around Port-au-Prince. The regime had quarreled with the Church and quarreled with the students, and had quarreled with whatever labor organization there was, and apparently killing and torturing had been continuing. I personally thought that the time would come when Port-au-Prince would explode—somewhat as it had done in 1915 under the regime of Guillaume Sam. My guess was that if the Dominican Republic exploded, quite likely the Haitian regime would fall very shortly.

And finally, there was the question of Cuba. This was serious. I outlined the information we had as to the extent of Russian armament (350,000 tons), the number of technicians, some of whom at least were officers in disguise, arriving every week. The number might be three or four thousand by now. Even passing through Curacao, I had learned that every week a KLM plane comes in loaded with Russians and Czechs. We knew that the CUBANA planes were bringing great numbers by way of the Azores. I also told him that there were a hundred Cubans in training in Czechoslovakia to run long-range jets and we expected such jets would arrive—possibly MIG 17's—very soon. The President was interested in the range. I told him I thought they had a radius of 1,000 miles, more or less, which would, of course, enable them to reach everything in the Caribbean.

The President inquired about Guantanamo. I said our feeling was that there would be no attack on Guantanamo; this was not a serious military threat to the United States. They would begin by making trouble all the way from the northern border of Mexico to Venezuela.

The President then inquired of the situation in Mexico. I stated to him most of the information we had; we thought that President Lopez Mateo was now hostile to the whole Cuban position but had political difficulties at home. The President smiled and said, "I would like to help you, but not publicly", which of course is the fact. The President had also noted that there was a meeting coming up in Mexico in a couple of weeks sponsored by Cardenas.

I then said that we were now squarely moving toward some sort of crisis though the time was not certain, and we had to consider how this could be handled. The hemispheric machinery was there for that purpose. But, if the hemispheric machinery did not work, nothing could prevent the countries involved from taking care of themselves as best they could.

The President then took up the story. He said that the sympathy for the Castro revolution, which had been very great a year and a half ago, was undoubtedly falling. The principal feeling was that Castro had undertaken to invade other countries, and had become part of an extra-continental machine. He said most people believed this, though

a good deal more discussed their opinions publicly without knowing what was taking place. He himself had no doubt about what was happening; the problem was to create a political atmosphere in the hemisphere. He then inquired what President Romulo Betancourt's views were.

I told him that President Betancourt had authorized me to repeat to him the conversations we had had in Caracas. I said that Betancourt would also send his own Ambassador to explain his views, and I did not wish, therefore, to give a definitive statement in spite of President Betancourt's authorization. Betancourt, however, had suggested that the way to handle the situation would be to deal with the Caribbean crisis, preferably the Dominican crisis first. He himself was prepared to send forces to maintain order and defend the Dominican Republic from Castro's intervention as soon as the Trujillo regime broke up, and that he wanted to do this in company with Colombia, although my impression was that he was prepared to do it alone if need be. This, Betancourt believed, would precipitate a situation in which a consultation of Foreign Ministers would be productive and which would authorize measures of defense against all Caribbean aggressors, including Castro. President Lleras observed that you could not always time events so that they fell out entirely at your convenience. I agreed that this was so and for this reason I had personally hoped that there might be very rapid consultation which would authorize the kind of action which might have to be taken on all sides. There was no point in having consultation, I said, after the damage had been done.

President Lleras then suggested that he, together with President Betancourt, might send representatives to the various countries in the hemisphere to explain the need of independent action. Both these countries were principals, both were in line of fire, both had general resources and direct interest in what happened in the Antilles. It would help, of course, if they could produce proof that Cuba was mixed up in the matter.

I then gave to the President the draft list (CONFIDENTIAL) we had made up of the various Cuban actions which showed both her aggressor intent and the extent to which she was now in the hands of an extra-continental power. President Lleras said this was evident from the known facts, as did Castro's recent speech threatening to export his revolution to other countries. He wished to read the document. I said that this was preliminary; we were gathering together the facts. I rather warmly approved his idea of sending someone around the hemisphere to explain the situation; it would come even with more force from Colombia and Venezuela than from the United States. In any event, the United States would be the last to be attacked.

We talked briefly of the proposed Inter-American Conference at Quito. I said that Betancourt felt it should be delayed; our own thinking

was running along that line. Lleras said this would be difficult for the Ecuadorans to take, but that he would consider it further. Obviously an Inter-American Conference, once thought of as a great achievement for a country, could be a great curse. He added a bit wryly that Colombia had reason to know that remembering the year 1948. We did not reach a definite agreement on the point.

I reverted to the possible consultation regarding the Caribbean crisis. I said that the Dominican Republic obviously could not go there; that it was illogical to have Castro there. In 1945 we had had a special Inter-American Conference from which the Argentine Government had been excluded. There was precedent, therefore, for having a special consultation to which the two Governments involved were not directly invited. President Lleras agreed that this was logical. (I gathered that a somewhat similar procedure would be agreeable to Betancourt.)

President Lleras then opened the problem of the Brazilian point of view. He said his impression was that the Governments to the south were not neutralists in the usual sense; they merely thought the problem was far away; which would not hit them in another ten years; they were, therefore, not greatly interested. He did think, however, that Argentina would be definitely interested in the situation, as would also Peru. Chile might be very much influenced by the Brazilian point of view. President Quadros was quite a "mystery"; no one knew exactly what he would do.

I said I was going to Brazil and would endeavor to find out.

We then turned to some of the specific difficulties Colombia had with the United States. The Military Mission, Lleras thought, ought to be devoting its time to tactics for meeting guerrilla attacks rather than the statistics of the Normandy landings, etc. He noted that the Colombian Army was totally unable to cope with guerrillas. I noted marginally that Castro's Army had not been able to deal with the guerrillas in the Escambray either.

President Lleras noted that the Inter-American Development Bank seems to be developing exactly the same rigidity which delayed the loan of the Export-Import Bank—credits granted 2½ years ago had not yet been drawn because of bureaucratic procedures. I said I had discussed that with the Embassy staff and had it on my mind. He noted especially that agrarian reform—which should be a part of any major Inter-American program, was partly blocked because the Americans seemed to want it done in accordance with a plan well understood but which would have little relationship to the realities here. I said I had discussed that in the Embassy and would endeavor to find out what could be done about it.

In closing the President reverted again to Cuba. He asked what was happening there. I told him from what information I had, I thought

it was rather gradually coming to a climax. We had to contemplate full civil war in Cuba. Then we would have the problem of two Governments in Cuba, and some action would have to be taken. Lleras said that especially if we could have a rapid consulta of minds this situation would somewhat add to the possibilities. I said that in view of the situation we ourselves could not consider that we had no responsibilities towards the region as a whole; if the hemispheric machine did not work, the Caribbean countries in immediate danger would have to act, and we would, of course, support them. President Lleras agreed that this was entirely logical. He added that in placing the situation before the countries it would be well to talk about that because they might easily drop responsibility by leaving it up to the Caribbean countries to carry the whole weight.

I pointed out that we were merely formulating our policies at this point without any commitments until we had ascertained the views of the countries principally involved; but that this gave us the background of our thinking. President Lleras said he was extremely glad to have this exchange of views; it made them more concrete in handling the problems with which he had to deal.

I gathered the impression that if the chips were down, he would immediately be of help.

A.A. Berle, Jr.

49. Memorandum of conversation, March 23, 1961, between Rusk and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría¹

March 23, 1961

SUBJECT

United States Military and Financial Assistance to Colombia

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, Ambassador of Colombia

Dr. Bernardo Rueda Osorio, Economic Counselor, Colombian Embassy

E.A. Gilmore, Jr., WST

Sam Moskowitz, WST/CO

¹ U.S. military and financial assistance to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

1. United States Military Assistance to Colombia.

By appointment, under instructions from President Lleras Camargo, Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría called on the Secretary. The Ambassador presented a memorandum to the Secretary, which he said was extracted from President Lleras' instructions to him, containing the Colombian President's views on the internal security assistance requirements of Colombia. The Ambassador said this assistance was needed urgently because: (1) the Colombian Armed Forces and police were inadequately equipped to meet present and potential internal security threats, and (2) after 12 years of civil war and rural violence, many Colombian peasants have been trained in guerrilla warfare to the point where they can effectively resist the poorly equipped Armed Forces. He said these guerrilla-bandits are armed and are receiving additional armaments through the flourishing contraband arms traffic into Colombia along its considerable stretches of uninhabited and unguarded coasts. (In response to a direct question, he confirmed to the Secretary that some of the arms are coming from outside Colombia). The Ambassador said that with the exception of the Communists and leftist-extremists, all political parties support the Government so that the political climate is now appropriate for the receipt of the requested military assistance from the United States. However, with elections for a new government scheduled early next year, the internal situation might become unfavorable toward United States military assistance, thus making Colombia's democratic government vulnerable to subversive attempts by extremists aided from abroad.

2. United States Financial Assistance to Colombia.

The Ambassador briefly discussed the background of the \$70 million line of credit earmarked for Colombia by the DLF and Eximbank. He said that President Lleras felt that the technical requirements set by the lending institutions and terms of credit were inconsistent with the social development objectives of the Colombian Government. President Lleras desired greater flexibility in the conditions of use of DLF credit, particularly as regards feeder roads, colonization, and housing. Also, President Lleras believed that the Eximbank terms of credit were too commercial and altogether inappropriate to the essentially social character of the contemplated projects they were to finance. Colombia, he said, would prefer to use the credit under conditions which would give the Government greater freedom of action and which would also have the added advantage of serving Colombia's balance of payments requirements. The Ambassador said that President Lleras' term of office would end in August, 1962 and that it would be most unfortunate for him not to be able to initiate a broad program of social development before then. He asked that the United States trust the Colombian Gov-

ernment to employ the credit sensibly and not squander it on foolish projects. The Ambassador said that he and his staff were undertaking a series of discussions with the Department and the DLF to make Colombia's views known in the hope that agreement can be reached to accommodate Colombia's requirements.

The Secretary stated that Colombia's position would be carefully studied. He also mentioned that the President had recently suggested to the Congress certain modifications in our foreign aid program which would enable our assistance to be more flexible and effective.

50. Memorandum from Mulliken to Carwell, June 8¹

June 8, 1961

SUBJECT

Meeting with Colombian Ambassador on Coffee Price Stabilization

Mr. Poole and I attended a meeting in Mr. Blumenthal's office on Tuesday afternoon, June 6, at which the Colombian Ambassador discussed his Government's views on what the U.S. should do in the way of price stabilization. He considered it most important that the U.S. be prepared to offer tangible proposals at the Montevideo meeting in July which will indicate progress in connection with Point 5 of President Kennedy's program for cooperation with Latin America. Since coffee is the most important commodity to the majority of the Latin American countries, he hoped that we would begin with a coffee agreement. In his opinion price stabilization is the best way to convince the small farmer in Latin America that the U.S. takes a serious interest in his problems. Money contributed through aid programs is administered by local governments, sometimes to achieve their own political objectives, whereas the proceeds of export sales go directly to the producer.

He expressed the hope that the U.S. would agree to participate in a coffee agreement designed to raise coffee prices by about 5 cents a pound. He also hoped that we would propose measures for placing existing stocks in the hands of an international body. He considers it dangerous to leave them at the disposition of individual governments

¹ Meeting with Colombian Ambassador on coffee price stabilization. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.21/6-861.

for bargaining purposes. He commented that these stocks would not be nearly as large as they appear if the governments holding them were obliged to grade them and throw out coffees which are not suitable for export sale. He also recommended that a part of the proposed increase in prices be turned over to a fund which could be used for developing new markets, improving methods of cultivation, and resettling marginal coffee cultivators in areas where they would undertake diversified farming. He thinks this is the only way to attack the over-production problem. He also expressed the hope that the U.S. would impose import quotas or at least require certificates of origin in order to assist the exporting countries in policing their export quotas.

Mr. Blumenthal encouraged the Ambassador to expand on his views and said that the U.S., while anxious to cooperate with the producing countries, believes that the coffee problem is primarily one for the producers to solve themselves. He hoped to hear from the other large producing countries' governments within the near future regarding their attitude toward the coffee agreement developed by the Coffee Study Group. He said the U.S. Government had been studying the proposal carefully and had developed a few ideas of its own which it was anxious to check against those of the producing countries, but that it would take a little time to reach a cleared position even within our own government.

Mr. Blumenthal questioned the desirability of giving the coffee question any real prominence on the Agenda of the IA-ECOSOC meeting, since the problem is world-wide in scope and is being considered in international forums. He thought the appropriate procedure would be to discuss with the Latin American producing countries at the meeting of Directors of the International Coffee Agreement which is to be held in Rio later this month, their views on whether 1) we should strive for a long-term agreement; 2) whether they wanted consumer participation; 3) whether they favored import quotas; and 4) whether they were prepared to turn over to any international body their unsaleable stocks, and at what prices. The next step he foresaw was to call a meeting of the Coffee Study Group in Washington, probably sometime in July, and learn the views of the consuming countries. Then, if there appeared to be substantial agreement, we might undertake to negotiate an agreement. Mr. Blumenthal stated that he hoped to be in touch with the Embassy again before the meeting in Rio to discuss some of the technical problems in greater detail.

Comment:

On the following day Mr. Blumenthal called a meeting of representatives of the geographic areas which have an interest in coffee, i.e., Africa and Southeast Asia, and outlined the steps which E is taking to

develop a position on coffee. They correspond closely to the summary contained in my memorandum of May 24. Mr. Blumenthal has already discussed the main features of his proposal with Mr. Leddy in Treasury, the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs of the Department of Commerce and with Assistant Secretary Duncan of Agriculture. No one had any objection to his moving ahead in an effort to develop a U.S. position which would incorporate the following points:

1. U.S. participation as a consumer in an international agreement to stabilize coffee prices at approximately the existing level.

2. Acceptance by the U.S. of an obligation to freeze non-participating countries at their present levels in the U.S. market (as is done under the International Sugar Agreement).

3. A possible contribution by the U.S. to financing of presently accumulated stocks of coffee of exportable grade provided producing countries will relinquish them at a small fraction of current prices.

Mr. Blumenthal has asked Mr. Rourk to provide us with a detailed statement of the position before the end of next week. His proposals, as outlined, appear to be entirely acceptable from the standpoint of ARA. I am not sure that Point 3 will prove acceptable to the Treasury Department. I pointed out that if we were to impose quotas on imports from non-participating countries it would require legislation, and I thought he would be well advised to discuss the proposal with appropriate congressional leaders and with the Industry Committee of the National Coffee Association before we make any public statement regarding our position. I understand that he has asked the Coffee Advisory Committee to come to Washington next week, and has already discussed the plan in broad outline with the President of the National Coffee Association.

Attachment:

Memorandum of May 24, 1961.

cc: ARA-Mr. Coerr

EST-Mr. Wellman

WST-Mr. Lane

OAP-Mrs. Bracken

CMA-Mr. Vallon

51. Telegram 3 to Bogota, July 3¹

July 3, 1961

Verbatim Text. Rptd Info: USUN, New York; By Pouch to all other American Diplomatic Posts in other American Republics; POLAD CINCARIB; Amconsul Ciudad Trujillo.

Please orally transmit to President Lleras following message from Secretary:

QUOTE After consultation with Ambassador Stevenson and upon examination of your memoranda Nos. 2 and 3 on the Cuban problem, I wish to express my personal gratification for your initiative and to inform you of our essential agreement with your objectives and general program for achieving them. We look forward to further consultation with you on the precise means for achieving our common objectives, particularly in the light of discussions which your Foreign Minister is now holding with other governments. We would wish to be helpful in consultations with other American Republics and would appreciate any suggestions you might have in this respect. In the meantime I have taken steps to inform our Ambassadors in other American capitals of your program and of the trip of your Foreign Minister.

With regard to the IA ECOSOC meeting at Montevideo in August, I look forward to a successful beginning of a massive planning effort which is so essential to the effective realization of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. The preparatory work thus far completed by the expert groups for the meeting has been of high quality and should provide an excellent basis for action. I am most hopeful that working together we will be able to develop practical methods for dealing with the Hemisphere's social and economic problems. UNQUOTE

Rusk

¹ Letter from Rusk to President Lleras expressing gratification for President's initiative on the Cuban problem. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, 1961.

52. Telegram 145 to Bogota, August 28¹

August 28, 1961

Info: AmEmbassy Buenos Aires; AmEmbassy Rio De Janeiro; All Other ARA Diplomatic Posts (by pouch); USUN, New York (by pouch); POLAD, CINCARIB (by pouch). Your 97 and 123.

In your meeting with President Lleras and Fonmin Turbay you may indicate Department believes it would be most helpful for GOC to translate action program outlined its memoranda into drafts of specific resolutions which would serve as basis consultations looking to their approval by MFM when held. In line with close consultations on this matter since first Lleras memorandum, we would also be grateful for opportunity to review and comment these drafts prior to their being taken up with selected key countries. In your next conversation with President or Fonmin this subject you should also indicate our strong interest their estimate support for such drafts on country-by-country basis, as well as on timing and site of possible MFM.

FYI Department not as optimistic, particularly following Punta del Este conference, about degree of support for Colombian initiative as various reports would indicate (e.g. Panama City 176 rptd Bogotá 5 and Turbay's estimate contained second paragraph your 123). Difficult to determine actual position of several doubtful countries until specific language put before them and commitment support solicited. Events in Brazil may also have significant bearing not only on Brazilian position toward Castro but also upon position of other countries which were influenced by Quadros' policies. Until support for Colombian plan clearly established, it would be inadvisable reach any decision on pressing for MFM. END FYI

Re Guevara's talk with Frondizi you may inform Lleras and Turbay that according to info we have received Guevara repeated line that Cuba had no intention enter into military arrangements with Soviets, wanted to remain in inter-American family, would like to negotiate differences with GUS, and would not try to export revolution. (US position of course remains as stated Depcirtel 936.) Guevara reportedly did not ask GOA help negotiate differences with US and did not bring up subject possible MFM.

Rusk

¹ Instructions for meeting with President Lleras and Foreign Minister Turbay regarding action program on Cuba outlined earlier by Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/8-2861.

53. Memorandum of conversation, September 25, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Turbay¹

Sec Del/MC/43

September 25, 1961

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 19–24, 1961

SUBJECT

Lleras Plan

PARTICIPANTS

US

President Kennedy

Colombia

Ambassador Turbay

Before the Secretary's lunch today for the Latin Americans, there was a short exchange of views between President Kennedy and Ambassador Turbay (Colombia). The President was interested in the progress of the Lleras Plan. Ambassador Turbay said it consisted of three resolutions, designed to test Cuba's willingness to conform to and remain within the Inter-American System. His exposition of this substance was as he gave it to Secretary Rusk on September 22. The texts had not yet come from Bogota.

Ambassador Turbay then said he hoped the President would speak of the Plan to President Frondizi, since Turbay had the impression the Argentine position was not as clear as it had seemed to be. President Kennedy asked whether in Ambassador Turbay's opinion a conference of Foreign Ministers could or should be called. The reply was that unless Argentine, Brazil, and Ecuador were in line (it was useless to hope Mexico would be), the bulk of the OAS members would abstain. It was true that if fourteen members were in agreement on a subject, the rest had to go along, but in this case, without these key members' approval, there would not be fourteen votes. President Kennedy inquired whether Argentina was the key to this problem. Turbay replied in the affirmative, saying good support by Argentina would surely bring Brazil and probably Ecuador along.

President Kennedy expressed the U.S. appreciation for Colombia's and Ambassador Turbay's initiative in the Cuban matter.

¹ Lleras Plan to test Cuba's willingness to remain in the Inter-American system. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, 1961.

**54. Memorandum from Woodward to Acting Secretary,
September 27¹**

September 27, 1961

TO: The Acting Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM

ARA—Mr. Woodward

SUBJECT

Urgent Need for Internal Security Aid to Colombia

Discussion

One of the major problems which the present Government of Colombia inherited when the rightist dictatorship was deposed in 1957 was a pattern of political unrest in rural areas where banditry had become a way of life for small but ruthless groups operating from isolated mountain or jungle hideouts. In addition, pro-Communist and pro-Castro elements have made increasing efforts to prevent the pacification of the rural population and to simultaneously stir up labor groups and slum dwellers in the cities.

Colombia faces crucial elections in 1962, with all Congressional and Senatorial seats to be voted on March 1 and a new President to be elected in May. Extremists of both the right and left are seeking to play an increased role in the election campaigns. They have had some success in encouraging rural violence and stimulating demonstrations and riots in the larger cities.

Acting on personal telephonic instructions from President Lleras, the Colombian Ambassador has been in to ask for urgent assistance with his country's internal security problems during the upcoming campaign months. The Ambassador also raised this matter with Mr. Goodwin in the White House, who, it is understood, expressed an interest in helping with this situation. In addition, the Chairman of Colombia's UNGA Delegation informed the Secretary of President Lleras' strong desire for this aid.

In actual fact, US plans for dealing with Colombia's internal security problems have been made on a continuing basis, interrupted solely by delays in congressional action on this year's aid appropriation bill.

¹ Urgent need for internal security aid to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.5-MSP/9-2761.

Working under the terms of a presidential determination obtained on January 5, 1961, internal security aid totalling \$1,670,000 was provided to Colombia during FY 61. Further internal security aid totalling at least US \$3 million has been provided for as a part of the FY 62 appropriation. Because of the urgency of the matter, however, it appears extremely undesirable to wait for final executive action on this appropriation, as this would delay deliveries of urgent internal security equipment items beyond the election campaign months when they are so badly needed. The best way to proceed with this matter appears to be to obtain at once an oral presidential determination of the need for internal security equipment for Colombia, so that the Department of Defense can order the necessary equipment and schedule early delivery. (It is believed that the delivery of major items under this program to Colombia prior to the end of this year would provide an active deterrent to extremist groups.) (This oral request would be followed by a formal written recommendation by the Department based on the requirements of the aid appropriation bill for FY 62.)

Recommendation:

That you telephone the White House to obtain an oral presidential determination that military aid for internal security purposes in an amount not to exceed \$3 million is necessary for Colombia.

**55. Memorandum of conversation, October 6, between
Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría and Coerr¹**

October 6, 1961

SUBJECT

Colombian Request for Additional Internal Security Aid

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, Ambassador of Colombia
ARA—Mr. Coerr
ARA/EST—Mr. Lancaster

Ambassador Sanz stated that he had come in under renewed personal instructions from President Lleras to reiterate Colombia's need

¹ Colombian request for additional internal security aid. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.5-MSP/10-661.

for additional military aid for internal security purposes. He referred to his conversation on this subject with Mr. Woodward on September 20 and stated that President Lleras continued to attach a high priority to this problem.

In his response to a question from Mr. Coerr, the Ambassador stated that he was not prepared to specify individual items of equipment needed, although it was clear that light transport aircraft had to be obtained to cope with outbreaks of banditry in isolated regions such as that now troubling the Colombian Government in the Vichada area. He indicated that the various types of equipment the Colombian Government desired were listed in a memorandum which he had given to the Secretary last spring (this memorandum was enclosed with the Department's A-146 to Bogota of April 24).

(On October 9 Ambassador Sanz telephoned Mr. Lancaster to say that he had received the following list of items on which the Colombian Government placed highest priorities in equipping its forces for internal security operations:

Infantry small arms:

4048 M1 rifles
888 M1 carbines
270 30 caliber machine guns
432 45 caliber sub-machine guns

Transport aircraft:
6 SA-16 Amphibians
4 C-47
3 C-54

The Ambassador stated that the Colombian Army Chief of Staff, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, would be discussing these and other priority problems facing the Colombian Armed Forces in the Department of Defense on October 10 and 11.)

56. Telegram 234 from Bogota, October 12¹

Bogota, October 12, 1961

Department pass Army, Navy, Air, CINCARIB.

President last night declared state of siege throughout country. Action taken by decree signed by full Cabinet following consultation with and concurrency by Council of State. This result of series of developments over past several weeks involving increased political agitation by elements such as Rojistas and MRL extremists, subversive activities MOEC and Communists, increased guerilla operations such as Vichada incident (EMBTel 229) and climaxed yesterday with subversive action Army Lieutenant and ex-Army officer Alberto Cendales who attempted lead group 135 soldiers into Llanos for subversive action under pretext taking them on maneuvers (see USARMA C-53 October 11). Cendales movement successfully eliminated within few hours but was straw that broke camel's back.

Seige decree declares public order disrupted, noting (1) acts disruptive of public order have been occurring in various sections of country; (2) some of these acts, characterized by use of force and by manifestations of open rebellion against constitution which although controlled for time being can have consequences constituting risk of security of country and can render difficult normal development electoral process; (3) it is Government's duty assure peace and quell acts internal disturbance.

In speech to nation last night President Lleras referred to Cendales affair and noted that this and Vichada incident may be part of "one or various" plans subversion which will persist. Observed that various political movements inciting subversion under pretext legal political action, declaring themselves "revolutionary" and frankly calling for violent action. President noted that these elements seek exploit social conflicts, incite criminal elements, protect or engage in arms contraband traffic, and foment discontent and disorder. Stated that groups with apparently different political objectives seek the same ends of national disturbances "with or without coordination". President then made significant statement that Government had been informed that economic, military and political support had been sought from the extreme right and the extreme left and, outside of the country, from international Communism and from retired or exiled dictators who want to establish a "black international" in the lands from which they were ousted.

¹ State of siege declared throughout Colombia by President Lleras. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/10-1361.

Lleras added that he believed prime objective all these elements was prevent elections and make constitutional transition power impossible but that Government would use all its resources protect constitutional process.

President said that state of seige would be used only facilitate necessary police measures prevent disorders and subversion. Would not be used issue decree-laws except for public order question and would not restrict legitimate civil and political rights. State seige would be lifted soon as possible and asked public remain calm.

Comment: Government's action clearly result of mounting concern over various incidents political and social agitation such as MRL exploitation labor difficulties, Rojista activity, Communist and MOEC extremist agitation. President's speech clearly reflects concern over Rojas and possibility he would mount strong subversive movement supported locally and abroad by extremists. Also reflects concern that various groups such as MRL, Communists, Rojistas might develop sufficient momentum and coordination create very serious problem. Hence State of Seige preventive effort curb agitation and incidents. Whole situation typifies what is becoming serious tension in Colombian situation, namely, increasing feeling legal electoral process may not provide viable solution political problems with corresponding increase in affinity for extralegal action by those elements who feel cannot achieve objectives via elections.

Dearborn

57. Telegram 315 to Bogota, November 1¹

November 1, 1961

Rptd: US POLAD CINCARIB. Joint State Defense message.

President has signed determination furnish internal security aid Colombia. Program has been designed here furnish on priority basis all items Colombian Ambassador requested in memcon October 6 except SA-16 aircraft and one of three C-54 aircraft.

¹ Announcement that President Kennedy has signed determination to furnish internal security aid to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/11-0161.

Ambassador and Chief MAAG should inform Colombian civil and military officials at high level of determination and program details, making following clear:

1. Items programmed represent only part total FY 62 military aid Colombia with balance dependent on division still under discussion of total appropriation for Latin America.

2. This is first internal security package arranged for any individual LA country during this FY and US has moved urgently this matter order help Colombian Government maintain law and order during upcoming electoral period.

3. US depriving other high priority end-users including possibly own troops order make early deliveries Colombia.

Secretary Defense seeing Colombian Ambassador and General Ruiz noon November 1 order inform them above points and hand over list specific items to be furnished. List Army items identical that given CINCARIB message CC 68609 MA October 21 with exception increases made infantry small arms to totals requested by Colombians in ref memcon. Air items are four C-47 and two C-54 for troop carrier use.

FYI Possibility being investigated of meeting your request deliver key items before elections. Embassy will be advised later of exact delivery dates. Department hopeful at present obtain target delivery date February for gas masks, tear gas, all infantry weapons except 106 mm rifles and possibly C-47 aircraft. Two programmed C-54 aircraft cannot be rehabilitated and delivered before August. All deliveries will be labeled with code name "Bandera" order distinguish this separate package clearly from other shipments reaching Colombia as result direct purchase or previous MAP programs.

Presidential determination set figure \$3 million for this internal security package. Scheduled deliveries, including shipment which by air for infantry weapons, total somewhat less than this figure leaving balance available future use as needed.

Regarding SA-16 aircraft, delivery problems preclude their inclusion this package. Three SA-16-B programmed ASW for Colombia in FY 62. As Embassy aware ASW items do not require presidential determination. If MAAG believes Colombia needs this type aircraft primarily for internal security mission, matter must be re-studied. Remaining funds under current determination would not cover cost these aircraft. End FYI.

Colombian Ambassador states he understands his Government does not desire publicity presidential determination or our plans deliver equipment thereunder.

Bowles

58. Memorandum of conversation, December 17, between
President Kennedy and President Lleras¹

December 17, 1961

SUBJECT

Developments in the Dominican Republic
Planning for Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Cuban Problem

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

President Kennedy
Mr. Chester Bowles, President's
Special Assistant
Ambassador Moscoso
Assistant Secretary Woodward
Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodwin
Ambassador Freeman
Mr. Henry Dearborn, Counselor of
American Embassy, Bogota

Colombia

President Camargo Lleras
Foreign Minister Castilla Caicedo
Minister of Finance Mejia
Director of National Planning Dept.
Gutierrez

President Kennedy called at President Lleras's office at 5:30 p.m. on December 17. Each President was accompanied by advisers as recorded above. Press photographers were invited in and pictures taken. President Kennedy then suggested that the group sit down for conversations and the Presidents, together with their advisers, held a discussion for over an hour.

Developments in the Dominican Republic

President Kennedy had just been handed a cable from the Consul General in Santo Domingo with information on developments there and the Dominican situation was the first item of conversation. He gave President Lleras information from the cable to the effect that President Balaguer had agreed to announce his withdrawal from the presidency before the end of February, actually intending to leave on January 26. Balaguer had agreed in the meantime to set up a Council of State consisting of Jose Maria CABRAL Bermudez as First Vice President, Dr. Rafael Bonelly as Second Vice President and with the following as members: Monsenor PEREZ Sanchez, Sr. Amiama Tio and Sr. Imbert. Presidents Kennedy and Lleras and others present discussed the characteristics of this group and it was generally agreed that the information in the telegram was encouraging.

¹ Developments in the Dominican Republic; planning for Foreign Ministers meeting on Cuban problem. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, January 1962.

Planning for Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Cuban Problem

The Presidents devoted most of their conversation to the pending Foreign Ministers' Meeting to consider the Cuban problem. The points discussed were: 1) the timing of the Meeting; 2) the place where it should be held; 3) the need for additional support; and, to some extent, 4) the substance of the resolutions to be presented.

President Kennedy raised the question of timing. President Lleras stated that before President Kennedy went to Venezuela and Colombia he favored holding the Meeting on January 10, as proposed earlier. Since the visits, and owing to their extraordinary success, he was even more firmly opposed to postponement. He thought the momentum derived from the visits should not be lost. President Kennedy agreed and said that preparations should be aimed at an early holding of the conference. He said that Ambassador Woodward and Mr. Goodwin would remain in Bogota for another day to join Ambassador Freeman in an effort to reach an agreement with Foreign Minister Caicedo and President Lleras on the texts of the resolutions to be presented.

In considering where the Meeting might be held, President Lleras stated that he was not one of those who was worried about adverse reactions if Washington should be chosen as the site. He remarked that no one could reasonably say that because the Meeting was held there, its action would be dictated by the U.S. Government. Washington was, after all, the seat of the OAS and what could be more logical than for important questions to be considered there. He doubted, for example, that many really believed the UN was under the domination of the United States because its headquarters was in New York. If the Meeting could be held elsewhere, President Lleras suggested that Bariloche in Argentina would be a good place. He added that Montevideo, Santiago, or "even Brasilia" would also be acceptable. He did not think El Salvador would be satisfactory, but he was in favor of Costa Rica if that Government were amenable. It was agreed that a site must be chosen before the end of the week, and it was the consensus that if no other place were available Washington should be the place.

President Lleras expressed the opinion that at least one other country should be brought into the group of those favoring action since Uruguay was doubtful. He believed that of the countries which abstained on the vote of December 4, Chile would be the most easily won over. He said he knew that President Alessandri was 100 per cent in agreement with him and that the reason why Chile had abstained was that Alessandri had lost the last elections and had bowed to political pressure. Argentina, Dr. Lleras thought, might be brought around, especially if it could be made to appear that the Argentine Government was playing a leading role. He asserted that he would be glad to have Argentina think it invented "the whole thing" if only it would adopt

a constructive attitude. Dr. Lleras urged that President Kennedy work on President Frondizi, President Alessandri and also on the Bolivian Government. Mr. Woodward noted confidentially that Mexico had let the United States know that it would break relations with Cuba if all the other American States did so. President Kennedy replied that the United States would work especially on Presidents Frondizi and Alessandri and would do what it could to influence Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador. He also urged President Lleras to concentrate consultative efforts on these Governments.

Regarding the substance of the resolutions, President Lleras emphasized that he thought the word "sanctions" should not be used as this would draw all manner of objections from various countries. He favored simply noting at the chosen time that the Cuban Government had identified its interests with the Sino-Soviet bloc and had reneged on its inter-American commitments, and therefore the nations of the inter-American system were breaking off relations with it. President Kennedy stated that he would prefer not to give Cuban relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc as a reason for the break, but rather that the Cuban Government was engaged in subverting the democratic governments of the western hemisphere in implementation of the policies of Moscow. President Lleras enthusiastically supported this suggestion.

President Lleras explained that Colombian strategy would be to hold firmly at first to an insistence that a special vigilance committee be set up to follow Cuban performance and to report to the COAS. He wished to assure President Kennedy, however, that Colombia would ultimately agree to having the COAS itself to perform this function. He said Colombia was adopting this strategy in order to sidetrack the numerous changes in the resolutions which other countries might propose. He hoped they would devote their efforts to convincing Colombia to give up its vigilance committee, thereby diverting them from seeking changes in more vital parts of the resolutions. Dr. Lleras suggested that the United States might inform other Governments that it was working on Colombia to dissuade it from insisting on a vigilance committee. He urged President Kennedy to meet with President Frondizi on the latter's way home from the Far East, but also urged that Colombia's strategy on the vigilance committee not be divulged. President Kennedy suggested that the U.S. might suggest that Argentina too attempt to convince Colombia to give up this committee idea.

President Kennedy asserted that it was now urgent to reach an agreement on the draft resolutions with Colombia and that he hoped this could be done the following day. Then consultations with the other Governments could begin promptly. He stressed again that a definite time and place for the Meeting should be set before the end of this week. Dr. Lleras was entirely in agreement and an appointment was

set up for Mr. Woodward, Ambassador Freeman and Mr. Goodwin to meet with Foreign Minister Caicedo and President Lleras on December 18. Mr. Jamison, who had just arrived in Bogota for these conversations, would be present. President Kennedy stressed that the strategy should be to draft fairly strong resolutions and then modify them if necessary.

59. Memorandum of conversation, June 8, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Freeman¹

June 8, 1962

SUBJECT

Report to the President on Colombia

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Fulton Freeman, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia

Taylor G. Belcher, ARA/WST

Ambassador Freeman told the President that he had hoped to report to him on events in one country where the Alliance for Progress was really moving forward. He said that the press was giving excellent treatment to the Alliance program and that Government officials as well as the U.S. business community were fully behind it.

With regard to the business community, Ambassador Freeman showed the President a newspaper advertisement, carrying the Alianza “torch” seal, highlighting some of the activities of the U.S.-owned oil companies in the field of education. Entitled “Cooperating with the Alliance for Progress”, it gave details and pictures of new buildings and classrooms provided by the companies. The President asked whether this sort of activity on the part of American business firms in Colombia was widespread and what sort of coordination there was in this effort. The Ambassador said the American business community, particularly in the capital, was well coordinated and was very interested in contributing as much as possible to the success of the Alianza. After the Ambassador described the nature of his monthly briefing at the Embassy residence for leaders of the U.S. community, the President requested that he be furnished a report on the efforts of the other

¹ Alliance for Progress results in Colombia. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

Embassies to coordinate the activities of the U.S. business community in the context of the Alliance. He also suggested that the clipping which the Ambassador had be shown to the Grace Committee so that it might serve as an example to be used by other firms in other countries.

The President said that this example of "impact" projects by private American companies was what the Alliance as a whole needed. He wished it could have a similar meaning for the average person in Latin America. He referred to the meeting held last week with senior officials of the Department regarding the need for projects which the people could see and touch and in which they could appreciate the direct benefit to them. Airports, roads, power projects, etc., were important but there was little direct impact on the people and this was what was needed for the immediate future.

Mr. Belcher mentioned the Cyprus-American grain relief program as an excellent example of a program which had an impact in every one of the 800 villages on the island. The President inquired regarding the means whereby this program was carried out and was informed that it had been done with PL 480 funds in cooperation with the local government.

The President asked how the OAS Committee on Cultural Affairs and Public Information was progressing. Ambassador Freeman said that Colombia was being used as a pilot project and that the organizational work was well in hand in Bogota with former Foreign Minister Turbay heading the group. The President also inquired regarding the activities of the Grace Committee and asked that he be given a report by Ambassador Morrison or Mr. Moscoso on progress in coordinating the activities of the U.S. business and trade union communities with the Alliance for Progress.

60. Memorandum of conversation, June 26, among U. Alexis Johnson, President-elect Valencia and other U.S. and Colombian officials¹

June 26, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting between President-elect Valencia and Department Officials

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
Assistant Secretary Martin (ARA)
Deputy Administrator Moscoso
(AID/LA)
Mr. John Robinson (AID)
Mr. Maxwell Chaplin (WST/CO)
Mr. Bruce Lancaster (EST/A)
Mr. Saul Moskowitz (WST)

Colombian Side

President-elect Guillermo Leon
Valencia
Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría
Finance Minister Mejia Palacios
Education Minister Posada
Mr. Salazar (OAS)
Colonel Durán
et. al.

After being greeted by Mr. Johnson, Dr. Valencia expressed his appreciation for the way he had been received in Washington. Mr. Johnson referred to the close ties between the two countries, and spoke of Colombia's willing and outstanding cooperation during the Korean conflict.

Dr. Valencia said that he considered that Colombia had a permanent alliance with the U.S., and that it would follow this country in defending the cause of justice and freedom anywhere in the world. Mr. Johnson said that the present danger was much closer than it had been in Korea, and that it was a danger that the two countries must face together.

Dr. Valencia said that he fully understood. He said that Castro's policy was to exert pro-Communist pressure, which in Colombia meant assistance to the bandits, including training of Colombians in Cuba. He said that he had learned that the guerrillas planned to step up their attacks when he took office. He said that both President Lleras' Administration and his own would not hesitate in taking any necessary steps to put down the guerrillas. He said that he hoped to obtain U.S. assistance in this endeavor, since it was a hemispheric rather than a regional problem.

Mr. Martin said that the U.S. Government was aware of this problem, and that Ambassador Freeman had discussed ways to reduce the

¹ Review of relations between the two countries. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.21/6-2662.

area of violence with Department officials and with President Kennedy, and that the Ambassador was looking forward to discussing the matter with Dr. Valencia.

Dr. Valencia said that he was pleased to hear this. He praised the work of Ambassadors Freeman and Sanz de Santamaría, saying that it was not a question of strengthening the ties between the two countries but of maintaining the existing excellent relations.

Mr. Johnson said that he had talked with Ambassador Freeman about the guerrilla problem, and that he considered it to have two aspects: the first was the internal factor in which the Castroites exploited discontent over living conditions; and the second was the external factor in which Cuba sent arms to the discontented in Colombia. He said that the U.S. would be pleased to cooperate with Colombia on both aspects.

Dr. Valencia said that unfortunately many Colombians, especially students, were going to Cuba to receive training in guerrilla warfare and political action. He said that, however, the number was decreasing. He cited a student and worker organization (MOEC) as being involved in this matter. He said that Secretary McNamara had asked him whether the guerrillas were bandits or Communists, and that he had replied that they were bandits led by Communists.

Dr. Valencia said that in Latin America public opinion was divided as follows: There were some men, including himself, who sincerely believed that the best policy for their countries was to work closely with the U.S.; there were other men who were strongly opposed to the U.S., many of them being crypto-Communists. The majority of the people, however, varied in either supporting the U.S. or Russia. Dr. Valencia said that he would respectfully suggest that the U.S. develop greater cooperation with its loyal friends. He applauded the Alliance for Progress for addressing itself to changing the living conditions of the people. He said that Alliance funds should be concentrated on projects that would substantially change living conditions, and not on projects that might have more rapid economic results but that at the same time would benefit only the leading classes.

Mr. Johnson said that he was very gratified to hear this idea, since it coincided with American thinking. He asked whether the Colombian students went to Cuba directly or through third countries.

Dr. Valencia replied that some of them travelled through third countries, and that so far it had not been possible to restrict direct travel to Cuba, although he had hopes of doing something about this, such as denying visas for travel to Cuba. He said that it would be difficult to restrict travel to Cuba through third countries.

Dr. Valencia said that if the guerrillas stepped up their violence for his inauguration, and if he received cooperation from the U.S., as

has been offered by President Kennedy, he would use violence in turn in an attempt to wage the final battle against the guerrillas.

Mr. Johnson said that Ambassador Freeman was prepared to discuss this matter in detail with Dr. Valencia, and that he hoped the U.S. could be of help. He asked to what degree the guerrillas were politically oriented.

Dr. Valencia replied that the violence was of political origin, although both major parties were opposed to it. He said that at present the violence was more commercially oriented, accentuated by the fact that coffee was ready to be picked, and the guerrillas like to steal coffee. He mentioned the “carteo” method of operations, in which the bandits would write to a farmer and warn him to abandon his property. Should the farmer leave, his property would be neglected and would therefore depreciate in value, and some third person would then be able to buy it at a low price. He said that the bandits could be divided into three categories: (1) the natural killers; (2) unscrupulous businessmen; and (3) those with political orientation. Of the last, most were oriented by international Communism.

Mr. Johnson asked whether arms were being shipped from Cuba. Dr. Valencia replied that he was sure this was the case. The Government had found new weapons in the hands of the Guerrillas, some of them from Iron Curtain countries, specifically Czechoslovakia, although most of them were American made. He said that this led some people to believe that the U.S. was to blame for the arms traffic.

Mr. Johnson said that the exchange of intelligence was of great importance. He suggested the Special Security Committee of the OAS as one means of exchanging information. Dr. Valencia said that he would pay special attention to this problem.

NOTE: This meeting ended at 12:00 noon. Mr. Johnson left and Messrs. Moscoso and Robinson from AID, and Mr. Lancaster from ARA joined the group.

Mr. Moscoso said that, in connection with the economic development of Colombia, everyone was looking forward to the creation of a consortium to provide the external financial assistance required for Colombia's Development Plan.

He said Colombia might be the first country to have a long-term plan approved. He said that there were a number of problems to be discussed. He had touched on one of them with the Education Minister, which was the primary education program. He said that it might perhaps be better to obtain financing for this program through loans than through grants, as in the past. He said that the credit terms would be easy, with a 40-year term for repayment and low rate of interest. He said that he hoped that all of the measures that had been approved in

January in connection with the balance of payments problems would be put into force. He said that AID would give favorable consideration to individual Colombian projects until the general development plan was approved.

Mr. Moscoso said that, as far as specific loans were concerned, it might be necessary to make some changes in the project for the survey of mineral resources, to avoid an overlap with a basic resources project already approved.

Mr. Mejia asked about the procedure for the mineral resources survey, and Mr. Moscoso replied that he would provide the Minister a memorandum on this matter.

Mr. Moscoso said that a problem existed on funds approved in August 1961 for a savings and loan association which had not yet been used. Members of the U.S. Congress took a dim view of approving new funds under these circumstances.

Mr. Mejia, in connection with this loan, asked how the loan associations would be controlled. He said that Colombia exercises strict controls over banking, and that the savings and loans institutions would not come under that type of control. He said that the Central Bank authorities complained of competition from these institutions.

Mr. Moscoso replied that controls were possible, and that in Puerto Rico, for example, there were both Federal and local savings and loans institutions, with no major problems. He said that competition might be a good idea.

Mr. Moscoso said, in connection with the national health program and the \$21,000,000 loan request for the 40 health centers, that AID was awaiting more information and hoped to have things settled by September. Mr. Moscoso said that the Buenaventura aqueduct project had been received by the Inter-American Bank on the previous day, and there was no information as to its present status. He said, with regard to the sewerage projects for Medellin and Cali, that they were being merged and integrated into a national project; time was needed for review but the project seemed good.

Dr. Valencia said that he was deeply interested in rural health facilities.

Mr. Moscoso said that AID was going to conduct experiments with mobile health units, and asked whether Dr. Valencia would be interested in this type of operation. Dr. Valencia replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Moscoso said that Colombia would be a sort of a pilot country for special private foreign investments. He said that a meeting had been scheduled for July 26 with a group of American investors, and that he would later speak with Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría, if things worked out, to fix a date for a meeting in Colombia.

Dr. Valencia said that he was enthusiastic about the possibility of Colombia being a pilot country for this type of investment.

Mr. Moscoso said that this group of investors was anxious to prove that private investment could be of help to a country without offending it.

Dr. Valencia said that the Alliance for Progress required a prior condition for its success in Colombia, and that was the stabilization of coffee prices. He said that a coffee crisis would have serious political repercussions.

Mr. Moscoso said that the U.S. was well aware of this problem.

Dr. Valencia said that Colombia purchased all of its machinery in the U.S. and paid its coffee labor well. A drop in coffee prices, therefore, created serious problems.

Mr. Moscoso said that coffee problems called for a short-term and a long-term solution. The former could be taken care of by, for example, coffee quotas and the International Coffee Agreement. The latter could be taken care of by diversification.

Dr. Valencia said that he agreed, but that a medium-term solution was also needed to cover the transition to diversification. He inquired whether the U.S. might help the transition by increasing imports of other Colombian products, e.g., cotton. He said that Colombia needed more flexible policies from the U.S. in this field.

Mr. Martin said that he believed Colombia had no argument with the U.S. as far as coffee was concerned, since the U.S. had taken the lead in the Coffee Agreement and in seeking price stability. He asked for Colombian assistance in influencing other coffee-producing countries, especially those from Central America, to get them to cooperate in the Agreement. He said that the Central American countries liked the idea of enjoying the “umbrella” provided by Colombia and Brazil, and that a problem also exists in obtaining the cooperation of the African producers.

Dr. Valencia thanked Mr. Martin and said that he was not complaining about the U.S. position, but wanted to stress that coffee was the only way to save Latin America.

Mr. Moscoso said that the U.S. had offered \$12,000,000 to the Central American Seasonal Coffee Marketing fund to get it started.

Dr. Valencia said that he wanted to comment on priorities in the Alliance for Progress. He said that he had been elected by his people, and would therefore do everything in his power to change the conditions in which his people live. He said that he did not want investments if they were of a speculative nature. He said that in the field of education he intended to concentrate on primary schooling, and leave it to future administrations to worry about secondary and university development.

He said that eradication of illiteracy and ignorance would be one of the major objectives of his Administration.

Mr. Moscoso said that Dr. Valencia could be very helpful if he encouraged coordination in the Colombian Government, in view of the inevitable pressures that were exerted for various projects. Dr. Valencia said that this kind of coordination was decisive for the success of the Alliance. Mr. Moscoso said that he would like to concentrate on four or five priorities.

61. Airgram A-145 from Bogota, September 5¹

Bogota, September 5, 1962

SUBJECT: Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation.

There is transmitted herewith a memorandum covering a conversation concerning the violence problem in Colombia which I had with President Guillermo Leon Valencia on September 4, 1962.

Fulton Freeman

Attachment

SUBJECT

The Violence Problem in Colombia

PARTICIPANTS

President Guillermo Leon VALENCIA
Ambassador Fulton FREEMAN

I called today at the President's request to discuss with him the problem of continuing violence in Colombia. On several previous occasions, both prior to the elections and subsequent thereto, President Valencia and I had discussed briefly the violence question in Colombia and he had expressed the desire to hear what recommendations and suggestions I might have. During a small luncheon meeting with President Valencia and Mr. Chester Bowles, just prior to the inauguration,

¹ Transmits September 4 memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Freeman and President Valencia on the violence problem in Colombia. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/9-562.

I had mentioned that the Embassy had conducted a fairly thorough study of the violence problem in Colombia and that we had come up with certain conclusions and ideas which might be of interest to the President. On that occasion the President had expressed keen interest in our ideas and he said that he wished to discuss the subject with me as soon after the inauguration as would be convenient.

On August 5th, 1962, the day prior to Valencia's inauguration, I had the opportunity to speak briefly with President Lleras at a social function. Lleras said that he had found our paper on violence to be of considerable interest, that many of the recommendations were completely practicable, and that he intended to pass it along to President Valencia at the first opportunity. He said that he would explain the background of the paper to President Valencia and that he would caution him as to the desirability of keeping its origin secret.

I opened the conversation with Valencia by inquiring whether he had received this document from President Lleras and, if so, what opinion he might have formed. Valencia replied that he had discussed the matter with President Lleras, that he knew of the existence of such a paper and some of its general conclusions, but that he had so far not received a copy from President Lleras.

I took the opportunity to describe the background of the paper and to reassure the President that it was not our intention to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Colombia. I explained that this had for the most part been an academic study, examined from the point of view of what we ourselves would do if we were to have the responsibility of eliminating violence in Colombia, and that the paper simply represented a summary of the conclusions, ideas and recommendations of the Embassy. Valencia assured me that he was very grateful for our interest in this matter and that he would examine the paper immediately and with the greatest care.

I explained that our paper gave no hint whatsoever as to its origin and was drafted in such a way that it might well have been written, for example, by a professor of sociology at the University of the Valle. I said that we were of course very anxious to avoid disclosure of the role of the Embassy in the preparation of this document, because such disclosure would of course be highly embarrassing both to us and to the Colombian authorities. The President appeared to appreciate and to agree with this point of view.

I explained that our paper contained four basic recommendations: (1) The need for coordination at the highest governmental level in planning and executing actions against violence; (2) the need for improving the intelligence capability of government entities; (3) the need for effective and appropriate law enforcement action by the armed forces and police, with adequate support of civilian authorities; and

(4) the need for adequate, prompt and effective rehabilitation measures by civilian entities, including the utilization in civic fields of military resources. I also took the opportunity to read to the President the paragraph proposing an organization such as a "National Internal Security Committee".

I then pointed out to the President that, in order to avoid any hint of origin, our paper contained no suggestions whatsoever of the areas where the United States Government might assist the Colombian authorities in the implementation of such a plan. As he was well aware, I pointed out that we were in fact willing and anxious to be of assistance in appropriate areas and I specifically mentioned the following: (1) Assistance in the intelligence field by training Colombian personnel in available U.S. training programs and in the provision of U.S. intelligence advisers through MAP; (2) support of military/police action against bandits by the provision through MAP of necessary equipment and advisory assistance; (3) USIS cooperation with troop indoctrination and education programs; (4) more extensive use of U.S. training programs and schools in both the U.S. and in the Canal Zone; (5) the temporary assignment of a small Civic Action Team to work with the Colombian Army in developing suitable projects; (6) assignment of a small Police Mission in order to advise the National Police on internal organization and training; and (7) support through AID and other appropriate agencies of the Colombian Government of efforts to conduct social and economic rehabilitation in the violence areas. In recapitulating this potential assistance, I placed particular emphasis on the Police and Civic Action Teams which I indicated were already prepared to depart for Colombia on fairly short notice should the President indicate to me that they were desired. Assistance in the other mentioned areas, I said, should be the subject of further close consultation between members of the Embassy staff and persons that the President might wish to designate.

The President said that he naturally wished to study the document in detail before commenting to me on it. He said that he did wish at the outset, however, to express his appreciation for our efforts to assist in eliminating the violence problem and that he did have some preliminary comments. As to the Police Mission and the Civic Action Team, he would take up these matters right away with the appropriate officials to see whether the necessary requests would be forthcoming. He gave every indication that this would be the case. With respect to the possibility of the establishment of a central coordinating group such as a "National Internal Security Committee", the President expressed great interest in the idea and said that he wished to study the Constitution once more to see if this might not be feasible.

With respect to military/police action now being taken in Colombia and planned for the future, the President stated that he had recently

been given a five-hour briefing on Plan Lazo and that he was quite satisfied with the detailed planning which had been carried out. He did state, however, that certain shortages in equipment were developing (he mentioned specifically radio and communications equipment) and he indicated that he might be submitting a request in the very near future for specific items of equipment. He recalled that when he was in Washington he had discussed the violence question with President Kennedy, and he stated that at that time President Kennedy offered to be of assistance in any appropriate way. Valencia said that he informed President Kennedy that he wished first to return to Bogotá and study the situation intensively, but that he had replied that he would quite probably be submitting a request for specific assistance in countering the violence problem. Valencia indicated that we would be receiving a note through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this subject in the very near future.

Before my departure, President Valencia insisted on setting a date for a further meeting with me on the violence problem at which time he would present his opinion and comments on our paper. We decided to meet on Friday September 7 at 11 a.m.

62. Memorandum of conversation, September 18, between Rusk and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría¹

September 18, 1962

SUBJECT

Colombian Request for \$60 Million Balance-of-Payments Loan and Counterpart Release

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría of Colombia
José Camacho-Lorenzana, Minister, Colombian Embassy
Mr. Thompson, ARA/WST

Ambassador Sanz made a farewell call on the Secretary this afternoon. He explained that he would be going to New York this weekend,

¹ Farewell call of Ambassador; Colombian request for \$60 million balance-of-payments loan and counterpart release. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

would sign the coffee agreement on September 28 and return to Colombia the following day to assume his new duties as Finance Minister. He said he wished to thank the Secretary for the many courtesies extended to him during his mission in Washington. The Secretary said that the occasion of Ambassador Sanz' call was a sad one in many ways. He said he was sure Ambassador Sanz was aware that he was leaving many friends in Washington, including the Rusks.

Ambassador Sanz said he hoped the Secretary was aware of the fine job Ambassador Freeman has been doing in Colombia. He said he mentioned this particularly because Ambassador Freeman has now been in Bogota for two years. According to U.S. practice, this might indicate that the time has come for his transfer. The Ambassador hoped that this would not occur. He said that Ambassador Freeman's thorough knowledge of Colombian affairs and his relationship with Colombian leaders would be of great help to him in his (Sanz') new assignment and that he would hope to be able to count on working with him for some time to come. The Secretary said he welcomed these remarks since Ambassador Freeman is an old friend. He said he had great confidence in Ambassador Freeman and had not given any thought to his transfer.

Ambassador Sanz pointed out that he will be assuming a difficult task as Finance Minister. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been insisting upon the need for exchange reform in Colombia. President Lleras believed that it would be unwise to add the impact of such a measure to the political uncertainty attendant upon the national elections and the inauguration of a new government. It now remains for the new government to carry out this step. The Ambassador said he had already invited the Fund to send representatives to Colombia to begin work on a new stand-by agreement. They will arrive with him, spend approximately two weeks, and then return to Washington to obtain IMF approval of the new agreement. Ambassador Sanz stressed that he was fully prepared to carry out the IMF recommendations on exchange reform in the hope that traditional monetary techniques would have good effects. He said that President Valencia was aware of his views on this matter. The Ambassador said he wished to emphasize how important U.S. support would be in this effort. While the DAC meeting in Paris had gone well, he said he had no real confidence in European support. The Europeans simply do not have the United States' interest in Latin America. As a result it will be principally the United States, the IBRD and the IDB who will be moving in support of Colombia's development effort.

The Ambassador said that the timing of U.S. support would be extremely important and that he hoped it would not arrive too late. He noted that Colombia is requesting an additional \$60 million in

balance-of-payments assistance and that Colombia will need the release of *peso* counterpart in order to offset the budgetary effects of devaluation. He said that December would be too late for this assistance. Colombia hoped to clean the slate in 1962 with regard to the old obligations which have caused the current balance-of-payments problem and to make a real beginning on the development effort in 1963. The Secretary assured the Ambassador that we would give very careful consideration to the Colombian request.

The Ambassador suggested that the Secretary attend the signing of the coffee agreement in New York on September 28 and concluded his visit with a reiteration of his standing invitation to the Secretary to visit Colombia.

**63. Memorandum of conversation, September 27, between
President Kennedy and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría¹**

September 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Farewell call on the President by the Ambassador of Colombia

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Ambassador Carlos Sanz de Santamaría of Colombia

Mr. Ralph Dungan, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, ARA

Ambassador Sanz paid a farewell call on the President this morning. He began by expressing his thanks for all the kindness and assistance shown him during his assignment by the President, the Department of State and other Government agencies.

The Ambassador said he had been pleased to hear on the radio the President's remarks about the effect on Colombia of the drop in coffee prices. The President said he had made use of Ambassador Sanz' previous remarks to him in speaking to the White House Conference of Business Magazine Editors and Publishers. In this connection, the Ambassador said he wished to leave with the President a memorandum

¹ Farewell call of Ambassador; Coffee Agreement; Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, July–September 1962.

describing the deterioration in the terms of trade for Latin American countries. He said that improvement in the terms of trade would be the most important thing the United States could do for Latin America. This would be more important than any kind of aid.

Ambassador Sanz noted that he would be signing the Coffee Agreement in New York on September 28. He remarked that it was unfortunate that U.S. Congressional ratification of the agreement could not be obtained in the current session since it would then be delayed until at least February 1963. The Ambassador was given assurances of our intention to submit the agreement to the Senate immediately in the belief that this would have good psychological effects.

The Ambassador said he was returning to Colombia with the intention of explaining the Alliance for Progress to his countrymen who, he feared, did not understand it very well. He said he intended to point out that it is a Latin American idea which the President is supporting and which fully merits Latin American support. The President said he would always welcome any views Ambassador Sanz might care to express to Ambassador Freeman in Bogota as to what we ought to be doing under the Alliance.

The Ambassador concluded his call with a reference to his Foreign Minister's attendance at the forthcoming Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Ambassador Sanz said he believed it was important to obtain wider support for any positions which might emerge from this meeting than existed at the last Punta del Este Conference, even if this required some concessions. He noted that, in his opinion, even Mexico was now in a better position to lend support than at Punta del Este. The President observed that we might think in terms of a very broad statement which could achieve the widest possible support and then proceed to more specific proposals with the Caribbean countries.

**64. DOS Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Colombia,
December 1962¹**

December 1962

**COLOMBIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDELINES FOR
POLICY AND OPERATIONS***I. Basic Approach*

There are no acute bilateral problems between Colombia and the U.S. Major U.S. concerns regarding Colombia are almost entirely connected with the general instability of the country's political, economic and social structure. Poverty, ignorance and the resulting social unrest are somewhat less evident than in most of Colombia's neighbors, but they still represent serious problems. Since the dictatorship was overthrown in 1957, Colombia's Government has reestablished democratic processes and has done much to restore Colombia's commercial reputation. Colombia appears to have caught the spirit of the Alliance for Progress and is actively seeking substantial assistance from abroad in order to carry out a comprehensive economic and social development plan.

The country has just given its Government a vote of confidence in congressional and presidential elections, and there is a good possibility that Colombia can provide constructive leadership in Latin America. Careful use of all available U.S. resources cannot only assist in the development of Colombia, but provide incentives for progress at a rate which should be able to meet the rising expectations of the people in this, the fourth most populous country in Latin America.

[Here follows section II., "Background."]

III. Objectives

1. To continue under present circumstances to support National Front governments as the most effective means of providing political stability, for developing a sound economy, and for solving Colombia's social problems within a framework of representative democracy.

2. To bring about recognition by greater numbers among the Colombian elite of the necessity for economic and social reform, and of their class responsibility to lead toward such reform.

¹ Secret. 10 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121.

3. To achieve a practical solution to the problem of stabilizing coffee prices on the international market, while actively working toward reduced dependence on coffee through the diversification of exports.

4. To assist with the continued reduction and eventual control, even in isolated areas, of the rural "violence" problem.

5. To encourage continued Colombian example and leadership in impressing the gravity of the danger posed by the Castro-Communist alliance on other hemisphere governments and peoples, as well as Colombia's participation with the U.S. and other OAS states in preventing or countering Castro-Communist aggressive action or subversion.

6. To assist the labor unions in resisting Communist infiltration, and to orient the labor movement toward the U.S.

IV. *Lines of Action*

Political

1. Impress on the political leadership of the major factions that U.S. contributions to the socio-economic development of Colombia depend on the extent to which they subordinate partisan or personal objectives to the national interest, thereby promoting both political and socio-economic stability and viability.

2. Encourage democratic political groups to move toward the isolation of extremist elements of both right and left.

3. Encourage the government and the governing elite to continue to press forward in a positive program of tax revision, housing development, agricultural and educational reform.

4. Encourage the government to: (a) take a leading role in impressing on other Latin American governments the gravity of the Castro threat to hemispheric peace and security, (b) inform Colombian public opinion of the true Communist, totalitarian and subversive nature of the Castro regime, and (c) influence other Latin American governments to do likewise.

5. Elicit Colombian support of broad U.S. international objectives, including OAS action on Cuba, and encourage Colombian leadership within the framework of the OAS, UN and IA-ECOSOC.

6. Utilize the efforts of the Labor Attaché, the newly appointed USIS Information Officer (Labor) and all other U.S. Government and private means available to help free labor unions to defeat Communist efforts to gain control of the labor movement.

Military

1. Implement, and if necessary amplify, the April 1961 military assistance agreement with Colombia in support of the elimination of the continuing problem of rural violence, but at the same time stress

to the Government the complementary need of improved law enforcement, reform of judicial procedures, and other measures to counter the “impunity” now enjoyed by many perpetrators of violence.

Economic

1. Continue to support Colombian planning for economic and social development in accordance with the aims of the Alliance for Progress, making judicious use of grants and loans which can be designed to step up the pace of this development. All branches of the U.S. Government should seek every available opportunity to praise the start which Colombia has made and to encourage the Colombian Government to implement new programs vigorously, so that Colombia can remain in the forefront of the Alliance for Progress.

2. Emphasize the need for responsible financial and import policies as a necessary basis for economic and social development, including consideration of a simplified and more realistic exchange rate structure. U.S. officials should continue to stress the fact that any reversion to the financial excesses of 1961 will not only imperil the favorable commercial reputation which Colombia has worked so hard to maintain, but will also drain off capital needed for essential economic and social projects. Because of the interconnection between Colombia’s overseas trading position and internal economic development, consideration of any U.S. aid project must include a study of its effects on the balance of payments.

3. Pursue negotiations for an international coffee agreement energetically, meanwhile encouraging Colombia to reduce coffee production. The technical assistance and AID loan programs in Colombia should regard the diversification of exports as a primary objective.

Public Affairs

1. Meet intensified Cuban, Chinese and European Communist propaganda by better explanation and interpretation of U.S. policies and objectives and through stepped-up publications output and improved distribution. Additional efforts are also necessary to publicize the expanding economic assistance program of the U.S.

2. Continue the AID labor leader program, as well as certain other technical assistance grantee visits to the U.S. which are consonant with the aims of the Alliance for Progress and which serve to augment the small leader grant and student exchange programs. The leader grant program should give increased emphasis to visits to the U.S. by young and volatile but non-Communist politicians whose knowledge of this country is deficient.

3. Expand community development projects on the Barrio Quiroga model at points of the longest range strategic value.

V. Contingencies

Possible developments which might frustrate U.S. policy and for which contingency planning may be needed:

1. A decision by the Colombian elite to rest on their political and economic accomplishments to date, with an accompanying refusal to implement social and economic reforms.

2. An inclination by the Colombian Government to relax financial and import controls in the belief that the U.S. will fund balance of payments deficits which arise.

3. A collapse of the world coffee market leading to a severe decline in coffee prices.

4. A breakdown of the National Front coalition system followed by a military coup d'état which might lead to either a rightist dictatorship or a Castro-Communist counter-revolution and takeover plus a shift toward neutralism in Colombian foreign policy.

65. Memorandum of conversation, February 1, among DOS officials¹

February 1, 1963

SUBJECT

Discussion of Colombian Political Economic Problems

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Taylor G. Belcher, Director, WST
Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Deputy Director, WST
Mr. Maxwell Chaplin, Colombian Desk, WST
Mr. Bruno Luzzatto, Economic Officer, REA
Mr. Arnesen, AA/LA
Mr. Green, LA/WC
Mr. Mitchell, INR

Political Scene

The discussion noted the political problems of maintaining an effective governing coalition, the recent growth in dissatisfaction with President Valencia, and the fact that opposition to him seems to be based

¹ Colombian political and economic problems. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL COL.

more on his unsatisfactory image as a leader and on general belief he is permitting stagnation than on specific shortcomings. Dissatisfaction has not yet reached alarming proportions, and the politicians seem to be able to mobilize wide support in specific cases, but there have been reports of discussion of alternatives to Valencia.

A review of the range of possible alternatives to the present structure of the National Front government, such as military *golpe*, military alliance with the MRL, or some right-wing configuration, did not indicate that such a radical change is probable under present political conditions. A consensus did emerge, however, that the current Colombian dissatisfaction, loss of confidence, and sense of stagnation, are politically and economically destructive and bear watching, whether the feelings are rationally justifiable or not.

Consultative Group Results

It was noted that the recent announcements of large foreign financing for the development plan had served to improve the confidence climate. It was also noted that since disbursements on most of the projects to be financed will be delayed up to a year, there is a serious risk of disillusionment if the consultative group announcements are not followed by some visible evidence of results.

In an effort to determine what part of the prospective U.S. AID program could be promptly implemented to serve as impact evidence of progress following the consultative group meeting, to improve confidence, it was noted that \$13 million peso counterpart of the advance disbursement of the December \$60 million loan is now available. It was then proposed that \$5 million counterpart be utilized immediately as a U.S. contribution to the Private Investment Fund, and the other \$8 million counterpart be made available for the labor housing project, which is ready to be executed immediately. It was further noted that the IBRD does not seem to be providing the leadership in establishment of the PIF which is required to execute this project rapidly, and more U.S. initiative is required to assure that the Fund is formally established in the next four weeks. It was agreed to instruct our mission in Bogota to explore the above proposals.

A review of the activities of U.S. AID/Bogota showed that the mission has assumed several entirely new functions in connection with the capital assistance program; the most important being long-range loan programming and design, and the surveillance of loan implementation. These activities require a degree of economic analysis not previously expected of the AID mission. Discussion emphasized that the problems for AID in the Colombian program are primarily ones of execution at this stage, since the program level and general projects to be financed are not in dispute. It was suggested that a bottleneck which

will need attention is the actual preparation and processing of loan applications. It was noted that the mission is not yet completely staffed to carry out its new responsibilities, but that the necessary personnel should be on duty soon.

66. Airgram A-731 from Bogota, May 10¹

Bogota, May 10, 1963

SUBJECT

Political Contingencies—Extra-legal Changes.

CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
- II. Conclusions for U.S. Policy
- III. Conditions for Extra-legal Change
- IV. Range of Possibilities
- V. Elite Action
- VI. Civilian-Military Action
- VII. Military Coup
- VIII. Social Revolt

I. Introduction

For the purposes of contingency planning this airgram considers the plausible range of alternatives which might take place under the hypothesis that an alteration of the constitutional order occurs. The range of alternatives considered here—and these are contingencies not predictions—go beyond what might be termed *unconstitutional* change (e.g. a *golpe*) to include quasi-legal change, that is, a forced change within the constitutional framework but outside the normal cycle of election—full term—new election (e.g. forced resignation of the president and assumption of the presidency by his constitutional successor).

It is obviously not possible to predict the precise form of an extra-legal development. The possible variations are virtually infinite. All that is attempted here is to consider what conditions might prompt an extra-legal change (a tabulation which could also serve as a listing of

¹ Political contingencies—extra-legal changes. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 23 COL.

“early warning signals”) and the general broad categories of possible action and US response.

II. Conclusions for US Policy

Any survey of this subject matter leads rapidly to one conclusion—any break in the constitutional process, however mild, runs a high risk of starting a chain reaction that cannot be contained. Such an opening of Pandora’s box means that virtually no one would have any control over subsequent events, and the risk of developments unfavorable to the US interest would become significantly great. For that reason extra-legal changes are to be avoided where possible. The inference is obvious for the US—US policy should be aimed at supporting the efficacy of the present administration and the National Front system and their ability to respond to national problems and aspirations. The converse of this inference is also clear—we should do nothing to weaken the administration. Thus, in seeking to prod the political mechanism to appropriate developmental action the relatively fragile political pattern must not be pushed beyond its depth (Embtel 654).

The above, of course, is the recommended general thrust of *current* US policy. Should it happen that a break in the constitutional process is provoked in any way, the range of choices then open to US policy would obviously be determined by the nature of the extra-legal change and of the surrounding and succeeding circumstances. In any such situation, regardless of its precise configuration, the basic objectives of US policy would be at least:

a) Avoid having the national situation in Colombia become hostile to the US and, if at all possible, maintain a friendly or sympathetic environment;

b) Minimize dislocations, antagonisms and frustrations to avoid the build-up of discontent and instability; instability provoked by dislocated and abnormal political and social patterns is particularly deleterious in terms of sane accommodation to domestic problems and needs, as well as potentially explosive in terms of international balance of power factors;

c) Avoid control of the country or sizeable increase in influence by Communists and Castroists.

To achieve these desiderata US policy would have to be aimed at:

a) pressing for a return to institutional normality (presumably elections) and to norms of sufficient enlightenment and flexibility to handle aspirations and change with a minimal risk of explosion;

and b) providing such financial and other assistance as circumstances may indicate are appropriate to avoid chaos and social dislocation and ease the return to normality.

The difficult part, obviously, is the translation of the above in to specific courses of action. In the Colombian context, any of the

contingencies listed here, except possibly elite action resting on a very broad-based consensus, would probably mean the end of the National Front. The stronger the break with constitutionality the greater the probability of civil divisions and antagonistic reactions. This risk is great considering Colombian history and the depth of traditional political feeling and divisiveness. In the event such flux and divisions occur, whether along historical political cleavages or even on class lines, the image of the US held by the various elements in the society will be extremely pertinent for future US relations with Colombia. The point for US policy is that identification of the US with one sector or sectors at the expense of antagonizing opposed but otherwise legitimate elements could be dramatically counter-productive.

It would be natural in such a contingency to feel the compulsion to do something rather than nothing. But in circumstances of wide fragmentation, restraint may be the wiser course. One is, in fact, tempted to argue that, given Colombian history and character, with its infinite internal animosities and complexities, the US should attempt not so much to manipulate specific internal elements as to exert its pressure on the broad basis of making clear to the society what the US goal is in terms of social justice, development, etc., and what circumstances will receive our cooperation and support. We must also recognize that the Communists will attempt to clothe themselves in legitimate causes. A correct policy of combatting the Communist threat will therefore require us to avoid both a simplistic understanding of the situation, and an oversimplification of our interest in public order into opposition to legitimate class or economic interests. Obviously a deterioration of the situation into civil war or an impending danger of Communist take over may require our greater commitment in the internal situation. But recognizing this means we must exert considerable wisdom, patience and understanding to avoid *unnecessary* involvement in domestic complexities.

Still another caveat is worth mentioning. It may be that past US policy in Latin America made the mistake in a few instances of supporting (and identifying itself) with the *status quo*, when the *status quo* was neither able to meet the people's aspirations or was itself domestically discredited. Just as the *Alliance for Progress* seeks to achieve, through what can be called the "normal" political system, an evolution of the social *status quo* to something more responsive to national aspirations, these same goals should be the guide for US policy in an abnormal political situation. The problem there will be to seek constructively to return that abnormal situation to a more normal and stable one to achieve the same goals.

It will be clear, then, that a situation which develops subsequent to an extra-legal change can become most complex and subtle. The

imperatives of the long-run national interest of the US will, therefore, force US policy to consider, on the one hand, the need to influence events and shape circumstances constructively to convert the situation into one favorable to us or at least not unfavorable to us, and, on the other hand, the need to avoid intervening in complex domestic situations in such a way as to ruin the chances of achieving that very objective. The Scylla and Charybdis of this dilemma will be the limits between which US policy must tread in such circumstances.

While US responses to general categories of contingencies are mentioned below, the following generalizations may be made by way of summary:

1. *Recognition*. The more broadly based the support for an extra-legal change, the less difficult is the problem of recognition. In any event, recognition as a means of leverage has severe limitations, as history has shown. Hence the US should not use recognition as a lever except in a quite limited manner for nudging the situation in a given direction. In case of a change, there will probably be no value in immediate public comment on the situation. The first task will be to gauge the situation and determine how stable or how convulsed it is. For this a prudent time will be required. If it is determined that a reasonably stable government is established, recognition can be extended. Not to do so given an otherwise stabilized situation is probably not practical. Recognition, however, should be based squarely and *explicitly* on Resolution 35 of the Ninth Inter American Conference, and it should be made clear that recognition implies neither approbation nor commitment *per se*. This puts the proof of the pudding on performance and avoids the risks and dangers of US identification with the regime in case of subsequent deterioration (in the way that Rojas became progressively unpopular).

2. *OAS*. Real and meaningful consultation should be undertaken. There will obviously be a value in allowing a number of LA states to recognize first, and it may be that OAS channels will prove valuable levers depending upon circumstances. It should be recognized, however, that the US cannot evade being judged alone, regardless of what other American Republics do, and it will probably be judged with different criteria. (Thus the public opinion of Uruguay's decoration of Pérez Jimenez was not the same as that of the US's performance of the same thing.)

3. *Assistance Programs*. Barring civil war or a particularly obnoxious regime, the first US reaction should probably again be silence and maintenance of existing programs. No public comment or speculation regarding the aid programs should be made so that future maneuverability is not lost. Whether aid programs continue to be maintained at the same levels, or are increased or decreased would depend upon the

development and the nature of governing elements. The aid programs are of course our strongest leverage, and should be used as such firmly but adroitly.

4. *Military Assistance.* What is said of 3 applies in this case. Military aid, however, is an especially delicate thing to handle. About all that can be said for planning purposes is that we should recognize the following pitfalls: It is quite likely that an extra-legal change would involve the military and military control of government. Such a change is also likely to arouse public reaction and resistance. Hence US military assistance could become mistaken for support of a military supported dictatorship. On the other hand, removal of military aid may cripple the only institution capable of confronting Communist subversion, especially insofar as the Colombian violence problem is concerned. The dilemma is deepened by the fact that legitimate opposition to military rule would most probably manifest itself in renewed rural violence, and a repetition of the 1948–53 political violence is a real possibility. In those circumstances US military assistance may be used to fight legitimate political opposition. These considerations must be carefully kept in mind. At this point it is difficult to imagine circumstances grave enough to warrant US military intervention, and it will be important to keep a tight rein on such compulsions.

III. Conditions for Extra-legal Change

An extra-legal alteration of the constitutional order could occur as one of two basic things: 1) “preventative” action by *status quo* elements motivated by a belief that their interests can be protected in no other way and/or by a belief that action is needed to forestall category 2; or 2) social revolution, violent or not, from either the right or left, aimed at changing the existing institutional order and *status quo*.

Circumstances and conditions which could result in category 1 are:

- a) Widespread and intense discontent;
- b) Intensification of problems especially economic and social;
- c) Relative impotence of authority to handle problems, and consequent lack of confidence in the administration or even in the institutional order;
- d) Visible increase in subversive capacity or challenge;
- e) Existence of leaders with sufficient prestige and power to take action.

Since the decision to act in a “preventative” type action is essentially a subjective one, it is impossible to predict at what point such a decision might be made. It could be made without disintegration being far advanced or the substantive situation being really very bad, because it would essentially be anticipatory.

Circumstances and conditions which would result in category 2 are:

- a) Widespread and intense discontent;
- b) Intensification of problems, particularly social problems that affect lower classes, such as unemployment;

[Here follows sections IV through VIII comprising “Range of Possibilities,” “Elite Action,” “Civilian-Military Action,” “Military Coup,” and “Social Revolt.”]

67. Memorandum of conversation, July 24, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Uribe Botero¹

July 24, 1963

SUBJECT

Colombian Ambassador’s Presentation of Credentials to the President

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary, ARA

Eduardo Uribe Botero, Colombian Ambassador

After a brief exchange of [illegible in the original] by the President to the great pleasure with which he and his wife recalled their visit to Colombia, the President asked the Ambassador how the violence problem was progressing. The Ambassador reported that the areas of violence had been much reduced and progress was good. The President welcomed this and then asked about the economic situation.

The Ambassador stressed the difficulties they were having with their budgetary deficit. The President inquired whether [illegible in the original]. inflationary problem. The Ambassador added not at the present time. The President commented that, if there were no problem of inflation, they ought to be able to handle the budgetary problem by various means. At the request of the President, Assistant Secretary Martin pointed out that they had just passed through crisis on inflation and balance of payments and were only now getting the situation under control. Under these conditions the budgetary deficit presented difficulties. The President agreed, emphasizing the seriousness of balance of payments problems.

¹ Presentation of Ambassador’s credentials; Colombian budgetary difficulties. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 17 COL–U.S.

The President inquired about his good friend Ambassador Sanz de Santamaria. The Ambassador replied that he was very well but very busy in his role as Finance Minister. He indicated he thought he might be in Washington in a month or two. The President said he would like very much to see him when he comes and would look forward to seeing the Ambassador and the Finance Minister together then.

The President concluded with an expression of pleasure at welcoming the new Ambassador and indicated he was always available to see him if he had any problems.

Costa Rica

68. Despatch 576 from San Jose, April 6¹

San Jose, April 6, 1961

Subject: Status of Relations with Current Costa Rican Government

SUMMARY: The Embassy and all members of the country team are currently concerned over what appear to be steadily worsening relations between United States officials in Costa Rica and the administration of President Echandi. The purpose of this despatch is to bring to the attention of the Department and of Ambassador Telles the country team's assessment of this situation and at the same time to recommend certain steps which we feel should be taken promptly in order to restore the status of United States representation in San José.

All members of the country team are in full agreement that relations between the top echelon of the Echandi government and the Embassy have been deteriorating for at least a year, and have now reached a low point at which the Embassy and most of its associated United States Agencies in Costa Rica are finding it difficult to perform their basic consultative functions with the Costa Rican government, insofar as these involve contacts with President Echandi and with his most intimate circle of cabinet ministers. Manifestations of the "cold front" are evident in one form or another to all members of the country team and have appeared in manifold and often subtle ways, frequently easier to sense than to document precisely.

Difficulties being faced by the Embassy and USOM in the development loan field have considerable bearing on the overall situation described in this despatch, although they must be regarded as contributing elements to the cold front atmosphere rather than results of it. Beginning with a recent rural credit loan project and in all applications since that one, President Echandi and the Minister of Economy Borbon Castro have simply ignored United States representatives in San José, channelling their proposals directly to DLF through Ambassador Escalante in Washington. The fact that these projects have been given prompt and considerate attention in Washington has encouraged Echandi to continue bypassing the Embassy and USOM with the result that recent requests stemming from the Act of Bogota meetings have

¹ Status of relations with current Costa Rican Government. Secret. 11 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/4-661.

been prepared hastily and incompletely and entirely without consultation with United States representatives on the local level.

More specific indications of an intentionally frigid attitude on the part of the Costa Rican government are as follows:

An officer of the Civil Guard noted to the Army Attaché that the attention and entertainment accorded the officers of "HMS Cardigan Bay," a British frigate which visited Puntarenas in February 1961, was considerably greater than that extended to the officers of United States ships which have visited the same port during the past year, and was, according to the Army Attaché's Civil Guard informant, intended by the Costa Rican government to emphasize the current feeling of coolness toward United States Missions in Costa Rica.

The United States Army Mission in Costa Rica is experiencing various difficulties in performing its mission, most specific of which has been the unwillingness of the Costa Rican government to assign officer students to the CONUS and USCARIBE Schools in Panama—and which is part of "an obvious change in a formerly cooperative attitude," which took place following the inability of the Mission Chief to provide an additional space for a Costa Rican participant (Col. Ventura, unofficial commandant of the Civil Guard) on "Operation Solidarity."

Neither President Echandi nor any of his closest circle of cabinet ministers appeared at a large reception given by the officers of the Embassy on March 16, 1961, to introduce the newly arrived Deputy Chief of Mission, (nor did he or any of his staff reply to or apparently take any cognizance of the formal invitations sent them on this occasion).² This was particularly noticeable in view of the fact that the President had apparently made a particular effort to put in an appearance at a reception given by the Spanish Embassy during the same week, and on the evening prior to his wife's departure for a stay in Guatemala.

The President has simply ignored other requests by the Deputy Chief of Mission for appointments—in one occasion in order to solicit his taped comments on the Kennedy speech, and in another instance to present to him a personal gift and note from Mrs. Katharine Bracken, Director of the Office of Central American and Panama Affairs (the embarrassment of the President's personal secretary with regard to these discourtesies has been quite apparent).

² NOTE: The Minister of Education did attend the reception and has in fact continued to be both accessible and cooperative in relations with United States representatives.

The President's attitude toward the Deputy Chief of Mission when the latter has spoken to him at other official receptions has been correct but icy.

Certainly one of the sources of Echandi's current attitude toward the Embassy is his own inner-directed personality, and the same can be said of certain of his cabinet members such as Minister of Economy Borbon Castro. However, the country team is unanimously agreed that most of our current difficulties result directly from a long, and unfortunately continuing succession of United States actions (or lack of actions) which have affronted the sensibilities of the President and his administration. The most important of these are the following:

- (1) *Occasions on which Echandi feels that he has been let down by the United States.*

Case of Claudio Antonio Volio and the Institute at Turrialba. (Ref. Embtels 342, 5/6/60; 346, 5/9/60 and Emb. Desp 642, 6/8/60)

While Echandi believed that he had secured the agreement of other Central American Presidents to have their representatives on the OAS vote for his personal candidate Claudio Antonio Volio to be Director of the Agricultural Institute at Turrialba a year ago, the latter lost the election as a result of a last minute switch by one Central American vote. Echandi subsequently learned that the Honduran Ambassador in Washington was prevailed upon to vote against Volio (which cost him the election). As a result, Volio resigned from the Institute and Echandi has been furious at the United States ever since, since he felt that we had not only not supported him on this matter but had probably influenced the Honduran representative to change his vote.

Reimbursement for Expenses Incurred In Providing Security at the San José Conference. (Ref. Emb. Desp. 513, 3/2/61)

The President and his military advisors have felt ever since the San José Conference of last August that the United States should reimburse the Costa Rican government for expenses incurred by the Costa Rican Civil Guard in providing security for the conference and the visiting delegations, of which the largest was from the U.S.A. The President has become increasingly disillusioned over the failure of the United States to make any tangible response in this connection.

Costa Rican Requests for Military Equipment.

The President has for some time been hoping for a United States gift of communications and transportation equipment for the Civil Guard, which is now down to the point, according to one source, of having to rent private cars for patrol purposes. A succession of visiting VIP's from the Department of Defense have come and gone, inevitably

leaving Costa Rica government officials with the impression that the United States would respond favorably to the Costa Rican desire for equipment. As nothing in the way of concrete help has materialized, the disappointed President has taken more and more the attitude that United States promises to Costa Rica are worthless. (This situation was aggravated recently when the Argentine Government decorated the President with the Grand Cross of the Order of San Martín in expression of Argentine appreciation for the care and cooperation extended to their delegation at the San José Conference.)

In addition, the President reflects concern felt by his military staff at the unsympathetic insistence by USCINCARIB for cash on the line for tear gas grenades which Costa Ricans requested urgently at the time of the banana workers' strike in 1959 (ref. Deptel 226, 1/6/60). The fact that Costa Rican credit with USCINCARIB had been jeopardized by prior difficulties in obtaining payment from the Costa Ricans for equipment purchased from CINCARIB is altogether overlooked by the Costa Rican government, and United States hesitancy in what they considered an hour of need is contrasted unfavorably with the fact that the Panamanian government responded immediately to the Costa Rican request with a loan of United States made grenades.

Loan Applications.

The delays and frustration which have attended each of the Costa Rican applications for United States loans to date tend to be regarded by the President and his administration as further examples of lack of United States support. The fact that many of these delays result from improper and inadequate preparation by the Costa Rican government are naturally overlooked locally. Additional salt has been rubbed in local wounds by the announcement of approved loans to Nicaragua and Honduras, as well as extension of a DLF loan to an Italian colony in Costa Rica, while nothing transpired on the Government's own rural credit loan.

13th Month Bonus Payment to the United Fruit Company Employees.
(Emb. Desps. 330, 6/13/60; 685, 6/24/60)

When in January 1960, President Echandi settled the banana workers' strike by payment on behalf of the United Fruit Company of the full 13th month bonus, he fully expected that the government would eventually be reimbursed by the company for the three weeks' wages which were paid from public funds. Echandi has been informed that recommendations to this effect by the local management were overruled in Boston and he reportedly thinks that pressure should have been exercised by Washington to bring about this result.

The Punta Llorona Affair.

Ever since the abortive Punta Llorona affair in which Costa Rica effectively broke up a Nicaraguan invasion attempt, Echandi has reportedly felt that the United States Government did not give him adequate and necessary support needed to effectively break up the rebel camp and insure that the arms there were taken over by the Costa Rican Government. Echandi has claimed that Deputy Aguiluz, one of the ring leaders in the affair, was able to get away with a plane load of arms because the United States did not immediately provide adequate air support. Echandi is also reportedly of the opinion that the United States has dragged its feet in response to requests for the use of IAGS and Panama based helicopters during various actual or suspected emergencies.

(2) United States Official Identification with José Figueres.

United States interest in Pepe Figueres as an international figure tends to be completely misconstrued in Costa Rica in consequence of Figueres' local identification as spark plug of the most active and effective domestic opposition to Echandi, and as leader of only one of the three or more parties currently engaged in pre-electoral maneuvers for the Presidential elections of February 1962. United States high official regard for Figueres has been frequent and continuous, and each public expression of it increases the resentment of the Echandi government and at the same time of the other candidates for Presidential office (see despatches 556 and 559, March 24, 1961). Specific examples of United States identification with Figueres which have rankled deep in San José are:—

Direct citation of Figueres by President Kennedy in his speech of March 13, 1961. Prior to the speech, President Echandi had expressed interest in the Embassy's invitation to provide taped comments on the substance of the speech. Subsequently he simply ignored the Embassy's invitation and gave his comments to the local A.P. correspondent. For the even more violent reaction of Otilio Ulate, a prominent candidate for the Presidency, see despatch 559, March 24, 1961.

A recent copy of "Combate," the publication of Figueres' International Institute of Political Studies prominently featured an article jointly written by Figueres and Adolph Berle. Mr. Berle is in consequence blamed locally for the close identification of the Kennedy administration with Figueres.

The obvious interest of United States official and semi-official visitors in the International Institute of Political Studies and the frequency of high level public exploitation of telegrams and letters of congratulations, confraternity, and esteem from noted American liberals has irritated many conservative Costa Ricans. The activities of United States Professor Harry Kantor and Sacha Volman, and Embassy contacts with the Institute and its backers are all highly suspect in the eyes of the Costa Rican Government.

During the past year, the new President of the United Fruit Company, Mr. Sunderland, made the tactical blunder of calling on Figueres before calling on Echandi. While this is something for which Echandi can hardly blame the Embassy, he is still most resentful of what he considered a gratuitous slight handed him by the largest United States Company operating in Costa Rica.

(3) *Personal Sensitivities.*

While Echandi is unquestionably aware of the importance of Ambassador Willauer's services outside of Costa Rica during the period of his assignment here, the President has evidenced displeasure over what he considers the casual attitude of the Department of State towards Costa Rica in so frequently calling the United States Ambassador away to attend to other priorities and leaving American representation in Costa Rica in the hands of a *Chargé d'Affaires*.

The President and other members of the Costa Rican Government were highly irritated at the conduct of District Engineer Brown of the Bureau of Public Roads. While Brown was ultimately removed from Costa Rica at the Embassy's request, the impact of his appointment here was just one more in this series of apparent United States affronts to Costa Rican pride.

The above succession of what the President clearly regards as either United States lack of support of his government or direct United States official identification with his opponents has now resulted in the Costa Rican freeze-out of the Embassy and its component elements described above.

The country team feels that the arrival of a new Ambassador, particularly one who is reportedly bilingual in Spanish and one who has a clear mandate to devote himself primarily to Costa Rica, should go far toward the re-establishment of good relations with Echandi, but we believe that additional positive actions by the United States Government are required to break the ice. Furthermore, the country team is agreed that any continuing relationship with Echandi will depend on the willingness of United States Government officials in Washington to avoid public identification with ex-President Figueres and to demonstrate impartiality in dealing with all Costa Rican political leaders.

In line with these thoughts, the country team recommends prompt and positive United States action along the following lines to remedy the situation:

1. Award of the Legion of Merit to President Echandi as an initial gesture by the new United States Ambassador immediately following his arrival. Basis for the award has been stated fully in the proposal made by the Army Attaché to the Department of the Army for award of the decoration, a copy of which is attached as Annex A to this

despatch. It is recommended, however, that relatively lesser emphasis be devoted in the citation to the conference of Foreign Ministers in San José, since the Argentines have already beaten us to the punch in this connection, and also in view of the complete change of administration in the United States since the meeting took place. Placed within an appropriate context, the country team feels that this gesture would be greatly appreciated by President Echandi and would help Ambassador Telles materially to make a fresh start.

2. A White House invitation to President Echandi for a Kennedy-Echandi meeting, if possible timed to coincide with approval of a significant Costa Rican loan request. It appears that President Echandi has particular personal reasons why he would appreciate an opportunity for a trip to the United States at the present time, but it is questionable whether he could obtain the required Costa Rican congressional authorization to leave the country except in response to an invitation of this magnitude. In addition, it has come to the attention of the Embassy that Figueres' supporters (United States and other) are endeavoring to arrange a Kennedy-Figueres meeting. The country team is unanimous in agreement that a Kennedy-Figueres meeting would utterly queer relationships with the Echandi Government and with all other current aspirants to the Costa Rican presidency, unless a Kennedy-Echandi meeting is arranged first.

3. The country team urges all interested Departments and Agencies in Washington to find the \$10,000 worth of radio supplies and ammunition which the Echandi administration feels is its due as a result of the San José Conference. The Embassy appreciates the good intent of the Departments of State and Defense in sending a proposed mission to examine all aspects of Costa Rican defense needs and endeavor to make a more substantial donation to the Costa Rican Government. However, so many Generals and other dignitaries have come through Costa Rica of late, listened sympathetically to Costa Rican pleas and ultimately provided nothing, that the country team currently advises against sending any new mission to this country unless they come armed with tangible evidence of their good will. In addition, the Chief of the U.S. Army Mission to Costa Rica points out—

a) that complete information on Costa Rican military needs is submitted annually to the DOD in connection with Mission programming (latest submission dated 3/21/61, copy attached as Annex B).

b) minimum lead time for delivery of the type of equipment desired by the Costa Ricans is 18 months which would be too late under any condition to help the Echandi government.

4. Prompt support by Washington agencies for those loan requests submitted by the Costa Rican Government which have prior country team support. The country team feels that it might be very helpful if

the two loans in which USOM has participated from the start (the San José Waterworks Loan and the INVU Housing Loan) could be given particularly prompt attention, which might make clear to the Costa Rican Government the advantages of joint planning in San José over “end runs” to Escalante.

5. Full support and backstopping by the United States at the Washington level for an anticipated Costa Rican request for an Exim Bank loan to cover relocation and reconstruction of the portion of the Inter-American Highway between El Coco and San Ramon. This section of the road is obsolete by today’s highway specifications and constitutes a real traffic bottleneck. The work has not been included in BPR programming or appropriations for Costa Rica and is not likely to be until completion of remaining unconstructed sections of the highway have been assured. However, the Costa Ricans are so convinced of the current necessity of this work that they propose to request a three million dollar loan to enable them to undertake at least the most urgent portions of the road themselves. President Echandi and his Minister of Public Works discussed this problem at length with Senators Chavez and Young during their visit to San José in November 1960.

6. Prompt ICA/Washington signature of the contract which will authorize the employment in Costa Rica of IDA contract personnel to advise the Costa Rican National Bank on colonization projects and to assist Costa Rican officials in the preparation of loan applications for this purpose. It is the strong view of the USOM Director in San José that had these experts been available prior to the submission of the current Costa Rican colonization loan project a greatly improved proposal would have been forthcoming. Their assistance in preparation of a resubmission of this request is even more urgently needed now.

E.F. Rivinus

Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

Attachments:

Annex A—Proposal by Army Attaché dated March 28/1961

Annex B—Submission to DOD of 3/29/61

(1) Military Assistance Plan FY 63–67 Plan Backup

(2) Military Assistance Plan FY 63–67 Plan Summary

69. Memorandum of conversation, April 17, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Escalante¹

April 17, 1961

SUBJECT

Call on the President by Costa Rican Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Ambassador Manuel G. Escalante of Costa Rica

Acting Assistant Secretary Wymberley DeR. Coerr

At the President's request, Costa Rican Ambassador Manuel G. Escalante paid his first official call on the President, who expressed his pleasure at the visit. The Ambassador said that President Echandi was most pleased that his representative had been invited to the White House and considered it a great honor.

President Kennedy inquired regarding the Costa Rican Government's program of land reform, expressing much interest in it. The Ambassador responded enthusiastically that the government was working on a program to settle some 1500 families in an area soon to be opened up in the northern part of Costa Rica. There followed a brief discussion of Costa Rica's main export products—which the Ambassador identified as coffee, bananas, cacao and sugar in that order. The Ambassador said that Costa Rica was most pleased to receive the recent increase in its sugar allotment. With regard to bananas, he briefly mentioned that the Presidents of Costa Rica and Panama would shortly hold a meeting on the border between those two countries in an effort to achieve some progress in stabilizing the banana market. He said that President Echandi was very glad that the United States was sending Ambassador Turkel as an observer.

¹ Costa Rican land reform program. Official Use Only. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Costa Rica, January–August 1961.

70. Despatch 625 from San Jose, April 25¹

San Jose, April 25, 1961

REF: Emb. Despatch 576 dated 4/6/61 and Emb. Despatch 624 dated 4/24/61. SUBJECT: President Echandi's Current Attitude Towards U.S. Aid.

The Embassy has observed an increasing disposition on the part of President Echandi to confuse U.S. support for Costa Rica with U.S. support for Echandi's own latest projects. The most recent and perhaps the most enthusiastic of these projects is the Echandi proposal for the organization of an association of banana producing states for the stabilization of banana prices and the banana market—but specifically for that portion of the draft agreements involving a price increase to be devoted to a capitalization fund for the banana workers, in accordance with the locally well-known "Plan Martén." In two recent conversations which he has had with official Americans, the first a visiting group of members of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and second the DCM, the President has made sardonic reference to his current thesis that the U.S. "does not come to the aid of any drowning Latin American until the water is up to his chin," and has added that, in his opinion, the forthcoming banana agreement would be a perfect case in point.

Echandi is currently convinced that the invocation of a profit sharing formula in line with the "Plan Martén" is the solution to Communism among the banana workers. He referred bitterly in his conversation with the DCM (the first time since the latter's arrival in Costa Rica that the President has said anything more than the most formal words of greeting) to the frequent citation of the American housewife as the ultimate judge of the practicability of an increase in banana prices. He claimed that the United States spends fortunes of the American housewife's money in efforts to combat Communism when it has gone too far, and declared that, in his opinion, the American housewife should be called upon to pay the relatively lesser cost of an increase in banana prices for the purpose of stopping the inroads of Communism in Costa Rica.

Even though Echandi has been informed in unequivocal terms by representatives of the two major banana producing companies in Costa Rica of their opposition to the scheme, he appears to feel that the U.S. Government can exercise sufficient pressure upon the companies to

¹ President Echandi's current attitude toward U.S. aid. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/4-2561.

make them withdraw their opposition. He also was informed that, in the opinion of the companies, in practice the scheme would prove unworkable. However, Echandi is so convinced of his position in this regard and has been so thoroughly sold by Alberto Martén during recent weeks of close collaboration that all arguments presented by close friends of his who oppose the plan have gone unheeded. When the DCM observed that a recent review of U.S. programs in Costa Rica had indicated an annual expenditure of several million by the U.S. for the basic improvement of the social and economic picture in Costa Rica, the President simply shrugged off this argument with a facetious reply, and stated that the bona fides of U.S. support of Costa Rica would be determined by the U.S. attitude toward the banana agreement.

E.F. Rivinus
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

71. Telegram 519 from San Jose, May 18¹

San Jose, May 18, 1961

Received impressive and friendly reception upon arrival at airport by large number of CR citizens including Ambassador Escalante and official representatives Foreign Office.

Protracted delay in GOCR scheduling my presentation of credentials has led to generally evident and widely-shared belief intent purposefully insulting, particularly since Lebanese Minister who arrived after me was promptly received by Echandi with accompanying publicity. Consequently I had long and frank talk yesterday with Foreign Minister Vargas Fernandez, during which latter confirmed that delay at President's direction and advised me in no uncertain terms Echandi and close associates including himself still deeply resent combination JFK reference to Figueres in March 13 speech and Kennedy-Figueres interview. In addition Figueres having obviously maneuvered departure time visiting Rector San Marcos University to coincide with my arrival was consequently able exploit our apparently chance encounter at airport through photos his papers plus accompanying caption sug-

¹ Reasons for delay in presenting credentials by new U.S. Ambassador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/5-1861.

gestion future close liaison between Figueres and me on Alianza Para Progreso. Vargas Fernandez claims absence of public denial by Embassy has added to Echandi's irritation. However I will select appropriate time to clarify this apparent deliberate effort by Figueres.

I feel that only means overcome President's attitude lies in establishment of effective personal relationship with him, and consequently propose officially overlook present petty insults and slights which I suspect ultimately will backfire on Echandi through his own people. Further I am optimistic of prompt and favorable results from my talk yesterday with Vargas Fernandez in which I expressed myself with equal frankness along guidelines outlined Deptel 449 and stressed President Kennedy's personal admiration for President Echandi and people of CR. I believe that more direct approach to problem at present would be counterproductive. Also, I am confident once I make personal contact with Echandi I can handle situation very effectively.

Telles

72. Despatch 360 from San Jose, January 24¹

San Jose, January 24, 1962

REF: [illegible in the original]. SUBJECT: President of Costa Rica expresses concern over 1962 Sugar Allocation.

SUMMARY:

President Echandi called the Ambassador in on Tuesday, January 16, and talked with him for two hours about the concern currently felt in Costa Rica over the 1962 US sugar allocation. The President felt that the US was discriminating against Costa Rica in comparison with Nicaragua and Panama, that the depressed prices for coffee and bananas make sugar exports at quota prices vital in the Costa Rican foreign exchange picture, that any reduction in quota and allocation from last year's 30250 tons will mean serious losses to numerous mill owners and thousands of small producers in Costa Rica, and he noted that commiefrent PADP leader Enrique OBREGON Valverde has already begun to exploit the current apparent discrimination evident in the 1962 allocations to create anti-US sentiment. The Embassy shares

¹ President Echandi's concern over 1962 U.S. sugar allocation. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.235/1-2462.

the President's concern, and urges that the US take prompt action to assure Costa Rica of an allocation for 1962 at least equal to last year's 30250 tons, and if possible an increase proportional to that granted Nicaragua.

The Ambassador visited President Echandi on January 16 at the President's request for a discussion of the 1962 US sugar quote and allocation to Costa Rica, a discussion which lasted two hours during which Echandi made the following significant points:

1.) Discrimination against Costa Rica becomes evident in any comparison between the quotas and purchase allocations made to Costa Rica in 1961 and for the 6 month period ending June 30, 1962, and the quotas and allocations made to Costa Rica's neighbors, Nicaragua and Panama over the same period.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Total Quota & Purchase Allo. 1961</u>	<u>Quota of Purchase Allo. to 6/30/62</u>	<u>% of 1961 quota purchase allo. granted for 1st 6 mo. of 1962.</u>
Costa Rica	30250 Tons	5000 Tons	16.7 %
Nicaragua	43368 Tons	50000 Tons	112.9 %
Panama	10000 Tons	5000 Tons	50.0 %

The President asked for some explanation of this apparent discriminatory pattern, to which the Ambassador was unable to respond. The Embassy requests that the Dept. furnish us urgently with an account of the rationale on which the current allocations are based. The Embassy notes that the sugar report for Nicaragua submitted by the Agricultural Attaché on Oct. 7 '61 predicts an export availability for 1962 of 60000 tons "of which 50000 tons can be shipped in the first six months." A parallel report on Costa Rican sugar, dated Oct. 10, '61 predicts an export availability for Costa Rica of 45000 tons "during calendar year 1962." The Embassy is hopeful that these reports have furnished the basis for 1962 allocations, and that current planning envisages an additional 40000 ton allocations, to Costa Rica. However, national rivalries in the area being what they are some public announcement of US interests to redress the balance between Nicaragua and Costa Rica should be made promptly, or subsequent allocations may well be regarded as defensive responses to (partly commie) local outcry.

2.) Echandi stressed the obvious importance to Costa Rica of holding the line and if possible increasing sugar exports as a foreign exchange counterbalance to currently depressed coffee and banana income. The GOCCR has indeed been striving to diversify agricultural production away from these two traditional export earners, and any reduction in quota or allocation at this point would both reduce Costa Rica's already weakened foreign earnings position and would deal a heavy blow to Costa Rican efforts at agricultural diversification.

3.) The President particularly emphasized the point (often made in Embassy despatches and reports on the sugar situation in Costa Rica) that a reduction in quota and allocations and consequent reduction in overall income from Costa Rica sugar exports would affect a relatively large number of people in Costa Rica, where 10% of the population depends for at least a part of their livelihood on sugar production. (There are an estimated 27,000 small sugar producers and a total of 33 ingenios (sugar mills) in operation throughout Costa Rica.) He compared this situation with that of Nicaragua where sugar production is controlled by a relatively small number of large producers (notably including the Somoza family) and with Panama, where two large producers, one of them the President, reportedly own virtually all refining and production capacity. The Ambassador and Embassy [illegible in the original] been shown several new or improved and augmented [illegible in the original] representing a substantial new investment in Costa Rica's sugar production capacity-based on expectations of at least a 50000 ton allocation for the future. Many of these new plants are owned and operated by Cuban refugees who have settled in Costa Rica and who in turn play a significant role in alleviating the Cuban refugee problem here by furnishing employment to other refugees. A reduction in sugar purchases at the quota price is likely to bankrupt a number of these struggling enterprises right at the start. In addition, the Embassy wishes to point out that the most immediate sufferers among producers should the sugar price weaken are apt to be the many thousands of small producers who lack the resources to withstand an adverse crop year. Their only resource in hard times is to sell their land—usually at a low figure and usually to larger landholders, a situation which runs directly contrary to the land reform objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

4.) Finally, the President called attention to the recent increase in publicly expressed concern over the sugar situation in Costa Rica. During the past two weeks articles and paid advertisements have appeared in the San Jose press (see attachments) deploring the low allocation to Costa Rica for the last 6 months of 1962, and giving a pessimistic prognosis for the future of the economy if the US does not respond to Costa Rica's needs. Not unexpectedly Enrique Obregon Valverde, US-hater and commie-party-lining candidate for the presidency on the PADP ticket is among the most articulate spokesmen of this concern, using the comparative allocations to Nicaragua and Panama in support of his party's thesis that Costa Rica's economy is overly dependent on the US which is committing Costa Rica along with the rest of Latin America to bankruptcy. (see attached advertisement of

PADP). Echandi noted that the current situation provides for the moment virtually irrefutable documentation for all opposition elements to indulge in demagoguery at the expense of the US, and that if US assurance of an increased allocation is not forthcoming soon they will be able to claim that future increases are the result of their agitation.

COMMENT:

The Embassy concurs in the President's estimate of the importance to Costa Rica's economy and to the 10% of the population dependent on the sugar market of insuring that the US purchase in 1962 at least 30000 tons of sugar from Costa Rica at the quota price. Further, in view of the increased investment in sugar production in the country and the desirability in terms of US objectives of agricultural diversification away from past dependence on coffee and bananas to urge that if possible total quota and allocation purchased from Costa Rica total the 45000 tons recommended by the agricultural attaché in his survey of Oct. 10, 1961. On several occasions and prior to the announcement of the 1962 (6-months) [illegible in the original] and expansion of the sugar industry and its importance to the economy of the country have been reported to Washington by the Embassy. This was done in an effort to bring this matter to the constant attention of those concerned in Washington, and so consideration would be given to this information in the establishment of sugar quotas. Also, the Ambassador during his recent visit to Washington, discussed this matter and expressed his concern to the Department and to representatives of the Department of Agriculture.

The Embassy considers this a serious matter affecting not only the B program of Alianza para Progreso, but our friendly relations with a good friend of the United States. Costa Rica is a country that stands out as a champion of democracy in the midst of the Latin-American countries, and is a loyal ally and consistent supporter of U.S. policy both in the U.N. and in the OAS. The Embassy cannot place sufficient emphasis on the seriousness of this problem, and it is believed that unless there is a satisfactory answer to this apparent disturbing situation, undoubtedly the sugar industry and the economy of Costa Rica will face a further serious crisis. Finally, the Embassy hopes that the Departments of State and Agriculture will coordinate with the Embassy on the public relations aspect in connection with future allocations, so as not only to counter current dissatisfaction over the comparatively small quota to date for Costa Rica, but to stimulate the maximum possible popular satisfaction from subsequent increases. Further and most important so that the U.S. Government will receive full credit for this assistance instead of a third party or private intermediary.

Raymond Telles

*Ambassador of the United States
of America*

Enclosures:

1. Telegram from President of Costa Rica
 2. Newspaper clippings: *La Nacion* Dec. 14, '61, Jan. 13, 14, 16, '62
 3. *Le Prensa Libre*, Jan 5, '62
 4. *La Republics*, (Not Dated)
 5. Letter—"Liga de Proteccion a la Agricultura de la Ceña"
 6. Petition of Ingenio de Birris
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73. Despatch 440 from San Jose, March 2¹

San Jose, March 2, 1962

REF: Joint Emb/USAID Message. SUBJECT: FINANCE: Costa Rica's Fiscal Difficulties and Request for U.S. Assistance.

We have received written indication from President-Elect Orlich of his intention to request \$20 million of budget support assistance from the United States (Emb. Desp. 429). Minister of Economy and Finance Borbón has discussed with the Embassy and will undoubtedly request \$5 million or more to clean the slate through April 30 (Emb. Desp. 397). He informed an Embassy officer this week that he has nothing more to add to the Central Bank's letter answering basic questions that Orlich had raised regarding the fiscal situation of the Government of Costa Rica (Enclosures 1 and 2), and said the information contained in the letter should be taken as constituting the report on the situation that he had said he would supply to the Embassy (Emb. Desp. 397).

From above indications plus published Central Bank reports there is strong evidence that the government is in a very difficult financial position. Orlich and his representatives indicate that they are determined to take the necessary drastic measures to correct the basic causes of the problem, including such unpopular measures as enforcing tax collections and strengthening the entire tax system. One of the prime causes of the unbalanced budgets in recent years and calendar 1962 has been the not infrequent irresponsible conduct of the Congress in fiscal matters. We hope that the new Congress, with a majority of one

¹ Costa Rica's fiscal difficulties and request for U.S. assistance, with a copy of a letter from the Central Bank to President-elect Orlich. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/3-262.

from Orlich's party, will cooperate and approve the well-intentioned plans of the president-elect. It will be months before the new administration can prove its capacity and effectiveness to improve the situation through self-help measures. However, it should be realized that Costa Rica, like other countries in the region, has drifted into this situation through continuing to increase its level of government expenditures at the same time that the prices of its principal export crops were declining. Costa Rican officials stress the urgency of the situation and claim that the alternatives are printing money or external aid before corrective measures can be effective. Certainly the situation is acute and worse than usual but a similar situation has existed in previous years on a somewhat lesser scale without disaster.

It is our opinion that the advisable method to assess the situation is to have an expert or a team of experts come here as quickly as possible to study and analyze the fiscal situation, and further, to study and advise the government on the adequacy of the present tax laws and enforcement of the same, and assist in reviewing the budget in order to determine the realism of the budget. All of this would be done in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of the same apparent present fiscal situation next year. We are contacting the government to try to get their concurrence in this and to agree to such a study. If it materializes as a request to AID then we will hope for speedy assistance. If they prefer IMF, IBRD or other agency analysis we should be prepared to support and hurry the selected agency.

It is recognized that this suggested study will be limited in scope. It cannot resolve any long term problem which will require time and the establishment of an effective planning body but it should provide us a technical basis for immediate decisions as to the real size of the problem and as to whether or not external assistance is required.

Raymond Telles

*Ambassador of the United States
of America*

Enclosures:

1. Letter from Central Bank to Orlich, with attached tables, in Spanish (7 copies)
2. Translation of above letter (without tables)

Enclosure

San José, February 22, 1962

TRANSLATION

Mr. Francisco J. Orlich,
President-Elect of Costa Rica, San José.

My dear sir:

The Bank is pleased to reply to the questionnaire contained in your interpellation published by the press February 16, relating to certain aspects of the difficult fiscal situation. The answers given in this letter to your interesting questions have had to be prepared very rapidly as we wished to be able to deliver them to you before your departure from the country, announced for tomorrow; therefore, they are very brief and just include the data expressly provided by the offices responsible for the conduct of the respective matters.

We are in a position to supply you this information with the desired timeliness because of the rapidity with which these government departments have attended to our request. To provide you a more complete report on the points answered below, we have considered it necessary to include the tables received from the different responsible public offices.

Question No. 1: What is the exact amount of the floating debt derived from government obligations pending as of December 31, 1961?

Answer: According to Table No. 1 supplied by the Treasury, the Treasury deficit as of December 31 last year reached the amount of 46.2 million colones.

Question No. 2: What Treasury deficit will there be as of the last day of April 1962?

Answer: The National Treasurer estimates that the possible Treasury deficit as of next April 30 will amount to 71.7 million colones, in accordance with the analysis which appears in Table No. 2.

Question No. 3: What are the due dates of the obligations incurred by the Government through loans for fiscal purposes supplied by the Central Bank, commercial banks and other institutions?

Answer: Complete details on these due dates are given in Table No. 4. The origin of the obligations included in this table, in chronological order, is as follows:

A. Commercial Banks (El Coco Highway): In April 1961 the Board of Directors of the Central Bank authorized the Commercial Banks a specific ceiling up to the amount of \$1.5 million, with an expiration date of December 31, 1962, in order that the Banks might buy public debt bonds from the Government, to permit the Treasury to pay for the right-of-way involved in the construction of the San José-El Coco Highway.

B. Treasury Drafts: As of November 20, 1961 the Central Bank had in its possession Treasury drafts for an amount of \$12.5 million. These certificates were thereafter cancelled November 23 with the proceeds of the bond operation indicated below. On December 18 the Board of Directors of the Central Bank authorized the purchase of new Treasury Drafts up to the amount of \$10 million. On that occasion it was directed that if at the end of the year there remained a balance pending to be redeemed, this could be cancelled through the issuance of new Drafts. On January 2, 1961, new certificates for the same amount of 10 million were acquired, cancelling the previous ones. The new issue of drafts has an expiration date of February 28, 1962.

C. Purchase of Bonds by the Commercial Banks: In November 1961 the Board of Directors of the Central Bank granted the Banco Nacional and the Banco de Costa Rica a specific temporary ceiling of \$20 million to enable them to acquire Government bonds and hold them as a temporary investment. The expiration date of this ceiling was set for April 30, 1962. The proceeds thus obtained by the Treasury ought to be used primarily in cancelling the Treasury drafts in the possession of the Central Bank, and the rest for attending to urgent disbursing needs, especially the payment of the thirteenth month salary of government employees.

D. Banco de Costa Rica: On February 1, 1962 the Board of Directors of the Central Bank agreed to authorize the Banco De Costa Rica a specific temporary ceiling, thus to permit it to buy public debt bonds up to the amount of \$2 million. The expiration date for the ceiling was set as March 6, 1962. The operation was carried out for a net of \$1.3 million.

Question No. 4: In what amount is it calculated that the revenues for the rest of 1962 were over-estimated?

Answer: In a letter to the Central Bank the National Treasurer calculates that in five of the principal revenue categories of the budget there will be a \$44.3 million shortfall in revenues.

Question No. 5: Are there expenditures anticipated for 1962 that were not included in the national Budget? If so, how much do they amount to?

Answer: The Budget Office estimates at \$21.9 million the obligations to be met in 1962 that are not included in the budget calculations.

Question No. 6: To sum up: What does the total National Treasury and budget deficit amount to, taking into consideration the data relating to the questions in the preceding paragraphs?

Answer: As indicated in Question No. 1, the Treasury deficit according to the Report of the Situation on December 31, 1961 (Table No. 1) reached \$46.2 million. With regard to the budget for the current

year, the Bank considers that the estimate of the deficit, even taking into account the deficiencies noted under the preceding questions, is a very uncertain matter, since such a result is based essentially on the policy that the Executive Power may follow in regard to public expenditures. Therefore, any calculation in this regard must take into consideration as a fundamental element the government policy decisions in the matter, which are unknown at this time.

In the form set forth above the Bank believes that it has satisfactorily attended to the objectives and anxieties of your public interpellation, especially if there is taken into consideration the limited time available and the objective of delivering this letter before your departure. Nevertheless, we are pleased to offer to amplify the above information or clarify any point which in your judgment might be necessary for a better evaluation of the fiscal situation in the current budget exercise.

Leaving to your better judgment the use which you may be kind enough to make of the information contained in this letter, we take the opportunity to repeat, Mr. President-Elect, that we are your very attentive and trusty servants,

Central Bank of Costa Rica,

Alvaro Castro J.,
Manager

74. Despatch 442 from San Jose, March 5¹

San Jose, March 5, 1962

REF: CERP D-18. SUBJECT: United States Efforts to Encourage Economic Planning in Costa Rica.

In line with the emphasis being placed on economic planning under the Alliance for Progress, the Ambassador has been active in his efforts to increase the interest of the Government of Costa Rica in the preparation of a comprehensive long-range economic plan. In the years that it has been working in Costa Rica, the United States Aid Mission, as a major part of the projects that it has undertaken, has cooperated with the Government of Costa Rica in working toward planned development in the various fields in which it has been active. In the fields of agricul-

¹ U.S. efforts to encourage economic planning in Costa Rica. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/3-562.

ture, public health, education, housing, public administration, industry, and labor, much has been done that can serve as ground-work for the preparation of an over-all plan for balanced, effective use of the country's human and natural resources. On several occasions the Ambassador has discussed the matter of planning with President Echandi, who has said he is very much in favor of a planning commission.

As a step toward making comprehensive economic planning a reality in Costa Rica, the Legislative Assembly, in December of last year, commissioned the University of Costa Rica to undertake comprehensive economic development planning in accordance with the Alliance for Progress (Emb Desp 315, December 21, 1961). The head of this planning group, Lic. Raúl HESS Estrada, has recently been designated to serve in the incoming (May 8) Orlich administration as Minister of Economy and Finance, a post he previously held in the latter part of the Figueres Administration (1954–58). It is therefore anticipated that the change of administration will not cause a break in continuity in the activities of the planning commission. On the contrary, with the head of the commission in the government's chief economic post, it can be expected that the commission's activities will be strongly reinforced.

When the Ambassador visited Washington on consultation in December 1961, he had several discussions with AID officials on the best way to encourage the Government of Costa Rica to proceed. When he expressed to Alliance for Progress Director Teodoro Moscoso his desire to encourage and assist the Government of Costa Rica to initiate and work on their economic development plan, Mr. Moscoso suggested that he get in touch with Mr. Harvey S. Perloff of Resources for the Future, Inc., to seek his advice and assistance. The Ambassador was unable to contact Mr. Perloff while in Washington but since returning to San Jose has corresponded with Mr. Perloff in the hope of obtaining his advice and assistance. (Enclosures 1, 2, 3 and 4.)

In the course of conversations with the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington last December the Ambassador was informed that the IDB expected to play a positive role in planning. It was his impression that the Bank was in the process of formulating the contributions it would be able to make in this field.

Also during his visit to Washington in December, the Ambassador discussed with Mr. J. Burke Knapp, Vice President of IBRD, the possibility of that institution providing technical assistance to the Government of Costa Rica (Enclosure 5). This conversation was followed by the visit to Costa Rica in February of Feliks Bochenski, IBRD Loan Officer. Embassy discussions with Mr. Bochenski are detailed in the attached memorandums of conversation (Enclosures 6 and 7). He directed his efforts toward representatives of the new administration that will take office on May 8, and met with a favorable response to the idea of the

IBRD assisting Costa Rica in its planning effort. There was, however, some difference of opinion as to timing and he encountered a feeling of uncertainty as to technique.

When Mr. Bochenski outlined his proposals either for 1) a survey team to make a planning study, 2) a resident IBRD representative to advise on planning, or 3) a combination of the two approaches, President-Elect Orlich said he would like to think it over in order to decide on the best approach. Economy and Finance Minister-Designate Raúl Hess said he wishes to get under way with planning, but wants a month to consider technique. Central Bank officials, as well as Jaime Solera (former Central Bank President and currently financial counselor to Mr. Orlich), would like the IBRD to begin planning work in Costa Rica immediately.

Apparently Raúl Hess, who is expected to be the key figure in Costa Rica's planning effort after May 8, is the only person who has significant reservations about the IBRD assuming a major advisory role in Costa Rican planning. As an economist who is just now completing a work at the University on planning, and as a partisan of ECLA, with which IBRD's relations have sometimes been strained, Hess's lukewarm attitude may stem from a reluctance to agree to something that may make it more difficult for him to act in accordance with his own ideas.

The Embassy is convinced that the new administration will accept the idea that an economic plan is needed and will cooperate in the preparation of such a plan. The matter will be pursued with President-Elect Orlich in order to enlist his full support. The Ambassador has recently reiterated to Mr. Moscoso (Enclosure 8) his desire to obtain suggestions and advice that will help toward the initiation of a planning program by the GOCR as soon as possible.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

James R. Johnston
Second Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Mr. Perloff from Ambassador 12/21/61 (5 copies)
2. Letter to the Ambassador from Mr. Perloff 1/8/62 (5 copies)
3. Letter to Mr. Perloff from the Ambassador 1/24/62 (5 copies)
4. Letter to the Ambassador from Mr. Perloff 2/2/62 (5 copies)
5. Letter to the Ambassador from Mr. Knapp 12/29/61 (5 copies)
6. Memo of Conversation with Mr. Bochenski 2/8/62 (5 copies)
7. Memo of Conversation with Mr. Bochenski 2/16/62 (5 copies)
8. Letter to Mr. Moscoso from the Ambassador 2/6/62 (5 copies)

75. Memorandum from Woodward to Moscoso, March 7¹

March 7, 1962

SUBJECT

Costa Rican Financial Difficulties

On February 15 Ambassador Telles received a memorandum from President-elect Orlich of Costa Rica reviewing the fiscal situation of the GOCR, which, in the latter's words, adds up to "a picture of absolute insolvency", with the Government requiring a total of 134 million colones, or approximately \$20 million, to balance its books in calendar 1962. The memorandum requested assistance from the U.S. to cover the deficit in the form of a long-term, low interest loan to be extended prior to June 30, 1962.

Orlich's memorandum was delivered to the Ambassador by Raúl Hess, who has been designated as the future Costa Rican Minister of Economy in the new administration which takes office on May 8, and by Jaime Solera, who is slated to be a director of the Central Bank. The latter, acting as spokesman for Orlich, made it clear that he had no authority to speak for the outgoing Echandi Government but expressed the hope that a loan could be obtained from the U.S. to cover the budgetary deficit. The Embassy does not consider the Orlich memorandum as a formal request for a loan, which could only be made by the present Echandi Government.

The Solera-Hess visit followed a previous approach to the Embassy on February 8 by Finance Minister Borbon Castro, in which he estimated the GOCR needs from external sources to meet the budgetary gap at \$5 million and promised to give the Embassy a detailed analysis of the situation, which would presumably serve to justify a loan request. This analysis has not yet been received by the Embassy nor does it have a firm indication that the Echandi Government plans to request a U.S. loan during the remaining two months of its term of office.

Nature of the Deficit

The Orlich memorandum, which is said to be based on Central Bank figures, breaks down the deficit into four categories, as follows:

¹ Costa Rican financial difficulties. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/3-762.

	<i>Million Colones</i>
1. Payments on internal bank loans due before April 30	30
2. Payments on 1961 obligations falling due in 1962 (Floating Debt)	43
3. Decrease expected in 1962 revenues	40
4. Expenditures not included in 1962 budget	21
TOTAL	134

Item 1 represents payments falling due on loans contracted by the GOCR with the commercial banks and the Central Bank. Obligations to the Central Bank consist of short term public bond issues and Treasury notes. The floating debt (Item 2) represents payments due to individuals in 1962 on obligations contracted in 1961. Item 3 represents an anticipated shortfall in 1962 revenues to meet expenditures programmed in the 1962 budget while item 4 consists of expenditures (unexplained) which were not included in the budget. Only items 1 and 2, totaling 73 million colones, appear to represent obligations for which the GOCR has already contracted.

The memorandum points out that the budgetary situation has led to the suspension of service on a number of Costa Rica's external obligations. The country is in arrears to the extent of \$600,000 on interest payments due on an Eximbank loan for the Inter-American Highway and has also failed to pay interest of £70,000 due on sterling bonds and on bonds held in France. The Foreign Bondholders Protective Council has expressed concern over the possibility of a default on service of dollar bonds due April 15. It is anticipated that all U.S. and international lending institutions will suspend action on current loan applications of the GOCR because of the serious question that these defaults have raised respecting its credit-worthiness.

From the material already submitted by the Embassy, particularly the Central Bank memorandum on Costa Rica's fiscal situation, it appears that the present budgetary crisis is the culmination of several years' mismanagement of GOCR finances and that rectification of the situation will require a thorough overhaul of GOCR budget and fiscal practices as well as a reform of the tax structure to create new sources of public revenue. In this connection, an official of the IBRD has indicated that it would be prepared to respond to a GOCR request for the assignment of a fiscal expert to provide advice on reform measures.

The loss of confidence in the national finances is already having adverse effects on the national economy, creating uncertainty for private enterprise and threatening a halt in economic and social development programs undertaken by the GOCR. USAID reports that the Government has failed to make contributions to certain projects included in the aid program because of its shortage of funds.

Proposed Fact-Finding Mission by AID Fiscal Expert

In response to a request from the Director of AID/Costa Rica for the temporary detail of an economist versed in fiscal matters to assist the mission in assessing the Costa Rican financial situation, AID/W is considering the sending of Mr. Frederic R. Fisher to San José.

ARA believes that the timing of sending an AID official to Costa Rica for the above purpose has political implications which merit serious study. In any event he should not proceed until the new administration takes over on May 8. 1) The Echandi Administration has about two months to go before transferring power. Echandi has not requested a loan. It is not clear whether his government intends to do so or intends to leave the deficit for the incoming Orlich Administration to handle. In either case the sudden appearance of the deficit will most certainly be fraught with politics. When the PLN assumes power they will naturally exploit the deficit problem bequeathed by the Echandi Administration, both for political purposes and in order to justify the necessary corrective measures. If a United States expert carries on extensive consultations with the Minister of Finance and the Central Bank the United States will find itself in the middle of a political fight. This might prejudice our desire to help the Costa Ricans work out a solution to the problem. 2) Even though Echandi applies for a loan no meaningful assessment of corrective measures could be considered with the present lame-duck administration. 3) It is not clear whether AID is prepared, in principle, to consider favorably a GOCR request of \$5 to \$20 million for a budgetary support loan.

Because of the political implications involved in Costa Rica's financial crisis and the undesirability of any action that could be intergrated by the Costa Ricans as a United States commitment to extend financial assistance at this time, ARA recommends that prior to Mr. Fisher's going to San José the Embassy and AID/Costa Rica be requested to transmit additional information on the problem available through their channels. From this data we should be able to make an adequate preliminary assessment of the situation and recommendations for United States action.

Robert F. Woodward
Assistant Secretary

76. Memorandum of conversation, April 24, between Foreign Minister-designate Oduber and Edwin M. Martin¹

April 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Economic Policies of Incoming Orlich Administration

PARTICIPANTS

Daniel Oduber Quirós, Foreign Minister-Designate of Costa Rica
Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Arturo Morales-Carrión, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. V.P. Randolph III, Officer in Charge, Costa Rican Affairs
Mr. Sacha Volman, U.S. member of Directorate of Institute of Political Education,
San José, Costa Rica

SUMMARY

In an informal, get-acquainted meeting with Department officials, Oduber discussed (1) the budgetary crisis (2) his government's intention to institute reforms and (3) its policies toward education and Central American integration.

Mr. Oduber stated that Costa Rica's primary problem was its current budgetary crisis. Using a figure of 420 million *colones* for the 1961 budget, Oduber said that of this sum 180 million *colones* due in taxes had not been collected, and blamed the vested coffee and sugar-producing interests behind the outgoing Echandi Government for contributing to the budgetary shortfall by failing to pay their higher taxes imposed by the 1961 tax reform law. He noted also that import (and duties) had fallen as a result of the 1961 tariff increase enacted with the advice of the IMF.

Oduber declared that first priority in the new Orlich government is going to be tax reform; that the new government has already a reform program worked out (he did not elaborate on this program); and that it will be submitted at an early date to the Legislative Assembly in which the Orlich government has an "overwhelming" majority. Oduber declared that his government felt the United States should not loan or give any Latin American government a penny until needed internal reforms were carried out and mentioned that Costa Rica had already made a start in self-help measures. Oduber repeatedly pledged that his government would implement such reforms before it sought assistance from the United States. He mentioned that President-elect Orlich

¹ Economic policies of incoming Orlich administration. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.13/4-2462.

wished to visit the United States after his reform program was underway.

Mr. Martin observed that it was difficult, if not impossible, for the Department of State to ask Congress for funds for budgetary support if the country in question had not collected the taxes due it, and emphasized internal fiscal reform as a requisite for financial assistance. Mr. Martin also stressed the U.S. reluctance to supply local currency costs in development projects, adding that local currency needs in special cases might be furnished during the transition period of local reform.

Oduber gave as his opinion that this transition period in Costa Rica might last as long as 10 years, but that the Orlich government would push immediately for internal reform, especially revision of the tax structure, despite the considerable internal opposition which is bound to develop.

Turning to economic matters of wider scope, Oduber said his government was fully committed to all forms of Central American integration, especially in the economic and educational fields. He noted that El Salvador was cooperating fully in Central American integration and Honduras to a lesser extent. Oduber said his "group" favors having price increases accruing from a World Coffee Agreement turned back to the government for it to help establish producers' cooperatives to break the big growers' control over the coffee industry. Oduber also referred to Costa Rica's shortage of properly-utilized land and stated that the Orlich Government's policy of "land reform" will be to encourage farmers to stay on the land by providing adequate rural education.

Oduber concluded by promising the full cooperation of the Orlich Government in working for the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

COMMENT

Not once during his 50 minutes with Mr. Martin did Oduber mention the name of José Figueres, leader of Oduber's (and Orlich's) Popular Liberation Party.

77. Memorandum of conversation, April 24, between Foreign Minister-designate Oduber and Edwin M. Martin¹

April 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Incoming Orlich Government's Attitude Toward Other Central American States

PARTICIPANTS

Daniel Oduber Quirós, Foreign Minister-Designate of Costa Rica
Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Arturo Morales-Carrión—Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. V.P. Randolph III—Officer in Charge, Costa Rican Affairs
Mr. Sacha Volman—U.S. Member of Directorate of Institute of Political Education, San José, Costa Rica

SUMMARY

Oduber discussed the attitude of the incoming Orlich administration toward the Governments of Nicaragua and Guatemala and, in less detail Honduras and Panama. He also affirmed his government-to-be's opposition to Fidel Castro.

Following discussion of another topic, Mr. Oduber reviewed the attitude of the National Liberation Party toward the governments of the other Central American countries. He states that the new ORLICH Government is watching events very closely in Nicaragua, whose "Somoza tyranny is hated" by the National Liberation Party. Oduber admitted that the Orlich government considered President Luis more reasonable than General Anastasia SOMOZA but felt the scheduled 1963 elections would be a fraud since no honest electoral machinery, e.g. registrations, is not being established. Discussing Nicaraguan internal politics, Oduber saw the Somoza's main preoccupation as safeguarding their fortune. He stated that he thought conservative leader Fernando AGUERO would win it if an honest election were held today; that Foreign Minister René Schick, the Somoza candidate, would eventually withdraw, and that his (Oduber's) group favored the Independent Liberal Party leader Alejandro ICAZA over the other possible candidates. Oduber also voices his fear that violence and assassination would mar the Nicaraguan presidential campaign.

¹ Orlich government's attitude toward other Central American States. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 810.18/4-2762.

Oduber declared that the Orlich Government would like to see an OAS team in Nicaragua well before the elections to set up the conditions for honest balloting as well as to supervise the vote.

Oduber characterized the situation in Guatemala as “new, fresh, and more dangerous”. He indicated the Orlich government favored both ex-President Juan José AREVALO and opposition leader Mario MENDEZ Montenegro, but especially the latter whom Oduber described as strongest in the cities while Arevalo’s chief support comes from the countryside. Oduber added that he did not like the idea of British Honduras being “conquered” by Guatemala, and inquired if Jamaica was about to become fully independent with a seat in the UN and on the OAS. Oduber also expressed concern at governmental corruption in Honduras and “some sectors” in Panama.

Oduber mentioned that his government would take advantage of the May 8 inauguration ceremonies to consult with representatives of the other Central American states in an effort to guide the Nicaraguan situation toward a democratic solution. Oduber also emphasized his government’s determination to take the lead in rallying Central America against Castro.

78. Memorandum of conversation, April 30, between Figueres and Moscoso and other U.S. officials¹

April 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Costa Rican Fiscal Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Jose Figueres, ex-President of Costa Rica
Jaime Solera, Director-designate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica
Teodoro Moscoso, AID Administrator for Latin America
Edward Marasciulo, AID/LA/CAP
Eric Fisher, AID/LA/CAP

¹ Costa Rican financial situation and possibility of U.S. assistance to rectify it. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/4-3062.

Joseph Carwell, Deputy Director ARA/REA
William Barnes, Deputy Director, ARA/OAP
Virgil Randolph, Officer in Charge, Costa Rican Affairs, ARA/OAP

The meeting was held at the request of Mr. Figueres to discuss the Costa Rican fiscal situation and the possibilities of U.S. assistance to rectify it. Mr. Moscoso mentioned at the outset that while the U.S. was concerned over the difficult financial situation faced by the incoming Orlich Government and desired to be as helpful as possible, under the existing AID legislation it was very largely limited to the financing of developmental projects. If the GOCR's fiscal difficulties could be remedied by assistance of this character, he said, the U.S. would be glad to consider it, assuming that the projects proposed for financing met the established criteria.

It was mentioned that an IMF Mission was due to arrive in San Jose in the middle of May after the new government had taken office, and that it would presumably be able to clarify the size and character of the budgetary deficit varying estimates of which had been received in Washington. Mr. Figueres said he placed the deficit at 200 million colones (\$30 million dollars) while Mr. Solera put it at 177 million colones (\$25 million dollars). In addition to the GOCR's fiscal problem, Mr. Figueres said there was need for an infusion of new funds into the Costa Rican banking system for relending to the private sector.

Mr. Moscoso inquired concerning the possibilities of the GOCR finding new sources of revenue through additional taxes and the improvement of tax collection methods. Mr. Solera said that tax increases and better collection methods would definitely be a part of the new administration's fiscal program. Mr. Figueres said that the existing economic depression in Costa Rica in which some 50,000 persons were unemployed and many firms were facing bankruptcy made him question the feasibility of raising taxes. While an effort would be made to do so, he was pessimistic about the results and thought that it would be a long time before a significant increase in revenue could be obtained. In answer to a question, Mr. Solera said that there were many possibilities for the reduction of GOCR expenditures during 1962 in order to lessen the fiscal deficit. Mr. Moscoso said that action in this respect, together with an increase in taxes, would be prerequisites for any help from AID.

Mr. Figueres attributed Costa Rica's difficulties to the decline in world prices of its principal exports of coffee, bananas, and cacao. He estimated that in relation to the export income obtained by Costa Rica in 1954 the country had lost some \$30 million a year ever since because

of price declines.² The only long-term solution, he said, was an increase in the prices of Costa Rica's chief export products and a diversification of export items. Mr. Moscoso referred to the report recently prepared by the OAS on the stabilization of export receipts and its proposals for an international agreement toward this end and asked that Mr. Figueres be given a copy.

Mr. Figueres maintained that Costa Rica had no significant problem of capital flight and that private funds on deposit abroad were small. He affirmed the intention of the new government to enter the Central American common market, thus reversing the non-participation policy of the Echandi Government.

Mr. Fisher asked how the reported shortfall in customs duties in 1961 was to be explained since imports in that year were only slightly under those in 1960. Mr. Solera said this was probably due to a change in the composition of 1961 imports but also mentioned that the pattern of imports had been disrupted by the September 1961 devaluation. This action had been debated in the Congress for three months, which gave importers an opportunity to make heavy purchases abroad in anticipation of duty increases. He conceded that duties might not yet have been paid on some of these extraordinary imports and that the shortfall in customs revenues estimated at the end of 1961 might thus not reflect the true situation.

Mr. Figueres estimated the current arrears in taxes at \$5 million. Mr. Solera repeated that the new administration planned to undertake comprehensive tax reform measures and Mr. Moscoso recommended that the GOCR seek technical assistance from the OAS for this purpose.

Mr. Figueres referred to the problem of coordinating technical assistance in the economic and financial field since the IBRD, the IMF, and the OAS were all in the picture. Mr. Moscoso said that such coordination was the responsibility of the GOCR. Mr. Figueres said that the new government was thinking of contracting with a private firm to obtain advice on development planning, and Mr. Moscoso said that

² According to data of the Central Bank of Costa Rica furnished to the IBRD, Costa Rica suffered no appreciable absolute loss in export income in the period since 1954. The value of exports was \$84.7 million in 1954, 80.9 in 1955, 67.5 in 1956, 83.4 in 1957, 91.9 in 1958, 76.7 in 1959, and 88.5 in 1960. However, the volume of coffee exports doubled between 1954, when they amounted to 510,000 quintals (46 kilos each), and the years 1958–60, inclusive, when they were at the annual level of 1 million quintals. At the same time, because of the decline in world coffee prices, the value of such exports increased only from \$35.8 million in 1954 to \$43.4 million in 1960. Had 1954 prices prevailed in the period 1958–60 Costa Rica would have earned some \$70 million in each of these years from such exports whereas their actual value averaged only \$45 million annually. In the case of bananas, the decline in prices was accompanied by a substantial reduction in export volume, both of which contributed to the drop in export value from \$35.8 million in 1954 to \$25 million in 1960.

AID funds were available for this purpose. Mr. Marasciulo said that AID would welcome the receipt from the GOCR of an overall proposal for U.S. assistance, which should be submitted through the USAID/San Jose. He pointed out that Costa Rica was almost the only country in Central America without a development planning office. Mr. Figueres said that some work had been done in this field by the University of Costa Rica and by planners associated with the PLN. He thought that a short-term plan could be prepared for consideration by AID within two or three months.

A discussion then ensued on Costa Rica's external debt service problem. According to Mr. Solera, the total external debt, including that of both the GOCR proper and the autonomous institutions totaled \$57 million, and the service charges on it in 1962 would amount to 16.5 per cent of total export income. Because the GOCR was short of colones to buy foreign exchange, service on the external debt had been halted, although the country's reserves, (now at the level of 20.8 million dollars,) were sufficient to maintain service payments. Mr. Solera anticipated, however, that the GOCR must reach an agreement with the Export-Import Bank for the refinancing of the unpaid balances of its loans from that institution totaling some \$18 million. Present repayment schedules called for \$2.5 million in service and amortization on these loans in 1962, which was considered too burdensome. The same problem did not exist with respect to the IBRD loans which had been made to the Central Bank. The IBRD had also made a loan of \$8.8 million to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for power development, payments on which would not start until 1964. The ICE had requested another loan of \$15 million but because of the current situation of default the IBRD was holding this application in abeyance. Both Mr. Figueres and Mr. Solera recognized the psychological value of the GOCR resuming service payments on its external debt as soon as possible.

In response to a question from Mr. Barnes, Mr. Figueres elaborated on his proposal that U.S. funds be made available to the Costa Rican banking system for relending to the private sector. He said that the four nationalized banks, which together had some 200 branches throughout the country provided a perfect mechanism for channeling funds to productive enterprise and stimulating economic development. Costa Rica, he said, had many able entrepreneurs but there was a dearth of capital for medium and long-term lending, and this situation had placed a brake on economic development in view of the drastic decline in export income. He estimated that an injection of \$20 million into the economy through a line of credit to the banking system to be utilized over a period of 3 to 5 years would give such an impulse to productive economic activity that unemployment would be eliminated

completely. Mr. Figueres said that ground rules could be developed for the extension of such a line of credit to assure that it would be used only for agreed purposes contributing to economic development. He suggested that tax collections could be improved by making loans to private entrepreneurs contingent upon prior payment of tax arrears. Interest rates would be moderate, not exceeding the current level of 8 per cent.

Mr. Moscoso pointed out that AID development lending was being directed primarily to support individual projects and expressed doubt that Congress would go along with the idea of a general loan to a national banking system for relending to private enterprise.

At the close of the meeting it was agreed that the incoming government should work through the Embassy and USAID mission in Costa Rica in preparing economic and fiscal proposals which it desired to have considered by the U.S. Government.

79. Letter from Telles to Edwin M. Martin, May 31¹

San Jose, May 31, 1962

Dear Ed:

The end of my first year in San José has happened to coincide with the end of the Echandi Administration and in consequence stimulated my Country Team and me to make a review and general assessment of our standing and achievements here, which has been rather sobering.

In essence it has shown that the greatest obstacle with which we have had to deal in the pursuit of our objectives has been the failure of the Department of State to act positively on our recommendations, in consequence of what has impressed us as an almost automatically negative attitude by the Department towards our suggestions, though possibly the Embassy's failure to adequately and forcefully present our recommendations has also played a role. In support of our analysis, we have compiled a balance sheet, noting the principal recommendations made by the Embassy and Country Team over the course of the past year, and the response of the Department in each case. (To twenty-

¹ End of year assessment: DOS failure to act on Embassy recommendations and lack of confidence Department has shown in Embassy; Orlich visit to Washington; Costa Rican fiscal and budgetary problem; U.S. policy in dealing with Figueres. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/5-3162.

five proposals made by the Embassy, the Department's response was negative thirteen times, the Embassy received no reply or replies so late as to destroy the effect of the proposal eight times, and affirmative exactly four times.) Since this is all water over the dam, and since this all happened prior to your taking office, I will not burden you with a copy of this information now. However, if you so desire it, I will be more than glad to send it to you.

As a result, the outgoing Echandi Administration made an effort to by-pass the Embassy with many of its requests. In turn this made it difficult, in some instances, to obtain their cooperation to our urging for actions and policy which we wanted but which they found inconvenient or untimely. Fortunately, I was able to get close to both former President Echandi and his Foreign Minister on a personal and friendly basis and we were able to obtain necessary results in this manner. On several occasions, as I found it necessary, I made certain action-decisions and assumed all responsibility. This was particularly true during the recent presidential campaign in Costa Rica. In the final analysis what counts is results. We had a free, peaceful, honest and most democratic election, and today we have in Costa Rica probably the most stable government and ideal democratic country in Latin America. Presumptuously, we here in the Embassy would like to feel that we contributed a little through our activities to the outcome and favorable results.

I know that my experience has not been particularly novel (Echandi was already thoroughly soured on what support he could expect from the Embassy before I arrived in Costa Rica), and my purpose in writing you now on this subject is not simply "to kick a dead horse" or to demand any retribution. However, I am asking in all sincerity for a change in attitude in the Department to coincide with the change of administration which has just taken place here in Costa Rica. President Orlich has assured me on various occasions both before his inauguration and since he has been in power that he will seek out my counsel and the assistance of my people on projects on which he desires U.S. Government aid, and that he will not by-pass the Embassy on these matters. He has already gone out of his way on at least one occasion to confirm this declared policy in deed. Many of the avowed objectives of the Orlich Government will represent changes in GOCR policies that bring Costa Rica directly into line with aims which the U.S. has been seeking here for a year and sometimes more, and I have the highest hopes that by cementing our relations with Orlich and his ministers at the start I will be able to make myself and my staff here of infinitely greater value to the U.S. and to the Department than was ever possible under the previous Costa Rican Government in consequence of Echandi's regrettable experience. To be successful, how-

ever, I must have confidence that the people in the Department who are directly interested will listen to our views and our recommendations, and that in the case of the latter, that they will try to see how these recommendations can be carried out rather than responding automatically with reasons why they can not.

Specifically, there are three immediate issues which face us on which our stock could very well rise or fall for the remainder of this administration:

1) An Orlich visit to Washington and to President Kennedy during calendar year 1962—In response to Orlich's known desire and even intent to come to the U.S. "for talks with President Kennedy and other high officials" we have proposed such a visit, received the usual negative response, modified our initial request to permit a less formal type of visit, and are still awaiting a reply. Meanwhile, Orlich as a President-Elect got red carpet treatment from the Chief of State or at least Foreign Minister of every country he visited in Europe and the Near East from Queen Elizabeth to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, which made a profound vivid impression on him, and against which he will certainly weigh our ultimate response. Orlich takes for granted that we will make the necessary arrangements and has indicated in a personal letter to President Kennedy that he plans a trip to the U.S. in the near future.

How the Department can arrange this visit, what category of presidential visitor Mr. Orlich should be are implementing details which the Department can arrange more wisely and appropriately than we. However, I cannot urge too strongly that the Department find a way to respond favorably to this first major request of Mr. Orlich.

2) From all indications, the Costa Rican Government is faced with a difficult and serious fiscal and budgetary problem. The IMF representatives have been here and conducted their limited study of the situation. We were not provided with a copy of the IMF report. The Embassy is now studying the data made available through the local Government, and holding conferences with the Costa Rican officials in order to realistically determine as closely as possible the problem and possible solution for recommendation to Washington. We have consistently for several months recommended to the Department three things. First of all, the determination of the exact fiscal problem by capable technicians. Second, the study of the tax structure and laws by qualified technicians and last, qualified technical help on the budgetary matter. This is all well in line with the Alliance for Progress, and in order that an adequate economic plan may be developed. According to the information provided by IMF to the Government here, the IMF people have made similar recommendations. We have very carefully analyzed the report provided to the Costa Rican Government by IMF on the fiscal situation. I might add that while the study made may well serve the IMF purpose,

I am not satisfied with the limited information provided towards determining the exact fiscal condition.

We will soon submit our thinking and recommendations to the Department on the fiscal problem as well as our request for immediate technical assistance on the tax and budget matters. We will need and will greatly appreciate your assistance and support as this is a problem of great concern to President Orlich and his Government, and I strongly feel that it is a matter which we should also consider important towards maintaining a stable situation here through the improvement of both their poor fiscal condition and economic progress.

3) U.S. policy in dealing with Figueres—It seems paradoxical that the spectre of U.S. high level attitudes towards Figueres should constitute a problem now that his party is in power, but we strongly suspect that such will be the case. As you certainly are aware, probably the most important single factor in queering the Embassy's relations with former President Echandi (at least during the past year) was the adulation and special treatment publicly accorded his arch enemy Figueres on every possible occasion by prominent members of the Kennedy Administration, including the President himself. I and my staff did everything possible to make clear to the Department the regrettable effects of this policy on our relations with the GOCR, but to no avail.

In assuming the presidency Mr. Orlich has been emphatic in his rejection of local gossip to the effect that he is a puppet of Figueres who will in fact run Costa Rica. Both I and the members of my staff believe that the next few months may well see the development of a significant split within the Liberación Party between the comparatively middle-of-the-road progressive thinking of Orlich and the demagogic, social-welfare-regardless-of-cost "liberalism" of Figueres. There is currently little question in our minds that strong U.S. backing of Orlich in such an event will represent the soundest policy for the U.S. Hence I urgently recommend as a matter of basic U.S. policy that the personal regard in which prominent members of the current Administration in Washington hold Figueres as a "hemisphere leader" not be permitted to upset our relations with the new President and Government of Costa Rica as it did with the last. I can offer no specific operational guidance for the present except to request that urgent recommendations from the Embassy on this subject in the future be given sympathetic consideration at the top level.

In conclusion I should like to say in a spirit of respect but of heartfelt sincerity that I believe it imperative that the Department should have more confidence in the experience and judgment of the Ambassadors and experienced career officers in the field if we are going to move ahead and meet the many challenges we face in these countries. Frankly, my first year's experience in San José has led me to question the need

for an Ambassador or senior officers if all we are to do is to carry out judgments and decisions made in Washington without regard for our carefully considered opinions. I believe that despite its small size and lack of certain elements of power, Costa Rica, and the freely given support of successive governments of Costa Rica in international questions, are more important to the U.S. than some of our leaders appear to recognize, and I fear greatly that our Government's current attitude for taking Costa Rica for granted in the absence of dramatic problems of the sort we face elsewhere in the hemisphere may ultimately lead to the generation of these very problems in our relations here, when through a little inexpensive positivism on our part towards Costa Rica we could so easily avoid them altogether.

I believe firmly that the time and the situation are ripe for Costa Rica to become a shining example of the reward to be achieved from close cooperation with the U.S. under the *Alianza para Progreso*, in dramatic contrast to the restrictions and actual want which are being even more clearly demonstrated in Cuba as the result of dependence on the communist system and the Soviet Bloc.

With best personal regards,
Sincerely,

Raymond Telles
*Ambassador of the United States
of America*

80. Airgram A-191 from San Jose, June 4¹

San Jose, June 4, 1962

REF: Embassy's Despatches 582, May 18, 1962 and 585, May 23, 1962.

President ORLICH again called me to meet privately with him and Minister of Economy HESS May 29 for the purpose of impressing upon me his sincere concern over the seriousness of Costa Rica's current financial crisis, and to emphasize in strongest terms his hope for US assistance.

¹ Meeting between President Orlich and Minister of Economy Hess and Ambassador Telles on seriousness of Costa Rica's current financial crisis and President's hope for U.S. assistance. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/6-362.

Finance Minister Hess made available to me at my request a copy of the preliminary report of the IMF team, together with his own analysis of the budgetary deficit and an outline and initial justification of planned Costa Rican measures to overcome it. The Embassy's first reaction to both of these documents is one of disappointment; towards the IMF report because of its failure to explain the basis on which the team calculated that outside assistance should not exceed \$5 million, and because it did not include a basis for assessing Costa Rica's actual needs; and towards the proposals of Minister Hess since a cursory study of these proposals and request for \$15 million of US assistance makes apparent the Minister's heavy reliance on US aid, while it appears to us that possibly additional revenue producing measures could be considered, even though unpopular, to reduce their outside requirement.

My staff and I are giving urgent study to these reports on their immediate requirement, and will endeavor to obtain more and more basic information from Hess. I have made no commitment of any sort to Orlich or Hess. I also consider that finding a speedy but long-term solution to Costa Rica's budgetary difficulties is of such vital importance to successful Costa Rican participation in the Alliance for Progress that we plan to obtain under AID contract US experts in the tax and budget fields to help the GOCR to bring their expenditures and resources into realistic balance. Orlich and Hess have both requested this type of assistance.

As soon as my staff and I have obtained sufficient information to come to a satisfying conclusion on the extent of the Costa Rican need for US assistance I shall forward to the Department our considered recommendations which from current indications, including the IMF findings, may well involve budget support for the GOCR, in which case I will add our conclusions as to a proper amount and a preferred means of making such assistance available.

Telles

81. Airgram A-46 from San Jose, July 23¹

San Jose, July 23, 1962

SUBJECT: Country Team Recommendation for Fiscal Assistance to GOCR. JOINT EMBASSY/USAID.

SUMMARY

The Ambassador and the Country Team have carefully studied the GOCR's request for U.S. financial assistance to help the new Government meet the fiscal deficit which it inherited on coming to power. We are convinced on the basis of such incontrovertible indications as shortfalls already evident in current income statements, delays on development projects, and the 40% discount prevailing on Government bonds in the local market, as well as from the IMF report and the GOCR's statements and analyses, that Costa Rica faces an exceedingly difficult fiscal situation, but that the new government has already shown a sincere determination to invoke politically undesirable but necessary measures to meet its problem and that with some emergency help from outside the GOCR will be able both to face up to the 1962 deficit and to operate on a sound fiscal basis in 1963. The Ambassador and the Country Team agree that if no financial help from the U.S. is forthcoming the political effects will be both serious and widespread in terms of U.S. objectives and interests not only in Costa Rica but possibly in other Latin American countries. Most important the Alliance for Progress will be slowed down in Costa Rica owing to the inability of the GOCR to provide its required share of development projects. Therefore, the Ambassador and the Country Team are fully agreed that there are cogent political and political-economic reasons to justify prompt U.S. assistance to Costa Rica on an emergency basis. We recommend that grant or loans, or a combination of both, be furnished to Costa Rica in the amount of \$10 million to be applied to a specific series of development projects to be selected from the 1962 and 1963 budgets, and that in addition the Department use its good offices to the utmost in supporting a Costa Rican request to re-negotiate its outstanding loans with the Export-Import Bank. *END SUMMARY*

I. The Budget Problem and the Government's Need for Assistance

The new Government of Costa Rica currently faces a fiscal deficit of such proportions that it has felt impelled to ask U.S. assistance to supplement its own efforts to alleviate the problem. The present situa-

¹ Country Team recommendation for fiscal assistance to GOCR. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/7-2362.

tion is a culmination of developments that go back a period of several years, during which time government revenues have not kept pace with expenditures.

Since 1956 government expenditures have increased at a rate of nearly 7 percent per year, while actual revenues during the same period have increased at an average annual rate of only 4.5 percent. Between 1960 and 1961 they actually declined by almost 9 percent, largely because of decreased revenues from import duties, which normally account for about two-thirds of government revenue. Largely through resort to the public credit (unpaid bills, treasury letters, and bond issues), the government has managed in the past to cover its deficits, but at the price of a cumulative stretching of such credit. A point has now been reached where it is apparent that the existing revenue structure will not support a politically suitable level of expenditures unless the government can obtain additional funds from other sources.

There has been much partisan argument among the Costa Ricans regarding who is to blame for the present state of affairs, but the basic figures making up the record of the situation, from a quantitative standpoint, have not been the subject of dispute. The issue has been a matter of interpretation, with disagreement centering on the question of how serious a problem the figures show.

The GOCR now estimates its fiscal problem at \$163 million. To cover this deficit it proposes to increase domestic receipts and reduce expenditures resulting in a saving of \$73.7 million, to renegotiate the Government's debt to the Social Security Institute in the amount of \$23, and to seek external assistance to cover the remaining \$66.3 million. (Enclosure No. 1) At the time of his inauguration (May 8, 1962) President ORLICH believed that \$20 million in external assistance would be necessary. Following several discussions with the Ambassador, the amount requested was scaled down to \$10 million, the GOCR in the meantime having moved toward further domestic measures to reduce the size of the budget deficit.

In reviewing the GCR's fiscal situation a number of facts stand out quite clearly. These facts cannot be obscured by arguments premised upon the obvious difficulty of determining the size of the *anticipated 1962 budgetary deficit* or by arguments over such terms as "treasury deficits".

1. The straightened circumstances of the GCR's finances are evidenced when income received as of June 30, 1962 is compared to income estimated for the entire year. The total regular budget income was estimated at \$422 million of which approximately \$183 million had been received by June 30, 1962. The major short fall is in customs revenues where of an expected total of \$249 million only \$79.4 million had been paid. The Ministry of Finance does not expect the year end

total to pass \$180 to \$190 millions. Income tax payments have reached \$37.5 million of a total estimated \$41 million. The emergency character of this problem is evidenced by the GOCCR's determination to produce and live up to a balanced fiscal situation in 1963 (see Enclosure No. 2).

2. It is a fact that the GCR is having a difficult time in meeting its payrolls. Little or no funds are available for the provision of supplies for hospitals, prisons, extension service, etc. The \$5 million loan from the Continental Illinois Bank is to be utilized in large part to service external and internal debt and a small part also to pay for the government's running expenses. The next four months make up a period of low income flow and will present a period of definite budgetary crisis;

3. Lack of local funds are paralyzing work on development projects which fall within the Alliance for Progress category. These include the highway development, the school construction, the low cost housing and water supply improvement projects. This is particularly serious as there is genuine interest on the GCR's part to implement a dynamic Alliance program;

4. The budget deficit problem has been growing in severity over the past six years. The Central Bank gives the following figures as being the adjusted deficit or surplus:

1957	(-C 20.5)
1958	(-C 18.3)
1959	(-C 32.9)
1960	(-C 29.2)
1961	(-C 91.2)
1962 estimated	(-C108)

The new government has inherited an admittedly bad fiscal situation and appears to be taking determined steps to eliminate the same.

5. The GCR's credit has sunk to a new low. Bonds are selling at a 40% discount making new issues virtually unmarketable which makes for extremely expensive financing.

6. A large proportion of the GCR's budgetary expenditures go toward meeting payrolls, but if it should resort to wholesale dismissals it would be legally liable for such a large amount of severance payments that the budget situation would be aggravated rather than improved.

7. Given these conditions, the new government will not let its development program go by the board in its totality. The interest in the Alliance for Progress has not diminished. If external development assistance for local currency use is not forthcoming, it is most likely that the GCR will resort to the issuance of colon notes to cover its operations.

The situation in brief seems to indicate that the GCR has little more than funds with which to meet payrolls. Government offices and official institutions are short of all types of supplies and operating necessities.

[Here follow seven pages of Part II, "Self Help Efforts Being taken by the GOCCR to Meet its Fiscal Problem."]

**82. Memorandum of conversation, August 13, among
Ambassador Facio, former Ambassador Esquivel and Edwin
M. Martin¹**

August 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Costa Rican Budget Problem

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Gonzalo Facio, Ambassador of Costa Rica

His Excellency Mario Esquivel, former Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States and a former Foreign Minister

ARA—Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin

CAP—Mr. John W. Fisher, Deputy Director

Budget Problem

Mr. Esquivel, former Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States and a former Foreign Minister, said that he is now a private citizen of his country, and as such he would like to give Mr. Martin his views on the budgetary situation there. While he left the Administration political party (PIN) several years ago, he is in contact with leaders, and Costa Rican President Orlich knew about and approved his coming to Mr. Martin about the fiscal situation.

Mr. Esquivel said the present Administration inherited a serious budget deficit from the outgoing Government in May of this year. He said the deficit was not the result of dishonesty, which the Costa Ricans do not tolerate in Government, but of some irresponsible fiscal management, together with a variety of economic reasons. In the event Costa Rica is unable to obtain the emergency help needed from the United States, it will have to resort to dangerous inflationary internal credit operations to stave off bankruptcy.

Mr. Esquivel said he understood that the American Embassy had forwarded to Washington a memorandum on the Government's budg-

¹ Serious budget deficit in Costa Rica; coffee conference in New York. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 718.00/8-662.

etary difficulties, and he hoped that the Department would be able to act promptly on the Costa Rican request.

Mr. Martin said the Department had received the Embassy's report on the budgetary problem. It seemed to reflect a few suggestions which he had offered during his recent visit to Costa Rica. He said the Department was giving intense study to the Costa Rican budget matter. Mr. Fisher added that several experts are working out the best means of reaching early decisions on the issues raised. He said the Department and AID may seek certain additional information from our Embassy.

Mr. Esquivel dwelt on the success of Costa Rica in maintaining itself as a democratic stable Republic, and said failure to meet this fiscal emergency would be a step backward. He wondered whether he should feel optimistic about the prospects of help. Mr. Martin said he should probably be somewhat optimistic, and said he hoped that the Department would be in a position to give definite answers in the near future.

Coffee

Mr. Esquivel and Ambassador Facio said that the news from the Coffee Conference in New York was not encouraging except for the fact of the strong position which the United States was taking. They thought that much of the difficulty came from lack of agreement among the producers themselves, and from the practice of giving undue representation to the coffee industry on the national delegations. The businessman was certainly entitled to have his interests considered, but the decisions must be taken and negotiations carried out by Government representatives if the larger interests at stake are to be protected.

Mr. Esquivel said a difficult problem for the high quality coffee producers is their inability to segregate their product from the low quality coffee of Brazil, whose big crop depresses the market. He thought the U.S. Food and Drug Administration should have jurisdiction over coffee imports and would surely exclude large quantities of inferior Brazilian coffee if it did. Central American and other high quality producers should find ways to keep their fine grades from disappearing in soluble coffee products where quality differentiation is hard to detect.

**83. Memorandum of conversation, August 13, between
Ambassador Facio and John W. Fischer¹**

August 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Costa Rican Budgetary Problem

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Gonzalo J. Facio, Ambassador of Costa Rica
Mr. John W. Fisher, Deputy Director, Office of Central American and
Panamanian Affairs

I explained to Ambassador Facio that I wanted to continue the conversation on the Costa Rican budgetary situation which we had started on August 10 at a reception but had been unable to continue because of interruptions.

The Ambassador said he much regretted that a misunderstanding had arisen which had resulted in Ambassador Telles' calling Mr. Martin from San José on August 10. On August 9 during a luncheon meeting which Ambassador Facio had with officials of the IMF and Mr. Oliver Sause of AID, the latter had remarked that he had seen no official request from the Costa Rican Government for emergency fiscal help, but only a communication from our Embassy at San José on the subject. Ambassador Facio mentioned this in a telephone call to his Minister in San José, where it unfortunately got somewhat out of context before it reached Ambassador Telles.

I said the Embassy's communication was sufficient evidence of Costa Rica's request for help and that the lack of a formal piece of paper from the Costa Rican Government has not stopped us from giving the problem serious and urgent consideration. I said we are studying ways in which Costa Rica's problem can best be approached. We have now asked our Embassy for information expanding and elaborating on that in the report of which the Ambassador spoke. Among other things, we need more details about the development projects in the current Costa Rican budget which have been suggested as possibilities for AID loans. At the same time, we are taking great interest in the measures which Costa Rica is taking to correct its fiscal situation once the current emergency is overcome.

Ambassador Facio said that the Finance Committee in the Costa Rican Congress has already approved several of the measures introduced to improve tax revenues, and passage by the Congress is virtually

¹ Costa Rican budgetary problem. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/8-1362.

assured. These measures include a requirement to deposit disputed taxes, pending litigation; establishment of a full-time tax tribunal in lieu of two part-time bodies; and the placing of tax collections on a current pay-as-you-go basis. He expects a bill will be passed to establish a revenue office to tighten up on tax collections, an exceedingly important part of the problem. He said he personally is anxious to see taxes collected from large numbers of people who now pay none, although well able to do so. He said Costa Rica is taking steps to withhold taxes from salary earners, starting with Government employees. I said it would be helpful to have up-to-date, realistic estimates of the effects of these and similar measures as they approach actuality.

Ambassador Facio said some of the earlier estimates on the budget situation assumed adoption of various tax reforms around May; it is now August and they are still not in effect, obviously reducing the amounts which can be realized from the reforms this year.

Ambassador Facio said he has inquired at the Eximbank about postponement of Costa Rica's loan repayment schedules, but he got no encouragement. He said the annual amount involved is around \$2.5 million. If all payments could be postponed until 1964 and if the emergency help needed now is forthcoming, the Government would be able to get back on its feet after next year, with a budget deficit it could manage on its own.

Ambassador Facio said it is not correct to say that the Administration does not have central control of the budget. As a former Minister of Economy, he can testify that the Minister has the duty of making the other Ministers conform to the budget plan. He said Minister Hess is a strong personality, quite capable of exercising the discipline needed.

Ambassador Facio wondered whether Minister Hess should come to Washington in the near future to furnish information on the situation. I said that we have already asked our Embassy for the information needed at this juncture and I would recommend that the Minister not come now.

Referring to the IMF report on Costa Rica, Ambassador Facio said he disagreed with its recommendation to augment Government revenues by increasing tariff duties on non-essential imports. He said Costa Rica has already cut down imports considerably, with the result that its balance of payments situation is good, but its Government revenue picture is bad because import duties are the principal source of revenue. Increases in import duties now would further reduce imports and total Government revenues.

Ambassador Facio said he felt reassured to hear again that we are working on the Costa Rican fiscal problem. He said he would try to bring back as much information as possible when he returns on August 18. He is departing for Costa Rica on August 13.

84. Memorandum of conversation, September 13, among Edwin M. Martin, Ambassador Facio, and other Costa Rican and U.S. officials¹

September 13, 1962

SUBJECT

U.S. Assistance in Costa Rican Budget Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Edwin M. Martin—Assistant Secretary ARA

Gonzalo Facio—Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States

Jaime Solera—Former Board Chairman, Central Bank of Costa Rica, and
Financial Adviser to President Orlich

John W. Fisher—Deputy Director—CAP

Oliver L. Sause—Director LA/CAP

V.P. Randolph III—OIC Costa Rican Affairs

Mr. Solera remarked that President Orlich had asked him to come to Washington to bring the answers to a questionnaire on the Costa Rican fiscal situation submitted to Ambassador Facio by the Department and to be of whatever help he could in the discussions on the GOCR request for U.S. financial assistance. Mr. Solera said he realized that any sort of U.S. aid, if extended, would come too late to be of much assistance to the GOCR in the remainder of 1962 but that he felt the GOCR could probably get through the rest of the year without external help, provided the GOCR could receive assurance of U.S. financial help in 1963. He said the situation was serious; he noted the September 12 suspension Central Bank cashing of GOCR employees' checks for lack of ready cash; and he emphasized that the GOCR needed an answer one way or another very shortly in order to know where it stood and make plans accordingly. He said he could remain in Washington until September 20, when he had to return to San José.

Mr. Martin replied that he was fully aware of the problem; that he appreciated the need for a rapid decision by the Department; and that he was encouraged by the report he had received of progress made at Mr. Solera's meeting September 12 with Messrs. Fisher and Sause. He said the Department would try to make a decision before Mr. Solera left Washington.

Mr. Solera expressed his gratification at this. He stated that the day before it had been suggested that U.S. assistance to the private sector of the economy would improve Costa Rica's reserve position

¹ U.S. assistance in Costa Rican budget crisis. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 811.10/9-1362.

and thereby be of indirect assistance in the current budget crisis. Mr. Solera said he felt this would not be attacking the immediate problem of budget deficit but would be nonetheless helpful. Mr. Sause observed that one way for the U.S. to help would be expansion of the present agricultural credit loan. Mr. Solera mentioned that it had been suggested that the United States might consider assuming the costs of certain development projects identified in the 1963 budget. Mr. Solera said all these measures would be helpful to the GOCR.

Mr. Martin said that he could make no commitment at this time but that he thought all these suggestions could be usefully pursued. He inquired as to the progress of the GOCR's own self-help measures, especially in the field of taxation. Mr. Solera and Ambassador Facio assured Mr. Martin that the GOCR legislative reform program was going well, with all its measures either already or about to be passed. Mr. Solera stated that many additional economic and fiscal reform measures, some quite unpopular, would be undertaken by the National Liberation Party. He added that if Costa Rica did not receive any external assistance in its budget crisis the GOCR would be forced to adopt drastic "unorthodox" financial measures, including discouraging imports through prohibitive duties, which would make Costa Rican participation in Central American integration quite difficult indeed. Mr. Martin inquired concerning general business conditions in Costa Rica. Mr. Solera replied that they were better now than in 1961 and that although the business community had confidence in the Orlich Government, failure to resolve the budget crisis was having a disquieting effect on the country's economy. Before taking leave of Mr. Martin, Mr. Solera said that the GOCR urgently needed a period of grace in repaying its Export-Import Bank loans and asked Mr. Martin if he could help arrange this. Mr. Martin said he was not informed on the legal aspects of such an operation, but he would see what he could do about it. He agreed that delay in the Exim bank repayments would be a desirable part of a package arrangement for U.S. help in the GOCR budget crisis.

85. Circular Airgram CA-6669, December 19¹

December 19, 1962

TO: The AmEmbassy, San Jose. INFO: POLAD CINCARIB.

SUBJECT: COSTA RICA—Plan of Action for Period from Present to October 1963.

The Latin American Policy Committee recently approved the enclosed Plan of Action for Costa Rica for the guidance of all agencies concerned with United States policy toward Costa Rica.

Rusk

EnclosureCOSTA RICA—Plan of Action for Period
from Present to October 1963I. *OBJECTIVES*A. *Political*

1. Continuance of an independent, stable, anti-Communist and western oriented Costa Rican Government which will continue both to implement a broad program of social and economic reform under the Alliance for Progress and support United States objectives in international and particularly in Latin American organizations.

B. *Economic*

1. Evolution of an economy less heavily dependent upon the export of coffee and bananas, through industrial development and crop diversification, but at the [illegible in the original] the creation of high-cost industries and the growing of [illegible in the original] is in crops under the protection of tariffs and subsidies inspired by economic nationalism.

2. Development of an economy directed to the maximum extent possible toward insuring political stability and satisfying the basic social needs of the rapidly expanding population, without, however, committing the Costa Rican economy to indebtedness or obligations beyond its capacity to support.

3. Conservative participation by Government and private enterprise in the Central American Common Market.

¹ Approved Plan of Action toward Costa Rica from December 1962 to October 1963. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/12-1962.

C. Military

1. Development and maintenance of an internal security organization looking to the United States for [illegible in the original] training and material support as they are unable to provide themselves and which is capable of defending Costa Rican territory against limited attacks, maintaining security against action by subversive elements and possessed of a self-sufficient intelligence and counter-intelligence and ability.

II. PLANS OF ACTION

A. Political

1. Take advantage of every appropriate opportunity to identify the United States with moderate liberal aspirations for social and economic progress in Costa Rica, with the caveat that United States representatives should be alert to the dangers of becoming identified with specific political groups or movements. In this connection the Department has recommended to the White House that President Orlich be invited to visit the United States early in 1963 as a Presidential Guest.

2. Encourage the GOCR to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors by asserting effective control over those elements supporting dictatorships of either the right or left who in the past have abused the haven granted by Costa Rica to promote revolutions and guerrilla incursions into neighboring countries, especially Nicaragua.

3. Encourage and assist, as appropriate, the free trade union movement in Costa Rica in raising the level of its leadership, expanding skill training programs and eliminating Communist control of labor unions, especially among the banana workers.

4. Encourage Costa Rica to play a constructive role in the development of regional institutions in Central America, bearing in mind the Costa Rican desire to [illegible in the original] independently its influence in Latin America.

B. Economic and Social

1. Assist the GOCR in consolidating its fiscal and budgetary position so that a sound basis may be provided for long-range development planning. However, in view of the fact that the GOCR for the time being has virtually reached its capacity to absorb additional loans, new loan proposals for expansion or development of the public sector of the Costa Rican economy should be carefully weighed to prevent the GOCR from incurring indebtedness beyond its capacity to repay.

2. Assist the GOCR in improving public administration, especially in the fields of tax administration, budget procedures and economic planning, in order that Costa Rica can expedite its reform and development programs.

3. Give greater emphasis to diversification of the Costa Rican economy, attraction of private capital in diversified industries and assistance to the GOCR in establishing a central planning office in accordance with its commitment at Punta del Este to develop and implement a comprehensive national economic development program. This program should include agricultural diversification, with emphasis on livestock quality improvement.

4. Improve land use and land tenure in Costa Rica by (1) demonstrating methods of diversifying agricultural production (2) providing scientific agricultural training and (3) making funds available to assist farmers in obtaining medium and long-term credits for the purchase of land and agricultural equipment.

5. Concentrate the USAID educational program on training skilled and professional workers.

6. Cooperate with the GOCR and other governments in efforts to stabilize their principal exports of commodities such as coffee and bananas.

7. Encourage the development of an investment climate which will stimulate local and foreign responsible private investment in the economic development of Costa Rica.

8. Provide advice and assistance to the GOCR and to private organizations to plan jointly with the governments and private organizations of other Central American countries the adjustments of the Costa Rican economy to the demands of the Central American Common Market, so as to add to its effectiveness and to promote economic development of a regional nature.

C. Psychological

1. Convince Costa Rican political, intellectual and financial leaders that it is in their national and individual interest to participate in and promote the Alliance for Progress.

2. Promote the programs of the Alliance for Progress in Costa Rica, especially those involving civic action.

3. Convince the Costa Rican students, educators and labor leaders of the subversive influence of Castro-communism in their community of interest.

4. Encourage the active participation of the Costa Rican Government in regional organizations which will advance the economic and social development of the nation; i.e., Organization of Central American States, Central American Common Market and the Superior Council of Universities of Central America.

D. Internal Defense

1. To assist the GOCR to maintain public order and internal security in all parts of the country:

a. make available to the public forces, on a grant basis if required, minimum military and police equipment, and necessary training.

b. provide advice and training to the public forces on civic action and counterinsurgency techniques.

2. Urge the GOOCR to increase the capabilities of the public forces to carry out its internal security functions, with emphasis on mobility, intelligence and counterinsurgency.

3. Encourage the GOOCR to employ the Civil Guard, as practicable, on projects contributing to economic and social development.

4. Encourage the GOOCR to continue its representation on the Inter-American Defense Board.

86. Memorandum of conversation among President Kennedy, President Orlich, and other U.S. and Costa Rican officials¹

San Jose, March 20, 1963, 8:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Requests for U.S. Aid: Project Financing, National Industrial Corporation, Education, Health and Fiscal Problems

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Martin
Ambassador Telles
Mr. Moscoso

Costa Rica
The President
Second Vice President Carlos
Saenz Herrera
Dr. Rodrigo Loria Cortez
Dr. Roberto Ortiz Brenes
Mrs. Marta Martinez de Montis
President's Four Year Old Son

President Orlich was accompanied by the Second Vice President of Costa Rica, Dr. Carlos Saenz Herrera, Dr. Rodrigo Laria Cortez, Dr. Roberto Ortiz Brenes, Mrs. Marta Martinez de Montis and his four-year old son.

President Orlich delivered a letter in book form to President Kennedy outlining in detail the problems which Costa Rica and the Govern-

¹ Requests for U.S. aid: Project financing, National Industrial Corporation; education, health and fiscal problems. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, President's Trip—San Jose, March 1963, Memcons.

ment are facing. He very briefly mentioned the four problems included in the letter and stated that all information desired in detail was included in said letter.

President Orlich spoke of the fiscal problem, stating that when he took office there was a deficit of 180 million colones which had accumulated over several past administrations, and that his Government had been able to reduce the existing deficit from 180 million colones to 90 million colones. However, the daily fiscal problem was still serious. He requested President Kennedy's assistance in obtaining necessary budgetary help through loan applications in connection with development projects involving schools, hydro-electric plants, industrialization of electricity and highways. President Kennedy assured President Orlich that he would look into this matter and requested Mr. Moscoso to submit to him certain information related to the pending development project loans involving fiscal assistance to the Government of Costa Rica.

The second item in the letter involves a request for help in the establishment of a national industrial corporation. President Orlich stated that this was essential and necessary for the industrial and economic development of the country.

The third item was the national educational program. President Orlich stated that due to the explosive population growth it was necessary to make every effort not only to meet the present additional need for schools and teachers, but also to attempt to meet the future problem of schooling which would become very serious due to the high population growth. Mr. Moscoso is to look into this matter though he pointed out that with the high rate of literacy in Costa Rica we thought economic development had a higher priority.

The fourth item was the national health program. President Orlich is interested in securing help necessary to continue the fight against malaria, tuberculosis and malnutrition in certain sectors of the population. President Orlich again stated that the details of these four matters were included in his letter. With the assistance of the doctors present he mentioned that the 450-bed Children's Hospital has just been completed, that it is a general hospital for children and that its equipment is now being installed. He mentioned that they had the necessary doctors and nurses which had been previously trained in the United States. However, their problem involved the funds required for daily operation once the hospital is inaugurated, probably in the next two months. He delivered a letter to Mr. Moscoso outlining the necessary funds required for the next three or four years. He stated that initially the hospital would need at least 50% help in its operating budget with a reduction of such help in future years from 50% the first year to 40% the following year, 30% the third year, and so on. He felt that then the

Government of Costa Rica would be in a position to assume a greater share of the operating responsibility and funds. President Kennedy asked Mr. Moscoso to look into this matter to determine what Washington policy is on such requests and notify President Orlich. The doctors, in the presence of President Orlich, presented President Kennedy with an antique coin and two gold Indian *Huacas* for Mrs. Kennedy as an expression of the gratitude and appreciation of the Costa Rican people to the American people for the help in building the Children's Hospital. (The United States Government provided a loan of two million dollars to assist in the construction of the Hospital in addition to the Alliance for Progress assistance contributed in the training of personnel and in the purchase of necessary equipment.)

87. Airgram A-7 from San Jose, July 6¹

San Jose, July 6, 1963

SUBJECT: President Orlich Criticizes US as Dilatory in Assisting GOCR Fiscal Problem.

At the inauguration of a dispensary at Palmares June 16, President ORLICH for the first time publicly criticized the US for its slow processing of GOCR loan applications (Weeka #25, Embtels 677, 686). He stated that had credit been granted quickly last year, when originally requested, the nation would already have shown proof of economic-fiscal recovery. He added that his experience leads him to agree with ex-Presidents KUBICHEK of Brazil and Lleras CAMARGA of Colombia that aid does not arrive expeditiously to assist the ailing Latin American economies.

President Orlich also expressed pride in the operations of the Social Security, Housing and Electric Power authorities, and commented that Costa Ricans should comply with tax laws. Stating that for the first time he was criticizing the Echandi Administration publicly, he charged them with the responsibility for the large public debt which his Liberation Party government inherited. But he, unlike Echandi, did not wish to govern in an easy going way, but wished to lead the country back from the bankruptcy in which Echandi left it. The economic situation daily growing worse, he was disposed to make various organizational

¹ Report of President Orlich first public criticism of U.S. for slow processing of GOCR loan applications. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15-1 COSTA RICA.

changes in the interest of economy. Costa Ricans must work he said and economize and reduce the importation of such luxuries as television and automobiles which is seriously affecting the national economy.

The President also took the opportunity to speak in high praise of the work of the Peace Corps in Costa Rica, and greeted 2 PCV's effusively.

COMMENT: The President was undoubtedly encouraged in his criticism of the US by the statements of Kubichek and Lleras Camarga. He was also pressured into the action by local politicians, both of his own party and the opposition. It is reported that Raul HESS, then retiring Minister of Economy, who has been under the relentless attack of the opposition press for his failure to restore the fiscal stability he promised upon taking office one year ago, was among those pressing Orlich for a public statement on the problem.

The President's statement resulted not only from the pressures of political friends and enemies, but undoubtedly represents his own long pentup feelings on the issue. Some of the criticism to which he is reacting is based not only on failure to secure US budget-loans, but also that based on the belief that President Orlich is not taking a firm stand with both party and government functionaries and agencies, and that he is reluctant to face the fact that in politics and government unpopular actions must sometimes be taken for the public welfare.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

H. Franklin Irwin
First Secretary of Embassy

Embassy sent copies to: CA Missions and Panama

88. Memorandum of conversation between Foreign Minister Oduber and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Cottrell)

July 31, 1963

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL COSTA RICA-CUBA. Secret. 1 page of text not declassified.]

Ecuador

89. Despatch 419 from Quito, February 2¹

Quito, February 2, 1961

REF: Embassy D-411, February 2, 1961. SUBJECT: U.S. Economic Assistance Policy Towards Ecuador.

As reported [*1 line not declassified*] told Ambassador Bernbaum that henceforth the U.S. should use its economic assistance as a bargaining counter to induce President VELASCO to cooperate with the U.S. on the Cuban and Communist issues. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Velasco is subject to manipulation by the U.S. in this way because he needs U.S. aid to carry out his promises to the Ecuadorean people of economic development and social reform.

Although the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] remarks provide a useful reminder that we should continuously evaluate our economic assistance to Ecuador in the light of our overall policy objectives, they should not lead us to contemplate any abrupt change in our economic assistance policy, for the following principal reasons:

1. An attempt to use our economic assistance to pressure Velasco politically would almost certainly backfire.

2. Our economic assistance program in Ecuador is designed to serve a number of objectives, most of them of a long-term character; such a program cannot be readily turned on and off like water at a tap.

These two points are expanded in the following discussion:

1. While [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Velasco needs U.S. economic assistance and can be influenced by it is partially true, this does not necessarily mean that we can or should make blatant use of particular bits of aid to secure his cooperation on particular issues. It is doubtful that so sensitive and willful a man as Velasco would submit to such treatment, however desirous he may be of obtaining U.S. economic aid. Moreover, there is room for doubt that he considers the U.S. the sole and indispensable source of outside assistance. Faced with a U.S. policy of parceling out aid bit by bit in return for corresponding political cooperation, we might well decide to turn—or threaten to turn—to the Communist Bloc for aid. We would then have either to accept aid [illegible in the original] of Bloc penetration of Ecuador or abjectly reverse our own aid policy to keep the Bloc out of this country.

¹ U.S. economic assistance policy toward Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 822.10/2-661.

While rejecting a policy of extending economic assistance to Ecuador with conspicuous political strings attached, we should realize that our aid is intended to (among other things) influence the Ecuadorean Government's policies, both domestic and foreign. This could continue to be one of our purposes, but we should employ the lever provided us by our aid program as subtly and as indirectly as possible, using economic assistance as one means of gradually shaping Ecuador's public opinion and national policies to suit U.S. interests. The thinly-disguised blackmail [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is not likely to have the intended effect on Velasco, as noted in the preceding paragraph, and it might well alienate other elements in Ecuador on which our aid might be expected to have favorable long-term effects.

2. A program of economic assistance seriously designed to be of long-term helpfulness to the recipient country cannot be turned on and off like water at a tap, nor can it be changed in direction or composition on short notice. Such a program derives its justification from the belief that long-run U.S. interests will be served by it. It may be argued that there will be no long run for us in Ecuador if we fail to surmount our short-run problems with Velasco. This argument contains an element of truth, but can be countered with the argument that heavy-handed use of our aid program to induce political cooperation offers little promise of resolving these short-run problems. Success is far more likely if the image we present to Velasco—and Ecuadoreans generally—is one of willingness to extend reasonable and justifiable economic assistance as a gesture of our genuine interest in Ecuador's well being.

This posture is the most promising for the long-run and in relation to the variety of objectives towards which our aid program is directed. In a sense it may be said that we have bigger fish than Velasco to fry in Ecuador. We must accommodate ourselves to Velasco at the moment, to be sure, but our broad policies towards Ecuador—including our economic assistance policy—must be conceived with a view to furthering long-term political and economic trends favorable to U.S. interests.

In the Embassy's view, this can best be done by continuing our existing economic aid policy, keeping in mind that we expect our aid to further economic and social development in Ecuador, create a favorable image of the U.S. in the minds of the Ecuadorean people, etc., as well as to influence Ecuadorean foreign policy at a given moment. While continuing our present aid policy, we should evaluate with meticulous care all aspects of our aid program. Each element of the program should meet two principal criteria: (a) It should fill an important Ecuadorean need to the satisfaction of which the Ecuadoreans themselves are willing to make a significant contribution in effort and resources; (b) It should show promise of contributing to the achievement of overall U.S. objectives in Ecuador.

These criteria should be applied in a process of continuous reexamination of existing assistance projects and of new projects proposed. Ideally, thus, the program should undergo continuous, gradual reshaping to meet our shifting policy needs, but abrupt changes of direction and composition should be recognized as counterproductive in the absence of truly basic changes in Ecuador's political situation.

As implied in the foregoing discussion, the Embassy does not believe there have been such basic changes, despite the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] pessimistic remarks of February 1. It seems to the Embassy that Velasco is less inclined toward Castro or the Communists, than he is desirous of not making any unnecessary enemies for Ecuador. It would be naive to suppose that he is a confirmed friend of the U.S., but it would be equally foolish to conclude prematurely that he is on the verge of allying himself with Castro. The Embassy could be mistaken in this analysis, of course, and will continue to follow developments closely.

SUMMARY COMMENT

The [*less than 1 line not declassified*] remarks of February 1 should be taken as a timely reminder to continue to evaluate carefully the usefulness of our economic assistance program in Ecuador. For the time being at least we should not contemplate modification of our economic assistance policy. Especially, we should avoid any appearance of foot-dragging on pending Ecuadorean requests for loans, technical assistance, etc. Our posture should continue to be one of standing ready to give aid which is sincerely desired and genuinely needed. This does not imply that we should seem to importune Ecuador to accept economic assistance from us. On the contrary, we should be quick to withdraw our aid—or offers of aid—in any area where the Ecuadoreans indicate it is not desired.

For the Ambassador:

Robert W. Moore
First Secretary

cc: Amcongen GUAYAQUIL;
Ecuador Desk; USOM/E.

Clearances:

Mr. Rogers
Mr. Little

90. Telegram 447 to Quito and 553 to Lima, February 25¹

February 25, 1961

REF: LIMA's 537, QUITO's 432.

FYI Dept shares Embassies' concern over indications possible arms race between Ecuador and Peru. Ecuador reportedly investigating procurement fighter aircraft, medium tanks, heavy bombs, anti-tank missiles, and torpedo boats from England; automatic small arms from Belgium, Holland, Israel and Czechoslovakia; fighter planes from France; Mortars, anti-tank weapons, land mines from Italy; in addition substantial number recoilless rifles, jeeps and helicopters from US. On other hand, Peruvians threatening outdo any purchases Ecuador makes. End FYI.

If no objection perceived, Embassy Quito requested approach appropriate GOE officials and without mentioning our sources information express our concern over numerous recent reports Ecuadorean negotiations purchase arms in Europe.

Embassy Lima requested in its discretion approach appropriate GOP officials to state that we have no confirmation report in refTel and we urge GOP not use such report, even if true, as rationale for increasing own arms purchase, especially since Peru's present Armed Forces far outweigh present [illegible in the original] Ecuadorean forces.

In [illegible in the original] emphasize [illegible in the original] ability arms race from point of view has [illegible in the original] and expenditure resources to [illegible in the original] and economic programs, and point out arms race usually harmful [illegible in the original] if one side pulls ahead, other follows, [illegible in the original] leaving relative positions unchanged. Also explained [illegible in the original] that aggression and remind both Governments of statement by [illegible in the original] spokesman on December 13 making clear that US would honor its [illegible in the original] which calls for individual or collective action in event of situation of aggression as defined in Treaty.

Rusk

¹ U.S. concerns over possible arms race between Ecuador and Peru. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.58/2-2161.

91. Memorandum of conversation, April 18, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Chiriboga¹

April 18, 1961

SUBJECT

Ecuadorian Foreign Minister's Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Foreign Minister Chiriboga of Ecuador
Ambassador Ponce of Ecuador
Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr

The Foreign Minister said he brought to President Kennedy the warm greetings of the President and people of Ecuador, and the assurance that President Velasco was looking forward with great pleasure to accepting President Kennedy's invitation to visit the United States next October. The Foreign Minister said that his President had accepted "in principle" in frank recognition of the possibility that social and economic conditions might make it unwise for him to leave Ecuador at that time. President Kennedy expressed his pleasure at meeting the Foreign Minister and his hope that conditions in Ecuador next October would be such as to permit President Velasco to come to the United States then. He also thanked the Foreign Minister for his comments on the program of Alliance for Progress.

The Foreign Minister declared that Latin America is in a period of active social revolution which the communists are effectively exploiting through propaganda, political parties and mass organizations, and that the next few years could see many Latin American countries "sink into communism" or "be saved for democracy." He said the issue hinges on whether the rich people of Latin America will achieve (sic) adequate social reforms and—especially—whether the United States can extend enough aid. The Foreign Minister noted that U.S. aid programs sometimes suffer from too much bureaucracy and red tape. He said specifically that the Government of Ecuador had been having considerable difficulty in satisfying requirements of the Development Loan Fund with respect to applications totaling some \$25 million.

The President said he fully recognized that red tape has its drawbacks but that at its best it may be regarded as a form of insurance against imprudent decisions, and he assured the Foreign Minister that

¹ Review of relations and security in Latin America. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 720.5-MSP/4-186.

agencies of the U.S. Government would do their best to expedite action as soon as they had in hand the information that might be required by law.

Referring to President Kennedy's statement in his Pan American Day speech favoring the holding of a high-level meeting on economic and social development during the coming summer, the Foreign Minister expressed the fear that such a meeting might detract from the prestige of the 11th Inter-American Conference scheduled for next May 24. He emphasized that his government felt strongly that the Conference should be held as scheduled.

The President asked the Foreign Minister whether there would be any security problem should the Conference be held as scheduled this May. The Foreign Minister asserted emphatically that there might be some few troublemakers, but that the Ecuadorean people were generally very friendly to the United States and that the government could exert sufficient force to maintain order. The President said that he of course hoped the 11th Inter-American Conference would be held on time but that, like President Velasco's visit to the United States, it might be affected adversely by economic and social conditions. He said that the United States neither had nor would take any initiative in the matter but of course would be influenced strongly by the consensus of opinion among the other nations of the Hemisphere.

92. Memorandum of conversation, May 2, between Foreign Minister Chiriboga and A.A. Berle¹

May 2, 1961

SUBJECT

Ecuador

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Jose Ricardo Chiriboga Villagomez, Foreign Minister of Ecuador
A. A. Berle

Dr. Chiriboga, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ecuador, was at my house last night.

¹ Chiriboga's concern over pro-Communist forces in Ecuador. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.00/5-261.

He took occasion to explain that he was very unhappy about the situation in Ecuador. His President is vibrating between the pro-Communist forces represented by Araujo and the pro-American forces which he represents. He considered that the great majority of the country was with him and so were the armed forces of Ecuador. Araujo and his group (he described them as “rats in the palace”) were always endeavoring to induce Velasco to do things contrary to the common interest which he considered Ecuador and the United States must maintain. He said that at some time the issue might be squarely forced in which case he would have to resign.

I inquired as to what he thought we ought to do.

Chiriboga said there was no point in discussing the question squarely. He thought it best

(a) to see to it that the boundary question between Ecuador and Peru was left strictly alone;

(b) to go forward with the loan on housing but

(c) to slow up diplomatically on other aid to Ecuador. Sooner or later, he thought, this would tend to bring home to President Velasco that he could not hunt with the hounds and run with the hare. Araujo is constantly telling him that he can get everything he wants out of us and then get more help from the Soviet Union later.

On the more cheery side, Chiriboga said there were demonstrations in Guayaquil, that they had been extremely weak and there was no great worry of the Communists upsetting the situation themselves. They would have to proceed through the palace in some fashion. Chiriboga intimated that if Velasco went too far the armed forces would upset the Velasco government.

A.A. Berle

93. Despatch 673 from Quito, May 9¹

Quito, May 9, 1961

REF: DepTel 624, May 3, 1961. SUBJECT: U.S. Military Relationship with Ecuador.

¹ U.S. military relationship with Ecuador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.5-MSP/5-961.

A number of recent developments have led to my giving considerable thought to the question of the United States relationship with Ecuador on military matters, particularly involving sales or grants of military equipment to this country.

There have been numerous well-based reports that the Ecuadoreans particularly following the enlivening of the boundary issue, intend to buy arms from the U.S., from friendly Western European sources, or possibly from the bloc. The Department's recent statement of position on purchases of arms by Ecuador is contained in its Telegram 602 of April 25. It is the Embassy's belief that, in view of the various considerations which make it probable that the Ecuadoreans will make arms purchases in any event, following the position set out in DepTel 602 will tend to leave a vacuum which makes it likely that Ecuador will make purchases from Czechoslovakia or another bloc source. Furthermore, this puts the United States in the position of appearing opposed to Ecuadorean determination to provide for self-defense, a course the GOE is most likely to follow in any event. Difficult as that situation is, it is aggravated by the related question of the extent to which the United States sells military equipment to Peru. The Quito press on May 1 carried a story that the Peruvian Air Force had announced the purchase of ten C-46 aircraft which were said to be used for supplying jungle units. The story continued that in June the first ten of 25 T-33 jet trainers which had been purchased in the United States would arrive in Peru. Such accounts are, of course, followed closely by the Ecuadorean military establishment and indicate to them that we favor Peru over Ecuador. The Embassy would appreciate verification of the details of this story about Peruvian acquisition of aircraft in the United States.

Because of the difficulties of our position the Embassy welcomed the receipt of the Department's telegram 624 of May 3 relating to an examination with the Ecuadoreans of "realistic requirements", keeping in mind the objective of minimizing arms purchases. It seems to the Embassy that we should work with the Ecuadoreans to do what we can to influence them along the lines of our own thinking and assist in acquiring those "realistic requirements", rather than being frozen out and providing a favorable situation for bloc suppliers. This is particularly important since bloc technicians accompany bloc arms.

This suggested approach is intended to maximize U.S. military influence in Ecuador which is now at the low point of recent years and which would doubtless fall considerably lower should we attempt a different approach. A related matter is the future of the military assistance program in Ecuador. The Chief of MAAG recently submitted to me his FY 63-67 plan for MAP in Ecuador. He informed me that shortly after it was submitted he learned informally that a decision

had been made in Washington that funds for force improvement would not be available commencing FY 1962, which would limit the MAP program solely to follow-on support, replacements and spares. This will cause termination of force improvement projects only recently programmed for introduction with deliveries extending over several years. If this decision is maintained, it seems to me that the timing could not have come at a worse time in the light of the present situation in Ecuador.

In summary, the Embassy welcomed DepTel 624 and will work closely with the Chief of MAAG in discussing with the Ecuadorean military the matter of “realistic requirements”. I have already discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Chiriboga (see EmbTel 599, May 8) who will initiate discussions with the Ministry of Defense as a basis for later joint discussions with Chief of MAAG.

Maurice M. Bernbaum

cc: AmGenGen—GUAYAQUIL
Ecuador Desk Officer, ARA.
CINCARIB

94. Telegram 211 to Quito, undated¹

undated

RPT: POLAD CINCARIB (NIACT). Amembassy, LIMA for Bernbaum (NIACT). Ref. EMTEL 176 and USARMA CX16.

1. We actively exploring possibility provide documentation to justify GOE break relations with Cuba.

2. Our records indicate that US-GOE internal security program carried out in 1959 and 1960 in preparation for (then scheduled) Quito conference amounted to about \$1.5 million. That program, divided between military and police in approximate ratio 65–35, provided training and substantial supplies tear gas, gas masks, transportation and communications equipment, etc., such as requested in REFTTEL CX16. Further we understand USOM director has on hand 1200 38 calibre

¹ DOS response to request from Ecuadorean military officers for equipment to assist in maintaining internal security. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador.

pistols and other police equipment intended for border patrol which could be diverted to police in present situation. We estimate stocks on hand adequate for any immediate emergency which military and police are determined to meet.

3. We strongly appreciate, however, advisability demonstrate to Velasco U.S. ability give him prompt support in this first instance in which he has turned to us for such emergency help. We therefore are prepared send immediately token air shipment tear gas, gas masks and smoke grenades. (We do not repeat not believe in U.S. interest supply vomiting gas. Weapons carriers not feasible short notice.)

4. Plane can depart a.m. October 8. We suggest you make plans within country team for expeditious and discreet handling.

5. We note both REFTELS cite only military officers as direct source GOE requests for assistance. We believe it would be highly advisable Embassy obtain and transmit confirmation by President or Foreign Minister (preferably President) before we make shipment.

6. We have White House advance assurance Presidential determination up to \$500 thousand subject future documentation.

7. We holding plane departure pending receipt your NIACT reply indicating a) whether above proposed action meets your current needs, b) confirmation desired paragraph 5, or your opinion thereof.

Rusk

95. Memorandum from McGhee to Woodward, November 9¹

November 9, 1961

SUBJECT

Ecuador: Anatomy of a Revolution

For at least two reasons, I think we would be well served by devoting considerable time and effort to an examination of just what happened in Ecuador and why:

1. If we except the Quadros succession problem, Ecuador represents the first old-style Latin American revolution since the Alliance for

¹ Anatomy of the revolution in Ecuador. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.

Progress and Punta del Este. It may be a precursor to others which we will encounter and must know how to deal with preventively or after the fact, as implementation of the Alliance progresses. For example, could we have influenced Velasco Ibarra against imposing the retrogressive consumer taxes which apparently sparked the revolution? Since these types of tax counter the spirit of Punta del Este, would efforts to dissuade Velasco have been legitimate preventive diplomacy of the type required if the Alliance is to succeed? What would have been the consequences of our involving ourselves in this matter?

2. The entire episode is obviously closely related to our new emphasis on the internal defense (security) of Latin American states and the corollary requirement that we understand thoroughly the social forces and tensions which can imperil constitutional order and evolutionary progress.

I doubt that the Washington Assessment Team now preparing to survey the internal security situation in South America is equipped to make this study. I think ARA should take the lead, therefore, and draw on INR and other resources as required. What I would like to see would be an end product which would examine in depth the forces called into play in this revolution and explain, among other things, why the Army supported Callegos and the Air Force favored Arosemena. I cannot help but believe that an anatomy of this revolution—which would, as far as I can recollect, represent the first exercise of this type—reveal things that would stand us in good stead in preventing or handling similar type of social dissidence in the future.

cc: S/O—Mr. Achilles

INR—Mr. Hilsman/Mr. Evans

White House—Mr. Goodwin

96. Memorandum from Woodward to McGhee, November 17¹

November 17, 1961

SUBJECT

Ecuador: Anatomy of a Revolution (Your Memorandum of November 9, 1961)

In preliminary response to your questions concerning the relationship between the “old-style Latin American revolution” in Ecuador and the Alliance for Progress, the following comments occur to me:

1. If former President Velasco Ibarra had heeded the principles of the Alliance for Progress as outlined in the Charter of Punta del Este, he might not have been subjected to this revolution. Therefore, we can expect that the increased observance of the Charter of Punta del Este will reduce the possibility of other revolutions for the reasons that this one was carried out.

2. There is, of course, likely to be a danger that—if a revolution is carried out for a purpose such as this (a protest against increases in taxes on consumers)—that the revolution could be led by leaders of the masses who could be Castroists. Therefore, it is obviously desirable for governments to avoid precipitating this kind of revolutions, and that is why it is beneficial for us to be exerting steady pressure through the Alliance for Progress for an evolution in taxes that will place the burden more fairly on those who are able to pay.

3. With respect to the question: Why did the Army support Gallegos and the Air Force support Arosemena? I think this is explainable by the fact that the Army tends to be more traditional-minded as an older branch of the Service, and the Air Force tends to be composed of younger officers who are more inclined to be sympathetic with the plight of the consumer and somewhat less inclined to be rigid in their traditional loyalties.

¹ Response to McGhee’s November 9 memorandum on the anatomy of the Ecuadorian revolution. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.

97. Memorandum of conversation, November 24, between Rusk and Ambassador Plaza¹

November 24, 1961

SUBJECT

Attitudes and Needs of the New Government of Ecuador

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Galo Plaza, Special Representative of the President of Ecuador

Eduardo Arosemena, Ecuadorean Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

Taylor Belcher, WST

John T. Dreyfuss, WST/E

Ambassador Plaza said that he had been asked by President Carlos Julio Arosemena of Ecuador to visit the United States on a special mission to explain to our officials and to the press of this country the attitudes and aims of the new government. Pointing out that his own pro-U.S., anti-Communist position was well known to us, Ambassador Plaza assured the Secretary that he would never have accepted the special mission President Arosemena had asked him to undertake unless he had been assured in his own mind that the new government was not extremist and on the contrary had every intention of living up to the commitments of the Alliance for Progress by engaging in self-help measures. In expanding on this theme, Ambassador Plaza remarked on the moderate cabinet chosen by President Arosemena, and on recent developments in establishment of a progressive inheritance tax and pending progressive income tax legislation. He said also that President Arosemena had taken immediate steps to reduce government expenditures and improve the administrative processes in Ecuador in order to help alleviate the present budgetary difficulties caused by the fiscal mistakes of the Velasco Government. In this respect, Ambassador Plaza said that Ecuador is urgently in need of assistance both in the fields of budgetary support and for social and economic development. He pointed out, however, that President Arosemena knows that he cannot expect the United States to solve all of Ecuador’s problems with loans and that he is determined to carry the main burden through self-help measures, with desired help from the United States adding to and accelerating the effects of the self-help measures.

¹ Attitude and needs of the new Government of Ecuador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

Ambassador Plaza said that he had been particularly disturbed by the attitude of the U.S. press towards the succession of Arosemena and that he felt that U.S. news media had seriously misinterpreted events and statements by Arosemena. Ambassador Plaza pointed out that in order to maintain a peaceful atmosphere while he organizes and consolidates his administration, President Arosemena must pacify the diverse political elements that supported his assumption of the Presidency, and that his statements on Cuba and the Soviet Union, which in reality are nothing more than a continuation of the previous government's foreign policy, must at this time be looked at in relation to internal political conditions. Commenting specifically on reaction to President Arosemena's statement on continuation of relations with Cuba, Ambassador Plaza said that the Velasco Government had not broken relations with Cuba, nor had it officially declared the Cuban Chargé persona non grata. However, Ambassador Plaza revealed, after Arosemena assumed the Presidency, the Cuban Chargé was called in by the Foreign Minister on the express instructions of the President and warned that Ecuador's position on nonintervention was reciprocal and meant that there would be strong reaction to any Cuban intervention in Ecuadorean internal affairs, with such intervention resulting in expulsion.

The Secretary thanked Ambassador Plaza for his clear exposition of the attitude and aims of the new Ecuadorean government and said that we had indeed been concerned at first over the events in Ecuador and over President Arosemena's statements and possible orientation. However, we, like Ambassador Plaza, had been encouraged by the Ecuadorean cabinet selections, by President Arosemena's stated intention to work within the framework of the Alliance for Progress; and, particularly, by Ambassador Plaza's decision to accept his current special mission. The Secretary indicated to Ambassador Plaza that we are ready to attempt to complement Ecuador's self-help measures under the Alliance for Progress. The Secretary went on to say, however, that he wished to point out the difficulties that could be caused for us by public statements that could be interpreted as favoring castroism or the extreme left, even if these statements are not matched by unfavorable action. Such statements have a profound effect upon public opinion and on our Congress, upon which we are dependent for the resources that make our economic and technical cooperation possible.

In closing the conversation the Secretary said that he would like to meet with Ambassador Plaza again to hear the Ambassador's opinions and comments after he had seen other U.S. officials and the representatives of international financing institutions he intended to visit while in Washington.

**98. Memorandum of conversation, November 28, between
President Kennedy and Ambassador Plaza¹**

November 28, 1961

SUBJECT

Ecuadorean Special Ambassador's Call on The President

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Sr. Galo Plaza, Special Ambassador of the Government of Ecuador

Sr. Eduardo Arosemena, Ecuadorean Chargé d'Affaires

Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Mr. Taylor G. Belcher, ARA/WST

During his call on President Kennedy at 4:45 p.m. November 28, Special Ambassador Galo Plaza delivered to the President a letter from Ecuadorean President Arosemena and expressed his sincere and deep appreciation of the reception which he had received in the United States, both from Government officials and from the press. He said he felt he had been successful in dispelling the doubts which had at first been expressed in the United States news media about the political orientation of the new Ecuadorean Government. Ex-President Plaza went on to assure President Kennedy that he would never have accepted the Special Mission which President Arosemena had asked him to undertake unless he had been assured in his own mind that the new Government was not extremist and on the contrary had every intention of living up to the commitments of the Alliance for Progress by engaging in self-help measures. He related recent developments establishing a progressive inheritance tax and described pending progressive income tax legislation. He said that President Arosemena had taken immediate steps to reduce government expenditures to a minimum in order to alleviate the present budgetary difficulties caused by the fiscal mistakes of the Velasco Government. President Kennedy said that news of such measures being taken in Ecuador would help in our forthcoming presentation to Congress requesting Alliance for Progress funds for next year's program.

In discussing the aid which Ecuador had already received from the United States, Ambassador Plaza said the budget support loan just approved was the type loan he hoped would never have to be repeated. He also remarked on the excellent work done in Ecuador by the various

¹ New Government in Ecuador; U.S. aid. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

Servicios. Their work had been effective and at a level at which there had been maximum impact on the community as a whole. He said that he had been distressed to find that the concept of the new AID organization seemed to be downgrading the role of the Servicios and he hoped that something could be done so that the valuable programs which they were carrying out would not be terminated.

President Kennedy asked Ambassador Plaza for his opinion as to the political future of Ecuador in view of the strong leftist influence which had been apparent in the recent disturbances. Plaza replied that it was true that left-wing elements had participated to an important degree in the change-over but that it was notable that the only group which had been excluded from the new government was that representing the extreme left and the Communists. He went on to point out that the universities were a focus of communist penetration, and that unfortunately the United States had failed to make an impression in the intellectual-cultural field in Ecuador. There had been some useful work done through the Fulbright program but it was extremely difficult to achieve further significant progress as long as we had a Cultural Attaché in Quito who could not speak Spanish. President Kennedy took note of this fact and observed that we would look into the possibility of enlarging on the limited teacher and professor exchange program which was already in operation to see whether it would be possible to expand this by taking advantage of summer school operations as well as the possibility of utilizing the "sister university" concept.

As the meeting broke up President Kennedy referred to the invitation which had previously been extended to President Velasco to visit the United States and said he hoped to have the opportunity of meeting the new President here in the United States as soon as affairs would permit him to come. He told the Chargé, who is President Arosemena's brother, that he would get in touch with the President through Ambassador Bernbaum in order to fix a mutually satisfactory date.

99. Memorandum from McClintock to Rostow, December 15, transmitting a memorandum from Woodward to McGhee and Ramsey, which attaches a memorandum from Woodward to McGhee¹

December 15, 1961

SUBJECT

Ecuador

You will be interested I believe in the first page of Mr. Woodward's memo on conclusions to be drawn from our experience of the recent revolt in Ecuador. You will note that his third paragraph substantiates the observation made in our paper on Preventive Diplomacy as to the importance of indoctrinating the military in various countries with American ideas of respect for constitutional order.

Attachment

SUBJECT

Ecuador

There is attached a preliminary analysis of the recent Ecuadorean revolution as it may relate to the Alliance for Progress.

I believe the main points in this situation are:

1. that there would have been *less likelihood* that President Velasco would have been thrown out if he had paid more attention to the principles of the Alliance for Progress and followed them—instead of applying additional taxes on consumer goods;

2. that it is possible that the wide advertising of the Alliance for Progress may tend to raise the expectations of the mass of the people so that their elected leaders will find it more necessary to take constructive action on behalf of the people rather than to make demagogic promises which they do not keep;

3. As an entirely separate matter, I believe this revolution also is a vivid reminder of the importance of the relations which have been developed over the past 25 years with officers of the armed services of Latin American countries. So many of these officers have been in the United States service schools and have been trained, at least briefly,

¹ Preliminary analysis of recent Ecuadorian revolution. Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.

as United States military installations, that there has been a very widespread contagion of the U.S. idea that officers of the armed services are "professional" guardians of the common weal. The way in which the Ecuadorean armed services sensed the true wishes of the Ecuadorean people during this revolution and did not arbitrarily attempt to maintain their own pre-conceived idea of what the government should be, was to me very impressive. This tends to reinforce my own conviction that there is no more important type of travel grant that we should encourage than a steady expansion of the existing system for training Latin American army, naval and air force officers in the United States and at Fort Gulick—not to mention the training that is given to non-commissioned officers at Fort Gulick.

Attachment

SUBJECT

Ecuador: Some Comments on the Revolution

I refer to your memorandum of November 9, 1961, in which you raise several interesting questions concerning the recent violent change of Government in Ecuador. While we have as yet not had the time necessary to devote to a well-coordinated study in depth of the complete "anatomy" of this revolution, I should like at this time to address myself to two major points you raised: the question of the retrogressive consumer taxes and the role of the military.

It is generally accepted that the imposition of the consumer taxes, which gave labor and student groups a convenient "cause" with which to foment disturbances, was the spark which ignited the fuse to the powder keg. Given the rigid, proud Velasco personality, his well-known shortsightedness, and the difficult fiscal crisis in which he found himself, I believe there was little we could have done to prevent the creation of the powder keg beyond what we did—giving technical assistance in the preparation of fiscal and tax reforms and strongly suggesting that those reforms be adopted. As you know, several expert missions, notably a [illegible in the original] group, had prepared detailed plans for tax reform and presented them to the Velasco Government. Although United States officials in both Washington and Quito urged officials of the Ecuadorean Government (of all levels) to adopt these plans rapidly, the GOE continued merely to "study" them. At the point at which Velasco found it necessary to impose the retrogressive taxes, the only way we could have damped this final spark which set off this explosion would have been our willingness to give immediate, massive budget support assistance (a step we, particularly our financial institutions, are hesitant to take) that would supply the

immediate revenue to the GOE that the taxes were designed to produce. Tax reform, by itself at this stage, would not have produced revenues rapidly enough to alleviate the immediate situation with which the GOE was faced.

I believe, then, that in studying the causes of the Ecuadorean Revolution and possible preventive measures, and in applying the lesson learned from it to problems we will face in the future, we must look much deeper than the final spark and attempt to attack the basic ills that produced the powder keg. In the case of Ecuador, Velasco, during his electoral campaign planted the seeds of his own destruction by his own demagoguery—promising more and raising more hopes than he could logically expect to fulfill. These seeds were nurtured by his own administrative inefficiency and his choice of Cabinet Ministers who were little more efficient than he was, and who were open to attack on charges of graft and corruption. Velasco had in the past controlled situations through the use of words and his magnetic personality. In his year of office this time he overestimated the power of his oratory and found he could not, with words and promises, satisfy people who were now expecting houses and employment and schools and a better standard of living. Velasco's own administrative failings, combined with an unfortunate decline in Ecuador's export earnings, led to the financial crisis that struck the final spark.

How do we attack the basic problems and guide the foreign government into logical channels to solve them? In Ecuador we gave a good deal of attention to assisting Velasco in planning for improved public administration, as a first step in solving his problems. Our missions studied, planned, and made suggestions. There was resistance to many of the suggestions, thus blocking our efforts to begin the cure of the patient. Our answer to this situation lies in the concepts of the Alliance for Progress, in which we make it clear to the governments that we will not be able to give them economic assistance unless they take the self-help steps necessary to lay the groundwork for the effective utilization of our aid. This is a good concept. Unfortunately, however, the Alliance for Progress is a long range matter. Many of the governments with which we must deal under the Alliance are shortsighted. What do we do when faced with governments that are unwilling to take the necessary steps and, in the absence of our assistance, cast about to solve their difficulties and shortsightedly impose measures, like the Ecuadorean consumer taxes, that we feel will lead to their destruction? We can only 1) continue to attempt to influence them to meet the requirements of the Alliance, and failing in this; 2) give short term assistance, without insisting on the basic self-help measures, in hopes that we can later influence the government to take the necessary steps; or 3) allow the government to fall, with the attendant danger

that the left might profit from the chaos caused by this. Our chance to influence the governments may be increased considerably by "selling" the concept of the Alliance to the people of a country, but if the government remains obstinate in this case, the results will be the same. There would appear to be no ready answer to this basic problem.

The military: Once the spark had been ignited in Ecuador, the nation's military forces played a determining role in the immediate outcome. We do not yet have readily available the detailed data that would indicate why a given unit or a given arm of the service backed one or the other candidates. However, we can speculate with a fair degree of accuracy on the general attitudes of the military in the crisis.

We have had evidence that the Ecuadorean military establishment in general is "constitutional-minded" and subject in some degree to popular sentiment. At the beginning of the Ecuadorean crisis the military performed its duty of maintaining internal security well and faithfully, and in so doing caused the death of several students. As the public agitation against Velasco and against the bloodshed gained strength, the Armed Forces found it difficult to maintain their role against public opinion. Opposition claims including a declaration by the Congress, that Velasco had acted unconstitutionally and was attempting to establish himself as a dictator outside of the provisions of the Constitution, gave the military leaders a constitutional "cut" and sealed Velasco's doom. Why the Chimborazo Battalion broke with Velasco before the remainder of the forces we do not at this point know. In the action of individual units personal loyalties and the personalities and politics of commanders, who may have hoped to influence their comrades, definitely come into play.

Once the military felt themselves freed from their duty to support Velasco, the armed forces leaders engaged in constitutional contortions by declaring that Arosemena had himself acted in an unconstitutional way and had thus disqualified himself from the Presidency. The solution was a caretaker government, with a military-appointed President, to rule for 90 days until a constituent assembly could be called. The question for the individual military commanders then resolved itself into 1) support for the interim president; or 2) support for the constitutional succession of Arosemena.

Governing factors in this situation were: 1. The action of the Congress in declaring Arosemena constitutional President; 2. Rapidly growing public support for the succession of Arosemena. Countering these factors was a general dislike in the military of Arosemena and his political attitudes.

The support of the "respectable" parties such as the Conservatives and Liberals for Arosemena undoubtedly had a deep effect on military thinking. These moderate forces feared that imposition of a military

president would lead only to continued agitation, and would result in gains for the left by the time the constituent assembly was called. They felt, and argued to military leaders, that only by supporting Arosemena and “constitutionality” could the military place themselves in a situation to influence the new president and maintain control of the situation. Arguments such as these, coupled with the military’s realization that it could not control the pro-Arosemena crowds without further bloodshed, and its support of “constitutionality” appear to have been the principal factors in switching sentiment from the military choice for President to Arosemena.

The role of the armed forces units stationed in Guayaquil, particularly air units, were the key and the spearhead in the physical military shift in allegiance, as air force units from Guayaquil flying to Quito to support Arosemena finally turned the tide in the wavering military thinking. The reason for the defection of the Guayaquil Air Force garrison (and other Guayaquil forces) is not immediately clearly apparent, but the fact that Arosemena is closely identified with Guayaquil, that violence against the populace by Velasco forces was greatest (in the initial phases of the disturbances) in Guayaquil, and that the military units in that city were exposed to strong pro-Arosemena public sentiment, very likely played a major role.

I believe that it will be interesting, after our officers in the field have had an opportunity to gather further information through discussions with military and political leaders over the next few weeks, to study further and in depth the personalities and forces that came into play in the actions of the military forces.

In examining the Ecuadorean events, the question might be asked “What did we do concretely to attempt to head off the explosion we saw coming?”. In addition to attempting to convince the GOE to take administrative and fiscal reform steps to attack the basic problem, as mentioned above, we concluded a loan agreement of 25 million for establishment of a housing bank in an attempt to meet one of the country’s basic needs, and in addition made available \$250,000 for immediate use in a self-help housing project. In regard to attempting to quench the final spark, we worked with the GOE on a budgetary support loan, which was delayed because the Ecuadoreans could not decide what they needed (if anything at all), and did, shortly before the fall of the Velasco Government, inform the GOE that we had approved a budgetary loan, based on continued compliance with the IMF standby criteria, of \$8 million that could serve to reduce a good deal of the popular pressure building up as a result of the measures the GOE felt itself constrained to take because of its bankruptcy. In the non-economic field, our Ambassador held discussions with members of the responsible opposition to attempt to induce them to forget past differences and

work together with the Government in planning corrective measures and in the interest of the maintenance of political stability and constitutional continuity.

**100. Memorandum of conversation, January 10, between
President Kennedy and Ambassador Ponce¹**

January 10, 1962

SUBJECT

Presentation of Credentials by Ecuadorean Ambassador—Discussion of
Forthcoming MFM

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ecuadorean Ambassador Neftali PONCE Miranda
Mr. Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol
Mr. William J. Tonesk, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Mr. Taylor G. Belcher, ARA/WST

Ambassador Ponce called at the White House to present his credentials. During the call the President asked the Ambassador for an assessment of the strength of leftist influence in Ecuador and of the degree of political stability which President Arosemena felt he now enjoyed. Ambassador Ponce said that the new President and his Cabinet had settled in well and that the Government was in firm control of the situation. He added that support for the President was widespread as exhibited during the tense period of the change of Presidents. At that time, although Communist influenced groups were apparent in the streets of the major cities, the people as a whole did not support them and they were not allowed to get out of hand.

The Ambassador said that President Arosemena and his Government were fully behind the Alliance for Progress and they felt that the success of the Alliance concept was the only answer to the Communist threat to Latin America. He emphasized the need for quick action on both sides and referred to the imminent tax and agrarian reforms in

¹ Presentation of credentials; discussion of upcoming Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, January 1961–March 1962.

Ecuador as evidence of his Government's devotion to the concepts of liberty, progress and social justice.

President Kennedy referred to the forthcoming Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, stating that the United States hoped for the strongest possible resolutions and at the same time hoped for the greatest possible degree of unanimity. The Ambassador commented at some length on the internal political situation in Ecuador which made it difficult for his Government to espouse openly the position which it would like to support. He added that the Government feared disturbances fomented by pro-Castro elements and was reluctant to place itself in a position requiring the possible use of force against the people. He doubted that the situation would permit Ecuador to vote favorably for sanctions but that the United States Government should not take this to mean that Ecuador supported Cuba.² He further said that Ecuador would in all probability follow the Argentine-Brazilian position. He agreed that some strong action was required to contain the Castro threat, asserting that Castro was a much greater security threat to Latin American nations than to the United States.

At this point the President accepted the Ambassador's credentials and exchanged transcripts of their formal remarks.

² The Ambassador later said to Mr. Belcher that he and his Foreign Minister would welcome very strongly worded resolutions which would call for a mandatory break of relations and obligatory sanctions, calling this "the best solution for Ecuador." He explained that Ecuador would abstain in a vote on any such resolutions but at the same time she would comply with her obligations under the Rio Treaty and carry out the terms of the resolution. It was politically impossible, he explained, to vote in favor of taking this action, but it was possible to explain the need to comply with the terms of the Treaty. COMMENT: I have no doubt that this accurately reflects the true feelings of the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador but whether this view is shared by President Arosemena is open to some doubt.

101. Memorandum for the record, February 6

Washington, February 6, 1962

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 B 01285A, Meetings With the President, Box 6, 12/1/61–6/30/62. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

102. Memorandum of conversation, July 23, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena and other U.S. and Ecuadorean officials¹

July 23, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Arosemena

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. SIDE

President John F. Kennedy
Acting Secretary George Ball
U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, Teodoro Moscoso
Ambassador Maurice M. Bernbaum
Director of WST, Taylor G. Belcher
Interpreter, F. von Reigersberg

ECUADOREAN SIDE

President Carlos Julio Arosemena
Foreign Minister Benjamin Peralta Paez
Ambassador Neftali Ponce-Miranda
Treasury Minister Manuel Naranjo Toro
Former Minister of Economy Federico Intriago
Guillermo Arosemena Coronel, Manager of Guayaquil Branch, Central Bank of Ecuador

The President started the meeting by welcoming President Arosemena. He pointed out that this visit was an additional proof of American interest and concern for Hemispheric problems. The President also pointed out, however, that the U.S. has many problems these days and that it is important to realize that its resources are not unlimited.

President Arosemena thanked the President and stated that he wished to bring up several economic problems affecting his Country. He prefaced his remarks by noting the expressions of great concern on the part of the U.S. Government and of President Kennedy himself with regard to all of Latin America. Ecuador realizes that American assistance is not unlimited, and that it is subject to a number of internal political factors. President Arosemena said that there is one difficulty which all the assistance programs have in common; namely, paternalism. It is impossible to try to regulate or legislate on a number of subjects when you are miles away from the countries that will be affected by such actions. As an example, President Arosemena referred

¹ U.S. assistance to Ecuador; situation in Ecuador; situation in Peru. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April–August, 1962.

to an Inter-American Development Bank loan for the cultivation of African palms, in which the Ecuadoreans have been compelled to utilize the funds in an area believed to be unsuitable to such crops.

The President continued by stating that certain necessary reforms have already been initiated in Ecuador. A new inheritance tax law has just been approved and a number of bills have been drafted and submitted for Congressional approval, covering income taxes, tariffs and fiscal and monetary reforms. During the first two or three years following these reforms, fiscal revenues will undoubtedly decrease and if no immediate external assistance is forthcoming these measures would be self-defeating, and agricultural and industrial productivity could not be given the needed impulse. The worst thing that can happen in Latin America is the disillusionment of the masses who hope the Alliance for Progress will help them increase their standards of living. Ecuador has submitted a request for assistance to finance its 1962 capital budget. During the last ten months Government revenue has been decreasing considerably and most public works projects have come to a complete standstill. The number of unemployed has increased by leaps and bounds and these masses constitute a dangerous and explosive time bomb. Therefore, President Arosemena specifically requested a \$14 million loan from President Kennedy for his country's capital budget. He stated that Ecuador committed herself to undertake additional legal reforms and President Kennedy would be given a memorandum on these reforms tomorrow, July 24. A second memorandum would deal with another very important problem; namely, that of the development of educational facilities of the country. Three hundred million sucres will be necessary to implement a five-year educational program, which will have as its main purpose the eradication of illiteracy and a much greater attendance rate at schools for all Ecuadorean children. A third memorandum dealing with the problems of the municipality of Guayaquil will also be delivered tomorrow. The city has had several budgetary deficits because of misuse of municipal funds and at the present time funds aren't even available to pay for the collection of garbage.

President Kennedy stated that these were indeed difficult problems and he realized that sometimes countries dislike foreign officials who give advice on sensitive, internal matters—outsiders may be wrong. He spoke of our legislative and regulatory problems in rendering assistance and of the serious problem of the dollar drain problem resulting from our tremendous foreign assistance program over the last fifteen years. Furthermore, the Congress believes that Europe should share a greater part of the foreign aid burden. Because budgetary support is largely a dollar loss to the U.S. which can easily become a gold loss, it is this type of funds that are extremely difficult to obtain. On the

other hand, funds are available for constructive, carefully planned development projects of a more lasting nature.

The President asked what could be done to increase the number of such projects. Ambassador Moscoso indicated that a \$1 million project for school construction had already been approved and that studies were being made with regard to airport improvements and other public works projects. The main problem was the presentation of loan applications. The U.S. now hoped to assist Ecuador in the preparation of projects and loan applications in accordance with the requirements of existing assistance legislation.

Mr. Arosemena, the Manager of the Guayaquil Branch of the Central Bank, stated that the present Ecuadorean Administration had made tremendous efforts to put the country's economy back in order. An austerity policy has been in force and the Government is avoiding Central Bank financing so as to maintain a stable currency. However, if no assistance from the U.S. is forthcoming, the Government will have to turn to the Central Bank and the repercussions of such a move would be disastrous. The country has had very little inflation and a stable currency and Government. Many sacrifices have been made. Many public works have been curtailed and the number of unemployed people has risen drastically. Ecuador therefore needs the \$14 million which might be a gold loss to the U.S., but it would help the country purchase American products in the future.

President Kennedy stated that it is important for the U.S. to counteract the dollar drain and to maintain world confidence in the dollar. The U.S., of course, realizes what the difficulties of Ecuador are and the only way to avoid disappointing people who have staked their hopes on the Alliance for Progress is by convincing the Congress that this Alliance is truly a joint effort. The President reemphasized that it was much easier to obtain funds for development projects than for budgetary financing.

President Arosemena said that Ecuador had believed that it would obtain \$14 million and had been making plans on the basis of such assistance. However, a few days before his departure several American experts had visited Ecuador and asked him what the plans were for 1963 and 1964. He stated that he had hardly been able to make plans for 1962 and that plans for 1963 and 1964 and maybe 1970 were completely out of the question.

President Kennedy stated that \$8 million had been granted to Ecuador and that the \$14 million loan to which President Arosemena referred was to have been given "sympathetic consideration". This, however, did not mean that the loan had been approved. The Minister of the Treasury of Ecuador briefly outlined the history of the loan discussions and reemphasized that according to his Government's

interpretation \$8 million would have been approved for the year 1961 and \$14 million would have been approved for 1962 for projects in the capital budget. The Government of Ecuador had made a number of plans on the basis of such an understanding. However, a few days ago, American technicians had visited Ecuador and had asked for specific long-term development projects. The Minister stated that only partial projects had been completed since the budget of 1962 was still in doubt. Now the capital budget is completely paralyzed. The Government has been taking measures and will take additional measures in the future. A technical body has been set up to carry out tax and administrative reforms. Civil servants are being trained. All these efforts would be fruitless without external financial support. The Country does not wish to devalue its currency again and it does not wish to ask for assistance, which might be inflationary, from its own Central Bank.

President Arosemena stated that he would bring up these problems again during these discussions tomorrow with other U.S. officials and that before leaving he would like to bring up another problem; namely, that of the old border dispute with Peru. When a military government has ruled Peru, it has always been very aggressive in its relations with Ecuador. Recent events have convinced President Arosemena that the highly unpopular military junta of Peru might try to “distract” public opinion by creating a serious border incident. The repercussions of such a move are very hard to foresee. The military are a curse in most of Latin America and even though Peru’s elections are a purely internal affair the possibility of military aggression should definitely not be overlooked. Ecuador supports Venezuela’s request for the establishment of some machinery to avoid militaristic coups in other Latin American countries.

President Kennedy strongly emphasized that the U.S. favors the resumption of normal constitutional processes in Peru and he hopes to know more about the Peruvian Government’s future in the next few days. He added that President Arosemena would have a chance to meet with Ambassador Moscoso again and discuss his country’s problems in more detail. Some of the other sister republics of South America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru also had considerable economic difficulties. If we look outside this Hemisphere, Vietnam, Korea and many other countries are also facing similar problems and the important thing is to try to obtain additional funds from the Congress to solve all of these needs.

President Arosemena ended the meeting thanking President Kennedy for his kind invitation and formally invited him to visit Ecuador “with or without a loan”.

103. Memorandum of conversation, July 24, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena¹

July 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Alliance for Progress

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Carlos Julio Arosemena, President of the Republic of Ecuador

Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter

President Kennedy greeted President Arosemena and his party in his office and was presented with an album of photographs of the city of Quito by Mayor-elect Jorge Vallarino, and a gift for Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy from Mrs. Vallarino. After the exchange of greetings, all those present with the exception of the two presidents and the interpreter, Mr. Hervas, left the President's office.

President Kennedy opened the conversation by saying that he agreed with the statement made by President Arosemena during their previous meeting on July 23 at the White House to the effect that there has been a great increase in the expectations of the peoples of this Hemisphere. He added, however, that no one has a perfect solution for the difficult problems to be solved, and pointed out that in this country also there are differences of opinion which result in changes of the political party in power.

The hope was expressed by President Kennedy that it will be possible to carry out in this Hemisphere a common effort toward progress. He noted that it is necessary to secure support for the Alliance for Progress program as well as financing for the Inter-American Development Bank. He added that it also is essential for Ecuador to adopt reform measures necessary to insure the success of these programs.

President Arosemena expressed his agreement with President Kennedy's remarks and added that he realized that there were problems within the United States arising from differences of opinion within and between the two major political parties. He also expressed his appreciation of the difficulties which must be overcome in achieving domestic support for United States foreign aid programs.

In reply, President Kennedy observed that there are two factors essential to the success of our joint undertaking, whether it be called

¹ Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April-August, 1962.

the Punta del Este Agreement, the Alianza Para el Progreso or Operación Pan Americana; our countries must be linked together in a common effort and within each of our countries the necessary efforts must be made to adopt essential reforms and progressive legislation. These efforts must be given adequate momentum and support.

President Arosemena stated that he agreed completely and that there was no difference in their views on this subject. He added that President Kubitschek of Brazil had originated this concept and that President Kennedy was carrying it out. He observed that this program offered President Kennedy an opportunity to assure his place in history. He further stated that Ecuador would cooperate to the fullest extent possible within its limitations.

President Kennedy referred to the feeling within the Hemisphere that, with the exception of the period of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration, the United States has been identified with reactionary forces in Latin America rather than with progressive elements. He expressed the hope that the United States would be better understood in the Hemisphere for its positive contributions.

The meeting was concluded when President Kennedy presented an autographed copy of his latest book to President Arosemena.

104. Memorandum of conversation, July 24, between President Arosemena and Acting Secretary Ball and U.S. and Ecuadorean officials¹

July 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Arosemena and Acting Secretary Ball

PARTICIPANTS

Ecuador

President Carlos Julio Arosemena

Minister of Foreign Affairs Benjamin Peralta Paez

Ambassador Neftali Ponce-Miranda

Minister of Treasury Manuel Naranjo Toro

Former Minister of Economy Federico Intriago

¹ Financial and economic situation in Ecuador. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April–August, 1962.

Guillermo Arosemena Coronel, Manager of the Guayaquil Branch of the Central Bank

Dr. Germanico Subia, Technical Director of the National Planning Board

United States

Acting Secretary George Ball

Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin

Ambassador Maurice M. Bernbaum

Mr. Moscoso, Assistant Administrator, AID

Mr. Belcher, Director of West Coast Affairs, State

Mr. Robinson, Director of West Coast Affairs, AID

Secretary Ball started the meeting by indicating that a joint group had been meeting earlier in the day to review some of the questions that had been raised during the White House meeting on July 23, and that Assistant Secretary Martin would proceed to brief President Arosemena with regard to the most recent developments.

Assistant Secretary Martin indicated that he had been very impressed with the outstanding character of the Ecuadorean delegation with which he and his advisers had discussed a number of fiscal and economic programs. These programs included a series of reforms that Ecuador had undertaken or was about to undertake and a review of some of the difficulties the country has had with the special emphasis on the need to control the expansion of credit and the economic repercussions of pending legislation affecting the collection of taxes and of import duties. There had also been a discussion of how Government income as a result of tax and tariff reforms would decrease during the next few months. The United States now felt that two specific questions would have to be answered in order to solve some of the difficulties that might be encountered in explaining the need for budgetary loans to Ecuador to the United States Congress. Mr. Martin reminded the President of the question that it so often asked; namely, why should the American taxpayer have to pay taxes to help other countries whose taxpayers refused to do the same? The two specific questions were: (1) To what extent can the amount of external budgetary support be decreased and still solve Ecuador's basic problem? It was the understanding of the United States that a reduction from \$14 million to \$7 million would not seriously hamper Ecuador's efforts and would still achieve the desired results. Secondly, in order to satisfy the American Congress and people, the United States would have to be assured that this would not become a permanent arrangement. The public should realize that this is a joint effort and that American assistance should go hand-in-hand with corrections of the causes of Ecuador's present capital budget deficiency.

Ambassador Moscoso reemphasized the main points made by Mr. Martin and stated that it would be very desirable to reach a solution before the 4:00 o'clock meeting of the two Presidents today.

President Arosemena thanked the Acting Secretary for his briefing and stated that it confirmed the interpretation given him by the members of his delegation. He expressed the hope that specific conclusions would be reached this afternoon. He stated that the discussion of Ecuador's problems had been very useful, that the time had come to solve the problems since another delay in their solution might well prove to be tragic. Ecuador understands that the United States has many problems in trying to aid all the countries in the world, and it also realizes that each country should solve its problems on the basis of its own efforts. However, without foreign assistance this process would be both slow and painful.

Mr. Salgado referred to a memorandum regarding Ecuador's economic development with a summary of its past and future loan applications. He distributed copies to all present.

President Arosemena asked Ambassador Ponce to bring up the question of Ecuador's sugar quota. Ambassador Ponce stated that Ecuador had been assigned a yearly quota of 25,000 tons of sugar which would benefit the country a great deal, although it was only a 2 or 2½ year arrangement. It was his understanding that during 1962 there would be a 300,000 ton deficit in supply of sugar to the United States which could not be covered by many of the supplying countries. The Ambassador therefore requested that sympathetic consideration be given to the possibilities of importing up to 41,000 tons of Ecuadorean sugar during this year which could be made available immediately since it was being stored in Guayaquil.

President Arosemena expressed his concern with regard to the recent Government changes in Peru and reiterated his fears as stated in his meeting with President Kennedy on July 23. He expressed his concern in the context of the United States position as one of the guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol. He said that Ecuador did not accept the Rio Protocol and considered it to be incompatible with the rule of law. However, the Peruvian-Ecuadorean dispute could and should be solved by peaceful means and Ecuador would drastically oppose the use of force to solve this paramount issue. "We will never become aggressors, but we will defend our country to the utmost", said President Arosemena. This would have to be done to avoid what he described as his country's mutilation in 1941.

Secretary Ball thanked the President and stated that he would take careful note of everything he had said and Assistant Secretary Martin emphasized that the United States could of course not approve any such action as the President feared.

Secretary Ball stated that he would like to bring up a problem of great interest to the United States—that of fisheries. During the month of June the Ecuadorean Government passed a decree setting up an

area that was 125 miles long and 40 miles wide as an area in which, in effect, fishing by other than Ecuadoreans was prohibited. Aside from the fact that we do not agree on what constitutes territorial waters, tuna fishing off the coast of Ecuador was an important industry that benefited a number of western states in the United States. The United States realized that the Ecuadorean decree had not been enforced and we hoped that a satisfactory solution to this problem would be found through the efforts of the experts which we had sent to Ecuador to study the problem.

President Arosemena replied that he had discussed this problem with Ambassador Bernbaum in Quito and that he had reached an agreement with the Ambassador. The Ecuadorean decree would not be put into force until American experts in the field of fisheries had completed a study of the situation. He stated that the Ecuadorean decree was nothing but "a manifestation of a country's criteria as to the extent of its territorial waters". Ecuador was concerned with the possible disappearance of fish and the destruction of one of its richest natural resources. Ecuador could not oppose other countries if they wished to exploit the riches of the seas, but it would defend its own natural resources with a very logical sense of self-interest. He added that some experts in Ecuador, rightly or wrongly, claimed that "pirate ships" had been using dynamite in order to catch more tuna. This could cause great harm. Secretary Ball stated that it was his understanding that the report of the experts was about to be completed and he was certain that a satisfactory solution could be reached.

President Arosemena thanked the Secretary for giving him a chance to discuss some of his country's problems.

105. Memorandum of conversation, July 25, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena and U.S. and Ecuadorean officials¹

July 25, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and President Arosemena

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. SIDE

President John F. Kennedy
Acting Secretary George Ball
U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, Teodoro Moscoso
Ambassador Maurice M. Bernbaum
Director of WST, Taylor G. Belcher
Interpreter, F. von Reigersberg

ECUADOREAN SIDE

President Carlos Julio Arosemena
Foreign Minister Benjamin Peralta Paez
Ambassador Neftali Ponce-Miranda
Treasury Minister Manuel Naranjo Toro
Former Minister of Economy Federico Intriago
Guillermo Arosemena Coronel, Manager of Guayaqual Branch, Central Bank of Ecuador

The President started the meeting by welcoming President Arosemena. He pointed out that this visit was an additional proof of American interest and concern for Hemispheric problems. The President also pointed out, however, that the U.S. has many problems these day and that it is important to realize that its resources are not unlimited.

President Arosemena thanked the President and stated that he wished to bring up several economic problems affecting his Country. He prefaced his remarks by noting the expressions of great concern on the part of the U.S. Government and of President Kennedy himself with regard to all of Latin America. Ecuador realizes that American assistance is not unlimited, and that it is subject to a number of internal political factors. President Arosemena said that there is one difficulty which all the assistance programs have in common; namely, paternalism. It is impossible to try to regulate or legislate on a number of subjects when you are miles away from the countries that will be affected by such actions. As an example, President Arosemena referred

¹ Economic problems and reform in Ecuador. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

to an Inter-American Development Bank loan for the cultivation of African [illegible in the original], in which the Ecuadoreans have been compelled to utilize the funds in an area believed to be unsuitable to such crops.

The President continued by stating that certain necessary reforms have already been initiated in Ecuador. A new inheritance tax law has just been approved and a number of bills have been drafted and submitted for Congressional approval, covering income taxes, tariffs and fiscal and monetary reforms. During the first two or three years following these reforms, fiscal revenues will undoubtedly decrease and if no immediate external assistance is forthcoming these measures would be self-defeating, and agricultural and industrial productivity could not be given the needed impulse. The worst thing that can happen in Latin America is the disillusionment of the masses who hope the Alliance for Progress will help them increase their standards of living. Ecuador has submitted a request for assistance to finance its 1962 capital budget. During the last ten months Government revenue has been decreasing considerably and most public works projects have come to a complete standstill. The number of unemployed has increased by leaps and bounds and those masses constitute a dangerous and explosive time bomb. Therefore, President Arosemena specifically requested a \$14 million loan from President Kennedy for his Country's capital budget. He stated that Ecuador committed herself to undertake additional legal reforms and President Kennedy would be given a memorandum on these reforms tomorrow, July 24. A second memorandum would deal with another very important problem; namely, that of the development of educational facilities of the Country. Three hundred million sucres will be necessary to implement a five-year educational program, which will have as its main purpose the eradication of illiteracy and a much greater attendance rate at schools for all Ecuadorean children. A third memorandum dealing with the problems of the municipality of Guayaquil will also be delivered tomorrow. The city has had several budgetary deficits because of misuse of municipal funds and at the present time funds aren't even available to pay for the collection of garbage.

President Kennedy stated that these were indeed difficult problems and he realized that sometimes countries dislike foreign officials who give advice on sensitive, internal matters—outsiders may be wrong. He spoke of our legislative and regulatory problems in rendering assistance and of the serious problem of the dollar drain problem resulting from our tremendous foreign assistance program over the last fifteen years. Furthermore, the Congress believes that Europe should share a greater part of the foreign aid burden. Because budgetary support is largely a dollar loss to the U.S. which can easily become a gold loss,

it is this type of funds that are extremely difficult to obtain. On the other hand, funds are available for constructive, carefully planned development projects of a more lasting nature.

The President asked what could be done to increase the number of such projects. Ambassador Moscoso indicated that a \$1 million project for school construction had already been approved and that studies were being made with regard to airport improvements and other public works projects. The main problem was the presentation of loan applications. The U.S. now hoped to assist Ecuador in the preparation of projects and loan applications in accordance with the requirements of existing assistance legislation.

Mr. Arosemena, the Manager of the Guayaquil Branch of the Central Bank, stated that the present Ecuadorean Administration had made tremendous efforts to put the Country's economy back in order. An austerity policy has been in force and the Government is avoiding Central Bank financing so as to maintain a stable currency. However, if no assistance from the U.S. is forthcoming, the Government will have to turn to the Central Bank and the repercussions of such a move would be disastrous. The Country has had very little inflation and a stable currency and Government. Many sacrifices have been made. Many public works have been curtailed and the number of unemployed people has risen drastically. Ecuador therefore needs the \$14 million which might be a gold loss to the U.S., but it would help the Country purchase American products in the future.

President Kennedy stated that it is important for the U.S. to counteract the dollar drain and to maintain world confidence in the dollar. The U.S., of course, realizes what the difficulties of Ecuador are and the only way to avoid disappointing people who have staked their hopes on the Alliance for Progress is by convincing the Congress that this Alliance is truly a joint effort. The President reemphasized that it was much easier to obtain funds for development projects than for budgetary financing.

President Arosemena said that Ecuador had believed that it would obtain \$14 million and had been making plans on the basis of such assistance. However, a few days before his departure several American experts had visited Ecuador and asked him what the plans were for 1963 and 1964. He stated that he had hardly been able to make plans for 1962 and that plans for 1963 and 1964 and maybe 1970 were completely out of the question.

President Kennedy stated that \$8 million had been granted to Ecuador and that the \$14 million loan to which President Arosemena referred was to have been given "sympathetic consideration". This, however, did not mean that the loan had been approved. The Minister of the Treasury of Ecuador briefly outlined the history of the loan

discussions and reemphasized that according to his Government's interpretation \$8 million would have been approved for the year 1961 and \$14 million would have been approved for 1962 for projects in the capital budget. The Government of Ecuador had made a number of plans on the basis of such an understanding. However, a few days ago, American technicians had visited Ecuador and had asked for specific long-term development projects. The Minister stated that only partial projects had been completed since the budget of 1962 was still in doubt. Now the capital budget is completely paralyzed. The Government has been taking measures and will take additional measures in the future. A technical body has been set up to carry out tax and administrative reforms. Civil servants are being trained. All these efforts would be fruitless without external financial support. The Country does not wish to devalue its currency again and it does not wish to ask for assistance, which might be inflationary, from its own Central Bank.

President Arosemena stated that he would bring up these problems again during these discussions tomorrow with other U.S. officials and that before leaving he would like to bring up another problem; namely, that of the old border dispute with Peru. When a military government has ruled Peru, it has always been very aggressive in its relations with Ecuador. Recent events have convinced President Arosemena that the highly unpopular military junta of Peru might try to "distract" public opinion by creating a serious border incident. The repercussions of such a move are very hard to foresee. The military are a curse in most of Latin America and even though Peru's elections are a purely internal affair the possibility of military aggression should definitely not be overlooked. Ecuador supports Venezuela's request for the establishment of some machinery to avoid militaristic coups in other Latin American countries.

President Kennedy strongly emphasized that the U.S. favors the resumption of normal constitutional processes in Peru and he hopes to know more about the Peruvian Government's future in the next few days. He added that President Arosemena would have a chance to meet with Ambassador Moscoso again and discuss his Country's problems in more detail. Some of the other sister republics of South America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru also had considerable economic difficulties. If we look outside this Hemisphere, Vietnam, Korea and many other countries are also facing similar problems and the important thing is to try to obtain additional funds from the Congress to solve all of these needs.

President Arosemena ended the meeting thanking President Kennedy for his kind invitation and formally invited him to visit Ecuador "with or without a loan".

106. Memorandum from Brubeck to Dungan, January 24¹

January 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RALPH DUNGAN
THE WHITE HOUSE

THROUGH

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT

Your Request for a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador

In accordance with your request to Assistant Secretary Martin I am transmitting to you a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador recently prepared by ARA and approved by Under Secretary McGhee. The paper was transmitted to Embassy Quito for comment. The Embassy has indicated its general approval. The paper has not been cleared outside the Department of State but will be discussed at the Latin American Policy Committee meeting on Ecuador on January 31.

/s/ **Howard Fumas**
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

Contingency Paper on Ecuador

Background

There is reason to believe that President Arosemena will not be able to complete his term of office scheduled to end on September 1, 1964. This paper is designed to review the contingencies which conceivably might occur in the latter eventuality and to set forth recommended U.S. positions thereon.

[text not declassified]

Arosemena's success in maintaining himself in office as long as he has is due to a number of fortuitous circumstances as well as to his

¹ Transmits a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 722.00/1-2463.

own physical resiliency and political ingenuity. To date at least, his opponents in the various non-communist political movements have been unable to act in unison or with sufficient vigor and despatch to oust him. In repeated instances when the President was physically unable to resist any move against him, the procrastination and indecisiveness of the opposition allowed him sufficient time to recover physically and regain control of the situation. Perhaps the most critical factor in the President's staying power has been the frequently declared determination of the armed forces to uphold constitutional procedures. The position taken by the armed forces has effectively limited Arosemena's opponents to seeking constitutional means of ousting him. These efforts have revolved around the constitutional provision which states, *inter alia*, that the President shall cease to exercise the duties of his office when he is declared to be permanently incapacitated mentally or physically.

In view of the progressively more serious consequences of his alcoholism, both physical and political, it is believed likely that a change in government based on the constitutional provision relating to physical and mental incapacity is impending. The most likely contingencies in the above eventuality are presented below.

a) *Accession of Vice President Varca to Presidency*

The constitutional successor to Arosemena is Vice President Varca. Although for some time under a cloud because of alleged complicity in an arms purchase scandal, the Vice President recently was cleared of the charges by an overwhelming vote of the Ecuadorean Senate. Varca is a former Army Lt. Col., once served as Assistant Military Attaché in Washington, and has held the positions of Commanding General of the National Police, Minister of Defense, and Senator.

The Vice President's forceful action during the recent Cuban crisis in assuring GOE support for the U.S. position at a time when President Arosemena was incapacitated by a drinking bout is a hopeful indication of what might be expected from his prospective administration.

Varca is known to have presidential ambitions and field reports indicate some military and political support for his accession to the presidency should Arosemena be unable to continue in office. The Vice President's main strength lies in the priority of his claim to succeed to the presidency under the constitution. The constitutional question is particularly important in view of the above cited attitude of the armed forces. Nevertheless it is possible that the military and political leaderships might find Varca unacceptable and reach agreement on a compromise successor to Arosemena.

Recommended U.S. Position

Unless there is determined and widespread popular opposition, the U.S. should support Vice President Varca's accession to the presidency as the logical and constitutional successor to Arosemena.

b) Accession of Compromise Candidate to Presidency

There is still resistance among some political elements, particularly the rightists, to the possible accession of Vice President Varca to the presidency. Varca, it is claimed, is still tainted by the allegations made against him in the arms purchase scandal and therefore is not a suitable candidate for the presidency. It is therefore conceivable that Varca might be induced to step aside for a compromise candidate. The chances for this contingency might be enhanced if the expected ouster of President Arosemena encountered difficulties and required concerted action by a number of political and military elements. Any effort at this time to identify possible compromise candidates by name would be highly speculative at best.

Recommended U.S. Position

Support adherence to constitutional procedures to the extent possible under existing circumstances and urge upon military and political leaders the importance of selecting a political moderate who will maintain Ecuador's recently expressed concern in the OAS over the menace of international communism in this hemisphere and continue the efforts begun under the Alliance for Progress toward social reform and economic development.

c) Report by Arosemena to the Military

It is conceivable that faced with the likelihood of being ousted and believing that he has lost any hope of continued support from the Democratic Front, Arosemena may attempt to use the armed forces to stay in office in the face of widespread popular opinion that he resign or be ousted. It is known that Arosemena's wholesale shuffling of the armed forces high command was designed to eliminate potential threats from that direction to his continuance in office. In large measure the President's efforts have been successful, at least in so far as the top echelon of the armed forces is concerned. In the event the degree of his physical incapacity is doubtful, Arosemena may attempt to use the military to frustrate efforts to remove him from office. He could under such circumstances call upon the military to uphold the constitution and support him on the grounds that he obviously is not "permanently incapacitated".

The degree to which the military might support Arosemena under these circumstances, particularly in the face of widespread popular feeling to remove him from office, probably would be limited. Assum-

ing that the military high command did support the President and were themselves successful in retaining the support of the bulk of the armed forces, it seems highly doubtful that Arosemena could for very long maintain himself in office solely with the backing of the military. Nor is it likely that the latter would for very long, if at all, continue to support the President in the face of widespread popular feeling that his usefulness to the country had come to an end.

Recommended U.S. Position

To make it forcefully clear to military leaders and to Arosemena that apart from the issue of constitutionality the best interests of the country are not served by attempting to thwart the will of the majority of the country's democratic political elements.

d) Appeal by Arosemena to the Extreme Left

In the event that Arosemena believes that he has lost the support of both the Democratic Front and the military it is conceivable that he might resort to making a demagogic appeal for help to the extreme left. This contingency in particular could produce serious disorders. It is not certain that the extreme left would take any overt action in support of the President under such circumstances in view of the almost certain reaction of the military and democratic political groups. In any such eventuality it is believed that the military would be capable of controlling the situation and assuring that the extreme left did not come into power. Any such effort by Arosemena would be one of desperation and probably would ensure his immediate departure from the political scene.

Recommended U.S. Position

Oppose any effort to establish the extreme left as the political base for Arosemena's continuance in office. Invite the Ecuadorean military to request emergency assistance from the United States deemed necessary to maintain order. Inform appropriate democratic military and political leaders that the ouster of Arosemena would not adversely effect United States-Ecuadorean relations.

e) Return of Former President Velasco

In the event that a more suitable successor to Arosemena cannot be agreed upon, it is conceivable that former President Velasco may be called upon to complete the balance of his term which began in September 1960. Velasco's supporters maintain that he did not formally resign in November 1961 and therefore is still Ecuador's constitutional president, a position which is debatable. There is reason to believe, however, that Velasco would prefer to wait until 1964 and run for a full four year term rather than complete the balance of the term he

began in 1960. Velasco already has declared himself to be a candidate in 1964. Many seasonal Ecuadorean political observers believe that he still retains his remarkable hold on the Ecuadorean masses and has an excellent chance of becoming President for an unprecedented fifth term.

Recommended U.S. Position

Accept Velasco's return to office, convince him of the genuine desire of the United States to assist Ecuador to achieve the social and economic reforms which he himself has so eloquently espoused in the past, and attempt to use his popular appeal to the Ecuadorean masses as a vehicle for arousing a national sense of purpose for achieving genuine reforms. At the same time it should be made abundantly clear that any return to a neutralist position on the Cuban issue by Ecuador will have serious consequences on U.S.-Ecuadorean relations.

f) Military Coup

While unlikely, it is conceivable that events subsequent to the ouster of Arosemena, particularly the inability of the military and political leaderships to agree on a successor, could result in an attempt to establish a military junta in control of the government. While there are strong factors against such an eventuality it is always possible that the example set by Peru might appeal to Ecuador's military leadership as a solution to the problem of naming a successor to Arosemena. Even if such a contingency did occur, it is not believed that it would be of long duration. The marked tendency of the Ecuadorean military in recent years to play a passive role in politics, to avoid interfering arbitrarily in civilian government, and to uphold the constitution make it likely that a military coup would be of a short duration, for limited purposes, and would provide for a return to civilian government within a short time.

Recommended U.S. Position

Extend recognition to the Junta as soon as several other OAS states have done so, assuming that the Junta's basic orientation does not conflict with the goals of the Alliance for Progress and the recent stand taken by Ecuador in the OAS on the Cuban issue. Exert our influence for the earliest possible return to democratic, constitutional government.

107. Telegram 17 from Quito, July 11¹

Quito, July 11, 1963

Emergency. Action Department 17; Information Bogota 3, Lima 2, Guayaquil Unnumbered. Department please pass to US CINCSO for POLAD, also ACSI and AFCIN. RE telecons with Belcher.

Pressure building in military for replacement Arosemena culminated today in announcement by chiefs three armed services of Arosemena's ouster and formation of military junta. Five-man junta includes Navy Commander Captain Ramon Castro Jijon, Army Commander Colonel Luis Cabrera Sevilla, Air Force Commander Lt Colonel Guillermo Freile Posso, Armed Forces Senator Colonel Marcos Gandara Enriquez who also head of War Academy, and Colonel Santiago Morochz, Subsecretary of Defense. Proclamation, issued by junta at 3:30 PM, stated objectives of change are to crush communism and end terrorism, carry out constitutional and structural reforms, and put into effect social and economic reforms. Proclamation also placed country under martial law, prohibited strikes and demonstrations, and suspended constitutional guarantees. Text of proclamation sent separately.

Following a period of uncertainty, during which President holed up in Presidential Palace with support of Presidential Guard, presumably awaiting the effect popular pro-constitutional demonstrations in Guayaquil and hopefully in Quito, President finally convinced, during visit of three armed services chiefs, to relinquish his office to junta and leave for airport where he flown out at twilight to either Cali or Panama.

Info regarding pro-constitutional reaction sketchy and not yet clear. Reports from Guayaquil indicate that large pro-constitutional rallies being led by Mayor Bucaram. Also reported that various prominent citizens have issued an appeal for return to constitutional government and that Vice-President Varea has called an extraordinary meeting of the Congress to meet tomorrow afternoon. Junta reaction has been announcement that extraordinary session will not be permitted and that a constituent assembly will soon be called. Varea reportedly arrested and to be deported.

Curfew imposed as of 9:00 PM tonight.

Events arose from incident at banquet given last night at Presidential Palace by Arosemena in honor of Admiral Wilfred McNeil, president of the Grace Lines. President most noticeably drunk while reading

¹ Announcement of five-man military junta ouster of Arosemena government. Confidential. 9 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.

speech during decoration Admiral McNeil. He made impromptu speech later at dinner in which he said he liked American public but that American Govt was exploiting Ecuador and Latin America. This naturally fell like a bombshell among official guests who were already shocked and ashamed over President's condition. In response to President's assurances to me that no personal offense was meant, I said that I could not agree with what he had said, and that the American Govt was the reflection of the American people. Arosemena staggered from the dinner table shortly thereafter and did not reappear.

In accepting apologies on behalf of GOE from all ministers present and other dignitaries after dinner, I attempted play down incident, saying USG has no quarrel with Ecuador or its people, and that President's statement while drunk would not affect my attitude or that of USG toward continued good relations with Ecuador. The extreme concern over effect of incident to those with whom I spoke was apparent, despite my assurances. I expressed the same assurances this morning to MinPublic Works Salem who concerned that incident might effect pending consortium road loan. According FonMin Peralta, Arosemena's blast due resent over UPI press article appearing same day in which Felando of American Tunaboat Association quoted as saying at San Diego that fishing negotiations failed due GOE bad faith and recommending embargo on imports fish products from Ecuador. Resentment also fed, according Peralta, by Panama hat problem.

Rumor already circulating in Guayaquil that coup undertaken at my insistence due insult USG. Dept alerted to possibility that this may be used in commie propaganda here and elsewhere.

Junta objectives explained to Mil Att and to me during visit today by Colonel Gandara. He said military disgusted by events last night and decided this morning to put an end to "disgraceful situation." Since preparations had already been underway for such a move in armed services, it took little time to put them into effect. Consideration given to Arosemena replace by Vice President Varea but idea discarded in face almost unanimous opposition. Presenting a partial preview of later junta proclamation, Gandara said junta proposed initiate new regime with revision laws to outlaw communism and put teeth into anti-communist measures. Planned promptly to call a constituent assembly to draft new constitution. Proposed take advantage of opportunity to effect clean sweep of Ecuador's outmoded social structure through agrarian, administrative and fiscal reforms to extent possible.

Gandara stated in response my query re restoration constitutional govt that current Congress could not be relied upon to make necessary changes in view its demonstrated incapacity, with result that job would have to be done by junta with collaboration patriotic and competent civilians. Although constituent assembly would be called promptly, he

estimated that elections could not be held before about two years. He assured me that military sufficiently unified to feel satisfied that junta could carry on for this period of time in face possible leftist, anti-junta reactions.

He repeated junta would merely represent military facade over civilian govt which should be able count support people through effective implementation reform measures while at same time controlling communist subversion.

I emphasized importance of an early return to constitutionality. I said US Govt wanted to help Ecuador and that assurance of return to constitutionalism within reasonably prompt period of time would facilitate always sticky problem of recognition, while determination of new govt to push social and economic reform would facilitate collaboration under the Alliance for Progress. Gandara replied he would not be honest if he said return to constitutionalism could be accomplished in six months because of needed structural changes in social, political and economic systems could not be effectively worked out in so short a period. He said junta did not want to repeat mistake of Peruvian junta which missed opportunity to institute widespread reforms required by Peru. Without arguing, I repeated a few times my original point on the importance of assurances of prompt return to constitutionality and implementation of social and economic reforms. I drew his attention to successful results of forward-looking attitude of Salvadoran military on constitutional and reform problems.

Colonel McRochz, another member of junta, telephoned me later. He said decision change govt taken in belief it essential for Ecuador's well-being and honor, and that crack-down on commies would be amongst first moves of junta. I repeated position told Gandara. I also noted wisdom of reform program since purely negative position against communist would leave door open communist-stimulated reaction, whereas immediately emphasized program of reforms and prompt return to constitutionality could reassure public and gain its confidence.

Visit from Alfredo Albornoz, independent liberal ex-Min govt, confirmed Gandara's assurance of high level civilian cabinet and understood that names various other well-known civilians being considered and approached. Said had been assured of prompt return to constitutionalism through near future convocation constituent assembly to reform outmoded constitution and then elect new president. Albornoz agreed on importance promptly announced guarantees of return to constitutionalism and said would push this further talks. He optimistic over future and confident junta in control situation. He discounted importance congressional reaction and thought political parties would fall in line. Albornoz was hard hitting Min govt who left govt last year due Arosemena's refusal clean house in govt.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] reaction to current developments:

1. Directorate of CTE meeting tonight 7:00 PM to consider calling general strike July 12.

2. Commie youth instructed to hold street demonstrations tonight after 9:00 PM curfew. Slogan will be “poder al pueblo; abajo la dictadura militar.”

3. Junta has issued order to arrest all known communists.

Comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] junta proclamations have in my opinion over-emphasized commie problem, [*2 lines not declassified*]. Aside from demonstrations in Guayaquil led by Mayor Bucaram, we have not as yet heard from other elements who, while opposed to Arosemena, may be expected also to oppose a military junta. Vice-President Varea has apparently been attempting to capitalize on this sentiment, particularly in Congress, in hope that he would be logical beneficiary under constitution. He has apparently been put out of the way. We should have some idea tomorrow of the congressional reaction and that of the political parties. If strong enough, these could conceivably influence a greater readiness for a prompt return to constitutionality. We shall of course press this point in further conversations. Strength of leftist reaction will undoubtedly be important factor for future.

Although US support clearly being solicited, question of recognition has not yet arisen. We propose, as the opportunities present themselves, to continue pressing for a prompt return to constitutional government, as well as guarantees that the new govt will honor its international commitments, including obligations under the Alliance for Progress. No problem anticipated with respect latter two points.

Although initially the three armed services and their commanders in the junta display high degree of unity and resolve, it is doubtful this unified facade will persist indefinitely, and it seems likely that questions of personal and service interest will eventually be divisive.
[*text not declassified*]

Bernbaum

108. Memorandum of conversation, July 17, between Rusk and Ambassador Ponce¹

July 17, 1963

SUBJECT

Informal Call on Secretary by Ecuadorean Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary ARA
Ambassador Ponce, Ecuador

The Secretary opened the conversation by mentioning that this would have to be considered an informal discussion between old friends in view of the fact that we had not established diplomatic relations with the new regime. Ponce said he understood and agreed fully.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the new regime would announce its plans for restoring constitutional government soon and expressed the hope that this would include a reference to elections, perhaps in June 1964 when they were originally to have been held. The Ambassador said he thought it might be possible to hold elections at that time, but he rather thought that what needed doing before the holding of elections would take long enough that elections at that time would only be those to the constituent assembly and that one would have to expect the Assembly to spend 4 to 5 months drawing up the constitution and electing the first president to serve under it. He pointed out this dual role for the constituent assembly had a considerable amount of precedent in Ecuadoran history.

The Secretary also stressed the great importance, to the future of Ecuador and to its external relations, of the junta respecting civil liberties, the rights of assembly and the free press and the freedom of all political parties to campaign preceding any election. The Ambassador said he agreed fully and felt sure that this was the approach which the junta would follow. He indicated that he would not have accepted a position in the junta if he had believed it was going to be a dictatorial regime and did not intend to restore civil liberties and a constitutional democratic government. He pointed out that there were to be six civilians out of the seven member cabinet and that those who had been

¹ Informal discussion of new regime and future of Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November 1963.

selected so far were all known to him as able and responsible people. The Secretary welcomed this report and commented that he thought that in the current world one had to distinguish between authoritarian regimes and regimes in which there was a monopoly control at the top for a limited period pending a restoration of democratic government.

The Secretary mentioned the usefulness of Ecuador making available to the pertinent OAS bodies the information they had recently secured in connection with the arrests of leftists returning from training in Cuba. He thought it important that the Hemisphere know what the Cubans were doing in this regard and see evidence of the possibility of frustrating their aims. The Ambassador said that he was sure the new regime was strongly anticommunist in character and determined to prevent communist subversion and would be happy to cooperate in this.

The Secretary referred to the problem of new members in the OAS and hoped the Ambassador could take a look at the Ecuadoran position on this issue. The Ambassador said it was a question with which he had been familiar for several years and he hoped to be able to get out new instructions before the end of this week.

The Secretary referred to the recent differences between the United States and Ecuador on the fishing question, and said he thought it of great importance to work out arrangements which would keep the temperature down in both Ecuador and the United States and permit maintenance of our traditionally friendly relations. The Secretary pointed out the concessions which we have made with respect to the 12 mile limit and the importance of working something out from the Ecuadoran side on the questions of base lines and licenses.

Having pointed out that these matters could only be discussed when relations had taken place, the Secretary said he could not predict when this would happen but hoped conditions would be established which would permit it in the not too distant future. He said there was a great deal to be done in Ecuador, and he was happy to see the junta indicating that they wished to tackle some of the problems there. We were anxious to be able to cooperate with them in dealing with these issues in the framework of the Alliance for Progress.

The Secretary inquired whether the Ambassador had made any plans to attend the UN General Assembly for the first couple of weeks. The Ambassador indicated he had not thought about it, but, if it were desirable, he would try to get there. The Secretary said it was an occasion when a great many Foreign Ministers came to New York and he thought there were advantages in the club of people holding this [illegible in the original] getting together for exchanges from time to time, as had been done in recent years at the opening of the General Assembly.

**109. Circular telegram CA-73 to certain American Republic posts,
July 18¹**

July 18, 1963

Dept's CA-73.

USG considers Ecuadorean Junta has demonstrated ability retain effective control, has restored most essential civil liberties, has given satisfactory assurances re acceptance of international obligations and desire carry out AFP. Major remaining point which US would like to have in hand is public statement by Junta indicating intention return to civilian government via constitutional procedures within approximately one year, thereby not departing significantly from previously scheduled elections in June 1964 and following basic Argentine and Peru time schedules. However USG will not extend recognition until at least several other Latin American countries have done so. You may indicate foregoing in consultations with host government.

Rusk

¹ U.S. withholding recognition new Government in Ecuador until junta indicates intention to return to civilian government and several other Latin American countries have recognized Ecuador. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November 1963.

**110. Circular telegram 170 to certain American Republic posts,
July 26¹**

July 26, 1963

On assumption several other Hemisphere countries recognize Ecuadorean junta by July 30-31 U.S. Government planning extend recognition July 31. You are requested informally consult host govern-

¹ U.S. plan to recognize Ecuadorean junta by July 31 if several other Hemisphere countries do so by then. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.

ment re above timing and any developments their plans on recognition. Action posts other than BA, Santiago and Rio may also say U.S. understands Argentina, Chile and Brazil considering recognition by July 31.

Rusk

111. Memorandum of conversation, August 7, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Ponce¹

August 7, 1963

SUBJECT

Farewell Call of departing Ecuadorean Ambassador, the New Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Dr. Neftalí PONCE Miranda, Foreign Minister of Ecuador

Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Taylor G. Belcher, Director, Office of West Coast Affairs

Dr. Ponce thanked the President for receiving him on such short notice, saying that aside from wishing to say good-by and thank him for all his kindness and hospitality during his two years here, he was under instructions from his Government to deliver a message from the Junta. He wanted to emphasize the desire of the new Government to work quickly and closely with the United States in achieving the goals of the Alliance for Progress. His Government was hopeful that they could get off to a good start utilizing the enthusiasm and the determination which were now apparent in the country. He said that for the first time it was obvious that there was a will on the part of the Government and the people as a whole to move forward.

The President inquired regarding the pending development programs, and Mr. Dungan said that there were a number in the pipeline which should be able to move ahead rapidly now that the new Government was organized.

The Foreign Minister referred to the fact that a number of very capable civilians were participating both in the Cabinet and in senior

¹ Farewell call of departing Ecuadorean Ambassador (the new Foreign Minister); Alliance for Progress; subversion of Communist activities in Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.

administrative positions, and said that with such talent in the Government many of the obstacles which had been apparent in the previous administration would disappear.

Dr. Ponce then read a translation of the message received from the Junta covering the following three points:

1. Cooperation with the United States in the Alliance for Progress.
2. A readiness to join with the United States and other American Republics in moves to control communist subversive activities.
3. A firm desire to reach an early solution to the fisheries problem.

In response to the President's inquiry as to possible solutions to the problem, the Foreign Minister said only that he was certain there was an area of agreement and that he intended to explore this fully immediately upon his return to Ecuador this week end. He would then engage in further conversations with Ambassador Bernbaum.

With regard to the communist problem, the President expressed his gratification at the willingness of the Ecuadorean Government to move to control subversion. He asked the Foreign Minister to comment on the position of the Communist Party in Ecuador. Dr. Ponce said that the Party itself had been outlawed by the new Government, that it was small and, with the exception of a number of extremists who were very active and vocal, it had not achieved any success. On the contrary, whenever it had attempted some action, it had failed with the exception of certain isolated instances of violence. He felt that with the recent moves to outlaw the Party and challenge its leaders, plus a determination to move forward in the eradication of social and economic evils in the country, the Party had no prospect of prospering.

The President inquired as to Dr. Ponce's possible replacement here. The Foreign Minister said that agrément had just been requested for Dr. José Antonio Correa, a career diplomat with previous experience at the UN and at Washington.

The President wished Dr. Ponce well in his new job and expressed his pleasure in knowing that someone who knew us and our problems so well would be in authority in Quito.

El Salvador

112. Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, January 25¹

January 25, 1961

SUBJECT

Overthrow of Government in El Salvador

According to reports received from [*less than 1 line not declassified*], the Military Attaché and our Chargé in El Salvador, the Junta Government of El Salvador was overthrown last night by the Salvadoran Army. There is apparently a tight control on communications. The reports are scanty and indicate that San Salvador is quiet this morning and that there is no indication of danger to U.S. citizens. The fragmentary reports indicate that the coup is a rightist one directed against the communists and against ex-President Osorio who is a moderate.

If this proves to be a rightist coup and the Army succeeds in stabilizing the situation it means that the immediate problem which I mentioned in staff meeting this morning of coping with a rapid communist build-up in the country is temporarily in hand. This would mean, on the other hand, that we have a new problem of convincing the new government that it should carry out elections under appropriate safeguards and institute needed reform.

Finally, we have received reports that Castro might attempt to intervene in Salvador if this kind of a situation develops.

¹ Overthrow of the Junta Government in El Salvador by the Salvadoran Army. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.00/1-2561.

113. Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, February 9¹

February 9, 1961

SUBJECT

Recognition of New Government of El Salvador

Discussion

On January 25, 1961, a military coup d'état overthrew the Junta of government of El Salvador which had assumed power by a similar coup on October 26, 1960, and replaced it with a new "Civilian-Military Directorate". The Junta had been showing signs of favoring or being susceptible to the growth of Cuban and communist strength in El Salvador. The new government is avowedly anti-communist and favorably oriented toward the U.S. The Directorate government now appears in effective control of the country, has indicated its desire to cooperate closely with the U.S., to carry out necessary social and agrarian reforms in the spirit of the Act of Bogota, and to hold early elections with a view to returning El Salvador to constitutional government.

While it is in our interest to recognize the new government, I believe we should defer our action until some additional Latin American countries have recognized to blunt the probable allegation that the new government is the result of United States' intervention. To encourage such action by these countries, as well as by others having resident diplomatic representatives in El Salvador, I believe we should inform these governments of our intentions along the lines suggested in the attached telegram (Tab A). This would afford them the opportunity to proceed with recognition in advance should they desire to do so.

Our Ambassador to El Salvador has recommended that we recognize the new government about February 15 and has reported that Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Austria, Germany, Argentina, Spain, and Nationalist China have already recognized.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached suggested circular telegram informing certain other governments of our intent to recognize the new government of El Salvador on or about February 15.

Attachment:

Suggested circular telegram (Tab A).

¹ Recommendation to recognize new Government in El Salvador on February 15. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.02/2-961.

114. Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, February 11, transmitting a memorandum from Rusk to the President¹

February 11, 1961

To: The Secretary

Through: S/S

From: ARA—Mr. Maan

SUBJECT

Recognition of the New Government of El Salvador

There is attached a suggested memorandum to the President. My thought is that recognition will be somewhat controversial and an announcement, especially by the President, might be somewhat counterproductive in terms of our effort to establish a more liberal, forward looking image of the United States in Latin America.

If you agree, I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Tab A

SUBJECT

Announcement of Recognition of New Government of El Salvador

On further reflection I believe it would be preferable to play in a low key our decision to recognize the new Junta Government of El Salvador.

The takeover by the Junta arrested a dangerous drift in El Salvador toward Castroism and Communism and it has promised to hold elections and to institute needed reforms. We believe that by recognition we will have our maximum opportunity to influence the new government to adopt a liberal approach to its very difficult economic and social problems. Nevertheless, Venezuela, Costa Rica and possibly Colombia may not recognize the Junta for some time on the theory that recognition should not be extended to governments which come into power by force. Some liberal elements in Salvador and in other parts of Latin America are not too happy with the new regime.

¹ Recommendation that no formal statement be made by the President or the Department at time of recognition of Salvadoran Government. Confidential. 1 pp. DOS, CF, 716.02/2-1161.

On balance, I therefore recommend that no formal statement be made at the time of recognition by either you or the Department.

Dean Rusk

115. Telegram 321 to San Salvador, February 13¹

February 13, 1961

Downs as Chargé is instructed to request appointment for February 15 to deliver following note of recognition:

QUOTE

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note No. A-800-D-261, dated January 27, 1961, informing me of the establishment of a Civil-Military Directorate on January 25, 1961, which assumed full legislative, executive and judicial powers. Your Excellency's note states that the new Government intends to comply strictly with all treaties and conventions to which El Salvador has adhered, to respect its obligations and commitments, and to maintain the closest possible friendly relations with democratic governments.

My Government notes with pleasure the statements in the Civil-Military Directorate's Manifesto of January 27, 1961, to the effect that the fundamental objective of the Directorate is to bring about free and democratic elections. It is also gratifying to note the Directorate's determination to work for the resolution of existing economic and social problems.

In view of the assurances set forth in your note, and the objectives proclaimed by the manifesto of the Civil-Military Directorate, my Government has instructed me to state that it is pleased to extend recognition to the Civil-Military Directorate as the Provisional Government of El Salvador.

Accept, Excellency, etc. **END QUOTE**

Inform Department promptly of changes in date and manner delivery. It is expected the President will make a statement regarding recognition new government at his press conference seven p.m. EST, February 15.

Rusk

¹ Transmits text of note of recognition of Salvadoran Government. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 716.02/2-1361.

116. Telegram 651 from San Salvador, April 13¹

San Salvador, April 13, 1961

Reference: Department telegram 379.

To assist directorate achieve its goals, which we believe in full accord our own policies and objectives in Latin America, it is essential for US and international lending agencies act promptly on principal requests for financial assistance as they are submitted. We are gratified that Department already helping in negotiations for Export-Import Bank loan airport improvement. After that there seems to be no other single project so advanced in planning and so worthy of immediate support as housing development on Ilopango road (G-99). Gonzalez who is moving force in that scheme is presently at IDB meeting Rio but said before leaving he could fly directly to Washington afterwards with engineers in order to present request for long term loan.

Besides direct financial support, we believe regime should be given our strong moral encouragement. Its program so far seems directed both to improving lot of masses of country and to developing nation's economy. All this is in tune with principles *alianza para el progreso*. Directorate's latest measure, exchange control, has incited wrath of some of rich families and also of merchants. Yet some control measure would seem necessary for a developing economy, which needs capital for its growth, Rivera and Portillo told me yesterday in private meeting it seemed only fair that capital formed by "sweat of Salvadoran workers" should be available for domestic investment.

Considering that exchange controls, if properly administered, seem reasonable and considering that next few weeks may provide severe test of regime's power survive against machinations of rich, I believe timely word of support from us may be helpful. Accordingly, I recommend that Department authorize me in course of general interview, which has been sought since my arrival by several newspapers, to express US Government's gratification that directorate has already given substance to its clear determination improve standard living of people of country. I might also say that decision to institute exchange controls was of course taken by Salvadoran Government independently without consultation with us. I would add, if the Department concurs, that exchange controls if properly administered have often been found during critical periods in many other countries, great and small, to be a useful means of encouraging economic development by making a

¹ Need for direct financial support and moral encouragement for new regime. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 816.10/4-1361.

nation's own capital available to promote its prosperity. In such an interview I would also quote again as I have already so often done in El Salvador, sentences from President Kennedy's inaugural address e.g., "If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich". While this will not make me popular with our rich friends, I believe time may have come when we must use our influence in frank talk so that El Salvador can be saved from fate of Cuba which Department white paper so clearly states was brought on largely by indifference of previous regimes to "needs of the people for education, medical care, housing, social justice and economic opportunity".

As a separate measure I believe we should privately and discreetly encourage government to seek outside assistance, possibly through Robert Nathan's mission to bring here soonest a group of fiscal advisers to assist in reform of tax structure.

Meanwhile, we shall endeavor appropriately to make it clear to the rich that efforts to resist sound reform especially through threat to overthrow government will receive no sympathy from Washington.

Williams

117. Telegram 391 to San Salvador, April 15¹

April 15, 1961

EMBTel 651.

Dept recognizes sensitivity of situation and concurs regime should be given moral encouragement. You are authorized make informal statement in press interview commending Directorate's demonstrated determination improve standard of living, promote social reform and develop nation's economy. To extent possible draw on public statements already made to reduce disadvantage personal attribution. Avoid specific reference to exchange restrictions or reference to measure as "useful means of encouraging economic development". If pressed for comment you might say that such restrictions have in

¹ DOS authorization to commend Directorate's determination to improve standard of living, promote social reform, and develop economy. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 816.10/4-1361.

emergency situations been helpful in some cases in meeting specific problems.

FYI Dept concerned that GOES considered it necessary to impose exchange restrictions departing from historical convertibility of colon. Experience other countries has shown that such restrictions once imposed may become difficult to remove, may lead to economic distortions, black market corruption and discourage foreign capital investment. In general if domestic capital desires to go abroad it finds means evading controls. END FYI.

While encouraging GOES officials seek outside expert assistance soonest in reform tax structure you should discreetly caution against seeking advice from multiple advisers. Problem reviewed here with Nathan who will discuss further with you on return Salvador on Monday. Salvadoran Embassy advises GOES intends work closely with IMF and that Fund representatives arriving next week.

Rusk

118. Memorandum of conversation, June 9, between Ambassador Lima and Ball¹

June 9, 1961

SUBJECT

Salvadoran Political Situation and Need for U.S. Financial Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Francisco R. Lima of El Salvador
B—Mr. Ball, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
Mr. Schaetzel, Special Assistant
OAP—Mr. Gwynn, Officer-In-Charge, Salvadoran Affairs

Ambassador Lima called at his request to make a courtesy visit and briefly discuss substantive problems. In the course of the conversation he made the following points:

1. The existing political situation in El Salvador is still very dangerous, with the present Government lacking a broad base of popular

¹ Salvadoran political situation and need for U.S. financial assistance. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 716.00/6-961.

support and facing serious threats from the extremes of both right and left.

2. The country is facing serious economic problems which are aggravating the situation.

3. The Salvadoran economy is highly dependent upon the world market price of coffee.

4. The Government is anti-Communist, pro-US, and in the face of strong resistance by the entrenched interests is demonstrating its expressed intention of implementing social reform, in line with the principles of the Act of Bogota and the Alianza para Progreso.

5. It anticipates that it will be able to obtain U.S. assistance in attaining these objectives in due course, but it is vitally important for the existing Government to be able to obtain US financial assistance now, both to help in resolving Salvador's current economic problems and to provide tangible evidence to the Salvadoran public of U.S. support for the present Government and its objectives.

6. The Government appreciates the US\$4 million Exim Bank-DLF loan for airport expansion recently announced.

7. The Government is agreeing to a proposed IMF program for solving its current balance-of-payments problem.

8. He expressed the hope that US agencies such as the Exim Bank would continue to consider pending Salvadoran applications for U.S. balance-of-payments assistance measures as highly urgent and would continue to expedite consideration of these.

9. He suggested that the U.S. consider using El Salvador as a model for carrying out the President's Alianza para Progreso program.

Mr. Ball indicated that he considered this last an interesting offer and stated that the Department would endeavor to assist El Salvador in its pending applications to other U.S. agencies for balance-of-payments assistance measures.

119. Telegram 502 from San Salvador, April 29¹

San Salvador, April 29, 1962

Seven Embassy teams blanketed country today to observe elections. Voting procedures greatly improved over last December with number voting places almost doubled and little congestion or confusion. While voters moved much more rapidly through polling places, teams consensus is that vote will be much lighter than in December when it totalled 345 thousand, possibly running as much as 30 to 50 percent smaller. Number of trucks and buses engaged in moving campesinos to polls was not impressive and overall enthusiasm of December contest was clearly lacking. Talks with officials at polling places indicate that single party ticket being given by them as reason for apparent apathy.

No known incidents occurred but early this morning some streets and roads in and around San Salvador were strewn with devises with nails for puncturing tires.

Despite foregoing assessment, CGS labor leaders told Embassy officer at 5 p.m. that they anticipate total vote would reach 500 thousand (double what PCN received in December).

Williams

¹ Report on elections. Official Use Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.00/4-2962.

120. Memorandum from Moscoso to President Kennedy¹

Washington, June 13, 1962

SUBJECT

The Alliance for Progress in El Salvador

1. I submit for your information this brief report, based on my three-day visit last week to El Salvador on the occasion of the opening of a U.S. Trade Fair.

¹ Alliance for Progress in El Salvador. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Salvador, 1961–64.

2. The recently-elected regime which takes office on July 1 came to power on an Alliance for Progress platform. This new regime, pro-U.S. and backed by the military, is headed by Colonel Julio Rivera and enjoys unanimous support in the Salvadorean legislature. A major problem facing the new government is to effect a face-saving but not principle-sacrificing rapprochement with the oligarchy dominating the business community so that the stagnant economy may grow again at the pace attained in the 1950's (This problem may seem not without modest parallels to you). My contacts with members of the present and future administrations, which are to a large extent identical, and with the business community were designed to assist this rapprochement. Indeed, one of our major loan projects there will be devoted to a private industrial development bank which the government sees as a concrete step in the direction of better relations with the business community. El Salvador has both money and managerial talent in its private sector and can grow significantly if the business community can be convinced to put its money to work in the country once more. President-elect Rivera, with whom I talked at length at the outset of my visit, seemed to see this problem clearly, as well as the need for social reform and for the building of stabilizing national institutions. While his cabinet seemed distinctly second rate, his posture thus far and the heavy emphasis he has placed on building a sound planning facility bode well for the future.

3. In addition to many discussions with members of the present and future government and business leaders, my four major public speeches, and my examination of the local US A.I.D. program, among other highlights of my visit were meetings with democratic trade union leaders, violent communist-inspired student attacks on the Alliance for Progress, and right-wing criticism of the Alliance in daily full-page advertisements. Another high spot was the inauguration of the first in a series of approximately 100 schools to be built this year in El Salvador. I attach photographs of the inaugural ceremony. This school was built in only 29 days to be ready for the opening of the Trade Fair. I have informed our mission in El Salvador that I wish the other schools built with comparable haste.

4. Local press coverage of the opening of the school and other aspects of my visit was heavy and prominent. There is no doubt that the Alliance for Progress is known widely in El Salvador. It is welcomed and supported by the Government and, as far as I can tell, by the chief non-Communist opposition to the government as well. It is violently attacked by the Communists, who have surrendered the issue of reform to us and campaign on the sterile ground that we seek to colonize their country. It is strongly criticized also by the oligarchy, which wants us to buy El Salvadorean coffee, sugar and other exports without limit

and to stop talking of social change. Thus attacked from both the right and the left, we and your able Ambassador, Murat Williams, intend to move ahead with the new government to rekindle economic growth, encourage social reform, and bring to the Salvadorean people the schools, homes and jobs they seek as the first fruits of the Alliance.

Teodoro Moscoso

121. Airgram CA-6720 from San Salvador, December 20¹

San Salvador, December 20, 1962

SUBJECT

El Salvador—Plan of Action from Present to July 1, 1963

The Latin American Policy Committee met on November 28 to discuss a Plan of Action for El Salvador. The enclosed Plan incorporates recommendations made by the Committee which then approved it for the guidance of all agencies concerned with U.S. policy toward El Salvador.

Rusk

Enclosure

El Salvador—Plan of Action from the Present to July 1, 1963

I. OBJECTIVES:

A. Political

1. Further reconciliation between the business-industrial community and President Rivera and his administration in order to make it possible for the Government to move ahead vigorously with development and reform programs along the lines advocated by Rivera in his inaugural address.

2. Assertion of leadership by President Rivera in the executive and legislative branches of the Government to get action on essential, long-delayed legislation.

¹ Plan of Action for El Salvador to July 1, 1963. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 611.16/12-2062.

3. The commencement of a program aimed at developing local community consciousness of and enthusiasm about their local developmental possibilities; capability for initiative and for producing effective and democratic local leadership; and a sense of responsibility and a will to use their own local resources to meet their necessities.

4. Reduction of communist, pro-Castro, anti-government and anti-U.S. influence in the national university, and further isolation of the Salvadoran Communist Party from political life.

5. Continuation of attitudes favoring political stability and moderate social and economic reform on the part of the Salvadoran military, the only really effective organized anti-Communist force.

6. Continuing development, as rapidly as is feasible, of responsible and democratically-oriented labor unionism, though realizing that it will have to continue to be supported largely by Government subsidy for the present.

B. *Economic*

1. Continuation of economic development activity at a steady or increasing pace, based on external loans and on an increase of 15% to 20% in tax revenues in 1963 over 1962 through proposed tax law reform and improvement in administration.

C. *Security Forces*

1. Maintenance of military and police forces capable of preserving law and order, detecting and countering subversive attempts against the government, and contributing through a civic action program to social and economic development.

[Here follows section II, "Current Situation," describing El Salvador's recent political changes, President Rivera's prospects, the strength of the communists, the orientation of the labor movement, the influence of the National University, prospects for economic development, and the need for government revenue.]

III. *LINES OF ACTION:*

A. *Political*

1. Continue to emphasize to both sides, especially the business community, the importance of cooperation between the government and the entrepreneurial class in the development of the country and the improvement of the condition of the individual, and the importance of adequate consultation between the Government and businessmen in preparing and carrying out forward-looking plans to accomplish these aims.

2. Continue to impress on President Rivera and members of his administration that continued failure to enact amendments to the hast-

ily-drafted 1961 decree increasing income taxes, to make it appreciably more effective, could seriously hinder achievement of the administration's economic and social development aims. Stress the importance of taking steps to build a public administration capability for increasing government revenues, to speed the mobilization of the country's resources and spread the tax burden more equitably, while ensuring that private initiative will not be stifled by excessively punitive measures.

3. Stimulate President Rivera into active leadership of his administration by making disbursements on forthcoming AID loan projects contingent on the adoption of measures outlined in 2 above; and by vetoing disbursements under the existing IDB housing loan in excess of US \$1 million unless the long-promised basic savings and loan legislation is enacted by the time that level of disbursements is reached.

4. To obtain *Objective 3*, attempt to encourage development of constructive local leadership, self-confidence among rural inhabitants, and improved conditions in rural areas. Do this through an *integrated community development* approach, defined as "A movement designed to promote better living for the whole community, with the active participation and, if possible, on the initiative of the community, but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, by the use of techniques for arousing and stimulating it in order to secure its active and enthusiastic response to the movement". Assign necessary AID resources to the early development and implementation of such a program.

5. Mindful of the fact that a political opposition which believes it cannot win in elections will inevitably attempt to foment coups, encourage initiatives by the Rivera Government designed to permit non-Communist opposition elements to acquire and hold local and national elective offices.

6. Seek to encourage development of stable political parties with well-organized grass-roots structures by both the "Ins" and the "Outs".

7. Support the IDB regional university reform program of introducing, via the Superior Council of Central American Universities, Basic Studies curricula and other measures to raise scholastic standards, eliminate politically-motivated "professional students" from the university, and direct the efforts of the country's qualified youth toward serious study and away from politics.

Increase still further U.S. contacts with university students, and secondary school teachers and students. Special attention should also be given to contacts among normal school students and teachers.

8. Continue to assist the weak non-communist labor unions to raise the qualifications of their present and potential leaders by offering training grants, as available; arranging contacts with U.S. labor union

representatives interested in helping them; and providing informational and similar services available from the U.S. Government, along with a morale-lifting show of interest in their problems and activities. Suggest to Salvadoran Government officials and to private employers where feasible the desirability of adhering to labor relations policies which will permit the democratic unions in the country to build independent strength by obtaining tangible benefits for their followers. Attempt to make clear to employers that otherwise the inevitable development of labor unions will be dominated by the communists.

9. Suggest to President Rivera and to his public security officials the importance of implementing the much-needed and stringent new anti-communist law with strong emphasis on accuracy in identifying targets so as to avoid popular discrediting of the new law and the Rivera Government as merely arbitrary and repressive. Continue training activities in intelligence as needed.

10. Discreetly promote the adoption of an Army retirement plan providing for the automatic and *mandatory* annual retirement of appropriate numbers of officers in the higher command and civilian government positions. The objective would be to avoid future congestion in the senior ranks and consequent discontent among younger officers, while diverting the energies of honorably retired officers to useful activity elsewhere in the society.

11. Expose fully the Castro-Communist threat to El Salvador's future, with particular emphasis on the failure and negativism of the Communist experiment.

B. *Economic*

1. Urge government-business collaboration in planning economic development, as in Political Line of Action No. 1, above.

2. In recognition of the fact that the Salvadoran Government's own resources are insufficient to match to any significant extent additional infusions of external credit for economic development, adjust, as needed, the matching requirement for AID development loans to a nominal percentage, provided the Salvadoran Government for its part adopts tax reforms which together with improvements in administration could increase tax revenues in 1963 on the order of 15% to 20% over 1962.

3. Support future Salvadoran approaches to the IMF for a judicious increase in the present Central Bank credit ceilings, provided that the Salvadoran Government takes prior or concurrent actions to increase public revenues as in 2 above. These measures would together be intended to enable the government to continue to borrow abroad and to maintain sufficient investment activity to keep up the momentum toward expansion of the economy without causing serious risk to fiscal and monetary stability and, as a consequence, to investor confidence.

Encourage maximum utilization of the available private capital on deposit in Salvadoran banks.

4. Urge the Salvadoran Government and private organizations to plan jointly with regional, national and private Central American entities to strengthen the Central American Common Market and regional development.

5. With a view towards achieving a fully operating and effective economic planning mechanism by the end of 1963, assist in the expeditious procurement, either through the consultant firm of Robert Nathan or if necessary through AID/W, of the needed additional technical staff.

6. Use our influence to help El Salvador and the other Central American countries get faster response from the Central American Bank for Economic Development on its application for loans for its segment of the regional cadastral survey, which is needed for improved land tenure, use and tax policies.

C. Security Forces

1. Make available to the Salvadoran Government, on a grant basis if necessary, the minimum military and police equipment and training needed to maintain public order and internal security.

2. Support a civic action military program through MAP and AID which would include training for literacy and technical skills.

3. Support a troop information program which would contribute to the objectives outlined in this paper.

122. Memorandum of conversation, March 20, between President Kennedy and President Rivera¹

March 20, 1963

SUBJECT

Salvadoran Political and Economic Situation, Plans—Support for Alliance Informational Activities—U.S. Cotton Policies—Requests Being Submitted for 5 Loan Projects, More Peace Corpsmen—Communism in El Salvador—Travellers to Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary Martin
Mr. Moscoso
Ambassador Williams

El Salvador
The President
Dr. Rector Ecobar Serrano,
Minister of Foreign
Affairs

After expressing his greetings and admiration, President Rivera said that in El Salvador his government was making a great effort to overcome certain backwardnesses which had handicapped the Republic for years. He spoke first of the political situation and emphasized that there was free activity of political parties except for the Communist Party. He said proposals were being undertaken for improvement in the electoral system and he expected that proportional representation would be introduced this year. He said that there was unrestricted liberty of the press.

Turning to the Alliance for Progress he mentioned his great friend Mr. Moscoso with whom he had collaborated closely in promoting the Alliance for Progress. He said that he felt now that there was need for greater dissemination of information about the Alliance for Progress. He referred to Ambassador de Lesseps Morrison's recent visit and said that he hoped that through his assistance a committee could be established to undertake this task. (There was further discussion between the President, the Secretary, Mr. Moscoso and Ambassador Williams of the role that USIA played in helping to spread information about the Alliance for Progress. It was pointed out that while the Committee to which President Rivera was referring was sponsored by the OAS, much work was already being done by USIS.)

Rivera next spoke of the success of El Salvador in creating an atmosphere of confidence so that economic production would increase.

¹ Salvadoran political and economic situation and plans; support for Alliance informational activities; U.S. cotton policies; loan projects; Peace Corps; communism in El Salvador; travelers to Cuba. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL EL SAL.

He said that when he began his program, there was much resistance by the wealthy people to social security. "As you know, Mr. President," he said, "wealth in our country is often in the hands of a few. We have achieved conciliation with the wealthy. The big capitalists are cooperating with us." He said that there were two representatives of the private sector on the National Planning Committee, one from the wealthy group, the other from the artisan level.

He then said that social progress and economic progress must move forward together. He said that much was being done now in economic sectoral planning.

Rivera expressed his concern over newspaper reports that there would be an increase in cotton subsidy in the United States which would have an unfortunate effect in El Salvador since it would probably cause a drop in cotton prices. This would have a bad effect on the economic growth of the country.

President Kennedy intervened to say that he thought that no legislation to permit an increase in cotton subsidy was likely in the near future, but he would let President Rivera know when he returned to Washington what the answer might be. He said that the matter had been raised in the United States.

Rivera then turned to his social program. He emphasized that 20 per cent of the national budget was going into investment in the public sector. He stressed the need for hospitals and First Aid Stations. He expressed pleasure over the arrival of the first mobile health units. He said he hoped to have two units in every department of the country (or a total of 28). President Kennedy asked how many there were now. Only two were in service but ten more were expected. Ambassador Williams noted that a mobile health unit had recently arrived from Germany, which would have an important contribution to the program.

Rivera had words of praise for the Peace Corps and said there was great support (*simpatia*) for it in the country. He said that the Minister of Agriculture had emphasized to him the value of the Peace Corps in education, technical improvements and community development. He said that he himself (Rivera) had had opportunity to observe the Peace Corps directly. El Salvador would soon request an increase in the number of volunteers. He hoped the Corps could assist in achieving two purposes: one, to raise production, the other, to foster a healthy spirit in the countryside which would resist Communism.

Rivera mentioned agrarian reform and said that El Salvador needed it, but suffered from severe lack of land. He had a committee studying it which would not seek the creation of many *minifundias* but rather a reform that would help to increase production and improve the lot of the *campesino*. He hoped to achieve land ownership for the small farmer which would be protected against exploitation.

On his over-all economic program, Rivera said he expected to see an increase in gross national product, from the present 4.7% per annum to a rate of 6.5%. This would require a considerable investment—150 million dollars in the next five years. Rivera then spoke of the industrious character of the Salvadorans. Unfortunately there was 18 per cent unemployment. It was vital to provide work. He said if people worked they will not be misled by Communism.

(Parenthetically, Rivera asked Ambassador Williams when the new American Embassy building would be constructed. Secretary Rusk said that there had been some delay in the Congressional appropriation. President Kennedy asked the status of the plans. Ambassador Williams replied that land had been bought, architectural plans had been made, construction could start as soon as the appropriation was available.)

President Rivera said that his government was submitting five new loan projects. These include three agricultural loans, one industrial development loan, and one loan for school construction for an over-all total of about 17 million dollars.

With respect to housing, President Kennedy inquired as to the status of the projects. Ambassador Williams said that a loan of 6.1 million dollars had been received from the Inter-American Development Bank and that low cost housing had already been built under this program. President Rivera spoke of his great satisfaction in having approved, just before his departure for Costa Rica, a new law authorizing the establishment of a savings and loan association designed to bring local savings into housing.

Rivera spoke next about measures to control Communism and said that Salvador now had a law for this purpose which he believed would be effective. He indicated that he had precise information about Communists and stated that in a population of 2,600,000 there were only 200 real Communist leaders and 5,000 sympathizers. In contrast, he said, President Somoza had said that in Nicaragua there were 35,000 Communists. Rivera said that violence had diminished in El Salvador lately and he believed that with an improved economy these would have less temptation to Communism.

Referring to his economic program he said that El Salvador had been handicapped by the lack of technical experts. Too many, he said, have gone over to international organizations, especially the Organization of American States. He was grateful for Mr. Moscoso's assistance in providing technical experts especially in planning. He expected El Salvador's national plan to be finished by the end of 1963.

President Kennedy asked what happened with Salvadoran students in Cuba. Did President Rivera know what they did when they returned?

Rivera replied that his government kept well-informed on these persons. Most of them were in the University. Ordinarily, he said, Salvadoran workers were not Communists. He mentioned the fact that the principal trade union confederation had 40 thousand members, whereas the Communist confederation had only about 3 thousand. What preoccupied him was that some of the workers who went to Cuba came back and did sabotage while students who went to Cuba went into the coffee and cotton fields to stir up the workers by illusory promises. Among measures to control this agitation were the National Guard patrols and the good work of the Catholic Church in the countryside.

Rivera said that he had noticed an interesting development among the Communists in El Salvador lately. There was a split between the advocates of Krushchev and the advocates of Mao. Some felt defrauded by Krushchev because of the Cuban crisis and had turned to Mao. There consequently had been changes in the personnel of Communist leadership. The psychological blow of Cuba had demoralized many who had now turned to the Chinese Communists. Neither of the two lines of Communist policy suited Rivera.

President Kennedy noted that we might be better off if they followed Krushchev, because if Krushchev thought he was losing the Communists abroad to Mao, Krushchev might feel a compulsion to become more violent.

In bringing the meeting to a close, President Kennedy said that he had been particularly anxious to meet President Rivera and to express to him the support for the Alliance during its early times. There had been much criticism of the Alliance but “these trees don’t grow overnight”. President Rivera said that he had delivered to Ambassador Williams a report on El Salvador for the President. President Kennedy said he would take it with him to Washington and would certainly do what was possible to help Salvador in its development program. (The report was delivered to General Clifton).

123. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, July 22¹

July 22, 1963

SUBJECT

El Salvador—Short-Term Prospects for Political Stability Good—Long-Term Prospects Less So

Despite El Salvador's Alliance for Progress accomplishments, there continues to be fairly serious underlying political weakness. Several recent developments underline the fact that the honeymoon is over for the year-old administration of Lt. Col. Julio Rivera. In this context Ambassador Williams has submitted the enclosed new assessment of "Political Realities in El Salvador", focusing more sharply on the lack of organized support for the Government of El Salvador and the Alianza among many civilians.

Recent unfavorable developments in El Salvador include the following:

1. The weakening of the ORIT-supported labor confederation—the Government's major ally in the elections of Rivera and his one-party Legislative Assembly—which became apparent in its poor showing in this year's May Day parades. This recurring problem stems from the fact that the infant non-Communist labor movement continues to be basically dependent on GOES support and subject to its restraint, with the result that the individual union member has difficulty seeing how union membership is benefitting him.

2. The recent success of opposition political figures in spreading rumors of coup attempts and/or GOES financial difficulties, thereby creating an atmosphere of uneasiness.

3. The apparent inability of the GOES to get the story of their "program" to the people as a means of evoking public support.

4. A recent report by the Vice President that the "young" military officers in particular are becoming more insistent concerning the need for social and economic progress, and harder to satisfy on this point because of the influence of the anti-Government press.

5. An indication that President Rivera may be becoming careless about the delicate problem of maintaining close personal contact with his military peers. (His Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff are concerned because he failed to consult them before appointing a key military "Out" to a political position.)

¹ El Salvador—long- and short-term prospects for political stability. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Salvador, 1961–64.

In his assessment, Ambassador Williams outlines in a general way what can be done and is being done to attack the underlying problem. His thinking is in the line with current policy directives, including the plan of action approved for El Salvador by the Latin American Policy Committee. Continued attention will be given to this problem and possible means of attacking it in the next plan of action submitted for the consideration of the Latin American Policy Committee.

Grant G. Hilliker
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

San Salvador's A-706.

Guatemala

124. Telegram 459 from Guatemala City, April 20¹

Guatemala City, April 20, 1961

Met with leading members American Community Noon today to exchange impressions and get their views gravity present situation and outcome current events. Majority view these men is that Ydigoras, by his deftness and stratagem of being firm enough but not too firm, will overcome present threat law and order posed by Castroists and extreme leftist continuing hold unauthorized manifestations. Minority view, while not doubting Ydigoras personally dedicated anti-Castroism/anti-Communism, fears Ydigoras allowing Communists too free hand and may allow situation get beyond control. This might have further effect, some thought, alarming military and causing important elements of them push Ydigoras aside and take matter in own hands. Some felt indeed some army elements, in conjunction political outs, might try overthrow Ydigoras on pretext he not acting forcefully enough, whether he were or not.

Last night's confrontation pro and anti-Castro groups somewhat unique. Presence armed anti-Castro groups, and their engaging pro-Castristas undoubtedly inspired by Ydigoras as Machiavellian way breaking up unauthorized pro-Castro meeting without use official armed forces. Deaths resulted but these were not martyrs shot down by Ydigoras's soldiers and police but people unfortunately shot by fellow citizens in melee which would not have taken place but for unauthorized public demonstration on part pro-Castro forces.

While air uncertainly and apprehension prevails, Embassy inclined subscribe majority view businessmen noted above that Ydigoras will be as firm as situation requires but not unduly so, and that he will overcome current crisis.

Muccio

¹ Report on exchange of views of current situation at a meeting with leading members of the American Community. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-2061.

125. Despatch 494 from Guatemala City, March 31¹

Guatemala City, March 31, 1962

REF: Embtel 428; Deptel 344. SUBJECT: U.S. Interests and the Guatemalan Political Scene.

The events of the past fortnight in Guatemala necessitate a reappraisal of the situation in terms of prospects for U.S. policy objectives. It is my belief that these events have significantly weakened the Ydígoras Government, that Ydígoras' chances to finish his term have been seriously depreciated, and that a major gain has been gratuitously presented to the candidacy of Juan José Arévalo. These events have, in other words, strengthened and encouraged the Communists and those opposed to the United States, and have dimmed the prospects for the success of U.S. policy.

A month ago, I had the impression that the Ydígoras Government, while almost certainly one which was going to be subjected to increasing attack as the weeks and months went by, would be able, as it had so many times before, to weather these storms, pursuing the standard Ydígoras tactics of dividing the enemy by a combination of deals and threats. The major necessities seemed to be to achieve some appreciable progress in social and economic development, to preclude an Ydígoras-Arévalo union, to seek and foster the development of a candidate who could succeed Ydígoras and defeat Arévalo. While I believed these to be difficult of attainment and that their prosecution required urgent and careful application of our skills and energies, they did not appear to be impossible of achievement.

The recent events, I believe, caught us by surprise—not in failing to anticipate the probability of demonstrations such as the students initiated, but in not having foreseen the manner in which Ydígoras would respond to the challenge. I believe that his response was equally surprising to the students, to the Communists, to the non-Communist opposition, to the military, to the public and indeed to members of his own party. The students were undoubtedly egged on by the Communists, ever eager to foment disorder, and by the non-Communist opposition, always willing to attack the Government. These elements may have hoped, for different reasons, that the Government would fall; the Communists doubtless hoped some martyrs could be produced so that further agitation would be abetted; but I do not believe that they expected these results. I believe they expected the President to be able

¹ U.S. interests and the Guatemalan political scene following recent demonstrations. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/3-3062.

to defeat their efforts and did not anticipate that he would adopt such violent methods as to offer what proved to be a major opportunity to overthrow his Government.

The President argues that the students' tactics left him no option but the use of force. He points out that they had planned their demonstrations to occur in the crowded downtown area both to effect a maximum disruption of normal activity and to involve large numbers of people not a part of their group. Thus traffic in city streets was to be blocked off and a minority of demonstrators spread throughout the groups of people could give the impression of a much larger protest and render more difficult the problem of policing the area. The President also contends that it was the demonstrators who commenced shooting and that the police were defending themselves. The possibility that non-Governmental forces initiated the shooting certainly exists, but it is equally likely that it began with the hated judicial police. Whatever the facts may be as to the first to shoot, the action of the police in the days that followed was brutal, violent and indiscriminate. It is impossible to conclude anything but that the President personally determined to use full force against the demonstrators (and as an obvious corollary), anyone else in the way, and to take the opportunity to bully his political enemies. I believe this decision was deliberate and I believe it was a basic political mistake.

The President's public justification for his action, and his private assertions, were that the movement was Communistic, that its participants were not students (except in the first days when there were some student dupes), that the power of the Communists was increasing rapidly by reason of outside support in the form of arms and money, and that the liberty of Guatemala was at stake. The Cuban radio provided him with considerable assistance in this effort by its claims that a "socialist" government was going to get power, its appeals for revolt, its threats of legions led by Arbenz, Paz Tejada, etc. It is noteworthy, however, that his actions did not include jailing Communist leaders.

The general public reaction against the violence of the repressive measures brought the non-Communist opposition to the sudden realization that Ydígoras could be dislodged if the military forces of the country could be persuaded to join in such a movement. While a union of the opposition and the military could have effected such a result at any time, the opportunity which presented itself for such a union was real, immediate and unexpected.

The military, and I must add that a major weakness in this Mission is its scarcity of information as to the attitudes and aspirations of the officer corps—excepting a few of the senior officers, is assumed to be anti-Communist and generally right of center in its political philosophy. Whether this assessment is valid, I do not know. Based on the available

evidence, it is my opinion that the senior officers at least are genuinely fearful of and thus opposed to a regime of the left since the events of Cuba have shown that such a regime would be adverse to the interests of the military itself. In all likelihood there are less crass motivations also present among the military, such as devotion to constitutional government, intellectual conviction as to the merits of democracy, and in some cases loyalty to the President.

Whatever the proper political analysis, there can be no doubt on the evidence we have from a variety of sources, including the President, that there was a substantial resistance in the Army to the proposal that the Army replace the police in patrolling the streets of Guatemala City and in maintaining order. As the President himself told me there were quite a few officers who felt that the Army should not be asked "to shoot boys and girls." It is a fact that there was a long delay between the issuance of the notice that responsibility had been given to the Army and the actual appearance on the streets of any military patrols. There is reason to believe that if the demonstrations had continued and that if substantial numbers of citizens had joined in them during the period after the order for Army control was issued and before the actual initiation of patrols, the Army might not have obeyed the order. The feeling of the officers was that it would not be the enemy at whom they were to fire.

For at least a brief period toward the end of the week of March 11–17 the non-Communist opposition believed it had achieved agreement with military leaders adequate to force the resignation of the President. Why this agreement collapsed or failed to last (if it indeed existed on any firm basis) is not entirely clear. Some believe the President was just a jump or two ahead and succeeded in shifting commanders just in time, others deny the agreement was ever soundly based—that is, that it had not obtained the consent of sufficient or sufficiently influential officers, others feel the President's warnings of Communist leadership and the Habana broadcasts frightened the officers off. A general feeling is that the spectre of a chaotic situation fertile for the Communists or of a Commie takeover, appeared a worse evil than the continuation of Ydígoras. Certainly the student movement had not been preceded by any really organized plan for or agreement on an anti-Communist succession to the present Government.

From the Communist point of view the events were splendid. The Government had reacted with violence, it had shocked even its own supporters, the division between Ydígoras and the anti-Communist opposition had been deepened and intensified. Current opinion among anti-Communist opposition to Ydígoras is that any union or cooperation between them and Ydígoras is "absolutely impossible." I don't think the Communists expected to take over, nor indeed is the situation

yet ripe for them. The logical sequence would seem to me to be one of continuous opportunistic exploitation of public antipathy for the Government, exacerbation of the division between the non-Communist forces, capitalizing upon targets of opportunity and paving the way for a government either so extreme (rightist military), so weak (a divided and inept coalition), or so amenable (Arévalo) that an ultimate Communist takeover is facilitated.

The Ydígoras Government has been gaining in unpopularity for some time. It may be true, as the President says, that his regime compares favorably in most respects with all of its predecessors, and that the opposition to him is a combine of envious competitors for power, none of whom he considers to have sufficient strength or conviction to be capable of preserving a democratic state, and of the Communists. However, it is also true that there is a great discontent with the regime which is based upon considerations other than Communism or political opportunism. This discontent stems first and foremost from the general public belief that the Ydígoras Government has overstepped the bounds of permissible graft, that is, that the "take" has been and continues to be greatly excessive. Secondly, the Ydígoras policy of "divide and rule" has left him devoid of much support beyond the sycophants or fellow grafters. No one can feel confident of his position; it is the Old Man and he alone who exercises power. Thirdly, and while this point receives less public attention, it does worry many and it worries me, the President has not really acted vigorously and effectively against the Communists within Guatemala. Some members of the American business community believe that the general public is fed up with Ydígoras' *failure* to be a strong man and contend that his handling of the riots was not strong enough rather than too strong. Action against non-Communist political enemies has been more frequent and prompt than against Communists. For example, the Government paper printed pictures and biographies of the four Communist student leaders during the recent events but professed inability "to find" them to arrest. They appeared rather easy to locate in our opinion.

The conclusion that the President has not only "gone easy" on domestic Communists but has found it politically convenient to have such a group seems to me well founded. Efforts made by U.S. representatives to persuade him to establish effective intelligence arrangements have been unsuccessful to date. No effort has been made by him to obtain more effective anti-Communist legislation. Information provided regarding Communist activity has not resulted in effective counteraction. The Old Man is a courageous and stubborn person who has managed to confound and refute those who have prophesied his fall for quite a long time. He knows his advent to power was opposed by the U.S. He has succeeded so far in keeping power by what he calls

his tightrope walking, balancing his opposing forces off one against the other. To his mind, I think, the Communists have helped to balance the non-Communist opposition and to keep some of his own conservative supporters in line. He told me he had flirted with Arévalo not because he liked him or intended to support him but to balance off—i.e., counter the “U.S. support of his enemy, Mario Mendez Montenegro.” He exudes confidence, enjoys this sort of political action, and, I expect, believes sincerely in his ability to continue the performance, “handling” the Communists and the opposition, the U.S., and the British (in re British Honduras) without mishap.

There is, of course, some truth in what I have assumed his analysis to be. It is a fact that the opposition lacks unity and if it has strong men capable of effective leadership, their presence is not obvious. It is true that the Arévalo-Arbenz period produced Communists, Communist sympathizers and a degree of indoctrination in Communist ideology which cannot be eradicated by force alone. It is true that to govern at all among the congeries of political forces here is a difficult feat requiring a mastery of political give and take and of the art of balancing competitive forces.

Perhaps the Old Man will prove to be correct in his belief that he can last out his term without either the Communists or the non-Communists being able to upset him. Certainly the non-Communist opposition has so far been frustrated by the Old Man’s success in avoiding overthrow. If it is assumed, for hypothesis, that he can last, it seems to me the likelihood of an Arévalo Government is greatly increased unless he changes his present techniques. If the non-Communist opposition comes to the conclusion, or if a substantial segment of it comes to the conclusion that no existing political leader or group alone can unseat Ydígoras, the temptation to accept Communist support will certainly be much harder to resist. With or without such support (since I assume the Communists would regard Arévalo’s election as a victory) the tendency to look for a charismatic leader will grow and grow. Arévalo’s highly intelligent position of remaining aloof from the present events, of maintaining that government should only change constitutionally, and his statements of rejection of Communist support are all likely, even if not calculated to be, to engender enthusiasm for him among the body, if not the leaders, of the non-Communist opposition as “the man” who can reunite and save the country.

I realize the danger of political prophesy in a scene such as exists here, and I am deeply conscious of my own limited experience in and knowledge of this environment. But I do not believe that Ydígoras will find it as easy to stay in office as he seems to think and I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that, if he does succeed through the use of his present tactics, we will have lost Guatemala. To continue in power,

Ydígoras must keep the military with him, or develop (as he has given many indications of a desire to do) a counter-military force of campesinos along with a part of the military, and he will be able and will be tempted to use them in increasingly harsher measures. If the opposition continues its actions against Ydígoras and provokes such harsher measures, or if it elects to join with the Arévalo camp and wait for 1964, the effect of either of these actions will be to force upon the U.S. a choice between the extremes of right or left.

I am inclined to the view that the opposition is not yet prepared to give in nor to join the Communists nor to support Arévalo. I think their efforts to find a means of getting military support so as to unseat the President will continue and are apt to reach a climax at any time, and possibly in the next two or three months. Their problems are difficult ones, however. They are united now in only one respect—they all desire the departure of Ydígoras. In varying degrees they are appreciative of the dangers inherent in dislodging him if no agreement on a successor exists. Some wish a constitutional change with Ydígoras resigning, the first designate becoming provisional President and elections within four months. Others feel a military junta is the answer, again with early elections. Some advocate a civil-military junta to hold and exercise power for a year or more. (A six man—three civilian and three military—junta with a larger advisory council, was the proposal that almost succeeded.) Their programs for action after they assume charge are somewhat vague. I am told they agree on (1) honesty in government, (2) better administration, and (3) anti-Communism. That these laudable principles or objectives need leadership, organization, discipline and executive capability to accomplish is acknowledged but such acknowledgment is not yet visibly accompanied by any specific plans or programs. No one of the leaders of the various political groups is an obvious good choice; their capacity and/or willingness to work together as a team is of uncertain but doubtful dependability.

None of them, as of this moment, is prepared to entertain cooperation with Ydígoras. They say such cooperation might have been conceivable prior to the recent events but that Ydígoras has made it impossible. Whether this attitude will persist I do not know, but it seems to be pretty firmly held now. Ydígoras has been making efforts to attract the opposition—using different emissaries to different groups—to join with him and has held out the bait of Cabinet changes, etc. They believe (and I expect Ydígoras does too) that this is a question of the spider inviting the flies into the parlor. It seems evident they lack conviction of their ability to deal on equal terms in any union. Thus the theoretical and desirable solution of a negotiated peace between the anti-Communist opposition and Ydígoras does not seem presently practicable. I believe that *if* the opposition could agree on a specific set of demands

for reforms and a program for anti-Communist action and for progress in the social and economic field, that it could secure the backing of the military for these, and that with the backing of the U.S., the President could be forced to accept the terms. But, as long as the opposition includes in its conditions the primary (presently sole) requirement of Ydígoras' resignation, no such solution appears possible.

Failing the possibility of a genuine cooperative program of this sort, presumably the next best thing for U.S. interests that an Ydígoras Government could do would be on its own to effect reforms, curb the Communists, and push a vigorous development program in a manner which would permit the growth and development not only of a suitable successor to the Office of President but of a political climate which could assure his election against Arévalo. This is a tall order. Whether Ydígoras could take actions which would deflate and satisfy the opposition is problematical. As for honesty in government, he will, of course, as he has before, deny the allegations and attribute them to his enemies. If he were to put an end to the present graft (assuming that he could) the charge of past graft would remain. Some victims for a purge (Alejos, Samayoa) might satisfy the public but the purging might prove hard to do and unless the Old Man felt confident of its effectiveness, he would be unlikely to act. As for anti-Communist action, I am not sanguine of success in persuading him as long as he is convinced of a greater need to counter other opposition elements. He would, I believe, be enthusiastic about development as long as the moneys come from aid and were used to improve his political stature. However, any real mobilization of the people of the country behind a developmental program is probably impossible as long as the larger issues of political conflict continue.

We have embarked on efforts to push him in these directions. I have insisted on the urgent necessity of an effective campaign against Communists here. It is too early to feel the effectiveness of these representations. I have also insisted that a better organization and plan is essential to economic progress. Efforts to produce something here are in motion but caution is the watchword. I have talked to him about the need to develop a candidate to beat Arévalo, but he is not giving an inch so far in terms of fostering any competitive political figures.

The chances of successful prosecution of U.S. objectives cannot therefore be described as bright.

We must, of course, consider other possible alternatives. These fall within the assumption that the Ydígoras Government is overthrown. This may happen with or without our concurrence or support. Obviously, also, the lack or existence of our concurrence or support could increase the chances of one or another of these alternatives. Thus, Ydígoras could be overthrown by a rightist military junta, or by a

junta of civilian and military elements. Such juntas might be of either temporary or enduring nature, and might or might not seek to maintain a cover of constitutional change. Again they might or might not be agreed upon a platform and an organization.

If we were to be able to secure a true cooperation between Ydígoras and his non-Communist opposition, I believe such would be the most desirable alternative for U.S. interests. A unilateral Ydígoras effort at reform and improvement of the sort described before would be preferable to a chaotic competition of oppositionists. However, it cannot be denied that if the Ydígoras Government were overthrown under a facade of constitutionality, by a civilian and/or civilian/military group united in direction and purpose to have clean government, rout the Communists and develop the economy, the interests of the U.S. would not necessarily be damaged and in reality might be advanced, especially if the alternative appears to be two more years of business on the same old basis.

In this highly volatile environment the possibility exists that an effort of this latter sort may be made; certainly the possibility of a request for U.S. support is a real one also. The granting or denying of such support by a course of either action or inaction may present us suddenly with a political decision of great importance. I think our judgment in such event must be coldly pragmatic in the light of an assessment of the probabilities and alternatives which are open to us.

John O. Bell

American Ambassador

126. Telegram 496 from Guatemala City, April 19¹

Guatemala City, April 19, 1962

In one and one half hour meeting with Ydígoras today I took occasion to point out that danger of Communist takeover in Guatemala greatly increased over past several months by success in creating belief in public mind that government (A) engages in or permits graft, corruption and inefficiency in conduct public business, (B) while attacking Communism abroad permits and fosters it at home and (C) lacks active

¹ Danger of a Communist takeover in Guatemala discussed with President Ydígoras. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-1862.

economic financial policy and program to reverse current deterioration and assure progress and that I felt imperative recognize these beliefs were political facts whether or not accurate and that equally important to mount vigorous counter offensive to dispel them. Suggested series of actions with respect to each which President might take, giving these as personal views not official US Government representations. President took this in good spirit and spoke with feeling (and I must say in moving fashion) of extreme difficulty encountered throughout term of office in finding honest, patriotic persons willing and able serve government effectively. Said he would give serious thought my views and thanked me for them. I remain convinced of accuracy in terms of US interests of local saying “con Ydígoras-malo; sin Ydígoras-peor”.

Bell

127. Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to McGhee, April 26¹

April 26, 1962

TO: M—Mr. McGhee

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: ARA-Edwin M. Martin

SUBJECT

Guatemala

I have not forgotten your memorandum of April 24 with respect to a Presidential communication to Ydigoras. We have been discussing it carefully as the Guatemalan situation has been evolving. At present we in ARA are unanimously opposed to getting the President into the act at this time. We feel that to do so would inevitably involve his prestige in one way or another. This we think would be unwise for several reasons.

Ydigoras has up to now refused to arrest the Communist leaders, in fact there are some people who feel he has given the Communists financial support on the grounds this strengthens his position with the

¹ Reasons to keep the President from getting involved in Guatemalan situation for the time being. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-2662.

United States and with his own military. He also is in close touch with the exiled, soft on Communism and politically popular leader, Arevalo.

At the same time he is constantly crying "wolf, wolf" with respect to the Communists and Castro in a most irresponsible fashion. There is almost no evidence to back up his repeated charges that the Communists were doing this or that.

He and his immediate entourage are thoroughly corrupt and becoming conspicuously so even for Latin America. This is a major factor in the opposition to him.

He has up to now shown little or no interest in governing the country in an even moderately decent way, particularly with respect to the Alliance for Progress objectives.

He is able to maintain himself in power and maintain order primarily as a result of the support of the military. His increasingly inept performance, as described above, is alienating some elements of the military and they can no longer be counted upon to be solidly behind him.

The alternative to Ydigoras is not necessarily chaos or Communism but more likely the succession of the military officer recently chosen as Vice President-designate and, hence, Constitutional successor in case of resignation of Ydigoras. There are one or two opposition leaders in whom we are interested, but none of them has adequate public or military support at present.

We have been working for some time on the problem of what to do in the absence of Ydigoras, and the LA Policy Committee meeting this afternoon will be devoted to this subject. I will let you know what progress we are making. Meanwhile I attach an ARA proposal.

Attachment:

Memo to EMM from OAP-Mrs. Bracken, dated 4/26/62 (Tab A).

**128. Memorandum from Katherine W. Bracken to
Edwin M. Martin, April 26¹**

April 26, 1962

SUBJECT

Guatemala: Current Situation and Contingencies

A. Current Situation

Ten days have passed since President Ydígoras announced on April 15 that he would reorganize his cabinet and otherwise attempt a conciliation with the opposition. With the breathing spell afforded by the Holy Week truce, an announcement of cabinet changes had been expected on Monday, April 23, but still has not been made. Some minor disturbances and some work stoppages have occurred since April 15, but a threatened “general strike” on April 23 failed to materialize. The most potentially serious development is the stoppage of railway service into and out of Puerto Barrios which threatens paralyzation of this major port and has already caused spoilage of banana shipments. It appears that Ydígoras’ promise to seek a conciliation with the opposition did not mean he would agree to form a coalition government with the opposition or enter into any formalized agreement with them; his action so far indicates he was seeking a peace period in order to divide opposition elements. The opposition still distrusts Ydígoras and remains adamant in its position that he must resign.

The fact is, however, that time is running out for Ydígoras unless he promptly announces a new cabinet which will command wide public respect and support, which would in turn probably assure Ydígoras of the continued support of the military. On the other hand, if he is unable to put together such a cabinet, the opposition forces will redouble their efforts to oust him. The final straw might be major disturbances sparked by the forthcoming May 1 labor day celebrations.

Unless Ydígoras can achieve a rather drastic improvement in his current status, he seems almost certainly headed for replacement within the very immediate future. Should this occur, then one of the following contingencies (in the order of their probability) may develop.

*B. Contingencies**1. Constitutional Substitution of Ydígoras.*

Should Ydígoras voluntarily or forcefully be removed, the constitutional process could likely be preserved, especially if the military sup-

¹ Current situation and possible contingencies in Guatemala. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-2662.

ported this solution. In this case, the First Presidential Designate, Colonel Ernesto MOLINA Arreaga (tough, unimaginative, pro-United States and strongly anti-Communist) would become President. Elections must then be held within four months. This solution is the more likely since it would appeal to the more conservative forces by avoiding abrupt changes and would still hold a promise of change to the more liberal forces through the electoral process.

2. Military-Civilian Junta.

Such a Junta may be formed if there is any split in the military. The major civilian representation would likely come from the opposition. However, the opposition was unable during the March disturbances to get sufficient military support to form such a mixed Junta. Since the constitutional succession (No. 1) would put in power Colonel Molina, nominated by Ydígoras as the First Designate (although at a time when the military were calling the shots), the opposition may prefer a mixed Junta where they could have representation rather than consent to the constitutional succession procedure.

3. Military Junta.

Should the political situation become chaotic to the point that a Communist or extreme left usurpation represents an imminent threat, or should there be no civilian agreement on either contingency Nos. 1 or 2, then the military will assume power themselves, to prevent anarchy and for self-preservation.

C. Suggestions for United States Action and Timing Under Contingencies

1. The United States should be prepared to support immediately and energetically a constitutional succession to Ydígoras, assuming that the constitutional provisions for election were immediately invoked.

2. Recognition of a military-civilian junta should be withheld for a short period pending clarification of its intentions and objectives, especially as regards a prompt call for elections. Recognition should be withheld until a consensus, especially in Central America, favors recognition.

3. Should military assumption of power be based only on failure or default on the part of the civilian powers, then recognition should be withheld until there is civilian participation with acceptable minimum guarantees of elections and freedoms.

129. Airgram A-142 from Guatemala City, September 11¹

Guatemala City, September 11, 1962

SUBJECT

Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Guatemala

Policy—Limit Distribution—S/S

The attached paper was prepared prior to the receipt today of a revised draft of "Guidelines of United States Policy and Operations Towards Guatemala." While comment on that draft will be forwarded as requested, this paper, it is requested, should be distributed on a limited basis to those concerned with U.S. policy towards Guatemala.

John O. Bell

Attachment

Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Guatemala

A variety of stimuli prompt me to the belief that it is timely to attempt a general review of U.S. policy and program in Guatemala in an effort to suggest a course for the future or at least for the balance of the legal term of office of the present government.

Eight months of opportunity to observe and study the Guatemalan scene and to revalue prior judgments and opinions is one such stimulus. The promised advent of the Byroade team with its mission of inquiry is another. A congeries of instructions from Washington reflecting a desire for emphasis upon particular goals and directing focussing of plans and programs to their ends is another.

In April of this year draft guidelines for policy and objectives for Guatemala were prepared by the Department in consultation with other interested Departments and Agencies. We are also in receipt of instructions which establish "youth" and "youth" programs as important goals, cite Central American integration and "regionalism" as warranting priority; call for development of internal defense plans "because Guatemala is within the cognizance of the Special Group (counterinsurgency)"—presumably as a country considered to be threatened by subversive insurgency; direct development of "civic action" programs as important priority needs; insist upon "reforms"

¹ Transmits guidelines for policy and operations in Guatemala. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, CF, 611.14/9-1162.

in accordance with *Alianza* "pledges" as essential to security; direct participation in regional health programs for mobile health units despite earlier insistence on reducing health activities to achieve "concentration"; direct participation in regional scholarship programs as important for U.S. interest; stress the need for military and police participation in health programs; emphasize the importance of child-feeding programs in our interest; warn of required emphasis on police programs, etc., etc., etc.

While it could not be contended that all of these instructions were inconsistent with or contradictory of the April guidelines, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile all of them into a coherent pattern of policy and program for Guatemala. I am familiar with the variety of reasons which lead to organizational arrangements and ensuing instructions emphasizing functional goals. I appreciate that it is hardly possible to draft these so as to be readily applicable to the particular and peculiar situations to be found in each foreign nation with which we have relations. Presumably it is the function and responsibility of the field mission to assure that the interpretation and application of these instructions is so accomplished as to fit the needs of U.S. interests in the country to which it is accredited.

It seems to me at this point in time that the definition of U.S. objectives set forth in the April draft require considerably more alteration and adjustment than was suggested by this mission in May. The purpose of this message is to discuss the first of the stated objectives.

To my mind the primary and overriding objective of U.S. policy in Guatemala should be to prevent it becoming a Communist state. I am not convinced that the objective set forth in the April guidelines: "the continuance of a legally established constitutional government in Guatemala, including the peaceful transfer of administration following the 1963 elections," if accomplished, would necessarily assure that Guatemala would be saved from Communism.

It is entirely conceivable, that Juan José Arévalo could be elected in a free election, and a peaceful transfer of administration achieved. If this occurred, political power in Guatemala would be in the hands of a man not only passionately and pathologically antagonistic to the United States and all its works, but a man who certainly paved the way for the accession of Communism into power in Guatemala during the Arbenz regime. In my opinion the coming of Arévalo again into power would be most likely to set into motion again a chain of events leading toward a seizure of power by the Communists. A close review of Guatemalan history certainly supports the contention that Arévalo paved the way for Communist control; if he did not realize he was doing so, he is dangerously stupid; if he did realize the logical results of his acts, he must be assumed to have intended or to have accepted

those results. In either case, it is hardly credible that the nature of the man has changed. He was nearly 50 years old at that time; he was no misguided, well-meaning youthful reformer. Even if one were prepared to make the very risky assumption that Arévalo, as President, would try to keep the Communists at arms length, the prospects for any cooperation with the U.S. in the Alliance for Progress would still be very slim indeed, and this would certainly contribute to the strengthening of Communism in Guatemala.

To many Guatemalans, perhaps to a majority, Arévalo is a dramatic figure of great appeal. Arévalo was the first President following the overthrow of the Ubico dictatorship and while his role in that overthrow was far from being the primary or even a significantly contributory one, he fell heir to the role of hero as a result. It is true that during the early days of his regime some reforms occurred; probably these would have taken place under any leadership succeeding Ubico, but Arévalo inherits the credit and the public image of a reformer. Coffee prices were high, the economy prosperous in Arévalo's days—although the fact of his administration had nothing to do with this, so that people think of Arévalo in terms of the "good old days." Arévalo succeeded in attaining recognition as a teacher outside of Guatemala; an international status is always an important asset to a politician in a small country. He has carefully avoided connecting himself in the public mind with the regime of his successor under whom Guatemala was given into Communist hands. He has been absent from Guatemala for many years and wisely remained aloof from the problems and issues with which other politicians have had to deal. At home, the competitors—rival politicians—are readily visible; their dimensions as men are apparent; their faults and weaknesses are open to notice. Given all these factors, it is not unnatural, especially among people largely inexperienced in self government, culturally conditioned over centuries to the concepts of the *caudillo* and the evasion of individual and group responsibility for political decisions, that Arévalo should appear to be the man on horseback whose return to power would assure a return to good times and relieve the people of having to worry about conditions.

To many other Guatemalans, however, especially and naturally those who have a more advanced economic status, those who are more politically sophisticated and have longer and more accurate memories of the past, as well as to a majority of the senior officers of the military, the prospect of an Arévalo return is a frightening and dismaying one. I am convinced that the single greatest reason and much more influential than all other reasons, which discourages Guatemalan capital investment and encourages its flight, is the fear of an Arévalo return. There is ample evidence now available to support the belief that conservatives and military leaders are seriously and with increasing determi-

nation considering how to achieve a coup as a means of preventing an Arévalo return. The Minister of Defense, Col. Peralta, has recently said "the Army of Guatemala will not permit Arévalo to be President." Whether these men can or will muster the courage and the force to overthrow the Government probably depends on their assessment of the degree of probability of Arévalo's success, their assessment of public reaction, and their assessment of U.S. attitudes. The events in Peru have been the subject of close and careful scrutiny. It is quite conceivable that in the final analysis the decision of these people as to whether or not to attempt a coup will depend on U.S. attitudes.

I am not suggesting that I believe we should encourage or abet those who are considering the solution of the Arévalo problem by means of a coup; certainly I think such action at this time unwise. I do suggest that it is conceivable that the time may come when the literal application of the stated policy objective would place us in the position of trying to assure Arévalo's assumption of power and thus the probability of a Communist Guatemala. If that situation should arise, and our policy were to be as indicated, I would ask to be relieved of any responsibility for its execution, since I believe such a course of action would be inimical to the interests of both the United States and Guatemala.

It seems to me that the objective of policy and operation earlier quoted might well be replaced by two objectives somewhat as follows:

"1. The prevention of the accession to power of the Communists in Guatemala.

"2. The continuance, if possible within the framework of objective No. 1, of a legally established, constitutional government of Guatemala, including the peaceful transfer of administration following the 1963 elections."

I do not think that the people of Guatemala really want what I think Arévalo would bring; I do not believe there are many Guatemalans who seek a Communist state. Nevertheless, Arévalo's appeal, his very real demagogic and political capabilities can serve to maintain the illusion in the minds of many Guatemalans that his Government would not be a Communist one or the inevitable forerunner of such a Government.

I am not prepared to concede at this point in time that another and acceptable candidate cannot be brought to victory over Arévalo at the polls, although many obstacles impede that achievement and although some Embassy personnel believe that such an achievement is not possible. I am not convinced that a coup to forestall Arévalo's election is presently practicable, even if we wanted one, and I am very doubtful that such a coup would prove to be more than a stopgap measure. The election of an acceptable successor to Ydigoras through

constitutional processes and democratic procedures is the only solution which would fully satisfy the needs of both the U.S. and Guatemala. I think our efforts must be directed toward this goal and that it should be considered the primary goal. If, in order to promote its attainment, we need to defer other goals, or to subordinate other desiderata, then we should do so. Nevertheless, as earlier indicated, we cannot exclude the possibility of failure nor the possibility of having to consider alternatives which fall short of the ideal solution.

I am convinced that the attainment of the objectives suggested above necessitates on our part a maximum effort to exert whatever influence and power we can bring to bear to coalesce support around a non-Communist opponent to Arévalo, to obtain a maximum unification of politicians and parties to this end.

In any such effort the role of Ydigoras is of considerable significance. Few would contend that Ydigoras could dictate the choice of his successor—certainly he does not have this power—but acquiescence in or support for the candidacy of Arévalo by Ydigoras would materially and perhaps fatally weaken the chances for defeating him.

It also seems apparent to me that the prospects for Arévalo's election would be materially improved if for the balance of Ydigoras' term the economic and fiscal situation were to deteriorate further. A growing conviction of failure of the *Alianza* to effect improvement in Guatemala's present status, regardless of where responsibility for such failure properly should be attributed, would certainly increase the political attractiveness of the great "spiritual socialist" Arévalo with his implication of capacity to solve all problems through acceptance of his mystic xenophobic doctrine. In this context (the economic and financial scene) the role of Ydigoras is also significant.

Ydigoras is the President of Guatemala. While his power and influence for the future surely wane as his term of office draws to a close, he is nevertheless the most powerful man in the country. The acts and functions of his government will directly and greatly influence the people, not only in their daily lives but in their assessment of the future and of the kind of government they will choose.

I am concerned, I hope unduly, that our relations with Ydigoras have been and may be handicapped by our attitudes toward him and his Government having been and perhaps being more harsh and more condemnatory than objective and realistic in terms of U.S. interests. This concern prompts me to an elaboration of this point, since I consider, as indicated above, that it is of considerable importance to our objectives to possess the maximum capability possible to influence Ydigoras.

Our relations with Ydigoras, while outwardly correct and friendly, are in fact as pleasant as they are primarily because the General is an intensely practical politician. He has realized and accepted the neces-

sity, in his own self-interest and preservation, of maintaining friendly relations with the U.S. and, in my opinion, has done his best to do so. The U.S., for reasons based on evaluations which do not appear to stand the test of hindsight judgment, was strongly opposed to Ydigoras' candidacy for President, and supported an opponent in that election with very considerable financial and other assistance. This fact was well known to Ydigoras, but he presented himself to Washington shortly thereafter as nevertheless determined to follow policies at home and abroad with which we would be in accord. We accepted the olive branch officially but, to express it crudely, we appear to have classified him as a "bad guy" and, while occasionally prepared to concede he might not be all "bad" and might have "some" good points or do some "right" things, essentially our attitude seems to me to have been one of doubt, suspicion and derogation. At any rate, this is generally believed here to have been the U.S. attitude. Ydigoras has certainly thought so. Similarly, other political groups in Guatemala have sensed U.S. reserve regarding Ydigoras; both the President and his opposition have believed we were against him and I believe with reason. The attitudes of U.S. officials toward Ydigoras, our readiness to see and accent the bad side of his regime and our discounting of its accomplishments, cannot really be dissociated from the uniformly unfavorable press which he has received in the U.S. No U.S. newspaper or periodical or news service has maintained or stationed an American reporter in Guatemala. (TIME is an exception, although its correspondent is more Guatemalan than American.) Reliance is placed on spasmodic visits in times of trouble by reporters, whose stories appear to have been written before they arrived, and/or local nationals whose objectivity is hardly noteworthy. It seems quite probable that the U.S. press detects an hostile attitude by U.S. officials, as do Ydigoras and his opponents.

Such an attitude on our part, I would suggest, has not been and is not justified, even if one believes antipathy warranted on moral grounds. We must not let it color our judgment and influence our decision when to do so is counterproductive to our interests.

The criticisms of Ydigoras are many and not without some degree of validity. It is not my purpose to portray him favorably or unfavorably; my point is that it is he with whom we have to deal—whether we like him or not is unimportant and irrelevant; we need to understand him, to know his strengths and weaknesses, to evaluate correctly what he can and cannot do, and to use this knowledge to our advantage. It is my opinion that his record to date, all factors taken into consideration, does not compare unfavorably with other Latin Chiefs of State. The background portion of the April guidelines states: "The ill-defined social and economic objectives to which he gives lip service are more nearly identified with those of the liberal-leftist opposition than of his

erstwhile conservative supporters So far, a shrewd political touch has enabled him to maintain himself in power in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds. The tragedy is that Ydigoras has neither chosen nor been able to use his abilities to rally support behind the fundamental changes which he apparently approves."

Ydigoras is not a man to originate nor to hold deep attachment for particular social or economic theories; he is not politically original nor creative. Nevertheless, in his own stubborn way he has sought to develop and to practice democracy in Guatemala within the limits of maintaining himself in power, the limited capability and willingness of the Guatemalan citizenry to practice it, and the nature of his own cultural and educational formation. If Washington is disappointed that he did not push or has not pushed (or tried to push regardless of the prospects of success) those ideas of the liberal leftists on which platform he did not run; the conservatives who elected him are similarly disappointed that he has not been a strong and dominant leader who would establish and maintain conservative government. In evaluating him, we must consider his power to act in realistic terms.

As noted in the background quoted above, Ydigoras has faced great difficulty in maintaining power. Submission of political differences and personal ambition to accept the fact of victory on the part of the opposition is not a characteristic of Guatemalan politicians and parties. (The recent vote in the Congress on the Investment Guaranty Agreement, for example, featured adverse votes by a number of Congressmen who, to my personal knowledge, believe the agreement important to Guatemala's progress but were more interested in opposing the Government for the sheer sake of opposition.) Our own attitudes referred to earlier have done little to temper or discourage the non-cooperative approach of the Ydigoras opposition; indeed, they may well have served to strengthen and encourage this position. From Ydigoras' point of view, he has been in a precarious position from the outset of his term, surrounded by opponents on all sides, denied full support by his own following, denied U.S. confidence and support if not actually denigrated by U.S. attitudes and actions, attacked by his enemies on any and every pretext. He has described his position as equivalent to a man on a slack wire equipped with a balancing pole which required careful and constant adjustment if he was to remain on the wire. His efforts to induce the so-called "better elements" of society to participate in government met with little success. His reaction to these circumstances has been to play off persons and groups against each other so that no one group would obtain enough power to upset him and so that a coalition of opposition would not occur. This had led him to a tolerance of Communists internally in the country. It has led him as well to wish to maintain the appearance of friendly relations with the

U.S. despite our opposition to his election and our subsequent attitudes. It has led him to even greater reliance on his own judgment and instinct in dealing with problems, since he has felt a lack of confidence in both the capability and the trustworthiness of those who surround him. It has been pretty much a one-man government, but very far indeed from being dictatorship. Whether for tactical reasons of self-preservation, or from a conviction of the importance of human rights and the necessity for cultivating the growth of constitutional concepts, it is noteworthy that there has been during most of his term the maintenance of civil liberties for the great majority of Guatemalans.

Ydigoras in some ways is suggestive of a big city boss of the old Tammany type. He has maintained a personal relationship with the people especially the poorer elements in the country and in the city. He is always open to a personal appeal from such elements and provides help in enough cases to maintain their confidence that he has basic good will toward them and interest in their problems. He has sought to bring advancement to the country; since 1960 he has built 189 new schools and 126 more are under way, as compared with 370 in 63 years preceding; he has supported and stimulated efforts to deal with illiteracy; he has supported and stimulated distribution of land to the *campesinos*, 4,613 new owners have been created; he has supported and stimulated low cost housing programs, 2,568 new houses have already been built under this program and more are included in approved projects; he has pushed road and highway construction; he has spent a larger percentage of the federal increase on development activities than his predecessors. During his regime there is no doubt that personal profit has been taken. Give the well-established Latin tradition that to the victor belongs the spoils, it would have been remarkable if Ydigoras had broken the practice of some self-aggrandizement which has characterized all previous regimes. Critics claim his take has been excessive; supporters claim it has been less; no one claims 100% honesty—hardly anyone seems to have expected that or even to regard it as sensible! The moral standard seems to be one of reasonableness in profit taking. It is doubtful that Ydigoras has been excessively corrupt in Latin terms.

Ydigoras' foreign policy has been one of rather complete cooperation with the United States. We have become so accustomed to expecting Guatemala to vote our way in every international forum and to support our position on every international issue that we take this pretty much for granted. This record of support and cooperation reflects, however, Government policy rather than an absolute identity of U.S. and Guatemalan interests, or of Guatemalan and U.S. opinion and thought. The principal and almost only aspect of Guatemalan foreign policy which has troubled us has been the Ydigoras position

on Belize—British Honduras, a claim antedating his regime. He has enjoyed pulling the tail of the British lion on this issue; it has proved a useful distraction from domestic issues; it is unlikely that this problem would ever prove more than passingly troublesome to us.

It is also worth noting that during Ydigoras' regime, the economy of Guatemala—long dependent on the basic crop of coffee—has been adversely affected by the growing excess of coffee supplies in the world. Government revenues based on coffee export taxes to a very great extent has accordingly depreciated. Thus as demand for additional Government services has grown, the financial capacity of the Government to provide them has depreciated. Obviously the need has been for fiscal and tax reform but such measures are largely dependent on legislation and Ydigoras' power to compel legislation has never been complete. As discussed in some detail in a separate airgram (A-120 of September 1, 1962), the U.S. outlays of aid following the overthrow of the Arbenz regime have in part made possible a continuation of a pattern of expenditures in excess of revenue, concealed or muted the need for reform and we had not until recently called either our own or the Guatemalan Government's attention to a consideration of either need or remedies.

Ydigoras' own temperament, his lack of creativity, his self-reliance, his lack of adequate political power, the lack of cooperation and support with which he has had to live, the U.S. attitudes, the deteriorating economy—all have had a part in history of the past four years and its accomplishments and failures.

While I think we must continue to press upon the President the need for actions to improve the political and economic situation in Guatemala, as we have been doing, I also think we should strive "to accentuate the positive" in our dealings with him. I do not suggest that we embark on a love-Ydigoras campaign, but I do suggest we strive to create in his mind the belief that we evaluate him fairly and that it is to his interest to play ball with us all the way. The establishment of such a conviction can go a long way in obtaining Ydigoras' cooperation in the achievement of our objective of a non-Communist Guatemala.

**130. Memorandum of conversation, November 28, between
President Kennedy and Ambassador Alejos¹**

November 28, 1962

SUBJECT

Ambassador Alejos' Call on President Kennedy

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Ambassador Alejos, Guatemala

Ambassador Alejos started out by expressing his Government's and the Guatemalan peoples' warm congratulations and admiration for the President's handling of the Cuban incident.

He then commented in general terms about the recent attack by Guatemalan Air Force personnel on the Government in Guatemala City. While he explained the primary motivation as being fear of Arevalo as President and concern on the part of conservative elements about recently enacted agrarian reform and income tax laws, he also stressed that a professional student organizer had recently returned to Guatemala from Cuba with large sums of money and was passing out checks in great profusion. It was not quite clear how the two things meshed together in this particular action.

He then said that President Ydigoras had long been deeply concerned about the Castro threat and felt that there could not be peace in the Caribbean until the Castro regime had been removed from power. The President and his advisors had drawn up a plan to this end in April, had been studying it since that time, but had decided a month or so ago that it was worth passing on to President Kennedy for such use as it may be to him.

President Kennedy read the plan quickly and noted that it was based primarily on training and arming Cuban refugees. The President expressed his appreciation for the suggestions and said they would be studied but that it seemed doubtful that one could get enough Cuban refugees to do the job. He referred to the special arrangements we have made for a Cuban brigade but indicated that relatively few Cubans had volunteered to serve. The President concluded the conversation by asking the Ambassador to convey his appreciation to President

¹ Unrest in Guatemala and concern over Castro threat. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guatemala, September–December 1962.

Ydigoras for the proposals made and said a reply would be forthcoming soon.

131. Telegram 385 from Guatemala City, December 18¹

Guatemala City, December 18, 1962

Action Department 385, Information POLAD CINCARIB Un-numbered.

FY 1962 MAP included four T-33 aircraft for Guatemala which are now at Kelly Field in Texas ready for delivery. Such delivery had been planned for December, GAF readiness to receive and maintain having been established. Events of November 25, 1962 initially publicly described as attempted Air Force revolt, necessitated suspension of delivery action until those events and results could be assessed. Embassy view is that we should proceed with delivery action at early date, subject only to conditions discussed below.

Appears clear that attempted coup was not (repeat not) a revolt by Air Force, but rather a badly planned, poorly managed, and wholly unsuccessful effort by small group officers probably stimulated and encouraged by other officers (including some Army officers) and by some civilians, to overthrow Ydigoras. Plot well advertised and probably made known in advance by some of its members to President, since he was well prepared to deal with it. Conspirators undoubtedly of rightist political persuasion and not (repeat not) communist nor communist-supported. Some of limited number of Air Force personnel who participated in sorties were under impression that Army in revolt and that Air Force role was to protect government. President told me he now satisfied that only handful of Air Force officers involved.

Motivation for attempt appears to have been combination of concern over economic and fiscal situation, general dissatisfaction with lack government leadership, fear that trend of events and attitude of Ydigoras fore-told advent to power of Arevalo and, of course, the usual ambitions for power. This current of thought not confined in Guatemala to persons active in revolt but extends to substantial group politically right of center. Possible that recurrent rumors of United States sympathy for Arevalo, credibility of which strengthened greatly here by recent

¹ Review of attempted "Air Force" revolt and MAP deliveries. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 714.5622/12-1762.

reports of Moscoso-Arevalo talks, increased feeling of this group of need for early action preclude his return to power.

While President was clearly informed of plans and was ready to deal with rebels, appears likely that he was not at all certain of extent of movement nor as to backing. An interesting aspect was that President early morning Sunday Nov. 25 telephoned [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to invite him come at once to Casa Crema for a discussion of no particular urgency. We believe it not unlikely that Ydigoras at this point was not entirely sure whether revolt might not have U.S. backing and that his invitation, which was readily accepted, was to check to see what reaction our people would have at being asked to be present at the scene where armed attack had been planned. Presumably ready and truly innocent acceptance served to dispel his concern. Also possible that vigorous and wholesale action against all of Air Force taken in aftermath of shooting reflected not only natural reaction to being subject of armed attack in rebellion against government, but also reflective of uncertainty as to degree to which Air Force as whole was involved.

Some opinion among U.S. Air Force personnel here, which not without logic, that President saw involvement of Air Force personnel as giving him opportunity effect some adjustments in Air Force, to reduce its growing aggressiveness regarding its wants, and to redress balance in influence with Army which to some degree envious Air Force prestige, better pay and greater emoluments. Friction between Lemus and Batres, numbers one and two in GAF, had been notorious and since both men well known Ydigoras supporters, this presented President with trying problem. Lemus had been increasingly strong in pushing the President for Air Force requirements and Ydigoras not type to enjoy pressure from subordinates. Ydigoras noteworthy for tactics of keeping groups divided and balanced against each other and may well have felt that Air Force getting a little big for its breeches.

In any case initial actions against Air Force were indiscriminate and harsh, perhaps pleasing to Army critics and public who suffered three dead and about a dozen wounded, but certainly resented by loyal and non-involved Air Force personnel. Ydigoras has now decided time has come to distinguish between guilty and non-guilty, and has taken opportunity to deal with command problem at same time. Both Lemus, who it could hardly be expected would retain command after being personally over-powered by rebels and ineffective in dissuading them, and Batres, who was playing golf (even though he reports that he phoned in and was told by Roberto Alejos not to report for duty), have been removed from their command positions and the Air Force has been placed under command of Gen Carrascosa, reputed to be strong on discipline. Air Force prestige is at a low point and it will be a long

time before it can regain influence it once had. At same time, it is clear Ydigoras does not want Air Force to become insignificant militarily or politically or in terms its balancing off of army forces, for which reason he is eager to get fresh start with Air Force. His idea is to proceed with delivery of long-wanted jets and on delivery to have an Air Force Day celebration, (previously scheduled event for December 10 having been cancelled in wake Nov. 25 events), and thus improve Air Force morale. It is hard to dispute Ydigoras' judgment as to wisdom these tactics, even if it seems in retrospect that the spanking given the Air Force will leave resentments not likely to be eradicated readily even by delivery T-33's.

From our point of view, there is no disputing that we are committed to the delivery to the T-33's. Not to do so at this point would not only be a breach of contract, but would be deeply resented by both the President and the Air Force to which the T-33's symbolize being a modern Air Force. The delivery of the aircraft appears to me essential to our policy of supporting the Ydigoras government, as well as essential to maintaining a relationship with the Air Force which would permit flexibility in considering alterations or modifications in our current policy at some future date if that should prove desirable. The political and military justifications for programming and committing ourselves to deliver these planes have not been basically altered by the fact of participation in an unsuccessful coup by a few Air Force officers.

At same time it would appear propitious moment to discuss with President certain measures which would appear necessary or desirable to assure an effective Air Force and conducive to restoration of Air Force morale—and thus to the Air Force becoming a balancing element of the sort Ydigoras is believed to want. While we are not overly concerned by Zea's previous opportunistic record as in itself constituting any great threat, since his history seems to reflect more of a desire to advance than a political concoction, and since his present post must exceed his past expectations, he is not a very attractive or dependable type. Further, our Air officers believe that his Prussian type ideas of discipline and his lack of flying capacity augur poorly for improvement in Air Force morale. Given the fact of his appointment, it would seem unrealistic to expect the President to change him now, but possibly he could be persuaded to make this a temporary appointment and to plan to change Zea in the not too distant future.

The time also seems propitious to get the President to order the Air Force to clean up its inventory by disposing of old aircraft (T-6 and C-45) which are presently only a burden but to which Air Force has held on in hopes that they could be disposed of in such a way as to assure that the proceeds went into Air Force funds. We will insist as a condition precedent to delivery of the T-33's that the organization

of the GAF squadrons and the assignment of pilots be re-established in accordance with sound practice. We will also require agreement that our Air Mission certification of competence be a prerequisite to permitting GAF pilots to fly the T-33's. We will also seek to obtain agreement to confining GAF pilots to flying one, or at most two, types of aircraft rather than the hit or miss assignment of any pilot to any aircraft which has prevailed and which prevents the top skill in handling any type to be obtained. The President will also be advised that to accept proposals to reduce Air Force pay and emolument and to require a common uniform of all military would seem inadvisable if the morale of the Air Force is not to be totally destroyed.

The occasion will also be used to discuss some general problems of MAP supply clearance. I think we can make some useful suggestions for more effective liaison arrangements between our military missions and elements of [illegible in the original].

In summary, I propose proceed as above envisaging delivery of aircraft on or about January 6. Would appreciate immediate telegraphic concurrence in this course action since President returning Guatemala mid-week and I will have to tell him something about our views shortly thereafter.

General O'Meara who enroute Washington and with whom foregoing discussed, is in accord that T-33's should be delivered.

Bell

**132. Memorandum from Dungan to President Kennedy,
January 22¹**

January 22, 1963

Attached are two background papers—one dealing with Haiti and one with Guatemala. They were prepared for your 4 o'clock meeting today.

As you will note from reading them, the situation in both countries has one similarity—both regimes are discredited, there is no suitable alternative on the horizon, and we have relatively few assets.

Ralph A. Dungan

¹ Transmits attached background paper on Guatemala. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Guatemala, Security, 1961-63.

Attachment

SUBJECT

Guatemala

1. The term of President Ydígoras ends in March 1964, with the election of his successor scheduled to take place late this year.

2. The prospect that former President (1945 to 51) Juan José Arévalo may successfully mobilize his considerable popularity to win re-election to office has spread fear and confusion among middle-of-the-road and other anti-Communist elements in Guatemala. Arévalo is not a Communist, but his confused, ill-balanced, political philosophy of "spiritual socialism", fed by deep prejudice against the United States, served the Communist purpose well during his administration, precursor to the Communist dominated Arbenz administration of 1951 to 54. Should he regain power, he would likely serve the Communist purpose well again, turning his country away from friendly relations with the United States, and away from a constructive role in the Alliance for Progress for which he has no apparent understanding or sympathy.

3. The moderate forces opposing Arevalism within Guatemala persist in their traditional inability to unify for victory. They have been unable thus far to produce a leader of significant political stature.

4. Ydígoras, through his mastery of internal Guatemalan politics, has maintained himself in power, but he is not leading his country anywhere. He suppressed a brief Air Force revolt on November 25, and has managed to overcome the most immediate severities of his administration's chronic budget problem and to meet Government payrolls quickly enough to avert disorder which threatened to come from arrears in payments.

(Guatemala recently succeeded in floating \$7 million in bond sales to private United States banks, removing the apparent need for an emergency budgetary support loan of the same amount which we had been prepared to make to the Government. While the basic condition of the Guatemalan economy is reasonably good and will probably improve, assuming political stability, Government finances are in need of drastic reform and the administration will operate on a hand-to-mouth basis for the foreseeable future.)

5. It is no secret that there is wide-spread feeling in Guatemala favoring a military coup to oust Ydígoras, and arrange for elections which would exclude the participation of Arévalo. Under Guatemalan electoral law, Arévalo would be ineligible to assume office for a term beginning before March 1963, i.e., before the end of a 12-year interval since he last held the office of President. The key element in this respect is the military; its intent is still uncertain.

6. Ydígoras is withholding endorsement from any of the current candidates, hoping to maximize his influence on the ultimate choice. While he has been an outspoken opponent of Arévalo, there has allegedly been some contact between them, and the possibility is not to be excluded that Ydígoras could accommodate himself to an Arévalo victory in return for assurance of being left in peace in Guatemala after retiring from office.

7. The Latin American Policy Committee with the participation of Ambassador Bell in November 1962 examined the problem of the presidential succession in Guatemala and decided on the course of action set forth in the Secretary's Memorandum for the President of December 7, relating to the Special Letter Attached to the Byroade Report on Guatemala.

[text not declassified]

133. Memorandum for the record, January 22¹

January 22, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House, January 22, 1963

Assistant Secretary Martin, AID Administrator Bell, Mr. Graham Martin, Deputy Coordinator Alliance for Progress; Mr. John Crimmins, Director of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, and I were present at a meeting at the White House January 22 to discuss Guatemala and Haiti. Col. J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, and Mr. Helms, his immediate superior from the Agency, were also present.

The President opened the meeting, asking about the situation in Guatemala and the candidacy of Arévalo. He was told that the Latin American Policy Committee had agreed in December on eight courses of action for Guatemala as follows:

[text not declassified]

Mr. Martin *[less than 1 line not declassified]* indicated that *[less than 1 line not declassified]* not too much progress had been made. Finding and building up an acceptable candidate in Guatemala seemed almost

¹ Meeting at the White House to discuss the situation in Guatemala and Arévalo's candidacy. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/1-2263.

impossible. Mario Mendez Montenegro had been discredited in the municipal elections and possibly Jose Cruz Salazar was stronger in the interior than had been expected. Three observers are working on the poll of Arévalo's strength in the interior and find that it is not as strong as it was suspected. By March, the results should be known. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Arévalo's prestige in Guatemala without the United States appearing to take [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Positions at Padua and West Berlin Universities have been found for Arévalo and, after there is some pressure on him, possibly he might take one of these. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is also beginning to look into the military attitude. The military leaders at present seem to indicate that they will not tolerate Arévalo's election. [*text not declassified*] another inter-agency meeting will take place early in March. The President was very interested and wanted to know more about Arévalo himself. He does not feel that we should appear to be in open opposition to Arévalo because he is afraid that if we could not do anything about stopping his election we must keep some lines open to him. The President wanted to know what the Mexicans think of Arévalo. (Mr. Martin has sent Tom Mann a letter on this subject.) [*text not declassified*] Mr. Martin indicated he had also written President Betancourt and Foreign Minister Muniz of Argentina that Arévalo was not a suitable candidate and the President wanted to know what Betancourt thought of Arévalo. Mr. Martin said that our Ambassador had twice reported that Betancourt was pretty disillusioned about Arévalo and the President suggested that the inter-agency meeting take place in mid-March before the Costa Rican meeting and that he would talk to Betancourt about Arévalo when the former visits Washington soon. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicated that one course of action open to Ydígoras is a trial of Arévalo for killing a Colonel Arana. The President made it clear that he did not want any physical action taken against Arévalo. This was clearly understood. He also wanted to know who Arévalo's friends in the United States are. It was agreed we would try and find this out. He was very interested in Arévalo's recent book and arrangements were being made to send a copy to Mr. Dungan. The President especially wanted to know what Arévalo had said or done the last two or three years, does this show he has changed? What does he think about things? Would it be possible to get along with him?

In the Haiti talks (reported separately) Mr. Martin indicated that President Duvalier had failed to perform properly and would probably not retire when his normal term of the presidency ended in May. Mr. Martin recalled that he had gone through a phony election last May allegedly extending his term six years. The President again indicated that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] (Mr. Martin had made it very clear that the opposition was completely fragmented) we should not cut all our bridges to Duvalier.

Another topic of interest introduced was the President's question as to why Muniz had raised a question of budgetary support in talks earlier that day. Mr. Martin reported that even when Ambassador McClintock had left Buenos Aires budgetary support was not on the schedule and that Muniz was very embarrassed to raise this but had apparently gotten orders from his President at the time of his departure to try and get some money.

The President also spoke of his visit to Costa Rica which will be covered in a separate memorandum.

V. Lansing Collins

Director

*Office of Central American
and Panamanian Affairs*

**134. DOS Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Guatemala,
February 1963¹**

February 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. BASIC APPROACH
- II. BACKGROUND
- III. OBJECTIVES
- IV. LINES OF ACTION
 - POLITICAL
 - ECONOMIC
 - EDUCATIONAL, INFORMATIONAL and
 - CULTURAL

GUIDELINES OF UNITED STATES POLICY AND OPERATIONS
TOWARD GUATEMALA

I. BASIC APPROACH

Guatemala knew three centuries of harsh grandeur as headquarters of the Spanish Capitancy General until independence in 1821. It suffered dictators, several bearing the 19th Century "liberal" label, from 1821 to 1944. Since that time, ferment rather than growth has character-

¹ Secret. 23 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 396.

ized the political scene. Indians, Ladinos² and Euro-Americans make up its people, in that order, with little sympathetic rapport between the segments. Economic development beginning in the late 19th Century centered principally around the coffee lands owned in great part, until World War II, by energetic German planters and merchants, and the banana plantations of the United Fruit Company. Economic growth and political upheavals since 1944 have created an emerging middle group, composed of new entrepreneurs and their employees, men in the professions, and civil servants, which favor movement toward a more modern economic and political system.

The wealthy landowning and business elements, numerically few and not organized to exercise direct political power, strongly influence legislation and government actions touching their interests through sporadic pressure group organizations and by dealing individually with politicians and bureaucrats. Political life takes place before a largely inert, apathetic disillusioned public, and consists mainly of maneuver among a few politicians for personal advantage.

The numerous political parties are mostly paper organizations, none of them having any historical continuity. The army is the ultimate arbiter of power. Its officers have a vested interest in safeguarding their status in society, which for most of them represents an advance from relatively modest origins. They are not sympathetic to communism or extreme leftism, tend otherwise to be politically neuter, with the leaders cautiously watching for the opportune time to use their power to shape political events to suit them.

The present administration has not exercised leadership in setting targets or means of encouraging any meaningful national effort at combined political and economic growth. Despite the surface indications of well-entrenched power, political unrest and social ferment is strong and increasing and if the desire for basic change is unduly thwarted it will undoubtedly lead to further upheaval in Guatemala.

We seek to use our total influence, comprising our economic aid and all other aspects of our presence in Guatemala, to induce action on a range of development programs with pre-conditions which will give a widening segment of the Guatemalan population a sense of confidence in combined political-economic growth, and faith in the ability of the country's governmental machinery to move toward satisfaction of democratic aspirations.

² A Ladino is a person of Indian or mixed Indian blood who has left traditional Indian community life and assimilated himself into the money economy and the social modes of the towns and urban centers. Three-fifths of the population is still pure Indian in blood, and 95% have some Indian blood.

II. BACKGROUND

Recalling its earlier role as the seat of Spanish power in Central America, literate Guatemalans desire that their country exercise leadership among its small neighbors. This aspiration has been frustrated in part by Guatemala's own economic, social and political weaknesses.

Economically, the country is tied to the prosperity of its export crops—coffee, bananas and cotton. Socially, the population is divided on class and racial lines, with the lower class being comprised principally of the Indian segment, which in recent years has begun to require more attention in the field of economic development as it moves into the money economy.

Politically, the country is in a transition period with control by the moneyed class of sectors on which they depended for power—rural labor and personal influence in ministries—being loosened but not yet broken. The politico-socio structure which would support development toward moderately representative government since 1944 has suffered alternate over-encouragement, artificial organization and restructuring in such rapid succession that the base for stable party organization today is still weak.

The social and political revolution beginning in 1944 manifested the aspirations of urban civilian groups. In its wake, political organization was established from the top down, and at the community level in varying degrees replaced, conflicted with, or operated parallel to the *cofradia* or sodality organization which had characterized Indian villages. These discontinuous changes, reflected in urban centers by a proliferation of labor unions and other quasi-political associations, were not understood by leaders or members. Personalism, *caudillismo* and *caciquismo* ("bossism") still dominate the political atmosphere today.

In 1944, the last of the 19th Century type dictators who had ruled Guatemala for most of the time since independence from Spain in 1821 was overthrown and Juan Jose Arevalo emerged to institute the first real social and economic changes the country had experienced.

The politically conscious segment of the population plunged for the first time into the exhilarating experiences of freely organizing and choosing among political groups, enjoying freedom of speech and press, forming labor unions and using their power against entrenched wealth, and demanding and getting from their government some of the social welfare benefits which they were learning to identify with advancement of their nation.

When Arevalo turned over power in 1951 to an elected successor, Jacobo Arbenz, it was the first time in Guatemalan history an elected President had served his full term. Arbenz was elected by a leftist coalition that had wide popular appeal. His administration, however,

came quickly under the effective control of a small group of well organized Communists. His excesses brought on the successful counter-revolution of Colonel Castillo Armas in 1954. In its zeal to obliterate every vestige of communism, the Castillo Armas regime allowed some worthwhile liberal social changes to founder in the shambles which Arbenz left behind.

The Guatemalan labor movement, in particular, still is affected by its resentment of the repressive tactics used by Castillo Armas to correct the excesses of the Communists during the Arbenz regime. However, by the time of his assassination in July 1957, Castillo Armas had begun to get some of his moderate forward-looking programs under way. His death was a blow to Guatemalan political development, not only because of the chaos of the nine months interim before Ydígoras Fuentes finally took office in March 1958, but because he had set on positive goals and had the understanding leadership to carry the people into a combined economic and political growth for the first time in Guatemalan history.

The liberationist (MDN) regime of Castillo Armas was replaced by the conservative *Redencion* administration of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, a military officer who had grown up under the last dictator Ubico and had been his Director General of Public Roads. The ill-defined social and economic objectives to which he gives lip service are more nearly those of his liberal leftist opposition than his erstwhile conservative supporters. In many ways he is still an enigma. In an apparent atmosphere of political freedom, he has been politically shrewd in dividing, fractioning and playing off any individuals or groups who give indication of leadership competitive to his own. He has not demonstrated the same political acumen in cultivating support for necessary economic measures (such as congressional ratification of a badly needed highway loan agreement) in a Congress where his party presumably controlled a coalition majority.

He has been in the forefront of Latin American presidents in the anti-Castro campaign and in proclaiming the dangers of Castro communism to Guatemala. At the same time, he has consistently refused to take measures to control or even give proper surveillance to Communist activities within Guatemala. He has allowed Communists to infiltrate major unions but has so far avoided major disruptive labor agitation by keeping key Communist union leaders on his payroll. Although his administration has managed a minimum amount of rural development apart from that financed by the AID program, he has capitalized on the opening ceremony of every schoolhouse and distribution of land title to enhance his image as the *Cacique* whom Indians will respect.

He cannot comprehend cooperative effort toward certain objectives; he deals in *quids pro quo*. In his mind, the United States owes

him assistance for his international stance against Castro. The Charter of Punta del Este is for the others who have been less cooperative than he. His government is highly personalized but ineffective. Just as many Guatemalans link the United States with the successful overthrow of Arbenz and blame us for the relapses that followed under Castillo Armas, they hold us responsible for the lack of progress under Ydigoras.

During his administration (which ends in March 1964), Ydigoras has weathered demonstrations by students, teachers, labor groups, one serious revolt attempt in the Army (November 1960), another abortive attempt by Air Force elements (November 1962), and periodic small-scale guerrilla activity in rural areas. In March-April 1962, he was brought almost to the brink of overthrow when the use of excessive violence in dealing with student demonstrations served to fan the fires of resentment that had smouldered since December 1961 when alleged widespread election frauds had created an issue. At the same time, unplanned coincidence of guerrilla activity near Puerto Barrios led by the November 1960 army dissidents kept the military off balance. Throughout these trials he has managed to remain in power because of support by the military.

During the April disturbances, responsible military elements reportedly maneuvered seriously with an opposition coalition. Well-to-do businessmen who have remained outside the political arena, except to manipulate on behalf of their private transactions, were constrained to begin a participation as a private enterprise group that may keep them in the political scene.

The military forces are identified with the preservation of the constitutional process insofar as the threat of a coup by leftists is concerned. While unified in this ideal, the higher ranking officers tend to think in *caudillo* terms of personalized military leadership, and the younger officers give indications of having been influenced by the desire for social progress. Another strain on military unity has been the lack of promotional opportunities for younger officers because of the already overcrowded higher ranks (of 801 officers, 357 are full colonels).

Many Guatemalans demand the renewal of the fundamental social revolution as it was promised in the 1944 movement under Juan Jose Arevalo, before the Communists took over and aborted it. From his exile in Mexico, Arevalo has announced his availability for re-election to the presidency for the term beginning in 1964, and there is wide belief in Guatemala that he can win. Hopelessly obsessed with a psychopathic hatred of the United States and blind to his own role in betraying the 1944 movement to the Communists, Arevalo's ambition and latent strength pose a danger to the peaceful evolution of Guatemala. There is ample ground to believe that Arevalo's return to power would repre-

sent a significant gain for the Communist/Castroite cause. Nevertheless, there is a cloud of doubt over Ydigoras' attitude toward, and relations with, Arevalo. There are traces of evidence that in his spiteful determination to thwart the presidential aims of an overt and apparently untainted leftist-liberal party in Guatemala (Revolutionary Party—Partido Revolucionario—PR), Ydigoras is engaged in covert collusion to build up Arevalo.

Guatemalan Communists number some 1200 hard-core members in their "Guatemalan Labor Party" (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo—PGT), with about 2500 sympathizers elsewhere, particularly in the United Revolutionary Party (Partido Unido Revolucionario—PUR). They have infiltrated both student and labor groups. However, as was demonstrated in the April disturbances, they are organized to exploit quickly and effectively minor breakdowns of public order or issues over which public emotions can be aroused.

Economically, the short term prospects for substantial progress in Guatemala are not encouraging. The very sharp reduction in coffee export earnings, the marked decline in both foreign and domestic private investment, and the critical fiscal situation of the government with the resultant drastic cuts in public investment, have all contributed to producing the economic stagnation that has endured since early 1960. Ydigoras certainly cannot be blamed for all the economic ills that now beset Guatemala, but the political unrest and upheaval of which he has been the central target have certainly compounded the effects of the other economic developments. The Gross National Product (1961: \$678 million) on a per capita basis has declined since 1960, whereas in the 50's Guatemala had enjoyed an average annual per capita GNP increase of 4.9 per cent. The imposition of exchange controls in October 1962 because of declining reserves would indicate the economic situation continues its deterioration. Constructive leadership by the government which would restore confidence and give a sense of direction would go a long way in putting the economy into forward motion.

The creeping discrepancy between actual revenues and minimum necessities for ever-expanding expenditure requirements is the single most critical economic problem of the moment in Guatemala. It can only be solved by creating new sources of revenue or more effective enforcement of existing measures. It has been difficult for Ydigoras to muster sufficient political support for additional revenues partially because he himself does not understand the long term problems involved. Limited fiscal resources have led to temporizing, with available funds applied where they will reap the most immediate political advantage. This failure to deal with basic fiscal problems has been cited as an example of his essential failure as a leader.

From January to April of 1962, Ydigoras carried on an intensive agitation campaign against the United Kingdom over Belize, threaten-

ing rupture of relations, confiscation of British interests, etc. As a result, informal tripartite talks were held in April between United Kingdom, Guatemala and British Honduran representatives. The resultant arrangements decided upon for improved economic cooperation have lightened pressure by the Guatemalans for the time being.

III. OBJECTIVES

Within the framework of the primary U.S. objectives outlined in the Latin American Guidelines, the following are specific objectives for Guatemala:

A. *Short Term*

1. Initiation by Ydigoras of actions or programs in which U.S. support can be identified with obvious long-term advantages for social and economic development in Guatemala, rather than merely with the personal prestige of Ydigoras.

2. The election of a successor to Ydigoras who from a broad political base will promote needed economic and social development in Guatemala, and favor a close and friendly relationship with the United States.

3. Strengthened capability of military and police forces to penetrate and control subversive activities of Castro-Communists.

B. *Longer Term*

1. The adoption of fiscal and other legislative and administrative reforms in order to provide a sounder basis for planning and implementing development under the Alliance for Progress.

2. Improvement of the capabilities of the military and police forces to maintain public order and internal security and contribute to development within a constitutional democracy.

3. Moderation of Guatemalan claims to Belize (British Honduras) and the reduction of Anglo-Guatemalan friction over this issue to the extent this can be accomplished without direct United States involvement.

IV. LINES OF ACTION

Political

1. Mindful of the threat which highly personalized government represents to the continuity of stable, democratic government, seek to convince both Ydigoras and his opposition that for the common good, they should concentrate their efforts on building political organizations which will participate in elections, rather than depend on *coups* or *counter coups*.

2. Encourage groups and associations of prominent and influential Guatemalans (such as the National Independent Union—UNI), who

have a larger economic stake in political stability and social order, to contribute both their personal capacities and their financial resources in working with the government to promote both short and long term social and economic goals. This could have a decisive influence in reinforcing the line of action set forth in 1 above.

3. Encourage greater delegation of authority and responsibility within the administration in order to dilute further the effect of personalism on the development of orderly democratic development.

4. Encourage activation of programs such as community development in order to instill techniques and institutions which will permit the predominant Indian population to assimilate into the mainstream of Guatemalan life with a minimum of friction and frustration.

5. Encourage the Guatemalan Government to cooperate in the orderly and peaceful transition of British Honduras to independent status, when its economic viability has become more assured, and to induce the latter to integrate economically with the rest of Central America.

Economic

6. Seek to secure basic improvements in all phases of public administration, but with most urgent priority on fiscal reforms which will increase revenues, distribute tax burdens more justly, diminish evasion, reduce expenditures and systematize fiscal planning and control. Continue, in this connection, the informal joint United States-Guatemalan steering group on the Alliance for Progress, created at our Embassy's initiative.

7. Persuade the Government of Guatemala and the private sector to develop jointly a broad plan for a self-sustaining rate of growth. Essential elements of a plan meriting our support would be (a) diversification of agriculture including expansion of the livestock and dairy industry, (b) development of agricultural processing industries and light and medium manufacturers, (c) study and development of power, communications and transport resources, and (d) eventual integration into the national economy of the large Indian population.

8. Encourage the Government of Guatemala and private organizations to plan jointly with regional, national and private Central American entities to strengthen the Central American Common Market and regional economic development.

Educational, Informational and Cultural

9. Encourage the Government of Guatemala and university leaders to cooperate with the Central American Superior Council of University Rectors or other regional educational organizations which will provide better regional use of funds invested in higher education.

10. Encourage part-time or evening class enrollment in the University of junior officers of the Embassy, USAID and our Military Mission, where they could not only exert some individual influence but more importantly acquire information on student movements and reactions and assist in spotting potential candidates for student exchange grants. Close liaison with American students and teachers at the University would serve similar purposes.

11. Within reasonable limits continue the successful USIA- and AID-assisted experiments in the use of television as an informational and educational media which has both intrinsic and demonstrational value.

Labor

12. Encourage the progressive relaxation by the government of the restrictions and controls on moderate, democratically oriented trade union elements, and increase our own assistance for training and orientation of carefully selected trade unionists.

Military and Police

13. Make available to the Government of Guatemala, on a grant basis if necessary, the minimum military and police equipment and training needed to assist in the maintenance of public order and internal security.

14. Support a civic-action military program by providing personnel and suitable equipment.

15. In order to implement the provisions of NSAM 140,³ applicable to Guatemala, encourage the continued friendly relationship between the Guatemalan and United States military establishments, the use by Guatemala of United States military material, the generation of greater understanding and acceptance of United States military doctrine, and expanded exchange programs between Guatemalan and United States military personnel.

V. CONTINGENCIES

Contingencies which would frustrate United States policies include:

1. Coup by "outs" or assassination of Ydigoras: If either contingency should occur, it could be followed by a period of chaos and uncertainty, particularly if Ydigoras were assassinated. Should Communists or radical leftists appear to be moving into a position of control over the new government, the military would probably react with force of arms.

³ NSAM 140: Subject: Participation of U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America.

2. A 1963 election victory by an anti-American leftist. If leftist, anti-American Juan Jose Arevalo, or someone of his stripe or under his influence, should win the 1963 elections, the new government (taking office March 1, 1964) would probably adopt policies and programs inimical to the interests of the United States.

135. Memorandum of conversation, March 20, between President Kennedy and President Ydígoras¹

March 20, 1963

SUBJECT

Relations with Cuba; Elections; Belize; Domestic Reforms

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES
The President

GUATEMALA
President Ydígoras

The President expressed his pleasure in meeting President YDÍGORAS, whom he admired for his courageous stand during the Cuban affair in 1961. President Ydígoras stated that Guatemala was ready to follow whatever policy the United States Government might adopt with respect to Cuba, and that he fully understood Cuba's place within the context of the over-all world situation. He stated that Guatemala would, if required, offer its territory for the training of another contingent of anti-Castro Cubans. He expressed the opinion that the United States should not directly participate in the invasion, but rather serve as a banker for the participants.

The President reiterated the situation of Cuba within the framework of the world situation and said that perhaps the elimination of Castro himself might lead to an improvement of the Cuban situation since Castro individually was of such great psychological importance.

The President inquired as to what the situation was for the forthcoming elections and as to what measures might be taken to make it more difficult for Arévalo to win. He expressed the belief that Arévalo would undoubtedly campaign as an anti-Communist moderate but that he would be dangerous if he won the elections.

¹ Relations with Cuba; elections; Belize; domestic reforms. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15-1 US/KENNEDY.

President Ydígoras said that Arévalo's projected return to Guatemala in March would undoubtedly cause a big stir, but that in the forthcoming months he expected Arévalo's popularity to drop. He said that he would attempt to create a split among Arévalo's supporters by indirectly proclaiming the need of Arévaloism without Arévalo and for having a new man as a candidate to carry out Arévalo's program. He agreed that Arévalo was dangerous because were he to win the elections he would not be able to contain the extreme leftists in his movement. Should Arévalo win, a preventive *coup* might be called for such as the ones that took place in Argentina and Peru.

The President said that he would look into this and pointed out that President Betancourt had expressed his opposition to Arévalo, to which President Ydígoras replied that a reconciliation was always feasible.

President Ydígoras explained a problem with Great Britain related to the outstanding payment due of \$1½ million on some bonds which were issued in 1830. The case was now in the lower courts in Guatemala and would undoubtedly take years before it is settled. Meanwhile, the World Bank has been holding up credits to Guatemala because of this. He stated that it was not appropriate for the World Bank to serve as a debt collector for any country.

President Ydígoras gave the President some reports on Guatemala's claim to Belize explaining that this area closes a potential outlet to the Caribbean from the richest area of the country. Guatemala wants Belize to eventually become an associated state in the Central American Federation with a status similar to that of Puerto Rico.

President Ydígoras said that Guatemala is working on its internal reform and that a proposed income tax law was pigeonholed in Congress for three years. He had pressured Congress into approving the law, and the day after he signed it, a group of right-wingers hired two Air Force pilots to strike his Palace in an assassination attempt that was almost successful. He said that for political reasons he had blamed Castroites and Communists for this attempt.

President Ydígoras said that his Administration needed to give tangible evidence during the months of April, May and June of its intentions to benefit them and that United States assistance would be very useful in this program.

**136. Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to U. Alexis Johnson,
March 27¹**

March 27, 1963

To: G—Mr. Johnson

THROUGH

S/S
FROM: ARA—Mr. Martin

SUBJECT

Guatemala Situation—Information Memorandum

Conclusion:

Imposition of a state of siege on March 25 was a political maneuver by Ydígoras to provide legal basis for denying Arévalo entry into Guatemala for at least the next 30 days.

The armed subversive acts alleged by the GOG to be justification for the state of siege are either staged or non-existent.

Background:

1. Ex-President Arévalo, strongest potential candidate in the presidential elections scheduled for the end of this year, has announced his intention to return to Guatemala in March to begin his campaign.

2. Arévalo, while not a Communist, is a super-egotistic leftist of confused political thinking whose return to power could dangerously facilitate growth of Communist influence in his country, as it did during his administration 1945–51.

3. The Arévalo threat has thoroughly frightened moderate and other anti-Communist political elements in Guatemala, but they have no effective leadership and have not come forward with anything resembling an agreed political program.

4. Ydígoras has found himself in a dilemma. He claims to believe Arévalo can be beaten in fair elections and that it is wiser to allow him in the country rather than give him the martyrdom other courses of action would afford. On the other hand, Ydígoras has been under heavy pressure, particularly from his military, to exclude Arévalo.

5. The Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff on March 18 informed our Embassy in Guatemala of “guerrilla activity” in Guatemala which might result in requests to United States for helicopters and other

¹ Background information on March 25 siege imposed by President Ydígoras. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL GUAT.

equipment. Intensive efforts by the Embassy have failed to elicit any evidence of guerrilla threat. A series of more or less of harmless bomb explosions has taken place in Guatemala City, with nothing to indicate they could not have been provocations staged by GOG.

6. Guatemalan Minister of Defense Peralta on March 21 in what was no doubt an unintentional gaffe admitted to reporters that he had no information of guerrilla activity. He later issued vague announcements alleging guerrilla activity in outlying areas.

7. Guatemalan Supreme Court on March 22 issued provisional injunction against exclusion of Arévalo from Guatemala by Government authorities.

8. Anti-Arévalo demonstration planned for March 23 was uneventful.

9. Guatemalan Government on March 25 decreed a 30-day state of siege due to "vast Communist plan of agitation and violence", suspending, among other constitutional guarantees, Article 46, which accords all Guatemalans the right to enter or leave the country.

Cleared in substance

CIA—Mr. Shivers

DOD—Capt. Sanborn

137. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 24¹

April 24, 1963

SUBJECT

Review Guatemalan Developments Since Coup d'Etat

There is enclosed herewith a memorandum summarizing developments during the first three weeks of the new Peralta regime in Guate-

¹ Transmits memorandum summarizing the first 3 weeks of the Peralta regime in Guatemala. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 2 GUAT.

mala. This summary has been prepared in reply to a verbal request made to the Department by Mr. Bromley Smith.

/s/ B.H. Read
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

THE NEW GUATEMALAN REGIME: ITS FIRST THREE WEEKS

Summary

The Guatemalan regime, headed by Col. Enrique Peralta, which took power through a coup d'état near midnight on March 30 completed three weeks in office on April 21. In that time it has accomplished its basic administrative organization, has announced and begun to implement its program of government, has received the recognition of a majority of the American Republics, and has continued to enjoy a wide base of political support within the country. There has been no challenge to the authority of the new government and no violence except for small-scale action taken at the initiative of the government itself against small guerrilla groups already in existence prior to the coup. While active opposition will undoubtedly soon emerge, the new Peralta regime has enjoyed a period of political calm enabling it to consolidate its position. The future success of the new regime will depend in large measure on the wisdom with which it wields its absolute power and its success in instilling a sense of urgency for social and economic improvement and the reestablishment of a constitutional democracy through free elections.

Consolidation of New Regime. Within twenty-four hours after the coup, most of the major political parties, including the center and moderate left, had approved the coup and indicated their support of the Peralta regime, at least for the emergency. This wide support was motivated as much by anti-Ydigoras sentiment as it was by anti-Arevalo feelings. Wide sectors were simply "fed-up" with the mal-administration, corruption, political anarchy, and lack of positive leadership by Ydigoras. The new regime's first decree-law continued the Labor Code in effect and thus confirmed the rights of labor. The new cabinet named on April 1 contrasted with that of Ydigoras in that it was largely composed of civilians and its members had a much higher degree of professional and technical competence. Though it had not yet been recognized by any of the participating countries, Guatemala sent dele-

gates to the Managua security and Alianza conferences, in order not to break the continuity of purpose achieved so recently at San Jose.

Recognition. From information now available, some eleven Latin American and some sixteen or more other countries (including nearly all major Western powers) have thus far recognized the Peralta Government. At the time the United States extended recognition on April 17, eight Latin American and eight other countries had done so. Eventual recognition by all the Latin American republics seems assured except for Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and possibly Costa Rica. Costa Rican leaders (including ex-President Figueres) have expressed approval of Peralta to United States officials and Costa Rica may seek some formula to extend recognition without offending their understanding with Betancourt on non-recognition of military coup governments.

Before recognizing the Peralta regime, the United States consulted closely with other Hemisphere governments and determined that there was a consensus favoring eventual recognition. Special note was taken that Mexico and three of the four Central American countries had by then extended recognition. Also, it was fully evident that there was wide support in Guatemala for the new regime in spite of its unconstitutional inception. Despite strenuous efforts we were not able to extract an official public statement fixing a specific timetable for elections. However, Peralta did give Ambassador Bell verbal assurances that hopefully elections would be held within a period of not more than two years. Also, on April 4 Peralta had been quoted in a *Miami Herald* story as stating: "It will take Guatemala about two years to get ready for free elections." He claimed that this was a public statement. In delivering our note of recognition on April 17, Ambassador Bell reminded the Foreign Minister of our acceptance of these assurances and our hope that elections would be held within the shortest possible time. We intend to keep reminding the regime of this point.

Program of the New Government. To date the Peralta Government has issued some fourteen decree laws. Among the more important were the Fundamental Charter of Government (No. 8 of April 10) and the Law for the Defense of Democracy (No. 9 of April 10). The Charter stated that public power would reside in the Army and be exercised by the Minister of Defense (i.e. Peralta) as the Chief of Government. It provided that the Chief of Government would exercise all executive and legislative functions acting with the assistance of the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) and the advice of an appointive Council of State. The courts were to function in an independent and exclusive manner. With the sole exception of the University of San Carlos, appointments of all officials in the country would be made by the Chief of Government. Rigid control and drastic penalties for communist and other

subversive action was established by the “Law for the Defense of Democracy” and in a companion decree-law (No. 10) to protect public order and prevent crimes of violence. A significant aspect of Decree Laws 9 and 10 is that violations of these decrees on subversion and crimes of violence will be tried in military and not civilian courts. This seems to contradict the “independent and exclusive” jurisdiction supposedly given the civil courts.

An important pronouncement was issued by the new government on April 19 which outlined its program. Besides pledging special attention to the poorer classes, its intention to honor its international obligations, and its support for the Declaration of Central America signed at San Jose on March 19, the government specifically announced an eight point program to implement its “full and enthusiastic support” of the Alliance for Progress. These eight points were: (1) reorganization of the public administration as an instrument to promote social and economic development, (2) institutional reorganization to provide more social benefits, (3) agrarian development, including rational land distribution, supervised credit and marketing services, (4) accelerated Central American economic integration, (5) industrial development using both public and private resources, (6) fiscal reform and effective administration, (7) coordination of government fiscal and monetary policy with public investment policy designed to secure an equitable redistribution of the national income, and (8) reinforcement of the National Planning Council in developing rational development plans.

U.S. Assistance to the New Government. No basic changes will be required in our AID assistance strategy in order to assist the implementation of the above program. Our programmed assistance was designed specifically for such purposes but was unable to work effectively with the previous Ydigoras administration. It is not anticipated that large additional amounts of aid will be needed or could be effectively used at this time. At the moment there is some \$30 million in unexpended funds, mostly loans from U.S. sources, which have not been used due to the inability of the Ydigoras Government to provide matching funds or otherwise take effective action. Should the present government prove effective in devising and implementing development plans then it can be anticipated that our assistance could be much accelerated and with only minimum requirements for grant assistance. This prediction is based on the present satisfactory economic situation in Guatemala and the prospects of greatly accelerated progress, provided the economic community can look forward to a more stable political atmosphere and the support of an efficient and effective public administration. The unwholesome domestic climate, administrative disarray and fiscal mismanagement have constituted more of a deterrent to the Guatemalan economy in the past three years than have low coffee prices.

138. Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, July 31¹

July 31, 1963

SUBJECT

Guatemalan Request for United States' Mediation of British Honduras Dispute

After presenting his credentials to the President on July 10, the new Guatemalan Ambassador, Dr. Carlos Garcia-Bauer, made reference to a note requesting the friendly mediation of the United States in the British-Guatemalan dispute over British Honduras (Belize). Ambassador Garcia-Bauer stated this request had been conveyed to Ambassador John O. Bell, the American Ambassador to Guatemala. The President indicated he wished to see and consider this request.

Ambassador Bell had reported an informal request made by the Guatemalan Foreign Minister on July 1 for friendly United States mediation in the dispute. At the same time Ambassador Bell was given a copy of a sharp note delivered to the British Chargé in Guatemala. The note to the British protested the unilateral British action of convening on July 11 "constitutional" conversations with British Honduran representatives on the future political status of British Honduras without previously consulting Guatemala. The note stated that if the UN persisted in creating a new state at the expense of Guatemalan territory then Guatemala reserved the right to take measures, also unilaterally, deemed appropriate to Guatemalan interests. Actually the Foreign Minister gave Ambassador Bell a Memorandum (text enclosed) implying that the consequences of such British unilateral action posed a threat to stability in the Caribbean area and, therefore, he solicited the friendly mediation of the United States to bring about an "understanding" on this problem.

Shortly before the above events, British representatives at the Birch Grove meeting on June 29 between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan sought the Secretary's views on United States assistance should complete independence be given to British Honduras. The Secretary subsequently requested Embassy London to convey the following views to HMG: 1) while appreciative of the British policy of moving its colonies as rapidly as feasible toward independence or self-determination, we wonder how independence can be accomplished quickly and smoothly in view of the complete lack of economic viability

¹ Guatemalan request for U.S. mediation in British Honduras (Belize) dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guatemala, April-July 1963.

of British Honduras and the uncertainties of Guatemalan, and even Mexican, political attitudes; 2) we speculate whether independence will merely mean the shifting of economic liability from the UK to the US; 3) we feel an interim step, contributing partially to economic viability, might be some form of British Honduran association in the Central American Common Market, the political and economic consequences of which might facilitate an eventual solution to the dispute; and (4) since we firmly support the Central American Market, we would examine carefully how we could be helpful should British Honduras become associated with it and the political problems with Guatemala and Mexico substantially eased.

The Department considers that the United States should not offer to mediate the territorial dispute over British Honduras, which would appear to some as intervention in behalf of Guatemalan interests and as an impingement on the principle of self-determination. However, the Secretary had earlier agreed that we would be willing to explore separately with Guatemalan and British diplomatic representatives in Washington to see if areas of agreement exist with reference to economic development of British Honduras wherein the good offices of the United States could be usefully employed. While there has not yet been an opportunity to carry this out, we are hopeful that circumstances will eventually permit it. The British replied on July 13 to the Guatemalan note of July 1 that HMG desires to see fully implemented the recommendations for social and economic development agreed on at the tripartite talks in San Juan in April 1962. The note also suggested informal discussions with Guatemala after the London constitutional talks, which were concluded on July 22 and provided for full internal self-government as of January 1, 1964.

After Guatemala on July 24 broke diplomatic relations with Great Britain, the British asked us to protect their interests in Guatemala. Our response has been to point out the disadvantages to the United Kingdom and the United States of such a proposal. Instead we suggested that the United Kingdom and Guatemala keep contact through their consulates.

We assume that Guatemala's request of July 1 for our mediation of the British Honduras dispute may no longer apply under the circumstances created by Guatemala's severance on July 24 of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. Ambassador Bell has recommended, and the Department concurs, that the President should not permit the Guatemalan Ambassador to involve him in this dispute. Meanwhile, the Department will continue to give close attention to the problem to determine what, if any, action we can take to ease the situation, looking toward a resumption of Guatemalan-British relations.

*/s/ John A. McKesson
for*

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure**MEMORANDUM**

(Delivered July 1 to Ambassador Bell
by the Guatemalan Foreign Minister)

On this same date the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Guatemala delivered to the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Great Britain in this city the note of which a copy is attached, pointing out that in case Great Britain persists in her intention of creating a new state in Belize at the expense of Guatemalan territory, this country will remain at full liberty to take the measures most suited to its interests.

In view of the vital interest that an adequate solution of this matter has for the stability of the whole region of the Caribbean, which would be seriously upset if Belize is unilaterally given a supposed or actual autonomy without taking into account the well-founded aspirations of Guatemala, this government solicits the friendly mediation of the Government of the United States which, as it has done in other similar cases, can, if it so wishes, make an effort to bring about an understanding on this question.

139. Telegram 123 to Guatemala City, September 24¹

September 24, 1963

We are increasingly concerned over failure of Peralta regime to organize any effective attack on the main economic and political problems facing it, and over its refusal to accept badly needed help and advice.

We fully endorse your intention (as set forth in para 1, page 3, A-147) assiduously to cultivate relationships leading to greater US influence with Peralta regime and to greater receptivity to help which is available from us for the asking. This in fact should be your central purpose during the coming months. We recognize that it is one which requires slow and careful action, and which must be based on elements of mutual respect, correctness and dignity, and best accomplished

¹ Concern over failure of Peralta regime to begin to solve the main economic and political problems facing Guatemala. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL GUAT-US.

through little steps forward without appearance of pressure or preaching.

Since Peralta is in less secure political position now than in early days his regime, and the gross inadequacy of his government's own unaided efforts presumably more apparent, you may find opportunities to begin applying useful leverage, not only on operational matters of mutual concern, but on some of the more fundamental questions. For example, possibly using your relationship with Peralta's brother or other influential individuals, you should look for, and take advantage of, any opening to draw the Peralta regime toward the realization that its repression of political activity only drives it underground, inviting violent subversion, and that regime should consider trying to bring politics out into the open and into constructive channels.

We note that you have in fact already started to work toward objectives outlined above, but wish to emphasize importance of continuing effort.

Request your comments on foregoing, including identity of some of the people which you and other members CT believe you can most usefully cultivate for purposes stated. If you concur, we will try to use Garcia Bauer to similar end. We have found him to be reasonably friendly, cooperative, and, in contrast to his predecessor Alejos, intelligent.

Ball

140. Telegram 254 to Guatemala City, November 27¹

November 27, 1963

Subject: Guatemalan Plans for Constitutionality.

Department continues have keen interest in return of constitutional government in Guatemala. When opportune, Ambassador should seek to elicit from Peralta his latest thinking on measures to restore constitutionality. FYI. During visit for funeral President Kennedy, Aguilar de Leon stated Peralta contemplating having a constituent assembly early in 1964 to prepare new constitution. He indicated that transitory article to constitution would give constitutional status to Peralta who would

¹ Guatemalan plans for return to constitutional government. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 15 GUAT.

continue in office until 1964. Aguilar not clear how constituent assembly would be created but implied that it would be based on some degree of political activity. Questions will arise if constituent assembly is not representative body, has not come into being by free choice of people, and serves only to perpetuate Peralta in office. Such steps would arouse criticism in hemisphere and would make it extremely difficult for Guatemala to qualify for exception to restrictions on foreign aid to military governments likely to be imposed by Congress. END FYI.

Rusk

Honduras

141. Telegram 657 from Tegucigalpa, March 13¹

Tegucigalpa, March 13, 1961

Embassy telegrams 652, 653.

President this afternoon listened quietly to recital of concern re threats to stability GOH from Hondurans, many militant oppositionists to government but many also sincere anti-communists who fear what they consider to be government's toleration or even encouragement of communist and Castrista activities. I emphasized danger of this anti-communist crusade becoming identified as an anti-Villeda Morales crusade and suggested moment had arrived for action to be taken which would make clear to any observer the anti-communist, anti-Castro position of his administration.

President indicated full awareness of problem and of sincere concern many people as well as of campaign being waged by enemies. Said action is being taken and will be continued against illegal communist activities; referred specifically to closure of *Tribuna Popular* and planned closure of other similar publications which he said will be forcibly maintained despite cries in name of freedom of press which he assumes will arise from leftist quarters. He referred to temporary haven being offered Cuban refugees through issuance visas in Havana by Honduran Ambassador and said demands of those who are calling for expulsion these refugees on grounds their anti-Castro activities will be ignored. Other steps will be taken which will make clear his government's position and which will satisfy true anti-communists; these steps will be short of driving PCH underground, which he considers ineffectual move in country like Honduras.

When I asked Villeda Morales about Cuban consulate in Puerto Cortes he reflected surprise; telephoned acting foreign minister who verified consulate functioning on provisional exequatur with 11 employees; and instructed immediate (this afternoon) withdrawal exequatur. Said no Cuban consulate has legitimate business in Honduras and expressed determination ascertain how exequatur issued without his knowledge.

I spoke of uniforms which have been seen here (Embassy telegram 652) and which are being used to "prove" communist infiltration. Presi-

¹ President Villeda Morales informed about threats to stability of his government. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/3-1361.

dent again demonstrated surprise but said he assumed they came from Cuba and if this could be established he would break relations immediately.

President expressed belief no division in armed forces. Said Colonel Lopez had told him of report GOES was concerned re situation in Honduras and was planning corrective action. Villeda Morales had called on highly-placed Salvadoran friend for report on this and had received today coded message which he read me denying any such concern or planned move by GOES but repeating reports Nicaraguan money passing through Salvadoran hands for use with Honduran military for subversive purposes. Message also conveyed warning re activities in Puerto Cortes which VM associated with news I had given him re Cuban consulate that place.

President's attitude today was in contrast, his usual relaxed dismissal of problems as of no importance. Although nothing was achieved in terms of break in relations with Cuba, closure of consulate in Puerto Cortes, largest official Cuban establishment in Honduras, would be first concrete action against Castro.

Burrows

142. Telegram 705 from Tegucigalpa, April 3¹

Tegucigalpa, April 3, 1961

Department telegram 415.

Although it may be possible President Villeda Morales is simply putting on as good a show as he can to impress us without going so far as to alienate completely his leftist friends, I believe he is sincere in his anti-communist protestations. In any case our tactic should be to accept his statements with open confidence they will continue to be followed by action.

Must be recognized he does have problems and does not have undivided support from any group. Thus his own Liberal Party while supporting him as President contains elements who are actively concerned with their own candidacy for next election, as well as some of those very leftist elements against whom President would like to move.

¹ Embassy assessment of President Villeda Morales' anti-Communist position. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/4-361.

Armed forces thus far honors its commitment to defend constitutional regime but feels no personal loyalty to Villeda Morales, some would even like to see him in trouble with Nationalists and leftist members his own party. Nationalists while pressing for action against Castro, *at same time and for purely political reasons question government* seizure communists literature and harassment “intellectuals.”

Under these circumstances, and assuming sincerity of his motivations, President must move cautiously and along what must seem zig-zag course. Likewise, I feel US, rather than exerting inflexible constant pressure, should step into breaches as they appear, pressing government to take action appropriate to moment, but keeping in mind possible counter-productiveness of too much pressure at wrong time. Villeda Morales could be toppled from either the right or the left and I fear the one nearly as much as the other.

I would hope that during the next three to six months we shall see a continuation of the hardening process which has already begun in the stance of GOH against Communism. I would hope also that the government's political opponents of the right may be brought to the realization that whatever Villeda Morales does in this direction is to the benefit of all and that he should receive the support of all loyal Hondurans in at least this program. Their political attacks should not be designed to deflect him from anti-Communist course in order that they may continue to attack him as pro-Communist.

I would hope that Villeda Morales will continue to separate well-known Communists and leftists from their government positions. This has been begun and the President assures me he intends to continue; recognition should be given his actions, even from his political enemies and insofar as possible the Embassy will endeavor to elicit such recognition.

We can hope to see continuing progress toward an openly anti-Castro position, with perhaps even a rupture of diplomatic relations. In regard to this last, however, we must keep in mind the moral influence of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico as well as the near hero-worship of Villeda Morales for Betancourt and Lleras Camargo. It would be difficult although I believe not impossible for Honduras to break with Castro in advance of at least one of these more influential LA colleagues.

I feel that the near future calls for an alert and unremitting awareness of our goals in Honduras but at the same time an ad hoc approach to action. We must be prepared to counsel, needle and press; we must also be prepared to accept at times what may appear to be dangerous vacillations. Whatever is obtained in the way of action will strengthen the moderate Liberals position and reinforce armed forces support for the Villeda Morales administration if they (and the nationalists) can

be brought to recognize the constructive nature of those actions. At the same time, of course, Villeda Morales must be brought to realize the danger that is present in the armed forces belief that they are being destroyed by the Liberals in favor of the Guardia Civil. This I shall keep clearly in mind in any conversations I have with the President and leading members of his party.

Above represents present analysis of situation; changes or refinements will be conveyed to Department as developing situation may require.

Burrows

143. Telegram 768 from Tegucigalpa, April 21¹

Tegucigalpa, April 21, 1961

President Villeda Morales announced tonight to cheering anti-Castro crowd, and over national hookup that he would lay before Council of Ministers his proposal to break relations with Cuba, and that Foreign Ministry would carry out action tomorrow, Saturday, April 22. President's oratory was strongly and outspokenly anti-Communist, stressed that his action was compliance will of people from whom he had sprung, cautioned that will to abandon extreme left implied equal responsibility to break with plotters of extreme right. Crowd had been warmed by two hours of oratory in main square before marching on Palace to ask for break, obviously with knowledge of authorities. Manifestation contrasted imposingly with failure several Castro-Communist attempts organize rallies. President's announcement was followed by shooting of fire-arms, a common practice at any celebration, but no disorder as yet.

Burrows

¹ President Villeda Morales proposal to break relations with Cuba on April 22. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, 715.00/4-2161.

**144. Letter from Ambassador Burrows to Katherine W. Bracken,
January 24¹**

January 24, 1962

Dear Kay:

I realize that the questions concerning Honduras included in the OCI document 5757–61 are in fact not intended to be dealt with either by the Embassy itself or by the Army Attaché's office. The document is, however, circulated in the Embassy, and it is quite natural that these two offices should study the questions asked with respect to their own reporting. We feel that since the questions themselves appear to reveal a distorted view of the situation in Honduras, responsive answers would seem to involve in the first place a straightening out of the questions themselves.

To take them in order, the first question ends with what to me is a completely unintelligible phrase, when it refers to "the constant political instability now sapping Honduran strength in many areas". Honduras is, of course, a country with political problems, but, as a matter of fact, the present Honduran administration has endured for over four years and appears to be going forward to complete its full six years in office without any great difficulty. It has been stable enough and strong enough to counter several subversive attempts of the sort which have, historically, overthrown previous Honduran Governments. It has constantly supported United States objectives, both within the country and outside. While the Government is not, any more than our own government, the unanimous choice of all of the citizens of Honduras, there is nowhere in Honduras the hard, sworn-to-the-death opposition of the sort which is found in both Guatemala and Nicaragua. Earlier in the same question the implication is given that "Villeda's lack of control over the legislature" is an element of serious weakness. This is, or purports to be, a democratic administration. There are elements of opposition to Villeda in Congress, a fact which would appear to support the thought that it is a democratic administration. When the extreme left and the extreme right elements of opposition to the President are united, they can control legislation to the extent of defying the President. I believe this is a normal situation in any congressional republic, including our own. If the question were stripped down to its essential center "will significant economic and other reforms be effected

¹ Thoughts that OCI's reporting requirements reveal a distorted view of the situation in Honduras. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/1–2462.

soon enough to show results which are badly needed?", it would be a more meaningful question.

The request for detailed and continuing reporting on the activities and contacts of ORELLANA Bueso reflects what may be a failure on the part of the Embassy [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to indicate the extent to which Orellana Bueso has removed himself from active contact and possibly also the extent to which his physical and mental health has deteriorated. The Embassy will be able to look into this in the near future.

Lt. Col. Hutchin is indignant about the third question because he can find no statement during the past year that there has been a "strong build-up of arms in the hands of Castroites".

These comments could be extended to the point of nit-picking, but I would rather not do so since I think that the above remarks indicate a very serious state of affairs in whatever office initiated the questions, and I would rather keep these comments on that level. Finally, the last or "Cloud 9" question as to the attitude of the left wing if Villeda attempts to retain power, is probably a record of some kind in the field of speculation. Any attempt on the part of Villeda to retain power would be so carefully cloaked behind a façade of one kind or another that the left wing would probably not know what was happening until the power was safely ensconced in Villeda's hands. The attitude of such individuals towards Villeda if he should attempt to retain power would probably be approximately the same as their attitude toward any other powerful politician who might be attempting to gain the power: they would weigh their chances of gain and determine their attitude accordingly. It would not be determined by ideological factors.

There are, of course, legitimate areas cited among the questions that will be continuing objects of study by the Embassy's Political Section as well as, I am sure, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Army Attaché. Our reporting on the cabinet speculations is well ahead of the seventh question. As for the eighth question which concerns presidential possibilities, the interesting new development, way ahead of the question, lies in the field of a possible coalition between the orthodox, or right-wing Liberals, and the Nationalist-Reformists.

This letter is intended simply to reflect the feeling of never-never-land that hit all of us here upon reading this list of priority reporting requirements furnished by the OCI.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Charles R. Burrows

145. Telegram 64 from Tegucigalpa, August 13¹

Tegucigalpa, August 13, 1962

Reference: Department circular telegram 230.

Country team (CT) believes criticism and assumption described reference telegram in general too sweeping and may reflect an incomplete appreciation of the marked political evolution which has taken place in LA generally, and LA armed forces particularly in recent times.

Re criticism: 1) Honduran armed forces are characterized by respect for constitutional principles manifested by both words and actions: Close association American officers with armed forces supports and strengthens this attitude; 2) in performing the expressed function of support for constitutionally elected government, armed forces are supporting the non-Communist democratic elements in this country despite some civilian pressure to do otherwise. Armed forces prestige is based upon reputation for honesty, integrity, and support constitutional principles, not upon their power, as may be judged by fact that in Honduras the military establishment receives only seven per cent of annual budget; 3) military establishment of 4,000 men, military budget seven per cent of national budget, and arms acquisition of Honduran military cannot be considered too large; 4) MAP in Honduras severely restricted by small size of military establishment and its small budget as well as by careful consideration by CT of various proposals presented, (e.g., recent CT position concerning possible additional deliveries C-47s to Honduras). Equipment and training given Honduran military under MAP is addressed to internal defense defined in narrowest terms (e.g., police type assistance against insurgency and guerrilla action plus eventual ability police frontiers and coastline). Armed forces are engaged in wide range civic action activities without US assistance, and a road building project with US assistance.

With regard assumption listed in reference telegram as basis for above criticism: A) CT has reported in past that it views legitimate mission of armed forces as limited to internal defense against infiltration of armed groups and initiation guerilla activities which, under conditions of hemisphere struggle would certainly be one of most important fronts; B) recent history Honduras includes no successful military coups but on contrary two successful thwartings of attempted coups and complete discrediting of Caudillo Armando Velasquez their leader; C) while it is true that Honduran military are largely conserva-

¹ Country Team response to criticism and assumption in circular telegram 230. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.5/8-1362.

tive and in that sense oriented toward the right, their civic action activities and their determined support of constitutional principles appear to negate, so far as Honduras is concerned, the stereotype of LA military referred to; D) resources of Honduran military are extremely limited but within these limitations armed forces are engaged in economic and social development and there is every indication that with further support in this direction they would undertake greater economic and social development activities; E) the MAP in Honduras has been carefully controlled with regard both to grants and sales by careful consideration in the CT to each specific request or suggestion whether received from armed forces themselves or from Washington, and this control has been effected bearing in mind primary role of armed forces in internal defense and civic action.

Further limitation of this assistance would appear therefore to jeopardize security interests US in reducing ability armed forces to perform what will be essentially a very important role in case armed attack against hemisphere, namely that of defense against insurgency and guerilla activities (it is assumed Department's reference to policy-type assistance refers to policing against insurgency border infiltration and guerilla activities); F) it would be difficult if not impossible to reduce Honduras military expenditures which are already as low as would be possible without elimination armed forces capability altogether. There is no damage to US public image in Honduras through association US with armed forces since they do not have reputation for extravagance and irresponsibility.

In opinion this CT a still more restrictive grant and sales policy with respect Honduras would result in net US loss in terms our across-the-board foreign policy objectives here.

Burrows

146. Telegram 51 to Tegucigalpa, September 11¹

September 11, 1962

EMBTEL 118.

Seek meetings with President Villeda Morales and with Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto at earliest possible time and state you are under instructions to convey following US expressions of concern over implications for foreign investment, public and private, in Honduras agricultural development as a result recently passed agrarian reform law.

1. Defining expropriation procedure as “administrative” and thus precluding judicial review creates uncertainty as to fields of application of law, particularly in view of experiences under unclear legislation under Castro. In normal administration of legislation as extensive as current law, cases of varying interpretation arise frequently. Foreign investors hold recourse to courts in such cases as important factor of “investor confidence”.

2. Compensation scheme contemplated would raise most serious issues under new section 620(e) of AID Act, which requires President to suspend assistance where country expropriates US citizens’ property and fails within reasonable time to take steps to discharge its obligations under international law including payment of fair compensation. In this instance, agrarian reform law apparently contemplates compensation which might not satisfy international legal standards in terms either of its promptness, its adequacy or its effectiveness, since bonds would be payable only in 20 years, standards of valuation not clear and bonds and interest obligations not denominated in dollars. AID act leave US President no repeat no discretion regarding aid suspension in these circumstances. FYI great care must be taken to avoid definitive interpretation agrarian law at this stage under AID act until reviewed AID/W and Legal Adviser end FYI.

3. View restricted finances GOH and weak organization Agrarian Reform Institute, new law effectively inhibits all credits for agricultural development and thereby obviates sound Honduran agricultural development which main point Alliance for Progress and AID programs.

We realize and understand political situation facing Villeda Morales in this election year. However, in view of detrimental effect law

¹ Instructions for meeting with President and Foreign Minister to convey U.S. concern over implications for foreign investment, public and private, in Honduras agricultural development as result new agrarian reform law. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 815.16/9–1062.

could have on ability US public and private sources assist Honduran development, as well as impact on current US congressional consideration of AID appropriations we suggest he veto measures as presented. As we interpret article 246 of constitution President may cite his opinion unconstitutional provisions or articles he deems in conflict with constitution and request Supreme Court decision. Honduran National Association of Industries study of June 1962 lists numerous conflicts which Villeda might note: Article 11 contravenes 156 of constitution; article 15 contravenes 242; 32, 40 and 41 contravene 67, 78 and 156; 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 164 contravene 78, 156 and 226; 211 and 212 contravene 66.

If Villeda cannot veto or refer to Supreme Court, or measure has already been signed, it appears minimum he could do to restore balance to situation is announce publicly his intention seek early legislation amend certain portions in conflict or which require further clarification.

Rusk

147. Telegram 68 to Tegucigalpa, September 20¹

September 20, 1962

Deptel 51 Embtel 141.

For your background the following sets forth some considerations pertinent to US policy on assistance to American private interests abroad and problems arising from some anticipated provisions of Honduran agrarian reform law.

1. USG traditionally acts to support American private interest abroad or espouse private international claim when concrete case justifying it arises. Justification usually rests on fact of specific injury suffered by claimant for which he is unable obtain redress through usual means. Conversely USG normally refrains from actions on behalf specific private interest on basis hypothetical injury.

2. Foregoing is distinct from situations where USG may take position on measures considered undesirable on general policy grounds.

3. With particular reference to Honduran situation, it seems clear that provision in original draft agrarian law for compensation for expro-

¹ Transmits considerations pertinent to U.S. policy on assistance to American private interests abroad and problems arising from provisions of Honduran agrarian reform law. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 815.16/9-1962.

priated land by 20-year bonds, deliverable on re-distribution of land, would at least raise the question of possible invocation of section 620(e). Foreign Assistance Act, not because of fact that payment to be made in bonds but because of particular arrangements surrounding transaction in this case. It is true that section has not yet been invoked with respect any country and that in any case it is impossible to determine in advance of legal study of facts in each separate concrete case whether section might or might not be considered to apply. Nevertheless, the possibility that compensation provision would bring to the fore in our relations with Honduras the question of application of section 620(e) was in itself sufficiently important to warrant action which was taken, namely to furnish GOH text of section and advise it of that possibility.

4. If original draft law has in fact been changed to provide for prior cash compensation for expropriated land, we concur with your view that this would cause section 620(e) to recede from picture. There does remain the question of judicial review of the evaluation procedure, and possibly justification for expropriation because of lack of proper economic use. On basis of information available it would seem unreasonable to expect president's veto of an otherwise acceptable law on this point, if he announces his intention of asking for suitable amendment at an early opportunity. However on basis of what we know now such amendment would appear highly desirable and you should continue to press President to hold to promise he now appears ready to make. We would of course appreciate information soonest on any amendments recently made in draft law which would bear on method of determining amount of compensation to be given.

5. It is important in general in handling problems involving US investment abroad to avoid allowing defense of legitimate interests by USG to become distorted in ways which would convey to foreign peoples the mistaken impression that the US opposes sound land reform, which is a keystone of the Alliance.

Rusk

148. Memorandum of conversation, October 4, between Foreign Minister Alvarado and Edwin M. Martin¹

October 4, 1962

SUBJECT

Honduran Agrarian Reform; Request for Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

Honduran Foreign Minister Andrés ALVARADO Puerto
Honduran Ambassador to the U.S. and the OAS Celeo DÁVILA
Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin—ARA
OAP—Mr. John W. Fisher
OAP/H—Mr. Edward M. Rowell

SUMMARY:

Minister Alvarado said that Honduras is democratic and has had problems with its neighbors, but it meets its international obligations, and restrains exile plotters within its borders.

Honduras embraces the Alliance for Progress completely, and fully recognizes the primary role of private investment, foreign and domestic. The Agrarian Reform program will be administered with this in mind. The GOH has no intention of doing anything which would damage fruit company interests.

The Agrarian Reform law was enacted hastily and therefore requires some modification. Enactment was democratic, and even the President of the Congress, Rodas, who was against it, was unable to prevent passage.

Honduras strongly opposes international communism and Castroism, and supports U.S. initiatives in this field. Internally communism is best fought by making reforms and repressing reactionary elements, thus preempting the communists' normal fields of operations.

The adverse U.S. press and congressional reaction to the Honduran Agrarian Reform law came as a great surprise, and was unwarranted in view of the true GOH intent. The Minister was pleased that Secretary Rusk said the U.S. still supports just and good reforms.

Mr. Martin said that President Villeda's promise not to sign expropriation decrees until the Agrarian Reform law is amended, made public through the *New York Times*, greatly helped the situation. We

¹ Honduran agrarian reform; request for assistance. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.04/10-462.

await with interest the action at the November session of the Honduran Congress.

Minister Alvarado and Ambassador Dávila said the law would be amended and asked the U.S. Government to furnish expert assistance in making appropriate changes in the law.

Mr. Martin said that the U.S. can supply purely technical advice on problems of Agrarian Reform, but Hondurans themselves will of course have to prepare changes in the law if it is to satisfy Honduras' own unique needs.

Minister Alvarado said that Honduras has a truly representative and democratic government which operates on a basis of consensus, and not by executive fiat. In contrast, some neighboring governments are much less democratic. They attempt to intervene in Honduran affairs occasionally to promote the establishment of a Honduran Government to their own liking. In the early days of Honduras' present administration, some local extremists intrigued against the country's neighbors, but the GOH halted these adventures as soon as they were discovered.

Minister Alvarado then said: Honduras is doing its best to accomplish the social and economic progress promised in the Alliance for Progress and espoused by the United States (Mr. Martin interjected the comment that these goals are enumerated in the Charter of Punta del Este, and Minister Alvarado agreed). The new Agrarian Reform law is part of the effort. The GOH intends to administer Agrarian Reform responsibly, and will not recklessly expropriate private property. Honduras fully recognizes the value and importance of such property, and the fundamental role of and need for private capital and foreign investment in its own development. Minister Alvarado emphasized very strongly that the Honduran Government never intended that the law be used to attack the American fruit companies or to drive them out of Honduras. On the contrary, Honduras wants the American companies to remain, and will work to keep the climates attractive to them.

The Minister recited the history of the enactment of the Agrarian Reform law, which he said in brief had aspects of hasty improvisation. The GOH some time ago established what it mistakenly thought was a technically qualified commission to study the problem and to draft a law. The commission was composed of OAS advisors, plus a Venezuelan advisor, plus a Mexican who was thought to be conservative but who turned out to be leftist. The draft finally was introduced in the Honduran Congress very late in the session, without review by any of the cabinet ministers, except the Minister of Natural Resources. Members of congress who should have demanded more thorough revision failed to familiarize themselves with it and acceded to it with-

out serious objection. Under the circumstances, even the President of the Congress, Rodas Alvarado, who opposed the law, was unable to prevent its passage.

Minister Alvarado said he was shaken at the U.S. press reaction to the Honduran Agrarian Reform law. He had been completely unprepared for the severity of the attacks, and he was taken aback when Secretary Rusk discussed the matter with him on the evening of October 2. He felt reassured when the Secretary made plain the United States' continued support for good and just rural reform.

Mr. Martin reemphasized U.S. espousal of sound rural reform properly executed. He said President Villeda's statement to *New York Times* correspondent Paul P. Kennedy on October 4, 1962, seemed to resolve our immediate concern over Honduran Agrarian Reform. (In an article on page 9 of the October 4 issue of the *New York Times*, Kennedy reported that Villeda had said that "he would sign no expropriation decrees until the law had been amended".) Mr. Martin added that we would expect appropriate action at the next regular session of the Honduran Congress in November 1962.

Minister Alvarado and Ambassador Dávila said the Agrarian Reform law can and will be amended to avoid damage to anyone. They asked the United States to furnish some expert assistance in formulating amendments to the law. This way, Honduras could be sure the proposed changes would satisfy U.S. legal requirements and would be technically sound. He hastily added that he was not proposing U.S. intervention in Honduras, but merely seeking technical advice.

Mr. Martin replied that every country has its own unique political-cultural-economic system. Therefore, an Agrarian Reform law, to be good and just, will have to be unique to the country enacting it. Hence, the law must be written by Hondurans. The United States will do what it can to provide purely technical advice at an operating level, but formulation and amendment of the law must be done by Hondurans.

Mr. Martin, Ambassador Dávila and Minister Alvarado agreed that this topic should be kept confidential.

The Foreign Minister then sketched Honduras' relations with Cuba. His government severed diplomatic relations in April, 1961. President Villeda has repeatedly attacked the "cancer of Castroism". Honduras firmly supports U.S. initiatives on Cuba, and is pleased with the results of the informal meeting of American Foreign Ministers, October 2-3. (Ambassador Dávila interjected the thought that the final communiqué should have been stronger. Mr. Martin replied that he was satisfied to have obtained as much as we did.) However, the present Honduran approach to internal communism is best for the long run; that is, communism will be defeated by reform and economic and social progress.

149. Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, November 7¹

November 7, 1962

TO

The Secretary

THROUGH

S/S

FROM

ARA—Mr. Martin

SUBJECT

Visit of President José Ramon VILLEDIA Morales of Honduras to the United States

Discussion:

I recommend that an invitation be extended to President José Ramon VILLEDIA Morales, President of Honduras, to make an informal working visit to Washington on November 30, 1962. Ambassador Burrows at Tegucigalpa in urging the invitation states (Tab B) that President Villeda is greatly interested in accepting an invitation to attend a meeting of exiled Cuban medical men (he is a doctor himself) in Miami on December 2. President Villeda has accepted the Cuban exiles' invitation to Miami "in principle" and is being pressed by them to make it definite, but wishes first to consult with reference to our desires concerning a visit to this country.

I feel strongly that President Villeda should be made welcome to this country and that while here he be invited for a brief informal working visit to Washington. This will be the second time Villeda has traveled to the United States on his own while chief of state. In 1960 he visited Miami and New Orleans but was carefully kept out of Washington and received no formal recognition. A rebuff to Villeda in his desire to attend the Miami exiles' meeting or a repetition of the treatment given him in 1960 would adversely affect our excellent relations with him.

During the past three years Villeda has become one of the staunchest supporters of United States policies in the United Nations and the Organization of American States (Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado gave a key speech supporting our position at Punta del Este in January

¹ Visit of President Villeda Morales to the U.S. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.11/11-762.

1962). He is a moderate liberal who identifies himself closely with President Betancourt of Venezuela. He broke relations with Cuba on April 21, 1961 at the end of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Domestically, his Government has progressed against the threat of Communist subversion, and is honestly trying to fulfill its Alliance for Progress commitments. He has worked hard for social and economic reforms including revision of income taxes, improved customs administration, education expansion, and enactment of legislation to promote private enterprise development of resources. Despite some personal political risk, he has heeded our representations on the recently passed controversial Agrarian Reform Law, a topic which drew intensive United States Congressional interest. He was in the forefront of our Latin American allies in rallying against the recent danger in Cuba.

Recognition of Villeda would demonstrate that we remember our stalwart friends, however small. It would buttress his prestige at home, making it easier for him to bring about a peaceful constitutional change of power at the end of his term late in 1963. And, in Ambassador Burrows' opinion, a Washington visit would be regarded by Villeda as the high point of his six-year administration.

U/PR estimates that the cost of this visit will be \$1500, covering the cost of official entertainment in Washington.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached Memorandum to the President (Tab A) which requests approval of the visit and extension of an invitation.

Concurrences:

W/PR—Mr. King G—Mr. Hackler CAP—Mr. Sause
H—Mr. Wexler A—Mr. Little AID—Mr. Martin

Attachments:

1. Tab A Memorandum to the President
2. Tab B Letter from Ambassador Burrows

150. Memorandum of conversation, November 30, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials¹

Part II (of 7)

November 30, 1962

SUBJECT

The Alliance for Progress

PARTICIPANTS

President Kennedy
Ambassador Charles R. Burrows
Assistant Secretary of State Martin
Assistant Administrator of AID Moscoso
Mr. Ralph Dungan, The White House

President Villeda Morales of Honduras
Honduran Ambassador to the United States and the OAS Céleo Dávila
Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto
Honduran Finance Minister Bueso Arias

President Villeda opened with the following comments concerning the Alliance for Progress:

Communism will be no threat in Central America if assistance is forthcoming under the Alliance for Progress. If Honduras receives what it is requesting, the country will be grateful to the Alliance, and the government will be able to convince the people that they should be patient because the Alliance will meet their aspirations.

Honduras has accomplished more in the past five years, than in all of the country's previous history. Education and health facilities have been constructed, mortality and illiteracy rates cut. Honduran money puts up a new school every two or three days. More bridges have been built in the last five years than in the previous 55.

President Villeda's administration now wants a few additional projects to cap its term. It wants to stimulate the growth of a pulp and paper industry. Oil offers great possibilities. And it wants to effect an agrarian reform program based on a recently passed law (see separate memorandum of conversation). These items will be discussed with Mr. Moscoso and Mr. Martin.

Unfortunately, totally undeveloped countries lack the means to meet the technical requirements of the Alliance for Progress, such as the feasibility studies required by American legislation. The United

¹ Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962–September 1963.

States can operate with a budget deficit, but a small country cannot. Plans and projects are important, but in a conflagration there is no time to wait for feasibility studies.

Serious difficulties also arise when a country tries to reform its land, tax and income structures in the face of prejudices against such reforms. It often is more difficult to take necessary action in a democracy than in a dictatorship. President Villeda understands the difficulty the U.S. Government has in meeting the requirements levied on it by the U.S. Congress, but the Honduran Government has its problems, too.

Responding to President Villeda's initiative on this subject, and in the course of discussion President Kennedy made the following observations:

United States funds are limited, and the country has economic and military commitments all over the world. Most assistance to Latin America comes from the United States. The foreign aid program has created a serious balance of payments problem. The most expensive assistance is dollar aid, because this represents a net drain on the economy. Europe should share the burden.

Nonetheless, expectations regarding rapid progress are greater in Latin America than in Africa or Asia. The United States gives priority to its commitments to Latin America in order to help solve urgent social problems.

The United States is well aware of the need to speed Alliance programs. The President was gratified by President Villeda's recognition of a "mutual" need for such effort. The United States recognizes the difficulty inherent in land and tax reforms, but there are also difficulties present when funds are requested of the U.S. Congress.

President Kennedy suggested that President Villeda continue future discussions of this subject with Mr. Moscoso.

Mr. Moscoso stated that the United States now plans to help recipients of aid with required pre-investment and engineering studies. The incapacity of underdeveloped countries in this regard has been a serious concern. American legislation requires the submission of specific projects, and plans and projects go hand in hand. Therefore, the United States is interested in the sound preparation of projects.

Interpreters: Mr. Van Reigersberg and Mr. Hervas

151. Memorandum of conversation, November 30, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials¹

Part III (of 7)

November 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Honduran Agrarian Reform and the United Fruit Company

PARTICIPANTS

President Kennedy
Ambassador Charles R. Burrows
Assistant Secretary of State Martin
Assistant Administrator of AID Moscoso
Mr. Ralph Dungan, The White House

President Villeda Morales of Honduras
Honduran Ambassador to the United States and the OAS Céleo Dávila
Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto
Honduran Finance Minister Bueso Arias

In a brief reference to Honduras' controversial Agrarian Reform Law and difficulties with the United Fruit Company, President Villeda said he would meet with United Fruit Company representatives in Miami. He said he would promise the company that its investments in Honduras are secure.

President Villeda noted that agrarian reform cannot be conservative. However, it does keep certain groups from usurping the leadership of revolutionary change. He added that a basic element of agrarian reform is respect for private property. He assured President Kennedy that "as long as a civilized man is head of my country, there is no reason to fear".

Concluding the interview, President Kennedy said he was pleased that President Villeda planned to meet members of the United Fruit Company. President Kennedy observed that it is not in the interest of either country that United Fruit should withdraw from Honduras, since withdrawal could produce chaos. The company should carry out its responsibilities in Honduras. President Kennedy was sure a solution could be found with the United Fruit Company which would protect the company's interests.

Interpreters: Mr. Van Reigersberg and Mr. Hervas

¹ Honduran agrarian reform and United Fruit Company. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962–September 1963.

152. Memorandum of conversation, November 30, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials¹

Part VI (of 7)

November 30, 1962

SUBJECT

The Swan Islands

PARTICIPANTS

President Kennedy
Ambassador Charles R. Burrows
Assistant Secretary of State Martin
Assistant Administrator of AID Moscoso
Mr. Ralph Dungan, The White House

President Villeda Morales of Honduras
Honduran Ambassador to the United States and the OAS Céleo Dávila
Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto
Honduran Finance Minister Bueso Arias

President Kennedy introduced the subject and made the following observations:

The Swan Islands are important to the United States because of the radio station and the weather station on them. The United States also is concerned about any implication that possible cession of United States sovereignty over the Swan Islands might have for United States ownership of certain other islands. Haiti is claiming one such island in the windward passage. The total number of islands affected must be determined. These United States interests must be safeguarded in any settlement of the dispute with Honduras.

Nonetheless, the United States seeks a solution to the problem. The United States is ready to go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This would be expensive, though costs probably would be about \$50,000 rather than the \$300,000 estimated by the Hondurans. If the case goes to the ICJ, the United States hopes it will be on a basis of equality so that both Honduras and the United States have the same amount of legal representation. This should be covered in any agreement submitting the case to the ICJ.

The possibility of arbitration (suggested by Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto) will be considered, and an answer given later. A paragraph noting this discussion as suggested by Alvarado Puerto

¹ The Swan Islands. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962–September 1963.

(see below) was to be inserted in the formal communiqué issued by the two Presidents. The text of the communiqué was to be given to Villeda before he left Washington.

Future discussion of the Swan Island question should be with Mr. Martin.

Answering a question posed by President Kennedy, Assistant Secretary Martin said United States rights to the Swan Islands are based on a 100 year-old act of Congress. The whole matter must be submitted to the Department of State's Legal Advisor for consultation. A claim on Christmas Island also is affected.

President Villeda said he wanted to resolve this question which is a tool of agitation. He agreed with President Kennedy regarding legal representation. He added that realistic appraisal shows the islands have no value for Honduras, while they render a service to the United States. Unfortunately, Latins are romantic, not practical. Hence, he wanted the discussion on Swan Islands included in the final communiqué. He said it was important to Honduras, the United States and all Latin America to state clearly that a solution of the Swan Island question would not set a precedent regarding rights of sovereignty and ownership, and that the meeting between the two Presidents, including discussion of the Swan Islands, was most cordial and satisfactory.

Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto reiterated President Villeda's points, adding that the Communists take advantage of the issue. He said that while a solution through legal channels, the ICJ, is possible, he would prefer arbitration within the confines of the Americas. This would be good for the whole Hemisphere as well as Honduras, and would test once more the spirit of fairness and justice of the United States. (Alvarado Puerto noted in passing that Honduran experience with the ICJ was good since the ICJ had favored Honduras over Nicaragua in a border dispute.)

Alvarado Puerto noted that Swan is not an island, but one of a number of keys about 60² miles off the coast of Honduras. He suggested that the following paragraph be inserted in the final communiqué:

"The two presidents, recognizing the strong friendship of the two countries, and recognizing the desire to reach a solution of the matter of Swan Island in harmony and justice, propose to undertake, in accordance with the principles of International Law and the Inter-American System and the principles of the Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the necessary steps for a rapid solution without taking the matter to an extra-continental tribunal."

² The Islands are actually 97 miles off the coast of Honduras.

(NOTE: The following paragraph was actually inserted in the communiqué after concurrence by Ambassador Dávila:

“The two Presidents agreed that their Governments should seek, on an urgent basis, a solution of the question of Swan Island, within the framework of the Inter-American System and taking full account of the rights and interests of both parties.”)

Interpreters: Mr. Van Reigersberg and Mr. Hervas

**153. Memorandum of conversation, December 4, among
Ambassador Burrows, Jasper Baker (United Fruit Company),
Edward M. Rowell, and John W. Fisher¹**

December 4, 1962

SUBJECT

Honduran Agrarian Reform and the United Fruit Company

PARTICIPANTS

Charles R. Burrows, United States Ambassador to Honduras
Jasper Baker, United Fruit Company Vice President Resident in Washington
Edward M. Rowell, OIC, Honduran Affairs, Department of State
John W. Fisher, Acting Director, Office of Central American and Panamanian
Affairs, Department of State (last few moments of conversation only)

Baker reported a conversation between Honduran and United Fruit Company officials which was held in Miami, Florida, on December 1, 1962, at 7:00 PM. The Hondurans were: President VILLEDA Morales, Finance Minister Jorge BUESO Arias, and Presidential Secretary Juan “Jack” AGURCIA Ewing. United Fruit was represented by: Victor C. FOLSOM, Vice President and General Counsel, Jasper BAKER, Vice President resident in Washington, Andrew HOLCOMB, Manager resident in Panamá, and Ben MILLER. The meeting was requested by the Honduran Government. President Villeda did most of the talking for the Hondurans, though toward the end Bueso spoke more frequently. Bueso interpreted for Baker.

According to Baker, Folsom opened the talk in Miami, emphasizing that frankness was essential. He asked Villeda if he thought he could amend the Agrarian Reform Law, reminding Villeda he only had a

¹ Honduran agrarian reform and United Fruit Company. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.04/12-462.

year left in office. Folsom handed Villeda a letter summarizing the law and suggesting general changes in many articles. Folsom made it plain that the company did not expect all the changes would be made, but some were absolutely essential. (Baker reiterated this last point to Ambassador Burrows.)

Reportedly, Villeda welcomed the frank conversation. Villeda said he is politically stronger now than he was two months ago. He promised to begin working immediately to amend the Agrarian Reform Law. However, the amendments would not be formally presented until the right moment, two or three months from now. Villeda was confident he could amend the law.

Villeda asked the size of United Fruit's replanting program for Honduras. Folsom said \$15 million. Villeda asked if the company would withdraw from Honduras if the Agrarian Reform Law were not amended. He was told "no", but that there would be no new investment or replanting. Villeda asked if he could announce publicly on his return to Honduras that United Fruit would not withdraw from the country. Folsom said "yes".

After giving this report, Baker made the following observations:

He believes Villeda was sincere at the Miami meeting and that he will earnestly try to amend the Agrarian Reform Law. Folsom shares this view, though Holcomb does not. The meeting was most cordial. Villeda was not disturbed by the terms of the letter handed to him. However, he did not read it carefully. Thomas Sunderland, President of United Fruit, will accept absolutely Baker's and Folsom's favorable view of the meeting. (This last was in response to a question from Ambassador Burrows.)

While neither Baker nor Folsom question Villeda's sincerity, the composition of the government which will take office in December, 1963, is very much in doubt. Hence, so long as key articles of the agrarian law remain unchanged, future Honduran policy is uncertain, and United Fruit cannot reinvent. Amendment must provide due recourse to the courts for appeal of administrative actions. This change should be accomplished before the law becomes an election issue.

Replying to a question from Ambassador Burrows, Baker said no order of priority was shown in the amendments United Fruit suggested to Villeda. Baker thought Villeda would be able to perceive by himself which were most important to the company.

Noting the great power the law concentrates in the head of the Agrarian Reform Institute, Baker said the present antagonistic director, Miguel CUBERO da Costa, would have to be removed. He implied the company might not reinvest in Honduras so long as Cubero holds his present position, even if the law is amended satisfactorily. This was not discussed with Villeda in Miami.

Baker noted that in preparation and passage the Agrarian Reform Law "had gotten away" from Villeda. He cited the fact that none of the ministers of government were allowed to see the law before it was submitted to the Honduran congress.

Baker said he told Secretary Rusk at dinner on November 30 that the "Hondurans had not moved in on United Fruit". Answering a question, Baker said he understood that the Agrarian Reform Law seriously affects leased lands, and that United Fruit does have large leased holdings in Honduras. He added that he had no idea how much land these leases covered, though later he informally hazarded a guess that perhaps 50% of the land controlled by United Fruit in Honduras is leased.

Answering another question, Baker said he agreed that a public investigation of Honduran agrarian reform in relation to the Hickenlooper Amendment and United Fruit would not be very helpful at this time. He added that if there is no progress in amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in two or three months he would want to review this position.

Baker said many are working to ease this problem in Honduras. Reportedly, Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, told Villeda at Blair House on December 1 that it is essential that Honduras maintain a favorable climate for private enterprise. Baker hoped the United States Government would continue to press the matter, and he asked Rowell to keep him (Baker) informed. When President Kennedy meets the Central American Presidents at San Jose in March or April 1963, Baker hopes Villeda will be able to report that the problem with United Fruit has been solved.

During the conversation Ambassador Burrows noted the following:

In view of Honduras' primitive judicial system, appeal to the courts is not very meaningful. While the Agrarian Reform Law was being passed and submitted to Villeda for signature no one knew what was in the law. Only a copy of the original draft was available. Burrows tried to have Villeda delay final Congressional action on the law until 1963, but this was not possible. The United Fruit Company took no strong action in Honduras regarding the law until it had been passed. Once passed, it was politically impossible for Villeda to veto it. Honduran politics have changed a great deal in the last 30 years.

154. Memorandum of conversation, September 30, between Cottrell, and Ambassador Dávila and Finance Minister Bueso¹

September 30, 1963

SUBJECT

Possible Coup in Honduras

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.A.

APA—Sterling J. Cottrell

OAP—V. Lansing Collins

OAP/H—Edward H. Powell

Honduras:

Ambassador Celeo Dávila

Finance Minister Jorge BUESO Arias

BUESO said that for several months disgruntled Honduran politicians associated with General Tibúrcio CARIAS Andino (ex-dictator, president, caudillo) have been pressing Honduran armed forces officers to overthrow the present Honduran Government and prevent elections, alleging as an excuse that (a) the government is riddled with communists, (b) a Rodas Alvarado election victory would lead the country into communism, (c) the elections will be fraudulent, (d) the armed forces will be deprived of their rightful constitutional position by Rodas. Communists in government (sic) were enumerated (several hundred) but not named. BUESO said OAS observers for election had been discredited by distortion of the Bonilla-Atiles statement that the prospects for a peaceful, honest election were very promising. The opposition press claimed that this statement proved that the OAS observers were under the control of the Villeda Morales government. Nonetheless, prospects for carrying out the election and subsequent constitutional transfer of power were good until the Dominican Coup in which Dominican Republic military leaders deposed Bosch on grounds similar to the charges being levied against Villeda Morales and Rodas Alvarado.

Bueso said the nervousness of opposition groups had been greatly increased by Rodas' uncompromising attacks against the opposition in campaign speeches. Bueso said Rodas had moderated this approach in his last three speeches.

(In passing Bueso said he had a pact with Rodas. If the Liberals win the election with more than 65% of the vote, Bueso will not comment on the kind of appointments Rodas makes; but if the Liberal vote is less than 65%—and Bueso believes it will follow the pattern of the last

¹ Possible coup in Honduras. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.

few elections in which the Liberals won 58%–60%—then Bueso will enter the Rodas government only on the condition that Rodas will appoint clearly qualified men to public office, including some Nationalists and others who are not necessarily Rodistas or Liberals. Bueso claimed Rodas agreed to this.)

Bueso then said about a week or ten days ago the Nationalist Party press had printed an editorial virtually inviting the Armed Forces to execute a coup, showing Lopez that his civilian backing had grown from a small group of Cariistas to most of the opposition.

Bueso commented that in personal terms Lopez' ambition was awakened by Carias' efforts in February 1963 to have Lopez made the Nationalist Party presidential candidate, and that this ambition is a contributing factor in the present situation.

Bueso then digressed into a recital of the Villeda Morales theory of controlling communism in the hemisphere, i.e., concentrate on social and economic progress and avoid giving the communists martyrdom and a popular cause through police repression. He claimed success for the system, referring to the recent expulsion of communists from leadership of the SITRASFRUCO union, and the inability of the Honduran Communist Party to organize demonstrations in Tegucigalpa against Operation Fraternidad in 1962. He noted that a military government in Honduras would mean a return to random jailings, police repression and the like, creating an ideal climate for communist agitation. He predicted strikes over a period of time and increased popular reaction against a military government.

In answer to a question Bueso doubted that a golpe would degenerate into a civil war.

Bueso noted that Lopez believes the U.S. Department of Defense holds views contrary to those of the State Department regarding military coups and government by armed force in Latin America. He thinks Lopez is sure the "Pentagon" would protect the interests of the Honduran Armed Forces after a coup, in spite of any "State Department policies to the contrary". Bueso believes the greatest single deterrent which can be brought to bear on Lopez now is a clear statement to Lopez from the U.S. Department of Defense urging Lopez not to engage in a coup. The statement must not smack of "State Department collusion". It was evident from his manner that Bueso had been discussing making a proposal to this effect with Ambassador Dávila during their drive to the State Department. Bueso also evidently had this proposal in mind when he left Honduras.

Bueso commented on the Villeda-Orlich efforts to have Schick (Nicaragua) and Rivera (El Salvador) issue a joint Declaration of Central America condemning the events in the Dominican Government, and striking out against unconstitutional changes of government. He said

Schick was willing to support Villeda and Orlich to the maximum on any statement except one supporting Bosch personally (because Bosch had personally attacked Schick earlier this year). The effort failed however, because Rivera and or his advisers refused to support Villeda and constitutional government in general, saying this would offend Col. PERALTA (Guatemala) whose government was born of a coup only this year.

Therefore the appeal for a U.S. Defense Department message is a last ditch effort by the Hondurans. Without it, Bueso believes a coup will occur before the October 13 election date—the coup is psychologically more justifiable before rather than after the election.

Bueso said Villeda recently met with Lopez but that the meeting was unproductive. He said conduct of the elections under the National Council of Elections, with both the Armed Forces and the Guardia Civil being controlled by the National Council of Elections on election day, (pattern of 1962 municipal elections) no longer seemed to be acceptable to Lopez. Bueso said a new meeting between Villeda and Lopez would take place October 1.

Dávila said there is no chance of any constructive and helpful action by the OAS. Only four countries (Honduras, Costa Rica, Venezuela and, maybe, Colombia) would support a Honduran request for further assistance.

155. Telegram 84 to Tegucigalpa, 134 to Guatemala City, 69 to Managua, 143 to Panama, 111 to San Jose, and 81 to San Salvador, September 30¹

September 30, 1963

INFO: POLAD CINCSO. POLAD CINCLANT.

Re rumors impending coup Honduras.

Department extremely concerned recent reports that Chief Honduran Armed Forces Lopez planning coup, and desires bring all feasible pressure on Lopez and civilians and military pushing him toward coup. If possible, neighboring countries especially Nicaragua and El Salvador should be persuaded disavow promise any support for Lopez. Though Guatemalan regime least likely disavow Lopez fact remains Peralta

¹ Rumors about impending coup in Honduras. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.

and his followers have recently given indication of wish return to some form of constitutionality and normal political activity. President Rivera should be aware that military coup in Honduras would not, repeat not, necessarily strengthen his hand in El Salvador. If report Managua 115 correct President Schick is prepared state publicly his support of constitutionally elected presidents. Presidents Villeda and Orlich have sent President Kennedy telegram expressing their concern regarding overthrow Bosch and their hope that upcoming declaration of Central America would strengthen support of constitutionally elected regimes. Reply is being prepared and effort will be made obtain permission Orlich and Villeda to publish exchange unless declaration, which Department understands not yet agreed to, comes out in meantime and provides suitable public peg for further press statements here in Washington.

Department believes another key to situation is meeting, (Tegucigalpa's 145, September 26) of Villeda, Rodas, Lopez, OAS Electoral Commission and President Electoral Council which was scheduled but has been put off. Anything that can be done to get this meeting to take place would be useful. Such a meeting would, it seems, be more useful than meeting merely Villeda and Lopez. Coordinated use of army and Guardia Civil forces to guard elections as was done in 1962 municipal elections should be possible.

Another key to situation is to create doubt in Lopez' mind that typical easy, bloodless Latin American coup possible; doubt regarding his ability to win prolonged, bloody coup; doubt regarding his own future in such situation; similar doubts in minds those military and civilians pushing Lopez toward coup.

Department getting in touch with Jorge Bueso and after discussion with him may suggest he return immediately Honduras attempt intervene between Lopez and Rodistas.

Department does not believe any OAS action possible. Department could keep major US interests in Honduras such as United and Standard Fruit informed of its strong view of calamity we think would befall Honduras and these companies as well if coup were to occur. Can companies get to people who are pushing Lopez? Embassy Tegucigalpa comments requested. In its discretion Embassy Tegucigalpa should take action outlined and in addition impress on Villeda that his failure to control Lopez at this critical point could cause him lose respect of Betancourt, Orlich and other democratic forces in Central and South America as well as U.S. Government. Villeda close relationship with Lopez and hatred of Rodas being well known, Villeda must be persuaded to insist on constitutionality.

Embassies other Central American countries and Panama should, in their discretion, take steps outlined above.

Tegucigalpa wire soonest names those persons, especially civilians, pressing Lopez for coup. If coup occurs would any moderate nationalists be in government, or would civilian participation be limited mainly to PPP rpt PPP?

Ball

156. Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, October 1¹

October 1, 1963

SUBJECT

United States-Honduran Dispute Over The Swan Islands

On November 30, 1962, Presidents Kennedy and Villeda Morales agreed:

“to seek on an urgent basis a solution of the Swan Islands question within the framework of the Inter-American System.”

On March 20, 1963, in San José, President Villeda Morales said he would send a Commission to Washington in late September to discuss the problem. We recently suggested a delay. However, the Commission will arrive, though in October rather than September.

The Hondurans want recognition of the validity of their claim to sovereignty over the Swan Islands solely to satisfy national honor. They plan no physical use of the islands or surrounding waters. The United States maintains weather facilities and an aerial navigation beacon on Great Swan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the position that the islands are strategically located in an area of continuing military interest, and future United States use of them could best be assured under United States sovereignty. CIA also operates a radio station on Great Swan and has a continuing interest in the islands.

Apart from reference to the International Court of Justice, which we have offered to undertake but which Honduras has not accepted, all the alternative courses which could bring about a permanent solution require Congressional approval. Such approval would be hard to obtain

¹ U.S.-Honduran dispute over the Swan Islands. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, Honduras, 1961–1964.

at present, and probably would complicate our efforts for Congressional action on more important foreign policy measures.

Ambassador Burrows has explained this problem to President Villeda and to Honduran Foreign Minister Perdomo who will head the Honduran Commission. They have agreed that for the present two half days of preliminary talks will be satisfactory.

We hope to be able to keep the dispute at the level of occasional diplomatic exchanges until circumstances favor proceeding into a permanent solution. If the Hondurans insist on a more positive response before we can prudently seek the necessary Congressional support for such a solution, we can consider offering a *status quo* agreement. The present lack of Honduran activity on the islands makes this difficult. However, we could provide safe landing, fresh water and drying racks on Little Swan (we only use Great Swan). This would enable the Hondurans to use the islands as a base for fishing outside the territorial waters of the islands.

The Department requests the President's approval to accept the Honduran presentation for further study, even though this does not completely satisfy the agreement of last November.

[illegible signature]
for

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

157. Telegram 74 to Managua and 86 to San Salvador, October 2¹

October 2, 1963

Re reports impending coup Honduras; declaration presidents Orlich, Schick, Rivera, Villeda issued 8:00 PM Sept. 30; Managua 118; and San Salvador CX-8.

To make Honduran Armed Forces Chief Lopez more uncertain regarding support he thinks Nicaraguan and Salvadoran Armed Forces might give him in a coup in Honduras, Embassies Managua and San

¹ Joint declaration by four American Republics presidents re impending coup. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.

Salvador in their discretion should again approach Schick and Rivera, respectively, and ask that:

(A) Nicaraguan and Salvadoran Ambassadors in Tegucigalpa be instructed emphasize to civilian Honduran contacts that joint declaration of four presidents issued night of September 30 is firm policy their governments, especially noting paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7;

(B) Nicaraguan and Salvadoran military attachés in Tegucigalpa make similar approach to Honduran military, especially Lopez, emphasizing Salvadoran and Nicaraguan military will not support coup in Honduras.

(C) Both Ambassadors and Military Attachés of Salvador and Nicaragua in Honduras should relay info in reftels to Hondurans.

Actions louder than words.

Ball

158. Memorandum of conversation between Foreign Minister Perdomo, Finance Minister Bueso, and Ambassador Dávila, and Cottrell and other U.S. officials¹

October 3, 1963

SUBJECT

Honduras

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Dr. Roberto Perdomo Paredes, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Honduras;

His Excellency Lic. Jorge Bueso Arias, Minister of Finance of Honduras;

His Excellency Lic. Céleo Dávila, Ambassador of Honduras to the United States; Deputy Assistant Secretary Sterling J. Cottrell;

Mr. Ward P. Allen, Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs;

Mr. V. Lansing Collins, Director, Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs;

Mr. Edward M. Rowell, Officer in Charge, Honduran Affairs.

At his request, the Honduran Ambassador in Washington called at the Department at 10:00 a.m. October 3 on instructions from President Villeda Morales, with whom he had been in telephone communication

¹ Request for U.S. assistance in holding back ongoing coup. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.

over the Inter-American system. The Ambassador reported on the situation in Tegucigalpa saying that the Presidential Palace was surrounded, there were 50 dead, many wounded, and that considerable fighting and a blood bath could follow.

Pointing out that the United States had, at least in the press, declared in connection with the Dominican Republic coup that military coups against constitutional governments were disastrous for the whole continent and that the United States backed constitutional and representative government, he hoped we could put pressure on Lopez to persuade him to stop the coup because Lopez probably believed that the State Department and the Pentagon had different policies. Mr. Collins pointed out to the Ambassador at this point that following our conversation several days ago several efforts had been made to make it clear to Lopez that there was no difference in United States policy. He said that the Army Attaché had called upon Lopez and delivered a message from the Pentagon and that yesterday General Bogart had flown up from the Canal Zone to talk to Lopez. We were forced to conclude that pressure on Lopez of this nature was not successful.

The Ambassador went on to note that there was an advantage in the Honduran situation that had not existed in the Dominican Republic, namely that Villeda Morales is still in the Palace, has not been given an ultimatum, has had no contact with Lopez, and is still President. The coup has not been completely consummated as yet. Asked for concrete suggestions, the Ambassador admitted that he had no instructions to work through the OAS. He said he had no confirmation of any interference by Nicaragua or Guatemala since Lopez had all the force that he needed. He said that since Villeda Morales was still President he hoped the United States could get out a declaration stressing our preoccupation with democracy and the tenets of Punta del Este, stating it would not recognize a military regime in Tegucigalpa if it were set up and that such a regime could not get any help from us of any kind. Reminded of the recent Central American Declaration the Foreign Minister pointed out that really all it meant was that the Governments agreed to consult each other before recognizing a regime established by military force. Mr. Cottrell told the Ambassador that it was very difficult to get a firm policy in a few minutes and that we planned to tell the press at noon only the facts of the take-over. He added we would consider this matter and be in touch with them later. The Hondurans then made two more points: 1. That further discussion regarding the Swan Islands scheduled for October 4 be postponed and 2. that since communication with Honduras through the Honduran Embassy might be cut off we keep the Honduran Embassy informed of events. Both points were agreed to.

The Ambassador and Foreign Minister then left but Jorge Bueso remained behind. He told Mr. Collins and Mr. Rowell that the President

had made it very clear to him on the phone that he expected the Ambassador to go through the motions mentioned above but that what he was really counting on was action by the United States. The President had said that he could hold out in the Palace for two or three days awaiting such action but that if it was clear that nothing was going to be done he would try and make an arrangement with Lopez.

159. Telegram 94 to Tegucigalpa, October 4¹

October 4, 1963

For Ambassador Burrows.

Following for your present guidance:

Since Villeda Govt deposed, Embassy will, of course, cease all formal contacts with members of that Govt, unless constitutional succession followed. Until a govt is recognized by US, Embassy should scrupulously avoid any official contact (formal or written communications, public appearances together, etc.) with the military or civilians associated with the coup or likely to be named to the new governing body which could imply approval of coup or foreshadowing recognition of any govt.

Embassy may find need for unofficial, informal, personal contacts with both military and civilians falling within above categories for purposes information gathering or conveying this Govt's position on matters arising this period of transition. Extreme care should be exercised in such informal contacts to avoid action which may be interpreted as recognition.

Dept plans no action on recognition question in near future.

Ball

¹ Instructions re contact with members of former Villeda government and question of recognition. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, 10/1–5/63.

160. Telegram 101 to Tegucigalpa, 96 to San Salvador, 80 to Managua, 123 to San Jose, October 4¹

October 4, 1963

Problem of eventual recognition Honduras and restoration of normal relations including military and economic aid tied to earliest possible establishment or restoration of Honduran constitutional government.

Study of Honduran constitution indicates following procedure might accomplish this.

1. Lopez, as head of government, would announce that the announced dissolution of the National Congress was voided and call for the Congress to convene within a certain number of days to select a Designate to serve out the unexpired portion of the current Presidential term. (Art. 201) (COMMENT: Department assumes the absence of the President is absolute as required by Art 201. It might be necessary arrange absolute absence of existing Vice Presidents as none seems suitable as designate.)

2. A quorum for a session of the National Congress would be QUOTE one more than half the number of members comprising Congress UNQUOTE (Art. 177), *i.e.*, 30 members inasmuch as the current membership is 58. (COMMENT: Since 22 members of Congress are nationalists, it should be possible obtain 8 more from among orthodox liberals and others acceptable to Lopez without necessarily having all Congressmen in attendance.)

3. This Designate would serve until December 21, 1963, at which time the Council of Ministers would take over the executive functions (Art. 203). (COMMENT: Presumably the Ministers would be named by Designate with Lopez concurrence.)

4. The Council of Ministers would be required to call for presidential elections within 15 days (Art. 201) and, therefore, would issue such an announcement on or about Sunday, January 5, 1964.

5. Assuming that all interested parties would prefer that the full four months permitted by the Constitution, would be allowed to run before election day, election day would be on or about May 5, 1964. The winner of this presidential election would be declared and installed within 20 days, *i.e.*, on or about May 25, 1964 (Art. 201).

¹ Eventual recognition of Honduran Government and restoration of normal relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

You are instructed as follows:

- (a) TEGUCIGALPA: Please indicate feasibility.
- (b) SALVADOR: Discuss above with Bueso without reference to comments making clear this not repeat not an official US position but merely a technical study which he may use without reference to US.
- (c) SAN JOSE: Discuss only with Oduber on same basis as (b) above.

Ball

161. Telegram 135 to San Jose, October 8¹

October 8, 1963

You are directed to deliver the following personal and confidential message from President Kennedy to Villeda Morales:

QUOTE I fully appreciate the very difficult situation created by the unfortunate military coup in your country. I assure you of the strong position of the United States in continuing a firm course of action. We have suspended diplomatic relations and are in the process of withdrawing in an orderly manner our military and economic aid personnel. Our Ambassador has returned to the United States and will remain here indefinitely. You may be sure that we will exercise our influence in seeing to it that other Inter-American and international agencies follow similar action. We will continue to keep Ambassador Telles fully informed on other steps which might be taken to hasten the return to constitutional and representative government in your country. UNQUOTE

Rusk

¹ Personal message from President Kennedy to Villeda Morales. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

162. Telegram 126 to San Salvador, 106 to Managua, 159 to San Jose, October 17¹

October 17, 1963

As you are aware from exchanges of messages past few days, Hondurans in and around the Lopez regime have begun to talk about ways to get back to constitutionality, and are sending feelers in our direction on how to normalize relations. These appear to be signs of genuine concern among leaders in Honduras resulting from stance which we and most of neighboring countries have taken.

We believe that if the pressure is maintained, there is reasonable chance that the Hondurans will work themselves up to devising a solution soon. They themselves must figure out how Honduras can get back to constitutionality. Others cannot do this for them, but we and the Isthmian neighbors which have not recognized Lopez can and should continue to hold off in order to keep the pressure on the Hondurans to do so.

You should inform GOVT of foregoing and strongly urge it not to recognize GOH in present circumstances.

You may at your discretion tell GOVT in general way about Honduran group in Washington and about growing talk in Tegucigalpa of a coalition arrangement.

MANAGUA: We continue gratified by Schick's attitude and trust he will stand firm.

SAN SALVADOR: Inform Rivera we think that in this developing situation his suggestion to Lopez through his Ambassador in Tegucigalpa on desirability of early return to constitutionality would be particularly timely now, and that details are for Hondurans to work out.

SAN JOSE: Inform Orlich confidentially repeat confidentially we believe the various Honduran initiatives now under way toward devising a solution should be allowed to proceed further before we consider sending in 5-nation committee.

Rusk

¹ Return to civilian constitutional government in Honduras. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

163. Telegram 159 to Tegucigalpa, October 26¹

October 26, 1963

SUBJ: Contacts with Lopez. REF: Embtels 250 and 252.

1. For your guidance, our objective in Honduras remains: early establishment of civilian constitutional government in which a reasonably broad spectrum of Honduran political forces can participate and which, therefore, may be considered generally acceptable to the populace as a whole. (Par. 1 of Deptel 115 to San Salvador).

2. Agree we should now rpt now solicit Honduran proposals in Honduras to accomplish this. In your contacts with Lopez regime (follow Deptel 152) you should engage in any amount of dialogue you think necessary to accomplish our objective.

3. You may find opportunity to exploit professed Duron position (Embtel 250) and *New York Times* article datelined Tegucigalpa Oct 24 in which Paul Kennedy quotes Lopez as saying only ambition is military career. FYI Kennedy also reported Lopez said (a) time needed to reform electoral law depends on electoral census and cannot be estimated; (b) Lopez will be chief of state until constitutional government restored. END FYI

4. Heartily concur with your effort maintain broad contact with Lopez regime, ascertain Lopez views over weekend.

Ball

¹ Contacts with Lopez. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

164. Telegram 258 from Tegucigalpa, October 27¹

Tegucigalpa, October 27, 1963

CINSCO for POLAD. Reference: Embassy Telegram 256.

Following are conclusions from conversation with Lopez Oct 25:

(1) Lopez determined maintain military control govt in transition period prior to new elections. Obvious various proposals put forward thus far for replacement military regime—Villeda plan, and Rivera proposal for designation civilian provisional president—unacceptable to Lopez.

(2) Prospects for early development civilian cabinet with real influence on overall policies of regime remote. Low opinion expressed by Lopez some of its members suggests he might be willing reshuffle govt if more capable figures, especially among liberals, were willing accept posts.

(3) Lopez views on duration transition period not yet completely jelled. Judge his inclination be for minimum period at least of year prior new elections, but at moment trying maintain flexibility on this point to accommodate himself to circumstances, especially to possibilities US recognition.

(4) Lopez, despite assertions Kennedy interview, probably continues entertain ambitions achieving presidency for himself but again mind not made up as best means achieve this end. Believe Lopez present inclination is toward extended period military mandate as best means remold political milieu in manner favorable to Lopez candidacy.

(5) Lopez, although anxious achieve US recognition, seems reconciled probability this will not be immediately forthcoming. Appears believe regime can weather this problem for perhaps another month or two and perhaps enhance its prestige by appearance maintaining "national dignity" under US pressure.

(6) Lopez not yet greatly concerned by economic and military consequences withdrawal US assistance although obviously unhappy about implications for political acceptability his regime.

Certain events of recent days tend to reinforce some of above conclusions. Recent appointment Lopez wife as president Social Welfare Board, position previously occupied by Sra. Villeda, may indicate Lopez intending use board as device enhance Lopez political image as it was successfully used by Villeda. Appointment Oct 25 new political

¹ Conclusions from October 25 conversation with Lopez. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

governors for 18 departments shows overwhelming preponderance military officers, indicating military determination assert supremacy over civilian authority in transition period and possibly indicating intent remain in power prolonged period. Furthermore, military appears be employing Health Ministry and its network politically useful rural health centers as means enhance military image. Major jobs in ministry staffed by army officers and Embassy has unverified report civilian directors health centers being replaced by army doctors.

Suggested course of action based on foregoing and on recent conversations with prominent liberals and nationalist figures will follow in subsequent message.

Knox

165. Telegram 268 from Tegucigalpa, October 30¹

Tegucigalpa, October 30, 1963

Following message in three parts, based on general observation of developments since October 3 GOLPE, contacts with military and civilian officials present regime and with prominent political party leaders, presents Embassy's analysis of (1) position of military regime and outlook for return to constitutionality; (2) policy considerations confronting US in defining its course of action vis-à-vis regime; and (3) recommendations of Embassy regarding course of action.

I. Position of Present Regime. Military government resulting from October 3 GOLPE appears to be firmly established and in effective control of country. While opposition liberal leaders tend to stress restiveness of rank and file followers, no substantial overt resistance movement has yet developed, although small clandestine liberal group now operating in capital. While there are some reports communist attempts to rally opposition sentiment this activity does not appear effective at present time.

While intent military regime to return government to constitutionality at some future date appears clear, no great hurry to move in this direction. Although force US reaction in terms terminating aid and dismantling aid mission came as something of shock, military continue

¹ Analysis of position of military regime; policy considerations confront U.S.; Embassy course of action recommendations. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

to feel US will come to some early accommodation re recognition which Lopez obviously anxious to secure. Impending recognition regime by UK and Germany, possibly followed by that of other Western European countries and some, if not most of LA countries may mitigate political needs recognition. However, pressure civilian ministers concerned with economic problems for government policies designed facilitate early return US economic aid, added to general desire military leaders to possess hallmark of respectability conferred by US recognition, will continue impel military leaders to consider accommodation with US on basis return to some type constitutionality.

Apparent, however, no possibility exists for adoption of solution to constitutional problem based on immediate application principles of 1957 Constitution. While liberals might eventually make appeal to Lopez on this basis, have little hope or chance of success.

The only uniform sentiment now current in Honduras (and this remains somewhat weak and certainly disorganized) is for a clear definition of the military regime's intention to return to constitutional government via free elections, etc. But there is no basic consensus on timetable. General position political parties appears as follows:

1. Liberal Party, which in principle opposed to GOLPE although some elements do not regret elimination of Rodas Alvarado, agreed on rapid return to constitutional government but some division exists as to tactics best suited to induce favorable attitude military regime. Some elements support clear public statement liberal policy opposing regime while others hope to avoid open stance which would prejudice opportunities influence Lopez behind scenes.

2. Nationalists who generally favor GOLPE divided on timing of return to constitutionality. Controlling group in Nationalist Party favor prolonged military regime probably with view to building up party strength, preserving jobs and other gains acquired through GOLPE. Galvistas remain on fringe of regime and distrustful of Lopez long-range intentions. Crucial, in final definition attitude of Nationalists, may be Gabriel Mejia who because of economic interests may be persuaded to adopt position favorable constitutionality in agreement with other political groups.

At present time there is some evidence of readiness on part certain Nationalist and Liberal Party leaders to collaborate in finding a solution to problem of return to constitutionality and maintenance of political stability in Honduras. These discussions generally involve so-called Colombian Plan and its variations, most recently enumerated in the Ramirez proposals (Embtel 266). No general agreement has yet emerged or even appear near, although there is considerable sentiment for a political solution embodying principle that minority party must share government positions either through Civil Service System or some constitutional formula for dividing bureaucratic spoils.

Military regime has not as yet expressed view on formula to return to constitutionality except for general statements re need to revise census and call for constituent assembly. From present indications military appear to be contemplating maintenance of power for one or two years, although concern over US recognition probably injects some degree flexibility in time-table for return to constitutionality. Objectives military regime in transition period still unclear. Strong possibility Lopez aspiring to election as President but this may not be unshakable ambition.

Attitudes toward US policy usually reflect attitudes toward coup itself. Some anger and some perplexity exists in military and nationalist circles. A few who favored coup understand what US is trying achieve and appear respect position while in disagreement. Liberals very pleased by US stance and perhaps somewhat surprised at US firmness. Public expressions of anti-Americanism have occurred but unless Nationalist and military leaders choose encourage anti-American campaign, unlikely that spontaneous mass anti-American feeling will develop.

II. US Policy Considerations. In formulating US approach to present Honduran situation, Embassy believes following points should be considered:

1. US actions should be consistent with cause, content and objectives of initial drastic reaction to October 3 GOLPE in cutting off economic and military aid and practically dismantling US aid mission with its attendant dislocations. Recognition of present Honduran regime without tangible and clear evidence of progress toward return to constitutionality at reasonably early date would obviously negate US objective of deterring future coups against constitutional and democratic governments in Honduras and other Latin American countries and would make drastic measures already taken appear bit ridiculous. In view particular circumstances Honduran coup—against a democratic regime which was within few months of fulfilling its constitutional term—serious consideration might be given to delaying recognition in any event until December 21 when Villeda Morales scheduled to leave office.

2. Action, however, must also be based on realities of situation, that is, existence of regime which is in firm control of country and which is unlikely to accept any return to constitutional government along lines laid down in 1957 Constitution. Hence restoration of constitutional government obviously must be result of fresh approach in which US should attempt to encourage participation all parties with view to finding solution not only to present situation but also to long-term problem of political stability in Honduras.

3. Existence of military regime should not at this stage be regarded as total disaster. If there is any follow-up to suggestions put forward

by Minister of Public Works Bogran, possibility exists some benefits may be derived in terms tax reform, establishment of Civil Service, etc which have been difficult to achieve under democratic regime. Within limits posed by circumstances, US should give encouragement to any plans along this line, especially Civil Service which may contribute solution basic political tensions which have long disrupted national life.

4. While suspension economic aid necessary to achievement US policy objectives in present situation, assume US does not wish to see serious deterioration economic situation or cancellation of economic growth achieved thus far. Believe therefore, it to interest of US to commence restoration some economic aid concomitantly with extension recognition following acceptable steps by military regime toward restoration constitutional government.

Recommendations for course of action which follow made against background these considerations.

III. Recommendations

1. In view euphoria likely to be induced present military regime by impending recognition UK, Germany, etc and probable consequent expectation US recognition will not be long delayed, pressure should be maintained on regime by immediate implementation plans for reduction Embassy, military and air mission staffs.

2. Concomitantly further informal contacts with Lopez, Bogran and other influential members of government should be made to determine clearly objectives of government not only in relation to return to constitutionality but also in regard to "legislative" program such as tax revision, establishment of Civil Service which conceivably might have some bearing on speed with which regime willing to reestablish constitutional system.

3. Lopez should be induced to establish time-table for return to constitutionality via free elections, preferably within period of six months but with some flexibility up to perhaps an additional three months depending on value US attaches to any "legislative" program that might be undertaken by regime. In event latter justifies more extended period prior to elections, US should press for establishment transitional coalition government to include representative members all parties.

4. Embassy should continue to encourage leading Nationalists, liberals and others to collaborate on proposals for reestablishment constitutional government with view to presenting Lopez agreed solution.

5. US recognition should result from establishment of acceptable time table for elections including definitive date for this and other steps process return to constitution. Resumption of economic aid would be gradual and linked to achievement of definite stages of time table.

Knox

166. Telegram 171 to Tegucigalpa, October 31¹

October 31, 1963

SUBJECT: Policy re Lopez. REF: Tegucigalpa 268.

1. Your analysis excellent. Your recommendations approved as general basis for continuing dialogue with Lopez and other Hondurans, with the understanding specific solutions which might develop will be referred to Department.

2. Following specific comments pertain:

a. For time being your recommendations are minimal U.S. objectives. Anything additional that might be accomplished (e.g. naming provisional civilian president or junta pending establishment new constitutional government) is desirable.

b. Your recommendation five seems to be logical final step after action completed on recommendations one through four. Believe six to nine months timetable for establishment conciliatory civilian constitutional government reasonable. However, our position not repeat not absolutely rigid. Consult with Department on any Lopez proposal on timing. Of course make no commitments as to Washington action on recognition, no matter what Hondurans may propose.

c. Expect to follow course action outlined last sentence recommendation five, but need not repeat not ponder specific relationships between levels aid and stages of timetable at this time.

Ball

¹ Approval of recommendations in telegram 268 from Tegucigalpa with specific comments. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

167. Memorandum for Bromley Smith, November 1¹

November 1, 1963

SUBJECT

Presidential Meeting on Honduras and DR—November 1—5:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

AID—Mr. David Bell, Mr. Reuben Sternfeld

Defense—Dr. Mountain

CIA—Mr. Richard Helms, Col. J.C. King

State—Mr. Edwin M. Martin

White House—Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Ralph Dungan

The current situation in the Dominican Republic and Honduras was discussed.

With respect to Honduras, it was observed that the conversations with regard to the return to constitutionality are still going on in the country, that an orderly withdrawal of U.S. personnel is underway, that there is no imminent threat of counter-coup or insurgent activity, and therefore our posture for the moment should be to stand pat.

With regard to the DR, it was decided (1) to dispatch Colonel Simmons and the President approved a general instruction for his mission, (2) the President requested a memorandum to be drafted for use in our Latin American embassies in the event that we recognize the new regime in Saigon, and (3) the President directed that the Chargé in Santo Domingo be brought back to the U.S. for consultation early next week.

Ralph A. Dungan

¹ Meeting among President Kennedy and other government officials on the current situation in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, 10/18–11/23/63.

168. Telegram 194 to Tegucigalpa, November 18¹

November 18, 1963

Subject: Lopez regime in Honduras. Reference: TEGUCIGALPA 295, 296, 297 and 298.

You should inform Lopez that Dept takes position that while mode of return to constitutionality described to you in recent conversation unobjectionable, timing appears to be all out of proportion to requirements of situation and views which Lopez and Zuniga had expressed previously, and unless abbreviated considerably would pose serious difficulties for early normalization US relations. (As one example of way to compress schedule Constituent Assembly should be able to meet within a few days of its election. At your discretion, you may remind Lopez that on several occasions he spoke favorably to Amb Burrows of "highly successful" 1956–1957 Junta, attributing its success directly to fact it lasted only one year. He said it would not have been so useful had it tried to extend its life beyond one year.)

You should say that Dept's consideration will be helped by including in decree definite date for holding of elections to National Constituent Assembly; and that final decision of US will be affected by timing called for by the terms of the decree, and by taking of initial measures set forth in decree to set up electoral commission composed of representative Honduran parties and other elements private sector showing effective intent to carry out objectives described.

You should inform Lopez that upon publication his regime's plans for return to constitutionality, USG will as customary consult with OARs. Nature of our consultation will depend on actual terms of announcement. We hope there will be a satisfactory solution soonest in order avoid unnecessary complications at planned MFM.

You should impress on Lopez extreme seriousness with which USG views the OAS recommendations to its members to submit to COAS on a continuing basis evidence of subversive Castro communist activity in their respective countries. This recommendation reaffirmed by Central American countries and Panama in Resolution 8 of Managua Security Conference April 3–4, 1963. It would be highly desirable for him to submit captured documents and correspondence at forthcoming Salvador meeting.

¹ Return to civilian constitutional government. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

As member of OAS we are most anxious that COAS have prompt access to documentary proofs of grave Castro communist penetration of Honduras described by Lopez.

Rusk

Jamaica

169. Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, April 3¹

April 3, 1961

SUBJECT

Visit of Premier of Jamaica

Norman Manley, Premier of Jamaica will be in Washington from April 17 to April 21. He is coming at his initiative primarily to discuss various matters of specific US-Jamaican interest such as housing, civil aviation, contract labor, sugar, and bauxite. We are arranging for him to be briefed on Cuba, and on inter-American defense arrangements. We plan also to discuss the political and economic future of The West Indies with him.

Mr. Manley is the outstanding West Indian statesman and is likely to be the first Prime Minister of the Federation after its independence in 1962. He will be meeting with other West Indian leaders on May 2 in Trinidad to determine finally the shape of the new West Indies nation. On May 31 these leaders will meet with the UK in London to set a firm date for West Indian independence.

The United States has substantial interests in this area. The Air Force has bases scattered through the Islands on which instrumentation for the Atlantic Missile Range is located. The Navy conducts anti-submarine operations from installations there, and the Naval Station at Chaguarmas guards the southern approaches by sea to the Panama Canal. In addition to its tourist attractions, the area is economically important for its bauxite resources and petroleum refining facilities.

Mr. Manley's prestige and leadership will be crucial at the Trinidad and London meetings. Jamaica's adherence to the Federation depends on his political strength within the Island. If he becomes Prime Minister, the early years of West Indian independence will be shaped by his concepts of international relations. During the recent successful base negotiations, he publicly declared his opposition to neutralism and his devotion to the principles of democracy. We understand he favors membership by The West Indies in the Commonwealth, the UN, the OAS, and the Rio Pact. He has influence in Africa.

¹ Upcoming visit of Premier Manley of Jamaica. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.

For the above reasons, I believe it would be in the interests of the United States for you to receive him for about an hour any time between April 17 and April 21. If you approve, Mr. Ivan White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, will accompany him.

Dean Rusk

170. Memorandum of conversation, April 19, between President Kennedy and Premier Manley¹

April 19, 1961

SUBJECT

Conversation Between The President and Premier Manley of Jamaica

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Norman Manley, Premier of Jamaica

Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

The President received Premier Manley at 3:40 p.m. April 19. He told Mr. Manley that the United States was greatly interested in the development of the West Indian Federation and its future and inquired as to the progress being made. Mr. Manley in reply said that the present schedule called for a constitutional convention in Port of Spain in May to be followed by a conference in London commencing May 31. At the latter it was expected that remaining differences would be ironed out and that the date for independence would be established, probably for April next year. At some date following the London conference Jamaica would hold a referendum to decide whether it would stay in the Federation or get out. He had promised such a referendum because the opposition party, after many years of a bipartisan approach to matters, had declared itself in opposition to federation. Mr. Manley said he was unsure as to how the referendum would turn out. He could have won the referendum two months ago but due to two blunders by Federation authorities the issue was in doubt. However, he, Manley, was going to exert every personal effort to include Jamaica in the Federation. He

¹ West Indian Federation; U.S. assistance; bauxite, immigration, and aviation; sugar quotas. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.

was convinced that over the long term a strong Federation would be an element of stability in the Caribbean area. Furthermore, a Federation was in the United States' interest because the alternative was fragmentation into ten small and weak states.

When the President inquired as to what the United States Government could do to be helpful in this matter, Premier Manley said he had considered this question and had decided that there was one helpful measure which the President himself could take. It would be most helpful if after the London conference, the President could issue a statement pointing to United States interest in the development of a strong Federation, to the community of interests between Americans and West Indians, and making a clear explanation of the intention of the United States Government to participate actively in the economic and social development of the West Indies along the lines of the program evolved for Latin America. Mr. White informed the President that he had discussed this matter briefly with Richard Goodwin of the White House staff and that there were possibilities of working out something through recasting the President's message to Congress on the Latin American program in terms specifically directed to the Federation of the West Indies. The President instructed Mr. White to follow up on this matter with Mr. Goodwin.

Mr. Manley then said that he and his colleagues had studied with great interest the President's message to Congress of March 13, 1961, and that they accept the challenge contained therein. Jamaica accepted the criteria set forth, including all aspects of self-help, in the field of economic and social progress. In return he was looking to the United States for assistance in meeting two highest priority problems; namely, low cost housing and water supply. Jamaica was not asking for grants, but rather needed long term loans at low interest rates. In reply to a question from the President Mr. Manley said that Jamaica was financially sound, was the first of the British colonies to borrow on the New York market, and was capable of servicing additional loans. Trinidad likewise was in good financial condition and had a per capita income 50% higher than Jamaica. Although the smaller islands in the Federation were in a deficit position, there was no reason why they could not be brought to the point of self support in 4 or 5 years.

When the President referred to their mutual acquaintanceship with John Pringle, Mr. Manley said that Pringle had evolved a proposal for financing such areas as the West Indies in which the American people had an interest. This would provide for a fund in which those interested could invest, with repayment guaranteed by the United States Government. The funds would be used for capital development in the West Indies. The President replied that the availability of capital appeared to be the big problem.

The President then took the initiative to say that he understood that Premier Manley was interested in questions concerning bauxite, immigration and aviation. The President had told Mr. Macmillan what he proposed to do in regard to the immigration quota and assumed that the Prime Minister had informed Mr. Manley. Mr. Manley replied in the affirmative. He said that in the case of bauxite, arrangements for stockpiling had been very useful to Jamaica, but that it would be helpful in planning production ahead if barter arrangements could be worked out covering a two or three year period rather than the single year system currently in effect. As regards aviation the British and the U.S. at the Barbados conference last year had reached agreement on a package covering additional air routes between the U.S. and West Indies which was satisfactory to both parties. Unfortunately this package had been held up by global issues between the U.S. and U.K., such as Hong Kong, which had nothing to do with the Caribbean. The Federation of the West Indies and Jamaica were heavily dependent on the tourist trade and these additional air routes would be most helpful. He greatly hoped that the U.S. and U.K. could resolve this matter by June. The President instructed Mr. White to follow up this matter with Mr. Feldman to see what could be done.

Mr. Manley then raised the question of sugar quotas. He said that the sugar industry was vital to the West Indies; that our Ambassador (Whitney) at London and throughout the West Indies had laid great stress on economic cooperation between the U.S. and the West Indies; and that the West Indies was greatly disappointed at the small quota of 65,000 tons which had recently been announced as its share in the recent allocation. In closing, Mr. Manley said that he had promised to raise one additional question with the President and this referred to the six or seven thousand migratory workers who customarily come into the U.S. each season to work in agriculture. He understood that there was some opposition to permitting these workers into the U.S. and expressed the strong hope that this working arrangement would continue. It was most important to Jamaica because it provided a livelihood for workers, permitted them to send remittances to their families in Jamaica and, finally, it was excellent training in agriculture which permitted the workers to return eventually to Jamaica and establish their own farms. The President informed Mr. Manley that Mr. White and Mr. Goodwin would pursue actively all of the problems raised by the Premier.

171. Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, May 28¹

May 28, 1962

SUBJECT

Visit of Premier of Jamaica

Sir Alexander Bustamante, Premier of Jamaica, will be in Washington from June 26 to 28. It is recommended that you receive him sometime during this period. He is coming at his initiative to discuss various matters of special U.S.-Jamaican interest. We are arranging for him to have talks with appropriate officials regarding the aid program for Jamaica, the Alliance for Progress, sugar, and bauxite. We are also arranging for him to be briefed on the Inter-American defense arrangement in view of his public statement favoring a defense relationship with the United States.

Sir Alexander is an aging, colorful politician who has been associated with the trade union movement and the drive for independence in Jamaica for almost half of his 78 years. In the recent general election of April 10, he defeated his cousin and traditional rival Norman Manley to become Premier of Jamaica and the man who will lead Jamaica into independence as a Commonwealth member on August 6 of this year.

The U.S. will be concerned to see that Jamaica follows a progressive, democratic course after independence. Of the British colonies in the Caribbean, Jamaica seems to be the best prepared in terms of leadership to play a responsible role in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere after independence. The future will not be without problems, however, and it is essential that the U.S. at an early stage establish a strong, friendly relationship with this new American nation.

You will recall that last year you received Norman Manley for an hour's interview. For the reasons specified above, it now seems in the best interests of the U.S. that you receive Sir Alexander Bustamante for a similar interview. His view of foreign policy does not differ in any substantial degree from that of his predecessor and there is every reason to hope that under his leadership a firm U.S.-Jamaican relationship can be established.

William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, will be present at this interview and will be available for any preliminary briefing you may desire.

Dean Rusk

¹ Visit of Premier Bustamante of Jamaica. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961–62.

172. Jamaican Scope Paper, undated¹

undated

JAMAICAN SCOPE PAPER*Objectives*

1. We should acknowledge Sir Alexander Bustamante's publicly stated desire to establish close and friendly ties with the U.S. and express our sincere gratitude for these overtures.

2. We should encourage Sir Alexander to continue his resolute anti-communism, and his intent to align Jamaica on the side of the Free World.

3. We should imply to Sir Alexander our hope that an independent Jamaica by the maturity of its leaders will provide an example of responsible government in the area, thus adding an element of stability to the Caribbean.

4. We should encourage Jamaica to continue to participate in Caribbean inter-area arrangements. The proposed West Indies Federation, though now dead, included various cooperative enterprises of a non-governmental sort (University of the West Indies) which should be continued.

Discussion

On August 6, 1962, Jamaica will receive its independence from the United Kingdom and thus become the first newly independent nation in the Western Hemisphere in almost 60 years.

The U.K. is gradually withdrawing from the Caribbean. Its influence, however, will remain a factor in post-independent Jamaica for some time to come. Nevertheless, its unwillingness to assume substantial economic or military commitments in the area will soon become apparent to Jamaica which we expect will look increasingly to the United States. The Premier of Jamaica, Sir Alexander Bustamante, has already asked for a Defense Agreement with the U.S. We have replied that the island's security could be preserved best by membership in the OAS and that as an OAS member Jamaica could participate in the activities of the Inter-American Defense Board. Further, Sir Alexander has been informed that after independence the U.S. would be prepared to extend oral assurances similar to those given several OAS members

¹ Independence; OAS membership; defense treaty; U.S. aid; sugar; bauxite; immigration. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.

in the Caribbean to come to its aid if it is a victim of direct attack and to take steps to assist it to deal with indirect communist aggression.

It is our intention to establish a firm and friendly relationship with an independent Jamaica. We desire that Jamaica perform a useful role in the Inter-American system. Sir Alexander has expressed his intention to apply for membership in the OAS. Jamaica has already announced that the post-independent government will be a firm ally of the U.S. and has no desire to play the neutral game of seeking aid from East and West. Sir Alexander has taken a firmly anti-communist position in his public speeches.

U.S. economic aid will be required, but the Jamaicans have indicated that they do not wish to assume the posture of a passive recipient. They seem sincerely interested in contributing within their limitations and see their future relationship with the U.S. as a partnership built on mutual respect.

Formerly destined to be a part of the proposed West Indian Federation, Jamaica, in a September 1961 referendum, chose to withdraw from the proposed grouping and seek separate independent status. Jamaicans feared that their comparatively prosperous island would be expected to bear a large part of the tax burden required to support the Federation government and the smaller non-viable islands. Sir Alexander's Jamaican Labor Party, the "out" party at the time of the referendum, equated federation with the ambitions of then Premier Norman Manley, leader of the People's National Party. While there are no prospects for the revival of a Federation in the near term, it is desirable to encourage cooperation between the islands in the hope that in time some form of regional association contribution to stability will evolve.

Representatives of the Jamaican Government, the opposition, and British colonial officials met in London in February 1962, agreed to a constitution, and set a time-table for the granting of independence. This Jamaican independence conference was held in an atmosphere of cordiality and cooperation. From it emerged a thoughtful and careful draft constitution, well endowed with heavily entrenched safeguards to protect personal and property rights. It was accepted without serious reservation by all participants at the conference.

On April 10, a general election was held. The hotly contested campaign pitted Premier Norman Manley against his cousin and ancient rival, Sir Alexander Bustamante. In a close contest which saw the two major parties separated by 1% of the total popular vote, Sir Alexander returned to power after 7 years of eclipse, with a seven-vote majority in the Assembly. Between them the two major parties accounted for almost 99% of the total vote. The remainder was spread among various independents and a racist third party which failed to attract either adherents or serious attention.

Politically Jamaica approaches independence with the basis of a two-party system firmly laid. However, each of the two major parties is the personal vehicle of a colorful, aging political figure. A struggle for succession within each party is expected on the passing of its leader. During such a struggle, it is possible that both the Jamaican Labor Party of 78 year-old Sir Alexander Bustamante, and the People's National Party of 68 year-old Norman Manley, could fragment.

As it approaches independence Jamaica has certain assets in its favor: a well-trained Civil Service; experience in self-government; a comparatively prosperous economy; and a determination to succeed. Against these must be ranged certain deficiencies. Economically Jamaica depends heavily on commodities and tourism; the latter is a fickle source of income which can be seriously damaged by political instability. Jamaica's commodities, on the other hand, have previously entered the protected U.K. market and will surely be affected if Britain enters the Common Market. Jamaicans recognize the tenuous aspect of the island's economy and are determined to buttress it by diversification and investment incentives.

Defense concerns, both internal and external, trouble the Jamaicans. On the one hand, the government fortunately is reluctant to expend large sums for the support of a defense force, and yet, with the withdrawal of British troops, the Jamaican authorities realize that a force of some sort will be required.

Internal disturbances are not anticipated and yet can not be discounted because of the possibility of subversive activity by communists or racists. Externally, the threat posed by Cuba is the main preoccupation. Traditionally the Jamaicans have worked in the cane and tobacco fields of Cuba, and nationals in the number of 40 to 50 thousand are at present employed there. Their presence confronts the new government with a dilemma and will almost surely require the maintenance of consular relations between the two countries to ensure the provision of citizenship and protective services. Despite press reports and stories by returning visitors, we do not believe there is a significant communist movement on the island at this time.

Premier Bustamante's great interest is in politics, and he tends to disdain detail. His call will not in all likelihood be devoted to any exhaustive bilateral exchanges. At his present stage in life he experiences periodically difficulty in concentration. He has asked that his three ministers, who are accompanying him, be included in this call. Because one of them will almost surely succeed Bustamante should he, as has been widely rumored, abandon the Premiership soon after independence to become Governor General of Jamaica, it is considered advisable to include them.

The following bilateral problems may be touched on:

Organization of American States

Jamaica has announced its intention to apply for admission in the OAS immediately after independence. We favor Jamaica's candidacy and will support it, although we feel it inappropriate to appear to sponsor Jamaica for admission.

Defense Treaty with the United States

Should Sir Alexander raise again his request for a defense treaty with the U.S., we should restate our belief that the island's security could be best preserved by membership in the OAS and adherence to the Rio Treaty. As an OAS member, Jamaica could also participate in hemispheric collective security planning, e.g., the Inter-American Defense Board. He should also be reminded that after independence, the U.S. would be prepared to extend oral assurances similar to those given several OAS members in the Caribbean to come to its aid if it is a victim of direct attack and to take steps to assist it to deal with indirect communist aggression.

Aid Levels

The Premier may request an indication of progress on present aid proposals and an idea of post-independence U.S. aid. In addition to a program of technical assistance, the U.S. is now preparing to finance a rural water supply loan and a low-cost housing loan. The water loan is awaiting final U.S. approval and should be ready for signing within a few days. Final action on the housing loan is expected within four to six weeks. As to the future, once Jamaica joins the OAS, it will be eligible to participate fully in the Alliance for Progress. We are prepared to assist Jamaica's efforts within the concept of the Alliance. Upon becoming a member of the OAS we suggest Jamaica as the first step ask the panel of experts of the OAS to study its development plan. We would look favorably on I.D.B. financing and will consider other requests for assistance within the Alliance framework. We stand ready to continue to assist the Government of Jamaica to develop projects so that it can seek funds from various lending agencies. (Because of our balance of payments difficulties and other heavy demands on AID funds, we should be careful not to create excessive expectations.)

Sugar

Jamaica has benefited from the reallocation of the former Cuban quota. Under the terms of the bill reported out of the House Agriculture Committee, Jamaica, as a member of the West Indies Sugar Association, would benefit from a permanent quota of 100,000 tons per year, plus a temporary quota of 150,000 tons drawn from the Cuban quota reallocation assigned to the Association. Bustamante may press for a separate Jamaican quota, offering to withdraw from the West Indies Sugar Asso-

ciation. The House bill, as reported, is at variance with the Administration's proposals. It should be pointed out to Bustamante that the West Indies would fare quite well under the terms of the House bill, that final legislation, however, is as yet undecided, and that the establishment of a separate Jamaican quota at this time would seem inopportune.

Bauxite

Jamaica has been supplying the U.S. with bauxite for stockpiling purposes under the barter program. Sir Alexander may press for a continuation of these purchases, citing as a reason the impact of their suspension on the economy of newly-independent Jamaica. It is suggested that Sir Alexander be informed that the entire stockpiling program is now under critical review by the U.S. and that until this has been concluded and a policy established, it will not be possible to make any commitments as to future barter possibilities.

Immigration

On attaining independence, Jamaica will become the only country in the Western Hemisphere not assigned non-quota status. Its quota will be 100 per year. Already this has become a domestic political issue, ex-Premier Manley having raised the question of a "double standard" in the Assembly.

We have recognized the importance from a foreign policy point of view of placing Jamaica and all other independent areas within the Western Hemisphere on an equal footing.

We are seeking the Attorney General's concurrence in a legislative proposal to be submitted to the 88th Congress which would eliminate quantitative controls on their immigration to the U.S. They would, as all other immigrants, remain subject to qualitative controls.

Concurrences:

ARA—Mr. Day
 Mr. Spencer
 AID —Mr. Martin
 SCA —Mr. Clattenberg
 E —Mr. Callanan
 Mr. Gabbert

173. Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Premier Bustamante, and other U.S. and Jamaican officials, June 27¹

June 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Call of the Premier of Jamaica on the President

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

William C. Burdett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

John R. Burke, Desk Officer, Jamaican Affairs, BNA

Jamaica

Sir Alexander Bustamante, Premier

Donald B. Sangster, Minister of Finance

Robert C. Lightbourne, Minister of Trade and Industry

Edward P. Seaga, Minister of Development and Welfare

The President opened the discussion by welcoming Premier Bustamante and his ministers to Washington. In response, Sir Alexander indicated that he was not a stranger to the United States, that he had lived for several years in Boston, and that he had left the U.S. in 1932.

The President initiated the substantive portion of the discussion by asking a series of questions concerning unemployment in Jamaica, emmigration, and the effect of the Common Market. In response to these inquiries, Sir Alexander informed the President that unfortunately, 18% of the available labor force was unemployed. This figure had been fairly consistent for the last few years. He noted that emmigration was related to unemployment, and that several thousand Jamaicans had been migrating each year to the United Kingdom. Regarding the Common Market, the Premier stated he did not know the effect it would have in Jamaica but that he “feared it”. Probing on the effect of the Common Market, the President asked about the future of Jamaican commodities, such as sugar and coffee. Mr. Sangster observed that it might in the long run prove an aid for Jamaican commodities if Jamaica were accorded the same preference within the Common Market as had been given former African colonies of France. However, he, too, agreed

¹ Economic situation in Jamaica; future of the Caribbean; West Indies; independence; emigration; migratory workers; sugar; tobacco production; AID project. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961–62.

with the Premier, and was backed by Mr. Lightbourne, that prognostications on this subject were chancey.

The President then inquired of the Premier his views regarding the future of the Caribbean. Sir Alexander stated that Trinidad would, after independence, become a viable unit and would survive. He felt that the "eight" would become a political unit, perhaps achieve independence, but would "forever" be in need of assistance from the U.K. Mr. Lightbourne predicted that one day a form of federation would probably evolve which might include Trinidad and the "little eight".

Under Secretary Johnson interjected a question regarding British Guiana, to which the Premier replied that "Cheddi is a law unto himself". The President then observed that there was a heavy percentage of people of East Indian origin in Trinidad. He wondered if this percentage might one day gain political control in Trinidad and what effect this might have on British Guiana's future relations with Trinidad and the "little eight".

The discussion turned to future links between Jamaica and the other islands of the West Indies. Sir Alexander stated that they would naturally share services, such as an airline, shipping companies, etc. However, he emphasized with some vigor his belief that Jamaica's natural affinity was not toward the other islands of the Caribbean, but rather to Canada and the United States. "After all", he stated, "Trinidad is 1200 miles from Jamaica." The President remarked that California was over 2,000 miles from the east coast of the United States. Sangster interjected that this was, however, a land separation as opposed to a sea separation, in response to which the President mused that often-times seas tended to unite political units rather than separate them, and the ease of transport they provided was superior to that which land could afford.

The President asked about the importance of tourism to the economy of Jamaica. Sir Alexander replied that it meant 11.5 million pounds annually to the island, and Mr. Sangster noted that this was approximately 15% of Jamaica's income. As to its future, Mr. Lightbourne reported that in recent years, though the number of tourists had gone up, the income derived had remained at approximately the same level.

Mr. Lightbourne then launched on a lengthy litany of Jamaica's problems on the eve of independence. Sir Alexander interrupted and provided by way of preface the remark, "But, Mr. President, you are tired of hearing about other people's problems." Mr. Lightbourne continued his résumé, dealing first of all in some detail with the subject of sugar, pointing out that the fluctuation in this one commodity had an important effect in Jamaica in view of the fact that 40% of the money realized from its sale actually reached the cane field workers in the form of wages (some 100,000 Jamaicans are employed in sugar produc-

tion). He also alluded to the problems which would be raised if U.S. purchases of bauxite in Jamaica were suspended. The President remarked that upon joining the Organization of American States, participation in the Alliance for Progress would be available to Jamaica and that this might provide an avenue to work out the resolution of these problems. Sir Alexander expressed the fear that the OAS might not admit Jamaica. He noted that Guatemala seemed to have reservations about Jamaica's candidacy. The President thereupon asked Mr. Johnson what machinery existed for the admission of new members into the OAS. Mr. Johnson informed the President that no machinery existed, and that as a matter of fact this question was now being discussed within the Council of the OAS. Sir Alexander interposed at this point the statement that Jamaica had made an irrevocable decision to commit itself to the side of the West, implying that this decision would not be affected even if Jamaica did not become a member.

Minister Seaga then began a brief review of the ten-year plan which the Jamaican Government hoped to follow in the decade after independence. He described it as a modest plan, based on their statistics for the past ten years. A growth rate of 7% per annum had been projected (4½% real rate after population growth had been taken into account). He pointed out that no sugar acreage increase was being programmed. However, allowance was being made for a 1% increase to be realized from technological progress. (Mr. Seaga digressed to restate the Jamaican case on the importance of the sugar industry to the island, emphasizing the point that a significant fraction of the income reached directly to the lowest strata of farm worker.) Continuing with his exposé of the ten-year plan, Mr. Seaga referred to the question of bauxite, explaining that few workers were involved in this extractive industry and that its importance for Jamaica was as a government revenue resource.

Mr. Seaga stated that immigration also would be an important factor in the ten-year plan. He noted that in the past an average of 22,000 Jamaicans had gone to the United Kingdom each year. This had eased the unemployment problem and had provided remittances which helped the balance of payments. Now, however, the recently enacted Commonwealth immigration bill would seriously hamper any future immigration flow to the U.K. Jamaica had nevertheless allowed in its ten-year plan for an annual outflow of 10,000 people. This could only be realized if the United States were to relax its immigration laws *vis-à-vis* an independent Jamaica and accorded the island non-quota status. He wished to draw this to the President's attention, pointing out that under existing U.S. law Jamaica would have a quota of only 100 after independence and would not enjoy equal status with other independent Western Hemispheric countries.

In reply, the President pointed out that the immigration problem was a complex one and involved Congressional action. The President promised that the Administration would think about this problem.

Ministers Sangster and Seaga then raised the question of migratory workers. Mr. Seaga referred briefly to the existing arrangement whereby several thousand Jamaicans came annually to the U.S. (mainly to Florida and the other states on the eastern seaboard) to work as migrant laborers. This arrangement had worked quite well in the past and had furnished a source of income for the island in the form of remittances. There was now a fear, however, that the recently enacted Mexican law which limited the period a migrant worker could be employed continuously in the United States to 210 days, would be invoked against Jamaica's laborers. This would cause many problems, particularly in view of the fact that it was more costly for a Jamaican laborer to travel to and from the U.S., thus making it only marginally profitable to him if he were forced to reside and work for a period of less than 210 days. Mr. Johnson informed the President that this subject was being taken up with Secretary of Labor Goldberg at a later appointment, and the President said that he would like a memorandum on the matter.

The Premier reverted once again to the question of sugar. He pointed out that the free market price for sugar at approximately £22 per ton was an economic impossibility for Jamaica where production costs dictated a price of almost £32 per ton. It was absolutely essential therefore that Jamaica enter restricted markets at preferred prices or the entire sugar industry, which meant so much to the island's economy and its workers, would be seriously shaken. He outlined to the President the importance of the Bustamante Industrial Trades Union which he headed and which was the political base for his party. Its nucleus was made up of the sugar workers and he knew from personal experience that a disruption of the sugar industry would have profound political implications for Jamaica.

The President then brought up the subject of tobacco production in Jamaica and inquired as to whether Jamaica could duplicate the Havana cigar. Mr. Lightbourne stated that not only could Jamaica duplicate it, but could produce a cigar of superior quality to those made in Cuba. A discussion of types of tobacco leaf then ensued which was concluded with an expression of interest on the part of the Jamaican delegation in exploring the possibility of an American market for quality Jamaican cigars.

Next, the Premier gave expression to a fear he had regarding a Russian effort to block Jamaica's entry into the United Nations. This move would be in retaliation to Jamaica's reaction to a recent visit by Russian trawlers to Kingston. On their arrival the Premier had refused

the crews permission to land because on a previous visit crew members had taken numerous pictures of the island. He ordered that supplies be given the vessels, but that contact with Jamaicans be limited to the minimum required to complete the supply operation. This, he emphasized, was part of his feeling on the general question of communism and his decision to commit his Government to the side of the West.

Minister Lightbourne mentioned a project which would, in his view, be of benefit to the Jamaican economy. He asked U.S. consideration for the establishment of a USDA inspection station in Jamaica so that truck farm produce could be shipped to the U.S. He noted that Cuba had in the past enjoyed a fairly lively trade of this type and it was Jamaica's hope to capture some of the market now left vacant. It was noted by the President that the Jamaican group would be having discussions with the Department of Agriculture on this point and he asked that a memorandum be prepared for him.

Mr. Lightbourne then embarked on a strong plea for an AID project in connection with the development of Jamaica's harbor. He pointed out the inadequacies of existing facilities, the potential of the harbor, and the existence of a detailed 1954 survey which could be brought up to date with very little additional work. He also pointed out that Jamaica had a very obvious strategic importance which could grow within the next few years. It was important, he stated, that after independence the people be given the idea that Jamaica was moving ahead. They would, he stated be willing to make sacrifices, but they must be presented with tangible goals and the hope of their achievement. He asked for U.S. assistance on this project.

Mr. Johnson suggested that funds for this development might be obtained from various international lending agencies, such as the IDB, but Ministers Sangster and Lightbourne indicated that prospects were not bright because of fears in the money marts regarding the future of Jamaica. The President inquired whether British assistance would be available; the Premier and his ministers were quite pessimistic on this point, fearing that British assistance would be negligible after independence. Mr. Lightbourne observed that many ill-timed problems were plaguing Jamaica on the eve of independence: the unsettled sugar market; bauxite and the stockpiling investigations; Britain's balance of payment ills. The President expressed sympathy for Jamaica's problems and he suggested that they bring these matters up in their talks with Mr. Moscoso and his assistants at the Agency for International Development. However, he pointed out that America's commitment was a global one and that resources were already spread thin. Nevertheless he assured the Jamaicans that the U.S. would do what it could in so far as commitments and resources would permit.

Sir Alexander told the President in strong terms that if the United States should ever desire to reactivate its air base in Jamaica, it was there

for the nation's use. Minister Sangster underlined this offer. Minister Sangster went on to thank the President for the dispatch of a Peace Corps contingent to Jamaica and informed the President that the Corpsmen had arrived, were on station, and that it was anticipated that excellent results would accrue from their presence.

The interview concluded with the President thanking the Premier and his ministers for their call and with mutual expressions of good will.

174. Memorandum from Moscoso to McGeorge Bundy, July 12¹

July 12, 1962

SUBJECT

Aid Program in Jamaica

In response to the President's request for information concerning our aid program in Jamaica, I submit the following:

1. The U.S. program, initiated in 1955, has been largely limited to technical cooperation in the fields of agriculture, health and education, and the average annual U.S. contribution approximated \$300,000 through 1961.

The FY 1962 program included \$2.2 million for a water supply loan, \$2.2 million for a low cost housing loan, and \$1.0 million grant for the continuation of technical assistance in agriculture, education and industrial development.

2. The FY 1963 Congressional presentation contains \$1.0 million for grants to Jamaica to cover the continuing costs of the general technical cooperation effort.

3. The first indication of GOJ's desire for a loan for Kingston port development arose with the recent visit of the Jamaican Premier and his delegation, and was mentioned by Minister Lightbourne in the meeting with Mr. Hamilton on June 26. Minister Lightbourne gave the port a higher priority than was accorded by the other members of the group. No loan application has been submitted by the GOJ. I presented Mr. Lightbourne with a brochure on port development in Puerto Rico, hoping that this would be helpful in analyzing his problem. I mentioned on one occasion the possibility of the creation of a port authority as well as financing by floating bonds in the open market. I also informed Mr. Lightbourne that I was willing to have my engineers examine his port plan made some years ago.

¹ Aid program in Jamaica. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.

We stressed that A.I.D. resources were limited and that Jamaica would of necessity have to approach other lending sources for development needs, explaining that A.I.D. was the bank of last resort. When the question was raised as to whether the U.S. could provide general financing for the new development plan, still in preliminary form, I urged that Jamaica, desiring to join the O.A.S., while here meet with the O.A.S. and present a copy of their plan for informal examination by the Nine Wise Men. As a result, the financial members of the delegation met with Dr. Saar and left their plan for informal examination.

The Delegation was informed that the water supply loan had received full consideration and was about to be approved, with the documentation of the housing loan to be completed within the next several weeks.

I informed the visitors that they were in many ways much further advanced from the standpoint of planning, as well as economic progress, than many of the Latin American countries and that with their relative prosperity it seemed likely that their potential for borrowing from international agencies and other sources was greater than many Latin American countries now competing for A.I.D. assistance.

Teodoro Moscoso

175. Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, July 19¹

July 19, 1962

SUBJECT

Establishment of an Embassy at Kingston, Jamaica

Jamaica will become an independent nation within the British Commonwealth on August 6, 1962. It will be a Monarchy with Queen Elizabeth as the Sovereign.

Jamaica is to be the first newly independent nation in the Western Hemisphere in almost 60 years. The original concept of a West Indies Federation envisaged Jamaica an important element. However, in September 1961 the Jamaican people, by referendum, withdrew, preferring separate, independent nationhood instead.

¹ Establishment of an Embassy at Kingston, Jamaica. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961–62.

Jamaica is attaining independence without rancor or strife and is expected to continue its cultural orientation toward the United Kingdom. However, since the United Kingdom has made it clear that only limited financial, political and military support can be granted it is obvious that the new country will look increasingly toward the United States as its ties weaken with the Mother Country.

I recommend that the United States recognize Jamaica and that we elevate our Consulate General at Kingston to the rank of Embassy on August 6, 1962. This has been our practice in recent years in our relationships with other friendly countries as they have become independent. Upon your approval of the establishment of an Embassy at Kingston, the Department will take the action required to insure it is open on the date of independence.

Dean Rusk

176. Strategy Statement for Jamaica, February 15¹

February 15, 1963

1961 and 1962 were poor years for Jamaica. Economic growth levelled off as the heavy investment of earlier years declined. Remittances abroad from the bauxite industries increased. Other major opportunity areas for investment have not appeared. When identified, heavy GOJ investment to make them feasible may be required.

At least part of the difficulty is of Jamaica's own making. For instance, the lagging construction industry was further demoralized by the Allen Award, a large pay raise to construction workers made retroactive for six months. It is symptomatic of the pressure on the labor government.

Somewhat less vulnerable to criticism is Jamaica's understandable lack of experience in dealing with international lending agencies. The essential justification for project credits has apparently not been sufficient. There is reason to believe some international agencies would give favorable consideration to good projects.

Today, the GOJ faces an expanding population which no longer has easy access to Great Britain as restrictions on Commonwealth migration

¹ Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.

come into effect. The economy of the country is narrowly based. The people are clamoring for a better living. The government faces difficult decisions on the use of its limited resources and like any other country, cannot always apply them for economic purposes. Opportunities for investment are both less obvious and less appealing. The government has no choice but to increase infrastructure and other forms of capital investment if it hopes to achieve again higher rates of growth and satisfy the demands of the electorate.

Despite its problems, Jamaica has accomplished much. It is a working democracy. Taxes are progressive. Government standards are high. Education is relatively widespread. Communist influence has been held to a minimum. It has just become a member of the U.N., I.B.R.D., and I.M.F.

C. Strategy

Current U.S. strategy for the transition period as Jamaica moves from colonial status into full self reliant independence is to help Jamaica attain economic viability and to improve social conditions. Also, it is to move her into full participation in the inter-American system through the O.A.S. These efforts on the part of the U.S. should help restore outside confidence in the future of Jamaica. The recently concluded investment guaranties agreement should help to attract U.S. investment.

A.I.D. will attempt to counsel the GOJ on establishing a modern monetary system, and on the best methods to secure funds abroad. To this end, A.I.D. will assist in the preparation of documentation necessary to favorable consideration of loans from outside sources. A.I.D. will also help finance feasibility studies which might lead to new investment.

Rural areas of Jamaica, in which half the population lives, are relatively depressed. A.I.D. will apply resources to the agricultural sector, provided the loan now under consideration is not negotiated in FY 1963. The aim is to increase food production for domestic consumption. A.I.D. will continue the rural water program if alternative financing is not available. This program is designed to provide an easy and safe supply of water to the rural people for the first time. Development lending assistance in the future will be provided on hard terms.

In addition, A.I.D. will continue its efforts to help increase the productivity of small industries and attract private capital to industry through the Investment Guaranty Program.

D. Goals

Proposed funding range: Development Grants \$675,000, Development Loans, \$4,000,000.

1. Support GOJ efforts to increase domestic food production in certain lines by 50% in five years.

2. Support GOJ efforts towards industrial development with the aim of a 5% annual increase in industrial product.

This statement may be used, until further notice, as the basis for preparing the Congressional Presentation. Further revisions may be necessary before its issuance as Agency guidance.

D.E. Bell
Administrator

177. Plan of Action for Jamaica beginning June 1¹

June 1, 1963

JAMAICA

Plan of Action for the Period Beginning June 1, 1963

(Approved by Latin American Policy Committee
May 29, 1963)

A. Basic Approach

Jamaica, although newly independent, has impressive political assets: stable democratic government based on a two party system, responsible political leadership, an impartial even-handed judicial system backed by a traditional respect for law and order, and, a capable professional civil service. The outlook for continued political stability is clouded, however, by a decline in the rate of economic growth accompanied by high unemployment resulting from a rapid increase in the population and reductions in emigration opportunities.

Externally, the country has openly aligned itself with the West and, although a member of the British Commonwealth, has tended increasingly to look to the United States rather than the United Kingdom for protection and assistance.

Basic factors conditioning United States policy towards Jamaica are (1) the island's strategic location, (2) its position as the world's largest bauxite producer, and (3) the desirability of supporting and

¹ Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.

strengthening the country's present political stability and pro-Western orientation especially during the critical early years of independence.

B. The Present Situation

1. Political

Following the advent of universal suffrage in 1944, Jamaica's political life has polarized around two major parties—the incumbent Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the Peoples National Party (PNP). They have much in common: each has controlled the Government, each is dominated by a strong-willed leader (Sir Alexander Bustamante of the JLP and Norman Manley of the PNP) and each is based on a nation-wide trade union organization.

Other political groups reflecting special interests or extremist views have so far attracted little support and have no representation in the legislature. There is no Communist party and front organizations are relatively weak.

The major problem confronting the government at present is a disturbingly high level of unemployment estimated at between 15 and 20 per cent of the labor force. The rate is even higher among urban youth where one-quarter to one-third cannot find jobs. The frustration and bitterness arising from unemployment are augmented by uneven economic development and the visibly unequal distribution of wealth.

Dissident elements are at present poorly organized. The main group is the Rastafarians consisting of several loosely joined sects—estimated to number about 12,000—dedicated to Negro superiority and professing the idea of returning to Africa. They form a potentially explosive group vulnerable to exploitation by any elements which might wish to precipitate violence against the government.

Other dissident organizations are the Socialist Party of Jamaica and the Unemployed Workers Council—Communist front organizations with a small membership of less than 200 each. The UWC, however, probably could attract the support of substantial numbers of jobless workers.

The Bustamante government since it assumed power in April 1962 has made little progress in restoring the nation's economic momentum or in alleviating the social and political pressures arising from unemployment. The broad outlines of the JLP program have only recently been announced; and, the government's revised national economic development plan which will specify how the program is to be achieved will not be ready for cabinet consideration until later this summer.

At the same time, the opposition PNP has confined itself to the role of political critic and obstructionist and done little to spur the government into action by recommending specific policy lines.

2. *Economic*

With 1.7 million inhabitants in an area of 4410 square miles Jamaica is one of the more densely populated nations in the Western Hemisphere. Until recently it has also recorded one of the highest rates of economic growth. During the period 1953–57 real gross national product rose by an average of almost 10 per cent per annum with the average annual per capita increase ranging around eight per cent. Since 1957, however, the rate of growth has dropped sharply averaging slightly over three per cent annually during 1958–61. With the population increasing almost two per cent per annum the average yearly rise in per capita GNP during this period was only a little more than one per cent. Provisional figures for 1962 reflect an increase in GNP at current prices of only about 2.4 per cent.

Much of the impetus to Jamaica's extremely rapid development prior to 1957 came from large American and Canadian investments in the bauxite industry combined with both foreign and local investment in hotels and other facilities for the booming tourist trade. These developments were accompanied by notable changes in the structure of the island's economy.

The mining sector was insignificant prior to 1953. Due to heavy investment in bauxite industry during the mid-1950's, however, mining since 1957 has accounted for nine per cent of the nation's gross domestic product. Bauxite and alumina together now provide 50 per cent of Jamaica's total export values, 20 per cent of the government's tax receipts and well paid employment for about 5,000 persons. The industry still continues to grow but at a much slower pace.

At the same time that the mining sector expanded, the share of total domestic output contributed by agriculture declined from 21 per cent in 1953 to 13 per cent in the period since 1957. Agriculture is more important than these figures suggest, however, since nearly one million persons out of the total population of 1.7 million live on farms. The agricultural sector also accounts for about 40 per cent of total exports.

The product of the banking, insurance, and real estate sector almost doubled during the 1953–57 period from less than three per cent to five per cent of the total in response to a higher level of economic activity and the expanding tourist industry. Tourism now provides employment for an estimated 11,000 persons and foreign exchange earnings of 34–38 million. For the past two years, however, tourism has tended to decline. In 1962 the number of visitors was almost eight per cent less than in 1961.

Manufacturing, based largely on processing of agricultural raw materials, has accounted for 13–14 per cent of Jamaica's gross domestic product throughout the 1953–61 period. There is some small manufac-

turing or assembling for the local market in such fields as clothing, footwear, and building materials. Under industrial incentive laws Jamaica since 1952 has managed to encourage establishment of firms which at the end of 1961 gave employment to about 5,000 workers. A majority of these workers were in American owned firms producing cotton textiles for the United States market.

During 1957–61 Jamaica has incurred a substantial current account deficit in its balance of payments, the cumulative total amounting to \$152 million or an average of \$30 million per year. The deficit dropped from 33 million in 1960 to \$12 million in 1961 due mainly to a decline in the normally adverse trade balance. Preliminary figures for 1962, however, reflect an increase in the deficit to \$17 million as a result of lower earnings from tourism and some deterioration in visible trade. These deficits have been financed through direct private investment, government borrowing, and an inflow of short-term money through banks and consumer credit companies.

At the end of 1962 Jamaica's foreign exchange assets totalled roughly \$95 million compared to \$87 million in 1961. These figures, however, are not a direct measure of the country's capacity to finance balance of payments deficits due to the operation of the sterling exchange standard under which commercial banks look primarily to their head offices in other countries rather than the Bank of Jamaica for liquidity in sterling.

Jamaica's record of self-help is good. Developmental planning and budgeting are long-established techniques. Jamaican business invests in Jamaica and the government has done well in mobilizing domestic capital through bond issues and an effective tax system. Both political parties have cooperated in maintaining an attractive climate for foreign investment and a reputation for fiscal responsibility.

3. Foreign Policy

Prime Minister Bustamante, who is also Minister of External Affairs, has defined Jamaica's foreign policy as anti-Communist and pro-Western. He has not elaborated on this simple formula.

Jamaica has not exchanged diplomatic missions with any Communist bloc country although it does permit a Cuban consulate, established prior to independence, to continue to operate in Kingston primarily because of concern over the welfare of the roughly 20,000 Jamaicans living in Cuba.

Aware that the United Kingdom is no longer willing to assure major economic or military commitments in the Caribbean, Jamaica has tended increasingly to turn to the United States. During the Cuban crisis, Prime Minister Bustamante publicly endorsed the steps announced by the President to force removal of Soviet offensive weap-

ons. At the same time, he granted permission for United States ships and aircraft to utilize Jamaican ports and air fields. Bustamante has also cooperated by rejecting requests for air travel to or from Cuba via Jamaica. The United States in turn has given unpublicized oral assurances that it will come to Jamaica's aid in the event of enemy attack and has also agreed to provide a one-time package of military equipment to increase the Jamaican Defense Force's capability for surveillance of the island's coast, 90 miles from Cuba.

Independent for less than one year, Jamaica is attempting to establish its position in the international community and at the same time cope with difficult problems of economic development. As a result, Jamaican government officials tend to be jittery if not panicky. Unfortunately, the United States has added to their sense of unease during recent months through the following negative actions:

(a) Equivocal replies to the Jamaican Government's request for amendment of the United States immigration laws to accord Jamaica (and Trinidad) the same nonquota status enjoyed by all of the other independent nations of the Western Hemisphere;

(b) Imposition of restraints on three categories of Jamaican cotton textile exports to the United States and a request for restraints on two additional categories;

(c) Inability so far to respond to Jamaica's request for continuation of the program under which the United States has bartered agricultural surpluses for bauxite since 1955;

(d) Denial of a request from the Prime Minister for a \$25 million loan for development projects which the Jamaican Government considered essential to the country's reasonable progress;

(e) Refusal to grant a waiver of United States procurement to permit the pipe required for an AID financed water resource project to be purchased in Mexico at a saving of about 40 per cent;

(f) Denial of an application for an agricultural credit loan; and

(g) Slow progress in efforts to secure Jamaica's admission in the Organization of American States.

In addition, confidential portions of the Clay report recommend that AID assistance be phased out completely in Jamaica (as well as Trinidad) while continuing it in Latin America.

Taken as a whole, these events indicate a trend which if unchecked could have an unhealthy impact on the present good political relations between the two countries. To the Jamaicans it would appear that despite their open alignment with the United States and the West and despite their excellent record of self-help and responsible government the United States proposed to deny them both aid and trade.

C. *Objectives*

1. Retention under favorable conditions of the right of United States military vessels and aircraft to utilize Jamaican ports and air fields.

2. Maintenance of politically stable democratic government friendly to the United States.

3. Integration of Jamaica into the political and economic institutions of the Western Hemisphere and meanwhile cooperation in matters connected with Cuba.

4. [illegible in the original]

5. [illegible in the original] in maintaining an adequate rate of economic growth as a basis for [illegible in the original] social progress and political stability.

6. [illegible in the original] of the Jamaican Defense Force to remain a pro-Western oriented, apolitical [illegible in the original] in support of the democratic constitutional government.

D. *Lines of Action*

[illegible in the original]

1. Take all possible steps within the Organization of American States to establish proceedings for the submission of new members which will permit Jamaica to join a [illegible in the original]. (Action: State)

2. *Participation in the Alliance for Progress*

[illegible in the original] without delay Jamaica's full participation in the Alliance for Progress as soon as it becomes a member of the OAS, including access to all [illegible in the original] financing under the terms and conditions that are applied to [illegible in the original] countries of the Hemisphere. In the meantime, apply Alliance criteria to the greatest extent practicable in United States bilateral relations with Jamaica. (Action: AID, State, USIA)

3. *Amendment of U.S. Immigration Laws*

[illegible in the original] for amendment of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act to accord Jamaica (as well as Trinidad and Tobago) the same nonquota status that is enjoyed by the other independent nations of the Western Hemisphere. (Action: State)

4. *Military*

(a) Expedite delivery of the military equipment requested by Jamaica to strengthen its coastal surveillance capability. (Action: Defense, AID, State)

(b) Maintain liaison with the officials of the Jamaican Defense Force and provide advice and assistance as may be requested and appropriate. (Action: Defense, State, AID)

5. *Foreign Policy*

[illegible in the original] into the OAS and consistent with our security requirements and diplomatic practice insofar as possible treat the Government of Jamaica as if it were a member of the OAS and consult Jamaica in advance of all United States policy developments affecting Latin America and the Caribbean. Insofar as possible, accord Jamaica the same treatment we accord Latin American countries with respect to matters pending before the United Nations.

6. *Bauxite-Barter Program*

In view of (a) Jamaica's serious unemployment problem; (b) the importance of bauxite in the Jamaican economy; and (c) the fact that the barter program has been in effect since 1955 and that it therefore would be particularly inappropriate to terminate it abruptly during Jamaica's first year of independence, recommend to the responsible United States authorities that the program be continued for an additional year and that at the same time the Jamaicans be notified that no further extensions can be expected unless justified on the basis of United States stockpile requirements. (Action: State, AID)

7. *Restraints on Jamaican Cotton Textile Exports*

Recommend to the Inter-Agency Textile Advisory Committee that restraints imposed on Jamaica's cotton textile exports be set at as high a level as possible, taking into account the necessity of maintaining a reasonable degree of consistency with restraint actions requested in the case of other countries. (Action: State, AID)

8. *Internal Security*

Continue the close relationships maintained with Jamaican security officials [4½ lines not declassified]. (Action: [less than 1 line not declassified] State)

9. *Economic Development Planning*

Encourage the Jamaican Government to accelerate formulation of its long-term development plan and to include national goals that are compatible with Alliance for Progress criteria. Further, encourage the Government to submit the plan when completed to the IBRD for review. (Action: AID, State, Country Team)

10. *Technical Assistance*

Give sympathetic consideration to Jamaican requests for technical assistance in such key fields as education, agricultural and industrial development, transportation and labor relations. Offer to assist the Government of Jamaica in the preparation of feasibility studies for economic development projects. (Action: AID, State, Country Team)

11. *Private Investment*

Support the Government's efforts to attract foreign private investment. Protect [illegible in the original] where appropriate joint ventures involving United States and Jamaican capital for investment in productive industrial or agricultural enterprise. (Action: AID, Commerce, State)

12. *Public Affairs*

Encourage the Government of Jamaica and the people of this newly independent nation to continue a policy of alignment with the West, strengthening their support for and belief in the democratic free enterprise system as the most logical base for economic progress and social justice. (Action: USIA, State, Defense, AID, Country Team)

13. *Relations with the United Kingdom*

Encourage the United Kingdom to continue its interest in Jamaica, including the economic or financial fields, and Jamaica to turn to the United Kingdom for private and public financing to the maximum extent possible. (Action: AID, State)

14. *Labor Programs*

Through such techniques as leader grants, technical assistance and worker education programs assist the leadership of the Jamaican labor movement to better understand labor economics and the legitimate rights and obligations of a free labor movement. (Action: AID, State, USIA, Country Team)

178. Memorandum of conversation, June 14, between Prime Minister Bustamante and President Kennedy and other U.S. and Jamaican officials¹

June 14, 1963

SUBJECT

Jamaica

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Alexander Bustamante—Prime Minister of Jamaica
Donald Sangster—Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Jamaica
Sir Neville Ashenheim—Ambassador of Jamaica

The President
Ambassador Doherty
Edwin M. Martin—Assistant Secretary, ARA

There was a preliminary exchange of pleasantries in which the Prime Minister emphasized how extensively Ambassador Doherty had gotten around among the people of all types in Jamaica and had become well-acquainted everywhere. He paid quite a tribute to him in this respect.

The President handed Bustamante the letter indicating the executive branch's endorsement of legislation to change the Jamaican quota. The Prime Minister expressed great appreciation for the letter. There was a brief discussion of how many people might come to the United States if the bars were lifted. The Prime Minister did not think the figures would be too large.

At the Prime Minister's request, Deputy Prime Minister Sangster outlined the new Jamaican development plan. He stressed that it would require about 100 million pounds of external resources over a five year period of which the Jamaicans thought they could secure 75 million pounds on relatively hard terms from various private and public sources. However, this left a gap of 25 million pounds which was needed on a soft basis with a low interest rate and with long terms and for which they must look to the United States.

The Prime Minister intervened to stress the importance of this and his concern that Ambassador Moscoso had expressed to him the opinion some time ago that Jamaica should be able to finance its development on essentially hard terms. The Prime Minister felt that with

¹ Jamaican quota; Jamaican development plan; Cuban refugees. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.

their unemployment problem and other difficulties this was just not a reasonable position.

The President asked Assistant Secretary Martin to comment. He said that the Prime Minister had seen Mr. Bell but that he did not know what Mr. Bell's thinking on this matter was. It was true, as he had said to the Prime Minister on a recent visit to Jamaica, that almost no other country in Latin America was able to borrow on private money markets of London and New York as Jamaica with its fine financial record was able to do and, with a general shortage of resources, this was a difference of which one had to take some account.

The President said that he hoped the Prime Minister would see Mr. Moscoso and discuss this difference of view with him. It was pointed out that they would be having lunch together and would do so.

The President went on to say that he would speak to Mr. Bell and send the Prime Minister a letter on what our situation was with respect to this request.

The President asked the Prime Minister whether they had any trouble with Cubans. The Prime Minister said they had a few refugees who had come there and whom they had not been able to pass along but that they stood firm on using Jamaica as a transit point. He said they had no use for Cubans and this was no problem for him. Ambassador Doherty reaffirmed the anti-Castro and pro-United States sentiment he felt everywhere in Jamaica and particularly in the Prime Minister's government.

Mexico

179. Letter from Edward G. Cale to Thomas C. Mann, February 14¹

February 14, 1961

Dear Tom:

We have been giving some careful thought to what the best method may be of handling our relations with Mexico in the present context of the change of Administration. As indicated in our cable 2048, we do not think that an early Presidential visit would be recommendable. Even though high level decisions may have already been reached, I think you should have the basis of our recommendation, as promised in the cable, and it is set forth in the attached memorandum.

I hope that our thinking here will be understood as aimed at constructive steps and that whatever final action results, we will be able to bring to the attention of yourself and your advisers the basis of the Embassy's thinking. Sending these thoughts in the form of a memorandum, rather than despatch, is intended to limit distribution and to avoid any controversial interpretation.

Sincerely yours,

Edward G. Cale
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Attachment

THE TACTICAL HANDLING OF RELATIONS WITH MEXICO

PROBLEM

What are the tactics most likely to produce more effective results in obtaining Mexico's acceptance and support of United States positions in 1961?

BACKGROUND

Relations between the United States and Mexico in the twentieth century have been, on the whole, unsatisfactory from the American

¹ Transmits paper entitled "The Tactical Handling of Relations With Mexico." Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/2-1461.

point of view. This is due principally to the effects of the Mexican Revolution (1910–17), with its anti-foreign, nationalistic and socialistic objectives bound to clash with many legitimate American interests. The conflicts and quarrels which marred relations almost continuously until 1940 were considerably alleviated under the extraordinary circumstances of the war years 1941–46. A sustained and conscientious effort on the part of the United States, in the period 1947–60, brought some further improvement and closer understanding, without, however, removing many of the principal points of disagreement and divergence. In net result, the United States cannot count on Mexico's support in facing the major problems posed by Soviet-Communist expansion; in its bilateral relations, the over-all score does not amount to an accord mutually acceptable and satisfying.

The United States effort to win Mexican friendship and support has been evidenced from the top levels of Government. Presidential visits are an outstanding example: President Miguel Alemán was invited to Washington in 1947, and his visit was reciprocated by President Truman in 1948; President Ruiz Cortines was the guest of President Eisenhower at the Falcon Dam in 1953, White Sulphur Springs in March, 1956, and the Panama Presidential Conference in July 1956. One week before his inauguration, President-elect López Mateos was visited by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, in November, 1958, and President Eisenhower visited President Adolfo López Mateos at Acapulco in February, 1959 (less than three months after the Mexican President's inauguration) and was honored by the Mexican President's visit to the United States in October of the same year. Then, as a final gesture of friendship, President Eisenhower visited President López Mateos at the site of the new Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande, late in October, 1960.

Throughout this 13 year period, Mexico's economic needs have received most considerate attention from the United States Government. The record of loans and credits from United States Government agencies has left Mexico with no complaint, with the exception of the single area of petroleum development through the nationalized oil company PEMEX. Even in the latter instance, substantial private credits to specific PEMEX operations have contributed to the continued expansion of the Government's oil monopoly.

Mexico's complaints on United States trade policies, such as restrictions on minerals imports, have been dealt with most courteously and carefully, and special endeavors made to accommodate Mexico's needs, even at some sacrifice of our own. Mexico has been consulted on sales of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities, particularly cotton, in order not to disturb the rate of Mexico's own export sales. The benefits of the GATT have been extended to Mexico, even though Mexico is not a member, and by its own action terminated the bilateral trade agreement

with the U.S. in 1949. American tourist trade to Mexico has received positive U.S. Government encouragement; Mexican history and culture, the advantages of investment, attractions of travel and residence in Mexico have been generously reported in the United States, with the direct cooperation and approval of our Government. Mexico's modest military requirements have been given maximum accommodation by our Department of Defense in terms of acquisitions and credits. A U.S. technical assistance program has been maintained in Mexico, its moderate size being influenced mainly by the wishes of the Mexican Government.

In international organizations, Mexico has been given special attention by the United States Delegations, in a general effort to gain for Mexico the recognition greatly desired. As typical examples, Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo has had the backing of the United States for the various U.N. positions obtained by him, such as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission; Ambassador Sanchez Gavito has been elected President of the Council of the Organization of American States.

A ROUGH CHECK-LIST OF RECIPROCITY

Under specific areas of relations, the following must be noted:

(1) *High Level Contacts*: Deliberately and frequently sought by the United States, these have been treated with coyness by Mexico, usually deferred or delayed, and finally entered upon with a lack of spontaneity indicative of the absence of genuine interest. While creating a better public climate for official relations, their tangible results are very limited. The record of four direct meetings with President López Mateos (one with Senator Lyndon Johnson, three with President Eisenhower) proves conclusively that the Mexican Chief Executive is noncommittal (at times to the point of silence) and unresponsive in discussions of substantive matters of prime importance to the United States in its foreign relations. In his speech to the Nation on return from the United States in October, 1959, he made no reference to President Eisenhower, assured that no secret agreements had been reached, and proudly proclaimed he returned home with the Presidential sash covering his breast "unstained."

(2) *Defense and Security Areas*: The United States has offered the whole gamut of military cooperation to Mexico, which in response has only purchased relatively minor amounts of arms and military equipment. There are no United States military training missions of any kind in Mexico; no military assistance agreement; very limited (however, increasing) training of Mexican officers in the United States; and a complete absence of mutual defense arrangements. Even an Air Defense Intercept Zone (ADIZ) over a contiguous strip of Mexican territory, to protect our SAC bases and vital industrial areas in the

south and southwest, has been effectively refused since 1954. Thus, while the United States spends billions for the complex series of defense bases and warning systems around the globe, its own “soft underbelly” lies completely exposed by the absence of any mutual defense arrangements in Mexico. The capabilities of the Mexican armed forces to play a responsible role in continental defense, under plans of the Inter-American Defense Board, are highly questionable. The Joint United States-Mexican Defense Commission is dormant, having held no working meeting for three years.

(3) *Economic Cooperation:* United States accommodation of Mexico’s credit requirements has indeed been reciprocated by an excellent repayment record on Mexico’s part; likewise, Mexican requests have been regarded as reasonable; Mexico in turn has handled its finances on a basis which has helped to stabilize its currency and resist the world-wide trend to inflation. But the fact that we have not generally linked our aid to our over-all objectives, surprises the astute Mexicans and gains us neither friendship nor respect.

At the same time, based chiefly on developments and political statements in Mexico in the latter half of 1960, there is growing concern among United States investors regarding the security of their position and there has been a certain slow-down in new credits and investments. Government acquisition of the electric power and movie industries has widened previous Government ownership in transportation, petroleum and other enterprises. Extra-legal pressures are being brought to bear on many new American companies to provide for Mexican control of the companies.

Problems faced by the principal American automobile companies, long established in Mexico, has raised with their managers doubts over their position in Mexico. A strongly nationalistic mining law, just published, requires Mexican control of mining companies if they are to receive much-needed reduction of taxes. Some Mexican businessmen who are friendly to the United States complain that our loans to state enterprises and our private credits which are used to finance the nationalization of Mexican industry are helping to undermine all private industry in Mexico. Top Government circles appear recently to have become aware of the reaction abroad (adversely affecting the attractive rating which Mexico enjoyed in international investment circles for more than a decade), to its policies and actions, referred to above, in the latter part of 1960. As a counteraction, the Administration within the last month has declared itself as recognizing the importance of, and its friendliness toward, private business. Nevertheless, the outlook is clouded and actions rather than words are needed if Mexico is to demonstrate its friendliness to private enterprise.

(4) *International Relations:* In spite of its extraordinary efforts to win Mexico’s confidence and support, the United States can count on neither

in international organizations. In August, 1960, Mexico's Foreign Minister so worked against the United States at the two Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at San José, Costa Rica, that Secretary Herter felt obliged to make vocal mention of Mexico's opposition to our objectives in handling the Cuban problem.

Barely perceptible is any change in Mexico's stubborn view of Castro as "a U.S.-Cuban quarrel;" the facts of Communist penetration, and Sino-Soviet threat to the Hemisphere, have been blindly ignored. Mexico keeps a pro-Castro leftist as its Ambassador in Habana, where great stock is made of Mexican support. Only in December, 1960, in a widely publicized ceremony, the Mexican Government made a gift of a complete school to Castro's regime; at the same time, school rooms are lacking for almost 40% of Mexico's own children, and funds for school maintenance are so lacking that the Government has to appeal to private organizations to undertake repairs. Castro's Communist Ambassador to Mexico is cordially received by the Government, and President López Mateos himself went out of his way to converse very cordially with him and the Soviet Ambassador at the New Year's Reception to the Diplomatic Corps, an attention extended to no other Chief of Mission.

In the United Nations, Mexico continues to adhere to an independent course of cool indifference to the position of the United States, frequently abstaining on vital questions, and standing out in the Latin American group as one of the few nations on which no reliance can be placed by the United States Delegation. In certain specific problems, such as the Law of the Sea, it may be recalled that Mexico worked arduously against the United States at the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences, killing by a one-vote margin the U.S. endeavor to obtain a genuine compromise solution of the thorny question of the breadth of the territorial sea.

(5) *Soviet-Communist Expansion*: Mexico has given no visible cognizance to the problem of Soviet activities in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet Embassy still operates with its bloated staff of 58 working members, in contrast to the total of five Mexicans in the Embassy in Moscow. Mexico as a base for Soviet operations in the area is as secure as ever, and provided the Soviets with a great advantage in renewing relations with Cuba in 1960. Mikoyan was able to take full advantage of his Mexican visit; the Soviet industrial exposition was given a good reception at the end of 1959.

Communist propaganda is imported or printed in Mexico, literally by the ton, without let or hindrance of the Mexican authorities, then widely distributed within the country to the most susceptible elements of the population, and shipped out to Caribbean and Central American countries. Domestically, the Communist parties suffer no restrictions,

while intellectual Marxism continues to flourish in the universities, pedagogical institutions, the Ministry of Education, and in many organs of economic policy and of public opinion.

The Presidential policy of flirting with Communists is continued in the close contact maintained with Vicente Lombardo Toledano (whose diplomatic passport was recently renewed) and in opening Mexico's doors to a Latin American conference sponsored by the Communist-front World Peace Council, scheduled for March, 1961. The influence of General Lazaro Cardenas remains strong, and apparently uncombated, within Government circles and such basic organizations as the farm workers.

It is, of course, true that several Communist labor leaders, such as Demetrio Vallejo, are in jail, as is also the prominent Communist party leader, the painter David Alfaro Siqueiros. In these cases, however, the reason for imprisonment has nothing to do with Communist ideology. Labor leaders who happened to be Communists forcibly challenged the authority of the Government, in connection with the strike on the national railways system in 1959, and are suffering the penalty provided in the Mexican law for this violation.

(6) *Some Miscellaneous Bilateral Stalemates:* There is no willingness by Mexico even to discuss the long-standing claim to El Chamizal, on the border adjacent to El Paso. Cooperation in atomic development is still declined by Mexico, which prefers international organization assistance to direct U.S. aid. Many small United States agrarian claims, assiduously documented and presented, lie dormant in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The dispute over Mexico's assertion of a 9-mile limit in the Gulf of Mexico remains as it has been for almost 20 years, and the related though not dependent problem of a shrimp fisheries conservation agreement gains no Mexican interest at this time. Our requests for action under the Extradition Treaty meet little response; Mexicans accused of crimes committed in the United States remain totally immune to punishment, even in their own country; American criminals in Mexico can generally count on Mexican cooperation to avoid extradition. An effective anti-narcotics program never gets beyond the discussion stage, leaving Mexico as one of the chief sources of dangerous drugs entering the U.S., to the peril of neighboring areas in Texas and California.

(7) *Some Miscellaneous Bilateral Successes:* The complex and delicate Bracero Agreement continues to be renewed at regular intervals, and the program of Mexican migratory farm labor in the United States continues to be carried out on an orderly and fairly satisfactory basis. Good treatment of American visitors and residents in Mexico by the police and immigration authorities helps greatly the protection functions of our Consulates. The bilateral aviation agreement is a practical

benefit to both countries. Collaboration with American scientists and governmental agencies is at a new high in Mexico's participation in Project Mercury. In the routine handling of inter-governmental business, the attitude of Mexican officials in dealing with United States Government representatives is uniformly courteous and frequently effective; but manners apart, the list of substantial accomplishments is not long.

(8) *Mexican Reaction to the United States*: It appears to be a considered and established Mexican position that Mexico has most to gain from her powerful northern neighbor, by a policy of opposition or non-cooperation. Modifications of this policy, when analyzed, will be found invariably to be dictated by Mexico's own interest, e.g., in the Bracero and Aviation Agreements, Project Mercury, and good treatment for the dollar-laden tourist. By remaining cool to the United States responsibilities in the prolonged crisis of the Cold War, Mexico feels pride in its sovereign independence. Aware that the United States itself believes "we cannot afford bad relations with our southern neighbor," Mexico has the confidence born of experience that, by simply playing the role of the coy or at least indifferent *Señorita*, she can bring the Yankee suitor rushing to her door.

THE PROBLEM OF TACTICS

Having used every device of ardent wooing which might be imagined in the past fifteen years, the United States should now strike a cool balance of the results and reconsider its tactics. Certainly the goal of Mexico's cooperation is worth the extreme endeavors made to win it during this critical period, but when such approaches do not produce the desired results, they should be most carefully re-adapted.

At the present time, Mexico is watching every move of the new U.S. Administration, not in a worried sense but in the expectancy that Uncle Sam will soon show how much he is thinking about her. The United States, by deliberately delaying any move in Mexico's direction, has a unique opportunity to cause Mexico to ponder, and to raise before Mexico's own eyes the variety of reasons the United States may have to weigh its Mexican relations. On the other hand, a quick and unmerited gesture of solicitude for Mexico will serve only to convince her that nothing is changed, all is the same as before, and Uncle Sam's favors will continue to be had without cost.

In specific terms, a re-examination of our tactics would mean to pass over Mexico as of no immediate concern in our Latin American relations at this time. Indirectly, "with the left hand," it should be made known that this attitude is derived from Mexico's record in the past few years. Simultaneously, a demonstration of genuine interest in the problems of certain other Latin American governments, which have

given effective support on the major problems which confront us (e.g. Argentina, Colombia, Peru, or some one of the smaller countries such as Costa Rica) would be realistically understood by Mexico as a sign of United States strength and purposefulness in this Hemisphere. It might even prompt Mexico to consider a more positive response to her northern neighbor. It is well worth trying.

180. Memorandum from Coerr to Ball, April 11¹

April 11, 1961

THROUGH

S/S

FROM

ARA—Kymberly Delf. Coerr

SUBJECT

Mexican Oil Import Problem

Discussion

As Mr. Martin pointed out to you in his memorandum of April 7, we are experiencing great difficulty with the Department of the Interior regarding our commitment to Mexico for the import of asphaltic crude and residual oil overland to Brownsville, Texas.

1. Interior claims the Brownsville arrangement is an absurd procedure that can be indefinitely expanded and could be used by non-contiguous countries to circumvent the objectives of the import quota system.

Admittedly, the system is based upon a technicality, and Mexico is perfectly willing to construct a pipeline from its oil fields to Brownsville, but Interior does not wish to give any assurance that it will permit the pipeline operation long enough to amortise the \$6 million or so that the pipeline will cost, nor will it permit the present arrangement on an interim basis at its present level. Mexico is willing to limit its truck imports to 30,000 barrels per day but not to cut them back by half.

¹ Mexican oil import problem. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 59, TFLA Subject and Chron Files: Lot 61 D 298, Box 9.

2. Interior argues that when the Brownsville arrangement was under consideration Mexico's immediate concern was finding an outlet for 15,000 barrels of residual oil. Therefore, the arrangement should be limited to 15,000 barrels of residual oil and United States consumers of the Mexican product should use it exclusively for fuel, not process it for any other purpose.

Mexico has always exported residual oil and asphaltic crude, making no distinction between the two in considering its surplus problem, because its exported crude is so heavy (over 95% residual content) that it *is* residual oil for all practical purposes. However, this crude is peculiarly suited to the manufacture of asphalt roofing material and since there is virtually an evaporable domestic crude, it is readily salable in the United States. If Interior's concern is to protect our domestic industry, one would expect it to attack Mexico's residual exports, not its asphaltic crude. At any rate our present regulations do not distinguish between crude and residual imports to overland transportation nor do they permit us to dictate to domestic importers the use they make of the product they import.

With regard to Interior's desire to impose a quantitative limitation, we should be guided by the CCDH's security justification on which the entire import quota system is based. This does not encompass protection for domestic producers in the narrow commercial sense for which escape clause action is available. National security is also the basis for the overland exemption to Canada and Mexico because pipeline oil from contiguous countries is the equivalent of domestic production from the security point of view.

Historically, Mexico has exported more than 30,000 barrels of its heavy oils to our northeastern states and bought refined products from California. When import quotas were imposed, this arrangement continued until Mexico's major customer, the Paragon Oil Company, was bought out by the Texas Oil Company so that Texas Oil could use the Paragon import quota to buy Trinidad oil. This left Mexico with an unexportable surplus of heavy oils which overflowed its storage facilities and was forcing it to dump 15,000 barrels of residual per day, much of it in open holes in the ground. When Cuba offered to buy Mexico's surplus heavy oils, Mexico asked us to modify our regulations to permit ex-quota imports of Mexican oil. We countered with the Brownsville arrangement but did not, and legally could not, unilaterally place a quantitative limitation on Mexico's overland imports, any more than we did on Canada's.

Surely we should not be required to treat Mexico less favorably than Canada. Historically Canada exported about 118,000 barrels per day to the United States. When the overland exemption was granted, it was understood that Canada would *increase* its exports by about

30,000 to 40,000 barrels, largely in the Puget Sound area. Recently this Administration made no objection to a Canadian announcement of its intention to *increase* its exports from some 130,000 barrels in 1961 to 225,000 barrels by 1963. Considering the volume of Canadian oil we import and the total United States consumption of 113,000,000 barrels of residual and crude, Interior's preoccupation with Mexico's 30,000 barrels is difficult to understand.

Of course, neither Canada nor Mexico should use the overland exemption to flood our market. We favor a bilateral agreement with Mexico that would permit it to amortize the construction of a pipeline and establish a reasonable limitation on its imports.

Based upon our Canadian experience, a fair level of overland imports from Mexico would be about 40,000 barrels per day, allowing a reasonable increase over the present rate to cover a part of Mexico's growing production and to make construction of a pipeline economically attractive. This level could be modified by mutual agreement as conditions warrant.

A fair trade policy with Mexico is essential to satisfactory relations with that country, already hit by our restrictions on its exports of lead and zinc, the recent two-cent increase in our cotton subsidy and the impending limitation on tourist imports—all this despite a bilateral trade account already two to one in our favor. Our unilateral abrogation of the Brownsville commitment would be considered the last straw.

International relations aside, it is in the national interest to come to an agreement with Mexico to establish pipeline imports under fair limitations that can be maintained for a reasonable period of time in full recognition that we need Mexico's residual and asphaltic crude as long as our domestic refineries find it more profitable to turn out lighter products.

Recommendation

That you again attempt to obtain Interior's acquiescence to (a) continuance of the present Brownsville arrangement at the 30,000 barrel level until a pipeline is constructed, and (b) a written agreement with Mexico permitting pipeline operations at the 10,000 barrel level until the cost of the line can be amortized.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Concurrences: FSD

181. Memorandum from Melville E. Osborne to Coerr, May 6¹

May 6, 1961

TO

ARA—Mr. Coerr

THROUGH

CMA—Mr. Vallon

FROM

CMA—Melville B. Osborne

SUBJECT

Mexico and the Castro Problem

Mexico presently threatens to become a more serious problem to us than it has been since the late 1930's when General Lázaro Cárdenas was President of that country. The latent fear, jealousy and animosity towards the United States that is always a complicating factor in Mexico was largely offset in the 1940's by our joint efforts during World War II and by Mexico's phenomenal growth (supported by United States credits and investment) in the post war period. But by 1958 internal stresses in Mexico had become so acute that the country ceased to have goals which are universally accepted and great optimism in the future declined. A description of these stresses follows:

1. *Evident and growing disparities in wealth and income that undermine confidence in the validity of Mexican policies.* Industrialization did create an entrepreneurial class and raised the living standards of skilled, organized labor, but the high cost of the domestic industrial product and exuberant protectionism placed most industrial products further and further from the reach of those whose incomes were not much raised by the growing economy of the country, well over one-half of the population.

2. *The evident failure of Mexico's agrarian reform.* The Mexican Revolution of 1910 destroyed the landed aristocracy without creating a large class of small, independent and prosperous farmers, for the land was redistributed to communal entities subject to political and financial manipulation while those who tilled the soil still lacked title to their land. The plots allocated to the landless under this system were from the beginning too small to permit prosperity and the population explo-

¹ Mexico and the Castro problem. Confidential. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 59, TFLA Subject and Chron Files: Lot 61 D 298, Box 9.

sion in the country exacerbated the acute land problem beyond all bounds. Real incomes of poor farmers have undoubtedly declined under this agrarian system, while those few large farms that were left and converted into factory farms have become so enormously efficient and prosperous that statistically Mexico's overall agricultural productivity has increased at least as rapidly as that of its industry. Unfortunately, these efficient factory farms produce crops largely for export (cotton, cattle, fruits and vegetables, etc.) and the benefits of this efficiency are not passed on to the less prosperous of Mexico. In an effort to hold down the cost of living for Mexico's urban, industrial poor, the prices of Mexico's agricultural production for internal consumption have been rigidly controlled making it even more difficult for poor farmers to earn a decent living and discouraging efficient Mexican factory farms from producing for the domestic market. As a result, Mexico imports corn, its basic food crop, while it is plagued with surpluses of cotton and exportable vegetables. Under these conditions the rural poor grow poorer while the rural wealthy grow richer, and this despite Mexico's agrarian reform laws. The large number of Mexican farmers who work on prosperous United States farms each year as migratory laborers serves further to demonstrate the inadequacies of Mexico's agrarian policies.

3. *The corruption and insensitivity of Mexico's ruling classes.* Industrialization has been profitable not only to skilled labor and management but to politicians as well. Industrialists expect to pay 20 percent or more of their profits and a larger percentage of the value of the government contracts they receive to Mexican politicians. Government-owned corporations pay salaries of \$10,000 or more per year to favored Mexican officials on their boards of directors whose sole corporate duties are to meet briefly one or two times a year. Shakedowns of one sort or another are common among lesser officials. State and local officials and Federal civilian and military officials share handsomely in the profits of vice, the illicit narcotics traffic and smuggling, the latter becoming highly profitable under Mexico's blatant protectionism. Corruption has always been a problem in Mexico but industrial prosperity has made politicians more greedy than ever and the Mexican people have come to expect that members of the ruling party, which includes labor, farm and industrial leaders, will always sacrifice the public interest in favor of personal profit. Opposition groups including Communist organizations are considered to be honest if only because they do not have access to the public till.

4. *Weak and incompetent leadership.* The internal stresses of Mexico are reflected in the nomination system of the ruling party and nomination, which insures election, is granted either to those non-entities who have made few enemies or to extremists who might be converted

into loyal subordinates by access to the extra legal sources of wealth. Cárdenas was the last strong President of Mexico. López Mateos is undoubtedly one of the weakest, but since he appears to be firmly in control of the Mexican political apparatus, he is probably better able to stand up to Cárdenas than he is willing to believe. The real crisis in Mexico will arise in 1963 when the growing influence of Cárdenas and extreme leftists in Mexican politics might well dictate the nomination and therefore the 1964 election of a Communist oriented Mexican politician.

5. *The failure to progress significantly towards political democracy.* In a Mexican political situation torn by economic stress and dominated by corrupt officials, concessions to genuinely democratic processes are likely to encourage the politically frustrated to commit excesses and threaten the country's political stability which the great, though probably declining, majority of Mexicans highly value after the years of violent instability that prevailed in Mexico from its independence to the 1940's. Since the comfortable alliance between politicians, industrialists and racketeers would be jeopardized by democratic progress, the ruling classes cannot be expected to be enthusiastic democrats. American investors also benefit from this alliance and probably do not wish to see it threatened though it is now apparent that the ruling clique is quite prepared to throw foreign investors to the nationalist wolves to steer reform away from itself.

6. *The advent of Castro.* In its doctrinaire tradition Mexico was so hostile to the Batista dictatorship that it gave support to the Castro movement without thought of the possible consequences to itself. Castro trained his forces on Mexican territory and sailed from Mexico in his successful invasion attempt [1 line not declassified]. We know now Mexico's tolerance of Communists made it easy for the 26th of July movement to be Communist infiltrated before it left for Cuba. Rather than admit error, Mexican officials have been willing to go to absurd lengths to justify the Castro regime and even now are unwilling publicly to admit that he represents a threat to their own country. Cárdenas, the great mystic of Mexican political life, has obviously fallen under the complete domination of the Communists around him [less than 1 line not declassified]. While the Mexican Government was caught trying to justify Castro against its own interests, Cárdenas was able to step in with open support for Castro and even to threaten a Castro-type revolution for Mexico. Given the internal stresses of the country and the 25-year infiltration of the entire Mexican educational system by known Communists, the Cárdenas threat has become serious. [2 lines not declassified] It should be noted that President López Mateos is himself a product of and greatly influenced by the Marxist educated intelligentsia of Mexico and probably suffers serious inner conflicts whenever

he has to take a position on the vital political problems he faces. This would explain his evident reluctance to take any stand at all. Since last summer at least, he has let us know that he is worried about Communism in Mexico and the Castro situation generally and that he hopes we can find an effective means of eliminating Cuban Communism. At the same time he has indicated that his Government, for domestic political and historical reasons, must remain opposed to foreign intervention in Cuba, direct or indirect, multilateral or bilateral. [1½ lines not declassified]

Mexico and Efforts to Achieve a Unified Latin American Front Towards Castro.

In deciding whether to apply any pressure on Mexico to take a public stand against Castro, we must be certain that we will not lose more in Mexico than we gain in Cuba or the rest of the hemisphere. If the contemplated pressure pushes Mexico significantly further along the road of concessions to Marxists, either immediately or during the next presidential nominations, such pressure would be highly detrimental to United States interests. If the pressure can be accomplished in a manner that would discredit both Castro and the Mexican Communists, and at the same time stiffen the spine of the Mexican Government against the Communist threat, a real feat will have been achieved. This may require some patient negotiations with some exasperating Mexicans but it will be worth that price.

I believe that Mexico is now more in the balance than we realise and recognition of this should be a part of every decision taken on the Castro problem.

182. Memorandum from Edwin E. Vallon to Jamison, June 6¹

June 6, 1961

SUBJECT

Mexican Request for Minesweepers

The Mexican Naval Attaché has discussed with the Navy the acquisition of 10 minesweepers on an “as is where is” basis. Your office asked for our comments and we in turn asked for recommendations

¹ Mexican request for 10 minesweepers. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 712.5621/6–661.

from Ambassador Mann. He has replied that he perceives no objection to the possible sale.

The Mexicans state that they desire to use the ships for patrol duty. The acquisition of these ships may enhance Mexico's ability to seize American flag shrimp vessels fishing illegally but I do not consider the possible use of these minesweepers against American flag shrimp boats a sufficient basis for disapproving the Mexican request.

The vessels would probably also be used to enforce Mexican revenue laws and prevent smuggling. In addition, the ships might be useful in surveillance type activity contemplated in the Caribbean security arrangements. I am not hopeful at all that Mexico would enter into any bilateral arrangements with the United States toward that end, but Mexico might on its own increase its surveillance activities.

I would suggest, however, that your office explore with Defense and Navy whether these vessels are needed in connection with the proposed Caribbean security arrangements. If so, countries willing to participate in such arrangements should receive first consideration. It may also be that South American countries which have shown a greater disposition to cooperate with the United States in defense arrangements are in need of this type vessel.

If there are no higher priority requirements elsewhere, then I have no objection to the sale of ten minesweepers to Mexico.

183. Memorandum from Vallon to Braddock, July 26¹

July 26, 1961

SUBJECT

Mexican Request for Purchase of Naval Vessels

Problem Should the Department approve the sale to Mexico of twenty (20) minesweepers for use as patrol vessels.

Discussion The Department of the Navy has for disposal forty (40) World War II 150' steel hull minesweepers for about \$15,000 each. The Mexican Government is seeking to purchase 20 of these ships for patrol duty. As a party to the Rio Treaty, Mexico is eligible to purchase these

¹ Mexican request for purchase of navel vessels (20 minesweepers). Confidential.
2 pp. DOS, CF, 712.5621/7-2661.

ships. The United States and Mexico also maintain a Joint Defense Commission established during World War II which continues to exist but otherwise does not perform too useful a function. No other defense arrangements exist with Mexico.

Mexico has some 30 patrol craft, but Mexico is not now capable of performing surveillance activities along her coasts to prevent clandestine activities, e.g., by Cuba. It is unlikely that Mexico would enter into any bilateral agreement with the United States for patrol activity off the Mexican coast. If Mexico had the capability, however, it might undertake more effective surveillance in its own interest and could take care of its own harbor defense. (See attached *New York Times* article of January 22, 1961). Mexico could also use these vessels to prevent smuggling and other activities in violation of its revenue laws.

U/FW feels strongly that Mexico will use the vessels to enforce Mexico's claim to a nine-mile territorial sea. In the dispute between the United States and Mexico over the width of the territorial sea, Mexico has seized and fined a number of United States flag fishing boats. (See U/FW memorandum attached). Our Embassy points out, however, that the number of US fishing vessels arrested by Mexico is small in comparison with the total number fishing within the nine mile limit claimed by Mexico and that Mexico has the capability of considerably greater harassment if it wanted to exercise it. The Embassy suggests that Mexico would react to a turn down of its request by stepping up seizures of fishing vessels.

Mexico would strongly resent a negative response to its request to purchase these vessels and it would undoubtedly worsen our relations at a time when we are seeking by every means to improve them and wean Mexico away from its present policy which has the effect of supporting Cuba. The Embassy points out that a refusal would not help our friends in Mexico, e.g., the Mexican Navy, who favor the adoption by Mexico of policies which would support our objectives, but would be used by those who are not disposed to be cooperative or who are even anti-American or pro-communist to support their arguments that the only interest of the United States in a narrow territorial sea is a commercial one. Further, we have recently made naval vessels available to other countries, e.g., Peru, Ecuador and Chile, which have even more extreme claims to territorial sea and have also seized and fined United States flag tuna boats. These three countries, however, have not enforced their claims with the same vigor as Mexico.

Ambassador Mann has been consulted and recommends the sale of the vessels to Mexico. (See telegram attached).

Recommendation That you discuss the foregoing with Mr. Taylor and that you inform him that we feel we must approve the Mexican request for overriding political reasons.

Attachment:

Memorandum of June 20, 1961 from U/FW.

Clipping from *New York Times*.

184. Memorandum from Robert F. Woodward to U. Alexis Johnson, July 31¹

July 31, 1961

TO

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

THROUGH

S/S

FROM

ARA—Robert F. Woodward

SUBJECT

Politico-Economic Discussions With Mexico

Discussion

Mexico is following a basically neutralist course. Its actions and attitude on the Cuba problem within the OAS and UN have had the effect of supporting Cuba despite Mexico's commitments under the OAS Charter and Rio Treaty. The Mexican attitude is prejudicial to our own foreign policy objectives. Internally, Mexico is following policies which are discouraging to foreign investment. At the same time, Mexico has been receiving substantial financial assistance from the US, primarily through the Eximbank, but needs and is seeking more to maintain its high rate of economic development. It professes to want foreign investment and desires increased tourism to Mexico and more favorable treatment of its exports.

Ambassador Mann has requested (see telegram No. 136 attached) (Tab B) that he be authorized to discuss with the Mexicans their policies with respect to communism and private foreign investment, to explore with them their development plans, and to indicate that we

¹ Politico-economic discussions with Mexico. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/7-3161.

want to be as helpful as possible in assisting Mexico to find resources for its economic development.

Ambassador Mann suggests we be flexible, but proposes that a basis for a cooperative effort might include action by Mexico (1) to repudiate Communist intervention, (2) to participate in hemisphere defense, (3) to establish and maintain a clear and consistent policy on foreign investment, and (4) to consider a program of tax reform based on ability to pay. Cooperation with us at the Montevideo meeting and support of the Colombian initiative on the Cuban problem offer excellent opportunities for Mexico to demonstrate a new cooperative spirit within the OAS framework.

For our part he suggests we be willing to consider (1) financial assistance on as substantial a scale as possible, consistent with resources of US lending institutions and support of Mexican request to international lending institutions, (2) encouraging private investment provided Mexico develops and maintains a reasonable policy on such investments, (3) encouraging private investors to give due regard to Mexico's financial situation in making remittances, (4) acceptance of an "independent" foreign policy by Mexico so long as it is consistent with Mexico's OAS Charter and Rio Treaty commitments (this excludes neutralism), (5) consultation with Mexico on any actions by the United States Government which would hurt Mexico's economy, e.g., termination of "commuter" employment in border cities, reduction or elimination of bracero program, and (6) settlement of all outstanding claims.

He suggests that making cooperation a two-way street is more urgent for Mexico than the United States. If Mexico is not receptive, we would withdraw from the discussions in a friendly manner and put a "slow man" on Mexico's requests.

Ambassador Mann has included in his list of items we might be willing to consider:

(A) Possible exception for Mexico on reduction of duty free import privileges for American tourists and,

(B) Coffee stabilization fund for Central America which would help Central America market its coffee in an orderly manner and avoid upsetting the market for Mexico which produces the same type of coffee.

We cannot agree to (A) because an exception for Mexico would be inconsistent with our GATT commitments. On (B), we are now considering the possibility of a world coffee agreement and until we know how that works out we would not want to undertake a separate arrangement with Central America. Further, Brazil strongly opposes such a measure. Brazil finances its own coffee marketing and feels Central America and Mexico could arrange private financing if they tried.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached telegram (Tab A) authorizing Ambassador Mann to undertake the exploratory discussions he proposes, with the exception of items (A) and (B) above.

Concurrences

E—Mr. Kerr B/FAC—Mr. Bell

Attachments

Tab A—Telegram to Ambassador Mann.

Tab B—Telegram No. 136 from Mexico City.

185. Memorandum of conversation, October 19, between Foreign Minister Tello and Under Secretary Bowles¹

October 19, 1961

SUBJECT

International Developments

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Tello
Under Secretary Bowles
Ambassador Mann

The Under Secretary commenced the conversation by expressing his interest in Mexico's plans for the development of low-cost housing as explained by Luis Quintanilla and made some complimentary remarks about Mexico's economic growth and its efforts to better distribute the national product. He told the Foreign Minister that he expected to make a speech on the Alliance for Progress at the Bi-National Center and offered to send him an advance copy of it. The Foreign Minister expressed his thanks.

The Under Secretary then spoke in general terms concerning the Berlin question making two principal points: (a) The Russians had internal difficulties of their own; had substantially failed to accomplish their objectives in the less developed countries of Africa and Asia and faced problems with Red China which could possibly become more

¹ Berlin question; Troika (UN). Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/10-1961.

acute with time and (b) The apparent Soviet intention was to frighten the U.S. and its NATO allies by bellicose speeches and nuclear testing. The Under Secretary said that the U.S. people firmly supported President Kennedy's policy of firmness and said that the U.S. was always willing to negotiate for a settlement on a fair and equitable basis.

Minister Tello expressed interest in the Under Secretary's statements, referred to two letters which President Lopez Mateos had recently addressed to the Soviet Union on the subjects of Berlin and Troika. He said that in the case of Berlin, Mexican policy was based on the principles of self-determination and non-intervention and in respect to Troika, on the principle that the U.N. could not function effectively without a Secretary General who had the authority to appoint his own staff.

186. Telegram 1744 from Mexico City, December 17¹

Mexico City, December 17, 1961

I had a secret, frank and friendly hour long talk with President Lopez Mateos at his home this morning summary of which follows:

1. I commenced conversation by saying that I recognized Mexican policy must be based on Mexico's own estimate of its self-interest. On other hand, I was sure he would understand vote in OAS plus projected visit created problem for US which would be compounded if another negative vote cast at MFM. I wished principally to get his advice on visit, but was also at his service discuss substantive problem if he wished.

2. Lopez Mateos said Mexico could not abandon its "position". (He did not say "vote") I inquired whether he had personally had occasion recently read text article 6 Rio treaty. He replied in the affirmative. I then asked whether the interpretation of article 6 was the important thing or whether real basis Mexican position was its doctrine absolute non-intervention based on Mexican historical experience. He replied latter was the case and said his regime was transitory and could not assume responsibility for reversing historical Mexican position on non-intervention. (I interpret this to mean Mexican opposition to OAS

¹ Report on discussion with President Lopez Mateos. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, January 1961–May 1962.

multilateral action of any kind directed against any American state for any reason.)

3. Lopez Mateos emphasized this did not mean Mexican sympathy for Castro or Communist doctrine. He referred in this connection to various measures which Mexico had unilaterally taken against Castro including refusing to sell Mexican petroleum products, cooperation in preventing transshipment US goods to Cuba and an assertion new to me that Mexican policy was to prevent shipments of Mexican foodstuffs to Cuba.

4. I said foregoing left my President difficult choice since I was certain he wished friendship with Lopez Mateos, but on other hand had to consider US public opinion and interpretation which would be given abroad to visit which followed closely on the heels of Mexican negative vote in MFM. It seemed to me principal question was one of timing. President Kennedy has, as he knew, preferred visit later in year. Perhaps best solution would be delay "fixing time for visit" (I did not use word "postpone") until after MFM. He said this would be satisfactory, but wished make clear Mexico willing give President Kennedy warm reception now. I expressed appreciation, but pointed out difficulty any other solution since short time between conclusion of MFM and January 27 would be inadequate make security and other preparations but no mention was made of a new date.

5. I suggested it would be desirable consider possibility some kind official statement in view of press speculation about visit in January. He agreed and said he would instruct Tello talk with me about this and attempt work out something. Will telegraph when I have additional information this point.

6. I then said that as we understood absolute character Mexican doctrine non-intervention, I hoped he would understand importance US gives doctrine democracy also in OAS charter. We sincerely believe we are on side of angels when we support right of people all countries chose their own government and when we say there is parallelism between peace and democracy. As applied to Castro, our principle means that Cuban people have right to chose their own destiny, a right which currently is being denied to them. I said that in addition I hoped he would understand US attaches greater importance than Mexico to the security and even military implications of a Communist beach-head in hemisphere and our deep concern that Communism could spread to other American republics. He acknowledged understanding US views on security but said he thought it was difficult in practice to achieve real democracy. I acknowledged difficulty, but pointed to great progress which has been made in this direction in recent decades, something which is not possible under Communist control.

7. President then repeated Tello rationale that as practical matter it is preferable Castro be allowed fall of his own weight. I said I could

agree with this in abstract, but entrenched strength of Communist apparatus in Cuba made obsolete yardsticks usually applied measure stability of regimes which depended on support of at least significant segment of people. I expressed opinion it would be imprudent expect Cuban people alone to oust Castro and argued from this premise that conclusion logically followed multilateral steps should be taken which worked toward ultimate isolation of Castro regime and reduction its subversive capabilities. I used as example Mexican intelligence of undoubted reliability that Cuban Ambassador recently summoned Mexican students to Cuban Embassy and lectured them on failure agitate effectively so as to earn monies given them by Cuban Embassy. I expressed opinion Cuban Embassy and all Communist activity was directed not only against US, but against PRI party and Mexico itself and noted Marxist doctrine called for elimination of liberal as well as conservative opposition, both potential and existing. To this President replied with familiar Mexican argument that only effective way deal with Communist danger is improve standards of living of people under Alliance for Progress.

8. I then inquired whether he had taken into account effect of negative vote or votes on a further weakening of confidence which is essential to Mexican economic growth. He deplored this but implied that need to follow traditional foreign policy overriding.

9. At this point, he suggested Tello and I attempt between now and January 10 to reconcile US and Mexican points of view on MFM. I said I would gladly attempt to do so. Lopez Mateos stressed that much depended on precise issue on which Mexico would be required to cast its vote. Any instruction which Department wishes to give me in this regard would be appreciated.

(On basis Lopez Mateos statements alone there is little room for optimism even recognizing he left door slightly open by suggesting talks with Tello. On other hand, Lopez Mateos appeared understand vote by Mexico would accomplish no practical purpose since decision two-thirds majority binding on all. Also we should not disregard fact dissatisfaction with Mexican position on Cuban issue widespread except in far left. Finally, we also note Aleman, Rodriguez, Ortiz Mena, Diaz Ordaz and others are concerned and are allegedly working to find face-saving formula. Possibility of Mexican abstention should not therefore be entirely discounted.)

10. There was also inconclusive discussion of need of both UN and OAS demonstrate they are not only debating societies but capable dealing with problems our time. I suggested failure of OAS to function might ultimately have consequences which would not serve best interests of LA.

11. In light of foregoing my recommendations to questions posed in DEPTTEL 1697 are:

A. We should delay until after MFM any further discussion regarding specific date for meeting. We will then be in better position determine best timing from standpoint our interests. Suggest Department take particular care avoid implying January 27 date was agreed upon, even tentatively so as to help Mexico save face. In regard to face, it is not impossible that Mexicans will rationalize that since Lopez Mateos "stood up" to US on issue of visit Mexico has more freedom change negative vote to abstention.

B. We should await discussions with Tello on possible public announcement which should give us outline of rationale Moyt acceptable to Mexico. Department will understand rationale is much more important to Mexico than to US. Lopez Mateos acquiescence in postponement should not be interpreted as equivalent of no displeasure. On contrary, President is almost certain to have hoped US would bail him out again.

C. After MPM, it would probably be preferable continue discussions re visit through this Embassy. But suggest definitive decision on this point be reserved.

D. Best chance of inducing change in Mexico's attitude is maintenance firm but friendly attitude until such time as light begins to dawn on Mexico that cooperation has to be a two-way street, and that Mexico needs US more than we need Mexico. It is important that in weeks ahead each statement by a US official and each action on loan applications be carefully considered in light of probable effect on Mexican decisions. Former Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla and other Mexican friends have urged in talks with me that US avoid any statement or action which would lead Mexico believe we attach no importance their attitude on Cuba.

Mann

187. Memorandum of conversation, February 16, between Rusk and Ambassador Carrillo¹

February 16, 1962

SUBJECT

Geneva Disarmament Conference and Salinity of Colorado River Water

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
 Ambassador Antonio Carrillo Flores, of Mexico
 Mr. Sayre—CMA
 Mr. Baker—ACDA

COPIES TO:

S	INR/D	Dept of Interior—3
U	ARA—Mr. Woodward	ACDA
H	IBWC—Colonel Hewitt—2	
G	Amembassy MEXICO CITY	
S/S	Amconsulate MEXICALI	
S/P	CMA—2	

The Mexican Ambassador called on the Secretary at the former's request. He informed the Secretary that the Mexican Government agreed with the position of the United States (as outlined to the Mexican and Brazilian Ambassadors by the Secretary on February 12), on the Soviet proposal to have the heads of government open the March 18 Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The Ambassador asked for clarification of the US-UK proposal that the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK and USSR meet at Geneva prior to convening the conference and that the conference be attended by Foreign Ministers. The Secretary explained that it had been originally agreed that the conference be attended by the Permanent Representatives. The United States and the United Kingdom proposed that it be attended by Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Union responded by suggesting that the heads of government open the meeting. The United States hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to our proposal that it be a Foreign Ministers meeting and that as many Foreign Ministers as possible, in addition to those of the US, UK and USSR, would attend. The Mexican Ambassador said that Mexico desired to be represented at the conference by its Permanent Representative PADILLA Nervo and that the Mexican Foreign Minister did not plan to attend.

¹ Geneva Disarmament Conference and salinity of Colorado River water. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 397.5611-GE/2-1662.

The Mexican Ambassador then discussed with the Secretary Mexico's serious preoccupation with the quality of Colorado River waters being delivered to Mexico under the terms of the 1944 Water Treaty. He said that the Mexican Government viewed the situation with grave concern. He recalled that the Mexican Foreign Minister had discussed the problem with the Secretary at Punta del Este. He showed the Secretary the February 13 issue of *Excelsior* which he described as a conservative, pro-American newspaper. The newspaper headline and lead story were to the effect that the Mexicali Valley faced a catastrophe because of the salt water problem. He said that he realized it was a complex problem and that the International Boundary and Water Commission is urgently considering it. He wanted to suggest that the immediate problem be separated from the long range solution and that action be taken within the next week or two to provide good quality water for the February irrigation of the wheat crop in the Mexicali Valley. He asked whether the United States could agree during the next two or three months to deliver water to Mexico from storage through the All American Canal. The drainage water in the Colorado River would be permitted to waste to the Gulf except to the extent that it might be diverted by Mexico and mixed with the high quality water. Mexico would reserve its position on whether the water wasted would be counted as part of the Treaty allotment.

Mr. Sayre explained that the Treaty allots Mexico 1,500,000 acre feet of water. He noted that delivery to Mexico of any quantity above that amount would create a serious internal domestic political situation because of the strong feelings of the 14 Colorado Basin State Senators and others on the division of Colorado River water. He said that the source of the drainage apparently responsible for the high salt content of the water is the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district in Arizona. The water Mexico is receiving from the River has a salt content of some 2,500 parts per million of salt, whereas deliveries to Mexico before this year had a salt content of about 1,500 p.p.m. He noted that US irrigation experts had advised us that the water now being delivered is usable for irrigation of wheat.

The Mexican Ambassador discussed briefly the salt water situation on the Rio Grande River which the United States complained about to Mexico in 1960 but on which no action has been taken. He said that the United States had asked on December 2, 1961, that the water behind Anzalduas Dam be wasted because of its high salt content and that Mexico had agreed within 24 hours. He hoped that the US could agree as promptly to the Mexican request. (The Mexican Ambassador had made this same point to Mr. Sayre before his conversation with the Secretary, at which time Mr. Sayre noted that the lower Rio Grande farmers had wanted to irrigate seedling vegetable plants which

required water of a low salt content. If wheat had been involved the water would have been used. The US counted the released water as part of its Treaty allotment. The quantity of water was negligible in contrast to the thousands of acre-feet involved on the Colorado River.)

Mr. Sayre noted that the quality of Colorado River waters was discussed during the negotiation of the 1944 Water Treaty and that it was realized at the time that the salt content of the water would increase. He said that in return for a higher quantity of water than that to which the United States considered Mexico entitled, Mexico had accepted provisions in the Treaty which required Mexico to take and count drainage water as part of its allotment. The Mexican Ambassador interposed that this was the point on which Mexico had reserved its legal position because it disagreed with the United States. He said that the only record of which he was aware that this had been discussed was in the hearings before the United States Senate.

The Secretary inquired what might be done to meet the Mexican request. Mr. Sayre said that we had received a similar proposal from the Mexican Commissioner but that we had understood the Mexican Commissioner, in effect, to suggest it as a long term solution. We had already prepared a reply to the Mexican Commissioner. He said the Mexican Ambassador's proposal was for emergency action and that he would take it up immediately with the Department of the Interior. The Secretary said that he would call the Secretary of the Interior and promised the Mexican Ambassador a prompt reply.

Note: The Ambassador's proposal was discussed with the Department of the Interior and an instruction was sent on February 15 to the United States Commissioner that he could accept the proposal if Mexico (1) understood the United States would count all waters delivered whether in the River or through the Canal as part of its allotment under the Treaty, (2) understood that the United States could not guarantee deliveries through the Canal at a level higher than provided in the Treaty because the capacity of the Canal is only sufficient to handle the requirements of US users plus the amount specified in the Treaty for Mexico and (3) paid the cost of delivery through the Canal in accordance with the formula worked out in 1950 when emergency deliveries were made through the Canal.

188. Memorandum from McGhee to Woodward, March 7¹

March 7, 1962

TO

ARA—Mr. Woodward

THROUGH

S/S

FROM

M—George C. McGhee

The attached memorandum, "The Salt Water Problem of the Mexicali and San Luis Valleys," describes a problem which has arisen in connection with our border treaty with Mexico of February 1944. I would appreciate it if you would advise me whether or not the problem of undue salinity of the water delivered has been called to the attention of the Department and has been considered by the United States Government. If not, would you take appropriate steps to consider whether or not this issue should be raised with the appropriate U.S. authorities.

Attachment**Memorandum***"The Salt Water Problem of the Mexicali and San Luis Valleys"*

Under the Water Treaty between Mexico and the U.S. of February 1944, Mexico is guaranteed annually 1½ million acre-feet of Colorado River water—from all sources. In the past, the dissolved salt content of the water delivered to Mexico has averaged about 750 ppm (parts per million), and Mexicali and San Luis Valley farmers have built up their farming practices and procedures based on water of this quality.

The Water Treaty does not provide for a guarantee of water quality, but "custom and usage," plus that of treaty administration in the "spirit of good will and friendly cooperation," morally demand that water of usable quality be delivered, if it is available, and this has been done until fairly recently.

Recently, however, a sudden and abrupt change was made in the quality of the water delivered to Mexico, this change having been

¹ Transmits memorandum entitled "The Salt Water Problem of the Mexicali and San Luis Valleys." No classification marking. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12322/3-762.

brought about by the pumping of drainage water or “waste” from the Wellton-Mohawk Area of Arizona into the Gila River. This drainage water, with 6,400 ppm or more of dissolved salts, flows down the Gila to the Colorado, commingles with Colorado River water and then flows on to Mexico. Please note the attached map showing location of the Wellton-Mohawk Area and its nearness to the Colorado River and to Mexico.

As a result of the above, Mexico is now receiving extremely poor quality water (with 3,500 ppm or more of dissolved salts)—water that is unsuitable for use on the “tight” soils of the Mexicali and San Luis Valleys.

In a 1953 report issued by the Arizona Underground Water Commission, an extract of same being attached, Nicholas A. Rose of Houston, William Guyton of Austin and R. J. Tipton of Denver, nationally known, reputable ground-water geologists *forecast the cause and the source of the difficulty* resulting in the delivery of poor quality water to Mexico and, at the same time, they also *forecast the solution to the difficulty*.

The first forecast made by Messrs. Rose, Guyton and Tipton has now been proven to be fully correct (the necessity of drainage pumping in the Wellton-Mohawk Area), and it is reasonable to assume that their second forecast is both sound and logical—that drainage water pumped from drainage wells will improve, because of dilution with good quality Colorado River water used in the Wellton-Mohawk Area, until it becomes entirely suitable for irrigation purposes. When this second forecast comes about, as it undoubtedly will, the Mexicali-San Luis difficulty will come to an end.

In the meantime, however, some 400,000 acres or more of Mexicali-San Luis farmland is being injured and a very large number of owners unnecessarily penalized for the benefit of a limited number of owners of some 75,000 acres in the Wellton-Mohawk Area.

The Bureau of Reclamation of the U.S. Department of Interior, the agency responsible for the Wellton-Mohawk drainage pumping, may be within its legal rights in pumping drainage waste into the bed of the Gila River even if it knows that such “waste” will end up on Mexican farmland; however, it is morally wrong and it is not being a *good neighbor* by throwing its waste over its fence onto its neighbor’s property.

The Bureau of Reclamation had ample notice and warning of the forthcoming necessity of drainage pumping in the Wellton-Mohawk Area, and had it commenced the solution to this particular reclamation project some years ago, it could have been easily worked out to the best interests of all concerned. A reclamation problem is not solved by merely moving it from one location to another.

If there is an urge and desire to do so, this problem and difficulty can still be solved without serious damage or injury to either party.

J.M.J.

189. DOS Policy Directive PD/ARA-3.1, March 15¹

March 15, 1962

SUBJECT

Mexico—Mexico's Protest on Salinity of Colorado River Water

References: None.

Objective:

To develop through the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) complementary programs for the United States and Mexico, so that the most beneficial use will be made of the water delivered to Mexico under the Treaty of 1944, and as little of the water lost as possible.

Plan of Action:

1. The Commission should complete its review of every feasible means of solution and recommend the measures the two Governments should take to remove the problem. This is being done.

2. The Departments of State and Interior should consult with appropriate Congressional leaders, and should decide soonest whether it is better tactically and legally to present an appropriations request for the US portion of the program in the budget of the Department of the Interior or the IBWC. The program should then be presented to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress as soon as possible for the necessary appropriations.

3. Any construction required of the United States should be commenced at once, and Mexico should be urged to execute its complementary program at a similar rate.

¹ Mexico's protest on salinity of Colorado River water. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Department and Agencies Series, DOS Policy Directives.

4. If Mexico seems to proceed in good faith with its own program, the United States should make every practical effort to minimize losses to Mexico pending completion of the complementary programs.

Action by:

US Section, International Boundary and Water Commission
B1, with assistance and guidance from Interior and Department
Departments of Interior and State
B2 and B3, with assistance of US Section, IBWC
US Section, IBWC, Departments of State and Interior
B4

Addressees:

Department Distribution:

ARA US-IBW
H AID
O
L

Embassies:

Mexico City

Consulates:

Mexicali
Tijuana

Other Agencies:

White House
Bureau of the Budget
Interior
HEW
USIA

Authority:

ARA—Assistant Secretary Woodward

Concurrences:

Interior: Mr. Langley (in substance)
IBWC: Colonel Hewitt

190. Despatch 1347 from Mexico City, April 27, transmitting April 26 memorandum of conversation between Foreign Minister Tello and Ambassador Mann¹

Mexico City, April 27, 1962

SUBJECT:

Mexican Proposals re Chamizal and Ojinaga Dispute

On April 26, 1962, Ambassador Mann was called to the Foreign Office regarding the Chamizal and Ojinaga questions. These two areas are tracts in dispute on the U.S.-Mexican frontier.

Attached as Enclosure No. 1 is a memorandum of conversation. The map and memorandum referred to are being forwarded to the Department under separate cover.

For the Ambassador:

Eugene V. McAuliffe
First Secretary of Embassy

Department: Please pouch IBWC/Mr. Friedkin, El Paso.

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECTS

Chamizal and Ojinaga

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Manuel Tello
Ambassador Thomas C. Mann
Mr. Frank V. Ortiz, Second Secretary of Embassy

During the course of Ambassador Mann's call on the Foreign Minister on April 26, the Minister referred to the suggestion which he had made previously in proposing an agenda, that the visit of President Kennedy to Mexico be used as an opportunity to resolve the long-standing Chamizal dispute (a disputed tract on the U.S.-Mexican boundary at El Paso, Texas). The Minister said that purely as a provisional, personal and non-official suggestion he was giving the Ambassador a map and a memorandum which he thought could serve as a

¹ Mexican proposals re Chamizal and Ojinaga dispute. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.1232/4-2762.

basis for resolving this problem. After studying the map, Ambassador Mann told the Minister that although engineering requirements might dictate some modifications of the Minister's proposal he now believed that there was a basis for exploration with the appropriate U.S. officials. The Ambassador said that at the earliest opportunity he would discuss the Foreign Minister's proposal with the appropriate U.S. officials. Ambassador Mann made it clear to the Minister that in his view it was necessary for both governments to decide precisely on the details of the settlement of the Chamizal dispute before any public announcement could be made.

The Minister then turned to the Ojinaga problem which also relates to a disputed area on the U.S.-Mexican border. The Minister hoped it would be possible for the Presidents to agree to a settlement of this question. He acknowledged that the Ojinaga dispute had been sent to the International Boundary and Water Commission for resolution twice previously and that the Commissioners were unable to reach agreement. He, therefore, thought it might be possible for the two Governments to give the IBWC guidance toward a solution. The Minister asked the Ambassador for an unofficial and provisional map showing a line in the Ojinaga area upon which the United States would be willing to negotiate. The Ambassador told the Minister he would attempt to do so but would have to rely on the experts for this. The Minister agreed with the Ambassador that if the Ojinaga dispute was settled, the Boundary Commissioners would be instructed to determine an equitable settlement of other areas along the Rio Grande that are in dispute.

**191. Memorandum from Ambassador Mann to Edwin M. Martin,
May 19¹**

May 19, 1962

SUBJECT

Salinity of Colorado River Water

I. *Problem* The Wellton Mohawk irrigation district in Arizona, which was rehabilitated in 1952, installed a drainage system which began discharging to the Gila River and thence the Colorado River in September 1961 underground water which contains an amount of salts four times greater than the amount taken into the district in Colorado River water. Its present drainage system consists of some 70 pumps which draw water from a depth of about 100 feet and discharge the water into a lined conveyance channel on the project. Water brought into the project from the Colorado River is used to replace the water pumped out. As a result of this operation, the salinity of the water delivered to Mexico jumped from less than 1,000 p.p.m. in the winter of 1960 to around 2,500–2,800 p.p.m. in the winter of 1961. The Mexican Government has protested vigorously and threatens to take the matter to the International Court of Justice. In substance, the Mexican Government is insisting that the the United States must maintain a “salt balance” in the Wellton-Mohawk district.

II. *Present Status of Problem* A joint group of US and Mexican scientists was appointed, at the request of the Presidents of the US and Mexico, to study the problem and recommend a solution within 45 days. We expected a final joint report on May 15, but it has not been received because the Mexican Government doubts that the solution proposed by the US scientists would give adequate relief during an interim period of some 10 to 15 years before Wellton-Mohawk achieves “salt balance”. Mexico agrees that over the long run the proposal of the US scientists would solve the problem.

The US scientists are proposing major modifications in the drainage system of the Wellton-Mohawk district. The major features of this proposal are: (a) installation of more pumps which will permit more pumping in summer to compensate for reduced or no pumping in winter and the tapping of areas where better quality water is present in the 90,000 acre district, (b) a by-pass lined drainage canal to permit dumping below Mexico’s diversion point drainage water with a salinity index of more than 4,000 p.p.m. and (c) a new drainage canal which

¹ Salinity of Colorado River water. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12323/5–1962.

would be used to deliver to the river water with a salinity of less than 4,000 p.p.m. (The scientists chose a breaking point of 4,000 p.p.m. because this was the lowest that they calculated they could go and still obtain the quantity of water needed as return flow.)

The US scientists considered over a dozen proposals and settled on this one because it comes closest to satisfying the desires of both Mexico and the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district. It would cost in the neighborhood of \$20 million. Because Wellton-Mohawk has a closed underground basin, the US scientists suggested that the basin be used for river regulation. During the winter months Mexico is required to take only 900 second feet of water but actually receives an average of 1340 second feet. If some system were available to store the difference of 440 second feet and deliver it in the summer months, the US would get full credit. The scientists propose to store it in the underground basin at Wellton-Mohawk after the basin is cleaned out. This would save an estimated 75,000 acre feet of water annually which the Chairman of the US scientific group estimates to be worth \$7,500,000. (It might be noted that the US gets no credit for Wellton-Mohawk drainage water now because it is all in excess of Mexico's order in the winter and it could therefore be wasted in winter without any loss to the US.)

The only other alternative which the US scientists considered as a serious possibility was a complete system of tile drains. This would provide drainage water with a salinity index of 3,000 ppm. In the interim period of 10 to 15 years this would be a preferable solution for Mexico. However, in the long run, the highly saline waters under Wellton-Mohawk would percolate up and pass out through the drains raising the salinity of the water possibly to a point where it would be unusable in the winter. The cost of tile drains was estimated at \$45 million. Such a system was absolutely unacceptable to Wellton-Mohawk because it would have denied the district an underground reservoir. Further, the topography and other conditions in the Wellton-Mohawk indicate that a tile system would not be particularly satisfactory.

Based on discussions with the Bureau of Reclamation and Senator Hayden, I gather that the Bureau intends to look for some other solution which would give the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district a full reservoir. Senator Hayden indicated, however, that if the Bureau would indorse the proposal of the US scientists he would accept it. The Bureau of Reclamation is seeking funds on a supplemental basis to study the feasibility of the proposal of the US scientists and also other possibilities. Based on my discussions, it appears that Reclamation believes that a solution involving more pumping in summer and less in winter would work. It is considering asking for \$2.5 million to install an additional 25 wells in Wellton-Mohawk. Presumably these pumps

would be in operation in the summer of 1963 and permit the district to discharge about 50% more water. It would then pump 50% less in the winter of 1963–64. The US scientists considered this scheme and rejected it as unacceptable to Mexico. It would not do anything to help achieve salt balance in the next 10 to 15 years. The Director of the US Salinity Laboratory considers this the issue. Although he considers that Mexico will have to improve its drainage system, he does not believe this is of practical importance in solving the present problem. Considering all circumstances, he does not consider that it would be feasible to install a drainage system in the Mexicali Valley which could handle water with a salinity index of 2,500–2,800 p.p.m. especially because the water has such a high sodium content. The Imperial Valley of California, with comparable soils, receives water with 900 p.p.m. and is having difficulties.

III. *Issue.* The issue is whether the President should (i) require the Bureau of Reclamation to modify the drainage practices of the Wellton-Mohawk district along the lines suggested by the US scientists or (ii) let the International Court of Justice decide the matter. (Because acceptance of the alternative that the Bureau of Reclamation seems to have in mind of pumping more in summer and less in winter would lead to ICJ action by Mexico, it is not considered a possible choice for the President.)

A. Consequences of alternative (i)

1. *Domestically*

a. The Colorado Basin states, except Arizona, have indicated acquiescence in the proposal of the US scientists. They would, however, prefer to do nothing.

b. Arizona has not agreed because it considers the proposal does not give Wellton-Mohawk all it wants. The real resistance is from Wellton-Mohawk. Senator Hayden has indicated he would accept the proposal if recommended to him by the Bureau of Reclamation. (If Wellton-Mohawk is required to pay the cost of the proposal, then it is possible that all of the Basin States would oppose.)

2. *With Mexico*

Mexico accepts the proposal as providing a solution over the long run. Mexico questions the increase in salinity it would have to accept in the interim. The US scientists consider that the water in the interim will have a salinity around 1,500 p.p.m. and that Mexico should be able to use this water without difficulty if it puts in the drainage system it is planning. It is doubted Mexico would take the matter to the ICJ, but if it did we would be in a good posture.

B. Consequences of alternative (ii)

1. *Domestically*

The Basin States want to do nothing and they also want to avoid a court case. Arizona would seek through the Congress to prevent the President from allowing the US to accept ICJ jurisdiction. Because the issue involved concerns the interpretation of a Treaty and the obligations of the US under international law, the Legal Adviser of the Department considers that the ICJ would have jurisdiction and that the Connelly Amendment would not apply. The Basin States seem to feel that the US would win, but they could lose much more from an adverse ICJ decision (as explained below) than from a decision by the President.

2. *Internationally*

a. Unless the President can give the Mexican President some assurance on how we plan to proceed in carrying out the recommendations of the US scientists, it will probably have an adverse effect on the President's visit. The Mexicans will probably consider the key to our attitude whether we act promptly to build a bypass channel to keep the highly saline waters out of the river.

b. Relations between the US and Mexico would become severely strained and we could expect only limited cooperation from Mexico. Mexico could be expected to assert that our action made a mockery of the Alliance for Progress and Mexico's attitude would hurt the program.

c. We know that Mexico will take the case to the ICJ. It might take several years to get a decision. It is likely that the US would be required to modify its irrigation practices to take into account the interests of Mexico. This decision might take the form of requiring the US to maintain a "salt balance" at Wellton-Mohawk. The ICJ might alternatively say that the US is required to treat equally all riparian users lower than Wellton-Mohawk. At present Mexico receives all return flows. The US might be required to divide them equitably. While the case is pending, Mexico might have to forego all production in the winter to avoid ruining its soils permanently. Winter production in the Mexicali Valley is valued at \$30 million and this would be part of the damages.

d. Mexico would probably take the issue to the OAS. Mexico would probably get the support of all the Latin American countries because existing resolutions of the OAS support Mexico on the issue.

e. Mexico would also take the matter to the UN where documents and resolutions of the International Law Commission support Mexico's position. The US could expect little support for its position that it can deliver any water it wants to Mexico.

f. Mexico would probably cease to restrain the popular outcry against the US in Mexico.

g. Mexico would get strong support from the Soviet Bloc in international bodies and in Bloc propaganda output.

This memorandum has not discussed the alternative that the US might win in the ICJ, because I do not consider this a serious possibility. The Wellton-Mohawk district, the seven Basin States, and the Department of the Interior, base their position on the interpretation of the Treaty in the hearings before the US Senate. In that hearing the witnesses for the Treaty said that the US could deliver return flows to Mexico regardless of salt content which were the result of normal agricultural development in the US. These witnesses expected gradually increased salinity over the years as the Colorado Basin developed. One Reclamation witness testified that this might reach 2,700 ppm at ultimate development. Mr. Tipton, one of the principal negotiators of the Treaty for the US, indicated that he did not consider it possible that the salinity of the water would ever get so high that it could not be beneficially used by Mexico. If it did, however, he thought Mexico would have to accept it as part of the Treaty water. I am inclined to believe that the interpretation of the witnesses was correct. At least we would have a strong case in court. But I think it is a distinct possibility that the court would hold that the US had to distribute equitably among all users the return flows and could not deliver all of them to Mexico.

Whatever the interpretation, I think it has little to do with the case before us. The facts are that the United States suddenly, and without notice to Mexico, began emptying an underground lake of saline water in the Wellton-Mohawk district and dumping this salty water into the river for delivery to Mexico. Wellton-Mohawk contends that when Mexico agreed to accept waters from the Colorado River "from any and all sources" it agreed to accept the underground salt water from Wellton-Mohawk. The hearings before the Mexican Senate clearly show that Mexico did not understand the Treaty that way and indicate that there was no meeting of the minds on this point. Sound irrigation and drainage practice requires the maintenance of a salt balance and irrigation in the Colorado River basin is based on this concept. No irrigation district in the US has a guarantee as to quality but is expected to accept water which is the result of salt balance. The master's report in the case of *Arizona v. California* would go a long way toward making this law by providing that no irrigation district could get credit for return flows that cannot be beneficially used by the lower riparian. Mexico is asking that the US show the same solicitude for Mexico that it shows for US irrigation districts. No one has brought to my attention a single US or international law case that would support the contention of the Wellton-Mohawk district. On the contrary, all US law and such international law as there is on the subject would forbid the drainage practices of the Wellton-Mohawk district. The general rules of US law

and international law require that persons act reasonably when their acts would affect others. No court could hold that Wellton-Mohawk may dump salt into the river with impunity because if it did it would set a precedent on water rights of riparians that would sanction anarchy and be ruinous to irrigated agriculture.

**192. Memorandum from Roger Hilsman to Edwin M. Martin,
June 13¹**

June 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Mexico and the Alliance for Progress

The following study on Mexico has been prepared in connection with the meeting of the Latin American Policy Committee to be held June 14.

Background

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 broke down old barriers of caste and race and gave the government an important role as provider of basic economic and social services. The government has also long functioned as arbiter between labor and capital, giving benefits to each group as needed to assure political stability. Important commercial and industrial groups, commercial farmers in the northern states, and much of urban labor, especially privileged union groups such as the petroleum workers, have been fundamentally satisfied with moderate course pursued by the government in recent decades. Becoming increasingly restive are those groups which have not benefited economically from the revolution. These include particularly the communal farmers and peasants of the central plateau area where the pressure of burgeoning population on small, uneconomic plots of land is reducing levels of living, breeding unrest, and leading to troublesome urbanization of unskilled labor.

Political situation

Mexico is ruled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which maintains virtually absolute control over the political life of the

¹ Mexico and the Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 712.00/6-1362.

country. Nearly 40 years in office, the PRI governs in the name of the continuing Mexican Revolution and is the only channel through which political advancement can be obtained. The party embraces heterogeneous groups of political elements ranging from the extreme left to the conservative right and has had remarkable success in accommodating and reconciling the divergent interests and ambitions of its members. President López Mateos, in keeping with his own views, has followed a left-of-center course on occasion radical enough to satisfy even the extreme left, but has stopped short of actions which would alienate the more conservative elements within the PRI.

The political climate became openly unsettled during 1961 when left-wing extremists, including some elements within the government party, PRI, made a bold effort to increase their influence, claiming that Castro-like policies were necessary to halt what they depicted as a drift from the original aims of the Mexican Revolution. A large role was played by left-leaning former President Cárdenas, who still commands the affection and loyalty of numbers of Mexicans, especially among the peasants and small communal farmers (*ejidatarios*). Despite his leftist leanings, however, Cárdenas has remained within the PRI.

The intensification of leftwing activities shook the business community and other moderate elements, which responded with a vigorous anti-Communist campaign. Partly as a result of this campaign and of the gradual decline of Castro's appeal throughout the hemisphere, middle-of-the-road Mexicans seemingly have regained the political initiative. Jockeying preliminary to presidential elections in July 1964 has already begun.

Communism

Mexico has long been a major center for the international Communist movement in Latin America. Mexican sympathies for the social revolutionary aspects of the Cuban revolution, historic opposition to intervention, and suspicion of the US fostered by historic relations, have provided an atmosphere from which the communist movement has profited recently. Estimated membership in a miniscule Trotskyite party (POCM), the 3,000-member orthodox Mexican Communist Party (PCM), and a much larger Marxist party (PPS) totals somewhat under 50,000. The PCM exercises strong influence in the Movement of National Liberation (MLN), a rabidly anti-US, pro-Cuban mass organization established in 1961 under the leadership of leftist ex-President Cárdenas. The Mexican Government continues to tolerate extreme leftists in the Foreign Ministry and other departments and in the educational system. Communists are also prominent in some peasant groups and a few labor unions. The large student federation at the National University, and its affiliated schools is not Communist-directed, but is

given to irresponsibility and has on occasion been effectively manipulated by its strong Communist minority.

Economic situation

Economic solutions are not readily available for the problem of the increasingly discontented rural and slum-dwelling masses. It is now obvious that neglect of Mexico's human resources is posing both economic and political threats to the industrial and commercial elite. The population is increasing by about 1 million persons or 3.1% annually, bringing roughly 350,000 people into the labor force each year. The cheapness of labor and its low productivity constitute increasing major deterrents to improving levels of living. Nevertheless, Mexico is not without assets in coping with the problems of an unfinished revolution and the stresses of economic development.

Mexican economic development has been considerable since 1940 when industrialization began in earnest. Since then, the physical output of goods has more than doubled with average real growth in excess of 6% a year through 1956. From 1957 to 1960 the annual growth rate slowed down to an average of 5% dropping to 3.5% in 1961 and adding only a little to per capita income in the face of a population increase estimated at 3.1% per annum. Nevertheless, per capita income has risen considerably for the period as a whole and now is equivalent to US\$320. Furthermore, Mexican output has acquired a composition characteristic of a reasonably advanced economy. Industry (manufacturing, construction, petroleum and electric power) accounts for over 35% of GNP, considerably more than agriculture with 20%. And even in agriculture a large part of the output is from commercial rather than subsistence farming. Mexican exports are more diversified than those of any other Latin American country, and only 20% of imports are consumer goods.

The public sector of the economy—when measured in terms of its direct contribution to the GNP—seems to occupy a minor role. To be sure, the government owns the petroleum industry, the electric power industry and the railroads; some major steel plants, fertilizer plants, railroad equipment plants and various lesser industrial establishments; a number of commercial and industrial banks; organizations engaged in the distribution of foodstuffs and newsprint; and a variety of other institutions. Still, the activities of these enterprises plus those of the governmental institutions proper account for little more than one-tenth of GNP. The total tax burden in Mexico is among the lowest in the world—around 11% of GNP. Limited revenues, which from 1957–1960 failed to grow as fast as real GNP, have meant substantial federal deficits in recent years as the government has rapidly increased capital expenditures and spending for social services while paying out subsidies to state enterprises, particularly the railways, petroleum and elec-

tric power entities. Aware of its need to improve its financial position the administration has introduced a limited income tax reform, which will increase revenue from that source to some extent and has lately indicated that it may move to reduce subsidization and limit access to central banking financing of deficits.

The government's role in capital formation is far larger than its contribution to GNP, currently accounting for around 40% of total investment. This proportion is rather low by Latin American standards although it has been increasing since 1957 as a result of expanded government outlays in the face of a slight decline in private investment as a percentage of real GNP. Since 1956 approximately 80% of government investment has gone into irrigation, electric power, petroleum and transportation with most of the balance going to social investment in public health, housing, education and research.

During the period 1962-64 most government investment is scheduled to increase in absolute terms with irrigation and social investment intended to increase most sharply over 1961 levels. In the absence of new taxes or reduction of subsidies, ambitious increases in government spending will require extremely large-scale internal or external financing.

The private sector of the Mexican economy has been one of the most dynamic in Latin America. It has successfully installed a full range of consumers' goods industries and many producers' goods plants, developed commercial agriculture for the local and export markets, and improved marketing and distribution systems.

The slowdowns in the rate of private capital formation and in the overall rate of growth in the period since 1957 are of obvious concern. There is no precise explanation of the trend but many factors have been mentioned and they have doubtless had a cumulative, negative effect. Among them are the sluggishness of the US economy, which has a depressing economic and psychological effect on Mexican business; the lower world prices obtaining for exports of coffee, cotton, and Mexican minerals; a lessening of easy opportunities for small investments yielding high returns; limitations placed on the internal market by inequitable distribution of income; and the limited availability of credit for the private sector in recent years. In addition, private loss of confidence stems from the fears of domestic capital regarding government intervention in business, apprehensions of foreign capital concerning the Mexicanization of enterprises, fears of radical social reforms and fears of Castro-communism. Such fears brought on a serious capital flight in 1961.

Economic prospects

Improvement in economic conditions in the United States would provide a much-needed shoring up of the confidence of the ruling

bourgeoisie and induce them to renew their previously vigorous entrepreneurial operations. Mexico, more than any other Latin American country, is locked into the US economy on which it depends in myriad ways—as its chief market, source of tourist receipts, outlet for surplus labor, supplier of foreign investment and technology and, to an important extent, a moulder of businessmen's attitudes. The direction of Mexico's GNP curve since 1940 has closely paralleled that of the United States and there is a strong likelihood that if the US economy pulls ahead Mexico will again achieve satisfactory growth rates.

In terms of its own resources and efforts, there are a number of steps that Mexico can take to encourage development. A step-up in gross domestic investment might be accomplished by reducing the threat of government competition with private enterprise. At the same time a fiscal policy that helps to redistribute income somewhat and increase demand for local manufactures and services could stimulate business. Correction of the urban-rural imbalance cannot be quickly realized but gradual improvement could be achieved with additional rural credit to small as well as large farmers and by transplanting of excess population from the central plateau to newly developing regions in the south-central area. Vocational education for the more restless, urbanizing elements of the rural population would also facilitate transfer into urban occupations.

Alliance for Progress prospects

Mexico is likely to be only a limited partner in the Alliance for Progress. The country's strong nationalism is expected to limit its willingness to advertise cooperation with the United States' Alliance programs. A government investment plan has been submitted to the OAS and the IBRD and a program of frontier development designed to renovate border towns along the Rio Grande has been announced. Officials and financial experts continue to resist planning for development on a national basis, preferring to draft plans by sector, such as railroads, power, irrigation or a specific industrial development. It seems probable that Mexico will continue to rely on IBRD and Ex-Im bank loans for external financing of major economic overhead projects.

Mexico's interest in foreign aid for social overhead projects will be shaped by domestic political decisions. Depending on the exigencies of the moment, Mexico may seek loans for rural credit, colonization and possibly housing. The country's nationalistic views regarding education will probably limit its interest in foreign assistance in this field.

If the commercial and industrial interests that have guided policy for nearly two decades continue to dominate the political situation, it seems probable that they will not encourage projects that build up government economic operations. They view government as a useful

partner for private capital and as a buffer against large-scale popular demands. They do not wish to see a build up of new privileged sectors of the population although they would probably permit limited assistance to the masses if it reduced politically dangerous unrest.

193. Memorandum of conversation, June 29, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Minister Tello¹

June 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Flow of Private Capital

PARTICIPANTS

President Kennedy
President Lopez Mateos
Minister Tello
Ambassador Mann
Ambassador Carrillo Flores

President Kennedy opened the conversation by expressing his gratification and thanks for the warm reception he had received and inquired about the youth organization which he had seen on the route from the airport. President Lopez Mateos said this was an organization under the direction of the Ministry of Education and had three purposes: Physical education, civic education and cultural education.

President Lopez Mateos suggested that Ambassador Moscoso and Mr. Linder of the Export-Import Bank meet with the Minister of Finance and with the Minister of National Patrimony. President Kennedy agreed.

President Kennedy lamented the fact that private capital today seemed to be [illegible in the original] and frightened. He spoke of the need for private investment in order to [illegible in the original] adequate economic growth rate and the importance of confidence on the [illegible in the original] private capital. The President remarked that Canadian difficulties today stemmed in part from a Canadian desire to reduce the rate of United States private investments in Canada; but this had had the effect of slowing down economic growth and creating

¹ Flow of private capital. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

a balance of payments problem. President Kennedy also spoke of his hope that United States private investments would flow in greater volume to developing countries rather than to the highly industrialized European Common Market. President Lopez Mateos appeared to be in agreement and made some reference to the fact that a newspaper article in a small town paper was adequate to cause flight of capital from Mexico.

In the course of the discussion, President Lopez Mateos invited President Kennedy to speak freely concerning any topic that was on his mind and mentioned that he particularly wished to discuss later the question of salt water as well as broader questions of the Alliance for Progress and hemisphere relations.

194. Memorandum of conversation, June 29, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Foreign Minister Tello¹

Part I

June 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Salinity Problem

PARTICIPANTS

President Kennedy
President Lopez Mateos
Foreign Minister Tello
Ambassador Mann
Mr. Martin
Ambassador Carrillo Flores

President Kennedy opened the discussion by indicating that the present situation with respect to salinity of the water being delivered to the Mexicali Valley is unsatisfactory. He hoped that agreement could be reached on means for correcting this, as he was not happy with what we had been doing. While there were no provisions in the treaty with respect to salt content, the United States should seek in a friendly spirit to help maintain the quality of the water. We thought we would be able to keep the salt at reasonable levels until the end of 1963, and

¹ Salinity problem. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

by then hoped to have worked out a solution to the problem. Any solution would require funds, and therefore a major part of our problem is satisfying the Congress as to its fairness.

President Lopez Mateos expressed concern that by 1963 there might be irreparable damage and felt that a canal to waste saline waters to the Gulf was required.

President Kennedy felt we must keep the scientific panel studying the question in order to come up with a solution. He emphasized that we could not contemplate any change in the Treaty itself, as the Senate would not approve any change. He pointed out that work needed to be done in Mexicali to improve the drainage. He stressed that we are concerned about the problem and that we will do all we can but it will take a cooperative effort.

President Lopez Mateos confirmed that Mexico had a long time plan to improve Mexicali's drainage. He thought that this was a problem which must be solved in a practical manner as quickly as possible, and nothing done in the Mexicali Valley would provide a solution.

President Kennedy said that we are anxious to meet our responsibilities but water is a very short commodity and there are wrong feelings about it. We would work ahead vigorously in the Executive Branch and with the Congress.

Ambassador Mann urged that Mexico submit an application to the IBRD for funds to undertake the works in the Valley. He felt this would be very helpful to us in securing action on our side.

President Lopez Mateos said this would be of no value if the United States did not reduce the salt content.

Ambassador Mann agreed, but said we must each have faith that the other would act.

President Kennedy affirmed again that we are going to do the best we can in face of difficult problems to correct the situation which had been created from our side of the border. We would keep in touch with the President of Mexico on our progress, and hoped that he would see what he could do on his side.

195. Memorandum of conversation, June 29, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos and Foreign Minister Tello¹

Part II

June 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Communism in Latin America

PARTICIPANTS

President Kennedy
President Lopez Mateos
Foreign Minister Tello
Ambassador Mann
Mr. Martin
Ambassador Carrillo Flores

President Kennedy brought up the subject of the danger of the spread of Communism in Latin America, particularly in the Caribbean basin, as a result of Sino/Soviet influence in Cuba and the use of Cuba as a springboard.

President Kennedy first asked whether President Lopez Mateos thought that the Cuban people would be able in the foreseeable future to recover their sovereignty from the Castro regime. President Lopez Mateos expressed the opinion that while the Castro regime had lost ground with the Cuban people because it had perverted the original purposes of the revolution and had come under the influence of the Communist bloc, it seemed doubtful, as a practical matter, that the Cuban people would be able to do very much about it in the foreseeable future because of the nature and military strength of the Castro regime. President Lopez Mateos doubted that the Communist revolution could gradually become a national type of revolution such as the one which took place in Mexico.

There was some discussion about the ability and disposition of the Soviet Union to give meaningful aid to Cuba.

President Kennedy, following up on President Lopez Mateos' appraisal of Castro's chances for survival, then asked what President Lopez Mateos thought could be done to prevent the spread of Soviet power and doctrine via Cuba to other American Republics. President Kennedy mentioned his concern with Soviet activities in countries like Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Ecuador. Guerrilla activities

¹ Communism in Latin America. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

in Colombia and the recent revolts in Venezuela were specifically mentioned.

President Lopez Mateos acknowledged that this was a very difficult question. He said that Mexico had the ability to deal with Communist subversion and implied each country should take whatever measures are necessary to defend itself. Mr. Tello suggested at this point that it is important that Latin American countries prevent their territories from being used as a base of operations against other American Republics.

President Lopez Mateos repeated the familiar Mexican thesis: The important thing is to create better economic and social conditions and especially to provide jobs. When the people were better off, he thought it would not be easy for the Communists to lead them astray. He stressed his opinion that the Alliance for Progress is the best way to combat Communism.

President Kennedy replied that he did not underestimate the importance of economic growth and social progress; nor was he suggesting that Communism was an immediate danger in the United States or Mexico. But he pointed out it would take a decade to achieve the objectives of the Alliance for Progress even under the best of conditions. In the meantime, the question was: What did Mexico think should be done to prevent the spread of Communism in other American Republics? President Kennedy pointed out that, as Cuba shows, once a Communist regime has fastened itself on a country, it is most difficult for the people to rid themselves of it.

The Foreign Minister then recalled that Mexico was the first country at Punta del Este to openly espouse the doctrine of incompatibility between Cuba and the inter-American system and argued that this was a very substantial contribution to the success of Punta del Este because this was the thesis that prevailed rather than the Colombian or Peruvian doctrines. He explained again the Mexican juridical doctrine of the necessity for amending the Charter of the OAS so that there would be a sound legal basis for collective action.

The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Castro regime had made many "mistakes" and in his opinion would continue to make mistakes. He said that Chile, for example, had recently been on the verge of breaking relations with Cuba. (Ambassador Carrillo Flores later informed Ambassador Mann that he interpreted Tello's statements about Castro's "mistakes" to mean that Mexico might later break relations with the Castro regime because of its interventionist tendencies in Mexico).

President Kennedy returned again and again to his question of what President Lopez Mateos thought was the best way to deal with the obvious danger of an expansion of Communist influence in Latin America. President Lopez Mateos each time repeated his view that

rapid economic development and social progress was the answer. In the end he said he would give the matter more thought.

In the course of the discussion, President Kennedy stated that the United States wished to deal with the problem of Communist penetration in the hemisphere in cooperation with other Latin American states like Mexico. He said he wanted to keep in close touch with Mexico on this point and to reach agreement on practical measures which could be taken by American states to deal with the threat. He said the United States had no plans at the present time for unilateral military action against the Castro regime.

196. Memorandum of conversation, June 30, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Foreign Minister Tello¹

June 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Salinity and other problems

PARTICIPANTS

President Kennedy
President Lopez Mateos
Foreign Minister Tello
Ambassador Mann
Ambassador Carrillo Flores
Mr. Martin
Senator Mike Mansfield

The meeting was opened with further considerable discussion of the salinity problem as it would be treated in the Communiqué. After the language had been worked out, President Lopez Mateos expressed his concern that the situation might become acute again after October 1963 which would be a very active period in preparation for the 1964 elections in Mexico. President Kennedy said he would do his best to prevent a recurrence of the difficulties which the Mexicans had experienced last fall.

¹ Salinity problem on the lower Colorado River and other problems. Confidential.
2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/6-3062.

There followed considerable discussion of the Communiqué on the subject of the Chamizal problem. At the conclusion of this discussion President Kennedy proposed that our experts continue to work on drawing up an appropriate line, with the Mexicans realizing the difficulty of taking land that had been built on and lived on by American residents of El Paso since the original award, and what would be possible in terms of compensation in lands less difficult for us to turn over. He thought we might seek a solution within the framework of an arrangement in which the United States would agree that the award was a just one which the United States should have accepted at the time it was made. Mexico would indicate that while it agreed with this view, it realized the changes that had taken place which made an accurate carrying out of the award very difficult, and as a gesture was accepting parcels of land elsewhere rather than at the exact location indicated by the award. President Lopez Mateos said he agreed with this.

Foreign Minister Tello, in response to a question from President Kennedy as to whether there were any points on which Mexico felt it might be in the wrong, said that Mexico was [omission in the original].

1. They would not support any action which was not related to the UN action.

2. They would not support anything which was related to positions taken at the Belgrade Conference.

3. They should defend aggressively the Alliance for Progress.

4. They should defend aggressively LAFTA.

5. In general, barriers to trade should be reduced and on this Mexico had in mind restrictions of the common market.

President Lopez Mateos, after expressing his appreciation for the exchange of views during the visit, said he was fully aware that recent Mexican actions, in particular with respect to Cuban matters, have created doubts in some parts of United States' opinion about Mexico's basic attitude on Cuba and the United States. He wished formally to assure President Kennedy and the people of the United States that in case any conflict should arise, Mexico would be glad to guard the United States' rear with its 35 million people. President Kennedy expressed his great appreciation for this, and said we would be glad to defend the Mexican flanks as well.

197. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, July 10¹

July 10, 1962

SUBJECT

Status of Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado River and Chamizal Dispute

1. Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado River

The United States Commissioner on the International Boundary and Water Commission and the Chairman of the United States panel of scientists studying the salinity problem went to Mexico City about June 16 in what proved to be a final attempt to reach agreement with the Mexican scientists on a joint report. This attempt followed a personal letter from the Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, in which the Secretary urged that the Mexican scientists be permitted to sign a joint report on which tentative agreement was reached on May 8. The effort was unsuccessful because the Mexican Government wanted to include a strong reservation as to the adequacy of the proposals of the United States panel and insisted, if any discussion of the Mexicali Valley were included, that the report state that the facts demonstrated that the situation in the Mexicali Valley was not responsible for the salinity problem. The United States panel saw little merit in a joint report which highlighted the disagreement between the scientists of the two countries. Although the panel considers that the crux of the problem is a reduction in the amount of salt discharged to the river by the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district in Arizona, it did not feel it could agree to a paragraph which stated that the situation in the Mexicali Valley had nothing to do with the problem.

The United States panel has now prepared a separate report of which a draft has been furnished to the Departments of State and Interior. As soon as it has been approved by the panel members it will be submitted formally to the United States Commissioner. The panel is expected to propose three possible solutions, the most promising of which involves the by-passing of saline waters without charge to Mexico. The United States Commissioner has prepared his comments and recommendations and will forward them with the report as soon as it is submitted to him. The Bureau of Reclamation has re-programmed \$50,000 of fiscal year 1962 funds, and will re-program an additional \$335,000 of fiscal year 1963 funds to complete engineering studies of

¹ Status of salinity problem on lower Colorado River and Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, General, June to September, 1962.

the proposals which the panel is expected to make. The Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, in agreeing to this re-programming, stipulated that none of the funds could be used to study any proposal involving the by-passing of saline water to the Gulf of California nor any proposal that did not charge to Mexico all drainage water from the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district. So long as this restriction applies, it will not be possible to investigate the proposal which the United States panel considers offers the best possibilities for a satisfactory solution.

2. *Chamizal*

The United States Commissioner on the International Boundary and Water Commission has let a contract for an aerial photograph of the Chamizal area. This is the first step in engineering studies to determine the feasibility of relocating the river in the El Paso area to "cut" to Mexico as much as practical of the Chamizal tract. He also plans to obtain estimates on (1) the value of land and improvements in the Chamizal, (2) the cost of relocation of public utility and power lines, the railroad, and Franklin irrigation canal and (3) construction costs for the new river channel and levees. In view of the public controversy which has been stirred in El Paso because of the discussion of the Chamizal issue, the Commissioner plans to wait until public debate quiets before he proceeds with the appraisals which of necessity would have to be done on a fairly public basis.

Ambassador Mann discussed Chamizal with the Mexican Foreign Minister on July 6. He urged that Mexico agree to accept our version of the 1864 river line (which would mean that the Chamizal tract contains 420 acres) if the United States is to agree to accept the Chamizal award. The Ambassador considers it would be physically possible, without injury to El Paso, to relocate the Rio Grande so that 420 acres would be cut to Mexico from the Chamizal tract or immediately adjacent thereto. The Foreign Minister showed no disposition to compromise on his position that the United States should accept the award, agree to Mexico's version of the 1864 river under which Chamizal consists of 457 acres, and give the acreage to Mexico in one cut in El Paso.

Ambassador Mann plans to brief the Governor of Texas, as well as the two candidates for Governor. It was not possible to work this out during the weekend July 7-8, but the Ambassador is prepared to do so any time after July 20 if agreeable to Vice President Johnson and Governor Daniels. Congressman Rutherford, in whose district El Paso is located, is being kept fully informed of all developments.

The United States Commissioner is preparing several alternative locations for the Rio Grande at El Paso which he believes would be acceptable to El Paso. He will discuss these with Ambassador Mann,

and the Ambassador will then seek an appointment with the Mexican President in an effort to reach an understanding that will provide a basis for the negotiation of a treaty on this matter. Unless such an understanding can be reached, it would not appear politically possible to consider recognizing the arbitration award rendered in 1911.

*/s/ Warren Slater
for*

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

**198. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy,
December 14¹**

December 14, 1962

SUBJECT

Sale of Minesweepers to Mexico

Early in 1961 the Government of Mexico expressed interest in purchasing a number of American minesweepers which had been declared surplus by the Department of the Navy. This interest caused considerable concern in American shrimp fishing circles owing to the continuing shrimp vessel seizure problem with Mexico. Mexico claims nine miles of territorial sea; the United States recognizes but three. The consequences of this controversy have been repeated molestation of American shrimp boats operating outside of three miles off the coast of Mexico in the Gulf of Mexico, including their seizure and the imposition of fines for alleged illegal fishing in Mexican waters (there have been well over 100 such seizures since 1950). It was feared that the acquisition by Mexico of an additional patrol fleet would serve to heighten Mexican enforcement activity against the American shrimp-fishing fleet.

It was realized that it would be difficult for the United States to refuse to sell to Mexico since such vessels had been declared available for purchase by any member of the free world. However, we wanted to be satisfied that the vessels would be used only for naval purposes

¹ Sale of minesweepers to Mexico. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 712.5621/12-1462.

and not for patrol intended to hurt American fishing activities considered legitimate by the United States Government. Consequently, in discussions between the Department and the Mexican Embassy it was made clear that we would have difficulty considering the request unless the vessels would be used only for naval purposes. The Mexican Ambassador said he understood this problem and that the ships would not be used for patrol activities against shrimp boats.

The Caribbean Defense Command and the Department of the Navy recommended the sale on military grounds to improve Mexico's patrol and minesweeping capabilities.

After thorough consideration, including consultation with the United States Embassy at Mexico City, and Mexican stipulation of the naval purposes for which the vessels would be used (not including fishery patrol) it was decided to approve the sale of the twenty minesweepers, provided:

"... that Embassy Mexico City should make a clear oral statement to the Mexican Foreign Office at the time the Mexican Government is informed of our willingness to make this sale . . . that the United States Government is not placing conditions on the sale, but wants the Mexican Government to understand that it would be a source of embarrassment in the relations between the two governments should any of the vessels concerned be used to seize United States shrimp boats outside a three mile limit from the Coast of Mexico."

The current furor regarding the transaction is attributable to a UPI story of November 24, 1962 from Tampico quoting an unnamed Mexican naval officer to the effect that the minesweepers were to be used against "pirate shrimp boats from Texas". Upon learning of this press story on November 28 the Department discussed it with the Mexican Ambassador. The Ambassador later informed the Department that he and the naval commander at Tampico had been authorized by the Foreign Minister and the Naval Minister to state that any such statement by a Mexican naval officer was unauthorized and that the minesweepers would be used by Mexico solely for naval purposes.

The Department has no information indicating that the Mexican Government has any plans for the vessels in question other than those naval purposes stipulated by the Mexican Government.

/s/ Howard Furnas
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

**199. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy,
January 11¹**

January 11, 1963

SUBJECT

Status report on negotiations for settlement of Chamizal dispute

This memorandum is in response to the President's request of January 9 to Assistant Secretary Martin for a status report on negotiations for settlement of the Chamizal dispute.

Ambassador Mann outlined *informally* to the Mexican Foreign Minister on August 9, 1962, a proposal for solution of the Chamizal dispute. At the same time he left with the Minister a draft note which would be delivered if Mexico considered the proposal a basis for negotiation. At the request of Vice President Johnson we did not press for a decision in September and October 1962 to keep the Chamizal dispute from becoming embroiled in the election campaign in Texas. Moreover, the President of Mexico and his Foreign Minister were on a trip to the Far East during October 1962. On January 4, the Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Mann that he would like to enter into detailed discussion of the salinity and Chamizal problems when the Ambassador returns to Mexico City on January 14.

The proposal which Ambassador Mann outlined informally to the Foreign Minister involves digging a new channel for the Rio Grande at El Paso which would transfer to Mexico a *net* of 437 acres of territory over which the United States now exercises jurisdiction. This is the most favorable offer we have considered making to Mexico in our 50-year effort to settle this dispute. The Mexican and United States Commissioners agreed that they could support a figure of 437 as the acreage south of the 1864 river which was awarded to Mexico in 1911. Previously the Mexican Government had insisted that the area south of the 1864 river consisted of 450 acres whereas the most we would agree to was 420 acres. Because of the location of buildings in the Chamizal Zone, particularly a high school, El Paso has been unwilling to agree to transfer more than 336 acres from the Chamizal Zone itself. It is prepared to make up the remainder of the acreage from the area east of Cordova Island. The "island" itself is under Mexican jurisdiction. In rectifying the river at El Paso, some 228 acres of Cordova Island which protrudes into downtown El Paso would be transferred to the

¹ Status report on negotiations for settlement of Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.1231/1-1163.

United States, and Mexico would be compensated with an equal acreage east of Cordova Island. The possibility that the northern half of Cordova Island would be transferred to El Paso is the feature of the proposal that makes a solution attractive to El Paso. The attached map shows this proposed solution.

The foregoing solution has been discussed with the Governor of Texas and city officials and civic groups in El Paso and is acceptable to them. We have also consulted with the Vice President's Office and interested Senators and Congressmen. A solution along these lines is also generally acceptable to them. Senator Tower has not approved the solution but stated he would go along with any solution approved by the people of El Paso. It is believed that Congressman Foreman, who now represents El Paso, would agree, but he made no commitment when Commissioner Friedkin briefed him on the dispute.

The Mexican Foreign Minister is not enthusiastic about our proposal for settlement. He wants as much as possible of the 437 acres to come from the Chamizal Zone. We are proposing that 336 acres come from the Chamizal Zone and 101 acres from the area east of and adjacent to Cordova Island. He apparently considers that Mexico should receive about 380 to 400 acres in the Chamizal Zone with the remainder to come from land east of Cordova Island. On the other hand, the proposal would be unacceptable to El Paso and Texas if we suggested any significant increase in the acreage in the Chamizal Zone to be transferred to Mexico or significantly decreased the acreage from Cordova Island which El Paso hopes to receive.

/s/ Walter Lubkeman
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Map showing proposed solution.

**200. Memorandum of conversation, February 15, between
Ambassador Carrillo Flores and Robert M. Sayre¹**

February 15, 1963

SUBJECT

Current Bilateral Problems Between U.S. and Mexico

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Antonio Carrillo Flores, Ambassador to Mexico
Mr. Robert M. Sayre, CMA

1. The Ambassador began by referring to the conversation he had just had with Assistant Secretary Martin on the delivery of minesweepers to Mexico. He said he had talked to Foreign Minister Tello who agreed that he could inform the United States that it was reasonable for the United States to expect that the use of the minesweepers by Mexico would not create any difficulties for the United States Government. (Mr. Martin had discussed with the Ambassador reports that the Mexican Government might use the minesweepers which it was acquiring from the United States for enforcing its fishing regulations and had emphasized the embarrassment it would cause the United States Government if the minesweepers were used for this purpose).

2. The Ambassador inquired whether there were any new developments looking toward a solution of the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River. Mr. Sayre said that the Bureau of Reclamation had not completed its engineering study but it was expected to do so very soon and that we anticipated a report around March 1. He said that there had been meetings between the White House and Interior on the subject but that he was not aware of the exact outcome of these meetings. He could only say that the matter is being followed very closely by the White House in keeping with the statement in the Joint Communiqué of June 30, 1962.

3. The Ambassador referred to the Mexican offer to settle the Sabolo claim and inquired whether the claimants had settled their tax problems with the United States Government. Mr. Sayre said that the lawyers for the claimants planned to discuss the problem with the Department's lawyers on February 18.

4. Mr. Sayre said that Ambassador Mann would be discussing the Chamizal problem with interested persons in Texas beginning February 18. He hoped that the informal understanding on a line reached be-

¹ Current bilateral problems between the United States and Mexico. Confidential.
4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.

tween Ambassador Mann and the Foreign Minister would be acceptable to El Paso.

5. The Ambassador referred to the political situation in Mexico and to a short item in *U.S. News and World Report* to the effect that Diaz Ordaz, now Minister of Government, is the front-running candidate for the next President of Mexico. The item had stated that Diaz Ordaz was anti-communist and pro-American. The Ambassador said he had talked to the magazine's reporter in Mexico about the item and had passed on comments he had heard that it might have been planted by enemies of Diaz Ordaz. He said Mr. Migdail had told him that he had filed a lengthy report on Mexico in which Diaz Ordaz had been mentioned as the leading candidate. This was the only part of his report that his editors had seen fit to publish so far. The Ambassador considered the political situation in Mexico tranquil. He expounded the PRI philosophy that the party had to keep the leftist elements within the PRI if political tranquility is to be maintained. He observed that Lopez Mateos had to act with caution during this period before the elections in 1964 to avoid upsetting the political situation. The Ambassador thought that the next President of Mexico would be more to the center. He acknowledged that President Lopez Mateos was left of center and thought we could now expect a swing back toward the center. He considered Cardenas to be outside the PRI because Cardenas had put himself outside the official party. He considered the newly-formed CCI of little consequence and thought its formation would have gone unnoticed except for the presence of Cardenas at the inaugural sessions. He considered Maldonado, ex-Governor of Baja California, to be a politician of no consequence. He hoped that the Government would not have to act against Cardenas and the CCI, but, if it did, he thought the move would be against Cuauhtémoc Cardenas. He said Alejandro Carrillo was close to the President. He characterized Carrillo as a Marxist and exponent of the view that Mexico should move closer to the neutralist countries. Thus Carrillo had urged that Mexico participate in the Belgrade Conference. Mr. Sayre said his problem with the so-called neutralists was that they were not neutral but heaped criticism on the United States while praising the Soviet Union or at least not saying anything critical. The Ambassador agreed.

6. The Ambassador said he was holding conversations with the Director of the Smithsonian Institution for the purpose of arranging for an exhibition of Mexican art in the fall of 1963 or winter of 1964. It is the same exhibit which has been touring Europe. He hoped to arrange for an exhibition in other major cities in the United States. If a showing could be arranged at the National Gallery he hoped that it could be opened by the President. Mrs. Lopez Mateos (or possibly the Foreign Minister or Minister of Education) would come to the United

States for the occasion. In view of the nature of the art exhibit, the Ambassador thought the only appropriate place for its showing in Washington would be the National Gallery. He thought January 1964 might be an appropriate time, but recognized that this was an especially busy time for the President. He also planned to discuss October or November 1963 as possibilities with the Director of the Smithsonian Institution.

7. The Ambassador referred to the proposed trip of President Lopez Mateos to France, Western Germany, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia and Poland. He said that his President was concerned that a trip to France at this time might be misunderstood in the United States. Mr. Sayre said that he did not think it would give rise to any particular misunderstanding. The Ambassador said that when President Lopez Mateos talked to him about the trip he had not mentioned all of the countries at once but had led him through a discussion of the problems *vis-à-vis* the United States of each country. He said he had inquired of the President why he had to go to Poland. He got essentially two reasons: 1) President Lopez Mateos wanted to visit Poland to see for himself how things are there and 2) visits to such countries are useful for demonstrating Mexico's independence of the United States. The Ambassador thought Mexico's views carried more weight in international meetings and was actually helpful to the United States if it had a reputation of being independent. He said the Mexican Congress would be called to approve the trip.

(The Ambassador made no suggestion at all that the visit might be expanded to include the Soviet Union. Rather, his comments emphasized that the countries were carefully chosen to give a balanced trip, taking into account Mexico's domestic and foreign policies.)

8. The Ambassador said that the Foreign Minister was definitely interested in a convention with the United States which would end the dispute over shrimp fishing in the Gulf. He thought Mr. Sayre had drawn the wrong conclusion from the fact that the Foreign Minister had evidenced no interest in a convention when it was discussed during the visit of President Kennedy to Mexico in June 1962 and in conversations last week between Ambassador Mann and the Foreign Minister. He said that Tello wanted to maintain the "tradition" of the Foreign Office and was reluctant to take any steps that might modify Mexican policy. Tello did not want to agree to anything which might adversely affect Mexico's claim to a nine-mile territorial sea. For this reason the Ambassador said he had discussed the matter with Undersecretary Gorostiza who represents the "tradition" of the Foreign Office. Gorostiza found no problem with the line the Ambassador was following. The Ambassador said he had told Tello there was no point talking about a fisheries convention if Mexico tried to settle the territorial

waters problems in the convention. He had urged that a convention deal only with conservation of fishing resources and that it contain a paragraph which said it in no way affected the position on territorial waters held by either country. On the other hand, the Ambassador said that the convention should give Mexico exclusive control over fisheries out to nine miles. He suggested that the convention which the United States signed with Cuba in 1958 seemed to provide a useful model for an agreement between the US and Mexico. He planned to suggest that an exploratory meeting be held in Mexico City soon to see whether there was a basis for reaching agreement. He hoped that Mr. Chayes would be able to come down on the US Delegation.

Mr. Sayre observed that the Lopez Mateos Administration would probably go down in Mexican History as the one to clear up all outstanding problems with the United States if we succeeded in clearing up all the problems we had discussed. The Ambassador said he had told the Mexican President the same thing and hoped that it proved to be correct.

201. Memorandum from Brubeck to Dungan, February 27¹

February 27, 1963

THROUGH

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT

Status Report on Chamizal Negotiations

Ambassador Mann held discussions with Foreign Minister Tello in January and February on the Chamizal problem and Commissioner Friedkin went to Mexico City in the first week of February to participate in these discussions. Ambassador Mann and the Foreign Minister agreed informally on the line along which the boundary would be relocated subject to further consultations with community leaders in El Paso. The Mexican President has also approved. The Ambassador spent the week of February 18-22 in Texas talking to community leaders in El Paso and to the Governor of Texas and other state officials.

¹ Status report on Chamizal negotiations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.

Department officers have consulted with the Vice President's office, Senators Morse, Yarborough and Tower, and Congressman Foreman.

The El Paso City Council, the County Board of Commissioners, the El Paso Chamber of Commerce and other civic groups have approved the recommended solution. The Governor of Texas also approves. Our estimate is that the recommended solution would have the support of most influential sectors in El Paso. There is opposition from residents of the Chamizal zone who are uncertain of their future and their ability to re-establish themselves elsewhere if they receive only the market value of their present holdings. Owners of tenement dwellings and industrial and commercial enterprises who would be moved out can also be considered as opposed. There is a third group which opposes under the slogan of "Don't give up one inch of sacred Texas soil". This third group would like a "plebiscite" in the zone affected or would require approval of the Texas State Legislature. Such procedures would pose a problem which at first glance would be unacceptable to the Federal Government. The Legal Adviser of the Department is preparing a memorandum on the precedents.

Two problems have merged in our efforts to work out the details of a settlement, now that we seem to have agreed on a new boundary line:

1. We have a claim which we have not asserted for some fifty years to the northern half of Cordova Island. Mexico wants to state in a proposed joint report which would make recommendations for final solution of the problem that Cordova Island is Mexican territory. We do not want to accept the Mexican language because this would extinguish our claim. We are prepared to drop the claim once a convention is ratified by both countries, but until that time we want our claim preserved. We are hopeful that we can work out language in the report which would do that.

2. In preliminary discussions last year the Mexican Foreign Minister agreed that Mexico would reimburse the United States for all structures which are passed to Mexico intact in the Chamizal and which we acquire by purchase or condemnation. Mexico is entitled free of charge only to the land on which those structures stand. The Mexicans awakened this week to the fact that this will run into several million dollars. They are concerned that the figure may look so big to the Mexican public that the Mexican Government will be accused of buying the Chamizal. The Mexican Foreign Office is now considering how it can handle this problem.

At the present time we have agreed with the Mexicans that the two Foreign Offices would prepare a joint report (a working draft of which is enclosed) containing recommendations for a solution. This report would be released simultaneously with press statements by each President (the first draft of proposed statements is also enclosed) that

he has approved the report and instructed his respective Foreign Office to proceed with negotiations of a convention. The convention would be submitted to the Senates of the respective countries for approval. The Mexican Foreign Office is presently of the view that we have to work out point 2 above before we can proceed on the negotiation of the report and convention.

/s/ J.T. Rogers
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Draft of Joint Report.
2. Draft of Proposed Statements.

**202. Memorandum of conversation, February 28, between
President Kennedy and Ambassador Carrillo Flores¹**

February 28, 1963

SUBJECT

Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado River and Transit of Latin Americans
Through Mexico

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Antonio Carrillo Flores, Ambassador of Mexico
Mr. Ralph Dungan, Special Assistant to the President
Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and
Mexican Affairs

The Mexican Ambassador called at his request to deliver a letter from the Mexican President on the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River. He said that he wanted first to thank the President for his

¹ Salinity problem on lower Colorado River and transit of Latin Americans through Mexico. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, General, March–June 1963.

cooperation in achieving a temporary solution until October 1963. He said that Mexico is anxious to know what measures can be taken before October 1963 to prevent the recurrence of the problem at that time. He noted that Mexico is entering a highly political period and that the Mexicali Valley is one of the few areas in Mexico where the Communists are active. The Mexican Government is concerned that they will use the salinity issue even more to agitate and create political difficulties for the Government.

The President recalled his conversation with President Lopez Mateos on the salinity problem. He said that he had asked the Department of the Interior for its recommendations on an urgent basis and anticipated that he would receive them in a few days. He noted that the two Governments are proceeding satisfactorily on achieving a solution to the Chamizal problem and hoped that we could do the same with the salinity problem. He asked the Ambassador to inform President Lopez Mateos that we will respond to his letter as soon as we have more details on what actions we might be able to take on the salinity problem. He inquired about the progress of the Mexican rehabilitation program for the Mexicali Valley. The Mexican Ambassador said that it is included in the Mexican "Plan of Immediate Action" now being studied by an IBRD Mission and an *ad hoc* committee of the OAS "Nine Wise Men." He said that Mexico realized that a rehabilitation program was necessary even if the salinity issue had not arisen. But he added that the problem in the Mexicali Valley had been made much more difficult for Mexico because of the highly saline water being delivered by the United States.

The President said that he wanted to write President Lopez Mateos in some detail about the serious difficulty which Latin American countries have because of the guerrilla and other type training which Latin Americans are receiving in Cuba. President Betancourt had raised the issue with him and had urged the necessity of a program to control travel to Cuba. The President noted that much of this traffic is through Mexico and he desired to explore with the Mexican President what might be done to help control it. He said that 2,000 Cuban trained agitators each year constituted a serious problem in Latin America especially because many of the Governments had serious internal political problems which these agitators could aggravate.

The Ambassador said he was aware of the problem and the fact that it had been discussed when Assistant Secretary of State Martin was in Mexico in January. He doubted that the traffic through Mexico was as great as suggested because there is only one round trip flight each week by Cubana. Foreign Minister Tello had agreed that Mexico would not grant a transit visa for travel to Cuba to any person from a Latin American country who presented a passport which bore a

notation that it was not valid for travel to Cuba. The Ambassador observed that under the Mexican Constitution the Government could prevent persons from entering the country but not leaving. He noted that some other Latin American countries are unwilling to take the political steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba and Mexico did not want to assume the political responsibility of doing it for them.

The President said the problem would be discussed at the meeting of Presidents in San Jose in March. The Central American countries share Venezuela's concern. He observed that we had the military threat posed by Cuba under control but that the countries in the Hemisphere needed to develop a system to take care of the subversive problem. The United States is developing the facts on the problem and would have concrete suggestions to make for both a multilateral and bilateral approach.

The Ambassador said that his President planned to visit France in March and would discuss trade problems with President de Gaulle. The President welcomed the trip because he considered it useful for the Latin Americans to bring their trade problems directly to the attention of the European countries. (President Lopez Mateos will also visit Poland, West Germany, the Netherlands and Yugoslavia).

203. Telegram 2494 to Mexico City, March 6¹

March 6, 1963

In news conference March 6 President was asked question Chamizal. Begin verbatim:

Question: Mr. President, reports from Texas seem to indicate that the United States is ready to transfer the Chamizal to Mexico. If this is true, could you give us some idea of the time-table expected?

The President: No, but there have been negotiations on Chamizal for a good many years, and they were stepped up following the visit to Mexico. We are close, I would hope, to an agreement and I think that the next week should tell us whether we can get an accord. The advantage of course of the Chamizal is that if we can get a solution, is that it will wipe out a black mark in the record of the United States

¹ President's response to news conference question on Chamizal. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.

where we refused to accept an arbitration claim 40 years ago and as a result we have never been able to get the Mexicans to agree to any arbitration with us. So I am very anxious to see that settled and we have made pretty good progress on it. There are still some questions that have to be settled but the prognosis I would think was hopeful and we would know in the next few weeks. End verbatim.

Rusk

204. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 29¹

March 29, 1963

SUBJECT

Solution of the Salinity Problem on the Lower Colorado River; Recommendations of the Department of State

This memorandum is in response to an oral request of March 21 from Mr. Ralph Dungan for the recommendations of the Department of State on a solution to the salinity problem with Mexico on the lower Colorado River. The Department of State recommends the following interim and long term measures to solve the problem:

I. Construction Required

A. Interim

Reduction of pumping in the Wellton-Mohawk District during the winter of 1963–64 by about 40,000 acre feet.

Installation of a tile drainage works in the District to further reduce the salinity and to insure against damages due to reduction of pumping. (Estimated cost \$3.3 million.)

B. Long Term

Construction of a 300 cubic second foot diversion channel which would permit the diversion of Wellton-Mohawk drainage during the five winter months to a point below Morelos Dam, and of additional wells to enable pumping of better quality wells in the summer. (Estimated cost \$11 million.)

¹ Solution of the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River; recommendations of the DOS. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32–1 MEX–US.

II. Operation of Works

A. An interim solution is required for the five winter months beginning on October 1, 1963. It is not possible in the intervening months to construct works that would provide adequate temporary relief. The Department of State therefore recommends that the Bureau of Reclamation review the practicability of the reduction of pumping in the District, supplemented by tile drainage works. A reduction in pumping is suggested in light of the lowering affected in the ground water table during the past eighteen months and the Department's understanding that the current rate of drainage pumping (210,000 acre feet per year) is that required for full project development of 75,000 acres, whereas for the some 60,000 acres now under irrigation, pumping of only about 170,000 acre feet annually is required. The Department believes that a reduction of 40,000 acre feet can be achieved by a 45% decrease in the rate of pumping during the winter months without a material rise in the water table that will result in waterlogging of any of the cultivated acreage. The District wells were completely shut down for about 10 days in November–December 1961 when ground water levels were considerably higher, with no serious adverse effects.

A reduction in pumping will probably be required in the equivalent of only four of the five winter months because Mexico may not need to irrigate during the other month. Resulting salinity to Mexico would be in the range of 1600 ppm to 1900 ppm depending upon the quantity of river flows. Tile drains should be installed in the possible danger spots in the District lands as suggested in the Bureau Report. Such supplemental drainage works would also enable some further reduction in salinity of waters to Mexico during the coming winter. A combination of reduction in pumping supplemented by tile drains would result in mean salinity water to Mexico at the northerly boundary in the range of 1400 to 1700 ppm depending upon the quantity of flows in the river. This would afford material interim relief to the problem.

The Bureau of Reclamation proposed the installation of additional pumps in Phase 1 of its program. The Department of State agrees that additional pumps are required as an essential part of the long term solution, but does not concur in the proposed method of operation suggested by the Bureau for either interim or permanent relief. The Bureau proposed that the highest salinity wells be pumped in summer, and the lowest in winter. Our analysis of this method of operation has convinced us that this would aggravate the problem because it would result in further serious deterioration in the quality of the water for Mexico's principal summer crop. The Department believes that the lowest salinity wells should be pumped in the summer to achieve an improvement in the quality of summer waters and that the highly saline wells should be pumped in the winter with the drainage to be diverted below Morelos Dam.

B. A *long term* solution requires that measures be adopted to reduce the total salts in the drainage water of the Wellton-Mohawk District. Such a solution can be achieved either by

1) Stopping the pumping of highly saline waters underlying the Wellton-Mohawk District and instead accomplishing drainage of the project with surface drainage works to include open or tile drains as is practiced in the nearby Yuma Valley and Imperial Valley, or

2) Reducing total quantity of salts pumped from the District to the Colorado River for diversion by Mexico, to an amount closely approaching the quantity of salts diverted to the District. This amount is required for successful irrigation in the District. Salts in excess of this amount should be disposed of elsewhere.

The Department understands that alternative 1) is not acceptable to the District primarily because of adverse effects on District lands. Estimates of the cost of installation of the tile drainage for the entire District vary, but are in the \$35 to \$45 million range. The Department considers this an acceptable cost only if there is no other practical way to solve the problem.

The Department considers that the more acceptable alternative is the diversion of an estimated 90,000 acre feet annually of Wellton-Mohawk drainage so that it does not mix with the reasonably good water in the river above Mexico's main diversion point, Morelos Dam.

III. *Legal Issues*

As a practical matter, drainage from Wellton-Mohawk in the winter is not required to fill Mexico's water schedule because winter water deliveries to Mexico now exceed Mexico's Treaty schedule by more than the amount of such drainage. This excess is a consequence, in part, of rainfall, releases from upstream dams for hydroelectric purposes, leakage at these dams, and irrigation drainage. The amount of water arriving in the limitrophe section of the Colorado River between October and February is thus 106,000 to 139,000 acre feet greater than the 1,500,000 acre feet which the United States is obligated to deliver to Mexico each year pursuant to the Mexican Treaty. Furthermore, Mexico does not credit the United States for this excess.

Inasmuch as the current winter salinity problem with Mexico arises from approximately 90,000 acre-feet of effluent from the pumps of the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district during these same winter months, we have examined the legal consequences of diverting this 90,000 acre feet to a point below Morelos Dam.

The Department considers that bypassing the winter drainage from the Wellton-Mohawk project down to the Gulf of California by means of the proposed bypass channel would not deprive the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district of its right to characterize such drainage as "return

flow" as that term is used in the recommended decree in *Arizona v. California*. The decree defines consumptive use as meaning the "diversions from the stream less such return flow thereto as is available for consumptive use in the United States or in satisfaction of the Mexican treaty obligation." The first point is whether the term "available" applies to the clause "in satisfaction of the Mexican treaty obligation."

Prior to 1961 when the pumps at Wellton-Mohawk started to discharge drainage for delivery to the Colorado River, the amount of water arriving at the limitrophe section for delivery to Mexico was already in excess of treaty obligations of the United States. If the definition of the use of return flow included only water actually used to *satisfy* the Mexican treaty obligation as opposed to water *available to satisfy* such obligations, the necessary effect would be impairment of cultivation in Wellton-Mohawk and any other irrigation projects south of Imperial Dam. This impairment would stem from the inability of these irrigation districts to cultivate all the acreage authorized by federal law if they received water diversions from the mainstream equal only to their drainage available for downstream United States consumption or actually used in satisfaction of Mexican treaty obligations.

We cannot conceive that the recommended decree anticipates that these projects which chance to be lowest on the United States portion of the Colorado River should suffer the loss of part of their authorized acreage merely because their drainage is not *needed* to meet Mexican treaty requirements. As noted above, the excess quantity of waters arriving for delivery to Mexico are beyond the control of these projects. Consequently, common sense urges that "available" is applicable to "satisfaction of the Mexican Treaty obligation".

As this must be the case, we believe that the Wellton-Mohawk District may reasonably claim that any water which arrives in the limitrophe section whether through a bypass channel or from the Gila River to the Colorado River is "available in satisfaction of the Mexican Treaty obligation." Return flows are now arriving in the Colorado River below Morelos Dam which are charged against Mexico's Treaty schedule.

There is no party that we can foresee taking issue with these conclusions so far as they are addressed exclusively to waters which are not only of no value to the United States in the Colorado mainstream but, indeed, render the United States a disservice. This legal formula cannot be applied to any effluent from Wellton-Mohawk which might be pumped out during the summer months so far as there is a need for water during these months and, if it is not supplied from irrigation drainage, it must be released from Davis Dam. Such a release from Davis Dam would be a net loss to the United States of useable water.

IV. Proposal of the Bureau of Reclamation

The Department has reviewed the study of the Bureau of Reclamation on the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River entitled "Special Studies—Delivery of Water to Mexico, February 1963."

The Bureau's stated purpose is to reduce the peak salts concentrations in water delivered to Mexico under the 1944 Water Treaty. Its proposal involves essentially a change in the delivery pattern for salts by reducing the salt concentrations in the peak winter months but increasing them in the summer. No material decrease would be achieved for many years in the total tonnage of salts delivered to Mexico from the Wellton-Mohawk District which is now discharging in its drainage water about 3.5 times the salt tonnage required for successful irrigation.

The Bureau's proposal, by decreasing the winter peak salt concentrations, would help the minor winter crop which provides less than 20% of the agricultural income in the Mexicali Valley derived from acres irrigated by Colorado River water but, by increasing the summer salt concentrations, would adversely affect the major summer crop which provides more than 80% of the income. The combined net effect would be a substantial reduction in income and hence aggravation of the problem. If the choice is between the present situation and the Bureau proposal Mexico would therefore probably prefer the present situation.

V. Recommendations

1. That the Department of the Interior discuss with the Wellton-Mohawk District a reduction of pumping for the winter of 1963–64 of 40,000 acre feet. This reduction should be coordinated with the Mexican irrigation schedule through the International Boundary and Water to achieve the maximum feasible reduction in winter salinity consistent with uses in the United States.

2. If necessary, lawyers of Justice, State and Interior should be prepared to discuss in detail with the Wellton-Mohawk Board of Directors and attorneys for the District the legal risks involved for the District and the United States unless a satisfactory solution is reached. Because our present information indicates that Mexico plans, if necessary, to press its case in the form of a suit by the Colorado River irrigation district of Mexico against the Wellton-Mohawk District in a U.S. Federal court, it is recommended that Justice assume responsibility for these discussions.

3. That the Department of the Interior prepare and submit legislation requesting funds to construct the works recommended above. The installation of tile drainage works should be accomplished as promptly as possible so that their operations safeguard the District lands and

make a further contribution to the reduction of salinities in the winter of 1963–64.

4. That the President discuss the matter with Senator Hayden before any of the foregoing steps are taken and seek his concurrence in them.

5. That the United States Commissioner on the IBWC consult with the “Committee of Fourteen” representing the seven Basin State Governors and seek their approval of the proposed solution.

*/s/ Dave Rowe
for*

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

**205. Memorandum of conversation, April 18, between
Ambassador Carrillo Flores and Sayre¹**

April 18, 1963

SUBJECT

Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado River

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Carrillo Flores—Ambassador of Mexico
Mr. Sayre—CMA

The Ambassador said he had been instructed by the Foreign Office to convey to the Department his Government’s serious concern about the salinity problem and the nature of proposals that the United States has under consideration for solving the problem. He showed Mr. Sayre the instructions which he has received which read in translation as follows:

“You may inform (the Department of State) orally that the preliminary review of the (Bureau of Reclamation) report has produced a distressing reaction among us because we believe that the measures which are recommended do not comply with the spirit of the conversations which took place between the two Presidents nor with the provisions of the Water Treaty.”

¹ Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33–1 MEX–US.

The Ambassador recalled the conversations which had taken place between the two Presidents in which he participated. He said that President Kennedy had remarked that the action of the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district was not in keeping with the spirit of the Water Treaty. The Ambassador said the phrase in his instructions had been chosen with President Kennedy's remark in mind. He said that Mexico's position is that a permanent solution should reduce the high salinity of the water throughout the year. His Government did not regard as an adequate or permanent solution measures which only "alleviated" the problem. He recalled his meeting with President Kennedy on February 28 and expressed his concern that he had not made his Government's position clear. He felt he may not have emphasized sufficiently the political difficulty it is giving the Lopez Mateos Administration or the use the Communists in Mexico are making of the issue to enhance their political position and promote anti-Americanism. Mr. Sayre said that the President understood the problem very well and he doubted that there was any misunderstanding on his part as to Mexico's views.

The Ambassador inquired why there should be any problem with the presentation of the issue to the International Court. He said that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the meaning of the Treaty and he thought that two friendly Governments should be able to submit such a dispute to a third party for resolution. Mr. Sayre said that we hoped the matter could be resolved by the adoption of a practical program. The Ambassador recalled that he had tried to get the United States to agree to refer the legal issue to the International Bank or the Inter-American Bank. He mentioned the mediation efforts of Eugene Black on the Indus River problem between India and Pakistan. Mr. Sayre said he recalled this, but that he thought the situation was different because the United States and Mexico had a Treaty on the subject whereas a treaty did not exist with respect to the Indus River. The Ambassador said he had pressed his Government strongly to present its rehabilitation program for the Mexicali Valley to the International Bank, but had been unsuccessful. He felt that the Bank's review of the program would have solved the factual question as to whether the water which the United States is now delivering is usable. He anticipated that the Bank would have refused to finance the project if it found that the water could not be used even with improved irrigation works. He said he had not been successful because his Government believed that such action would have been an admission by Mexico that the salinity problem was a soils problem in the Mexicali Valley. His Government was firmly convinced this was not the case and did not want to take any action on its part to prejudice its position.

Mr. Sayre said that the President's Science Adviser was studying certain technical points and we hoped he would be making his recom-

mendations in the near future as to possible alternative courses of action. He said he would convey the Mexican Ambassador's message to the appropriate persons.

**206. Memorandum from Edwin Martin to Acting Secretary Ball,
May 22¹**

May 22, 1963

TO

The Acting Secretary

THROUGH

S/S

FROM

Edwin M. Martin

SUBJECT

Settlement of the Chamizal dispute with Mexico

Discussion:

Ambassador Mann, with the assistance of Commissioner Friedkin on the International Boundary and Water Commission, the Legal Adviser's Office, and this Bureau, has succeeded in negotiating with the Mexican Government a proposed settlement of the Chamizal dispute. The problem of sovereignty over the Chamizal zone in El Paso, Texas, originated in 1864, and has constituted a major problem in relations with Mexico since the United States in 1911 rejected an international arbitral commission's decision awarding a large part of the Chamizal zone to Mexico.

Every Administration beginning with that of President Taft has attempted to resolve the controversy in a mutually satisfactory manner. Proposals have differed widely and naturally have become increasingly costly. The present settlement, in accordance with the instructions of the two Presidents issued when President Kennedy visited Mexico in June 1962, is intended to give effect to the 1911 award as nearly as

¹ Settlement of the Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.

practical in today's circumstances, but not to prejudice the juridical position of either Government with respect to the award.

The attached memorandum to the President (Tab A) describes the nature of the recommended settlement. The memorandum lists the Members of Congress who have been consulted, and suggests that the President may want to consult with them and possibly others.

The terms of settlement are presented to the President in a Memorandum in the form of recommendations by the two Foreign Offices (Tab B), on the substance and language of which agreement has been essentially reached after months of tedious discussion. If the President approves the terms and procedure for agreement, the Embassy at Mexico City would agree with the Mexican Foreign Office, through an exchange of notes (Tab C), on the terms of the proposed settlement and on simultaneous release of statements by President Kennedy and by President López Mateos (Tabs D and E) accepting the solution proposed in the Memorandum. In the exchange of notes the Embassy would affirm that in the event of a failure of the settlement, this Government's position would remain as it was before the negotiations.

The Department is also requesting in the memorandum to the President authorization to proceed at once with the conclusion of a convention, which would incorporate the terms of settlement already agreed upon in the Memorandum.

The Mexican Government is particularly sensitive about the proposed arrangement whereby Mexico would reimburse the United States for the structures passing intact to Mexico in the Chamizal tract by a relocation of the boundary. By a separate exchange of notes a procedure would be agreed upon, for incorporation in an annex to the convention, for a lump sum payment to be made by a Mexican bank based on the value of the structures to Mexico (Tab F).

Since relocation of the boundary will not take place at least for two years, the Mexican Government would like a symbolic ceremony in the area shortly after ratification of the convention by both Governments. The Department would agree to a preliminary marking of the new boundary for that ceremony.

It is proposed that the Department issue a press release at the time the Presidential statements are released. This release (Tab G) would emphasize that the proposed settlement is a further step in the resolution of the controversy that has been earnestly sought by every Administration since 1910. The final step would be, of course, the conclusion and ratification of a convention.

Because of the imminence of a Presidential electoral campaign in Mexico the completion of these steps is most urgent. It is hoped that the Presidential statements can be released not later than May 24.

If the President approves, the Department will immediately authorize Ambassador Mann to agree on a public release on or about that date. Ambassador Mann will also be authorized to initiate negotiation of a convention.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the memorandum to the President;
2. That, subject to the approval of the terms and procedure by the President, you authorize me to instruct Ambassador Mann to inform the Mexican Government that the Department approves the Memorandum containing the terms of the recommended settlement, and to arrange with the Mexican Government for its public release;

Approve GWB
Disapprove _____

3. That you authorize me, in consultation with the Legal Adviser's Office, to approve any last-minute minor revisions in these documents that may seem desirable; and

Approve GWB
Disapprove _____

4. That you authorize me in accordance with the Department Circular 175 to instruct Ambassador Mann to proceed with negotiation of the convention.

Approve GWB
Disapprove _____

Concurrences:

L _____ P _____ H _____ A _____

Attachments:

1. Memorandum to the President (Tab A).
2. Foreign Offices' Memorandum (Tab B).
3. Embassy note (Tab C).
4. Presidents' release statements (Tabs D and E).
5. Notes and letters (re payment to Mexican bank) (Tab F).
6. Press release (Tab G).

207. Memorandum of conversation, May 23, between Ball and Ambassador Carrillo Flores¹

May 23, 1963

SUBJECT

Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado River

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary, Mr. Ball
Antonio Carrillo Flores, Ambassador of Mexico
Mr. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Sayre, Acting Director, CMA

The Mexican Ambassador called at his request to present a note protesting the delivery of water to Mexico under the 1944 Water Treaty. (Note No. 2011 of May 17, 1963)

The Ambassador said he wanted to express the deep concern of his Government regarding the special study of the Bureau of Reclamation of February 1963 on the salinity problem. He said that he knew that the report had not been approved by the United States Government but that his Government was frankly disturbed about the recommendations in it.

The crux of the problem, the Ambassador said, was that the United States did not recognize any obligation to Mexico with respect to the manner in which it conducted irrigation operations in the United States which directly affected Mexico. He said that Mexico could not accept the position of the United States that it had no obligation to Mexico under the Treaty or international law. He considered that the United States was bound by the same legal principles with respect to Mexico that it applied internally with respect to the several states. He said Mexico could not accept a solution which did not recognize that Mexico had rights under the Treaty and international law. He considered a solution based only on comity and the view that the United States had to be a good neighbor was unsatisfactory.

The Ambassador noted that if one of the States was being adversely affected it would have a remedy in the Supreme Court, or the State's representatives in Congress would look after the State's interests. Mexico, he noted, had no such representation, but he felt that Mexico had the right to expect that the United States Government would make every effort to treat Mexico as fairly as one of the several States.

¹ Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33–1 MEX–US.

The Acting Secretary said that the United States was very conscious of the salinity problem and that we had taken several preliminary steps to resolve it. He noted that it continued under active consideration within the United States Government.

The Mexican Ambassador said that he understood the United States' domestic and political problems which made it difficult to reach a solution but he thought that the United States Government had tied its hand by declaring that it had no obligation to Mexico. He hoped that the United States could present a fair proposal for a solution of the problem. He did not think that the United States should place arbitrary restrictions on the types of solution which might be considered such as the restrictions imposed by the Congress when it authorized the studies carried out by the Bureau of Reclamation.

Finally, the Ambassador desired to point out the political aspects of the problem for Mexico. He said that Mexico was entering a "political" period in which Mexico would have to choose a new President. He noted that the situation in Baja California was particularly sensitive because of radical groups in that area. He implied that unless a satisfactory solution could be achieved and a flare-up avoided in Baja California that the President would be under considerable pressure to select a candidate more acceptable to radical elements.

Mr. Martin noted the problem of obtaining agreement among the technicians as to the facts and to the effect of those facts on both the Mexicali Valley and the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation district. He said that the President's Science Adviser is actively engaged in the effort to develop a satisfactory solution.

The Acting Secretary said that the United States Government was very sympathetic to the problem presented by the Mexican Government and would continue its efforts to achieve a prompt and fair solution.

**208. Memorandum from George Ball to President Kennedy,
May 24¹**

May 24, 1963

SUBJECT

Settlement of the Chamizal Dispute

In accordance with your understanding with President López Mateos of Mexico, the Department of State, the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations, and the International Boundary and Water Commission have drawn up recommendations for a final solution to the Chamizal dispute. The dispute originated with a shift in the channel of the Rio Grande at El Paso, Texas in 1864. After a meeting between Presidents Taft and Diaz in 1910, the dispute was submitted to international arbitration. The United States did not accept the arbitral award on the ground, among others, that the Arbitral Commission exceeded its terms of reference by dividing the tract. Each Administration since that time has attempted to work out a solution to the controversy.

A Memorandum which presents the essential features of a settlement in the form of recommendations to the Presidents has been drawn up by the two Foreign Offices. The recommended settlement entails a net transfer to Mexico of 437 acres of United States territory. (A map of the area showing the recommended boundary changes is enclosed). The Rio Grande would be relocated into a new channel so that all Mexican territory (366 acres in the Chamizal zone, 193 acres of Cordova Island already under Mexican jurisdiction, and 264 acres east of Cordova Island for a total of 823 acres) would be south of the Rio Grande.

Press statements expressing acceptance of the recommendations have been drafted for you and President López Mateos to issue simultaneously with the public release of the Memorandum. Finally, there is general agreement on an exchange of notes which would incorporate a related understanding on payment for structures which would pass intact to Mexico, which because of the sensitivity of this problem in Mexico, the Mexican Government prefers to handle separately from the Memorandum.

These documents would represent a commitment to conclude a convention on the terms recommended in the Memorandum. Once the recommended terms are formally accepted by both Presidents, the Foreign Offices would proceed as quickly as possible to conclude a

¹ Settlement of the Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.

convention, which would be submitted to the respective Senates for approval.

We estimate that the net cost to the United States of acquiring the lands and improvements in the areas involved and our share of the cost of relocating the river channel, replacing existing bridges, and moving two rail lines would be about \$18 million. This figure is based on preliminary estimates, and would entail an appropriation of \$26.5 million, offset subsequently by reimbursement of \$4.7 million for structures passing intact to Mexico and by \$3.3 million from sale of a portion of the land acquired by the United States. The cost of relocating the river channel and of erecting new bridges is to be shared equally. Some 3,750 persons would have to be evacuated from the part of the Chamizal and the area east of Cordova Island to be transferred to Mexico.

Ambassador Mann, United States Commissioner Friedkin on the International Boundary and Water Commission, and officials of the Department have regularly over the last several months consulted with local, Texas and Federal officials and with members of Congress. Officials of El Paso and Texas, including Governor Connally, and most community leaders in El Paso favor a settlement and have indicated acceptance of the one proposed. Within the last week the following have been advised in detail of the terms and timing of the proposed settlement, either directly or indirectly according to their preference: the Vice President through Mr. Jenkins; Senator Mansfield through Mr. Valeo; all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Relations Committee Staff; Senators Morse and Hickenlooper had been consulted in detail previously; Senator McClellan through Mr. Westbrook; Senator Hayden by memorandum; Senators Yarborough, Tower and Saltonstall directly; Congressman Morgan through Mr. Crawford of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff; Congresswoman Bolton and Congressmen Bow, Selden and Foreman directly, and Congressmen Hailiard, Cannon, and Rooney by memorandum. Only Senator Tower and Congressman Foreman have expressed reservations, but have not indicated they are opposed. No significant organized opposition to the settlement has been expressed in Texas except by home owners in the actual area to be transferred and by extremist groups.

I recommend that you approve the general terms for settlement of the dispute, and authorize the Department to reach agreement with Mexico on the Memorandum and the Presidential statements approving it and their release to the press, and to proceed with the negotiation and signing of a Chamizal convention.

I also recommend that, before public release of the terms of settlement, you consider meeting with the above-mentioned members of

the Congress to inform them of your decision or have an appropriate member of your staff consult them.

George W. Ball
Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Foreign Offices' Draft
Memorandum of Recommendation.
2. Map of El Paso-Juarez area.
3. Proposed Presidential press statement.
4. Proposed press statement for President Lopez Mateos.

209. Memorandum from Edwin Martin to Chayes, June 20¹

June 20, 1963

SUBJECT

Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado River

The Congress has appropriated \$6 million for additional pumps in the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District and the Bureau of Reclamation expects to operate them in a manner which would reduce the salinity of the water delivered to Mexico in the winter time to a peak of approximately 2000 p.p.m. In addition, the Bureau of Reclamation expects to adopt other measures such as a reduction in pumping of approximately 20,000 acre-feet, which will reduce the winter salinities to a peak of 1800 p.p.m. No other measures are foreseen which would reduce the winter salinities below 1800 p.p.m. for the winter of 1963–64. You will recall that Mexico refused to accept any water with a salinity of 1800 p.p.m. during the winters of 1961–62 and 1962–63. We, therefore, have the clear prospect of a serious crisis in our relations with Mexico in October.

In the meeting which you attended at the White House on the salinity problem, the Secretary of the Interior recommended that we adopt whatever measures we can to alleviate the salinity problem without causing any adverse effects on the Wellton-Mohawk district

¹ Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32–1 MEX-US.

and await the Mexican Government reaction. This is the course we are now following.

The Secretary of the Interior suggested that if the Mexican reaction was sufficiently strong we might then be able to persuade those opposed to measures which would remedy the problem to agree to such steps as a bypass channel or tile drains in the Wellton-Mohawk district. Neither of these remedial measures could be adopted and have any effect before the winter of 1964-65. The only actions of which we are aware that could avoid a crisis this winter are (1) release of storage water and (2) reduction of pumping in the Wellton-Mohawk district by about 75%.

We have no basis for judging the possible Mexican action in October except by past actions and the statements of both the Mexican Foreign Minister and Mexican Ambassador. Our best estimate is that the Mexican Government would seek to have us take emergency measures to reduce the salinity of the water to an acceptable level. Failing this, Mexico would probably refuse to accept any water this winter and there would be no agricultural production in the Mexicali Valley for this five month period. It is possible that Mexico would seek to minimize the adverse effects by restricting wheat acreage and increasing water applications to compensate for the higher salinities. To the best of our knowledge, however, it did not do this in either of the two previous winters. Mexico would probably seek a remedy by court action. The Mexican Foreign Office has retained lawyers for this purpose. The Mexican Government apparently has not decided whether to take the case to the International Court or to a US Federal court. The Mexican Foreign Minister is known to favor bringing the case in the International Court, but may decide a US Federal Court is preferable on the assumption that a decision can be obtained sooner.

Ambassador Mann discussed this possible course of events with the Secretary on June 17. He noted that the Mexican President considers he obtained a commitment from President Kennedy to remedy the situation before October 1963. He expressed concern that a major crisis with Mexico could have the most serious consequences for our relations and could be used by the extreme left to tip the scales in favor of an extreme left candidate for President of Mexico. Ambassador Mann took issue with what seems to be the implicit assumption in our present course of action, i.e., that if we let the issue go to court we will win, or at the very worst, if we lose the decision would not require more extensive remedial measures than mentioned above.

The Secretary requested a brief on the problem which he might use for discussions with the President and Senator Hayden. He desires to take the matter up with the President after the President returns from his European trip. He asked to be informed primarily of the

possible effect on the supply of Colorado River water available to US users if the United States should lose a suit in either the International Court or a US Federal Court. He desires to know:

1. Whether there is a sound legal basis for Interior's view that the operations at Wellton-Mohawk are in keeping with the 1944 Water Treaty and international law; or, to state it in the reverse, whether Mexico has a strong legal basis for its assertion that the operations are in contravention of the Treaty and international law.

2. Whether the Mexican Government would be able to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the International Court or a US Federal Court. If the Mexican Government decides not to subject itself to the jurisdiction of a US Federal Court, would the Mexicali farmers have standing in a Federal Court and what is the likelihood of their success in enjoining the Wellton-Mohawk operations and being awarded damages.

3. What are the possible legal theories which a court might adopt in deciding a case brought by Mexico or the Mexican farmers and what would be the effect on the supply of water available to the Colorado Basin states under each theory.

210. Telegram 504 from Mexico City, August 21¹

Mexico City, August 21, 1963

Dept Pass IBWC El Paso. For Martin from Mann.

Urgent and important decisions are necessary concerning the salt water problem which continues to be the number one issue in our relations with Mexico. I consider this problem of such high priority, and the risks and consequences of further delay in reaching decisions so great, that I believe this telegram merits the personal attention of the President and the Secretary.

The salinity issue has not yet reached crisis proportions in Mexico, despite strong pressures on the government from various sectors, including the 300,000 people whose livelihood depends on the Mexicali Valley, only because the government has up to this time decided to down-play this problem. However, Mexico interprets the statement on salinity in the joint Presidential communiqué of June 30, 1962—"They expressed their determination, with the scientific studies as a basis, to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time

¹ Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.

with the aim of preventing the recurrence of this problem after October, 1963"—as an undertaking on our part to come forward with a satisfactory solution before the end of October 1963.

If we cannot negotiate successfully with Mexico in the next two months on the basis of concrete plans on our side for a "permanent and effective solution" we should expect Mexico to move toward actions which can only be harmful to our national interests. I believe Mexico would, sooner or later, file suit in the World Court or encourage a class suit for injunction in one of our Federal Courts, or raise the issue of rights of a lower riparian state in the OAS or the UN, or simultaneously follow two or more of these routes. I doubt that Mexico has made final decisions about the action it will take, and it is not improbable it might defer decision until November or December. By that time it will be clear to Mexico that this winter's salinity levels (predicted at about 2,000 parts per million throughout the winter) will be higher than they were last winter and Mexico must decide whether to waste the water with all that this implies for the winter wheat crop or to use it with the consequent additional salt damage to the soil. Moreover, by that time a decision will also have been made on the Nobel Peace Prize, with reference to which Mexico has been reluctant to become involved in international disputes because of the effect this might have on its campaign to obtain the peace prize for Lopez Mateos.

If the salinity issue is taken to court by Mexico it seems to me probable that the decision would be against us, and even possible that it would be adverse to a degree which could permanently prejudice the present rights of United States users of Colorado River waters. I assume that it was this possibility of a court decision far more damaging to American users of Colorado River Waters than a negotiated settlement which prompted six of the seven Colorado River Basin States to recommend a by-pass channel through which the most highly saline Wellton-Mohawk waters could be wasted. And even in the unlikely event a court should sustain our position, the price we would pay would be confirmation of Mexico's right to send into the Rio Grande highly saline waters which would seriously damage US farmers in the lower Rio Grande Valley.

Moreover, if Mexico is forced to take action against us the wraps presently held around Mexican press coverage will be taken off, the people will learn of the facts in this issue, and unnecessary damage will be done to our relations with the government and people of Mexico. Communists and opportunists will take every advantage of this opportunity to attack us on legal and moral grounds, raising issues on which they will be joined by many other Mexicans, even those who are anti-communist and normally friendly to us. Indeed, since the salinity issue could come to a head precisely at the time the Lopez Mateos administra-

tion selects the next Presidential candidate, it is even possible that a wave of anti-United States feeling, stemming from our inaction and apparent indifference, could cause the selection of a leftist candidate deemed capable of standing up to the United States in defense of Mexico's rights. I need hardly say that the implications of such a selection could be far reaching.

We should face up to the fact that the Wellton-Mohawk salinity problem was not created by an act of God. It was deliberately created by us on the theory that because the 1944 Colorado Water Treaty is silent on the issue of quality, the United States had no obligation to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary injury to a lower riparian user. According to this theory, we are, in consequence, free to dump on the Mexicali Valley over an estimated 20 year period the highly saline Wellton-Mohawk underground lake and gradually to replace those underground waters with water of a better quality from the Imperial Dam so that the Wellton Mohawk could have a usable underground reserve supply available for its crops in addition to its allotted share of river water. The fact is that the Wellton-Mohawk is pumping out and sending down to Mexico nearly four times as much salt as would normally be required for successful irrigation operations. There is no way to disguise this hard fact or the additional fact that gradually but inevitably the productivity of the soil of the Mexicali Valley will be seriously impaired if the water is used.

The only remedial action which the Mexicali Valley could take, if it used the water, would be further to substantially reduce the number of acres in cultivation so as to be able, by applying more water per acre than is normally required, to wash the added salt through the root zone. And even if this were politically and economically feasible to do in this heavily populated valley (which I doubt) there could be no assurance that salt would not continue to accumulate to the detriment of productivity in at least a part of the smaller acreage cultivated. Mexico has a shortage of arable land as well as water. It is not an overstatement to say that the Mexicali Valley is as important to Mexicans as the Imperial Valley is to us.

We have the opportunity now to reduce these risks by negotiating settlement with Mexico based on the concept of approximate salt balance. This can be achieved either by wasting the poorest quality waters of the Wellton Mohawk District or going over to a system of tile drains such as are used in the Imperial and other valleys. We will not have this same choice nor the initiative once we are waist deep in a crisis situation.

Mann

211. Telegram 508 to Mexico City, September 5¹

September 5, 1963

Following is uncleared memcon between Secretary and Mexican Ambassador on September 5. No additional memcon will be prepared:

Mexican Ambassador called on Secretary at former's request to deliver letter from President Lopez Mateos to President Kennedy on the Chamizal. Letter recalls agreement of two Presidents to attempt achieve solution of Chamizal problem and expresses hope now that Convention has been signed that it can be promptly ratified. Secretary said he would discuss with Senator Fulbright after Convention submitted to Senate. He inquired whether any doubt Convention would be approved in Mexico. Carrillo Flores said there was not but that Mexico traditionally waited until US acted on important bilateral treaties. Secretary expressed hope Mexico would act this year even if US Senate did not so that ratification would not be postponed until September 1964. He noted US Senate might not get to Treaty until January. Carrillo Flores said he had recommended to his Govt that Mexican Senate act on Convention before it adjourns in December even though US had not approved. He noted that he had recommended to President Lopez Mateos that Mexican Cabinet approve Convention so that Presidential hopefuls would be bound and that this had been done. Ambassador said he had also discussed Convention approval with Senator Mansfield who is personal friend of Lopez Mateos. Secretary expressed appreciation for letter and said he would be pleased forward it to President.

Mexican Ambassador then raised salinity problem. Said he hoped that provisional action could be taken avoid crisis this winter. Secretary said he was studying problem and would be talking to Secretary Udall and President. He promised talk again with Ambassador once he had more definite information.

Secretary then inquired about Mexico's views on Cuba. Ambassador said he considered it significant Lopez Mateos did not make any remarks on Cuba in his September 1 State of Union message which could be considered favorable. He noted President had referred only to missile crisis in which Mexico had urged withdrawal of missiles and had condemned wanton aggression of China against India. In response to question, Secretary said there appeared to be further with-

¹ Transmits September 5 memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Ambassador Carrillo Flores re Chamizal dispute; salinity problem; Cuba; President Lopez Mateos' trip to Europe. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.

drawals of Soviet forces and that recent increase in shipping had disturbed us but that it may have been associated with sugar shipments. He thought real problem was continued training in Cuba of Latin Americans for guerrilla and subversive activities in their own countries. US saw no signs Castro's desire dominate Latin America had lessened but we continued believe Castro considered himself revolutionary of hemisphere importance and too big for Cuba alone. Ambassador inquired about US assessment of reported break between Soviets and Cuba. Secretary said we did not attach much credence these reports. He speculated that fact Cuba has not signed Partial Test Ban Treaty, for example, might indicate desire on Cuba's part avoid taking sides between USSR and China.

Secretary inquired about results of Lopez Mateos trip to Europe. Ambassador said it had been successful trip. He noted that Tito would be visiting Mexico next month. His subsequent remarks reflected Mexican view that visit by Tito to Mexico would not unnecessarily disturb US because US-Yugoslav relations were most QUOTE normal END QUOTE of generally QUOTE abnormal END QUOTE relations between US and Soviet bloc countries. To bolster point he said Senator Mansfield had told him US Congressmen would be visiting Yugoslavia in near future. Secretary acknowledged US relations with Yugoslavia were probably on better basis than with any country in Soviet bloc. He said import of Khrushchev-Tito meeting not clear as yet. He considered it useful for members of Congress visit Yugoslavia to see situation first-hand. He was hopeful Congress would remove restrictive provisions in foreign aid legislation on trade with Poland and Yugoslavia.

Rusk

212. Memorandum of conversation, October 11, among Rusk, Udall, and other U.S. officials¹

October 11, 1963

SUBJECT

Colorado River Salinity Problem

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Interior
Mr. Floyd Dominy, Commissioner of Reclamation
Mr. Joseph F. Friedkin, U.S. Commissioner, IBWC
Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell, Acting Assistant Secretary
Mr. Abraham Chayes, Legal Adviser
Mr. Frank J. Barry, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
Mr. Edward Weinberg, Deputy Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Deputy Director, CMA

Secretary Udall said that the water supply on the Colorado River was the shortest this year that it had been in several years. He noted that it might be necessary to release some of the water being impounded at Glen Canyon Dam to meet downstream requirements. This situation made it extremely difficult to find a solution to the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River. He thought any solution involving the provision of the additional water to Mexico would not be acceptable to the Basin States. Mr. Dominy recalled the Senate hearings that had followed his decision last year to release impounded flood waters for river regulation. Mr. Friedkin agreed that any solution to the salinity problem involving the release of additional water for Mexico would not be acceptable to the Basin States and thought that other solutions were possible.

The Secretary of State said that he was seriously concerned that continued failure to find a solution would lead to court action in which the United States stood to lose, given the state of facts in this case. Secretary Udall agreed and said that he desired to avoid any possibility that an international water master might be appointed for the Colorado River.

Secretary Udall said that the proposal of the Department of State for coordinating the pumping at Wellton-Mohawk with the Mexican diversion schedule was essentially sound, but that his Department would need the details on the Mexican schedule to work out a program.

¹ Colorado River salinity problem. Limited Official Use. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.

He said that his Department would attempt to work out a program so that the salinity level of water delivered to Mexico would be 1,500 p.p.m. or less during the coming winter. Commissioner Dominy asked if the Mexicans would be agreeable to such a program and would accept water with 1,500 p.p.m. Commissioner Friedkin said that 1,500 p.p.m. this winter would be about salt balance. He thought that the Mexicans would accept it. In any event, he considered that the United States could defend itself if it achieved this quality of water for delivery to Mexico this winter. He said he would take the matter up with the Mexican Commissioner as soon as possible. He added that he thought the Mexican Commissioner would have a difficult time accepting unless there were a long-term solution in prospect. He regarded a satisfactory long-term solution as the key to any acceptance by the Mexicans of an interim solution which they did not regard as entirely in keeping with their rights under the Treaty.

Mr. Weinberg noted that under the Treaty Mexico has the right to divert 900 cubic second feet at all times and that they would in effect have to forego this right for limited periods during the winter. Mr. Friedkin agreed that this was the difficult point for Mexico. Mr. Chayes observed that the two Presidents had agreed to work out a practical solution without regard to their juridical positions. He thought the temporary solution for this winter fit this formula and hoped that the Mexicans would agree.

Secretary Udall agreed that there had to be a long term solution. Working out a long-term solution was not as easy, however, because it would require appropriations. He considered the alternatives the installation of tile drain or the by-pass channel. He recalled that his Department had obtained funds to install 8,000 acres of tile drain at Wellton-Mohawk and that this construction is now well underway. However, Bureau of Reclamation's model studies to date do not reveal that tile drains would be effective in initially reducing salinity of the drainage effluent as indications are that the tile drains would intercept and discharge the saline waters of the lower aquifer. It is understood, however, that installation of a tile drain system and abandonment of the deep well pumping would satisfy Mexican interests and would avoid the legal issues raised by a by-pass channel. Mr. Dominy observed that the Bureau's model studies are not definitive and that there is conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of tile drains insofar as producing a drainage effluent of better quality than that from the deep drainage wells. Commissioner Friedkin agreed that there was conflicting evidence on the tile drain solution. Nevertheless, the Mexican Commissioner regarded tile drain as an acceptable method of drainage and Commissioner Friedkin thought that the United States could defend itself on using this type of drainage at Wellton-Mohawk.

Secretary Udall said that his Department would consider a by-pass channel as a long-term solution if tile drain proved impractical. He emphasized that the long-term solution required appropriations and that he and Commissioner Dominy would have to discuss it with Senator Hayden and other interested parties before he could make a definitive decision. He wanted to be assured that the Mexican Government would not publicly discuss the possible alternatives before he could complete the necessary discussions. Mr. Sayre said that the Mexican Government had consistently taken the position that it had a commitment from President Kennedy to resolve the problem by October but had not discussed possible alternatives. He thought the Mexican Government would agree to avoid any discussions of details. He said the Department could instruct Ambassador Mann to discuss the matter with the Foreign Minister and obtain a specific commitment to that effect.

The Secretary of State inquired whether the Mexican Government had indicated it would accept the temporary solution proposed for the winter of 1963-64. Mr. Sayre said that Foreign Minister Tello had proposed informally to Ambassador Mann a temporary solution along the lines the Department of State had recommended. The Foreign Minister had not been specific in his conversation, but Mr. Sayre thought the proposal would be acceptable to Mexico.

It was agreed that Commissioner Friedkin would obtain as soon as possible Mexico's proposed diversion schedule for the winter of 1963-64 so that the Bureau of Reclamation could develop an operating program for coordinating the pumping at Wellton-Mohawk with the diversion schedule. It was also understood that Commissioner Friedkin could assure the Mexican Commissioner that the United States would make a decision soon on a long-term solution.

It was agreed that the Department of State would instruct Ambassador Mann to discuss the matter with the Mexican Foreign Minister, to inform him in general terms of the temporary solution proposed for this winter, to assure him that a decision would be made on a long-term solution soon, and to obtain a commitment from him that the Mexican Government would avoid any discussion of the details of the temporary solution or the possible alternatives for a long-term solution.

Venezuela

213. Memorandum of conversation, March 31 between Foreign Minister Falcon Briceno and Thomas C. Mann, and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

March 31, 1961

SUBJECT

VENEZUELA: Urgent Need for Financial Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Marcos FALCON BRICEÑO, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
Dr. Raul NASS, Counselor, Venezuelan Embassy
Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State
Milton J. Barall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
John J. Ingersoll, Officer in Charge of Venezuelan Affairs
William Pryce, Staff Assistant to Mr. Mann

COPIES TO

ARA — Mr. Mann
ARA — Mr. Barall
S — Mr. Berle
E — Mr. Martin
FN — Mr. Moser
EST — Mr. Boonstra
EST — Mr. Ingersoll

REA — Amb. Turkel
INR — AmEmbassy Caracas

Dr. Falcon Briceño called on Mr. Mann, by appointment, to discuss a number of matters. Other subjects covered in this talk are reported separately.

The Foreign Minister spoke with some emotion about the urgent need of Venezuela for financial assistance from the United States, covering much the same ground as he had on the preceding day in his talk with Mr. Berle.

Mr. Mann suggested the desirability of a "package" of assistance for Venezuela, and to this end recommended consideration of the utility of a team of well-known, Latin American economists and technicians from the Inter-American Development Bank and other financial agencies visiting Venezuela and working out with the GOV plans for meeting the immediate problem and also for long-range economic development. Such persons should be experts in their fields but, perhaps more

¹ Venezuela's urgent need for financial assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 731.5-MSP/3-3161.

important, they would be thoroughly familiar with the criteria, procedures and policies of the various Washington lending agencies.

Dr. Falcon Briceño said he felt that Venezuela has good economists and technicians who know what needs to be done, from an economic and financial point of view. But, he said, the arithmetic is easy; the real problem is political. He said that to balance the budget would require reducing the payroll of the Federal Government by more than 24,000 persons. Virtually all of these are in Caracas and their discharge, into the already troublesome ranks of the unemployed, would be political suicide for the Betancourt Government. He said that all of the existing financial institutions are fine but that for the Venezuelan situation they take too long. He said that while their long-term development plans are being worked out, democracies such as Venezuela can founder. This is the aspect which makes the problem frighteningly urgent.

Mr. Mann said he felt the sending of a team of technicians to Caracas would help speed things up rather than lose time. He suggested also that the Venezuelan Government prepare figures and hard factual data and, with such material in hand, talk privately with Secretary Dillon and others at the forthcoming Rio de Janeiro Conference of the IDB.

214. Memorandum of conversation, May 5, between Perez Guerrero and Bowles and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

May 5, 1961

SUBJECT

Venezuelan Financial Mission's Call on The Under Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Manuel PEREZ GUERRERO, Director, Office of Coordination and Planning,
Venezuela

Dr. Jose Antonio MAYOBRE, Ambassador of Venezuela

Dr. Ivan SENIOR, Director, Office of Public Credit, Ministry of Finance of
Venezuela

Mr. Alejandro OPOPEZA Castillo, Governor, Federal District of Caracas

¹ Request by the Special Financial Mission from Venezuela for U.S. assistance with its economic development program. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 331.

Mr. Oscar NIEMTSCHIK, Economic Counselor, Embassy of Venezuela
Dr. Carlos SOSA Rodriguez, Venezuelan Ambassador to the Un N.
The Under Secretary
Teodoro Moscoso, U.S. Ambassador-Designate to Venezuela
John J. Ingersoll, Officer in Charge of Venezuelan Affairs

The Venezuelan Special Financial Mission, headed by Dr. Perez Guerrero, called on the Under Secretary, by appointment, at 4:15 p.m. on May 5, 1961. The Under Secretary received the group in the diplomatic waiting-room adjoining the Secretary's suite.

The Under Secretary expressed his pleasure in receiving the Mission and inquired about their activities and objectives.

Dr. Perez Guerrero explained that his purpose was to meet with officials of the United States Government concerned with financial matters and with officials of the several United States and international lending institutions from which his Government hoped to obtain assistance in carrying out its four-year economic development program and in achieving budgetary balance and restoring confidence in the investment and financial stability of Venezuela. He outlined briefly the sense of his group's meetings with Department officers and his immediately preceding meetings with Secretary of Treasury Dillon and with Mr. George McGovern, of the President's Food for Peace Program. He said that his mission would meet with officers of the Export-Import Bank immediately after this call and that one of the items with which he was most concerned was a request to the Eximbank for a further \$50 million credit on terms similar to those of a credit for a like amount which is in the final stages of negotiation. He expressed his hope that his Government could count on the support of the Under Secretary and the Department of State for this credit which is much needed as a part of the Government's over-all development program.

The Under Secretary expressed the desire of the United States Government to help effectively to improve living standards and economic and social conditions in under-developed countries and noted that these efforts must be accompanied by serious efforts on the part of the peoples of the less developed countries themselves. He said that we and countries receiving assistance from us have made mistakes in the past and that he hoped we all have learned from our mistakes.

Ambassador Mayobre asked the Under Secretary if it might not be possible for the Department of State to issue a statement to the press regarding the Perez-Guerrero mission and the serious desire of the United States to help the Venezuelan Government succeed with its economic development and stabilization programs. He said that the IBRD and the IDB were planning to issue releases and that such a statement by the U.S. Government would be most helpful psychologically in Venezuela.

The Under Secretary said the Department would be glad to issue an appropriate statement. He instructed Ambassador Moscoso and Mr. Ingersoll to check with Mr. Rogers in his office on the preparation of such a statement.

Dr. Perez Guerrero thanked the Under Secretary for his kindness in receiving the group and expressed his pleasure with the warm and constructive reception his mission had been receiving from all of their contacts in the United States Government.

215. Memorandum of conversation, June 22, between President of the Chamber of Deputies Caldera, Ambassador Mayobre and Rusk and Ingersoll¹

June 22, 1961

SUBJECT

VENEZUELA: Political Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Rafael CALDERA, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Venezuela

Dr. Jose Antonio MAYOBRE, Ambassador of Venezuela

The Secretary

John J. Ingersoll, Officer in Charge of Venezuelan Affairs

Dr. Caldera, accompanied by Ambassador Mayobre called on the Secretary at 4:40 p.m. today.

The Secretary expressed his pleasure to see Dr. Caldera and Dr. Caldera said he wished to express to the Secretary the appreciation of his Government for the sympathetic and helpful attitude of the Department and the new Administration for Venezuela's problems.

The Secretary asked Dr. Caldera what are the principal problems occupying the attention of the Venezuelan Government.

Dr. Caldera said that the principal problems are economic at the present time. He described the budget difficulties, the unemployment situation and the austerity measures proposed by President Betancourt.

¹ Political situation in Venezuela. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 731.00/6-2261.

He said that the communists and other extremists had labelled these measures "Program of Hunger". He said that for the most part the Government has demonstrated its ability to control the subversive and disruptive efforts of the left-wing extremists.

The Secretary inquired about the political conditions at the University and Dr. Caldera said that political action by his party and other moderate elements is necessary at the University and secondary school level because the communists are extremely active in these fields and must not be left to control these vital groups. Dr. Caldera said that the recent elections in the labor unions and in the Universities have shown considerable and growing strength on the part of the COPEI and AD forces. He outlined in some detail the extent of the recent victories in the individual Universities.

The Secretary asked about the strength of religion in Venezuelan politics. Dr. Caldera replied that the Venezuelans try to keep religion and politics separated. There followed some general discussion of the tactics and ability of the communists to extend their influence at all levels of the population, particularly in the towns and villages and rural areas. The Secretary said that Mr. Khrushchev has tried to label the United States the "Gendarme of the Status Quo" and that we must make clear to the common people everywhere that this is not so and that we do, in fact, sincerely desire to improve the lot of the common man but in an atmosphere of freedom.

Dr. Caldera thanked the Secretary for his courtesy in receiving him and expressed his hope that they would meet again soon.

216. Memorandum from Battle to Swank, October 16¹

October 16, 1961

*Memoranda of Conversation Between the Secretary
and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Falcon-Briceño*

The following memoranda of conversation, dated October 6, between the Venezuelan Foreign Minister and the Secretary are referred for approval prior to distribution:

Tab A—Perez Jimenez Extradition Case;

Tab B—The Cuban Problem; and

Tab C—U.S. Congressman Rousselot's Verbal Attack on President Betancourt.

These memoranda were drafted by Mr. Moskowitz, the Venezuelan Desk Officer. The Secretary's remarks are sidlined in red. These memoranda are considered suitable for distribution to CIA.

L.D. Battle**Tab A****SUBJECT**

Pérez Jiménez Extradition Case

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Marcos Falcón-Briceño, Foreign Minister of Venezuela

Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Ambassador of Venezuela

The Secretary

ABA—Mr. Coerr

EST—Mr. Moskowitz

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister had requested an appointment with the Secretary to discuss several matters of mutual interest.

Dr. Falcón-Briceño brought up the subject of the Marcos Pérez Jiménez extradition case. He touched briefly on the legal developments to date and then expressed the concern of the Venezuelan Government that Pérez Jiménez may attempt to flee the country as the time approaches for a verdict by the Appellate Court. He said that he did not believe there was a great likelihood that Pérez Jiménez might flee

¹ Transmits memoranda of conversation, between Rusk and Foreign Minister Falcon-Briceño. Perez Jimenez extradition case; Cuban Problem. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 331.

before such a moment. However, he mentioned that Mr. Westwood, of the law firm representing the Venezuelan Government in the case, had expressed his fear to the Venezuelan Government and to United States authorities that Pérez Jiménez might take advantage of the absence of surveillance to make good his escape.

The Secretary referred to the legal limitations confronting the United States executive authorities in this particular matter. He pointed out that the Department had expressed its concern to the Justice Department and asked that the necessary measures be undertaken to prevent Pérez Jiménez from fleeing illegally. He also stated that when the case was resumed the Department of Justice might undertake to approach the Court about Pérez Jiménez's bail.

Tab B

SUBJECT

The Cuban Problem

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Marcos Falcón-Briceño, Foreign Minister of Venezuela

Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Ambassador of Venezuela

The Secretary

ARA—Mr. Coerr

EST—Mr. Moskowitz

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister had requested an appointment with the Secretary to discuss several matters of mutual interest.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister for his opinion of the Cuban problem.

The Foreign Minister immediately referred to a recent speech by President Betancourt in which the latter had stated publicly that only humanitarian reasons were preventing a break in diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Cuba. The Minister pointed out that there were still close to 70 asylees in the Venezuelan Embassy in Habana for whom the Cuban Government had thus far refused to issue safe conduct passes. Among these were former Cuban President Urrutia and his young daughter (granddaughter?). The latter was suffering from a serious illness and the Minister thought that it was possible that she might die in the Venezuelan Embassy if permission were not granted for her to leave to receive medical treatment. He said also that the Venezuelan Chargé had recently returned to Habana with orders to do everything possible to get the Cuban Government to issue safe conduct passes for the asylees remaining in the Embassy. In response to a question he answered that about 70% of the asylees in the Venezuelan Embassy, who had numbered more than 200 a few weeks ago, had

been given safe conduct passes and had departed with the assistance of a Venezuelan sponsored airlift.

The Foreign Minister mentioned that there were numerous Cubans living in Venezuela who were divided into pro- and anti-Castro groups. They were creating problems for the Venezuelan Government by engaging not only in polemics but also in what amounted to terrorist activities against one another.

The Foreign Minister stated that Venezuela's position on Cuba was well known to the Department and alluded again to President Betancourt's recent speech, mentioned above, as being indicative of the Venezuelan Government's antipathy for the Castro regime. The Minister stated that he had heard the rumor that there might be some early action from the Inter-American Peace Committee on the Cuban problem and asked whether we had any information on this.

Mr. Coerr stated that we were interested in possible action by the Inter-American Peace Committee as were a number of Latin American states.

217. National Intelligence Estimate No. 89-61, November 21¹

November 21, 1961

THE SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for the Betancourt government, for the survival of democratic government in Venezuela, and for orderly social and economic reform.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Venezuela, an extraordinarily wealthy country in terms of its natural and financial resources, is nevertheless beset by severe economic, social, and political problems which reflect the strains inherent in a transition, in one lifetime, from military dictatorship and an oligarchic social order toward a democratic welfare state. (*Paras. 10-11*)

¹ "The Situation in Venezuela." Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.

2. The Betancourt administration, elected after the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship, is a social democratic-Christian socialist coalition committed to the evolutionary reform of economic and social institutions. It is opposed by extreme leftists, including the Communists and other Castro sympathizers, and also by rightist elements, but, with the support of the armed forces, has survived repeated coup attempts, including several attempts to assassinate Betancourt. (*Paras. 15–22*)

3. Pro-Castro sentiment, once strong in Venezuela, has sharply declined. In late 1960, the successful suppression of serious disorders fomented by the revolutionary left showed that it lacked sufficient strength to coerce or overthrow the government. (*Paras. 23–27*)

4. Despite the resources available to it, the Betancourt government is beset by severe financial problems resulting from (a) the end of the Venezuelan oil boom, with a consequent decline in the growth of income from the petroleum industry, and (b) greatly increased expenditures for politically necessary social welfare programs. Its difficulties have been further complicated by a serious economic recession and heavy flight of capital. Unemployment now amounts to about 12 percent of the labor force and is rising. (*Paras. 33–36*)

5. The government is counting heavily on external assistance to restore business confidence and to carry out its programs for economic recovery and development. Even with such aid, progress in these respects is likely to be slow and uncertain. (*Paras. 37–41*)

6. Popular dissatisfaction and impatience with the slow rate of economic improvement is likely to grow, especially in the congested urban areas. This dissatisfaction will provide the Communists and other revolutionary leftists with further opportunities for agitation against the regime. At the same time, distrust and dissatisfaction in business circles is likely to continue, and some rightists will continue to conspire with reactionary military elements to overthrow the regime. Thus Betancourt will remain under continuing threat from both the left and the right. (*Para. 42*)

7. On the other hand, Betancourt enters the final half of his term with certain important advantages. His standing in the Caribbean area as a leading exponent of constitutional government and moderate reform adds to his domestic prestige. The military will probably continue to support him against threats from the right as well as from the revolutionary left. (*Paras. 43–44*)

8. On balance, we believe that Betancourt will probably be able to serve out his term, ending in early 1964. We are much less confident, however, that his administration will have provided a stable foundation for the continuation of constitutional government. (*Paras. 45–48*)

9. Betancourt has carefully avoided any appearance of dependence on the US, but has done his part to keep relations with the US on a

cordial footing. His position at home and in the area has been strengthened by recent developments in the Dominican Republic. He probably is inclined to go along with an inter-American acceptance to the Balaguer government in the Dominican Republic now that the Trujillo family's power over it has been broken. He has broken diplomatic relations with Cuba, and is supporting the Colombian proposals for collective action against the Castro regime. (*Paras.* 49–51)

[Here follows the discussion section of the paper.]

218. Memorandum of conversation, December 16, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

December 16, 1961

SUBJECT

Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt—Community Development

PARTICIPANTS

The President
 Ambassador Chester Bowles
 Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
 Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
 Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the Agency for International Development
 Mr. Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
 Mr. Harold Linder, President of Export-Import Bank of Washington
 Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS staff interpreter
 President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela
 Dr. Marcos Falcón Briceño, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
 Dr. Andres German Otero, Minister of Finance of Venezuela
 General Antonio Briceño Linares, Minister of Defense of Venezuela
 Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States
 Dr. Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Governor of the Federal District of Venezuela
 Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Chief, Office of Coordination and Planning, Venezuelan Government

¹ Community development-housing/slum clearance project. Limited Official Use. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

The meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, 1961, at Los Nuñez, President Betancourt's residence in Caracas, Venezuela. Several unrelated matters were discussed at this conference, including the subject covered in this memorandum.

Community Development—Housing/Slum Clearance Project

President Betancourt asked Governor Oropeza to explain the national community and municipal program and urban low-cost housing improvement plan described in his memorandum No. 3.

Governor Oropeza spoke of the necessity of hastening urban housing, pointing out that the shacks (*ranchos*) ringing Caracas were eloquent testimony of the need. He said the Federal District needed this type of low-cost housing most, but that similar problems were faced in Maracaibo, Maracay, Cumaná and other larger cities. A total sum of \$50,000,000 is needed in 1962.

Dr. Oropeza stated that certain funds for housing had already been obtained by Venezuela. However, the situation in Caracas was extremely critical and special funds that could not be obtained from traditional sources would be necessary in order to start work. Venezuela's funds are one-hundredth of what is really needed. Therefore, a new approach in financing had become necessary.

President Betancourt asserted that 33 per cent of the population of Caracas lived in shacks forming a cordon around the city. On the other hand the Government had ambitious plans for an independent autonomous foundation to provide a massive community development program which would re-locate persons, provide light, sewers, self-help housing, and improve economic opportunities. He cited that of every 300 persons in Venezuela, only 30 had access to running water. He said this project needed special financing, not being within the realm of the Export-Import Bank, IDB or DLF.

Mr. Moscoso remarked that he was well acquainted with the problem and that a more careful study of requirements for Caracas low-cost urban housing had to be made. He suggested that a housing expert be brought from Puerto Rico to make the study. He said that plans have to be drawn up very carefully. Knowing that a problem exists is not enough. A solution can only be justified by the programs that are necessary to solve the existing problem. We might be able to work out a five year commitment for the United States to do certain things provided Venezuela did part of the work. Slum clearance is a very urgent matter. People who live in slums should be given the hope of improving their lot. Some slums have to be eliminated completely and some can be rehabilitated by building roads, water supply systems, and sewage facilities. The extremely bad social conditions which prevail in the Caracas slums give the Communists fertile ground for subver-

sion. If work could start soon in various parts of the city it would give people the necessary hope and incentives.

Mr. Goodwin emphasized that plans were extremely important in order to justify the projects.

President Kennedy stated that two problems have hindered progress in this field; insufficient planning on the Venezuelan side and excessive slowness on the American side. It would be important for Mr. Fowler Hamilton and Mr. Moscoso to look into the matter at once. The United States can provide technical assistance in drawing up the necessary plans in order to justify the project. This technical assistance would include the training of Venezuelan experts who could take an active part in the actual implementation of the plans.

Dr. Perez Guerrero stated that if Venezuela were given the opportunity to start this type of work and if it received assistance during the next few months it would be able to get out of the present recession and use more of its own resources. Time is an essential factor. Long-term fund commitments are indispensable for sensible planning. All traditional sources of funds have been used for other projects and a new approach is necessary for this type of work.

President Kennedy stated that funds available for Latin America are probably insufficient. However, it will be difficult to get additional funds from Congress.

President Betancourt underlined the importance of slum clearance and housing.

219. Memorandum of conversation, December 16, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

December 16, 1961

SUBJECT

Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt—
Oil Imports Problem

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Chester Bowles
Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim
Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the Agency
for International Development
Mr. Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
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President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela
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Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Governor of the Federal District of Venezuela
Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Chief, Office of Coordination and Planning,
Venezuelan Government

The meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, 1961, at Los Nuñez, President Betancourt’s residence in Caracas, Venezuela. Several unrelated matters were discussed at this conference, including the subject covered in this memorandum.

Oil Import Problem

President Betancourt at this point expressed Venezuela’s concern about United States restrictions on imports of Venezuelan oil, which is discussed in memorandum No. 1 of four submitted to President Kennedy by the Venezuelan President. He said this matter was extremely vital for Venezuela and he hoped that the United States Government would give it further study. He indicated that Venezuela was interested in increasing its quotas both for residual and crude oil, with emphasis on the latter. He said considerable harm was being

¹ Oil imports problem. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

done the Venezuelan oil industry by granting United States inland independent refineries oil quotas which they, in turn, assigned to other importers to the detriment of Venezuela.

When President Kennedy asked whether an increase in residual oil imports would help Venezuela, the Venezuelan President said this would indeed be helpful but any decrease in crude oil imports would seriously hurt the local industry.

Mr. Goodwin pointed out that the present quotas had been frozen for six months while a study was being made and there was no intention for the moment of decreasing Venezuelan crude imports.

President Kennedy stated that the United States might be able to assist Venezuela by increasing residual imports but crude was another matter. However, he promised to look into (1) residual oil; (2) increasing crude imports, and (3) the question of import licenses for inland refineries. He stated that a meeting on the oil problem had already been held and that another was scheduled for next week. To illustrate the problems connected with crude imports he explained that the key Senator on whom the success of his new trade program rested came from an oil-producing state.

Ambassador Mayobre said Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, was in New Orleans for medical treatment but planned to visit Washington early in January for discussions. President Kennedy said he did not plan to wait until January to look into the problem and added he would keep in touch personally with President Betancourt on the oil import program.

220. Memorandum of conversation, December 16, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

December 16, 1961

SUBJECT

Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt—
Military Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Chester Bowles
Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim
Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the Agency
for International Development
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Dr. Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Governor of the Federal District of Venezuela
Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Chief, Office of Coordination and Planning,
Venezuelan Government

The meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, 1961, at Los Nuñez, President Betancourt’s residence in Caracas, Venezuela. Several unrelated matters were discussed at this conference, including the subject covered in this memorandum.

Military Assistance to Venezuela

Minister of Defense Briceño Linares was asked by President Betancourt to discuss military equipment needs. General Briceño Linares said that the equipment of the Venezuelan armed forces was obsolete and worn out and that, in view of the Castro menace and increasing arms smuggling, it was vital that new equipment be obtained on long credit terms to make the Venezuelan armed forces more efficient. The Air Force is flying F–86’s and some European-made airplanes but

¹ Military assistance. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

would need new equipment. The same applies to the Army, which is also in great need of new barracks.

President Kennedy invited General Briceño to visit Washington to discuss his needs with the Pentagon. He asked what Venezuela needed and the Minister said he was preparing a list.

President Kennedy indicated that there has been considerable Congressional curtailment of funds for military assistance to Latin America as a result of previous use of some of these funds in Latin American countries under dictators who procured weapons which they utilized to keep themselves in power. President Kennedy expressed the opinion that Castro did not present a great overt aggressive threat to Venezuela because, if his forces attacked Venezuela, the OAS and US would come to Venezuela's defense in a matter of hours. He did think, however, that Venezuela might justify its military needs to provide internal security against such things as guerrilla warfare and arms smuggling.

General Briceño said unassessed intelligence in possession of his Government indicated that Panama, through the collaboration of the Panamanian National Guard and a "prominent Panamanian family", was becoming a dangerous center for smuggling of arms, some of which were coming into Venezuela. This information has been uncovered by the Venezuelan military and additional studies are being made. When asked whether Iron Curtain Country weapons were being encountered, General Briceño replied that most of them were surplus weapons emanating from the United States and from many European countries.

President Kennedy stated that some way should be found of halting arms smuggling and added that if General Briceño could devise a plan for so doing and present it during his Washington trip it would be very helpful. The President said that it might be possible to take some Caribbean-wide measures to counter this smuggling. This might include the creation of Caribbean defense machinery.

President Betancourt stated that a special fund administered by the armed forces had been heavily drawn upon for the purpose of lending money to the military for housing and additional new funds were needed. He inquired whether funds that are appropriated under the Mutual Security program could be assigned to this housing fund. President Betancourt pointed out that, in general, Venezuela does not want more equipment but only wishes to replace that which is becoming useless. The change would be for conventional and more modern equipment without seeking anything fancy. He said the Venezuelan aircraft were antiquated and that ships which go out on *Unitas* maneuvers thereafter require expensive overhauling abroad. The purchase of these ships in Europe during the dictatorship was accompanied by huge graft payments with the result that Venezuela got stung. Venezuela has only one submarine, although three crews have been trained and a morale problem is thereby created.

General Briceño also mentioned the need for an additional submarine.

President Kennedy replied that it would be very difficult to provide a submarine at the present time.

President Kennedy said he would look forward to seeing General Briceño in Washington and would put him in contact with the Defense Department. He asked again that General Briceño attempt to devise a solution to the arms smuggling problem.

General Briceño, as a parting shot, mentioned the gift of aircraft to Yugoslavia and President Kennedy said the aircraft obtained helped the Yugoslavs very little.

President Betancourt thanked President Kennedy and expressed his satisfaction over a very fruitful meeting.

The meeting concluded at 7:00 P.M.

221. Memorandum of conversation, December 16, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

December 16, 1961

SUBJECT

Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt—Refinancing Venezuela's External Debt

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Chester Bowles
Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the Agency for International Development
Mr. Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
Mr. Harold Linder, President of Export-Import Bank of Washington
Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS staff interpreter
President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela
Dr. Marcos Falcón Briceño, Foreign Minister of Venezuela

¹ Refinancing Venezuelan external debt. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

Dr. Andres German Otero, Minister of Finance of Venezuela
General Antonio Briceño Linares, Minister of Defense of Venezuela
Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Governor of the Federal District of Venezuela
Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Chief, Office of Coordination and Planning,
Venezuelan Government

The meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, 1961, at Los Nuñez, President Betancourt's residence in Caracas, Venezuela. Several unrelated matters were discussed at this conference, including the subject covered in this memorandum.

Refinancing Venezuela's External Debt

President Betancourt introduced the subject of refinancing Venezuela's external debt, which is discussed in detail in his memorandum No. 2, and called upon his Finance Minister, Dr. Otero, to make an oral presentation. Dr. Otero said the Government of Venezuela is called upon to pay \$118,400,000 in each of the years 1962 and 1963 to cover loans received from United States commercial banks and to repay treasury bonds financed by external institutions. The 1962 budget provides for repayment but the Government would prefer that part of the sum be refinanced over a longer term to free the budgeted funds for developmental projects in the country. He asked for United States support in obtaining longer terms from the private banking institutions. He said that negotiations on Venezuela's behalf were being undertaken by Mr. George Woods of the First Boston Corporation to have part of the debts mature over a 10-year period of time and some headway was being made. The Chase Manhattan Bank and the First National City Bank seemed disposed to postpone until 1964 three-fourths of the amounts due in 1962 on their loan.

President Kennedy stated that he was familiar with the situation and that he hoped that Minister Otero would have a chance to discuss this matter with Mr. Linder, President of the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. Moscoso expressed the view that the proposal made by the commercial banks could be improved and he and Mr. Woods were of the opinion that the Venezuelan Government should seek a better deal. Mr. Moscoso said that he was working closely on the matter with Mr. Woods, hoping to have half of the 1962-63 payments financed on a long-term basis. He added that Venezuela needs long-term capital and should try to obtain a delay in repaying any debts for a couple of years in order to strengthen its economic and financial position.

Dr. Falcon Briceño asked whether the new law concerning insurance of credits could be extended to Venezuela and he was assured that it could be.

President Kennedy said he would talk next week to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon about this subject and that he would confer also with Mr. Moscoso and Mr. Linder in Washington.

222. Memorandum from Hilsman to Edwin M. Martin, May 29¹

May 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Venezuela and the Alliance for Progress

The following study on Venezuela has been prepared in connection with the meeting of the Latin American Policy Committee to be held June 7.

1. Political Setting

The Venezuelan political picture has historically been characterized by chronic instability and extended periods of dictatorship, usually in the persons of military caudillos. Progress toward popular self-government is a product of the last 25 years, but was interrupted by the authoritarian regime of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948–58). In fact, the present government headed by President Rómulo Betancourt, who recently completed three years in office, is the longest-lived popularly elected civilian government in the country's experience.

Power and authority in the society traditionally rested with an oligarchy of landholders and merchants. However, in response to increasingly insistent popular demands for representative government and socio-economic reforms during the past quarter century, two vigorous and competing political forces emerged: the armed forces, which espoused order and authority and were also eager to seize and exercise power in their own interest, and mass-based political parties. In addition, as part of the process of modernization of the country in recent decades, a new class of industrial and commercial representatives has arisen to displace the old order as directing elements in the society. Moreover, burgeoning urban labor and middle class groups have made their appearance, and at present the political party and government leadership is largely derived from the latter sector.

The Betancourt government was elected to a 5-year term in December 1958 in an atmosphere marked by widespread revulsion over the excesses of the recently overthrown Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, strong popular determination to prevent a return to authoritarianism, and a formal pre-election agreement to establish a coalition government with representation of the major political parties and independent political sectors and to undertake basic socio-economic reforms. Inaugurated in

¹ Venezuela and the Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 8 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, Venezuela, 1961–1962.

February 1959, President Betancourt organized a coalition government comprised of his own Democratic Action (AD) Party, the Social Christian (COPEI) Party, the Republican Democratic Union (URD) Party, and political independents, which was endorsed by the armed forces and all major non-political civilian groups.

During the first two years of the regime, President Betancourt followed a policy of preserving harmonious relations among the political parties as a prerequisite for survival of constitutional, democratic government, and initiated action on a comprehensive 4-year socio-economic reform program. Nevertheless, from its inception the government was subjected to a continuing series of attempted coups d'état by disgruntled reactionary civilian and dissident rightist military elements, including an almost successful assassination attempt against the President. These moves have been thwarted by effective government action, strongly supported by the armed forces, and rightist plotters have been generally discredited. Nevertheless, their activities continue at the present time.

In addition, since mid-1960 the Betancourt government has been threatened by the militant activities of extreme leftist groups, including the Communists (PCV), the pro-Communist Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) and elements of the URD, seeking its overthrow and the installation of a Castro-type regime. To counter this threat the government partially suspended constitutional guarantees and initiated a campaign of moderate harassment against these groups. With the separation of the URD from the coalition in late 1960, President Betancourt reorganized his government along a narrower but more homogeneous political basis, including only AD, COPEI and independents, which still retained majority control over the Congress and organized labor and continued to have the support of the armed forces and responsible non-political groups. The coalition lost control of the lower house of Congress in early 1962 after a "Young Turk" group (ARS) abandoned the AD and joined forces with the opposition. Moreover, in recent months the government has had to contend with renewed agitation by extreme leftist forces including a small Communist-student guerrilla movement in the interior, a campaign of terrorist activities in the major urban areas, and a sizable abortive revolt by dissident leftwing military elements collaborating with PCV and MIR in the port city of Carúpano in early May. In the face of considerable popular unrest over the continuing violence and indications of growing armed forces uneasiness, the government undertook vigorous military action to curb the guerrilla groups and on May 10 issued a decree banning PCV and MIR activities.

2. The Socio-Economic Setting

The large-scale development of its petroleum resources during the past 20 years has provided Venezuela with the highest economic

growth rate and per capita income in Latin America. It is the largest petroleum exporter and third largest petroleum producer in the world. Its tremendous natural resources offer the prospect for continued rapid advances and diversified economic development over the long run. However, even in the short run there is also the alternative of economic collapse and chaos as the result of a possible breakdown in orderly political processes.

US economic interest in Venezuela is quite substantial, since total US trade with the country is greater than with any other in Latin America and US direct investment in Venezuela (about \$3 billion) is larger than in any other country except Canada. In fact, foreign capital and technology (US, British, Dutch) have been primarily responsible for development of the country's natural resources.

The population of over 7.5 million, although growing at an annual rate of about 3.5%, is small in comparison with Venezuela's natural resources, and the rapid economic expansion in recent years has not been accompanied by development of its human resources. Many Venezuelans have been virtually untouched by the nation's prosperity, and distribution of national income is extremely uneven. Thus, most Venezuelans are ill-fed, poorly housed, unhealthy, and lacking in basic facilities. As recently as 1958 perhaps 50% of the population was still illiterate, while several hundred thousand school age children were unable to attend school due to lack of teachers and adequate facilities. The housing shortage is on the order of an estimated 700,000 units and is increasing at the rate of more than 100,000 each year. Unemployment (about 13% of the labor force) and underemployment are critical problems, primarily in the large urban areas. As the result of the petroleum boom and recent heavy internal migration to the cities, there is a considerable imbalance between urban (70% of the population) and rural areas.

During the past 4 years the economy has been depressed by comparison with the pre-1958 high, and the annual economic growth rate has since declined almost to insignificance. This situation resulted from a combination of factors, including large-scale capital outflow, sharp reduction of foreign exchange reserves, Venezuela's weakened competitive position in the world petroleum market, a slowdown in petroleum exploration and construction, serious budgetary deficits, and widespread apprehension and distrust in foreign and domestic business circles concerning the economic policies and objectives of the leftist reform government. The problem has been aggravated by a marked increase in bureaucratic payrolls, the large expenditures required in the implementation of the government's reform program, and widespread opposition to austerity and exchange control measures.

The government's 4-year development program (adopted April 1960 and revised annually in subsequent years) calls for a more rational

utilization of income derived from the petroleum industry in order to promote diversification and expansion of agriculture and industry, agrarian reform, and improvements in education, housing, and health and public welfare services. The plan gives target dates and specifies the goals set forth in each sector of planned development. Substantial but varying progress has been achieved to date in several areas of reform, notably agrarian resettlement, rural housing and education, but in other areas, such as urban renewal and measures to relieve unemployment, improvements have at best been haphazard. Nevertheless, the Betancourt government is one of the hemispheric leaders in the promotion of social reform and economic development within a democratic constitutional framework.

3. *Problems and Prospects*

The basic problem confronting Venezuela and, specifically, the Betancourt regime involves, on the one hand, strengthening the framework of constitutional, representative government and orderly political processes, and, on the other, moving forward energetically on socio-economic reforms, while promoting a revitalization of the economy and its diversification. The success of such efforts is hampered by lack of consensus in the society and violent divergences between political groupings in the country, which threaten to precipitate a breakdown in public order and reversion to authoritarian government. The vested interests—including the propertied groups, some of the military, and certain favored classes in the metropolitan area—developed their expectations during the 1950's boom period, tend to associate the Betancourt regime with lack of popular discipline and unsound economic policies, and regard the masses with fear and distrust. Some metropolitan interests see their future compromised by AD's emphasis on development of the hinterland and of human resources in general. Agrarian reform has whetted the appetite of *campesinos* for land, credits, and housing, without providing solutions up to the level demanded by this group. The national complex of dependence on the foreign petroleum companies nourishes suspicion and dislike of foreigners in dominant positions. Student groups supply a receptive audience for Communist and Castroist propaganda and have shown their alienation from society in violent demonstrations and, recently, in guerrilla activity.

In all these conflicts and suspicions extremist political forces find a fertile field to sow dissension and to hinder the growth of broad support of government programs for development. Frequently Venezuelans appear to be agreed only on the desirability of getting as much money as possible as fast as possible. This nourishes political conflict, since competing groups in the population make most of their claims in terms of material aid, direct or indirect, from the government. In this

charged atmosphere the pressures on the government have increased considerably with adverse effects on the economy.

The close involvement of business, labor, agrarian, and unemployed elements as well as political parties with the exercise of government authority has meant that the maintenance of power on a democratic footing required a repeated marshalling of pro-government groups to match displays of force by the opposition. This in turn has tended to limit the flexibility and the range of action in government economic policy. To ask for austerity and restraint on behalf of a long-term investment program becomes impractical when political stability is constantly being placed in question by subversive movements of the right and the left.

Compounding the effect of pressures on the government for immediate satisfaction of conflicting demands is the general inexperience and incapacity of the bureaucracy. It is not only highly political by recruitment and by sympathy, but it is also learning to govern and administer on a trial and error basis. The present government and political leadership not only has much to learn about economic management but inherited a fiscal and administrative system little changed from pre-modern days. With a background largely in party organization this leadership is personalistic and expedient in approach, and it is not inclined to impose the discipline and standards needed for large-scale economic operations of the government at the expense of losing political support. Moreover, the tendency of the Old Guard political leadership, particularly in AD, to monopolize the positions of power has frustrated much of the parties' younger, less experienced element, with the consequence that much of this group has defected to the opposition and to advocating extremist solutions for the country's problems.

4. The Alliance for Progress and Related Programs

Until recently there was virtually no US assistance program for Venezuela, and the government's development plan originally did not call for large-scale foreign assistance. Nevertheless, during the past year a substantial Alliance for Progress program has been formulated with respect to Venezuela, involving assistance in the fields of programming and urban and rural development. The Venezuelan Government is also currently revising its 4-year development program in line with the coordinated country plan approach set down at Punta del Este, which is scheduled for early submission to the "Nine Wise Men" and the US Government. Considerable progress has been made in formulating Alliance programs and selecting projects, and some actual work is already in progress on a number of projects. Nevertheless, USAID Caracas is still only about one-third staffed and President Betancourt

has complained to our Embassy over what he characterized as undue slowness in implementation of the Alliance program. This, obviously, is the major problem toward the solution of which those involved in the Alliance operation have been exerting their efforts.

To supplement the substantial progress already being achieved in the economic and social aspects, consideration might also be given to formulating a joint program directed specifically toward preserving political stability in Venezuela over the long run, and over the short run assisting the present government to fill out the remainder of its term (to March 1964), providing for an orderly transition of power to its duly elected successor, and contributing to the efforts of the moderate forces to win the late 1963 elections. Although the US capacity of influencing this situation directly is limited, our interest in the problem might be dramatized by efforts to improve the somewhat deteriorating relationship between Old Guard political leaders, who presently occupy most top positions in the government, the parties and the labor and peasant unions, and the younger leaders in these sectors, many of whom are frustrated in their ambitions to advance rapidly in their professions and see their progress blocked by the older element. We might influence this situation initially by approaching President Betancourt and other top government and party officials with suggestions for a joint US-Venezuelan undertaking along the following lines:

a) To establish in Caracas a Venezuelan version of the Costa Rican Institute of Political and Social Studies, which would offer political leadership training to acceptable (moderate, progressive, non-extremist) young members of the AD and possibly COPEI and independents. Young AD members have been participating in the Costa Rican experiment for some time; however, their numbers are limited and they are forced to be away from Venezuela for extended periods. An institution located in Venezuela would enable larger numbers of young political figures to participate while continuing to fill their party, labor, government or other positions. Moreover, assuming a favorable Venezuelan response, the United States would be able to contribute directly and to a greater degree than in Costa Rica to a new undertaking of this type, with the resultant political and propaganda advantages. As in Costa Rica US universities should be encouraged to participate. However, consideration should also be given to the possible propaganda and other pitfalls resulting from extensive official US involvement in such a project.

b) To expand on a priority basis the exchange program for young leaders, whereby really significant numbers of party, labor, government and other representatives are regularly invited to visit the United States (including Puerto Rico) for short observation, study, or other types of tours. To date the exchange program has been quite limited in this

respect. An expanded program would enable a sizable proportion of the country's future leadership to acquire a first-hand impression of the United States, which should contribute to continuing close relations between the two countries and to a better understanding of democratic constitutional government processes by the younger Venezuelan element. Moreover, it would be most profitable to have regular visits of similarly qualified young American leaders to Venezuela. American companies operating in Venezuela should be encouraged to participate.

c) To investigate the feasibility of initiating a large-scale public administration educational program in Venezuela, probably in cooperation with local and American universities. In view of the limited capacity of Venezuelan universities at present to offer courses in this field, consideration should be given to assisting these universities to expand their facilities. Some study has already been devoted to an effort of this type.

d) To provide US assistance for a major program of training for labor union rank-and-file members and junior directors in Venezuela, in addition to the effort that has existed for some time on the part of AD and to the somewhat limited approach scheduled under the US aid program. In this connection also, urgent action is imperative. American universities, labor unions and businesses should be urged to participate.

e) To undertake overt and covert approaches to moderate elements in ARS as a possible means to encourage stronger support for the present government, its reform program, and orderly political processes. Similarly, with regard to URD, consideration should be given to (1) encouraging "responsible" opposition and (2) splitting the moderates away from the extremists in the party.

In view of the dangerous extent of Communist and pro-Communist infiltration of university and secondary student circles in Venezuela and their success in instigating anti-government student violence and anti-American sentiment there would appear to be urgent need for the formulation of a broad US program aimed specifically at students. There are indications that the Venezuelan Government is reaching the limits of its toleration of student agitation and insurgency, and that it may be contemplating adoption of restrictive measures against these elements. Nevertheless, the problem of student irresponsibility and extremism is a basic and long-lasting one and, consequently, it might be appropriate to investigate in some detail the feasibility of implementing a positive US approach to Venezuelan students, as well as the possibility of assisting the Betancourt Government in its efforts in this field. Some study has already been devoted to this question by the Embassy in Caracas and in the Department, but early action on a positive counter strategy (overt and covert) program is indicated.

223. Memorandum of conversation, August 30, between President Kennedy and Minister of Defense Briceño and other U.S. and Venezuelan Officials¹

Part I (of 2)

August 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Venezuelan Defense Requirements

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Brigadier General Antonio Briceño Linares, Venezuelan Minister of Defense

Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin

Lt. Colonel George Dwyre, (USAF), DOD Escort Officer

Major Teodoro Thielen, Venezuelan Aide to General Briceño

Donald F. Parnes, State Department Interpreter

Several related matters were discuss during the conversation including the subject covered in this memorandum.

General Briceño said that on the occasion of the President's visit to Caracas, he had mentioned the aspirations of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of obtaining special assistance from the United States, above and beyond the aid received under the mutual assistance agreement. He said that he was not optimistic about the outcome of this request, but that he wanted to make a plea that the U.S. Government [illegible in the original] of special additional military [illegible in the original] on a loan or lease basis. He said that the Venezuelan Armed Forces [illegible in the original] requested more funds than they did in the national budget; but that they understood the need for balancing the budget, and limited their requests to the amount recommended by the Finance Minister. He said that the Armed Forces did not want to ask for funds that could better be used for the solution of social problems and for alleviating the living conditions of the working class. He said that he was fully aware that social measures were the best way of counteracting the spread of Communism, rather than a repressive government.

General Briceño said that the Venezuelan military realized that a dictatorship was not the best solution to the problems of the Armed Forces, and that Venezuela had suffered under two dictators that proved this point. General Briceño said that the 27-year Gómez dictatorship had represented a period of no progress for the Armed Forces,

¹ Venezuelan defense requirements. Confidential. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Venezuela, 1962, 000.1-381.

since the soldiers in those days were put to work on the dictator's farms, and the officers were used to [illegible in the original]. During this period, other Latin American [illegible in the original] colleges, which permitted them to have well-trained cadres of reserve officers now.

General Briceño said that under the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship the Armed Forces had been nothing more than a bluff, and that the 10 years of this regime had seen no progress in the organization of the Armed Forces. There had been much discussion as to what units should have the primary combat mission, with no decisions being made. Some equipment had been purchased during those years, on a haphazard basis, with poor maintenance. All of this had contributed nothing to the needs and objectives of national defense.

General Briceño said that under the new Administration, the various [illegible in the original] of the Armed Services had prepared [illegible in the original] organizational plans [illegible in the original], with clear objectives, tailored to the [illegible in the original] of the [illegible in the original], but the country lacked the economic means to develop their plans especially with [illegible in the original] to construction of buildings.

General Briceño said that he knew that the United States had a lot of military equipment that was obsolete by American standards, but that could be put to good use in Venezuela; and that it was knocking on the door [illegible in the original] United States in an appeal for some of this equipment, knowing that the answer could be either a yes or a no.

The President said that the entire quantity of military aid [illegible in the original] to Latin America was under fire in Congress, due particularly to the events in Peru and Argentina. He said that each was being [illegible in the original] over the fact that it [illegible in the original] tank that had knocked down the gates of the Presidential Palace in [illegible in the original], and that a U.S.-trained officer had been the one to arrest the Peruvian [illegible in the original]. He said that these arguments were not valid as far as he was concerned, but that they increased the complexity of the problem. He said that, for example, Senator Wayne Morse, a friend of President Betancourt's, seriously questioned the wisdom of military assistance to Latin America. He recommended that General Briceño have a talk with Senator Morse. He said that he understood that Venezuela had received 12 million dollars worth of mutual assistance last year, and was scheduled to receive 10 million dollars this year. He asked whether Venezuela needed military assistance over and above this amount.

General Briceño said that Venezuela would like to receive aid for construction projects for its Naval Academy, similar to that received by Uruguay and Colombia.

Mr. Martin said that General Briceño was going to have a meeting with the Acting Secretary of Defense.

General Briceño handed the President a list of requirements. He said that the reconnaissance squadron mentioned in the list was of special importance. He said that Venezuela's position was very different from that of other Latin American countries, due to its location.

The President said that he was aware of the support given by the Armed Forces to President Betancourt.

General Briceño said that he intended to hold a press conference to refute the allegation that the Armed Forces had exercised pressure on President Betancourt. He referred to a *Time* magazine article in which this accusation had been made. The President told him not to be concerned about *Time* article.

The President said that he thought it would be useful if General Briceño talked with Senator Morse, who was opposed to the military assistance program to Latin America. He said that he felt that this program was vital, since the Armed Forces were essential to prevent the radical left or right from taking over.

224. Memorandum of conversation, August 30, between President Kennedy and Minister of Defense Briceño and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

Part II (of 2)

August 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Smuggling of Arms into Venezuela

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Brigadier General Antonio Briceño Linares, Venezuelan Minister of Defense
Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin
Lt. Colonel George Dwyre, (USAF), DOD Escort Officer
Major Teodoro Thielen, Venezuelan Aide to General Briceño
Donald F. Farnes, State Department Interpreter

Several related matters were discussed during the conversation including the subject covered in this memorandum.

¹ Smuggling of arms into Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Venezuela, 1962, 000.1-381.

President Kennedy asked how the situation was in Venezuela, and General Briceño replied that it had improved. When the President inquired about participation of Naval officers in the latest attempted coup, General Briceño replied that they were Marine Corps officers. He said that they were sympathizers of the extreme Left, and that the Government had traced the plot beginning in November 1961. He said that the Government had learned that the plotters had hoped to cause a disturbance on the occasion of President Kennedy's visit to Venezuela, but had failed. He said that it was difficult to prove participation in plots such as these until the plotters actually struck.

The President said that the Venezuelan Government had been doing a wonderful job in this connection. He asked whether it was true that arms were being smuggled into Venezuela via Panama. General Briceño replied that he had some information in this sense, which his Government had no means of processing. He gave the President a number of documents in English, which the President read.

The President asked whether it would be possible to prove a connection between the arms shipments and General Pérez Jiménez (the former Venezuelan dictator), General Briceño said that this was something the United States Government could trace. The President said that he had no information of any connection. Mr. Martin said that he was not aware of any such connection, but that he would check.

General Briceño said that Venezuela found it difficult to halt arms [illegible in the original] of its low cost and the lack of equipment.

President Kennedy asked Mr. Martin whether the U.S. had discussed this matter with Panamanian authorities. Mr. Martin replied that he had not been aware of arms going through Panama to Venezuela. General Briceño said that a high Panamanian official, who was in a good position to help the smugglers, was involved.

225. Memorandum from Clint E. Smith to the Latin American Policy Committee, September 21¹

September 21, 1962

SUBJECT

VENEZUELA—Plan of Action for Period to March 2, 1964

The attached plan of action for Venezuela during the period from the present until March 2, 1964, the end of the Betancourt Administration's term of office, was approved by the Latin American Policy Committee on September 13, 1962. Each member of the Committee is requested to integrate these actions into the programs of his respective agency.

A. OBJECTIVES

1. To have the Betancourt Administration complete its term of office democratically and constitutionally on March 2, 1964.

2. To increase the stability of the Betancourt Administration in order to strengthen the prospects for continued democratic civilian government in Venezuela.

3. To encourage the Venezuelan Armed Forces to remain loyal, support the Betancourt Administration and, when called on, suppress insurgencies fomented by opponents of democratic, constitutional government.

4. To assist the Betancourt Administration in rapidly carrying out a sound reform and development program to achieve orderly economic, social and political progress.

5. To support and encourage the orientation of Venezuela's Government and people toward individual freedom, national independence and economic and social progress under a democratic system.

6. To prevent the growth of Communist strength or influence in Venezuela or the conversion of Venezuela into a beachhead for the propagation of such strength or influence elsewhere in the Hemisphere.

7. To encourage continued Venezuelan cooperation in action to isolate, weaken and promote the downfall of the Cuban Communist Regime.

B. PLAN OF ACTION

I. Political

1. Emphasize United States support for the constitutional, democratic Betancourt Administration in public statements by or messages

¹ Plan of action for Venezuela to March 2, 1964. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 611.31/9-2162.

from high United States officials on appropriate state occasions or in the event of serious threats against the Betancourt Administration.

2. Have our diplomatic and consular officials in Venezuela communicate the foregoing sentiment, as appropriate, to Venezuelan military officers, politicians, businessmen, journalists, and public opinion leaders. Indicate when necessary that the United States would view with grave concern the overthrow of elected constitutional government and its replacement by an unrepresentative authoritarian regime of the Right or Left. We would consider such a development as being contrary to the purposes and principles of the inter-American system and prejudicial to the objectives of the Alliance for Progress; and it would necessitate re-examination of our relations and existing cooperation with Venezuela in this context.

3. Discourage would-be subversives of any kind who seek United States acquiescence in or encouragement of their activities to overthrow the Betancourt Administration.

4. Discourage conspiratorial activities against the Betancourt Administration by dissident Venezuelans residing in or visiting the United States. Undertake legal action against such persons if we have reason to believe they have violated United States laws by engaging in anti-Betancourt activities.

5. Identify and encourage democratically-oriented and socially conscious leadership, which may be politically dormant, to take an active and constructive part in the political life of Venezuela as a means of broadening the political base of forces which can effectively carry out Venezuela's economic and social progress under a democratic system.

6. In the event Venezuelan democratic political leaders seek our intercession in Venezuelan internal political problems, we should express our interest in the cooperation of all responsible elements, who adhere to representative democracy and constitutionality, in making the democratic system operate effectively to achieve political stability and social and economic progress in which we are prepared to assist. In responding, we should avoid even an appearance of intervening in Venezuelan internal political conflicts or becoming too closely identified with any political party or faction, not excluding that of President Betancourt.

[text not declassified]

III. Labor

(Several of the following are general statements largely complementing the more detailed presentation in a separate AID/LA Policy Consideration Paper.)

1. Assist Venezuela in maintaining a free labor force in support of the present government and resisting left extremist attempts at creating parallel organizations to the CTV.

2. Assist Venezuela in preparing its labor force in various skills, trades and professions to facilitate optimum development of human resources.

3. Assist Venezuela in training government labor officials to provide effective government labor services and strengthen labor-management-government relations.

4. Assist the democratic leadership of the Venezuelan labor movement through leader grants and worker education programs to strengthen its internal trade union administration so that it may be more effective in Venezuelan economic and social programs.

5. Encourage the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor and its affiliates to enlarge their contacts with ORIT and the International Trade Secretariats (ITS) to augment the possibilities of establishing trade union leadership training programs, improving collective bargaining techniques, etc.

IV. Economic and Social

(Several of the following are general statements largely complementing the more detailed presentation in a separate AID/LA Policy Consideration Paper.)

1. Join our AID, Food for Peace and Peace Corps programs, as appropriate, with other free world sources of assistance in the Alliance for Progress, to help the Venezuelan Government to strengthen the Venezuelan economy as rapidly as possible and continue progressive social development efforts in direct impact projects in the fields of housing, education, agrarian reform, health and community services.

2. Intensify our efforts to work with the Venezuelan Government to improve its reform projects and to institute other self-help measures such as a unified exchange rate, further tax reforms, liberalization of the central government's borrowing authority, further reduction of government operating costs, and improvement of public administration.

3. Assist Venezuela in developing and implementing a sound program which will stimulate a maximum use of private funds and enterprise to induce economic recovery.

4. Assist Venezuela in developing an effective cadre of public administrators and instructors to train lower and middle echelon public servants in specialized fields.

5. Assist Venezuela in stabilizing the rural population through more effective implementation of its agrarian reform program, including: supervised agricultural credit; commercial agricultural development; and rural health, welfare and community services.

6. Assist Venezuela in increasing industrial production by encouraging private capital and initiative; and in implementing sound, labor-

intensive programs, such as private and public housing, which will create employment opportunities in the cities.

7. Assist Venezuela in setting up and carrying out a savings and loan system for middle class housing; and in developing and initiating a long-range housing program for urban centers to clear slums and provide decent, hygienic, low-cost housing units.

8. Utilize the Peace Corps to:

a. help expand the programs of the non-denominational Venezuelan YMCA to help urban youth to develop socially and to become better citizens;

b. assist the Venezuelan Government's efforts to make its newly established University of the East a model of social responsibility and scholarship;

c. supplement the efforts of the Venezuelan 4-H (5-V Clubs) organizations to increase agricultural production and improve the rural standard of living in the Western Andean region.

9. Encourage the Venezuelan Government to foster a climate of security for beneficial foreign private capital investment by clearly enunciating and pursuing policies which will dispel fears of nationalization, discrimination or unfair competition from public corporations.

10. Encourage and, if possible, assist the GOV to obtain sound private management for its government-owned industries and other enterprises, demonstrating thereby that competent private management of government-owned industries may be a politically feasible means of improving the administration and operations of presently unprofitable state enterprises.

11. Encourage the function of sound joint ventures in which United States and Venezuelan capital join forces and utilize United States "know-how" in developing economically rational industrial enterprises.

12. Within limits of United States national security interests, avoid undue restriction of imports and off-shore purchases of Venezuelan petroleum products. Explore ways to open new possibilities for petroleum and other exports to the United States.

13. Encourage Venezuela to do away with trade and exchange restrictions as soon as possible and to follow a trade and tariff policy that will allow a maximum freedom of trade without uneconomic protective provisions.

14. Do not oppose Venezuelan trade restrictions which limit selected imports for the protection of developing industries contributing to the diversification of Venezuela's economy; but support credit assistance for the initiation or expansion of enterprises only when they appear to offer a reasonable net contribution to that economy.

15. Oppose discriminatory or unreasonable restrictions on United States shipping or air carriers, with due consideration for legitimate

Venezuelan interest in developing and protecting Venezuelan national carriers.

16. Undertake civil aviation consultation, whenever appropriate, to establish agreed interpretations and modifications of the bilateral air transport services agreement of 1953.

V. Military Security

1. Assist Venezuela in developing its military capability to maintain internal security, counter guerrilla and other insurgent activities and protect Venezuelan oil fields, iron mines and ancillary installations. Facilitate training for Venezuelan military personnel in Venezuelan and/or at U.S. installations; and expedite the delivery of equipment under our bilateral military credit program.

2. Maintain close liaison with the Venezuelan Government on contingency planning to prevent another Communist-dominated regime from coming to power in the Caribbean region.

3. Discourage conspiratorial or undemocratic sentiments from flourishing among Venezuelan military personnel by using personal contacts to good advantage.

4. Encourage the employment of Venezuelan military forces, as practicable and without detriment to their primary security mission, on projects which contribute to economic and social development.

VI. Civilian Security Forces

(See also AID/LA Policy Consideration Paper)

1. Assist the Venezuelan civil police forces to improve their capability for maintaining law and order, rendering needed police services and controlling civil disturbances.

2. Assist the Venezuelan civil security forces to improve their capability in counter-subversive techniques.

3. Expedite delivery of equipment and ammunition urgently required by the civilian security forces.

VII. Public Affairs

(Several of the following are general statements largely complementing the more detailed presentation in USIS-Caracas Country Plan for FY 1963 contained in USIS message 113 of 6/21/62, as amended).

1. Help to strengthen the confidence of Venezuelans in their present system of constitutional, democratic government.

2. Convince Venezuelans that their aspirations for economic development with social justice can be achieved most effectively by applying Western democratic concepts rather than those of Communist totalitarianism, with the Alliance for Progress the positive do-it-yourself means of achieving their desired objectives.

3. Emphasize U.S.-Venezuelan cooperation in the Alliance for Progress.

4. Enhance Venezuelan knowledge about the United States and its foreign policy; and respect and appreciation for United States cultural, social and scientific achievements as developed by a free society for the general welfare.

5. Exploit the Cuban Communist Regime as an example of Communist imperialism which seeks to destroy Venezuela's political independence and to impose a system which flouts the dignity of the individual and human rights, impedes economic and social progress and retards the general welfare.

VIII. *Youth/Students*

1. Encourage, through cooperation with the Government [*1 line not declassified*], the orientation of Venezuela's youth and students toward the support of Venezuelan democratic institutions and the pursuit of serious academic programs in the national institutions of higher learning.

226. Memorandum of conversation, February 19, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

February 19, 1963

SUBJECT

U.S.-Venezuelan Petroleum Relations (Part 1 of 2 Parts)

PARTICIPANTS

For the United States:

The President

Mr. Edwin M. Martin (ARA)

Mr. Griffith Johnson (E)

Ambassador C. Allan Stewart (ARA)

Mr. Teodoro Moscoso (AID)

Mr. John M. Kelly, (Interior)

Mr. Ralph A. Dungan (White House)

Mr. Myer Feldman (White House)

For Venezuela:

President Betancourt

Dr. Andres Germán Otero, Minister of Finance

¹ Petroleum issues. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.

Dr. Godofredo Gonzalez, Minister of Development
Dr. Enrique Tejera París, Venezuelan Ambassador to U.S.
Dr. Carlos Pérez de la Cova, Venezuelan Embassy

Following President Kennedy's opening remarks at 4:30 p.m. on other matters, the conversation turned to petroleum. President Betancourt stated that he would like to refer only to economic matters of common interest during this meeting and would leave consideration of political questions for the meeting to be held the following day when the Foreign Minister would also be present. He indicated his interest in extending the exchange of views to other areas of the world such as Europe and Asia.

President Betancourt stated that the main problem confronting Venezuela is that of oil. He noted that the Presidential Proclamation of November 30, 1962 had produced a scare in Venezuela, and had serious political repercussions. In Venezuela there is a national awareness of the importance of this problem and every six months the country lives a period of anxiety until the determination is made of the amount of crude and residual fuel oil that Venezuela will be able to place in the United States market. He asserted that Venezuelan crude oil was being sold in the U.S. market at a price which was not only under the domestic price but also under the price of Canadian oil. The system of giving import allocations to inland refineries, instead of limiting them only to the traditional importers, resulted in the practice of discount sales that placed a pressure on Venezuelan prices. He stated that Creole Petroleum discount sales represented a loss of Venezuelan revenue amounting to 70 cents per dollar.

President Betancourt said that present U.S. policy discriminates against Venezuela, a consistent war and peace oil supplier of the United States, and benefits Mexico and Canada. He stressed that high level technical discussions should be continued in order to seek a mutually satisfactory solution. He suggested that the final press communiqué state that in the future joint consultations would be held before any steps are taken on matters affecting oil imports to the U.S. market. He did not consider that consultations held 48 hours before the proclamation allowed sufficient time for a careful study.

President Betancourt advocated the establishment of a system of Western Hemisphere quotas that would assure stable prices, in the belief that this would be a satisfactory solution that would maintain the "terms of trade". With stable prices and a stable quota Venezuela would not need Alliance for Progress assistance (AID or Social Progress Trust Fund loans) because World Bank and Export Import Bank financing would suffice. He emphasized the political importance of oil that makes Venezuela the number one objective of the Castro-Communist offensive.

President Kennedy agreed that there should be prior consultation and that this should be stated in the communiqué. Oil was a matter of great interest to the U.S. Congress because it affected the balance of payments situation. For national security reasons it was also an important factor in relations with Canada and Mexico. It was very difficult to satisfy all parties concerned and the reason the U.S. had not consulted at greater length was our belief that Venezuelan oil interests were adequately protected under the terms of the last proclamation. The White House experiences considerable pressure of all kinds on this matter—from coal producers, from Middle Eastern, Canadian and Mexican oil producers, and also from consumer groups. Consultations should be held in the future, not 48 hours before a proclamation, but real consultations. As was expressed by the Feldman mission, it was hoped that the Venezuelan share of the U.S. market would not diminish. He asked whether President Betancourt was more concerned about the November proclamation than about the future.

Dr. Otero explained that Venezuela was facing the same problems confronted by other developing countries dependent upon the sale of their raw materials. In the last few years the terms of trade have deteriorated. Oil represents 92% of the export earnings of Venezuela and these have increased only 2 or 3% in the last few years. However, the price index of manufactured goods imported from the U.S. and Europe has increased between 24 and 30%. It is necessary to stop this trend and the problem is of special urgency because it affects a kind of resource (oil) that is irreplaceable. U.S. restrictive policies since 1957, while justifiable to strengthen the domestic industry, have been implemented in a manner which has adversely affected oil prices. The system of allocating quotas to inland refineries exerts a downward pressure on prices. Bilateral studies at the technical level should continue in order to find a formula to achieve U.S. objectives without adversely affecting Venezuelan oil prices. Unfortunately, the areas of agreement reached in recent technical discussions are still limited. Discrimination is one problem. Venezuela would like a similar treatment as that accorded to Mexico and Canada and therefore it proposes a quota system for the entire Western Hemisphere.

Dr. Otero said that another area of disagreement is the matter of considering liberalized residual fuel oil imports as a means for compensating Venezuela for lower crude oil imports. Residual fuel oil is a low value product. The U.S. refining processes have improved to such a degree that U.S. refineries only produce 9 percent of residual oil. Venezuelan oil is refined in such a manner that 50 to 60 percent of it is residual oil. The trend therefore is for Venezuela to receive the lowest earnings for its oil.

To a question of President Kennedy, Mr. Feldman replied that Canadian oil imports were 125,000 barrels daily in Districts I through

IV and that this figure was much lower than the 450,000 barrels a day imported from Venezuela. The 30,000 barrels a day imported from Mexico is a very small amount that is not of great concern. Voluntary restrictions on the part of Canada would allow Venezuela to share in the increasing U.S. oil market.

Dr. Otero replied that Venezuela did not object to imports from Canada of 120,000 or 130,000 barrels daily but that the objection was to the system of quota allocations to inland oil refineries.

Mr. Feldman stated that there was disagreement between U.S. and Venezuelan technicians on this point, and that, although allocations to inland refiners were necessary to U.S. security, the impact of the present balance between coastal and inland refiners would be studied further.

Mr. Kelly stated that there was actually a discount on Canadian prices. Canadian oil was not being sold at the same price as U.S. domestic oil. Allowing imports of 125,000 barrels daily from Canada removed the pressure for Canadian industry to build a pipeline to the Montreal area market that presently imports Venezuelan oil at the rate of 220,000 barrels daily.

Responding to President Kennedy's question regarding the reasons for differences in U.S. import conditions between Canada and Venezuela Mr. Kelly stated that U.S. security considerations were initially responsible. At first the U.S. market was unrestricted to Canadian exports but during the last 15 or 16 months these had increased 100 per cent. For this reason we recently asked Canada to establish voluntary restrictions, limiting exports to the U.S. to 125,000 barrels. The balance of the U.S. market is open to competition and Venezuela is one of the competitors who captures a very large share of this market. With a growing U.S. market, Venezuela can share in the growth while Canada and Mexico are restricted. The present system is considered a balanced one, that offers a price umbrella to Venezuelan exports to Canada and to the U.S. The volume balance might not be perfect but the revenue balance is quite good when you consider both the number of barrels and the price of oil.

President Kennedy then instructed the U.S. experts present to look further into the inland refinery distribution structure to report its effects on the Venezuelan crude oil price structure.

Dr. Otero stressed Venezuela's concern over the import system of tickets that are subject to trading with a deteriorating effect on prices. Venezuela would prefer a system of free competition with payment of custom duties, rather than a system of tickets that further depresses already low prices.

President Betancourt stated that although it is true that Venezuela would benefit from U.S. market growth in terms of number of barrels,

it would not benefit from the standpoint of increased revenues. Venezuela is selling oil cheaper to Western Europe, but this is due also to the deteriorating prices in the U.S. oil market. It is unfortunate that countries such as Italy and France, that have been made prosperous by the Marshall plan, should be buying raw materials from underdeveloped countries at low prices.

President Betancourt then referred to the attempts of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) to achieve stable prices in order to improve national incomes and carry out social reform. He said that the Middle Eastern countries are also seriously menaced by the Communists. He had been informed that the Shah and King Faysal were going to meet with the directors of the oil companies to discuss problems relating to oil income. He had been asked to convey to President Kennedy a request to have the State Department cooperate with those countries in order to improve their income from oil.

President Kennedy agreed that it was unfortunate that Western European countries should be bargain hunting and playing Middle Eastern oil against Latin American oil and also using Soviet oil as a bargaining factor. The U.S. would try to convince its Western European allies of the need to protect common interests.

At this point the petroleum discussion ended and the conversation turned to another subject.

227. Memorandum of conversation, February 19, between President Kennedy and President Bentancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

February 19, 1963

SUBJECT

U.S.-Venezuelan Balance of Payments (Part 2 of 2 parts)

PARTICIPANTS

For the United States:
The President
Mr. Edwin M. Martin (ARA)
Mr. Griffith Johnson (E)

¹ Balance of payments. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.

Ambassador C. Allan Stewart (ARA)
Mr. Teodoro Moscoso (AID)
Mr. John M. Kelly, (Interior)
Mr. Ralph A. Dungan (White House)
Mr. Myer Feldman (White House)

For Venezuela:
President Betancourt
Dr. Andres German Otero, Minister of Finance
Dr. Godofredo Gonzalez, Minister of Development
Dr. Enrique Tejera Paris, Venezuelan Ambassador to U.S.
Dr. Carlos Perez de la Cova, Venezuelan Embassy

Following a discussion of petroleum matters, President Kennedy raised the question of the U.S.'s unfavorable balance of payments with Venezuela.

Dr. Otero stated that his figures did not indicate that the U.S. had an unfavorable balance with Venezuela. Venezuela sells to the U.S. 36% of its total exports and buys 55 to 56% of its imports from it.

President Kennedy gave the following figures on U.S. payments with Venezuela for the year 1962:

Exports \$500 million.
Returns on investment \$100 million.
Imports from Venezuela \$970 million.
Adverse balance of payments in the order of \$300 million.

Dr. Otero replied that although he did not have available figures for 1962, 1961 figures did not reflect such an imbalance. On the basis of income tax returns of U.S. oil companies a disinvestment of over \$300 million had taken place in contrast to the U.S. figures of only \$100 million.

Secretary Martin stated that there had been some disinvestment. However there was an increase in the value of the companies as a result of reinvestment.

Dr. Otero stated that the 1961 balance of payments was favorable to the U.S. and that U.S. oil companies had possibly reinvested profits withdrawn from Venezuela in other areas such as Libya, Argentina and other countries.

President Betancourt noted the existence of another problem related to this disinvestment. While foreign capital needed to finance Venezuelan industrialization was being withdrawn for investment elsewhere, Venezuelan banks were making loans to U.S. companies. The Ford Co., with a solid reputation and Detroit backing, had set up an assembly plant financed largely by Venezuelan banks.

President Kennedy expressed interest in the possibility of such a "leakage" and asked his economic advisers to look into the balance of payments figures more deeply.

Dr. Otero stated that there were only three countries with a surplus balance of payments with Venezuela: Italy, Germany and Japan. All other countries have an unfavorable balance with the exception of the United States which up to 1961 had an even balance of payments.

President Kennedy noted that in 1962 there was an unfavorable trade balance of about \$400 million and suggested that technical discussions could probably be held with U.S. companies focusing attention on this problem. He then asked about steps that could be taken to steer Venezuelan trade to the U.S.

Dr. Otero stated that until 1961 he considered Venezuela had been instrumental in collecting U.S. dollars around the world. Another point in connection with the balance of trade between both countries was that oil companies had decreased imports of equipment from \$400 million in 1957 to only about \$30 million in 1962. He understood the U.S. dollar drain problem and agreed to cooperate in seeking solutions to it.

In conclusion President Kennedy indicated his satisfaction with the cordial meeting and stated it would be necessary to set aside at least one and one-half hours the following day to continue the discussion of the political questions.

228. Memorandum of conversation, February 20, between President Kennedy and President Bentancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials¹

February 20, 1963

SUBJECT

Second and Final Conversation between President Kennedy and President Betancourt of Venezuela—Flight of Capital from Venezuela (Part 6 of 6 Parts.)

PARTICIPANTS

For the United States:
President Kennedy
The Secretary of State
Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Ambassador C.A. Stewart

¹ Flight of capital from Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.

A.B. Duke, Chief of Protocol
D.F. Margolies, Deputy Director, Office of East Coast Affairs (State)
Ralph A. Dungan (White House)

For Venezuela:
President Betancourt
Ambassador Tejera Paris
Falcon-Briceño, Foreign Minister
Gonzalez, Minister of Development (and representative of COPEI)

1. Restoration of Confidence in Venezuela

President Kennedy referred to the flight of capital from Latin America and asked how this affected Venezuela. President Betancourt said that there had been considerable flight of capital from Venezuela, mainly from two causes. First, some capital had been attracted to Venezuela during the dictatorship which he characterized as piratical since it gained 20 to 40 percent interest. With the end of the dictatorship this capital had left Venezuela. Second, in the beginning years of his administration there had been uncertainty as to the political stability of his regime, and fear of military take-over. A spreading loss of confidence gave rise to a flight of capital of considerable proportions. He said that his government had since become more firmly established, as evidenced by the rapid suppression of the two military revolts, and confidence had been greatly restored.

His finance Minister told him that the flight of capital had come to an end by last year, and in fact there appeared to be some re-flux of capital into Venezuela. The improvement of reserves which reflected this situation was evidenced by the fact that recently GOV had paid off a commercial bank loan of \$67 million in advance of the due date thereby saving \$3 million interest.

2. Concluding remarks

President Kennedy expressed appreciation for the talk. President Betancourt said that he had hoped to have an opportunity of a sincere and frank exchange of views about hemisphere problems with the President and was deeply gratified by the way the meeting had worked out.

229. Circular airgram CA-10071 to Moscow, March 18¹

March 18, 1963

INFO

Amembassy CARACAS

SUBJECT

Cuban Propaganda and Subversive Activities Venezuela

Embassy may find useful in conversations Soviet officials draw upon following summary of terrorism and sabotage Venezuela since October in relation to overt Cuban inflammatory propaganda directed Venezuela during same period:

1. Following October 1962 bombing Creole oil fields Castro/Communist-led terrorist and extremist activity Venezuela continued at alarming rate despite increased efforts GOV halt them. These paramilitary acts reached highest point in weeks just prior President Betancourt's February 19–28 trip to US. Most colorful and best publicized effort was hijacking Venezuelan merchant ship *Anzoategui* in mid-February. Other major incidents include brazen January theft five valuable paintings on loan GOV, successful bombings several US business interests (Sears Roebuck and Dupont paint warehouses); and early March sabotage of a Creole pipeline. Minor acts of terrorism in Caracas and rural areas are almost daily occurrences. Principal organization carrying out this paramilitary activity is communist dominated, Castro-oriented FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation). GOV convinced Castro and Communists are supporting and encouraging this activity in Venezuela.

2. Appeals for violent revolution in Venezuela have long occupied dominant place Castro-Cuba propaganda output. Calls for armed struggle have been particularly vehement in speeches by regime leaders since October–November 1962 missile crisis. Frequently, Havana sponsored meetings of hemispheric communists and leftists have provided forum from which to attack Betancourt government. In November a "week of solidarity with the Venezuelan people" (November 17–21) was officially declared. Cuban Education Minister Armando Hart closed this week of anti-Betancourt tirades with harangue in which he pledged Cuba's "solidarity with Venezuela is not a solidarity of words." Referring to Venezuelan communists and leftists in his January 2 speech, Castro said "The imperialists were given evidence of what

¹ Cuban propaganda and subversive activities in Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.

revolutionary solidarity is—active solidarity of revolutionaries who do not sit in their doorways to wait for the corpse of their enemy to pass by, of revolutionaries who understand that the duty of all revolutionaries is to create the revolution.” Other Cuban leaders have spoken in similar vein. At the March 1 Venezuelan-Cuban solidarity meeting Larazo Pena, Secretary General of the Revolutionary Cuban Workers Organization, thanked Venezuelan people for striking at Venezuelan oil installations during missile crisis. Pena, like Hart, Castro, Roca, Guevara and others have urged Venezuelans to follow the Cuban example under the leadership of Venezuelan Communist Party and the MIR (Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario).

Ball
Acting

**230. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
April 30¹**

April 30, 1963

SUBJECT

Venezuela—General Lansdale's Report

I refer to your request that I brief the attached report by General Lansdale. The report, which the General wrote after a visit to CINCARIB and a nine-day visit to Venezuela, examines the Communist insurgency menace in that country. It concludes that while Venezuela is a tinder box and not a fire, there are enough sparks to make the situation dangerous; more should and can be done to counter the Communist threat.

The report is very interesting and conveys a good, colorful feel for the Venezuelan situation. It contains some suggestions for action which seem to me to be worthy of further study. The following are some of the highlights of the report:

¹ Highlights of General Lansdale's report on Communist insurgency in Venezuela. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.

A. The Elements

1. *The Threat*—One of the two most vulnerable areas is Caracas. While the poor people living in the surrounding hills are the raw material for the rabble rousers, the explosive elements in the Caracas picture are the university students, who have immunity behind the Central University walls, and the legal Communist Party with its membership in Congress. University and high school students carry out countless acts of terrorism in Caracas—e.g. killings, bombings, disarming of police, telephone threats.

Where the threat in Caracas is politically significant, the threat in West Venezuela (the oil fields) is economically significant. The oil well operation at Maracaibo and the long pipeline leading to the refineries 125 miles away are very vulnerable to sabotage; there were a number of attacks in 1962. These attacks could really be catastrophic. For example, if some one set up mortars and bazookas and stopped the main power plant at La Salina (this is a feasible attack) the GOV would lose \$2 million per day in oil revenues.

2. *Communist Forces (FALN)*—Estimates vary, but there are very roughly 300 to 500 men in the Communist paramilitary forces; probably about $\frac{1}{2}$ of these are in Caracas. While this is a small force (which tends to grow when the students are on vacation), it should be noted (1) that Castro's forces were small and (2) that it may be a relatively large force in view of the fractured missions of the GOV forces—i.e. nobody short of Betancourt is really charged with meeting the Communist threat.

The FALN appears to be a unified force (e.g. courier systems), and is quite effective in psychological warfare (reporting phony terrorist acts to stir up fruitless GOV activity) as well as in the more violent forms of terrorism. Its composition is indicated by the following breakdown of 177 FALN prisoners—44 students, 15 professional men, 23 laborers, 43 farmers, and 52 unknown.

3. *Venezuelan Military*—There are 9,000 men in the National Guard (FAC), which is a voluntary outfit; 14,000 men in the Army, which is composed of 2 year, largely illiterate draftees; 1,400 men in the obsolete and poorly repaired Air Force; and 2,900 men in the Navy which is supported by 2,700 politically suspect Marines. The General saw mostly the FAC and the Army.

The FAC is the best fighting force in Venezuela and has received counter-guerrilla training. However, it is primarily a stationery force which operates in battalion size throughout the country (e.g. guarding critical installations, highway patrols, game wardens); it does not have a real counter-guerrilla role. The Army, which is a second rate outfit, has the primary anti-guerrilla role in the countryside. They seem to be

trying hard, but the FAC could perform the active counter-guerrilla role much more effectively.

4. *Special Group (CI)*—It is called the Unified Command in Venezuela and is made up of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Justice, and Agriculture, the Commanders of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of Police; it also has an advisory Intelligence Committee. It is nominally a standing group but usually meets only in emergencies; reportedly it works efficiently and effectively in meeting emergencies.

5. *Police*—The police are ineffective (daily accounts of police being robbed, and of police being unable to stop thieves, terrorists, etc.) and it is illogical to depend on the police as the main protection against urban terrorists. Police functions are split up to a ridiculous extent; there are municipal, political, technical, traffic, and security police, all responsible to different organizations. When a car was blown up in the assassination attempt on Betancourt, different police had bits and pieces of the car and of the mechanism used in the explosion; all the bits and pieces were never brought together in one place for study.

6. *Special Forces Mobile Training Teams (MTT)*—This American team has done a fine job and the Venezuelans love them. The Venezuelans also seem interested in having a Special Air Warfare MTT; this would be a good thing.

7. *Psychology of Terrorism*—Americans on the scene receive threats constantly but their outlook remains cheery, almost abnormally so. The Country Team should keep record of these threats and press the GOV to take some action.

8. *Repealing Parkinson's Law*—The reporting requirements from Washington are becoming excessive. It is a good Country Team and Washington should let it run the show. Washington can spot check by brief visits. Washington can also help by sending in appropriate mobile training teams on a temporary basis. For example, a Public Safety MTT, bilingual in Spanish, would be very useful.

9. *Talks with Minister of Defense and Ambassador Stewart*—General Lansdale's talks with the Minister of Defense covered such subjects as the need for U.S. help; the moral reluctance of Venezuelans to take life; the virtues of using martial law under certain conditions; and troop information and education.

Ambassador Stewart pointed out to the General that the prestige and influence of the U.S. Military Group could be increased if military equipment deliveries were expedited.

B. Conclusions

1. Venezuela is not a fire but there are plenty of sparks.
2. The capabilities of the Communist paramilitary forces are growing.

3. The GOV assignment of forces against the guerrillas is not as effective as it could be.

4. There is need for serious U.S. effort to help Venezuelans understand their responsibilities as citizens.

5. Venezuela has many positive elements in the struggle to build a strong democracy—a growing middle class, a heavy infusion of hard-working U.S. citizens, tremendous natural resources.

6. The U.S. Country Team is impressive and is capable of undertaking a successful pilot project in which more independence of action would be given to the field.

7. Venezuelans look to the U.S. for support. 1963 is a critical year because of the Presidential electoral campaign and Communist blockage of budget support in Congress.

C. Suggestions

1. *Students*—Central University in Caracas is the Communist jugular vein. Get a group (20 to 100) of tough and resourceful American students to enroll at and be active in the University.

2. *Peace Funds*—The Venezuelan people need to get into the act. Start a 3 month campaign to raise funds which can be used as rewards to capture FALN leaders and saboteurs.

3. *Psywar*—Make an asset out of 2 year draftees in the Army. Give them an understanding of patriotism and their civic responsibilities. An MTT of psywar pros would be useful.

4. *Veterans*—Instead of “running scared” of the military, Venezuelan leaders should make use of the military virtues in strengthening democracy. Encourage veterans to form organizations with patriotic platforms; use veterans to cadre colonies in the hinterland.

Gordon Chase

231. Telegram 446 to Caracas, November 21¹

November 21, 1963

Embtels 572 and 573.

1. We believe Betancourt's plan for briefing LA chiefs on arms cache is excellent way surface evidence Cuban origin. We expect U.S. will be included in briefing to maintain hemispheric front. Would also be helpful have Canadian and West European chiefs present or briefed separately.

2. As indicated in message sent to you through other channels, we continue think that announcement of arms cache evidence provides excellent basis for reporting to OAS and making appeal for developing appropriate means for multilateral cooperation in surveillance under Resolution II of 8th MFM.

3. On reporting to OAS we gratified Betancourt has not closed door. We think it would be serious mistake, however, use forthcoming MFM forum to present evidence or raise question because of terms under which meeting convoked and disruptive effects likely to be produced by introduction Cuban subversion issue in specific terms. On other hand COAS is clearly indicated organ to receive report as result assignment given it by 8th MFM (Resolution II, paragraph 1). Furthermore, we think GOV would do OAS major disservice if it were to present evidence to diplomatic corps OAS countries and not follow-up with presentation to COAS because it might be misinterpreted as GOV lack of interest in role which OAS can play in meeting problem of Castro-Communist subversion in this hemisphere.

4. We disappointed Betancourt cool to idea of call for some form of multilateral cooperation in surveillance since intelligence reports indicate need for such action. Given his coolness and delicacy preelectoral situation, we of course do not rpt not intend push this further with him at this time. However, we would want to take advantage of any indication from him of reconsideration in order to pursue subject.

5. For your background only following is outline of tentative operation plan to interdict air and sea shipments of arms and men for purposes of Castro-Communist subversion which we had wanted you discuss with Betancourt in event he had reacted favorably to making appeal:

¹ President Betancourt's briefing of LA chiefs on Cuban arms cache. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, October-November 1963.

a. Whenever intelligence received of shipments of arms and men to any of countries in area, this information would be immediately relayed to the governments concerned including flag country of vessel or aircraft and, in cases of transshipment, countries of departure and destination.

b. To degree intelligence justifies such action, governments concerned (US and LA) would immediately alert internal security forces and contribute units to establish cooperative air and offshore surface surveillance. These land, sea and air units would work together in search for the ship or aircraft to identify, intercept it and prevent arms and men from reaching their destination. Direct means of communication between such units would be worked out to facilitate surveillance coordination.

c. With respect to sea shipment: (1) governments concerned including US would agree in advance to give reciprocal rights to intercept and search their respective flag vessels in international waters which conform to description of suspect vessel. If intercepted ship is found to be carrying arms and men it would be escorted to the nearest port of the participating powers and turned over to local consul of country whose flag the vessel flies; (2) governments concerned would agree in advance to allow units of countries participating in the cooperative surveillance effort to enter their territorial waters to intercept and search vessels of any flag suspected of carrying arms or men. If found to be carrying such arms or men, ship would be taken to nearest port of territorial country and turned over to local authorities.

d. With respect to air shipments, suspected aircraft would be shadowed to destination to assure search and apprehension upon landing or to prevent clandestine airdrops to Castro-Communist elements. Governments concerned would agree in advance to permit aircraft other cooperating governments to enter their national airspace for this purpose.

e. Governments concerned would agree in advance to give each other reciprocal use of port and airport facilities for units used in cooperative surveillance.

f. Implementing details of foregoing plan would be worked out through appropriate inter-governmental channels. In situation in Venezuela course of action along following lines, in three consecutive stages, would be considered on request: First stage: provision joint survey and mobile training team to provide training, assistance and advice in matters related surveillance and intercept operations and coordination of all Venezuelan military and para-military forces and US forces involved in the operation; limited number RC-121 aircraft for all-weather reconnaissance and intercept control; Second stage: provision mobile radar package; Third stage: provision fighter-interceptor aircraft

to destroy intruder aircraft. Foregoing in addition to US air and sea forces to supplement Venezuelan surveillance capabilities.

In connection Betancourt's reaction to sea-air surveillance we note GOV agreement JOC MTT (COMUSMILGRUVEN 1919557ZEA). Would appreciate your assessment of further types of training and equipment they might want taking into consideration assistance outlined in part 1 of First Stage and Second Stage of paragraph (f) of operational plan. Second part of First Stage and Third Stage refer to US forces and equipment operating from Venezuelan bases. Under present circumstances we recognize Venezuela would not request it and we of course would not be prepared to execute these stages without an explicit, written and disclosable request by GOV.

Action requested: Please follow-up OAS aspects with Betancourt along lines paragraph 3. You should strongly urge that as minimum he submit evidence to COAS. You should be ready take advantage any indication he is reconsidering position on multilateral cooperative air-sea surveillance in order to explore this further with him to determine in what ways he would be willing to have us assist him. In this circumstance you may draw on all or part operational plan as illustrative of possible arrangement. We have discussed handling arms cache and surveillance problem with Tejera along general lines you have discussed with Betancourt and this message. Briceño ill and could not participate.

Ball

Cuba

November–December 1960

**232. Briefing papers used to brief President-elect Kennedy,
November 18¹**

November 18, 1960

Briefing Papers used by Mr. Dulles and
Mr. Bissell—President-Elect Kennedy

COVERT OPERATIONS—CUBA

1. BACKGROUND

17 March 1960—President authorized Agency undertake covert action program to replace Castro government with one more devoted to true interests of Cuban people and more acceptable to U.S. in such manner avoid appearance of U.S. intervention.

2. PROGRAM PLANS

Four major courses:

- a. Creation of unified Cuban opposition.
- b. Creation of mass communication facilities for propaganda offensive.
- c. Creation of intelligence and action organization within Cuba.
- d. Development of paramilitary force with necessary logistical support for military operations on Island.

Instrumentality

Government-in-exile as cover and manpower source.
Developed under ostensible private U.S. interests. Unilateral operations to complement group activities.

¹ Covert action program to replace Castro government. Secret. 6 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 64–00352R, Box 4, US Govt—President, Memoranda, Letters, Reports re CIA Relations with President and Cabinet.

3. POLITICAL ACTION

We consider requests for support from any anti-Castro (and non-Communist non-Batista) group or individual inside or outside Cuba with demonstrable capability. On 22 June 1960 at Mexico City five prominent anti-Castro groups declared opposition to Castro. Group called Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD).

4. PROPAGANDA

a. Radio

Major radio mechanism is Swan Island, medium and short-wave broadcasts, 6½ hours of each daily. Under commercial cover. Anti-Trujillo and anti-Castro. Conclusive evidence of effectiveness throughout Cuba, except central Havana, where jammed. Constitutes practically a "Radio Free Cuba."

b. Other Radio

WRUL: 30 minutes, week day on short wave.

Guatemala: 30 minutes daily on short wave.

WMIE (Miami): Two daily broadcasts on medium wave.

Nicaragua: Clandestine short-wave broadcasts to begin soon.

Seaborne: Irregular clandestine broadcasts.

c. Publications

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] tabloid from Florida, 17,000 copies weekly circulated in Latin America, including 5,500 mailed into Cuba.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] magazine from U.S. resumed publication 7 October in 130,000 copies. ABC certified audit shows a second issue order of 150,000.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] weekly newspaper from New York is being published in 7,000 copies.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] weekly newspaper from Miami.

Other Propaganda Efforts

Assisted in stimulating riotous anti-Communist religious demonstrations on 17 July.

Assisted in issuance of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] condemning drift toward communism.

Three million leaflets awaiting air drop and sea infiltration.

Special operation in New York during UNGA, including "Caravan of Sorrow" from Miami, student demonstrations, and defection of a Castro agent.

5. PARAMILITARY

An instructor cadre of 25 was trained secretly in the Canal Zone and thereafter placed in Guatemala for instruction of up to 500 men in paramilitary operations.

Radio training—21 operators in training in Guatemala for use with paramilitary teams.

Air training—39 pilots for tactical air force at training base in Guatemala with B-26 and C-46 aircraft.

Dissident Groups

Checking and evaluating 12 groups inside Cuba for development unilateral assets. Two air drops of supplies and equipment.

6. PARAMILITARY PLAN OF OPERATIONS

The *initial phase* of paramilitary operations envisages the development, support and guidance of dissident groups principally in three provinces of Cuba: Pinar del Rio, Las Villas, and Oriente. These groups will be organized, trained, and led by Agency's Cuban assets for concerted guerrilla action against the regime. It does not now appear that such action alone will be successful in sparking a successful revolt.

The *second phase* would be initiated by a combined sea-air assault by FRD forces on Cuba coordinated with general guerrilla activity. This will establish a close-in staging base for future operations.

The *last phase*, if needed, would be air assault on the Havana area with the guerrilla forces on Cuba moving on the ground into the Havana area.

A contingency plan for overt U.S. military intervention includes planning for the coordinated use of Agency assets.

Maritime ex- and infiltrations started 28 September, with five successes to date.

7. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

[1 line not declassified]

[1 line not declassified]

Ten provocations identified and contained.

8. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Staybehind acts—4 in Havana area completed, one used exclusively for ex- and infiltration duties. Two in place in Santiago de Cuba area.

Twenty-two W/T sets cached for staybehind.

[1 line not declassified]

[1 line not declassified]

**233. Memorandum from Joseph W. Scott to Livingston Merchant,
December 6¹**

December 6, 1960

The first part of the attached paper recommends a program of action in the overt field designed to bring about the removal of the Castro regime.

We now need your reaction to Part One before meeting with Tracy Barnes in preparing the second part, which will recommend covert actions designed to supplement and reinforce the suggested overt program.

Tom Mann and Hugh Cumming have seen and concurred with Part One.

Joseph W. Scott
Special Assistant

Attachment

Tom Mann called last night and made the following four points regarding the attached draft, dated December 6, on Cuba.

1. The section on Basic Assumptions commits us to a short time table. I pointed out that this section was written in anticipation of a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the subject which is due Friday, December 9.

2. The last sentence of the Basic Assumptions section (page 2) may be a non-sequitur. I agreed that it might be and said I thought the sentence could be deleted.

3. On page 4, para 2a, Tom felt the training program should be spelled out, particularly with reference to drawing a distinction between training for overt and covert purposes. He agreed that this could be done by means of an additional tab.

4. With regard to para 2b on page 4, Tom estimates there may be 2 to 3 thousand "hard core" Americans who can't be encouraged to leave Cuba under any foreseeable circumstances and that appropriate

¹ Transmits memorandum recommending a program of covert action to remove the Castro regime. Top Secret. 9 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov. 1960-Jan. 20, 1961.

account should be taken of this. We will pursue this further and see that it is included for consideration in subsequent drafts.

Joseph W. Scott
Special Assistant

Attachment

SUBJECT

A Suggested Program for Cuba

Part One of this paper recommends a program of action in the overt [illegible in the original] the removal of the Castro regime. Part Two recommends covert actions designed to supplement and reinforce the suggested program.

PART ONE

I. Basic Assumptions

Time is running against us in the Cuban situation. In the foreseeable future (the next year to 15 months) the curve of effective totalitarian controls over the people in Cuba will rise at a faster rate than will the curve of dissatisfaction and potential resistance to the Castro regime (See Tab A). Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or significant weakening of the Castro regime. Political, social and psychological controls will facilitate any further belt-tightening required. In addition, the Soviet bloc can and will provide the assistance necessary to prevent serious deterioration in the Cuban economy in the short run and to permit an expansion of economic capabilities over the longer term. The Soviet Union will continue to support the military buildup in Cuba and will unstintingly exert its political and military influence—short of risking general war—to sustain the present regime in Cuba (See Tabs B and C).

The Castro regime will continue a course parallel or subservient to the policies of international Communism. It will continue its efforts to minimize the position of the United States and to spread the Castro revolution to other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Given the serious social and economic pressures building up in most countries of Latin America and the weaknesses of many of the present governments, the chances of the establishment of one or more Castro-like governments over the next year to 15 months are appreciable. Indefinite prolongation of the Castro empire and its present policies is intolerable from the standpoint of the internal security of the United States.

II. Suggested Solution

Back through a Meeting of Foreign Ministers commencing February 1, 1961, collective OAS action under the [illegible in the original] Treaty

for severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba, application of economic sanctions, authorization for inter-American [illegible in the original] activity and increased measures by Member States to protect their borders and strengthen their internal security.

Failure to [illegible in the original] effective OAS action, and without prejudice to further multilateral effort, seek to persuade as many Latin American states as possible to accompany us in unilateral severance of relations with Cuba and a [illegible in the original] of the foregoing measures. Make known our readiness to respond favorably to requests for naval and air patrol action from governments threatened by Cuban-based aggression.

Promote the establishment of a government-in-exile with control over some portion of the territory of Cuba; seek to persuade other governments to join us in extending recognition thereto as soon as possible after collective or unilateral severance of relations with the Castro regime; and assist through personnel training and other material support the efforts of that group to expand the area under its control to include all of Cuba.

III. *Measures to Implement Proposed Solution*

1. *Seek Collective Action Through the Organization of American States*

The obligations and responsibilities undertaken by the United States or a member of the inter-American system require that every effort be used to bring about a solution of the Cuban problem without resort to [illegible in the original]. It is therefore incumbent upon us to attempt, in the first instance, to achieve such a solution through the mechanism and procedures of the OAS.

Ideally, we [illegible in the original] work to have some one or more Latin American governments take the initiative in calling the meeting of Foreign Ministers and [illegible in the original] the necessary resolutions aimed at Castro. Should this be impossible, however, the United States should itself take the lead and [illegible in the original] forcefully to have such a meeting on February 1, 1961 (Tab F).

At a meeting of Foreign Ministers, member states should be asked to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba until such time as its government and policies cease to represent a threat to the peace, tranquility, stability and security of the inter-American community. In addition to this, member states should be asked to apply thorough going economic sanctions both to imports from Cuba and exports thereto.

Finally, and without prejudice to the right of the United States to act in response to direct requests for assistance, stand-by authorization should be sought for inter-American patrol activity by air and surface craft of member states when necessary to impede movements of men, arms, supplies or other instruments of Cuban-sponsored aggression or subversion against another American state.

2. *Initiate [illegible in the original] Action by the United States, to include:*

a. *[illegible in the original] Training Program*

[illegible in the original] any future government in Cuba be competent [illegible in the original] with United States interests, we should begin now to select and train a group of Cubans in government operations and public and [illegible in the original]. This training, to begin without delay, should be [illegible in the original] of the new program to be mounted by a special representative of the President for the relief and rehabilitation [illegible in the original] of Cuban refugees now concentrated in the Florida [illegible in the original] financial from Mutual Security Act funds (Tabs D and E)

b. *Severance of Diplomatic Relations*

If collective action through the OAS to sever relations with Cuba [illegible in the original] and if more Latin American states refuse to join us in such action, the United States should unilaterally sever diplomatic relations with the Castro regime.

Prior to severing relations, we should take steps to encourage the departure of U.S. citizens from Cuba, and we should assume that it will not be possible or feasible to maintain consular offices in the country.

Full explanation of our action should be furnished promptly to our NATO allies and through our diplomatic missions to governments around the world. All instruments of diplomacy and propaganda should be focused on all-out effort to secure if not parallel action at least worldwide understanding and support of our step.

c. *Economic Sanctions*

Immediately following the severance of diplomatic relations, [illegible in the original] as against Cuba. Export controls already in place should be further [illegible in the original] by elimination of [illegible in the original] and medicines. Authorization should be [illegible in the original] to impede the flow of Cuban imports into this country; financial controls should be applied to all transactions involving Cuba; and our NATO allies should be [illegible in the original]-type controls against Cuba.

d. *Recognition of Cuban Government-in-Exile*

[illegible in the original] relations with the Castro [illegible in the original] recognize a government-in-exile. To this end, we should begin now [illegible in the original] to select a junta which would be qualified [illegible in the original] for an acceptable political alternative for the Cuban people and [illegible in the original] successor government (Tab G). It is [illegible in the original] that the junta be able to attract the support of large numbers of Cubans within Cuba as well as outside. In addition, it should be able to [illegible in the original] in support of military force able to establish a [illegible in the original] on the island

of Cuba and hold it until outside aid is available. The junta should [illegible in the original] that when this point is reached, the United States would respond favorably to [illegible in the original] requests for help in the form of:

- (1) military supplies and equipment,
- (2) civilian emergency aid (of Red Cross type),
- (3) financial assistance,
- (4) diplomatic support, and
- (5) press and other news media support. (Tab H)

A centrally developed campaign should be started, as soon as an acceptable government-in-exile announces itself publicly, to build up [illegible in the original] of its leaders and to line up Latin American support for the government. Similar efforts ultimately will be necessary in the UN. (Tab F)

e. *Overt Assistance to Government-in-Exile*

[illegible in the original] extended recognition, the United States should approach other friendly governments to follow suit. It should maintain open [illegible in the original] of the government-in-exile and of [illegible in the original] assist them in their [illegible in the original] to other governments with appropriate requests for equipment, supplies, facilities, and financial assistance. Additionally, those Cuban refugees training or rehabilitated in this country prior to establishment of the government-in-exile should be encouraged to place themselves at its [illegible in the original] and to work with it in preparing for eventual return to Cuba and assumption of government responsibilities.

f. *Prevention of Movement of Arms and Men from Cuba to OAS Member States and/or Naval Blockade of Cuba*

Consideration should be given to the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* around Cuba. The moral and legal position of the United States would be considerably better if we were to act in response to the request of other member states. Therefore, the United States should announce publicly its readiness to respond favorably to requests for naval and air [illegible in the original] governments threatened by Cuban-based aggression.

[illegible in the original] that may prove necessary and feasible and would consider the possibility of instituting a naval blockade (Tabs I and J). [illegible in the original]).

PART TWO

[illegible in the original] by Agency.)

IV. *Recommendations*

1. [illegible in the original] approval is obtained from the Secretary, a Special [illegible in the original], and the President for the course of

action outlined herein. [illegible in the original] through collective action if possible and unilateral [illegible in the original] the replacement of the present Cuban Government with [illegible in the original] from the standpoint of United States interests.

2. That, if the above approval is obtained, the concurrence of the President-elect be sought.

234. Notes of a Special Group meeting, December 29¹

December 29, 1960

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS—CUBA

1. Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in the next three days.

2. Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such, since this would be impractical in view of requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.

3. The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent. However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

4. Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries, some time before January 20th.

¹ Overall plan for covert actions in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Meetings—Cuba.

5. Mr. Merchant also said that he had come to the firm conclusion that it would be impossible politically to carry out three days of pre-invasion bombing in Cuba. All members of the Group agreed; Mr. Bissell said the concept has been revised to include only one day before the invasion.

6. Mr. Douglas then outlined his understanding of the general outlines of the overall plan for Cuba. Mr. Bissell agreed that this understanding was an accurate one. Mr. Douglas questioned the possibility of expanding the initial beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the government. Mr. Bissell said that our thinking is that this will not be possible unless one or all of the following situations develops: (a) overt support, (b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive use of air support.

7. It was agreed that care should be taken as far as possible to avoid any possibly-abortive uprising on a comparatively small scale, such as the proposal made by a group of internal dissidents to seize an airfield and port near Havana.

8. Mr. Douglas said that it should not be assumed that Defense could not move quickly in support of covert operations. He acknowledged the fact that various subordinate elements of the DOD structure can slow things down considerably, but said that the top Defense echelon could cut through this if necessary.

9. Mr. Dulles reminded the Group that the President of Mexico had expressed a desire to meet with him. He said he proposed to visit that country on a vacation in January and that he hoped at that time to arrange a secret meeting with the President. He said he would like to talk to Mr. Mann before the trip; Mr. Merchant thought this would be useful. Mr. Dulles pointed out that this contact might provide a means of obtaining facilities in Mexico for the Cuban operation.

10. Mr. Merchant suggested that Messrs. Willauer, Mann and Barnes might usefully be present at meetings of the Group which included discussion of Cuba.

January 1961

235. Paper prepared in the CIA, January 1961¹

January 1961

TRINIDAD (CONCEPT OF OPERATION)

1. *MISSION*. Commencing at H-hour on D-day, the Assault Force lands, seizes, occupies, and defends a lodgement in the TRINIDAD-CASILDA area in order to establish a base from which further land and air operations can be launched against the Castro government of CUBA.

2. *CONCEPT OF OPERATION*.

a. On D-day the Assault Force conducts an amphibious/airborne landing in the TRINIDAD area.

b. Prior to D-day, sabotage activities are directed at reducing and destroying the GCC ground, air and naval capability throughout CUBA, with particular emphasis on air, communications, transportation, armor, artillery and POL. Propaganda activities are intensified in order to obtain active support of the Cuban populace.

c. On D-1 tactical support aircraft attack major GOC air force installations in order to destroy aircraft on the ground and to inflict maximum damage to runways and control and communications facilities. Attacks are also launched against tank parks, artillery parks, motor transportation, and other military targets.

d. At about H-6 hours a tactical deception operation is conducted in the LA FE area of PINAR DEL RIC in order to cause movement of enemy forces away from the area of intended actual operations.

e. Immediately prior to and following H-hour on D-day, tactical support aircraft provide air support for the Assault Force in landing and seizure of objectives, with particular attention to enemy defensive installations and troop formation in the immediate objective area. Major rail and highway bridges west and northwest of TRINIDAD and along the coastal road toward CIENFUEGOS are bombed in order to isolate the objective area. Daily armed reconnaissance missions are continued in order to prevent movement of enemy forces against the lodgment.

f. Commencing at H-hour, the Assault Force lands by landing craft (LCVP and LCU) over designated beaches, (Beaches 1 and 2), and by

¹ Mission and concept of operation for action against Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee.

parachute in designated drop zone, seizes objectives A, B, and C, and on order of Assault Force Commander, seizes Objectives E and F. (Annex D—Operation Overlay).

g. After seizure of initial objectives, the Assault Force attempts to obtain cooperation, assistance and good-will of the local populace in the TRINIDAD–CASILDA area. Combat inside the City of Trinidad is avoided. Facilities such as the hospital in TRINIDAD and the port facilities and petroleum supplies at CASILDA are converted to Brigade use.

h. After consolidation of the lodgment, Assault Force coordinates operations with local guerrilla leaders and civil leaders in the area making maximum efforts to organize, equip and employ additional forces and incorporate them under command of the Brigade Commander.

i. Upon seizure and preparation of the airfield at TRINIDAD, transport aircraft (C-46) utilize this base for supply and evacuation operations.

j. Follow-up logistic support is provided by air landing, air drop and seaborne means on a scheduled basis and in response to call of Brigade Commander.

k. In the event the TRINIDAD area cannot be held, the Assault Brigade, on order of the Brigade Commander, withdraws to the ESCAMBRAY MOUNTAINS in order to continue resistance operations against the Castro government. Support for these operations will be provided by aerial means.

**236. Briefing paper for Secretary of State-designate Rusk,
January 1961¹**

January 1961

Briefing of Secretary of State Designate Rusk

On 17 March 1960, the President authorized the Agency to undertake a program designed to replace the current Cuban government

¹ Presidentially authorized program to replace current Cuban Government with one suited to democratic ideals of Cuban people and compatible with long-range U.S. interests. Secret. 28 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba Task Force.

with one more suited to the democratic ideals of the Cuban people and compatible with long-range U.S. interests. Since that date we have conducted this program along five major lines, namely: Political Action, Propaganda, Paramilitary Action, Foreign Intelligence, and Counter-Intelligence. Each of these activities is summarized in the following sections of this paper, which concludes with a résumé of the principal currently pending policy questions.

I. POLITICAL ACTION

We have conducted our political activities under the following concepts:

Opposition to the CASTRO regime should have as its goals full restoration of the 1940 Constitution and return to the basic principles of the revolution as enunciated in the 1958 Caracas Declaration.

The opposition should be pro-Western, strongly anti-Communist, embrace factions ranging in political orientation from a little to the right of center to somewhat left of center, and be able to appeal to and muster the broadest possible support of the Cuban population as a whole.

In order to implement these concepts, it was found necessary to establish an exile central management group, which would be used as a cover for covert actions, a catalyst for the unification of approximately 184 different anti-CASTRO groups, and a possible nucleus for a Provisional Government of Cuba.

The Agency gave much consideration to the composition of this central management group. Since it was felt unwise to include individuals closely associated in the past with the BATISTA regime, our primary attention was focused on personalities and groups who had participated directly in the original government of CASTRO but had left it, or who had collaborated with CASTRO's revolutionary effort but—because of the failure of his government to uphold the basic principles of the revolution—had gone into early opposition.

A. *Formation of the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD)*

As a result of the foregoing considerations, we were able to forge—in April/May 1960—five political groups into one anti-CASTRO organization, which adopted the name Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD). The groups spearheading the campaign against the CASTRO regime, under the umbrella of the FRD, are:

1. The Autentico Party, headed by Manuel Antonio de VARONA;
2. The Monticristi Group, headed by Justo CARRILLO;
3. The Christian Democratic Movement, headed by Jose Ignacio RASCO;
4. The Movimiento Revolucionario Recuperadora (MRR), headed by Manuel ARTIME; and

5. The Movimiento Institucional Democratico (MID), headed by Ricardo Rafael SARDINA. (It might be mentioned that the AAA organization, headed by Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango, was a charter member of the FRD; SANCHEZ Arango chose, however, for reasons of his own, to leave the FRD and the MID organization was then brought into the FRD.)

The FRD has its ostensible headquarters in Cuba and branch offices in the U.S. (primarily Miami) and a number of Latin American countries. Its components consist of a 5-member Executive Committee (the policy-making body of the organization), a General Coordinator (Manuel Antonio de VARONA, who is the *de facto* general manager of the organization), and 10 action departments, such as Plans and Programming, Propaganda, Transport, and Military Affairs.

B. The Political Posture of the FRD

The political posture of the FRD, which is less homogeneous than we would like it to be, ranges from somewhat right of center (SARDINA) to a little left of center (Justo CARRILLO). The MRR and the Autenticos can be considered centrist, with the important difference that the MRR represents the young generation, while the Autenticos, under VARONA, are a somewhat up-dated and much cleaner version of the early PRIO era.

On 22 June 1960, the FRD issued its Manifesto in Mexico City. This Manifesto strongly condemns the dictatorial and communist nature of the CASTRO regime and calls upon the people of Cuba, other Latin American nations, and the world to help the FRD to overthrow Fidel CASTRO's dictatorship. The FRD is dedicated to re-establish in Cuba a representative, democratic system and full civil liberties under the 1940 Constitution. The FRD is pledged to hold free general elections within 18 months after the establishment of a Provisional Government. It desires to ban the Communist Party; it promises an extension of social gains for the working classes, and agrarian reform that will develop the national riches and raise the rural standard of living; it desires a true trade union movement and a maximum enlargement of Cuba's gross national product, and more equitable distribution thereof. In other words, the FRD favors political, social, and economic evolution in Cuba.

C. FRD Activities

1. *Unification of Exile Groups:* In view of the particularities of Cuban exile politics, complete unification of exile groups is an almost impossible task. The FRD, however, has succeeded in causing the coalescence of various exile elements and is in contact with the more significant ones. By its sheer presence inside and outside Cuba, the FRD has much contributed to mobilize public opinion against CASTRO and has

induced individuals and groups to actively oppose the regime. We are in contact with other acceptable exile groups, and we are examining every operational proposal these groups make with the intent to support them on a unilateral basis if their proposals have merit.

2. *Paramilitary Activities*: The FRD originally fronted for the selection and establishment of training sites in Guatemala. Through the mechanisms of the FRD military department, recruitment activities were undertaken; the FRD has also furnished the military manpower for those actions on land, in the air, and on the seas, which have taken place so far.

3. *Planning Activities*: The FRD has prepared many papers on a variety of subjects designed to provide as orderly as possible transition from the CASTRO regime to a new government: an agrarian law, amendments to the Constitution, a labor code, a military code, a judicial code, and others.

4. *FRD Branch Office Activities*: There are FRD branch offices in 15 Latin American countries. These branch offices are engaged in destroying the CASTRO image in these areas by utilizing local press and radio contacts and by engaging—on appropriate levels—in behind-the-scenes lobbying activities among governmental circles. These branch offices also are distributing written material attributable to the FRD (see below). Until these branch offices appeared on the local scene in the various Latin American countries, there were no focal points for the expression of anti-CASTRO sentiment in these areas. FRD branch offices have filled this void.

5. *FRD Affiliates*: The FRD has several affiliated organizations undertaking tours of Latin America to present to those who are in danger of being swayed by CASTROISM the true picture of the Cuban Communist dictatorship and the plight of all classes in the country. Teams composed of Labor Representatives (FORD), Students (DRE), Women's Group (CFC), Teachers' Group (DFR), and Jurists (AFJ) have already been organized and several have embarked on propaganda tours of Latin America. One clandestine student propaganda team has been infiltrated into Cuba and recently effected a successful clandestine broadcast over a dormant TV channel.

The FRD "Affiliates" and the independent Crusada Feminina Cubana (CFC) have given excellent results, particularly with respect to their tours throughout Latin America. The excellent press and other media coverage of their activities during these trips attests to the favorable impact they have had.

II. PROPAGANDA

Starting with press conferences in June in New York, Mexico, and Miami, and the publishing of a Manifesto which has been widely

distributed, the FRD propaganda efforts have now reached the point where the FRD is well known as the principal resistance coalition dedicated to the overthrow of the CASTRO Communist dictatorship. The FRD propaganda mechanism now has representatives in many Latin American countries; this mechanism is responsible for two radio programs beamed into Cuba (one of them from a boat broadcasting from international waters), facilities for the production of printed material for infiltration into Cuba, three regular weekly publications, and is preparing a study called "Listen, Mr. Mills", in reply to C. Wright Mills' book, "Listen Yankee".

Special propaganda operations undertaken by the FRD include the "Caravan of Sorrow". In September 1960, 62 Cuban women dressed in black and "mourning the death of freedom in Cuba" went from Miami to New York City in a protest against the visit of Fidel CASTRO to the United Nations. Reportorial coverage of this operation was excellent in Miami, New York, and Washington. During this same time in New York City, FRD student groups demonstrated against CASTRO and the Communist leaders. The effect of these demonstrations was evident in the press coverage and in the attempt by the 26th of July Movement in New York City to assassinate members of the student group on 22 September, which unfortunately resulted in the death of a Venezuelan child, an innocent bystander.

In addition to the FRD propaganda mechanisms, we have developed a great number of other propaganda operations to combat the CASTRO government and to generally support both the FRD and the United States' position in the Caribbean.

A. Primary Radio: The primary mechanism utilized is Radio SWAN. This station, owned ostensibly by a private company, started broadcasts to Cuba and the Dominican Republic in May 1960, and now broadcasts five hours nightly and four hours each morning, both short and medium wave. In addition to straight news reporting and a few general entertainment programs, the broadcasts include programs prepared by leading anti-CASTRO newspapers now in exile. There is every evidence that Radio SWAN broadcasts are hitting Cuba and that they are hurting CASTRO. CASTRO and the Cuban governmental propaganda organs have attacked the radio and the government is jamming it; we have received many letters from Cuban listeners, supplying useful evaluations of the broadcasts and an unexpected source of intelligence.

B. Other Radio: Daily short-wave broadcasts to Cuba are made over WRUL; these are repeated by SWAN on its medium wave transmission. A morning and evening broadcast is made over WMIE, Miami. We have just completed arrangements to start on 19 January two one-hour Spanish-language broadcasts daily over WGBS, Miami. These

broadcasts will be sponsored by the Cuban Freedom Committee, which also utilizes Radio SWAN facilities; the programs, containing news, music and commentary, will endeavor to present the U.S. viewpoint in a calm, dignified manner.

C. *Publications*: We support financially three major exile newspapers:

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] This is a sensational tabloid-type newspaper published in Miami by [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Beginning in June 1960, it has gradually increased its distribution to approximately 25,000, two-thirds of which go to Latin America or Cuba.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]. A middle-of-the-road weekly newspaper produced in Miami by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] but published in Wilmington, Delaware. This first appeared on 5 October in 12,000 copies. It is being mailed into Cuba and throughout the hemisphere.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] This conservative paper is published in Miami and control is exercised through [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

We also support:

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] This most widely-known Cuban weekly magazine, now with a Caracas dateline but published in Atlanta by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] first appeared on newsstands throughout Latin America on 7 October. Heralded as the "magazine which CASTRO could not kill," it is now receiving orders for 140,000 copies weekly (ABC Chicago guaranteed circulation). Beginning with the Christmas issue, a clandestine copy was printed in pocket-book size. The owners hope to have 40,000 copies smuggled into Cuba.

The Cuban Information Service Weekly Newsletter: Published in both English and Spanish in approximately 1,000 copies and mailed to editors and writers throughout Latin America. It summarizes the important news from and about Cuba and contains editorials which can be reproduced in other papers and used over the radio. It also contains a historical supplement which exposes Communist tactics, especially as regards Cuba.

D. *Propaganda Air-Drop Operations*: To date we have dropped the following Agency-produced leaflets over Cuba:

1. "A Call to the People of Cuba" asking for resistance to CASTRO and Communism. (About 4,000,000 during three different air operations)
2. "Land Title" addressed to the campesino audience (100,000 during two missions)
3. "Hungarian", comparing Communist control over Hungary and Cuba (300,000 on one mission)

In addition to further supplies of the above, we are printing supplies of a "Milicia" leaflet, targeted against the militia; a "Sabotage"

leaflet, containing instructions; and a "Fish Symbol," a non-political sign of resistance; all of these will be used in future drops.

We have also dropped 700 pounds of clandestine-sized copies of *Avance*, *El Mundo* and *Bohemia Libre*, stamped "Compliments of the FRD" and we will continue to drop these publications.

Future leaflet operations will be in support of our paramilitary objectives. We plan to have "D-Day" leaflets asking the people to join the anti-CASTRO forces or engage in sabotage.

III. PARAMILITARY

A. Strike Concept: The concept envisages the seizure of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by an all-Cuban amphibious/airborne force of about 750 men. The landings in Cuba will be preceded by a tactical air preparation, beginning at dawn on D-1 Day. The primary purpose of the air preparation will be to destroy or neutralize all Cuban military aircraft and naval vessels constituting a threat to the invasion force. When this task is accomplished, attacks will then be directed against other military targets, including artillery parks, tank parks, military vehicles, supply dumps, etc. Close air support will be provided to the invasion force on D-Day and thereafter as long as the force is engaged in combat. The primary targets during this time will be opposing military formations in the field. Particular efforts will be made to interdict opposing troop movements against the lodgement.

The initial mission of the invasion force will be to seize and defend a small area, which under ideal conditions will include an airfield and access to the sea for logistic support. Plans must provide, however, for the eventuality that the force will be driven into a tight defensive formation which will preclude supply by sea or control of an airfield. Under such circumstances supply would have to be provided entirely by air drop. The primary objective of the force will be to survive and maintain its integrity on Cuban soil. There will be no early attempt to break out of the lodgement for further offensive operations unless and until there is a general uprising against the CASTRO regime or overt military intervention by United States forces has taken place.

It is expected that these operations will precipitate a general uprising throughout Cuba and cause the revolt of large segments of the Cuban Army and Militia. The lodgement, it is hoped, will serve as a rallying point for the thousands who are estimated to be ready for overt resistance to CASTRO but who hesitate to act until they can feel some assurance of success. A general revolt in Cuba, if one is successfully triggered by our operations, could serve to topple the CASTRO regime within a period of weeks.

If matters do not eventuate as predicted above, the lodgement established by our force can be used as the site for establishment of a

provisional government which can be recognized by the United States, and hopefully by other American states, and given overt military assistance. The way will then be paved for United States military intervention aimed at pacification of Cuba, and this will result in the prompt overthrow of the CASTRO Government.

Other paramilitary programs are being intensified and accelerated. They include the supply by air and sea of guerrilla elements now in Cuba, the conduct of sabotage operations, the introduction of specially trained paramilitary teams, and the expansion of our agent networks throughout the island.

At the present time we have over a half-dozen Agency-trained agents with radio communication facilities conducting clandestine paramilitary operations inside Cuba. These activities range from simple sabotage acts to the organization, training and equipping, via our covert supply missions, of resistance groups.

To date we have delivered, via twelve maritime missions, over 15,000 pounds of arms, ammunition and demolition materials to resistance elements in Cuba. As of 13 January, we had dropped over 36,000 pounds of arms, leaflets and food on thirteen overflights. Some of the items dropped were seized by CASTRO forces but a sizeable amount of them were received by the resistance reception groups.

B. Status of Forces:

1. Air: The Project tactical air force includes ten B-26 aircraft currently based in Guatemala and at Eglin Air Force Base. However, there are only five Cuban B-26 pilots available at this time who are considered to be of high technical competence. Six additional Cuban pilots are available, but their proficiency is questionable.

It is planned that seven C-54 and four C-46 transports will be available for strike operations. Here again, the number of qualified Cuban crews is insufficient. There are two qualified C-54 crews on hand at this time, and three C-46 crews.

Aviation ordnance for conduct of strike operations is yet to be positioned at the strike base in Nicaragua. Necessary construction and repairs at this base have commenced, and there appears to be no obstacle to placing this facility in a state of readiness in time for operations as planned.

2. Maritime: Amphibious craft for the operation, including three LCU's and four LCVP's, are now at Vieques, Puerto Rico, where Cuban crew training is progressing satisfactorily. These craft with their crews will soon be ready for operations.

The BARBARA J (LCI), now returned to the United States from Puerto Rico, has undergone repairs and is ready for missions. Its sister ship, the BLAGAR, is outfitting in Miami, and its crew is being assembled.

3. Ground: There are 560 Cuban personnel now in training in Guatemala. All other recruits should shortly be available for at least four to six weeks of training prior to commitment.

The Assault Brigade has been formed into its basic organization (a quadrangular infantry battalion, including four rifle companies, and a weapon company). With the recent acquisition of 37 U.S. Army Special Forces instructors, training should be completed by our target date. Our plans call for the assault group to contain five tanks. These tanks are to be moved to Vieques, where Cuban crews will be trained to operate them. They will be loaded with other assault vehicles on the vessels departing from the Vieques area for the strike.

C. Timing of Paramilitary Operation: Since the military training teams are now in position, we feel that the Assault Brigade will achieve acceptable readiness for combat during the latter half of February 1961. All other required preparations can be made by that same time. The operation should be launched during this period. Any delay beyond 1 March 1961 would be inadvisable for the following reasons:

1. It is doubtful that Guatemala can accommodate the Cuban forces at our Guatemalan training base much beyond 1 March 1961.

2. Cuban trainees cannot be held in training for much longer. Many have been in the camp for months under most austere and restrictive conditions. They are becoming restive and if not committed to action soon there will probably be a general lowering of morale. Large-scale desertions could occur with attendant possibilities of surfacing the entire program.

3. While the support of the CASTRO Government by the Cuban populace is deteriorating and time is working in our favor in that sense, time is working to our disadvantage in a military sense. Cuban jet pilots are being trained in Czechoslovakia and the appearance of modern radar throughout Cuba indicates a strong possibility that CASTRO may soon have an all-weather jet intercept capability. His ground forces have received vast quantities of military equipment from the Bloc countries, including medium and heavy tanks, field artillery, heavy mortars, and anti-aircraft artillery. Bloc technicians are training his forces in the use of this formidable equipment. Within the near future CASTRO's hard core of loyal armed forces will undoubtedly achieve technical proficiency in the use of available modern weapons.

4. CASTRO is making rapid progress in establishing a Communist-style police state which will be difficult to unseat by any means short of all-out overt intervention of U.S. military forces.

IV. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

Primary emphasis has been placed on the collection of intelligence to support our paramilitary operations. The recent break in relations

and the withdrawal of our staff personnel from Cuba will necessarily mean a reduction in the speed and volume of our collection, however, due to our preparations for this event, we do have staybehind networks active with radio and secret writing communications. In the Habana area we have one collection net and one propaganda distribution/collection net. In the Santiago de Cuba area we have two collection nets. In addition to the three radio sets being used by these active nets, we have 22 other radio sets cached throughout Cuba. We are also running collection operations from the United States and other countries utilizing Cuban and third-country nationals.

V. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Our counter-intelligence effort has developed along the lines of attempting to protect our operations from CASTRO and other opposition infiltrations, to uncover other individuals who are a threat to our objectives, and to penetrate Cuban intelligence/security organizations. We have identified and neutralized several known Cuban agents and provocateurs who have penetrated our activities, and have identified and have under close observation several others who pose a potential threat. Efforts to penetrate Cuban services have been relatively unsuccessful, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. An intensive study of the services is being made and all possible leads are being followed in the anticipation that we will have additional successes.

We are also actively engaged in organizing, training, and providing guidance to an FRD security and intelligence group. In the short time that this group has been operating, they have developed amazingly well. A greater part of our effort is now being channeled in this direction with the thought that this group will not only help us now, but will become more necessary during the action phase, and will be a durable asset after a successful displacement of the present Cuban Government.

VI. PENDING POLICY GUIDANCE AND DECISIONS

A. Composition of Provisional Government: A primary factor in our planning to date has been the assumption that an anti-CASTRO Cuban provisional government would be formed (and recognized by the U.S. and Latin America countries) during our paramilitary strike phase.

With reference to the composition of any future provisional government, we have received lists of suggested candidates from a number of responsible anti-CASTRO leaders or groups. We have checked and evaluated these lists and can provide them to the State Department for a decision on a provisional government which might be acceptable to a broad segment of the anti-CASTRO leaders and the U.S. Government.

Requirement: A decision by the State Department on the members of a future provisional government which would be acceptable within the political objectives of the U.S. Government.

B. Recognition and Support of Provisional Government: Even though a successful paramilitary lodgment with a provisional government is established, it may be necessary that the U.S. Government provide overt assistance to this government to enable it to overthrow the CASTRO regime. We should be able to assume that the U.S. will recognize a provisional government and also promptly extend support to maintain it and, if necessary, to enable it to extend its control to all of Cuba.

Requirement: A decision that the U.S. Government will recognize a provisional government and will provide the overt support that will enable that government to extend its control to all of Cuba.

(Concerning recognition of any future provisional government by Latin American countries, there appears to be some need for bilateral talks with these countries in order to assure that they take the action desired. The Agency is prepared to assist the Department in this action if desired.)

C. Policies of Future Cuban Government: Another factor closely related to any future provisional government is the policy to be followed by that government once established. An objective of our operation was to have a future Cuban government compatible with U.S. national interests. Today we are in contact—in varying degrees—with anti-CASTRO Cubans who range from right to extreme left in the political spectrum and their views will necessarily be reflected in any future government actions. Thus we should, at an early date, begin to influence and back—to a greater extent than heretofore—those elements which mostly are responsive to U.S. objectives. An acceptable solution, in light of the pragmatic facts facing us, would seem to be a middle-of-the-road complex, favoring an evolution of social, economic and political changes in Cuba under the 1940 Constitution.

Requirement: A decision regarding the acceptable political, social and economic governmental procedures and policies within which we may attempt to mold the future Cuban government.

D. Other policy decisions required concern our paramilitary effort against the target. The requirements involved and our recommendations are as follows:

1. *Timing:* As stated before, our plans for this operation are predicated on a strike date of not later than 1 March 1961, and we are conducting our training and developing our strike support preparations to meet this date.

Recommendation: Approval for the mounting of the strike operation in the latter half of February and not later than 1 March 1961.

2. *Air Strikes:* It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be

knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run into the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Although every effort will be made to select a landing area where our assault force will be unopposed by enemy ground forces, our invasion force is very small in comparison to forces which may be thrown against it, and we must compensate for numerical inferiority by effective tactical air support, not only during the landing but also thereafter for so long as the force remains in combat. It is essential that opposing military targets (such as artillery parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys, and troops in the field) be brought under effective and continuing air attack. Psychological considerations also make such attacks essential. The spectacular aspects of air operations should go far toward producing the uprising in Cuba that we seek.

Recommendation: That the air preparation commence not later than dawn of D minus 1 Day.

3. *Use of American Contract Pilots:* The paragraph above outlines the requirement for precise and effective air strikes, while an earlier paragraph in our paramilitary section points up the shortage of qualified Cuban pilots. It is very questionable that the limited number of Cuban B-26 pilots available to us can produce the desired results unless augmented by highly skilled American contract pilots to serve as section and flight leaders in attacks against the more critical targets. The Cuban pilots are inexperienced in war and of limited technical competence in navigation and gunnery. There is reason also to suspect that they may lack the motivation to take the stern measures required against targets in their own country. It is considered that the success of the operation will be jeopardized unless a few American contract B-26 pilots are employed.

With regard to logistical air operations, the shortage of Cuban crews has already been mentioned. There is no prospect of producing sufficient Cuban C-54 crews to man the seven C-54 aircraft to be used in the operation. Our experience to date with the Cuban transport crews has left much to be desired. It is concluded that the only satisfactory solution to the problem of air logistical support of the strike force and other forces joining it will be to employ a number of American contract crews.

Recommendation: That policy approval be obtained for use of American contract crews for tactical and transport aircraft in augmentation of the inadequate number of Cuban crews available.

4. *Use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua:* The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is essential for conduct of the strike operation unless strike base is made available in the United States. Our air base in Guatemala is 800 miles from central Cuba—too distant for B-26 operations and for air

supply operations of the magnitude required, using the C-46 and C-54 aircraft. Puerto Cabezas is only 500 miles from central Cuba—acceptable, although too distant to be completely desirable, for B-26 and transport operations.

Puerto Cabezas will also serve as the staging area for loading assault troops into transports much more satisfactorily than Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, which is exposed to hostile observation and lacks security. It is planned that troops will be flown in increments from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, placed in covered trucks, loaded over the docks at night into amphibious shipping, which will then immediately retire to sea.

Recommendation: That firm policy be obtained for use of Puerto Cabezas as an air strike base and staging area.

5. *Use of U.S. Air Base for Logistical Flights:* An air base in southern Florida would be roughly twice as close to central Cuba as Puerto Cabezas. This means that the logistical capability of our limited number of transport aircraft would be almost doubled if operated from Florida rather than Puerto Cabezas. Logistical support of the strike force in the target would be much more certain and efficient if flown from Florida.

There is also a possibility that once the strike operations commence, conditions would develop which would force us out of the Nicaragua air base. Without some flexibility of operational capability including an additional logistical support air base with pre-positioned supplies in the United States, we would conceivably be confronted with a situation wherein the Assault Brigade would be left entirely without logistical air support. Supply by sea cannot be relied upon, for the Brigade may be driven by superior forces from the beach area. Such a situation could lead to complete defeat of the Brigade and failure of the mission.

It seems obvious that the only real estate which the United States can, without question, continue to employ once the operation commences is its own soil. Therefore, an air base for logistical support should be provided in the United States. This will offer the possibility of continued, flexible operations, if one or both of our bases in Guatemala and/or Nicaragua are lost to our use.

Recommendation: That policy be established to permit use of an air base in southern Florida (preferably Opalocka, which is now available to us and has storage facilities for supplies) for logistical support flights to Cuba.

237. Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to McCone, January 2¹

January 2, 1961

SUBJECT

Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba, 3 January 1961

1. The present [*less than 1 line not declassified*] preparations and activities are:

a. *Propaganda*. An extensive propaganda program involving the use of radio facilities (mainly Swan Island and WRUL); the publication of newspapers (exile editions of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and [*less than 1 line not declassified*]); magazines ([*less than 1 line not declassified*]); and newsletters. Moreover, a boat has been equipped for radio broadcasts and leaflet drops have been made (one 3-plane drop and one 1-plane drop by us plus at least one leaflet drop by another anti-Castro group not aligned with us). Also, speaking tours throughout Latin America have been arranged and various opposition symbols (e.g., the fish) have and are being built up.

b. *Political Action*. Political action involving mainly an effort to unite the opposition, to build up the FRD, to consolidate views regarding a platform for a post-Castro regime and discussions with the State Department regarding the membership for and the appropriate procedure for designating a provisional government. A number of problems are involved in this connection (mentioned below) such as official recognition of a provisional government, aid that it will be granted, etc.

c. *Economic Action*: Economic action involving sabotage which it is hoped may be increased and discussions with the State Department and business interests regarding embargoes including the denial of important spare parts.

d. *Paramilitary Action*: Paramilitary action involving the introduction of communicators and specialist teams to support internal opposition plus air drops of matériel and infiltration of bodies and matériel by sea. It is also planned in the near future to return some political figures to encourage more active internal opposition. Meanwhile, additional teams and communicators are being held in Panama for later infiltration, approximately 500 men are being trained in Guatemala, a small air force is being established and some maritime assets developed. Additional recruitments are being made in an effort to raise the total

¹ Material for January 3 policy meeting on Cuba, Secret. 9 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–Jul 1961.

trainees to 750. The readiness date for these trainees at present is mid February.

The general paramilitary plan contemplates a landing at some point of the Cuban trainees in a single force of approximately 650 men which would leave a few trainees as reserves. It is hoped that this landing may establish some sort of a beachhead on Cuban soil into which representatives of a provisional government can be introduced. It is hoped at this stage that this government will then be recognized as the government of Cuba by at least the United States and hopefully the United States and a number of Latin American countries. Once this is done, it is further hoped that some reasonably overt assistance can be provided. Basic to the plan is the expectation that not only the paramilitary teams mentioned above but even more the landing in force will encourage and produce active internal opposition to Castro.

2. There are a number of important unsettled issues inherent in the above activities and planning and it is presumed that these points will provide the main basis for discussion at the 3 January meeting.

a. There have been some recent suggestions that a major effort should be made prior to 20 January. In the absence of substantial support from other elements of the Government, it would be impossible for the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] paramilitary plan to meet any such requirement. It is always possible, of course, that the present step-up of support to internal groups, including introduction of teams, may achieve a more substantial internal reaction than anticipated. If so, such a reaction should of course be given maximum support and could conceivably achieve the results planned for the subsequent more substantial landing. Unfortunately, however, this seems a rather remote possibility.

b. U.S. diplomatic efforts to obtain Latin American support. Pawley's recent trip to Argentina and Peru falls into this category. It would seem useful, however, to increase such efforts and to include a member of other countries particularly Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and possibly Costa Rica, Ecuador, Chile and Honduras. Mexico would, of course, be opposed. Nothing can be done in Brazil since Quadres has made himself unavailable until 1 February. Nicaragua will probably require some negotiating since we are still going ahead with preparations for a strike base at Puerto Cabezas. In view of the attitude of a number of Central American countries to the Samoans, however, it would seem better not to press the diplomatic approach too hard in Nicaragua. I believe that the State Department is willing and even anxious to pursue this general course on a bi-lateral basis as distinguished from the OAS but is holding back on the grounds that the policy, particularly from the new administration, is not clear. Moreover, in order to be successful with certain of the above countries, a more active anti-Trujillo position

must be adopted by the U.S. In this connection, it is possible that some headway could be made with Betancourt and others with his point of view by offering later aid against Trujillo in return for present aid against Cuba. This may not be very persuasive since Betancourt, et al, are only interested in actions, having been given in their opinion words without action for much too long. This diplomatic effort should attempt to obtain a joint understanding regarding termination of relations with Cuba (where it has not already occurred) and the recognition of a Cuban provisional government at an appropriate moment and the support of this provisional government as required including some arms, hopefully some men, and some money although this is perhaps less important at the moment. We should push at the January 3 meeting to get this effort started immediately.

c. The questions as to how and when a provisional government should be named is wholly unresolved. Our position is that at least the top individuals should be selected by the State Department in consultation with us. When selected, we feel that the individuals should only be told immediately before being dispatched to some Cuban-held real estate. We believe that if it is done any sooner, the political battles within the Cuban emigres will be unmanageable. If, on the other hand, the selected leaders become the only ones on Cuban soil, their position is far less vulnerable. There is, of course, the question of their acceptance by the internal resistance which cannot be answered in advance. There should, of course, be some high positions for leaders emerging within the internal opposition. Tom Mann has argued that the provisional government should be named at an earlier date on the grounds that under such circumstances recognition might be obtained by some Latin American countries as well as by the U.S. For the reasons mentioned above, we cannot agree to this position and feel that the Latin American countries recognition must occur after the introduction of the provisional government into Cuba. It is hoped that the 3 January meeting will decide that immediate steps should be taken to determine or at least to screen thoroughly names for leaders of a provisional government as well as to prepare an agreed plan for how they should be named.

d. The economic aid which will be given to the provisional government is still unsettled. This involves determinations not only as to the extent of such aid but the proper time for its announcement. Moreover, decisions should be reached as to how much military aid can be given to help the provisional government overthrow the Castro regime. It may be that this latter will not be necessary but the planning should certainly assume that it will. Presumably, once the provisional government has been recognized, support similar to that recently given Guatemala and Nicaragua could be provided on request, i.e., protection from certain invasion or intervention. This would go a long way to secure

the beachhead. The next question is to what extent aid can be provided to enable the provisional government to move out of its own beachhead in order to take the rest of Cuba. It is hoped that in addition to providing materiel arrangements can be made to give the provisional government thinly veiled volunteers. These volunteers will, hopefully, include some disguised soldiers from other Latin American countries (as a result of the negotiations mentioned above) plus some disguised Americans. Both the materiel and the man should be turned over within the beachhead.

e. Another unsettled point which needs deciding is the extent to which planning can go forward on the use of U.S. soil to support the [less than 1 line not declassified] invasion in its early phases. Both air strikes and air drops will be much more practical and effective if they can be run from the U.S. If not, Nicaragua is the only other available spot and this due to distance will be difficult though feasible. In this connection it is hoped that the beachhead acquired will have some air facilities to which at least some if not all of the FRD air force can be moved.

f. Another issue which may well be raised by Tom Mann is the possibility of transferring the [less than 1 line not declassified] trainees from Guatemala to the U.S. He will also possibly argue that the Nicaraguan strike base should not be used. His reasons for this are that the operation is essentially a U.S. one and as a matter of honor we should do what we can to protect the shaky governments of Nicaragua and Guatemala from having to take the rap. Our position on this is that we have no desire to move the trainees unless it is absolutely necessary since to do so will cause unquestionably a morale problem and equally certainly the presence of the trainees in the U.S. will become as well known as their presence in Guatemala is now known. This being true, the operation in effect becomes overt and official as well since the trainees will be occupying a U.S. base. If we are prepared to go this far, it would seem better to go the whole way and simply do the job with the Marines. On the other hand, we are prepared to bring the trainees to a staging area in the U.S., if one can be found, just prior to the landing. This would seem to take care of Tom Mann's problem and would not raise too many difficulties since the group could be closely contained for a period of 36 to 48 hours. Moreover, there would be no morale problem since a brief stop of this type could not be construed by the trainees as a further delay. As far as the Nicaraguan strike base is concerned, our position is merely that we must use it unless we can receive authority to use some other base within an acceptable range. On present facts, the only other bases fitting this requirement are in the U.S.

g. Further briefings of the new administration are being pushed by the Department. Our view on this is that since the operation cannot

fail to continue into the new administration, it is important that appropriate officials are knowledgeable. Moreover, there are a few decisions regarding preparations on which it would be very useful to have their views. From our point of view these are:

(1) Approval of the general outline of the plan in order to justify expenditures now being made in preparations.

(2) Attitude toward possible use in the future of U.S. bases in order to permit selection and placing of inventories.

(3) Continuation of trainees in Guatemala and preparation of Nicaraguan strike base. These are only important in case there is any likelihood of a decision for sudden change after 20 January.

(4) Attitude regarding the diplomatic and provisional government points made above to the extent and only to the extent that the State Department refuses to proceed without an indication of the new attitude. In my opinion, the Department should proceed anyhow on the points indicated but since they have been hesitant to do so, there is a practical issue here.

h. The State Department may also raise the desirability of the U.S. breaking relations with Cuba in the near future, possibly within the next week or ten days. It seems to us that there are two aspects to this problem: one, the operational effect it may have on us; and the other the advantages which it might gain for the U.S. through favorable reactions from other Latin American countries. Although our [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is necessarily restricted, there are still definite benefits to be obtained from its presence. As far as other Latin American countries are concerned, it seems to me that these benefits can be equally obtained through the diplomatic discussions mentioned above which, of course, will include consideration of a break in relations and the proper time to do it. We would prefer, therefore, to have the U.S. delay an actual diplomatic break.

C. Tracy Barnes
A/DDP/A

**238. Memorandum from Barnes to the Special Assistant to the
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, January 17¹**

January 17, 1961

SUBJECT

Joint Planning Committee—Cuba

As agreed at the 16 January meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, I am sending you some comments on the Staff Study presented by DOD at the meeting, on the working draft of the memorandum, dated January 16, submitted by Ambassador Willauer and on certain other related matters. I am addressing my memorandum to you as I felt that a number of Special Group matters were involved and that, consequently, you should be the focal point. I am, however, including a copy for Ambassador Willauer and an extra copy in case you might need it. I am also returning Ambassador Willauer's working draft.

A. DOD Staff Study

1. As indicated at the 16 January meeting, it is our opinion that the DOD draft paper, entitled "Evaluation of Possible Military Courses of Action in Cuba" is a useful document. I would like to point out, however, that there are a number of points which concern us about the paper unless, as agreed at the meeting, the premise on which the paper is written is strictly applied. This premise, as you know, has a number of alternatives which stated in my own language are: a) the present FRD strike force lands and is thoroughly defeated; b) attempts to land but utterly fails; or, c) prior to any landing attempt, a judgment is reached as to the extent of the opposition which results in a decision not to use the strike force at all. Any of these alternatives assume a sufficiently strong pro-Castro political situation within Cuba to make the DOD paper acceptable to us. Should there alternatives, however, not be basic to the paper, there are some points which in our opinion raise inferences with which we cannot agree. For example:

(a) It is quite clear that the entire DOD plan is written without any reference whatsoever to planning which has taken place to date in connection with the FRD and its strike force. As indicated, this is acceptable on a strict application of the premise but I want to make it clear that we cannot agree to any inference that the planning to date is not and has not been valid.

¹ Joint Planning Committee on Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960–Jan 29, 1961.

(b) The DOD stated orally in connection with paragraph 15 of its paper that any force of less than 5,000 men would be foolish to consider. We do not accept any inference that this applies to present planning based as it is on different premises.

(c) Paragraph 17 concludes that only courses of action involving the overt use of U.S. forces can be successful. Again, we cannot accept any suggestion that such a conclusion applies to present planning.

2. Additional points could be made but do not seem necessary since we do not believe that there was any misunderstanding at the 16 January meeting. This conclusion is, in our opinion, established by General Gray's agreement that there is still a further area of planning which has not been covered, i.e. a plan now exists culminating in the use of the FRD strike force and the DOD paper presents a plan based on the complete elimination or failure to use this strike force. As yet unplanned are the possibilities that the strike force may be sufficiently successful to achieve a landing and establish itself on a piece of Cuban soil but it is unable without help to either advance any further or to hold its position beyond a given period of time. Joint planning between CIA and DOD is necessary in order to consider what can be done to cover these possibilities. In our opinion, these possibilities are the really practical ones and, therefore, the ones on which particular emphasis should be placed. As indicated, CIA proposes to proceed on these with DOD as suggested by General Gray.

3. A further possibility exists: namely, the landing or attempted landing of a strike force which fails. It is not felt that this possibility should be considered since there has been complete agreement by everyone from the start that no action should be undertaken unless it were quite clear that all steps necessary for success would be employed if required.

4. Although, perhaps, obvious, it is still important to point out that the planning discussed above is strictly limited to military or paramilitary problems and completely leaves out many intimately related issues of a political nature for which planning is essential and on which to date no decisions have been made. In this connection it might be said that although it is recognized that decisions may have to await the new administration, still there are not even firm recommendations available on many of these issues. Agreed recommendations, for example, are not presently available on urgent matters directly connected with the FRD strike plan, on many political aspects of the FRD plan and on the implications on certain possible courses of action vital to other planning. Examples are whether or not U.S. air bases can be used; how far the U.S. should go in recognition of a provisional government; what specific action will be taken to discuss with and discover attitudes of selected Latin American countries; and what the implications of recognition of a provisional government might be in terms of actual support of a strike force.

B. Ambassador Willauer's Draft Paper

Regarding Ambassador Willauer's draft paper, our opinion is that it states matters with which we are generally in agreement. On the other hand, we believe that it would be better to focus the attention of the Special Group to a few specific issues rather than to open at this time a number of problems which could lead the Group away from the main matters of concern. This seems particularly important since it is the Group's last meeting and the members, therefore, can only be expected to pass on a few items which preferably should be of an extremely precise nature. Perhaps Ambassador Willauer could submit his draft memorandum separately in which case we would be glad to submit our comments in detail, if desired. As far as the Group is concerned, it seems to us that we should concentrate on reporting to them the planning which has taken place since the last meeting, what additional planning must occur and our proposals on how this should be accomplished. The uncompleted planning should include both joint planning and any other planning required by each Department involved, i.e., State, DOD and CIA.

C. Tracy Barnes

cc: Ambassador Willauer

Attachment: Amb. Willauer's Working Draft Memo, dated 16 January 1961

**239. Memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Merchant,
January 18¹**

January 18, 1961

SUBJECT

The suggested Program for Cuba contained in the Memorandum to you dated December 6, 1960

1. As instructed at the last meeting of the Group, DOD, CIA, and ARA (to a limited extent) under my chairmanship have done the following:

¹ December 6 plan to overthrow the Castro regime. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961.

a. Fulfilled the desires of DOD to be updated on current thinking on the program for Cuba. This was done orally to General Gray and Captain Spore by myself and others.

b. After concluding this we assumed that the December 6 plan (updated in the light of developments since that time) *might* not succeed in the objective of overthrowing the Castro regime. We made it clear that we were not trying to pass judgment on this point. We stated that our principle reasons for not doing so were the absence of very important policy determinations which many of us feel must promptly be taken; and also in the light of our belief that the final judgment as to whether such a plan will have a reasonable chance of success will have to be made almost at the last minute in the light of the then existing evaluation of Castro's capabilities, the capabilities of internal opposition, etc.

c. We further assumed that final operations under the December 6 plan (i.e., air attack and "covert landing, etc.) would not be triggered unless the U.S. Government were prepared to do everything else needed overtly or covertly in the light of the existing evaluation in order to guarantee success. I and others pointed out in the meeting that this determination would undoubtedly have to be made in the light of the then existing political climate in the United States, in Latin America, and in the rest of the world.

I emphasized my own view, as set forth in my memo of January 16 to Secretary Herter through you, entitled "The Interconnection of the Cuban and Dominican Problems Politically," that so far as Latin American opinion was concerned, I feel that the key to a favorable opinion lies in the impact of whatever policy the new administration will adopt towards "dictators of the right as well as of the left." It is my current view that we will probably get support from many Latin American countries of democratic inclinations in direct proportion to the degree we are felt to be aiding in the overthrow of Trujillo and generally are "on the side of the angels" in the entire problem of dictatorships vs. free governments in the hemisphere.

d. Based on the foregoing assumptions and with guidance on State's and CIA's concepts of the situation we have obtained from DOD "An Evaluation of Possible Military Courses of Action in Cuba." This I conceive was the main objective of the work I was instructed to do.

2. From DOD's "Evaluation", which has been submitted to you, and from a paper submitted by Tracy Barnes to you dated 17 January, it seems to me that the following conclusions emerge:

a. The incoming administration should make the immediate policy decisions now lacking for the implementation of the December 6 plan. Some of the principle decisions of this nature are:

(1) Whether or not U.S. air bases can be used for supply and resupply, and for D-day minus 1 air strikes, and subsequent air support;

(2) Whether the staging of the "covert" Cuban strike force now principally located in Guatemala can at some point be transferred to the United States. It should be noted that this decision could be forced upon us very rapidly either by further disclosures or by events in Guatemala;

(3) What kind of specific action and when will it be taken to discuss with and discover the attitudes of selected American countries regarding support for our activities;

(4) How and when we will recognize a provisional government and whether this government will have to either have leaders within Cuba or occupy a specific piece of real estate therein. Implicit in this decision is the very difficult problem of the makeup of such a government in a form acceptable to us without directly dictating who shall be in it, and the techniques of bring it into action as a government;

(5) How far the decisions finally taken on recognition will permit more overt support to the strike force. Implicit in this is possibly a mutual assistance pact with the provisional government and the extent to which considerations of world opinion, international law, etc., will affect the extent of our support.

b. In the absence of these decisions, or at least most of them, there is a grave danger that the December 6 plan (updated) may have to be abandoned as an *effective* means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support, and that the only practical course of action for the *physical overthrow* of Castro will be either: (1) open U.S. war with Cuba, or (2) a seven-month overt training by the U.S. on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force which will be planned to strike with at least overt U.S. logistical support.

It is conceivable but not probable that other non-U.S. bases in some acceptable Latin American countries could be used for this training, but obviously this will require a radically different Latin American political climate than now exists or which is now foreseen.

In our discussions we weighed without coming to a conclusion the advantages of rapid, effective action by direct war in terms of getting matters over with without a long buildup of world opinion vs. the inevitability of such a buildup under any seven-month program.

**240. Memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Rusk,
January 27¹**

January 27, 1961

SUBJECT

Meeting of Task Force on Cuban Case

1. I chaired a meeting this morning attended by Mr. W.P. Bundy of Defense, Mr. Tracy Barnes of CIA, and General Gray and two other officers from the Joint Chiefs.

2. I fully briefed Mr. Bundy on the political problems as we now see them and their interrelationship with the operational problems.

3. Mr. Bundy advised that there is a meeting at the White House on the Cuban matter scheduled for 10 a.m. tomorrow. As of possible usefulness on this meeting, we prepared our task group's recommendation for Presidential orders or determinations now needed. They are as follows:

A. Formally reconstitute a special group, pursuant to NSC 5412. (Such a group has in the past consisted of appropriate senior officers of the Departments of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.) Charge this group with urgent responsibility in the Cuban situation, and specifically to set up a Task Force to:

(1) Prepare plans on a national basis to get an acceptable new Cuban Government, including plans for use of US forces as necessary. Continue and expand existing activity under 5412 direction, and prepare fall-back plans to preserve existing assets. (An informal Task Force chaired by Ambassador Willauer has already done much preliminary work.)

(2) Prepare plans for accompanying political action. (Much has been done on this already.)

(3) Consider the degree to which action against the present Dominican Government can and should be combined with action in the Cuban situation.

B. Appoint a high-level Presidential emissary to explore at once the degree of support that can be obtained from other Latin American governments so that they might, in or out of OAS, support action to remove Castro, or at least reject any attempt to condemn such action. This emissary to report within one month, via the Secretary of State, to the Special Group.

¹ Recommendations from meeting on the Task Force on Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961.

C. Initiate action for an early Presidential speech, to prepare the way for Latin American support of necessary action, specifically by stating firm US opposition to aggressive dictatorships in Latin America, whether of the Right or Left; and most particularly when they are acting for, or in concert with, the International Communist Conspiracy, as is the case with both Castro and Trujillo.

241. Memorandum for the record, January 30¹

January 30, 1961

SUBJECT

[less than 1 line not declassified] PM Briefing

1. At 4:30 today, in the WH/4 war room, Colonel Hawkins and members of the *[less than 1 line not declassified]* PM Section gave a detailed briefing to the DDCI, Admiral Wright, General Bull, and General Barnes. This briefing was in preparation for the 31 January briefing of designees of the Chairman of the JCS, A/DDP/A and C/WH/4 were present.

2. For a ninety-minute period the senior Agency officials were given a description of the *[less than 1 line not declassified]* strike force, the tactical plan for its use, and intelligence on the target. It was emphasized that the proposed strike could be conducted with no overt U.S. military support other than the provision of one LSD, and that the force once committed would not have to be evacuated in the event of inability to hold the initial objective area as it could, if required, disperse and continue to survive. Concurrently it was emphasized that our estimate of the likelihood of success was very high in terms of staying in the initial objective area long enough and in sufficient control to permit the introduction of a "Provisional Government" and provide a rationale for the subsequent employment of overt military force, if desired.

3. The senior Agency officials critiqued the plan at some length. Several specific suggestions for improvement were made and will be reflected both in the plan itself and in the presentation of that plan to the JCS representatives. There was general agreement that the time

¹ Briefing on strike force in Cuba, tactical plan for its use, and intelligence on the target. Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-0664R, Box 3, Vol 10, Chpts 5 & 6.

schedule involved requires most prompt policy approval of the operation if it is to be undertaken as planned.

R.D. Drain
C/WH/4/P&P

February 1961

**242. Memorandum from Chester L. Cooper to the US.
Intelligence Board, February 11¹**

February 11, 1961

SUBJECT

Probable International Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action
Against the Castro Regime

The attached Memorandum for the Director is forwarded for your information.

Chester L. Cooper
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT

Probable International Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action
against the Castro Regime

Introduction

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to assess the principal international reactions to various types of action the US might take to bring down the Castro government in Cuba—especially the nature and magnitude of possible Bloc countermoves and the possibility of serious adverse reactions on the part of Latin American countries or others in the Free World. The possible actions here considered are: (a) provision of active support, of varying degrees of magnitude and overtness, to an attempt by Cuban opposition elements, internal or in exile, to overthrow Castro; (b) military invasion of Cuba with US forces; or (c) establishment of a naval blockade of Cuba in international waters.

¹ Transmits a memorandum from Abbot Smith to Allan Dulles on probable international reactions to certain U.S. courses of action against the Castro regime. Top Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, General Maxwell Taylor Committee on Cuba, 28 Jan–21 May 1961.

2. We must emphasize that actual international reactions might be greatly influenced by circumstances which cannot be accurately foreseen—by the precise nature of the US action; by the manner, speed, and success with which it was carried out; by the extent to which drastic US action might appear to be justified by possible new Cuban provocations; or by possible changes in Cuban relations with other Latin American countries. However, we believe that some valid generalizations can be made on the basis of the situation as it has developed so far and of the nature of the possible US actions considered.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Reactions

3. Bloc leaders from the start have recognized the value of a revolutionary, pro-Communist Cuba as a source of irritation and embarrassment to the US, as an example for revolutionary movements elsewhere in the hemisphere, and as a center for Communist as well as Cuban agitation and propaganda throughout Latin America. The Bloc has provided Castro with extensive political, economic, and military support.

4. Moreover, the Cuban example has assured increasing prominence in Communist assessments of the world situation. Cuba is being depicted as a prime example of the thesis that colonial regimes are inevitably toppling under the impact of revolutionary nationalism, and that Bloc strength can prevent the imperialists from intervening to reverse this process. In the Bloc's view the Castro regime is farther along toward the next stage—the advent of Communist power—than any other Free World country. While more recent Soviet pronouncements have tended to minimize specific military commitments to Cuba as well as Khrushchev's implied threat of last summer that Cuba was under the protection of Soviet missiles, the Soviets have if anything reinforced their political alignment with the Castro regime.

5. For these reasons, the Bloc would regard Castro's downfall as a substantial political defeat and would respond vigorously to any major US move—overt or covert and whether or not supported by others—to bring it about. Its efforts would probably be directed primarily at heading off the American threat to Cuba by political means, utilizing in the process all opportunities to arouse sympathy for Cuba as a victim of colonialist aggression, and to depict the US action as a threat to the peace. To this end, it would probably stimulate and support mass demonstrations against the US in various countries of Latin America and elsewhere. It would probably demand action by the UN to censure the US and preserve Castro, most likely through strong resolutions calling on the US to desist but possibly also through establishment of some sort of UN presence in Cuba. The USSR would firmly oppose any US move to establish a blockade and would use all diplomatic and legal means at its disposal to deny it international acceptance.

6. In the event of a prolonged military struggle between Castro and US-backed opposition forces, the Bloc would almost certainly seek to continue or even to increase its military aid to the Castro regime. However, we believe that the Bloc would avoid a direct military confrontation with US forces. The Communist leaders almost certainly recognize that they have little or no capability to counter US military power in the Cuban area and that US sensitivity regarding Cuba is very great. Certainly they would not wish to risk general war over this issue. Although the Soviets would probably seek to test a US blockade, for example, they would almost certainly do so with a merchant vessel, perhaps announcing that it was loaded with foodstuffs and other consumer requirements, rather than with a warship.

7. Even if the US succeeded in bringing Castro down, Bloc leaders probably believe that they could offset this defeat to some extent by depicting Castro as a martyr to American imperialism, which took advantage of Cuba's small size and closeness to the US. The Bloc leaders would probably also feel themselves impelled to increase pressures elsewhere in order to restore the image of Communist advance. A decision about what to do would depend on many factors, such as the local circumstances at whatever spot was under consideration and their appraisal of the new political situation created by the US action, including any reassessment of US willingness to resist Bloc moves elsewhere.

8. Especially if the US action were obvious or acknowledged, Khrushchev would be under pressure especially from Communist China to give up his present conciliatory line and to shift to a more militant policy. The atmosphere would make it difficult, for a time at least, to hold any US-Soviet discussions looking toward an improvement of relations.

Latin American Reactions

9. Castro's stature in Latin America has markedly declined over the last year, although he still commands a good deal of sympathy among lower income groups of the area. His dictatorial methods, his political meddling in other countries, and his close collaboration with world communism have progressively alienated many who initially felt that Castro was bringing a long needed social revolution to Cuba. Official opinion, at least privately, has generally crystallized against Castro, and the earlier tendency of many secretly to applaud his Yankee-baiting has subsided. The majority of Latin American governments apparently felt that the US economic embargo was justified and virtually all have at least privately sympathized with the US decision to break diplomatic relations. Peru and five lesser countries—among them the authoritarian regimes—have also broken or suspended diplomatic

ties with Cuba, and four others have withdrawn their ambassadors from Havana.

10. Most Latin American leaders still are reluctant to take a public stand against Castro for fear of stirring up the vociferous and sometimes strategically placed minority of pro-Communists and other leftists who look to Castro as a symbol of their own revolutionary aspirations. Moreover, these leaders themselves continue to be influenced by traditional fears of US domination of the hemisphere. One or two Latin American governments (e.g., Ecuador and perhaps Mexico) are still inclined to work for a negotiated settlement between the US and Castro. The stand of Brazil's new president is uncertain. Thus, we see little likelihood as matters now stand that the OAS can be induced to participate in or officially sanction anti-Castro measures of the drastic nature considered in this memorandum. However, many Latin American leaders probably expect that the US by itself will sooner or later feel compelled to take increasingly strong measures against Castro. Indeed, some sectors of Latin American opinion already criticize the US for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Cuban regime.

11. Despite the likelihood of outcries from the far left, most Latin American governments would at least privately approve of unobtrusive US support for an opposition move against Castro which they believed likely to win broad popular support in Cuba. Perhaps a few governments such as those in Venezuela and Colombia would be more inclined to approve if they had been consulted by the US in advance. Some, indeed, would probably be willing to provide covert assistance of their own for such a move, particularly if they were assured that the US would participate in efforts to overthrow the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. This last issue is critical to Venezuelan President Betancourt, whose moderate leftist government is widely respected in the hemisphere. If Betancourt supported new US moves against Castro in return for US commitments regarding Trujillo, a number of other Latin American governments probably would fall in line.

12. Willingness to go along would be greatly weakened if the US role were such as to suggest that the US was imposing a new regime rather than assisting the Cubans themselves to settle their own destinies. Direct participation of US combat forces in overthrowing Castro within Cuba itself would cause a bitter reaction throughout the hemisphere, reflected in strong opposition in the OAS and UN. These reactions would be especially deep and lasting if it appeared that the US was attempting to install another reactionary Batista-type regime in Cuba; in the long run, the reactions would be somewhat mitigated if the new regime appeared clearly to be supported by a representative of the Cuban people.

13. The Latin American reaction would also be adverse if the US established a blockade of Cuba in international waters, though it would probably be less intense than in the case of US combat operations within Cuba. At least in the absence of new and persuasive Cuban provocations, most Latin American countries would condemn a blockade unless it were in support of an armed insurrection within Cuba of which they otherwise approved.

Reactions Elsewhere in the Free World

14. The other Free World nations have for the most part not been deeply involved with the Cuban issue. The Western Europeans have preferred to let the US handle Cuba as it sees fit, and the Afro-Asians have taken little note of Cuba, which is far from their sphere of interest. However, drastic US actions (and Soviet counteractions) might create strong opposition by stimulating fears of general war and by creating (especially for the Afro-Asians) an impression of rampant colonialism.

15. The reaction would be minimal in the case of unobtrusive US support for an opposition attempt against Castro. This might produce a good deal of cynicism throughout the world about the US role, but if quickly successful little other lasting reaction. However, an operation in which US participation was marked, or one which resulted in prolonged and inconclusive fighting, would probably generate widespread pressure for moves to internationalize and control the situation.

16. Actual US military intervention in Cuba would almost certainly evoke widespread and vehement political opposition, even if carried out so rapidly as to present the world with a *fait accompli*. It would remind many people of the Soviet intervention in Hungary. It would provoke a particularly unfavorable response among the Afro-Asian nations, who are, like the Latin Americans, extremely sensitive to what they consider great power disregard for the rights of smaller nations, particularly in colonial or former colonial areas. In some respects the US might be placed in a situation comparable to that of the British and French at the time of Suez, with even many of our NATO allies likely to take the position the US did at that time.

17. Although US imposition of a naval blockade in international waters would probably cause somewhat less international furor than an overt US military invasion of Cuba, there would be widespread receptivity, particularly in the Afro-Asian world, to the likely Castro argument that the US was trying to starve the Cuban people into submission. Since most trade with Cuba is carried on by ships of other nations, moreover, a blockade would pose the question of international acceptance in a particularly acute form. Even among these nations otherwise not particularly sympathetic to Castro, there would probably be widespread resentment at having their own ships halted and denial

of the US right to do so. Although we would not expect military counteraction, even by the Bloc, there would be great pressure on the US, diplomatic and legal, to abandon the blockade.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman

243. Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to Rusk, February 16¹

February 16, 1961

SUBJECT

Proposed Transfer of Cuban Trainees from Panama Canal Zone to the United States

Discussion:

Central Intelligence Agency has requested the Department's clearance of the proposed transfer on Sunday, February 19, of 32 Cuban trainees plus approximately 18 Agency training personnel from a training site in the Canal Zone to a surplus military property, the Bell Chase Naval Ammunition Depot, in Louisiana. Mr. Berle and I feel that you should be aware of and make the decision in this matter.

The 32 Cubans are the remainder of a group, originally numbering approximately 50, being trained in radio and demolition techniques. CIA states that their transfer away from the Canal Zone has become necessary and that within a 60-day period following their arrival in this country it is contemplated that all would have completed their training and been re-exported, in staggered groups, to carry out missions assigned them.

For purposes of background and perspective, it should be noted in this context that some 50 Cubans are already being trained in landing-craft operation at Vieques, and 25 more are being given tank training at Fort Knox.

¹ Proposed transfer of Cuban trainees from Panama Canal Zone to the United States. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961—.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to inform CIA that the Department interposes no objection to the proposed transfer of personnel from the Canal Zone to the contemplated training site in the United States.

Approve DR

Disapprove _____

CONCURRENCE:

S—Mr. Berle

March 1961

**244. Memorandum from Barnes to the Deputy Director (Plans),
March 1¹**

March 1, 1961

SUBJECT

Project [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

1. A number of recent events have brought into focus what we need to do vis-à-vis [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in the immediate future. These events are:

- a. Jake Esterline's talk with Senator Smathers.
- b. A comment by Paul Nitze to me on 23 February to the effect that as far as he was concerned, we should go ahead and do it.
- c. The diversionary effect of recent flurries in the [*less than 1 line not declassified*].
- d. The continuation of looseness as far as decision is concerned in the State Department.

2. In view of the above and in view of the passage of valuable time, I am convinced that we have got to make a very strong stand as to what we would like to have happen sometime next week. At that point the JCS visiting committee report will be in, which I understand is reasonably favorable though we may have to negotiate on one or two points: Berle will be back and I can only guess from the reports out of Brazil that his trip will tend to support Tom Mann; and we will have what I hope will be the benefits of the Alejos visit from Guatemala. He, as you know, reaches Washington on 2 March.

3. In view of the political difficulties involved in a favorable decision and in view of Tom Mann's continued opposition and apparent growing strength with the White House (see Smathers), there is no doubt in my mind that our only chance is to be very firm in our position and be very strong in urging the need for the proposed action. This means, as I see it, persuading the Boss that this must be done. I recognize the natural reluctance towards pushing for a policy conclusion but merely pushing does not mean that we are trying to assume the policy role but only that we are willing to stand up and be counted on what we consider the proper decision.

¹ Courses to take in immediate future in the Cuba project. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO, DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.

4. In addition to the importance of being firm ourselves, I think that we should consider making the best possible use of potential supporters like Senator Smathers. What I have in mind here is either the Boss or you should get in touch personally with Smathers, discuss the whole problem on a personal basis, be candid about the difficulty of the decision that must be made, tell him quite frankly that we propose to push hard for approval and ask his advice as to what he could suggest to get the desired result. In the first place, there is no better way to obtain an ally than to ask him a favor. In the second place, Smathers is clearly strong in the White House. In the third place, Smathers can help us enormously on the Hill if we need some allies in the future should something go wrong.

5. In addition to the above, I think that before making the final pitch to the Summit, you should have a very frank talk with Mac Bundy, explaining not only the need for decision but laying it on hard as to why we feel a favorable decision for the Project is the best solution.

6. I would also hope that you would have an informal but very candid talk with Lemnitzer. This would, of course, depend to some extent on negotiating the points mentioned above which may come out of the JCS visiting committee report. I have no doubt, as I have already said, that we can do this. Strong support from Lemnitzer unquestionably will materially improve our prospects.

7. I recognize that one aspect of this whole problem is still unresolved, i.e., the Cuban Provisional Government. At the moment, I gather that this may not be going too well. Possibly a blow-up of this aspect would require us to change our approach. I am optimistic, however, that some sort of an acceptable result can be fashioned and, in the meantime, it should not affect our plans for trying to get approval.

8. Inherent in the foregoing is a recognition also that approval does not have to be exclusively to the original tactical plan. I still feel that it is a very good one but changes in facts, such as repositioning of the Cuban militia, can require variations. What I am really aiming at is approval for the best possible use of the Cubans now in Guatemala. This includes, of course, as a fall-back position, an effort to have the whole operation taken over by Ydigoras (with our "unofficial" help, of course) in case we receive an adamant refusal to continue as presently planned. I feel very strongly that dissolution, even if it is feasible, is not an acceptable solution. You know the reasons as well as I, so I will not go into them.

C. Tracy Barnes

245. Notes of a Special Group meeting, March 2¹

March 2, 1961

1. The DCI gave a summary of operations during the past week. He also told the Group that Alejos is in Washington with a letter from President Ydigoras addressed to President Kennedy, and that he is attempting through his brother, the Guatemalan Ambassador, to obtain an appointment with Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Dulles said that he understood the letter took a strong position on the necessity of early action vis-à-vis Cuba, but—in answer to a question—assured the Group that we had neither written nor inspired the letter.

2. Mr. Dulles also said that he thought we should discuss soon with the Special Group actions to be taken with respect to employment of the forces now in training in Guatemala.

¹ Guatemala involvement in Cuba project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs—Cuba.

246. Notes of a Special Group meeting, March 8¹

March 8, 1961

1. Mr. Dulles noted that a meeting is scheduled for Saturday morning to discuss broad policy aspects of this operation with Mr. Bundy's associates. He told the Group, however, about operational developments during the past week, including the landing of the airplane in Jamaica and the arrival of its nine-man crew in Miami. Mr. Dulles also touched on the visit to the White House of the Guatemalan emissary, and the reported threat that Guatemala would proceed with its own anti-Castro activity if the U.S. did not move. He also reported some progress in developing a cohesive political organization among the Cuban exiles.

¹ Operational developments during the past week on the Cuba project. Secret 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs—Cuba.

247. Memorandum from Barnes to Chief, WH-4, March 10¹

March 10, 1961

SUBJECT

DCI's [less than 1 line not declassified] Check List

I am attaching two copies of a check list prepared by the DCI covering points which he feels should be given consideration. You will note that they are not matters calling for immediate action but I think that it would be useful early next week (subject to Saturday's decision) to discuss our reactions. You will remember that General Cabell has shown an interest in pursuing Point II and will probably call a meeting on it sometime next week (again, subject to Saturday's decision).

C. Tracy Barnes**Attachment**

Although there is no question that we must show flexibility and willingness to examine any reasonable suggestions, I believe that we *MUST* at the same time transmit the following basic premises at some point. How and in just what language is obviously a matter of tactics and depends on the way the session is progressing.

1. Flexibility must be weighed against the past and also against an important present fact of life. As far as the past is concerned, we have varied the plan considerably and have also carefully examined a number of possibilities which were discarded as being inadequate (e.g. series of small landings, single night landing, taking of Isle of Pines, trying to capture airfield in Zapata, etc.) Consequently, there has been history of change and attempts at adjustment.

The applicable present circumstance is the Cuban Strike Force. The Cubans cannot be *ordered* to do anything. True they do not know the present plan but they do know their weapons, including planes and tanks, and they do know that a landing in full force is planned. Present plans No. 1 and No. 5 are within the scope of the action for which they volunteered. Anything else should be cleared with their leaders and might not be accepted, but surely should not be accepted until cleared.

¹ Transmits a checklist prepared by DCI on the Cuba project. Secret. 5 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files; Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.

2. The long process of analysis has brought forward two plans. These have been meticulously cleared with DOD. We are prepared to negotiate in connection with them any contingencies or conditions, laid down by the DOD. These plans are not necessarily the *last* word but they have been determined to have a good chance, to be effective and there should be some reasonable alternative put forward, not just a haphazard suggestion, to require full scale planning of something new. (This assumes that we have knocked down the Mann “slow build-up” scheme.)

3. There appear to be misconceptions about present plans:

a. Air activity is limited. Straffing of specific targets will be involved, not indiscriminate bombing and two aircraft is probably the most that will be seen at any one time. Moreover, there will probably never be more than four over the whole of Cuba at any one time.

b. It is NOT a U.S. operation. Surely there are and will be allegations and evidence of U.S. support. The operation, however, is by *Cuban* volunteer patriots, operating entirely from non-U.S. bases. These Cubans cannot be *ordered* to do anything (could be if a U.S. operation). They will be patriotically fighting to install a Cuban-selected provisional government. The only *foreign* government with any jurisdiction over them is the Guatemalan government and it cannot order them to invade, it can only attempt to impose rules or sanctions within Guatemala. The U.S. need not feel sorry for the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua, they know what they are doing and the Ydigoras letter plus the Alejos trip do not indicate any hesitancy on the parts of the Guats. *All* equipment being used is easily purchasable and is in many countries already. Deniability, though tenuous, will exist. Moreover, any other form of action will be laid at the U.S. door and in the case of the Mann “slow build-up” approach will involve much more U.S. participation.

4. Despite foregoing, greater flexibility would be possible if it were not for the unavoidable time urgency. Cannot change rainy season, moon phase, post factors bearing on morale or fact that time generally running against us.

5. Nothing succeeds so much as success. Consequently, the plan most likely to succeed has many advantages in the long run over one which modifies this chance in order to gain temporary political benefits. Such temporary benefits would be of little value against the loss of the ultimate goal or even at the expense of unduly extending the conflict which will tend to force U.S. participation and offer opposition forces and efforts an opportunity to organize and accentuate their effect.

In conclusion, I believe that we must not undersell what we have carefully prepared and on which a favorable DOD reaction has been obtained after detailed review. It is easy for State to throw all sorts of

wild or unanalyzed possibilities into the hopped on the theory that ANYTHING might conceivably work and the burden of proving impossibility is on us. In view of time and history, we should ask to be let out rather than be forced to review any new plan which doesn't on its face contain REAL possibilities and REAL advantages. It must be remembered that our two plans have been tested and passed as feasible by the authorities in government having the proper jurisdiction.

248. Memorandum prepared by Barnes, March 16¹

March 16, 1961

Although I fully agree with the conclusion which we unanimously reached after the 15 March meeting, i.e. that we would be happy to pursue either the original "E" Plan or the last created "Z" plan, I have decided after cogitation that I prefer the latter. In addition to the reasons listed in Jack Hawkins' presentation, I would add the following as being of importance.

1. An unopposed landing has tremendous benefits particularly for unblooded troops and even more so for unblooded Latin troops. An initial setback or indeed serious initial difficulties might be just enough to break an inexperienced outfit of this type even though well trained. On the other hand, the morale uplift from getting their feet firmly set on Cuban soil and from establishing a beach head without serious initial problems or losses could make real tigers out of them.

2. Another enormous advantage is the simplicity of defense. The few and narrow access routes should be easily maintained against highly superior troops almost indefinitely. This might not be so if the opposition had air, but it would be hoped that any opposing air would be eliminated reasonably soon.

3. Granting that break-out will not be easy, there is conversely the benefit of not having to rush due to the easy defensibility mentioned above. Consequently, there should be complete freedom of choice with regard to timing and if the beach head were to be maintained for sometime, there is the possible advantage of recognition of a provisional government with subsequent U.S. matériel support. Such recognition, however, is not a requirement of the plan.

¹ Reasons to pursue the "Z" plan versus the original "E" plan. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.

4. The advantage of having a usable air strip is enormous. Even though a limited number of aircraft should be based on it (say, two) still the time over target for planes as based would be so long as to permit extensive ranging over any part or parts of the island on each mission. Such air support will, in my opinion, do more than anything to bring out opposition elements wherever they may exist.

5. Control of the air plus tanks plus the other heavy firepower held by the strike force should be a combination that would make break-out comparatively simple.

In addition to the foregoing, sea supply should be easy to manage.

In addition to the above points, it would be extremely helpful, in my opinion, if we could cover the following points in some way:

1. Air cover for the strike force shipping as it approaches Cuba. Granted that it is unlikely that the Cubans would attack such shipping in international waters prior to their having taken any affirmative act themselves, still air cover could be very comforting. Possibly the USAF or the U.S. Navy would be willing to do this.

2. U.S. air fields should be selected and ready to receive aircraft post-strike in order to avoid, insofar as possible, return of aircraft to Latin America. The security problem here is significant particularly as support at a later date for allegations against the U.S. Nevertheless if, as suggested by the State Department, this is acceptable politically, we should certainly take advantage of it.

3. The U.S. should be poised and ready to fly in massive supplies as soon as recognition of a provisional government occurs, provided of course that this has received political clearance. Again, however, I understand that the State Department has no objection to such support under such circumstances.

4. Any reserve Cuban force, even though slightly trained, should be included in our plan for use as the circumstances may require, i.e., either to supplement the forces in the beach-head or to support possible uprisings elsewhere on the Island or, conceivably, as a surprise element to coordinate with a break-out.

5. A few small teams will presumably be held in reserve in order to be available for infiltration at appropriate points in support of internal opposition and to provide additional communication facilities.

C. Tracy Barnes

249. Memorandum from Barnes to Chief, WH-4, March 21¹

March 21, 1961

SUBJECT

[less than 1 line not declassified] Points Raised by the DCI

The following is the checklist of points raised by the DCI. You will remember that I mentioned these to you after they were given to me orally on 20 March. The DCI recognizes that many of these points are already being considered and did not mention them for any purpose other than to bring to your attention a number of points which occurred to him.

1. With regard to Puerto Cabezas, have we planned all possible steps with regard to security. This, of course, means not only the pattern of activity previously discussed but the need to place in the town some CI types to sound out local gossip, etc. I would hope that some sort of report on exactly what can be done with regard to both of these can be made to DD/P by the evening of 23 March or the morning of 24 March.

2. A number of points with regard to details of the initial portions of the tactical plan. Presumably, these will all be included at the time that DD/P receives a briefing on the plan as finally worked out but, for what it is worth, the points specifically mentioned were:

a. Command authority both over the entire convoy while in transit and at time of arrival and debarkation, plus command of each ship and craft. This should include a specific indication of the nationalities of the two or three top officers in each case, plus the number of contract Americans and the number of Staff personnel. As to the last, their duties throughout should be carefully detailed, and steps should be taken to "sheep dip" all such Staff personnel that might be used in order that they will be ready for use if necessary.

b. Has there been any further consideration of possible AA both on shipboard and on shore. In this connection it is felt that the Cuban pilots will be timid so that evidence of some kind of AA is more important than actual effectiveness. This point may have been resolved in a previous discussion but it is sufficiently important to justify some further consideration.

c. What overt steps, if any, might be suggested which could have a sensible explanation and yet which would act as a deterrent to Soviet action. For example, assume that the State Department were to declare the present Cuban Government to be outside the Inter-American structure because it is Communist dominated and that it intended to prevent

¹ Checklist of points raised by DCI on Cuba project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.

this government from exporting revolution to the rest of the Hemisphere. It is recognized that as a practical matter little can be done effectively to prevent such action but quite aside from this, the placing of substantial elements of the U.S. fleet in the Caribbean could have a deterring effect in other ways. It could include a large carrier, plus air patrols, plus perhaps a few destroyers which seems to me might be quite healthy. Of course maneuvers is another obvious excuse but I am in no position to know whether it is a useful one. Another excuse would be to state that the shipment of further arms by the Soviets to Cuba would be considered unacceptable by the U.S. and the equivalent of formulating Hemisphere disruption. On this theory, it would seem to me that ships, plus possibly air cover, could be put on the Atlantic side of Cuba on the theory that they were planning to intercept any destroyers or other ships carrying cargo such as aircraft to Cuba. There are probably other and better possibilities.

3. Finally, there are a few intelligence requirements which should be written up fairly soon. The first is the evidence now in hand of efforts by Castro to export revolution to the Hemisphere. In this connection, special efforts should be made to continue to collect evidence on this point. The second is what evidence exists as to shipment of armament to Cuba. This has recently been drawn together but should be kept current.

4. Evidence regarding the status of the training of Cubans by the Czechs. I am placing this requirement separately on [illegible in the original] through [less than 1 line not declassified] who has responsibility for the Czech [illegible in the original].

C. Tracy Barnes

250. Information report No. TDCS-3/469,582, March 27¹

March 27, 1961

COUNTRY

Cuba

SUBJECT

Government Action Against Opposition Forces in the Escambray Mountains

¹ Status report on opposition groups in Escambray region of Las Villas province. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, Jan 1961—.

DATE OF INFO

January-1 March 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

Cuba (24 March 1961)

SOURCE

Leader of an Opposition Group in Escambray Mountains (F)

1. Of the four or five opposition groups that had been fighting in the Escambray region of Las Villas province, only the one commanded by Evelio Duque is believed to be there still. Duque's main force is believed to have been divided into small bands, which are without communication with one another and are operating independently.

2. In late January the Castro government concentrated militiamen in the Escambray, mainly near Manicaragua, and began large-scale offensive operations. Armed with Czech submachine guns and R-2 (sic) rifles, Belgian FAL rifles, mortars, bazookas and artillery pieces, the militia units encircled isolated groups of opposition forces. The Cuban army used helicopters to pinpoint concentrations of opposition units, then launched artillery barrages, which were followed by an assault by specially-trained militia riflemen.

3. Although neither well trained nor greatly disposed to fight, the militiamen were usually effective because they greatly outnumbered the opposition. The majority of the militia units were under the command of communist officers of the rebel army. Although the government faced the constant threat of defection by the militia, mainly as a result of the discontent over the lack of food, this was minimized by the immediate arrest or transfer of malcontents.

4. The opposition forces have suffered setbacks because of a lack of supplies rather than because of the effectiveness of the attack by the government forces. Lacking both arms and food the opposition forces were constantly on the defensive and were forced to move from place to place at a moment's notice. Attempts to supply the opposition forces by air were ineffective, and even the wholehearted support from residents of the Escambray area was not enough. In addition to the lack of food and arms the opposition forces were handicapped by a lack of communications among the different groups.

5. Field dissem: CINCLANT.

End of message

April 1961

251. Telegram 3811 to the CIA from Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 16¹

April 16, 1961

EMERG [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

1. 10 B-265 scheduled for strategic targets D-Day per ref [illegible in the original] 4 of these have secondary mission to provide ground support 1100Z to 1200Z. Eleventh A/C has time over beach of 1200Z and can loiter until 1430 hours. Two A/C assigned Napalm (NDR4) mission will make quick turn around and with 230 cal bombay tank installation plus reinstalled externals will have capability loiter 3½ hours over beach. Estimated time over beach these two A/C 1315Z. This leaves no air cover over beach 1330Z to 1815Z (4-45 hrs).

2. Request guidance as to priority and which targets to postpone if support priority NBR 1.

End of message

¹ Strategic targets on D-day and timing of missions. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I.

252. Telegram 4681 from CIA to Balgar, April 17¹

April 17, 1961

Pass Emergency Blagar; Info OPIM Barbara J, Essex, LANT Puerto Cabezas.

¹ Instructions for ships participating in Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II.

"1. Have Barbara J if practicable proceed immediately to Blue Beach offload as much as possible 1,000 man pack into LCVP and small boats in time permitting. Retire from area not later than 18070CZ towards point Zulu at best speed.

2. Blagar, Atlantics and Caribe with LCU proceed south of Point Zulu remain minimum 50 miles from Cuban territory.

3. Jet air cover being provided outside 15 mile from Cuban territory.

4. Air drops and strikes tonight and dawn.

5. Request latest situation report on all ships/LCU/LCVP."

End of message

J.D. Esterline, C/WH/4

J. Hawkins, C/WH/4/PM

253. Telegram 4292 to CIA from Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 18¹

April 18, 1961

Emergency [illegible in the original] cite

[less than 1 line not declassified]

1. Believe all sea furies and T-335 hampering ground and air operations located San Antonio. Strikes early morning darkness 18 April unsuccessful due to low scud and haze and city blackout. Now plan max effort either sunset or predawn on this base using all ordnance available. Request approval.

2. Request approval use contract crews.

End of message

¹ Report of unsuccessful attacks; request for approval later attack and use of contract crews. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I.

254. Telegram 7123 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 18¹

April 18, 1961

OPIM [*1 line not declassified*]

RYBAT [*1 line not declassified*]

FOR [*1 line not declassified*]

1. Authority now granted for use cargo aircraft to deliver improvised napalm bombs to isolated airstrips. Targets should be in order San Julian AB, Santiago AB, San Antonio AB, Managua, Nueva Gerona AB, caution crews to avoid residential areas.

2. Dept. of the Air Force beach resupply to begin night 19 April thereby relieving your transports. Suggest Wimby begin improvising Napalm Bombs for use night 19 April. Drop time approx 20/0700Z.

3. NBR ACFT used and launch, your discretion.

End of message

S.W. Beerly, AC/DPD

¹ Approval of use of cargo aircraft to deliver napalm bombs and beach resupply schedule. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85–00664R, Box 4, Vol I.

255. Telegram 4455 from Agency personnel in Nicaragua to CIA, April 19¹

April 19, 1961

CITE [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

1. Concur, already under way. Two B–26's schedule out every two hours to work all roads leading into beachhead. C–54 being loaded with 55 gallon drums of napalm. Also to hit beachroads and MSR's (main supply roads) approaching beach.

¹ B–26 bombing schedule. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85–00664R, Box 4, Vol I.

2. All above crews will be American. Cuban crews nearly broken without at least 12 to 24 hrs off.

3. Above efforts will continue through tomorrow but very concerned re lack of effective Navy air cover. Tonites B-26 mission were met at the 12 mile limit inbound and outbound. Beach repts enemy aircraft made passes on beach while Navy A/C remained at high altitude. If this procedure used in the morning Hqtrs can expect to lose some American crews.

End of message

256. Telegram 7237 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 19¹

April 19, 1961

Flash. To Air Commander.

1. Positive aggressive Navy air support and cover granted for one hour 11:30Z to 12:30Z 19 April.

2. All enemy forces on approaches leading into Playa Giron Airfield should be attacked.

3. Supply aircraft will also receive escort for this period.

4. Main purpose is hope to catch enemy aircraft in area.

5. Follow on air strikes as indicated in your message tide 879 desired.

6. Please advise plan.

7. Essential make best use opportunity this one hour period.

8. Small boat will be resupplying beach avoid attack.

End message

S.W. Beerli
AC/DPD

¹ Navy air support and cover granted for 1 hour. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II.

**257. Telegram 7238 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua,
April 19¹**

April 19, 1961

RYBAT [*less than 1 line not declassified*] COMMO.

Pass following EMERGENCY to brigade:

1. We can continue to furnish logistic support by air.
2. Cannot furnish jet air cover now.
3. We plan to provide T-33 jet fighter support within estimated two days.
4. If you feel you cannot hold position, let us know now so we can evacuate brigade tonight. Ships moving into position for possible evacuation, we await your decision.

(End of message)

J.D. Esterline
C/WH/4

J. Hawkins
C/WH/4/PM

¹ Message to brigade re U.S. logistic support. Secret. 1 p. CIA/DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II.

258. Notes by General Eisenhower of April 22 meeting with President Kennedy¹

April 22, 1961

NOTES BY GENERAL EISENHOWER IN LUNCHEON MEETING,
APRIL 22, 1961, WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY AT CAMP DAVID

(I talked with Allen Dulles the previous day, at the President's suggestion.)

Mr. Kennedy met me when I landed from the helicopter at Camp David. We went to the terrace at Aspen Cottage to talk. He began by outlining the Cuban situation, including a description of the planning, the objectives and the anticipated results. This outline agreed exactly with that given me by Allen Dulles yesterday morning.

He explained in detail where things began to go awry and stated that the whole operation had become a complete failure. Apparently some men are still hiding in the "bosque" and possibly have made their way to the mountains. Apparently about 400 prisoners were taken.

The chief apparent causes of failure were gaps in our intelligence, plus what may have been some errors in ship loading, timing, and tactics.

It appears that too much specialized equipment was carried in a single ship and, when this ship was damaged, the troops on the beach were left fairly helpless. I inquired whether or not the troops had had the equipment immediately with them (in platoons and companies) to establish effective road blocks on the three avenues of entry into the swamp area. He was under the impression that this equipment was properly distributed and the troops well trained in its use. Therefore the reason for the quick penetration of the swamp into the vulnerable beachhead was unknown.

The press has mentioned a great deal about MIGs. The President is not certain, and neither was Allen Dulles, that these were MIGs. They could easily have been T-33s, equipped with rockets and guns; but, at least, they shot down a number of our airplanes and apparently operated effectively against our troops in the beachhead.

He is having General Taylor come to Washington to analyze all phases of the operation, including all of the planning and the methods so as to see whether there are lessons to be learned. He has the feeling that we can be faced with some similar situation over the next decade

¹ Failure of Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-69, Augusta-Walter Reed Series, Cuba (2), Box 1.

and thinks we should do our best to be prepared to meet it. (He did not say that this report would be made public—but I did get the impression that it would.)

The next thing that he wanted to talk about were the direction and prospects for future action. I was unable to give him any detailed suggestions, but did say that I would support anything that had as its objective the *prevention of Communist entry and solidification of bases in the Western hemisphere*.

He believes that the two great powers have now neutralized each other in atomic weapons and inventories; but that in numbers of troops, and our exterior communications as opposed to the interior communications of the Communists, we are relatively weak. He did not seem to think that our great seapower counteracted this situation completely.

The only real suggestion I could give him regarding the Western Hemisphere was to do his very best to solidify the OAS against Communism, including a readiness to support, at least morally and politically, any necessary action to expel Communist penetration. I said that this was something that had to be worked on all the time. I told him, also, that I believed the American people would never approve direct military intervention, by their own forces, except under provocations against us so clear and so serious that everybody would understand the need for the move.

The President did not ask me for any *specific* advice. I contented myself with merely asking a few questions about the tactical action, including the timing of the support that I understood the Navy Air had given to the landings. He said that in the first instance they were so anxious to keep the United States hand concealed that they accorded no such support, and when they finally did get word of its need it was too late. This situation was complicated by the fact that all communications went out. I understood that the communication equipment was on the ship that sank, but this is hard to believe because each unit carries some light communication equipment, including the ability to send radiograms to a distance of some fifty to a hundred miles.

There are certainly factors, now unknown, that will finally come to light under searching scrutiny. The purpose of this scrutiny is not to find any scapegoat, because the President does seem to take full responsibility for his own decision, but rather to find and apply lessons for possible future action.

The President brought up Laos. He outlined the situation and said that the British were very reluctant to participate in any military intervention and of course the French positively refused to do so. He thinks that both the British and the French would like to see Souvanna Phouma brought back to power as the only man who could possibly maintain and sustain a neutral position in Laos. (As I remember, our

own general opinion, which we had formed before January 20th, was that Souvanna Phouma had gone so far toward the Soviets that he could scarcely extract himself from their clutches.)

The President was quite sure that there was no possibility of saving Laos by unilateral military action. Consequently he looked forward to a ceasefire, which is promised for this coming Monday, the 24th. He remarked that he was not so much concerned about Laos as Thailand. I replied that, in that event, it would seem the part of wisdom to begin immediately the strengthening of the Thai forces and positions. My former reports led me to believe that the Thai might be very sturdy soldiers whereas obviously the Laotians didn't like to fight. I asked him whether the ICC was to be allowed, coincidentally with the ceasefire, to survey the whole country and see exactly what the situation was. He said our people would insist upon that.

Again I told him that from my own position I could not offer any advice—I could just say that as a generality in order to keep your position strong at the conference table you had constantly to let the enemy see that our country was not afraid. We believe in what is right and attempt to insist upon it.

Quite naturally a conversation such as this had no definite conclusion. We talked throughout most of the luncheon, and afterward strolled through the camp and continued discussing various aspects of each situation, but nothing of a dramatic character came up.

Finally we met with a group of newspaper reporters and photographers in front of Aspen Cottage. I enjoyed meeting so many of my old friends among the crowd. He made a very short statement and said that he had just outlined for me the situations in these two parts of the world and had asked for my counsel. Nothing else was said.

When the reporters turned to me I said that it was rather fun to be in the position of not having to make a statement and having nothing to say. They then asked me whether I supported him. I repeated a generalization that I had expressed on other occasions—that when it came to problems of foreign operations, then an American traditionally stands behind the Constitutional head, the President.

This of course was said with respect to purposes; no one outside government is committed to support details of timing, tactics, selection of operation sites and methods. These are not even yet known to outsiders.

After all this, he took me in his car to the heliport and suggested a golf game in the near future. Dick Flohr was driving and John Campion was riding in the front seat.

259. Chronology of Bay of Pigs operation from January 1960 to April 19, 1961, dated April 23¹

April 23, 1961

- 18 January 1960 Established Branch 4 within Western Hemisphere Division. Began period of organizing and acquiring personnel—established with 18 permanent positions at Headquarters—provision built in for handling additional personnel as needed for other Project installations.
- 18 January to
17 March 1960 (A) Began exploratory work on opening [*less than 1 line not declassified*] black area for training of small initial cadre to be used in training of greater force, which force to be used as teams introduced into Cuba to aid and assist the guerrilla units in the field.
- (B) Reconnoitered the Miami area for covert office space and safehouses, from which to initiate covert action operations into Cuba, including in/ exfiltration operations into Cuba of men and matériel, propaganda, and setting up recruiting offices.
- (C) Conducted active screening of Cuban political figures in conjunction with the Habana Station in view of setting up at the appropriate time (after policy approval) a Cuban front which would serve as the covert instrumentality through which clandestine operations, primarily propaganda and paramilitary, could be conducted.
- (D) Conducted map reconnaissance in the Caribbean area for territory on which to build a quasi-clandestine radio transmitter for broadcast into Cuba.
- (E) Conducted physical reconnaissance of Greater Miami area in view of locating suitable site for a major communications center.

¹ Top Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82–00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee.

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- 17 February 1960 Paper on "Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro" (Sabotage Against Sugar) approved by Special Group (Designated Representatives under 5412), but disapproved by the President.
- 14 March 1960 Paper on "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" approved by Special Group subject to preparation and submission of a rewritten proposal to the President.
- 17 March 1960 "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" approved by the President.
- 17 May 1960 Radio Swan completed testing and was ready for regular, scheduled broadcasting.
- 21 July 1960 Approval granted by Special Group this date for sabotage actions against Cuba. Paper originally forwarded on 12 July. DCI made reservations (1) be non-attributable to U.S. and (2) no loss of life if possible.
- 18 August 1960 President and Cabinet briefed on Project progress and budget. Approval given to continue and budget of \$13,287,611 for FY 1961 approved. As we understand it, DOD agreed to make available to the Agency the personnel and equipment needed to support training and logistical phases of the Project. [*text not declassified*]
- 7 September 1960 The DDP approved the reorganization of the FRD to institute the General Coordinator operation through his specialized action staffs.
- 8 September 1960 Approval granted by the Special Group for supply overflights over Cuba utilizing a Cuban crew with flight originating from Guatemala. Our requests for overflights were initiated in August, asking for permission to run a supply drop from U.S. bases with aircraft manned by Agency covert contract crews. This request was disapproved by the DDCI and DCI. On 1 September we submitted a request to run an overflight with the aircraft manned by a CAT crew. The flight idea seemed to receive agreement, but use of the CAT crew was denied. The approval finally received included the provision that we did not have to brief the Special Group formally before each supply

- flight, but that Mr. Parrott, DDP/EBM, would touch base by telephone with members of the Group on each drop.
- 13 September 1960 Department of State turned down the concept of use of foreign nationals in a PM Contingency Force (this according to note on routing sheet from C/WH/4 to Mr. Stanulis).
- 28 September 1960 We completed our first successful maritime operation, infiltrating 300 pounds of demolitions and exfiltrating two personnel from a rendezvous off the north coast of Cuba.
- 28/29 September 1960 First supply overflight mission over Cuba. C-54 dropped cargo in Escambrays but not on DZ. A/C landed in Mexico and is still being held by the Mexican Government.
- 6 October 1960 The Special Group approved the Agency's request to begin screening lists of potential volunteers (American) for use in Project operations with the understanding that none of these volunteers would be committed to action in Cuba without additional Special Group approval.
- 12 October 1960 The Special Group agreed that the Agency could run U-2 photographic mission over target country.
- 17 October 1960 At a meeting with the DDP it was agreed that, although we will continue to back the FRD, we will give aid to any other politically-acceptable groups which can provide evidence of Cuban assets worthy of support.
- 27 October 1960 DDP approved the spotting, recruiting and training of U.S. contract-type personnel for Project maritime operations. Utilization of these types in operations in Cuban waters will require further approval and must be under FRD cover.
- 3 November 1960 Special Group would not approve Agency suggestion that consideration be given to the use of U.S. bases for training and operations. (This request had been originated by the Agency because of Assistant Secretary of State Mann's opinion that attention focused on Guatemala in the U.N. made such a change necessary.)

- 3 November 1960 In light of the above, at a meeting with DDCI and DDP it was agreed that we would develop the proposed facility at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for a training, holding and staging area. It was agreed that a time loss was inevitable under this new arrangement.
- 16 November 1960 A new concept of paramilitary operations was discussed with the DDP. It envisaged landing a force of some 600 men by LST on beaches from which they would move inland and create a safe area in the mountains. This group and those joining it internally are to be resupplied by airdrop. D-Day to be 1 February. After discussion, it was agreed WH/4 would proceed on this plan, pending any further word from higher authorities.
- 29 November 1960 The President made it clear at a meeting with General Goodpaster, Messrs. Dillon, Merchant, Gates, Douglas, General Gray and Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell that he wanted all done that could be done on the Project with all possible urgency and nothing less on the part of any Department. There was general agreement that training in the U.S. was out of the question.
- 8 December 1960 Special Group, augmented by Messrs. Mann and Scott of State and General Lansdale from Defense were briefed on current status and proposed plan for PM operations with admittedly optimistic D-Day toward end of February. Approval was granted for concept of regular leaflet drop flights over Cuba with stipulation the Group be given customary advance notice of flights. Agreement reached later in the day with Mr. Mann to allow recruitment of U.S. contract types for maritime operations into Cuban waters. There was no firm decision on our request to fly supply drops from U.S. bases. In regard to protection of the U.S. Special Forces we plan to utilize as trainers in Guatemala, it was agreed that the Agency would negotiate a secret agreement with the Guatemalan Government outlining their status and rights.
- 11 December 1960 First propaganda leaflet drops made by three aircraft over Cuba.

- 15 December 1960 Special Group had no objection to the Project budget submitted; it was agreed that their function was not to examine details but simply to be aware of the general magnitude of and the principles on which the budget was based.
- 3 January 1961 At a meeting with the President, it was agreed that our PM forces should be increased to the greatest extent possible, but that U.S. bases could not be used for training.
- 3 January 1961 (2030 hours) Break in relations between U.S. and Cuba as direct result of Castro's demand Embassy staff be cut to eleven.
- 4 January 1961 DCS/OPS/DA consulted as to basis for DA's objections to our request to use FA teams for training in Guatemala.
- 6 January 1961 Mr. Esterline briefed M.G. Woodnough at DA's request for liaison with the Project in view of alert of 18th Corps.
- 10 January 1961 Mr. Esterline briefed General Cabell as to Project problems w/DOD so that General Cabell could raise these points with JCS members at the Puerto Rico meeting.
- 11 January 1961 DCI appeared at a closed session with the Foreign Relations Committee and provided material on the FRD.
- 12 January 1961 At the Special Group meeting, Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives of State, Defense, the Joint Staff and the Agency to draw up contingency plans covering the possible use of overt U.S. forces. All members agreed that such planning is an essential step and a preliminary report was requested for 19 January.
- 13 January 1961 Proposed prop drop turned down by Mr. Barnes due to impending change of administration.
- 17 January 1961 DCI briefed Secretary of State designate Rusk on basic paper.
- 19 January 1961 Mr. Willauer presented to the Special Group the highlights of a paper on contingency planning. He concluded that several major aspects of the overall plan required clarification or further policy decisions, citing the following: (1) use of U.S. bases for air strikes before and after D-Day;

- (2) staging of invasion force (possibly from U.S.); (3) specific actions, including timing, to obtain support from other Latin American countries; (4) how and when to recognize a provisional government; (5) possibility of providing more overt support than originally planned. The Group agreed that our maritime missions could proceed, but that a high-level meeting, to include new Secretaries of Defense and State, should be set up as soon as possible to reaffirm basic concepts of projects.
- 22 January 1961 Mr. Barnes informed Col. King he had participated with Mr. Bissell and DCI in briefing Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, the Attorney General, and others at which Project generally endorsed and to proceed with steps now underway.
- 24 January 1961 CINCLANT planning meeting JCS to issue Admiral Dennison a planning directive to prepare to support Project with overt assistance.
- 25 January 1961 Mr. Barnes attempting to get State approval to train tankers at Fort Knox. Agreed with Mr. Bissell it was necessary that General Lemnitzer designate someone to receive full project briefing so that subsequent meetings with President can have a better informed DOD view.
- 27 January 1961 Met with DCI in preparation for 28 January meeting with President and State/Defense. Agreed to press for decision by 10 February and to abet that decision by giving JCS designees a full briefing as basis for joint planning.
- 28 January 1961 Meeting with President, Secretaries of Defense and State, General Lemnitzer and aides, Mr. Bundy and DCI. Decisions made were: (1) to continue our present propaganda and political action activities, sabotage, ex/infiltration and overflights; (2) to present the tactical PM plan as soon as possible to a limited number of senior officers designated by General Lemnitzer in order that a DOD position may be formulated.
- 30 January 1961 Col. Hawkins presented his plan in a detailed briefing of Generals Cabell and Bull and Admiral Wright.

- 31 January 1961 Col. Hawkins presented his plan in a detailed briefing of General Gray and party from JCS Staff.
- 1 February 1961 DOD indicated policy would not permit Armed Forces personnel in Nicaragua.
- 6 February 1961 General Lemnitzer forwarded to DCI the JCS favorable evaluation of Project strike plan, including a number of suggestions.
- 7 February 1961 Meeting with Mr. Berle at which Assistant Secretary Mann urged going slowly.
- 9 February 1961 Prepared paper for Mr. Berle at his request outlining bad effects of disbanding strike force.
- 9 February 1961 Prepared paper on alternatives to using strike force (i.e.—air and sea infiltration), and briefed Mr. Bundy thereon. He indicated there would be delay in Presidential decision.
- 11 February 1961 Reviewed General Gray's outline of field trip, and suggested Nicaragua base not be visited.
- 11 February 1961 Meeting with Mr. Bissell as to forming a Revolutionary Council.
- 15 February 1961 Met with Mr. Bissell to discuss Cuban civilian/military relations, composition of the Cuban political organization, and relations between the Project's PM section and the JCS Staff.
- 17 February 1961 DDP paper presented to President outlining several courses of action possible to the Agency.
- 20 February 1961 Understood from meeting with President it will be two weeks at least until a decision as to using force; decided not to expand up to 1,000 at this time, although that is possible.
- 25–27 February 1961 Three JCS officers visited Guatemalan and Nicaraguan sites for inspection of our forces in training.
- 1 March 1961 Meeting with Mr. Bissell to brief him on evaluation of force during JCS representatives' trip to the camps.
- 2 March 1961 Meeting in Assistant Secretary Mann's office to review JCS Staff's draft inter-agency plan.
- 3 March 1961 Assistant Secretary Mann asked that we not announce formation of Revolutionary Council or take any untoward act until after this 5–9 March Mexico City "Peace Conference".

3 March 1961	Began preparation of paper on military alternatives to the Trinidad plan for forthcoming meeting with President.
4 March 1961	C-54 drop flight down in Jamaica.
7 March 1961	Emissaries from President Ydigoras met with the President who stated a decision would be forthcoming.
7 March 1961	Noted we had 16 PM W/T men in target, 8 current in touch, and 48 agents geographically spread.
8 March 1961	Agreed to use Belle Chase facility for training of up to 200 of Nino Diaz PM group.
10 March 1961	First ship ("Atlantico") loads to depart for Nicaragua. Decision expected by noon 11 March. Meeting with Mr. Bissell to consider security necessary to achieve surprise.
11 March 1961	Meeting with President.
14 March 1961	DCI, General Gray, MacGeorge Bundy met and latter then briefed President.
15 March 1961	Morning meeting with Mr. Barnes to prepare revised military plans to meet limitations imposed.
15 March 1961	Afternoon meeting with Mr. Bissell to prepare for 1600 meeting with President. Reviewed paper as to political requirements last said to condition and limit the military plan.
15 March 1961	Met with President to present revised plan.
16 March 1961	DCI, DDCI, DDP briefed in war room.
17 March 1961	DDCI and party briefed Vice Admiral Beakley and party as to Navy support requirements in view of recent decisions regarding Project.
17 March 1961	Started intensive defection project.
17 March 1961	Started survey of trainees' knowledgeability of U.S. involvement.
27 March 1961	Revolutionary Council members visit Guatemala training camps.
27 March 1961	Sent representative to President Somoza.
28 March 1961	Decided not to use Sanchez Mosquera troops.
29 March 1961	Prepared papers on internal support to a landing and on the status of defection program for use at 1500 meeting in White House.
30 March 1961	Reviewed and prepared for release cables on 200 MIGS and on 4 Czech aircraft.

- 31 March 1961 Prepared contingency demobilization plan, and contingency plan for emergency evacuation.
- 1 April 1961 After meeting with Mr. Bissell and his inquiry to Mr. Bundy, informed bases there would be 24-hour delay in start of movement from Guatemala to Nicaragua.
- 3 April 1961 Briefed General Gray and Mr. Braddock on propaganda plan.
- 4 April 1961 Meeting with President, with decision promised for morning 6 April.
- 5 April 1961 Prepared B-26 "defection" plan.
- 5 April 1961 Agreed that if decision is not to use force, then we will move them until they get to sea, then divert on grounds of new intelligence.
- 6 April 1961 Prepared for U.S./U.N. a rebuttal of the *New York Times* preview of what Roa would charge (indicating what true and what not), and a collection of Castro's anti-U.S. statements.
- 7 April 1961 Agreed strike force briefing team to leave for Nicaragua 9 April.
- 8 April 1961 Briefed Mr. Bissell in war room on strike and on Diaz operation.
- 8 April 1961 Attended air briefing in 1717 H Street.
- 9 April 1961 Discussed with Nicaraguan representative back on 1-day consultation tightening up of Nicaraguan security.
- 10 April 1961 Reviewed agents' requests for drops in light of aircraft commitment to transporting troops.
- 11 April 1961 Received permission from Department of the Navy to move Diaz group this night from Belle Chase to Boca Chica for loading in ship.
- 12 April 1961 Sent CINCLANT plan to General Cabell.
- 12 April 1961 Meeting with President. Agreed Mr. Berle to tell Miro Cardona no overt U.S. support; we to close out U.S. training; take all steps necessary to divert to Vieques if necessary.
- 13 April 1961 All Headquarters sections on 24-hour duty.
- 14 April 1961 Briefing team returned from Nicaragua.
- 14 April 1961 U.N. Cuba question possibly today, probably 17 April.
- 14 April 1961 Consulted General Cabell, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Braddock in State re using sonic boom. Mr.

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- Braddock said Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr could not approve as too obviously U.S.
- 14 April 1961 Composed open code for DCI to use in telephoning from Puerto Rico for progress report noon 17 April.
- 14 April 1961 Reinstated FBIS coverage of Radio Swan.
- 15 April 1961 Pilot deception operation.
- 15 April 1961 Reviewed photography and sent mission cable to air base.
- 16 April 1961 At 2200, General Cabell and Mr. Bissell to Secretary of State, following calls from Mr. Bundy re foregoing H-hour spoiling raids on airfields in favor close support of beach. At 2300 sent revised missions.
- 17 April 1961 (0130) meeting with General Gray to discuss additional military action.
- 17 April 1961 DCI met at 2340 at Friendship Airport on return from Puerto Rico and briefed as to situation as to that time (men ashore, supplies not, 2 ships sunk by enemy air).
- 18 April 1961 Revolutionary Council briefed in Miami safehouse on situation as of 1400: beachhead under attack by tanks and air.
- 18 April 1961 President asked at 1130 to authorize Navy air cover 19 April A.M.
- 19 April 1961 Discussed evacuation cable in DCI's office, and released at 1130. Held telecon with air base 1230-1315.

May 1961

**260. Memorandum from Jacob D. Esterline to the Chief,
WH/4/PM, May 2¹**

May 2, 1961

SUBJECT

Straightening Out Dates of Strike Force Concept for the Taylor Committee

1. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] has in his notes instructions to write a paper straightening out in the Taylor Committee's mind when we actually became involved in strike operations. The need for this paper apparently arises from Lt. Col. Egan's statement to the effect that we always had a strike force concept. During his testimony he apparently made reference to a trip he took in June to one of the training camps, indicating at the time of trip the strike operation had already been decided upon. My recollection is that Lt. Col. Egan came to us about June 1960 and that he arrived with certain ideas which he carried from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the Cuban problem. This, however, did not constitute [*less than 1 line not declassified*] policy. I am sure you—or more particularly, members of your staff—will find that we had no approved philosophy of the operation within the Project until well in September. The training program [*less than 1 line not declassified*] was directed solely toward training an instructor cadre in small unit or "guerrilla-type" operations. This cadre when it arrived in Guatemala, in addition to working on building the camp [*less than 1 line not declassified*] continued to train the first recruits in the same kind of training they had received.

2. Another example of my positiveness that we were not, at Project level, thinking of a strike operation is the first conversation that we held in my office in Barton Hall wherein I referred to the fact that the PM staff had been talking about the development of a strike operation, but that I, myself, was not convinced of it at the time and that I preferred to put small teams into existing units at the appropriate time. As I recall, you had an open mind at that point although without positive study of Cuba you leaned toward the concept I outlined. It was at a somewhat later date, therefore (probably before the first of October), that we talked again and you stated your conviction that CASTRO could not be overthrown without a major or catalytic effort being made

¹ Straightening out dates of strike force concept for the Taylor Committee. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 2, vol III, Part III.

against him. After deliberation I came to the same conclusion and we then began to think in terms of expanding the force to the strength of a reinforced battalion more-or-less.

3. The foregoing is important only because General Taylor is going into very fine points in his analysis of government policy. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to get the record straight in this manner, and, although Lt. Col. Egan may have had in his own mind the idea of a strike operation—and I believe he came to us with some ideas on hitting the Isle of Pines—this nevertheless was not approved Project or Agency policy until quite a few months later. In point of fact, as I look back over that period I'm sure during that period I found myself drifting along devoting myself merely to creating basic capabilities in a variety of fields without any clear-cut idea of what national policy would permit us to do.

4. I hope the foregoing will be of some use to the PM staff in putting together the paper required by General Taylor. I will be available all day today; however, if further clarification is needed over and above that readily available within the PM staff, I suppose [*less than 1 line not declassified*] or [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would be in the best position to comment on this as they were, in fact, the only instructors on the scene at the time.

Jacob D. Esterline
C/WH/4

261. CIA memorandum, May 3¹

May 3, 1961

SUBJECT

Detailed Statement of all the Circumstances Surrounding the Cancellation of the D-Day Air Strike

REFERENCE

Memorandum Entitled, Additional Information Desired of CIA, dated 1 May 1961, paragraph 1

¹ Detailed statement of the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-day air strike. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee.

1. On D–1 (Sunday, 16 April 1961) at 2130 hours General Cabell was telephoned by Special Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy. General Cabell received this call in Mr. Esterline's office. On completion of the call, General Cabell indicated that Mr. Bundy had stated it had been decided that there be no air activity until such activity could be conducted from the air strip in the beach area. Mr. Bundy had indicated that he had been in communication with the President. Mr. Bundy was leaving for New York to consult with Ambassador Stevenson. The President had directed that the Agency consult the Secretary of State.

2. General Cabell called Mr. Bissell. It was indicated that Mr. Bundy had also called Mr. Bissell. Mr. Bissell undertook to come immediately to Mr. Esterline's office.

3. At 2150 Mr. Barnes telephoned Mr. Esterline's office to say that Secretary Rusk had called to say that the President had suggested that there be no air activity until such activity could be conducted from the air strip in the beach area, but that that should not be the case if there were operational reasons against it.

4. Shortly after ten o'clock, General Cabell and Mr. Bissell went to see the Secretary of State. Shortly after General Cabell and Mr. Bissell left, Colonel Hawkins returned from dinner and was briefed by Mr. Esterline as to the above developments. Colonel Hawkins telephoned Mr. Bissell at Secretary Rusk's conference and advised that the results of a cancellation of the air strike could be disastrous. Colonel Hawkins requested that the matter be taken up again with the President in order to explain the seriousness of the situation and to request consideration.

5. When General Cabell and Mr. Bissell returned at approximately 2315, General Cabell stated that there had been a change in our orders and that air support would be limited to close support of the beachhead. They reported they had not seen the President, but that Secretary Rusk had telephoned the President and recommended there be no air strike, in view of political considerations.

6. Colonel Hawkins, Mr. Esterline and Mr. Drain all pointed out that this change came too late to divert the strike force; our most recent information indicated that, according to the strike plan, at that very moment the force was transferring to the smaller craft and proceeding towards the beach and therefore could not be recalled. The task force officers estimated that the failure to strike the aircraft, which Zip reports and actual photography had shown in place after the D–2 air strike, would be that our shipping would be attacked at dawn, or shortly thereafter, with a result that supplies would not be landed and some of the ships certainly sunk. It was put that the cancellation of the D-Day strike would probably mean failure of the mission. General Cabell replied that we had our "marching orders" and would comply.

7. General Cabell requested that Colonel Beerli, the Acting Chief of the Air Division, be called to send to the Puerto Cabezas Air Base

a revised air order. Such a revision was transmitted at 0158 on 17 April and said, in part:

“Complete plan amended to place all B-26 aircraft at disposal of Brigade commander for Task Force protection: targets outlined in OPS Plan 200-1, attachment 1, appendix 2 to Annex B are cancelled. . . target restrictions are as follows: (1) only those armed vessels approaching task force or landing area; (2) no seaports to be attacked; (3) only those land targets that are called for by Brigade Commander for close in support; (4) no large cargo ships.”

8. A message received from the Puerto Cabezas Air Base at 0645 on the 17th indicated that the above message was received at that base 17 minutes after transmission. The Base’s reply read, in part:

“Refs received and reluctantly complied with. Complete plan amendment per refs received 170715Z with all pilots in cockpit ready for start engines. Needless to say this less than desirable operating procedure when 12 aircraft timed for take-off between 0730Z and 0800Z. Realize it desired give maximum protection to Brigade however believe change will not afford as much protection as original strike plan. The only real offensive danger to the Brigade is enemy fighters and bombers which are better hit on their home field—not repeat not over the beachhead. . . Pilots were in continual briefings today without sleep prior strike as a result late guidance and last minute changes.”

9. At approximately 0015 of the 17th, General Cabell telephoned Major General Gray at the latter’s home and requested that General Gray join General Cabell and Project officers in Mr. Esterline’s office. General Gray arrived at 0100. General Cabell informed General Gray as to the cancellation of the strategic strikes on the airfields and on the Managua Military Reservation and explored with General Gray what the JCS might do to compensate for this limitation. General Gray left at approximately 0145 to consult with JCS personnel. TS cable JCS 99422 was subsequently transmitted by General Gray to Admiral Clark and Admiral Denison. That cable, a warning order, indicated that the CEF aircraft would be limited on 17 April to defense of the beachhead from air and ground attack and that limited Cuban aircraft patrol activity was expected in the area. It also stated that the recipients should be prepared to execute on order the following missions “as soon after first light as practicable throughout daylight hours 17 April:

“a. Provide Air Cap for CEF shipping outside territorial waters. Rules of engagement as stated in your Op Plan apply as applicable.

“b. Provide EW for CEF ships to include LCI’s for purpose of warning ships of approaching aircraft. EW ships should remain maximum distance off shore consistent with capability to communicate with CEF ships.”

10. At 0525 Mr. Bissell called Colonel Shuler of the JCS Staff to advise him to implement General Gray’s warning order immediately,

with the following amendments: paragraph a, negative; paragraph b, affirmative, with two provisos: (1) no support to be closer than 30 miles to the coast of Cuba, and (2) ships not to be too close to one another. Mr. Bissell had earlier received this advice in a telephone conversation with General Cabell and the Secretary of State.

262. Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to the Deputy Director (Plans), May 8¹

May 8, 1961

SUBJECT

Actions To Be Taken as a Result of Meeting, 6 May 1961 re NSC/Cuba Paper and a Separate Meeting with Mr. Richard Goodwin

PROPAGANDA:

1. Discussion with Henry [illegible in the original] re possibility of transferring Swan Island to USIA for use as an official U.S. station.

2. Discussion with John McKnight of USIA re questions of propaganda to Latin America, particularly:

- a. Obtaining and disseminating atrocity stories from Cuba.
- b. Obtaining and disseminating material establishing Communist/Dictatorship aspects of Castro regime.
- c. Obtaining better Latin American press for U.S. generally and particularly in relation to the loan programs which are about to begin. This would also include good build-up for the anticipated Foreign Ministers meeting and coverage of same.

3. Discuss with Arthur Schlesinger the question of including with Murrow's report on USIA Latin American activities a statement of our activities. Murrow's report is for the President and I feel that it would give a false picture of the U.S. effort unless our activities were also included.

PARAMILITARY:

Prepare as soon as possible a suggested program including any aspects which we wish to work out with [illegible in the original].

¹ Propaganda, paramilitary, political, intelligence and budget actions to be taken resulting from Cuban invasion. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.

When recommendations are ready they should be passed to the White House for consideration. This can be done either through the Special Group or directly to Goodwin's office. In this connection, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] should be put in touch with Ray as soon as possible to work up the points outlined in the suggested prospectus.

POLITICAL:

In order to work out satisfactory arrangements as to the proper channels for the Revolutionary Council, we have agreed to review all present RC (FRD)-U.S. relationships in order to determine how they should be continued for the future. It is understood that Dr. Miro Cardona and the Council will maintain a number of overt contacts, mainly with State (apparently, Morales-Carrisa will be named to do this) but to some extent with Defense and HEW. As soon as possible we should present our analysis of relationships to Goodwin for such discussion as he may want to have with the other Departments.

INTELLIGENCE:

1. Normal intelligence collection should continue and, to the extent possible, be increased with respect to receipt by Cuba of Communist aid and material. We might want to consider some U-2 flights from time to time in order to check for jets or destroyers.

2. [*text not declassified*]

3. On the propaganda side, we should increase our collection to obtain useable stories. I believe that this can be done to some extent through newspaper sources. We might consider the possibility of any intercepts plus, of course, some system of interrogating individuals leaving Cuba.

BUDGET:

We will have to budget activities pretty soon since the JMATE project will unquestionably have to terminate in the reasonably near future, presumably around the end of May at which time I believe the money will be pretty low anyhow.

C. Tracy Barnes
A/DDP/A

263. Memorandum, May 24¹

May 24, 1961

SUBJECT

Special Group Consideration of the Strike Force Concept

1. On 3 November 1960, CIA submitted a paper to the Special Group, Subject: "Support for Covert Paramilitary Operations." The Background Section of this paper indicated: "the heavy influx of foreign (including Sov, Sat) arms, equipment and tactical advisers, the increasing activity of the militia, the improved ability of the security forces and the rapid development of effective police state controls indicate that a sizeable strike force of up to 3000 men may be required to reinforce and support indigenous opposition elements. This strike force must be capable of seizing a beachhead and defeating opposing military forces. It would require sufficient tactical air and maritime assets to support the invading forces." The Recommendation Section read "that approval be granted for the utilization of bases in this country for the covert paramilitary training and holding of air, ground, and maritime indigenous groups." A copy of this paper is attached as Appendix A.

2. Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 3 November 1960 indicate that Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, General Cabell, Parrott (Secretary) and General Lansdale attended. The pertinent comments on Cuban operations from this meeting are:

"Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

"From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that

¹ Special Group consideration of the strike force concept. Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-99679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II.

this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.

"Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

"Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.

"Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, General Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

"Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared

to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

“In this connection General Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization—either an existing one or a contrived one—to backstop the operations.

“Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.”

3. CIA did not receive permission to utilize U.S. bases for training or holding as requested in this paper, but it was indicated here that we contemplated augmenting our GW activities with a sizeable paramilitary assault effort from outside Cuba.

4. Minutes of the Special Group meeting of 19 November 1960 indicate that Messrs. Merchant, Mann, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell, Parrott (Secretary) and General Lansdale were present and the following covers the discussion on Cuba:

“Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we were putting more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S., but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly if an increase in numbers is contemplated. Therefore, the only solution would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries; this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a government in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some training in the U.S.

“Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embarrassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would be acceptable, particularly in the U.N.

"Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investigation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same way as Guatemala.

"Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate future and some over a period of longer range. They include:

"a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long or how effectively.

"b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This could be handled more securely, but the existence of an area where peculiar things are going on could not be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be private property such as the King Ranch, but this would take longer to arrange than a military base.

"c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already trying to get the U.S. Marines out.

"d. The CIA site on [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift.

"e. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost certainly know where they were.

"Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available, such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has been contemplated to date. General Lansdale said that he and General Bonesteel were of the same opinion.

"Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be. Mr. Dulles acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps within the militia itself.

"Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not

turn in our favor. He said that in the meantime, we could infiltrate small groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that overt U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued in any case.

“Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann’s estimate that the OAS investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFS and [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined.”

5. Minutes of the Special Group meeting of 23 November 1960 indicate that Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, Bissell, Parrott (Secretary) and General Lansdale were present and the following extract from the minutes covers the only reference to an assault concept:

“Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that we have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt will take place on the reported time schedule, or indeed at all, but emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others, so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition, he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines. Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.”

6. The following are pertinent extracts on the strike force concept taken from a memorandum for the record by an officer from the Cuba Desk on discussions held with the DDP after a meeting with the President on 29 November 1960:

“1. The DDP briefed the participants as to the President’s meeting with Department and Agency representatives, and reviewed the Project’s budget and staff paper in preparation for the Special Group’s 30 November meeting.

"2. Following a session with Mr. Pawley, the President had called a conference with Messrs. Dillon, Merchant, Gates, Douglas, Gray, Goodpaster, Dulles and Bissell.

"a. The President made it clear he wanted all done that could be done with all possible urgency and nothing less on the part of any Department.

"b. The Director outlined the Project's paramilitary concept and timing, emphasizing that our first choice for training continued to be Guatemala but that it seemed feasible to use [*less than 1 line not declassified*] if necessary. There was general agreement that training in the U.S. was out of the question."

3. For the next Special Group meeting, the DDP proposed to stress the following:

"a. We will train an absolute minimum of 600 in Guatemala, taking up the San Jose finca, moving out 60 to [*less than 1 line not declassified*], and building up to the 600 number as fast as recruiting and additional construction will permit.

"b. [*text not declassified*]

"c. Our budget is high, but a sizeable portion of the cost represents reimbursements to the DOD.

"4. The DDP stressed the unanimous belief of the other Departments and of the Agency's leadership that we must set our strength goals higher than 600. To train substantially more will involve an additional site and other considerations which can perhaps best be seen after we are farther along with the 600. Accordingly, it was agreed not to conclude as to additional strength for several weeks, and to keep the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facility on a contingency basis."

7. Minutes of the Special Group meeting of 30 November 1960 indicate that Messrs. Merchant, Mann, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell and Parrott (Secretary) were present. The following extracts cover references to our paramilitary activities and plans:

"Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were agreed:

"a. Mr. Gray's associates stand ready to deny U.S. activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to make it possible to deny plausibly).

"b. If the program is enlarged, additional facilities may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No training of Cubans will be conducted in the U.S. under present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala.)

"c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness. (Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's notice before any OAS

committee actually visited Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to avoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissell said that if we do have a week, evacuation could be carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is required, DOD assistance might be necessary. Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary refugees should be kept in mind.)"

8. On 8 December 1960, the Special Group members were briefed on the Cuban force existent at the time and the strike force concept which had been developed. A copy of the minutes of this meeting indicating members present and items discussed is attached as Appendix B. There is no indication in these minutes that an explicit approval was given by the group on the strike force concept as proposed.

9. Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 15 December 1960 indicate that Messrs. Hare, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Barnes, Parrott (Secretary) and General Lansdale were present. The following are pertinent extracts from the minutes regarding the strike force concept:

"Mr. Dulles and Mr. Barnes outlined the salient points of the Cuba budget for the rest of FY 61. Mr. Barnes mentioned particularly the items for ordnance costs and for maintenance, stating that the figures were calculated on the assumption of continuing support from the Air Force on these aspects. Mr. Douglas appeared to accept this assumption. Mr. Barnes also pointed out that the budget is based on holding the strike group until approximately March 15th.

"The Group had no objection to the budget as presented. Mr. Hare commented, and the rest agreed, that their function was not to examine details but simply to be aware of the general magnitude and principles on which the budget was based.

"Mr. Douglas said he understood that there is an outstanding request for Air Force personnel in addition to the 38 Special Forces people. Mr. Barnes confirmed that a request has been made for 9 to 11 specialists, who will be required in connection with the Nicaragua base. Mr. Douglas said he thought it would be very desirable to have these individuals protected in the same way as the Army personnel destined for Guatemala; Mr. Barnes confirmed that this could be done.

"This led to a brief discussion of the arrangements for the Army people. It was agreed that it would be useful for Mr. Barnes and General Lansdale to talk to Assistant Secretary of the Army Roderick after it becomes clear what results Mr. Esterline has obtained in his interview with President Ydigoras.

"Mr. Douglas also asked that he be informed whenever non-official contract Americans are to be used "in or over" Cuba. It was agreed that, since other members were also interested, this could be handled at Group meetings as it may come up. Mr. Douglas wanted confirma-

tion of his understanding that no U.S. official personnel would be used in this manner, and he was given this assurance. Mr. Gray said that his associates would view this in the same way as Mr. Douglas."

10. Minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960 indicate that Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell and Parrott (Secretary) were present. The following extract from the minutes is the discussion held on Cuba:

"Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries, some time before January 20th.

"Mr. Merchant also said that he had come to the firm conclusion that it would be impossible politically to carry out three days of pre-invasion bombing in Cuba. All members of the Group agreed; Mr. Bissell said the concept has been revised to include only one day before the invasion.

"Mr. Douglas then outlined his understanding of the general outlines of the overall plan for Cuba. Mr. Bissell agreed that this understanding was an accurate one. Mr. Douglas questioned the possibility of expanding the initial beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the government. Mr. Bissell said that our thinking is that this will not be possible unless one or all of the following situations develops: (a) overt support, (b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive use of air support.

"It was agreed that care should be taken as far as possible to avoid any possibly-abortive uprising on a comparatively small scale, such as the proposal made by a group of internal dissidents to seize an airfield and port near Havana."

11. On 3 January 1961 a meeting was held on Cuba which was attended by the following: Secretaries Herter, Gates, Anderson, Messrs. Dulles, Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Bissell, Barnes, Mann and General Goodpaster. The following are pertinent extracts on paramilitary actions against Cuba taken from a Memorandum for the Record prepared by Mr. Barnes:

"There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba with general agreement on its seriousness and on the need for action. It again was made clear that action would be taken immediately should the Cubans provoke it in any aggressive way. Even without such provocation, it was clear that the meeting felt that pretty rigorous action should be taken and obviously could successfully be taken—the danger,

however, being that if it went too far it might rupture the structure of the OAS which, of course, is undesirable.

"As to present preparations, there was some discussion about the use of U.S. soil for training. The consensus of the meeting was against this although it was agreed that efforts should be made to try and increase the number of trainees, possibly up to 1500, which if done would require additional training sites. In this connection it was felt that perhaps some additional trainees might be spread around in relatively small groups and given some training. The cover story could be that enlistment in these small cadres was the best way to keep them together, cover the language problems, provide them with some sustenance and keep them occupied. Another possibility suggested was some military training in refugee camps, some of which have already been created. The conclusion, however, was clear that preparations should proceed and that to the extent possible the size of the force should be increased."

12. Minutes of the Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961 indicate that Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell, Barnes and Parrott (Secretary) were present. The following is a copy from the minutes of the discussion on Cuba:

"Mr. Douglas felt that Defense (Colonel Prouty) was now in a position to iron out all the difficulties in connection with the Special Forces personnel for Guatemala. It was agreed that State concurrence in the arrangements should be obtained, but Mr. Douglas said Defense would not slow down its activities awaiting this.

"Mr. Douglas then read from a paper left with him by General Lemnitzer. This indicated a schedule of training time, if training were conducted under Army auspices, which would approximate 24 weeks or—on a sketchier basis—12–16 weeks. The memo also referred to numerous difficulties which might arise, such as medical care pay, etc., as well as problems of cover, political orientation and the like. All agreed that a training schedule of this kind is totally impractical in current circumstances. The members appeared to agree that this constituted a good argument for a reexamination of basic concepts, particularly as to the need for overt intervention and early recognition of an exile government.

"Mr. Barnes pointed out that due to the different political colorations of the emigres, if for no other reason, it would be difficult to name a government before members of it are physically on Cuban soil.

"It was agreed that in any case a decision as to ultimate overt intervention is required, but that will probably not be practicable to obtain this in the next fifteen days. Mr. Gray undertook to pass on the word that the Army plans, as outlined in the paper read by Mr. Douglas, were not responsive to the need. Mr. Bissell said that one alternative action that can be taken is to obtain Cubans who have already had

military experience and to train them in the U.S. He recognized that this would constitute essentially an overt act.

"Mr. Barnes pointed out the desirability, in the course of bilateral discussions with other Latin American countries, of attempting to obtain commitments for limited personnel support at an appropriate time. In answer to a question, Mr. Merchant said that he did not foresee the necessity for a temporary evacuation of the Guatemala base."

13. Minutes of the Special Group meeting of 19 January 1961 indicate that Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Willauer, Barnes, Parrott (Secretary) and General Lansdale were present for discussions on Cuba. The pertinent extracts from the minutes on paramilitary actions against Cuba are:

"Mr. Willauer presented the highlights of a paper which he had prepared following meetings of the special contingency planning group. He concluded that several major aspects of the overall plan require clarification or further decision, citing the following: (a) the use of U.S. air bases for strikes before and after D-Day, (b) staging of the invasion force, possibly from the U.S., (c) specific action, including timing, to get support of other Latin American countries, (c) how and when to recognize a provisional government, (e) the possibility of having to provide considerably more overt support than originally planned.

"Mr. Dulles noted that the next ten-day period poses a number of problems from the standpoint of policy approval. In answer to a question. Mr. Barnes said we are not planning specific overflights in the immediate future but urged that we be in a position to service requests as quickly as possible. The Group agreed that dispatches by sea can be continued without further approval at this time. It was also agreed that a high level meeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and of Defense should be arranged as soon as possible to reaffirm basic concepts."

14. After the change in Administration in January 1961, briefings on our proposed operations were given to the President and representatives of the Departments of State and Defense. Special Group meetings were resumed in February 1961, and the Group was briefed at various meetings as to the progress of CIA operations against Cuba, but there is no indication in the minutes of their meetings as to any position taken by the Special Group on the ultimate launching of the strike force.

264. Memorandum for the record, May 26¹

JMG-0399

May 26, 1961

SUBJECT

Post-D Day Supply Drops from *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

1. General Cabell called the afternoon of 25 May, requesting information on the number of supply drops flown from *[less than 1 line not declassified]* following D-Day, 17 April 1961. I debriefed *[less than 1 line not declassified]* and Major Skinner on this subject and called General Cabell back with the following facts:

a. The night of 18 April a total of seven C-54 loads were rigged and launched from *[less than 1 line not declassified]* to the Blue Beach and Red Beach areas. Each aircraft carried approximately 12,000 pounds of brigade ammunition including grenades, tank ammunition, mortar shells, and small and heavy weapon support items. The loads of three of these were kicked out at the Blue Beach, while one went on to the Red Beach region. Three aircraft did not complete the mission due to the presence of early morning daylight and enemy aircraft activity. These loads were returned to *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

b. Additionally, one C-46, with between eight and ten thousand pounds of the same cargo, discharged its load the morning of 18 April at the Playa Giron Airfield. A second C-46, similarly loaded, did not land because of enemy aircraft but returned to *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

c. Additionally, a single C-46 had attempted to land at the airfield the previous afternoon, but while on route to the target area was in radio communication with two B-26's returning to *[less than 1 line not declassified]* who informed him that enemy aircraft were active in the area and the chances of a successful landing were small. This aircraft then returned to *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

2. General Cabell also had asked me about why we had been unable to load and dispatch the four C-130 aircraft from Kelly Air Force Base on 18 April. I told him that there had not been time to rig the approximately 90,000 pounds of cargo in the time allotted with the insufficient number of riggers on hand. I did advise him that *[less than 1 line not declassified]* and six PDO's/riggers had flown from Missoula, Montana, to the Depot in a chartered airplane, and had the beach not

¹ Post D-day supply drops review. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I.

been lost the afternoon of the 19th, the C-130's would have been ready to go that night.

[name not declassified]
Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P

Distribution:

- 1—C/DPD/ASB
- 2—ASST CH/DPD
- 3—AC/DPD
- 4—EO/DPD
- 5—DPD/MAT
- 6—DPD/SO
- 7—DPD/RI

DPD-DD/P: *[name not declassified]*

June 1961

265. Memorandum from Allen Dulles to General Taylor, June 1¹

June 1, 1961

On Friday, November 18, 1960, Mr. Bissell and I briefed the President-elect at Palm Beach, Florida. This briefing included a status report with respect to certain important covert operations and in particular the Cuban Operation. The particular purpose of the briefing was to bring the President-elect up to date with regard to the policy paper on Cuba which had been approved by the President on March 16, 1960 and to outline the progress which had been made towards accomplishing the aforementioned objectives set out in that paper, all of which called for action in the covert field.

It seemed important to advise the President-elect of these facts since he was receiving a large number of suggestions and was under considerable pressure from certain Congressional leaders who were not aware of the action programs which were being developed in the Cuban situation.

The purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the President-elect's approval or disapproval of the program but merely to acquaint him of its existence.

Allen W. Dulles
Director

¹ Summary of November 18, 1960, briefing of President-elect Kennedy on planned covert actions in Cuba. No classification marking. CIA, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B01285A, General Maxwell Taylor committee on Cuba, 28 Jan-21 May 1961.

266. Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, June 26¹

June 26, 1961

SUBJECT*Intelligence Note: Implications of Delivery of Soviet MIG Aircraft to Cuba*

Shipment of Soviet Jets Arrives in Cuba. Reliable intelligence reports indicate that Cuba has recently received a shipment of 23 crates containing MIG jet aircraft, perhaps including some MIG-19's, from the Soviet Union; that this shipment was probably preceded by an earlier delivery of a number of MIG-15's or 17's; and that some 60 Cubans have either returned or will soon return from military training, presumably flight training, in Czechoslovakia.

Cuba Will Have Greatly Increased Air Capability. The Cuban Air Force, which has relied principally on several US T-33 subsonic jet trainers, a few Sea Fury propeller-driven fighters, a small number of B-26's, and a few poorly trained, politically unreliable pilots, must, when the new jets become operational, be considered to have a substantially improved air strength. Additional plane deliveries (which are likely), the return of more flight trainees from the Bloc, the presence of Bloc instructors in Cuba, and further training within the country will serve to increase this capability.

Fear of Cuban Aggressive Moves in Caribbean Will Increase. The possibilities are increased that Castro will feel himself in a better position to take advantage of underlying tensions in the Caribbean, heightened since the assassination of Dominican dictator Trujillo. Use of the jets to support Cuban-sponsored invasions or pro-Castro uprisings in these countries, although still highly unlikely because of probable US or OAS reaction, cannot be discounted. The countries of the area will almost surely feel themselves threatened by Cuba's possession of MIG's and may well react with an avalanche of requests for modern US jets.

Invasion of Cuba Without Heavy Air Support Impossible. The acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of Bloc-trained pilots makes any invasion of Cuba a virtual impossibility without strong air support from modern jet fighters flown by well-trained pilots. It will no longer be possible for a small number of obsolescent aircraft to provide adequate air cover for an invasion force.

Soviets Apparently Discount Possibility of US Intervention. The MIG deliveries apparently indicate that the Soviet Union does not believe

¹ "Implications of Delivery of Soviet MIG Aircraft to Cuba." Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, May 1961—.

the presence of such aircraft in Cuba will be viewed by the United States as sufficient provocation to warrant direct US intervention.

Implications for US Policy. The possession of jet aircraft by the Castro regime does not appear to introduce any new factors requiring a major reorientation of US policy. It may, however, provide grounds for the imposition of further restrictive measures against Cuba, such as application of the Trading with the Enemy Act. It may also serve to make Latin American governments more aware of the dangers of Cuban ties with the Bloc, and to arouse greater hemisphere support for US policies toward Cuba.

7/5/61

Mr Hilsman

Roger,

On Friday, June 30, Lt. Gen. Robert Wood told me that his command (U.S. Army Air Defense Command) had recommended a 4 phase program to the Joint Chiefs with the objective of preventing any irrational sorties of the MIGS over the Miami area. The Chiefs approved the first two of the 4 phases of the recommended program, i.e., the deployment of interceptors and radar in the area.

Joe

July 1961

**267. Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to the Chief, Covert
Action Staff, July 3¹**

July 3, 1961

SUBJECT

Possible Funding of Cuban Revolutionary Council

1. At a recent meeting called by Mr. Goodwin and attended by State, HEW, Bureau of the Budget, and ourselves (Jake Esterline and me), there was a long discussion as to what should or should not be done by the U.S. Government in relation to the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The major problem is created by the question of support (i.e., money) which arises due to the historic fact that support has been provided for the maintenance of the CRC/FRD political organization for some months. Consequently, support must be either continued or broken off which makes the problem much more difficult than if it were merely a decision regarding support in the first instance.

2. It was, I believe, the general consensus of the meeting that the present Council in all likelihood does not represent the political "wave of the future" as far as Cuba is concerned. Moreover, it was felt that the post-Castro political leaders may not even be visible as yet, since in all probability, as pointed out by Dr. Morales-Carrion, they will emerge from the ranks of those now living in Cuba who are being forced into the opposition as a result of their experience of life in a police state.

3. In view of this, the meeting agreed that someone (preferably Goodwin's boss) should have a candid talk with Miro Cardona advising him of these views and urging him to broaden the base of the Council in an effort to make it more representative and saying that the matter will again be discussed at the end of July or early August. It should be noted in this connection that Miro's illness may make this schedule difficult.

4. Conceivably, Miro may be unable to expand the Council and it may very well fall apart as a result of its inability to provide representative leadership. In many ways, this result has some advantages, i.e. it clears the decks of any Cuban political group with special privileges

¹ Possible funding of Cuban Revolutionary Council. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.

and the breakdown of the Council would have been the result of failure on the part of the Cubans rather than something which could be blamed on the Americans such as refusal to provide support. On the other hand, if Miro should produce a more effective and representative Council, it is then conceivable that the U.S. should try to produce support but on a clandestine basis. It is this last point on which I would like your help. How can such support be best achieved without being blown at an early date to the U.S. press or elsewhere? Rich contributors, a foundation, plus some additional cash slipped on the side are obvious possibilities. Could you, however, give this matter some thought and see what you can work out in the way of suggestions? Jake Esterline has asked for your help and hopes to get it. Although the problem will not arise for about a month or so, it is not going to be easy to solve and it will unquestionably take a fair amount of preparation even when a system has been adopted.

C. Tracy Barnes
A/DDP/A

268. Draft memorandum for the files, July 17¹

July 17, 1961

SUBJECT

Salient Points of Mr. Woodward's Report to Mr. Scott (7/14/61) on Meeting at White House on July 12, 1961, with Mr. Bowles, Mr. Dulles, and Mr. Goodwin

Mr. Bissell and Barnes were also reported to have been present

Mr. Woodward said the matter under discussion was the Agency's May 2, 1961, proposal to cost \$12,000,000 for a further program for Cuba. It was in three parts, namely: intelligence collection, propaganda and sabotage and other disruptive activities. This third category of activity was not related in the presentation to specific Cuban political groups.

Mr. Woodward reported that after the discussion, there was unanimous agreement that any paramilitary activities should be undertaken

¹ Salient points of Woodward's July 14 report to Scott on a July 12 meeting at the White House. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961—.

only through political groups and not as separate independent activities.

A new paper is being drafted by Messrs. Bissel and Barnes.

In response to Mr. Scott's question, Mr. Woodward said that there was no mention made of any consideration being given to the use of B-26's, C-46's or any air base in conjunction with sabotage activities.

There was some discussion of the desirability of obtaining fast sea-going vessels for use in moving people into and out of Cuba.

269. Memorandum from Woodward to Bowles, July 20¹

July 20, 1961

SUBJECT

Cuban Program Paper

I suggest that you concur in the recommendations contained in the *Cuban Program Paper*. This bureau is, of course, unable to determine the exact amounts needed for the fields specified, but approves of the activities contained in the proposed program.

It is hoped, in fact, that, consistent with careful planning, all of these activities will vigorously and promptly be promoted as a means of generating a renewed hope within the Cuban people.

I will wish to be informed in more detail with respect to individual activities contemplated and especially with regard to those which might have an impact upon foreign relations with other countries. Under the latter might be included plans for forward operating bases, training sites, and communications facilities. I think it extremely important that plausible cover protect all of these activities.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

¹ Transmits memorandum for the Special Group on the program of covert action directed at the Castro regime. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Special Group

SUBJECT

Cuban Program Paper

The attached paper replaces the Cuban Program Paper discussed at the 29 June Special Group Meeting except for Annex A which remains unchanged and is, therefore, not resubmitted.

Attachment

1. *SUBJECT:*

Program of Covert Action Directed at the Castro Regime

2. *OBJECTIVES OF AND ESTIMATES UNDERLYING THE PROGRAM*

a. The basic objective of the program is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop Cuban political leadership in opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S. which one achieve sufficient strength to overthrow the Castro regime and take its place.

b. It is estimated that at the moment the Castro regime is strong politically, is steadily increasing its military strength (e.g., receipt of jets), has an active and reasonably efficient internal police system and is prepared to enforce Soviet type methods to stay in power. Consequently, the objective stated above will be very difficult to attain, will take a considerable period of time, and will involve both activities within Cuba and support of such activities from outside Cuba.

c. Although invasion by U.S. forces could achieve the destruction of the Castro regime, it is assumed that there is no present intention to undertake such an invasion and, in the absence of some substantial and unexpected change in the situation, some to do as in the foreseeable future. Similarly it is assumed that there is no present U.S. intention to support any attempted large scale landing by Cubans or other non-Americans or even to authorize or encourage training outside of Cuba of any substantial groups for the possibility of such an invasion. Moreover, there is no present U.S. belief that opposition elements within Cuba can be developed to the point where they can overthrow the Castro regime by military or paramilitary action absent some significant change in Cuban attitudes resulting in a large disaffection of potentially

controlling elements, such as important political leaders (e.g., Che Guevara) or large segments of the militia.

d. Despite the foregoing, it is believed that limited, carefully and cautiously planned acts of a paramilitary nature can be helpful to the overall program as contributions to political results. Unless circumstances change, paramilitary acts as such are probably undesirable but they can be very helpful and constructive in bolstering morale; aiding the opposition in its recruitment; giving evidence to the regime and the populace of active opposition; and providing confirmation to outside support with respect to a capability for action (this is particularly persuasive if it can be demonstrated as action susceptible of coordination through responsiveness to some outside control). The incentives and encouragement provided by this type of activity is especially effective and important in a police state where it is the only outlet for opposition expression in an otherwise clandestine and unobtrusive existence. Moreover, it is quite possible that circumstances may arise in Cuba which would justify sabotage against selected targets (e.g. oil refineries and sugar mills) with a view to causing economic difficulties for the Castro regime.

e. In view of the foregoing, the initial goal of a covert action program is to collect all possible intelligence with regard to the situation within Cuba, the attitude of the Cuban people and particularly the existence of actual or potential elements in opposition to the Castro regime. Such information will be sought through independent U.S. assets or through assets belonging to existing Cuban political groups. As to the latter, there are a number which have a political philosophy acceptable to the U.S. and which appear to have usable assets within Cuba. None of these groups, at least for the moment, appears to have sufficiently strong leadership or programs to justify its selection as a potential successor government to Castro. Consequently, any of these groups having assets in Cuba and in no way representing a Communist or Batista-type extremist political attitude will be worked with and supported from the operational (as distinct from the political) point of view.

f. A second immediate goal of a covert action program must be to try to identify political leadership that might with proper aid develop strength in Cuba adequate to overthrow and succeed Castro. As soon as such leadership can be identified, decisions will have to be taken with regard to focusing U.S. support behind such leadership and doing everything possible to accentuate its influence.

g. The budget (Annex A) requested for the covert program is of necessity an estimate. Moreover, since the period involved extends over a fairly substantial period of time (i.e. through FY 1962), the estimates have necessarily been formulated on assumptions that may never materialize, e.g., support of guerrilla groups has been budgeted

on the basis of the development of such groups, activity on their part plus the desirability of providing support. In order to adjust to the actual facts as they develop, it is proposed, if the budget is approved, to request initially only 50% of the total budget and to review the situation carefully prior to further withdrawals.

3. PROPOSED PROGRAM

The activities budgeted in Annex A fall into the following categories, each of which will be briefly discussed below:

- a. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
- b. Political Action
- c. Propaganda
- d. Paramilitary (more appropriately identified as special activities in support of a political result).

a. *Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*: It is proposed to salvage these elements of the intelligence networks and agents within Cuba which survived the recent Castro security operations and to expand the number and scope of intelligence collection activities. In addition, we plan to utilize Cuban exiles on intelligence operations, either unilaterally as Agency assets or as assets of Cuban groups with which they are associated; to expand our use of third country nationals in an operational or support capacity; and to induce defection of selected individuals in the Cuban government. Our counter-intelligence activities will concentrate on efforts to penetrate the Cuban Security Services and Communist Party and to prevent detection of our operations by the Cuban Security Services. Estimate of Fiscal Year 1962 funds required: \$739,132.

b. *Political Action*: These operations will be devoted to exploiting those opportunities which may arise within Latin America for clandestine political actions utilizing either the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) or other Cuban political groups or unilateral assets designed to further U.S. national policies or to combat Cuban subversive efforts. Moreover, particular efforts will be made to identify and support, if and when found, any opposition group with real potential given appropriate support for overthrowing Castro's regime and succeeding it. The question of how much support will be necessary and whether or not it should be provided will have to be decided at the time. Estimate of Fiscal Year 1962 funds required: \$200,000.

c. *Propaganda*: Operations will be planned and executed with the purpose of destroying the image of Castro as a true revolutionary interested in the welfare of his people and the replacement of that image with one of the ruthless dictator who, under the false banners of revolutionary reform, has deprived his people of their basic liberties and turned their country into a Soviet satellite. This will require continued use of existing covert press, radio (including Radio Swan) and

other media assets outside of Cuba as well as strengthening clandestine propaganda mechanisms inside Cuba, including underground printed propaganda, clandestine radio broadcasting station, radio and TV intrusion operations.

In addition to those activities directed at the Cuban people, we will utilize media assets and exile Cuban political and professional groups to combat Castro's propaganda efforts, to create insofar as possible a militant opposition to Castro, and to encourage a climate of support for future action against Cuba throughout Latin America.

The general breakdown of the funds required for propaganda activities is:

Regular Publications	[text not declassified]
Other Publication Activities	[text not declassified]
Radio Swan	[text not declassified]
Other Radio	[text not declassified]
Internal Clandestine Operations	[text not declassified]
Western Hemisphere and other operations	[text not declassified]

Estimate of Fiscal Year 1962 Funds Required \$4,204,000

d. *Paramilitary*: Activities of this nature will be cautiously undertaken and will only be approved if they contribute to some desired political result, e.g., the improvement of morale or the strengthening of some political group in Cuba. Initially, emphasis will be on training of personnel (always in very small groups), building up inventories of supplies and acquisition of needed assets (e.g., boats for infiltration/exfiltration of men and matériel). The program has been estimated on the possibility of recruiting up to 100 agents during FY 1962 of whom 50 (including 10 radio operators) will be selected for possible infiltration and the remainder employed in support and operational capacities externally. The main effort in these activities will be to work with and through Cuban political groups or exiles with internal affiliations of potential political consequence.

It is contemplated that the Agency will repair and retain its present maritime assets and acquire two additional vessels with greater range in order to provide the capability for adequate support of planned activities. These vessels have been budgeted at a fairly substantial, though considered reasonable, figure. If cheaper purchases can be achieved they, of course, will be. Present maritime assets consist of one long-range vessel, three medium-range 55 to 85 foot vessels, and nine small boats suitable for deck loading on a mother ship and for fast runs in and out. These assets will be utilized in the infiltration of personnel, supplies and funds into Cuba and to exfiltrate agents, agent prospects and defectors from Cuba.

Sabotage planning will be undertaken against a small number of key and industrial targets as well as against targets of political or propaganda significance. Actual sabotage operations will be carried out only where some of the advantages mentioned in para. 2.d. above can be realized or reasonably anticipated.

Although the program does not contemplate significant direct encouragement of guerrilla bands during FY 1962, the Agency will maintain equipment to provide modest support, if requested and approved, to those guerrilla elements which might arise, either spontaneously or as an effort on the part of Cuban or Agency assets to survive.

In order to provide for the support of operations proposed by existing or emerging anti-Castro Cuban groups, we have included what we consider a reasonable amount of funds according to experience factors.

We have also concluded that it is advisable to maintain a limited air capability for possible resupply, leaflet and deception operations. Support of these activities will involve the cost of aircraft storage, readying the aircraft for operational use, crew costs and expenses for missions actually mounted. Estimate of Fiscal Year 1962 funds required: \$4,610,000.

4. *SUPPORT:*

The primary financial need is for salaries, travel, and related expenses for personnel assigned to Cuban operations. In addition, we must provide funds for the maintenance and logistical support of a forward operating base, a maritime base, small operational or training sites, and communications facilities and equipment. These costs have not been [illegible in the original] in regular Agency budget estimates. Estimate of Fiscal Year 1962 funds required: \$4,025,000.

N.B. The foregoing activities, as indicated, (particularly in connection with paramilitary operations) will be carried out in part through Cuban political groups having a political viewpoint or "platform" acceptable to the U.S. In working with these groups, the Agency will not attempt to dominate them but will give them some freedom of action. This attitude is prompted by the fact that the best political leadership often is the least willing to accept controls and may easily be lost if too restricted. Some controls, however, are necessary in order to have a sensible and businesslike arrangement. For example, any group receiving support will be required to submit a statement of its intended program, showing the type of activities it proposes to undertake, the amount of money it intends to devote to various activities, the kind of assets which it wishes to receive and how it proposes to use them. In addition, such group will be expected to keep the U.S. fully apprised of the results of its activities and to disseminate to the

U.S. all intelligence obtained. On the other hand, such a group will normally not be required specifically to identify individual agents and will be given considerable freedom in the planning of proposed operations. Moreover, a group with a proven record of successful operations will, as would be expected, be granted more and more autonomy.

In view of the publicity engendered by the Agency's past operations in the Florida area, we are planning to change the physical location and cover of our primary operations bases in Florida, to utilize personnel not contaminated by exposure or relations with the former operation, and to employ cutouts and other security measures in order to assure, to the maximum extent possible, that our present operations in the area remain covert.

In addition, the above facilities and personnel will be available for the support of stay behind operations to be developed in certain other critical areas of the Western Hemisphere and not part of the Cuban program.

5. *RECOMMENDATION:*

It is recommended that approval be granted for the above covert action program against Cuba and that a maximum of \$13,778,132 be authorized for the implementation of this program. Only 50% of this total will be withdrawn initially. Later withdrawals will depend on how the program develops.

270. Memorandum from Woodward to Johnson, July 26¹

July 26, 1961

SUBJECT

Policy Recommendations with respect to Paramilitary-Type Operations for Cuba

REFERENCE

Memorandum for Special Group of July 25, 1961, entitled "Internal Action Operations Against Cuba"

ARA agrees with the proposals contained in the memorandum of July 25, 1961, entitled "Internal Action Operations Against Cuba."

¹ Transmits a memorandum for the Special Group on internal action operations against Cuba. Secret. 8 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.

This Bureau wishes to emphasize particularly its agreement with the types of *minimum* paramilitary actions contemplated for the immediate future while attempts will be made to assist the consolidation and expansion of opposition political action groups. The reason for this is that ARA has the general impression that sabotage or terrorism—which goes beyond the political objective of annoying the Castro Government and making its officials appear ridiculous—may have a counter-productive effect until such time as there has clearly developed a coherent opposition within Cuba.

Likewise, ARA is in agreement with the belief that any expanded operations of a paramilitary nature should follow and be the outgrowth of the development of genuine political opposition movements or increased opposition sentiment.

Consistent with these views, ARA is inclined to the view that unilateral paramilitary-type actions which are not related to any Cuban political movement are likely to be useless or even counter-productive.

ARA likewise wishes to express the hope that covert activities can be as deeply cloaked as possible in order to make it as difficult as possible to attribute these activities to the United States.

It would be greatly appreciated if ARA could be consulted with regard to any planning beyond the stage visualized in the memorandum of July 25, 1961.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Special Group

1. *SUBJECT*: Internal Action Operations Against Cuba

2. *INTERNAL Situation*:

a. *Agency Assets*. Despite the severe repressive measures instituted by the Castro regime during the April invasion period, the Agency still has in Cuba:

11 general purpose agents (active) with 3 radios.

2 general purpose agents (inactive at present).

[illegible in the original] trained propaganda agents (could be used as general purpose)

In addition the Agency has available in the U.S. ready for immediate dispatch 8 trained radio operators. Based on very recent debriefings of members of the Cuban underground opposition, we have ascertained that approximately 17 tons of arms, ammunition and miscellaneous equipment is still intact and in the hands of resistance elements in

various parts of Cuba, mainly in Oriente Province and in Pinar del Rio. Apparently, there is little or no sabotage equipment (e.g. plastic detonators) so that the underground is unable to conduct such operations until some of this matériel is introduced into the island.

b. *Resistant Elements Active in Cuba*: A number of leaders of some of the principal internal resistance groups have recently come to the U.S. either legally or black from Cuba and have presented their estimates of internal resistance and outlined their plans. The impression which they gave was that they were being conservative in their estimates and realistic in their assessment of the availability of individuals for active work. In fact, although matters of this sort are always subject to proof, it is our present impression that they have presented a reasonably accurate picture. There is only one group of approximately 100 men located in the Encambray which is operating as a guerrilla force. The remainder of the individuals are living ostensibly normal lives in their homes and at their regular employment. They are, however, willing and able to find time for organization work and, if necessary, for small sabotage operations. The groups with their estimated militant strength are:

MRR (Artime's old group—left of center)	150
MRP (Ray's party—left).....	150
MDC (Catholic Labor Group).....	100
DRE (student organization)	75
UR (a mixed group covering a broad political area).....	75
30th of November (Labor group)	50
Rescate (remnants of Tony Varona's Authentico group).....	25
TOTAL	625

The plan presented by these leaders was based on the understanding that a movement to unify the above groups into a single opposition will, in fact, occur. Apparently, the internal opposition has recognized that its only possible salvation is unity at least until the removal of the Castro regime. Internal unity apparently has been worked out without regard for external Cuban political elements who, as it might be suspected, are not highly considered on the inside and who, according to the leaders contacted, have little political following on the inside. Specifically, the Cuban Revolutionary Council was mentioned as being unacceptable as a leadership element and, in addition, Ray was removed as the MRP leader by the MRP internal executive committee and another individual has been sent to the U.S. to take his place as the MRP U.S. representative.

Unity having been achieved, the leaders proposed a clandestine organization program to cover the entire island with the idea of uli-

mately achieving an organization with a maximum of 3,000 members. All the leaders asserted that 8,000 is a perfectly feasible maximum and can be achieved by accepting for membership only solid, stable members of the opposition. The reason for limiting the numbers is that it is believed that this is a manageable membership but still sufficiently large to provide the basis for supporting any ultimate moves that might be attempted. Part of the organization effort will include the establishment of communications, both internally and from Cuba to the U.S.

All the leaders were of the opinion that gives the present situation in Cuba, some outward evidence of opposition is essential for morale purposes and as an aid to recruitment. In their unanimous opinion, this evidence is best provided by small acts of sabotage. The type of actions which they contemplate are disruption of transportation facilities through insertion of additives in gas tanks and tacks on highways; small bombings for nuisance value at political rallies and public meetings (not involving personal injury); harassment of public figures to make them and the regime appear ridiculous; and propaganda to exploit and publicize these opposition actions. The function of the internal organization, in addition to increasing its membership and forming compartmented note as indicated above, will be to collect intelligence, carry on propaganda activity, provide mechanisms for the dispatch and reception of exfiltration and infiltration of men and matériel; and to achieve the types of sabotage described above.

Although a central leader has not yet been selected, it is believed that one of the men with whom we recently had contact has a very good chance of being the individual chosen. There will, of course, be a liaison relationship between the internal groups and the Cubans in the U.S. even though the latter are not acceptable for leadership. They can, however, provide aid and advice. Moreover, assuming that they wish to infiltrate themselves at some point, it is quite possible that they can over a period of time attain a more prominent position.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Based on the foregoing, it is our belief that there is a good chance of achieving the internal unification of a substantial portion of the internal Cuban opposition and an equally good chance of helping the unified party expand its membership. It is not, of course, clear how successful this expansion can be or to what extent it can evade the internal security forces. On the other hand, a failure to provide any support at this stage particularly in the light of existing specific requests would inevitably be interpreted as an affirmative decision by the U.S. to the effect that internal opposition can have no place in U.S. plans. This will surely result in either a disbanding of existing groups plus

the possibility of many of them joining the other side. It will surely mean that any future effort to find opposition will be enormously increased. Since the organization period, which it is expected must last a minimum of three months and may well extend over a period of six to eight months, will be one of minimal overt activity, it will not involve the U.S. in binding commitments. Consequently, should the organization fail in its purpose, there will be no real problem in terminating support. If on the other hand, the organization period succeeds, there is no commitment to undertake further activity although it will be possible, based on the new facts, to contemplate the advisability of sterner measures.

There are rumors to the effect that considerable dissatisfaction exists in Cuba and there has even been one report from Mexico to the effect that Castro is rather rapidly losing his popular appeal. It is not our belief that these are accurate conclusions. Assuming, however, that they are, it could be argued that the U.S. policy should permit this dissatisfaction to increase on its own and not take active measures to augment it. Such a course would, it is believed, be short-sighted since, even if dissatisfaction were substantially to increase, it would be very much to the advantage of the U.S. for the future to have some association with the opposition. Moreover, the U.S. participation during the organization and build-up period should not be of such a nature as to interfere with any spontaneous dissatisfaction.

It is, therefore, recommended that:

A. The CIA be authorized to provide support to the internal opposition particularly with a view to enabling it to consolidate the proposed unity and to enlarge its membership. This support will involve money, communications, transportation (maritime) and sufficient sabotage matériel to enable the opposition to carry out small operations of the types indicated above. Authority should also be given to provide training which will undoubtedly be necessary in a number of categories such as communications, organization and intelligence work and use of sabotage equipment.

B. The CIA be authorized to continue to work with such of the Cuban elements outside of Cuba as appear to have assets available for increasing internal opposition. It is understood that care must be taken to avoid competition and conflict which could be damaging to the overall effort. In this connection it will be important to determine whether any particular movement begins to emerge as the primary and most forceful leader. If so, it will be important to decide whether or not support should be focused more directly to it. Since this is a political issue, CIA will maintain close liaison with State in analyzing its progress.

C. CIA be authorized to plan more elaborate sabotage activities as well as potential guerrilla support activities with the understanding,

however, that these plans are not to be put into effect prior to their approval by the Special Group.

As the Special Group is aware, CIA is presently paying a civilian budget for the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Nothing has been said in this paper about the future of this support as it is understood that it is to be considered by the State Department in the near future. It might be said, however, that it is the CIA position that these payments should very soon be reduced in size and very probably should be terminated soon thereafter.

August 1961

271. Memorandum from Coerr to Johnson, August 2¹

August 2, 1961

SUBJECT

Program of Covert Action Directed at the Castro Regime

I recommend that you concur in the program of covert action directed at the Castro regime as described in the Agency's memorandum of August 1, 1961.

This Bureau has previously commented upon the two Agency papers which have been combined in that of August 1, and feels that the latter takes these comments into consideration. It is hoped that the internal plan of action can be fully implemented as soon as possible in the hope that the Cuban opposition can be revived and encouraged.

One consideration not noted in the memorandum is the wish of ARA to be kept fully informed of the development of the operations and fully consulted at every stage.

It is noted that the two previous papers were approved with comments by Mr. Woodward.

Attachment

1. *SUBJECT*:

Program of Covert Action Directed at the Castro Regime.

2. *OBJECTIVE*:

The basic objective of the program is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S.

3. *PROPOSED PLAN*:

a. *Agency Assets in Cuba*: The Agency assets in Cuba which survived the recent severe repressive measures of the Castro regime consist of:

¹ Transmits a memorandum for the Special Group on program of covert action directed at the Castro regime. Secret. 13 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 4, August 3, 1961.

[less than 1 line not declassified] intelligence agents with one radio plus several secret writing systems. (Remainder of previous stay-behind net.)

[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA singleton agents each with a secret writing system.

[less than 1 line not declassified] general purpose* agents (active) with 3 radios.

[less than 1 line not declassified] general purpose* agents (inactive at present).

[less than 1 line not declassified] trained propaganda agents (could be used as general purpose*)

b. *Agency Assets outside of Cuba*: Agency assets outside of Cuba but ready for use consist of:

[less than 1 line not declassified] trained intelligence and counter-intelligence agents.

[less than 1 line not declassified] trained general purpose* agents.

[less than 1 line not declassified] trained radio operators.

(*—General purpose agents are agents who in addition to intelligence collection have been trained in paramilitary activities.)

c. In addition to the foregoing, recent reports from Cuban exfilitrees justify conservative estimates of a guerrilla group of about 100 men active in the Escambray plus approximately 625 members of leading opposition parties presently living normal lives but willing to participate in organising and militant action. These individuals are distributed in various provinces and are believed to have the following party associations:

MRR (Artime's old group—left of center)	150
MRP (Ray's party—left).....	150
MDC (Catholic Labor Group).....	100
DRE (student organization)	75
UR (a mixed group covering a broad political area)	75
30th of November (labor group).....	50
Rescate (remnants of Tony Varena's Authentics group).....	25
TOTAL	625

d. The internal Cuban opposition which is presently agreed to attempt to achieve a unification of the main elements (i.e. the parties listed above) has access to caches totalling about 17 tons of arms and equipment previously infiltrated by CIA. In addition, the Agency either owns or has access to several vessels adequate for maritime operations and has continued to maintain a potential for mounting air operations. There is a complete propaganda apparatus, including weekly magazines and newspapers, newsletters, and production and placement of

radio shows, covering all of Latin America. There is also Radio Swan, covering the Caribbean basin, and contacts with national and international press for exploitation of themes. Moreover, CIA is prepared to continue its present contacts with the Cuban Revolutionary Council, other politically-acceptable Cuban groups and any individuals who appear to play a key part in internal exposition activities.

e. *Operational Concept*: The primary objectives of the present plan are to increase insofar as possible the collection of intelligence on the internal Cuban situation and the attitude of the Cuban people particularly with regard to opposition elements; the identification of political leadership; and the recruitment of additional members of opposition groups together with the organisation of these groups into the most effective anti-Castro opposition. There is no intention to undertake for the present any paramilitary activities except insofar as they may contribute to the strengthening of the opposition. In this connection it is believed that some outside manifestation is essential for morale purposes and as an aid to recruitment. This manifestation is considered to be best provided by minor acts of sabotage such as additives in gas leaks, lacks on highways, small nuisance bombings to disrupt public meetings with no intention to injure, and harassment of public officials. Such acts should, of course, be exploited by propaganda.

No prognosis as to the success of the effort to build up the internal opposition is possible. Conversely, however, a failure to provide support to such an effort, particularly in the light of existing specific requests, would inevitably be interpreted as an affirmative U.S. decision that internal opposition has no place in U.S. planning. Such a conclusion would surely disrupt if not destroy anti-Castro elements. Should the expansion effort fail, support can always be withdrawn. Should it succeed, additional support is in no sense committed but such success would at least provide the U.S. with the opportunity to continue encouragement if it should so choose.

f. *FY 1962 Operational Budget (Annex A Attached)*. The funds requested in the budget for each activity outlined below of the covert program are necessarily estimates and they do not contain any funds for support of political groups for the administrative support of their organizations nor for continued payments to dependents of Cubans who participated in the April invasion. A general outline of the budgeted activities follows:

(1) *Intelligence*: In addition to the targets mentioned above, every effort will be made to improve and expand our collection of operational intelligence on Castro's plans, intentions, and capabilities; our counter intelligence activities will concentrate on penetrating the Cuban Security Services and preventing detection of our operations by these Services.

(2) *Political Action*: In the political action field we will endeavor to foster support for U.S. national policies on Cuba throughout Latin America, to combat Castro's subversive efforts in that area, and to assist, where possible, in strengthening a unified opposition to Castro among the Cubans inside and outside Cuba. Particular effort will be made to identify and support, if found, any opposition group with a real potential for overthrowing and replacing Castro's regime.

(3) *Propaganda*: As already stated, a number of previously created propaganda assets are being supported. Consequently, the budget is fairly high without undertaking anything new. Although these existing assets are considered good, they are being reviewed to determine if any should be terminated. Meanwhile, our propaganda activities will be devoted to destroying the popular image of Castro in Cuba, and combatting Castro's propaganda efforts, creating a militant opposition to Castro, and developing a climate of support for future action against Castro throughout Latin America.

(4) *Paramilitary*: Our primary task will be to expand our present personnel and support assets both inside and outside Cuba, for use in working with or through Cuban groups in developing an underground organization or several such which, hopefully, will achieve island-wide coverage. After secure reorganization, this mechanism could be used in exfiltration/infiltration of personnel, supplies and matériel, intelligence collection and propaganda operations as well as in a low-key sabotage and resistance program against Castro designed to harass the regime and to maintain and mobilise the spirit of resistance among the people of Cuba. We propose to develop more elaborate large-scale sabotage activities to be performed after approval by the Special Group. Although the program does not contemplate significant direct encouragement of guerrilla hands during FY 1962, the Agency will maintain equipment to provide modest support, if requested and approved, to those guerrilla elements which might arise, either spontaneously or as an effort on the part of Cuban or Agency assets to survive. We have also budgeted funds to maintain a limited air capability for possible resupply, leaflet and deception operations.

(5) *Support*: The primary financial need is for salaries, travel, and related expenses for personnel assigned to Cuban operations. In addition, we must provide funds for the maintenance and logistical support of a forward operating base, a maritime base, operational or training sites, and communications facilities and equipment.

4. RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that approval be granted for the above covert action program against Cuba and that a maximum of \$12,738,132 be authorized for the implementation of this program. Only fifty percent

of this total will be withdrawn initially from the Bureau of the Budget, with later withdrawals to be dependent on a review, within six months, of the operational progress made.

Annex A

DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF FUNDS REQUIRED FOR FY 1961 FOR CUBAN OPERATIONS

Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Operations—Total [illegible in the original]

Intelligence Collection		[text not declassified]
Collection Networks in Cuba		[text not declassified]
Agent Salaries (20 on board)	[text not declassified]	
Agent Salaries (20 planned)	[text not declassified]	
Courier Operations	[text not declassified]	
Training, Equipment and Other Expenses	[text not declassified]	
Singleton Legal Travel and Resident Agents		[text not declassified]
Agent Salaries (64 on board)	[text not declassified]	
Agent Salaries (37 planned)	[text not declassified]	
Principal Agents & Cutout Salaries	[text not declassified]	
Training, travel & other expenses	[text not declassified]	
Third Country Operations		[text not declassified]
Agent Salaries (20 planned)	[text not declassified]	
Travel and Expenses	[text not declassified]	
Other Operational Activity		[text not declassified]
Counter-Intelligence		[text not declassified]

Penetration Operations	[text not declassified]
Detention Operations	[text not declassified]
Other Operational Expenses	[text not declassified]
<i>Political Action Oppositions—Total</i> [illegible in the original]	
Support for covert contacts with political leaders in third countries to influence their National policies against Castro	\$ [text not declassified]
Support for covert actions in third countries to bring about support for a unified anti-Castro organization and its objectives.	[text not declassified]
<i>Propaganda Operations—Total</i> \$[illegible in the original]	
[illegible in the original] Publications	[text not declassified]
[text not declassified] (weekly)	[text not declassified]
Newspaper (daily)	[text not declassified]
News Bulletin (weekly)	[text not declassified]
Other Publication Activities	[text not declassified]
Leaflet, pamphlet production	[text not declassified]
Book and article production	[text not declassified]
Mailing Operations	[text not declassified]
Radio Swan	[text not declassified]
Other Radio	[text not declassified]
Cuban Freedom Committee cover for Swan and production of programs for broadcast from Florida Station	[text not declassified]

Maintenance and planned use of vessel for broadcasting off Cuba	[text not declassified]	
Radio Equipment for use inside Cuba	[text not declassified]	
Preparation and distribution of radio tapes throughout Latin America	[text not declassified]	
[illegible in the original] Clandestine Operations		[text not declassified]
[illegible in the original] into Cuba for clandestine propaganda and harassment operations [text not declassified]	[text not declassified]	
Western Hemisphere and Other Operations		[text not declassified]
Maintenance of selected exile Cuban groups (students, labor, lawyers) and companies for anti- Castro propaganda tours by these groups throughout Latin America	[text not declassified]	
Tours of above groups to other areas of world	[text not declassified]	
Operations, including placement of selected motion picture and TV footage, throughout Latin America to create opposition to Castro	[text not declassified]	
Black operations (exposure of arms ostensibly from Castro for subversive actions, decreased manipulation) throughout Latin America	[text not declassified]	
Funds for development of new operations or one-	[text not declassified]	

time propaganda
operations

Cost of personnel involved are included in the estimates for the various activities above.

Paramilitary Operations—Total \$7,370,000

Recruitment, training,
 emplacement and
 support of paramilitary
 agents

[text not
declassified]

Fee agents at \$_____

[illegible in the original]
(including compensation
and death benefits, etc.)

[text not
declassified]

Communications
 equipment, facilities,
 and special training

[text not
declassified]

Development and
 maintenance of
 maritime capabilities

[text not
declassified]

Repair of present craft

[text not
declassified]

Operating costs for one
 year (include crews'
 salaries)

[text not
declassified]

Infiltration-exfiltration
 operations (includes
 infiltration of personnel,
 supplies, funds, and
 exfiltration of agents,
 defectors, and agent
 prospects)

[text not
declassified]

Conduct of sabotage
 operations

[text not
declassified]

Training and operational
 [illegible in the original],
 safehousing and other
 operational support

[text not
declassified]

[text not
declassified]

Technical services and
 special equipment

[text not
declassified]

Raiding operations-
 establishment and
 operation of training
 sites

[text not
declassified]

Support of guerrilla activity	[text not declassified]
Operation control of ten [illegible in the original] or equivalent	[text not declassified]
Purchase of special devices and equipment	[text not declassified]
Support of operations as proposed by emerging Cuban groups	[text not declassified]
Development and maintenance of air capability	[text not declassified]
<i>Support Operations—Total \$4,325,000</i>	
Personnel	[text not declassified]
Salary (265) and related charges	[text not declassified]
Travel and [illegible in the original]	[text not declassified]
Other charges	[text not declassified]
Safe Establishment and Maintenance	[text not declassified]
Forward Operating Base	[text not declassified]
Maritime Base	[text not declassified]
Training and/or operational safehouses and alias	[text not declassified]
Communication Base	[text not declassified]
Support from other U.S. agencies for security, [illegible in the original], etc.	[text not declassified]
Logistics support	[text not declassified]
Logistical support or bases, safehouses, alias, (transportation, security, etc.)	[text not declassified]

Other	[text not declassified]
Legal fees, cover companies, etc.	[text not declassified]
Communication equipment and maintenance	[text not declassified]
TOTAL RECRUITMENT	\$12,735,132

September 1961

272. Memorandum, September 6¹

September 6, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

[*name not declassified*]

SUBJECT

Castro's Instructions to Dorticos Before Belgrade Conference

According to sources considered reliable, Dorticos had absolute instructions from Fidel Castro and Che Guevara to have secret contact with the American Embassy in Belgrade at some time during the conference. According to these sources, there was a meeting in Castro's private apartment in Havana, attended by Castro, Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Roa, and Dorticos, at which it was explained that Cuba was desperate for getting some contact with the United States, and that, in order to do so, it was willing to release three or four thousand political prisoners and even hold sham elections to elect something similar to a congress. The main purpose of the attempted contact is to get back the bulk of the sugar quota.

[*name not declassified*]

¹ Report on Castro's instructions to Dorticos re contact with American Embassy in Belgrade during Belgrade Conference. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical files, Cuba, August 1961—.

273. Memorandum for the record, September 8¹

September 8, 1961

SUBJECT

Meeting in the Office of the Under Secretary of State Ball on 8 September 1961
to Discuss Policy with Respect to the CRC

PARTICIPANTS

Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Mr.
Robert Woodward, Mr. Richard Bissell, Mr. Richard Goodwin, Mr. Park
Wollam, Mr. Robert Hurwitch, Mr. Paul Vallen and [name not declassified]

1. Mr. Woodward opened the meeting by referring to the attached document that he had written directed to Mr. Ball on the subject of U.S. relationships with Cuban exile groups. After discussing this document it was agreed to recommend approval of all recommendations with one slight change on recommendation No. 3. That recommendation would be changed from saying that U.S. assistance would be coordinated under the strictest terms of secrecy with a *select small group of Cubans* to saying it would be coordinated with Mr. Miro Cardona and that Miro would have full responsibility for the security of such information. It was also agreed to add a recommendation that the contacts of CIA with Miro Cardona be stepped up to a higher level in order to keep him happy and to utilize him to the greatest extent possible. It was agreed that the disbanding of the Council would be a loss and an effort should be made to work more effectively with Miro Cardona to try to maintain and increase his usefulness. It was agreed also that a budget would be worked out with Miro Cardona on the \$75,000 per month level and that it would probably be more effective to work out an annual rather than a monthly budget. If special operations were proposed by the Council they would be considered for approval by CIA and upon CIA concurrence would be funded apart from the normal budget.

2. Concerning the payments of pensions to dependents of veterans of the invasion force that participated in the 17 April invasion of Cuba, the only ruling that there has been is that the President had informed Mr. Goodwin that payments should be continued for a certain amount of time. It was agreed that it is not yet time to consider cutting off these payments. Mention was made of the fact that trials of certain members of the invasion force were now just beginning in Cuba and

¹ Meeting among Ball, Woodward, Bissell, Goodwin, et al., re policy with respect to the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba.

will probably continue for just as long as they are useful to whip up revolutionary fervor in Cuba. Psychologically this would be a bad time to consider cutting off the support we are now giving to dependents of the veterans.

[name not declassified]

DC/WHD

October 1961

**273A. Survey Report by CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick,
October 1961¹**

October 1961

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION
October 1961
TABLE OF CONTENTS

- A. Introduction
- B. History of the Project
- C. Summary of Evaluation
- D. Evaluation of Organization and Command Structure
- E. Evaluation of Staffing
- F. Evaluation of Planning
- G. The Miami Operating Base
- H. Intelligence Support
- I. The Political Front and the Relation of Cubans to the Project
- J. Clandestine Paramilitary Operations—Air
- K. Clandestine Paramilitary Operations—Maritime
- L. Clandestine Paramilitary Operations—Training
Underground Leaders
- M. Security
- N. Americans in Combat
- O. Conclusions and Recommendations

ANNEXES

- A. Basic Policy Plan of 17 March 1960
- B. Briefing Paper of 17 February 1961
- C. Operational Plan of 11 March 1961

¹ Survey of the Cuban Operation with Annexes. 216 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files, Job 85-00664R.

D. Operational Plan of 16 March 1961

E. Operational Plan of 12 April 1961

A. INTRODUCTION

1. This is the Inspector General's report on the Central Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means of a covert paramilitary operation.

2. The purpose of the report is to evaluate selected aspects of the Agency's performance of this task, to describe weaknesses and failures disclosed by the study, and to make recommendations for their correction and avoidance in the future.

3. The report concentrates on the organization, staffing and planning of the project and on the conduct of the covert paramilitary phase of the operation, including comments on intelligence support, training, and security. It does not describe or analyze in detail the purely military phase of the effort.

4. The supporting annexes have been chosen to illustrate the evolution of national policy as outlined in Section F of the body of the report. Annex A is the basic policy paper approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960. Annex B is a paper prepared by the project's operating chiefs for the briefing of President Kennedy in February 1961. Annexes C, D, and E are the planning papers successively prepared during March and April 1961 in the last few weeks before the invasion.

5. The report includes references to the roles played by Agency officials in Presidential conferences and interdepartmental meetings at which policy decisions affecting the course of the operation were taken, but it contains no evaluation of or judgment on any decision or action taken by any official not employed by the Agency.

6. In preparing the survey the Inspector General and his representatives interviewed about 125 Agency employees of all levels and studied a large quantity of documentary material.

B. HISTORY OF THE PROJECT

1. The history of the Cuban project begins in 1959 and for the purposes of the survey ends with the invasion of Cuba by the Agency-supported Cuban brigade on 17 April 1961 and its defeat and capture by Castro's forces in the next two days.

2. Formal U.S. Government adoption of the project occurred on 17 March 1960, when, after preliminary preparations by the Agency, President Eisenhower approved an Agency paper titled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" (Annex A) and thereby authorized the Agency to undertake this program:

a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to provide cover for Agency operations.

b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.

c. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the direction of the exile organization.

d. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance groups.

3. The budget for this activity was estimated at \$4,400,000. The breakdown was: Political action, \$950,000; propaganda, \$1,700,000; paramilitary, \$1,500,000; intelligence collection, \$250,000.

4. This document, providing for the nourishment of a powerful internal resistance program through clandestine external assistance, was the basic and indeed the only U.S. Government policy paper issued throughout the life of the project. The concept was classic. The Cuban exile council would serve as cover for action which became publicly known. Agency personnel in contact with Cuban exiles would be documented as representatives of a group of private American businessmen. The hand of the U.S. Government would not appear.

Preparatory Action

5. Some months of preparation had preceded presentation of this paper to the President. In August 1959 the Chief of the Agency's Paramilitary Group attended a meeting [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to discuss the creation of a paramilitary capability to be used in Latin American crisis situations. At this time Cuba was only one of a number of possible targets, all of which appeared equally explosive. The Chief of the Paramilitary Group prepared a series of staff studies for the Western Hemisphere (WH) Division on various aspects of covert limited warfare and urged the creation of a division paramilitary staff. He also set up a small proprietary airline in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for eventual support use.

6. In September 1959 the WH Division assigned an officer to plan potential Agency action for contingencies which might develop in a number of Latin American countries. There was a lack of sufficient readily available operational information on potential target areas, so a requirement, with special emphasis on Cuba, whose Communist control was now becoming more and more apparent, was sent throughout the intelligence community, and resulted in a three-volume operational study.

7. By December 1959 these studies had produced a plan for training a small cadre of Cuban exiles as paramilitary instructors, these in turn to be used for training other Cuban recruits, in a Latin American country, for clandestine infiltration into Cuba to provide leadership for anti-Castro dissidents.

Organization of Branch

8. On 18 January 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban operation. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and two at Santiago Base.

9. The branch also began negotiations for a Panama training site. Its officers reconnoitered the area of Miami, Florida, in search of suitable installations for office space, warehouses, safe sites, recruiting centers, communications center, and bases for the movement of persons, matériel, and propaganda into or out of Cuba.

10. At the same time Headquarters and the Havana Station were conducting a study of Cuban opposition leaders to prepare for the formation of a unified political front to serve as the cover instrument for clandestine operations and as a rallying point for anti-Castro Cubans. They were also making a map reconnaissance of the Caribbean, seeking a site for a powerful medium-wave and short-wave radio station.

Preliminary Progress

11. As a result of this intensive activity over a relatively brief period the Agency was able to report considerable preliminary progress and to predict early performance in a number of respects, when it carried its request for policy approval to the President in mid-March of 1960.

12. Among the facts so reported (Annex A) were: That the Agency was in close touch with leaders of three major and reputable anti-Castro groups of Cubans whose representatives, possibly together with others, would form a unified opposition council within 30 days; that the Agency was already supporting opposition broadcasts from Miami, had arranged for additional radio outlets in Massachusetts, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and [*less than 1 line not declassified*], and that a powerful "gray" station, probably on Swan Island, could be made ready in two months; that publication of an exile edition of a confiscated Cuban newspaper had been arranged; that a controlled action group was distributing propaganda inside Cuba, and that anti-Castro lecturers were being sent on Latin American tours.

13. The President was further informed that an effective intelligence and action organization inside Cuba, responsive to direction by the exile opposition, could probably be created within 60 days and that preparations for the development of an adequate paramilitary force would require "a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight."

Policy Discussions

14. Discussion at high policy levels of the Government had preceded submission of this program to the President. In the last months

of 1959 the Special Group, composed of representatives of several departments and agencies and charged by NSC 5412 with responsibility for policy approval of major covert action operations, considered several Agency proposals for exile broadcasts to Cuba. During January and February of 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence informed the Special Group of Agency planning with regard to Cuba, and on 14 March an entire meeting was devoted to discussion of the Agency's program. Concern was expressed over the length of time required to get trained Cuban exiles into action, and there was discussion of U.S. capabilities for immediate overt action if required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have said that forces totaling 50,000 men were ready if needed and that the first of them could be airborne within four hours after receipt of orders. Members of the group urged early formation of an exile junta. The Agency announced its intention of requesting funds to pursue the program, and no objections were raised by the group.

15. The project to unseat Castro had thus become a major Agency activity with the highest policy sanction, engaging the full-time activity of the personnel of a rapidly expanding operating branch, requiring a great amount of detailed day-to-day attention in higher Agency echelons and entailing frequent liaison with other agencies and departments of the Government.

16. The activities described to the President continued at an accelerated rate, but the financial approach to the project was relatively cautious in the early weeks.

Financial Preparations

17. On 24 March 1960 the project was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in the initial amount of \$900,000 for the rest of Fiscal Year 1960. However, only two weeks later, on 7 April, WH/4 Branch reported that 85% of the \$900,000 had been obligated. By 30 June an additional \$1,000,000 was obligated.

18. In April the Director of Central Intelligence told a meeting of WH/4 personnel that he would recall people from anywhere in the world if they were needed on the project. From January 1960, when it had 40 people, the branch expanded to 588 by 16 April 1961, becoming one of the largest branches in the Clandestine Services, larger than some divisions. Its Table of Organization did not include the large number of air operations personnel who worked on the project and who were administered by their own unit, the Development Projects Division (DPD), nor did it include the many people engaged in support activities or in services of common concern, who, though not assigned to the project, nevertheless devoted many hours to it.

19. In the early months of the project there were intensive efforts to organize an exile front group, to get a broad and varied propaganda

program under way, to begin a paramilitary program, and to acquire sites in Florida and elsewhere for training and recruiting activities and for office space.

20. The so-called "Bender Group", composed of project political action officers, was set up as a notional organization of American businessmen to provide cover for dealing with the Cubans. After a series of meetings in New York and Miami a nominally unified *Frente Revolucionario Democrático* (FRD), composed of several Cuban factions, was agreed upon on 11 May 1960.

Propaganda Activity

21. Radio broadcasts from Miami into Cuba were continued under the sponsorship of a Cuban group. Preparations were made for exile publication of *Avance*, whose Havana plant had been seized by Castro. Anti-Castro propaganda operations were intensified throughout Latin America, and a boat for marine broadcasts was purchased. The Swan Island radio station, on which the President had been briefed, was completed and on the air with test signals by 17 May.

22. The action-cadre instruction training program was being prepared, and \$25,000 worth of sterile arms were being sent to the Panama training base, which was activated 11 May. At the same time Useppa Island, Florida, was acquired as a site for assessment and holding of Cuban paramilitary candidates and for training radio operators. Screening of paramilitary recruits had begun in Miami in April, and the training in Panama began in June.

23. The Miami Base was opened on 25 May in the Coral Gables business district under cover of a New York career development and placement firm, backstopped by a Department of Defense contract, and on 15 June a communications site, with Army cover, was opened at the former Richmond Naval Air Station, which was held under lease by the University of Miami. Safe houses were also acquired in the Miami area for various operational uses. The use of other sites for project activities, in the United States and other countries, was acquired for varying periods as time went on.

24. Project officers were engaged in liaison on numerous matters. In April they reached an agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service on special entry procedure for Cubans of interest to the operation. They consulted with Voice of America and the United States Information Agency on propaganda operations. There were many discussions with the Federal Communications Commission on the licensing of Radio Swan and with the Defense Department concerning its cover. The State Department was regularly consulted on political matters.

Uneasy Front

25. Although Cuban leaders had formed a “front” at Agency urging, it was an uneasy one. They were by no means in agreement, either among themselves or with Agency case officers, on politics or on operations.

26. Power struggles developed early in the life of the FRD. The Cuban leaders wanted something to say about the course of paramilitary operations. As early as May 1960 one of the more prominent leaders was urging an invasion on a fairly large scale from a third country.

27. By June the American press was beginning to nibble at the operation, principally at Radio Swan, some of the stories implying that it was not a completely legitimate commercial venture. Another indication that operational security was less than perfect was a statement by a defected Cuban naval attaché that it was common knowledge among exiles in Miami that a certain Cuban leader was backed by the Agency and that “there were entirely too many Americans running around the area waving money.”

28. On 22 June the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence briefed the National Security Council on the project. Ultimate objective of the training program, according to the paper prepared for this briefing, was a minimum force of 500 men split into approximately 25 teams skilled in organizing, training and leading indigenous dissident groups, each team to be provided with a radio operator. Preparations were under way for creating an exile Cuban air force, and attempts were being made to develop maritime capabilities for support of paramilitary groups.

29. This briefing contained an expression of doubt that a purely clandestine effort would be able to cope with Castro’s increasing military capability, pointing out that implementation of the paramilitary phase of operations would be contingent upon the existence of dissident forces who were willing to resist and that such groups had not as yet emerged in strength.

Training in Panama

30. The air training program began to get under way in July 1960 with the screening of Cuban pilot recruits and negotiations with Defense for 12 AD–5s and the Navy being asked to supply 75 instruction and maintenance personnel.

31. In mid-June 29 Cubans had arrived in Panama to begin training in small-unit infiltration.

32. The FRD was resisting Agency attempts to persuade it to move its headquarters to Mexico and was demanding direct contact with the State Department or with some high government official in order to

argue its case. It also showed reluctance to become involved in the recruiting of Cuban pilots. It presented a budget for \$500,000 a month, excluding paramilitary costs, but was told it would have to get along on \$131,000 and would get this only if it agreed to move to Mexico. It did agree to furnish 500 paramilitary candidates and finally gave in on the issue of moving to Mexico. It remained there only a few weeks because of harassment by the Mexican Government, in spite of prior agreements to the contrary. It appears that one reason why the FRD leaders were so reluctant to be based in a third country is that they desired to establish a direct, official channel to the U.S. Government.

Emphasis on Resistance

33. In August WH/4 Branch prepared papers for use in briefing the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively. By about 1 November it was expected to have 500 paramilitary trainees and 37 radio operators ready for action. It was stated that this group would be available for use as infiltration teams *or* as an invasion force. The briefing paper for the Joint Chiefs made the point that "obviously the successful implementation of any large-scale paramilitary operations is dependent upon widespread guerrilla resistance throughout the area."

34. The paper prepared for the President's briefing identified 11 groups or individuals with whom the Agency had some sort of contact and who claimed to have assets in Cuba. The paper for the Joint Chiefs spoke of the problems of obtaining support bases and trained manpower and warned that an exile invasion force might have to be backed up by a contingency force, augmented by U.S. Army Special Forces personnel.

35. The terms "invasion", "strike", and "assault" were used in these documents although the strike force concept does not seem to have been given any sort of policy sanction until the Special Group meetings which took place toward the end of 1960.

Plan of Operations

36. The Presidential briefing paper of August 1960 outlined the plan of operations as follows:

"The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in three areas of Cuba: Pinar del Rio, Escambray and Sierra Maestra. These groups will be organized for concerted guerrilla action against the regime.

"The second phase will be initiated by a combined sea-air assault by FRD forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated with general guerrilla activity on the main island of Cuba. This will establish a close-in staging base for future operations.

"The last phase will be air assault on the Havana area with the guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground from these areas into the Havana area also."

37. Expenditures were rapidly running beyond the original estimates. The WH Division estimated operating costs for four weeks starting 1 July at \$1,700,000 and for the fiscal year at approximately \$25,000,000. On 19 August an additional \$10,000,000 was requested and obtained. About half of this figure was the estimated cost of paramilitary activities, with about another \$2,000,000 estimated for propaganda.

Anti-Castro Broadcasts

38. Propaganda activity had gotten off to an early start and had developed rapidly. After an initial shakedown period Radio Swan had gone on the air first with anti-Trujillo, then with anti-Castro broadcasts. Radio programs were also originating in Miami and [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The newspaper *Avance in Exile* was being published by the end of the summer, and a second paper and a weekly magazine were planned. There had also been some successful black operations. Most such operations had thus far been conducted without participation by the FRD.

39. By the end of August the FRD had a lawyer team set for a Latin American propaganda tour and was ready with its first broadcast on Radio Swan, which was reported to be getting world-wide reception with many listeners in Cuba. An anti-Castro comic book was being reprinted, and a Spanish-language television program was being prepared in Miami.

40. At the end of August WH/4 Branch was reporting that a machine run search had failed to find any bilingual Agency employee suitable as a Radio Swan announcer. (This search went on for some time. On 28 December the branch reported finding a candidate, but on 18 January 1961 that he had backed out.)

41. Late September 1960 saw the almost simultaneous occurrence of the first maritime operation and the first air drop over Cuba. The former was successful. The latter, the first of a series of failures, resulted in the capture and execution of a paramilitary agent on whom the project had set great store.

Maritime Operations

42. Several successful maritime operations took place during the latter months of 1960 before severe winter weather began to make them almost impossible. But the project had only one boat regularly available during this period, and the process of supplying and building up a resistance movement through clandestine means began to seem intolerably slow, especially since during this same period Castro's army was reported to have been strengthened with 30 to 40 thousand tons of Bloc arms, and Cuban internal security was being tightened.

43. The strike force concept which, as noted, had already begun to be associated with the project as early as July, began to play an ever greater role in WH/4 planning. This role became dominant in September 1960 with the assignment to the project, as chief of its Paramilitary Staff, of a Marine Corps colonel experienced in amphibious operations.

44. In late October the Nicaraguan Government offered the Agency the use of an air strip and docking facilities at Puerto Cabezas, some 250 miles closer to Cuba than the facilities in Guatemala. At about the same time, the Agency requested the Army to supply 38 Special Forces personnel as instructors. Due to prolonged policy negotiations, these trainers did not arrive in Guatemala until 12 January 1961.

Switch in Concept

45. On 4 November 1960 WH/4 took formal action to change the course of the project by greatly expanding the size of the Cuban paramilitary unit and redirecting its training along more conventional military lines. Appropriate orders were sent to the Guatemala Base, which had 475 air and ground trainees on 10 November, and to Miami where recruiting efforts were increased.

46. By this time Miami Base, through liaison with the FRD military staff, had already recruited and dispatched to Guatemala 101 air and 370 paramilitary trainees, plus six specialists (doctors, dentists, and chaplains). The base had also recruited 124 maritime personnel for manning the invasion fleet that was being acquired.

47. By 28 January 1961 the strike force strength was 644, on 3 February it was 685, by 10 March it had risen to 826, by 22 March to 973. On 6 April 1961 brigade strength was reported at 1,390.

48. On 3 November 1960 WH/4 reported it had only \$2,250,000 left for the rest of Fiscal Year 1961, and by 16 December this was almost gone. A supplementary budget estimate was prepared, and an additional \$28,200,000 was obtained from the Bureau of the Budget.

Freedom Fund Campaign

49. There were also financial problems on a smaller scale. To publicize Radio Swan, and perhaps to enhance its cover, the Cuban Freedom Fund Campaign was organized in November to solicit donations through newspaper advertisements. The radio station, which was budgeted at \$900,000 for Fiscal Year 1961, received \$330 in gifts during the next few weeks.

50. *Bohemia Libre*, a handsome weekly magazine, budgeted at \$300,000 but actually costing about \$35,000 an issue, had bad luck from the start in seeking advertising and once missed an issue on that account. Additional funds had to be sought for it several times. Yet it

developed an audited circulation of 126,000, said to be second only to the *Reader's Digest* in the Spanish-language field.

51. While the project moved forward, acquiring boats, planes and bases, training men, negotiating with foreign governments, seeking policy clarification, training an FRD security service, publishing magazines and newspapers, putting out radio broadcasts, and attempting to move arms, men and propaganda into Cuba by sea or air, the FRD, in whose name most of this activity was being carried on, was making little progress toward unity.

52. Members would resign in a huff and have to be wheedled back. Each faction wanted supplies to be sent only to its own followers in Cuba, while groups inside were reluctant to receive infiltrates sent in the name of the FRD. The FRD coordinator had his own radio boat which made unauthorized broadcasts until halted by the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Provisional Government Plans

53. Tentative plans for a provisional government were first discussed with FRD leaders in December, and this set off a flurry of intrigue and bickering which delayed the recruiting process and did nothing to advance the cause of unity. In mid-January Miami Base reported that "the over-all problem is simply to maintain the Frente (FRD) as an operational facade until military action intervenes and a provisional government can be established." Until the question of how and by whom such a government was to be selected could be answered, the base reported, "we are at political dead center."

54. This dead center remained until very near the target date and was only resolved by an ultimatum to the FRD Executive Committee directing its members to agree on the chairman for a Revolutionary Council or risk the loss of all further support.

55. However, in selective ways the FRD proved to be a responsive and useful instrument. An example of this was the counterintelligence and security service which, under close project control, developed into an efficient and valuable unit in support of the FRD, Miami Base, and the project program.

56. By mid-March 1961 this security organization comprised 86 employees of whom 37 were trained case officers, the service having graduated four classes from its own training center, whose chief instructor was a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] police officer.

Security Activities

57. The FRD's service ran operations into Cuba, many of them successful. It built up a voluminous set of card files on Cuban personalities. One of its most helpful services was reporting on meetings of FRD

committees and other anti-Castro groups and on political maneuvering within the FRD hierarchy. It also helped in recruiting for the strike force at a time when the political leaders were sabotaging this effort. Security and counterintelligence teams were also trained for integration with the strike force. These had the primary mission of securing vital records and documents during the invasion and a secondary mission of assisting in establishing and maintaining martial law.

58. The service also carried on radio monitoring and conducted interrogations and debriefings. An indication of its alertness and efficiency is the fact that it supplied Miami Base with its first information on the location of a C-54 plane which was forced down in Jamaica after a mission over Cuba. The chief of the service was largely responsible for personally persuading the crew of the downed plane to return to the training camp.

59. In the first three months of 1961 the problems faced by the project were many and complex. Although the Army Special Forces instructors had finally arrived in Guatemala the brigade trainee quota was still only half fulfilled and a call went to the training camps for special recruiting teams to be sent to Miami. Meanwhile trainees who had been in the camp for several months had had no contact with the political front and were wondering what sort of a Cuban future they were expected to fight for. Disturbances broke out, and the project leaders persuaded three FRD figures to visit the camp and mollify the men.

Training in the U.S.

60. During this period the Nicaraguan air strip which had been placed at the project's disposal was being made ready for use and two new training sites were activated. Although a definite policy determination on the training of Cubans in the U.S. had never been made, 25 tank operators were successfully trained for the strike force at Fort Knox. Another eleventh-hour training requirement was fulfilled when the project acquired the use of Belle Chase Ammunition Depot near New Orleans. This was used for the training of a company-sized unit hurriedly recruited for a diversion landing and of an underwater demolition team.

61. During the period between the U.S. national elections and the inauguration of President Kennedy the Government's policymaking machinery had slowed down. A number of piecemeal policy decisions were vouchsafed, but not all the specific ones the project chiefs were pressing for, for example, authority for tactical air strikes and permission to use American contract pilots.

62. President Eisenhower had given a general go-ahead signal on 29 November and had reaffirmed it on 3 January 1961, but the impending

change in administration was slowing matters down. For example, a proposed propaganda drop was turned down on 13 January for this reason. On 19 January, at the Special Group's last meeting before the inauguration, it was agreed that a high-level meeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and Defense, should be set up as soon as possible to *reaffirm* the basic concepts of the project.

Preparations Endorsed

63. Such a meeting was held 22 January, and the project and current preparations were generally endorsed. At a meeting with the new President on 28 January the Agency was authorized to continue present activities and was instructed to submit the tactical paramilitary plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for analysis. Shortly thereafter, in an attempt to get a high-level internal review of the plan, it was briefed to Gen. Cabell, Gen. Bull (consultant) and Adm. Wright (ONE). By 6 February the Joint Chiefs had returned a favorable evaluation of the strike plan, together with a number of suggestions.

64. On 17 February the Agency presented a paper (Annex B) to the President which outlined three possible courses of action against Castro.

65. Noting plans for early formation of a government in exile, the paper described the growing strength of the Castro regime under Bloc support and observed: "Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except by the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open."

66. This paper found the use of small-scale guerrilla groups not feasible and advocated a surprise landing of a military force, concluding that the brigade had a good chance of overthrowing Castro "or at the very least causing a damaging civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba."

67. Following presentation of this paper to the President, the project leaders were given to understand that it would be at least two weeks before a decision would be made as to use of the invasion force. They thereupon withheld action to expand the force up to 1,000 for the time being.

Movement of Agents

68. Although the invasion preparations were absorbing most of the project's energies and funds WH/4 Branch was still attempting to nourish the underground. There were six successful boat operations, carrying men and materials, in February and 13 in March, and two successful air drops in March. Infiltration of agents was continuing. As of 15 February Miami Base reported the following numbers and types of agents in Cuba: Counterintelligence, 20; positive intelligence, 5; propaganda, 2; paramilitary, 4. As of 15 March the base reported that these numbers had risen, respectively, to 21, 11, 9, and 6.

69. By the invasion date the personnel strength of Miami Base had grown to 160. The intensity of activity there during the latter months of the operation is indicated by the record of a day picked at random—it happened to be 9 February—when 21 case officers spent 140 man hours in personal contact with 125 Cubans.

70. Successive changes in the operational plan and postponements of the strike date are discussed later in this report and are documented in Annexes C, D, and E. Detailed policy authorization for some specific actions was either never fully clarified or only resolved at the eleventh hour, and even the central decision as to whether to employ the strike force was still somewhat in doubt up to the very moment of embarkation.

71. During the weeks preceding the invasion the pace of events quickened. In early March the State Department asked the Agency not to announce formation of the Revolutionary Council or to commit any untoward act until after the 5–9 March Mexico City Peace Conference. The Cubans conferring in New York disagreed on various aspects of a post-Castro platform. The Guatemala camp was having counterintelligence problems.

Sabotage Action

72. On 12 March the LCI "Barbara J" successfully launched and recovered a sabotage team in an action against the Texaco refinery in Santiago.

73. During 13–15 March project chiefs were working intensively to prepare a revised plan which would meet policy objections cited by the State Department. On the 15th the new plan was presented to the President.

74. In mid-March ten members were added to the FRD Executive Committee, the politicians continued their platform talks, and 23 March was set as deadline for choice of a chairman. An intensive defection project was started from Miami Base. A survey was started with the object of determining the trainees' knowledgeability of U.S. involve-

ment in the strike preparations. Trainees at Guatemala were impatient, and a number had gone AWOL.

75. Jose Miro Cardona was unanimously elected Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

76. In late March the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] ostensible owner of the Swan Island radio station, thanked all the sponsors of political programs and advised them that no more tapes would be required; purpose of this action was to clear the way for a unity program during the action phase of the operation. A Radio Swan listener survey had received 1,659 replies from 20 countries. Ships with strike force equipment were arriving in Nicaragua, and the Guatemala camp was still receiving trainees as late as the week of 4 April.

Overflights Suspended

77. Cuban overflights were suspended on 28 March. Two reasons have been given for this suspension: (a) that the aircraft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the invasion ships; (b) that the Agency wished to avoid any incident, such as a plane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of events during the critical pre-invasion period.

78. For a White House meeting on 29 March papers were prepared on these subjects: (a) The status of the defection program; (b) internal Cuban support which could be expected for the landing operation.

79. On 5 April the B-26 "defection" plan was prepared in an effort to knock out some of Castro's air force before D Day in a manner which would satisfy State Department objections. Project chiefs agreed that in event of a policy decision to call off the invasion they would move the troops to sea, tell them that new intelligence made the invasion inadvisable, and divert the force to Vieques Island for demobilization.

80. On 12 April at a meeting with the President it was decided that Mr. Berle would tell Miro Cardona there would be no overt U.S. support of the invasion. The President publicly announced there would be no U.S. support. On 13 April all WH/4 headquarters sections went on 24-hour duty. The Revolutionary Council was assembled in New York and advised that it would be briefed in stages on the military aspects of the project. On 14 April the Council agreed to go into "isolation" during the landing phase of the military operation.

81. The raids on three Cuban airfields were carried out by eight B-26s on 15 April, and destruction of half of Castro's air force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike photography. Afterward, according to plan, one of the pilots landed in Florida and announced that the raids had been carried out by defectors from Castro's own air force. The Council was briefed on the air strike. The diversionary

expedition by the force which had been trained in New Orleans failed to make a landing on two successive nights preceding the strike.

82. Immediately before D Day, Radio Swan and other outlets were broadcasting 18 hours a day on medium-wave and 16 hours on short-wave. Immediately after D Day, these totals were increased to 55 hours and 26 hours, respectively. Fourteen frequencies were used. By the time of the invasion a total of 12,000,000 pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuba.

83. Late on 16 April, the eve of D Day, the air strikes designed to knock out the rest of Castro's air force on the following morning were called off. The message reached the field too late to halt the landing operation, as the decision to cancel the air strike was made after the landing force had been committed.

84. The invasion fleet which had assembled off the south coast of Cuba on the night of 16 April included two LCIs owned by the Agency, a U.S. Navy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs, all of them pre-loaded with supplies, and seven chartered commercial freighters. All these craft participated in the assault phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up supplies for ground and air forces. These vessels were armed with 50-caliber machine guns. In addition, each LCI mounted two 75-mm. recoilless rifles.

85. In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile soldiers, the armament provided for combat included sufficient numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank truck, a tractor crane, a bulldozer, two large water trailers, and numerous small trucks and tractors.

86. The invasion brigade comprised 1,511 men, all of them on the invasion ships excepting one airborne infantry company of 177 men. The brigade included five infantry companies, a heavy weapons company, an intelligence-reconnaissance company, and a tank platoon.

87. These troops had been moved by air on three successive nights from the Guatemala training camp to the staging area in Nicaragua where they embarked on the ships which had been pre-loaded at New Orleans. The ships had moved on separate courses from Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40 miles offshore in order to avoid the appearance of a convoy. From there they had moved in column under cover of darkness to a point 5,000 yards from the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These complicated movements were apparently accomplished in a secure manner and without alerting the enemy.

88. Of the three follow-up ships, one was due to arrive from Nicaragua on the morning of D Day plus 2 and two others were on call at

sea south of Cuba. Additional supplies were available for air landing or parachute delivery at airfields in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Florida. At a Defense base in Anniston, Alabama, there were also supplies ready for 15,000 men. Altogether there were arms and equipment available to furnish 30,000 dissidents expected to rally to the invasion force.

89. The landing was to be carried out at three beaches about 18 miles from each other on the Zapata Peninsula. The left flank of the beachhead was Red Beach at the head of Cochineros Bay; Green Beach was at the right flank, with Blue Beach at the center. The lodgment to be seized was thus a coastal strip about 40 miles long, separated from the interior by an impassable swamp penetrated only by three roads from the north and flanked by a coastal road from the east.

90. In the early hours of 17 April Cuban underwater demolition teams, each led by an American contract employee, went ashore to mark Red and Blue Beaches. Each of these parties engaged in fire fights with small enemy forces but accomplished their tasks, and the troops began moving ashore in small aluminum boats and LCUs. Before daylight small militia forces were encountered at both beaches. These offered little opposition, and many of the militiamen were quickly captured.

91. Not long after daylight the airborne infantry company was successfully parachuted from C-46 aircraft to four of the five scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the mission of sealing off approach roads.

92. At dawn began the enemy air attacks which the project chiefs had aimed to prevent by the planned dawn strikes with Nicaragua-based aircraft against Castro's fields. Action by Castro's B-26s, Sea Furies, and jet T-33s resulted in the sinking of a supply ship, the beaching of a transport, and damage to an LCI. The plan for a landing at Green Beach was thereupon abandoned, and these troops, with their tanks and vehicles were put ashore at Blue Beach. Shipping withdrew to the south under continuous air attack.

93. The air attacks continued throughout the day. The 11 B-26s of the Cuban exile force which were available for close support and interdiction were no match for the T-33 jets. However, at least four of Castro's other aircraft were shot down by machine gun fire from maritime craft, assisted by friendly air support.

94. The first ground attacks by Castro's forces occurred at Red Beach which was hit by successive waves of militia in the morning, afternoon and evening of 17 April. While ammunition lasted these attacks were beaten off with heavy enemy casualties, and several of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed by ground or friendly air action. On the morning of 18 April, the Red Beach Force, nearly out

of ammunition, retired in good order to Blue Beach without being pressed by the enemy.

95. In addition to supporting the ground forces and protecting shipping on 17 April, the friendly B-26s also sank a Castro patrol escort ship and attacked the Cienfuegos airfield. Four of the friendly B-26s were shot down, while three returned safely to Nicaragua, and four landed at other friendly bases.

96. Attempts were made to resupply the brigade with ammunition by air drops. On the night of 17-18 April one C-54 drop was made at Red Beach and three at Blue Beach, and on the following night Blue Beach received two drops. Preparations for resupply by sea had to be cancelled due to enemy air action.

97. At Blue Beach the enemy ground attacks, supported by aircraft, began from three directions on the afternoon of 18 April. Six friendly B-26s, two of them flown by Americans, inflicted heavy damage on the Castro column moving up from the west, using napalm, bombs, rockets, and machine gun fire to destroy several tanks and about 20 troop-laden trucks. Air support to the Blue Beach troops was continued on the morning of 19 April, when three friendly B-26s, including two piloted by Americans, were shot down by Castro T-33s. Jet cover from the Navy aircraft carrier "Essex" had been expected to protect the 19 April sorties, but a misunderstanding over timing hampered its effectiveness.

98. In spite of this air action, however, and in spite of a reported 1,800 casualties suffered by the Castro forces, the brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on resupply of ammunition, which had now become impossible. On the night of 18 April, when failure appeared inevitable, the Cuban brigade commander refused an offer to evacuate his troops. And on the morning of 19 April, with ammunition rapidly running out, the brigade was still able to launch a futile counter-attack against the forces relentlessly moving in from the west.

99. In the last hours of resistance the brigade commander sent a series of terse and desperate messages to the task force command ship pleading for help:

"We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help. We cannot hold."

"In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing in. Help must arrive in next hour."

"When your help will be here and with what?"

"Why your help has not come?"

100. The last message was as follows: "Am destroying all equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot repeat cannot wait for you."

101. An evacuation convoy was headed for the beach on the afternoon of 19 April. When it became known that the beachhead had collapsed the convoy reversed course.

102. During the next few days two Americans and a crew of Cuban frogmen succeeded in rescuing 26 survivors from the beach and coastal islands.

C. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION

1. In evaluating the Agency's performance it is essential to avoid grasping immediately, as many persons have done, at the explanation that the President's order cancelling the D-Day air strikes was the chief cause of failure.

2. Discussion of that one decision would merely raise this underlying question: If the project had been better conceived, better organized, better staffed and better managed, would that precise issue ever have had to be presented for Presidential decision at all? And would it have been presented under the same ill-prepared, inadequately briefed circumstances?

3. Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind the possibility that the invasion was doomed in advance, that an initially successful landing by 1,500 men would eventually have been crushed by Castro's combined military resources strengthened by Soviet Bloc-supplied military matériel.

4. The fundamental cause of the disaster was the Agency's failure to give the project, notwithstanding its importance and its immense potentiality for damage to the United States, the top-flight handling which it required—appropriate organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel, and full-time direction and control of the highest quality.

5. Insufficiencies in these vital areas resulted in pressures and distortions, which in turn produced numerous serious operational mistakes and omissions, and in lack of awareness of developing dangers, in failure to take action to counter them, and in grave mistakes of judgment. There was failure at high levels to concentrate informed, unwavering scrutiny on the project and to apply experienced, unbiased judgment to the menacing situations that developed.

D. EVALUATION OF ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

1. The project was organized at the level of an operating branch, the fourth echelon in the organization of the Agency, in the Western Hemisphere Division. Its chief, a GS-15, was not given the independence and the broad, extensive powers of a task force commander. Instead, he had to apply constantly for the decision of policy questions

and important operational problems to the Deputy Director (Plans) (DD/P), who was in fact directing the project, although this was only one of his many responsibilities. The DD/P delegated much of his responsibility to his Deputy for Covert Action, especially the handling of policy matters involving contact with non-Agency officials. The office of the DD/P and the offices of the project were in different buildings. Consideration was given by the DD/P in late 1960 to raising the project out of WH Division and placing it directly under his Deputy for Covert Action, but this was not done.

2. The Chief of WH Division was in the chain of command between the chief of the project and the DD/P but only in a partial sense. He exercised his right to sign the project's outgoing cables until the week of the invasion even though the project's own signal center was activated at the end of December 1960. He supervised the staffing activities and attended some of the meetings of the Special Group. But the DD/P and his deputy dealt directly with the project chief, and gradually the Chief of WH Division began to play only a diminished role.

3. The DD/P, in turn, reported to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) who usually represented the Agency at the meetings of the 5412 Special Group.

4. The Director delegated his responsibility for major project decisions to a considerable extent. He relied on the DDCI, an Air Force general, for policy matters involving air operations. For military advice he relied on the military officers detailed to the project. This reliance deprived the Director of completely objective counsel, since the project's military personnel were deeply involved in building up the strike force and the DDCI was taking an active role in the conduct of air operations.

Fragmentation of Authority

5. Thus, the project lacked a single, high-level full-time commander possessing stated broad powers and abilities sufficient for the carrying out of this large, enormously difficult mission. In fact, authority was fragmented among the project chief, the military chief of the project's Paramilitary Staff, and several high-level officials, whose wide responsibilities elsewhere in the Agency prevented them from giving the project the attention it required. There were too many echelons; the top level had to be briefed by briefers who themselves were not doing the day-to-day work.

6. Three further extraordinary factors must be mentioned:

(1) The Chief of Operations of the Clandestine Services (COPS), who is the DD/P's chief staff advisor on clandestine operations, played only a very minor part in the project. On at least two occasions COPS

was given express warning that the project was being perilously mis-managed, but he declined to involve himself with the project.

(2) The three Senior Staffs, the Agency's top-level technical advisors in their respective areas, were not consulted fully, either at the important formative stages of the project or even after grave operational difficulties had begun to develop; instead, they allowed themselves to be more or less ignored by the chief of the project and his principal assistants. This state of affairs is partly attributable to the inadequate managerial skill and the lack of experience in clandestine paramilitary operations of the WH/4 chiefs; it was not corrected by the DD/P or his deputy or by the Chief of WH Division.

(3) There was no review of the project by the Agency's Project Review Committee, which would at least have allowed the views of the most senior review body in the Agency to be heard.

Independence of DPD

7. Still another important factor in the diffusion of direction and control was the insistence of the Agency's air arm, the Development Projects Division (DPD), on preserving its independence and remaining outside the organizational structure of the project, in which it had a vital, central role, including air drops to the underground, training Cuban pilots, operation of air bases, the immense logistical problems of transporting the Cuban volunteers from Florida to Guatemala, and the procuring and servicing of the military planes. The project chief had no command authority over air planning and air operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was completely independent.

8. The result was a divided command dependent upon mutual cooperation. There was no day-to-day continuing staff relationship, which is essential for properly coordinated operations. Headquarters of the two units were in different buildings far away from each other. The chiefs of air operations in Guatemala and Nicaragua were DPD representatives, independent of the WH/4 chiefs of these bases, and the Headquarters confusion was compounded in the field.

9. In October 1960, shortly after his assignment to the project, the paramilitary chief noted coordination difficulties between WH/4 and DPD. He pointed out that the organizational structure was contrary to military command principles, to accepted management practices, and to the principles enunciated by the DD/P himself in 1959, and recommended that the DPD unit be integrated into WH/4, under command of its chief.

Failure of Integration Effort

10. The DD/P rejected this recommendation as not being the most efficient solution for technical reasons. The insufficiently effective rela-

tionship between the project and the DPD unit was one of the gravest purely organizational failures of the operation. The DD/P has subsequently confirmed this conclusion and has ascribed this lack of effectiveness to personality frictions and to the "classic service rivalry." (We would note that this does not exist in present-day combined commands.)

11. The organizational confusion was augmented by the existence of a large forward operating base in the Miami area, which in turn had loose control over several sub-bases. The mission of this base was vaguely defined and not well understood. In theory the base had a supporting role; actually it was conducting operations which for the most part paralleled similar operations being conducted by WH/4 from Headquarters. This divided effort was expensive, cumbersome, and difficult to coordinate. In some cases the efforts of the two elements were duplicating or conflicting or even competing with each other.

12. The upshot of this complex and bizarre organizational situation was that in this tremendously difficult task the Agency failed to marshal its forces properly and to apply them effectively.

E. EVALUATION OF STAFFING

1. In April 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence stated that he would recall from any station in the world personnel whose abilities were required for the success of the project. This recognition of the need for high-quality personnel is nowhere reflected in the history of the project. The DD/P's Deputy for Covert Action advised his subordinates that the Director's words did not mean that the project was to be given *carte blanche* in personnel procurement but that officers could be adequately secured through negotiation.

2. In actual fact, personnel for the project were secured by the customary routine method of negotiation between the project and the employee's office of current assignment; no recourse was had to directed assignment by the Director of Central Intelligence. The traditional independence of the 55 individual division and branch chiefs in the Clandestine Services remained unaffected by the Director's statement. The lists prepared by the project for the purpose of negotiation for personnel naturally reflected the preferences of the chief of the project and the willingness of the person in question to accept the assignment. In many cases, the reason for assigning a given person to the project was merely that he had just returned from abroad and was still without an assignment.

3. The basic mistake was made of filling the key spots early, without realizing how much the project would grow and that it should be staffed for a major effort. In some cases, officers originally selected to supervise five persons ultimately had to supervise 15 or 20 times as

many. Of the three GS-16 officers assigned to the project, none was given top-level managerial responsibilities. The result of all these factors was that none of the most experienced, senior operating officers of the Agency participated full time in the project.

An Indication of Quality

4. An interesting insight into the quality of the personnel of WH/4 is afforded by the initial "Relative Retention Lists" prepared in April 1961 by the divisions and senior staffs of the Clandestine Services and other Agency units pursuant to the requirements of Regulation 20-701 (Separation of Surplus Personnel). Each such unit was required to group its officers in each grade into ten groups, on the basis of the performance and qualifications of each one. (Under the prescribed procedure, these lists are to be reviewed at several levels before becoming definitive.)

5. Of the 42 officers holding the principal operational jobs in WH/4 in grade GS-12 through GS-15, 17 officers were placed in the lowest third of their respective grade, and 9, or 21% in the lowest tenth. The ratings of 23 of these 42 were made by WH Division, which placed seven in the lowest third, and 19 were rated by other units, which together placed ten in the lowest third.

6. It is apparent from these ratings that the other units had not detailed their best people to WH/4 but had in some instances given the project their disposal cases.

7. Furthermore, although the project eventually included the large number of 588 personnel, there were long periods in which important slots went unfilled, due to difficulty in procuring suitable officers. For example, the counterintelligence officer of the Miami Base was never supplied with a case officer assistant, there was a long period in which the project professed inability to find a CI officer for the Guatemala Base, and months were spent in search of an announcer for Radio Swan. Few Clandestine Services people were found who were capable of serving as base chiefs; the support services had to supply most of them. All of the paramilitary officers had to be brought from outside WH Division, or even from outside the Agency. (Air operations presented no staffing problem for WH/4, since DPD supplied its own people.)

8. There were in fact insufficient people to do the job during the latter stages of the project. Personnel worked such long hours and so intensively that their efficiency was affected. Personnel shortages were one of the reasons why much of the work of the project was performed on a "crash" basis.

Scarcity of Linguists

9. Very few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-American background knowledge. In a number of instances those senior operat-

ing personnel in the field stations that did speak Spanish had to be interrupted in their regular duties merely in order to act as interpreters. This lack occurred in part because of the scarcity of Spanish linguists in the Agency and in part because WH Division did not transfer to the project sufficient numbers of its own Spanish speakers.

10. There were many other examples of improper use of skilled personnel. In many instances, case officers were used merely as "hand-holders" for agents and technical specialists were used as stevedores. Some of the people who served the project on contract turned out to be incompetent.

11. Staffing of the project was defective because the whole Clandestine Services staffing system, with absolute power being exercised by the division and branch chiefs, is defective. Each division seeks to guard its own assets; scanty recognition is given to the respective priorities of the various projects.

12. In spite of the foregoing, there were a great many excellent people in the project who worked effectively and who developed considerably in the course of their work. It should also be emphasized that, almost without exception, personnel worked extremely long hours for months on end without complaint and otherwise manifested high motivation, together with great perseverance and ingenuity in solving the manifold problems that the project constantly raised. It should be stated that in general the support people sent to the project by the support component were of excellent quality and effective performance.

13. Unfortunately, however, while many persons performed prodigies of effort, these were often directed towards overcoming obstacles which better organization and management would have eliminated. Such efforts were especially necessary (a) in support of the chimera of "non-attributability" of the operation; (b) in negotiating with the Armed Services for equipment, training personnel, etc., which the Agency should have been able to request as of right; and (c) in providing the support for an overt military enterprise that was too large for the Agency's capabilities.

F. EVALUATION OF PLANNING

1. Before proceeding to an evaluation of the Agency's planning, the over-all policy decisions of the United States Government with reference to the Cuban operation will first be stated in summary form. These decisions not only constituted the background against which Agency planning was conducted but also presented numerous important factors that limited or otherwise determined its scope.

2. We will next endeavor to point out the various occasions on which we believe that the Agency officials responsible for the project

made serious planning errors, both of commission and of omission, which affected the project in vital respects.

3. Between the plan approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960 (Annex A) and the invasion plan actually carried out on 17 April 1961 (Annex E) there was a radical change in concept. Originally the heart of the plan was a long, slow, clandestine build-up of guerrilla forces, to be trained and developed in Cuba by a cadre of Cubans whom the Agency would recruit, train and infiltrate into Cuba.

4. But thirteen months later the Agency sponsored an overt assault-type amphibious landing of 1,500 combat-trained and heavily armed soldiers. Most of them were unversed in guerrilla warfare. They were expected to maintain themselves for a period of time (some said a week) sufficient to administer a “shock” and thereby, it was hoped, to trigger an uprising.

Discard of Original Plan

5. By November 1960 the original planning paper (Annex A) had for practical purposes ceased to exist as a charter for Agency action. By that date the Special Group had come to be unanimously of the opinion that the changed conditions, chiefly Castro’s increased military strength through Soviet support and the increased effectiveness of his security forces, had made the original covert activities plan obsolete.

6. The Special Group had, however, not yet agreed on a substitute plan and strong doubt was expressed whether anything less than overt U.S. forces would suffice to obtain Castro’s downfall. But there appeared to be agreement that, whatever the ultimate decision, it would be advantageous for the United States to have some trained Cuban refugees available for eventual use, and that CIA should continue to prepare such a force.

7. At the end of November 1960, the Agency presented a revised plan to President Eisenhower and his advisors. This included (a) infiltration into Cuba by air of 80 men in small paramilitary teams, after reception committees had been prepared by men infiltrated by sea; (b) an amphibious landing of a team of 650–700 men with extraordinarily heavy firepower; (c) preliminary air strikes against military targets. CIA stated that it believed it feasible to seize and hold a limited area in Cuba and then to draw dissident elements to the landing force, which would then gradually achieve enough stature to trigger a general uprising. At this stage of the planning, clandestine nourishment of resistance forces was still an important element, though now overshadowed by the overt strike force concept.

8. President Eisenhower orally directed the Agency to go ahead with its preparations with all speed. But this meeting occurred during the U.S. political interregnum and the proposed target date was later

than 20 January 1961, so that in effect the President's instructions were merely to proceed and to keep the preparations going until the new Administration should take office and should make the definitive decisions, especially whether and under what circumstances the landing should take place.

Search for Policy Decisions

9. As an example of the decision-making process, at the meeting of the Special Group held 8 December 1960 the Agency requested authorization (a) to make propaganda leaflet flights over Cuba; (b) to screen non-official U.S. personnel for use in maritime operations; (c) to resupply Cuban resistance elements from U.S. air bases at the rate of two flights a week. Only the first authorization was given at that time.

10. In mid-January 1961 various major policy questions were, at CIA's request, under discussion by the Special Group. These included: (a) use of American contract pilots for tactical and logistical air operations over Cuba; (b) use of a U.S. air base for logistical flights to Cuba; (c) commencement of air strikes not later than dawn of the day before the amphibious assault and without curtailment of the number of aircraft to be employed from those available; (d) use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, as an air-strike base and maritime staging area.

11. In the end only one of these policy questions was resolved in the affirmative, that with regard to the use of Puerto Cabezas. It should be especially noted that the project's paramilitary chief had strongly recommended that the operation be abandoned if policy should not allow adequate tactical air support.

Conflicting Views

12. The raising of these questions and the failure to resolve many of them demonstrates the dangerous conflict between the desire for political acceptability and the need for military effectiveness. It also indicates the fluctuating policy background against which the officers running the project had to do their day-to-day business. This policy uncertainty was, in several respects, never satisfactorily resolved right up to the very hour of action, and many problems arose out of the changing limitations to which authority to do certain things was subjected in the name of political necessity.

13. Thus, during the months immediately preceding the inauguration on 20 January 1961, the Agency was recruiting and training Cuban troops and otherwise proceeding with a changed plan not yet definitely formulated or reduced to writing, with no assurance that the invasion, which was now the essence of the plan, would ultimately be authorized by the new Administration. The Agency was driving forward without knowing precisely where it was going.

14. The first formal briefing of President Kennedy and his advisors took place on 28 January 1961. (He had received briefings on earlier occasions, even before his election.) At this meeting there was a presentation, largely oral, of the status of preparations, and President Kennedy approved their continuation. But there was still no authorization, express or implied, that military action would in fact eventually be undertaken.

15. In the ensuing weeks, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director (Plans), accompanied in some instances by other Agency representatives, attended a number of meetings with the new President and his advisors. (The paper prepared for a 17 February meeting is appended as Annex B.) In the course of these meetings, the Agency presented three informal planning or “concept” papers, dated 11 March 1961, 16 March 1961 and 12 April 1961, each a revision of its predecessor (Annexes C, D and E, respectively). These papers served chiefly as the bases for oral discussions at these meetings.

Successive Alterations

16. According to our information, the revised concept, as exposed by the paper of 12 April 1961, was apparently acceptable to the President although he indicated he might order a diversion. Before that he had authorized the Agency to proceed with mounting the operation, but had reserved the right to cancel at any time. The President was advised that noon on the 16th was the last hour for a diversion. The DD/P checked with Mr. Bundy shortly after noon on the 16th, and no diversion being ordered, authorized the landing to proceed.

17. These three papers disclose that, starting with the World War II commando-type operation outlined in the 11 March 1961 paper (Annex C), the plan had been swiftly and successively altered to incorporate four characteristics which had been deemed essential in order to ensure that the operation would look like an infiltration of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution and would therefore be politically acceptable.

18. The four characteristics were:

- a. an unspectacular night landing;
- b. possibility of conducting air operations from a base on seized territory;
- c. a build-up period, after the initial landing, to precede offensive action against Castro's forces, and
- d. terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare in the event the invasion force could not hold a lodgment.

19. The airfield requirement obliged the planners to shift the invasion site from Trinidad to Zapata. The former area was close to the Escambray Mountains and therefore offered better guerrilla possibilities, but only the latter had a suitable airfield.

20. The third paper also introduced a plan for a guerrilla-type, diversionary landing in Oriente Province two days before the strike and provided that supplies should be landed at night during the initial stages. It also provided for air strikes on military objectives at dawn of D Day as well as on D Day minus 2.

Guerrilla Role

21. Close reading of the three papers also discloses that the invasion was no longer conceived as an effort to *assist* Cuban guerrilla forces in a coordinated attack. The papers make no claim that significant guerrilla forces existed with whom—after evaluative reports from our own trained agents, confirming their strength, sufficiency of arms and ammunition, and their readiness—we had worked out plans for a coordinated, combined insurrection and attack against Castro. As the 12 April 1961 paper expressly states, the concept was that the operation should have the *appearance* of an internal resistance.

22. With reference to the strength of the resistance in Cuba, the 11 March 1961 paper refers to an estimated 1,200 guerrillas and 1,000 other individuals engaging in acts of conspiracy and sabotage, but it makes no claim of any control exercised by the Agency or even that coordinated plans had been made and firm radio communications established.

23. The 12 April 1961 paper states the estimate at “nearly 7,000 insurgents” (without specifying the number of guerrillas included therein), who were “responsible to some degree of control through agents with whom communications are currently active.” It locates these in three widely separate regions of the island and states that the individual groups are small and very inadequately armed and that it was planned to supply them by air drops after D Day, with the objective of *creating* a revolutionary situation.

24. The foregoing language suggests existence of 7,000 insurgents but refrains from claiming any prospect of immediate help from trained guerrilla forces in being. The term “insurgents” seems to have been used in the sense of “potential” insurgents or mere civilian opponents of Castro. A statement about military and police defectors was similarly vague; the Agency was in touch with 31 such persons whom it hoped to induce to defect after D Day.

Arrests of Agents

25. These tacit admissions of the non-existence of effective, controlled resistance in Cuba correspond to the intelligence reports which clearly showed the unfavorable situation resulting from the failure of our air supply operations and the success of the Castro security forces in arresting our agents, rolling up the few existing nets, and reducing guerrilla groups to ineffectiveness.

26. It is clear that the invasion operation was based on the hope that the brigade would be able to maintain itself in Cuba long enough to prevail by attracting insurgents and defectors from the Castro armed services, but without having in advance any assurance of assistance from identified, known, controlled, trained, and organized guerrillas. The Agency hoped the invasion would, like a *deus ex machina*, produce a “shock”, which would cause these defections. In other words, under the final plan the invasion was to take the place of an organized resistance which did not exist and was to generate organized resistance by providing the focus and acting as a catalyst.

27. The Agency was matching the 1,500-man brigade, after an amphibious landing, against Castro’s combined military forces, which the highest-level U.S. intelligence (USIB reports entitled “The Military Buildup in Cuba”, dated 30 November 1960 and 9 February 1961, respectively) estimated as follows: The Revolutionary Army—32,000 men; the militia—200,000 men; employing more than 30 to 40 thousand tons of Bloc-furnished arms and heavy matériel of the value of \$30,000,000.

28. It is difficult to understand how the decision to proceed with the invasion could have been justified in the latter stages of the operation. Under the Trinidad plan (Annex C), access to the Escambray Mountains for possible guerrilla existence might have constituted some justification for the enormous risks involved. This justification did not apply to the Zapata area which was poor guerrilla terrain and offered little possibility for the break-out of a surrounded invasion force. The lack of contingency planning for either survival or rescue of the brigade has never been satisfactorily explained.

29. The argument has been made that the Agency’s theory of an uprising to be set off by a successful invasion and the maintenance of the battalion for a period of a week or so has not been disproved. It was not put to the test, this argument goes, because the cancelled D-Day air strikes were essential to the invasion’s success. Such an argument fails in the face of Castro’s demonstrated power to arrest tens of thousands of suspected persons immediately after the D-Day-minus-2 air strikes and the effectiveness of the Castro security forces in arresting agents, as demonstrated by unimpeachable intelligence received.

Views of Joint Chiefs

30. Agency participants in the project have sought to defend the invasion plan by citing the approval given to the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). To this argument, members of the JCS have replied, in the course of another inquiry, (1) that the final plan was presented to them only orally, which prevented normal staffing; (2) that they

regarded the operation as being solely CIA's, with the military called on to furnish various types of support and the chief interest of the JCS being to see to it that every kind of support requested was furnished; (3) that they went on the assumption that full air support would be furnished and control of the air secured and on the Agency's assurances that a great number of insurgents would *immediately* join forces with the invasion forces; and (4) that, in the event the battle went against them, the brigade would at once "go guerrilla" and take to the hills.

31. The Agency committed at least four extremely serious mistakes in planning:

a. Failure to subject the project, especially in its latter frenzied stages, to a cold and objective appraisal by the best operating talent available, particularly by those not involved in the operation, such as the Chief of Operations and the chiefs of the Senior Staffs. Had this been done, the two following mistakes (b and c, below) might have been avoided.

b. Failure to advise the President, at an appropriate time, that success had become dubious and to recommend that the operation be therefore cancelled and that the problem of unseating Castro be restudied.

c. Failure to recognize that the project had become overt and that the military effort had become too large to be handled by the Agency alone.

d. Failure to reduce successive project plans to formal papers and to leave copies of them with the President and his advisors and to request specific written approval and confirmation thereof.

32. Timely and objective scrutiny of the operation in the months before the invasion, including study of all available intelligence, would have demonstrated to Agency officials that the clandestine paramilitary operations had almost totally failed, that there was no controlled and responsive underground movement ready to rally to the invasion force, and that Castro's ability both to fight back and to roll up the internal opposition must be very considerably upgraded.

33. It would also have raised the question of why the United States should contemplate pitting 1,500 soldiers, however well trained and armed, against an enemy vastly superior in number and armament on a terrain which offered nothing but vague hope of significant local support. It might also have suggested that the Agency's responsibility in the operation should be drastically revised and would certainly have revealed that there was no real plan for the post-invasion period, whether for success or failure.

Existence of Warnings

34. The latest United States Intelligence Board, Office of National Estimates, and Office of Current Intelligence studies on Cuba available at that time provided clear warning that a calm reappraisal was necessary.

35. But the atmosphere was not conducive to it. The chief of the project and his subordinates had been subjected to such gruelling pressures of haste and overwork for so long that their impetus and drive would have been difficult to curb for such a purpose. The strike preparations, under the powerful influence of the project's paramilitary chief, to which there was no effective counterbalance, had gained such momentum that the operation had surged far ahead of policy. The Cuban volunteers were getting seriously restive and threatening to get out of hand before they could be committed. The Guatemalan Government was urging the Agency to take away its Cubans. The rainy season was hard upon the Caribbean. The reappraisal never happened, though these very factors which helped prevent it should have warned the Agency of its necessity.

36. These adverse factors were compounded and exacerbated by policy restrictions that kept coming one upon another throughout a period of weeks and right up until the point of no return. These caused successive planning changes and piled up more confusion. Rapidly accumulating stresses, in our opinion, caused the Agency operators to lose sight of the fact that the margin of error was swiftly narrowing and had even vanished before the force was committed. At some point in this degenerative cycle they should have gone to the President and said frankly: "Here are the facts. The operation should be halted. We request further instructions."

Consequences of Cancellation

37. Cancellation would have been embarrassing. The brigade could not have been held any longer in a ready status, probably could not have been held at all. Its members would have spread their disappointment far and wide. Because of multiple security leaks in this huge operation, the world already knew about the preparations, and the Government's and the Agency's embarrassment would have been public.

38. However, cancellation would have averted failure, which brought even more embarrassment, carried death and misery to hundreds, destroyed millions of dollars' worth of U.S. property, and seriously damaged U.S. prestige.

39. The other possible outcome—the one the project strove to achieve—was a successful brigade lodgment, housing the Revolutionary Council but isolated from the rest of Cuba by swamps and Castro's forces. Arms were held in readiness for 30,000 Cubans who were expected to make their way unarmed through the Castro army and wade the swamps to rally to the liberators. Except for this, we are unaware of any planning by the Agency or by the U.S. Government for this success.

40. It is beyond the scope of this report to suggest what U.S. action might have been taken to consolidate victory, but we can confidently assert that the Agency had no intelligence evidence that Cubans in significant numbers could or would join the invaders or that there was any kind of an effective and cohesive resistance movement under anybody's control, let alone the Agency's, that could have furnished internal leadership for an uprising in support of the invasion. The consequences of a successful lodgment, unless overtly supported by U.S. armed forces, were dubious.

The Choice

41. The choice was between retreat without honor and a gamble between ignominious defeat and dubious victory. The Agency chose to gamble, at rapidly decreasing odds.

42. The project had lost its covert nature by November 1960. As it continued to grow, operational security became more and more diluted. For more than three months before the invasion the American press was reporting, often with some accuracy, on the recruiting and training of Cubans. Such massive preparations could only be laid to the U.S. The Agency's name was freely linked with these activities. Plausible denial was a pathetic illusion.

43. Insistence on adhering to the formalities imposed by a non-attributability which no longer existed produced absurdities and created obstacles and delays. For example, the use of obsolete and inadequate B-26 aircraft, instead of the more efficient A-5s originally requested, was a concession to non-attributability which hampered the operation severely. A certain type of surgical tent requested for the landing beach was not supplied because it could be traced to the U.S. A certain modern rifle was not supplied, for the same reason, although several thousand of them had recently been declared surplus. In the end, as could have been foreseen, everything was traced to the U.S.

44. U.S. policy called for a covert operation and assigned it to the agency chartered to handle such things. When the project became blown to every newspaper reader the Agency should have informed higher authority that it was no longer operating within its charter. Had national policy then called for continuation of the overt effort under a joint national task force, vastly greater man-power resources would have been available for the invasion and the Agency could have performed an effective supporting role. The costly delays experienced by the Agency in negotiating for support from the armed services would have been avoided.

Piecemeal Policy

45. In the hectic weeks before the strike, policy was being formed piecemeal and the imposition of successive restrictions was contracting

the margin of error. The last of these restrictive decisions came from the President when the brigade was already in small boats moving toward the Cuban shore. Had it come a few hours earlier the invasion might have been averted and loss of life and prestige avoided.

46. If formal papers outlining the final strike plan in detail and emphasizing the vital necessity of the D-Day air strikes had been prepared and left with the President and his advisors, including the Joint Chiefs, with a request for written confirmation that the plan had received full comprehension and approval, the culminating incident which preceded the loss of the Cuban brigade might never have happened.

47. We are informed that this took place as follows: On the evening of 16 April the President instructed the Secretary of State that the D-Day strikes set for the following morning should be cancelled, unless there were overriding considerations to advise him of. The Secretary then informed the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Director being absent from Washington, and the Deputy Director (Plans) of this decision, offering to let them call the President at Glen Ora if they wished. They preferred not to do so, and the Secretary concluded from this that they did not believe the strikes to be vital to success.

A Civilian Decision

48. Earlier that evening the project chief and his paramilitary chief had emphatically warned the DD/P to insist that cancellation of the strikes would produce disaster. Thus the DD/P, a civilian without military experience, and the DDCI, an Air Force general, did not follow the advice of the project's paramilitary chief, a specialist in amphibious operations. And the President made this vital, last-minute decision without direct contact with the military chiefs of the invasion operation.

49. The President may never have been clearly advised of the need for command of the air in an amphibious operation like this one. The DD/P was aware that at least two of the President's military advisors, both members of the Joint Chiefs, did not understand this principle. This might well have served to warn the DD/P that the President needed to be impressed most strongly with this principle, by means of a formal written communication, and also have alerted him to the advisability of accepting the Secretary's invitation to call the President directly.

50. If the project's paramilitary chief, as leader of the overt military effort, had accompanied the DDCI and the DD/P to the meeting with the Secretary he might have brought strong persuasion to bear on the decision.

51. This fateful incident, in our opinion, resulted in part from failure to circulate formal planning papers together with requests for specific confirmation.

Shifts in Scope

52. The general vagueness of policy and direction permitted a continual shifting of the scope and scale of the project, that is, the type of operational planning commonly referred to as “playing it by ear,” and this in turn led to various kinds of difficulties about people, money, supplies and bases.

53. A staffing guide prepared in May 1960 listed a total of 235 personnel required for the foreseeable future (107 being on board). By September, the strength had been built up to 228. In October another staffing guide listed a total of 363 positions. By the end of the project, 588 people were working in WH/4. There were 160 people in the Miami area alone.

54. The original plan contemplated 200 to 300 Cubans as a contingency force. By mid-July, a force of 500 was being considered. In early November, the plan was to use 1,500 men, and there was talk of as many as 3,000. In early December, a brigade of 750 was agreed upon. Its strength was built up to 664 by the end of January. By 17 March the ground forces in training numbered 973. By 28 March equipment for 1,600 men had been ordered, and the actual brigade strength on 6 April was 1,390. Such changes made it very difficult for the supporting components, particularly the Office of Logistics and Development Projects Division, who were not given much lead time.

55. The original estimate for the project anticipated expenditures to the total of \$4,400,000 during the two fiscal years, 1960 and 1961. On 24 March 1960, \$900,000 was released for the balance of Fiscal Year 1960. This amount was expended within a month and an additional million dollars released to carry the project to the end of June.

56. In August, a budget was presented for Fiscal Year 1961 which amounted to \$13,000,000. By December, \$11,300,000 had been obligated and an additional \$28,200,000 was requested and authorized. In May 1961, an additional \$5,000,000 was requested to meet obligations incurred. The total amount of money for this project for Fiscal Years 1960/61, instead of \$4,400,000, was more than \$46,000,000.

57. When the project started, it was not realized that bases would be needed at Useppa Island, Key West, Miami, and Opa-locka, Florida; New Orleans, Puerto Rico, Panama, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, as well as innumerable safe houses and other facilities. Consequently the project suffered, because many of these facilities were not ready when needed. The WH Division launched into a large paramilitary project without the bases, the boats, the experienced paramilitary personnel, or a complete and sufficient plan, and never really caught up.

G. THE MIAMI OPERATING BASE

1. The confused relationships between WH/4 headquarters and the forward operating base in the Miami area were a significant factor

in the over-all performance of the project mission. The base was activated in late April 1960 and was put in Miami mainly because it was the chief center of Cuban refugees in the United States.

2. From the beginning, the DD/P and his associates took a firm stand against allowing this base to become more than a small support organization, and until September 1960 the base did little except carry on liaison with the Cuban exile organizations and U.S. law enforcement agencies. For example, there was only one paramilitary officer at the base during this period.

3. The DD/P's Chief of Operations wrote in June 1960: "I recognize your need for some operational personnel in the Miami area to service and conduct certain activities there. I am firmly opposed, however, to the growth of an organization which would represent a second headquarters or intermediate echelon there." At this same time, the DD/P's Assistant for Covert Action emphasized that the function of the forward operating base should be one of coordination, with command remaining in Headquarters.

4. In August the DD/P wrote that he was worried about Miami and wanted to be sure that "we are not duplicating there any functions that are being performed in Headquarters. For instance, I am not quite clear what are the duties of the PM types there since this component is neither a headquarters nor a training installation nor even a forward command post." And in another memo in November, he again urged that WH/4 be especially careful to avoid any duplication of effort between Miami and Headquarters.

Duplication of Effort

5. By this time there was plenty of duplication. Headquarters and the Miami Base had become engaged in many parallel or overlapping operations and were even competing with each other. Both components were handling all kinds of agents and in some cases the same ones. The only activity that Miami did not get into was air operations, but even here it necessarily had a role in many of the clandestine air drops.

6. There was a general feeling at Headquarters that the forward base existed solely for support and that Headquarters was in the best position to handle operations because it had ready access to policy guidance and fast radio communications to and from all elements. This view ignored the fact that much of the communication with Cuba was only by secret writing and couriers; that Miami was the main source of information, politicians, agents, and soldiers for the project; that it was the logical location for infiltration and exfiltration; that the base, through the maintenance of effective liaison, had the complete cooperation of the local FBI, the Border Patrol, Immigration, Coast Guard, FCC, Customs, Navy, and police officials.

7. Except for the Director of Central Intelligence, who visited the base, top Agency officials concerned with the project did not have first-hand knowledge of what was being done and what could be done at Miami. The limitations they placed on base activities had serious consequences. For example, when the resistance organizers being trained in Guatemala were ready to go into Cuba in September, the maritime capability to infiltrate them did not yet exist. By the time the base had built up some capabilities in various lines, valuable months had been lost.

The Miami View

8. On the other hand, there was a general feeling at the base that it should be a "station", conducting operations just as Havana was able to do (up to the date when diplomatic relations were broken off), with Headquarters providing support, guidance and policy. This view failed to realize that a station with several hundred people would have been very difficult to conceal, that it would have cost a million dollars to move everyone to Miami, and that Headquarters would have gotten into the operations anyhow, due to the easy access to Miami from Washington, especially by telephone.

9. The letter of instructions to the base chief, dated 6 October 1960, was pretty vague. It stated that he would have authority over all project personnel and responsibility for the supervision of any project activities conducted through the Miami area from other areas. It authorized him to use personnel, matériel, facilities and funds for the accomplishment of the over-all Agency mission. He was made responsible to the chief of the project.

10. The first intelligence (FI) case officer reported to the base in September 1960 and proceeded to acquire, train and direct agents. At the time of the invasion, the Miami Base had 31 FI agents in Cuba, all of whom were reporting and all of whom had been recruited by the base.

The CI Section

11. The counterintelligence (CI) section began to function in mid-July 1960. By the time of the strike, this section had 39 carefully selected, highly educated Cubans trained as case officers to form a future Cuban Intelligence Service; also, 100 selected Cubans trained as future CI officials and civil government officials; also, a reserve of 100 older non-political individuals trained as a reserve intelligence corps.

12. The paramilitary (PM) section was opened in late June 1960 with *one* officer. His job was to conduct liaison with the Cuban leaders in order to obtain recruits for the Guatemala camps. A second PM officer reported in August, and at this time there was a beginning of

an attempt to infiltrate arms, ammunition and personnel into Cuba clandestinely by boat. (These were the “PM types” whose duties had mystified the DD/P.) There were also two maritime “types” who were training the crew of a borrowed small boat for clandestine trips.

13. By 15 November 39 people had been assigned to the Miami base in addition to 44 people from the Agency’s Office of Communications. In addition to support elements, there were sections for propaganda, FI, CI, political action, and PM.

14. By 15 April 1961, the base and its sub-base had 160 persons assigned, as follows:

10	FI
5	CI
2	Political Action
7	Propaganda
25	Support
26	PM
14	Security
68	Communications
3	Miscellaneous

15. While the Havana Station was still operating, Miami Base was in close touch with it by courier and secure communications. When Havana Station was closed, Miami expected to take over the stay-behind assets, such as they were. However, Headquarters took over their control. Miami concentrated on the training and infiltration of agents.

PM Support Role

16. In PM activities, control was tightly held by Headquarters, and the PM section of the base was limited pretty much to providing support in recruiting soldiers and running small boat operations. This tight control meant that the PM officers at the base looked to Headquarters for guidance rather than to the chief of base. The PM and other sections had their own channels to Headquarters, and this led to uncontrolled action and considerable confusion. PM officers in Key West, a sub-base of Miami, also sometimes communicated directly with Headquarters.

17. There are alleged to have been cases in which a Headquarters decision was conveyed to the Miami Base by three persons simultaneously, each over the telephone. The result of this was that the base had an enormously high phone bill and the base chief often was not informed of events until after they were over, if at all.

18. The Miami case officers retained their agents as long as the agents were reporting by secret writing. Once the agents reported by radio, they were taken over by Headquarters. This was resented by

the Miami case officers, who felt that they were in the best position to know the agents, having recruited and trained them.

19. Case officers in Headquarters, on the other hand, felt that Miami case officers tried to steal their agents when they passed through the Miami area. One agent who visited Headquarters received promises of money and support which went far beyond what the case officer in Miami had offered. The base was not informed of these promises until the agent mentioned them. For the next several months, this particular agent was unmanageable and would not even meet with the Miami case officer. This was naturally viewed as Headquarters meddling.

Examples of Confusion

20. Case officers in Miami also felt that they were unduly handicapped in that Headquarters was not only competing with them but also reviewing their actions, which was something like playing a game with the umpire on the other team. It is doubtful that a reviewing component can maintain objectivity when it is also competing with the component whose activities it is reviewing.

21. Numerous examples could be cited to illustrate the confusion that existed. The divided control over maritime operations is discussed elsewhere in this paper. There was an expensive fiasco over some special lubricating oil additive intended for sabotage use in Cuba. The organizational arrangement made necessary hundreds of telephone calls and cables which otherwise would not have been sent, and the areas for uncertainty and misunderstanding were still considerable. For example, a Miami cable of 15 February referred to an agent message and asked, "Does Headquarters intend to answer and arrange this operation?"

22. The general situation also led to an extraordinary number of temporary-duty trips back and forth between Washington and Miami. These were not only expensive but added a great many problems in the way of support and security.

23. In December 1960 the base chief pointed out to Headquarters that the base needed "clarification and specification of the requirements it is expected to fulfill and tasks that it is expected to perform, together with the investment of sufficient authority and discretion for the operational action which may be involved." In March 1961 he pointed out that "the base would welcome more precise requirements for its agents than had been received up to that time in the interests of making efficient use of them."

24. In May 1961 he wrote a memorandum on control of denied-area operations which pointed out that future operations should either be controlled from Headquarters or from a forward operating base, but that the divided control which had existed during the project had

resulted in parallel, sometimes duplicative and conflicting efforts and in operational relationships which were competitive, without purpose, and sometimes counter-productive.

25. The inspectors agree that this divided effort represented an ineffective and uneconomical use of time, money, and matériel, and less than maximum utilization of Agency employees, plus unexploited, delayed or poorly coordinated use of Cuban agents and assets.

H. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1. The WH/4 Branch had not only the responsibility for the Cuban project but also the normal area duties of a geographical unit in the Clandestine Services. Besides being considered a task force with the mission of overturning the Castro government, it also had the Headquarters desk responsibility for Cuba, including support of Havana Station and Santiago Base until the break in diplomatic relations.

2. This arrangement required WH/4's intelligence (FI) section to collect intelligence on Cuba not only for the task force, with its special requirements, but also for the entire U.S. intelligence community, with its diverse and long-range needs.

3. The section was plagued with personnel shortages from the start, but as long as the U.S. Embassy in Havana remained open, thus assuring communications, it received and processed a good yield of intelligence from Cuba, chiefly on political, economic, and Communist Party matters. Late in 1960 the section was directed to place emphasis on military information, but it found that its agents in Cuba lacked access to high-level military sources.

4. The FI section transmitted copies of all the reports it processed to the paramilitary section as well as to the rest of its regular intelligence customers.

The Net in Havana

5. The section devoted considerable effort to supporting Havana Station in preparing its agents for stay-behind roles in the event of a break in diplomatic relations. When the embassy finally closed on 3 January 1961 the station had a single net for positive intelligence. It comprised some 27 persons, 15 of whom were reporting agents and the rest radio operators, cutouts and couriers. The principal agents and one of the radio operators were U.S. citizens and thus had doubtful status after the break in relations.

6. In September 1960 as the military invasion concept was beginning to gain ascendancy in project planning, the chief of the project created a G-2 unit. But instead of placing this unit directly under himself as a project-wide unit and making its chief a member of his immediate staff, he put it in the paramilitary section under the aggressive Marine Corps colonel who became the paramilitary unit chief at about that time.

7. As chief of this low-echelon intelligence unit, whose analyses were to have important influence on an action vitally affecting national security and prestige, WH/4 brought in an officer of undoubted ability but of limited experience in paramilitary and FI operations. It was a grave error to place this G-2 unit in such a subordinate position in the project, and this error produced the serious consequences described below.

Function of G-2 Unit

8. The paramilitary G-2 unit consisted of four officers and several secretaries. Its principal function was to prepare intelligence annexes to the successive invasion plans. Its sources of information included, in addition to the FI section's reports, photographic intelligence, cartographic intelligence, Special Intelligence, armed services reports, and messages received from the paramilitary section's own agents in Cuba. Reports from the armed services were procured rapidly through direct informal liaison rather than through the usual slower channels.

9. In various ways the functioning of the regular FI section, which was directly under the project chief, was adversely affected by the paramilitary G-2 unit.

10. The PM unit absorbed the available personnel. The chief of the FI section was not invited to attend WH/4 staff meetings, and for security reasons, he never had access to WH/4's war room. During the final weeks the FI section was not permitted to examine the PM section's incoming operational cables for possible positive intelligence content. The FI section chief did not have a clearance for photographic intelligence.

Lack of Liaison

11. There was no close liaison between the two sections, and this resulted in some duplication in preparation of reports requested by the DD/P, because neither section would learn of the requests made of the other. Until the end of 1960 the two sections were housed in different buildings.

12. The most serious consequence of the third-echelon position of the G-2 unit was that it concentrated in the hands of the unit chief the dual function of receiving all the information available from Government-wide sources, including that from the agents of his own paramilitary section, and of interpreting all these data for the purpose of supplying intelligence support to the various invasion plans.

13. Interpretation of intelligence affecting the strike force aspect of the operation was thus entrusted to officers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that their judgments could not have been expected to be altogether objective. This circumstance

undoubtedly had a strong influence on the process by which WH/4 arrived at the conclusion that the landing of the strike force could and would trigger an uprising among the Cuban populace. This conclusion, in turn, became an essential element in the decision to proceed with the operation, as it took the place of the original concept, no longer maintainable, that the invasion was to be undertaken in support of existing and effective guerrilla forces.

14. Irrespective of the validity of that conclusion, it is clear that the interpretative analysis should have been made not by the persons who were working day and night to prepare the invasion but by an objective and disinterested senior interpretation specialist from the Agency's FI Staff or from its Office of Current Intelligence.

Intelligence Support Vacuum

15. Another serious error in the field of intelligence support was that Miami Base received almost no intelligence support from the Headquarters G-2 section. This may be attributed to the facts that the paramilitary chief was almost completely preoccupied with the strike force preparations and that his subordinate G-2 was not given project-wide responsibilities and to the rigid security restrictions under which the paramilitary section was expected to operate, as well as to the general confusion in the organizational position of the Miami Base.

16. This serious support vacuum at Miami was compounded because the base, in spite of its large size and the fact that it was deeply engaged in its own operations in Cuba, had no intelligence support section. There was no single officer or unit charged with responsibility for interpreting the considerable amount of intelligence derived directly from base sources and from Special Intelligence.

17. Furthermore no photographic intelligence was available to Miami Base, which had no officer with a clearance entitling him to receive it. There was substantially no intelligence support covering the Cuban beach areas or the political situation inside Cuba. There was no analysis or interpretation of Special Intelligence, and there was no mechanism to call critical material to anyone's attention.

18. The result of this highly defective state of affairs was that individual Miami case officers were forced to rely upon their own interpretation of the separate intelligence reports, instead of having this material interpreted for them by specialists. They were not given a number of other items of operational intelligence which were in existence in the G-2 unit of the paramilitary section at Headquarters.

I. THE POLITICAL FRONT AND THE RELATION OF CUBANS TO THE PROJECT

1. The Cuban opposition front, as conceived by the Agency in consultation with the State Department, was to have the following characteristics:

- a. Full restoration of the 1940 Cuban constitution.
- b. Return to the basic principles of the revolution, as enunciated in the 1958 Caracas Declaration.
- c. Pro-Western and strongly anti-Communist orientation.
- d. Political complexion ranging from a little to the right of center to somewhat left of center.
- e. Ability to muster the broadest possible support from the Cuban population.

2. The functions of such a front organization were conceived to be:

- a. A cover for covert action against the Castro regime.
- b. A catalyst and a rallying point for anti-Castro groups variously reported to number 178, 184, or 211.
- c. A possible nucleus for a provisional government of Cuba following Castro's downfall.

3. The terms of reference thus excluded followers of the former dictator, Fulgencio Batista. They also excluded extreme leftists.

4. Exclusion of the Batistianos and other ultra-conservatives caused one kind of problem. Many of the exiles had been Batista followers. Many of them were rich and had assets, such as boats and followers, which could be used. Some had military experience. Some of them had American friends who were influential enough to urge their claims to consideration upon the White House.

The Leftist Fringe

5. Exclusion of the far-left fringe caused another kind of problem. It was hard to tell how far left some persons were. And some of those whose political acceptability was questionable nevertheless claimed such substantial following inside Cuba that it was difficult to ignore them.

6. In forming the *Frente Revolucionario Democrático* (FRD) the Agency focussed its attention principally on personalities and groups who had either participated in Castro's government or supported his revolution but had become disillusioned and gone into opposition.

7. In early 1959 the Havana Station was already assessing a wide variety of anti-Castro personalities with whom it was in contact. In mid-1959 a station agent was exploring the possibility of covert support to the Montecristi Movement of Justo Asencio Carrillo Hernandez.

8. In the mid-1950s the Montecristi group had been active against Batista, who exiled Carrillo. He returned after the revolution to take an important banking post but found Castro's Communist tendencies intolerable and went into opposition again. His group is described as liberal and progressive but rejecting any accommodation with Communism.

The Organizing Committee

9. Carrillo was one of several Cuban figures whom the Agency induced to defect in late 1959 or the early months of 1960. Others were Manuel Francisco *Artime* Buesa, Jose Ignacio *Rasco* Bermudez, and Manuel Antonio *Varona* Loredo. It was these four who, after long negotiations, formed the organizing committee of the FRD in May 1960.

10. Artime, who is still under 30, joined Castro's movement as an anti-Batista student. Under instructions from the Catholic Church he organized a group of 4,000 Catholic Action students to gain the farmers' help against Batista. The view has been expressed that he was the Jesuits' penetration of the 26 July Movement. Castro gave him a high post in National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) from which he resigned after ten months to form the Movement to Recover the Revolution (MRR), composed in part of his former Catholic Action followers. This exile opposition group provided a large proportion of the recruits for the strike force.

11. Rasco, a college and university classmate of Castro's, is a lawyer and history professor, described as a nice young intellectual without much talent for action. In the fall of 1959 he became the first president of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), an anti-Communist Catholic group which Castro drove underground in April 1960 at which time Rasco fled the country.

12. Varona's career in government and in opposition politics goes back to the 1920s. During the regime of President *Prio* Socarras he held several important posts, including that of prime minister, and was responsible for anti-Communist policies and measures. He collaborated with Castro until the Communist pattern of the new regime became evident, coming to the U.S. in April 1960. Before leaving Havana he had presented a plan for Castro's overthrow, including a unified opposition and U.S. aid for developing propaganda and military capabilities.

The Political Spectrum

13. Varona was representative of the older opposition parties (Autentico and Ortodoxo) which had survived both Batista and Castro and which were roughly in the middle of the political spectrum. Artime's group also occupied a centrist position, but its membership was drawn from the younger generation on Cubans. Carrillo and Rasco appeared to be a little left and a little right of center, respectively.

14. Thus the original group of organizers represented a fairly broad range of political views. They were joined in June 1960 by Aureliano *Sanchez Arango* who claimed leadership of the AAA group, the initials possibly representing *Asociacion de Amigos de Aureliano*. Both Sanchez Arango and Varona claimed to have considerable following in the

Cuban labor field. Sanchez Arango and his followers appeared to have some general knowledge of the use of clandestine techniques.

15. These five associated themselves in issuing a manifesto at Mexico City on 22 June 1960. This document called upon Cubans, other Latin Americans and the world at large to help the FRD overthrow Castro's dictatorship. The FRD pledged itself to establish a representative democratic government with full civil liberties under the 1940 Cuban constitution. It pledged free general elections within 18 months of establishment of a provisional government. It proposed to ban the Communist party and institute a program of social and economic progress for all classes of Cubans.

16. Varona's maturity and experience led to his selection as coordinator, in effect, general manager, of the FRD. This immediately precipitated the resignation of Sanchez Arango and in turn led to the beginning of a problem in establishing and maintaining FRD unity which the project never fully solved.

Change in Policy

17. The FRD had originally been conceived as the channel through which all of the project's aid to the Cuban cause would flow. However, Sanchez Arango's walkout threatened a loss of assets and capabilities which the project wanted to preserve. The result was expressed as follows in a briefing prepared by WH/4 for CINCLANT in November 1960:

"In October we made a change in operational policy. Heretofore we had kept our efforts centered on the FRD; however, we will now consider requests for paramilitary aid from any anti-Castro (and non-Batista) group, inside or outside Cuba, which can show it has a capability for paramilitary action against the Castro regime. We feel that the combination of our controlled paramilitary action under the FRD aegis and the lesser-controlled operations of other Cuban revolutionaries will bring about a considerable acceleration of active anti-Castro expressions within Cuba. We will, in any event, have the lever of support as a mechanism for influencing the ultimate emergence of one individual or group as the primary figure in the anti-Castro community."

18. Because of the gregariousness of Cuban exiles, the project was unable to prevent this change in policy from becoming known to the FRD executive committee. When the Bender Group, now generally understood by Cubans and many others to represent the CIA, began responding to requests from and giving support to defectors from the FRD and to groups which the FRD considered politically unacceptable, the organization which was supposed to be a world-wide symbol of Cuban freedom and which was being groomed as the nucleus of the next government of Cuba naturally felt that its prestige had been undermined.

Diffusion of Effort

19. This complicated relations between project case officers and the FRD leaders. It also appears to have resulted in some diffusion of effort in the attempts at clandestine infiltration of arms and paramilitary leaders into Cuba. It seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity, sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts.

20. The composite political complexion of the FRD shifted a little to the right in August 1960 with the joining of Ricardo Rafael *Sardinia*, who headed an organization called the *Movimiento Institucional Democrático* (MID).

21. A source of friction between the FRD and its project sponsors was the effort to induce it to set up its headquarters outside the U.S. The Cuban leaders were finally persuaded by financial leverage to move to Mexico City where the Mexican Government had agreed to be hospitable. Housing and office space were arranged for the executive committee members and their families and for a project case officer and his secretary. [less than 1 line not declassified] in Mexico City was reactivated for support duties, such as [less than 1 line not declassified] and the move was made.

22. However, the Mexican Government appears not to have kept its word, and the Cubans were subjected to surveillance and other harassment. Within a few weeks it became evident that the situation was intolerable, and everybody moved back to Miami, which is where the Cubans wanted to be in the first place.

The Bender Group

23. The man responsible for laying the groundwork of the FRD, arranging a long series of meetings among the Cubans, and persuading them to merge their differences and issue a joint manifesto, was the chief of the project's political section. He was known to the Cubans and inevitably to the press as "Frank Bender". The Bender Group, for reasons of plausible denial, purported to be composed of U.S. businessmen who wanted to help overthrow Castro. The Cubans do not seem to have cared whether this was true or not, but the guise irritated them because they wanted to be in direct touch with the U.S. Government at the highest level possible.

24. Bender's linguistic accomplishments did not include Spanish and this may have diluted his effectiveness in dealing with Cubans.

25. After the FRD was launched the handling of purely FRD affairs in Mexico City and later in Miami was turned over to a case officer with fluent Spanish and long experience in Latin American affairs.

26. However, Bender continued to be identified with the project. The FRD leaders' antagonism toward the Bender Group was sharpened

when, at the time of the change in operational policy noted above, WH/4 assigned Bender the responsibility of dealing with Cuban individuals and groups outside of the FRD framework.

The Rubio Padilla Group

27. One of the outside groups the project continued to work with was the Action Movement for Recovery (MAR), headed by Juan *Rubio Padilla*. Use of this conservative group of rich landlords was strongly advocated by William D. Pawley, an influential Miami businessman. A paper prepared by WH/4 for the Director of Central Intelligence's use in briefing Senator Kennedy in July 1960 stated MAR's claims to a widespread resistance organization needing only arms and ammunition and orders to go into action and called the MAR relationship a most encouraging development.

28. However, Rubio was too conservative for the FRD's taste, and the MAR was never incorporated into the FRD.

29. An organization which resisted incorporation in the FRD until March 1961 and which meanwhile had a stormy relationship with the Bender Group was the *Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo* (MRP), headed by Manuel Antonio *Ray Rivero*. Ray had been Castro's minister of public works until he lost his job to a Communist. He arrived in this country in November 1960 and agreed to accept assistance from the Bender Group but wished to maintain his freedom of choice. The project's unilateral use of Ray resulted in some successful maritime operations.

30. Bender's efforts to get Ray to join the FRD produced strained relations, but in December Ray agreed to accept military aid through the FRD. Ray's program appeared to be identical with Castro's but without Communism and without hostility to the United States. Ray became less intransigent as time went on and in February and March 1961 was participating in talks with Bender and Varona on the formation of the Revolutionary Council which he ultimately joined. There seems to be no substance to allegations in the press that Ray was ignored. In fact, his unsubstantiated claims to wide underground resources are said to have been received uncritically by some project personnel.

Contact with Batistianos

31. Another allegation which gained some currency was that the project was supporting and otherwise using former associates and supporters of Batista. At one point WH/4 did have contact with one ex-Batista leader, *Sanchez Mosquera*, and gave some support to his group, but this effort was soon called off. There were also attempts by Batistianos to penetrate the project's military effort, but these were

resisted. The FRD's own intelligence section was active in attempting to screen out Batistianos. The strike force contained some members of the former Cuban Constitutional Army, which existed under Batista, but these were recruited as soldiers not as politicians.

32. The brigade officers seem to have been clean of the Batista taint. However, the FRD, for whom they were supposedly fighting, justly complained that it had had no hand in their selection.

33. Jose *Miro* Cardona, a distinguished lawyer who turned to politics late in his career, was the first Cuban prime minister after the Castro revolution, was later ambassador to Spain, and was ambassador-designate to the United States when he broke with Castro, took asylum in the Argentine Embassy, and was eventually granted safe conduct to this country (in October 1960) where he became the FRD's secretary-general for public relations.

34. Under the guidance of Bender he became a strong force for unity in the FRD during its most difficult period, the virtual political interregnum before the inauguration of President Kennedy. Miro was influential in bringing Ray into the Revolutionary Council which was formed on 20 March with Miro as chairman.

Visit to Training Camp

35. Miro, with other Council members, visited the strike force in Guatemala on 29 March in a much-needed effort to spur troop morale. There had been far too little contact between the FRD and the soldiers being trained in its name. Artime, Varona, and Antonio Jaime *Maceo* Mackle had been there in February in an attempt to calm mutinous spirits. The last previous visit had been made in the fall of 1960 by Col. Eduardo *Martin* Elena, head of the FRD's military staff and a former constitutional Army officer. Martin Elena antagonized the trainees, and with the beginning of straight military training under a U.S. Army officer, who had no interest in Cuban politics, a ban was placed on visits to the camp by Cuban politicians.

36. This was probably a mistake and an unreasonable interference in the Cubans' management of their own affairs. Controlled contact between the FRD and the troops could have done much to improve the morale and motivation of the troops and make the training job easier. There was nobody in the Guatemala camp who could answer the political questions of the trainees, who were all volunteers and deserved to know what kind of a future they were preparing to fight for. Furthermore, the FRD needed a chance to develop the loyalty of the troops who were presumably to install and protect its leaders on Cuban soil as members of a provisional government.

37. This was one example of a high-handed attitude toward Cubans that became more and more evident as the project progressed. Cubans

were the basic ingredient for a successful operation and, although the aim of having the exiles direct activities was probably idealistic and unattainable, nevertheless the Agency should have been able to organize them for maximum participation and to handle them properly to get the job done.

An American Operation

38. But with the Americans running the military effort, running Radio Swan, and doing unilateral recruiting, the operation became purely an American one in the exile Cuban mind, and in the public mind as well. In by-passing the Cubans the Agency was weakening its own cover.

39. The official attitude which produced this situation is reflected in the project's progress reports. In November a report noted that the Agency had "plenty of flexibility to choose the Cuban group we would eventually sanction as a provisional government." A January report indicated that the Agency, rather than the Cubans, was making the plans and decisions: "We have charted five different lists of proposed assignments for any future provisional government of Cuba and are compiling biographic data on those Cubans who might be utilized by us in forming a future Cuban government."

40. The crowning incident which publicly demonstrated the insignificant role of the Cuban leaders and the contempt in which they were held occurred at the time of the invasion. Isolated in a Miami safe house, "voluntarily" but under strong persuasion, the Revolutionary Council members awaited the outcome of a military operation which they had not planned and knew little about while Agency-written bulletins were issued to the world in their name.

41. They had not been puppets in the early days of the project. Some of the Cubans had drawn up detailed operational plans for resistance in areas of Cuba that they knew intimately; others provided cover and support. One wealthy exile even voluntarily went through the assessment routine at Useppa Island along with the young trainees. They had reason to feel that the project was in the nature of a joint venture, at least.

The Military Emphasis

42. But when the project began to shift from a clandestine operation to a military operation, Cuban advice and participation no longer seemed necessary. Cubans who up to about November 1960 had been close to some of the plans and operations were cut out. To the military officers on loan to the project, the problem was a military one, and their attitude was "to hell with the Revolutionary Council and the political side."

43. The paramilitary and the political action sections of WH/4 were not in effective touch with each other; in effect, they treated their tasks as unrelated, and this was reflected in the field. The diminished relationships with the Cuban leaders were a measure of the extent to which people in the project became carried away by a military operation.

44. The effective utilization of Cubans and cooperation with them was also hampered to some extent because many of the project officers had never been to Cuba, did not speak Spanish, and made judgments of the Cubans on very slim knowledge. (A notable exception was the propaganda section, which was well qualified in this respect.) They considered the Cubans untrustworthy and difficult to work with. Members of the Revolutionary Council have been described to the inspectors as “idiots” and members of the brigade as “yellow-bellied.”

45. However, many staff employees in the project realized that the Cubans would have to be dealt with realistically and allowances made for their differences and weaknesses. In some instances, case officers achieved quite remarkable rapport with the Cubans they were handling. These officers were ones who had had considerable experience in dealing with foreign nationals in various parts of the world, and the results showed it.

Dealing with Cubans

46. Some military officers on loan to the project were less successful in dealing with Cubans. They simply gave military orders to these foreign nationals and expected to be obeyed.

47. Some of the contract employees, such as ships' officers, treated the Cubans like dirt. This led to revolts, mutinies, and other troubles. Some very able Cubans withdrew from the project because of the way they were treated.

48. The inspecting team has received a definite impression that this operation took on a life of its own, that a number of the people involved became so wrapped up in the operation as such that they lost sight of ultimate goals.

49. There is a substantial question whether any operation can be truly successful when the attitudes toward the other people are so unfavorable. There does not seem to be much excuse for not being able to work with Cubans. If this nationality is so difficult, how can the Agency possibly succeed with the natives of Black Africa or Southeast Asia?

50. The Agency, and for that matter, the American nation is not likely to win many people away from Communism if the Americans treat other nationals with condescension or contempt, ignore the contributions and the knowledge which they can bring to bear, and generally

treat them as incompetent children whom the Americans are going to rescue for reasons of their own.

J. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS—AIR

1. The first attempt at a clandestine air drop over Cuba took place on 28 September 1960. (By coincidence this was the same night as the first maritime operation.) A 100-man arms pack was dropped for an agent rated as having considerable potential as a resistance leader. The crew missed the drop zone by seven miles and dropped the weapons on a dam. Castro forces scooped them up, ringed the area, caught the agent and later shot him. The airplane got lost on the way back to Guatemala and landed in Mexico. It is still there.

2. This operation might have indicated an unpromising future for air drops. In fact, its failure was influential in persuading the chiefs of the project of the futility of trying to build up an internal resistance organization by clandestine means, and within the next few weeks the operational emphasis was beginning its fateful swing toward the overt strike-force concept. To this extent the portent of failure was heeded, but it did not suffice either to halt the air drops or to ensure arrangements for their success. The attempts went on and on with results that were mostly ludicrous or tragic or both.

3. On 26 December 1960, Headquarters received word that a Cuban agent, who had been given Agency training in this country, wanted an air drop of not more than 1,500 pounds of demolition and sabotage matériel and weapons. He clearly specified the layout and the location of the drop zone, and also the amounts and kinds of matériel desired. WH/4 cabled this requirement to the air base in Guatemala, where all the flights originated. However, the Development Projects Division (DPD) then cabled Guatemala that arms and ammunition would be dropped *with food to make a maximum load*, also 200 pounds of leaflets for a drop elsewhere. This cable was not coordinated with WH/4, which sent a message to the agent the following day stating that a cargo drop would take place *as requested* and that the weight would be 1,500 pounds.

Rice and Beans

4. A drop was made on 31 December. The 15-man reception team received, not only 1,500 pounds of matériel which was different from the original request because the specific items could not be packed in waterproof containers in time, but also 800 pounds of beans, 800 pounds of rice and 160 pounds of lard.

5. This was the only drop to this Cuban agent. He was so vexed with the drop that he came out of Cuba specifically to make a complaint and to cancel a succeeding drop which had been planned. He stated

that he would not accept another drop, no matter what the cargo was. He pointed out that the Agency had endangered his safety by dropping cargo which he had not asked for, did not need, and could not handle. Furthermore, the aircraft had stayed in the vicinity too long, had flown with its landing lights on, had circled around and made numerous U-turns and even dropped propaganda leaflets on his property. He decided the Agency lacked the professional competence to make clandestine air drops.

6. This operation was recorded as “successful” by the Agency because cargo was actually delivered to the people it was meant for. There were *four* such “successes” in all, out of *30 missions flown* up to 21 April 1961. (The Fiscal Year 1961 budget called for *105* air drops.) The first of these took place on 30 December after numerous attempts beginning in mid-October. There were 13 unsuccessful attempts during January and February. The third success took place on 3 March, when three agents were dropped (previous attempts to drop them had been made on 7 February and 27 February). The fourth successful drop was on 29 March.

The Successful Drops

7. Except for the rice-and-beans drop, the successful drops were all to an agent who had been trained in air reception procedures by staff personnel at Headquarters.

8. The three cargo drops known to be successful were all made in the Pinar del Rio Province. In other words, practically all the supplies went to one small area of western Cuba. Small amounts are thought to have been received in Camaguey and Oriente, but none in Matanzas or Havana. Ten missions were flown into the Escambray at the request of an agent who had no training in air reception. Twice the cargo was not dropped because the drop zone was not located, and once the plane turned back because of bad weather. On the seven occasions cargo was dropped, it was either totally or in large part recovered by the Castro forces. Three times cargo was dropped blind, three times in the wrong place, and once on the drop zone when the reception committee was not there.

9. In all, about 151,000 pounds of arms, ammunition and equipment were transported by air. Not more than 69,000 pounds of this was actually dropped; the rest was returned to base. Of this 69,000 pounds, at least 46,000 pounds were captured by Castro forces, who recovered all or a large part of ten drops, compared with our agents, who recovered three. In other words, out of 75 tons which were air-lifted, paramilitary agents actually got about twelve (about enough to arm 300 men, figuring 7,500 pounds to a hundred-man pack).

10. Except for the one team, there were no clandestine personnel drops made or even attempted during the entire project.

Lack of Procedure

11. The agents on the ground did not have a standard procedure for air reception (most of them had not been trained). The locations of drop zones were variously and insufficiently described by coordinates, sketches, or azimuths. In two operations the requesting agents did not even have maps of their areas. In one of these WH/4 headquarters, DPD and Miami Base each arrived at a different set of coordinates from the reference points given. In another case the coordinates given for a drop zone were in the ocean. Reception parties proposed to mark the drop zone with various bizarre and impractical patterns, such as: two red lights and one white light about 15 feet apart moving clockwise; an arrow 50 meters long with lights at two-meter intervals; lights in the form of a straight line with a sign in the middle lit up with Christmas lights (on this one, the crew at one point mistakenly identified cars on a road as the drop-zone signal); two crosses side by side; a triangle of three lights with a fourth light in the center. In some areas there were so many small lights in the vicinity that no pattern could be located. For one drop the agents made four proposals in rapid succession: no lights, a nine-man cross, a line of five bonfires, a 60-meter line of colored flashlights.

12. The standard light patterns taught by paramilitary instructors and generally accepted as best, were (a) an "L" of 4 lights; (b) a "T" of 5 lights; and (c) a cross of 6 lights. All lights should be 15 to 25 yards apart, with one light different from the others.

13. The Cuban air crews must share the blame for the failures, as must their trainers. Policy did not allow American observers to go along on the missions to correct the errors. Pilot discipline was lacking and instructions were not followed in numerous instances.

14. For example, one air crew, under specific orders to abort the mission if the drop zone was missed on the initial run and not to search for it or circle around, made four passes four miles away, according to the ground report (which added, "Pilots drunk or crazy.").

15. Another crew commander, under orders not to drop unless the T pattern was positively identified, elected to drop without seeing the T because he had a "positive feeling" that he was over the drop zone. Another aircraft remained in the drop zone area 41 minutes before dropping cargo.

Headquarters Direction

16. The Headquarters direction of these air drops left much to be desired. DPD, which controlled the crews and planes, never had a representative physically assigned to WH/4, and the two activities were operating in a divided command situation on the basis of mutual

cooperation rather than generally accepted management practice and military command principles.

17. Daily consultation proved impossible although there was a requirement of it. There was trouble on cover stories, on funding, on security, and on cables, among other things. It was difficult to determine where the responsibilities of one component ended and those of the other began.

18. The WH/4 paramilitary chief recommended that the DPD unit be assigned to the chief of the task force for integration within his staff. But no action was ever taken, and the situation remained as described for the duration of the project.

19. WH/4 and DPD did not even agree on doctrine and techniques. In addition, all flight plans had to be personally reviewed and approved by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) and by the 5412 Special Group. The requests for air drops came from Cuba by radio, secret writing or telephone to Miami and then were forwarded to WH/4 headquarters, which then put in an operational request to DPD, which in turn directed the Guatemala air base to mount the flight after approval had been given by DDCI. DPD could and did release its own cables, without coordination.

20. This cumbersome system was complicated even more by the scarcity of agent radio operators inside Cuba. Some of the arrangements had to be made by secret writing, which was not only slow but contributed to misunderstanding. Necessary last-minute changes of plan by the reception groups or air crews could not be communicated to each other.

Example of Confusion

21. The drop finally accomplished on 30 December is an outstanding example of the confusion that prevailed.

22. WH/4 informed Havana that the drop would be made from 400 feet. DPD told the Guatemala Base that the drop would be at 1,000 feet. Guatemala, on the other hand, felt that 600 feet would be best. WH/4 informed the agents that the aircraft definitely would make only one pass over the drop zone. But DPD authorized one 360° turn in order to make the drop good if the drop zone was not located on the initial run. (Actually, the crew made *three* passes.) This drop then failed (on 5 December) because the reception group understood that the plane would make only one pass, and turned off the lights when the plane came back for a second try. There was also confusion over the time of the drop and the number of bundles. The difficulties in arriving at an understanding among all parties concerned were so great that this operation, first planned for 22 October, was re-scheduled for 13 November, run on 5 December without dropping, then scheduled

for 19 December. Then this had to be changed to 25 December and finally to 30 December.

23. For another operation WH/4 told Guatemala that the cargo should weigh 6,000 pounds, but DPD told Guatemala it could not be more than 4,000 or 5,000 pounds. The DPD message was not coordinated with WH/4, as Guatemala then pointed out.

24. Some of the techniques used by DPD were highly questionable. In one instance DPD told Guatemala that in the event the drop-zone lights were not seen by the crew the pilot should nevertheless drop his cargo on the drop zone as determined by dead reckoning. As it turned out, the reception group had dispersed after an encounter with a Cuban army patrol and was unable to be at the drop zone. The Castro forces then picked up at least half of the bundles dropped.

Supplies for Castro

25. In another case 1,600 pounds of food and matériel were dropped blind (in the dark of the moon) on each of four hilltops to a group which was known to be in such a precarious position that it was not able to stay in place long enough to lay out a drop zone. Again, the Castro forces got most of the load.

26. In still another, DPD told Guatemala that turns were allowed if the plane was not lined up on the initial run over the drop zone. The agents reported that the plane passed over twice without dropping and that this alerted the Castro army to attack the resistance group and to disperse it.

27. Once two planes were sent over the drop zone half an hour apart and allowed to make two passes each. Not surprisingly, 200 militia searched the area the next day and seized the cargo. The drop altitude for another operation was set at 4,000 feet. The pilot reported he had hit the drop zone from 3,500 feet, even though unable to recognize the marker, but there is evidence that the enemy got at least half the drop.

28. One aircraft received heavy fire and was damaged. Its crew thus learned the hard way that dropping leaflets first had helped to alert the area and recommended that in the future the cargo be dropped first. Miami Base pointed out to Headquarters that it was a mistake to drop heavy weapons before a group had a known capability of using them or had specifically requested them.

29. For a long time the results of the drops, as reported by the ground elements, were not forwarded to the air crews, who got no critiques but continued to report successes when in fact they were missing the drop zone by many kilometers.

Handling an Emergency

30. The handling of an emergency also left something to be desired. One of the planes had to land in Jamaica. The commander's phone call to an emergency number in Guatemala produced the reply, "Never heard of you." [less than 1 line not declassified] first heard of this landing from [less than 1 line not declassified], who had assumed (wrongly) that [less than 1 line not declassified] had been advised by Headquarters.

31. In January 1961 Division D of the Agency's FI Staff made a study which raised pertinent questions about the air drops. The project's paramilitary staff made a study in March and concluded that the Cuban crews did not have sufficient experience or supervised training in clandestine paramilitary air operations to meet the project objectives and that they were too undisciplined to obey instructions or to make correct reports. This study recommended that contract American aircraft commanders be used, but it did not receive the approval of the paramilitary chief and went no further.

32. DPD also made an analysis in March and recommended certain overdue corrective action such as obtaining agent reports of drop results for prompt dispatch to the air base in Guatemala, critiques for each mission regarding compliance with instructions, elimination of blind drops, and better identification of drop zones. DPD cabled Guatemala on 7 March that an analysis of the mission results to date would be forwarded shortly to be used as a basis for refinement of tactics and improvement of coordination with the reception teams. And at the end of March a check pilot was included for the first time in a mission crew. He noted discrepancies in pilot procedure and crew coordination.

Tardy Corrective Action

33. These corrective actions came too late. The seeming inability to support resistance elements augmented the growing reliance being placed on the idea of an amphibious strike force to accomplish the objective; then, as the strike idea took over more and more, interest in clandestine drops decreased among officers in charge of the project. On or about 28 March a policy decision was made that there would be no more clandestine drops until after the amphibious assault. Inasmuch as the WH/4 case officers handling these drops were not informed as to the strike plan or the date, this posed a problem for them because 19 drops to specific drop zones were requested between 22 March and 19 April, and it was necessary to stall off the requests with such messages as:

"Don't give up hope. We'll drop as soon as we can."

"Regret unable mount BERTA. Definitely planning support your operation. Beg you understand our problems."

But the agents had their own problems during this time:

"Unjust to delay operation so much. . . This is not a game."

"How long will I have to wait for the drop. The lives of peasants and students depend on you."

"Dear Allies: Arms urgent. We made a commitment. We have complied. You have not. If you have decided to abandon us, answer."

"We are risking hundreds of peasant families. If you cannot supply us we will have to . . . demobilize. Your responsibility. We thought you were sincere."

"All groups demoralized. . . They consider themselves deceived because of failure of shipment of arms and money according to promise."

Perhaps the situation was best summed up by this agent message:

"Impossible to fight. . . Either the drops increase or we die. . . Men without arms or equipment. God help us."

34. The Inspector General reluctantly concludes that the agent who was showered with rice and beans was entirely correct in his finding that the Agency showed no professional competence in its attempts at clandestine air drops into Cuba. Furthermore, these attempts in their over-all effect probably hurt the resistance more than they helped.

K. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS—MARITIME

1. WH/4 Branch had two separate maritime problems. It needed to transport men and supplies clandestinely to the coast of Cuba by small boats, and it needed ships to transport and support an amphibious landing of a military force, more or less overtly. This section of the report will be mostly concerned with small boat operations.

2. The WH Division had no assets in being; there was no Agency element comparable to DPD to call on; and for obscure reasons the Navy was not asked to provide the help it might have. WH/4 had to start with nothing; there seemed to be very little maritime know-how within the Agency.

3. The original operational plan called for building up a substantial resistance organization, which could be done only if supplies and people were delivered to the right places. During the critical period March–December 1960, WH/4 had *one* boat, the "Metusa Time", a 54-foot pleasure cruiser which was lent to the Agency by a friend. Two maritime operations officers, more or less under deep cover, labored from March to October to outfit this boat and train its crew.

4. The boat went on its first mission on 28 September, offloading 300 pounds of cargo and picking up two exfiltrates. By January it had made five additional trips and transported about five tons, but only one infiltrate. It had another successful operation in March 1961 and another in April.

[less than 1 line not declassified] Boats

5. In November and December there were six other successful small boat operations conducted with boats owned by various Cubans. The arrangements were made by individual case officers at Miami (there being no maritime section) and mainly in response to requests by the owners. No memoranda of understanding were made and the agreements as to supporting, equipping, and funding these Cuban boats were exceedingly loose, thus causing many problems later.

6. A Cuban would say, "Give me a tank of gas and a machine gun, and you can use our boat and we will help run it." After the operation he was likely to come back and say that the boat needed all sorts of equipment which had been damaged by the operation, and many claims were built up in this way.

7. Although more than twenty of these boats were offered to case officers, most of them were too small and too limited in range to be of much use. Furthermore, the bad weather which lasted from December into March made small boat operations impossible at a time when they were badly needed. In January 1961 there was not a single successful operation.

[less than 1 line not declassified] Boats

8. By December the need for some *[less than 1 line not declassified]* boats was becoming obvious. The "Sea Gull" (see below) was picked up by Headquarters about this time. It turned out to be a complete "lemon"; one of the most experienced employees in small boats spent most of his time from December to June trying to get it to run, and it never did participate in an infiltration or exfiltration operation. Also, about December a 75-foot yacht, the "Wasp" *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. It had a 17-knot speed and a 600-mile range and ran its first successful mission on 15 February.

9. About February the "Tejana" also became operational. This was a 110-foot yacht which became available through a Cuban contact of a case officer. The arrangements made by the case officer with the Cuban owner were so vague that payment of bills incurred was a continuing problem. However, the "Tejana", in four operations in March, infiltrated 19,000 pounds, as compared with 12,700 pounds which had been infiltrated from September up to February by all available boats.

10. The statistics compiled by WH/4 and by Miami Base on the small boat operations are somewhat confused and inconsistent. However, the general picture is clear. The small boat operations succeeded in getting about 76 people into Cuba clandestinely. Most of these were taken in during March. Up to the middle of February only ten had

been successfully infiltrated by this means, the first being in mid-November.

11. In the matter of arms, ammunition and other supplies to the resistance, the boat operations were not an outstanding success. From September to the time of the strike about 70,000 pounds were successfully infiltrated. This was about three times as much as was put in by air drops. The total amount of supplies put into Cuba by air and boat operations amounted to about 93,000 pounds (46½ tons); this would be about enough to equip 1,250 men.

Limited Area

12. There was one successful boat operation in September; two in October; three in November; six in December, none in January; six in February; thirteen in March; and two in April. Up to February only six and a half tons were sent in.

13. One should not get the idea that these supplies were uniformly distributed throughout Cuba. Most of them were placed in one small area, the north coast of Cuba close to Havana. The small boats did not have the range to go farther.

14. In almost all cases the supplies were transferred to a Cuban boat or an offshore key rather than deposited on the shores of Cuba itself. In the fall, boat operations were restricted by policy to offshore rendezvous. By January Miami had begun to plan beach landing operations as a means of overcoming the unreliability of Cuban-based boats. At this time Miami Base did not even have aerial photos of the north coast of Cuba.

15. Of the 33 missions rated as successful only 27 could be considered entirely so since the cargo on the other operations was later recovered by the Castro government or the success was only partial. The reception committees did not seem to have had much training in maritime reception procedures.

16. In sum, a small amount of matériel was put into the Havana area in the period September-December by some ill-suited small boats. Then by using the "Wasp" and the "Tejana" a substantially larger amount of supplies was put in during February and March as well as some people, but to a limited area only. At this point the "Barbara J" and the "Blagar" (former LCIs) were used because of their longer range and larger size; however, for various reasons they were also unsuccessful in placing anything on the south coast except at the westernmost part.

Lack of a Plan

17. Officers who worked on these operations reported that there was no effective project plan for using small boats to deliver men and

equipment to forces inside Cuba who were best suited to use them to build up a powerful underground movement against Castro. According to these officers, WH/4 did not plan small boat operations; the case officers simply responded to requests by individual Cubans and groups. One officer remarked that the Cubans were running the operations.

18. Of all the attempts made to land men and supplies in Cuba clandestinely by water some of the most notable were made by the "Barbara J", a surplus LCI which the Agency bought in October 1960. It was intended that this craft would serve as a mother ship for small boat operations and also provide a long-range lift capability.

19. After a shakedown voyage in December, featured by a mutiny, the ship was scheduled for clandestine maritime infiltration of three paramilitary teams into Cuba. Initially there was some confusion as to who was running the operation since Miami had been handling small boat operations and had made the rendezvous plans for this one, but Headquarters had responsibility for the "Barbara J". WH/4 then sent the chief of its maritime section to Miami to coordinate, to brief the captain, and to dispatch the boat on its mission on 16 January.

20. The "Barbara J" put into Vieques Island on 31 January 1961 after having been unsuccessful in putting anybody ashore in Cuba. The crew's morale continued to deteriorate. Some refused to take direct orders, attempts to discipline the men were ineffective, the engineers refused to stand watch, and all of the crew wanted to return to Miami and resign. Also, nine of the ten agents did not wish to stay on the ship for another mission.

A Sit-down Strike

21. On 4 February the "Barbara J" sailed from Vieques for a rendezvous on the south coast of Cuba, 24 crew members having been left on a Vieques beach, where they staged a sit-down and a hunger strike. On 9 February the "Barbara J" reported that the contact had not shown up at the rendezvous point.

22. After trying again on 10 February, the captain of the "Barbara J" cabled: "Take a message to Garcia: The reluctant heroes in fishing boat again conspicuous by their absence." On 11 February he sent another odd cable: "Last message to Garcia: Your fishing boat still manifesting extreme shyness. Suggest next operation send in varsity." On 13 February he sent: "Cruised without making contact. Picked up small target on radar, tracked it down, and scared hell out of some fishermen who wanted no part of us."

23. The case officer and the team leaders had a different story. They stated that when the "Barbara J" arrived at the rendezvous point it was approached by a small boat that came at the right time and gave

the correct signals, but that as the boat came alongside the captain of the "Barbara J" ordered two floodlights turned on the boat which apparently scared it away. On 18 February the reception party sent a message that their boat had been at the right place at the right time and that a patrol boat had showed up. The "Barbara J" arrived at [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on 14 February without having received arrival instructions. On 15 February Miami sent a message saying that it was setting up facilities at Key West to receive the "Barbara J". Upon landing in Key West the ten paramilitary agents, having been on this trip for a month after spending two months in a safe house, were ready to resign and it took a considerable amount of persuasion to get them to stay with the program. They were then sent to New Orleans for holding.

Earning a Citation

24. Several officers who were associated with the captain of the "Barbara J", a contract employee acquired from Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), have testified to his drinking on duty, his bullying of Cubans, and his disregard for security. Drew Pearson wrote about the drunken American LCI skipper who scared away Cuban underground leaders with his ship's floodlights, and who threatened to abandon a sabotage team. On 21 March the project's paramilitary chief relieved the captain of his command and requested that he be terminated. However, the captain was retained on duty and eventually received full pay and a bonus for a six-month contract period in the amount of \$14,698.

25. WH/4 Branch initiated action to get the captain commended by his parent service for outstanding performance. In July 1961 he was cited "for completing an assignment involving extreme hazards in an outstanding manner, and displaying exceptional skill and courage" and given the Navy Superior Civilian Service Award—the highest honorary civilian award within the authority of the MSTS commander.

26. The branch had never taken action either to clear him or to convict him of serious charges, and the high commendation he received casts doubt not only on the validity of other WH/4 recommendations for merit citations but also on the quality of personnel management in the project.

Peculiar Organization

27. The organization for controlling clandestine maritime operations was peculiar. The forward operating base in Miami had the responsibility for small boat operations but could not run any without Headquarters approval. It was seldom that Headquarters had any query or refused to give approval.

28. But the Miami Base did not have the equipment and experience that were needed. For a long time the docking facilities were inade-

quate. The desirability of having a base at Key West was recognized as early as November 1960, but this base was not established until mid-February. It was insufficiently staffed and had a great many cover, security and administrative problems on which it received little assistance. At first it was under the direction of the Miami paramilitary section; eventually it was placed under the chief of the Miami Base.

29. The small staff at Key West not only supported small boat operations; it also had to take whatever action was necessary when disabled black flights came in to the local Naval air station since DPD had no representative in the area. Each unsuccessful maritime operation doubled the work. Boats coming back to a safe haven loaded with arms and explosives, usually crewed by Cubans and sometimes disabled in various ways, had to be unloaded again by whoever was available among paramilitary case officers and security and support people. A few staff employees worked almost around the clock for a month loading and unloading cargo without benefit of even a forklift. Many tons were so handled.

30. It is clear that there was no over-all policy in regard to the small boats. There was no clear directive as to whether to acquire short-range, speedy boats or long-range, slower boats; whether to use fishing craft and crews or special-purpose boats built specifically for our use. There was no policy on the use of a mother craft. There was no control over the amount of money spent on these small boats and their outfitting.

The Maritime Unit

31. WH/4 Headquarters had a staff employee whose job was small boat coordinator. This meant, in effect, checking proposed operations with the intelligence section, extending approvals and keeping records. WH/4 also had a separate maritime unit which handled the technical side of the small boats, approved funds for them, and arranged for personnel for them, but had nothing to do with their operations.

32. This maritime unit also had the responsibility for acquiring and fitting out the larger ships such as the "Barbara J", the "Blagar", the three LCUs and the ships used in the strike. This unit also had the responsibility for training underwater demolition teams, directing raiding operations, and overseeing the Vieques Base.

33. The lack of equipment, the shortage of experienced personnel, the press of time and the problems of coordination are shown by the experience which the maritime unit had with the acquisition and outfitting of the LCIs and the LCUs. The press of time hardly allowed for advertising for specific types of craft or soliciting competitive bids. The two LCIs (the "Barbara J" and the "Blagar") were purchased from a private corporation in Miami for \$70,000. About \$253,000 was then spent in modifying, repairing and outfitting them.

34. This work, which extended over a period of several months, was directed by officers from Headquarters during short temporary duty tours in the Miami area. The day-to-day supervision of the work was under several Navy chief petty officers (borrowed from the Agency's Office of Training) who had no contact with Miami Base, no authority to spend money or give orders, and no channel to procure parts and equipment. The technical and training abilities of these Navy chiefs were grossly misused by the project; much of their time was spent at stevedore or deckhand labor.

Training on LCUs

35. [1½ lines not declassified], three LCUs were bought directly from the Navy in September 1960 at \$125,000 each. Supposedly in operating condition, these craft had been stripped and were in such bad shape that they could hardly be moved from the dock. The dozen or so Agency employees who went to Little Creek to get them into operational condition were so busy with repairs that there was little time left for learning how to operate the craft, even though some members of the group were not familiar with LCUs, the engineers did not all know engineering and the skippers did not all know navigation. This group got the LCUs to Vieques Island somehow and proceeded to train the Cuban crews, which, however, were given no training in night landing and very little in navigation.

36. In all, about \$1,400,000 was spent on boats and ships, and the total cost of the maritime phases of the project was about \$2,679,000. Wages were a considerable item. For example, ship's masters on contract were budgeted at \$2,500 a month, cooks at \$1,000. There seemed to be a general failure at the top to realize how much boats cost to run and to keep in repair. The arrangement whereby officers in Headquarters tried to control the expenditures being made in Florida to repair and operate boats which were urgently needed was highly impractical. The high cost of boats in this project is well illustrated by the dismal case of the "Sea Gull".

Case of the "Sea Gull"

37. [1½ lines not declassified] It had previously been used to service offshore oil-drilling rigs and was estimated to have a fair market value of \$74,500.

38. The request for approval [less than 1 line not declassified] was signed for the chief of the project by a special assistant in the FI section (acting for the acting chief!) and approved by the Deputy Chief of WH Division (acting for his chief). It was [less than 1 line not declassified] christened the "Sea Gull" and transported to Miami, where it broke down 500 yards from the pier on its first trial run. On 6 January 1961

it was estimated that repairs and modifications would cost \$10,000; by 30 January, the estimate had grown to \$32,000; by 22 February, to \$40,000; and on 24 February, the shipyard doing the work submitted a bill for \$65,000! In all, the “Sea Gull” cost:

[text not declassified]	\$39,500
Repairs (eventually reduced from \$65,000)	58,000
Communications gear, tools, arms, navigation aids	14,000
	<hr/> \$111,500

39. The “Sea Gull” was not ready to be used until the last week of March; at this time it was commandeered (along with the “Wasp”) by a headquarters unit which was staging a deception operation in connection with the amphibious strike, over the strong protests of Miami Base, which never got to use the boat on an infiltration operation.

40. The lack of qualified personnel, the confusion of responsibility, the lack of planning, and the skyrocketing costs in the maritime activity led to a high-level request for the assignment of a qualified senior Naval officer to the project. When a captain reported, no one seemed to know what to do with him and, after he briefly visited Miami and Key West bases, he was assigned to the naval side of the strike planning at Headquarters. He is reported to have been not entirely happy with his brief Agency tour. In any event he was another example of poor handling of people in this project, and he was not given a chance to solve the problems of maritime operations.

41. It is apparent that the Agency had very little capability for maritime operations even of a clandestine nature. It lacked trained personnel, boats, bases, doctrine, and organization. The employees who worked in this sadly slighted activity were well aware of this, and morale was not high. As one of them said, “The lowest kind of operations officer is a paramilitary operations officer, and the lowest kind of PM officer is a maritime operations officer.”

L. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS—TRAINING UNDERGROUND LEADERS

1. Early in the project a carefully selected group of Cubans was trained for infiltration into Cuba to organize resistance. The loose management of the project is illustrated by the confusion between the headquarters elements and the training elements over what these men were being trained for, and by the failure to have their missions, means of entry, and reception ready for them.

2. The trained Cubans put into Cuba were too few and too late to do very much, and the strike planners ignored them. The cost of training and holding these men probably ran well over a million dollars, yet most of them were never used for what they were trained to do, and some were not used at all.

3. This particular endeavor began in December 1959 when the WH Division made a decision to pick a small group of Cubans and train them to train other Cubans for infiltration into Cuba in small paramilitary teams to organize resistance forces. Possible training sites in Panama were surveyed at this time, but no further action was taken. The basic policy paper approved by the President in March 1960 included the above proposal.

4. In April 1960, the Cuban leader Manuel Artime, who was in Miami, offered a number of his followers as recruits for this program. Useppa Island was acquired as an assessment and holding site, and a preliminary screening of the candidates for the training program began.

5. During May and June 1960 complete polygraphs, psychological and psychiatric tests, and evaluations were obtained on 66 individuals. Basic Morse code training was begun at the island. In June 29 trainees were sent from Useppa Island to Panama for basic paramilitary training. In July 32 trainees were sent to Guatemala to be trained as radio operators, and Useppa Island was then closed down.

The Training Site

6. A worse training site could hardly have been chosen than the one in Guatemala, it being almost inaccessible, with no training facilities and almost no living facilities. The trainees were put to work building the camp, working during the day and studying at night. This went on for several months.

7. The number of Americans at the camp was held to a bare minimum for security reasons. They were represented to be either tourists or adventurers. The camp commander was also the chief of training and the project officer for Guatemala. When he arrived, he had to set up the temporary camp, find an area for a permanent camp, contract for buildings, supplies, and equipment; he also had to find sites for a suitable air base, a maritime base, and a prison and contract for these facilities to be built. He had three assistants: a communications officer and two contract employees.

8. The initial group of paramilitary trainees was transferred to the Guatemala Base from Panama after two months of training. By 23 August there were 78 paramilitary trainees, 34 communications trainees, and nine staff and contract employees.

9. By September the training camp had enough facilities and instructors to begin a four-week basic training course. The trainees were sorted into seven-man teams according to their area knowledge and their aptitudes. Sixty were selected to go into Cuba (either legally or illegally) and to contact resistance groups; 60 were selected for action teams to go in illegally and join the resistance groups that had been contacted by the first teams; the remainder of the trainees would be

formed into a small conventional strike force. The training base expected the teams to be ready to go in October and asked Headquarters to provide the infiltration plans.

10. The trainers did not realize that Headquarters had changed the plan. Already in July the FRD, the exile political front, had been asked to provide 500 individuals for a paramilitary action cadre, and the training base was asked if it could accommodate this number. Obviously, it could not. Conditions actually got worse. In September the training camp was plagued by torrential tropical rains, shortages of food and supplies, plus trouble with agitators and hoodlums among their recently arrived trainees, who were not being screened and assessed as the first ones had been. The training base chief got into disfavor with Headquarters apparently because of his blunt cables asking for assistance. ("My men are going hungry and barefoot.")

Request for Missions

11. In October the infiltration teams that had been selected from among the trainees worked out detailed operational plans for themselves, complete with maps, propaganda handouts, and resistance operations. When the base announced that about a hundred men were ready to go, Headquarters replied that it was proposing the illegal infiltration of the teams in November by boat. (Actually, the only boat the project had at this time was the 54-foot "Metusa Time".) Headquarters further cabled that it was engaged in preparing a general plan for the employment of the infiltration teams but that *the details were not yet ready*. The base chief was recalled in October, and thereafter the training base had a new chief each week for five weeks. *One trainee* was put into Cuba legally at the end of October.

12. In November 1960 (12 months after the original decision had been made to train Cuban teams for resistance organization) ten teams were reported ready to go. But they were *still awaiting Headquarters plans* for infiltration. In all 178 men (including 23 radio operators) had been trained in security, basic clandestine tradecraft, intelligence collection and reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, reception operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrilla action, and similar matters.

13. Headquarters approved the use of 60 of these men for the resistance teams; all others were scheduled to begin formal, conventional combat training on 15 November as an element of a strike force of 1,500 men. This drastic change in over-all plan was announced to the training base by a cable on 4 November and led the base to plead for closer coordination in the future between Headquarters planning and the field training. During this month six trainees were moved to a Miami safe house where they stayed for two months, awaiting transportation into Cuba.

Move to Panama

14. In December 1960 Headquarters advised the training base that it was expecting approval of its operational concept, which included internal resistance stimulated by teams as well as the use of a ground and air assault force. It advised the base that a 750-man brigade (instead of 1,500) was being planned and that 80 men (instead of 60) were approved for infiltration teams. During this month the 80 men were moved to Panama where they were held until somebody could find out what to do with them. An offer from DPD to give them jump training was turned down by the project.

15. By January 1961 the morale of the trainees in Panama had declined considerably. There was not even an interpreter available for briefing and debriefing them. Headquarters then had 24 of them brought to safe houses in Miami to be made ready for dispatch. Twelve radio operators were moved from Panama to the Agency's training base in the United States for further training.

16. By February 1961 the 32 trainees still in Panama were described as disillusioned and at the breaking point. They were then transferred to a base in New Orleans to be given additional training in sabotage and air-maritime reception. February was actually a red-letter month. Six of the radio operators were infiltrated legally. On 14 February the first resistance team was put into Cuba, and two more teams went in at the end of the month. However, the two teams which had sat in a Miami safe house from mid-November to mid-January returned to Miami in bad humor in mid-February after a month on the "Barbara J" circumnavigating Cuba without being put ashore.

17. An effective infiltration mechanism never was developed. Not one of the paramilitary teams was ever delivered by air. On 29 March the project was able to put four agents into Cuba through Guantanamo Base. It is not clear why this could not have been done earlier. No infiltration was ever tried by submarine.

Morale Problems

18. On 10 March 1961 (16 months after the original decision to train resistance teams) the 90 men who had been trained for this were distributed as follows:

- 32 infiltrated, including 14 radio operators
 - 5 at sea on a sabotage mission
 - 6 in New Orleans as members of a raider team
 - 28 in New Orleans still awaiting infiltration
 - 19 detached to Miami for various impending operations.

The morale of the remaining trainees was low and their anger high. This caused a great many problems in New Orleans. Some of these

men had been *held in five different camps over a ten-month period*. On 30 March, about three weeks before the invasion, the remainder of the group (about 20) were transferred to Miami and turned loose, being described as a collection of spoiled individuals distinguished by bad conduct. At least 30 of the agents who were recruited between May and September 1960 *never got into Cuba at all*; among the 30 were eight who came into the project in the original group in May 1960 and who were in training almost continuously from that time up to April 1961.

19. The time spent in training is no measure of the quality of the training, of course, and there was undoubtedly a great waste of time. One of the Cubans trained for infiltration into Cuba wrote that after he arrived in Panama in December 1960: “. . . during almost three weeks, the only thing I did . . . was cleaning a small dam and the shooting range. After that we just didn’t do anything, just sleep and ate, that’s all.” When he arrived in Florida on 18 January: “There, the same history, sleep, eat, play card and watch television. The only training I received during that time was on secret writing, which was very good but nothing else.” The same agent pointed out serious deficiencies in his weapons training and his final briefing.

20. One of the instructors in Guatemala in the early months later claimed that only two instructors knew their business; the others were chosen from the trainee cadre, who had only a background of two months’ training themselves. He included himself among the unqualified.

Training Omission

21. The remoteness of the training site caused additional difficulties. When brigade training started on 29 November there were only two compasses for 405 troops, and these belonged to trainees. Compasses had first been requested on 2 October, but when they were not received the training in their use had to be omitted from the program.

22. More serious, there had never been any definition of training goals, and the base and Headquarters were working at cross-purposes. The chief of the training base in Guatemala never received any letter of instruction.

23. The situation at the New Orleans Base in March 1961 was even more chaotic. The instructors found a training area which was 90% swamp and filled with poisonous snakes. Demolition classes had to be conducted along a footpath leading from a theater to a mess hall, with constant interruptions from passers-by. Nobody seemed able to define the training that was required. A demolitions instructor was assured on arrival that the group he had come to train did not need the instruction; in any case, there were no explosive training materials, no adequate range, and no gear to set one up. Another instructor, sent

to New Orleans to train a small raider group, found himself expected to train, organize and equip a 90-man guerrilla force. A week later he found himself training a 160-man assault battalion instead. The training requirement was never spelled out, and the training equipment never showed up.

24. Training activity of various sorts was going on continually; there were requirements for everything from counterintelligence to small boat handling. But there was no full-time chief of training in the project to oversee requirements, define responsibilities, set up facilities and provide support. Consequently, what training was done, was done without control, by individual case officers doing the best they could. How effective this training was cannot be determined. Much of it took place in Miami, where personnel from the base were instructing Cubans in intelligence collection, counterintelligence techniques, psychological warfare activities, or paramilitary subjects, according to need.

25. The training was necessarily conducted in safe houses, and required a considerable expenditure of time on the part of base personnel. Other training was conducted in the Washington area, usually by case officers. One man was trained in a hotel room to make a parachute jump (he made one successfully!). Many requests were levied on the Office of Training for instructors and training materials. But these were uncoordinated and wasteful. Many of the instructors, when made available, were not used in their specialties, ending up in such jobs as stevedoring instead.

26. A well thought-out project would have had a training annex which would have laid specific requirements on the Office of Training, particularly when the training of hundreds of people was an integral part of the venture. Instead, the requirements were met in piecemeal and improvised fashion, under difficult conditions, and with dubious results.

M. SECURITY

1. The assault on Cuba is generally acknowledged to have been a poorly kept secret. It could hardly have been otherwise, considering the complexity of the operation and the number of people involved, both Cuban and American. The inspection team did not make a detailed study of the security aspects of the operation but came across many weaknesses in the protection of information and activities from those who did not "need to know."

2. In general the Cubans who were in the operation do not seem to have had any real understanding of the need to keep quiet about their activities. Many of them knew much more than they needed to know, and they were not compartmented from each other and from Americans to the extent that was necessary. For example, one wealthy

Cuban who was close to the operation was being contacted by at least six different staff employees.

3. Some agents were being handled by two or three different case officers at the same time, with confusing results and lack of control. Many of the agents who were sent into Cuba had known each other during training; for example, a dozen radio operators had been trained as a group. If one was arrested, he would know who the other ones were. One radio operator inside Cuba was aware of almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba from the beginning of the project.

4. Agents who were supposedly well trained disregarded elementary rules of personal security and were arrested because they needlessly gave away their true identities by visiting relatives who were under surveillance or by carrying identifying documents in their pockets.

Hazard in Miami

5. The Miami area represented a particular hazard because stories and rumors spread rapidly through the large Cuban community, which included Castro agents. Movements of boats and people soon became known. One agent, who had been infiltrated into Cuba by boat, reported later that within three days his family in Miami knew when and how he had landed, because one of the crew members of the boat had told many people in Miami about it. Letters from the training camp, although censored, managed nevertheless to convey information to the Miami Cubans.

6. The Americans on the project in many cases also failed to observe strict security discipline. One senior case officer holding an operational meeting with Cubans in a Miami motel was overheard by a citizen, who reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

7. It has been testified that the security measures at the training camps in Guatemala and at New Orleans were inadequate. Furthermore, the training camps had no adequate counterintelligence capability. Except for an instructor borrowed from the Office of Training for a few weeks, the Agency was unable to provide a counterintelligence officer to the camps. This lack was serious because, in order to obtain a great many recruits for the strike force in a hurry, there was very little screening of the volunteers, and some who were sent to camp had been inadequately checked.

Poor Backstopping

8. Instances were noted of poor backstopping of the cover stories of Agency employees, sketchy briefings on cover, weak cover stories, and faulty documentation. Much of this can be ascribed to lack of attention to detail due to the press of time. Many of the early difficulties

in Guatemala stemmed from the inadvisability of providing supplies and support to instructors who were posing as “tourists” and “soldiers of fortune”. This pretense eventually had to be dropped because of its impracticality. A serious weakness showed up in the poor arrangements for backstopping overflights (for example, the plane that landed in Jamaica).

9. Somewhat curiously, a strict compartmentation was applied in certain areas of the project which actually denied information to people who needed it. Those who were engaged in running agents into Cuba were never allowed into the War Room or given the plan for the strike.

10. For security reasons, the resistance elements inside Cuba were not advised of the time of the assault, and could hardly have risen up even if there had been 100,000 of them. The entire complement of the Miami Base was likewise uninformed and was unprepared to take action when the strike occurred. Staff employees at the Miami Base, who could have benefited by special clearances, did not get them until much too late.

Use of Guatemala

11. The use of Guatemala for training bases was, in terms of security, unfortunate. It is obvious now that the training could have been done more securely in the United States (as for example, the tank crew training, which got no publicity at all). The Guatemala camps were not easily hidden and not easily explained. The air base was located on a well-traveled road and in view of a railroad where trainloads of Guatemalans frequently halted on a siding.

12. It is strange that the training of the Cubans was undertaken in a foreign country, where the trainees were necessarily exposed to the natives and reporters could pick up information. Presumably this was done on grounds of security and non-attributability; however, the radio operators who were trained in Guatemala were later brought to the United States for further training. The force for the abortive diversionary expedition was trained in New Orleans rather than being sent outside the country. Other Cubans were trained in both paramilitary and espionage subjects in the outskirts of Miami and Washington, and still others were trained on American soil at Vieques Island. Of all these training locations, only the ones in Guatemala became known to the world.

13. It is acknowledged that many Cubans and Americans observed strict security discipline, that the security officers of the project made an outstanding contribution, and that many arrangements and activities are not open to criticism regarding their security. Unfortunately, this was not good enough for a project of this size and importance, conducted by professional intelligence officers.

14. Because of the operation's magnitude, the errors committed resulted in the exposure of Agency personnel and *modus operandi* to many uncontrolled individuals, both foreign and American.

N. AMERICANS IN COMBAT

1. During the invasion landing two Agency contract employees, assigned as operations officers aboard the two LCIs, went ashore to mark two of the beaches and exchanged gunfire with Cuban militia. One of these employees had taken part in a sabotage raid on a Cuban oil refinery a month earlier. Both of them engaged in rescue operations along the Cuban shore after the brigade collapsed.

2. In late 1960 the project leaders were becoming doubtful of the motivation of the Cuban pilots they were training and of their ability to perform tactical missions successfully. In January 1961 the Agency requested the Special Group to authorize the use of American contract pilots. The authorization given was limited to the hiring of the pilots and reserved for later decision the question of their actual use. The Special Group also granted authority to recruit and hire American seamen to serve in the invasion fleet.

3. Three American contract pilots with long Agency experience were made available from another project. A number of other pilots and air-crew technicians, members or ex-members of several Air National Guard units, were recruited especially for the project in early 1961 under cover of a notional commercial company.

4. Through the first day of fighting, 17 April, only Cuban air crews were used for combat or drop missions. Of 11 Cuban-manned B-26s which had gone over the beachhead, only three had returned to base, and four of the others had been shot down. That night the available Cuban crews were exhausted and dispirited.

5. On 18 April the hard pressed exile brigade was calling for air support. Two American fliers volunteered to go, and several Cuban crews followed their example. The result was a highly successful attack against a column of Castro's forces moving on Blue Beach. Four American-manned aircraft were in combat over the beachhead the following day, and two of them were shot down by Castro's T-33s. Later the same day two American crews returned for another sortie. Four American fliers were either killed in combat or executed by Castro forces after being shot down.

6. In addition to these actions, an American-manned PBY patrolled the waters south of Cuba for a total of 57 hours during five days on air-sea rescue and communications relay duty.

7. The American pilots lost in combat were aware of United States Government sponsorship and probably also of Agency interest, but had been instructed not to inform their families of this. In spite of wide

press coverage of the invasion failure, the story of the American pilots has never gotten into print, although its sensational nature still makes this a possibility. In dealing with the surviving families it has been necessary to conceal connection with the United States Government. This effort has been complicated by the fact that the original cover story was changed and a second notional company substituted.

8. The resolution in a secure manner of the legal and moral claims arising from these four deaths has been costly, complicated and fraught with risk of disclosure of the Government's role. These problems were aggravated by the inclusion in the employment contracts of certain unnecessarily complicated insurance clauses and by the project's failure to prepare in advance an effective plan for dealing with the eventual legal and security problems.

O. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Certain basic *conclusions* have been drawn from this survey of the Cuban operation:

1. The Central Intelligence Agency, after starting to build up the resistance and guerrilla forces inside Cuba, drastically converted the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation. The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.

2. The Agency became so wrapped up in the military operation that it failed to appraise the chances of success realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success, and it did not press sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast moving situation.

3. As the project grew, the Agency reduced the exiled leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation.

4. The Agency failed to build up and supply a resistance organization under rather favorable conditions. Air and boat operations showed up poorly.

5. The Agency failed to collect adequate information on the strengths of the Castro regime and the extent of the opposition to it; and it failed to evaluate the available information correctly.

6. The project was badly organized. Command lines and management controls were ineffective and unclear. Senior Staffs of the Agency were not utilized; air support stayed independent of the project; the role of the large forward base was not clear.

7. The project was not staffed throughout with top-quality people, and a number of people were not used to the best advantage.

8. The Agency entered the project without adequate assets in the way of boats, bases, training facilities, agent nets, Spanish-speakers, and similar essential ingredients of a successful operation. Had these been already in being, much time and effort would have been saved.

9. Agency policies and operational plans were never clearly delineated, with the exception of the plan for the brigade landing; but even this provided no disaster plan, no unconventional warfare annex, and only extremely vague plans for action following a successful landing. In general, Agency plans and policies did not precede the various operations in the project but were drawn up in response to operational needs as they arose. Consequently, the scope of the operation itself and of the support required was constantly shifting.

There were some good things in this project. Much of the support provided was outstanding (for example, logistics and communications). A number of individuals did superior jobs. Many people at all grade levels gave their time and effort without stint, working almost unlimited hours over long periods, under difficult and frustrating conditions, without regard to personal considerations. But this was not enough.

It is assumed that the Agency, because of its experience in this Cuban operation, will never again engage in an operation that is essentially an overt military effort. But before it takes on another major covert political operation it will have to improve its organization and management drastically. It must find a way to set up an actual task force, if necessary, and be able to staff it with the best people. It must govern its operation with clearly defined policies and carefully drawn plans, engaging in full coordination with the Departments of State and Defense as appropriate.

Previous surveys and other papers written by the Inspector General have called attention to many of these problems and deficiencies, and have suggested solutions. For example, in June 1958 a recommendation was made, in a survey of the Far East Division, that a high-level Agency study be made of the extent to which the Agency should be engaged in paramilitary operations, "if any"; and that it include an evaluation of the capabilities of other government departments to assume primary responsibility in this field.

In January 1959 the Inspector General pointed out in a memorandum to the Deputy Director (Plans) that: "A basic problem in the PM field is the delineation of responsibility between the Agency and the military services. In our view, the Clandestine Services tends to assume responsibilities beyond its capabilities and does not give sufficient consideration to the ability of other Departments of the Government to conduct or participate in these operations."

A 1955 survey of the then Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff warned against the by-passing of this staff by the operating

divisions, who were dealing directly with the Deputy Director (Plans) and the Director of Central Intelligence instead. In March 1961 the survey of the Covert Action Staff again warned against ignoring the staff and failing to utilize its services.

The July 1959 survey of the Deputy Director (Plans) organization again stressed the importance of the functional staffs, particularly in relation to the conduct of complex operations, and advocated the use of a task force for covert operations having major international significance.

"These operations", the survey stated, "may be aimed at the overthrow of a hostile regime and may require extensive paramilitary operations, and clandestine logistics and air support of substantial magnitude. Such operations must be coordinated with national policy on a continuing basis, and may require constant high-level liaison with the State Department and the White House. To be successful, major covert operations of this nature require the effective mobilization of all the resources of the DD/P, and are clearly beyond the capabilities of any one area division."

The same survey added that the Caribbean task force located in the WH Division was planning at a great rate, but accomplishing little because it was too low-level to act decisively or to obtain effective policy guidance from other departments of the Government; it did not even inspire confidence among many senior DD/P officers. Such task forces within a single division "represent a woefully inadequate response to a problem of major national significance. Command of such a task force must be a full-time job, and the task force commander must be of sufficient stature to deal directly with the Under Secretary of State or with other senior officials of the government as the need arises."

The same survey also discussed the management problem in the DD/P area at length, and made a number of recommendations which are on record. Among other things, it pointed out the confusion as to the relationship and functions of the three top officers.

The study of the Cuban operation shows that these criticisms and many others discussed in previous Inspector General surveys are still valid and worthy of review. But the Cuban operation, in addition to demonstrating old weaknesses again, also showed Agency weaknesses not clearly discerned before.

The Inspector General, as a result of his study of the Cuban operation, makes the following *recommendations* regarding future Agency involvement in covert operations which have major international significance and which may profoundly affect the course of world events:

1. Such an operation should be carried out by a carefully selected task force, under the command of a senior official of stature on a

full-time basis, and organizationally outside the DD/P structure but drawing upon all the resources of the Clandestine Services.

2. The Agency should request that such projects should be transferred to the Department of Defense when they show signs of becoming overt or beyond Agency capabilities.

3. The Agency should establish a procedure under which the Board of National Estimates or other body similarly divorced from clandestine operations would be required to evaluate all plans for such major covert operations, drawing on all available intelligence and estimating the chances of success from an intelligence point of view.

4. The Agency should establish a high-level board of senior officers from its operational and support components, plus officers detailed from the Pentagon and the Department of State, to make cold, hard appraisals at recurring intervals of the chances of success of major covert projects from an operational point of view.

5. A mechanism should be established for communicating these intelligence and operational appraisals to the makers of national policy.

6. In return, a mechanism should be established to communicate to the Agency the national policy bearing on such projects, and the Agency should not undertake action until clearly defined policy has been received.

7. The Agency should improve its system for the guided collection of information essential to the planning and carrying out of such projects.

8. The Agency should take immediate steps to eliminate the deficiencies in its clandestine air and maritime operations.

9. The Agency should take steps to improve its employees' competence in foreign languages, knowledge of foreign areas, and capability in dealing with foreign people, when such skills are necessary.

10. The Agency should devise a more orderly system for the assignment of employees within the DD/P area than that currently in use.

Annex A

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. *Objective:* The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside

of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. *Summary Outline:* The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations

on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. *Leadership*: It is important to avoid distracting and divisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. *Cover*: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. \$100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional \$2,000,000.

5. *Budget*: It is anticipated that approximately \$4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is \$900,000 with the balance of \$3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy deci-

sions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. *Recommendations*: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

Tab A

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived—many being former 26th of July members—and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.

[omission in original]

Tab B

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). [less than 1 line not declassified] and [less than 1 line not declassified] have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave

broadcasts from [less than 1 line not declassified] and [less than 1 line not declassified]. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one “gray” U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid “gray” broadcasting from Florida.

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. *Avance*, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas’ paper), has been confiscated as has *El Mundo*, another Cuban daily. *Diario de la Marina*, one of the hemisphere’s outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print *Avance* weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of “exile” editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.

Tab C

FINANCIAL ANNEX			
I.	Political Action	FY-1960	FY-1961
	Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities	150,000	800,000

II. *Propaganda*

Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of transmitters)	400,000	700,000
Press and Publications	100,000	500,000

III. *Paramilitary*

In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training	200,000	1,300,000
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IV. *Intelligence Collection*

	50,000	200,000
Totals	<u>2900,000</u>	<u>3,500,000</u>

Annex B*CUBA*

1. *BACKGROUND*: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion the organization of a broadly based opposition to the Castro regime and the development of propaganda channels, clandestine agent nets within Cuba, and trained paramilitary ground and air forces wherewith that opposition could overthrow the Cuban regime. The concept was that this should be so far as possible a Cuban operation, though it was well understood that support in many forms would have to come from the United States. Great progress has been made in this undertaking. A Government-in-Exile will soon be formed embracing most reputable opposition elements. It will have a left-of-center political orientation and should command the support of liberals both within Cuba and throughout the hemisphere. It will sponsor and increasingly control trained and combat-ready military forces based in Central America. A decision must soon be made as to the support (if any) the United States will render the opposition henceforth.

2. *PROSPECTS FOR THE CASTRO REGIME*: The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. Assuming that the United States applies political and economic pressures at roughly present levels of severity, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support. There is no significant likelihood that the Castro regime will fall of its own weight.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on

² These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

b. Cuba is in economic difficulties but the Communist Bloc will almost certainly take whatever steps are necessary to forestall any decisive intensification of these troubles. Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or the significant weakening of the Castro regime.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained Cuban pilots of known political reliability. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open.

3. *THE NATURE OF THE THREAT*: Cuba will, of course, never present a direct military threat to the United States and it is unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other Latin American country since the U.S. could and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the side of the invaded country. Nevertheless, as Castro further stabilizes his regime, obtains more sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia, Cuba will provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations and expansion of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Arms, money, organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba to dissident leaders and groups throughout Latin America in order to create political instability, encourage Communism, weaken the prestige of the U.S., and foster the inevitable popular support that Castro's continuance of power will engender. A National Estimate states: "For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the United States."

4. *POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION*: For reasons which require no elaboration the overt use of U.S. military forces to mount an invasion of Cuba has been excluded as a practical alternative. Broadly defined the following three possible alternative courses of action remain for consideration:

a. Intensification of economic and political pressures coupled with continued covert support of sabotage and minor guerrilla actions but excluding substantial commitment of the Cuban opposition's paramilitary force.

b. Employment of the paramilitary force but in a manner which would not have the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.

c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.

These alternatives are discussed in the following paragraphs.

5. *DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE*: There is little that can be done to impose real political and economic pressure on the Castro regime and no such course of action now under serious consideration seems likely to bring about its overthrow.

a. A true blockade of Cuba enforced by the United States would involve technical acts of war and has now been dismissed as infeasible.

b. Action to halt arms shipments from Cuba into any other part of the hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily evaded if air transport were employed. While undoubtedly of some value it is difficult to see that the institution of such measures would either impose severe pressure on the Castro regime or effectively insulate the rest of the hemisphere from it. Castro's principal tools of subversion are people, ideology, the force of example and money. The flow of these items cannot be dammed up.

c. Further economic sanctions are theoretically possible but can quite readily be offset by an increase of trade with the Bloc.

d. In any event, it is estimated that the prospects for effective international action are poor.

6. *THE MIDDLE COURSE*: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary force gradually to an assembly point in suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major encounters in the process and committing it to extensive guerrilla action. This course of action would have the advantage of rendering unnecessary a single major landing which could be described as an invasion. The infiltration phase would take on the coloration of efforts by small groups of Cubans to join an already existing resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be infeasible on military grounds. Basically the reasons (explained more fully in the attachment) are:

a. It is considered militarily infeasible to infiltrate in small units a force of this size to a single area where it could assemble, receive supplies, and engage in coordinated military action. Such an operation would have to be done over a period of time and the loss of the element of surprise after initial infiltrations would permit government forces to frustrate further reinforcements to the same area.

b. Military units significantly smaller than the battalion presently undergoing unit training would fall short of the “minimum critical mass” required to give any significant likelihood of success. Smaller scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings of wide-spread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro’s armed forces.

c. Actually, the least costly and most efficient way to infiltrate the force into a terrain suitable for protracted and powerful guerrilla operations would be by a single landing of the whole force as currently planned and its retirement from the landing point into the chosen redoubt.

7. *A LANDING IN FORCE*: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of the plan for a landing by the Cuban opposition. They have concluded that “this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success” (that is of detonating a major and ultimately successful revolt against Castro) and that, if ultimate success is not achieved there is every likelihood that the landing can be the means of establishing in favorable terrain a powerful guerrilla force which could be sustained almost indefinitely. The latter outcome would not be (and need not appear as) a serious defeat. It would be the means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime and would be a continuing demonstration of inability of the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for an OAS intervention to impose a cease-fire and hold elections.

a. Any evaluation of the chances of success of the assault force should be realistic about the fighting qualities of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia are not fighters by instinct or background and are not militiamen by their own choice. Their training has been slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire (particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are strong that substantial numbers will desert or change sides.

b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary force would be widely assumed to be U.S. supported. Nevertheless, this conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its activity would not be inconsistent with the potentialities for support by private Cuban and American groups rather than by the U.S. Government. It must be emphasized, moreover, that this enterprise would have nothing in common (as

would the use of U.S. military forces) with the Russian suppression of Hungary or the Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. This would be a force of dissident Cubans with Cuban political and military leadership.

c. There would be adverse political repercussions to a landing in force but it is not clear how serious these would be. Most Latin American Governments would at least privately approve of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an opposition move, especially if the political coloration of the opposition were left-of-center. The reaction of the rest of the free world, it is estimated, would be minimal in the case of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an attempt. It might produce a good deal of cynicism throughout the world about the U.S. role but if quickly successful little lasting reaction. Generally speaking it is believed that the political cost would be low in the event of a fairly quick success. The political dangers flowing from long continued large scale guerilla warfare would be greater but there are diplomatic preparations that could be made to forestall extreme adverse reactions in this contingency.

8. *DISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARY FORCE*: A decision not to use the paramilitary force must consider the problem of dissolution, since its dissolution will surely be the only alternative if it is not used within the next four to six weeks. It is hoped that at least one hundred volunteers could be retained for infiltration in small teams but it is doubtful whether more than this number would be available or useful for this type of activity.

a. There is no doubt that dissolution in and of itself will be a blow to U.S. prestige as it will be interpreted in many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidence of the U.S. inability to take decisive action with regard to Castro. David will again have defeated Goliath. Anti-U.S. regimes like that of Trujillo would gain strength while pro-U.S. Betancourt would undoubtedly suffer. Surely Ydigoras, who has been an exceedingly strong ally, would also be placed in a very difficult position for his support of a disbanded effort. It must be remembered in this connection that there are sectors of Latin American opinion which criticize the U.S. for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Castro regime. In fact, one reason why many Latin American governments are holding back in opposing Castro is because they feel that sooner or later the U.S. will be compelled to take strong measures.

b. The resettlement of the military force will unavoidably cause practical problems. Its members will be angry, disillusioned and aggressive with the inevitable result that they will provide honey for the press bees and the U.S. will have to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments. Perhaps more important, however, will be the loss of good relations with the opposition Cuban leaders. To date almost all non-Batista, non-Communist political leaders have been encouraged

or offered help in fighting Castro. An abandonment of the military force will be considered by them as a withdrawal of all practical support. In view of the breadth of the political spectrum involved, this will cause some difficulties for the future since it is hard to imagine any acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not include some of the exiles dealt with during the past year.

9. *CONCLUSIONS:*

a. Castro's position is daily getting stronger and will soon be consolidated to the point that his overthrow will only be possible by drastic, politically undesirable actions such as an all-out embargo or an overt use of military force.

b. A failure to remove Castro by external action will lead in the near future to the elimination of all internal and external Cuban opposition of any effective nature. Moreover, the continuance of the Castro regime will be a substantial victory for the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will use Cuba as a base for increased activity throughout the Western Hemisphere, thereby accentuating political instability and weakening U.S. prestige and influence.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force, if used, has a good chance of overthrowing Castro or at the very least causing a damaging civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba. Whatever embarrassment the alleged (though deniable) U.S. support may cause, it may well be considerably less than that resulting from the continuation of the Castro regime or from the more drastic and more attributable actions necessary to accomplish the result at a later date.

d. Even though the best estimate of likely Soviet reaction to a successful movement against Castro indicates problems to the U.S. arising from the removal or substantial weakening of the Castro regime, Soviet propaganda and political moves will still be much less prejudicial to the long-range interests of the U.S. than would the results of a failure to remove Castro.

Appendix A

A. CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION BY SEA OF SMALL GROUPS (UP TO 50 MEN)

1. The only areas of Cuba with mountainous terrain of sufficient extent and ruggedness for guerrilla operations are the Sierra Escambray of La Villas Province in Central Cuba and the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at the eastern extremity of the island. The Sierra de les Organos of Western Cuba do not encompass sufficient area and are not rugged enough to sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition. Of

the two areas with adequate terrain, only the Sierra Escambray is truly suitable for our purposes, since the mountains in Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases in Latin America available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary reliance would have to be placed on this method of supply for guerrilla forces.

2. The Government of Cuba (GOC) has concentrated large forces of army and militia in both Las Villas and Oriente Provinces. Estimates of troop strength in Las Villas have varied recently from 17,000 to as high as 60,000 men, while up to 12,000 men are believed to be stationed in Oriente.

3. While of dubious efficiency and morale, the militia, by sheer weight of numbers has been able to surround and eliminate small groups of insurgents. A landing by 27 men of the Masferrer Group in Oriente, for example, was pursued and eliminated by 2,000 militia. A similar group of insurgents in Western Cuba, was attacked and destroyed by six battalions of army and militia (about 3,000 men).

4. A build-up of force in a given area by infiltration of small groups would require a series of night landings in the same general vicinity. Discovery of the initial landing by GOC forces would be almost a certainty, since security posts are located at all possible landing areas. Even if the initial landing were successful, the GOC could be expected to move troops and naval patrol craft to the area making further landings difficult if not impossible. Any small force landed, experience has shown, will be rapidly engaged by forces vastly superior in numbers. Therefore, it is considered unlikely that small groups landing on successive occasions would succeed in joining forces later. A series of surrounded pockets of resistance would be the result.

5. Repeated approaches to the Cuban coast by vessels large enough to land up to 50 men would probably provoke attack by the Cuban Navy and/or Air Force, either of which is capable of destroying any vessels which could be used by CIA for these purposes.

6. In the Sierra Escambray, which is the only area of Cuba in which true guerrilla operations are now being conducted, ill-equipped and untrained groups of up to 200 to 300 men have been hard pressed to survive and have been unable to conduct effective operations. The only worthwhile accomplishment of these bands has been to serve as a symbol of resistance. Smaller groups, even though better trained and equipped, could not be expected to be effective.

7. There are very few sites on the south coast of the Sierra Escambray where small boats can be landed. These are found principally at the mouths of rivers and are all guarded by militia posts armed with machine guns. A small group landing at such a point by shuttling from a larger vessel in small boats would probably receive heavy casualties.

8. Small-scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings and widespread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces. *These conditions must be produced before the Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of overt intervention by United States armed forces.* As long as the armed forces respond to Castro's orders, he can maintain himself in power indefinitely. The history of all police-type states bears out this conclusion.

9. The CIA Cuban Assault Force, composed entirely of volunteers, has been trained for action as a compact, heavily armed, hard-hitting military unit, and the troops are aware of the combat power which they possess as a unit. They have been indoctrinated in the military principle of mass and instructed that dispersion of force leads to defeat in detail. They will be quick to recognize the disadvantages of the infiltration concept, and it is unlikely that all would volunteer for piecemeal commitment to military action in Cuba. The troops can be used in combat only on a voluntary basis. The Government of the United States exercises no legal command or disciplinary authority over them.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. This course of action would result in large scale loss of life, both through military action against forces vastly superior in numbers and as a result of drum-head justice and firing squad execution of those captured.

2. This alternative could achieve no effective military or psychological results.

Annex C

PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

1. *Status of Preparatory Action:* About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers.

A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows:

a. *Political:* Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democrático), which was created in the hope that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified opposition to Cas-

tro, has proved to be highly useful as a cover and administrative mechanism but important political elements refused to join it.

Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would include the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a provisional government. Considerable progress has been made in negotiations with the principal Cuban leaders in which great efforts have been made to permit the Cubans to chart their own course. It is expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. What is emerging from these negotiations is a provisional government with a center to left-of-center political orientation, and a political platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of the 26 July movement. It is believed that this will command the support of a very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups.

b. *Military*: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness.

(1) A reinforced battalion with a present strength of 850 which will be brought up to a strength of approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes and as a reserve.

(2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion.

(3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C-54s and 5 C-46s.

(4) Shipping including 2 100-ton ships, 5 1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCUs and 4 LCVs.

A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. *Timing*: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. *The Situation in Cuba*: We estimate that time is against us. The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the

absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is making good use of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3. *Possible Courses of Action:* Four alternative courses of action involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are:

a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a manner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.

b. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing with tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil

of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.

c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location in the same manner as in paragraph 3.b. above.

d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep control of a beachhead for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition of a provisional government and a gradual build-up of military strength.

4. *Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces:* Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks.

a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.)

b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualties could not be evacuated.

c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.

5. *A Landing in Full Force:* This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support.

a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force.

b. This course of action has a better chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing shock.

c. If this operation were not successful in setting off widespread revolt, freedom of action of the U.S. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neither require U.S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i.e., guerrilla action could be continued on a sizeable scale in favorable terrain. This would be a means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime.

6. *A Diversionary Landing:* As a variant of the above plan, it would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a force of about 160 men in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a landing of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. At least a part of the provisional government would go in with the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional government on Cuban soil would thereupon be announced. The subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined in paragraph 5 preceding.

a. This course of action might have certain political advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help.

b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit.

7. *Landing and Slow Build-up:* Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt

or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U.S. after a decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead.

a. A major political advantage of this course of action would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military organization than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually unopposed by land forces. Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for a protracted build-up after the initial assault.

b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which both contains a useable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up.

c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three.

8. *Conclusions:*

a. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight. In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected.

b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castro's military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing a damaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba.

d. Among the alternative course of action here reviewed, an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result.

Annex D

REVISED CUBAN OPERATION

1. *Political Requirements:* The plan for a Cuban operation and the variants thereof presented on 11 March were considered to be politically objectionable on the ground that the contemplated operation would not have the appearance of an infiltration of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but rather that of a small-scale World War II type of amphibious assault. In undertaking to develop alternative plans and to judge their political acceptability, it has been necessary to infer from the comments made on the earlier plan the characteristics which a new plan should possess in order to be politically acceptable. They would appear to be the following:

a. *An Unspectacular Landing:* The initial landing should be as unspectacular as possible and should have neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air support. It should conform as closely as possible to the typical pattern of the landings of small groups intended to establish themselves or to join others in terrain suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air support and in order to fit the pattern, it should probably be at night.

b. *A Base for Tactical Air Operations:* It was emphasized that ultimate success of the operation will require tactical air operations leading to the establishment of the control of the air over Cuba. In order to fit the pattern of revolution, these operations should be conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces. Since it is impracticable to undertake construction of an air base in the rainy season and before any air support is available, the territory seized in the original landing must include an air strip that can support tactical operations.

c. *Slower Tempo:* The operation should be so designed that there could be an appreciable period of build up after the initial landing before major offensive action was undertaken. This would allow for a minimum decent interval between the establishment and the recognition by the U.S. of a provisional government and would fit more closely the pattern of a typical revolution.

d. *Guerrilla Warfare Alternative:* Ideally, the terrain should not only be protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attack from land but also suitable for guerrilla warfare in the event that an organized perimeter could not be held.

2. *Alternative Areas:* Five different areas, three of them on the mainland of Cuba and two on islands off the coast, were studied carefully to determine whether they would permit an operation fitting the above conditions. One of the areas appears to be eminently suited for the operation. All the others had to be rejected either because of unfavorable

geography (notably the absence of a suitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of enemy forces, or both. The area selected is located at the head of a well protected deep water estuary on the south coast of Cuba. It is almost surrounded by swamps impenetrable to infantry in any numbers and entirely impenetrable to vehicles, except along two narrow and easily defended approaches. Although strategically isolated by these terrain features, the area is near the center of the island and the presence of an opposition force there will soon become known to the entire population of Cuba and constitute a serious threat to the regime. The beachhead area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate to handle B-26's. There are several good landing beaches. It is of interest that this area has been the scene of resistance activities and of outright guerrilla warfare for over a hundred years.

3. Phases of the Operation:

a. The operation will begin with a night landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objective area and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with few if any casualties and with no serious combat. As many supplies as possible will be unloaded over the beaches but the ships will put to sea in time to be well offshore by dawn. The whole beachhead area including the air strips will be immediately occupied and approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore in the initial landing. It is believed that this operation can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro regime will have little idea of the size of the force involved.

b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro Air Force. Concurrently C-46's will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance equipment, and maintenance personnel. As rapidly as possible, the whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will be based there plausibly to account for all observable activity over the island.

c. In the third phase, as soon as there is adequate protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will move back into the beach to discharge supplies and equipment (including tanks). It must be presumed that counter attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken within 24 to 48 hours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the most direct approach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizeable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the beachhead.

d. The timing and direction of such offensive action will depend upon the course of events in the island. At least three directions of break out are possible. Because of the canalization of the approaches

to the beachhead from the interior, a break out will require close support by tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces are thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault with tactical air support against a different objective area if it should seem desirable.

4. *Political Action:* The beachhead area proposed to be occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should be entirely feasible to install the provisional government there as soon as aircraft can land safely. Once installed, the tempo of the operation will permit the U.S. Government to extend recognition after a decent interval and thus to prepare the way for more open and more extensive logistical support if this should be necessary.

5. *Military Advantages:*

a. This is a safer military operation than the daylight landing in force originally proposed. The landing itself is more likely to be unopposed or very lightly opposed and the beachhead perimeter could be more easily held.

b. There are no known communications facilities in the immediate target area. This circumstance, coupled with the plan for a night landing, increases the chance of achieving surprise.

c. By comparison with any of the known inaccessible parts of the Oriente Province the objective area is closer to rear bases for air and sea logistical support.

d. The plan has the disadvantage that the build up of force can be only gradual since there is virtually no local population from which to recruit additional troops and volunteers from other parts of Cuba will be able to infiltrate into the area only gradually.

6. *Political Acceptability:* The proposal here outlined fits the three conditions stated in paragraph 1 above for the political acceptability of a paramilitary operation. The landing is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until an air base of sorts is active within the beachhead area; the tempo of the operation is as desired; and the terrain is such as to minimize the risk of defeat and maximize the options open to the opposition force.

a. It may be objected that the undertaking of tactical air operations so promptly after the landing is inconsistent with the pattern of a revolution. But most Latin American revolutions in recent years have used aircraft and it is only natural that they would be used in this case as soon as the opposition had secured control of an air strip. Wherever in the island a paramilitary operation is attempted and whatever its tempo, command of the air will sooner or later have to be established, and aircraft will have to be flown into a beachhead to enable this to be done. Sooner or later, then, it is bound to be revealed that the

opposition in Cuba has friends outside who are able and willing to supply it with obsolescent combat aircraft. This revelation will be neither surprising nor out of keeping with traditional practice.

b. An alternative way to handle this problem would be to make a few strafing runs against the Castro Air Force some days before the landing and apparently as an opposition act unrelated to any other military moves.

7. *Conclusion:* The operation here outlined, despite the revision of concept to meet the political requirements stated above, will still have a political cost. The study over the past several months of many possible paramilitary operations makes perfectly clear, however, that it is impossible to introduce into Cuba and commit to action military resources that will have a good chance of setting in motion the overthrow of the regime without paying some price in terms of accusations by the Communists and possible criticism by others. It is believed that the plan here outlined goes as far as possible in the direction of minimizing the political cost without impairing its soundness and chance of success as a military operation. The alternative would appear to be the demobilization of the paramilitary force and the return of its members to the United States. It is, of course, well understood that this course of action too involves certain risks.

Annex E

CUBAN OPERATION

1. *Orientation and Concept:* The present concept of the operation being mounted to overthrow Castro is that it should have the appearance of a growing and increasingly effective internal resistance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban aircraft and by the infiltration (over a period of time and at several places) of weapons and small groups of men. External support should appear to be organized and controlled by the Revolutionary Council under Miro Cardona as the successor to a number of separate groups. To support this picture and to minimize emphasis on invasion, the following steps have been taken:

a. The public statements of Cardona have emphasized that the overthrow of Castro was the responsibility of the Cubans, that it must be performed mainly by the Cubans in Cuba rather than from outside, and that he and his colleagues are organizing this external support free of control by or official help from the U.S. Government.

b. The plans for air operations have been modified to provide for operations on a limited scale on D-2 and again on D-Day itself instead of placing reliance on a larger strike coordinated with the landings on D-Day.

c. Shortly after the first air strikes on D-2 a B-26 with Cuban pilot will land at Miami airport seeking asylum. He will state that he defected with two other B-26 pilots and aircraft and that they strafed aircraft on the ground before departing.

d. A preliminary diversionary landing of true guerrilla type will be made in Oriente Province on D-2. The main D-Day landings will be made by three groups at locations spaced some distance apart on the coast. These will be followed about one week later by a further guerrilla type landing in Pinar del Rio (at the western end of the island).

e. Ships carrying the main forces leave the staging base at staggered times. (The first one sailed on Tuesday morning.) They will follow independent courses to a rendezvous for the final run-in. Until nearly dusk on D-1 they would appear to air observation to be pursuing unrelated courses so there will be no appearance of a convoy.

f. All the landings will be at night. At least in the first 24 hours, supply activity over the beaches will be at night. There will be no obtrusive "beachhead" to be seen by aircraft. Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland.

2. *The Time Table* of the plan is as follows:

- D-7: Commence staging main force—staging completed night of D-5.
- D-6: First vessel sails from staging area—last vessel departs early morning D-4.
- D-2: B-26 defection operation—limited air strikes.
- D-2: Diversionary landing in Oriente (night D-3 to D-2).
- D-Day: Main landings (night D-1 to D)—limited air strikes. Two B-26s and liaison plane land on seized air strip.
- D to D+1: Vessels return night of D to D+1 to complete discharge of supplies.
- D+7: Diversionary landing in Pinar del Rio.

3. *Diversion or Cancellation*: It would now be infeasible to halt the staging and embarkation of the troops. In the event of a decision to modify the operational plan or to cancel the operation, ships will be diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to ports in the U.S. If cancellation is directed, the troops and ships' officers will be told that the reason for the diversion is that all details of the operation, including time and place of intended landings, had been blown to the Castro regime and that under these circumstances the landings would be suicidal. This explanation would be adhered to after the demobilization of the force in the U.S. The U.S. Government could take the position that this enterprise had been undertaken by the Cubans without U.S. Governmental support, that it had failed because of their poor security, and that the U.S. could not refuse to grant asylum to the Cuban volun-

teers. If by reason of either new intelligence or policy considerations it is necessary to effect a major change in the operational plan, it will be necessary to divert to Vieques Island so that officers of the brigade and ships' captains can be assembled and briefed on the new plan. (The advantages of this location are its security together with the opportunity for the troops to be ashore briefly after some days on board ship.)

4. *Naval Protection:* The ships carrying the main force will receive unobtrusive Naval protection up to the time they enter Cuban territorial waters. If they are attacked they will be protected by U.S. Naval vessels but following such an intervention they would be escorted to a U.S. port and the force would be demobilized.

5. *Defections:* Every effort is being made to induce the defection of individuals of military and political significance. At the present time contact has been established by and through Cuban agents and anti-Castro Cuban groups with some thirty-one specific military and police officers, including [text not declassified] and the [less than 1 line not declassified] and the [less than 1 line not declassified]. An approach is being made to [less than 1 line not declassified]. There are, of course, in addition many others rumored to be disaffected but to whom no channel of approach is available. The objective of these efforts is not to induce immediate defections but to prepare the individuals for appropriate action in place after D-Day.

6. *Internal Resistance Movements:* On the latest estimate there are nearly 7,000 insurgents responsive to some degree of control through agents with whom communications are currently active. About 3,000 of these are in Havana itself, over 2,000 in Oriente, about 700 in Las Villas in central Cuba. For the most part, the individual groups are small and very inadequately armed. Air drops are currently suspended because available aircraft are tied up in the movement of troops from their training area to the staging base. After D-Day when it is hoped that the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced, it is planned to supply these groups by daytime air drops. Every effort will be made to coordinate their operations with those of the landing parties. Efforts will be made also to sabotage or destroy by air attack the microwave links on which Castro's communication system depends. The objective is of course to create a revolutionary situation, initially perhaps in Oriente and Las Villas Provinces, and then spreading to all parts of the island.

7. *Propaganda and Communications:* Currently medium and short wave broadcasting in opposition to Castro is being carried on from seven stations in addition to Radio Swan. Antennae modifications of the latter have increased its effective power in Cuba and it is believed that there is now good medium wave reception of Swan everywhere except in Havana itself where it can still be effectively jammed. The

number of hours of broadcasting per day will be increased beginning immediately from about 25 to almost 75 soon after D-Day. The combination of multiple long and short wave stations which will then be in use, supplemented by three boats which carry broadcasting equipment (two short wave and one medium wave) will assure heavy coverage of all parts of the island virtually at all times. Radio programs will avoid any reference to an invasion but will call for up-rising and will of course announce defections and carry news of all revolutionary action. Soon after D-Day a small radio transmitter will be put in operation on Cuban soil.

8. *The Political Leadership:* As of the present moment, the six members of Cardona's Revolutionary Council, notably including Ray, have reaffirmed their membership. Although no specific portfolios have been confirmed, the following possibilities are currently under discussion: Varona, Defense; Ray, Gobernacion (Interior); Carrillio, Finance; Hevia, State; Maceo, Public Health. The political leaders have not yet been briefed on the military plan but they will be informed at each phase of military operations. Advance consultation with the political leaders is considered unacceptably dangerous on security grounds and although last minute briefings will be resented, it is believed that the political leaders will want to take credit for and assume control as quickly as possible over these major operations against Castro. The present plan is that one of them (Artime) will go into Cuba with the main force, others will follow as soon as possible after D-Day and they will announce the establishment of a Provisional Government on Cuban soil.

9. *Command:* Military command will be exercised in the name of the Revolutionary Council and later of the Provisional Government. In fact, however, the CIA staff constitutes the general staff of the operation and the Agency controls both logistics support and communications. Accordingly, in the early stages at least, the functions of a general headquarters will be exercised from the Agency with the Cuban brigade commander exercising field command over the units that land on D-Day.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. McCone

SUBJECT

Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. Presented herewith is a 150 page survey of the Cuban operation, together with the most important basic documents on the operation which are included in the five annexes. In this report we have not attempted to go into an exhaustive step by step inspection of every action in the operation. Nor have we tried to assess individual performance, although our inspection left us with very definite views. Rather, we have tried to find out what went wrong, and why, and to present the facts and conclusions as briefly as possible. This report has been doublespaced for ease in reading. The ten recommendations for corrective action start on page 148.

2. In conducting this survey we reviewed all of the basic files and documents, including all of the material prepared by the Agency for General Maxwell Taylor's Committee, as well as the minutes of that Committee which were made available to us. In addition, we conducted extensive interviews with all of the principal officers on the project from the DD/P on down, and made detailed memoranda for our files on all of these discussions; e.g., my meeting with the top three officers of the Branch reviewing the operation the week after the landing failed is reported in some 70 pages. Thus, while the analysis and conclusions presented herewith regarding the operation are those of the Inspector General, the bases for these conclusions are extensively documented in the files.

3. This, in my opinion, is a fair report even though highly critical. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA's inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency's weaknesses reflected in this report. Consequently, I will make no additional distribution of this report until you indicate whom you wish to have copies. In this connection, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has requested a copy in time for Mr. Coyne to give a brief report on it at their December 9 meeting. I will await your wishes in this regard.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

**274. Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to Chief, WH-4,
October 6¹**

October 6, 1961

SUBJECT

Pending Matters—Cuba

This memorandum is merely to confirm a few requests which I have made at various times.

a. General Taylor recently suggested that we should prepare a contingency plan setting forth action which might be taken in case of the unexpected removal of Castro from power. Admittedly since there is no possible way of anticipating how or when such a removal might occur (if at all), it is difficult to plan in any great detail. On the other hand, it should be possible to assume that the event could occur within some reasonable period in the future, and on this assumption to consider what steps might be taken. Such a plan could be projected further into the future at a later moment. The plan should be prepared for presentation to the Special Group and should, I think, be ready at the latest for the meeting on 19 October, which means that it should be in the DD/P's office by 16 October at the latest.

b. Chief, WH-4 indicated that there are in being a number of detailed plans supporting proposed sabotage action. He agreed that he would provide some of these to me as samples in order that they could be studied. I might say that the type of sabotage intended in this request is not the so-called "minor key" actions but rather the more elaborate large scale actions for which Special Group approval will have to be sought.

C. Tracy Barnes
A/DDP/A

¹ Confirmation of requests re Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity—Western Hemisphere—Cuba.

275. Memorandum to Park F. Wollam, October 6¹

October 6, 1961

SUBJECT

What Would Happen If Castro Died?

The attached paper, subject as above, is forwarded in response to your request of 5 October 1961.

[name not declassified]
[text not declassified]

Attachment

SUBJECT

What would happen if Castro died?

1. *Introduction.*

The impact of Fidel Castro's sudden death would obviously have some internal repercussions on his Communist dominated regime. However, it would be wishful thinking to believe that the Cuban people would immediately rise up and overthrow the regime, now that Castro had departed the scene. In view of the tremendous strides made during the last five months toward the organization of Cuba into a complete police state and the lack of any unified anti-Castro opposition, there can be little doubt that the demise of Fidel Castro, whether by natural causes or assassination, would offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control. To believe otherwise would be to underestimate the strength and power of control of a Communist police state. If he died of assassination, instead of natural causes, the factor of his martyrdom to the Cuban masses would further strengthen the power of the present regime in maintaining control. Also, it is probable that the Soviet Bloc would react to such an event with greatly increased economic aid in order to assure maintenance of their established beachhead on the American continent. Although it is possible to anticipate the immediate results of the death by assassination of Fidel Castro, the end result of such an action would depend to

¹ Transmits paper entitled "What Would Happen If Castro Died?" Secret. 8 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 73-00853R, Box 1, WH Division Liaison with Department of State.

a great extent on the respective effectiveness of the work of the police, the Communists, the military, and the anti-Castro groups.

2. *Fidel Castro's Successor.*

It would appear that Castro's successor would emerge from the following choices:

Raul Castro, Minister of Armed Forces
"Che" Guevara, Minister of Industry
Nunez Jimenez, Director INRA
Faure Chomon, Ambassador to USSR

Early in 1961, Raul Castro was appointed Vice-President and principal executive officer of the Central Planning Committee. This increased authority and his continuing power as Minister of the Armed Forces rank him second only to the Prime Minister.

It is felt that Ernest "Che" Guevara would not be acceptable to the Cuban people as he is not Cuban born. He appears destined to wield tremendous power but not as the ranking authority.

Nunez Jimenez, the Director of the Institute of Agrarian Reform lost a good portion of his industrial empire to "Che" Guevara during past reorganization and consequently relinquished considerable prestige among the present leadership.

Faure Chomon fought with Castro to oust Batista. He led his own "13th of March" group in the early fighting. Subsequently he was appointed as Cuban Ambassador to Moscow and it was generally conceded that, at the time, Castro was ridding himself of a potentially dangerous rival.

Of the four individuals aforementioned, none of them have the personal magnetism or popular support of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, Raul Castro, Guevara and all the top Communists together have strength and control which could not possibly be equalled by an opposition leader. Many of the most influential and promising young anti-Communists have long since left the country. Of the anti-Communists remaining in Cuba, many have been arrested and/or executed and any known or suspected ones would surely be rounded up quickly by the government forces in the advent of Fidel's death. Communications media, which are controlled almost completely by the government, would use every means to control and frighten the opposition from acting, and those who might otherwise support an opposition movement would be inclined to wait too long to act effectively.

3. *Reaction Among the Military and Security Forces.*

The military leaders, under the direction of Raul Castro, would undoubtedly call for immediate increased use of police state methods, which would include mass arrests, tightening of all types of controls,

increase of vigilance and informant reporting, and elimination, at least by arrest if not more violent action, of any anti-Castro figures of influence or strength.

4. *General Reaction of the Cuban Populace.*

Once dead, the first reaction should be a stunned shock and kind of suspended animation among the Cuban populace, while the security forces move in to tighten the lid still further. Raul Castro conceivably could take over and, supported by Che Guevara, initiate overwhelming propaganda about saving the revolution and trying to tidy Fidel up into an acceptable martyr. Fidel Castro is the one who has always had the magic hold on the people, been able to hypnotize them with his speeches and it is to Fidel that the urban and rural poor have always looked as a kind of "Great White Father", a symbol of invocation that is looked to, to right the wrongs done to them. The evils done are still not associated with him as much as with his subordinates and Fidel is the last court of appeal. The poorer classes feel that if his ear can only be gained, he will still make things right. Fidel's voice is what covers the naked power of the repressive organs and can still appeal. When he is out of the way, there will be no myth to cling to and no voice to lull.

5. *Reaction Among Anti-Castro Individuals and Groups.*

After the first shock, particularly of Castro's death, is accomplished sufficiently ignominiously (some still believe he is personally incorruptable) there should be an increase of restlessness and petty sabotage. If the same restrictions on travel outside the country continue that are now in force, the emotions leading people to flee into exile will be directed *within* and there can be an open war between the population and the repressive organs of the Security Services. The government would then most obviously be unpopular and at war with its own people. This would be the time for small well-trained, well-supplied guerrilla groups to appear in the mountains. This would give heart to whatever may be left of the underground, give those who want to fight somewhere to go, provide a base for urban sabotage and greatly facilitate the overthrow of Fidel's unpopular heirs and their Bloc supporters.

If by some fluke such an assassination attempt should be successful, the only opposition group in any position *at present* to take advantage of wresting control from the Communists is the right-wing movement forming under FRIO. This group's plans reportedly include use of a re-activated BATISTA army, now called the "Ex-Constitutional Army", which has an external militant organization composed of upwards of 5000 men for combat and a number of internal factions who have engaged in limited sabotage and resistance activity against the Castro

regime. It also includes the CIC in Exile, headed by Eusebio MUJAL, and composed of a large number of experienced labor leaders. The resumption of power by this group would probably result in an early renewal of civil war and an eventual return to power of the Communists.

6. Reaction Among Neutral/Passive Cubans.

There are still a number of Cubans who support the cause of the socialist revolution, who revere Fidel Castro, and who still remain in Cuba, but who do not support the cause of Communism and who would be against any further takeover in Cuba by the Communist Party. In addition, there are those Cubans, primarily of the middle class, who have lost some of their precious wealth and position, and others who have become dissatisfied with increased state control and economic shortages. This group and those in definite opposition can be subdivided into those who have shown what might be termed a passive resistance to the Castro government, and those which have taken part to some extent in organized anti-Castro activities. Unfortunately the latter group probably lacks the leadership, organization, funds and material support to act effectively in opposition to the strict police state methods which would surely be imposed. Included in both the aforementioned groups and to a certain extent in the government forces, such as the Militia, are those persons who, although they do not basically support the Castro government, would wait to see the turn of events before they would commit themselves to changing sides.

7. Reaction Among Pre-Castro Cubans.

Certainly those Cubans who have gained through the changes brought about by the Castro revolution would continue to support his cause and to avenge his death. Those peasants who have gained materially, the youth who have acquired a new importance and recognition and who have been thoroughly indoctrinated by the socialist regime, would continue to support the government.

8. Communist Party Reaction.

Those leaders of the PSP (Partido Socialists Popular) the Cuban Communist Party, who are already in influential positions would certainly attempt not only to retain that influence but to increase it under advantageous circumstances. There are few government leaders left in Cuba who are anti-Communist to the extent that they would oppose the Communists.

9. Unilateral Actions By Latin American Nationals.

During the last few years, the Latin Americans have in addition to overthrowing three well established police states—Peron, Perez Jime-

nez, Batista—via internal uprisings—conducted successful assassinations against four chiefs of state—Ramon of Panama, Somoza of Nicaragua, Kastilio Armas of Guatemala and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. Therefore, the possibility of an assassination attempt against the Castro regime, which the Cubans may have concluded is the only alternative for achieving the overthrow, should not be ruled out.

10. *Manner of Fidel Castro's Death.*

The effects of Castro's death, particularly in the short run, depend considerably on how he dies. Because of the aura still clinging to the man in the minds of the radical left of Latin America, particularly among student groups, he is sure to remain the symbol of "Revolution". Thus, because of the need to undercut this image in the hemisphere as well as to destroy the final vestiges of regard in which he is held within Cuba, it is important that he not become a new martyr. The conditions surrounding his death must publically and irrefutably be set in one of two alternative situations; first, he can die ignominiously and in a situation that will contribute to besmirching his character or second; he can be eliminated by the Russians as being unstable and no longer necessary to their interests.

In the event of the death of Castro by natural means, rather than assassination, the immediate reaction by government forces might not be so severe, since they could not conceivably implicate the United States in such an event.

11. *Probable Soviet Bloc Reactions.*

The Cuban government would certainly hope for support from their Soviet Bloc friends in the event of any real crisis. To judge the extent to which this support would materialize is somewhat difficult. Certainly the Bloc would hope to protect their investment in Cuba, but on the other hand, the Soviets would probably hesitate to act in such a manner as to add to the already difficult world situation. Probably their interest in Cuba is not great enough to chance losing out in other strategic areas of the world. As a practical thing, it is believed that in a crisis the Soviet Bloc and the Chicoms would intensify their economic support to Cuba in order to prevent that country from joining the ranks of free Latin American nations.

12. *Conclusion.*

It is fairly certain that the use of an assassination program as a means of overthrowing the Cuban Communist regime would have to be targeted against Fidel and Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and several other key Communists, to have any chance of creating enough chaos to provide an opportunity for the overthrow of the regime. In order to be effective such a program should be coordinated with a well

organized resistance movement capable of providing a simultaneous internal uprising. Recently Raul CHIBAS, MRP leader in exile, commented that assassination presented the only real prospect for bringing about an early change in the Cuban situation. CHIBAS commented further that even an assassination program would not be a solution unless there was detailed and intelligent planning for action following the event.

Any hope for the eventual resumption of a democratic regime in Cuba lies, not in any anticipated or immediate takeover by opposition forces, but in the possible disagreement, disorganization, and fight for control that might result among the remaining leaders from the loss of Fidel Castro.

276. Memorandum for the Special Group, October 12¹

October 12, 1961

SUBJECT

Cuban Program Report

1. The purpose of this report is to present the status of the CIA operational effort under the covert program approved last July by the Special Group.

The Cuban Covert Program emphasized two priority goals. First, collection of intelligence on significant aspects of the Cuban internal situation, and second, attempted identification of Cuban political leadership which with appropriate aid might develop strength in Cuba adequate to overthrow and succeed Castro.

The activities budgeted in support of these goals were divided into four categories, each of which will be discussed more fully below.

- a. Intelligence and Counter-intelligence.
- b. Political Action.
- c. Propaganda.
- d. Paramilitary.

¹ Cuban program report. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961.

2. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence.

These activities have become progressively more hazardous due to increased internal Cuban controls. A number of important individuals have been arrested; freedom of movement is even more difficult since strangers (Cuban or otherwise) are suspect and closely watched; successful illegal entry is daily [illegible in the original], of course, legal travel is still possible within [illegible in the original] and the populace generally (in addition to the C-2, the militia and block controls) has been alerted to be on guard for and to report any counter-regime actions or suspicions thereof.

In spite of the above, we have been able to maintain [illegible in the original] with [less than 1 line not declassified] agents. Communications are by secret writing except in one case where W/7 is available and working. It must be stated, however, that the geographic distribution of these agents is unsatisfactory since all but [less than 1 line not declassified] are in Havana Province and all but [less than 1 line not declassified] are in the city of Havana.

In addition, we have been able to give brief training, including an [illegible in the original] system to legal travelers returning to Cuba. Such trainees average an additional person a week in Cuba. [illegible in the original] Cuba specifically limits the duration of a traveler's stay outside the country (48 to 72 hours often being the maximum posted) [illegible in the original] gives is understandably restricted.

[illegible in the original] are in training, the total bring forty to forty-five individuals, moreover possible some of whom will to mainly intelligence agents but many of whom will have other [illegible in the original] as well, e.g., political organization and action, propaganda and paramilitary (sabotage) [illegible in the original] and training.

The Cuban exile (political) groups have been worked with clearly as indicated below but mainly in the political field. They have not as yet been very protective of intelligence sources mainly because they are unable to effective infiltration (except legal travel) and because the individuals proposed by them need substantial training before being sent. Most of their old contacts are blown and cannot risk returning except to live "black" which is not easy or productive for untrained individuals.

In counter-intelligence, we have some active penetrations of the Communist Party, C-2, the Ministry of Justice, the Government [illegible in the original] Agency, and the Air Force Academy. These are not adequate particularly as they are not high level. Consequently increased coverage is being sought. In addition social information is being obtained from [less than 1 line not declassified] agents operating from and reporting to third countries. Finally, a Cuban organization of about

30 agents has continued to operate in the Miami area entirely in support of the U.S. The Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) attempted to take this organization under its jurisdiction but the members of their own volition refused. Through their efforts and those of their and other agents, the U.S. is reasonably well apprised of the activities of the Cuban exile groups and, it is believed, of Castro's efforts to penetrate the U.S. and the Cuban exile activities.

Improvement of W/T internal assets is a high priority. There are four or five trained operators for whom operational planning is almost complete and who should be in place in the next thirty days. An additional eight or ten of those previously trained may be persuaded to return to Cuba. They are in Miami and are being recontacted. Five to ten more are ready for a full training course which will take ninety days. If five operators could be placed in Cuba and well dispersed geographically, thin but adequate coverage would be available since the extensive SW systems could handle the remainder of the traffic.

3. Political Action.

All the known Cuban exile groups have been worked with from the point of view of operational planning and support. Most of them started with extensive plans which they could not support but now are pursuing what we consider more practical, more manageable projects. A brief outline of the present status is:

a. *MRR*. A small operation scheduled for early November to contact the party and determine its exact situation. Also, an effort to organize a recruitment effort will be made.

MRR/C, the dissident wing of the *MRR*, now has a team in Cuba in an effort to exfiltrate the internal *MRR/C* leader in order to arrange negotiations to settle *MRR* party differences.

b. *MRP*. An operation is planned as soon as a full team is produced by *MRP*. The team will consist of a small group for intelligence, political organization and sabotage with commo. *MRP* is still trying to find the last two men required.

c. *MDC*. The leaders are discredited as they have been unable to produce any operational assets or possibilities.

d. *DRI* (Students). Sixteen men in training for sabotage operations. Training is general (act limited to sabotage) and should be completed in two weeks. The group will be divided into several small teams for infiltration.

e. *UR*. We are working with the main leader who is presently preparing a plan. He has a boat with a 4000 mile range which should prove a useful asset.

f. *30th November*. Ten men have been selected by the party for training which is expected to begin within a few days. They will be given general training but will have sabotage missions.

g. *Duque* (formerly [illegible in the original] leader). He is preparing to go back to his home territory (Sierra del Cristal) with a W/T operator as soon as possible.

h. *Cuban Intelligence Organization*. Three operations are about to be despatched to get intelligence, form internal nets and reception teams and establish infiltration routes and reception capability. They will concentrate on Plaza del Rio and Oriente.

i. *Dr. Miro Gardona and the CRC*. See paragraph 6. below.

Other Cubans are being worked with but insufficient progress has been made to justify a report.

The external exile groups are far from organized or coordinated. This is a high priority problem but has, in our opinion, a connection with the U.S. relationship with Dr. Mira Cardona and the CRC. Consequently, it will be deferred, as indicated above, to paragraph 6 below.

The internal opposition has made some efforts at consolidation and organization but has not advanced too far. Activity has been limited due to the difficulties already mentioned and, moreover, incentives for better organization have been lacking since an operational relationship productive of outside support has not as yet been established. It has been noted that no coastal point presently exists through which supplies can be infiltrated by maritime effort. Bodies can be landed but no reception capable of moving beached supplies is available. The Cuban exiles are just as devoid of such assets as the U.S.

4. *Propaganda*.

Costs have been reduced in the propaganda field but even so this is the one activity which is running ahead of its budget. The average can be covered by some shifts of money from other activities without major difficulty. Speaking tours are being encouraged by women's groups, teachers, students, jurists, lawyers, and labor. Also, as indicated above, the DRI is training a number of members for infiltration to Cuba as in FORD, a labor organization. However, publications—[*less than 1 line not declassified*—continue at somewhat reduced budgets while some newspaper support will be given for another two or three months. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for example, has been given money through this calendar year. [*less than 1 line not declassified*], a news sheet for editors and intellectuals, receives encouragement for its Spanish and English publication (weekly). Substantial numbers of cheap pamphlets are being printed exposing Castro's political line.

Radio Swan still broadcasts about 125 hours a week on both medium and short wave while approximately 168 a week of non-attributable anti-Castro broadcasts are transmitted by about 60 Latin American stations while 59 hours weekly are broadcast by three Florida stations. The latter are prepared by Cubans sponsored by the U.S. while the Latin American programs are affected through controlled distribution of taped programs.

A ship capable of medium and short wave broadcasts is ready for use. It will also have a capability previously operated within Cuba of intruding radio broadcasts through TV channels.

In addition, a program for the placement of selected Cuban students in Latin American universities for agitation and propaganda is well under way. Sixty students are available, three of whom have been actually placed and twenty-one of whom are processing.

5. *Paramilitary.*

Most of the paramilitary activities have been mentioned above under Political Action since Cuban political groups were involved and since the paramilitary activity was only a part of the projects described.

In addition, however, a fully trained commando element of 35 Cubans is in being and ready to operate from Florida. Some of the men will be used for instructors, for armed support of ships and other needed activities with the result that after their reassignment a highly select group of at least twenty men will be retained for exclusively commando or similar type operations.

Ships, counting those presently owned and those to be purchased, are considered adequate for any foreseeable maritime operational requirements. No air operations are presently planned.

Due to the internal controls mentioned above, it has become apparent that infiltration, particularly of weapons, ammunition, and sabotage matériel, has become difficult and will continue to be difficult. Nevertheless, we still are planning minor key sabotage. Some such sabotage is now occurring in Cuba without our support. It is apparently being accomplished by opposition groups with matériel provided by us in the past.

Moreover, harassment (very small scale) sabotage can be planned and sponsored from the outside. Likewise, internal groups can be organized and trained which, as indicated, is the basis for a number of the external projects mentioned above.

In addition, the commando unit can infiltrate in small groups either on a hit-and-run basis or on the basis of infiltrating and spending some time (e.g., a week or two) surveilling the target and preparing the operation. Hit-and-run minor key operation is planned for the near future. For purposes of this project, a minor key operation is one which:

- a) has a favorable chance of avoiding detection prior to detonation (e.g., a lightly guarded or unguarded target);
- b) will reasonably appear to the Cubans to have been organized and run from the inside; and
- c) will not cause major internal disruption.

Planning has been substantially completed on a number of larger possible targets and these will be presented for approval as soon as appropriate. We want to run some smaller operations first with commando team, and test internal reactions to the creation of additional

teams. Moreover, we need to establish additional infiltration routes for man as well as matériel.

6. *Special Aspects of Relations with Dr. Miro Cardona and the CRC.*

Although it could be inappropriate in this report to discuss this problem in detail, it is sufficiently important to deserve mention. It will be considered in detail with the State Department and, if necessary, brought again to the Special Group.

Miro is being paid a substantial monthly budget which largely covers administrative support of his organization and portions of Tony Varona's former FRD now allied with the CRC. In addition, Miro expects that these payments will continue at the rate of about \$90,000 a month until at least the end of this fiscal year, i.e., 1 July 1962.

The fact is that these payments almost entirely support individuals of Miro's choosing and, in addition, provide funds for Miro to disburse as he desires. Some but very little operational benefit is realized. The inevitable result is that Miro tends to devote his time to the protection and consolidation of the exile organization which he controls rather than on methods of improving internal Cuban opposition. Moreover, the support to Miro discourages other opposition leaders who construe it as evidence of a U.S. selection of Miro as the leader of a post-Castro government. Miro, it might be said, does not discourage this impression, inaccurate as it may be.

The above situation is inconsistent with present U.S. policy, which is not as yet prepared to select a post-Castro leader, which desires to encourage internal rather than external leaders, and which does not wish to discourage in any way the emergence of strong leadership. As indicated above, possible solutions are being sought and further discussions with the State Department are planned. In the meantime, however, it should be recognized, as stated above, that coordination of the Cuban opposition is experiencing trouble.

November 1961

277. Memorandum, November 4¹

November 4, 1961

The following are some tentative recommendations meant to serve as a basis of discussion:

I would recommend that the Cuban operation be organized in five components:

- a. Intelligence collection and evaluation
- b. Underground and guerilla
- c. Propaganda
- d. Economic warfare (other than covert activities within Cuba)
- e. Diplomatic relations

Although these sections will make use of available agency capabilities the operational authority for each of these aspects of the operation will be in the hands of the section leader who is responsible to the chairman of the group. All of these activities will be compartmentalised as much as possible, i.e., only the chairman will be kept completely informed on all aspects of the operation.

The operation should have its physical headquarters in the Department of Defense, both for maximum security and to detach it as much as possible from identification as a CIA activity.

The first steps are:

1. Designation of section chiefs;
2. A complete survey by each section chief of current operations in his field;
3. The establishment of control over operations by the section chief;
4. The expansion of operations where feasible.

Bob Amory should be asked to designate one of his best men to centralize the intelligence collection and evaluation.

The Defense Department should designate the section chief for underground and guerilla activities.

We should discuss expansion of propaganda operations with Ed Murrow and appropriate CIA officers—not relating it to stepped up operations in other fields. With these people we should select a single person to be the propaganda chief, coordinating CIA and USIA opera-

¹ Recommendations on subsequent actions in Cuban operation. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba.

tions. I have suggested that Tad Sulz—if he can be persuaded to take a leave of absence—would be a useful person to advise on this aspect of the operation.

Both economic warfare and diplomatic relations should be handled by a designee of the State Department. It is important to keep the diplomatic relations aspect of this operation under some sort of control so that we can't involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing situations in the OAS, e.g. voting to send an investigating committee to Cuba when our operations are at a height and Fidel has evidence to present of U.S. participation.

The Deputy should be from CIA.

The President should not talk to the press. It may be that some contacts with a few key newsmen should be made—in the most general way. But if the President approaches them personally and the operation does not succeed it is inevitable that he will become the focus of another Cuban failure. There are two types of newsmen involved here. There is a rather large group which will hear rumors and stories of various kind. There is nothing to be done about them. There are a few newsmen whose contacts in the Cuban community are so extensive that they might be able to put together a coherent story. If any approaches are to be made it should be restricted to these; although they should never be told we are going to wage an all-out operation. In addition, as much contact and operational work as possible should be done outside the Miami area.

Our next step should be to design to section chiefs, establish their authority and have them make a complete survey of present operations. This would include a survey of current covert operations and capacities here and in Miami (and anywhere else they are going on), as the first task of the Defense Department designee with CIA assistance. The physical headquarters should be established.

Although the Attorney General should maintain a general operational supervision, it is probably unwise for him to be the formal chairman of the group because the risk of identification is fairly high.

If such identification is made, and the operation is not successful, another Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard this as fairly remote in this type of operation but the danger can be decreased if the operation is formally headed by someone who is not so clearly acting at the direct behest of the President. The Attorney General can give assistance and maintain general supervision on behalf of the President, working with the Chairman alone—rather than extending his contacts to include all the operation chiefs.

278. Notes on conversation, November 9, between President Kennedy and Tad Sulz¹

November 9, 1961

TS invited by JFK at Bobby's suggestion after lunch at DOJ. Meeting a bit over 1 hr. Dick Goodwin only person present. Miss Lincoln next door. She brought in JFK pix he autographed for Nikki/JFK in rocker, TS and Goodwin on white sofa. JFK wanted talk abt Cuba—continuing conversation of TS with RFK—and mainly kept asking questions. Also asked for suggestions and recommendations. JFK knew I had been in Cuba in May with Tractors and seen a lot of Castro. He asked questions about Fidel, what type person, he is personally, politically, etc. I told JFK of Castro's remarks about JFK, that Castro thought despite Bay of Pigs, JFK was the only American politician with whom he could deal in terms of improved relations, etc. . . . JFK asked about how strong Castro regime is, etc. . . . whether new guerrilla operations by US would make sense. He talked about the need of controlling CIA in some way so that CIA wouldn't construct another operation like Bay of Pigs. Said CIA was a problem in government; he and Bobby wanted to deal with it—I guess to control CIA better. Then, suddenly, Pres leaned forward and asked me. "What would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?" I said this would be terrible idea because a) it probably wouldn't do away with regime; on contrary it would strengthen it, and b) I felt personally US had no business in assassinations. JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same way—he added "I'm glad you feel the same way"—because indeed US morally must not be party to assassinations. JFK said he raised question because he was under terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intelligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro murder. Said he was resisting pressures . . . Dick thinks this may have to do with the Guantanamo thing we been hearing about. Navy? Meeting was little after 11 AM. First, RNG and TS waited in Fish Room. Also, JFK said something about setting up special group on Cuba, to take new look at whole Cuban thing from all points of view. No details—Didn't say if group would be at WH or where. . . .

¹ Sulz' visit to Cuba and meeting with Castro; assassination of Castro. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 233, JFK Collection.

**278A. Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to
CIA Director Dulles, November 24¹**

November 24, 1961

SUBJECT

Report on the Cuban Operation

1. The report on the Cuban Operation, as is true of all Inspector General reports, was prepared under my personal direction and worked on by myself and my deputy, Mr. David McLean, as well as the three officers who did the principal collecting of information and preparation of the text: Messrs. [less than 1 line not declassified], [less than 1 line not declassified] and [less than 1 line not declassified]. The final editing was done by myself personally and the report represents the views of the Inspector General.

2. In preparing the report we had access to all of the material prepared by this agency and submitted to the Taylor Committee, as well as the minutes of the Taylor Committee meetings, and a chance to see their final conclusions and recommendations. In addition to this we had all of the documentary material available in the WH Division, WH-4, and other staffs and divisions of the agency who had cognizance of or prepared material for WH-4. These particularly included ONE, OCI and Staff D of the DD/P.

3. As is noted particularly in our report, we did not go outside of the agency in any respect and tried to confine our inspection to only internal agency matters, except where reference had to be made to outside actions that affected the operation. In interviewing persons connected with this operation, we talked initially to three of the top officers in the operation, commencing with Mr. Esterline and Colonel Hawkins, and having our initial lengthy discussions with them within a week of the operation. We interviewed all of the appropriate supervisors in the DD/P, starting with the DD/P himself and including the A/DDP/A, Chief, WH, Chief WH-4, and some 130 other officers and employees directly involved in the operation. We kept extensive notes and material of all of these discussions which are documented in our files.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

¹ Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

December 1961

**278B. Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to
CIA Director McCone, December 1¹**

December 1, 1961

SUBJECT

Report on the Cuban Operation

1. In our conversation on Friday morning, the first of December, you mentioned your concern that the Inspector General's Report on the Cuban Operation, taken alone, might give an erroneous impression as to the extent CIA is responsible for the failure of the operation. In my opinion the failure of the operation should be charged in order to the following factors.

a. An over-all lack of recognition on the part of the U.S. Government as to the magnitude of the operation required to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime.

b. The failure on the part of the U.S. Government to plan for all contingencies at the time of the Cuban operation including the necessity for using regular U.S. military forces in the event that the exiled Cubans could not do the job themselves.

c. The failure on the part of the U.S. Government to be willing to commit to the Cuban operation, as planned and executed, those necessary resources required for its success.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

¹ Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

**278C. Memorandum prepared by CIA Deputy Director Cabell,
December 15¹**

December 15, 1961

SUBJECT

The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

To comment on the subject report in detail would result in a paper approaching in length, that of the survey itself. Such a commentary would have to deal in depth with the aim of the survey, its scope, and the method used in compiling it. Such a commentary would, at a large number of pages, be required to note inaccuracies, omissions, distortions, unsupported allegations, and many erroneous conclusions.

A detailed inquiry on the Cuban operation on elements other than clandestine tradecraft, has already been completed by the group headed by General Taylor. General Taylor's report was based on testimony by all the principal officers involved in the Cuban operation. The Inspector General's report is not based on complete testimony; some of its conclusions are in conflict with General Taylor's conclusions.

It is not clear what purpose the Inspector General's report is intended to serve. If it is intended primarily as an evaluation of the Agency's role, it is deficient. Neither Mr. Dulles nor I was consulted in the preparation of the Inspector General's report. As a result, there are many unnecessary inaccuracies.

The report tries to do both too much and too little.

On the one hand, it attempts to describe the processes of national security policy-making as though this were a process in logical deduction like working a problem in geometry. According to the Inspector General's account, firm propositions should be laid down in writing and in advance from which correct conclusions as to proper actions must inevitably be drawn. In this respect the report goes far beyond an analysis of the Agency's role, and it is not accurate. It tries to do too much.

On the other hand, the report treats the preparations for the April landings as if these were the only activities directed against Castro and his influence throughout the hemisphere and the world. It chooses to ignore all other facets of the Agency's intelligence collection and covert actions program which preceded, accompanied, and have followed the landings in April of 1961. Thus, it does too little.

¹ Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

The report misses objectivity by a wide margin. In unfriendly hands, it can become a weapon unjustifiably to attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency. It fails to cite the specific achievements of persons associated with the operation and presents a picture of unmitigated and almost willful bumbling and disaster.

In its present form, this is not a useful report for anyone inside or outside the Agency. If complete analysis beyond that already accomplished by General Taylor and his group is still required, then a new kind of report is called for,—a report with clear terms of reference based on complete testimony. Such a report could concentrate on clandestine tradecraft, an asset for which the Agency remains uniquely responsible.

C.P. Cabell

General, USAF

Deputy Director

January 1962

278D. Analysis by CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell,
January 18¹

January 18, 1962

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CUBAN OPERATION

BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION (Indicated by Blue Tabs)

- I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
 - A. Organization and Execution
 - B. Errors of Judgment
 - C. The Decisions that Led to Failure
 - D. Washington Decision Making
 - E. Agency vs. Government Responsibility
 - F. Why an "Overt" Operation
 - G. Government vs. Agency Decisions
 - H. Conclusions
 - I. Lessons for the Future
- II. THE SURVEY'S STATEMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
- III. WHY A MILITARY-TYPE INVASION
- IV. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
 - Annex A*—Memorandum dated 23 March 1961 for Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, "Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba."
- V. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE PLAN
 - Annex A*—Cable from C/WH/4/Paramilitary dated 13 April 1961 to CIA Headquarters.

¹ Report on the Cuban operation. 188 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

VI. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS

Annex A—Memorandum dated 24 October 1960
for A/DDP/A, *et al.*, Procedures for
Cuban Overflights.

Annex B—Memorandum dated 12 October 1960
for Chief, WH/4, "Organization and
Command Relationships—WH/4 and
Development Projects Division."

VII. PERSONNEL

Annex A—Biographic Summary of Certain Senior
Officials.

Annex B—Memorandum dated 16 May 1960 for
Chiefs of All Special Staffs and
Operating Divisions, "Clerical
Assistance for WH Division."

VIII. THE POLITICAL FRONT AND RELATIONS
WITH THE CUBANS

IX. AIR MARITIME OPERATIONS

A. Air

B. Maritime

C. Training Underground Leaders

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the nature of and the reasons for the failure of the Cuban operation and in so doing to suggest what are the correct lessons to be learned therefrom. It is prompted by and is, for the most part, a commentary on the IG Survey.

That document gives a black picture of the Agency's role in this operation. It makes a number of different kinds of allegations.

First, there are numerous charges of bad organization and incomplete: execution, including specifically criticisms of: command relationships; the quality of personnel; the internal operational planning process; the conduct of maritime and air operations; and the collection and evaluation of intelligence. These deficiencies are portrayed as responsible for the failure to build up and supply resistance organizations under rather favorable conditions.

Second, and more serious is the allegation of major errors of judgment, notably (a) the decision to convert the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation beyond the Agency's capability, (b) the treatment of the Cuban exiles as "puppets", (c) the inadequacy of the military plan for the invasion, and (d) the failure "to appraise the chances of success realistically".

Third, the Survey is critical of the Agency's failure to insure that the decision making process in the Executive Branch was orderly and effective. The Agency, it is alleged, "failed to keep the national policy makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success, and it did not press sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast moving situation". As a corollary of this judgment, the Survey attributes the blame for incompetence of execution and for errors of judgment essentially to this Agency alone.

It is almost self-evident that some of these allegations are true, at least in part. In any large and rapidly organized undertaking there are certain to be errors of organization and of execution. In all likelihood major errors in judgment were committed. Similarly, the decision making process in the Executive Branch of the Government operated in a manner that left something to be desired. Nevertheless, this paper argues: that a large majority of the conclusions reached in the Survey are misleading or wrong; that the Survey is especially weak in judging what are the implications of its own allegations and, therefore, that its utility is greatly impaired by its failure to point out fully or in all cases correctly the lessons to be learned from this experience. This generalized rejection can be made more meaningful by an elaboration at this point, which will at the same time serve the purpose of outlining the structure of this paper and summarizing certain of its main conclusions.

A. Organization and Execution

As to the first set of allegations, there is not too much that can be said short of detailed discussion which is contained in later sections, except to make the obvious point that perfection in organization and execution is never attained and that the real question is whether the mistakes that were made were worse than they reasonably should have been and justify blanket condemnation. Stated flatly, the conclusions reached here on the main substantive points are:

- a. That Agency command and organizational relationships were what they should have been.
- b. That any shortcomings in the internal planning process reflected, for the most part, the difficulty of securing clear policy guidance from outside the Agency and prompt, willing, support based on that guidance.
- c. That the failure of most air operations in support of the resistance was the result of circumstances completely beyond the control of the air arm and probably not remediable by any action that the Agency could have taken.
- d. That the intelligence on the Castro regime and on the internal opposition thereto was essentially accurate.

The greatest operational weaknesses were in the early phases of maritime operations and, possibly, in the failure to place trained paramilitary agents with resistance groups, although it must be recognized that major efforts were made to accomplish this result and even with hindsight it is not clear that any different operational procedures or any greater effort could have achieved greater results.

The ultimate test of any project such as this is, of course, its outcome but if a judgment of the effectiveness of organization and execution is to be made, the deficiencies need to be balanced by the accomplishments. As even the Survey remarks, "There were some good things in this project". After a slow start, a sizable number of small boat operations were run efficiently and a large number of persons and volume of cargo were infiltrated successfully into the Island. In the last weeks before the invasion, a political organization was formed which covered a remarkably broad spectrum of political opinion and brought together what was described by a State Department officer at the time as the best group of exile leaders that could be assembled and that left outside no important politically acceptable element. In the military build-up, a force was created that was twice as large as originally envisaged and larger than any paramilitary force ever developed by the Agency. It was brought to a high state of combat effectiveness with a remarkably low percentage of individuals who had to be eliminated for unsuitability and with high morale later proven in combat. This force was airlifted to a staging base, the location of which was never revealed until after the finish of the operation. It was loaded on ships which sailed on dispersed courses and achieved complete surprise five days later. The Brigade then successfully carried out what had been described as the most difficult type of military operation, a landing on a hostile shore, carried out largely at night. Finally, as the battle was joined, adequate supplies of all sorts were available within a few hours of the beaches, had conditions permitted their off-loading. These various results were accomplished in such a way that only a small number of Agency staff officers were ever exposed to the Cuban participants and the true identities of these Americans have never been revealed. Moreover, the entire build-up was accomplished under the limitation that it contemplate no use of Americans in combat and no commitment of American flag shipping. As the event proved (and the Survey remarks), "This was not enough". Nevertheless, a recital of affirmative accomplishments suggests that whatever shortcomings there were in organization, personnel, and execution were not the decisive reasons for failure. It will be necessary to return to this point later.

B. Errors of Judgment

The second set of criticisms, those described above as allegations of major errors of judgment and the third, relating to the Agency's

relationships with the rest of the Executive Branch, are more complex. Their validity is discussed in separate sections below (Section III on Why a Military Type Invasion and IV on The Decision Making Process, Section VIII on The Relationships with the Cubans, and Section V on The Assessment of the Adequacy of the Plan and on the Appraisal of its Success). Summarized in flat statements, the conclusions there reached are these:

a. The basic reason for placing increasing emphasis as the build-up progressed upon the planned military operation and decreasing emphasis on the internal resistance is that for a number of reasons the capacity of the resistance to achieve an overthrow without a significant assist from the outside appeared to be diminishing rather than growing despite the best efforts of which the Agency was capable to support it. Moreover, preparation for the military operation was not intended to reduce support of the resistance and the two efforts became truly competitive only in the last week before the invasion was mounted.

b. The decision to deny the Cuban political leadership control of or close contact with the Brigade and to withhold from them knowledge of the impending invasion was based on two considerations. First, it was believed at the time that if the Brigade was to achieve unity and esprit de corps, it must not be split by political rivalries and its officers must be chosen on professional grounds. This clearly precluded control of the Brigade, or even free access to it, by the political leaders. Second, the insecurity of the Cubans was notorious. It was quite inconceivable that they could know the details of times and places without the gravest risk that the essential advantage of surprise would be lost. It was clear at the time that the Agency assumed a significant risk in denying responsibility to the Cubans and inevitably assuming this responsibility itself. No evidence that has come to light during or since the invasion suggests that military effectiveness and security could have been obtained without paying that price.

c. The conclusions of this paper on the adequacy of the military plan are really too complex to be summarized in a sentence or two. All that can be said here is that (1) there was solid reason to believe that it had a good chance of at least initial success; (2) the last minute cancellation of the D-Day air strike significantly reduced the prospects of success; (3) there was never a test of whether internal support for the invasion would materialize on the scale and in the manner anticipated; and (4) the main deficiencies in the plan and in the capabilities of the Cuban force which may have contributed to the defeat have not been touched on in the Survey.

d. The appraisal of the chances of success may well have been faulty. The intelligence was generally good but it may have underestimated the skill with which the Castro forces would be directed, the

morale of the militia units he would deploy against the Brigade and the effectiveness of any T-33's that remained in operation. There was some exaggeration of the capabilities of both ground and air forces of the invasion. It is impossible to say how grave was the error of appraisal since the plan that was appraised was modified by elimination of the D-Day air strike. Had the Cuban air been eliminated, all of these estimates might well have been accurate instead of underestimated. Probably, therefore, the primary fault lay in having one factor (i.e., the elimination of Cuban air) achieve so vital a significance to the whole plan. Although the D-Day air strikes were essential to the destruction of the Cuban air, no guaranty of such destruction was possible even had there been authority for the strikes.

The conclusions summarized above bear on the correctness of the Survey's allegations of deficiencies of execution and major errors of judgment but for the purposes either of understanding what happened or of learning how to avoid such a failure in the future, it is far from sufficient to know that certain activities were (or were not) incompetently performed and certain mistakes were (or were not) made. With many of the deficiencies it is essential to understand why they existed. And with all of them it is important to know what part they played in causing the outcome to be what it was. The central weakness of the Survey is that it is often misleading in its implications as to why certain things were done and it is grossly incomplete in its analysis of the consequences of mistakes alleged to have been made. Accordingly, before proceeding to the detailed discussion beginning in Section II of this paper which supports the conclusions summarized here, it has been felt necessary to make good in some degree these errors of omission by commenting on the nature and causes of the failure in a manner which will be in part alternative and in part supplementary to the Survey.

C. The Decisions That Led To Failure

It has been suggested not only in the Survey but elsewhere that the operation against the Castro regime should never have been allowed to take the form that it did of a military invasion. It ultimately did take this form, however, and it was in this form that it failed. The military failure has been analyzed far more exhaustively and with greater authority by General Taylor and others than this paper can pretend to do. Nevertheless, certain conclusions as to the nature of the military failure must be restated here if its causes are to be understood.

There is unanimous agreement that the proximate cause was a shortage of ammunition on the beachhead and that this shortage was directly traceable, in turn, to the effective interdiction of shipping and air resupply by the Castro Air Force. It has been less emphasized that

Castro's command of the air deprived the Brigade of its capability for battlefield reconnaissance, of the equivalent of field artillery, and of close air support against enemy ground forces. It deprived it, too, of the possibility of "strategic" strikes against enemy lines of supply and communications. Finally, reliance had been placed on daytime and virtually unopposed air and sea resupply as a necessary condition for the activation of resistance groups throughout the Island. It is incontrovertible that, without control of the air, and the air crews and aircraft to exploit that control of the air, the whole military operation was doomed. Even with control of the air it might have failed but without it there could not have been any chance of success. If, then, one wishes to learn what actually caused the military operation to fail, rather than what might have done so, the starting point must be an inquiry into why control of the air was lost and never regained. Of equal significance for an understanding of the whole operation is an awareness of the circumstances that did *not* contribute to the failure in the air.

Fortunately, it is possible to list without much possibility of controversy the circumstances that led to the outcome in the air. First, the nearest real estate that could be used was Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua a distance of over 800 miles from the target area. The only way to avoid this severe limitation on the capability of any but the most modern aircraft would have been to use a base on U.S. territory. Second, in choosing types of aircraft, no sort of plausible denial could be maintained unless the project limited itself to the kinds of obsolete aircraft that might plausibly be found in the hands of a privately financed Cuban force. There was the further argument that it was desirable to use types of aircraft that could have defected from the Castro Air Force. The choice was thus rapidly narrowed down to B-26's. Third, policy guidance throughout the project was to the effect that no U.S. air crews could be committed to combat or placed where they might be involved in combat. This restriction was not relaxed until the second day of the invasion and then only in desperation. This had implications not only for the quality of the air crews but also for the number that could be assembled, screened for security, and trained within the time period available.

Given these limitations, the only way in which there was the slightest possibility of achieving control and maintaining control of the air was by destruction of the Castro Air Force on the ground before the dawn of D-Day when vulnerable shipping would be exposed to air strikes. The one air strike on D-2 was not expected to be, and in fact was not, sufficient to accomplish this purpose. Only one other strike was planned for this purpose and that was cancelled. Moreover, in the interests of making the air strikes appear to have been done by the

Castro Air Force, a restriction was placed on the number of aircraft that could be committed to these strikes by the invasion force.

Even after the very considerable damage done on D-Day itself by enemy air, it is possible that a determined and major strike on the night of D/D+1 would have crippled the Castro Air Force, the final destruction of which might have been completed the following night. By the evening of D-Day, however, the Cuban air crews were exhausted and dispirited and the opportunity could not be fully exploited.

Even if things had gone better on D-Day, it is questionable whether the 17 Cuban air crews that constituted the air arm of the strike force would have been adequate to accomplish all of the tasks for which reliance was placed on the air arm. The chance of success would have been greater (with or without the D-Day strike) if it had been possible to assemble and commit to action more trained Cuban or U.S. air crews.

D. Washington Decision Making

These, then, were the circumstances which together led to defeat in the air and made inevitable a defeat on the ground. Several things are notable about them. In the first place, it should be emphasized that these all trace back to Washington decisions. The defeat in the air cannot be blamed on bad maintenance at Puerto Cabezas, or on a shortage of spare parts or fuel. It cannot be blamed on a shortage of B-26's, inasmuch as it proved possible rapidly to replace losses from the U.S. It cannot be blamed on the cowardice or lack of skill of the Cuban air crews, who by and large gave a good account of themselves. Nor can it be attributed to bad tactical decisions made either at Puerto Cabezas or in the Washington command post. The crucial defeat in the air was to no significant degree the result of bad execution. It was directly and unambiguously attributable to a long series of Washington policy decisions.

Before exploring the touchy question of whose decisions these were and how they were made, the implications of this conclusion deserve emphasis and elaboration. It suggests that the bad organization, improperly drawn lines of command, low quality personnel and operational inadequacies alleged by the Survey were not in the actual event responsible for the military failure. If organization and execution had approached perfection, the invasion would still have failed in the absence of more and larger pre-D-Day air strikes or the use of more modern aircraft from U.S. bases.

To be sure, this conclusion derives from an analysis only of the failure to gain control of the *air*. It is arguable that even if control of the air had been achieved, maintained, and exploited, the beachhead would not have been consolidated nor the Regime ultimately overthrown. Without arguing that point here, however, the evidence

strongly suggests that if the Brigade had been defeated by ground action under these more favorable circumstances, it would have been because of errors of planning and conception rather than by errors of execution. The Brigade fought long enough to prove its determination and tactical skill. It appears to have been well handled by its officers. There were ample supplies at hand to support continued ground action. And Castro himself has admitted that the terrain was well chosen. Given control of the air, the Brigade might ultimately have been defeated by a complete failure of any resistance to materialize under conditions which would have encouraged it and permitted air support coupled with continued effectiveness in the face of heavy casualties of the Castro militia. Either of these possible developments would have confirmed the errors of intelligence and assessment that are alleged but would have given no support to the view that errors of organization and execution in the build-up phase were responsible for the military defeat. Despite whatever mistakes of this character there were, the Agency did after all (with the invaluable help of the Department of Defense) build up, train, equip, and deploy a force that proved itself in combat to be of high quality.

E. Agency vs. Government Responsibility

Another notable feature of the decisions that together were responsible for failure to achieve control of the air (in addition to the fact that they were all Washington policy decisions) is that they were all interdepartmental decisions. Other elements of the Executive Branch were involved along with the Agency in making them. This is not to imply that in all cases they were imposed on the Agency. Regardless, however, of how blame should be assessed between the Agency for accepting restrictions and the policy makers outside the agency for imposing them, it is necessary to have clearly in mind the nature of the decision making process in a project of this sort in order to understand how the ultimate failure came about.

Inherent in this situation was a clear conflict between two goals, a conflict of the sort familiar in recent American history. One objective was that, mainly through the various activities comprised in this project, the Castro regime should be overthrown. The other was that the political and moral posture of the United States before the world at large should not be impaired. The basic method of resolving this conflict of objectives that was resorted to was that of attempting to carry out actions against Castro in such a manner that the official responsibility of the U.S. Government could be disclaimed.

If complete deniability had been consistent with maximum effectiveness, there would theoretically have remained no conflict of goals but in fact this could not be (and never is) the case. The most effective

way to have organized operations against the Castro regime, even if they would have been carried out exclusively by Cubans, would have been to do so perfectly openly, on the largest scale and with the best equipment feasible. Practically every departure from this pattern of behavior imposed operational difficulties and reduced effectiveness. Inherent in the concept of deniability was that many of these restrictions would be accepted but at every stage over a period of many months questions had to be answered in which operational effectiveness was weighed against the political requirement of deniability.

As these decisions presented themselves week after week, the Agency as the executive agent for the conduct of the operation was usually and naturally the advocate of effectiveness. The State Department and, with respect to certain matters, the Department of Defense were the guardians of the correctness of the country's political posture and thus the advocates of deniability. There was obviously no way in which a generalized policy could have been laid down which would have furnished guidance as to the way the many successive decisions ought to be made. There was no quantitative measure of either the improvement in the chances of success that would have resulted from say, permission to use American air crews in overflights or of the decrease in deniability that would have resulted therefrom. Each of many such decisions had to be discussed and made on its own merits, and in almost all of them several agencies had to take part.

One of the consequences of this state of affairs was that prompt decisions were hard to obtain. Another was that, like so many interdepartmental decisions, these were subject to differing interpretations by different participants in the process. Delays and differences of interpretation were compounded by the constantly changing situation both of Cuba and the Castro regime on the one side and of the opposition on the other, which would have rendered rigid and entirely orderly planning difficult under the best of circumstances.

The nature of the decision making process had other consequences as well. It explains in large measure the failure to write tidy and comprehensive plans and have them properly approved in writing by competent authority well in advance. It explains why there was a long succession of alternate plans and of modification to plans under consideration. Above all, the constant weighing of costs and benefits in the effort to satisfy the military requirements for success without excessive impairment of the political requirement of deniability explains why the final plan (and most of the variants considered in the last six weeks) was a compromise.

F. Why An "Overt" Operation

Against the background of these remarks on the way decisions were made and on the nature of policy issues involved, it is worth

commenting briefly on one of the major errors of judgment alleged by the Survey: the decision to “convert the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation beyond the Agency’s capability.” In part this “decision” was compelled by the failure of the internal resistance the reasons for which are discussed in later sections and are not germane to the current context. As for the Agency’s capability, enough has already been said to suggest that the operation was not so much beyond the Agency’s capability as it was beyond the scope of activities judged to be acceptably deniable. The question that is highly relevant to the policy making process is how and why the project was allowed to become overt and, when this had happened, why it remained the responsibility of the Agency.

That it did become “overt” in the sense that there was extensive public discussion of the preparations for invasion and that the military action was widely attributed to the United States Government, both before and after it took place, there can be no doubt. Nor is there any mystery as to why this happened. It was quite out of the question to infiltrate men and arms by sea and air for months, recruit, train and arm a strike force of some 1800 Cubans, to organize the political fronts, first the FRD then the CRC and run a major propaganda campaign, without at least reports and rumors of these activities becoming widespread. Nor were there any illusions either in the Agency or elsewhere in the Executive Branch as to the degree to which the facts were surmised and accepted as true by journalists and other informed persons. Why, then, would anyone continue to regard the involvement of the United States as plausibly deniable and why was the undertaking not converted into an overt operation, which presumably would have become the responsibility of the Department of Defense?

The answer to the first part of this question is that up to and through the invasion itself the operation remained to an extraordinary degree *technically* deniable. Funds were disbursed in such a way that their U.S. Government origin could not be proved. No Agency case officer who played an active role was publicly revealed as such by true name. No Americans were captured (although the bodies of an American B-26 crew were probably recovered after its loss on the second day of the invasion). In short, even the best informed correspondents in Miami who published what purported to be detailed, factual reports could substantiate them only by quoting Cubans who themselves were often not well informed.

This limited and purely technical maintenance of deniability was less important to the decisions of the Executive Branch, however, than the fact that no one in the Executive Branch was ready at any point until after the defeat officially to avow U.S. support. Indeed, this alternative was never seriously considered. Even the most inadequate fig

leaf was considered more respectably than the absence of any cover whatsoever. Indeed, the final changes in the operational plan made in March, the official announcement in April that the United States would not give support to the rebels, and the cancellation of the D-Day strike were all last minute efforts to shore up the plausible deniability of an enterprise for which Governmental support was bound to be conclusively surmised even if it could not be proved. These decisions were made by the senior policy makers of the Government who were reading the newspapers every day and knew well to what degree the project had in fact become "overt". These men simply were not willing to state officially either that the United States itself was about to make war on Cuba or that the U.S. Government was openly supporting a group of Cubans, not even recognized as a Government in exile, in a military invasion. In the aftermath of failure this decision may have seemed a wrong one. Had the operation succeeded reasonably quickly and without too much bloodshed, the decision would probably have seemed a correct one. Be that as it may, it was not the Agency's decision and, as the above cited actions suggest, the pressure to strengthen deniability in the last few weeks came from outside the Agency and led to decisions which were unwelcome to the Agency. To suggest, as the Survey seems to do, that the Agency was responsible for this clinging to deniability is demonstrably false.

G. Government vs. Agency Decisions

The same comment applies in some degree to the three other alleged major errors of judgment. (These have to do respectively with the treatment of the Cuban exiles, the adequacy of the military planning, and the appraisal of the chances of success. They have been touched upon above and are discussed at some length in Section V below.) In the context of the decision making process, the most important conclusion that emerges is that, whether they were wise or unwise, they were Governmental decisions in a very real sense. As to the handling of the Cubans, this was a matter of the most intimate consultation with the State Department, especially in the two months preceding the invasion when the CRC was in process of formation. As to military planning, the record clearly shows that there was detailed consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the JCS considered the successive plans both formally and informally, and that these were the subject of review and discussion at the highest levels of Government. The chances of success were assessed favorably by the Joint Chiefs (minus, of course, the last minute cancellation of the D-Day strike) as well as by the Agency. The Agency must accept a sizable share of the blame for whatever mistakes were made in these three areas but no one who studies the record with care can assert (and no one who has done so has asserted) that the responsibility was narrowly focused on any one of the participants in the decision making process.

H. Conclusions

This introductory and summary section began with a restatement of the main allegations of error made in the Survey and it followed with a summary of the conclusions reached in this paper (partly in the foregoing discussion but principally in the later more detailed sections) with respect to these allegations. For the most part the allegations are rejected. In concluding this section it may be useful first to list, for comparison and contrast with the Survey, what in the judgment of this paper do appear to have been the strengths and weaknesses of this undertaking and second to suggest some of the lessons to be drawn therefrom. The list is as follows:

1) Small boat infiltration and exfiltration operations were slow to start (but by and large were effective and well run in the last three months). Moreover, due to the existence of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, defectors and legal travel, the need for illegal infiltration was comparatively slight until January 1961.

2) Partly for this reason, the effort to place trained communicators, paramilitary types, and other agents with resistance groups inside the Island, and thereby to create a reception capability for air and maritime resupply, never caught up with Castro's improving security measures. This impaired the build-up not only of guerrilla groups but of intelligence nets. It is doubtful, however, whether significantly more could have been accomplished in building up an effective internal resistance particularly in view of the timing of the whole operation and the lead time involved in recruiting and training.

3) Aside from these weaknesses, alleged defects of organization and execution had little to do with the unsuccessful outcome. In particular, the limiting factor on air operations in support of the resistance was not bad management but the limitations of the reception parties and competence of Cuban air crews.

4) The air arm should have been stronger by the time of the invasion in numbers of air crews, type of equipment, availability of U.S. bases, or some combination of all these. If relief could not have been obtained from any of the politically motivated restrictions, and if a larger number of competent Cuban air crews could not have been recruited, the Agency should on its own responsibility have assembled more U.S. nationality air crews in the hope that their commitment would be permitted in an emergency.

5) There should have been more pre-D-Day air strikes and they should have employed the full strength of the air arm. The D-Day strike should not have been cancelled.

6) The military plan was a good one (except for the restrictions on, and possible inadequacy of, the air arm). It was properly worked out

as between the Agency and the Joint Staff and was a product of highly competent, professional military planning.

7) The appraisal of the chances of success was probably faulty for reasons summarized above (para. d, page 8).

8) The important decisions were Governmental not those of one Agency. It was frustrating but of little practical consequence that the decision making process was at times cumbersome and did not promote tidiness. It was inevitable that the whole shape of the operation was determined as a compromise between the conflicting goals of deniability and effectiveness.

I. Lessons For The Future

What are the lessons for the future to be drawn from this unhappy experience? Perhaps the main one is that the U.S. should not support an operation such as this involving the use of force without having also made the decision to use whatever force is needed to achieve success. If the political decisions necessary to facilitate the effective use of force on an adequate scale, up to and possibly including the overt commitment of U.S. military forces, are too difficult to make, then the operation should be called off unless the odds in favor of success within the politically imposed restrictions are very great.

It is a fact of life that the use of force by the U.S. (or any major Western nation—the Communists seem to be judged by a different standard) in an effort to influence the course of events in another country is deeply unpopular with an important body of opinion. Most of the damage to the political posture of the U.S. that is done by such action occurs when the action is identified, whether on the basis of evidence or of pure surmise, with the U.S. Once this point of identification has been passed, it will almost invariably be true that ultimate failure not only means loss of the original objective but further exaggeration of the political damage. Ultimate success, on the other hand, is the only way partially to retrieve and offset the political damage. It is, therefore, only the part of wisdom to reassess an undertaking of this sort when identification of the U.S. Government with it has begun to occur or appears imminent and to determine at that time either to insure success or to abandon it.

The feeling has been widespread that another major lesson to be learned has to do with respect to the decision making process in the Executive Branch. In any major operation involving the actual exercise of power by the U.S. Government (as distinguished from the threat to exercise power), some branch of the Government will be responsible for execution, preoccupied with the achievement of success, and therefore generally the advocate of a massive and effective exercise of power. At the same time, the U.S. will always be in pursuit of a variety of

essentially political objectives which will impose a requirement to maintain a certain public posture (notably in the UN). This requirement, in turn, will imply limitations on the manner in which and the scale on which power can be exercised. The guardian of the public posture whose primary responsibility it will be to devise and support restrictions on action will typically be the Department of State, or policy makers outside the action organization. In such a situation there is almost bound to be a succession of operational decisions that present (or appear to the participants to present) major issues of policy and, since there is an inevitable, and in a sense legitimate, conflict of interests between departments reflecting the conflict of objectives, there will typically have to be an arbiter who is himself neither the activist operator nor the statesman-like guardian of the country's political posture.

Such issues are continuously brought to top levels for resolution. The result is a very human tendency on the part of the decision makers to decide not only the policy matters which only they can handle but also operational matters in which they have little of the expertise necessary for judgment and can rarely acquire through briefings enough depth of factual detail for a full understanding. Admittedly, expert advisors can be used but under pressure of time compounded by the unavoidable ambiguity of committee considerations, decisions are often made by the policy makers without full concurrence of the experts based on an inadequate understanding of the issues or their implications.

These are of course eternal problems of high level decision making and minor changes in governmental structure will not cause them to disappear. Nor are they in any sense unique to clandestine operations conducted by this Agency. Whenever something like the Cuban situation arises, what seem to the operators to be operational decisions will in fact raise policy issues. The issues will be real because they arise out of a real conflict of objectives. The decision making process could be tidier than it usually is and a meticulous written record would minimize recriminations after the fact, but tidiness and a good written record will have little bearing on the substantive wisdom of the decisions themselves. Whether in important matters of this sort any one other than the President himself can resolve the conflict between the requirements for effectiveness of action and acceptability of the political consequences remains to be seen. Perhaps the most useful lesson about Government decision making to be learned from the Cuban case is that one must be prepared for and philosophical about this process.

A third lesson of lesser generality has to do with the covertness or deniability of paramilitary and other large scale operations. An operation can be said to be covert only so long as the knowledge that it is being performed can be restricted to authorized individuals. This

is possible if an activity can really be concealed (e.g., photography of a document without the knowledge that the document has been reproduced) or if that part of the activity which is observable by unwitting people can be made to appear to them to be perfectly normal (the black movement of bodies or cargo from place to place through the use of false documentation). Unfortunately, a good many large projects including notably most paramilitary operations cannot be covert in this sense. Journalists and other unwitting people are almost certain to learn that something untoward is afoot. The only aspect in which such operations can be kept clandestine is by successfully concealing the part played by the U.S. Government.

It is a necessary condition for the preservation of such deniability that no unwitting individual acquire hard evidence of Governmental participation but this is by no means a sufficient condition. If it comes to be widely believed even in the absence of hard evidence that the U.S. Government is assisting or participating in an illegal activity, then a considerable part of the benefit that accrues from deniability has already been lost. After all, the effect on public opinion depends on what is believed by that part of the public with which the policy makers are for the moment concerned. There may still remain, however, a benefit to be derived from deniability after the public has decided that the denials are false because the Government can still maintain a formally "correct" posture. The Soviets frequently derive advantage from this limited official deniability. As a rule, however, the advantages that accrue to a Western Government, with a lively and at least partly hostile press and with statesmen who shrink from the utterances of flat untruths, are limited.

The lesson suggested by these remarks is that in future clandestine operations of any size, it behooves all concerned to assess realistically the degree to which the operation is, and is likely to remain, clandestine. If the very scale of the activities makes it impossible to conceal them, can they be made to appear to suspicious journalists and others to be perfectly normal? If it is becoming apparent that something newsworthy is going on, can suspicion of Government involvement be kept to an acceptably low key? Or is the only option that remains open that of firm, repeated, public official disclaimer of a responsibility which will generally be attributed to the Government anyway? A corollary is that the advantages of whatever degree of deniability that remains feasible should not be overestimated. With hindsight, the U.S. did not buy very much political advantage with all the restraints imposed on air activity in the Cuban operation. Had it been decided even ten days before the invasion that responsibility for the operation would be unanimously attributed to the U.S. and that only official deniability could be preserved, consideration might have been given to recognizing

the Cuban Revolutionary Council as a government in exile and allowing it to make as many and as powerful air strikes as it could. Another possibility might have been to use U.S. aircraft for a night strike. No one proposed either course of action at the time. They are mentioned here as theoretical possibilities only to illustrate the kind of conclusion that might have flowed from a more realistic assessment of the achievable degree of covertness and of the benefits to be obtained by maintaining only that limited degree of covertness.

There may be a fourth lesson to be drawn with respect to the assessment of the chances of success of any inherently risky operation. As stated above, a conclusion of this paper is that the assessment may have been faulty. Generally, this has been attributed, both in the Survey and elsewhere, to the circumstance that those responsible for conducting the operation were doing the appraising and exhibited a predictable bias. But this diagnosis ignores the role of the JCS who were directed by the President to review the prospects for the operation principally so that there would be an independent and professionally competent judgment. It is also true that in judging the temper of the Cuban people, principal reliance was placed on a National Estimate. Nevertheless, it is probably true that the views of men deeply involved in the operation received too much weight in the assessment of the probable outcome, though it is far from clear where and how additional skeptics could have been introduced into the process of judgment without simply adding to the confusion. The only clear lesson is that policy makers should not make mistakes, which is scarcely helpful.

Finally, there are various lessons to be drawn with respect to Agency organization, procedures, and resources. No attempt will be made here to elaborate them, partly because to do so would require rather detailed exposition and partly because these are not among the really important lessons. It must be repeated still again that errors of execution did not have much to do with the failure and it must be emphasized that ways were found of bringing to bear on the conduct of the operation professional talent of a high order, especially in the military field. The mistakes were mainly those of judgment which a different organization would not have forestalled.

II. *THE SURVEY'S STATEMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT*

The Survey quite accurately refers to changes in the "military" plan which occurred on a number of occasions prior to the adoption of the final plan (i.e., the Zapata plan). The final plan, however, is the only one here considered except that earlier plans will be discussed to the extent that they are relevant to it.

As described by the Survey, the attack involved about 1500 "combat-trained and heavily armed soldiers" in an "overt assault-type

amphibious landing" (page 46, para. 4) on certain beaches on the Zapata Peninsula on the south coast of Cuba. The troops had been moved by air on three successive nights from a Guatemalan training camp to the staging area in Nicaragua where they embarked on ships which had been pre-loaded at New Orleans.

"The ships had moved on separate courses from Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40 miles offshore in order to avoid the appearance of a convoy. From there they had moved in column under cover of darkness to a point 5000 yards from the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These complicated movements were apparently accomplished in a secure manner and without alerting the enemy." (Page 29, para. 87).

The intention was to seize a "coastal strip about 40 miles long, separated from the interior by an impassable swamp penetrated only by three roads from the north and flanked by a coastal road from the east." (Page 30, para. 89).

The landing which occurred during the night of April 16–17 was substantially unopposed. In addition, shortly after daylight an "airborne infantry company was successfully parachuted from C-46 aircraft to four of the five scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the mission of sealing off approach roads." (Page 30, para. 91).

Air support prior to the landing was given by raids by eight B-26's on three Cuban airfields on 15 April and "destruction of half of Castro's air force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike photography". (Page 27, para. 81). Air strikes planned for dawn on 17 April in order to knock out the rest of the Cuban air force were "called off. . . late on 16 April". (Page 28, para. 83).

Early morning enemy air attacks on 17 April resulted in sinking a supply ship and beaching a transport as well as damage to an LCI. (Page 30, para. 92). Ground attacks by Cuban militia occurred during the day of 17 April. "While ammunition lasted, these attacks were beaten off with heavy enemy casualties, and several of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed by ground or friendly air action. On the morning of 18 April, the Red Beach Force, nearly out of ammunition, retired in good order to Blue Beach without being pressed by the evening." (Page 31, para. 94).

Adequate resupply (whether by sea or air) became increasingly difficult and finally impossible due to enemy air action (page 31, para. 96) with the inevitable collapse resulting. The Survey, referring to air support attempted for the Brigade on 18 and 19 April:

"In spite of this air action, however, and in spite of a reported 1800 casualties suffered by the Castro forces, the Brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on resupply of ammunition, which had now become impossible." (Page 32, para. 98).

[NB: No mention has been made of a separate landing planned for D-2 at a point 30 miles east of Guantanamo. Nino Diaz, who had a following in Oriente Province, was to land with 170 men with the idea of starting a fairly large scale diversion by drawing to him his followers and the resistance known to exist in Oriente. Although the Diaz group put to sea and reached its Cuban landing area on schedule, it never in fact landed due to a number of factors beyond U.S. control. Since the group played no role, no further discussion seems warranted.]

[NB: By letter, dated 22 April 1961, the President charged General Maxwell D. Taylor with the responsibility of investigating among other things the Cuban operation and of reporting the lessons to be learned therefrom. General Taylor, in association with Attorney General Kennedy, Admiral Burke and Mr. Allen Dulles (known as the Cuban Study Group) immediately held continuous hearings receiving testimony from all possible informed witnesses including a number of individuals who had been on the Zapata beachhead. General Taylor filed no written report but gave the President an interim oral report on 16 May 1961 and wrote the President on 13 June 1961 that he was ready to make his final report orally, which he did thereafter. The oral reports were supported by four memoranda which are here referred to as they provide a far more complete review of all aspects of the military portion of the operation than given above or in the Survey. Brief references to certain of these memoranda are made hereafter.]

III. *WHY A MILITARY-TYPE INVASION*

The answer is based on a number of factors. First, it became clear through the summer of 1960 that Castro was more firmly settled as Chief of State than had originally been hoped. Moreover, it became apparent that he was receiving and would continue to receive significant support from the Soviet Bloc (including the Chinese) economically, in military matériel, and in much needed advisers, e.g., military, internal security, positive intelligence and communications (to name the main fields). Thus, it was recognized that it was becoming more and more difficult to organize and maintain internal opposition, and, moreover, it was daily becoming more apparent that forceful evidence of outside support was needed to cause the internal opposition to show its hand.

During the summer and fall of 1960, some guerrilla resistance continued in the Escambray Mountains and in some of the provinces. Although poorly fed and equipped, this resistance was respected by the militia which despite vast superiorities in number would not engage the resistance in direct combat. Rather, the militia surrounded resistance pockets, staying on the main roads away from the hills; kept food and supplies out of resistance areas, and captured the guerrillas

when they came out of the hills singly or in small numbers seeking food or other aid. Nevertheless, until the morale of the militia could be shaken, it seemed clear that, due to its vast superiority in numbers, it could continue at least to contain the resistance. Moreover, it became evident through the fall and early winter that the outside force to be successful needed to be self-sustaining since small bands or elements would, due to numerical inferiority in all likelihood, be cut off, surrounded and overwhelmed or rendered harmless by the militia.

In addition, difficulties of supplying the opposition soon became apparent. Air drops were rarely successful which is not an unusual operational experience. Under much simpler conditions approximately the first 12 or 13 drops in support of Castillo Armas were wholly unsuccessful in Guatemala. Thereafter, slight improvement occurred but mainly due to the fact that the drops were made in daylight and directed to terrain held by the invaders who were in open conflict and not in hiding. Even in France during WW II at a time when experienced pilots were dropping to experienced reception committees in vastly more favorable terrain than available in most of the attempted Cuban drops the rule of thumb was that only 50% success should be expected. At any rate the lack of success by air and the difficulty of distributing within Cuba the substantial amount of matériel landed by boat (plus, of course, the restrictions imposed by the constantly increasing and improving internal security) made it clear that no internal resistance buildup could achieve adequate size to eliminate the regime without substantial outside support.

As early as November, therefore, the Government decided to continue to aid the internal resistance as much as possible but to begin to plan for the introduction into Cuba of a trained force from the outside. Unquestionably, Castillo Armas in Guatemala was an analogy and precedent. Over the period from November until April the possibility—indeed the probability—of a military type invasion was continuously a generally approved part of the concept. In addition, by common consent of all involved, the size of the Brigade was increased bit by bit until the final 1500 total was reached. (Page 65, para. 54). There was no magic in any particular number. Nevertheless, factors such as features and size of terrain to be attacked desired fire power and logistics were carefully weighed by officers experienced in guerrilla and special force actions with the result that a minimum basic force of 750 was decided in December 1960 to be the proper size for the requirements. Thereafter, the increase was undertaken to provide extra strength on the simple theory that as long as flexibility was retained more men and guns would inevitably be useful.

Although the decisions involving size and use of the Brigade were in general based on its employment as a single force, the possibility

of piecemeal use through infiltrations in small groups was seriously studied. Obvious political advantages would have been gained with such use rather than the larger "invasion" type landing. Nevertheless, the considered military judgment (i.e., of both Agency and JCS staff and military officers) was that small groups would not be able to prevent the large numbers of militia from either isolating or gradually eliminating them. Moreover, it was felt that the state of the internal opposition was such that they would not respond aggressively to the undramatic and, at best, slow impact of small bands of this sort. Consequently, such a plan could only result in a wasting of assets and a failure to use effectively the trained manpower of the Brigade. The military-type concept of introducing the entire Brigade into Cuba as a single force, therefore, emerged as the most feasible possibility.

IV. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

In order to place the Agency's role in the proper perspective and to indicate the general participation of the Executive Department, it is essential to examine the planning process that was involved. The Survey is highly critical of this aspect but it should be noted that the Survey is particularly incomplete in the discussions of decision-making and planning.

Regarding the planning process, for example, the Survey comments that in January 1961 "the Agency was driving forward without knowing precisely where it was going." (Page 50, para. 13). What is meant is unclear, particularly as in the next paragraph the Survey states:

"At this meeting (28 January 1961) there was a presentation, largely oral, of the status of the operation, and President Kennedy approved their continuation." (Page 50, para.14).

In the same connection, the Survey states that at the end of November 1960, the Agency presented a revised plan to President Eisenhower and his advisors and "President Eisenhower orally directed the Agency to go ahead with its preparations with all speed." (Page 48, para. 8).

Some direction, therefore, was visible to two Presidents even though no definitive decisions were made until the very last minute. The fact, however, that the Survey could make such a statement and at the same time include only the barest facts suggests a lack of understanding of the decision-making process.

The Special Group prior to 20 January 1961 (Messrs. Dulles; Gray; Herter until appointed Secretary, then Merchant; Douglas, with Irwin sitting for him on occasion) reviewed the entire situation on numerous occasions and considered special issues on others. Cuban discussion in the Special Group started in 1959 when concerns about the political situation and the undesirability of Castro were aired. Covert actions (e.g., radio broadcasting, economic actions, possible sabotage) were

discussed at several meetings in January, February and March 1960 including the examination of a detailed “General Covert Action Plan for Cuba” on 14 March 1960. This plan was approved by the Special Group, then partially rewritten and finally approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960. (Page 46, para. 3., and the Survey’s Annex A).

Between mid-March and 20 January 1961, the Special Group had discussions of Cuba at 37 meetings, of which at least 8 to 10 in the period during and following November 1960 were detailed discussions. Gordon Gray, as the President’s representative on the Special Group, reported to the President regularly on such Special Group activities. Moreover, at a general briefing on the project at the Special Group meeting of 8 December 1960, Assistant Secretary Mann and Mr. Joseph Scott of State also attended as did General Lansdale from Defense. In addition, C/WH regularly held weekly meetings with the Assistant Secretary of State at which Cuba was often discussed; liaison with Mr. Scott’s office in State by A/DDP/A and others was almost on a daily basis on Cuba alone; and members of WH/4 also had substantially daily contact (on Cuba) with General Erskine’s office in Defense (General Lansdale, the Deputy) regarding Defense support and details of the preparation for the possible “invasion”.

President Eisenhower, in addition to the 29 November 1960 meeting referred to in the Survey, held a further detailed meeting on 3 January 1961 so that with these plus the reports which he received from Mr. Gray and others he was personally familiar with the status of the project at the time he left office.

Also as the result of an understanding first worked out with General Bonesteel of the JCS and later adopted by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, a Task Force (or committee) was created chaired by Ambassador Willauer with representatives of State (Assistant Secretary Mann and his deputy, Mr. Coerr); JCS (General Gray and other military members of his staff); and CIA (A/DDP/A and C/WH/4 or when absent, his deputy). Later William Bundy of Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze’s office joined the Task Force. The Task Force was responsible for examining the project with a view to determining what actions should be considered which were either not covered by existing plans or necessary to support existing plans. Ambassador Willauer reported to the Special Group at its meetings of 12 and 19 January 1961. The work of this Task Force resulted in the creation of a special JCS team headed by General Gray (discussed below) to review military planning and a committee to keep track of non-military aspects of planning consisting of Defense (General Gray), State (Mr. Braddock, last Chargé in Havana prior to the break in relations) and CIA (A/DDP/A). This latter committee met regularly

from about mid-February and prepared a list of tasks to be discharged by the Agency and each Department. This paper was approved by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the DCI and was used as a check list. A copy is attached as Annex A. As noted, it contained no reference to the military or Brigade action.

The new Administration was brought into the picture as soon as possible. President Kennedy was given a general briefing by the DCI and the DD/P on 18 November 1960 and Secretary of State Rusk was briefed by the DCI prior to inauguration on 17 January 1961. Rusk was again briefed on 22 January by the DCI and the DD/P in a group including the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General.

Thereafter, there were a number of meetings with the President at which the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the Attorney General, the DCI were present. In addition, Messrs. McGeorge Bundy and Schlesinger from the White House Staff; Berle and Mann from State; Nitze and William Bundy from Defense; General Gray from the JCS; and the DD/P were present. Such meetings were held on:

- 28 January
- 17 February
- 11 March
- 14 March (smaller meeting)
- 15 March
- 4 April
- 12 April

(Special communications regarding action under the Plan were also held with the President on 14 and 16 April via McGeorge Bundy and the Secretary of State).

In addition to the foregoing, the President on 7 March met with the Ambassador from Guatemala to the U.S. and the Ambassador's brother, a special emissary from President Ydigoras, who presented President Ydigoras' views. Numerous meetings also were held with Messrs. McGeorge Bundy, Berle and Mann, and Mr. Berle met with Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Also in the second week in April due to attacks in the UN by Foreign Minister Roa of Cuba and stories in the press, mainly the *New York Times*, a substantial amount of time had to be spent with the State Department preparing material for use by the USUN delegation including a briefing of Ambassador Stevenson. It is fair to say, therefore, that the senior members of the Administration were personally and intimately familiar with the status of the project and the issues and problems involved.

On the military side, General Lemnitzer with the approval of the Secretary of Defense designated General Gray of the JCS on 4 January 1961 as the chief military liaison for the project. General Gray, thereafter,

became closely associated with the military planning. From 31 January to 6 February a complete, detailed review of the operations plan was made by General Gray and a team of officers. This involved a thorough briefing by Esterline, Chief/WH/4 and Colonel Hawkins, Chief/WH/4/PM, and officers of their staffs plus several days of study by the JCS team. The Trinidad plan was the one reviewed on this occasion. During the review a memorandum was prepared by the team, approved by the JCS, and sent to the Secretary of Defense. (JCS Memo 57–61 of 3 February 1961, to Secretary of Defense, Subject: Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba).

This memorandum reached a favorable assessment of the plan. It stated, however, that it was unable to evaluate the combat capabilities of the Cuban Brigade and Air Force except on the testimony of others since the Team had not seen these themselves. As a result, a team of 3 officers, a Special Forces Colonel, a Marine Colonel, and an Air Force Colonel, were selected by General Gray from among the officers briefed and sent to Guatemala from 25 through 27 February to examine the air and ground forces personally. A subsequent report to the Secretary of Defense confirmed their finding that the forces were capable. (JCS Memo 146–61 of 10 March 1961, to Secretary of Defense; Subject: Evaluation of CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force). This latter report recommended that an instructor “experienced in operational logistics” be assigned to the training unit “immediately for the final phase of training.” A Marine Colonel with these qualifications was so assigned.

Thereafter, General Gray and his team were intimately connected with all plans and moves of Colonel Hawkins’ PM Section. In fact, it would not be inaccurate to say that General Gray and his team were the equivalent of a full partner of the Agency in this phase from mid-February 1961 until 17 April. (This did not, of course, affect the primary CIA responsibility). During this period General Gray briefed General Lemnitzer at frequent intervals and also briefed the JCS at formal JCS meetings.

When DD/P headquarters elements went on 24-hour duty on 13 April 1961, General Gray’s staff did likewise and assigned a full time liaison officer to sit with Colonel Hawkins’ section in order to be able to brief General Gray fully each day. General Gray, in turn, briefed General Lemnitzer.

The Trinidad Plan was always the plan preferred by the military, i.e., the JCS, General Gray and Colonel Hawkins and his staff. It was, however, considered unacceptable in certain aspects for political reasons so that on or about 11 March 1961. President Kennedy decided that it should not be executed. A further study of the entire Cuban shore line was then conducted by CIA, mainly WH/4, from 13 through 15 March. As indicated in the Survey, this study resulted in a shift

from Trinidad to Zapata. Two alternate concepts were sketched out but the Zapata area concept was the only one which met the political requirements and provided a reasonable chance of success. This concept was fully described to General Gray and his team and passed on by the JCS as the best alternate to the Trinidad plan (JCS Memo 166-61 of 15 March 1961 to Secretary of Defense; Subject: Evaluation of Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts of CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba.) The covering memorandum from General Lemnitzer as Chairman of the JCS states in part:

"3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows:

"c. Alternative III" (substantially the final Zapata Plan) "has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility of the area may limit the support from the Cuban populace.

"4. It is recommended that:

"a. the Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions."

After 15 March, the JCS reviewed the Zapata plan as a body four times. The final plan was reviewed by individual Chiefs since it was only presented to the JCS on 15 April which was too late for its review by the JCS as a body.

The *only* reference in the Survey to JCS participation states that "members of the JCS" have stated "in the course of another inquiry (1) that the final plan was presented to them only orally, which prevented normal staffing; (2) that they regarded the operation as being solely CIA's with the military called in to furnish various types of support and the chief interest of the JCS being to see to it that every kind of support requested was furnished; (3) that they went on the assumption that full air support would be furnished and control of the air secured and on the Agency's assurances that a great number of insurgents would *immediately* join forces with the invasion forces; and (4) that, in the event the battle went against them, the Brigade would at once 'go guerrilla' and take to the hills."

Neither the "members of the JCS" nor the other "inquiry" are identified nor is there any citation supporting the alleged testimony. Being unable, therefore, to locate the full text from which the quotation was taken, it is not possible to analyze or clarify the points made. Presumably the "inquiry" referred to was that conducted by General Taylor although no verbatim minutes were kept. At least no transcript or full report of these hearings is available to the writer. In response, therefore, it can only be repeated that the JCS, as indicated, did review the Zapata plan and continued to be closely associated through their representatives and briefings with all actions taken thereon.

It is quite clear from the four memoranda supporting General Taylor's oral report mentioned above that the Cuban Study Group considered the operation to be one by the United States, not by the Agency, even though the Agency was the Executive Agent. Memorandum No. 2., entitled "Immediate Causes of Failure of Operation Zapata", says on this point:

"The Executive Branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation. There was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense and USIA." (Memorandum No. 2., Para. 11, page 4).

As far as the concurrence of the JCS is concerned, Memorandum No. 3, entitled "Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group", concluded:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the important responsibility of examining into the history of the operation. By acquiescing in the Zapata plan, they gave the impression to others of approving it. . ." (Memorandum No. 3, para. 1.h., page 3).

Annex A

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT

Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks for the planning and conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, and act as members of a Central Office for the operation, has agreed upon the tasks to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases: Pre-D-Day Phase; D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition Phase.

2. The tasks for the Pre-D-Day Phase are set forth in Enclosure A hereto.

3. The tasks for the D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition are set forth in Enclosure B hereto.

4. The tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth in Enclosure C hereto.

5. The proposed time schedule for the Pre-D-Day Phase is attached as Enclosure D hereto.

Department of State Representative

Department of Defense Representative

CIA Representative

Enclosure A

PRE-D-DAY PHASE

1. Department of State representatives will:
 - a. Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval.
 - b. Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements.
 - c. Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.
 - d. Determine action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to Latin American countries—e.g.,
 - (1) Guatemala
 - (2) Nicaraguaand other countries, e.g.,
 - (1) United Kingdom
 - (2) France
 - e. Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the development of the Free Cuba Government.
 - f. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible nonmilitary support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.
 - g. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible nonmilitary support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.
 - h. Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.
 - i. Prepare plans for Post-D-Day actions.
2. Department of Defense representatives will:
 - a. Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.
 - b. Prepare logistics plans for arms, ammunition, and equipment support beyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.

c. Prepare plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.

d. Prepare letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

e. Keep CINCLANT planners informed.

3. CIA representatives will:

a. Establish a Central Office from which Executive Department and Agency representatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.

b. Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required.

c. Assist in the organization of a Free Cuba Government.

d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

e. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.

f. Continue to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

g. Prepare detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition, establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

h. Exert effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel. (N. B: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable.)

i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.

j. Support the preparation of a White paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government.

k. Review cover plans.

l. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements.

m. Review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological warfare plan.

n. Review Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase.

o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

p. Prepare contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

q. Prepare final briefing on entire operation.

Enclosure B*D-DAY AND POST-D-DAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNITION*

1. Department of State representatives will:
 - a. Take such steps as may be feasible for the protection of U.S. citizens in Cuba.
 - b. Execute plans for support of the Revolutionary Council or Free Cuba Government in the United Nations or Organization of American States and to counter communist and/or Castro charges in the United Nations or Organization of American States, as appropriate.
 - c. Lend support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer Force and the Free Cuba Government.
 - d. Revise plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government.
 - e. Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate.
2. Department of Defense representatives will:
 - a. Provide follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/or in accordance with logistics plan.
 - b. Provide support from operational forces as directed.
 - c. Prepare detailed plans to support the U.S. aid plan for the Free Cuba Government for implementation when overt support is given.
 - d. Coordinate support by DOD agencies and commands.
3. CIA representatives will:
 - a. Execute and support over-all paramilitary plan.
 - b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements.
 - c. Continue execution of psychological warfare plan.
 - d. Be responsible for the continuous operation of the Central Office and present briefings of the situation as required or directed.
 - e. Introduce representatives of the Revolutionary Council and of the Free Cuba Government into Cuba at an appropriate time.

Enclosure C*POST RECOGNITION PHASE*

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, as appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in relation to the new Cuban government.

Enclosure D

TIME SCHEDULE

1. *D-14*

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Complete White Paper for Presidential approval.
- (2) Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba Government (continuous).

b. Department of Defense Representatives:

- (1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

c. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Establish a Central Office.
- (2) Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required (continuous).
- (3) Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government.
- (4) Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.
- (5) Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements (continuous).
- (6) Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

2. *D-11*

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements (continuous).
- (2) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

3. *D-10*

a. DOD Representatives:

- (1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

4. *D-9*

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.
- (2) Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.
- (3) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible nonmilitary support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objec-

tives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc.

(4) Complete plans for Post-D-Day actions.

b. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.

c. CIA Representatives:

(1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(2) Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

(3) Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

(4) Complete review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

(5) Complete review of Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

5. D-8

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete support of a white paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government and arrange to have that Government issue same.

6. D-7

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete review of cover plans.

7. D-6

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

8. D-5

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Brief CINCLANT and CONAD planners.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(2) Complete preparation of final briefing on entire operation.

9. D-3

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America.

10. D-2

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior to this date).

V. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE PLAN

As stated above one of the considerations raised by the Agency's capability to perform the operation is the question of what it thought the chances of success to be and if, as was the case, these were thought to be good, how reasonable this conclusion was in the light of the known facts. An examination of the adequacy of the military plan is essential to a resolution of this latter point.

Whatever conclusions or inferences may be drawn from the defeat of the Brigade, no one can deny that, in the absence of the planned D-Day dawn air strikes, the operational plan was never tested. Perhaps these air strikes would have had no significant effect but in view of the essentiality of eliminating Castro's air force, it can be asserted that without these air strikes the plan never had a chance. No issue has received more thorough analysis since the failure of the operation than the decision to cancel. Although the Survey fails to tell the full story, it is felt that nothing can be gained from further review. There is no doubt, however, that the informed military view without exception and at all times was that complete control of the air was absolutely vital.

(N.B. The Survey's statement indicating that "two of the President's military advisors, both members of the Joint Chiefs" did not understand this principle is considered inaccurate.)

To the extent that there was a failure to communicate this to the appropriate political levels, blame should be attached. Quite candidly, it is unknown where this failure occurred, if, in fact, it did.

Before analyzing the reasonableness of the view that the D-Day air strikes could have changed the result it is important to examine the basic theory of the operation and what was accomplished, what failed and what was not tested. As to the last the only possible judgments are whether the theory based on existing evidence was sensible. The operational theory in outline was:

a. To destroy the enemy air force. *Not tested though partially accomplished.*

b. To land the Brigade on the Zapata beachhead achieving surprise. *Accomplished successfully.*

c. To maintain the Brigade on the beachhead perhaps for several weeks. *Not tested.*

d. To persuade the Cuban populace (both private individuals and governmental, including military) actively to oppose the regime. It was never expected that this would happen until the populace was convinced that an opposition force supporting democratic leadership receiving outside support was able to maintain itself on Cuban soil. How long this would take was unknown. *Not tested.*

The failure to knock out Castro's airpower (particularly his T-33 jets) was fatal. How reasonable was the assumption that the D-Day strikes would have eliminated this airpower or at least made it non-operational for a period of time?

The best estimates based on all sources, including photography, (later confirmed as substantially accurate) were that prior to D-2 Cuban combat aircraft strength was 36 aircraft, i.e.:

17 B-26's
13 Sea Furies
5 T-33's
1 F-51

All of these were at three airfields—San Antonio, Libertad, and Antonio Maceo. The in-commission rate was assumed to be 50% (believed to be slightly high) so that presumably 18 combat aircraft were operational at the time of the initial D-2 strikes.

Based on all source reports, including COMINT and photography, the Cubans subsequent to the D-2 strikes were able to launch only 7 aircraft against the beachhead, namely:

2 B-26's
2 Sea Furies
3 T-33's

Photography, of course, cannot determine serviceability but photography of aircraft movements post D-2 were consistent with, and, it is fair to say, confirm the above figures.

In addition, these operational aircraft were concentrated by the Cubans at San Antonio with the possible exception of 1 B-26 at Libertad. With the potent fire power carried by the B-26's flown by the Brigade, and based on the results of the D-2 strikes, the elimination of these seven aircraft could reasonably have been anticipated assuming surprise. Since the landing achieved surprise and since the Cubans had no effective anti-air warning system, surprise would almost certainly have been achieved.

With regard to the ability of the Brigade to maintain itself once ashore (assuming the elimination of hostile aircraft), the theory was that the Zapata area was so difficult of access via only three exposed roads across swamps that a small force could easily defend it against vastly superior forces for "several weeks" as stated by the JCS. Hostile concentrations and artillery would have been almost impossible to conceal from the air due to the terrain and the B-26 fire power would have been devastating against these. This is confirmed by the one actual encounter of B-26's against Cuban tanks. The Brigade's fire power was also heavy and could have prevented passage of any Cuban troops or equipment down the narrow access roads. As long as the ammunition lasted the Brigade actually succeeded in doing this. Supplies, absent hostile air, could have been landed in large quantities since ships could have been brought in to the beachhead.

The accuracy of this conclusion depends, of course, on technical considerations and must be based on experienced military judgments assessing such matters as the terrain involved; the size and capacity of friendly and opposing weapons involved; and the capacity particularly of the attacking force to maintain logistic support. Such an analysis could again be made but it would seem sufficient to support the reasonableness of the judgment reached in April by reference to the judgments reached by the Agency military planners and supported by the JCS and its staff.

Although it was believed that the Brigade under the assumed conditions could maintain itself on the beachhead almost indefinitely, still for ultimate success internal support was obviously needed. The concept of the plan was as indicated that at some point (not immediately) the existence of the Brigade would be recognized and Castro's quiescent opposition would become active.

As far as internal opposition was concerned, there was essentially general agreement regarding the situation. Such disagreement as has existed has been with respect to the accuracy of the prognosis regarding internal support the Brigade might expect after landing.

The December 1960 U.S. estimate regarding the internal situation was that Castro was firmly in control; that his regime had consolidated its hold; that Cuban internal security was being rapidly built up; that Bloc assistance in the form of military technicians and instructors was about 200; that Cuban pilots and other specialists had been taken overseas by the Bloc for training; that the Cuban Communist Party controlled key positions; and that no one group or combination of the regime's enemies seemed well enough organized or sufficiently strong to offer a serious threat without outside help to Castro's authority (SNIE 85.3-60: Prospects for the Castro Regime).

Essentially the same facts were presented in the pamphlet released in early April by the State Department on Cuba, the facts in which

were worked on jointly by all interested departments and agencies, (Department of State publication 7171, Inter-American Series 66, entitled "Cuba", pages 19-25).

Again the same conclusions were stated by the Agency in its presentations. An example is the memorandum, dated 17 February 1961, Annex B of the Survey which sets forth the view on these points consistently presented by the Agency throughout this period and up to 17 April 1961.

What then was the Agency prognosis? The Zapata plan took the view that there was evidence to justify the conclusion that once it could be shown to the Cubans that a Cuban force in opposition to Castro, having Cuban political leaders of political stature and democratic views, was capable of maintaining itself on Cuban soil, there would be substantial defections from the Castro regime in all walks of life, private and governmental.

In December the USIB had estimated that, despite the hold established by Castro and his regime, "Internal resistance to the Castro regime has risen sharply in the last six months."

"The Catholic Church, the only major institution not brought to its knees by the regime, has taken an increasingly firm stand against Castro."

"The middle and professional classes are now for the most part disaffected. Some *campesinos* are disgruntled, notably over the regime's failure to redistribute large landholdings as it had promised; thus far only token allotments have been made."

"A number of anti-Castro guerrilla groups are operating in the Sierra Escambray area and in Oriente Province, but the regime has demonstrated its ability to contain these bands."

"Within the Army, Navy, and Air Force, there probably remains a measure of dissidence and probably considerable resentment at the regime's decided preference for the civilian militia, but this may decline as more Bloc equipment is made available to them."

(The above quotations are all from SNIE 85-3-60, page 5).

The militia numbering at least 200,000 was estimated to have been drawn largely from the lower income peasants and urban workers.

"Thus far, the militia's overall combat efficiency is low; many units are still on a part time training basis. However, a basic cadre of well organized well equipped, and trained units is emerging and on a number of occasions the militia has been used effectively to control mobs and to perform other security duties."

"The regular forces are still disrupted as a result of successive purges, and rehabilitation has been delayed by the employment of substantial army and navy detachments in construction and other pub-

lic works. At present, the combat effectiveness of the air force is virtually nil, that of the navy poor, and that of the army at best fair, although it probably now exceeds that of all but the best militia units."

(Above quotes from SNIE 85–3–60, pages 3–4. For similar conclusions approved by the USIB on 7 February 1961, see "A report prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the USIB." OCI No. 0592/61–C, Part I, para. 6, page 3, and Part I, para. 8, page 4.)

Further evidence of the instability of the Castro regime was apparent in the constantly growing list of individuals once close to Castro who were defecting from him. Many of these were referred to in the State Department pamphlet referred to above. Some significant examples (and only *examples*) are:

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, once Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government.

Dr. Manuel Urrutia y Lleo, hero of the Revolution, Provisional President of the Revolutionary Government. Under house arrest after being forced to resign.

Manuel Ray Rivero, organized anti-Batista underground in Havana. Castro's Minister of Public Works.

Humberto Sori Marin, Castro's first Minister of Agriculture.

Major Huber Matos Benitez, hero of Sierra Maestra, revolutionary *comandante* of Camaguey Province, then thrown in jail.

Manuel Arttime

Nino Diaz

Justo Carrillo

} Sierra Maestra heroes.

Raul Chibas, fund raiser for the Revolution and fought with Castro in the hills.

Felippe Pazos, represented the 26th of July on the Junta of Liberation, and was appointed by Castro as President of the National Bank of Cuba.

Pedro Diaz Lanz, chief of the Cuban air force and Castro's personal pilot.

David Salvador, labor leader, "anti-Yanqui" pro-Castro secretary general of the Cuban trade union federation. Castro intervened on the Communist side against Salvador's free labor movement and jailed Salvador.

Miguel Angel Quevedo, editor of *Bohemia*.

Luis Conte Aguero, radio and television commentator.

Jose Pardo Llada, radio official famous for attacks against U.S. on Castro's behalf.

Further available evidence supporting the conclusion that internal support would be forthcoming if an effective internal opposition force could be established was:

a. Many requests for aid during the period 22 March to 17 April were received through Agency communications channels, some of which are noted in the Survey at pages 108–109. The issue discussed by the Survey as to why aid was not given is not here involved. The messages, however, do emphasize the number of groups anxious to

engage in active opposition. For example, between 22 March and 17 April there were 15 unfulfilled drop requests in support of a claimed total of 5,000 men. Even after the landing between 17 and 22 April seven groups totaling about 3,350 men begged for support in order to fight. These groups were in Oriente (2,500 men); Camaguey (two groups totaling 400 men); Las Villas (three groups totaling 400 men); and Pinar del Rio (50 men).

b. Manuel Ray Rivero, the organizer of the anti-Batista underground and a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Council took the view that the internal resistance was so strong that Castro could be overthrown without an "invasion" from the outside. His view was not officially accepted but represented the informed view of an individual experienced in this field regarding the opposition potential. The disagreement with his conclusion had to do with what action was necessary to persuade the opposition to rebel, not as to its existence.

c. Sabotage from October 1960 to April 1961 was evidence of internal opposition activists even though aside from psychological benefits to the opposition, the sabotage caused insignificant damage in and of itself to the regime. Examples were:

- 1) Approximately 300,000 tons of sugar cane destroyed in 800 different fires.

- 2) Approximately 150 other fires, including the burning of 42 tobacco warehouses, two paper plants, 1 sugar refinery, two dairies, four stores, twenty-one Communist homes.

- 3) Approximately 110 bombings, including Communist Party offices, Havana power station, two stores, railroad terminal, bus terminal, militia barracks, railroad train.

- 4) Approximately 200 nuisance bombs in Havana Province.

- 5) Derailment of six trains, destruction of microwave cable and station, and destruction of numerous power transformers.

d. The view of many of the Brigade who had been members of the militia which confirmed the official estimate mentioned above, i.e., that only a small percentage of the militia would fight against a resolute opposition with strong fire power. This hard core was considered to number 5,000–8,000 at the most. The Army was considered to have been too disrupted to fight.

e. Students and their professors were in revolt, e.g., two thirds of the faculty of the University of the Oriente in December 1960 openly condemned Castro in a public statement. Other students were actively engaged in acts of disruption and subversion working with groups supported by the Agency.

f. Labor was in opposition. Not only was David Salvador in jail as indicated above, but open acts of opposition occurred, e.g., the electrical workers in December 1960 marched from union headquarters in Havana to the Presidential Palace to protest reductions, while on 18

January 1961 workers' wives were attacked by Castro's strong arm squads for demonstrating against the execution of workers (as "traitors") alleged to have sabotaged the Havana power plant.

Since the issue of what the internal reaction would have been under the conditions assumed necessary for effective internal support never arose, it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of the prognosis. It can be said that no one expected an immediate uprising; no advance warning was given to the internal resistance, as a security precaution, to avoid any disclosure of D-Day; ample supplies existed to support uprising had groups showed themselves; communications existed that could have identified areas of resistance (though no communicator was able to join the resistance in the Escambray); no one expected the resistance to join the Brigade on the beach in anything but very small numbers; and it was estimated that the psychological impact of unopposed heavily armed B-26 aircraft flying up and down the island would be significant—an assumption based, of course, on control of the air.

Whatever the correct conclusion, in fact, might have been, the situation was such as to render the judgment (mentioned above) regarding internal support a reasonable one. Surely it was one painfully reached by many informed observers.

Post-invasion planning did exist contrary to the Survey's contention. Some of it has been discussed above. In addition plans for a breakout from the beachhead had been generally worked out recognizing that precise details had to await knowledge of the exact situation. As indicated, the Brigade, it was considered, could maintain itself on the beachhead for a substantial period assuming no hostile air. Consequently, large reserves of supplies and matériel could have been landed; air attacks against enemy concentrations could have been flown; and an attack following heavy air strikes could have been executed when the time was considered most propitious. Such attack could also have been supported by concurrent air strikes, plus, if desired, the dropping of a small airborne force back of the enemy lines to cause disruption. Similarly, air drops of individuals or teams plus supplies could have been made to any active resistance throughout the island.

A further possibility was overt U.S. support in the form of supplies on the basis that the opposition government (the Cuban Revolutionary Council) would have landed on the beachhead, declared itself as the rightful government of Cuba, and requested and received recognition from the U.S. Such recognition could have been accorded on the theory that Castro's regime was a Soviet-dominated dictatorship and, therefore, not representative of or the choice of the Cuban people while the opposition government was democratic, as representative as possible, and offered a program for choice by the Cuban people, if it attained power. Conversely, the Castro regime by its dictatorial actions had

removed from the people all methods of effecting a change except forceful overthrow. Such U.S. recognition, it was believed, would justify U.S. matériel support, if not active support to an offensive. It should be emphasized that U.S. recognition was not considered an essential part of the plan (useful as it would have been) since matériel support could have been provided anyhow.

The planning for failure was, it is believed, all that was possible. If, as happened, the failure occurred before the consolidation of the beachhead, there was little that could be done except an effort to salvage what little was possible. Had the beachhead been established, a number of possibilities were planned, none too satisfactory because a failure of the beachhead was at any time a serious blow. If the Brigade or parts thereof could move together, they were to attempt to reach the Escambray. Assuming some help from the country people, this might well have been feasible. Another possibility was the removal of individuals, conceivably units, by air and sea while teams and matériel could have been airdropped in other parts of Cuba, if resistance had become apparent.

As to the Agency's capability and the adequacy of the plan, the best answer—since the military aspects are the sole consideration—is to refer to the supporting military judgments which were based on full knowledge of the facts. Some evidence of attitudes just prior to D-Day is the message sent by Colonel Hawkins from Puerto Cabezas regarding the desirability of despatching the Brigade. (Attached as Annex A). This message is significant as it received wide circulation at the time in Washington, including the White House, and was accepted as essentially accurate.

The allegation of failure to appraise the chances of success realistically may be accurate but it is submitted that the available facts at least made the judgments reasonable. Moreover, what actually occurred supports these judgments. The Brigade landed with the benefit of surprise; it held its own while ammunition lasted (even though it failed to land some of its firepower); the B-26's when they got a shot at the Cuban tanks demolished them; and the attitude of many of the militia during the early states of the fight was favorable to the Brigade, including defections by militia men to the Brigade even at this early indecisive moment of the engagement. All serious damage was inflicted by the Cuban's air, essentially the three T-33 jets.

The supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report are relevant on these points. Memorandum No. 1, in discussing the operation expresses the view in paragraph 75 on page 26 that "the beachhead could not have survived long without substantial help from the Cuban population or without overt U.S. assistance." Two of the Cuban Study Group (Admiral Burke and Mr. Dulles), however, differed with this

statement on the grounds that there was “insufficient evidence to support the conjectures of this paragraph.”

A footnote on their views at the foot of page 75 went on to say:

“The well motivated, aggressive CEF fought extremely well without air cover and with a shortage of ammunition. They inflicted very severe losses on the less well trained Cuban Militia. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that if the CEF had had ammunition and air cover, they could have held the beachhead for a much longer time, destroyed much of the enemy artillery and tanks on the roads before they reached the beachhead, prevented observation of the fire of the artillery that might have been placed in position and destroyed many more of the local Militia en route to the area. A local success by the landing party, coupled with CEF aircraft overflying Cuba with visible control of the air, could well have caused a chain reaction of success throughout Cuba with resultant defection of some of the Militia, increasing support from the populace and eventual success of the operation.”

Therefore, even in retrospect the Brigade’s inability to hold the beachhead for some time was not clear to well-informed individuals who had soaked themselves in all the available evidence. A prospective judgment in favor of success prior to the event would, therefore, seem understandable.

Finally, regarding the question of intelligence failures, the supporting memoranda to General Taylor’s oral report state that the effectiveness of the Castro military forces, as well as that of his police measures, was not entirely anticipated or foreseen. Memorandum No. 3, however, setting forth conclusions says:

“Although the intelligence was not perfect, particularly as to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the T-33’s, we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat.” (Memorandum No. 3., para. 1.i., page 3.)

Section V — Annex A

TIDE 519 (IN 3197).

1. My observations last few days have increased my confidence in ability this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions but also ultimate objective of Castro overthrow.

2. Ref² arrived during final briefing of brigade and battalion commanders. They now know all details of plan and are enthusiastic. These

² Requested if experiences the last few days had in any way changed Colonel Hawkins’s evaluation of the brigade.

officers are young vigorous intelligent and motivated with a fanatical urge to begin battle for which most of them have been preparing in the rugged conditions of training camps for almost a year. I have talked to many of them in their language. Without exception they have utmost confidence in their ability to win. They say they know their own people and believe after they have inflicted one serious defeat upon opposing forces the latter will melt away from Castro who they have no wish to support. They say it is Cuban tradition to join a winner and they have supreme confidence they will win any and all engagements against the best Castro has to offer. I share their confidence.

3. The brigade is well organized and is more heavily armed and better equipped in some respects than U.S. infantry units. The men have received intensive training in the use of their weapons including more firing experience than U.S. troops would normally receive. I was impressed with the serious attitude of the men as they arrived here and moved to their ships. Movements were quite disciplined and efficient and the embarkation was accomplished with remarkable smoothness.

4. The brigade now numbers 1400 a truly formidable force.

5. I have also carefully observed the Cuban air forces. The aircraft are kept with pride and some of the B-26 crews are so eager to commence contemplated operations that they have already armed their aircraft. Germosen informed me today that he considers the B-26 squadron equal to the best U.S. Air Force squadron.

6. The brigade officers do not expect help from the U.S. armed forces. They ask only for continued delivery of supplies. This can be done covertly.

7. This Cuban force is motivated strong well trained armed to the teeth and ready. I believe profoundly that it would be a serious mistake for the United States to deter it from its intended purpose.

VI. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The Survey reaches the flat conclusion that the project was "badly organized." The reasons given are:

"Command lines and management controls were ineffective and unclear. Senior Staffs of the Agency were not utilized; air support stayed independent of the project; the role of the large forward basis was not clear." (Para. 6, page 144).

The Survey directs these criticisms exclusively at the Agency structure making essentially no effort to relate Agency organization and managerial problems to the participation in the project by other elements of the Government. Before responding, therefore, it should be stated that we share the views set forth in one of General Taylor's

supporting memoranda and quoted in another section of this paper that “the Executive Branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of a paramilitary operation” and that “there was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense, and USIA.” In other words, it was a U.S. rather than a CIA project.

The real organizational problem is one of the basic dilemmas of the U.S. Government, namely, how to manage military or quasi-military operations in peacetime—a dilemma accentuated in those instances involving an effort to maintain clandestinity. Since most of the operational acts involved in paramilitary projects of this nature raise or could, under certain circumstances, raise significant political issues, they normally require high level political clearance prior to being undertaken. Such clearance involves at least the State Department, often the White House, and, due to military implications, the Defense Department plus one or more of the military services. The description in another section of this paper of the extensive participation by and with other elements of the Government indicates that the Cuban project was clearly of this troublesome type.

The Survey’s failure to examine or consider these relationships means that most of its criticisms limited as they are to Agency consideration alone, are too localized or provincial to be realistic or fully understandable. An analysis will, however, be attempted.

The criticism of command lines is, if properly understood, directed essentially at two major defects, one that the project lacked a single, high-level full time commander possessing stated broad powers and abilities sufficient for carrying out the mission; the other that there was a fragmentation of authority between the project chief, the military chief of the project’s Paramilitary Staff and several high level officials, whose wide responsibilities elsewhere in the Agency prevented them from giving the project the attention it required. (Para. 5, page 37).

The DCI allegedly “delegated his responsibility for major project decisions to a considerable extent.” (Para. 4, page 37). The Survey appears to support this statement on two grounds, first that the DCI relied on the DDCI “for policy matters involving air operations” and for “military advice he relied on the military officers detailed to the project.” The consequence of this “reliance” according to the Survey was that the DCI was deprived “of completely objective counsel.”

“Reliance on”, according to normal usage, does not mean the same thing as “delegation of responsibility”. Whatever the Survey intends to say in this connection, it is a fact that the DCI *never* delegated any portion of this responsibility at any moment during the project. Naturally he relied on others for many things (he could hardly run the entire project himself) and he even delegated *authority* (not *responsibility*) in some limited respects.

He did, for example, authorize within clearly understood limits the DDCI to approve certain aspects of Cuban overflights for him. It should be noted in this connection that the clearance of overflights resided in the first instance with the Special Group or the White House and was requested through briefings by the DCI or the DCI plus one of his people, normally the DDCI, the DD/P or both. Thereafter, whether or not an overflight was within the terms of the top level approval and was operationally sound was cleared by the DDCI on behalf of and at the direction of the DCI.

The DCI never released the authority regarding over-all air planning recommendations. The word "recommendations" is used because final air plans decisions lay at a higher level outside of the Agency. Before presentation to such outside authority (the Special Group or the White House) these recommendations were first passed on within the Agency by the DCI.

As far as reliance on military officers is concerned, the DCI obviously received briefings which were mainly given by the DD/P but often the DD/P presentation was expanded by statements from C/WH/4 (the Task Force Commander) his Paramilitary Chief or other individuals connected with the project as appropriate.

Both with regard to air and ground, the DCI also insisted upon and received the advice and judgment of air and ground military officers assigned by the Pentagon to study project plans and activities; of the JCS as a body, and of individual members of the JCS. This entire process has been explained elsewhere in this paper and is developed in considerable detail in the supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report.

Moreover, the DCI, almost without exception, held three staff meetings a week attended by his senior officials including the DD/P, COPS, and A/DDP/A. When any significant matter relating to Cuba needed approval or clarification, the DCI was briefed after one of these meetings. These briefings and meetings plus continuous telephone communications, plus cable traffic, kept the DCI current on all but the smallest details.

The DD/P is criticized by the Survey for "in fact directing the project, although this was only one of his many responsibilities." (Para. 1, page 36). Presumably the Survey did not mean to suggest that the DD/P should have given up his other duties to be full time Task Force Commander. Consequently, his alleged fault must have been a failure to make a broad enough delegation of authority.

The Survey defines the limitations on the DD/P delegated authority by stating that C/WH/4 had "to apply constantly for the decision of policy questions and important operational problems" to the DD/P. It is suggested that, except in very unusual or certain "hot war" situations,

such reservation of authority is the normal one between any unit commander and his next higher echelon. Moreover, until 17 April 1961 (the landing date) urgencies, although great, were never such as to make this sort of review impossible. Undoubtedly it was irksome to C/WH/4 in the same way that any higher authority is considered a problem to a commander who is anxious to push ahead without hurdles or outside restraint.

Quite apart from these considerations, however, the DD/P, because of the requirement to clear outside of the Agency many issues (including details) as policy questions, had to maintain a close control over the project in order to guard against omissions of such outside clearances and to be in a position to request them through the DCI.

To avoid delays in communications between WH and the DD/P, the A/DDP/A spent substantially full time on the project. His position was thoroughly understood by all involved though a purist chart-maker might have felt some concern as to the proper designation of the job on a chart. A/DDP/A was, in fact, an extension of the DD/P arm. He was physically located next to the DD/P; saw him constantly; had immediate access to him whenever he was available, and, therefore, knew instinctively what the DD/P reaction to most problems was and would be. Consequently, he could act for him in many instances while at the same time being fully aware of those situations which should be brought to the DD/P for decision. If chart terms are necessary, he was a senior special assistant with a perfectly clear and understood delegation of authority on matters which he could decide for the DD/P. This individual's availability plus the amount of time accorded the project by the DD/P personally meant that the Task Force was able to obtain decisions from the DD/P level rapidly provided that they were in the DD/P's jurisdictional competence. The many decisions already mentioned which required outside clearance had to be obtained either in accordance with regular procedures as in the case of the Special Group or by special arrangement if some other tribunal such as the White House was involved. The DD/P and the A/DDP/A were both positioned effectively with respect to the senior Agency or non-Agency officers involved to be able to arrange on the most expeditious basis possible whatever high level consideration might be required in given situations.

All existing decision-making procedures were, it is believed, well understood or if a new clearance procedure was needed for recurring activities, a special procedure was created. An example is the procedure for clearance of Cuban overflights, dated 24 October 1960, which is attached as Annex A.

The Survey criticized C/WH because he was "in the chain of command" but "only in a partial sense". (Para. 2, page 36). He signed many

outgoing cables, supervised staffing activities and attended some of the meetings of the Special Group. "But the DD/P and his deputy dealt directly with the project chief, and gradually the Chief of WH Division began to play only a diminished role." (Para. 2, page 36). All of this is essentially true (C/WH, however, was not in the chain of command except on certain specified well-understood matters) although the Survey fails to state that C/WH also sat in on substantially all of the DD/P and DCI meetings on the project attended by any WH personnel, and handled many of the policy negotiations with the State Department as well as some of the more difficult special problems with the Cuban political leaders and some other special negotiations, i.e. those involving possible economic sanctions (with the Treasury and some leading U.S. businessmen and lawyers) and those with particular individuals such as William D. Pawley. Also, of course, interrelationships with the many Agency stations throughout the Hemisphere and their activities were supervised by C/WH.

Even in retrospect, this arrangement with C/WH is believed to have been organizationally sound and would again be adopted under similar circumstances. Black and white organizational answers often do not meet the complex interplay of problems in a project involving as many facets as the Cuban one. Granted, each echelon, starting with the DCI, should have one individual in the next lower echelon to hold responsible for all decisions of that echelon but such individual responsibility was quite clearly identifiable in the project.

C/WH could have been the Task Force Commander but the DCI, having discussed the matter with C/WH, decided that, since C/WH could not be the Commander and also run the rest of WH Division, it was preferable for him to do the latter. Nevertheless, C/WH had long and wide experience in the WH area; connections with many Latin Americans as well as Americans with WH associations; intimacy with the WH Division, its personnel and activities, and had been for many years at a policy level in the Agency. Consequently, his advice and reactions were wanted in the Cuban project and he was asked to stay as close to project activities as he could while performing his other duties. The matters listed above were, therefore, covered by C/WH pursuant to this concept. Actually, C/WH had substantially the same relationship to this project as he had to the Guatemalan anti-Arbenz project which worked well. Nothing new, therefore, was involved.

The Chief of the Task Force (i.e. C/WH/4) is not criticized but his superiors are criticized for selecting for this post only a GS-15 at the fourth echelon in the organization of the Agency. With regard to grade, the C/WH/4 was a senior GS-15 or, in other words, the equivalent of a senior full colonel in the Army. More grade could hardly be required for the top operational command job. As to competence and experience

for the post, it is felt that he will compare favorably with any officer in the CS.

Perhaps the echelon was too low but this is a matter of judgment. Actually the C/WH/4 was at the third not the fourth echelon, the first being the DCI and the DDCI and the second the DD/P. If the Agency alone is considered, it is believed that the echelon was not too low. If all of the Executive Department elements involved are considered, numerous other factors are introduced which involve so different an organizational concept as to make any relative analysis impossible. This overall organizational problem has been mentioned and is now under Governmental study so that it would seem preferable here to discuss only the internal Agency relationships.

At any rate, C/WH/4 for reasons already discussed was obviously not free to make all decisions on his own whatever the Survey may advocate in this respect. He was, however, very much the Task Force Commander. All elements of WH/4 in and out of Washington responded to his command. The extent to which he had to clear decisions with higher authority has been indicated. It is a matter of judgment whether or not the delegation of authority was adequate but it must be re-emphasized that the judgment of most non-delegated items lay outside of the Agency (i.e., as General Taylor's memorandum said, "there was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating. . ."), and within the Agency (once the problem of non-Agency clearances is recognized and accepted) the powers reserved by the DD/P and the DCI were in keeping with normal relationships between command echelons. Moreover, the DD/P, supplemented by the A/DDP/A, was able to expedite decisions so delay was held down as much as possible. Admittedly, the U.S. organizational structure as a whole was not satisfactory for this type of operation. The Government, as indicated, fully appreciates this and is attempting to find a solution.

The Survey makes another point regarding too many echelons, namely, that "the top level had to be briefed by briefers who themselves were not doing the day-to-day work." (Para. 5, page 37). This conclusion is another statement of a troublesome problem of senior governmental management in the complex modern world. How can the individuals informed on details communicate to the top policy decision-makers the relevant parts of their knowledge in a timely and fully informative way? In the Cuban project, it can only be said that the top level saw more of the detail people than is usual. The DCI and the DD/P brought C/WH/4 or the project's Paramilitary Chief with them to substantially all the Presidential meetings on Cuba. Moreover, the Chairman of the JCS brought General Gray (and often another member of his team) with him. Detail knowledge was, therefore, represented.

Moreover, of course, briefings at high levels within each interested element were numerous. General Lemnitzer and the Secretary of

Defense received daily briefings in the period immediately prior to 17 April. The Assistant Secretary of State (ARA) and the Secretary of State were constantly briefed throughout the project. McGeorge Bundy, Rostow and Schlesinger had almost daily contact with the DD/P or the A/DDP/A. The DCI and the DDCI, of course, also were kept current on details. In view of this and the extensive interdepartmental coordination involved in this project and described in another section, the amount of top level detailed information was unusually complete. Admittedly, however, this does not mean that it was satisfactorily complete on all issues and this is one of the problems involved in the above-mentioned Governmental study on organization for projects of this nature.

Three other Washington Headquarters factors are described as "extraordinary" by the Survey, namely, that:

- 1) COPS played "only a very minor part in the project". COPS also allegedly "declined to involve himself with the project" although on at least two occasions he was given "express warning that the project was being perilously mismanaged";

- 2) The DD/P Senior Staffs, the Agency's top level technical advisors, "were not consulted fully" but "they allowed themselves to be more or less ignored"; and

- 3) The Project Review Committee did not review the project. (Para. 6, page 38).

These allegations are so "extraordinary" (to borrow the Survey's word) that it is difficult to accept a serious intent on the part of the Survey's authors. Quite naturally COPS spent little time on the project. The DD/P office was a three-man office, one of whom (A/DDP/A) was spending essentially full-time on the project and another of whom (DD/P) was spending a very substantial part of his time. Consequently, it was only logical, if not essential, that COPS devote his time to the rest of the world as well as to the numerous remaining issues of internal management.

As to the statement about express warnings of perilous mismanagement, it is indeed strange that such a charge should not be identified at least sufficiently to permit some assessment of how responsible the warnings were and of what they consisted. COPS remembers receiving no such warning. Of course, COPS, as well as many other people were told on numerous occasions that some mismanagement as well as other mistakes were occurring in the project. In what project does this not occur, particularly if it is urgent, complex, and disruptive of normal procedures? These "warnings" were given such attention and recognition as the facts in each instance warranted. Actually, the Survey is unclear as to what it believes COPS should have done though the

inference is that he should have used the alleged “warnings” as a basis for taking the project away from the DD/P.

The criticism regarding consultation with the Senior Staffs obviously is directed at a failure to obtain available competent advice. Undoubtedly, the Senior Staffs had good officers who could have been helpful. The judgment involved, however, was at what point do you draw the line when you have operational activities to be accomplished. Each of the Senior Staffs assigned officers to work with the project staffs. No Senior Staff officer not so assigned could have been kept sufficiently well-informed without full and constant briefings. In view of the briefing obligations already in existence, it was decided that additional briefing burdens were unacceptable. Moreover as indicated above, a line had to be drawn and it was felt that sufficient senior personnel were fully involved. The Survey’s criticism in this connection is based on a concept of a normal DD/P project rather than an extraordinary one like Cuba. In this connection, it should again be emphasized that participation by other elements of the Government is wholly omitted by the Survey.

The Project Review Committee’s (PRC) clearance at the most under PRC procedures would have involved a review of the proposed project in its early stages with a view to determining whether or not it should proceed. The peculiar nature of the Cuban project resulted, as already indicated, in clearances throughout the Government at levels which make it hard to comprehend how the PRC would have affected the process. Moreover, even internally in the Agency, the PRC is only advisory to the DCI and it is doubtful if its normal procedures were intended to apply to this type of project.

The Agency, particularly the DD/P, is criticized for failing to deprive the Development Projects Division (DPD), the Agency’s air arm, of its independence by placing it within the organizational structure of the project. The proper organizational positioning of an air commander in relation to the ground commander has long been a matter of argument in the Armed Services. The same difference evidenced itself in the Cuban project with WH-4 favoring the Marine view of complete subordination of air conflicting with the DPD air view advocating a separate command with responsibility to support. This conflict was never fully settled and did cause friction (and probably in a broader sense never will be to the full satisfaction of all the services). It is not felt that it created any more serious difficulties. At any rate, the DD/P dealt with this difference in the only possible practical way in early October 1960. On 5 October the Paramilitary Chief sent a study through C/WH to DD/P expressing at length his views on the command relationships for air operations. On 12 October 1960, the DD/P wrote an answer which set forth the controlling decisions. A

copy of this memorandum is attached as Annex B. Operational control of air forces and facilities required for the project was assigned to Chief of the Task Force. An air staff section for air operations was created in the Task Force. The Acting Chief of DPD was designated chief of the new air section which was to include all DPD personnel when actually employed on project business.

Since DPD had many air commitments to service outside of the Cuban project, AC/DPD was directed to report to the DD/P in the usual manner as to this non-Cuban business.

In view of the foregoing, the Survey is simply wrong when it says "The project chief had no command authority over air planning and air operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was completely independent." (Para. 7, page 39).

The Survey is also wrong in stating that there was no day-to-day continuing staff relationship. Two DPD officers (one, an air operations officer) were assigned full-time from DPD to the project and were physically located with it. In addition, a senior air operations officer attended daily staff meetings. He also spent all of his time with and on the project. Consequently, the air unit was organized to be completely responsive to the requirements of the Task Force with the exception of air safety considerations. In addition, DPD facilities (e.g., weather, communications, mapping and planning air operations, photographic intelligence and related interpretation services) were made available as needed. These were not physically moved as they were more effective in place and were able by remaining to service other Agency requirements as well. In fact the DPD relationship with WH was much closer than quite effective relationships which it had with other Area Divisions having similar requirements.

The Survey devotes several pages to criticism of the WH-4 intelligence collection (pages 75-80) covering a number of points. The most serious allegation is that the interpretation of intelligence was "entrusted to officers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that their judgments could not have been expected to be altogether objective." (Para. 13, page 78). One of the essential items referred to is the estimate regarding the effect of the strike force landing in triggering "an uprising among the Cuban population". (Para. 13, page 78). The Survey's lack of understanding of the project's theory on this point and the evidence for the judgments reached has been discussed in detail elsewhere.

It might be noted again that one of the supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report concluded "we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat". Moreover, two members of General Taylor's four-man Cuban Study Group, even in retrospect, still felt after hearing all the evidence that the operation might have been successful had the Cuban air power been eliminated.

Probably if any similar effort were to be attempted in the future an even greater association between DD/P and DD/I should be worked out for evaluation purposes. In view of the above conclusions, however, it would seem fair to say that admitting failures (which indeed is done) they were not as obvious as the Survey suggests. In fact a case can still be made that the estimates were right.

The Survey's other criticism regarding WH/4 intelligence activities will be dealt with briefly. The creation of a G-2 in the paramilitary unit rather than with the Project FI Section is strongly criticized. (Pages 77–79). The alleged bad consequence of this error, i.e., improper estimates, has just been discussed. In other respects on this point the Survey is inaccurate. The Chief of the FI Section did attend WH/4 staff meetings (Para. 10, page 77). There was liaison between the G-2 and FI Sections (Para. 11, page 77). They both saw cables (Para. 10, page 77). They exchanged intelligence and generally supplemented each other (Para. 11, page 78).

The remaining criticism regarding intelligence is directed at a failure to support the Miami Base. Since the Base raises a number of other considerations, they will be discussed together.

The Survey, in effect, commends many of the operational results achieved by the Miami Base. The FI and CI activities are mentioned in paragraphs 10 and 11 on page 70 and, it is believed, that these accomplishments are commendable.

The PM side involves a more complicated picture. The Survey is critical of the fact that Headquarters in Washington kept too tight a control on Miami. Consequently, too little authority was delegated to enable Miami to function effectively. There is no doubt that a number of Miami officers felt that they were being over-controlled. No good operations officer ever feels differently or if he does, he is not doing his job. Consequently, the normal, healthy operating effort to shake the bit and run free was part of the attitude held by Miami operators in relation to Washington.

Washington, on the other hand, was anxious to avoid moving Headquarters functions to Miami or treating Miami as a field station which it clearly was not. Miami was not Cuba. Communications from target areas could be received and handled just as fast in Washington as in Miami. Many aspects of operational planning could be handled just as well, if not better, in Washington than Miami. Coordination with other operating areas was better handled in Washington. There were, of course, exceptions. Some of the more obvious exceptions were that Miami was a center for Cubans and an active interchange by sea between Miami and Cuba was a fact of life. The project organizational concept, therefore, was to provide Miami with people and the authority needed to take advantage of these potentials. Mainly, of course, this

meant FI and CI activities, some propaganda activities, some special training, and the handling of the Cuban exile leaders. The Survey apparently does not find major fault (except as noted in the following paragraphs) with respect to Headquarters-Miami organizational relations in these fields, whatever the Survey may say about these activities in other respects.

The Survey does to some extent criticize the training run by Miami by saying that there was no full-time chief of training, no training objectives or plan and that much of it was merely a case officer doing the best he could. (Paras. 24–26, pages 133–134). The results allegedly were haphazard. For example, “one man was trained in a hotel room to make a parachute jump”. (Para. 25, page 134). Obviously a full jump course would have been preferable but the Survey’s comment indicates a lack of understanding of the problem. In WW II, many officers did successful operational jumps with only minimal ground training. Combat pilots and air crews, when forced to jump, did so without having even been trained in a hotel room. Anyhow, as the Survey says the hotel-trained jumper “made one (jump) successfully!” It might also have been stated by the Survey that the man in question was in his early thirties, in excellent physical condition and an *expert tumbler*. Moreover, his one successful jump was the only one he was asked to do. This case, unimportant in itself, is referred to because it brings out several relevant points, i.e., in projects of this kind operating necessities are handled in the best possible way. Agents are often used without adequate training in the hope of getting some benefits; training sites are often inadequate but are accepted as the only available ones in view of all applicable conditions; operational equipment is not selected as being the best for the job but the best for the job in the light of applicable limitations; drop zones, reception committees and internal organization are rarely what would be described as ideal in the training text book. Communications are difficult, zones hard to identify and agents are on the run and harassed. Since the Survey at no point suggests the existence of these problems, some reference to their presence seems essential.

The hotel room as a training site for parachute jumping is only one of many examples of the Survey applying unrealistic criteria. We repeat what has been previously stated that the project surely had many faults but they should be tested against what was possible not against a theoretical and impossible ideal.

Moreover, the Survey provides some evidence inconsistent with the foregoing. In paragraph 5 on page 126 the care taken in selection and screening of Useppa Island trainees is described. Paragraph 12 on page 129 sets forth the training given to 178 trainees originally prepared for infiltration. “In all,” the Survey states, “178 men (including 23 radio

operators) had been trained in security, intelligence collection, and reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, reception operations, explosives and demolitions, guerilla action, and similar matters." This would seem reasonably complete and organized. Granting a normal complement of faults and failures, it is still believed that the Miami PM operational and training record is a good one and that this will be supported by the results.

After November 1960 the PM focus was away from Miami. Under the "invasion" concept training, air operations, and planning were the major problems and these were primarily located outside of Miami. Nevertheless, Miami had much to do in connection with portions of these activities. Recruitment was largely done in Miami. Despatching of matériel and recruits took place from Opalocka; PM agents were infiltrated from and exfiltrated to Miami; communications and certain other limited training was handled in Miami, and the efforts to find and maintain maritime assets centered in Miami.

As between the two offices, Headquarters retained the final decisions on any operation activity directly involving Cuban soil or territorial waters. The concern of non-Agency elements of the Executive Department, already described, meant that it was inadvisable to permit operational decisions involving Cuba to be made outside of Washington. Moreover, with the speed of communication the extra time required was normally acceptable, since not operationally fatal, even though aggravating to those involved (i.e., mainly Miami officers). Of course, overflight decisions *had* to come to Washington as did landings of any substantial amounts of matériel. Small exfiltration and infiltration operations could have been decided in Miami but policy limitations, such as no entry into Cuban territorial waters of boats having Americans aboard, made close Washington supervision advisable. Moreover, delay in obtaining decisions on these latter type operations was especially minimal since in substantially all of these cases WH/4 was authorized to make the decision. Actually, as pointed out by the Survey, Headquarters seldom had any difference of view with Miami. (Para. 27, page 118).

As far as PM results were concerned, the statistics were that in mid-April 1961, 43 trained PM agents (these are in addition to the 31 FI agents mentioned in Para. 10, page 70 of the Survey) were on the ground in Cuba of which 13 were regularly functioning, non-doubled radio operators and four more were radio operators but in reserve since they had no sets of their own. The geographic distribution of both these agents and radio operators was pretty good, covering most of the island.

The maritime operations handled by Miami had by mid-April landed 88,000 pounds of matériel (which with the 27,800 lbs. actually

delivered by air provided the resistance up to 17 April with a total of 115,800 lbs.), had infiltrated 79 bodies and exfiltrated 51 bodies. Admittedly, much of the matériel, though by no means all of it, was landed on the north shore in Havana Province since this was a resistance center. Consequently, those who wanted it and those who could handle it were concentrated there—particularly in the early days. Of the 88,000 lbs. total, however, about 45,000 lbs. was in provinces other than Havana, i.e., about 19,000 lbs. in Matanzas and 26,000 lbs. in Pinar del Rio, Las Villas and Camaguey. In addition, some matériel was landed on the south coast at both the west and east ends, i.e., a small amount, perhaps 800 lbs. in Oriente and 20,000 lbs. in Pinar del Rio. In the early days after a ship with the range was available, a few efforts were made to land some matériel in the central part of the south coast but connections were never made with the reception parties. For a substantial period (at least two months) prior to the landing the central south coast was intentionally avoided since it was felt to be vital not to provide even the slightest suggestion of operational interest near possible landing areas.

Some of the specific criticisms of the Miami Base should be mentioned.

1.) Conflict and confusion between Headquarters and Miami was said to exist, resulting in duplication of effort (para. 5, page 68) and division of control as to both agents and in the maritime field as well as high phone bills and unnecessary cables. The duplication of effort undoubtedly existed to some extent, particularly in the summer and fall of 1960 as the organization was being set up, but the Survey does not give enough specifics to enable direct answer, and undue or serious duplication is not remembered. As to confusion of channels, there was surely some confusion in the early days on Washington-Miami calls, but in the fall of 1960, rules were established which, it is believed, adequately clarified this problem. The division of control on maritime assets was intended, namely, the small boats were considered tactical and were under Miami control, the big boats strategic and were, therefore, kept under Headquarters control in order to keep them available for and ready to support the main landing. As far as is known, this division of control, which is considered to have been sound, caused no real difficulty.

2.) Miami allegedly received almost no intelligence support (paras. 15–18, pages 79–80). The general nature of these allegations plus a failure to indicate what the alleged consequences of the errors were once more make it difficult to answer directly. Obviously, there was no intention to deprive Miami of needed support and no Miami operation is known to have failed because of lack of operational intelligence. Beach areas and the internal Cuban situation were as well known to

Miami as to Washington. (See para. 17, page 80). U-2 photography did not go to Miami, but it was not needed for any of the Miami decisions. Also, it was available in Washington to Miami officers. As to Special Intelligence (para. 16, page 79), the Miami Base was supported by a whole Staff D unit at another location. Miami did not, it is true, have a Staff D officer in Base Headquarters. An FI officer, however, was given the responsibility of digesting all Special Intelligence material in order to pass it to operations officers if important. In addition, he briefed the operations officers on this material twice a week.

3.) Security is attacked (paras, 1 et seq., page 135). Obviously many aspects of the Cuban project were public knowledge. With the required relations with many Cubans, politicians, military, and otherwise; recruitment efforts; press, magazine, radio and other propaganda programs, a substantial amount of undesired publicity along with the desired was unavoidable. Otherwise, it is believed that the security record of the project was not too bad. For example, it is now known that any case officer was ever “blown” by true name. The Useppa Island operation was never disclosed. U.S. training sites were mentioned in the press but not located specifically and were not, it is believed, identified. The movement of the brigade from Guatemala to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua to Zapata was not discovered. In view of the efforts to find out everything by the Cubans and the U.S. press, these were significant accomplishments. Sending agents to Cuba who had known each other in training is criticized and blame is registered for one radio operator who knew “almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba from the beginning of the project”. In reply, it can be said that every effort was made to send agents trained together to different parts of Cuba. Admittedly, there were cases where they may have moved together after arrival (e.g., working their way into the city of Havana). No case is known, however, where two agents trained together were despatched together to the same place. As to the knowledgeable radio operator, it is quite true that there was a man with exclusive knowledge of operations. He served under three resistance chiefs, the first two having been killed. Each of these chiefs chose him as their command communications channel, thereby evidencing the utmost confidence in him. He managed to escape and is now an instructor for the Agency. No reason is known as to why the belief in him was not justified. The disregard of security rules by trained agents (para. 4, page 136) was regrettable but Cuban, or indeed human, discipline is fallible. No instance is reported or known where such indiscipline was too serious or could have been avoided. As to American lack of discipline the Survey cites only one case, i.e., that of a case officer in a Miami motel (para. 6, page 136). The Survey might also have said that this case was *thoroughly* investigated immediately and reported on long before the

project was completed. Had the Survey mentioned this, it might also have indicated that unfortunate as the incident was, the DCI on the recommendation of the DD/P, decided that in view of all the circumstances the officer had made a mistake but an understandable one and not one requiring action other than a warning to increase future safeguards. As to screening recruits, it was impossible to use the same precautions regarding recruits to the camps, particularly toward the end when the recruiting rate was high (para. 7, page 137), as was used with individual agents. In camp, however, they were members of a group making individual activity difficult and even if they had known something, they had no means of communication. The pre-landing movements and the landing, it must be remembered, remained unknown. Also, the brigade members discharged their duties well. Bad consequences, therefore, of the looser procedures were not too evident.

Section VI—Annex A

MEMORANDUM FOR

A/DDP/A
C/WH Division
C/WH/4
AC/DP Division

The following procedures shall apply to all Cuban overflights undertaken under the Cuban Project, with the exception of any U-2 reconnaissance missions. Approval for the latter shall be obtained and instructions issued in accordance with standard U-2 procedures.

1. Prior to sending any notification to the field, the DD/P and A/DDP/A (or one of them if either is unavailable) shall be briefed on the operational plan. If possible DDP/EBM shall be included in the briefing in order to be informed when the matter is presented to the Special Group.

2. WH/4 should be responsible for arranging this briefing. As a rule it should cover at least the following aspects of the proposed operation:

- a. Status and means of communication with reception party.
- b. Detailed flight plan.
- c. Communications plan.

A representative of DPD should always be included to cover the second aspect.

3. The DD/P, or A/DDP/A on his behalf, shall make arrangements for an appropriate briefing of the D/DCI on each such flight. Normally such briefing will occur after a DD/P plan has been decided upon following the briefing referred to in paragraph 1 above. In case of

urgency, however, the DD/P, or A/DDP/A on his behalf, may decide to combine these briefings into a single briefing in order to save time. [N. B.: All briefings of either the DCI or the D/DCI on Cuban Project matters including the above shall be arranged through the Office of the DD/P.]

4. Following the above briefings an appropriate message, or messages, will be sent to the field. Since an approval of the operation and of specific operational plans will have been obtained in the briefings, messages may be released by C/WH/4 (and AC/DPD as appropriate), provided they communicate plans reviewed at the briefings. If, however, any message includes important instructions the substance of which has not already been reviewed then it should be released by the DD/P or D/DCI as appropriate.

5. No flight shall be dispatched until the Special Group has been advised of the plan or the DCI has specifically waived this requirement.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director (Plans)

Section VI—Annex B

MEMORANDUM FOR

Chief, WH-4

SUBJECT

Organization and Command Relationships—WH-4 and Development Projects Division

REFERENCE

Memo for C/WH-4 dated 5 October 1960, from C/WH/4-PM, subject: Study on "Organization and Command Relationships of Cuban Task Force (CTF) for Air Operations"

1. *Comment on Reference:* The referenced study I find penetrating and well expressed. The facts set forth in paragraph 2 are accurately presented and the considerations elaborated in paragraph 3 have great force. On the other hand, certain additional considerations bearing on the problem appear to have been ignored. When these are taken into account, the conclusions as stated in paragraph 4 require slight modification and the recommendations set forth in paragraph 5 must be substantially modified in order to be acceptable.

2. *Additional Considerations Bearing on the Problem:*

a. As stated in the reference present command relationships do not give the Cuban Task Force Commander (C/WH/4) control over all the major assets committed or proposed to be committed to this

operation. In particular, air capabilities are under the control of AC/DPD, a separate component subject to no common command below the level of the DD/P. Although the referenced paper does not specifically refer to other resources required for the CTF which are not under the command of C/WH-4, it is important to emphasize that this project will require extensive support from other organizational components and that no contemplated arrangements will give C/WH-4 command authority over all the resources and supporting activities upon which the success of the project depends. Accordingly, the issue raised by the paper is whether with respect to air assets the dividing line between assets under the command of the C/WH-4 and other assets remaining under separate command but used in support of the Cuban Project should be drawn as at present or should be redrawn in such a way as to place part of DPD under command of C/WH-4

b. The reference argues that the proper place to draw the line is between the Air Support Section of DPD, which should be transferred to the control of C/WH-4, and the other elements of that component. It is believed that this judgment is erroneous. In actual fact, the Cuban Project will require at one time or another the performance of operational and supporting activities by most of the branches of DPD. The reason is that DPD has been developed as a largely self-sufficient, intergrated organization which includes staff sections for not only operations, but logistics, personnel, finance, security, and administration—all of which may have some part to play in the Cuban Project. Specifically, it will probably be desirable for logistic support of air operations to be managed by DPD. As for operational planning and Headquarters monitoring of operations, it may well be desirable to use the DPD control room and communications facility. The DPD Cover Officer certainly has important contributions to make as does the Security Section. Even the Air Proprietaries Branch will be concerned with the Cuban Project because of the need for some of its resources. In order, therefore, to place under the command of C/WH-4 all of the air assets he may require it would be necessary to transfer a substantial part of DPD.

c. The foregoing suggests that the proper dividing line between the authority of C/WH-4 and that of AC/DPD should be redrawn in such a way that perhaps half of the latter component would be under the command of the Cuban Task Force Commander. In fact, however, it would be inefficient and probably wholly infeasible to draw a dividing line in this fashion. All of the Branches of DPD which have responsibilities for the Cuban Project, and most of the personnel who will discharge these responsibilities, also have concurrent duties which fall outside of the responsibility of C/WH-4. If DPD were a large Headquarters it would at least be feasible to split each Branch into two

pieces but such is not the case. Moreover, the burden of the Cuban Project activities and of other business will vary from day to day and week to week. Efficient utilization of personnel requires that in many cases the same individuals perform both sets of duties.

3. *Supplementary Conclusions:* It is concluded that DPD as an organizational unit cannot be split into two parts, one of which would have full and exclusive responsibility for Cuban Project activities and be placed under the command of C/WH-4. Taking this conclusion in conjunction with those stated in paragraph 4 of the reference it would appear that a solution must be sought not by splitting DPD, but by placing the whole of that Division under the control of the CTF Commander with respect to air activities which are in fact Cuban project operations. This solution will have the added and vital advantage of making available to C/WH-4 as a senior staff officer, AC/DPD who is the senior air commander in the Agency.

4. *Physical Separation:* The considerations set forth in paragraph 2 above suggest that no modification of command relationships will overcome the major difficulties that grow out of the physical separation of WH-4 and DPD. It is manifestly infeasible to house the whole of DPD in the Cuban Project headquarters. The physical location of the DPD Air Support Section with WH-4 may be desirable but obviously will leave the DPD Operations Control Room and its Logistics and Administrative Branches in a remote location. Accordingly, such matters as the devising of cover stories, the working out of budgets and funding arrangements, certain security business, and the clearance of many cables will still have to be done between officers who are housed some distance apart. It should be emphasized that this is inherent in any arrangement whereby the full resources of DPD are employed in support of the Cuban Project. Perhaps the most serious problem is that presented by the remoteness of AC/DPD's office from that of C/WH-4. This can only be overcome by reasonably frequent meetings between these two individuals. The inconvenience which is the cost of this solution is the price that must be paid for the employment in the Cuban Project of the best technical talent available to the Agency under circumstances that will permit that talent to be used part-time for the performance of other essential tasks.

5. *Task Force Concept:* A solution along the lines outlined in paragraph 3 above is in the main consistent with comments on the military task force concept contained in paragraph 3.b. of the reference. In particular, the proposed solution will permit unity of command. It must be recognized, however, that this solution will in effect provide C/WH-4 with a large air section and with the services of a senior staff officer for air activities. It is the size and competence of the air section thus provided that precludes physical integration as explained in para-

graph 4 preceding. Moreover, if such an air section is to be used efficiently and to make its full contribution, C/WH-4 must practice substantial delegation to his air section and should recognize that it is competent to handle details in the implementation of broad instructions issued by him. It is especially desirable that full use be made of DPD in its capacity as the air section of the Cuban Project, along with other staff sections of WH-4 as appropriate, in the development of military plans. It will be necessary, if high professional standards are to be maintained, for several military specialists, of which air represents one, to be made use of in planning as well as in operations.

6. Approved Action:

a. Operational control of all air forces and facilities required and employed in the Cuban Project will be assigned to Chief, CTF.

b. Chief, CTF will exercise this control through a newly created staff section for air operations in the CTF.

c. AC/DPD will serve as the Chief of the CTF Air Section. The staff of the Air Section will include any and all DPD personnel when actually employed on Cuban Project business.

d. For DPD business unrelated to the Cuban Project, AC/DPD will continue to report in the usual manner to the DD/P. When and if questions arise concerning the allocation of DPD resources as between the Cuban Project and other requirements and activities, such questions will be resolved by the DD/P.

e. The Cuban Task Force as presently constituted has a unified force with a single Headquarters. If and when it should seem desirable to establish a forward Headquarters or a Field Command having responsibility for military operations in which air and other forces will be employed, the constitution of any such Field Command and its command channels to CTF Headquarters will require careful consideration. The desirability of such a combined Field Command and relationship between the CTF Air Section (DPD) and air assets committed in Field operations will be considered when military plans are more nearly complete.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director (Plans)

VII. PERSONNEL

The Survey is critical of the Project's personnel management in two major respects:

1) The Project was not staffed throughout with top-quality people; and

2) A number of people were not used to the best advantage. (Page 144, para. 7.)

There are three basic difficulties common to the entire Survey which are equally and perhaps especially applicable to the sections on personnel and which make specific responsive answers almost impossible. They are the existence of:

1) Unsupported allegations of fact as in paragraph 5 on page 42, which will be discussed further below.

2) Conclusions unsupported by facts as in paragraph 13 on page 45 where a number of "obstacles" are stated in such general terms as to make their understanding difficult or in paragraph 3 on page 42 where it is stated that as a result of a number of factors "none of the most experienced, senior operating officers of the Agency participated full time in the project." (Underlining supplied).

3) An admixture of allegations some of which apply to the DD/P generally (e.g., lack of Spanish linguists, para. 9, page 44; defective nature of entire CS staffing system, para. 11, page 44); some of which apply to the government or the Department of Defense (e.g., problems with Armed Forces, para. 13, page 45); and some relate to the Project.

An effort, however, will be made to be specific in reply and where this is impossible to indicate the difficulty. Regarding inadequate competence in staffing, it should be stated that the Survey mentions no names. A somewhat general response is, therefore, unavoidable, but to be reasonably specific, it has been felt that the names and the backgrounds of a number of the senior officers in the project, excluding the DD/P, A/DDP/A, and C/WH, would be helpful in determining the managerial judgments in this selection. (See Annex A). Support personnel, including communications, have not been included since the Survey is rightly complimentary of their performance. (Page 45, para. 12; page 145, lines 5–7).

A major criticism by the Survey in connection with personnel assignments was an alleged failure to carry out a statement made by the DCI in April 1960 that he would do anything necessary to provide the personnel needed for success. In fact, this was given substantial recognition. On 15 April 1960, the practice was established that if the Project wished to secure the services of a particular individual about whose release there was some question, C/WH would advise the A/DDP/A who would examine the case with the DD/P. Obviously *carte blanche* could not be given but a rapid procedure was established for resolution of difficult cases. In this connection, it is not clear if the Survey in paragraph 1 on page 41 is criticizing a failure to give *carte blanche*, but, if so, the conclusions suggest an organizational concept with which we disagree.

The Chief of the Clandestine Service Personnel Office (CSPO) also had meetings with the A/DDP/A in which the DCI's views were discussed (at least one of which is recorded in a Memorandum for the

Record, dated 22 April 1960) and the CSPO arranged a procedure with WH-4 whereby personnel requests were brought to him either by name or by skill requirement, then by him to the appropriate Panel and finally to the element in question. The understanding was, as indicated above, that difficult cases would be brought to the DD/P via the A/DDP/A. The purpose of this procedure was to avoid the need for WH-4 negotiating directly with other elements regarding personnel thereby eliminating any potential divisional conflicts.

On 16 May 1960, COPS sent an EYES ONLY memorandum to Staff and Division Chiefs and Chief, Operational Services indicating the need of WH for clerical assistance as well as imposing certain requirements on the addresses for help in this request. A copy is attached as Annex B.

Again on 25 August 1960 at the DD/P weekly staff meeting attended by Division and Staff Chiefs of the CS, COPS, in order to re-emphasize the above, announced that the DD/P wanted to be sure that WH-4 was receiving "enough first class people to assure success in their efforts." The solution announced was:

"We have staffed WH-4 thus far without seriously interfering with other operations and activities. The seriousness of the situation demands your most sympathetic consideration of requests for temporary assistance to them. They now have about a dozen critical officer vacancies. We have agreed to having WH-4 suggest the names of those officers whom they would prefer to have particular jobs. The CS Personnel Office will be in touch with you on the names produced by WH-4 and on others identified as being qualified. If you can possibly spare them for the next few months, I urge you to do so. If you feel you cannot spare them, please tell the CSPO your reasons. Mr. Barnes, Mr. Bissell or I will then attempt to judge the relative priorities and make a decision respecting such assignments."

In view of the foregoing, there can be little doubt that senior CS officers knew of the CIA policy to support WH-4 in its personnel requirements. The success or failure of the application of the policy is, of course, a matter of judgment. Obviously no personnel roster is ever wholly satisfactory. Conversely, no project can take *any* officer regardless of other commitments. The attached roster, it is believed, establishes that on an impartial judgment the project was served with officers of experience and competence.

Obviously the requirements of the Project were unusual and urgent, but a review of the pace at which officers (i.e., staff not contract) were assigned and detailed has revealed no more than the usual problems, e.g., a requesting officer wanting help more rapidly than provided and some junior officers being less qualified than desired. On the whole, however, assignments and details were kept pretty well up-to-date and the caliber adequate. In a number of cases the performance of

many officers responded to the challenge of the project, and, consequently, was better than might have been anticipated. In this connection, it might be noted that despite the enormous time demands, inconveniences, family separations, and other difficulties imposed on personnel the project's record for sick leave or absenteeism was so good as to be spectacular.

It might be noted that the CSPO, one of the few senior officers with whom the I.G. or his representatives had any discussions on this matter, asked the chief investigating officer what officers were considered poor. One PM officer was named. The CSPO then demonstrated that, although this officer was disliked by some people, he had been specifically requested by WH-4, had performed extremely well and in fact was continued in WH-4 after the misfortunes of April 1961 because of his performance in the project. No more was then said about this individual but no other examples were offered despite a specific request for names.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that the Survey allegations be at the very least set aside until specific evidence be introduced to which an answer can be addressed.

The few minor points listed by the Survey regarding personnel are discussed below:

1. A basic mistake was made by filling key spots early without realizing how much the project would grow with the result that officers often ended up supervising three to four times as many people as originally anticipated.

The inference of supervisors beyond their depth is clear. It can only be said that supervision during the project in no place seemed to require change due to inability. Moreover, it must be recognized that in a fast moving situation an informed junior officer, who has lived with the project often is more effective than an uninformed senior officer. At any rate, further factual support of the criticism must be produced before any more thorough answer can be provided.

2. None of the three GS-16 officers assigned to the project was given top-level managerial responsibilities (Page 42, para. 3).

Actually, there were four GS-16 officers with the project. One, however, was detailed for a special assignment. One of the other three was Chief of Station, Havana until the Embassy was closed in January 1961 when he returned and became the senior man dealing with the Cuban political elements. Another GS-16 was Deputy Chief of Station in Miami. The Chief in Miami was junior to him in grade but he had been with the project from the start (having initially been the project deputy); he was an old hand in the WH area and was performing well. All, including the GS-16, agreed that the Deputy Chief of Station,

Miami was appropriate for the GS-16 since it was a high enough post to permit him to be effective and still did not upset a situation by changing purely for reasons of grade an officer, performing well, in favor of a late-comer who was not an area expert. The third GS-16 was a DD/I officer, not a DD/P officer, who performed well in a responsible overt post. To have made him a manager would have created problems since he did not have operational experience.

3. Of the 42 officers "holding the principal operational jobs in WH-4 in Grade GS-12 through GS-15" a large percentage were rated in a low position in the *initial* "Relative Retention Lists". (Paras. 4-5, page 42).

Without analyzing specific cases, it is submitted that these statements are completely deceptive as possible evidence of poor quality of personnel. The reasons are:

a. The ranking of individuals under the above procedure in many cases had nothing to do with competence or ability in given assignments. Rather the criteria were the needs of the service over the years to come. A high grade specialist in a little needed field, therefore, might be rated very low. A specific example is a paramilitary officer assigned to WH-4 from another division who served in the project with distinction. Nevertheless, since his parent division had no foreseeable need for such officers, he was ranked low in the *initial* list. More generally a similar result might well be true of paramilitary officers since the feeling is that the Agency, particularly post-Cuba, will in all likelihood have few similar projects in the future. Surely this view would be reflected in initial lists prepared by Divisions and would tend to be corrected as necessary during the elaborate policy level review of the lists.

b. Ranking is competitive, and since many of the project officers were not WH officers, they were ranked in the retention lists *initially* by WH officers in competition with WH officers for long term WH assignments. On this scale, they might well come out badly regardless of their competence for the Cuban Project. In the first place, if paramilitary officers, their speciality is not in future demand; and if not WH area specialists, they would be poor competitors with area specialists looking to a long term future. They might, however, have been excellent officers in many Cuban Project assignments without area knowledge.

c. The *initial* lists were substantially revised for the above and other reasons in subsequent reviews. Consequently, by themselves they are of little validity.

Again, therefore, it is recommended that at the very least the Survey's allegations in this respect be set aside until a more detailed examination is possible covering the specific individuals in question; why they were rated low on *initial* lists; did their ratings change on

later lists and, more specifically, what relation the rating for retention purposes had to the performance on the Cuban Project. Obviously, the reverse might also be true, i.e., an officer could receive a top rating for retention purposes but still have poor qualities for the type of urgent rather peculiar requirements existing in the Cuban Project.

4. "A very few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-American background knowledge." (Para. 9, page 44).

Obviously, it would be desirable for most officers in a project of this sort to have both the language and area knowledge. Admittedly, the Agency has not achieved this capability to the extent desired, and probably never will. It must also be recognized that in special projects like Cuba the personnel demands must be met in substantial part by assignments based on functional experience even though the individual assigned lacks area or language qualifications.

As to the Project itself, the need for Spanish should also be analyzed. Obviously it was necessary primarily for those dealing with Cubans. Not all such officers, however, needed Spanish, since, for example, PM instructors were quite able to perform effectively without the language since they taught by showing and example. Actually, there were Spanish-speaking trainers in Guatemala so this point is made only for purposes of analysis. Moreover, the training job both on the ground and in the air was never an issue as it was generally conceded to have been excellent.

As to others dealing with the Cubans, the officers working with the Cuban politicians were all fluent in Spanish with one exception, a senior officer who had no difficulty dealing with the Cubans in English and who was relied on very heavily by many of the senior Cubans. His lack of Spanish, therefore, did not prevent his achieving a position of personal confidence.

The officers in propaganda had native Spanish and in addition the publications, the newspapers and the radio scripts were written and produced by Cubans who, in the case of most of the newspapers and publications, had run and produced the same items in Cuba immediately prior to defecting.

The senior FI and CI officers had fluent Spanish. In Miami, an officer with native Spanish organized a corps of 35 to 40 Cubans into a CI organization of considerable competence. Even the Survey called this a "responsive and useful instrument". (Para. 55, page 19; paras. 57–58, page 20).

C/WH-4 and his Paramilitary Chief had fluent Spanish, as did the Chief in Miami. To generalize, of the sixteen senior managerial officers listed in Annex A, eleven had fluent Spanish. During the last four months, the Project operated its own Signal Center and its own Cable

Secretariat providing 24-hour coverage. Two of the three post-duty Duty Officers had fluent Spanish. Also, a Translation Unit of seven people was developed to provide 24-hour coverage of direct communications.

It can be asserted that Spanish speakers were available for all needed uses. Some inconvenience may have been caused on occasion due to not having even more Spanish speakers, but a lack of adequate Spanish speakers cannot honestly be alleged as a ground for any major failure in the project.

5. "Some of the people who served the project on contract were incompetent." (Para. 10, page 44).

Undoubtedly, this statement has some basis in fact, but since no more is said and the consequences to the Project not explained, a reply is not possible in any manageable context.

6. Regarding the improper use of skilled personnel, the Survey has little to say. Inadequate use of GS-16's is discussed above. The only other comments in the Survey are:

a. "In a number of instances, those senior operating personnel in the field stations that did speak Spanish had to be interrupted in their regular duties merely in order to act as interpreters." (Para. 9, page 44). This is answered above.

b. "In many instances, case officers were used as 'hand-holders' for agents and technical specialists as stevedores." Surely any case officer does some handholding. Wherein this was particularly serious in the project is not known nor indicated by the Survey. The "stevedore" reference is elsewhere expanded by the Survey to the effect that the "technical and training abilities" of several Navy Chief Petty Officers who were borrowed in connection with work in certain of the Project's ships were "grossly misused" as "much of their time was spent at stevedore or deckhand labor." (Paras 33-34, pages 120-121). It is quite true that some Navy personnel on duty with the Agency were made available by their components to represent the Agency interests and keep an eye on maritime repairs and modifications. Unquestionably, they were not fully employed though their presence at moments was very important. In all likelihood, therefore, this was a situation where some inefficiency of employment resulted. One Chief Petty Officer was upset by the assignment and asked to be returned to his regular duties. Others, however, accepted the situation as special and largely unavoidable, and served without complaint as long as their experience was needed.

c. The Navy Captain assigned at Agency request to the Project to handle maritime activity was "reported to have been not entirely happy with his brief Agency tour. In any event, he was another example of

poor handling of people in this project, and he was not given a chance to solve the problems of maritime operations.” (Para. 40, Page 123.) It is not known who “reported” the Navy Captain (Captain Scapa) as “not entirely happy”, but we are surprised at the statement since Agency officers close to him thought that he left in a pretty good frame of mind. Of course, it must be remembered that his experiences might well have caused some discouragement. He was flown on short notice from his shipboard Navy assignment to detail with another Agency with which he had no previous experience. He arrived in February 1961 so that the project was well along and he had to fit himself to it in a great hurry and under pressure. He was, however, able to provide substantial help and his assignment was distinctly worthwhile. He examined such ships as the project had; went to Vieques and inspected the Cuban crew training; spent a substantial amount of time at Project Headquarters working on the maritime aspects of the Trinidad and Zapata plans and finally accompanied the Paramilitary Chief to Puerto Cabezas to participate in the final briefing of the Brigade and the ships’ crews. Thereafter, he returned to Project Headquarters and spent night and day in the war and operations rooms working on all maritime aspects of the final days of the effort. Such employment of Captain Scapa, it is submitted, was sensible and constructive.

Section VII—Annex A

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY OF CERTAIN SENIOR OFFICIALS

Jacob D. Esterline E.O.D. February 1951 *Chief, Cuban Task Force*

Mr. Esterline’s prior Agency experience included an assignment as a senior official on the anti-Arbenz project in Guatemala and [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Mr. Esterline had fluent Spanish. He has since been assigned as Chief of Operations, WH Division.

During World War II he had 20 months with OSS including two tours behind the lines in Burma. He was a Captain and commanded guerrilla units up to battalion strength.

1951–52, Chief Instructor at Guerrilla Warfare School at Fort Benning

1953, Chief Instructor [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in Guerrilla Warfare

Edward A. Stanulis E.O.D. September 1952 *Deputy Chief, Cuban Task Force*

Mr. Stanulis served in succession as Chief, Plans and Programs, Chief of Operations, and ultimately as Deputy Chief of the Cuban Task Force.

His military service was with the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1950 wherein he progressed in rank from 2nd Lt. to Major.

He is now permanently retired for combat incurred disability (loss of leg). His assignments prior to combat duty included:

Asst. Reg. Intelligence Officer, Eastern Defense Command
Regimental Adjutant, Instructor, Intel. School
Asst. Plans and Ops Officer
Training Officer, Infantry Tactics

In combat (ETO), with the rank of Captain and Major, he served as Commanding Officer of an Infantry Co. (Rifle) with tactical control of battalion attacking elements. Having been wounded, he was a POW for six months.

On return to active duty in Washington he served as a Major in Public Information Divisions of the Army and the Department of Defense until his discharge in 1950.

He has also had broad experience in public affairs, writing, editing, and publishing. His prior Agency experience included assignments to OPC/PW, P&P Staff, and PP Staff. Assigned as an instructor and ultimately Chief of Headquarters Training, Ops School/OTR. Mr. Stanulis instructed in and assisted in the revision of PP, FI, and PM courses.

Richard D. Drain E.O.D. March 1951 *Chief of Operations, Cuban Task Force*

Mr. Drain reported to the Project from an overseas assignment in [less than 1 line not declassified] where he was Chief of Internal Operations and on occasion [less than 1 line not declassified].

His military record includes service as an officer with the U.S. Army, Field Artillery (Armored). His active duty extended from April, 1943 to May, 1946. His training included the *Ground Forces Intelligence Course #1*, with special emphasis on O. B. and the *Armored Command Hqtrs. Combat Intelligence Course*.

Among other assignments he conducted Basic Training; served as Assistant and Acting Battalion S-3; was an Instructor at the Armored School, and was Battery Officer in Advanced Training.

In combat (ETO) he was Forward Observer with a Combat Team and a Platoon Commander.

His decorations include the Silver Star and Bronze Star.

He is a lawyer and practiced in D.C. prior to Agency EOD. His Government experience also included Agency assignments as Executive Asst. to the DD/I, Staff Officer for O/IC (Office of Intelligence Coordination), Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee; and he was detached from the Agency for two extra-Agency assignments. In the first he served on the White House Staff of the Planning Coordination

Group under Mr. Nelson Rockefeller. In the second he served with the Department of State as a Special Asst., Multilateral Affairs.

John F. Mallard, Col., USMC E.O.D. August 1957 *SA Military, Cuban Task Force*

Prior to his assignment with this Agency, Col. Mallard had served with the Office of the CNO, Assistant Head Naval War Plans Section. His performance was outstanding with comments indicating an excellent background of staff experience and professional capabilities. Noted as diligent, thorough and possessing mature judgment. He had earlier served as Assistant Plans Officer on the staff of the Commander, 7th Fleet, where he also received an outstanding rating and was looked upon as a source of strength on the staff. Had earlier been a Battalion Commander and was rated an outstanding Artillery Battalion Commander. Col. Mallard carried the brunt of liaison with the military services and heavy responsibility with the State Department on military matters.

[less than 1 line not declassified] E.O.D. June 1951 *Chief/Intel/PM Section/Cuban Task Force*

[less than 1 line not declassified] reported to the Project from the FI Staff. His earlier assignments had included that of senior FI Case Officer in *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, Chief/*[less than 1 line not declassified]* and Chief Instructor, Resistance Ops Course/OTR. He has received numerous commendations for his performances in Headquarters, in the field, and in Agency liaison activities.

His military service was with the USMC where he served overseas as Bomb Disposal Officer from 1943 to 1945 at New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, and Northern Solomons. He is a Major in the USMCR.

Albert C. Davies, Lt. Col., USA E.O.D. March 1960 *DC/Intel/PM Section/Cuban Task Force*

At the time of his assignment to the Project Col. Davies (a regular infantry officer) had been serving as Army G-2, USACARIB from 1956. He is rated by his service as an Infantry Staff Officer. Served in the European theatre during World War II and in Korea. He holds the Silver Star and the Bronze Medal with two oak leaf clusters. Prior to his assignment to USACARIB he had been an infantry instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Battalion Executive Officer, and Battalion Commander in the Far East, and had been a student at the Army Command and General Staff Officers Course in Oklahoma. Col. Davies' assignment with the Cuban Task Force included that of Post Command at Et. Randolph and later Deputy Chief, Intel Unit-PM Section. He has broad area familiarity with Latin America and has some fluency in the Spanish language. He is currently serving as Chief/Intel, Research, and Reports/WH/4.

[less than 1 line not declassified] E.O.D. February 1952 C/FI Section/
Cuban Task Force (Later DC/WH/4)

[less than 1 line not declassified] experience included ten years with the Department of State with whom he served in Tegucigalpa, Madrid, and Santiago, Chile, the latter two as Second Secretary. He has fluent Spanish, Portuguese, and French, and has wide experience in Latin American affairs with a thorough knowledge of economic matters.

His WH Division assignments include the following

[less than 1 line not declassified]
[less than 1 line not declassified]
[less than 1 line not declassified]

He is now preparing to assume duties of [less than 1 line not declassified].

Ralph G. Seehafer E.O.D. August 1952 DC/FI Section/Cuban Task Force

Mr. Seehafer entered on duty with the Agency in August of 1952 and has served exclusively with WH Division. His overseas tours of duty included an assignment as [less than 1 line not declassified]. He possesses fluent Spanish and also speaks Portuguese and German. Mr. Seehafer took his undergraduate degree in Hispanic studies. He is noted for his deliberate and untiring efforts and was a source of strength to the several senior officers who served as Chief of the FI Section.

David A. Phillips E.O.D. April 1955 C/PP Section/Cuban Task Force

Originally a contract agent and covert associate in [less than 1 line not declassified], Mr. Phillips became a staff employee with the Agency on assignment to P&P Staff and PP/Operations. He then had assignments to the Havana Station and [less than 1 line not declassified]. Noted as an outstanding propagandist with excellent supervisory qualities. Mr. Phillips has fluent Spanish with excellent area knowledge as evidenced by the fact that he often speaks publicly on the area, including having been on the "Town Hall of the Air".

Philip A. Toomey E.O.D. December 1951 DC/Propaganda Section/Cuban
Task Force

Entered on duty with the Agency in December 1951 and has had prior assignment with OPC/WE/Plans and Ops, served abroad [less than 1 line not declassified] as a PP Ops Officer, returned to the PP Staff in Headquarters and was serving with WH/3 at the time of his assignment to the Project. He has native Spanish and possesses ability to handle a tremendous amount of work. Mature judgment and skill in the propaganda field are only a couple of his attributes.

Jack Hawkins, Col., USMC E.O.D. October 1960 C/WH/4/PM

Col. Hawkins was serving on the staff of Marine Corps School, Quantico, Virginia at the time of his appointment by Commandant,

USMC to the Cuban Task Force. He is a Naval Academy graduate and saw service in the Philippines at Bataan and Corregidor until taken prisoner. Having escaped from his prison camp, he joined guerrilla forces and led raiding parties in attacks against the enemy for which action he was awarded the DSC. He was later awarded a Bronze Medal for the Okinawa campaign. Following World War II he served as a member of the Naval Mission to Venezuela and later as Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in combat in Korea. He was there awarded the Silver Star. Served as an instructor in Quantico for three years and then as G-3 at Camp LeJume where he was promoted to his present rank of Colonel. Col. Hawkins possesses native fluency in Spanish. He was personally selected for the assignment by General Shoup, CIG., USMC

Frank J. Egan, Lt. Col., USA E.O.D. June 1960 C/SPU/PM/WH/4

Col. Egan reported to the Cuban Task Force with a background of experience in Special Forces, U.S. Army. He had on earlier occasion worked in a liaison capacity with this Agency and always showed a true appreciation of the peculiar requirements of covert action. Serving originally as Chief of the Strikes and Plans Unit/PM Section, Col. Egan later proceeded to Guatemala where he assumed command of all indigenous Brigade training. He held this position with the help of a few staff and contract employees until the arrival of the group of Special Forces Trainers. His capacity for work was outstanding and the rating he received by his senior officer, Col. Hawkins, reflects Col. Hawkins' respect for his abilities. Comments particularly pertinent refer to his ability to influence and inspire the confidence and respect of troops.

Ernest Sparks E.O.D. August 1954 *Sr. Cuban Task Force Rep/Guatemala*

Entering on duty as Ops Instructor in 1952, Mr. Sparks departed for Korea with the USMC and remained there as an IO/PM and Maritime Officer until 1954. He then served at *[less than 1 line not declassified]* until 1958 first as an Instructor, then Chief of the Maritime Branch, later as Instructor, and ultimately, Chief of the Ops Course. He was commended as an outstanding instructor and capable administrator. Prior to his assignment to the Cuban Task Force he served as Chief/Cover Training *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, where he set up and administered a highly competent tutorial facility. His performance was noted as being outstanding.

Jacob Scapa, Capt., USN E.O.D. February 1961 C/Maritime Ops/Cuban Task Force

Assigned to the Cuban Task Force as a Special Assistant for Military Matters by the CNO, Capt. Scapa appeared on the scene in the late

stages of Project development. He was at the time of his assignment on the Staff of the Commander, Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet. He had earlier served as Commanding Officer of the USS *Walke* and served aboard the USS *Wisconsin*, and had been on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic. Capt. Scapa quickly reviewed and made himself familiar with all maritime operations and plans. He participated in pre-invasion briefings and added a significant touch of professionalism to maritime matters.

TDY visit to Miami Base/[*less than 1 line not declassified*] to review problem of Maintenance Facility for LCI's and Small Boats. On return recommended and assisted in acquisition of Navy CPO's (Machinists).

Then assigned to Plans and Strike Operations Unit where he assisted greatly in liaison with Navy components and in preparation of sailing instructions, etc. He participated in final briefings of Brigade and maritime personnel Active during actual strike in War Room, Headquarters, Cuban Task Force. Currently Chief of Naval Mission, Ecuador.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] E.O.D. September 1951 C/CI Section/
Cuban Task Force

Entered on duty with the Agency as an instructor in the Ops Course in 1951. He remained with OTR until his assignment to [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. He served there as a Training and Intel Officer and Director of FI Operations. Returning to OTR in 1956 as an instructor in the CE/CI Training Course, he was responsible for the training of two [*less than 1 line not declassified*] services. He became Chief Instructor in the Agency Orientation, CI Familiarization and Security Officer Courses. All reports indicate he was a superb instructor, a good executive and supervisor. He has been noted as being the outstanding instructor on the Headquarters Operations School faculty.

Gerard Droller E.O.D. September 1949 C/PA/Cuban Task Force

Extremely capable PP Officer, original, enthusiastic, aggressive. Requires challenge. Outstanding PA man. Long time EE Officer. Entered on duty with the Agency in 1949 in OPC tour in [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
—52–54 excellent reports. Respectively C/Ops/[*less than 1 line not declassified*], C/[*less than 1 line not declassified*] DC/[*less than 1 line not declassified*], C/[*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Bernard E. Reichhardt E.O.D. November 1947 P&P Officer/Cuban Task
Force (Later C/FI Section)

Mr. Reichhardt's earlier Agency assignments included that of Finance Officer, later Chief/Cover Division. He served FE Division in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and as Chief/Branch 1/Headquarters. Later assignments were to the PP Staff and with Branch 3 WH Division.

His assignments with the Project included a stint of duty at Miami Base before returning to Headquarters as DC/PA Section/Cuban Task Force. He was then moved up as Plans and Policy Officer and ultimately served as Chief/FI Section. Mr. Reichhardt has native fluency in Spanish. He is currently [less than 1 line not declassified].

[less than 1 line not declassified] E.O.D. September 1947 *Special Asst/WH/4/Cuban Task Force*

Prior assignments included [less than 1 line not declassified] and Department of State (Mexico) 1931–41. [less than 1 line not declassified] has fluent Spanish. Was commended for extraordinary performance [less than 1 line not declassified] by C/WHD. Characterized as dependable and resourceful, and having the ability to get the most out of employees.

E. Howard Hunt E.O.D. November 1949 *PP/PM/Cuban Task Force*

Mr. Hunt's background prior to his service with the Agency was working as a writer and as a correspondent for *Time*, Inc. He was assigned to OPC and served in [less than 1 line not declassified] for three (3) years, was then reassigned to SE/P & PW Staff. He was then assigned as a PP Officer to [less than 1 line not declassified] before being selected as [less than 1 line not declassified]. He was rated, before his assignment to the Cuban Task Force, as having outstanding ability in the covert action field. He is exceptionally talented and imaginative in the PP field. His assignment in [less than 1 line not declassified] drew outstanding reports. He has fluent Spanish.

B.H. Vandervoort E.O.D. September 1947 *C/SI Unit (FI/D), Cuban Task Force*

Mr. Vandervoort's outstanding military background is well known to all in the Clandestine Services. He possesses area knowledge in WE, FE and WH Divisions and he has good Spanish. He is a competent reporter. Earlier personnel reports note his exceptional qualifications for participation in contingency task force operations. He had also earlier been recommended as a Senior War Planner.

U.S. Army service from 1939 to 1946 and was discharged with the rank of Lt. Col. He gave outstanding service in the ETO and was decorated by Generals Gavin and Ridgeway as "outstanding WW II Battalion Co., 82nd Airborne". Decorations: two DSC's, two Bronze Stars, three Purple Hearts, plus French, Dutch, Belgian Decorations.

Robert Reynolds E.O.D. October 1949 *COB/Miami Base*

Mr. Reynolds' career has been spent largely with WH Division beginning with his assignments in OSO. He served in [less than 1 line not declassified], [less than 1 line not declassified], and later as [less than 1 line not declassified]. Mr. Reynolds had returned to WH/3 at the time

of his assignment to the Project and was one of the first senior officers so assigned. Serving first as DC/Cuban Task Force he was later transferred to Miami Base as Chief of Base. Mr. Reynolds possesses fluent Spanish ability.

Section VII—Annex B

MEMORANDUM FOR

Chiefs of All Special Staffs and Operating Divisions

SUBJECT

Clerical Assistance for WH Division

1. Certain activities of the WH Division require experienced clerical personnel. It is desired that all CS components contribute to this effort to the maximum extent possible.

2. Requirements now exist for first-class stenographers and typists, grade immaterial, who have had general experience in the Clandestine Services for temporary detail to WH Division for an indefinite period. It is requested that you provide at least one such person from your component. Please notify the Clandestine Services Personnel Office (Ext. 4541) of your selection so that the necessary arrangements may be made. The CSPO will notify you several days in advance of the date when your nominee should report to WH for duty.

Richard Helms

Chief of Operations, DD/P

VIII. THE POLITICAL FRONT AND RELATIONS WITH THE CUBANS

One of the conclusions of the Survey (as stated in para. 3 on page 143 was "as the project grew, the Agency reduced the exile leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation". This summarizes the Survey's general criticism of the handling of the Cuban leaders. Two more specific criticisms are made at least by inference in the discussion of this matter in the body of the Survey. The first was that the decision in November 1960 to consider requests for paramilitary aid from groups other than the FRD "complicated relations between Project case officers and the FRD leaders," and "appears to have resulted in some diffusion of effort". It also "seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity, sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts". The second criticism is that the Agency prevented close contact between the political leaders, first of the FRD and later of the CRC, and the

military forces in training in Guatemala. The Survey states (para. 36, page 92) that “this was probably a mistake and an unreasonable interference in the Cubans’ management of their own affairs. Controlled contact between the FRD and the troops would have done much to improve morale and motivation of the troops and make the training job easier”.

As will be shown in the following paragraphs, the generalized criticism that the exile leaders were treated as puppets has little if any basis in fact. As to the two more specific criticisms, the facts are correctly stated, but as explained below there were plausible reasons for both decisions and even with the benefit of hindsight these decisions appear to have been wise. This does not mean that no disadvantages attached to them. The Survey is correct in pointing out that relations with the FRD were strained by the decision to support certain non-FRD groups and that the lack of contact between the political leaders and the Brigade gave rise to difficulties on both sides. What is omitted from the Survey’s discussion, however, is any explanation of the considerations that made these two decisions seem necessary, let alone any attempt to balance the risks and costs of different courses of action against the disadvantages of those actually pursued.

The press has carried many stories especially after the events of April 1961 citing the sentiments of Cuban exiles to the effect that they were disenchanted with their role in the affair. It is understandable that after the defeat these Cubans would look for scapegoats and allege that they had been used as puppets. It is, on the other hand, disturbing that these Cuban utterances in the press are accepted as fact in the Survey, particularly when considerable documentary evidence to the contrary was available to the Survey team.

Before analyzing the Survey’s above conclusions, it is important to examine various aspects and complexities of what the Survey calls “exile leaders”. First, one must differentiate between the political and military leaders. Second, one must recognize the pressures which existed within each of these two groups. Third, one should understand what the term “leadership” meant within the Miami Cuban exile community.

From the very beginning of the Project it was evident that there were considerable differences of opinion—on almost all important questions—among Cuban exiles of varying political shades and leadership capabilities. Clearly, there was unanimity on the desirability and need to overthrow Castro; but during the great debate on how to accomplish this, two main trends became discernible: the activists, principally the military element in this category, wanted to fight. Political considerations meant little to this segment of exiles who believed political solutions would evolve automatically after Castro’s demise.

As a matter of fact, they had the greatest contempt for "the politicians". On the other hand, the politically minded exiles realized that the overthrow of Castro without specific plans and preparations to fill the vacuum created by his departure would be an immense error. They agreed with the activists that the overthrow could only be accomplished by violent action but they feared that during the fighting one or more of the military leaders would emerge whose politico/economic postures were unknown quantities and who—in the exuberance of victory—might be accepted by the population as the new political chief of Cuba. Consequently, the political and military exile elements grew apart despite the existence of bonds of friendship and loyalty between individuals in one element and people in the other. Thus, when speaking of "exile leaders" a distinction must be made between political and military leadership.

Also within the political and military groups a high degree of competition existed. Personal ambitions were rampant. Each individual claimed larger followings inside and outside Cuba than the next man; each tried to belittle the potential and capabilities of the other; each proselyted the other's assets. In the early autumn of 1960, over sixty different anti-Castro political groups were active and vocal, almost all of them in the Miami area. They ranged in size from an individual exile with three or four personal henchmen to sizeable bodies with substantial organizations still active within Cuba itself. The Agency representatives were in contact with many of these and its constant effort was to induce as many groups and individuals as possible to support a broadly based unified movement which would exclude only the supporters of Castro on the left and the Batistianos on the right. The Agency exerted pressure on the Cubans throughout the whole period from mid-1960 up to the invasion in only two ways: to promote the greatest and most inclusive unity of effort and to promote the greatest feasible effectiveness. Decisions, however, as to who should be the dominant leader and what the political platform of the opposition should be were studiously left to the Cubans themselves.

Despite the pressure for unity, it remained true up to the election (by the Cubans) of Jose Miro Cardona as president of the CRC in March 1961 that exile Cuban leadership—if taken in the broadest meaning of the term—consisted of the spokesmen of a great number of anti-Castro groups whose prominence, importance and capabilities for active participation in the operation varied greatly and whose claim for leadership remained highly controversial. If the term is to connote the FRD Executive Committee then it is highly pertinent to keep in mind the barrier between the "Politicians" and the "Militarists" mentioned above and the very remarkable checks the FRD Executive Committee members imposed on each other. For rather obvious reasons they attempted

to make the FRD an “Exclusive Club” by restricting, if not closing, membership in it and they insisted on a system of parity throughout all FRD working elements, that is to say that each Executive Committee member placed the same number of his followers, as did any one of his fellow members, on any working group. This concept of leadership—not surprising in exile politics and somewhat reminiscent of past Cuban history and practices—had, of course, its effect on dynamic action and puts the term leadership in a somewhat different context. Moreover, the U.S. and the Agency did not feel that a different concept could be forced on the Cubans.

As the pace of the build-up and of current operations accelerated in the autumn of 1960, it became increasingly apparent that any approach to the effectiveness which was the second of the two objectives of Agency pressure would require a higher degree of control over and direction of the anti-Castro movement by the Agency than had originally been hoped. The Cubans never did succeed in creating a Cuban organization sufficiently free of internal divisions and competently enough staffed to perform the rapidly expanding operational tasks. Radio broadcasts had to be organized, publications arranged, and propaganda material prepared. Paramilitary personnel had to be recruited, screened, and trained. Boats had to be procured, crewed, and maintained. Air crews had likewise to be selected and trained and air operations mounted. Two bases had to be built in Guatemala. There was the large and continuing task of logistic support. All of these tasks would have had to be performed in one form or another even if the major emphasis had continued to be on the internal resistance rather than on the preparation of a strike force. The FRD never came close to achieving the capability to take the major initiative in planning, directing, or conducting these activities. The hope entertained in the summer of 1960 that the FRD would soon evolve into an organization which could take increasing responsibility for the direction of the effort, relying on the Agency mainly for financial and logistic support and for some help in training, proved completely illusional. It is fair to say that by mid-autumn of 1960, the choice was between a degree of initiative and control by the Agency recognized at the time to be undesirable and, as the only feasible alternative, the abandonment of any serious effort to accomplish the end in view.

Against this background one can examine whether the FRD’s political and military elements were reduced to the status of puppets and whether the advantages of their active participation was lost by this.

1. *The FRD political element.*

a) From the outset, the basic principle was established to respect the independence of the Project’s Cuban collaborators and, for all intents and purposes, to treat and deal with them as equals; no orders

were to be issued, results were to be accomplished by persuasion and by the application of normal, generally accepted practices of political intercourse. The 11–12 May 1960 New York meeting which resulted in the formation of the FRD is but one example of the application of this Agency's posture: Agency representatives served as hosts for the assembled Cubans, stated unequivocally the view that formation of a unified opposition to Castro was strictly a Cuban affair and then withdrew leaving it to the delegates to establish their organization in terms upon which they could agree.

b) The staffing of the FRD working elements and the initiation of activities via these elements was in the hands of the Cubans who were not obliged to check their moves with their U.S. contacts. In fact, the inclusion of Aureleano Sanchez Arango in the Executive Committee on 10 June 1960, which took place without Agency consultation and was at that time at least considered an undesirable development, is another example of the freedom of action the Cubans enjoyed. It might also be said that Sanchez Arango never had any assets of any kind to offer. He had a longstanding friendship with "Pepe" Figueres of Costa Rica and President Betancourt of Venezuela which enabled him to muster some pressure in the early days for a high position. In view, however, of his lack of following, his resignation was of no significance whatsoever contrary to the statement of the Survey (Para. 16, page 85).

c) From the moment the FRD was formed in May 1960 in New York, the Cubans were aware of the importance attributed in the early stages of the Project by their U.S. contacts to having FRD Headquarters moved to Mexico. The Cubans opposed this move for a variety of reasons—mostly personal and some, from their view point, political. Had the Agency treated its counterparts as puppets, this move could have been accomplished within a matter of weeks. However, in spite of considerable pressures on the Agency, the principle of tactful persuasion was relied upon and it was not until August 1960 that the FRD got to Mexico and then it was only for a short time.

d) The establishment of FRD branch offices in numerous Latin American countries was accomplished by the FRD Executive Committee, with U.S. contacts merely playing an advisory role.

e) The aforementioned self-imposed system of parity and of running the FRD by Committee resulted in less dynamic action than was desirable. A partnership with divergent views among the partners is not the best mechanism for decisive action. Thus, U.S. contacts suggested in September 1960, the creation of the position of an FRD General Coordinator, a suggestion accepted in principle by all Cubans concerned. The Cubans, however, wanted their U.S. colleagues to declare their preferences for a particular person. Again this was not done because of the principle of non-U.S. interference in strictly unilateral

exile Cuban affairs. The exile internal warfare on this leadership issue assumed rather remarkable proportions but initially the FRD Executive Committee selected Antonio de Varona as General Coordinator on 27 September 1960.

f) The concept of permitting the FRD Cubans to run their own show as much as possible coupled with their own preoccupation on mending their political fences and creating their own political machines, caused many tactical difficulties to those Agency elements charged with day-to-day propaganda activities whose successful implementation hinged on immediate action without protracted negotiations on each detail. Thus, of necessity unilateral Agency operations had to be created in substantially all the action fields (e.g., propaganda, intelligence collection, paramilitary) which were impossible to conceal from the FRD. The FRD leadership resented what they considered competition and demanded exclusive control of these activities; they also demanded that the FRD be the only channel for U.S. dealings with any segment of the internal Cuban opposition or the Cuban exile community. On the latter point the Department of State did not agree; on the former, the Agency could not acquiesce because of operational considerations. Moreover, on the former point there was a strong feeling throughout the U.S. Government that it would be wrong to permit the FRD to be in a position to rule out any Cuban elements which might have usable internal Cuban assets. It was clear at least by December 1960 that the effort to broaden the membership of the FRD to the point where it included all political acceptable elements of the opposition had failed and that the effort of its members to use it to advance their own political fortunes within the exile community was resented. All elements of the U.S. Government were agreed that it could not be an exclusive chosen instrument with a monopoly of governmental support. These problems were certainly not the product of coercion.

g) The inability of the FRD Cubans again—because of their incessant preoccupation with political advantage—to establish an effective paramilitary recruiting mechanism within the Project deadlines called for the utilization of Cuban officers and men outside the FRD channel. This action was in line with the realities of the situation, i.e., the inability of the political elements to tackle the military tasks as speedily and effectively as necessary and the aforementioned unwillingness of the military (or activists) to accept the political leadership. (Only after the election of Miro Cardona as CRC President did the Liberation Army support and accept the political structure.) Thus, political personalities retained their independence in their specialty and the military (and activists) worked—with the guidance of U.S. military specialists—in theirs. If closer coordination had been possible between the political and the military it would clearly have been desirable. Only the political

urgencies of an actual attack were sufficient to achieve any real unity and this was in many ways a mirage and a "sometime thing".

It is true as stated in the Survey that the Agency intervened actively to prevent visits by the political leaders to the training camps in December and January, and that this was deeply resented by the political leaders. It is also true that this lack of contact with the political leadership left the Cuban military personnel unsure of what and for whom they were going to fight, even though being activists not political scientists they were generally satisfied with a mere "Down with Castro" slogan. There were, however, the most specific and urgent reasons for following this policy. During these months, as the crucial role of the strike force was recognized by all concerned, the competition between the political leaders to secure control of it was at its maximum. Varona used the FRD recruiting machinery to try to insure a preponderance of loyal personnel that would be acceptable to and have some loyalty to him. Other members of the CRC were equally anxious to insure the inclusion of recruits loyal to them. Most (but not all) of the FRD leaders resented the inclusion of men who had not been supplied through their own recruitment machinery. The FRD leadership, and later some members of the CRC, were determined to try to displace the senior military officers of the Brigade with political appointees acceptable to them. During the four months before the invasion, no one of the political leaders could have been allowed to visit the camps alone without accusations of favoritism. Meanwhile, the Cuban military leaders in training and the American training officers who were endeavoring to fashion the Brigade into a cohesive and powerful force, feared above all any encouragement of factionalism in the ranks. Moreover, although the troops needed indoctrination in the ideology for which they were going to risk their lives, it was known that some members of the FRD and later of the CRC were unpopular in the camps. There was a real possibility that if there were many visits of the political leadership, and if these visits were not carefully controlled when they were permitted, a real cleavage would have opened up between the military force and the political committee with the possible disruption of the Brigade, the one essential asset at the time. The decision to isolate the Brigade from the political leadership for a considerable period was obviously a difficult one and no one can state with certainty that the course of action actually followed was the wisest. It did, however, produce a situation on D-Day in which the Brigade was unified and the political leadership had, at least superficially, accepted their relationship to it.

h) As the deadline for the Project approached the need to broaden by democratic means and strictly by Cuban action the FRD base and to evolve a provisional government became pressing. Continuous negotiations were conducted during February 1961 and March 1961, and

on 22 March 1961 the CRC was created. Every Agency position paper prepared on this matter stressed the need for letting the Cubans have their own say. Indeed it was felt that *only* Cuban selection could have any real value. This policy had the approval of the Department of State and was carried out to the letter. The following excerpts from an address by an Agency representative to the Cuban Revolutionary Assembly on 18 March 1961 just prior to the start of the selection of the CRC exemplified this: "Naturally, the procedures employed in the election of your leader or Provisional President must remain entirely in your hands. . . Obviously we are not trying to tell you whom you should elect—that is your responsibility and yours alone. . . The decision is up to you. I am confident you will make the right one." Thus, acting independently the Cuban exiles elected Miro Cardona as their provisional President.

i) It is quite true that CRC members went into isolation during the 17 April invasion; it is also true that statements on the invasion were issued in their names. On the former, CRC members were briefed and counseled by two high ranking Agency officials and the Cuban agreement was given voluntarily and without coercion and in recognition of the demands of the hour. In fact Miro Cardona was told that he might stay in New York City over the fateful weekend of 14–17 April. He, however, asked to be isolated with the other members of the CRC.

j) In summary, the facts prove that FRD (and later CRC) members were not reduced to the status of puppets—regardless of their feeling in the ice cold reality of defeat—and that their action capabilities were exploited to the fullest (an outstanding example is the great number of laws and plans which were ready for promulgation and implementation upon the assumption of power in Cuba by the Provisional Government). Such limitations as existed on active participation by Cubans in post-Castro plans for Cuba were created by their own preoccupation with matters relating to personal ambitions, long-standing personal biases and exile politics Caribbean style. Indeed as pointed out above, politicians had little to do with the military aspects of the operation since they lacked by their own admission technical competence. Just before the landing, however, the politico-military understanding was at its best. The Brigade and its leadership recognized the political leadership of the CRC and Manuel Artime, a leading member of the CRC, stayed and landed with the Brigade as a representative of the CRC.

2. The FRD Military Element.

a) The military element similarly enjoyed freedom of action consonant with traditionally accepted rules of military discipline and order. Although American advisors, of necessity, directed the planning of the troop training from the basic stage through advanced large unit

exercises and maneuvers, the Cuban military leadership participated in this planning and was solely responsible for the conduct of the training and for the control of the troops. In this latter connection, the Cuban military leaders were responsible for the maintenance of law, order and discipline and in the discharge of these responsibilities meted out disciplinary punishment ranging from "company punishment" to incarceration.

b) Without coercion on our part, the Liberation Troops pledged their loyalty to the Cuban political leadership as represented by the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

c) The traditional cleavages of military versus political leadership naturally were evident in this operation as they are in almost any organized state in the world. There is no evidence, however, to support any contention that the gap between their respective objectives and methods to be employed to achieve these objectives was any wider than would be expected given the circumstances that existed. Merely because those like Manuel Ray who never favored an invasion said after the defeat "I told you so" to all available newspapers did not mean that the D-Day unity was not sufficiently strong to have provided a platform on which to build. Failure, quite naturally, provided the most potent fuel to the flames of dissension which lay only just below the surface.

3. *Miscellaneous.* Other than the main conclusion mentioned above, there are some minor criticisms in the Survey. Project officers are criticised for not speaking Spanish. This point is discussed elsewhere but it might again be noted that of the six senior officers dealing with the Cuban leaders, five had fluent Spanish and the one officer who did not succeeded nevertheless in achieving a close relationship with a number of the top Cubans including Miro Cardona.

Paragraphs 42–50 on pages 94 to 97 of the Survey contain a series of criticisms and preachments which are so general, unsupported or unconnected to some specific consequence that we can only comment that they have been noted with dismay and that we regret that until more detail is furnished, an answer is not possible.

The remainder of the Survey's section on the political front and the relations to the Cubans starting on page 81 is mainly factual. It is only unfortunate that it treats so complex a problem so superficially and fails to include any of the extensive Agency relationships with the State Department and the White House with respect to the proper line to take with the Cuban leaders and the correct interpretation of the political views of these leaders. Also, what political attitudes were the most desirable from the point of view of the U.S.? In addition, the Agency did considerable work on the preparation of political documents. Moreover, some non-Agency experts were obtained to work

with the Cuban leaders at their request in the development of the planks for their political platform. The absence of this whole story and the problems faced as it unfolded makes it difficult to have any real understanding of what was involved on the political side.

IX. *AIR MARITIME OPERATIONS*

The Survey only has a one sentence conclusion regarding the carrying out of paramilitary operations (as distinguished from the basic military concept), namely, "Air and boat operations showed up poorly." (Para. 4., page 143.) The body of the Survey, however, has three chapters on this point dealing with "Air", "Maritime", and "Training Underground Leaders". (Page 98–134.) The major points in these chapters will be considered below.

[NB: Three maps have been kept and are available, if desired, which show all air and maritime deliveries into Cuba plus all PM assets on Cuban soil as of 17 April 1961. These can be examined at any time. They are believed relevant to these paramilitary points.]

A. *AIR*

1. Before discussing the many specific criticisms of the Survey, a few background points should be presented.

a. For reasons already discussed, U.S. bases could not be used. Consequently, drop missions had to be flown the longer distance from Guatemala, the only foreign soil within range for which permission from the local government was possible. Conceivably, President Somoza might have approved Nicaragua, but for many reasons Guatemala was preferable for these missions, e.g., a usable base in Nicaragua was not ready until late in the project; Nicaragua was farther from the U.S. and during this period supplies had to come from the U.S.; the trainees were in Guatemala, so that by using the same country the logistic support was simplified; and a separate country for the strike base was desired. Moreover, it was advisable to keep pre-strike activities out of the country providing the strike base.

b. U.S. airmen could not be used. The Cubans recruited had extensive experience and were given a lot of training. Their air background, however, was commercial flying which, as it turned out, did not provide them with the kind of night flying navigational precision desired. Moreover, being Cuban and emotionally involved, their discipline was not good. For example, they often violated orders by remaining over targets too long in an effort to find the DZ and help their countrymen.

c. Reception committees were either untrained or performed under difficult conditions. Even a trained individual, other than perhaps a surveyor, can make a slight error in figuring the coordinates of a DZ, particularly in rough terrain. A small mistake is enough to destroy the effectiveness of an air drop.

d. The recent and productive experience of making drops in difficult areas, such as [*less than 1 line not declassified*], has convinced us that communications with the receiving group, including ground to air communications from the DZ to the dropping aircraft (whether by radio, W/T or beacon), is essential to any assurance of success. In the Cuban situation, communications at best were difficult. For example, although contact was established with groups in the Escambray by courier, efforts to infiltrate a trained radio operator with equipment were never successful. In other cases it was advisable, if not necessary, to keep the radio operator away from the DZ in order to avoid risking so scarce a commodity. This meant an unavoidable delay with respect to last minute messages between the senders and the actual receivers. In no case were the desired communications mentioned above ever possible.

e. The Cuban land mass is not easy for drops. Either the terrain is rough and DZs are few as in the Escambray or the area is relatively crowded making an isolated spot difficult to find. In addition, Castro, as a former guerrilla leader, had surveyed possible DZs and was thoroughly familiar with their location.

f. Drop operations without all aids are inherently difficult. As already stated even toward the end of WW II skilled crews dropping to skilled and experienced reception committees were accorded, as a rule of thumb on the basis of lessons learned, only a 50% chance of success. The technical facilities in Cuba were less good than those in France in 1944-45 and the human capabilities much less good.

Having made the foregoing comments, it should then be admitted that the drop record in Cuba was poor. Efforts to improve it, however, were not successful, nor is it clear that any permissible action would have done any good. Some 27,800 lbs. of matériel were actually delivered (somewhat more than stated by the Survey). (See para. 9, page 101.) The major deliveries, however, as already explained, were by boat. Only one body drop was made. The reason for this was that drops were obviously going badly and individuals could be infiltrated more successfully by boat.

2. Specific allegations of the Survey follow:

a. The first drop was close but missed by 7 miles as stated by the Survey (para. 1, page 98). A contributing factor was an unknown dam construction marked by lights. No U-2 flights had been approved at this stage of the project and knowledge of the construction was not available. On return the plane hit the proper coast-in point in Guatemala, and the crew captain then turned the plane over to the co-pilot. The latter took a short cut, climbed above some cloud cover, was lost when he came down and landed on the first field he found, i.e., in Mexico, even though he still had sufficient fuel to return to Guatemala. Obviously, this was bad procedure and poor crew discipline.

b. The rice and beans drop (para. 4., et seq., page 99) is an exaggerated case. In order to fill out the load, the DDCI decided to drop some food, as food shortages were clearly a problem with the resistance. Probably too much food was dropped and the agent was disturbed and angry. He continued, however, to work for the resistance and with the Agency, coming to Miami at a later date and returning again to Cuba thereafter.

c. Reception procedures (para. 11–12, pages 101–102) were the best that could be devised in each instance, given the circumstances, i.e., the DZ, the local situation, the communications and the matériel available or that which could be used, (e.g., bonfires often were impossible, thereby making flashlights necessary). As to differences of view, there is no doubt that before a final flight plan was decided upon in particular cases there were often varying suggestions as to what should or should not be done. The clearance procedures already described were fully understood, however, and, it is believed, worked. In view of all the circumstances, they were not “cumbersome”, as alleged by the Survey. The Special Group gave the overall clearance; the Task Force made the request for a drop and recommended the time, the place and the load; DPD handled the preparation of the flight plan and suggested any changes prompted by air safety considerations; and the DDCI gave the specific flight plan and final operational clearance. The crews were briefed in Guatemala. Their air discipline, as already indicated, was poor but how to correct it was difficult. Pilots and crews were hard to find so that they could not be fired. Navigation also was faulty though usually mistakes occurred in the difficult area after hitting the Cuban coast-in point.

d. Pilots were often told, as indicated by the Survey, to drop if they had any reason to believe that they were close to their targets. Often the need was so urgent that any effort to deliver supplies was justifiable. Moreover, capture of matériel by Castro’s forces was a matter of no consequence as the Cubans had more equipment than they could use. Also, there were cases where recovery was by non-resistance Cubans who then passed the matériel to the resistance. Consequently, this chance was always present. If the blind drop theory was wrong, at least it was consciously adopted by all concerned at the time.

e. The so-called “tardy corrective action” (para. 33, page 108) was misunderstood by the Survey. In late February or early March a review of drops was made to try to see what, if anything, could be done to improve results. The findings merely confirmed the problems but really provided no solutions. Some suggestions were made which, in effect, were merely a restatement of existing procedures. Blind drops, as already indicated, were continued as a matter of policy when conditions were urgent, even though the review recommended their elimina-

tion. The other study made in January 1961 (para. 31, page 107) was stopped by the Paramilitary Chief as he knew that a solution by use of American pilots was politically unacceptable no matter how desirable operationally.

In conclusion it might be said that the DPD overall air drop record is a good one and will stand close examination. The failures in Cuba were not the result of lack of competence nor of poor organization. They were rather the result of many complex factors, some beyond Agency control, some undoubtedly within Agency control. During the project, the only real solutions were believed to be in the area of political infeasibility, although an improved record might have otherwise been achieved. Surely if better communications could have been provided with the resistance elements at the time of drops, there would have been greater success. It must be remembered in this connection that during the early months in 1961 the communications picture improved materially. Moreover, during the last two or three weeks before the invasion some 15 drop requests were received which could not for other reasons be fulfilled. The groups making these requests were, however, well equipped and capable.

B. MARITIME

In the maritime field, it should be noted that the Survey makes no mention of the operational atmosphere or difficulties. This, of course, is true throughout the Survey, but, because of the particular difficulties encountered in connection with ships and crews and the amounts of money involved, the omission of realities seems perhaps more conspicuous in the maritime field.

One major omission, for example, is the effort made by the Agency to find boats in the Navy and the Coast Guard. Although such effort was made and both Services were thoroughly cooperative, no usable boats could be found. Consequently, although the Agency fleet was not what might have been desired, it was, of necessity, obtained out of what could be found.

Another omission is any review of performance in relation to difficulties. For example, under the circumstances, it is suggested that the infiltration of 88,000 lbs. of matériel plus 79 bodies and the exfiltration of 51 bodies is a perfectly reasonable performance. Moreover, the transportation of the Brigade to the beachhead without hitch was surely a commendable operation.

As to supplies, the Survey criticizes the limited distribution achieved geographically in Cuba, but the fact is that the distribution was fairly good. This has been explained in an earlier section along with the reasons why the central south coast was not covered.

As to the condition of ships and the money required for their purchase and repair, no detailed discussion seems justified, although

the Survey devotes considerable space to these items. The only significance of these allegations, it is felt, would be if, in the light of the existing requirements, urgencies and availabilities (i.e., of both equipment and people), the judgments exercised were reprehensible. Admittedly, the Agency fleet cost a substantial amount of money. Moreover, as stated, the craft were not ideal. The issue, however, is what else was possible. It is doubted that anything could have been done at the time which would have materially altered the situation.

Admittedly, as indicated in the Survey (para. 41, pages 123–124), the Agency capability in the maritime field at the start of the Cuban project was not very substantial. This, however, is no great surprise in view of the unlikelihood pre-Cuba that the Agency would become involved in a project requiring this type of maritime capability. It should be noted that for two years prior to Cuba DD/P officers examined all aspects of PM requirements, including maritime, to determine what preparatory steps, if any, could be constructively taken in advance of an actual project requirement. Although a number of actions were taken the Cuban maritime needs were not anticipated.

In this connection, in retrospect it would probably have been wise to have requested Captain Scapa or some other senior Navy officer earlier in the project. A Marine Colonel was, of course, the Paramilitary Chief and had charge of maritime operations. Also, continuous liaison with the Navy and Navy officers in Defense was taking place. Nevertheless, a full time Navy Captain in the project could have resulted in the adoption of more imaginative methods which might possibly have produced greater performance. Even in retrospect, however, it is not known what these would have been.

1. The main specific criticisms of the Survey are:

a. Difficulties with crews particularly the “Barbara J”. There is no question that trouble was experienced with the Cuban crews. One problem was that the Cubans, when recruited, thought that they were going to control the ships. This impression could have been given by Agency officers in good faith. At any rate, it soon became apparent that such control was impossible, particularly for the landing operation. Clearance was, therefore, requested by the Agency and obtained to hire American masters plus a few American officers for special posts (e.g., chief engineer, communications) on the main landing ships. The heads of MSTs went to extensive pain and trouble to help the Agency find such officers. When hired, however, they were resented by the Cuban seamen, who felt that they had been deprived of their own command and control, and time and circumstances did not permit shakedown cruises. The consequence, particularly when the crews were first put on board ship, was trouble, partly for the reason given and partly because of differences between the Cubans themselves. These

latter conflicts were unfortunate, but it is unknown how they could have been discovered or anticipated during the recruitment unless more time had been available. These problems, moreover, were ironed out before the landing movement in which these particular ships were involved. In addition, the crews were effectively given good training at Vieques as evidenced both by Captain Scapa's examination and the later performance of the crews.

b. The Survey makes a great deal of the case of one of the Masters of the "Barbara J" who was discharged and subsequently had his name included in a letter of commendation. (Paras. 24–25–26, pages 117–118.) This case had a long history known to the inspectors which unfortunately the Survey does not choose to mention. Briefly, the Master was considered by MSTs as one of their best men. In fact he was one of the youngest of their men (about 35) to be made a Master. A strong personality difference arose between him and one of the senior Agency contract employees who was to be a central figure in the landing. This employee made charges against the Master including a charge that the Master had been drinking on an operational trip. He, therefore, demanded that the Master be discharged. The case was such that under the circumstances the Agency employee had to be backed or lost. Due to the employee's importance to the mission, the fact that he was a very good officer, and the shortness of time, he was backed and the Master discharged. On further investigation, it was found that the Master not only denied all the allegations against him but claimed that he could find men to substantiate his story and asked in writing to vindicate himself. In view of his superior MSTs record and faced with serious issues of fact plus obvious security problems and with no time or opportunity to hold hearings to resolve these issues, it was decided to give the Master his contract pay and to explain the facts to the Industrial Relations Officer of MSTs. This was done. Thereafter, at the last moment it became essential to obtain a Master for one of the reserve supply ships. Due to the urgency of the situation, the Master's background and the very good impression that the Master had made following the other incident he was asked to take the job. Knowing of the problems at the beachhead including the dangers from enemy air attack and despite his strong disagreement with the decision resulting in his discharge, the Master still immediately accepted, took command of the ship and put to sea. Due to subsequent events beyond his control, he was recalled. In view of all these facts, his name was later included in the general letter to MSTs commending the performance of the more than 20 officers provided by MSTs. On this record, the action taken still seems correct.

c. As to infiltration of teams (para. 11, page 128), there were some difficulties but again the situation must be examined in regard to all

the existing facts. In the first place through the summer, fall and early winter of 1960, the Havana Station was in existence (the Embassy and thus the Station was closed in early January). Consequently, internal Cuban contacts and communications were excellent. Moreover, legal travel was relatively easy and as pointed out by the Survey, some 8 radio operators were put into Cuba legally. In addition, defectors, as indicated in an earlier section, were exfiltrating in large numbers. Many of these held responsible positions in the Castro Government or in the community and were in close touch with resistance groups. Moreover, the Miami exile community, many of whom were U.S. representatives of internal resistance groups, had their own communications through couriers or otherwise. Consequently, the six maritime operations mentioned by the Survey in September, October, and November must be assessed in relation to this background. Also, in addition, in the summer and fall of 1960 (ending in December) the RIO ESCONDIDO was used to infiltrate and exfiltrate as many as 16 people. The ship had a smuggling compartment in the boiler room which could take two individuals, preferably one. The Survey does not mention these movements, probably because they were not considered maritime operations, rather arrangements with the ship's captain. Five of the 16 people infiltrated during this period were key resistance leaders and their W/T operators. Another factor during this period was that legal movement was relatively easy for individuals legally in Cuba so that the desirability of putting in individuals who had to live and leave black was reduced. In view of all these factors, it was decided to keep out many of the teams originally planned for infiltration. The reaction of trained teams to such inactivity was, what might have been expected, anger, discouragement and lowered morale. On top of this the ill-fated trip of the "Barbara J" was unfortunate since 3 teams were aboard who were not put ashore in Cuba. Consequently, the attitude of this group of Cuban trainees was at times bad. After the Havana Station was closed, however, the infiltration efforts picked up despite being thwarted by bad weather through January. By the end of March or early April, the paramilitary agent infiltration had achieved an adequate total. Moreover, thirteen communicators was a satisfactory number although it is probably fair to say that there is no such thing as too many communicators.

d. The Survey alleges that small boat operations were not planned (para. 17, page 114). Probably under the press of events the paper work was not as tidy as might be found in normal charter parties. Planning, however, was, it is believed, what was possible. Maritime operations can only be planned in relation to known facts such as an available reception, an available boat and a moment timely for a mission. Overall plans are obviously possible and it is believed that it can be shown

that such plans existed. In the same way what was desired in the way of boats was known but actual purchases were only feasible as particular craft materialized on the market.

C. TRAINING UNDERGROUND LEADERS

The major criticisms of the training were that the sites were inadequate and in some cases too remote; training on foreign soil would have been better accomplished in the U.S.; some of the U.S. training was with haphazard facilities and trainers; and the training was piecemeal without plan.

Before responding to the particular allegations, it must be noted that, with all due respect, the Survey's criticism suggests the attitudes of a dweller in a secure and well-ordered academic "Never-never Land" who assumes that all training must be similarly conducted or it is poorly managed. It is the Harvard Law School trying to comment on the advantages of sandlot training for baseball players. The only difference being that the HLS would be judiciously analytic which is a point of view never achieved by the Survey.

The facts are that none of the project's training sites were ideal or picked solely for the accomplishment of the training involved. Security considerations, or, in other words, political concerns, played a vital role.

Moreover, if results are any criteria, the training sites were adequate. As far as the Brigade and its air arm are concerned, the conclusions of impartial experts (i.e., the JCS team) regarding the competence achieved are recorded in writing. The performance of the trainees on the beachhead is further proof. The training of the landing ships' crews at Vieques was good and effective in operation. The training in Panama was excellent on all reports as was the screening and handling of personnel to be trained at Useppa Island. The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was, according to all observers, well trained and ready to fight. Its failure to land was due to poor leadership and not the fault of the troops.

The communications training has always been reported as excellent and the Survey itself commends the communications effort. Practice also established that the trained agent communicators in Cuba had far fewer garbles in their messages than normally found in such transmissions.

The agents, who were trained (and all those who were infiltrated as agents were given training), received courses in how to live black; some weapons and demolitions training; some CE; air reception and how to handle drops; resistance organization and how to contact underground groups. The teams who were to be infiltrated received, as stated by the Survey (para. 12, page 129) and mentioned earlier, training in "security, basic clandestine tradecraft, intelligence collection and

reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, reception operations, explosives and demolitions, guerilla action and similar action.”

There was, therefore, no lack of training doctrine or planning. Incidentally, since it has been raised by the Survey (para. 11 et seq., page 101), the air reception procedures taught to all agents were those taught in the Agency School on this subject.

Regarding sites, it should be pointed out that, whether good or bad, the Guatemala sites were the *only* ones available. The U.S. was politically unacceptable and the Guatemala government was the deciding element as to the sites in Guatemala that could be used. The Survey says that the ground training base in Guatemala “obviously. . . could not” accommodate 500 individuals. (Para. 10, page 127). The fact was that it did plus many more and worked.

Similarly the initial situation at New Orleans was difficult. (Para. 23, page 133). Again, however, the problems were adequately corrected to provide adequate training. It took work and some help from the Armed Services to get the base functioning but both occurred and prevailed.

The Survey, as indicated, also alleges that training could have been more effective and secure if done in the United States (Paras. 11–12, page 138). The Survey points to tank and communications training which did take place in the U.S. to support its conclusion. What is not said is that the tank training only involved 25 men and was done at a U.S. base accustomed to training foreign groups and quite able to assimilate a small group of this size. Similarly, communications could be and were taught in small classes. Political clearances, therefore, were granted specifically for these classes, i.e., a U.S. base for tankers and U.S. safehouses for communicators, but as a recognized exception to the basic rule of generally denying the use of the U.S. for any kind of training. The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was obviously another exception and one which was somewhat inconsistent with the general rule, but the clearance was given nevertheless because time was short (the invasion was imminent) and an attempted diversionary operation was considered important. Moreover, no other site was available that was either better or usable, taking all factors into account.

The question of haphazard facilities and trainers has been discussed earlier. Obviously, there is a good deal of adjusting to the needs of the moment in a project of this sort. It is believed, however, that the record will show that the training plans were reasonably detailed and complete. Moreover, that wherever a training course of any length was involved, there was a specific training plan.

**278E. Letter from CIA Director McCone to President of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Killian,
January 19¹**

January 19, 1962

Dear Dr. Killian:

Attached is copy of the CIA Inspector General's "Survey Of Cuban Operations" together with comments thereon by General C.P. Cabell, Deputy Director of CIA and "Analysis Of The Cuban Operation" by Deputy Director (Plans). This latter report is intended as a comment on the Inspector General's report.

As you readily understand, I am not in a position to render a personal opinion concerning the validity of the IG's report or the statements by the DDCI and the DDP because I was not in CIA at the time. However it is my personal opinion as a result of examinations I have made of this operation after the fact that both the report and the rebuttals are extreme. I believe an accurate appraisal of the Cuban effort and the reasons for failure rest some place in between the two points of view expressed in the reports.

I believe it is safe to say the failure of the Cuban operation was Government-wide and in this respect the Agency must bear its full share (though not the entire) responsibility.

For this reason I would recommend that your board, in reviewing the Inspector General's Survey also review the comments and analysis of the DDCI and the DD/P.

Yours very truly,

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Forwards Kirkpatrick's survey of the Cuban operation and comments of other CIA officials. 1 p. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

**278F. Memorandum from CIA Assistant Deputy Director for Plans
Barnes to Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, January 19¹**

January 19, 1962

SUBJECT

Survey of Cuban Operation

1. My work in support of your "Analysis of the Cuban Operation" gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care the document which caused the Analysis to be written, namely, the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation, October 1961".

2. My consideration of the Survey has forced me to reach certain conclusions which I feel that I must record. I do so in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of sufficient significance to demand the discipline of a written expression. Moreover, I feel that those who disagree with me should have the opportunity to direct any replies that they may choose to make to specific identifiable comments.

3. I may say that my decision to write this memorandum was reached with considerable reluctance and only after long deliberation. The deciding factor was my belief that the suggestions for action in paragraph 6 below are worthwhile and should be submitted. They would have been meaningless without the reasons set forth in the earlier paragraphs. The views expressed are, needless to say, exclusively mine.

4. In my opinion the I.G. Survey is most unfortunate for three reasons:

a. It is an incompetent job. The authors never understood the problems with which they were dealing and failed to express their views with any precision or proper use of relevant facts.

b. It is biased. Basically relevant evidence on vital issues was not only left out but never even mentioned. The Survey undertook only to present those items which suggested failures or inadequacies. These items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false picture was given. Admittedly, an I.G. must expose fault but it is also his job to do so accurately.

c. It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively, it is intentionally biased. Admittedly, this is a serious charge and is, at best, merely a statement of opinion. I can only say that I hold such opinion firmly. In my view it could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey's total omission

¹ Survey of the Cuban operation. 5 pp. Secret; Eyes Only. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

in many places of significantly relevant evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided as to substantiate the conclusion that they must have been intentional. In addition, however, I would like to mention four other points:

1) The fact that the inspectors, in making their investigation, omitted any discussions of their findings with the senior officers responsible for the project. Although, technically, the I.G. can accurately state that he talked to the DD/P and the then A/DDP/A about the Survey, the fact is that these discussions were exceedingly brief and covered none of the real issues in the Survey. The AC/DPD was not spoken to at all. The Security Officer of WH/4 was not spoken to at all. Other senior officers, such as C/WH and C/WH/4, were never given an opportunity to express their views in relation to statements in the Survey.

2) Some officers with whom the inspectors had discussions felt after they had a chance to see the Survey, that it did not impartially express the information which they had provided and left out much of the relevant information given. Moreover, some officers have reported that the attitude of the inspectors and their line of questioning indicated a desire to obtain facts or views to support judgments already formed. Opinions contrary to these judgments were not only disregarded but resisted.

3) The distribution of the final Survey was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice that it raises an inference of intended partiality. The method of distribution is known and will not be repeated here. It might be added that there were other facts with respect to the distribution of the Survey worthy of mention. C/WH/4 was called one day and asked if he wanted to read the Survey. He said that he would like to do so but since both C/WH and DC/WH were away he could not leave since he was Acting Chief of the Division. Particularly, he could not meet the requirements of the offer which were that he would only have an hour from the time of the telephone call to see the Survey (including travel time) since it then had to be sent to the printer. Why the urgency was so great is not clear. As far as is known, only one individual outside of the I.G. Staff saw the Survey in final or substantially final form before it was distributed, namely, an officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/4 during the project. Why he was selected instead of one of his superiors who was connected with the project is not known.

4) Since this particular operation, without question, involved more political interest and dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever participated, there was every reason for following regular procedures meticulously. In addition to the distribution point mentioned above, it seems relevant to wonder how Dr. Killian and the Attorney General knew of the Survey's existence so as to request a copy.

5. I should say that, whatever the appearance of the foregoing, I have not been trying to I.G. the I.G. The information reported came to me unsolicited and in the normal course of my work with you and your Analysis. Maybe there is additional evidence of importance, but I have not looked for it and do not plan to do so.

6. The significance of the foregoing is to provide the reasons for the main purpose of this memorandum, i.e., the submission of the following recommendations for action.

a. The DCI should resolve to his own satisfaction the conflicts on major issues between the I.G.'s Survey and your Analysis. Since both these documents are internal to the Agency, there is no Agency position on the Cuban operation unless the conflicts are resolved. In view of the importance of and the continuing interest in the operation at high levels of the Government, an Agency position seems essential. Such a position is also important for the future. The operation is bound to be studied for various reasons and there should be an Agency position at least as to what happened, what were the mistakes and what were the lessons. Moreover, the DCI, having assumed office after the operation was thoroughly finished, has every reason for wanting to have some definitive findings and conclusions.

b. If the DCI agrees with a. above each recipient of the Survey and Analysis (and it is understood that they will only be distributed together) should be advised of the fact that such an Agency position is being sought. This might help to avoid independent conclusions outside of the Agency being reached first.

c. The following requirements should be imposed on all future I.G. surveys at least on any aspects of the DD/P area of responsibility.

1) No survey shall be undertaken without specific written terms of reference approved by the DCI.

2) The DD/P shall be satisfied that in each future survey covering any portion of his area of responsibility the I.G. or his staff will interview at least all officers having had responsibility for any part of the activity inspected by the I.G. and prior to the distribution of the survey the DD/P and each such officer will be given an opportunity to express his views on points included in the Survey. Obviously the I.G. need not accept these views. Such procedure, however, will save an enormous amount of time required to answer surveys such as the Cuban one which fail to present a full factual picture regardless of the conclusions reached.

7. I am addressing this memorandum to you as my immediate superior. I hope, however, that you will agree with my request that the memorandum be passed to the DCI for his consideration. I do not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or any part of it merely because you transmit it.

C. Tracy Barnes

**278G. Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Barnes, January 22¹**

January 22, 1962

Dear Tracy:

Thank you for your courtesy in sending me a copy of your memorandum of 19 January concerning the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation. I do hope that Dick forwards it to the DCI, and I am enclosing a copy of this note to you in case you wish to send a copy to Dick.

I have not had time to study your memorandum, or even in fact do more than glance at the DD/P analysis in view of the meeting with the President's Board all day Friday and the fact that I am going to be away all this week. However, I will make the following comments. Needless to say, I completely disagree with your statement that it is an incompetent job. I feel that it is competent and I believe that the more than one file cabinet drawer full of background documents will prove its competence. I do not believe that it is biased. We made it very clear at the start of the report that it would only deal with inadequacies and failures and would not purport to be a thorough analysis of the operation.

Most of all I object most strongly to your third observation, namely that it is malicious and intentionally biased. I have asked the men who did this survey to review your memorandum and comment on the reasons you believe that it is biased. I should perhaps acknowledge that more time should have been spent with you or Bissell, but inasmuch as this devolved on me, if there is a fault, it is mine personally. But to imply that for some reason, unknown to me, that we would slant this report is an unfair comment. You apparently feel there was something unusual in the distribution of the final report. The only thing unusual in it was that we had two Directors at the time, and Mr. McCone having asked for it received it as he was leaving for the West Coast on the day before Thanksgiving and everybody else got their copies on the day after Thanksgiving. Your concern as to how the President's Board and the Attorney General knew of the survey's existence can be answered very simply. In 1956 the President's Board in writing advised all agencies that all inspector general reports should be forwarded to them automatically. I don't believe it was a week after the Cuban operation that the direct question came from that Board as to whether

¹ Response to Barnes' January 19 memorandum commenting on Kirkpatrick's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

an inspection was going to be done to which an affirmative reply was given. The Attorney General's source I do not know.

Finally, as far as to what should be done next, you and Dick should know that at the conclusion of my discussion with the President's Board I urged that a group, or individual, who had not in any way been associated with the operation be charged with taking the Taylor Report, our report and your comments and all background material and writing a truly national and detailed report. I believe that would be a far better solution than trying to develop a CIA position, which really is not very practical inasmuch as there were so many outside factors affecting this operation.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

278H. Memorandum from the staff officers of the CIA Office of the Inspector General to CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick, January 26¹

January 26, 1962

SUBJECT

The IG's Cuban Survey and the DD/P's Analysis of the Cuban Operation

1. The scope of the IG Survey is briefly and clearly stated in the Introduction. The Survey's intent was to identify and describe weaknesses *within the Agency* which contributed to the final result and to make recommendations for their future avoidance. The IG had no authority to conduct a survey of the machinery for making decisions and policy at other levels of government. This field was covered by the group headed by Gen. Taylor. The Survey expressly avoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase of the operation.

2. Much of the DD/P's Analysis is devoted, however, to a discussion of governmental decision-making and to a rehash of the military operation. It criticizes the Survey for insufficient attention to these matters, putting the major blame for the operation's failure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.

¹ Kirkpatrick's Cuban survey and the Deputy Directory of Plans analysis of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

3. The Analysis attempts to refute most of the weaknesses described by the Survey. The few which it admits were, it contends, not significant to the final result. It rejects the Survey's statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and that staffing was inadequate. It blames the failure of the air drops on the Cuban reception crews and air crews. It states that small boat operations could not well have been handled in any other way. And it states that other weaknesses were not important because they were not the decisive reason for failure.

4. There is a fundamental difference of approach between the two documents. While the Analysis is preoccupied with interdepartmental policy-making and military strategy, the Survey is mainly concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance in Cuba through clandestine operations. The Analysis fails to shed any further significant light on this fundamental issue.

5. The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of what was going on at the case-officer level than of events in policy-making circles. This is apparent in a number of inaccuracies in the Analysis. For example, the discussion of activities in Miami is inaccurate and misleading. Conduct of training in Miami is defended although it was not criticized by the Survey. The 178 trainees alluded to in the Analysis as trained in Miami were in fact trained in Guatemala. The PM section in Miami was being *built up* beginning in November 1960, rather than being de-emphasized. These and other inaccuracies suggest that the Analysis should be read with caution where it deals with events on the working level of the project.

6. The IG investigators centered their inquiry on certain phases which are significant to the success or failure of any operation and of the Agency's over-all mission itself. They cannot be ignored or argued away just because of policy decisions made outside the Agency.

[names not declassified]

**278I. Memorandum from CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell to
CIA Director McCone, January 27¹**

January 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Mr. Barnes' Memorandum on the IG Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. As you are aware, Mr. Tracy Barnes did a major part of the work in preparing our comments on Mr. Kirkpatrick's Survey of the Cuban Operation. At the conclusion of the task, Mr. Barnes wrote me the attached memorandum which I hereby pass on to you.

2. I may say that I am in agreement with Mr. Barnes that the Survey, largely by reason of the omission of material relevant to its conclusions, constitutes a highly biased document and that the bias is of such a character that it must have been intentional.

3. I will be glad to discuss this with you if you so desire.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director (Plans)

¹ Barnes memorandum on the IG Survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Secret; Eyes Only. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

February 1962

**278J. Memorandum from Allen W. Dulles to CIA Director
McCone, February 15¹**

February 15, 1962

SUBJECT

The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. Upon receipt of the Inspector General's report of October 1961, on the Cuban Operation, which reached my desk prior to my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence, I immediately transmitted a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans) for his comment. This was in line with the practice I had consistently followed in dealing with the reports of the Inspector General: namely, the Office which is the subject of the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on the I.G. report before the Director determines the action to be taken thereon. The reply of the Deputy Director (Plans), dated 18 January 1962, of which I have received a copy, was submitted to you following my resignation.

2. Meanwhile, I have also received and considered the comments of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cabell.

3. I remain at your disposal for any comments you may wish me to submit on any phases of this matter relating to C.I.A. responsibilities. Hence I will not submit detailed written comment on the Inspector General's report.

4. At this time, however, I wish to make certain general comments:

a. As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed by the President, I participated fully in the work of his Committee and joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to the President on this subject. While I do not now have a copy of these documents, I made only one or two reservations to the general conclusions and recommendations of these reports. I consider them to be sound and believe they should be accepted as the best available Survey of this particular operation.

b. The Inspector General's report suffers from the fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of one segment of one agency, namely, the C.I.A. Opinions based on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by him.

¹ IG's survey of the Cuban operation. 3 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

c. Judgments could not properly be rendered in this matter without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor Committee, of actions of all of the participating elements in the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of the Agency which affected the operation. This applies particularly to the participation of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to certain elements of the Executive Department of the Government.

d. At no time during the preparation of his report did the Inspector General request any information from me and he makes certain serious errors in areas where my direct responsibility was clearly involved.

5. Two major areas of criticism in the I.G. report cover (1) the operational arrangements for the organization, training, transportation and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration and their political organization. As to these points, I submit the following:

a. First, while certain organizational matters, in the light of developments, may be open to some criticism, the Brigade with its entire complement of men and equipment reached the landing area on schedule and under circumstances which achieved complete surprise. The situation in the landing area was substantially as predicted. The enemy battle order intelligence was essentially correct. The failure to get the ammunition and supplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Brigade commander or its personnel.

b. Second, with respect to the organization of a Cuban emigre political committee in support of the operations, I would point out that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition of Cuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was realized.

These two important achievements covered major areas of C.I.A. responsibility.

6. As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in view of my other duties to delegate certain responsibilities within the Agency for the day-by-day management of the operation, and on military matters and judgments I relied heavily on military personnel assigned to C.I.A. and on Department of Defense personnel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I assumed throughout full responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept currently advised of all important developments. During the concluding days of the operation, I was particularly influenced by the judgments in Col. Hawkins dispatch, dated April 13, 1961, relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade (Annex A to Chapter IV of DDP report).

7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment is a matter which can be debated and on which even today military experts differ. Certainly, the responsibility for failure does not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the Inspector General's report.

8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed out in the Taylor Reports. These Reports, I believe, should be taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions in support of the operation.

Allen W. Dulles

**278K. Letter from CIA Director McCone to Allen W. Dulles,
February 19¹**

February 19, 1962

Dear Allen:

I have received your memorandum of 15 February 1962 containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation. Copies of this memorandum, together with the DD/P analysis of the survey, the comments made by General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and the personal views expressed by Mr. Tracy Barnes, will be bound in the report—and therefore will be known to anyone who might have occasion to read it.

Sincerely,

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

279. Program review by Brigadier General Lansdale, February 20¹

February 20, 1962

THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal. In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum of 30 November 1961, the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The Situation. We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba, although we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However, some salient facts are known. It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist controls inside Cuba are severe. Also, there is evidence that the repressive measures of the Communists, together with disappointments in Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes a resistance program a distinct and present possibility.

Time is running against us. The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast. They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon. They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime. Since late November, we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success in our task.

The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85–62) promises² to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with due recognition of the sparsity of hard facts. The needs of the Cuba project, as it goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance. These will be prepared on a periodic basis.

Premise of Action. Americans once ran a successful revolution. It was run from within, and succeeded because there was timely and strong political, economic, and military help by nations outside who supported our cause. Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty.

¹ "The Cuba Project." Top Secret 26 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62–4/62.

² A marginal note at this point on the White House copy, in McGeorge Bundy's hand, reads: "Will be got ready and held on call. A big job for USN."

On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies of the U.S. government, in order to provide a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities.³ The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action. The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action. The answers also revealed that the course of action must contain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance.

The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present operational estimates and intelligence. *Actually, it represents the maximum target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible.* It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962. It is a series of target actions and dates, not a rigid time-table. The target dates are timed as follows:

Phase I, *Action*, March 1962. Start moving in.

Phase II, *Build-up*, April–July 1962. Activating the necessary operations inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political, economic, and military-type support from outside Cuba.

Phase III, *Readiness*, 1 August 1962, check for final policy decision.

Phase IV, *Resistance*, August–September 1962, move into guerrilla operations.

Phase V, *Revolt*, first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime.

Phase VI, *Final*, during month of October 1962. Establishment of new government.

Plan of Action. Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside help from the U.S. and elsewhere. Since this is an operation to prompt and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, flexibility is a must for success. Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations, with consultation in the Special Group when policy matters are involved. Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans, which cover:

- A. Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba
- B. Political Support Plan
- C. Economic Support Plan
- D. Psychological Support Plan
- E. Military Support Plan
- F. Sabotage Support Plan
- G. Intelligence Support Plan

³ The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action. The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action. The answers also revealed that the course of action must contain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance.

Early Policy Decisions. The operational plan for clandestine U.S. support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President. A vital decision, still to be made, is on the use of open U.S. force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty. If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed, and recommended U.S. responses, are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense. An early decision is required, prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program.

Attachment

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN INSIDE CUBA

PHASE I
(March, 1962)

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<i>MARCH</i> a. Establish three "pathfinder" agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.	Explore operational conditions and requirements. Report on potential and active resistance elements and situation for exploitation by resistance teams. Lay groundwork for bringing in additional agents and teams as conditions warrant.	Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts and communicate securely with CIA. Risk to the personnel is substantial due to lack of intelligence, but mission is essential to planning and operations.

PHASE II
(April-July 1962)

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<i>APRIL</i> a. Establish up to five more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.	Report on resistance potential and lay groundwork for additional agent operations.	These additional teams should provide current reporting on major Cuban areas, so broad political action program can be planned. Risk to teams will continue high, but mission is essential.

OPERATION IN CUBA

b. "Voice" of Cuban movement goes on the air.

PURPOSE

Establishes vital psychological assurance to people that a movement exists to overthrow the regime.

CONSIDERATIONS

Preferably, the "voice" should be from mobile transmitter inside Cuba. Broadcasts can be brief ones at first: identifying music, slogan, and short news. News to include reports on "resistance" acts, taking credit for all sabotage. As daily broadcasts are established, "criminals against people" should be named and promised swift justice, two names per broadcast. If operational judgment dictates *transmitter can be aboard submarine for early broadcasts, as a strictly temporary measure*. It is vital to take risks by having it inside Cuba; a second transmitter and crew should be moved in if the first is lost.

MAY

c. Re-supply agent operations as necessary.

Deliver supplies to satisfy needs developed by agent operations, if valid.

The agents will have to prove to local partisans that outside support is a reality. Thus, as arms, ammunition, and equipment, etc. are needed to equip resistance groups, we must be able to respond effectively to these needs. Maritime and, as feasible, air re-supply will be used. This capability will have to expand as resistance is developed.

OPERATION IN CUBA

- d. By June establish 12 more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.

JUNE

- e. By June, introduce three resistance teams in areas under initial "pathfinder" surveillance, if situation is favorable.

- f. Establish bases for guerrilla operations.

PURPOSE

Mission is the same as for previous "pathfinder" operations.

This will test acceptance and use of the more highly trained teams that must guide development of the popular revolution within Cuba. This also will check emphasis and timing of program from viewpoint of Cuban situation.

To have focal points, with some viability to stockpile for defensive needs and for future attack operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

These will be the last agent operations infiltrated into key areas from the outside. Further expansion by "pathfinders," after these teams are in, can be done from groups inside. It is likely that some of these last "pathfinders" will be replacing casualties.

Very minor resistance actions by important population elements such as labor must be tried and groundwork laid for broader anti-regime program leading toward firm uprising program. Realism of political platform can be tested.

These bases are to be selected after on-the-ground surveys by the teams inside Cuba. Some may exist already. These will also be logistical bases, for caches and stockpiling of arms and equipment to be used by the resistance. The p.a. teams will need not only supplies for active resistance, but also should be able to provide some welfare aid (such as to families of resistance members, families affected by plants shut down by sabotage, etc.).

OPERATION IN CUBAPURPOSECONSIDERATIONS

g. Establish clandestine leadership headquarters with means to communicate with all resistance elements.

Organize internal direction and control of the popular movement.

Leadership will have been emerging and this is about the earliest date possible to establish a clandestine headquarters. It should be of a bare, field type, in the securest area possible. This can become the meaningful source of political-psychological actions, to develop Cuban will to resist and fight.

h. Collection and use of psychological action material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of tyranny of regime to awaken world opinion and fan fire of revolt inside Cuba, for use by support operations and by resistance teams inside.

The resistance teams will use this material with timeliness inside and get it back outside so that it can be exploited fully in Latin America and elsewhere, building official and public opinion in support of the inside operation.

JULY

i. By July establish up to 5 more resistance teams in areas prepared by "pathfinder" operations, as operationally feasible.

Mission is the same as for the first resistance teams (A II e above).

Experience of first resistance teams must be considered in preparing these additional teams for operations. Security of personnel is very important at this point, as the operation expands.

j. Basic organization of underground in vicinity of airfields and communication centers.

To prepare the means for sabotage against military aircraft and key communication links of the regime's security forces.

This requires ground surveys, selection of sites for caching of sabotage supplies, and recruitment of local underground, including members of military and communications employees. Popular support must be prepared by resistance teams.

OPERATION IN CUBA

k. Expand infiltration points along coasts.

l. Low-key resistance sabotage, as a continuing and expanding program.

PURPOSE

To obtain maximum security for stepped-up infiltration.

To demonstrate public disaffection with the regime and give examples which will prompt similar actions by many others. To build attitude and morale of the Cuban people to become activists for their cause against the Communist dictators.

CONSIDERATIONS

Original "rat-lines" need to be expanded into a functioning "underground railway" to pass more infiltrates into interior. Means of quick alerts to danger, delaying defenses, multiple routes, coastal watchers and receivers need to be organized and activated.

Actions under resistance team guidance can include:

- "Runs" on State food and clothing stores and ransack where possible (prompting similar acts by those who want to get enough to eat and wear).
- Sugar in gas tanks of public buses and local official cars and trucks.
- Ice-picking tires.
- Removing receivers from telephones.
- Harassing telephone calls to officials.
- Throwing stones with threatening notes into homes of officials.
- Disrupting rail switches and sand in gear boxes of trains.
- Swiping spark plugs and distributors from vehicles.
- Housewives complaints on shortages of food, medicine, doctors, etc.

OPERATION IN CUBA

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

—Public contempt campaign against Cubans in regime’s puppet organizations, including effigy burning.

A. BASIC ACTION PLAN

PHASE III
(1 August 1962)

AUGUST

m. Final check on resistance elements in Cuba.

To have a final look at the situation and at the means in place before giving the signal to initiate actions leading to full-scale revolt.

This is a last-minute pause, to be certain that the resistance has a possible organization in key places which will act when needed, that the significant portion of the Cuban people are in sympathy with the aims of the movement and will join in when given the chance, and that the movement will be able to gain an area of Cuba as its own against the regime’s military forces, as a minimum

PHASE IV
(August–September 1962)

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<u>AUGUST</u> n. Symbolic work slow-down.	To give workers a feeling of participating in the popular movement, without immediate reprisal.	12 August is the anniversary of the overthrow of dictator Machado. The resistance should link the Castro-Communists with Machado and call on workers to lose one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug. to commemorate the overthrow of one dictator. Workers should be asked to give either one-hour by slow-down or one act of sabotage. The “Voice” of the movement should thank them the next day for their splendid response (to shame those who didn’t participate by making them feel alone).
o. Symbolic signs painted on walls: “Machado One”	To commemorate the downfall of one remembered dictator and give a symbolic pace to the resistance.	Timed with the symbolic work slow-down (A IV n above). Spaced a few days apart, the signs should have lines added to them to read: “Machado One Batista Two Castro Three.”

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
p. By August, have actions to penetrate and subvert the regime.	To weaken and frustrate organized actions against the popular movement.	These are actions on officials of the regime, including the military and the police. Some should be defected in place. Others should be defected and helped to escape to the outside world to tell the inside story of the regime's tyranny, to evoke world sympathy with the freedom fighters.
q. Cuban paramilitary teams infiltrated to bases in the hills.	To provide a trained guerrilla cadre upon which to form guerrilla units.	The paramilitary teams must be capable of initiating minor harassment and reprisal actions, as well as organizing and training guerrilla units. Popular support is essential.
r. Guerrilla bands activated in key areas.	To build a military striking force for the popular movement inside Cuba.	Recruits will be coming in after the symbolic harassment and reprisal actions. They will be screened, organized, and trained for guerrilla action. The regime's security forces can be expected to be very active. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft tactics are necessary. Increased popular support is a must in this phase.
SEPTEMBER s. Commence expanding underground to every locality in Cuba.	To have a truly revolutionary organization throughout Cuba.	The guerrillas are the open arm, but the popular movement must have mass support, which requires intelligence collection and clandestine activists in cities and towns throughout. They will surface when the revolt needs open support.

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
t. Step-up of guerrilla actions.	To season the guerrilla forces with larger scale raids.	Actions will be to seize police files, kidnap officials as hostages, capture local militia arms stores, increase road ambushes, and destroy fuel supplies and transport by raid actions.
u. Activate larger-scale "black" operations on bureaucracy, as penetration assets permit.	To overburden the regime's administrative machinery by false orders, increase the amount of paper work by adding new forms, issue regulations to discredit superiors, and sow suspicion and friction between bureaus.	This will require intensive preparation, including defection in place of some personnel, intimate knowledge of current procedures within bureaus, and means of producing material which can pass as official.
v. Start entry of volunteer "freedom fighters" from Latin America and elsewhere.	To let the Cuban people know that they are not alone in their struggle against tyranny, by the physical presence of foreign "freedom fighters."	A "Marti Battalion" might be formed for foreign volunteers. Recruits from Latin America, from refugee groups (such as Hungarians, Poles, etc.), and Americans, need a controlled means of entering the good fight. Some veterans of the Huk campaign could be a gesture and a practical one.
w. Attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders.	To express popular anger against the regime's tyranny and to give harsh reality to the listing of "criminals against the people."	[text not declassified]

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
x. Operations liberating political prisoners held by regime, if possible.	To liberate prisoners for impact upon popular support of guerrillas and general resistance program.	[<i>text not declassified</i>]
y. Start blocking assistance from the Communist Bloc.	To shut off Bloc assistance to the island of Cuba by all possible means from the inside.	While appealing to the free people of the world to help shut off Communist shipments of arms being used to kill the Cuban people, the resistance must act on its own inside Cuba—striking against ships delivering Bloc supplies, denying harbors by mining, sabotaging transport aircraft, destroying Bloc supplies in warehouses, and acting against Bloc technicians.
z. Commence active sabotage of military aircraft, ground transport and communications.	To hamper the ability of the regime's security forces to strike at the resistance movement as it emerges into more open guerrilla bands.	More sophisticated sabotage devices, contaminants, etc., should be in target area by this time.

PHASE V
(FIRST TWO WEEKS, OCTOBER 1962)

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<p>OCTOBER</p> <p>a. General strike by the Cuban workers.</p>	<p>To make public the popular support of the militant revolt, signifying the passing from underground to open rebellion.</p>	<p>Strike must tie-up transportation and communications. The resistance teams must have set the readiness of the workers for this defiance of the regime. Arms must be available. Military cells will be activated. Funds will be needed to help the workers hold on and to bait defections of groups.</p>
<p>b. Anti-regime demonstrations.</p>	<p>Same purpose as noted above (A V a) for the general strike.</p>	<p>The resistance teams must have set the readiness of all population elements (youth, farmers, Church, etc.) to openly defy the regime. Arms must be available, including anti-tank weapons. Military cells will be activated.</p>
<p>c. Declaration of the revolt.</p>	<p>To initiate the hour of decision by calling on all Cubans for open support.</p>	<p>Since the aims of the liberation will have been publicized previously, this is the "go" signal. All Cubans and the world need to hear it.</p>
<p>d. Open revolt by the Cuban people.</p>	<p>To overthrow the Communist regime.</p>	<p>This is the combat phase, fighting to take and hold ground.</p>

<u>OPERATION IN CUBA</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
e. Return of Cuban refugees who are qualified and want to help liberate their homeland.	To start a more open movement back to Cuba of those Cuban refugees who are able and willing to risk their lives in overthrowing the Communist regime.	Cuban refugee organizations will be tested with a “put up or shut up” proposition. Those who have ability to contribute to the popular movement inside Cuba should be given a chance to go home and act. Their screening and infiltration will have to be controlled. It must be a joining-in, not a taking-over of the inside movement.
PHASE VI (During October 1962)		
a. Establish a new Cuban government, which can be recognized by the U.S.	To give legality to the moral right of the Cuban revolt.	When the popular movement is holding meaningful territory in Cuba, it should form a provisional government. This should permit open Latin American and U.S. help, if requested and necessary. A military government situation will exist for the initial period and we must insist upon realism in this interim period preceding reasonable civilian control.

B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

ACTIVITY

1. Use OAS and its organs.

PURPOSE

To reaffirm strong official condemnation of Communist rule in Cuba. To influence Latin American and world opinion against Communist grab of Cuba and favorably toward Cubans recapturing their freedom.

CONSIDERATIONS

OAS members must be firm and open about this being a regional concern. OAS must build support *for* the cause of the Cuban people against the Communist regime, by statements and reports about the police state methods and foreign domination in Cuba. This will require official and personal diplomacy with a real sense of mission, and must be an effort by Latin American as well as U.S. officials. (State responsibility, with CIA and USIA support.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
2. Use United Nations members and U.N. organs.	To enlist world opinion for plight of Cuban people under domination of a foreign sponsored government. Build hostility to Communist regime and a favorable attitude to people's revolt. Develop basis for outside support of Cuban people.	Statements of world leaders for humanity and justice can come from speeches and comments about misery of Cubans under Communist political-economic program. Plight of trade unionism, religion, health, education all fall within UN interest. Phoney Communist maneuvers about persecution of Castro regime can open way for a challenge to a UN inquiry team from OAS states re the true status of popular support within Cuba. A challenge to hold free elections under UN monitor could be timely and place Cuban Communists on the defensive. A UN "aid for Cuban poverty and health" would be sound move to highlight situation. (State responsibility.)

ACTIVITY

3. Use US officials and news releases at Washington level.

PURPOSE

Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

CONSIDERATIONS

Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches can keep pressure upon Castro regime directly by timely statements. This also supports similar attitude by leaders of other nations and helps spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal. (State has responsibility to lead in this very important line.)

4. Use U.S. diplomats and staffs in official and other contacts.

To influence attitude of political leaders favorably for the Cuban people and hostile to Communist dictatorship. To influence key staffers of foreign leaders along same line and, as appropriate, influence leaders in intellectual and major population groups.

Personal influence upon foreign officials is vital to build sympathy and support for Cuban revolution against Castro regime. Can lead to independent actions by other nations to build the case for the Cuban people. Latin American nations are most important, but NATO also important. Official attitude of Spanish government can be key to operational values in homeland ties to Spanish colony in Cuba. (State responsibility, with support by others as required.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
5. Activate Latin American leaders, government and public.	Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For own public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.	Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. (State responsibility, with support by CIA and USIA.)
6. Activate labor leadership in other countries, especially Latin American area.	To lead major population groups in opinion formulation and in actions impressing upon political leadership a demand for support of the Cuban people against their dictator regime. To counter and steal the Communist maneuver using labor to defend the Cuban grab and launch other takeovers. To employ any contacts with working class in Cuba as a means to help generate the resistance and revolt.	[<i>text not declassified</i>]
7. Use exile Cuban labor leaders.	To help develop labor assets and actions in Latin America and to assist main operation by communications and infiltration of personnel inside Cuba.	[<i>text not declassified</i>]

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
8. Use exile groups under Cuban Revolutionary Council.	To maintain a significant symbol of special groupings for contacts within Cuba and impact upon Latin American public opinion.	Special groupings such as students, youth, professions, women are under the CRC and must be used with care and avoid political imprint of CRC to maximum.
9. Use exiles as touring teams for political action in Latin America.	To give personal witness against the Communist regime and ask support for the people recapturing their freedom.	Teams of students, lawyers, ex-Castro associates can tell impressive story that is newsworthy.
10. Special news coverage for Latin America, to generate political action.	To arouse public and official sympathy for the suppressed Cuban people and to sharpen appreciation of the Communist threat to other Latin American countries. Will provide leads for popular actions such as public pressure through petitions to local political and public leaders.	[text not declassified]

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
11. Radio programs for Cuban political activation.	To inform and keep basic interests within the Cuban population.	Religious programs, interviews with exile workers, students, fishermen, families to help keep Cubans in touch with the way of life they must recapture from the Communists. CIA capability for daily and special broadcasts exists, noting Swan Island station, and arrangements with private stations in Miami, New Orleans, and some 75 small outlets in the Caribbean area. (Use of printed materials for dissemination inside Cuba is possible through mails and drops, but hazard to receiver too great prior to climax.) (CIA and USIA responsibility.)
12. By October, official U.S. and Latin American policy support.	To provide a positive basis for more open support of the people's revolution, possibly a foundation for military assistance upon request of recognized new government.	The policy line for recognition of a revolutionary government is involved directly at this point.

C. ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Persuade OAS, NATO and countries friendly to freedom to desist from trading with the Communist dictatorship in Havana.	To build anti-regime feelings among Cuban people, by economic squeeze.	The regime may be weakened as the Cuban dollar market is depleted through loss of credit line. Requires full cooperation of allies and friends. (State responsibility with CIA and Commerce.)
2. Stop trans-shipment of U.S. items to Cuba, especially via Mexico and Canada.	To reduce supply of items and parts critical to the Cuban regime's economic program.	Target is Cuban sugar economy, power petroleum, communications, transport. (State responsibility with CIA, Commerce, Justice.)
3. A "positive list" for Latin America subject to licensing procedures for other parts of the Free World.	To reduce supply of special interest items.	(Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIA participating.)
4. Harassment of shipping destined for or arriving from Cuba.	To delay and reduce supplies Cuban regime needs in economy.	[text not declassified]

C. ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
5. Obtain cooperation of National Foreign Trade Council in delaying or refusing charters to vessels calling at Cuban ports, by mid-March.	To reduce supplies the Cuban regime must have to keep economy going.	(Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CIA participating.)
6. [text not declassified]	To disrupt Cuban economy.	[text not declassified]
7. Obtain by mid-March the cooperation of U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic boycott of Cuban regime.	To harass Cuban economy.	(Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CIA participating.)

C. ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
8. By June, rumor campaign against Cuban items in free world market.	To discourage sales of Cuban produce and to further deplete Cuba's dollar market.	Tropicals, tobacco, and sugar could be targeted. (Responsibility of CIA with State and USIA participating.)

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN

1. Create atmosphere of a "crusade" for human liberty."	To set the deeply-moving tone and motivating force for the liberation of Cuba.	All media. This means maximum use of spiritual appeal (such as the prayer for Cuba by Bishop Boja Masvidal who has a genuine Cuban revolutionary background), recapturing the ideal of Marti by taking use of his memory away from the Communists (even to issue of commemorative U.S. stamp), and popularizing songs by commercial recordings. (USIA and CIA responsibility.)
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D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN

(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
2. Ready broadcast means for "Voice" of inside Cuban movement, to commence broadcasting in April.	To ensure maximum effectiveness of broadcasts.	These broadcasts entail considerable work and risk to mount. They have to pay-off every second while on the air. They need identifying music (by guerrilla instruments such as guitar or harmonica), identifying slogan, and a format worth risk to the listener inside Cuba. If operationally required, initial broadcasts can be taped and transmitted by submarine. As soon as feasible, portable transmitter(s) must be established inside Cuba. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense and USIA as required.)
3. In March, commence visits of prominent U.S. and Latin American personalities to Cuban refugee camps in Florida.	To demonstrate concern for plight of refugees, particularly parentless children.	Mrs. Kennedy would be especially effective in visiting children refugees. (One camp near Miami has about 1,000 children who came out without their parents.) Her impact upon Latin Americans on the recent Presidential visit to Venezuela and Colombia suggests this. (USIA responsibility.)
4. Publicity for selected defectors from Castro team.	To demonstrate Cuban regime's failure to live up to promises of original 26th of July movement.	Feature stories, documentaries, etc. (USIA responsibility, with help of CIA, Justice, and State.)

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
5. Publication of weekly reports with human-interest stories about Cuban refugees, starting in March.	To illuminate intolerable conditions in Cuba and the plight of the Cubans who remain inside.	This should include supporting reports giving statistics on the numbers of refugees who have fled, and keep fleeing, to the U.S., Jamaica, Venezuela, Mexico, and Spain. (USIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)
6. Activate bi-partisan group to provide medical supplies to Cuba, by September.	To dramatize plight of the Cuban people and the failure of the Communist regime to care for the people.	(Responsibility of CIA and USIA.)
7. Dramatize individual stories of Cuban refugees representative of major population groups: workers, youth, farmers, fishermen, women, church.	To publicize that ordinary citizens, not just the rich, have fled tyranny.	Documentaries, etc., of these refugees now at work in the U.S. (not just in refugee centers), awaiting the day they can return to strike a blow for liberty. (USIA responsibility.)

E. MILITARY SUPPORT PLAN

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Provide logistic, personnel and training support.	To insure optimum implementation of the basic plan.	The basic plan requires complete and efficient support of the military, to include the use of facilities and military cover. (Defense responsibility.)
2. Induce actions against Cuba through bilateral and multilateral military organizations, to include personal contacts.	To enlist support of military elements of the Free World for the resistance movement, to encourage opposition to the Cuban regime and actions against that regime.	Make full use of the Inter-American Defense Board, the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission, the Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission, and the Permanent Joint Board for the Defense, Canada-U.S. Additionally, use should be made of extra-hemispheric military organizations. (Defense responsibility, with State support.)
3. Prepare to increase military activity in the Caribbean area.	To deceive Cuban government or to divert attention, to provide psychological support for the resistance, to frustrate the Cuban regime, and to demonstrate U.S. determination to other states.	Increases in flights or naval shipping, moves of dependents, reinforcement or increased supply will improve readiness posture in the area. (Defense responsibility.)

E. MILITARY SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
4. Prepare to intrude Cuban sea or air space.	To divert attention of the Cuban regime, and to help impede transport of supplies the regime needs.	Unattributable. (Defense responsibility with CIA support.)
5. Prepare to harass Cuban civil aviation and surface shipping.	To delay, confuse, or deter Cuban transportation and communication.	Unattributable. (Defense responsibility with CIA support.)
6. Prepare to protect elements of the resistance movement.	To insure success of resistance at critical juncture.	Air cover or escort and sea and air rescue operations. (Defense responsibility with CIA support.)
7. Prepare to intrude or jam Cuban communications.	To confuse and block Cuban communications.	(Defense responsibility—CIA and USIA support.)

F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel to Soviets.	To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports.	[text not declassified]
2. Sabotage fuel supply.	To cripple transportation.	[text not declassified]

F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

3. Sabotage communications.

To dramatize and encourage the spirit of resistance.

Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S. broadcasts). Attacks mounted only when operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave net should be dealt with when there are sufficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide with a critical need, in August–September.

4. Sabotage power supply.

To increase strain on regime and bring daily business to a standstill, by dramatic action all people will note.

This should be a concerted attack, as feasible in July–August, on power plants at Havana, Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara, Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type requiring detailed planning and special equipment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba.

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Special Operations Room fully activated, by 1 March 1962.

To provide the Chief of Operations and the project team with current intelligence and daily developments. To provide top U.S. officials with status briefings, as useful.

A maximum security room for this project will be maintained in the inner JCS security area of the Pentagon. (Defense responsibility, with support by CIA and others as required.)

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
2. Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.	To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 42 at work. The staff is now being increased in phases, as quickly as personnel are trained, to supplement the initial staff of 9. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)
3. Develop additional Interrogation centers in other areas, during March 1962.	To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional assets for the operation, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, as first priority, CIA must survey means and methods for activating other interrogation centers where useful. [text not declassified] should be included in this survey. The new centers should be activated as quickly as feasible. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense and others as necessary.)

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
4. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage, as required.	To develop increased "hard" intelligence.	(Defense responsibility, in collaboration with CIA.)
5. Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.	To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.	There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Famously, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (Justice/FBI responsibility, with support from CIA and others as required.)
6. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.	To add to the increased U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.	(Responsibility of Defense, with support by others as required.)

G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
7. Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.	To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

March 1962

**280. Memorandum from General Lansdale to the Special Group
(Augmented), March 13¹**

March 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

¹ Institutional planning for Operation Mongoose. Top Secret. 15 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 482, Mongoose.

Attachment

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (State)
March-July 1962

ACTIVITY

Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (Defense)
March-July 1962

1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

March–July 1962
(cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.	To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.	Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.
3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.	To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.	The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.	To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.	The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (USIA)
March-July 1962

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (State)

1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.

To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.

This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U.S. security interests.

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.	Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.	Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.
3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.	Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.	Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (Defense)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. After political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.	To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.	DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.
2. After political decision, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.	To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.	Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.

<u>ACTIVITY</u>		OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE II (CIA)	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. Support U.S. military actions in Cuba.			To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U.S. military operations.	CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U.S. military commander of the U.S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.
		OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE II (USIA)		
1. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.			To neutralize opposition to U.S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.	Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (CIA)
1-15 March 1962

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<u>Intelligence Operations</u> 1. * ² Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.	Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.	There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April. Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that

² Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

1–15 March 1962 (cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
		they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.
2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.	To collect intelligence.	These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.
3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, readied to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.	To collect intelligence.	

1-15 March 1962 (cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
4. * Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.	To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)
5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.	To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

1–15 March 1962 (cont.)		<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>		
<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<i>[text not declassified]</i>		
Other Operations				
6. <i>[text not declassified]</i>	16–31 March 1962			
<u>Intelligence Operations</u>				
7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.		
8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Possible future use in communications and support.		
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.	To ready agent operations.	Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.		

16-31 March 1962 (cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.	To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.	There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)
11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.	To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. [<i>text not declassified</i>] Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in [<i>text not declassified</i>] are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

16–31 March 1962 (cont.)		
<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1–15 April 1962		
<u>Other Operations</u>		
None.		
<u>Intelligence Operations</u>		
12. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Number of agents undetermined as yet.
13. 5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	
16–30 April 1962		
<u>Other Operations</u>		
None.		
<u>Intelligence Operations</u>		
14. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.
15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.	To collect intelligence.	Possible use for communications and support.

<i>16-30 April 1962 (cont.)</i>		
<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<i>1-15 May 1962</i>		
<u>Other Operations</u>		
None.		
<u>Intelligence Operations</u>		
16. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.
17. 3 legal resident agents in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	
18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana.	To collect intelligence.	
19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.
<u>Other Operations</u>		
None.		
<i>16-31 May 1962</i>		
<u>Intelligence Operations</u>		
20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.

<u>16–31 May 1962 (cont.)</u>		<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>	
<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>		
21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.	To collect intelligence.	Difficult	
22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.	To collect intelligence.		CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable.
23. Five “legal travel” agents inside Cuba.	To collect intelligence.		
24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.	To ready agent operations.		
<u>Other Operations</u>			
25. [<i>text not declassified</i>]	To debase the economy of Cuba.		[<i>text not declassified</i>]
<u>1 June—31 July 1962</u>			
<u>Intelligence Operations</u>			
26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.		Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

1 June-31 July 1962 (cont.)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.	To reinforce and resupply, as possible.	Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).
28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.	To ready agent operations.	
29. * Collection of psychological material.	To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.	This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.
30. * Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.	To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.	This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.
31. * By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.	To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.	This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."
<u>Other Operations</u>		
None.		

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
32. * Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.	To provide the Special Group (NSC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation. <i>End of July 1962.</i>	The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. military intervention.

281. Memorandum from Barnes to Dulles, March 13¹

March 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Cuban Operation—July/September 1960

1. Although I believe that I have found enough material to answer the questions which you passed to me regarding the Cuban operation, I have not been able to locate any briefing paper for the 18 September briefing nor have I had a chance to re-examine the I.G. Survey and the DD/P answer to it. The latter documents are available through Kirkpatrick's office in the new building on special request. I would have liked to examine the March 17 policy paper (i.e., the document approved by the President setting forth the original basic plan) but it was not essential that I do so, so I did not press for this material. You, of course, can get it if you feel that it would be useful to you.

2. I am attaching some documents which I think might be useful, namely, papers having to do with the 23 July briefing; a copy of the Special Group minutes dealing with Cuba which I have marked with paper clips to indicate the more significant meetings prior to 13 September 1960; and a chronology of the operation which was prepared for General Taylor's committee in April 1961. I would appreciate it if you could return these three documents to me (1412 K Building) when they have served your purposes.

3. It is quite clear that prior to early November, the original 17 March concept of the operation prevailed. From the point of view of paramilitary operations, this involved training a cadre of trainers who in turn were to train approximately 500 Cubans for use as members of small teams for penetration of the Island. In this connection, I suggest you read the 3 November 1960 Special Group meetings and that you read pages 6 and 7 of the document entitled "Briefing Paper on Cuba" which is one of those in the 23 July briefing set.

4. You will remember that although no change in concept was adopted until November there had been discussion during the summer regarding the difficulty of organizing an internal opposition in such a way as to provide adequate strength to achieve an overthrow without some fairly potent force being introduced from the outside. This thinking was the genesis of the ultimate change in concept. I believe that if you want to get it, the DD/P answer to the I.G. Survey contains some

¹ Cuban operation, July–September 1960. Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–June 1962.

description of the reasons why these uncertainties developed through the summer 1960. A variant of the original 17 March plan, also discussed in the summer of 1960, was the possibility of taking over the Isle of Pines with the thought that it could provide a base from which to operate and on which to introduce the FRD, or perhaps more appropriately, a dissident government. You will remember that this plan ultimately had to be abandoned because of the fairly strong defenses which were introduced and the fact that the defensive terrain made it possible for a relatively small force to stand off a bigger force particularly at the end where the prison was located. Moreover, it was quite clear that the scale of attack necessary to achieve this goal was far beyond anything contemplated during the summer of 1960 or indeed was contemplated at a much later date.

5. As of 18 September 1960, the following paragraphs express, I believe, an accurate statement of the operation:

a. *Plan*. In addition to what is mentioned above, the plan contemplated the development, support and guidance of opposition groups in Pinar del Rio, the Escambray, and Oriente. No air drop had yet been attempted (the first supply mission was on the night of 28/29 September). A few minor maritime operations had been run which are described below.

b. *Training*. The main training camp in Guatemala (for ground forces) was ready to receive up to 500 trainees, of which the first contingent of 200 men was in place. In addition, in a special area in Guatemala 26 communicators were receiving their final training.

The training camp in the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] had completed training 29 Cubans for the training cadre in Guatemala and had been placed on a standby basis.

c. *Air Operations*. The air strip and camp at Retalhuleu, Guatemala were complete, training was underway and overflights were being planned. Cuban crews and sterile aircraft were on hand as were substantial amounts of arms and ammunition and other matériel for air drop inside Cuba. Leaflets had also been prepared for air drop. I am not certain exactly when the first B-26 aircraft arrived at this base, but I am substantially sure it was well after 18 September.

d. *Maritime Operations*. At this time three covert runs had been effected infiltrating a small amount of arms and other matériel plus two agents. In addition, 16 other in-exfiltrations had been accomplished involving a single individual each time through the use of a special compartment in a Cuban ship. At that time, of course, diplomatic relations were still in effect in Cuba and the need for black operations for the movement of personnel was usually not essential.

e. *Internal Resistance*. The estimate at this time was that 1500–2000 persons being the total of the five main Anti-Castro groups constituted

the internal resistance. [*text not declassified*] The internal resistance had by this time perpetrated a great many relatively minor acts of sabotage.

6. A final point not mentioned above is that by September it was clear that the original estimate of having a 500 man cadre ready for use in small teams by 1 November had slipped. I cannot remember definitely what date was estimated by the latter part of September, but I am sure that it was late November or even the end of December. On the other hand, we did hope at that time to follow the 17 March plan to the extent of infiltrating teams that were ready with the idea of continuing the team infiltrations over a period of approximately two months. This was changed, of course, in November when it was agreed that some form of larger unit influence would probably be necessary to touch off the required internal support.

7. Please let me know if you need anything further.

C. Tracy Barnes

ATTACHMENTS

1. 23 July Briefing papers
2. Special Group Meetings—Cuba
3. Chronology

**282. McCone's notes for discussion with Helms and Harvey,
March 16¹**

March 16, 1962

SUBJECT

Notes for Discussion with Helms and Harvey concerning MONGOOSE

1. (tape did not pick up dictation first part of tape)
—housing, food, employment, general conditions, etc.
- b. Civilian political attitude—resistance to versus support of regime, discussed, willingness to revolt, apathy, etc.
- c. Attitude of higher officials at city, province or government level.

¹ Operation Mongoose. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961–5 April 1962.

d. Information on military installations—location of military units, dispersal of equipment, etc.

e. Specifics on proposed sabotage operations.

3. How will the agents be equipped—with arms—communication equipment, etc.?

4. Will agents co-mingle with population, live in communities covertly or hide out and operate at night? Will they operate in groups or singly? And will they communicate with one another or each individual or group communicate directly and if so, by what means?

5. Will they recruit guerrilla organizations? If so, are agents selected on a basis of having available to them possible “in place” guerrilla bands.

6. What are the agents’ plans for circumventing a new registration and rationing plan of the Castro regime? How would they obtain food?

7. What is the probable group resupply problem? Is it a question of supplying the agents or providing supplies, arms, equipment, etc., for guerrilla bands recruited by the agents? What is the probable timing of the supply or operation? When will it start? How extensive will it become under the existing plan?

8. How will they monitor success or failure of the agent teams—how do we know if and when they are “rolled up”?

9. What will be the extent of attribution by captured agents—will U.S. government be clearly identified—will CIA be clearly identified or identified by suspicion?

10. What are CIA’s plans for keeping the training and dispatch of the agents away from the Florida press corps—will trainees be free at any time during training and prior to placement—will “safe-house” trainees be permitted freedom—what will be done with rejected trainees or surplus trainees—in other words, how are we going to avoid leaks and gossip?

John A. McCone

Director

April 1962

283. Memorandum of discussion between Rusk and McCone, April 10¹

April 10, 1962

SUBJECT

Brazilian Foreign Minister Dantas

1. Rusk explained that he had had confidential discussion with Dantas concerning Cuba and had told Dantas that Castro's affiliation with International Communism and his efforts to subvert or otherwise influence other Caribbean and Latin American countries were not negotiable as far as the United States was concerned. Rusk indicated other matters such as compensation for American properties, etc. were in his opinion negotiable.

2. *[text not declassified]*

3. Rusk envisaged a two-stage operation; first the rupture between Castro and the Communist and, second the disposal of Castro. At one point Rusk intimated that Castro might be acceptable if free of Communist influence. McCone disagreed.

4. Rusk felt we should attempt to develop a direct unattributable contact with Castro as the ability to reach him might be important at some future time.

5. Rusk denied any involvement in policy on Food for Prisoners. McCone expressed great concern over AG's talks with *[less than 1 line not declassified]* President's meeting this afternoon with Cardona, which Rusk knew nothing about. Apparently probing in this area is being done outside of State.

6. In summary, Rusk felt we should *[less than 1 line not declassified]* to split Castro and the Communists but should not under any circumstances reveal our decision reference Castro.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Rusk report on confidential discussion with Brazilian Foreign Minister Dantas concerning Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962.

May 1962

284. Memorandum for the record, May 17¹

May 17, 1962

Memorandum of Review of Operation Mongoose—Thursday, May 17th

General Lansdale reported on the operations, submitting a written statement of even date covering operations from May 11th to 17th.

There was no discussion of Mr. Harvey's report on TV intrusions of May 16th except to the extent commented in the Lansdale report.

General Lansdale submitted a new schedule of priority operations for the period May 21st to June 30th. The schedule was accepted by the Special Group for review and study and decision at the meeting on Thursday, May 24th.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Review of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.

June 1962

285. Memorandum for the record, June 25¹

June 25, 1962

Special Group (Augmented)—Special Operation MONGOOSE—21 June 1962

General Lansdale's report of 20 June was received and noted. It was his suggestion that the Group call for a new SNIE on Cuba in the immediate future. This was considered and it was decided that preparation of a SNIE at this particular time would not be productive and that we should order a SNIE prepared and issued on or immediately after July 31st.

ACTION: National Board of Estimates do the preliminary work on the SNIE assembling all information currently, so that the SNIE will be forthcoming on or after July 31st.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Special Group (Augmented) decision on new SNIE on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.

July 1962

286. Notes of Special Group (Augmented) meeting, July 12¹

July 12, 1962

*Notes of the 13 July Special Group Augmented Meeting given to Knoche
by General Carter*

The air re-supply issue was deferred until next week. The Group objected to a lasting of so many alternatives. Lansdale is instructed to staff this out and come up with a recommendation.

Alexis Johnson and all members of the Special Group Augmented, *except CIA*, had a paper entitled Post/Castro political doctrine. The paper examined the kind of government we would eventually see in Cuba. No action was taken on this paper.

Action: We should get a copy of Johnson's paper soonest.

¹ Operation Mongoose. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.

287. Memorandum for the record, July 20¹

July 20, 1962

THE MONGOOSE OPERATION

The MONGOOSE operation against Cuba has now been in operational phase for about six months. During this period we have infiltrated and maintained nine intelligence teams (about half the expected number the lesser number accountable for by extreme and unexpected difficulties encountered); interrogated thousands of refugees at Opa Laka; recruited and are regularly working with a substantial number of third country agents who report political, economic, and military

¹ Review of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962.

information; recruited two or three Cuban defectors in place, and several Cuban defectors who have taken refuge outside of Cuba. In addition U-2 flights have been run regularly.

The operation is expensive for CIA, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in direct costs and a greater amount each month in indirect support costs. However, the effort has given us substantial amount of hard intelligence on political, economic, and military conditions within Cuba which was not available to us six months ago.

I summarize the situation about as follows:

1. A continuation of this effort will provide additional new current hard intelligence and possibly reveal opportunities for political, guerilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrow Castro. No such opportunities considered reasonably certain of success are apparent at the present. However, the deteriorating situation will cause further resentment by the people and possibly cause a break in the political structure at the top or defection on the part of the military.

2. I have received many suggestions recently from individuals who feel dynamic action such as mass landings and a more positive military approach is indicated. Our information does not support this viewpoint and I believe any such attempt would face disaster unless U.S. military forces en masse were committed in support of such movement.

August 1962

288. National Intelligence Estimate No. 85-2-62, August 1¹

August 1, 1962

THE SITUATION AND
PROSPECTS IN CUBA²

The Problem

To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.

Conclusions

A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (*Paras. 1-10*)

B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (*Para. 11*)

C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (*Paras. 12-29*)

D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and

¹ "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba." Secret. 13 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebook, 12 Jan 63.

² This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid.

controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. (*Paras.* 22–23)

E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and industrial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is unlikely that agricultural and industrial production can be significantly increased within the next year or so. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963. (*Paras.* 30–35)

F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing. This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, however, dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances, for fear of the regime's massive apparatus for surveillance and repression. (*Paras.* 36–41)

G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming. (*Paras.* 42–51)

H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the "inevitable" revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations: e.g., in Guatemala or Venezuela. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. (*Paras.* 52–59)

Discussion

I. *Castro and the Communists*

1. Developments in 1962 have tended to define more clearly the relationships between Castro and the leaders of the prerevolutionary Cuban Communist Party (PSP) and between Castro and the USSR. For the time being, at least, Castro has established his primacy in Cuban communism, and the PSP and USSR have been constrained to accommodate themselves to that situation.

2. Differences between Castro and the "old" Communists of the PSP developed in 1961 and reached a climax in early 1962. Castro had

accepted “old” Communists in every branch of his government and had relied heavily on them for their expertise. However, he was anxious to preserve his own authority as leader of the Cuban revolution and wanted the “new” Communists—his followers of the 26th of July Movement—to play a role at least equal to that of the veteran PSP members. Castro was also anxious to have Cuba accepted as a member of the “Socialist camp” and resented the appellation of “national democracy” (as opposed to “socialist democracy”) which was invented for Cuba in 1960 at a world congress of Communist Party leaders in Moscow. The Soviets were reluctant to make these concessions to a regime that they did not consider to be Communist and that was not under their firm control.

3. Castro kept up the pressure for full recognition, proclaiming Cuba a socialist state and himself a Marxist-Leninist. Meantime elements of the PSP pushed ahead as rapidly as possible to establish “old” Communist control of Cuba through the machinery of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), an interim party set up to bring together the various political forces behind the regime and create a single dominant political party. Veteran Communist Anibal Escalante, the organizing secretary of ORI, was the key figure in this effort.

4. The result was a head-on clash between the “old” Communists and Castro, who realized that they were threatening his position and that of his loyal followers of the 26th of July Movement. After careful maneuvering a new National Directorate for the ORI was agreed upon, in which power was shifted from “old” to “new” Communists. Then on 26 March Castro denounced Anibal Escalante and by implication all “old” Communists for seeking to dominate the Cuban revolution.

5. Further reorganization of the ORI and of other elements of the regime’s political machinery followed, with the general effect of strengthening the position of the “new” Communists. These changes, however, can by no means be described as a wholesale purge of the veteran Communists. Many, including Blas Roca, the PSP chairman, have remained in important positions and Castro has made it clear that the differences between “old” and “new” Communists are not over the goal of communizing Cuba. The overall effect of the “Escalante affair,” and of the changes in the regime which followed, was the assertion of Castro’s personal leadership of Cuban communism.

6. Neither the PSP nor the Soviets proved willing to contest the issue with Castro. Both moved quickly to acknowledge his authority and to reaffirm their close ties with him. Blas Roca gave his approval to Castro’s move against Escalante. There followed an article in *Pravda* which expressed firm support for Castro as the leader of the Cuban revolution and granted the most forthright recognition to date of the Cuban regime’s claim to be Communist. Moscow then proceeded to

elevate Cuba in the "socialist" hierarchy by placing it next after the Bloc states and ahead of Yugoslavia on the list of May Day greetings and by such minor but significant moves as referring to the Cuban premier as "Comrade Fidel."

7. In yielding to Castro's desire to have Cuba brought into a closer relationship with the Bloc, the Soviet leaders have made a significant concession. That they should have done so, fully aware of Castro's undisciplined nature, is a measure not only of the importance they attach to Cuba, but also of the narrow field of choice open to them.

8. The Soviet Union has also made a considerable concession in its agreement to supply a line of credit for the purchase of consumer goods. It has, in effect, reaffirmed its willingness to pay the increasing costs of keeping Cuba afloat, despite the Cubans' failures in the field of economic reorganization and development. In exchange for this concession the Soviets are apparently insisting on more influence over the management and direction of the Cuban economy. The Soviets probably continue to believe that Cuban economic development should be based primarily on Cuban resources, effort, and sacrifice, and are likely to show restraint in their response to Cuban appeals for relief from a situation better than that which prevails in many Bloc countries. Questions relating to the management of Cuba's economy are now a major source of friction between the Soviets and the Castro regime.

9. We believe that the USSR is likely to concentrate on the problem of the economic restructuring of Cuba. For the present, the Soviets have committed themselves to getting along with Castro and have had to accept the risks involved. They would prefer a better disciplined and more orthodox Communist and may hope some day to replace him, but they recognize that he will remain, on the whole, an asset for some time to come. Moscow, the PSP, and Castro are all moving over unfamiliar and hazardous ground, and we expect that disagreement and even conflict will flare up among them from time to time. Such conflicts are unlikely, however, to destroy the ties of mutual dependence linking Castro to the PSP and Cuba to the USSR.

10. On balance, Castro is in a stronger position now than appeared likely a few months ago. He has asserted his leadership and it has been accepted by the USSR and by the "old" Communists in Cuba. He has demonstrated remarkable political skills and an ability to engage in carefully calculated maneuvers which had been obscured by his generally erratic and bombastic behavior. He seems to be well in control of the apparatus of government and security. His attack on Escalante and the efforts of the "old" Communists and the reshuffling of the top leadership of the ORI and the armed forces have apparently satisfied the majority of the "new" Communists, who were becoming restive. At the same time he has retained the cooperation of the "old" Commu-

nists and the USSR. He probably believes that he can handle them and that both the “old” Cuban Communists and Moscow must continue to accept him as the indispensable man in Cuba.

11. The USSR is becoming more deeply committed to the preservation and advancement of the regime in Cuba. However, the Soviets have made no formal commitment to ensure Cuba’s security and would almost certainly never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba’s sake. They have sought to create the impression that Cuba was under the protection of their missile power, but they have carefully avoided a categorical commitment to protect and defend the Castro regime in all contingencies.

II. The Military Establishment

12. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces to suppress insurrection or repel invasion have been greatly enhanced by the Bloc’s provision of military equipment³ and instruction and by a thoroughgoing reorganization initiated in the fall of 1960. This reorganization and concomitant training programs are now well advanced, although not completed.

13. Up to 350 Bloc military advisers and instructors are believed to be now in Cuba. Bloc advisers are probably assigned to the principal staffs throughout the military establishment. Most of the instructors are stationed at established military schools and training areas. In addition, several hundred Cuban military personnel have received or are receiving military instruction in Bloc countries.

14. Almost certainly the present military establishment as a whole is politically reliable. Successive defections and purges have eliminated the seriously disaffected elements. The principal commanders have been selected for their personal loyalty to the Castro brothers. Great attention has been paid to the political indoctrination of the troops. Morale probably has been adversely affected, in some instances, particularly among reserve components, by the discontent of the general population. However, the military establishment as a whole will almost certainly support and defend the Castro regime, unless its overthrow seems imminent.

The Ground Forces

15. The Cuban ground forces are believed to consist of a standing army of about 75,000 men and a ready reserve of about 100,000 men.

³ See the tables in the Annex for inventories of Cuban ground force arms and equipment, aircraft, and naval ships from all sources, including the Bloc. (The bulk of heavy equipment from the Bloc arrived in Cuba between September 1960 and February 1962. Shipments since then are believed to have been largely replacement parts, small arms, and ammunition.)

Some of the standing army personnel serve as full-time cadres in ready reserve units. In addition, there are homeguard type militia units numbering about 100,000 men.

16. The standing army has received intensive training in the use of Bloc-supplied arms and equipment and tactical training through the battalion combat team level. It has acquired capabilities for the combat employment of armor and artillery (including antiaircraft and antitank weapons) hitherto unknown in any Caribbean country.

17. The ready reserve battalions are less heavily armed and less thoroughly trained. Each has a full-time cadre varying from 40 to 150 men. The remaining personnel are available for only one or two drills a week and a month of active duty training each year. The arms are kept in the custody of the full-time cadre. These battalions are based on places of employment and are generally capable of rapid mobilization.

18. The homeguard militia units have no significant combat capability. Their function is to augment the police as necessary to control the population.

19. For operational purposes, Cuba has been divided into three territorial commands designated as the armies of the West, the Center, and the East. Each has operational control over all standing army, ready reserve, and tactical air units within its area and is intended to be logistically self-sufficient. The basic combat unit is the battalion combat team. Active operations are conducted by task forces established according to the requirements of the occasion and operating under the direct control of the appropriate territorial army command.

20. Within the three armies there are corps and division headquarters having administrative and training responsibilities, but as yet no apparent operational role—although the divisions, as territorial commands, probably do have internal security and static defense responsibilities within their respective districts. As the reorganization of the ground forces progresses further, the divisions may be developed as operational units.

21. There are believed to be some 265 battalions in the Cuban ground forces. A full-strength standing army battalion probably numbers about 1,000 men; a full-strength ready reserve battalion, about 600, including the full-time cadre. However, they all now vary greatly in strength and efficiency. At present we are unable to determine how many battalions are standing army and how many are ready reserve.

22. The Cuban ground forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They have not been able to eliminate the low level of sporadic guerrilla activity which now exists in Cuba, but they are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action.

23. The equipment, organization, and training of the Cuban ground forces appears to be designed primarily to prepare them to resist an anticipated invasion from abroad. They could probably repel any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. Their plans for that contingency evidently contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected key points and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare.

The Air Force

24. In the emergency of April 1961, the Castro regime could get only six aircraft into the air. Since then, a virtually new air force has been in process of creation through Bloc delivery of jet fighter aircraft and related ground equipment and Bloc training of pilots and ground personnel. This process is not as far advanced as is the rehabilitation of the Cuban ground forces. Cuban air defense and ground support capabilities remain very limited. However, the new Cuban Air Force includes about 45 MIG jet fighters and about 60 fighter pilots with some Bloc training.

The Navy

25. As in the case of the air force, a new navy is now in the process of creation. Hitherto, coastal patrol has been accomplished chiefly by militiamen in confiscated fishing and pleasure craft. Recently, however, the USSR has provided six submarine chasers (PC's) and 12 motor torpedo boats (PT's) and several hundred Cuban naval personnel have received training in the Bloc.

Prospects

26. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces will continue to improve through further training and experience. The Bloc will almost certainly continue to support this development through the provision of equipment, instruction, and advice.

27. It is notable that Bloc military deliveries to date have been such as to enhance Cuba's capabilities for defense against external attack and for the maintenance of internal security, but not such as to contribute primarily to the development of an independent offensive capability. Although the Cuban ground forces have been made formidable by Caribbean standards, Cuba lacks the air and naval capabilities required for major overseas operations, even at Caribbean distances. The bomber force is still limited to a few inherited B-26's.

28. We believe that the Bloc will continue to limit its military assistance to Cuba in this way. Such a policy would not preclude the provision of more advanced jet fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and modern radars, or even the provision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers to replace the B-26's now in service.

29. We also believe it highly unlikely that the Bloc would station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, service, and intelligence personnel. It is likely that special Soviet communications and intelligence facilities have been or will be established in Cuba.

III. *Economic Problems*

30. Mid-year 1962 finds the Cuban economy in deepening trouble. A highly vaunted economic plan and the record budget officially announced for 1962 have by now, for all practical purposes, been abandoned. The pervasive disruption which was evident in industry and transportation last year manifested itself this year in the agricultural sector as well, most conspicuously in the sugar industry, the very heart of the economy and the principal earner of foreign exchange.

31. Cuba's foreign exchange earnings in 1962 will be reduced substantially because of declines in both volume and value of sugar exports. The 1962 sugar crop was hard hit by a prolonged drought, growing apathy and passive resistance among the cane-cutters, and bad managerial judgment—such as the decisions to reduce the rate of replanting and to divert cane land to other crops. Production of 4.8 million metric tons not only fell far short of last year's extraordinary harvest, but also came to only 83 percent of the average annual crop during 1957–1960. Because the total supply of sugar available in 1962 is less than in 1961, exports will decline. Exports to the Bloc will be somewhat below 1961 levels, but the major reductions will be in exports to Free World countries. Convertible exchange income from sugar will also be reduced because world sugar prices averaged less during the first half of 1962 than during 1961.

32. With respect to other agricultural products Cuba has clearly not achieved the much needed expansion called for under the regime's plans. Cuba's own production of food has remained insufficient to support the population, and food rationing has become necessary. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector the deterioration of plants, equipment shortages, poor quality of raw materials, and gross mismanagement continue. Because of the US embargo and the shortage of foreign exchange, the Cubans have not been able to find adequate sources for the machinery and parts formerly imported from the US and other Western countries. Only the first beginnings have been made in the reconstruction of Cuban industry with Bloc equipment; though announced Bloc development credits total \$457 million, few deliveries have yet been made. Mismanagement of plants by unqualified personnel, often selected for their political reliability, continues to be the rule.

33. The regime has responded to the agricultural crisis with a series of changes in policy and organization. The National Agrarian Reform

Institute (INRA), the chief instrument of government direction over agriculture, has been taken over by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, an old-line Communist with considerable competence in economics. New regulations have been announced easing governmental controls over private farmers and tightening controls over the collectivized sector of agriculture.

34. However, the chief immediate effect of Cuba's economic troubles has been to increase its dependence on the Bloc. In the spring of 1962, Cuba began a new series of negotiations with Bloc countries concerning the 1962 trade protocols signed several months earlier. In May, a supplemental protocol was signed with the USSR providing for an increase of \$50 million in the proposed level of trade for 1962—the increase to cover Soviet shipments of food, raw materials, and capital goods. New agreements were also signed with the European Satellites, but there is no evidence indicating that significant changes were made in the original protocols. Since the new USSR protocol does not call for increased Cuban exports, it appears that the additional Soviet exports to Cuba will be financed by a commodity credit. The Soviet decision to finance current purchases on credit, rather than to confine itself to developmental loans, is a new departure in Soviet relations with Cuba, and in fact is contrary to general Soviet practice. It almost certainly reflects Moscow's recognition of the seriousness of the Cuban situation.

35. Cuban economic prospects for the remainder of 1962 and for 1963 are bleak. Cuba will not be able to build up significantly its dangerously low holdings of convertible foreign exchange. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to bring about net growth of Cuba's economy in the next 18 months, although it may establish preconditions for some improvement over the longer run. The effect of the new agricultural policy remains uncertain; in any case it could not result in a significant increase in production within the next year or so. Supply and management problems will continue to plague industry; transportation difficulties will probably get worse. No substantial overall improvement in the Cuban economy is likely to occur for several years.⁴

⁴ On August 2, CIA Director McCone sent a memorandum to the other members of the Special Group (Augmented), plus Rusk and McNamara, asking for comments on NIE 85–2–62 in advance of its consideration at the scheduled meeting of the group on August 10 to review progress on the Mongoose operation. (Memorandum from Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to McCone, to McNamara and others, August 2; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, McN Working Papers) In an undated copy of a memorandum to McCone, U. Alexis Johnson replied that the Department of State officers who had reviewed the estimate found it to be generally well-balanced and adequate in coverage of points of interest to the Department. He noted, however, that with respect to the discussion of Cuban economic prospects in paragraph 35, the outlook in the Department was for further deterioration of the Cuban economy during the remainder of 1962 and 1963, rather than stagnation, as seemed to be suggested in the NIE. (Department of State, S/S Files: 65 D 438, Mongoose)

IV. *Popular Attitudes*

36. Active support for the Castro regime has declined to about 20 percent of the population, but this includes a high proportion of the youth of the country (ages 15–30). The hard core of this support consists of those who have a vested interest in the revolution, especially the new managerial class and the Communists. Others support the revolution because they have been influenced by indoctrination and participation in the mass organizations. A substantial proportion of supporters are persons who still see in Castro the personification of their awakened national consciousness.

37. Disaffection is increasing primarily because of the growing inability of the regime to provide the goods and services to which most of the Cuban people have been accustomed. The shortages of food, ordinary household items, medicines, public transportation, etc., have underscored, in terms understandable to the individual Cuban, the regime's failure to live up to its original promise. Others have become bored with years of repetitious propaganda. One factor which is likely to have an increasingly adverse effect on public attitudes is the deterioration of public health conditions and services.

38. The majority of the Cuban population has for some time been indifferent toward the regime. In the past few months, however, there has been an increase in passive resistance, including absenteeism and slowdowns, and in the open expression of disaffection by public protests and demonstrations.

39. In the past four months Fidel Castro and other regime spokesmen have themselves acknowledged two causes of popular discontent and have begun corrective measures. One of these is the dissatisfaction and insecurity aroused by the increasingly obvious "old" Communist takeover which threatened to destroy the loyalty of a large segment of the "new class" until Castro took action in March. The other is the fear of collectivization on the part of farmers, which the regime has also taken steps to allay. Public hostility to Communist regimentation is likely to continue to be a factor in the ability of the regime to control the population, but it is the effect of such regimentation on them personally, rather than communism itself, that seems to arouse the Cubans. Increasing communization is likely to continue to provoke discontent, but it is unlikely to produce much active resistance.

40. Many people still in Cuba hate and detest the regime, but few of them are willing to take the risks involved in resistance activity of any kind. The number who are willing to do so is strongly influenced by what appear to be the chances of engaging in resistance activity and coming out alive, as well as the chances of achieving some effective result against the regime.

41. The outlook is for the steady increase of popular dissatisfaction, but it is likely to continue to find expression largely in passive resistance or unorganized and sporadic opposition at a level that can be controlled by the regime. Yet such resistance may provoke the regime to use force on such a scale as to alienate greater numbers of the population. A cycle of disaffection-repression-resistance might be set in motion, but would be unlikely to cause major difficulties for the regime in the absence of substantial external support.

V. Resistance

42. There has been some increase in active resistance to the Castro regime despite its massive and expanding security apparatus and its constant efforts to intimidate, harass, and immobilize those who take action against the government. The armed forces are used extensively to guard against sabotage, to control public demonstrations against the regime, and to sweep areas of rebel activity. The Ministry of Interior, run by a loyal Castro follower, exercises checks and controls over the Cuban public through its extensive police apparatus, its network of informants in the Committees of Defense, and the antisabotage People's Defense organization. Between 400 and 500 thousand Cubans—one in every 14—are involved in this elaborate security machinery.

43. This widespread security effort by the Castro government does effectively limit and harass the active opponents of the regime. Nevertheless, there are at least six nationwide resistance groups in Cuba,⁵ with a claimed membership ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand, only a small part of whom are active at any one time. In addition there are a number of small guerrilla bands and local groups which operate on their own without effective communication or liaison with the national groups. Guerrilla activity has been greatest in the mountains of central Cuba, including the Sierra del Escambray, but some has occurred in the mountains of eastern Cuba, including the Sierra Maestra, and in western Pinar del Rio Province. In plains areas, like Matanzas Province, and in urban areas, resistance groups are smaller than in the mountainous areas and tend to live separately, coming together only occasionally. Many individuals who are not mem-

⁵ 1. The People's Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo—MRP);

2. The 30 November Movement (Movimiento 30 Noviembre);

3. The Christian Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democrático Cristiano—MDC);

4. The Revolutionary Recovery Movement (Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionario—MRR);

5. The Student Revolutionary Directorate (Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil—DRE);

6. Rescue Movement (Rescate).

bers of organizations or of guerrilla bands engage in occasional actions against the regime.

44. The activity of resistance groups reflects the operating situation and their resources, human and material. Activity fell off markedly after the massive roundup of suspects following the April 1961 invasion attempt. It has increased since April 1962 primarily in response to the rise of popular resentment of shortages of foodstuffs and other consumer goods. This increase in activity has been limited, however, by government drives to clean out areas in which guerrillas have been active and the capture of several important resistance leaders. The size of many guerrilla bands is limited by their lack of arms with which to equip potential recruits.

45. There is some coordination of the activities of the national organizations and there have been reports of a recent agreement among them for unified action. In practice, however, activities tend to be planned, directed, and carried out on a local level. In frequent instances members of several different organizations have cooperated to carry out an operation. These operations are still largely limited to sabotage (particularly setting fire to cane fields, government buildings, and public conveyances), attempts to obtain arms, and the operation of an "underground railroad" to get persons sought by the government out of Cuba. In recent months resistance organizations have been fostering campaigns of planned waste of electricity, city water, etc.

46. The effectiveness of the guerrillas is extremely limited; confronted by large and well-equipped security forces, the small guerrilla groups lack arms, food, medical, and other supplies. One of their principal problems is keeping Castro agents and informers out of their ranks. They just barely survive, if they survive at all. Their activities are made possible by their superior familiarity with the terrain and with hiding places. Effective government security measures impede coordination between groups in different geographical areas. Noncombatant opposition elements maintain some liaison with guerrillas operating in nearby territory and provide some support, mostly intelligence. Guerrilla forces have at times escaped capture because of the lack of interest, ineptitude, or passive disloyalty of segments of the forces sent against them. Some of the guerrilla bands claim actually to have recruited some of their membership from the militia.

47. At present the primary effect of resistance operations is psychological: they are an embarrassment to the regime and force it to commit large resources to meet security requirements. To a lesser extent they are an inspiration to the civilian opposition, proof that the regime's forces of oppression are not all-powerful.

48. The national resistance organizations have representatives in the US who are authorized to speak on certain matters for the groups

in Cuba. Effective collaboration in Miami and between groups there and in Cuba is complicated by factionalism, personal feuds, general politicking, and the difficulty of communications. There is also a tendency on the part of those who remain in Cuba to distrust the exiles and to condemn them for their failure to supply those who are continuing the fight in Cuba with the arms and equipment they so badly need.

49. The Cuban Revolutionary Council (Consejo Revolucionario Cubano—CRC) seeks to represent the combined views of the resistance organizations, but it now represents only half of them and is relatively ineffective. The CRC actively propagandizes its anti-Castro position through representatives in most Latin American countries. In June 1962, CRC President Jose Miro Cardona traveled through Central America for this purpose.

50. Several other exile groups have undertaken to coordinate resistance activities in Cuba and to organize “armies of liberation” among the exiles. One of them has sought to establish a government-in-exile in collaboration with President Ydigoras of Guatemala and to develop an armed force to invade Cuba. None of these efforts has made much progress.

51. In present circumstances, the prospects for a resistance effort in Cuba capable of threatening the government are nil. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase substantially. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming.

VI. *External Relations*

52. Castro seems to have no doubts about the desirability of facing the rest of the world as a member of the “Socialist camp.” He will continue to associate Cuba with the Bloc and to seek to make the most of Soviet commitments. For their part, the Soviets must regard the situation in Cuba as a net gain for their international position, despite the misgivings they must feel about the Latin American reaction to the proclamation of an avowedly Communist regime in Cuba and about the attendant risks, in Soviet-US relations. The Soviets are aware of the psychological and political influence, actual and potential, of a revolutionary Cuba on Latin American states on the brink of revolution, and will seek opportunities to make use of it.

53. Castro’s vitriolic anti-US position continues unchanged. Anti-Americanism is deeply ingrained in the regime and in much of the Cuban populace. The authority of the regime depends in significant part on its so-far successful defiance of the US, and the regime is

unlikely to see any advantage to be gained by changing its attitude toward the US. Opponents of the regime hope for help from the US, but their expectations of assistance are at a very low ebb.

54. The Cuban regime continues to try to appeal to the Afro-Asian neutralist bloc, even while proclaiming its adherence to Marxism-Leninism. It seeks to play a role at such neutralist-sponsored conferences as the "World without the Bomb" meeting in Ghana and the underdeveloped nations economic conference in Cairo. However, the conduct of the Cuban emissaries at these meetings has generally been such as to antagonize the Afro-Asian neutrals.

55. The appeal of Castroism has dimmed considerably in other Latin American states as a consequence of the Cuban leader's avowal of Marxism-Leninism, his obvious toadying to the Bloc, and the self-acknowledged failings of the regime. After a period in which Castro and Cuba were the focus of attention through the area, Latin Americans have turned back to their own problems. However, there are militant pro-Castro minorities in several Latin American states and many neutralists and protagonists of reform who look with favor on Castro. In Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico there are significant elements in government who sympathize with the Castro regime.

56. Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay are now the only Latin American countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba. Relations between Cuba and Uruguay have been strained on account of the nearly 400 asylees in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. The Mexican Government has been irritated by the use of the Cuban news agency office in Mexico City to foster anti-US activity during President Kennedy's visit there in June.

57. Cuban leaders, although preoccupied with domestic problems, still seek to assert Cuban leadership of the "inevitable" revolution in Latin America. They have been very active in attempts to organize a new and ostensibly neutral Latin American labor organization. Cuba operates schools for indoctrinating and training in guerrilla warfare Latin American students who eventually return home to apply what they have learned. The first half of 1962 has seen an increase in reports of Cuban arms shipments to other countries in the area, but no such shipments have been confirmed. There is firm evidence that Cuba has provided at least \$10,000 to Guatemalan revolutionaries—the 13th of November group—in Mexico City.

58. Communist parties in other Latin American states have been disturbed by events in Cuba, and particularly by the Soviet Union's acceptance of Castro as a Communist, because they feel that the role and the prerogatives of veteran Communists have been cast in doubt. Uruguayan Communists were disturbed by statements made by Blas Roca at a Communist Party meeting in Montevideo to the effect that

it had been demonstrated that a non-Communist could lead a successful revolution against the capitalists and imperialists. There has been dissatisfaction among Guatemalan Communists over the Cubans' support of the 13th of November group, which includes Communists but is not Communist-dominated.

59. The present image of the Castro regime in Latin America is that of a client of the Bloc and a failure in the conduct of its own affairs, particularly in the important area of economic development. Nevertheless, the Cuban regime has proven that violent social revolution and a break with the US is possible in Latin America and probably impressed many would-be revolutionaries with the possibility of gaining Soviet support without accepting Soviet control. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and if hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. Cuba is also a danger because its subversive activities might provide the spark that would set off explosions in unstable countries such as Venezuela and Guatemala.

[Here follows an annex comprised of three tables providing inventories of the arms and equipment of the Cuban armed forces.]

**289. Memorandum from William Harvey to McCone, August 8,
with attached Operation Plan¹**

August 8, 1962

SUBJECT

Operation MONGOOSE—Future Course of Action

REFERENCES

- A. Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brigadier General Lansdale dated 25 July 1962, Subject: Review of Operation Mongoose
- B. Agenda for 10 August Meeting, Special Group (Augmented)
- C. Memorandum to the DCI dated 24 July 1962 from C/TFM, Subject: Operation MONGOOSE—End of Phase I
- D. NIE 85–2–62 dated 27 July 1962, Subject: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

Action: This memorandum sets out a recommended CIA position on the future course of action to be followed in Operation Mongoose, which will be discussed at the meeting of the Special Group (Aug-

¹ Operation Mongoose future course of action. Top Secret. 19 pp. CIA Files: Job 84–00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 841, 7 Aug 62–15 Aug 62.

mented) on 10 August 1962. Paragraph VII below contains recommendations for your approval. A copy of this memorandum with Attachment A has been forwarded to the Office of National Estimates for the preparation of their separate comments and assessment pursuant to your oral instructions on 2 August 1962.

I. Background:

A. On 16 March 1962, the Special Group (Augmented) approved Phase I of Operation Mongoose authorizing and directing that between that date and 31 July 1962, CIA mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan authorized intelligence—political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the target area or otherwise require U.S. armed intervention. The plan required that actions taken during Phase I should be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro in the Western Hemisphere and be undertaken in such a way as to permit U.S. disengagement with minimum losses of assets and prestige. Major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence have required approval in advance by the Special Group (Augmented).

B. Phase I of Operation Mongoose did not provide for a maximum operational program against Cuba and did not authorize any extensive use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and facilities. No decision was made to undertake a phased operation to provoke a revolt with the commitment that such revolt would be supported by U.S. military forces. You will recall that on 10 April 1962 on your instructions, a reassessment was made of the Mongoose operational plan which pointed out that, if a more intensive effort was to be undertaken, additional use would have to be made of United States military facilities, personnel, and bases. This reassessment concluded that Operation Mongoose as constituted during Phase I was not likely to result in the overthrow of the Castro regime, unless followed by extensive additional preparation and action based on a firm decision to use U.S. military forces as necessary.

C. In his memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962, General Lansdale recommended that the Group consider in determining the future course of the operation the following four possible courses of action:

“a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or

“b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or

“c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or

“d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.”

D. Preliminary comments concerning the above four courses of action are contained in General Lansdale’s memorandum of 25 July 1962 and the attachment thereto, and in the attachment to the memorandum to you dated 24 July 1962, referred to above.

II. *Courses of Action—General:*

No detailed comments are being submitted concerning courses of action “a” or “d”. Course of action “a” will not exert any appreciable impact on the Castro regime and will accomplish little beyond continuing long-term intelligence coverage. Course of action “d” is not believed politically feasible, nor is it felt there is any chance that higher authority would approve it unless possibly as a part of and concurrent with the final phase of course of action “c”. The adoption as a future course of action of “b”, “c”, or “d” would require the revision of the present Operation Mongoose Guidelines. Courses of action “b” and “c” are discussed in greater detail below, as is a possible alternative course of action to be considered, particularly if higher authority does not approve course of action “c” or an acceptable variation thereof.

III. *Course of Action B:*

A. Course of action “b” if fully implemented as now stated would require CIA to undertake a maximum aggressive intelligence and operational program utilizing all available assets without any commitment that the United States would intervene to support or preserve from destruction any Cuban revolt which might occur. A maximum effort under course of action “b” would inflict appreciable damage on the Castro regime, but would not alone result, in all probability, in its overthrow. It is possible that this course of action might incite a revolt in Cuba, but this revolt would be crushed almost immediately unless the United States stepped in with military force.

B. Any such revolt would be clearly attributable in the United States and if we permitted it to be crushed, the United States would, in our opinion, suffer a loss in prestige and face approximating the results of the April 1961 fiasco. Stated another way, a maximum operational program under course of action “b” has inherent in it the possibility of escalation into a situation where the action provided for in course of action “c” would be necessary but under course of action “b” might not have been fully prepared for and therefore would not be feasible. Vital to preserving any revolt in Cuba if one occurs is the speed and timing of military intervention, since the Castro police, security, and military forces are capable of crushing any such revolt in a matter of days. Although token forces from Latin American, particularly Carib-

bean, nations could and should be solicited to assist in any such military intervention, this offers little practical hope of success unless their assistance is requested as an adjunct to U.S. forces.

C. Among the serious objections to course of action "b" is the fact that it constitutes an open-ended assignment with no clear terminal point and without the willingness to drive the program through to ultimate success by the use of military force if this becomes necessary. This would prevent us from giving to agent personnel and other Cubans the type of motivation, instructions, and training for an ultimate timed revolt which are necessary to fully exploit their potential.

D. Since, to an extent, course of action "b" as now stated is a piecemeal effort with no clear objective goal other than to create the maximum pressures against Castro, inevitably this effort, the longer it progresses would suffer to an ever increasing degree by attrition. This attrition would result not only from Castro counteraction, since the plan would permit him to attack our efforts piecemeal, but from the increasing disillusionment and discouragement of Cubans and other personnel employed. In effect, short of fortuitous circumstances leading to an unanticipated successful revolt without military intervention (which is believed improbable), this course of action would lead to the death and imprisonment of a substantial number of Cubans, to considerable criticism of U.S. motives and actions, and to a steady dissipation of the available assets for use against Cuba.

E. Maximum implementation of course of action "b" would also require a much broader utilization of and dependence on Cuban exiles and exile groups with all of the attendant difficulties of control and security inherent therein.

F. An operational program to carry out course of action "b" could not be unattributable and could not be conducted in any aggressive sense without United States participation therein becoming widely known and probably widely criticized.

G. Course of action "b" would require of CIA a substantially expanded program against the Cubans involving an estimated 600 personnel and a yearly budget of approximately 50,000,000 dollars. There is serious question whether the results to be obtained from course of action "b" alone would be worth this expenditure of funds and manpower.

H. In addition, if CIA is given course of action "b" as a mission as it presently is worded, we would be vulnerable to any and all criticism for lack of success on the theory that we had not done "all possible".

I. Attached as Attachment A is an operational plan outlining the actions and policy approvals that would be required if CIA is to imple-

ment course of action “b” on a maximum aggressive basis. All of the actions outlined are feasible and could be done with greater or lesser success, although in the case of a number of these actions the exact measure of success and the time involved to attain it cannot definitively be ascertained until the actions are undertaken. The feasibility of these actions depends of course upon whether higher authority is willing to grant the necessary policy approvals required and sustain the high noise level and attribution which could result. In preparing this operational plan we are not proposing that it be adopted as such and particular attention is directed to the assumptions therein, specifically assumption “b” which has been inserted to underline the fact that unless this assumption (which we believe is invalid) is made, this operational plan is not valid as a plan which, in end of itself, is likely to succeed in overthrowing the Castro-Communist regime.

IV. *Course of Action “C”:*

A. Full implementation of course of action “c” would require the bulk of the actions outlined in connection with maximum course of action “b” as set out in Attachment A to this memorandum. The significant difference is that under “c” these actions would be keyed to a phased plan, the termination of which would be the triggering of a planned revolt in Cuba to be supported immediately by United States military forces in order to prevent the revolt being destroyed by Castro counteraction.

B. Under course of action “c” it would be far easier for us to recruit and motivate Cubans, incite resistance, generate widespread opposition to the Castro regime, and organize aggressive action operations against Cuba.

C. It is not contemplated that the Cubans would be advised of the decision to use military force, but they could be told, and this would have a tremendous effect in strengthening our efforts, that if they themselves created a revolt on a timed basis under our direction, the United States would not permit that revolt to be destroyed by Castro police and military counteraction.

D. Course of action “c” fully implemented has an excellent chance of succeeding in organizing such a revolt, with good fortune, by the end of 1963 and resulting in the successful overthrow of the Castro-Communist regime.

E. If course of action “c” is adopted it would require approximately the same, perhaps slightly higher, CIA commitments in manpower and money than would be required by the operational plan in Attachment A. In addition, in the phase after the military intervention, it would require a substantial commitment by CIA inside Cuba principally in the intelligence, counterintelligence, and counter-subversion fields in

support of whatever occupying forces were maintained in Cuba, as well as in support of the new Cuban government.

V. Possible Alternate Course of Action:

A. If higher authority does not approve course of action "c" or a workable variation thereof, a possible alternative course of action should be considered. It would be a reduced "b" type operation which, in effect, would remove from the operational plan in Attachment A many of the more aggressive action operations described and would curtail the extent to which other actions in this plan would be undertaken. Such an alternative course of action would be more aggressive than course of action "a" but would have no chance alone of provoking a major revolt and, while it would hurt the Castro regime materially, the damage would not be vital.

B. Such a course of action would require from CIA approximately the current commitment in funds and manpower i.e., \$25,000,000 a year, and approximately 500 personnel.

C. Such a course of action would amount to a long term effort playing for fortuitous, hoped-for breaks in the Cuban situation which might be capitalized upon.

D. Such a course of action would not require policy approval from higher authority to the same extent as courses of action "b" or "c". It would involve a much lower noise level and a much greater possibility of plausible denial of United States sponsorship.

E. In view of the length of this memorandum and the attached operational plan, no separate plan for this possible alternate course of action has been drawn. In summary, this course of action would envisage generally the approach outlined in Attachment A for a maximum type "b" course of action, but with the omission or substantial curtailment of the actions referred to in the following points in Attachment A which have been circled in the attachment for convenient reference.

III.A.5.

III.B.2.

III.C.1,3,6,7

IV.B.

IV.B.1,3,4

IV.C.

IV.C.1,4,5

IV.C.6b,e

V.A.2a,c,e

V.A.3a

V.B.

VI.A,B,D,E,F,G,H,I,J,K

F. If serious consideration is given to this alternate course of action, a separate operational plan will of course be drawn for it.

VI. Conclusions:

A. Course of action “a” will not and should not be adopted as the future course of action for Operation Mongoose.

B. Course of action “d” will not and should not be adopted as the future course of action for Operation Mongoose, unless it is coupled with course of action “c”.

C. Full implementation of course of action “b” will require a major CIA commitment over and above the present commitment in both personnel and money. It will not alone result in the successful overthrow of Castro. It clearly will be attributable to the U.S. and will carry with it a very high “noise level”. In addition, this course of action will in effect leave CIA almost solely responsible for solving the Cuban problem and will leave the Agency in an extremely vulnerable position to criticism.

D. Course of action “c” is feasible and if properly implemented has an excellent chance of successfully overthrowing the Castro government by the end of 1963. Course of action “d” involving a provocation or provocations which could be arranged by CIA could be productively and sensibly coupled with course of action “c” and, if higher authority is willing to undertake this, we would strongly recommend that this be done.

E. Course of action “b” should not be adopted unless higher authority is willing to make the decision now that if it is adopted and a revolt occurs in Cuba, such revolt will be supported by U.S. military force to prevent its rapid destruction by the Castro regime.

F. Effective implementation of either course of action “b” or “c” requires approval, in principle at least, of the policy decisions listed in paragraph VI of Attachment A to this memorandum.

G. Fully effective and efficient implementation of either course of action “b” or “c” requires that the Special Group establish broad policy guidelines and that the current detailed monitoring by the Special Group (Augmented) of operational activities and decisions be substantially relaxed.

H. If course of action “b” is undertaken, it may well result in a spontaneous or other uprising in Cuba which, without proper provision for military support would be crushed. This, in our opinion, would destroy any practical possibility of effective future clandestine operational action against Castro’s regime and as a direct result the United States would, in our opinion, since this would be a “U.S. sponsored revolt”, suffer a loss in prestige and influence approaching the magnitude of that which resulted from the April 1961 fiasco at Playa Giron.

I. If higher authority does not approve either course of action “c” or a workable variation thereof, and does not approve course of action

"b" with the understanding that if a revolt occurs it will be supported by military force which will be kept available on a contingency basis, then the alternate course of action discussed in paragraph V above is preferable to "a", "b" as now worded, or "d". This alternate course of action in effect would be a watered-down "b" with the "all possible" provision deleted or materially changed.

VII. *Recommendations:*

It is recommended that, if you concur, you propose to the Special Group (Augmented) the approval by higher authority of proposed course of action "c" or, at the very least, that a preliminary decision be made now to support with U.S. military forces any revolt which occurs or is provoked inside Cuba as a result of, or attributable to, United States action. It is recommended that the maximum course of action "b" as outlined in Attachment A of this memorandum not be adopted unless this commitment to support any revolt with military force is clearly accepted and understood. If higher authority does not approve the above, it is recommended that you take the position that the alternate course of action described in paragraph V above be adopted in principle by higher authority as the future course of action for Operation Mongoose and that appropriate detailed operational plans for implementing this course of action be drawn immediately.

William K. Harvey
C/IFW

Attachment A

OPERATIONAL PLAN

I. Situation:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action "b" in General Lansdale's memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62.

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. Conclusion D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.)

2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.

3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open

resistance and through fortuitous circumstances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a “time table” basis.

II. *Mission:*

“Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment.”

III. *Tasks:*

A. *Political:*

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CHC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the “power centers” of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

5. Induce the population to engage in militant uses action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and sabotage.

B. *Economic:*

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics.

3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.

4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread minor sets of sabotage.

C. *Resistance:*

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population.

2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.

5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia posts, telephone centrals, etc.

7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.

D. Psychological:

1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, and elsewhere.

E. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

- a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
- b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
- c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
- d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
- e. Militia morale.
- f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.

IV. Implementation:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expansion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

A. Intelligence (FY):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

B. *Psychological Warfare (CA)*:

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage in "high noise level" types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slowdowns, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy approval to establish this is required.

2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.

3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.

4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.

5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.

6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.

7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. *Paramilitary*:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program

must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide "the spark of hope". Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential:

1. *Commando/Raider Teams*—Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable period. They should have a minimum of four months training, for which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel.

2. *Urban Resistance Cells*—Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission [text not declassified]. A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. [text not declassified]

3. *Rural Resistance Cells*—Three to five men teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams

can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors.

4. *Guerrilla*—Five in eight man teams equipped with W/T communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) “hit and run” guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. *Cuban Exile Forces*—The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a “Cuban Freedom Fight” under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the “Cuban Freedom Fighter” groups. Additional Policy approval is required.

6. *Infiltration/Exfiltration*—The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including:

- a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability.
- b. Submarines and other naval craft.
- c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

V. Support Required From Other Agencies:

A. From Department of Defense:

1. *Ground Support*: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support.

a. *Site A*—commando/raider training

Provide a four month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 200 men.

b. *Site B*—Special Forces type training

Provide four month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

c. *Site C*—Special Forces type training

Provide four month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

2. *Naval Support:*

a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher.

b. Submarine radio broadcasts—"Voice of Free Cuba"

c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now.

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity in Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. *Air Support:*

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. *Personnel:*

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

B. *From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:*

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. *Policy Approvals Required:*

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant uses action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitted by Radio Free Cuba.

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.

D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.

F. Authority to use, U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated.

H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities.

I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltrations/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters".

K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.

VII. *Estimated Cost to CIA:*

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. *Estimated Budget:*

Fiscal Year 1963—\$40,000,000

Fiscal Year 1964—\$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis.)

290. Memorandum from Harvey to Carter, August 14¹

August 14, 1962

SUBJECT

Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.
2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."
3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.
4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.
5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

William K. Harvey
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment

Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

¹ Operation Mongoose—assassination of Fidel Castro. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.

September 1962

291. Telegram 72756 from McCone, September 4¹

September 4, 1962

TO [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Priority. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. Cuban readout confirms eight and probably nine SAM rpt SAM sites under crash construction. Eight of nine sites noted will blanket entire western half of island. Ninth is on east coast and we expect others will be built to cover entire country. Construction proceeding so quickly we look for some to be operational within next week or ten days. Readout also showed eight torpedo boats with dual, radar-guided, missile launchers. Such missiles have estimated range of about 15 miles for a 2,000-pound hi-explosive payload with good accuracy. Presume you know of weekend communiqué in which Moscow claims right to extend military assistance to Cuba while danger of invasion persists. All this creates new atmosphere. Principals meeting with President today to discuss whither now, and with Hill leadership at White House this afternoon.

2. Donovan is back from Havana with new price list from Fidel. Latter will settle for three million cash and 25 million in food and medicine. Donovan to confer with Hurwitz and Atty Gen before returning to Havana later this week. Word we have is that Fidel wants to complete all arrangements quickest, within ten days. Outlook is for agency to be asked to help out. We will insure clearance on the Hill prior to any involvement.

¹ Soviet military assistance to Cuba confirmed. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.

292. Telegram 73741 from McCone, September 6¹

September 6, 1962

To [less than 1 line not declassified]. Eyes Only [less than 1 line not declassified] from [less than 1 line not declassified].

1. Continued readout now shows total of nine, probably ten, SAM sites. Other info, from ground reports, points strongly to at least two others. In meeting with Latin American Ambassadors here 5 Sept re Cuba, Sec State asked them to touch base with home govts and reach early agreement to convene meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers to discuss Cuban developments. Sec State in response to query from Mexican Amb said we have impression Moscow does not rpt not desire develop Cuba as Soviet base this hemisphere. He said Soviets under Cuban pressure give econ and military help but are thus far careful not to make unlimited security commitment.

¹ Confirmation of nine SAM sites in Cuba; Latin American Ambassadors asked to convene meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers to discuss Cuban developments. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962.

293. Telegram 18314 to McCone, September 7¹

September 7, 1962

Opim Dir Cite [less than 1 line not declassified]. Eyes Only [less than 1 line not declassified] from [less than 1 line not declassified]. No Dissemination.

4. Question very much if C-package will be helpful Cuba and urge frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance operations which Gilpatrick advises informative. Also I support use of R-101 if necessary. My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable type in Cuba which could command

¹ Support for frequent reconnaissance missions; develop joint policies for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean and South American states. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.

important targets of Southeast United States and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas.

5. You might suggest to Rusk that we develop joint policies for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean, South-American States as an alternative to seeking unanimous OAS action which most certainly will be an ineffective compromise solution if past history is any indicator.

294. Telegram 74587 from McCone, September 8¹

September 8, 1962

Priority [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. Readout of latest (5 September) take shows three more SAMs, these in Las Villas province in Central Cuba. Total SAMs now twelve, probably thirteen. To blanket island, we look for eventual total of about 25. Also spotted one MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield. Nineteen crates seen probably house MIG-21 which would total 20. (Total number MIG-15, 17 and 19 is carried at about 60.) MIG-21 is 1,000 mph jet, high altitude capability 60,000 feet, equipped with two air-air infrared missiles as well as standard rockets and cannons.

I have talked with Rusk who was most appreciative for your suggestion re joint action planning with selected Latino States.

¹ Twelve SAMs confirmed and MIG-21 cited. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.

295. Telegram 19372 to McCone, September 10¹

September 10, 1962

Dir Cite [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and Elder from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

2. Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consistent with other policies such as refugees, legal travel, etc. Appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBM's to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest BNE study motives behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed those provided most satellites.

¹ Appearance of secrecy measures being deployed in Cuba to cover Soviet offensive capability. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA: Job 80-51676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.

296. Carter diary entry, September 10¹

September 10, 1962

1. Met with Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and the Attorney General in McGeorge Bundy's office at approximately 5:45 in a meeting generated by Secretary Rusk's concern over Cuban overflights and his particular desire to avoid any incidents. (See attachments)

Earlier this day Bundy through Tom Parrott requested information on inquiries posed by Mr. Rusk on the importance of our intelligence objectives necessitating Cuban overflights; how much intelligence would suffer if reconnaissance were limited to peripheral flights; and an engaging question whether anyone in the Community might wish to provoke an incident. (See attachment)

¹ Intelligence objectives behind overflights of Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop.

2. Sent Secretary of Defense a memorandum on “Tactical Reconnaissance of Cuba” indicating COMOR’s recommendation and DIA’s request for the following needs:

- a. Coverage of Banes as a possible surface-to-air missile site;
- b. Need for larger scale coverage of Banes than can be acquired by the U-2; and
- c. Recommended Secretary of Defense initiate necessary action for tactical type reconnaissance of Banes or other targets as identified by COMOR. (See attachment)

3. At President’s instruction briefed General Eisenhower on Cuban situation.

4. DCI Cable urging BNE to study motives behind Cuban defense measures which might be designed to hide installation of offensive capability. DD/I notified.

297. Telegram 75341 from McCone, September 11¹

September 11, 1962

Priority [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. Havana radio charges that two cargo ships, outward bound from Cuba, one Cuban and the other British, were attacked 11 Sept off Northern Coast of Cuba. We have info that an exile group called Alpha-66 (based in Puerto Rico) probably did the job. Student exile group in Miami last weekend publicly announced intention to attack bloc ships moving in and out of Cuba. There is growing mood of frustration among refugees and danger of unilateral operations and incidents is likewise growing.

Assume you noting in press the Soviet statement issued 11 Sept making sweeping charges that US preparing Cuba invasion and warning that “if this attack is made, this will be beginning of unleashing of war.” Implications of the 4,000-word statement under study. Will advise you further.

2. Ref your request that BNE examine implications of defensive equipment. Following is prelim BNE statement:

¹ Exile group attacks two outward bound cargo ships from Cuba; BNE statement re Soviet motivations for MRBM installation. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.

"Whole question Sov motivations, including possible reasons why Sovs might consider installation MRBMs, being examined in SNIE being drafted for USIB next week. BNE still persuaded that costly crash operation to install SA-25 is more reasonably explained by other than desire to hide later buildup and that Sovs likely to regard advantages of major offensive buildup not equal to dangers of US intervention. Cuba leaking like sieve from ground observation alone. Thus sudden crackdown on refugee flow and legal traffic would be strong indicator of possible desire to undertake further military buildup in secret."

298. Telegram 21493 to McCone, September 13¹

September 13, 1962

Opim Dir Cite [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Ref Dir 35650 (Out 75733).

1. I believe securing prisoner release a serious obligation of United States, important from a humanitarian standpoint and an essential step in our ultimate objectives for Cuba. Therefore perfectly agreeable to alter my plans to assist with congressional leadership and committee chairmen. Do not believe my identification as Republican particularly important but recognize a bi-partisan approach by the Executive Branch of the government on this delicate matter important, as are my personal connections on the Hill.

2. Do not understand apparent readiness to approve medicine and drugs to the extent indicated but no food, as I believe both have their humanitarian considerations and personally support both. Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapon capability and once this is done the implementation of our policy as reported in the press might be extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers.

¹ Release of exiled Cuban prisoners; humanitarian support for Cuba; installation of defensive equipment. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.

299. Carter diary entry, September 14¹

September 14, 1962

Acting

1. Attended Special Group (Augmented) Meeting. Colonel Steakley outlined capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area are available. Further consideration was thus deferred until next week's meeting. I said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present (cruise missile sites at Banes, not identified conclusively at this time). It was agreed that the Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military flights in the Cuban area. (from Minutes)

2. "Action on low-level reconnaissance over Cuba was deferred until next week's meeting. The Acting DCI pushed hard to keep the Group disposed toward a favorable consideration later. The Agency is to continue to press this matter." (From Elder's Memo for the Record)

3. See attached record of MONGOOSE meeting.

4. Went to ISO.

¹ Special Group (Augmented) meeting on low-level reconnaissance over Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.

300. Telegram 23209 to McCone, September 16¹

September 16, 1962

Opim Dir Cite [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. Following August meeting principals when we first reported Soviet Cuban buildup I suggested BNE study economic prospects of Cuba assuming Soviet technical assistance and guidance could correct present mismanagement of industry and agriculture by Castro organi-

¹ Soviet Cuban buildup including possible MRBMs. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.

zation. I then felt and stated that Soviets would reason that proper management could build Cuba into a viable economy with sufficient export of agricultural and manufactured product and other natural resources to cover needs for import and provide some excess for social betterment. In view of very extensive press comment on deterioration of Cuban economy leaving impression situation can never be reversed and possibility of such reasoning influencing U.S. policy importantly I believe the study proposed will be revealing and useful.

2. Also believe we must carefully study the prospect of secret importation and placement of several Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us if Cuban defenses deny overflight. In reflecting on my observations of Thor installation in Britain and Jupiters in Italy I can envisage a Soviet plan to package missile, control and operating equipment in such a way that a unit could be made operational a few hours after a site cleared and a modest concrete pad poured. Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community must keep government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuban defense system operative.

3. Thrust of press reports reaching me is that there exists a clear demarcation between defensive and offensive preparations and I question if we can be sure of this. I recognize Cuban policy decisions most delicate and beyond agency or my competence. However believe we must give those making decision our best estimate of possible developments and alternative situations which might evolve and unexpectedly confront us.

301. Telegram 77871 from McCone, September 18¹

September 18, 1962

Opim [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].*

Re: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] (In 23209).**

1. No doubt that Cuban economic resources capable of substantial development given better management and sufficient capital investment. SNIE 85-3, before USIB tomorrow, recognizes this as a probable

¹ Review of SNIE 85-3 regarding Soviet buildup in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.

Soviet intention and that the objective is to stimulate communist political action elsewhere in Latin America. As noted in 85–2 (1 Aug), however, present state of Cuban economy is very bad and substantial upturn will be delayed until after 1963.

2. SNIE 85–3 discusses in detail possibility of introduction of MRBMs into Cuba, but judges this to be unlikely because of risk of U.S. intervention involved unless there is a radical change in Soviet policy not presently indicated. Such a change would have implications extending far beyond Cuba. We know from our briefing that government top level realizes possibility of developments shielded from our detection once SA–2's operative. SNIE 85–3 stresses that there is a middle ground in which defensive or offensive character of buildup is a matter of interpretation. Various alternatives explored. Again we know ambiguities of offensive-defensive distinction brought to top level attention before public statements formulated.

C/S comment: *Dissemination same as referenced cable.

**Cable from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] concerning the Soviet buildup of Cuba.

302. Telegram 78480 from McCone, September 19¹

September 19, 1962

Priority [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. Herewith conclusions of Special National Intelligence Estimate approved by USIB on 19 September.

A. We believe that Soviet Union values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba

¹ Transmits conclusions of SNIE approved by USIB on September 19. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept–21 Sept 1962.

might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.

B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 September, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home, it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America.

C. As the buildup continues, the Soviet Union may be tempted to establish in Cuba, other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more "offensive" character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles. A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction.

D. The Soviet Union could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of sub base could be more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations.

E. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to the technical implications of the military buildup. Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intrusion into the hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain 2/3 OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of military action aimed at Cuba. It became clear that the Soviet Union was establishing an "offensive" base in Cuba, most Latin American governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement.

303. Telegram 25591 to McCone, September 20¹

September 20, 1962

Op In Dir Cite [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Eyes Only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

1. Ref. Dir 372281: (out 78480)* suggest most careful consideration to conclusion last sentence paragraph D. As an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet Cuban base will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take an unexpected risk in order to establish such a position.

¹ Comments on telegram 78480 transmitting SNIE conclusions. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80–B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.

304. Memorandum for the file, September 24¹

September 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on Monday, 24 September, Subject "Donovan Negotiations"

McCone and AG met alone. Discussed the subject for about an hour, DCI took strong position advocating pursuit of negotiations after AG had briefly reviewed his personal discussions with Donovan. DCI support was based on (1) humanitarian aspects, (2) responsibility of the United States toward the prisoners, (3) importance of the prisoner group together with their relatives and friends as a hard core of continuing support of U.S.-Cuban relations as future political situation in Cuba evolves, and (4), and most emphatically, Castro held prisoners as hostages and would use them even to the extent of execution of them in the event of further action by U.S. against Cuba. Such actions

¹ Discussion with the Attorney General on proposed Donovan negotiations for release of Cuban exile prisoners held by Castro. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

might be necessary as would be the case of the defense of Guantanamo, should it be attacked.

In a brief discussion of the political aspects, DCI stated that he felt that this matter could be handled so that there would be no serious adverse political reactions. In fact the pluses and minuses would in all probability balance off each other.

AG and DCI were in substantial agreement. It was decided to discuss subject with the President at 4:00 p.m. the following day.

At the close of the discussion, DCI asked AG his views on the performance of CIA during DCI absence. AG spoke most enthusiastically for the operations of General Carter for whom he holds the greatest respect, the functioning of the organization, and most particularly the relationship between CIA and FBI as reported to him by J. Edgar Hoover. AG stated that J.E.H. told him that the change in climate between the two organizations was miraculous, that the two were working together now whereas they had been fighting one another for years, that he was highly pleased, that our servicing of certain FBI operations was most satisfactory to J.E.H. and the AG.

305. Memorandum of meeting with the President, September 25¹

September 25, 1962

At 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 25, AG, DCI and Mr. Kaysen met with the President.

AG introduced the question. DCI then took a very strong position in support of immediate action, reiterating arguments briefed above, reviewed briefly his telephone conversation with Donovan, copy attached; indicated feeling that we should go much further if necessary than the few million dollars for medicine which had been discussed, and stated that the Donovan-Castro contact was an important relationship which might possibly, though by no means assuredly, lead to constructive discussions on other matters.

The President reviewed the political implications and raised the question as to whether we might "hold the situation in abeyance" for the next six weeks by supplying some medical supplies, food, etc.

¹ Proposed Donovan negotiations for release of Cuban exile prisoners held by Castro. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.

covertly as an indication of good intentions, but not attempt to make a deal on the eve of election which might become a political issue. DCI stated this possibility but that he felt time was eroding and that we should at least have exploratory talks.

It was finally agreed that we would proceed with discussions on the following lines:

DCI would immediately approach General Eisenhower, secure his reaction. He would indicate the situation evolved as CIA and DCI matter, rather than a Presidential matter, that DCI had reviewed subject with President Kennedy but the President should not be put in the foreground; on the other hand, DCI should be put in the foreground in the initial discussion with General Eisenhower, possibly, leadership.

If Eisenhower position favorable, then President would discuss Democratic leadership. Following this, DCI would pursue with Republican leadership, both Houses, and with various members of confidential committees.

Donovan political situation reviewed and DCI explained Donovan position as reported in telephone conversation. President and AG stated they felt if this became a matter of concern, they could request, and secure, resignation of Donovan as a candidate.

There were no further discussions of intelligence matters except a general statement of the attitude on the part of the President that he felt CIA's operations were going on very well.

[text not declassified]

John A. McCone

Attachment:

Copy of DCI/Donovan telephone conversation

306. Memorandum of conversation between McCone and Eisenhower, September 26¹

September 26, 1962

DCI discussed the proposed Donovan project, tracing the inception of the Citizens Committee, the discussions with Robert Anderson, the appointment of Donovan as Committee Council; DCI encouraging Donovan trip to Cuba and the results of Donovan/Castro discussions as summarised in the Donovan/DCI telephone conversation of 9/25, and the Donovan conclusion that (a) a deal could be made, (b) price 62 M food and medicine at Cuban retail values, (c) Castro lists indicated about 54 M food and 8 M medicine, (d) Donovan thought it could all be medicine, (e) Cuba retail prices about five times our actual cost for medicine therefore the cost would be about \$10–12 M out of pocket.

McCone thought some food must be supplied. Secretary of Agriculture had authority and CIA had reserve funds but under Congressional injunction because of tractor deal. E. seemed favorable toward food, noting that it would help dispose of some surpluses.

Therefore McCone sought Eisenhower's advice on approaching selected Republican members of Senate and House if President Kennedy would approach selected Democratic members to solicit support and have injunction removed. McCone stated had talked with President Kennedy who looked with favor on plan—McCone wished Eisenhower's views.

After long exchange Eisenhower agreed idea worth a try. Agreed McCone could use his name in discussions. Suggested that after McCone and President Kennedy initial talks concluded then Democrats and Republicans should meet jointly with President Kennedy and McCone to ensure common understanding—then Donovan should move at once.

Eisenhower then proposed a guarantee of delivery of goods be made and all prisoners released at one time and then guarantee drawn down as goods actually received in Cuba.

Warned against the danger of failure and therefore only a few should know and U.S. involvement never disclosed and plan always denied if deal falls down or Castro runs out as he did on the tractor deal.

Eisenhower disturbed that foreign policy getting into politics—quoted Kennedy speech in which he referred to “8 years of drifting

¹ Proposed Donovan project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

under Eisenhower and now things better”—also Cuba was lost to Communism under Ike administration.

McCone agreed to call Eisenhower after meeting with President Kennedy.

John A. McCone
Director

**307. Notes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting,
September 27¹**

September 27, 1962

(As Told by the DDCI to Knoche)

1. The MONGOOSE balloon delivery capability plan was approved in concept but the Group is to be provided with an outline operational plan which is to be based on using refugees to the maximum extent possible. Reasoning for the use of refugees is:

- a) To keep them busy on projects like this, which are less dangerous than projects in which they might otherwise engage, and
- b) To provide the US with increased capacity for plausible denial.

Alexis Johnson wondered whether there was any way we can make our overall approach to the Cuban problem something which would show less of the US hand and which would be built more around the refugees.

2. General Taylor read from a paper on Cuba, prepared by Rostow and which has gone forward to the President. DDCI wants us to get a copy of this paper. There was a discussion indicating that Defense, State, and CINCLANT are preparing some kind of presentation re Cuba for the President. DDCI wants us to find out about this and participate if advisable.

3. The DDCI did not brief the Group on the mining sabotage operation, but will do so when we get to the point of trying the operation again.

¹ Mongoose balloon plan; Rostow paper on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 91–00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.

308. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Donovan and McCone, September 29¹

September 29, 1962

Mr. Donovan called to discuss my communication to him of even date.

Mr. Donovan stated that he thoroughly understood the conditions of the last two paragraphs of the communication and under no circumstance would the Cuban release matter be injected into his political campaign either now or later, that he recognized his obligations predated his decision to run for office, that he was not particularly happy over what appeared to be a "conflict" and stated that, of the two situations, that is his running for office and his efforts to release Cubans, the latter was much more important to him. I did not ask if he would withdraw from the campaign, however I feel that such a request from others would be seriously considered by Mr. Donovan. His statements over the telephone were positive and without reservation. Note: Nevertheless it is my opinion Donovan's efforts to secure release of the Cubans, and particularly his success if his mission is successful, will be used as a basic political position by him.

With respect to costs Donovan stated that Castro had in his hands a wholesale price list of medical supplies as issued by major drug manufacturing companies in the United States. Further indicated that the "shopping list" which he had discussed with Castro was based upon wholesale U.S. prices. He indicated that these did not necessarily govern the final arrangement but he did not think Castro would agree to multiply these prices by a factor of 2 to 3 to establish what might be considered equivalent Cuban retail prices. In other words, it was Mr. Donovan's position that this is a trading area that he would have to work on but he did not wish us to labor under the impression that the entire transaction would be based on what might be considered as Cuban retail prices, as such prices actually do not exist for many desired commodities because none are available in Cuba.

Donovan stated that he, together with CIA agents, the banks and the lawyers had been working continuously since my talk with him Thursday noon in an endeavor to produce documentation which would be satisfactory to Castro. This work was not completed largely because the banks would only work half a day on Saturday and hence documen-

¹ Plans for Donovan mission to Cuba to gain release of Cuban exile prisoners. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.

tation would not be in final shape until some time Monday. Donovan therefore postponed his departure for Cuba until Monday afternoon or, at the latest, Tuesday morning. Nevertheless he felt that he should, and could, go down armed with documentation in a form satisfactory to Castro and which would give Castro acceptable guarantee of faithful performance of the Donovan commitment. He therefore felt that if he succeeded he could get the prisoners out promptly. *[text not declassified]*

Donovan informed me that after a thorough study of the Pfiser Company's inventories, Mr. McKeen, Chairman, reached the conclusion that Pfiser Company could not meet this entire commitment and that, to do so, would require the resources of Merck and several other drug companies. For this reason Mr. McKeen discussed the project with Mr. John Connor, President of Merck (Note: Mr. Connor is former General Counsel of the Department of Defense during the Forrestal administration and house is close to a number of former government officials, including Mr. Ed Feley and Mr. Tommy Corcoran.) Mr. Connor was concerned about two things. One, approval of the Administration that export to Cuba of such large quantities of drugs would be favorably looked upon by the Administration. Secondly, that collaboration between Pfiser, Merck and other companies would not bring them all under the spotlight of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice and more particularly the Kefauver Committee. For this reason, Mr. Connor called Ed Foley who in turn apparently talked to Tommy Corcoran and this accounts for the contact made with the Attorney General's office. I insisted that Donovan must take the position that the Administration was sympathetic to this effort but had nothing whatsoever to do with it officially or financially.

Donovan than commented on a proposed press release which would be distributed to the press after his departure from New York for Miami and Havana. A copy of this press release is attached. It appears appropriate to me.

As the matter was left, work will proceed on documentation. On Monday Donovan will leave for Miami, at the earliest Monday night, and for Havana Tuesday morning.

The terms and restrictions of his mission are outlined in my communication of September 29th to him, however Donovan continues to feel that the bill will be between \$18 million and \$20 million.

John A. McCone
Director

October 1962

309. Memorandum for the record, October 2¹

October 2, 1962

This morning Mr. Gilpatric de-briefed me on the results of his meeting at the White House on Cuban trade and asked that I pass the following along to ISA. The subject of the meeting was a draft memorandum for the President submitted by the Department of State on policy toward non-Bloc ships in Cuban trade. The consensus of the group was that the actions recommended in A-1 thru A-4 plus Alternative IV of A-5 should be submitted to the President. Second, the timing on the recommendation including publication of the statement and actions should be considered in reference to our talks with our NATO allies on Cuban trade and with the OAS Foreign Ministers. Also to be considered is the Ball appointment to the Kitchen Committee. Third, we should recognize that none of these or any other actions not adopted have any real substantive effect on cutting down Soviet Bloc trade with Cuba. Denial of bunkering at U.S. ports or other sanctions will not stop the Soviets from using their own vessels in Cuban trade. All the Soviets have to do is to shift the Cuban trade to their own bottoms and use Free World chartered ships in non-Cuban trade. The effects of any action will be primarily psychological and political. We should have some effect on the South American countries and our NATO allies; however, the best political effect will accrue in the United States which is why we recommended the President go ahead.

Have ISA look into the possibilities of negotiating with the British a US/UK agreement which would deny facilities to ships in the Cuban trade if they are carrying strategic materials for Cuba. However, even here Mr. Gilpatric does not believe that such action would have much effect.

With respect to recommended action in A-2, Mr. Gilpatric wants looked into the possibilities of retaliatory actions that would hurt us in shipping U.S. or other arms to South Vietnam or other countries. In the case of U.S. arms, he feels that probably most of this is shipped by Naval or MSTs vessels; however, shipment of MAP equipment might be affected. If we close our ports to ships of a country engaged in trade with Cuba, what effect would their denial of ports to U.S. be, particularly with respect to carrying arms?

¹ Results of Gilpatric meeting at the White House on Cuban trade. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 000.1-092.

Air transportation was specifically excluded from the discussion this morning. The U.S. wants to encourage air cargo, particularly out of Cuba and we recognize that little heavy equipment or other supplies will be moved in by air.

Departments of Treasury and Commerce would be charged with enforcing these actions. Two enforcement methods were noted: (a) Certification to agencies and (b) Government black list.

William D. Houser

*Captain, USN
Military Assistant*

310. Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 2¹

Part I (of 4)

October 2, 1962

SUBJECT

Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, Washington, D.C., October 2–3, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

See Attached List of Participants

The Secretary of State opened the meeting with a few welcoming remarks, recalling the first informal meeting of American Foreign Ministers held in September, 1958. He suggested that the current meeting have no formal agenda, voting nor resolutions. He expressed the hope that there would be no statements to the press during the meeting. The Secretary discussed the free world confrontation of communism, the most direct of which, he said, extended from Berlin to Korea and now had reached this hemisphere. In speaking of signs of harsher measures being applied by the Soviet Union, he noted the failure to reach an agreement on disarmament arrangements and Soviet rejection of the nuclear test ban. Regarding Berlin, the Secretary noted that the Soviet proposals were aimed at the removal of Western forces and undermining Berlin's security. He noted the steady improvement of the active war in Viet-Nam where 10,000 U.S. troops were serving. He

¹ Communist bases in Cuba. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

observed that we would be watching closely the October 7 deadline for withdrawal in Laos in accordance with the Geneva accord. He spoke of problems confronting the Soviets, and, referred specifically to production failures in East Germany and North Viet-Nam and setbacks in mainland China. He noted the Soviet fear of the European Common Market, and contrasted United States preparedness to open trade opportunities with that Market through new trade legislation. He noted the growing nationalism in certain Soviet bloc countries. The Secretary cautioned that in spite of these problems in the Communist world, we can take no comfort because "Khrushchev may take dangerous measures." However, the Secretary stressed, the United States has enough nuclear power to destroy the Soviet Union if it should try a sneak attack.

In turning to Communist penetration in this hemisphere, he reviewed briefly the resolutions adopted at the Eighth MFM and specifically recalled the voting on several of those resolutions. He said that, as Castro has continued to fade as the hope of the Western Hemisphere, he has obtained additional Communist support which involves further Soviet intervention. He noted that thousands of bloc technicians had arrived in Cuba, spoke of the air defense build-up there, and noted that for the first time an extra-continental power had established missile bases in the Western Hemisphere. He gave certain statistics on bloc ships and cargos carried to Cuba. He said 12 sites in Western Cuba would be operational in the next few weeks for launching ground-to-air missiles which could attain an altitude of from 60 to 80,000 feet and a lateral range of 25 miles. He noted the presence in Cuba of high quality MIGs and Komar class ships on naval patrol. He said that because of the complex electronic equipment supplied to Cuba, the Soviet technicians would probably stay for some time to give training in the use of this equipment. He said there was no sign yet of significant offensive equipment.

The Secretary noted that the United States had already taken certain measures including declarations on the limit of the military build-up in Cuba which the United States would permit, warning that U.S. forces would move into action if the arms in Cuba were used outside of Cuba and that the United States would not permit the development of Cuba as a Soviet base. He recalled the warnings that any attack on Guantanamo or the establishment of ground-to-ground ballistic missiles would not be tolerated, but noted that there had been no signs to date that the Soviets intended to go that far.

The Secretary stressed that the recent developments in Cuba had made a profound impact on the American people and noted there always existed a danger of action which would mean bloodshed and casualties, especially in Cuba. He said it was better for the Foreign

Ministers to try to find another way to solve the problem and invited them to give an assessment of the situation in their countries.

The Secretary said it was expected there would be a step-up in training activity in Cuba, financial aid to subversive groups and subversive propaganda by the press and radio throughout the hemisphere and, if there was a chance, active support of subversive efforts with arms, even to overthrow governments by force. He mentioned specifically support to student, labor, sports, and cultural groups. He cautioned that we must anticipate that the Soviets will hide their efforts under the aegis of international law while working to destroy it. He noted that Dorticós will be going to the United Nations and that he will probably make wild charges and stressed that a systematic diplomatic effort was needed in the UN to help others better understand the true situation.

The Secretary specified two lines of action to counter Soviet intervention in Cuba: (1) make it more difficult and costly for the Soviet Bloc to supply Cuba, and (2) demonstrate that what the Soviet Union does in Cuba will not affect the hemisphere, that is, to isolate Cuba. He said that we must also inform our friends around the world that Cuba represents a new penetration by the Bloc in a part of the world which wants to be free.

The Secretary noted that certain NATO and other countries were prepared to take steps to prevent their ships from being used in the Bloc-Cuba trade but that others appeared less anxious to help.

The Secretary stressed that it must be made clear to the rest of the world that the regime in Cuba would fail. He said that we must reassure the Cuban people, both inside and outside Cuba that their cause has not been abandoned. He emphasized that the question of Cuba had not been discussed with the Soviet Union, that the United States did not want Cuba regarded as related to the Berlin "affair".

In closing, his initial remarks, the Secretary suggested that a communiqué might be issued at the end of the meeting and invited suggestions in this regard.

The Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, Alfonso ORTEGA Urbina, expressed the great preoccupation of his country at the "vital problem" of Communist bases in Cuba. He pointed out that the small countries do not have the same means of protection that large countries do and consequently, their worry was how to stay free. He acknowledged that the United States was prepared to stop arms movement into Central America but pointed out that small movements, including men, couldn't be prevented by surveillance. He pointed out that some small countries have only small or no armies and that police forces could not cope with these problems.

He said that Communist activity in small countries was hurting their economies, that because of unsettled conditions any investment was paralyzed. He emphasized that a collective defensive procedure was needed to detain the Communist advances in Central America. He said that Central American countries had insufficient naval craft adequately to patrol their long coasts. Therefore, they were looking for a regional formula. He also discussed the Soviet efforts to develop a cultural and social system foreign to this hemisphere.

The Secretary again recalled the decisions of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and pointed out that this meeting was to obtain the views of the main body of the OAS countries regarding dangers arising in special areas.

The Representative of Argentina, Roberto T. ALEMANN, expressed the clear concern of his Government at Soviet penetration in Cuba and its effect in the hemisphere. He said that an effort should be made to contain the danger and with this in mind, the Argentine Delegation was prepared to discuss this matter. He said that the first law of self-defense is to strengthen the ties of the countries concerned and pointed out that these countries are linked by "serious commitments" which should guide them in their deliberation. He said that countries in other parts of the world should also think of what they can do regarding this danger.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic, Mr. Bonilla Atilas, spoke of the world as divided into two ideologies: (1) Communist, and (2) democratic. He said that Moscow was the leader of the Communist sector and asked the Secretary if the United States is willing to be the standard bearer for the free world.

The Secretary, in reply, pointed out the difference between leadership in the Communist world and the free world, the latter being made up of free nations with which the United States was allied in different ways. He cited NATO as one example, but pointed out that the United States had 42 other Allies around the world. He noted the tremendous increase in the United States peacetime defense budget in the past 15 years. He noted that the United States is the only member of the free world, other than Viet-Nam, that was suffering casualties at this time in fighting communist aggression. The United States, he said, will accept the leadership, but others also have a responsibility in the struggle for freedom. He pointed out that we must act through cooperation and solidarity on the basis of elements of freedom and not of unilateral decisions which affect other peoples elsewhere in the world; this, he said, is why we wish to consult on this matter.

The DOMINICAN Secretary for Foreign Affairs spoke of his gratitude at being in the free world, but noted that Soviet leadership up to now had been for measures to spread communism throughout the world.

The position of the free world, he said, is weak, not militarily but ideologically. He referred to the Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) in response to the Dominican request regarding the propaganda broadcasts from Cuba beamed at the Dominican Republic. He noted that the SCCS emphasized the importance of propaganda and counter-propaganda. He said that, as he had said in New York earlier, the countries must mobilize themselves in this field. He said that the Soviet Bloc is mobilized and identifies the United States as the main enemy. The Soviet technique is first ideological penetration, then penetration by arms. He said Cuba fell because the apple was ripe, that this was made possible by advance groundwork. He said we need a system of counter-propaganda to prepare the spirit of our peoples. He proposed the creation of a hemispheric center to train the people to lead in this effort. This training should be indoctrination in an aggressive type of democracy. For this, he said, we need money, equipment, and "democratic armies". He spoke of general mobilization and the coordination of efforts within each country patterned on that done by the United States during World War II. To explain to our peoples what is taking place, we must have radio stations operating "26 hours" a day and our journalists must be more conscious of the struggle, he said, and added that the people must be trained and a corps set up similar to the Peace Corps but differing in that the former would be an army of "aggressive democrats."

He said Cuba must explode eventually, but we must do our utmost to avoid a tragic result when this happens.

The GUATEMALAN Foreign Minister, Mr. Jesús UNDA Murillo, spoke briefly of the purpose of the meeting and expressed confidence that the meeting would result in the cooperation of the countries. He said Cuba was the most serious threat. He referred to his remarks at the Eighth MFM concerning the Cuban danger and said that it had become unbelievably more serious since that time. He referred to the Communist military build-up in Cuba and spoke of it as a challenge to the United States and to the rest of the hemisphere. He noted the threats of the Soviet Bloc regarding thermonuclear warfare if we adopt defensive measures against what is happening in Cuba. He said that Guatemala had been pointing out the danger for years and referred to the statements he had made at the Seventh and Eighth MFM's and in the 14th UNGA regarding the need to take defensive measures. He pointed out that he had emphasized the need to define our positions and to save democracy for our people, that Guatemala would support all measures necessary but unfortunately some countries had not listened with candor. The Foreign Minister referred to the Communist gains in his country in the early 1950's. He expressed awareness that Guatemala's attitude provokes insults by the Communists but it knows

its cause is just. He emphasized that there is no such thing in Communists' eyes as a neutral or non-allied state, that one is either Communist or reactionary, and the reactionaries are liquidated. He said it was most important that American Governments be prepared to defend themselves, that Communism must not be regarded as a mystic theory but recognized as brutal machinery aimed at dominating the world. However, he commented, the free countries are weak. He said that the Soviets were attempting to achieve through Castro: (1) to reduce the resistance of the Cuban people, (2) to make Cuba a fort against free countries of the Western Hemisphere, and (3) a base for engaging in subversion and aiding insurgency.

The Foreign Minister said that Resolution VIII of the Eighth MFM gave the Council power to extend the suspension of trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war to other items of strategic importance. He said that the COAS should adopt a resolution to interrupt all trade with Cuba and that it should also (1) request the IADB to bring up to date the continental defense plans and prepare a plan for the protection of the hemisphere against the encroachments of Communism and (2) instruct the SCCS to prepare a report on Communist subversion in all its aspects including agents, propaganda, smuggling of weapons, etc. He emphasized that we can delay no longer if we are to avoid a war that will annihilate mankind.

The Foreign Minister of HONDURAS, Andrés ALVARADO Puerto, said that Honduras is in the central area of danger in the Hemisphere, that it was a country of poor and ignorant people, but a people with great spirit. He spoke of the efforts of the democratic regime in Honduras to start a democratic revolution but referred to the extreme circumstances the country faced. He said that the Honduran people had been able to fight the Communists in the streets and in the newspapers because of their faith. He said there was need to develop a political action program. Because Honduras is near Cuba, the Honduran people are worried, he said, and added that a movement should be started to increase the faith of all the Latin American peoples and that Honduras was "in complete agreement with any measures because Communists only understand force." He said, "We have to be determined to fight."

The Foreign Minister noted that Central American countries had exchanged views concerning this problem and they felt that this exchange of views should be expanded to the Caribbean area so that steps can be taken. The Caribbean area is the most affected by the menace in Cuba but the problem is worldwide. He recognized that the small countries cannot express ideas that might lead to war but added they cannot remain inactive in the face of this danger, which affects the United States and other hemisphere countries.

The Secretary, in thanking the Honduran Foreign Minister, emphasized that the underlying issue was not bilateral, but the independence

of free states and that once this could be assured there could be no cold nor hot war. The Secretary urged that his colleagues explain this to their representatives in the United Nations so that they could see this clearly and express it in their statements there. He added that, in resolving the problem facing the hemisphere of the Communist threat in Cuba, we should not think of it in terms of the danger of a thermonuclear war. He concluded that Cuba is not vital to the Soviet Union and Khrushchev will not destroy the Soviet Union over Cuba.

(The preceding conversations were carried on through interpreters.)

311. Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 2¹

Part II (of 4)

October 2, 1962

SUBJECT

Informal Meeting of American Foreign Ministers

PARTICIPANTS

See Attached List of Participants

The Foreign Minister of Paraguay, Raúl SAPENA Pastor, noted that Paraguay is Catholic and very anti-communist, and pointed out that during the 1958 informal MFM he had attacked Soviet Communism and in turn was attacked by several Foreign Ministers. In 1958, Paraguay had realized the Communist danger but, he added, questions must be ripe to be discussed.

The Foreign Minister, in referring to a talk he had had a few years ago with an outstanding world Communist, said the Communist had asked him if he believed that Paraguay would remain anti-communist if its neighbors became Communist, pointing out a problem of international solidarity, that is, a country is Communist or anti-communist depending upon its neighbors. The Paraguayan Minister said that, though Paraguay has suffered from a Cuban invasion from abroad, it was not afraid.

Discussing methods of communism, the Minister pointed out that Communists, utilizing the weapons of misery, take advantage of those

¹ Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Confidential. 8 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

freedoms which it pretends to protect, without utilizing its own resources. Referring to the Secretary's statement that U.S. soldiers are willing to defend the world against communism, the Minister noted that the USSR never uses Russian citizens, with the exception of technicians who teach others to fight.

He said Communists should be deprived of the environment of poverty; that the Alliance for Progress must grow more rapidly without political ideas interfering with its economic goals. A strengthened Alliance, he said, will be the strongest weapon to defeat communism.

The Minister stressed that his delegation would support any effective measure to fight Soviet Communist domination in Cuba.

The Colombian Foreign Minister, José Antonio MONTALVO, presented two main premises: (1) The hemisphere is anti-communist, and (2) there is a spirit of solidarity. Colombia is close to the inter-American system and, said the Foreign Minister, it is hoped that the system would be strengthened by the Informal Meeting.

The Minister stressed that the problem for America is Cuba. Other problems can wait.

The Minister averred that the Communists are trying to distract attention from Berlin with their efforts in Cuba, which seriously threatens the Hemisphere.

The Minister said that there are two stages in Cuban development; The doctrinary or dogmatic and then the military or strategic stage. Regarding the former, there is nothing, stated the Minister, that we can add to the measures taken at the 8th MFM, where it was stated that Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system.

In turning to the so-called strategic stage, the Minister undertook a discussion of Colombian domestic politics. He briefly described the Colombian political situation: The resolution of the former bitter rivalry between the political parties. He said that in military potential Colombia is weak, but that Colombia now has over 100,000 soldiers to control rural vandalism and banditry which is the result of the Communist conspiracy to subvert the peasants and to destroy the country. He said that Colombia has been victimized by Cuba. The Soviets support these bandit groups in Colombia. They have Soviet propaganda from Cuba. The Minister stated that he could not explain how the bandits obtained weapons.

Examining Cuban military power, the Minister said that Cuba is stronger now than before the April, 1961 invasion and will be still stronger if "we don't stop the supply of equipment to this base." He said this is the greatest challenge to the OAS. If America does not eliminate this danger, then Cuba will be a permanent beachhead in the Hemisphere and will become an offensive power. The Minister

went on to say there was no desire to question President Kennedy's statements on the defensive nature of the Cuban arms build-up but the situation would become worse as Cuban strength grows and if Cuba gets nuclear and atomic warheads. The Minister pointed out that all weapons are defensive or offensive depending on who uses them. The Minister also raised the question of assistance in supplies and trade which Western countries give to Cuba. He also spoke of the building of land and air forces and the aggressive Russian policies which will worsen the situation.

Montalvo in effect rejected a Caribbean security-type arrangement when he stated strongly that it would be a mistake to think of a subregional organization within the regional organization. He said that the countries do not have the necessary military capability.

The Minister stated that while the United States has the greatest responsibility to eliminate the Cuban danger, the small countries have a responsibility. Russia, said the Minister, would not jeopardize its conquests elsewhere because Castro needs help. He said the Soviets work in Colombia by subversion.

The Minister said that total Hemisphere solidarity is better than direct U.S. action. All countries are threatened. Colombia, the Minister said, is ready to fulfill her obligations with respect to the Rio Treaty. No legal argument is needed to invoke the Rio Treaty. If we undertake sanctions against Cuba, said Montalvo, it is better to use general terminology and simply say that we are invoking the Rio Treaty.

The Minister said he favored a final communique at the end of the Meeting, affirming belief in democracy and freedom of the peoples.

He agreed with the representatives of the Dominican Republic and Paraguay that it is important to have a coordination of efforts on the ideological level to disseminate the ideas of the Western world. He offered Colombia's moral support. The Foreign Minister said that Latin America has a balanced judgment of President Kennedy, who is being incited by his countrymen, but does not allow himself to be pushed off the brink, but it was comforting to know, that if the USSR takes aggressive measures, the United States can annihilate it. He reiterated that we should tell the world that we would invoke the Rio Treaty if necessary.

The Foreign Minister of Panama, Galileo Solís, said that very little has been done to point out the falseness of communist doctrines. The smaller countries, he urged, can help in this regard since they cannot help with arms. The Minister said that the masses swallow communist deceptions of promises of paradise. Solís asked if the American republics have sufficient resources to convince their masses of the advantages to be had in following democratic life. A tremendous effort is required to prepare the masses to resist communism, he said.

Referring to economic development, the Minister commented that the Alliance for Progress is prepared to resolve the struggle against communism. He pointed out, however, that one year of the Alliance for Progress brings the conclusion that the immediate impact of the Alliance is retrogressive. He said that the Latin American countries have to adopt laws to change their fiscal structure. These laws react slowly, but fiscal needs are immediate. Therefore, said the Minister, there must be economic assistance to meet the increased fiscal load.

The Minister said that Russia can maintain its political communist system only by expansion. Rather than open war, stated the Minister, the Communists infiltrate. Panama is a victim of this. It is more serious than a military aggression, because it uses the needs of the masses for its ends.

The Minister indicated that the Caribbean countries are receiving the direct impact of the communist infiltration. These countries, he said, look with longing for continental solidarity to confront the menace, otherwise each country must try to save itself. He continued that the Charter will not get in the way of a country which feels its security threatened.

Although Panama is a small country, said Solís, she offers her full support to maintain inter-American solidarity at any cost in order to demonstrate to those countries more distant that sooner or later they may find themselves in a similar situation.

Secretary Rusk, at this point took the floor to say that the United States wished to consult with the Hemisphere and NATO countries on trade with Cuba. He pointed out that shipping to Cuba is not a significant hemisphere problem, but it is a serious problem with other friendly countries. He indicated that the United States has been discussing the problem with NATO allies. Germany, Turkey and others are taking steps to handle the problem, but other maritime countries do not have legal authority or the political possibility to demonstrate such a degree of cooperation. Therefore, said the Secretary, the United States has felt that it would be possible to make use of its own facilities and opportunities to restrict the Cuban trade. The President had asked him, the Secretary declared, to consult NATO and with the Ministers present on four points. The U.S. would:

1. Close all U.S. ports to all ships of a country if any ship under that country's flag carries arms to Cuba.

2. Direct that no U.S. cargoes be carried on foreign flag ships if any ship of the same owners is used hereafter in Bloc-Cuba trade.

3. Direct that no U.S. flag ship or U.S. owned ship shall carry goods to or from Cuba.

4. Close all U.S. ports to any ship which on the same continuous voyage was or is being used in Bloc-Cuba trade.

The Secretary said these points involve legal and practical problems.

The Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, Daniel ODUBER Quirós, recalled that Costa Rica had helped groups fighting for democracy, that Costa Rica supported Castro before 1959, and even after that date. He said that Costa Rica believes that the Cuban Government is accountable for betraying “our” revolution. Castro has started to fade in the last six months according to information reaching Costa Rica, he said. The Castro Revolution is starting into another phase, that being the Soviet Commissar phase so well known in the European satellites. He said the signs of occupation are clear and recalled statements of some of the other delegations on discrimination in rationing in favor of foreigners.

The Minister explained that Russia’s technique in the case of Cuba was to make itself appear as a protector of countries wanting to be independent. However, since July, because of developments in Cuba, Russia has been forced to unmask to a growing degree its true intention. The countries of the Western Hemisphere have not been telling the world what is happening, he said. The Soviet Union does not want professional communists to defend Castro. It wants “new liberal groups.” It has failed in this regard to a growing degree and, therefore, has now been forced to change its tactic and resort to giving military aid.

The Minister emphasized the strategic position of the Caribbean in hemispheric politics. Today, he said, we are being challenged in this strategic area. If Costa Rica fights against communism, it wants all of Latin America to fight, through the democratic system. He emphasized that we have confidence in democracy as the means for realizing our hopes. However, we must not continue hiding our conviction. If we are only content to yell “anti-communist”, he said, we will lose.

The Minister declared emphatically that we should give a collective report to the press and “demand” continental solidarity. He emphasized a point which he said he considered of utmost importance, that being that the strongest nation represented in the Meeting, the United States, was the least desirous of taking unilateral action for its security; that it, instead, had called all of its sister nations to Washington to consult.

He then proposed that there be a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to:

1. Study the possibilities of determining if the continuing arms build-up in Cuba constitutes an act of aggression;
2. Study how to strengthen the exercise of representative democracy;
3. Agree on the coordination of an increase in surveillance by land, sea and air;
4. Establish an effective exchange of information on developments in and activities of Cuba throughout the Hemisphere; and

5. Establish a method for coordination of propaganda to counter that of the Communists. The propaganda would make clear to the people the exact nature of the differences between democracy and communism.

The Colombian Foreign Minister, in reply to a question by the *Foreign Minister of Uruguay*, Homero MARTINEZ Montero, stated that there were positive and negative proofs of communist agitation among the Colombian bandit groups. As positive proof he cited large amounts of propaganda and weapons found among the groups. As a "negative" proof, the Minister explained that there had been a political struggle between the two Colombian political parties. Since the struggle no longer exists, and the bandit trouble still exists in Colombia, the origin of this trouble must be foreign groups. He added that Colombia does not have any ship's log stating that ships carried weapons, but Colombia has received oil drums and upon opening them has found them full of rifles. Weapons might be smuggled from Panama, and these might be traced to Cuba, but Colombia had no proof.

The Uruguayan Minister, noting that four countries at the Meeting still maintain diplomatic representatives in Cuba, said that Uruguay has reports that the Cuban food and health situation is very bad and that there is no domestic reserve of food.

The Brazilian Foreign Minister said that his Ambassador in Habana had reported that there is a food shortage in Cuba, but not a famine. *The Chilean Foreign Minister* agreed, and added that the rationing and the issuance of food cards in Cuba indicate that discrimination has been shown in the amount of food made available, with foreigners and certain Cuban families getting preference. *The Mexican Representative* said that Mexico's information coincided in general with the Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Chilean information.

Secretary Rusk thanked the Uruguayan for underlining the importance in exchanging information and the possibility of pooling information. The Secretary said that Canadian trade with Cuba has changed greatly, with a drop from \$35 to \$7 million. He noted a severe reduction in the amount of foreign exchange available to Cuba, and that the current supply of oil in Cuba, with rationing, will last for several months. The Secretary said that he would have information on this subject compiled for the Ministers.

The Dominican Foreign Minister commented that the British Embassy in Habana has been helpful to the Dominicans in supplying information, also Cubans who once worked for Castro brought out information. Regarding rationing in Cuba, Dr. Bonilla said there is a new class in Cuba, and Castro's enemies do not receive their food quotas.

The Uruguayan Foreign Minister expressed his conviction that the Foreign Ministers receive a large amount of propaganda from the exile

Cuban revolutionary councils. He asked the Secretary of State to enlighten the group as to whether there is more than one revolutionary council, and if one day should there be a new government in Cuba, whether there would be unity among exiles.

The Secretary responded that we need experts for precise information on this question. He commented that the Cubans find it difficult to agree among themselves and have different views. They have real political differences, although personal rivalries also prevail. The Secretary said that the assembled group should share information on this subject in detail.

The Dominican Foreign Minister said that he had been in touch with Dr. Miro Cardona, whose group represents what was formerly twenty groups. Unfortunately, Bonilla added, there are 122 additional groups. Some have so-called leaders and the members of the groups are the intimate friends of the leader. The Minister said he believed that Miro's group can be unified with the more important of the other Cuban exile groups. These groups should have a voice.

The Foreign Minister of Ecuador, Benjamin PERALTA Páez, in a short statement, expressed support for inter-American solidarity. He asserted that the inter-American system as expressed in treaties is flexible but is not able to take into account all possible measures. At the 8th MFM, the Foreign Ministers united against threats. The Minister expressed his and his Government's hope that America will continue along the paths of glorious dignity.

(The above conversations were carried on through interpreters.)

312. Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 3¹

Part III (of 4)

October 3, 1962

SUBJECT

Informal Meeting of the American Republics, Washington, D.C., October 2–3, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

See Attached List of Participants

¹ Communist infiltration in Cuba. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

The Foreign Minister of El Salvador, Hector ESCOBAR Serrano, expressed El Salvador's concern about Communist infiltration, and the psychological effect of Castro in El Salvador. The geographical situation of the Caribbean countries expose them more to Communist infiltration, and this vulnerability, said the Minister, should be concern for all Latin America. The Minister said that he could not determine whether communism has increased or decreased since Cuba declared itself Marxist-Leninist. The Communists challenge the Salvador Government openly, visit Cuba frequently, and import weapons and funds from Cuba. The Minister noted that new decrees have been passed in El Salvador to combat communism. But, he added, El Salvador knows that while successful, these decrees will not be enough. He declared his agreement with the Dominican Foreign Minister on the need to coordinate and increase democratic propaganda which must have strong content and must be accompanied with improvement of the social and physical lot of the people. Resources are limited, but the Alliance for Progress would be the best weapon if it were working faster, he said, adding that El Salvador is ready to support any measures to solve these problems.

Non-intervention and self-determination are important, said the Minister, but the case of Cuba, occupied by an extracontinental power is different. He expressed his concern for the plight of the Cuban people. He agreed with the Guatemalan suggestion that a Meeting of Consultation should be held immediately to guarantee hemispheric peace.

The Foreign Minister of Venezuela, Marcos FALCON-BRICENO, reviewed Venezuela's position vis-à-vis Cuba and her position at the 8th MFM. He said that Venezuela has no trade with Cuba, even though Cuba is a natural market for Venezuelan oil. In this connection, the Minister mentioned that the Soviet Government had tried to have Venezuela barter 16% of her surplus oil to the USSR.

The Venezuelan Minister commented that through friendly Ambassadors in Cuba and "serious" Cuban exiles, Venezuela has obtained the following information:

1. Anti-Castro penetration into the Cuban army is difficult. Cuban exiles with internal contacts say that the army is controlled by foreign officers and that not even the Cubans know what is going on in the army.
2. Castro doesn't trust his own militia men.
3. Cuba has armed herself disproportionately considering her size and is not directly paying the cost of these armaments. Her sugar production has decreased so that she does not have the funds to maintain her present large military apparatus.

4. Ambassadors in Habana report possible divisions between Castro and the Communists.

5. Cuba has unquestionably been for Venezuela and other countries a source of disturbances. Venezuela has no proof of Cuban arms in Venezuela but can assume that they are there. Cuba also continues a constant propaganda campaign against the Venezuelan Government.

The Government of Venezuela, stressed the Minister, believes that one of the safest bulwarks against the Communist struggle is democracy. Venezuela would prefer that a democratic reaffirmation be adopted by the Foreign Ministers rather than an anti-totalitarian position. He said that communism was no problem in Venezuela before Perez Jimenez, that it flourished during the ten year dictatorship, and that now President Betancourt has inherited the situation. Falcon-Briceño noted communism opposes dictatorship and thereby gains the support of democratic groups.

Instead of persecuting the Communists, the Betancourt administration, said Falcon-Briceño, initiated agrarian reform. The Foreign Minister said that because of Cuban influence, guerrilla groups, something not seen for many years, are now operating in Venezuela. However, these guerrillas, who must depend on the peasants, have not been well received by them for they are receiving the benefits of social and agrarian reform causing the avalanche of Communist propaganda to be unsuccessful. He claimed that Castro and communism will fail to take over Venezuela.

Falcon-Briceño concluded that the strengthening of American democratic regimes with a social concern will be the weapon to give the Latin American masses confidence so that they can face any extreme left or Communist movement.

Falcon-Briceño said the statement of the Costa Rican Foreign Minister contained specific points which the Ministers should vigorously put into action. He said the impact of the Cuban regime is felt more greatly in "our" area because of its proximity to Cuba, but, the impact is felt in all America. Cuba is being helped by an ambitious imperialist power which uses unscrupulous methods to infiltrate all of the American countries.

The Minister said that the Caribbean countries should not admit publicly that they are particularly vulnerable to Castro for this frightens away investors. The Minister said that the final communiqué must avoid these divisions and should always talk of "American" and should reaffirm faith in the representative democratic system which is the basis of the inter-American organization. The Minister declared that he was not trying to point at any country in discussing totalitarian regimes but that twentieth century democracy must respond to the needs of the awakening masses.

The Representative of Mexico, José GOROSTIZA, said that political stability and economic progress have been achieved in Mexico as a result of the Mexican revolution and these are the most solid barriers against Communist penetration in the continent.

Gorostiza noted that the meeting had been called because of Soviet military intensification in Cuba, but that the Ministers had been told that this is still defensive and is not a threat to the peace of the continent.

Gorostiza observed that Mexican relations with Cuba are based—as they are based with all—on the principle of non-intervention. Stressing that he was speaking in a hypothetical sense, he said that if Cuba should ever intervene in Mexican affairs, Mexico would “be in a position to face this situation”. However, if the situation is not dangerous militarily, then politically the situation is not dangerous. Mexico recognizes, he said, that Cuba can be of concern for other countries. The Cuban problem has already become an inter-American problem. The public sources, said Gorostiza, say that Cuba is becoming a critical point in the Cold War, in which case Mexico cannot be indifferent to the question. The Mexican delegate said that there should be no problem in expressing concern because the intensified assistance to Cuba is entering the field of armaments.

The Mexican said that a press communiqué at the end of the meeting should reflect only a unanimous consensus.

He spoke of the practical value of maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba. It is not necessary, he said, to evolve a list of suppositions as to how and when the situation in Cuba might become more serious. Soviet intervention in Cuba might call for a Meeting of Consultation. However, the Minister added, Mexico does not favor an early or premature Consultative Meeting which, when held, should be held strictly within the terms of the Rio Treaty.

Gorostiza indicated support for a propaganda program to counteract Communist propaganda, but he claimed that education is the best propaganda.

Subversion, travel of young people to Cuba for indoctrination, radio propaganda and transfer of funds from Cuba, he said, are controlled in Mexico by very specific laws; therefore, Mexico must leave each country to apply its own restrictions within its own laws.

Gorostiza said that Mexico favors an appeal to all democratic countries to refrain from transporting arms to Cuba. He said that he was unable to comment on the Secretary's four points on possible U.S. action to reduce shipping to Cuba, but added that Mexico might study this question in depth on a bilateral basis.

The tenor of the remarks of some Foreign Ministers on how Cuba affected their countries, Gorostiza said, caused him to believe that this

informal MFM might try to give an interpretation of paragraph three of Resolution II of the 8th MFM. He commented that he did not believe that this meeting could do this. If the Caribbean countries adopt a resolution for their common defense, the current informal MFM might take note of this effort in the sense that measures to be taken should be in accord with the Charter and the Rio Treaty. Gorostiza said that Mexico would accept any Caribbean resolution. Mexico would not feel free from the obligations imposed by these “instruments” [presumably meaning the Charter and the Rio Treaty] if faced by aggression.

Secretary Rusk at this point had distributed to the Foreign Ministers two papers: (1) *“Major Cuban Exile Organizations”*; and (2) *“The Status of Agriculture, Industry, and Medical Services in Cuba.”*

The Foreign Minister of Peru, Luis Edgardo LLOSA, began a review of the Cuban situation since the 8th MFM. Any doubts which Foreign Ministers there had of Soviet influence in Cuba surely had been eliminated, said Llosa. While he agreed that the present military situation in Cuba is not a threat and that the Soviet weapons there are not of an offensive nature, he nevertheless added that the military situation can change in a short time. For that reason consideration of Cuba as a Soviet stronghold and real threat to the U.S. and the hemisphere cannot be avoided.

The Minister said that fortunately the communist threat in Peru is still relatively small. The Communists are the only group, he asserted, which cannot take part in “public affairs”. While the Peruvian Government efficiently watches Communist activities there, the danger of infiltration by this well-trained group cannot be dismissed.

Llosa said he recognized that other countries are more closely affected by the proximity of Cuba. He added that he respected the opinion and the right of these countries to believe in a NATO type organization, but he could see that a NATO type organization could “conspire” against the inter-American system to which those present belong. He added his agreement that measures to fight communism should be adopted unanimously.

Llosa proposed three types of measures which, he thought, all present could accept at the present time—before the situation becomes uncontrollable:

1. Military measures;

(a) a meeting of an Advisory Defense Committee (under Art. 44 of the Charter) to deal with urgent military matters such as studying how troops and equipment in Cuba could militarily affect Hemisphere security;

(b) the IADB reviewing and bringing its defense plans up to date in light of recent events in Cuba;

(c) keeping close vigilance over Cuban waters to check arms, as proposed by the Secretary of State.

2. Economic measures; Isolating Cuba economically, including a complete break in trade relations, (the products at present being exported to Cuba to be sold to another free world country), and the elimination of all maritime and air traffic with Cuba. The Foreign Minister suggested that the four points on shipping mentioned by Secretary Rusk should be studied carefully by the American Republics.

The Minister added that, as an additional economic measure, each country should accelerate its slow moving social development. More assistance should be requested and red tape should be eliminated to provide more economic assistance sooner.

3. Political measures; Strengthening hemisphere unity and solidarity effectively to face the common enemy.

He said that there is the need to: Implement the inter-American agreements of 1948 and 1954 to contain Communism; to halt the travel of students to Cuba for indoctrination and military subversive training; to exchange information to coordinate the fight against subversion; and to strengthen and use more effectively the SCCS.

Llosa said that after the informal meeting, the Foreign Ministers should consider the possibility of a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to discuss exclusively the Cuban military build up and its Sino-Soviet links. The Minister closed his statement by stressing that Peru will support any collective action to impede the Cuban threat as well as any measures to re-establish immediately continental solidarity.

(The above conversations were carried on through interpreters.)

313. Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 3¹

Part IV (of 4)

October 3, 1962

SUBJECT

Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, Washington, D.C., October 2-3, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

See Attached List of Participants

¹ Communist infiltration in Cuba. Confidential. 8 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

In opening the afternoon session, *the Secretary* observed that members of the delegations were working on the draft of a communiqué which would state some of the ideas expressed at the current meeting. He said what was desired, to the extent possible, was a statement of mutual concern for developing events in Cuba.

The Haitian Foreign Minister, René CHALMERS, after commenting on the family council feeling of the meeting, then branched into a discussion of the history of communism, its efforts in Latin America, and the need to eliminate the climate which tends to make people accept the line that communism can fulfill their needs.

He announced that his country supports fully the position of Peru for a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to deal exclusively with Cuba and its penetration in the Americas. The Government of Haiti, concluded the Foreign Minister, is firmly at the side of the brother countries of America in the fight against Communist penetration in the hemisphere.

Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Homero MARTINEZ Montero, rejected the thesis that by containing Cuba within the perimeter of the island, the continent would be safe. Communism is using Cuba, Castro, and social injustice for penetration. In response, the American Governments must give their peoples a good standard of living, he said.

The Minister pointed out that all Cubans are not Communists; some believe in Castro, others accept him because of their impotency to fight him. Castro may come in conflict with his Communist masters. This conflict might tear apart the Cuban regime. The Cuban people should receive the truth from abroad so that they will know what is happening in their country.

The Minister then discussed Cuba's efforts to join the Latin American Free Trade Zone, which the American Republics frustrated. Referring to Castro's accusations that provisions of the Montevideo Treaty were being ignored, Martinez asked why the American Republics should validate by their silence Castro's charges.

Martinez noted that Cuba is politically dominated by Communists and is armed as no other Latin American country. The decision to launch an attack will be taken not by Castro but by the USSR. The latter, said the Minister, will think twice about taking aggressive measures because it knows that the Free World will react strongly.

The Cuban problem cannot be ignored, he continued, but it is difficult to know whether Castro may try coups d'état or armed attacks. But all American Governments must be ready to repel these activities and have the will to defend themselves and others. Martinez asked that there be an exchange between governments of information on subversion affecting the other governments. He suggested that Castro's

radio stations, one of which is the strongest in the Caribbean, could be silenced if brief, easy-to-read materials were distributed to Latin Americans. Martinez spoke favorably of the creation of a Latin American radio station to let others, even those in the United States, know what the Latin Americans are thinking.

Speaking of the Alliance for Progress, Martinez said that its effects will be slow in coming and will be delayed more than is advisable. He said that neither the Latin American countries nor the United States are prepared to put the Alliance into effect. Coordination among the governments is imperfect and should be improved.

Martinez then spoke of the problem of low prices for Latin American commodities and ever higher industrial prices. Where prices of Latin American products are higher, less aid is needed, for the Latin Americans prefer dignity. Martinez averred that the Communists offer Latin America safe markets and good returns for their products. Martinez offered an offhand criticism of the Common Market. Referring to a speech of Henri Spaak in the U.N. on the preceding Monday, Martinez noted that Spaak made no mention of Latin America, so that Latin America is outside the Common Market's world plans. He noted that the Secretary of State has given the Latins hope in saying that the U.S. would use its influence to defend the Latin American export production. Martinez formally proposed at that point that such a statement be included as one of the items of agreement at the current meeting.

On the notion of inter-American solidarity, the Foreign Minister noted that the fight against communism cannot be resolved if the American Republics cannot resolve their differences, which are small in comparison.

The Brazilian Special Representative, Afonso ARINOS de Mello Franco, began by explaining the absence of the Brazilian Foreign Minister.

He said that three fundamental conclusions could be drawn from the preceding speeches: (1) the formal appeal of this meeting for a strengthening of continental solidarity; (2) the expression of concern over the Communist threat; (3) the almost unanimous consensus on the advisability that the current meeting conclude with a document corresponding to the statements made at the meeting.

Arinos said that there is no doubt of continental solidarity in recognizing and willingness to meet the continental threat. He had noticed, he said, a few discreet comments to the effect that this solidarity could be harmed. Some countries, he said, seek for themselves the most suitable internal methods to solve the Communist threat. He pointed out that Brazil does not believe that a country's internal policy for handling the Communist threat can be treated as part of the general question of continental solidarity.

Arinos said that Brazil is determined to combat the Communist threat and pointed out that the Communist Party in Brazil is outlawed because it has not technically met the requirements of the electoral law. He then noted that the Communist Party in Brazil in the last election in which it operated pulled about five percent of the vote. Arinos asserted that an inter-American procedure to fight communism cannot be restricted to a plan which does not apply in fact and in practice to his country. He then reviewed steps being taken in Brazil to counter communism and noted certain signs of good results.

Moving to the question of regional action against the Castro threat, Arinos commented on the Venezuelan Foreign Minister's idea that there are certain disadvantages in officially recognizing that the pressures are stronger in certain regions of the continent by asking which countries would be officially designated as the "nerve center of the storm". The Brazilian acknowledged that there is no doubt that special situations exist which make the Cuban Communist threat more keenly felt and effective in given regions of the continent. Therefore, within the framework suggested today by the Mexican delegate, there should be recognized the spontaneous right of the representatives of these countries to coordinate or organize themselves into a sort of regional organization. Their defensive organization would operate in the framework of existing treaties.

The Minister commented that the final communiqué ought not to state that a general universal course of action is recommended for a given region. It is not acceptable to recommend measures for specific countries which already have their own ways to combat communism.

Arinos emphasized that the communiqué should express a unanimous consensus. A spirit of tact is required to find the common ground for agreement. Arinos stressed that he came to the meeting with an open mind. Claiming that those who do not know Brazil had expressed doubts about her, Arinos also commented that understanding is indispensable for continental solidarity.

The Chilean Foreign Minister, Carlos MARTINEZ Sotomayor, said that his presence at the informal meeting was true proof that Chile understands the gesture of the Department of State, and that Chile wishes to express her friendship. He then explained the Chilean constitutional provision requiring Chamber of Deputies approval for his attendance at the informal meeting and that the Chamber had approved his attendance when it was made clear that there would be no votes, resolutions, nor agenda. The Minister expressed agreement with the issuance of a communiqué at the end of the meeting, but he understood that it would be a simple narration or description of unanimity on general or specific ideas.

He expressed agreement with the Peruvian's statement that three kinds of methods are necessary to combat communism: Military, eco-

conomic, and political. The Chilean Foreign Minister agreed with the Brazilian delegate's speech which suggested three minimum aspects as unanimous agreement of the meeting: (1) continental solidarity; (2) recognition of the threat of communism in America; and (3) issuance of a communiqué.

Reviewing the situation in Chile, the Foreign Minister said that pro-Castro activities are not at present important. The Communist Party is legal in Chile and has seats in Congress. It may be, the Minister said, that the public does not accept the Castro image any more. Exporting the Cuban revolution to Chile, he said, makes no sense. This fact can be seen in Chilean elections, the Minister said, recalling a recent by-election in Santiago where the group representing Castro was defeated, and a non-Castroite was elected.

Fueling his argument that Castro is not a problem in Chile, the Minister said that no arms have been exported to Chile. Martinez stated categorically that no groups of Chileans are going to Cuba, although a few individuals go there but cannot remain outside Chile for an extended period because of passport limitations. There are FAO technicians who are Chilean who went to Cuba during the first stage of the revolution and not quite a hundred are still there. Gorostiza of Mexico nodded his head affirmatively when the Chilean delegate said that Gorostiza would probably know that the number of Chileans going to Cuba is limited.

The Minister said that the Cuban situation is part of the Cold War. He subscribed to Minister Oduber's comment that communism should be faced positively. Democracy, said Martinez, must show that it can accomplish the revolution and put an end to poverty, illness, and ignorance. It is most essential, he added, that the American Republics offer steadily greater respect for human rights and improvement of democratic institutions. These measures the Foreign Ministers adopted at the 8th MFM against only one negative vote. The American Republics have the instruments and elements through existing agreements to handle the events of the past few months in Cuba.

The Chilean Foreign Minister said that there was some difference between the scope which the U.S. Government placed on the communiqué and the scope seen by certain others who cannot trespass certain constitutional limitations.

He said that if there are differences between the Republics over a communiqué, they will be creating a remedy worse than the disease and will be contributing to the Castro revolution in Cuba. Chile believes, said Martinez, in the efficacy of the mechanisms of the OAS and through these will give the fullest cooperation in the framework of continental solidarity. The final communiqué should not be a document which could be misunderstood.

The Bolivian Foreign Minister, José FELLMAN Velarde, said Bolivia is here to demonstrate its solidarity. He added that because of the Bolivian position in the inter-American system, he would not present any issues not in line with the cordiality of the gathering. He reaffirmed his expectation that no resolutions or recommendations would be adopted.

Reviewing the opinions expressed by the foreign ministers, Fellman categorized: (1) those of a special nature, relating particularly to certain countries. Presumably thinking of the Caribbean area, Fellman said that Bolivia recognizes the right of a group of countries to “coordinate agreements”, (2) those of a multilateral nature concerning controls on travel, etc. Bolivia, he said, supports all such ideas in line with the decisions taken at the 8th MFM which cover all these points, (3) those suggestions which would be operative through the OAS. Bolivia, said Fellman, could not give its opinion on these because of its being separated provisionally, he hoped, from the OAS.

Fellman agreed that there was a consensus at the informal meeting to put democratic government in opposition to the Communist system. The best way to do this is to offer freedom, economic security, and a better distribution of wealth. He suggested that the communiqué ought to mention the adequate treatment of Latin American raw materials.

Secretary Rusk, as Chairman, noted that it was not for him to offer a ruling on the inclusion of such an item because it is not his function. Speaking of the communiqué to be discussed later, the Secretary indicated that since the meeting is informal, no group can put into the mouths of others its views. “It will be fine if we can agree”, said the Secretary, “and if some countries cannot agree perhaps “we can talk about that later.”

Minister Bonilla of the Dominican Republic distributed to the Ministers the SCCS report of its investigation in the Dominican Republic of Castro’s subversive efforts and opined that the instruments of the OAS are available and should be used. He said that he was preparing a draft “execution plan” for the resolutions of Punta del Este which he did not have time to complete prior to the termination of the informal meeting. He promised, however, that when completed the plan would be sent to all present. Bonilla called for solutions to the differences which separate the American countries, and asked Bolivia and Chile to join hands again so that Bolivia might again be a member of the OAS.

Discussion of Draft Communiqué

The Secretary of State introduced for discussion a draft communiqué which had been prepared for the Ministers’ consideration.

The comments of the *Chilean Foreign Minister* stressed that the communiqué should always describe the meeting as informal. He rec-

commended repeatedly changes of wording in order to make the communiqué less resolution-like in nature. The Chilean rejected a revised paragraph dealing with limitations on the Cuban trade, but finally did not insist that his reservation be recorded when the paragraph, with slight changes, was included in the communiqué. The Chilean also expressed on different occasions a preference to use the adjective "communist" or "international communist" in preference to the word "Sino-Soviet".

The Mexican Representative questioned frequently the harshness of the wording and content of some paragraphs because of his fear that they might harm Mexico's diplomatic relations with Habana, and Mexico's efforts to secure safe conduct for Cuban asylees.

The Brazilian Representative made it clear that uppermost in his mind was inter-American adherence to principles of self-determination and nonintervention. He secured inclusion of a statement of these principles in the communiqué. He also claimed that some of the portions of the draft were unacceptable because they dictated methods for combatting communism in conflict with Brazilian internal law. Primarily because of his objections, as well as the objections of the Mexican, there was deleted from the communiqué a paragraph which stated that the Castro regime has betrayed the original postulates of the Cuban revolution and subjugated Cuban sovereignty to Soviet imperialism. The Brazilian generally attempted to blunt the impact of the wording of the communiqué.

The Bolivian Foreign Minister frequently suggested revised wording, stressing the more trivial. He also suggested revised wording to tone down a strong phraseology in the communiqué and more than once indicated that he could not express an opinion on those parts of the communiqué directly related to the OAS. The Bolivian Foreign Minister obtained inclusion of a statement that adequate treatment should be given Latin American export commodities.

The original draft of one of the paragraphs recognized the fact that the Caribbean area is particularly vulnerable to the Castro threat. *The Foreign Minister of Costa Rica*, joined by the *Foreign Minister of Guatemala*, requested that this reference be deleted.

The Peruvian Foreign Minister frequently stressed the need for unanimity on the contents of the communiqué and complained that nowhere in the draft communiqué was there a reference to the need for inter-American solidarity. The Secretary pointed out that paragraph one made such a reference.

The Colombian Foreign Minister made several suggestions aimed at resolving differences of opinion. Some of his comments implied complaint at too weak a communiqué.

The Secretary of State, in closing the informal meeting, noted that there has been a growing solidarity among the American Republics since the 8th MFM as well as a growing awareness in the United States of the problem of Cuba. He expected that the United States would be in constant touch with the other American Republics on these matters. Secretary Rusk reiterated that he did not bring to the informal meeting any concealed intentions. He asked the Ministers to leave in a spirit of confidence and solidarity, with emphasis on their agreement at the informal meeting.

(Interpreters were utilized during the course of the conversation.)

314. Memorandum from Sloan to Gilpatric, October 8¹

October 8, 1962

SUBJECT

Release of Cuban Prisoners

At a special meeting at State Saturday afternoon, John McCone advised the status of the Donovan mission to Havana. Following the meeting, contact was made with the President who approved the general conclusions. One of these conclusions was that little or no attempt at secrecy would be useful for more than a short time and that admission of the U.S. Government backing of the exchange would be made (without details) upon press inquiry.

The quid pro quo is \$50 million in drugs and medicines (\$20 million cost to Government) plus approximately \$7 million collected by the Prisoners' Committee, in cash, to be transferred to the Royal Bank of Canada.

Donovan, after flying to Miami yesterday for some last minute instructions from Mr. McCone, was to return to Havana and fly out with the last group of prisoners. A contract with Pan American had already been affected by CIA to bring the prisoners out commencing today or tomorrow if all goes well.

I am available to brief you on further details of the meeting if you wish.

Frank K. Sloan
Deputy Assistant Secretary

¹ Release of Cuban prisoners. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3591, Cuba 1962, 00.1 (383.6 Cuba).

315. Summary memorandum of discussions with Congressional Leaders, October 8¹

October 8, 1962

THE DONOVAN PROJECT

1. Each of the following was given a briefing of the background of the transaction from the time the Cuban Prisoner Family Committee negotiated for the release of 60 prisoners who were ill and Castro established a \$62 million prize for all prisoners, down to the current status of the negotiation as outlined in draft memorandum of 6 October 1962.

2. Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Kuchel and Saltonstall agreed without reservation and with full knowledge of the extent of the covert U.S. Government support as outlined in the memorandum.

3. Chairman Cannon and Vinson also agreed. Cannon indicated he would expect CIA funds used in the amounts indicated to be replaced from other reserves, such as the "Presidential Reserve Fund." Chairman Vinson in approving requested that Congressman Les Arends be informed and this will be done immediately.

4. Senator Russell, when briefed on Thursday, indicated no positive objection but wished to be informed as negotiations progress and expressed particular concern over the use of government appropriated funds, indicating a preference for the use of surplus foods which would not represent an "out of pocket loss" to the U.S. Government. Parenthetically Senator Russell was unavailable Saturday afternoon and Sunday and will be contacted today if possible.

5. Speaker McCormack has not been available. An attempt will be made to contact him on October the 8th.

6. Congressman Charles Halleck voiced strong opposition, indicating a preference to "take the prisoners by force." However when asked if this meant he advocated military invasion of Cuba, he replied that he did not. Halleck stated that he would not disclose DCI discussion with him nor would he speak out against the transaction if it was consummated.

7. Senator Hickenlooper indicated dissatisfaction on the grounds that the release of the prisoners for a substantial consideration, even though in the form of drugs and food, would create adverse reaction with allies and neutral countries we have asked not to trade with Cuba.

¹ Donovan project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.

He believed that for the long term, firmness in our policy would be better and that this trade would be unacceptable to a large segment of the American people. Hickenlooper reserved the right to speak out against the transaction but added he would respect all confidences.

John A. McCone
Director

316. Memorandum for the record, October 9¹

October 9, 1962

Meeting attended by the President, the Attorney General, Secretary Ball, Mr. Bundy, Secretary Martin of State, and Mr. McCone at noon on Tuesday, 9 October 1962

1. McCone stated the position of Senator Russell as developed in his talk with Mr. Warner, and recorded in the Warner memorandum. The President asked that McCone see the Vice President and then if the Vice President feels it advisable arrange a meeting with the President, Vice President, and DCI and Russell the following day.

2. The status of the financial transactions as discussed with Donovan on Sunday was thoroughly reviewed and understood by all. It was agreed that the U.S. was really in the role of a guarantor and in all probability, the U.S. position must ultimately be made public. Decision on this was not reached.

3. McCone reviewed in detail the discussions with Donovan on Sunday and with McKeen and Connor. There followed an extended discussion of possibility of using tax deductible contributions as a means of reducing the U.S. government commitment from appropriated funds.

4. The President asked McCone to contact Mahon and Ford. This was done and is covered in a separate memorandum.

5. McCone met with the Vice President on Monday evening. The Vice President urged that an agreement be reached with Russell; said that if this is not done, Russell had the power to destroy the DCI and CIA; that the Vice President would not support the deal unless Russell

¹ Summaries of meetings with the President and Vice President on the Donovan project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.

was on board, that the Vice President felt very serious political implications and these would be most serious in Texas; and finally agreed to go along if Russell went along.

John A. McCone
Director

**317. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and Acting DCI Carter, October 13¹**

October 13, 1962

In the light of the extensive discussions which have been conducted in recent days with respect to the responsibility for a particular reconnaissance operation authorized by higher authority on October 9th, I wish to record my own view of the present situation and of appropriate further procedures. In the light of the views of those with direct recollection of opinions of higher authority who are present in Washington, it seems to me right that responsibility for this particular operation which has been authorized should now be vested in the Department of Defense, and it is the understanding of all concerned that this responsibility now rests with that department. I have been assured by the Acting Director of CIA that all of his people are being instructed to cooperate in every way. At the same time, we must all recognize that there is here a deep and honest difference of opinion not only about the wisdom of this particular decision but also in the best way of proceeding in the future. Accordingly, it is my judgment that the assignment of responsibility for this operation should not be regarded as a binding precedent and that the whole question of roles and responsibilities in this area should be reviewed by the appropriate special group and presented to higher authority for decision when further authorizations are requested.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Bundy's view of situation involving Donovan project and further responsibilities therefore. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.

318. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 15¹

October 15, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962,
DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Monday, 15 October

JCS met at 1400; SecDef and DepSecDef joined them at 1430; Discussion of JCS 2304/68, contingency planning for Cuba:

CJCS: If CPLAN 316's requirement for an airborne assault after five days' preparation is to be met, the Marine RCT must move from Camp Pendleton to the East Coast.

SecDef: President wants no military action within the next three months, but he can't be sure as he does not control events. For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 63 boxes on ships that are not believed to be 11–28s and cannot be identified. However, the probabilities are strongly against military action in the next 30 days.

Discussion of JCS 2304/69, which deals with preparations necessary to execute oplans:

SecDef: I suggest we use [*1½ lines not declassified*]. We can't do what the British and French did over Suez—say we will take action, then do nothing while a long buildup is completed. We can't do nothing during the 18-day preparatory period for OPLAN 314 while the enemy

¹ Contingency planning for Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

prepares and world pressure mounts. So I suggest that [*1½ lines not declassified*].

CNC: A Marine RLT would have to be moved from the West Coast; that requires 20 days' notice and an 18-day voyage.

SecDef: We would not mobilize reserve air squadrons until air strikes begin. All present agreed.

CSA: The thing about OPLAN 314 that bothers me is that we [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

[*text not declassified*]

SecDef: We should bring this problem to the President's attention as soon as possible. [*1½ lines not declassified*] JCS agreed with him that a briefing should be prepared for the President outlining these two alternatives.

319. Memorandum for the record by General Carter, October 17¹

October 17, 1962

1. On Monday evening, 15 October late, I was informed that the latest readout from Cuban U-2 photography indicated initial deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. I immediately authorized the dissemination of this information on a very limited need-to-know basis to USIB members and their immediate commanders. On Tuesday morning at 11:45 I attended an NSC Meeting at the White House which included the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Secretary Martin, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Gilpatric, General Taylor, the Vice President, Secretary Dillon, the Attorney General, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and myself. I made a preliminary briefing to the group as to what we thought we saw and Mr. Lundahl and Mr. Graybeal expanded thereon. At the end of the intelligence portion of the briefing, the group went into general discussion.

2. Secretary Rusk was greatly disturbed about this new development but pointed out that Mr. McCone had predicted such a possibility back in mid-August. He said that he had been thinking about courses

¹ Summary of October 16 NSC meeting with the President re latest U-2 photography indicating deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.

of action and that he had a number of comments to make, along the following lines:

- a. A quick-strike surprise attack by air to wipe out these bases;
- b. Consideration to expand this into a total invasion to take over the island;
- c. We must not operate in a vacuum but must of course pre-inform our allies, at least in part;
- d. We should consider making an announcement very shortly and to determine whether or not to call up the Reserves;
- e. Perhaps we should get in touch with Castro through a third party and tell him it was now or never and that he was selling Cuba down the river by getting involved with Soviet missile bases;
- f. We should try to create maximum confusion and not worry too much about the noise level. Here he was referring to infiltration and sabotage efforts;
- g. We should review our policy on a provisional government and try to get all the various factions working together. In any event, we must keep Cuba isolated from the Free World although in doing so we must not isolate ourselves.

3. In the final analysis Mr. Rusk felt that we had to either make a quick surprise attack and knock out these bases or to lay on a heavy propaganda barrage in all areas which might cause a withdrawal. Rusk stated that we could not in our thinking separate Berlin and other trouble areas in the world. He seemed deeply troubled and did not seem firm in any of his proposals but appeared to have been boxing the compass as to courses of action.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that if we are going to take overt military action, it must at all costs be done on a 100% basis and before any of the missiles become operational. General Taylor pointed out that the element of surprise would be essential but since this would then be a one-shot operation, we should establish an immediate blockade and then look toward invasion although this latter prospect did not enthuse him. He stated that the decision to invade would be the hardest one to make because of the long-time involvements and the lack of any substitute for the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Soviet decision must have been made early in the summer and that these missiles probably arrived in Cuba at about the time the President was making his policy statements. Bundy thought there was a real possibility that Khrushchev may be confused or misled as to the temper of the American people and the intimate concern we all have over Cuba.

5. The President pointed out that the missiles certainly had to be removed one way or another, and stated that he would meet again at six o'clock that evening with his advisers. In the meantime there was much information to be gathered and much analysis to be done as to pros and cons of all the various courses of action. He authorized as

many U-2 flights as needed to get full, complete, 100% coverage of the island. He asked for a report on the latest analysis of just what the thinking toward Cuba is in Latin American countries as well as NATO as to any action the U.S. might take; some unanswered questions on whether or not to surface the fact that we were making surveillance flights and whether or not to surface this new information; also whether to precede any military action by some form of political pressure action; what would be the effect of military strikes, how long would it take to organize, how many sorties would be required, etc.

320. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 16¹

October 16, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

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RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Tuesday, 16 October

JCS Meeting at 1000:

CJCS says he will see the President at 1145.

¹ Medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

Briefing by Mr. McLaughlin of DIA: 3 SS–3 sites located: MRBMs could have ranges of either 700 or 1100 miles; all-out effort could make them operational within 24 hours.

VCSAF (Gen. Seth McKee): Once the missile sites become operational, Castro can threaten retaliation for any offensive move by the US. Delaying action until the missiles are set up could touch off nuclear war.

CMC: Soviets might be attempting to pose a nuclear threat to the US without running a risk of nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union.

JCS agree the threat is so serious as to require the US to take out the missiles by military effort.

CSA favored air attack without warning, to be followed by invasion.

CNO recommended air attack followed by invasion as the only way to eliminate the Communist regime from Cuba. Once the missiles were removed, however, he did not see a Communist Cuba as a military threat.

JCSAF foresaw a possibility of avoiding the need for invasion by efficient application of air strikes and naval blockage.

CJCS: am not convinced that air strikes need be followed by an invasion. What threat is Cuba once missiles and aircraft are knocked out?

CMC favored an ultimatum to remove the missiles or the US would destroy them.

JCS agreed that the recommended sequence would be: get additional intelligence: make surprise attacks on missiles, airfields, PT boats, SAMs and tanks; concurrently, reinforce Guantanamo; prepare to initiate an invasion.

JCS meeting at 1630 attended by Adm. Dennison (CINCLANT), Gen. Power (CINCSAC), Gen. Sweeney (CG, TAC) and LTG Hamilton Howze (SG [illegible in the original] Abn Corps);

CJCS gives a debrief of the 1145 White House meeting; President gave unlimited authority to use U–2 reconnaissance. Rusk said he was not certain that the MRBMs were in Cuba. SecDef, after being briefed on JCS recommendation, was with us except on one point: We should strike before any of the missiles show their head, before they become completely operational. CJCS then had presented the JCS view [*1½ lines not declassified*]. Conferees felt that our deterrent would keep Khrushchev from firing nuclear missiles. The President speculated why Khrushchev would put missiles in Cuba. Rusk said: To supplement his MRBM capabilities and further his [illegible in the original] objectives. After President left the meeting, SecDef set forth his view that the known missiles would have to be taken out.

CJCS concluded his debrief by saying that the question was whether to go for the missiles or go for missiles as well as blockade, to be followed by possible invasion.

JCS and commanders discussion followed:

CJCS: in an invasion, we would be playing Khrushchev's game by getting 250,000 troops tied up ashore.

Discussion followed of what targets should be attacked: Must be not only MRBMs but also M.Gs, SAMs, patrol boats, tank parks, and all significant military targets, together with a blockade. [*1 line not declassified*] JCS discarded the 18-day buildup period. SecDef then joined the meeting: I said this morning that *after* missiles are operational. I was against attacking Cuba because they probably could launch missiles before we destroyed them. SecDef asks JCS whether they would favor attacking under those circumstances; they say yes. SecDef gives the following guidance: Heavy reconnaissance effort is authorized as well as augmentation of air defenses in the Southeastern U.S. I think that three courses of action were open: (1) political moves—useless; (2) open surveillance and weapons blockade, and if they use missiles we attack—costly but might be worth the cost; (3) a military action—might trigger a Soviet response. JCS agreed that the following general war preparatory steps were necessary: SAC on 178th airborne alert; disperse those SAC and NORAD aircraft carrying nuclear weapons; move Polaris subs from Holy Land; augment air defenses in the Southeast; [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

After SecDef left, CJCS asked whether JCS favored going to low-level reconnaissance flights, which might tie our hand. All said no.

JCS agreed that if the decision was to go for MRBMs only, they would recommend that we not do anything.

**321. Memorandum from Carter to the Special Group
(Augmented), October 16¹**

October 16, 1962

SUBJECT

Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals

1. The Director of Central Intelligence proposes that CIA undertake as soon as possible the following listed sabotage operations:

a. Demolition by an eight-man raider team of the railroad bridge near Galafre, Pinar del Rio Province

b. An underwater demolition attack by two Cuban frogmen against shipping and port facilities at the port of La Isabella, Las Villas Province

c. *[text not declassified]*

d. Mine with moored oil drum mines the approaches to one or more of the following harbors: Moa Bay, Nicaro, Banes, Neuvas, Mariel, Bahia Honda

e. A demolition attack by a hit-and-run raider team on the Matanzas power plant

f. A hit-and-run mortar and gunfire attack on the Soviet SAM site near Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province

g. *[text not declassified]*

h. Set afire by gunfire an oil tanker off Havana or Matanzas harbor. This operation will be mounted from a small, fast boat using recoilless rifles and rockets.

i. Incendiary attack by a hit-and-run raider team on the Texaco oil refineries at Havana and Santiago

2. Approval of the Special Group (Augmented) is requested for CIA to undertake the above listed sabotage and raider operations.

Marshall S. Carter

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Operation Mongoose/Sabotage Proposals. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.

322. Memorandum for the record, October 16¹

October 16, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House on Cuban MRBM's, October 16, 1962

ATTENDANCE

The President
Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of State Ball
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Mr. Martin
General Carter
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Sorenson

1. General Carter led off by showing the President a recent intelligence report on Cuban MRBM's. It was stated that it was difficult to say whether any of the missiles were operational. That required stable, hard platforms, the presence of which could not be assured from the air photos. Secretary McNamara pointed out there was no security guards at the site, hence it was difficult for him to believe that atomic storage was present.

2. Upon the request of CIA and Secretary McNamara, the President approved such U-2 flights as might be necessary in the future. Low level flights were discussed but no decision was taken.

3. Secretary Rusk expressed surprise the Soviets had given MRBM's to Cuba. He thought that we should respond by a series of acts which were divested under two alternative heads: either start with a sudden air strikes against military targets, or, alternatively, a slow buildup of acts prior to military strikes. He explained the latter as including an appeal to OAS, possibly getting word to Castro that he risks destruction or betrayal. At some point we might call up selected military forces and announce what has taken place in Cuba and stating that we intend to conduct continued surveillance of the Island. We might also reinforce

¹ Meeting at the White House on Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Memos for the Record.

our forces in Guantanamo and in the southeastern part of the United States. Finally, we might step up action in the guerrilla field, review(?) possible exile political organizations, and alert our allies while asking them to stop all communication with Cuba.

4. Secretary McNamara emphasized the need to schedule air strikes prior to the time when the missiles would become operational. His thought was to strike all missile aircraft and nuclear storage sites as fast as possible. Thereafter we should be prepared to invade within seven days while mobilizing to the level of 150,000.

5. General Taylor stressed the importance of surprise in making an air attack and added that it would be necessary to have a naval blockade to prevent the continued introduction of war materials.

6. Secretary Rusk pointed out that if the Cubans fired a single missile that would be the start of a general nuclear war and Khrushchev must know this.

7. The President wondered why Khrushchev has given missiles to the Cubans. Rusk replied that it was probable to add MRBM's to his strike capability and perhaps provoke us into an involvement before a Berlin crisis.

8. Secretary Dillon pointed out that the followed political track would give the USSR time to utter threats of retaliation from which it might be difficult to withdraw, hence he would favor a quick, sudden strike.

9. Bundy mentioned the adverse effect on allies of the actions under consideration.

10. The Vice President expressed himself in favor of taking out the missiles although recognizing the adverse factors.

11. General Taylor called attention to the fact that there would not be a single air strike but rather a continuous series in order to assure no reappearance of offensive weapons.

12. The President summed up the points which must be decided as follows:

- a. Should we attack just the three missile bases or the broader targets suggested by Secretary McNamara?
- b. Should we review(?) the foregoing and institute a naval blockade?
- c. Whom should we consult prior to action?

He later expressed the certainty that we should at a minimum take out all known missiles. At the same time, we should prepare for the complete air strike and be ready for a follow-up invasion.

13. There was some discussion of the need to expand the number of individuals privileged to the plan. General Taylor pointed out the need to give need-to-know information to certain commanders, expressing the view that about ten individuals represented the requirement at this time.

14. It was agreed to meet again on the same day at 7 p.m.

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**323. Memorandum of conversation between Carter and Hilsman,
October 16¹**

October 16, 1962

General Carter: I just got back to the office and heard the quote that was going around the Agency that you had said, in going in to see Dean Rusk, that you had to report a tremendous failure on the part of U.S. intelligence—I don't know whether it's true or not, it's true in part, but I thought you should also know that Dean Rusk, at the meeting this morning, said, substantially along these lines, "This is really no surprise, Mr. McCone alerted us to it in mid-August." Which he had done and which he put in a message to me when he was on his honeymoon, bringing it up.

Mr. Hilsman: Well, I don't know—funny, I don't recall saying anything in going in to see Dean Rusk. Oh, maybe when your fellow was listening, what I said was none of us, with the notable exception of McCone, really expected this, and I think none of the Sovietologists—

General Carter: That's true, nobody expected it except Mr. McCone. Incidentally, if there isn't any secretary listening on your line, you'd be interested in Bobby's reaction—"Oh, s——!"

Mr. Hilsman: No, but what I was saying to the Secretary, quite sincerely, was that I did not expect it.

General Carter: Well, none of our people did either.

Mr. Hilsman: None of my Sovietologists did.

¹ Failure of U.S. intelligence (with the exception of McCone) to predict development of Soviet missiles in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.

General Carter: Our psychiatrists over here didn't even expect it. OK, Roger—

Mr. Hilsman: Mr. McCone's the only one who can claim to have foreseen this because—I didn't expect it, and it was—nor did any of the other Sovietologists—

General Carter: Well, my only claim to fame is that in June I wrote a memo to Mr. McCone and said, "What's going to happen if such and such happens, are we ready for it?", you know—this, however, referred to the early August stuff and not the current stuff, so I can't claim a damn thing—but Mr. McCone really had it pegged; he's coming in, incidentally.

Mr. Hilsman: Well, I'm frank to admit that I did not expect this.

General Carter: OK, coach, lots of things are going on around here—

Mr. Hilsman: Yes, I imagine.

General Carter: I'll see you.

324. Paper prepared by Sorensen, October 16¹

October 16, 1962

Recognizing that only the most unusual circumstances would cause this country to initiate an armed attack, and to risk even slightly the chance that the chain of events thus precipitated might lead to nuclear war, we should at least make certain that we are prepared to answer in perspective the following questions:

1. How many other Soviet missiles—ICBM's or submarine-based MRBM's—are already pointed at the United States?

—(If the answer is none, does one MRBM complex pose a very real threat when we have so many to deter its use?)

—Assuming the answer is many, how significantly does one additional complex increase the total number of megatonnage hanging over our heads?

2. If the decision is made that this complex must go, are there non-military means of getting it withdrawn?

¹ Questions U.S. should be prepared to answer in case Soviet missiles in Cuba cause the United States to initiate an armed attack that might lead to nuclear war. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, 1961–64, Cuba, General, 1962.

—Pressure on Castro, warning of destruction to island?

—Pressure on Khrushchev, warning of danger of war or of our stationing nuclear warheads in Berlin or Iran?

3. If the decision is made that it must be taken out by military means, are there any means short of an air strike?

—Guerrilla action or saboteurs in that area?

4. If the decision is made that it must be taken out by an air strike, can that strike be so swiftly completed and so clearly confined to this one complex that we can announce that our policy remains the same, having merely implemented one feature (“if Cuba should ever become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security”) in self-defense, but without any intention of abandoning our traditional peaceful and collective posture?

—This would presumably sit easier in Hemisphere, among Allies, in UN, perhaps even among the Soviets—and would prevent Congress from asking how we could engage in general warfare without their declaring war or being consulted.

5. Other possible questions:

A. Would it be helpful—in presenting our case to the nation and world afterwards—to obtain (presumably publicly through some third nation at the UN, or privately more directly) a new Soviet (and possibly Cuban) denial that such an offensive capability existed?

B. Can we get the prisoners out first—so we can explain in our telecast that they were hostages likely to be killed in the event of our strike?

C. If we announce continued and close surveillance and similar action against any new missiles, do we need a naval blockade (which would stop friendly ships but not Soviet submarines)?

D. Is another unpopular call-up of reservists essential in the next three weeks?

E. Can any public announcement be delayed—in the interests of national security—until after the missile complex is gone (thus preventing both panic and political turmoil)?

F. Are we prepared for all contingencies of Soviet counteraction—e.g., a similar “clean, swift strike” against bases in Turkey or West Berlin?

325. Memorandum from Dillon to the President, undated¹

undated

It is my view that the Soviet Union has now deliberately initiated a public test of our intentions that can determine the future course of world events for many years to come.

If we allow the offensive capabilities presently in Cuba to remain there, I am convinced that sooner or later and probably sooner we will lose all Latin America to Communism because all credibility of our willingness to effectively resist Soviet military power will have been removed in the eyes of the Latins. We can also expect similar reactions elsewhere, for instance in Iran, Thailand, and Pakistan.

I, therefore, believe that the survival of our nation demands the prompt elimination of the offensive weapons now in Cuba. This cannot be negotiable and any course of action leading to negotiation on this issue, which inevitably would be prolonged, would have the results outlined above.

The question remains how best to achieve the prompt elimination of these weapons from Cuba. I recognize fully the public opinion difficulties involved in a surprise attack but believe that, if no other effective course is available, they must be accepted rather than run the grave risk to our national security involved in allowing the weapons to remain in Cuba.

Accordingly, I would reject the blockade course insofar as it is designed to lead to negotiations either in the UN or direct with Khrushchev.

If militarily acceptable, I would prefer to initiate action with a blockade and intensive low-level surveillance, coupled with a demand on Cuba to immediately remove the weapons and to accept international inspection, beginning within 24 hours. In the event of Cuban refusal, the air strike would follow immediately, no later than 72 hours after the initial public statement.

If this is not militarily acceptable or if such delay would involve unacceptable risks of the use of nuclear weapons from Cuba against the US, I would favor an early strike in accordance with the air strike course of action.

¹ Outlines Dillon's views on need to eliminate offensive weapons from Cuba and course of action to do so. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. III.

In such a situation, I believe that, in the interests of the survival of the entire free world fabric, we must be prepared to accept the public opinion results of a surprise strike, placing the full blame on Cuba for ignoring our clear and repeated warnings as well as the strong views of the other American states.

Douglas Dillon

326. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 17¹

October 17, 1962

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STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE
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OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Wednesday, 17 October

JCS meeting at 1000: CJCS joined meeting at 1120:

DJS (RACM Riley): SecDef debriefed me on White House meeting at 1800 last night. Five courses of action were proposed. I: Attack MRBMs plus nuclear storage sites. II: Add to those MiG-2's and 11-28s. III: Add to those other air capabilities, SAMs, surface-to-surface

¹ Five courses of action proposed at White House meeting evening of October 16. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

missiles, and missile-carrying boats. IV: Attack all significant military targets but exclude tanks, since IV was not prelude to invasion. V: Add tanks to IV. They talked exclusively about carrying out I, after political preparations. The SecDef asked JCS about requirements to carry out these five options. The J-3 worked through the night and came up with this estimate for sorties: I: 52; II: 104; III: 194; IV: 474; V: 2002. (Several days later, because these totals did not explicitly include requirements for escort, suppression of air defenses, and post-strike reconnaissance, these figures had to be substantially revised upward. At that point, Gen. Taylor reacted as follows: "What! These figures were reported to the White House. You are defeating yourselves with your own cleverness, gentlemen.")

The JCS felt they should go on record as opposing strikes on MRBMs alone. Otherwise, if things went wrong, they might get the blame (see JCSM-794-62).

DJS: CJCS says that whatever is decided it will be a long time before they go to any invasion.

CJCS gives debrief of White House meeting that morning. This was the first small meeting (CJCS, McNamara, Rusk, Ball, Nitze, R. Kennedy, L. Thompson). We all agreed we had no hard positions. State preferred, first, a series of political measures that would minimize damage to the alliance and give Khrushchev an indication of what we planned to do. State also proposed a Kennedy-Khrushchev summit meeting. CJCS thinks they will say there must be some political action before a showdown. It was agreed that if we want to go to a blockade, we must declare war. CJCS adds that blockade is only in the minds of people who feel that striking missile sites alone is not enough.

327. Gilpatric's handwritten notes of meeting, October 17¹

October 17, 1962

RLG's

Preferred Course of Action

1) Letters to K&C protesting MRBMs and declaring that workers removed at once (with satisfactory proof). U.S. will act to protest [?] against threat to its security.

¹ Preferred course of action. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.

2) Absent satisfactory response to letters by [unclear] certain. U.S. government:

a) declares state of war with Cuba, acting under existing Cong. resol.

b) establishes blockade against all vessels entering Cuban ports

c) calls upon OAS to take complementary action in defense of West. Hem. under Rio Treaty

d) notifies UN of action taken in self defense

e) asks NATO allies for cooperation in blockade

3) Concurrently with 2) U.S.:

a) announces open and comprehensive air & sea surveillance of Cuba

b) alerts forces for air strikes against Cuban military targets in event Cuba moves militarily vs U.S. and prepare [unclear] for possible invasion

c) establishes air & sea defense for S.E. U.S. for possible invasion.

d) evacuate dependents from Guantanamo and strengthen latter's defensive position.

e) alerts overseas forces against possible Soviet or [unclear] aggressive acts

328. Gilpatric's handwritten notes of meeting, October 17¹

October 17, 1962

Rusk

10/17/62

1) U.S. cannot accept MRBMs in Cuba

2) no profit from preliminary exchange with K&C

3) hold until middle of next week

4) then execute Plan I after informing key allies, U.K., France, Germany perhaps Turkey, & some LA nations (such as Venezuela) at same time notifying K, NAC, OAS, & UN

5) be prepared for Soviet reactions in Turkey, Berlin, Korea, & Taiwan (Quemoy & Matsu)

¹ U.S. position on missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.

329. Memorandum for the file, October 17¹

October 17, 1962

SUBJECT

Conversation with General Eisenhower—Wednesday, 17 October 1962

At President Kennedy's request I called on General Eisenhower today at 12:00 o'clock. Reviewed the Cuban developments. President Kennedy had asked that I carefully avoid indicating any particular line of action as none had been agreed upon, and this was observed.

I briefed Eisenhower on all aspects of the recent Cuban-Soviet build-up and showed him the U-2 pictures of three MRBM missile sites under development. Eisenhower expressed no particular surprise indicating that he felt this offensive build-up would probably occur.

He then expressed criticism of the Bay of Pigs failure and also the fact that we did not respond more energetically when Castro publicly embraced Communism.

With respect to the current situation, Eisenhower felt that it would prove to be intolerable, that its purposes can not be clearly defined, and that discussions or adamant demands to either Khrushchev or Castro or both, would be of no avail.

In discussing blockades, he mentioned the difficulty of type of action we would take if and when a Soviet ship, laden with military hardware and personnel, is stopped on the high seas. The question he raised, as do I, is "What would we do with the ship then?"

Eisenhower questioned limited military action as being indecisive, irritating world opinion, creating fear in all areas where the Soviets could retaliate with limited action and therefore would be inadvisable. He recalled that when President Truman ordered limited air support in the first two or three days of the Korean war, he, Eisenhower, told the President that from 2 military standpoint this would not work and more decisive action was required.

Throughout the conversation Eisenhower seemed to lean toward (but did not specifically recommend) military action which would cut off Havana and therefore take over the heart of the government. He thought this might be done by airborne divisions but was not familiar with the size of the Cuban forces in the immediate area, nor the equipment. Eisenhower seemed to feel that such a plan would be more

¹ Conversation between McCone and former President Eisenhower on Cuban developments. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

decisive, would mean less bloodshed, could be accomplished more quickly than a landing and a conventional type of slow invasion.

I told General Eisenhower that I did not expect an answer but both the President and I wished him to be fully informed and that I would like to consult with him from time to time. He agreed to be available personally or by telephone at any time.

John A. McCone
Director

330. First State Strategic Paper, undated¹

undated

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

This memorandum is an attempt to set down the full spectrum of possible actions—beginning with pure political moves having no military aspects and progressing, in an ascending order of intensity of military commitment, to action involving an invasion of Cuba. Obviously there are many variants possible, and common elements may be differently mixed to produce different results.

I

PURE POLITICAL ACTION

There are several kinds of political action that might be taken—counterploys in other parts of the world designed to harass or threaten the Bloc, an increase of the hemispheric pressure against Castro, the organization of economic pressure by the NATO countries, or even efforts to buy off Castro. It is highly doubtful that these actions, taken either individually or collectively, would by themselves produce the desired result.

A. Possible Counterploys

1. Threat to put MRBM's in Germany

Advantages:

The Soviet Union has long been obsessed with the fear that Germany might acquire nuclear capability.

¹ Possible courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 14 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962.

Disadvantages:

a. We are in no position to implement this threat inside of a year or more.

b. The Soviet Union would be more likely to respond by aggressive action against Berlin than by relinquishing its arrangements with Cuba.

c. This action would upset our other NATO allies.

*2. Threat to put MRBM's in the Republic of China**Advantages:*

Giving MRBM's to the Generalissimo would present a serious threat to Red China and might well cause concern in Moscow.

Disadvantages:

a. The most probably immediate effect would be increased pressure by the CHICOMS for increased nuclear capacity of their own—a development that could be of real concern to the West.

b. The Generalissimo would interpret such an act as American support for an invasion.

c. Our NATO allies would be inclined to consider this as an act of irresponsibility.

*3. Threat to put MRBM's in Iran**Advantage:*

The Iranian frontier has always been sensitive from the point of view of Russian policy.

Disadvantage:

a. It would increase the Shah's blackmail capacity.

b. The Soviet response might well be a military move against Iran which we would be in no position to counter.

*B. Actions to put pressure on Castro**1. The indication that we have targeted US missiles on key points in Cuba.**Disadvantage:*

There is no evidence that this would cause Castro to yield his own MRBM capability. He would know that we could not fire our weapons without great danger of starting a general nuclear war.

2. Action by the Organ of Consultation Under the Rio Pact to authorize unilateral or collective military action against Cuba and to urge open surveillance of military bases.

Advantage:

The principle utility of this action would be as a preliminary to a military move.

Disadvantage:

If such action were possible it could hardly be achieved by unanimous vote. Hence, hemispheric solidarity would be strained. Moreover,

having taken the action the United States would almost certainly be committed to follow it by a military move of some sort.

3. *Effort to intensify economic isolation of Cuba.*

Advantage:

The sealing off of Cuba from non-Bloc trade would increase the difficulty and cost of Soviet support of the Cuban economy and perhaps decrease the effectiveness of that support.

Disadvantages

a. Even with the new evidence of a Soviet aggressive intention in Cuba we could not expect the unanimous support of either the OAS or NATO countries in enforcing anything approaching a complete embargo.

b. The additional costs imposed on the Soviet Union even by a substantially complete embargo would probably not prevent it from continuing its Cuban build-up.

4. *Persuade the remaining Latin American countries to break relations with Cuba.*

Advantages:

If Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Bolivia were to break relations with Cuba it would have a damaging political effect in Latin America. In addition, it would have a slight but real effect on American public opinion.

Disadvantages:

Cuba, itself, would not be seriously affected by the breaking of diplomatic relations.

5. *Establishment of Government in Exile in Guantanamo.*

Advantage:

The effect on Cuban public opinion of the establishment of a government in exile in Guantanamo with United States backing might serve to encourage dissidence within Cuba, particularly if we coupled the establishment of such a government with a threat to help it move out into Cuban territory unless Castro took certain required actions.

Disadvantages:

a. We would have great difficulty setting up a reasonably representative provisional government.

b. The Cuban refugees would be unwilling to be used as trading pawns to bring about actions by Castro that might be useful for our purposes but not for theirs.

c. We would compromise our position in Guantanamo.

6. *Attempt to reach some modus vivendi with Castro.*

Advantage:

By separating Castro from complete dependence on Soviet support we might neutralize him as an aggressive force in the Western Hemisphere.

Disadvantages:

1. There is real doubt that Castro could survive if he repudiated any of his basic relations with the Bloc, particularly since he is surrounded by hardcore Communists.

2. The American public is in no mood to accept a deal with Castro and Congress would be unprepared to provide the means to make that deal effective, such as the restoration of the sugar quota, a program of foreign assistance, the relaxation of the embargo, etc.

7. *A Summit Conference with Khrushchev.*

Advantage:

In view of the great increase of tensions brought about by the Soviet action, some direct conversation between the President and Khrushchev might help avert a major conflict.

Disadvantages:

The President would not have the full support of the American people if he talked without first acting.

II

OPENLY ANNOUNCED RECONNAISSANCE
OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBA

Scenario

A. This course could be instituted simultaneously with the despatch of messages to Khrushchev and Castro and the issuance of a public statement by the President on the presence of the MRBM bases. The President's statement could include:

a. Facts on the bases, emphasizing nature of threat to all of Caribbean area.

b. Reference to previous Soviet public and private assurances that bases would not be established.

c. Reference to President's previous statements on establishment of offensive threat in Cuba and Congressional Resolution.

d. Reference to OAS Foreign Ministers communiqué of October 6, including specifically surveillance of Cuba.

e. Precautionary military steps that have been taken to neutralize threat. (This would imply but not specifically state nuclear weapons are targeted for immediate use against bases.)

f. Fact of institution of surveillance making clear that orders provided aircraft were not to take offensive action but, if attacked, all necessary steps would be taken to protect aircraft.

B. *Other actions that would be required:*

1. Unilaterally inform key NATO countries (Germany, UK, France) and key Latin American countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil) of action taken, seeking their support. A special effort should be made to have Venezuela, Colombia, and Central American countries

issue prompt public appeals for effective action keyed to threat bases represent to them.

2. Inform NAC of action taken.
3. Seek appropriate supporting action in the OAS.
4. Immediately undertake evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo.
5. Quietly put all US forces on appropriate alert status.

C. Possible Allied Reactions

Allied reactions would be mixed and would heavily depend upon our accompanying diplomatic moves. On the one hand, many would privately welcome apparently incisive action by the United States while being relieved that the action did not go further. On the other hand, there would be strong public recriminations on our lack of consultation and some allies might seek to divest themselves of responsibility for ensuing consequences. However, the nature of this would be tempered by the nature of the demands we made on Cuba and the Soviet Union.

D. Soviet and Cuban Reactions

Within Cuba, counter-reaction could include attacks on our reconnaissance aircraft both by fighter aircraft and SAMS and/or an attack on Guantanamo or on aircraft entering and leaving Guantanamo. This, of course, would require Cuba to "fire the first shot". On the other hand, it would be difficult for Cuba and the Soviets to permit such reconnaissance flights to go unchallenged. Apart from international prestige factors, such a demonstration of impotence on the part of the Castro regime would severely strain its ability to maintain its internal control. If such attacks against reconnaissance aircraft took place there would, of course, be American casualties and the public reaction would make it difficult for the United States to keep its responses within precisely defined military limits.

Outside of Cuba, Soviet responses might include overflights of such areas as Peshawar, Pakistan (designed to bring pressure on Pakistan to expel us from the installation), and the Jupiter bases in Turkey, our bases in Japan, etc. The Soviet Union could condition cessation of such flights on our cessation of flights over Cuba.

III

LIMITED ONE-TIME STRIKE (50 SORTIES) AGAINST MRBM SITES

Scenario

A. To be most effective politically, this action should probably be taken without any prior warning or consultation but should simultaneously be accompanied by a dramatic political move or moves that would seek to forestall Cuba from reacting against the United States or the Soviet Union from reacting either directly. Such a move could be a public call on Khrushchev for a bilateral summit conference. From

a political point of view, such an action would demonstrate incisiveness on the part of the United States, thus reinforcing—in the eyes of both our allies and the Soviet Union—the positions we have taken elsewhere, particularly with respect to Berlin, while also indicating willingness to negotiate. Such an action should be accompanied *mutatis mutandis* by the steps listed under II above. The limited nature and objectives of the attack would be made clear both publicly and privately.

B. *Cuban Reactions*

In the absence of knowledge of command and control relationships between the Cubans and the Soviets in Cuba on the one hand, and between Moscow and the Soviet forces in Cuba, on the other, it is difficult to estimate the range of reactions. An action within the control of Cuba would be an attack on Guantanamo and/or attacks against aircraft entering and leaving Guantanamo. Depending on the nature of control arrangements between Moscow and the Soviets manning the MRBM's as well as the readiness of the weapons, the availability of warheads, and the success of the attack in promptly disabling all weapons ready for firing, the possibility that the Soviets crew, in the heat of action, might fire a missile or missiles against American targets cannot be excluded. However, this does not appear to be a high possibility. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that such an action, even if fully successful against weapons at the site, would not itself prevent the emplacement of additional weapons in the pipeline in Cuba or en route.

C. *Soviet Reactions*

Soviet reactions would somewhat depend on the degree to which the action was presented as directed against the Soviet Union and to what degree it was kept confined to action against Castro. The Soviet Union, having denied it had established, or intended to establish, bases in Cuba, could disassociate itself from the matter if it so chose. On the other hand, there is a wide range of possible Soviet counteraction—which might include action against the lines of communication of our forces in Berlin, a similar attack against the Jupiters in Turkey, and some aggressive action against Iran and/or Pakistan based on our installations there.

IV

Blockade

A. *Basis for Blockade*

A possible alternative to a single limited air strike would be the institution of a full or limited naval blockade. A limited blockade might be conceived of as inspection of vessels for offensive weapons or possibly for military materials of any kind. Under principles of international

law—accepted and stoutly supported by the United States—blockades of any kind cannot be imposed or enforced except under conditions of a formal declaration of war. It is extremely doubtful whether we could obtain the sanction of the OAS and Rio Treaty for such a declaration of war. It is, therefore, likely that such a declaration would have to be unilateral on our part. Having declared war there would not be a major political difference, either in terms of allied or Soviet reaction, between confining our military action to a blockade or taking direct military action against Cuba. In any event, enforcement of such a blockade would require action, including the use of force, primarily directed against Soviet and Soviet bloc vessels.

B. Soviet Reactions

It is certain that the Soviets would not acquiesce in, or observe, such a blockade. It could be presumed that, at the minimum, they would seek to escort their vessels so that enforcement of the blockade would eventually result in a situation where action would be required against Soviet warships or submarines. In any event, an obvious countermove on their part could well be the imposition of a blockade against only American forces in Berlin. Together with all the other circumstances, this could produce a condition of great allied disarray.

C. Cuban reactions

Cuban reactions could include an attack against Guantanamo.

V

ONE-TIME AIR STRIKE RANGING FROM 100 SORTIES TO INCLUDE AIRFIELDS AND IL-28 CRATES TO 500 SORTIES AGAINST ALL MAJOR TARGETS

A. Politically, there is little difference, in terms either of allied or possible Soviet reactions whether the attack is at the top or the bottom of the range. If this action should be taken without prior consultation with our allies and an opportunity for both Castro and Khrushchev to avoid attack by making reasonable concessions, the effects on our alliances, particularly NATO, could approach the catastrophic. If the Soviet Union were to respond vigorously—for example, by moving against Berlin—the United States would, in the eyes of most Europeans, be held responsible for having endangered its allies in a reckless manner, and many would probably be relieved at the opportunity for disengaging themselves from the embarrassment of Berlin.

B. European nations are clearly not sympathetic with the United States position regarding Cuba. They regard our reaction to the recent Soviet buildup as hysteria; many have argued that our national preoccupation with Cuba proves that we are not fully responsible and should not have such a large influence in deciding the fate of the Free World.

Since the Europeans live with 400 MRBM's pointed at them every day, they cannot be persuaded that the location of a few batteries of MRBM's in Cuba is a serious military threat to the United States. For us to respond to that threat by unilateral military action would seem to them, therefore, out of all proportion to the provocation and a reckless act endangering the peace of the world.

C. We might expect Khrushchev to seek to capitalize on this European reaction. He would try to increase the division and disarray of the West.

D. On the other hand, prior consultation is most unlikely to produce any consensus and most of our allies would seek to bring to bear the strongest possible pressure to deter us from the action. Prior approaches to Castro and to the Soviet Union would also open to the Soviet Union the possibility of making such strong threats of nuclear retaliation against the United States as to make it difficult for the Soviet Union to fail to implement the threats if indeed we subsequently took such action against Cuba. It would also give Cuba and the Soviet Union sufficient strategic warning to enable them to ready the MRBM's in Cuba for prompt firing against US targets with or without action from the Soviet Union against the United States.

VI

FULL-SCALE (2,000 sorties or more) AIR ATTACK WITH OR WITHOUT SUBSEQUENT INVASION

A. Such action is subject, in an increased measure, to all of the political disabilities and dilemmas of prior consultation and notification set forth in V above.

B. Cuban reactions would probably include, subject to their capabilities, an attack on Guantanamo and the possibility of an attempt to use MRBM's against American targets. It is difficult to foresee Cuban domestic reactions and much can depend on the political context of the attacks. A high rate of civilian casualties would, of course, produce strong sentiment. National feelings would be highly aroused. The attitude of the "July 26 Group" would in part be determined by its estimate as to the reprisals it might expect from the Cuban people or from the United States if it lost control. It is possible that an air strike in itself might produce such a condition of disorder within Cuba as to require US ground intervention, whether or not we desire to undertake such intervention.

C. *Soviet reactions.*

Many lines of retaliatory action would be open to the Soviet Union. These include a military take-over of West Berlin, which Khrushchev might well believe he could safely undertake, particularly if he joined

the action with some diplomatic gestures towards Western Germany and possibly Britain and France. Other possible actions include a quick Soviet strike against the Jupiters in Turkey, action against Iran on the grounds that it also contains US installations on the border of the Soviet Union, renewal of the action in Laos, etc. With or without Soviet concurrence the Chinese Communists might well seek to take advantage of what they could regard as an opportunity for a movement against Quemoy and Matsu.

331. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 18¹

October 18, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Thursday, 18 October

JCS meeting at 0930 (Gen. LeMay, previously represented by Gen. McKee, now joined discussions):

DIA officers give results of U-2 mission of 15 October. Photos were shown of four bases: Guanajay; San Julian; San Cristobal; and Santa

¹ Courses of action in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

Cruz. Mr. McLaughlin said it will take six months to make the sites completely operational.

CJCS: Now permanent missile sites show up. This is really significant. I now feel air strikes are not enough, and occupation is the only answer.

CJCS gives debriefing on last night's meeting. Five courses of action were considered.

A: Inform West European leaders and some Latin American leaders on Tuesday. On Wednesday, hit missile sites only, make a public statement and send a message to Khrushchev. Then wait and see what happens. Rejected by Rusk.

B: Same as above, but notify Khrushchev about three days beforehand and wait about three days to obtain his reply. Rejected by Defense.

C: Tell them we know where the missiles are and we are going to stop any more from coming in. Then would follow declaration of war, complete blockade, air surveillance, and readiness for additional actions. State is optimistic about this one.

D: After limited political preliminaries, strike all targets except those connected with invasion. Prepare for invasion, possibly blockade.

E: Same as D, with no political preliminaries. There was no support for this, but CJCS feels there may be some stiffening when they see today's intelligence. CJCS says I have changed my mind on invasion, and I think they will too.

JCS agreed that minimum should be Course E, with complete blockade and air strikes on all significant targets except those that might be struck for an invasion.

JCS also agreed that, if a decision is made to hit only the missile sites, 11–28s also should be hit.

JCS meeting at 1400, attended by Operations Deputies:

CJCS debriefs on White House meeting this morning: Rusk said the new information had changed his outlook. Action would have to be taken, and of a heavier kind than was contemplated yesterday. But Rusk still thought Khrushchev should be informed in advance. SecDef said that new intelligence called for invasion. In the car, SecDef told CJCS that if he knew there was an operational missile in Cuba, it would change his outlook since we would have to go nuclear. Three plans were being considered: (1) maximum political effort; (2) a combination with military effort being built around blockade then reconnaissance; (3) no political discussion—air strike followed by invasion. Plan (1) is out. CJCS said he asked the President if we could discard the partial air strike. We agreed to do Category III, IV, or V (see 17 Oct. 1000 meeting). Next State proposed a five-day preliminary, talking to Khrushchev, UN and OAS; then clamp on blockade and state of war.

The President seemed to feel we should hold back until we get a feel for the Russian reaction.

CSAF: Are we really going to do anything except talk?

CJCS: Definitely. Probably there will be a political approach, followed by warning, a blockade, hitting the missiles, and invasion—in that order. We will probably start in the early part of next week.

332. Standing Committee Paper, undated¹

undated

PLAN I

LIMITED ONE-TIME STRIKE (50 SORTIES) AGAINST MRBM SITES

Action Contemplated

A. Basic Features

The target of the single strike contemplated by this plan would be limited to the known MRBM site, including the MRBM's and launchers, the warheads and the suspect nuclear storage sites. Presumably this strike could be accomplished in a matter of minutes.

B. Advantages of Plan

Because the contemplated action is of a severely limited nature it should appear in the eyes of the world as not incommensurate with the danger presented to the United States by the missile sites. Particularly if the operation were coupled with some diplomatic gesture, the emphasis might well be shifted to the American desire to achieve a political solution rather than to the military action itself.

C. Alternative Possibilities

Two possible approaches to this operation should be considered:

Alternative One

The operation could be carried out without prior notification either to Khrushchev or to Castro but with simultaneous public announce-

¹ Plan I—Limited one-time Strike against MRBM sites. Top Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, 1961–64, Cuba—Subjects, General and Historical Information 8/31/62–10/19/62.

ment and the delivery of messages to Khrushchev and Castro. Under this alternative Macmillan, Adenauer, and DeGaulle would be advised by the President 12 hours in advance. President Betancourt and two or three other Latin American heads of state might be notified an hour or two ahead of the operation. However, it is doubtful that any Latin American head of state could be given as much as 12 hours notice without jeopardizing possibility of surprise.

On the same day authorization would be sought to convene the OAS Organ of Consultation and the NAC would also be advised, preferable by a high level emissary of the President.

Alternative Two

The same schedule would be followed except that a prior approach would be made to Khrushchev and Castro 24 hours in advance. They would not be notified of the nature of the proposed operation or of its timing but they would be advised that some early action was planned.

D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Alternative

Alternative One

Advantages

An operation conducted without advance notice would be most economical since it could exploit the element of surprise. One can argue, in fact, that the major reason for limiting the operation to the specific missile targets is in order to justify action against them without prior consultation. Since the targets were about to become operational it could be argued that the requirements of security did not permit advance discussions.

An additional argument for this alternative is that the whole operation could presumably be completed within an hour. It would thus be a *fait accompli* before there would be a chance for any reaction. In a sense it can be argued that the preventative action of taking out the missile sites would not be unlike Khrushchev's actions in shooting down the U-2.

Disadvantages:

The disadvantages relate not only to the reactions of Khrushchev and Castro but also to the reactions of our NATO allies—and to a lesser extent to members of the OAS. Khrushchev might well feel that he had been humiliated and, therefore, under compulsion to make some counter-strike. Castro could use the incident as an evidence of the callousness and arrogance of the United States in suddenly attacking a small nation without notice. He might well respond by killing prisoners, by an attack on Guantanamo, or even by an impulsive raid against some United States coastal city or installation.

*Alternative Two**Advantages*

The advantages of this alternative are that, by offering a time for Khrushchev and Castro to respond to our *démarche*, we would possibly provide them and the United States with a way out without bloodshed. Moreover, we would, in the eyes of the world, be using the pattern of Suez.

Disadvantages

The obvious disadvantage of the second alternative is that it compromises the element of security. It may, therefore, render the operation not only more costly but even impossible of fulfillment, since, with advance notice, the Russians might get the weapons under cover. However, if the advance notice were limited to 24 hours or less, the possibility of effective dispersal would be greatly reduced.

Another possible disadvantage is that advance notice might result in Khrushchev being led to make some hard threats which would commit him to take reckless action after the event.

*E. Accompanying Diplomatic Moves**1. Message to Khrushchev*

Under alternative 1, this message would be delivered simultaneously to Dobrynin in Washington and, hopefully, by Ambassador Kohler to Khrushchev in Moscow. If the operation were undertaken at dawn this would mean that the message would be delivered to Khrushchev in the latter part of the afternoon.

Whether delivered in advance or simultaneously, the tone of the message would be more sorrow than anger:

It would:

(a) Underline the President's shock at discovering unchallengeable evidence of an MRBM installation in Cuba;

(b) point out that the President had been assured by Khrushchev that the Soviet Union would put no offensive weapons in Cuba;

(c) recall that the President had stated publicly that, in the event the Cubans were given any offensive capability, he would take appropriate action;

(d) recite that the President was taking action to eliminate the specific MRBM's so far identified and that similar action would be taken against any additional nuclear installations as soon as they were discovered; and

(e) put Khrushchev on notice that, meanwhile, the United States would, as a matter of self defense, fly low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba.

2. Message to Castro

The message to Castro, which would be made public at the time of the attack, would:

- (a) point out the prior warning given by the President;
- (b) the determination of the United States to act for the defense of its own interests and those of the other American states; and
- (c) the decision of the United States to take action against this specific target. The message would point out that the action was limited to the target but that it would be repeated against any other offensive installation that might be later identified, and that in the meantime the United States would fly close surveillance missions.

3. Public Statement Justifying Attack

The President would at the time of the attack also issue a statement pointing out:

- (a) that limited military action was being taken in defense of the security of the United States and the other American states;
- (b) recalling the President's prior warning on this subject and emphasizing that the operation was being so designed as to result in the minimum jeopardy of human life;
- (c) making clear that the mission had to be undertaken on an emergency basis so as to assure that the installations would not become operational;
- (d) referring to Chairman Khrushchev's assurances that no offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba;
- (e) recalling the President's prior warning that, in the event Cuba were armed with offensive weapons, the United States would take necessary action;
- (f) pointing out that this action was taken reluctantly and that no prior consultation was possible because of the imminent danger of the weapons becoming operational;
- (g) emphasizing that the operation was limited to the narrow objectives of destroying the particular weapons and that it was designed to minimize casualties;
- (h) making clear, however, that the United States would feel compelled in the future to take similar action against any further offensive weapons that might appear; and concluding
- (i) that for purposes of its own defense and in fidelity to its treaty obligations to the other American states, it would find it necessary to fly close surveillance missions.

4. Call for Summit Conference

The message might include a call for a summit conference. It could point out that the introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba in violation of the assurances of Chairman Khrushchev had created greatly increased tensions to add to the other problems between the Western powers and the Communist Bloc. Those circumstances made it imperative that an immediate conference be held at the summit—presumably on a bilateral basis in order to permit the Chairman and the President to discuss the whole range of problems between the Communist Bloc and the Western powers. Otherwise the situation might rapidly deteriorate.

D. Possible Cuban Response

The major defect of this plan, from a military point of view, is that, in providing for the elimination merely of the known MRBM installation, it leaves intact other Cuban offensive capabilities. Thus there is a danger that Castro might respond to our attack by a counter-strike against a Florida city, such as Miami, or an American military installation in the Southeast, such as Cape Canaveral.

In answer to this, it can be argued that Castro would be unlikely to risk the almost certain destruction that would follow an offensive action against the United States—particularly if it were made clear at the time of our air strike that it was limited to the known MRBM installation.

Another objection to the plan is that it would leave intact other possible Cuban nuclear capabilities, such as airborne nuclear weapons or MRBM sites not disclosed by aerial reconnaissance.

E. Soviet Response

It is possible that, in view of the speed with which the attack could be concluded, it might pass as a relatively minor incident. In that event, Khrushchev could treat it as of no more importance than his own shooting down of our U-2 in 1960. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that he would feel it necessary to make a military response against Berlin or possibly Turkey.

F. Attitude of NATO and the OAS

While there might be some disposition on the part of certain of the NATO countries to suggest an impolite analogy to Suez, the fact that the United States was compelled to act quickly in order to prevent the missile from becoming operational would tend to blunt the indignation that might result from a failure to undertake prior consultations. Indignation would be further blunted if the President were to make a simultaneous call for a summit conference, which would meet the expressed or unexpressed wishes of a number of the NATO countries.

The effect on the members of the OAS would undoubtedly be mixed. There would be an unconscious resentment against United States intervention in Cuban affairs. Certain of the Caribbean countries might feel regret that the action was not more definitive. Other Latin American countries would be relieved that the air strike was so limited.

333. Standing Committee Paper, undated¹

undated

II

*BLOCKADE**Action Contemplated*

A. This alternative contemplates a series of political steps culminating in the establishment of a full or limited naval blockade based on a formal declaration of war within the framework of the OAS and the Rio Treaty. The maximum objective would be the bringing down of Castro and the minimum objective would be the prevention of the introduction into Cuba of further offensive weapons. Hopefully, at some stage in the political steps, Khrushchev and Castro, faced by our clear determination, would agree to a settlement that would accomplish the minimum objective without the necessity of proceeding to the blockade. However, the likelihood of this is not high and once having undertaken this course we should be prepared to proceed firmly and expeditiously through its various steps. A full blockade could possibly be effective in about three months in bringing economic chaos to Cuba. A limited blockade could permit the passage of food, medicines and other purely civilian goods to reduce hardship to the Cuban people, and be directed only at offensive weapons or all weapons and war matériel, including POL.

B. *Advantages.* The advantages of the plan are that it contemplates a series of ascending political steps, at each stage of which Khrushchev and Castro could find an “out” if they desired and by maximum consultation reduce strain on our alliances and permits the action to be undertaken with the maximum possibility of such allied support as can be obtained. It also avoids the necessity of major military action directed against Cuban soil and could accomplish our objectives with minimum casualties on both sides.

C. *Disadvantages.* The Soviets could readily counter with a full blockade of Berlin or a blockade against only American forces in Berlin which could face us with a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets attempted to break the blockade it would also require that we take direct military action against Soviet vessels, including Soviet warships or submarines. The series of political steps contem-

¹ Option II—Blockade. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961–64, Cuba—Subjects, Standing Committee 9/62–10/62.

plated would also permit our allies considerable opportunity to bring pressure to deflect or deter us from our course.

D. Accompanying Diplomatic Moves.

Scenario

1st day

1. Immediately communicate privately with Khrushchev and Castro on presence of MRBM's, implying that, if satisfactory answer not received, further unspecified action would be taken.

2. Simultaneously inform key Latin American Governments (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and selected Central American countries) of facts, including showing of photographs here to Ambassadors, of communications to Castro and Khrushchev and of contemplated OAS action.

3. Simultaneously inform key NATO countries (Germany, France, U.K. and Italy) of facts, including showing of photographs to Ambassadors here.

2nd day

4. On the following day inform the NAC and OAS of the facts without spelling out contemplated action in detail.

5. On the same day, following conclusion of NAC and OAS meetings, the President issues a public statement including the following elements:

a. Facts on the bases, emphasizing nature of threat to all of Caribbean area.

b. Reference to previous Soviet public and private assurances that bases would not be established.

c. Reference to President's previous statements on establishment of offensive threat in Cuba and Congressional Resolution.

d. Reference to OAS Foreign Ministers' communiqué of October 6, including specifically surveillance of Cuba.

e. Precautionary military steps that have been taken to neutralize threat. (This would imply but not specifically state nuclear weapons are targeted for immediate use against bases.)

f. The fact that we have immediately instituted consultation with the OAS members on further steps to be taken to meet this threat to hemispheric security.

6. Without prior announcement but without attempting to conceal the fact, undertake evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo.

7. Make a special effort to have Venezuela, Colombia and Central American countries issue prompt public appeals for effective action keyed to threat bases represent to them.

3rd day

8. Await replies from Khrushchev and Castro and gauge domestic and international reaction.

9. Call for meeting of “Organ of Consultation” of the OAS for following day.

4th day

10. Dependent on assessment of reactions and replies received from Castro and Khrushchev, convene “Organ of Consultation” of the OAS seeking a resolution authorizing armed action against the threat to the security of the Hemisphere.

5th day

11. If and when OAS action (which requires two-thirds’ vote) is favorable, immediately seek a special session of the Congress to obtain a declaration of war. In the presentation of the resolution to Congress, the limited objectives of seeking the prevention of installation in Cuba of offensive weapons through a blockade should be expressed.

12. Immediately following favorable action by Congress, impose blockade.

E. Allied Reactions

While the major European maritime powers have vigorously resisted the presently proposed limited inhibitions on the shipping trade with Cuba, they can be expected to take quite a different position when they are once informed of the nature of the Cuban threat to the United States and the seriousness of the American response. Particularly if there is a formal declaration of war by Congress, the Governments of the Allied Powers can be expected to cooperate with the United States in enforcing the blockade and in imposing the necessary discipline on their own shipowners. Under these circumstances it is not believed that the blockade itself would result in serious problems for the NATO alliance; however, other actions taken by the Soviet Union in response to the blockade might prove divisive as indicated above.

F. Soviet Reactions

While there can be no certainty of Soviet reaction, there is a possibility that the Soviets would not attempt to break the blockade so declared but would confine themselves only to action in the United Nations, propaganda, etc. The possibility of their moving against Berlin would in part be determined by their estimate of the allied unity that would exist on this subject. If they moved on Berlin, either by a full blockade, a blockade of allied forces, or a blockade of only American forces, we would of course be faced with a direct confrontation there. In any negotiations the Soviets would, of course, seek to “trade off” Cuba and Berlin. If the Soviets attempted to break the blockade direct military action would be required against Soviet vessels, including warships and submarines.

G. Cuban Reactions

Cuban reactions could include an attack against Guantanamo, which would require direct military action on our part outside the area of the base to insure its defense. Castro might also take such action as beginning the execution of small groups of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, and/or other political prisoners making the lifting of the blockade the price for stopping. If and when the blockade resulted in threatening Castro's hold he might in desperation make small sporadic air attacks against American civilian targets on the East coast. It is very unlikely that he could, without Soviet cooperation and assistance, fire MRBM's or other atomic weapons at U.S. targets.

334. Standing Committee Paper, October 18¹

October 18, 1962

ATTACK 3—INVASION

1. It is assumed that an attack of the magnitude of Plan 3 will almost inevitably escalate into an invasion of Cuba through either attacks by air or sea on US territory, attacks on Guantanamo, or internal uprisings of the Cuban people to which we would be compelled to respond.

2. There might be some advantages in minimizing negative reactions by both Soviets and free world by initiating only an attack on offensive capabilities in Cuba and letting escalation take place in response to Cuban initiatives. However, we should make our military plans on the assumption that we would have to continue the air assault into the pre-invasion softening-up phase and at the appropriate time land in force.

3. The effectiveness of Plan 3 in achieving its military objective of knocking out offensive capabilities in Cuba would be seriously diminished without strategic surprise. Opportunities would be given to disperse and camouflage targets and alert air defense forces. Therefore, there is a strong argument against either Congressional actions, private exchanges with Soviets or Castro, or consultations with our major allies.

¹ Option III—Invasion. Top Secret. 9 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. I.

3(a). There are also possible political advantages in surprise. A sudden attack, over in a day, would become so quickly a *fait accompli*, that foreign ministers would have no time to develop attacks on the action but would be busy with its aftermath. On the other hand failure to give notice is subject to the charge of sneak attack or reverse Pearl Harbor, which is not considered really cricket in some quarters.

4. If the initial decision is for invasion, this is no longer a problem as invasion preparations would deprive us of strategic surprise in any case. In addition the intensive and continued air attacks incident to invasion should make possible the destruction of most priority targets. The removal of the Castro Government would deprive any remaining targets of their threat.

5. It should be noted that if invasion does not take place Plan 3 cannot be assumed to be a one-time affair. As new targets are discovered or arrive in Cuba, prompt new strikes will become necessary to eliminate their threat to the US and maintain the integrity of our public commitments. It may be difficult to adjust their timing to the current international situation. We will still have given the Soviets the power to force us into military action in Cuba at times of their choosing.

6. Plan 3, itself, involves no sure threat to the Castro regime. It therefore involves some risk of our having undertaken a warlike act which will displease many people in the free world without unseating Castro's regime and thus pleasing all the others, particularly our best friends in Latin America.

7. At the same time it would be difficult for the Soviets to resist pressures to retaliate, preferably in kind as in Turkey. We would have killed Soviets in Cuba certainly, in addition to many Cubans, and an attack on Turkish bases is almost sure to involve killing Americans. It would then be very difficult to avoid an escalation into general nuclear war as feelings would be high among both peoples. A retaliation by major moves in Berlin would be equally difficult for the West to accept.

8. If NATO were forced to choose between defeat in Berlin or disgrace in Turkey, on the one hand, or nuclear war on the other, because of 200-sorties against Cuban facilities which might have become a nuclear threat against the US of the sort the Europeans have long lived with, the alliance would be put under serious strain indeed.

9. Similar issues might be raised for the US if instead of Soviet retaliation in Europe, our bombing was not wholly effective, some of the MRBM's were operational, (much less likely that MIG's would have nuclear bombs) and in the heat of combat Soviet crews with poor connections to Moscow, perhaps believing the attack on them was only part of a general first strike by the US on the Soviet Union, should launch nuclear missiles on the US. It would be exceedingly difficult to

prevent US retaliation on the Soviet Union. Their ability to do this might be enhanced if they had several days warning of a possible attack.

10. It is difficult to be persuaded that these difficult dilemmas are worth creating unless the military posture of the US vis-à-vis the Soviet Union were to be seriously impaired in the absence of this action. But from the standpoint of relative nuclear balance it is most difficult to make this argument. The basic justification must then be the need for the US to act to support the creditability of its word and firmness in the eyes of the Soviets and of its partners. If other actions could come close to satisfying this criteria, they would deserve careful consideration.

11. It seems unlikely that in over-all terms our allies will be any more concerned by invasion than by substantial air attacks with prospects of their continuation. The immediate reaction would, of course, be tempered by the nature of the Soviet response. Most of our LA allies would prefer invasion and the remainder would see no difference. While they might not say so, many of our European allies are bored and bothered with our constant concern about Cuba and would be happy to have us take care of the problem and remove it from the world scene, even if that meant invasion. But their public posture would, of course, be strongly influenced by Soviet reaction, and somewhat less so by the nature of our advance consultations. These would, of course, be better from their standpoint in the invasion situation.

SCENARIO

1. With Plan 3 alone the need for surprise is so great that no advance consultation can be recommended. Preferably action would be as follows:

- a. D or Decision day.
- b. D + 24 hours Notification and justification delivered in personal letters from President to Macmillan, DeGaulle and Adenauer, and from Secretary Rusk to heads of state or Foreign Ministers of Latin American countries and Canada.
- c. D + 24–25 Dependents leave Guantanamo on no alert notice basis, while reinforcing ships stand by.
- d. D + 25 Castro and Mr. K. notified and reasons for and limits of intended action explained.
- e. D + 25 Attacks commence, and Pres. announces what we are doing and why.
- f. D + 48 Action explained and current situation discussed at NATO and OAS Council meetings by senior State Department representatives and position presented to world by Stevenson in speech at UN. OAS requested authorize meeting of Organ of Consultation to consider action to be taken in light of new situation.
- g. D + 48 In accordance with notice given in all these forums US planes start overland surveillance at such levels as may be necessary, with fighter escort to protect them from MIG's.

h. D + 48 ± Follow-up actions as necessary to defend Guantanamo, protect significant rebel movements in Cuba and eliminate new offensive weapons as discovered.

i. D + 24 + US forces throughout world on 24 hour alert until called off and special units and stocks of riot control equipment available in Canal Zone for air transport to assist in maintaining friendly governments of Latin America in power against possible attacks by Castro-Soviet sympathizers.

2. If it should be decided from the start to invade, the time and activities required to prepare for it will permit consultation rather than notification.

a. D—Decision to invade.

b. D + 1 Letter sent to Castro and Mr. K. along lines of present drafts.

c. D + 3–4 If no favorable responses, President announces facts and calls for Organ. of Consultation meeting and special NATO meeting to consider situation, dependents pull out of Guantanamo and behind Curtain, some reserves called up, NATO and Guantanamo forces strengthened.

d. D + 5–6 Organ. of Consultation authorizes necessary measures to defend Hemisphere against threat of aggression, including armed attack, US announces total blockade of Cuba in framework state of war.

e. D + 6 US position presented by Stevenson in UN. Latin American allies alerted to possible internal disorders, US support on standby basis in Canal Zone.

f. D + 7 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] provided no political moves have made it unnecessary, all US forces around world on 24 hour alert.

g. D + 12–14 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] provided no new political developments have made it unnecessary, with help some OAS forces.

335. Memorandum by McCone, October 18¹

October 18, 1962

USIB should address itself to the following problems at once and be prepared to report at a meeting Friday morning.

The question is to analyze the effects of probable courses of action which might be taken by the United States. The courses are three:

¹ Problems the USIB should address at next meeting on possible courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.

1. To accept MRBM and other offensive capabilities in Cuba as a fact of life and do nothing about it.

2. To initiate a total or limited blockade under a declaration of war against Cuba.

3. To take military action ranging from:

(a) Take out of the identified MRBMs.

(b) (a) plus concurrent take out of Cuban air capabilities—MIGs, IL 28s, etc.

(c) (a) plus (b) plus take out of SAM sites and cruise missile sites.

(d) Invasion/destruction of Castro Regime.

There are two alternative approaches to 2 and 3 above. They are:

(a) Confrontation of Khrushchev with our knowledge of what is going on and determine his willingness to cease and desist and unravel the situation prior to action by us and then taking actions under 2 and 3 if, and only if, Khrushchev's responses are unsatisfactory. Similarly, some approach might be made in the form of a warning to Castro.

(b) To act under 2 and/or 3 without warning to Castro or Khrushchev on the theory that Presidential statement and Congressional Resolution, etc., constitute a warning.

USIB's opinion and appraisal of all aspects of the above contemplated actions are requested.

In making these studies, careful attention should be given to the question of the military significance of MRBMs in Cuba. There is a body of thought that since a nuclear stalemate exists, the installation of MRBMs in Cuba does not alter the equation. It is thought that the Soviets do not now or at any time in the future, have the capability to strike us with such complete devastation that we cannot strike back at them with unacceptable damage to them. On the other hand, it is likewise felt that we cannot strike the Soviet Union in a surprise attack with assurance of so destroying their restrike capability that they cannot strike back at us inflicting unacceptable damage to us. Therefore, it is thought that the nuclear offensive power is "in balance" and will remain so until some defensive mechanisms come into being. In view of this, the question is raised as to whether MRBMs in Cuba alter this particular equation.

This question should be analyzed as part of USIB's study without reference to the political implications. As a collateral part of the study USIB should address itself to the following:

(a) The political implications which involve enhancement of USSR prestige throughout the world and particularly on Latin America and Africa by "getting away with the installations"

(b) The probability that this will turn out to be a rallying point for the Communist minorities throughout Latin America and conversely

result in a loss of prestige to the United States, because the Soviets got away with this;

(c) The effect on our position throughout the world and our friends' appraisal of our courage and determination in such troubled areas as Berlin, Nationalist China, Korea, etc, if we "buckle under" to an established offensive capability in Cuba, which is a situation we have repeatedly said we would not tolerate.

John A. McCone

336. Joint Evaluation prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 18¹

October 18, 1962

JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA
CONCLUSIONS IN BRIEF

Offensive Missiles

1. At least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm (SS-4) medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites. These sites presently contain unrevetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, check-out, and support equipment. Those missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, these mobile missiles must be considered operational now and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch. A refire from each launcher could be accomplished within 5 hours after the initial firing.

2. Fixed, soft sites which could achieve initial operational capability during December 1962 are now being developed near Havana. We believe that the 2200-nm (SS-5) intermediate range ballistic missile is probably intended for these sites. Photography of these sites show

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (5 Sept-19 Oct 1962).

eight, fixed launch pads under construction which probably equate to an additional missile regiment with eight ready missiles and eight for refire.

3. All of these offensive missile systems are Soviet manned and controlled. We believe that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Union but have not yet found the command and control communication links.

Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

4. There is no positive evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, nor have weapons storage facilities of the standard, highly secure Soviet type been identified. However, there are seven, large Cuban munitions' storage areas south of Havana which could be converted to Soviet needs in a relatively short time. Temporary storage could be provided in ships or field sites which might not be identified.

5. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capability as it becomes operational. The warheads expected for these missiles weigh approximately 3,000 pounds and have yields in the low megaton range.

Coastal Defense Missiles

6. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). In an alert status, these cruise missiles can be fired in about 10 minutes, with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals.

Air Defense Missiles

7. There are now 22 surface-to-air missiles (SA-2) sites located in Cuba, nine of which are believed to be individually operational at the present time. The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks. Each site contains six missiles with six additional missiles in an adjacent hold area. The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert, providing the site has reached readiness. Refire from a single launcher will take approximately 3 to 5 minutes.

[text not declassified]

Force Levels

9. There are now at least sixteen 1020-nm Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba which are in such a state of readiness that they could be fired within 18 hours of a decision to launch. It is likely that other installations now being examined in photography will raise the number to 32, all of which could be ready in the next week. Furthermore, 8 launchers with sixteen 2200-nm missiles will probably be operational in Cuba

during December 1962. We must emphasize that this is the visible threat, and that additional missiles may be discovered as additional photography is analyzed.

Support and Supply

10. Offensive missiles systems are being introduced into Cuba primarily through the Port of Mariel. Possible central missile checkout, storage and repair bases have been tentatively located at Soroa near the western deployment sites and at Managua south of Havana. It is significant that all three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba (SS-4, SS-5, SA-2) probably use red fuming nitric acid as an oxidizer so that a common propellant supply and storage could be used.

Significance

11. The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of strength.

12. A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S. (see map). By deploying stockpiled shorter range ballistic missiles at overseas bases against which we have no BMEWS warning capability, the Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way. This overseas strategic force is protected by an extensive SA-2 deployment in Cuba.

13. This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U.S. and a large portion of Latin America for the first time.

14. The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and put into motion last spring.

ADDENDUM

Two additional launch sites have just been found north of Santa Clara (Mission 3107). Neither site was present on 5 September 1962. Analysis is still underway; only preliminary views can be expressed. One site is similar to the fixed soft site described in paragraph 2. This site is in a more advanced state of readiness and could have the essential features for an operational capability within one month. The other site is similar to the field-type installation described in paragraph 1. These new sites are not included in the numbers appearing elsewhere in this paper.

337. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 19¹

October 19, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Friday, 19 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

CJCS gives a debrief of White House meeting on the previous evening: The tendency is more and more toward political actions plus a blockade; the President shows a preference for this. State will provide the details of political approaches. The JCS will consider total blockade, selective blockade, and the [illegible in the original] for a declaration of war. State's idea is that there should be a selective blockade for offensive weapons [illegible in the original]. CSAF: It would be sure disaster to try that. CJCS: The President wants to see us this morning. [illegible in the original] between Course E (above) and the new [illegible in the original] act as plus blockade. We should recommend to [illegible in the original] attack on comprehensive targets, (2) reconnaissance surveillance and (3) complete blockade. A briefing was given by DIA: There are 35–36 MIG 21s and 21 (17 still in crates). [illegible in the original] There are 7 MRBM sites (4 are for SS–4s with 1100 n.m.

¹ CJCS summarized previous evening's meeting at the White House on reaction to photographic pictures of Cuban missile sites in Cuba; JCS position for meeting with the President; debrief on morning meeting at the State Department. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

range: 3 are for SS–5s with 2200 n.m. range); there are 16 launchers for SS–4s and 12 for SS–5s, with two missiles each. There are 22 SAM sites, 9 believed operational. In just a few weeks, they can have a couple of air defense nets with rest capability.

The JCS position decided upon for the meeting with the President was:

1. Notify Macmillian and possibly Adenauer two hours in advance.
2. Carry out a surprise attack on comprehensive targets.
3. Reconnaissance surveillance.
4. Complete blockade.
5. Trade Cuba? CSA, CSAF and CNO say yes: CJCS says only be prepared to do so.
6. Realize there will be a [illegible in the original] upon and NATO and problems about Berlin.

JCS meeting at 1400:

[illegible in the original] meeting at the State Dept. that morning. R. Kennedy thought we should say nothing but simply go ahead and make that attack and then go to the OAS. State said that we could never get two-thirds approval from the OAS unless we went to it first. CJCS says that conferees split into two teams to prepare their cases: Red team favoring blockade. Blue team favoring attack. The Blue Team consisted of R. Kennedy, Douglas Dillon, McGeorge Bundy, Dean Acheson, and John McCone.

CJCS related that R. Kennedy said that from here on out, if we make a surprise attack, we will be accused of another Pearl Harbor. So would you be willing to accept a 24-hour delay in order to inform the allies? CSAF and CNO said yes; CJCS agreed with them.

338. Memorandum from McCone to USIB members, October 19¹

October 19, 1962

A discussion among the principals on October 18th indicated a probable decision, if any action is taken against Cuba, to initiate a limited blockade designed to prevent the importation into Cuba of additional arms. To do this the United States would make such statements concerning a condition of war as is necessary to meet the legal requirements of such a blockade, but a formal "declaration of war against Cuba" would be avoided if possible and resorted to only if absolutely necessary.

The blockade could be extended at our discretion to include POL and possibly a total blockade if Castro persisted in the offensive build-up.

Continued surveillance would go forward so that we would know of the situation within Cuba as it evolved.

The blockade would start possibly on Monday, following a public announcement by the President which would include a display of photographic intelligence, persuasive notification to our Allies among the Soviets and the Cubans, but with no prior consultations with our Allies or any Latin Americans unless it proved necessary for legal reasons to assemble the OAS and secure the necessary approval to invoke the Rio Pact.

More extreme steps such as limited air strike, comprehensive air strike, or military invasion would be withheld awaiting developments. The possibility of more extreme actions has not been dismissed, however initiating such actions was considered unwise.

The argument in favor of the blockade was principally that it initiated a positive action which could be intensified at our will or could be relaxed depending upon evolving circumstances. Soviet reactions are expected to be severe and very probably involve a blockade of Berlin and a widespread propaganda effort, however it was considered that we could have some control over the extent of Soviet reaction and in the event of a confrontation, would be negotiating from a position of positive action which would be intensified at our own direction.

The obvious disadvantages are the protracted nature of the operation, the difficulties of sustaining our position in world opinion because of our own complex of foreign bases and our deployment of offensive

¹ Transmits probable decision among principals to initiate a limited blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-31 December 1962.

missiles and nuclear weapons and finally, the action does not reverse the present trend of building an offensive capability within Cuba nor does it dispose of the existing missiles, planes, and nuclear weapons if the latter now exist there.

Positive military action initiated now appeared undesirable because of the impact of current and future world opinion, the spectacle of a powerful nation attacking by surprise attack a weak and insignificant neighbor, engagement by the United States in a “surprise attack” thus giving license to others to do the same, the indefensible position we would be in with our allies, and finally, the price to us of extreme actions of which the Soviets appear capable of executing.

The above course of action is by no means unanimous. The opinions range from doing nothing on the one hand, to immediate military action on the other. There exist differences of opinion as to the handling of Khrushchev, Castro, NATO, the OAS and Latin American states; and finally, a question of the “declaration of war” awaits legal opinion; also differences exist concerning the intensity of the blockade with some advocating a more comprehensive blockade which would include POL at the very start.

I would like guidance from USIB members for my use in further discussions which are to take place commencing at 11:00 a.m., October 19th, and will probably continue throughout the week end.

John A. McCone

339. Handwritten notes of meeting made by McCone, October 19¹

October 19, 1962

1) 10/19—11:00 AM

All including Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Thompson, Meeker

Briefing by Lundahl—

28—launchers

23—SAMs

35—MiG 21 +4 probables

¹ Possible courses of action in Cuba. No classification marking. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–31 December 1962.

Nitze asked if we had it all

McCone said not all—maybe 30%—or double or triple

Cline reviewed estimate—appendix and generic-fair[?] NPIC esti[mate?]

Exchange of discussion of Appendix A

Conclusions: limited action results were retaliation [unclear] also invasion

Gilpatric[?] remarks—SOV assistance solely defensive—help industry—help agriculture

Note get notes on this

Katzenbach—No problems on establishing blockade except difficulty ratification OAS and taking to UN. Pres needs no more authority—declaration [of] war not necessary and [unclear] to int[ernational] law and U.N. charter

2) Need to justify action on reason [?] other than attack or [unclear] of attack—UNGA action unavailable—under OAS and UN treaties we cannot use force. Arguments of [unclear] require of [unclear] law in the West Hem[isphere?] give US special privilege—This will not stand up. To make our actions legal must have action under Art. 6 & 8 of OAS Treaty. Martin believes we would get 14 votes easily. This would excuse any use of force.—

Acheson If discussion is on a [unclear] of legal steps. [rest of paragraph unclear]

3) [unclear] supports a

Rusk ask[ed] for summary of last night's meeting. McN[amara] responded w/ 3 [unclear]

1—Political

2—Limited blockade which [2 words unclear]

3—Full strike I–II–III plus threat to [unclear] (300–400 sorties)

Pres tentative decision (2)

Decision to [unclear]—[unclear] on Monday or Tuesday

Bundy says not sure of Pres state of mind—Talked with Pres this AM—not serve him well if use did not offer more than one course of action—

Taylor—JCS strongly favor military action—strike against *all* known installations

All difficulties of blockade and surveillance

Guantanamo

4) AG—[unclear] please [?] new arguments for 2 and 3. Feels Pres will have difficult time attacking Cuba. [unclear] M/180 M raises special moral problems. And relationships with other countries. ICBs in

USSR are just as dangerous as missiles in Cuba. OK to make both scenarios but final decision most difficult.

Thompson favors blockade but feels it will escalate. Gromyko feels we will have showdown and we must choose best time. Killing SOVs in Cuba means possible nuclear war.

Acheson When we get into a showdown we run danger of nuclear war and if we fear this then K will [2 words unclear] of Latin America—Do we know Castro will not someday have status. Blockade will not remove [?] missiles—Therefore they will become operational and we can never again act.

340. Memorandum prepared by McCone, October 19¹

October 19, 1962

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING ACTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY THREAT

The Intelligence Community has provided the Administration with comprehensive and current information concerning developments in Cuba. The United States Intelligence Board has prepared several estimates on the implication of these developments and the consequences of possible United States action.

Since I have been participating in the policy discussions concerning possible actions and from time to time have expressed views on policy matters beyond my competence as DCI, I feel compelled to now express my personal opinion concerning the course of action now being considered.

First, I think we are having difficulty in determining a clear-cut course of action because we have not clearly defined exactly wherein lies our most important and vital interest.

It is my conviction that, while Berlin is important and also the NATO alliance and arrangements with many other countries throughout the world, nevertheless, I have reached the conclusion that maintaining maximum security and safety of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere, cementing Western Hemisphere relationships,

¹ Actions against the Soviet-Cuban military threat. Top Secret. 6 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–31 December 1962.

and reversing the growth of communism in the Western Hemisphere represent our most important national interest and must be our over-riding concern.

I feel that a continued build-up of a Soviet-Cuban military capability of an offensive nature, with the strong probability that there will exist in Cuba a large number of operational missiles and aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons of the megaton range capable of striking the United States, the Panama Canal and most Latin American countries, constitutes a situation that we cannot tolerate.

Of equal importance is the fact that Castro's accomplishments will be a challenge to every dissident group in countries throughout Latin America. It is my personal opinion that this will result in Latin American countries from Mexico in the north to Argentina in the south seeking ever closer ties with the Soviet Union because of demonstrated Soviet strength and power. Conversely, these Latin Americans will move away from alliance with or dependence upon the United States because of our own demonstrated weakness and lack of resolution.

What is at stake here then, in my opinion, is Western Hemisphere security and the inevitable growth of communism in Latin America. These two considerations are over-riding in their importance. Actions required to insure Hemisphere security and stop the advance of communism in the Hemisphere are of more immediate concern to our vital national interests than are the problems that confront us in more distant areas.

Turning to the suggested plan of action, I do not believe a partial blockade or, for that matter a total blockade, is a satisfactory answer. It might have been an acceptable answer had the offensive missiles and planes not been delivered to Cuba. However, they are there now. They represent a serious threat, and a blockade will not remove them. Indeed, the blockade, which must be maintained for a protracted period, will provide an opportunity to place all systems in an operational status. This means the establishment of a capability of almost instantaneous delivery of a substantial megatonnage of nuclear weapons. At this point the opportunity of reversing the situation is remote for then military action on our part would possibly invite a retaliation which would inflict upon us unacceptable damage. Hence the blockade will not solve the problem that confronts us.

During the period of the blockade, Khrushchev will lay before world opinion through the United Nations and elsewhere, facts with respect to United States deployment of offensive capabilities and nuclear weapons throughout the world and thus establish that in effect what has occurred in Cuba is only a small fraction of that which we have done through the years in many places throughout the world. It is my opinion that the propaganda attack and the world public opinion

which would support it would be of such intensity that we would have to reconsider our blockade policy almost immediately.

The American public will realize that there exists in Cuba the power to wreak the greatest of havoc in the United States and in Latin America. Hence there will be great fear and distress among the American people and disenchantment with our policies. The same attitude will prevail among people in all countries of Latin America.

I therefore oppose the blockade idea, and strongly recommend that we act more decisively. I think we should issue an ultimatum to Castro at once. I think we should tell him to cease and desist and to remove all such offensive armaments, including missiles, MIG 21s, IL 28s, etc., or we will remove them for him. I think we should give Khrushchev notice of contemplated action and tell him to remove the Soviet bloc technicians and military personnel at once or assume the inevitable consequence of having his people harmed. Such warnings should be planned and timed to be adequate for their purpose, but to have the minimum effect upon any military operation. If, in the opinion of military authority, the consequences of the warnings would render a military operation of questionable effectiveness or risk the possibility of a missile being fired at the United States, then there should be no warning.

Having done this, I believe we should take over Cuba by military means, remove the threat and also remove the Castro-Communist government and establish in Cuba a government which will serve the interests of the Cuban people and become a member of the Western Hemisphere community of nations.

The action I am proposing is drastic. However, I believe it conforms to, and the risks are consistent with American policy as stated publicly by President Kennedy on 13 September. The President said in part:

"If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantamo, our passage through the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this Hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

John A. McCone

The above is representative of the personal views of John A. McCone, as an individual, and is not to be construed as representative of the views of, or a recommendation of, the United States Intelligence Board or the Central Intelligence Agency.

341. Paper prepared in the White House, October 19¹

October 19, 1962

*The Defense of Berlin if Cuba is Blockaded**A. Preliminary considerations.*

1. The defense of Berlin is already politically fragile, in that there is no certainty of the responses of most other NATO countries under very severe pressure. Only the Federal Republic and the U.S. are really strong, and they are frequently suspicious of each other.

2. A Berlin blockade imposed in ostensible response to a blockade of Cuba would inevitably stir feeling among all Europeans that this crisis was in some measure the fault of the Americans. No matter how different the two cases, the simple psychological equality of "blockade for blockade" would be powerful.

3. It is a strong probability that Khrushchev would trade Berlin for Cuba any day; such a trade would be a heavy net loss for the U.S.

B. Possible alternative scenarios.

1. Khrushchev might simply accelerate his peace treaty procedures and let a blockage of access come as a result of this process. This is probably the most favorable case for us, since it would re-emphasize the very shaky ground on which Khrushchev himself is proceeding, and somewhat minimize the direct parallel between his course and ours. Yet it has a certain likelihood because of the degree to which the Soviets are already on this track.

2. More dangerous, though perhaps a shade less likely, would be an immediate interruption of access explicitly stated as a peace-loving means of controlling the imperialist aggressors. This would take the form of interruption of U.S. access, allied access, or general access. It could be screwed up and down in a neat parallel to our Cuba effort. Its object would be at a minimum to force us to lift our Cuban blockade while the Berlin crisis continued unresolved, and at a maximum to take Berlin.

C. Our responses.

In principle, our immediate response under all these contingencies would be governed by our present contingency plans. These plans are slow and incomplete and they depend for their execution upon a degree

¹ The defense of Berlin if Cuba is blockaded. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 10/15-23/62.

of allied resolution which is uncertain even now. Under prolonged blockade, with us sharing the blame, the morale of Berlin would be very likely to crack, and no one would fight a nuclear war for a dying city.

The general consequence is that if we were to be able to meet effectively a new Berlin blockade, with a Cuban blockade as its immediate cause, the weight resting upon the U.S. would be enormously increased. We should have to shorten our reaction times, increase the directness and force of our responses, and be prepared to confront Khrushchev at a very early stage with a bluntly nuclear choice. This is a direct reversal of our current posture in a number of ways, but without it I do not believe that Berlin can be held.

And at the best such a confrontation could hardly lead to a lifting of the Berlin blockade without a parallel relaxation in Cuba. And then where would we be? Castro would be there still. His weapons system would be there still, and covert supply could be continued.

**342. Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and
Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic
Interpretation Center, October 19¹**

October 19, 1962

JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

CONCLUSION

Offensive Missile Deployment²

1. At least one Soviet regiment of 1020-nm (SS-4) medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites near San Cristobal. Each of these sites presently contains eight missiles and four unrevetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, check-out, and support equipment. These missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, this regiment must be consid-

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (5 Sept-19 Oct 1962).

² See Figures 1-9.

ered operational now. The presence of eight missiles at each site indicates a refire capability from each of the four launchers. Refire could be accomplished in 4 to 6 hours after the initial firing. A third facility in this area, previously identified as Launch Site 3, could be either a technical support area for this regiment or a third launch site; however, the early stage of development precludes a positive identification of this activity.

2. An additional regiment of Soviet 1020-nm (SS-4) missiles is now deployed at two sites east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area, nine miles apart. These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature. Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system. Also, there are permanent structures at the launch pad areas which are not found at the San Cristobal sites. There are four launch positions at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week. The sizes of the missiles, associated equipment, and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1020-nm MRBM system.

3. Two fixed sites are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana. Four launchers, two blockhouses, and underground propellant storage are being built at each site. We believe that the 2200-nm (SS-5) IRBM is probably intended for these sites because they closely resemble Soviet sites believed to be associated with testing and deployment of this missile system. Site 1 is considered to be in a mid- to late-stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks. Site 2 is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December 1962. There are no missiles or support equipment detectable within the Guanajay Area at the present time.

Command and Control

4. All of the offensive missile systems in Cuba are Soviet manned and controlled. We believe that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Union, but have not yet identified the communication link.

Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

5. We believe that a nuclear warhead storage site is under construction adjacent to the most complete of the fixed missile launch sites near Guanajay (see Figure 6). This site could become operational at about the same time as the associated Launch Site 1. Construction of similar facilities has not yet been identified at other sites.

6. An especially secure port facility located at Punta Gerardo may be used for nuclear weapons offloading (see Figure 10).

7. There is still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear weapons

could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available.

8. The 1020-nm missiles would probably be equipped with nuclear warheads yielding 2 to 3 megatons. The 2200-nm IRBMs could have 3- to 5-megaton warheads, if our planning estimate for the payload weight is correct.

Offensive Force Levels

9. We believe that there are now at least two regiments equipped with 1020-nm MRBM's in Cuba. One is located in the San Cristobal area and the other in the Sagua La Grande area. In addition, we believe a regiment equipped with 2200-nm IRBM's is being deployed to the Guanajay area. When operational, present MRBM and IRBM units will have an aggregate total of 24 launchers. An estimated schedule of site activation is presented in Table 1. Each launcher will have a refire capability. A summary of the MRBM and IRBM threat, including the projected number of operational ready missiles for each site, is presented in Table 2. The corresponding nuclear yield deliverable from each site is shown in Table 3. The technical characteristics of the two offensive missile weapons systems are summarized in Table 4.

Support and Supply

10. Offensive missile systems are being introduced into Cuba, probably through the Port of Mariel. A new Soviet ship, the *Poltava*, possibly designed as a ballistic missile transport, has been noted making frequent trips between the USSR and Cuba. This ship has made two trips to Cuba since 17 July, and is next estimated to arrive in Cuba on or about 2 November 1962. See Figures 11 and 12.

11. Possible central missile checkout, storage, and repair bases have been located at Soroa, between the two eastern deployment areas, and at Managua, south of Havana.

12. It is significant that three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba (SS-4, SS-5, SA-2) probably use red fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer, permitting exploitation of a common system for propellant supply and storage.

Coastal Defense Missiles

13. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). These cruise missiles have a range of 35 to 40 miles and are probably derived from the AS-1. They can be fired in about 10 minutes in an alert status, with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals.

Air Defense Missiles

14. There are now 26 surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites located in Cuba, two of which appear to be alternate sites. See Figure 13. Of these,

16 are believed to be individually operational at the present time. The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks. The list of sites considered to be operational is presented in Table 5.

15. Such SA-2 sites provide for six launchers with missiles, and an additional six missiles in an adjacent hold area. The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert, providing the site has reached readiness status. Reload and refire from a single launcher will take approximately 3 to 5 minutes.

16. Valid air defense tracking data of Soviet PVO type has been noted in COMINT since 12 October 1962, indicating that an integrated air defense system is now approaching operational status.

Tactical Missiles

17. There are several refugee reports indicating the presence of tactical (FROG) missiles in Cuba, although there is no photographic confirmation thus far.

Significance

18. The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of strength. Some of the deployment characteristics include permanent elements which suggests that provision is being made for Soviet presence of long duration.

19. The rate of deployment to date, as well as the speed and variety of construction, indicates that the Soviet military build up in Cuba is being carried out on an urgent basis. This build-up has proceeded by deploying defensive weapons first, followed by deployment of offensive weapons. The pattern of missile deployment appears calculated to achieve quick operational status and then to complete site construction.

20. A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S. (see Figure 2). By deploying stockpiled MRBM IRBMs at overseas bases, the Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way.

21. This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U.S. and a large portion of Latin America for the first time.

22. The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the operation itself begun last spring.

343. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 20¹

October 20, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Saturday, 20 October

JCS meeting at 1000:

CJCS said that the President might want to hit them as early as tomorrow morning. He proposes sending a memo strongly recommending against a hasty attack on offensive weapons; it should be launched on 23 Oct and include all offensive weapons and supporting defenses. JCS agreed.

Briefing by Gen. Quinn of DIA: One regiment on 1020 n.m. missiles is near San Cristobal and is operational now. Each site has eight missiles and four launchers. There is another regiment with two sites in the Sagua la Grande area; these will be operational within one week. The 2000 mile IRBMs could be operational within six weeks; there are four launchers at two fixed sites. Operational SAM sites have risen to 16. There is no evidence of nuclear warheads in Cuba.

CNO: We are dividing the Pentagon into two teams. [Red] with McNamara, Taylor and Gilpatric will review surprise attack scenarios. Blue with Anderson, Yarmolinsky, Griffin, Shoup and McNaughton

¹ Various courses of action in response to Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

will consider blockade. In taking leadership of the Blue Team, CNO said he protested to the SecDef that this would [be] locking the barn door after the horse had been stolen. Blockade would not accomplish the objective, was not in the US interest, would be imposed after the missiles had been emplaced, and would bring a confrontation with the Soviet Union rather than Cuba. It would incur the danger of attacks on Guantanamo and US shipping in the Florida Strait, and left the possibility of missiles being launched from Cuba.

BG Lucius Clay (Dep Director, J-3): I have just come from a meeting at State attended by Cabinet members and some others. They are considering two courses: (1) limited blockade followed by an air strike three days later; (2) limited blockade followed by negotiations. Consensus is that we will have to go through political shenanigans, followed by blockade and then air strike. UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson is strong for blockade less POL.

CJCS rejoins the meeting at 1230: President will preside at a White House meeting this afternoon. The SecDef wants an in-between plan: a five-day blockade and then strike. CJCS says he will tell the President that we have every reasonable chance of hitting all those missiles. If we wait, they'll have time to hide them.

JCS meeting at 1815:

CJCS debrief on White House meeting that afternoon: "This was not one of our better days." After a two-hour discussion, the decisive votes were cast by Rusk, McNamara and Adlai Stevenson. Decision is to draw up plans for a blockade, to take effect 24 hours after the President's TV speech on the evening of the 21st or 22nd. OAS approval should be obtained during the 24-hour interval. The blockade will concern offensive weapons: POL probably will be added during the week. We should be prepared to execute an air strike against missiles only (1) without warning on Monday or Tuesday or (2) after 24 hours' notice. The rationale is that we don't want a Pearl Harbor on the American record, and we want to protect unprepared allies against retaliation. We also talked about possible negotiations with the Soviets about giving up missiles in Italy and Turkey, and using Polaris subs in the Mediterranean as a substitute. The President said to me, "I know that you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I trust that you will support me in this decision." I assured him that we were against the decision but would back him completely.

CSA: "I never thought I'd live to see the day when I would want to go to war."

344. Supplement 1 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 20¹

October 20, 1962

SUPPLEMENT 1
TO
JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA
NOTICE

This supplement up-dates and amplifies [*less than 1 line not declassified*] dated 2000 hours, 19 October 1962. Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba.

Offensive Missile Readiness

General

1. Analysis of the comparative photographic coverage of the offensive-missile sites in Cuba now leads us to conclude that the Soviets did not have as their main objective an immediate operational capability at any of the identified sites. An *emergency* operational capability to launch some of the missiles on hand within about 8 hours could now exist at the four MRBM sites. They appear to be pursuing an urgent but systematic plan to achieve an operational capability which will maximize the effectiveness of the missile regiments. Within the sites the steps necessary to achieve an immediate operational capability have not occurred. For example, at San Cristobal Site 2 the three launchers and five missiles present continue to be bunched together in a field. Were an immediate launch capability intended one would expect deployment of the launcher to the vicinity of the intended launch positions.

San Cristobal Area

2. Activity in Site 1 and Site 2 continues to indicate an urgent effort to achieve full operational readiness. The launch crews, missiles and associated equipment are in the immediate area. From the status of the sites as of our last coverage (Mission 3111 on 18 October), we estimate that Site 1 could now have full operational readiness and that

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 8 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct–22 Oct 1962).

Site 2 could achieve this status by 25 October. By full operational readiness we mean the ability to launch in salvo four missiles per site with a refire capability of four missiles per site within 4 to 6 hours.

Sagua La Grande Area

3. The MRBM sites at Sagua La Grande were first identified on 17 October and were covered by photography twice that day. (The last previous coverage was on 7 July and showed no evidence of missile activity.) The status of preparation at the two sites on 17 October was approximately the same. It is believed that the missile regiment was moving into the area on 17 October, inasmuch as 35 vehicles arrived in a support area at Site 1 within the 1¾ hour period between two photographic coverages.

4. Construction activity and random location of missile support equipment indicate that development of the area was not complete. The presence of missiles and launchers indicates that the sites have an *emergency* operational capability. However, the regiment could reach full operational readiness at these sites by 1 November.

Guanajay Area

5. A detailed reexamination of the evidence available at this time indicates that the operational date for these launch sites may be somewhat earlier than our previous estimate. Construction activity appears to be progressing at a more rapid pace than that observed in the USSR at similar facilities. Several features of the sites such as the control bunkers, excavations for fuel tanks, and blast walls for component protection are several days more advanced than previously determined. Mission 3111 on 18 October indicates that concrete is being installed at all four pads at Site 1.

6. Although we are unable to determine a precise date for an operational capability, we believe these sites may be ready to launch missiles between 1 December and 15 December.

[text not declassified]

Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

9. At the probable nuclear storage site under construction adjacent to the Guanajay IRBM fixed missile launch Site 1, earth-moving activity at the 114 by 60 foot drive-through building continues at an apparent high rate.

10. A curved-roof building similar to that at Guanajay Site 1, but only about 35 by 67 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios.

11. Foundations of structures (approximately 60 by 35 feet) which might be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have

been observed at the San Cristobal Sites 1 and 3 and at Sagua La Grande Site 1. The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth-covered.

12. The tank trailers observed in the quay area of the Punta Gerardo port facility are similar to those seen in 22 May 1962 photography taken before security fences were erected. This strongly suggests that these trucks have no nuclear association.

13. Search of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage.

Offensive Force Levels

See Table 2.

Support and Supply

No change.

Coastal Defense Missiles

No change.

Air Defense Missiles

14. There are now 24 primary surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites located in Cuba (see Figure 2). Two of these sites, Santa Lucia and Deleite, each have an alternate site located 3 to 5 nm from the primary site. These alternate sites are pre-surveyed, have no equipment and could possibly be used for mobility training exercises. Of the 24 primary sites, 20 are individually operational at the present time. The remaining primary SA-2 sites could be operational sites in approximately one week.

15. There are 6 surface-to-air missile assembly and support areas. Photography shows large quantities of surface-to-air missile cannisters and missile transporters. See Table 3 for a list of surface-to-air missile sites, missile assembly areas and associated equipment.

[text not declassified]

Guided Missile Patrol Craft

17. There are now a total of 12 KOMAR class patrol craft in Cuba. Each KOMAR craft carries two homing missiles which have an effective range of 10 to 15 nm and carry 2000 pound HE warheads. The KOMARs must return to base or to a tender for reloading. Tenders for these craft have not yet been identified in Cuba. All KOMARs in Cuba are considered to be operational. At least six are based at Havana and four at Banes. The remaining two have been observed operating in the Mariel area, but it is not known whether they are based there or were operating from the Havana base.

18. The KOMARs have all been transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. The first shipment arrived

in Havana on 14 August 1962. Whereas it probably took several weeks to establish base and logistic support for the first KOMARs to become integrated fully operational units, additional units can probably become operational within one week after offloading.

Tactical Missiles

No change.

Significance

19. The apparent Soviet objective to rapidly achieve full operational status for their MRBM and IRBM regiments rather than to achieve an immediate operational capability at each site as the missiles and equipment arrive, may be very significant to the planners judging various Soviet courses of action.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

Addendum

Preliminary analysis of photography of 18 October reveals an unidentified secured installation in an early stage of construction 5 nm southwest of the town of REMEDIOS. It consists of 4 large excavations in a symmetrical pattern; however, their function cannot be determined at this time. This installation is, however, considered to be a suspected surface-to-surface missile site.

345. Paper, October 20¹

October 20, 1962

I—AIR STRIKE SCENARIO

The Military Program

This plan calls for a surprise strike aimed at medium range missiles, surface to air missiles, and high performance aircraft and nuclear storage sites in Cuba. The object is to ensure by conventional means the most rapid and complete removal of any operational capability in these fields. This operation would be followed by continual close surveillance and very promptly by a blockade in which all Bloc shipping would be

¹ I—Air Strike Scenario. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. I.

turned back and imports of fuel prohibited. The alternative of omitting the blockade is not recommended, because of the danger of a recreated threat. The alternative of a strike limited to known missile sites is no longer recommended even by those who first proposed it because of the dangers presented by a surviving and substantial air capability. This build-up should be hit promptly as a whole complex, or not at all.

Schedule of Public Statements

Intelligence estimates put a high premium on maximum tactical surprise, but political considerations at home and abroad dictate some minimum announcement that medium range missiles are being installed in Cuba. The current recommendation is that there should be a White House announcement of the estimates of the introduction of such missiles early Saturday evening. This statement would also announce that the President was recalling the Congress to a special session to meet on Tuesday morning. This announcement would be followed by a brief Presidential statement on all networks Sunday morning at the time the strike begins and the announcement presently would be completed by a Presidential TV address by mid-morning Sunday.

Notice to Khrushchev and Castro—Alternative 1

It is recommended that no advance notice be given to Khrushchev. The principal point here is that there is no notice to which he cannot make a politically damaging reply, and no serious advantage in giving him any precise advance indication of a course which is inevitable. We have been unable to draft any advance warning which would carry conviction either in the following days of crises or in history.

There should, however, be a carefully drafted statement to Khrushchev delivered approximately simultaneously with the air strike. This message would carry much of the President's argument in his later public speech. It would carefully define and delimit the grounds and the extent of the military operation with special emphasis on its conventional character. It would renew and reemphasize the depth and intensity of the United States commitment to defend Berlin by *all* necessary means. It would include an urgent invitation to a Summit meeting. It might also include a statement that while we are currently treating these as Cuban missiles, any nuclear use of them would have to be regarded as an act of the Soviet Government.

The problem of notice to Castro is different. It is his country which will come under attack, and it is best from our point of view to focus responsibility on him. At some time between the White House statement on Saturday evening and the air strike a message should be delivered to the Cuban representative in the UN which would indicate plainly that what we now know is completely inconsistent with Cuban

assurances, Soviet statements, and our own clearly announced position; thus it will now be necessary for us to take appropriate steps. The military preference is that warning to Cuba should be given not more than 2 hours before attack if tactical surprise is not to be jeopardized.

Notice to Khrushchev and Castro—Alternative 2

On the political side there is a strong feeling that a real advance communication to Khrushchev and Castro is needed, if the United States is not to be marked as a reckless aggressor and this Administration cursed forever as the force which opened the door to a world of catch-as-catch-can violence. In spite of the difficulty of saying anything that could not be turned against us, this group has urged that advance warning be given. If this is done, the military operation is degraded in the ways argued in the Annex, depending on whether 6 or 24 hours of notice is given.

Such a warning could not be precise in its threat. Its basic sentence might be something saying that "unless the Soviet (Cuban) Government can give immediate and unequivocal assurance that these offensive weapons (missiles and IL-28s; MIGs?) will be removed immediately, the United States Government will have to meet its own responsibilities." The rest of the message would be, in essence, a preview of the President's speech.

If this sort of warning were given, it should be given simultaneously with or shortly after initial public statement. In that case the timing of the statement from the White House should be changed accordingly.

Notice to Friends

It appears to us essential that advance notice of this action be given to the heads of Governments of the following countries: The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Turkey. The latter two are included because of the existence of nuclear forces on their territory. Notice should be given not more than 2 hours before the strike. The messages to our principal Allies should rehearse basic evidence and argumentation and the messages to Italy, Japan and Turkey, and also to Great Britain, should direct attention to the particular problem of United States-connected nuclear installations which may become a hazard. The United States should not indicate any fear on its own part, but should indicate a readiness to take account of the desires of its Allies in this grave situation. (If warning is given to Khrushchev, the content of these messages should be revised, and their timing advanced.)

On Sunday for Monday the United States would call a meeting of the Consultative Organ of the OAS and in that Organ it would press for a two-thirds majority endorsing this remedial action.

The United States would brief the North Atlantic Council on Monday, perhaps through a special emissary who may also be dispatched to De Gaulle. This briefing would emphasize the great provocation of the Soviet action, the increased determination of the United States, and the real balance of strategic power.

**346. Memorandum of conversation among the President,
Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, General Taylor,
McCone, October 21¹**

October 21, 1962

1. General Sweeney reviewed in considerable detail the plans for an air strike against the missile bases, the air fields, a few SAM sites in critical locations and finally the plans for invasion.

2. It was decided that at a minimum an air strike must include both the missile sites and the air fields and such SAM sites as are necessary, and General Taylor was instructed to plan accordingly.

3. There was complete agreement that military action must include an invasion and occupation of Cuba.

4. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor told the President that an air strike could not provide absolute assurance that all missiles were destroyed; they indicated a 90 per cent probability. They also stated that any warning would very possibly cause the movement of missiles to obscure unknown locations from which they could become operational. General Taylor therefore recommended, on the basis of military grounds, that the air strike be conducted immediately, suggesting tomorrow morning, and that it be without warning. Secretary McNamara confirmed the military appraisal expressed above but made no recommendation as to policy.

5. In response to direct questioning from the President, the Attorney General and McCone advised against surprise attack for the reasons discussed at previous meetings. The Attorney General failed to make an absolute recommendation with respect to future military actions, indicating this question could be decided as the situation developed from day to day, and that only preparatory steps should be taken now. McCone urged on the other hand that the President in a public

¹ Possible military courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.

statement indicate an intention to remove the missiles and other potential weapons by means and at a time of his own choosing if surveillance did not prove conclusively that the Soviets and the Cubans were removing them.

6. The meeting adjourned to be reconvened at 2:30, with additional principals in attendance.

John A. McCone
Director

347. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 21¹

October 21, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Sunday, 21 October

JCS meeting at 1300:

CJCS: Gen. Sweeney and I saw the President this morning. Sweeney said he needed an additional 150 planes to get the missiles and 500

¹ Debrief of meetings with the President on possible air strikes against Cuba, President's speech, and blockade of Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

planes for the whole job. The President said if we make the strike we will do the whole job. What are the chances of getting the known targets?

CSAF: 90 percent.

CNO: The President's speech is solid for Monday night.

CJCS: How soon after that will the blockade begin?

CMC: State wants to make it indefinite, so as to get OAS reaction first. I said if they wanted 24 hours, all right.

CAPT Houser brought a memo from the DepSecDef into the JCS meeting. The President wants to be sure that Jupiters in Turkey and Italy are not fired without his authorization, even in the event of a Soviet nuclear or non-nuclear attack on those units.

JCS reply is JCSM-800-62, opposing any further steps.

JCS meeting at 1715:

Debrief of a White House meeting that began at 1430:

CJCS: CNO and I attended.

CNO: It was agreed that the President's speech was too precise on the numbers of missiles and launchers (5–6 MRBM sites, 32 missiles; 2 IRBM sites, 15 missiles). Also, we will call this a quarantine rather than a blockade; then we could escalate to a blockade. References in the draft to horrors of war will be toned down, and direct references to West Berlin eliminated. All Services and the Joint Staff were instructed to shorten from 7 to 5 days the period for execution of OPLAN 316.

CJCS: "The Pearl Harbor complex has affected the good people at the White House. . . . There will be no air strike, but it is in the offing."

348. Telegram 6830 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Certain Military Commands, October 21¹

October 21, 1962

[illegible in the original] from Taylor.

THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE.

1. The President of the United States has under consideration the initiation of blockade operations against Cuba.

2. The reaction to these operations by Cuban military forces could lead to U.S. air strikes against Cuban armed forces, and invasion of the island of Cuba. Preparations for these contingencies are in progress. These sub-[illegible in the original] actions, if initiated, would probably result in the [illegible in the original] of force against Soviets military and civilian [illegible in the original] and would directly challenge the prestige of the Soviet Union. The reaction of the USSR cannot be predicted with accuracy.

3. It is imperative under the circumstances which could arise to present the strongest possible deterrent to any [illegible in the original] of Soviet military action. The U.S. must demonstrate unequivocally that it is ready militarily to meet and to defeat retaliatory Soviet actions at whatever level is necessary. At the same time, we must avoid actions in other areas which may be considered provocative or which may create civil alarm.

4. At the time of the public announcement by the President of the United States of the decision to initiate blockade operations DEFCON 3 level of readiness will be effected world-wide. It is expected that the announcement will be made on the evening of 22 October Washington time. The time of initiation of blockade operations will tentatively be 24 to 48 hours later.

5. Should the action taken against Cuba include air attack and invasion of Cuba, reinforcement capabilities for the European and Pacific commands, as reflected in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, applicable for general war, may be delayed.

6. JCS desire all commanders to review applicable plans, and be prepared to report critical limitations to the conduct of general war operations in their respective areas.

7. The contents of this message are sensitive and must be closely held.

¹ Possible reactions to initiation of blockade operations against Cuba and instructions to review applicable general war plans. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 10/16/62-10/21/62.

**349. Circular telegram 700 to all Latin American posts,
October 21¹**

October 21, 1962

This message not to be acted on until receipt later single word message "GO" and time President speech.

1. October 21 or 22 President Kennedy will make nationwide TV statement, text or summary of which will be sent you by separate message. Subject this statement will be situation created by proof we have that Soviets are creating offensive nuclear capability in Cuba, together with action we propose should be taken. This message covers actions required of you in connection with that statement.

2. It is of utmost importance that contents that statement and President letter (see below) be known in advance of statement to no one in Embassy staff except yourself, your secretary, DCM and CAS. Substance this message should also be provided to others than yourself only on a strict need-to-know and piecemeal basis.

3. On receipt code word you should seek earliest possible appointment with FM or most senior official available in succeeding couple of hours and state that US has received intelligence information which suggests that sometime in next few days there may be concerted Hemisphere-wide attacks led by local Communists on established governments, public order and US property and citizens of unprecedented violence. You should suggest that quiet and not too visible but prompt measures be taken in order to be ready for such developments. You should also state that US will have stocks of riot equipment on call by air at short notice in Canal Zone. You should also say that you expect to have more specific information in the course of the day and therefore wish as matter of greatest importance to see Chief of State or highest ranking other official available later same day. (One hour in advance of President's statement.) (FYI. You are authorized convey substance this paragraph to those constituent posts which your judgment should be informed in order make necessary preparations for likely local Communist activity. END FYI)

4. At appointment with Chief of State you should give him text or summary of President Kennedy's TV statement if received in time and also letter from President Kennedy to Chief of State contained in separate message.

¹ Instructions for Ambassadors following the President's nationwide TV statement on Soviet offensive nuclear capability in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-2262.

5. You should also inform him that at US request OAS Council is being called into session for 10 a.m. the following morning at which time the US will request approval for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System to consider this new situation in Cuba. You should reinforce President's letter by strongly emphasizing the importance of getting instructions to his OAS representative to support such action.

6. You should also reinforce the President's request for support of a resolution by the Organ of Consultation taken as promptly as possible, and very preferably on same day, agreeing that the governments of the Hemisphere should take all actions they may deem necessary against Cuba as provided for in Article 8 of the Rio Pact. (FYI. For time being US primary interest lies in obtaining Organ of Consultation resolution which includes provision use armed force indicated meet situation including blockade. Such resolution would not rpt not require all states to use armed force. US will however quite probably seek agreement through Organ at subsequent meetings on other measures envisaged Article 8 which we contemplate would be mandatory and binding upon all OAS members. END FYI) Proposed text of US resolution is contained in separate message and should be made available to him. All important arguments for such support are clearly set forth in President's statement and letter.

7. You should make clear that this is a first vital step to deal with a major threat by the USSR to the peace and security not only of this Hemisphere but the whole free world. It is not possible to anticipate how this more intensified struggle against the forces of international communism will develop. Therefore it will be necessary to keep the Organ of Consultation in being to consider other actions which may become necessary or may be suggested by one or another of the member states.

8. You should also follow up President's letter to discuss possible collaboration in military field by host country. If Chief of State interested, such collaboration can be arranged with special representatives US JCS and you should inform us.

9. You should inform Chief of State that in recognition of possibility of disorders fomented by local Communist elements on orders from Moscow and Havana against law and order and the established government and perhaps US property and citizens, the US has special stock-piles of riot control equipment in Canal Zone available promptly by air on request to you. You should also state that if at any time he feels that under the provisions of the Rio Pact or the Punta del Este resolutions he needs assistance, the US stands ready to render all practicable help in the maintenance of law and order against the attempts of such elements to destroy democratic government. Such help will be available on as short notice as possible.

10. You should report the results of your interview NIACT. All cable traffic unrelated this subject or other emergency should be kept absolute minimum.

All cable traffic this subject should be slugged EYES ONLY.

Rusk

350. Memorandum of discussion between the President and McCone, October 21¹

October 21, 1962

On my report of my discussion with General Eisenhower at my residence this morning, the following information was given later to the Attorney General. It is not to be given to anyone else.

After briefing by Lundahl, General Eisenhower and I engaged in a long discussion concerning the proper procedure to be followed. Eisenhower's conclusions are as follows:

1. Any military action would be inconclusive and therefore inadvisable unless it employed invasion and occupation of Cuba. Eisenhower gave this opinion on a basis of his experience in war in countless examples of air strikes which though most effective, were never completely conclusive.

2. From a military point of view a surprise attack would be most effective and most desirable if followed in a minimum time by invasion.

3. However, from a broader point of view, he opposed surprise attack because of the indictment, the resulting tensions, and the fact that such action by the United States would license other countries to resort to violent military action without notice.

4. Therefore Eisenhower would accept the handicaps from a military point of view, of warning or notice, and therefore would follow the suggested plan of initiating a blockade, conducting intense surveillance, and announcing the intention of taking military action if the Soviets and the Cubans either maintained the status quo of their missile installations or continued the construction of their missile bases. The military action he envisaged would be air strikes and invasion.

¹ Conclusions of McCone's discussion with former President Eisenhower on military procedures to follow in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.

5. General Eisenhower emphasized he was giving his opinion based solely on intelligence and without the benefit of a study of the war plans or the most recent diplomatic exchanges with Castro, Khrushchev, our allies, etc. It seemed fair to conclude that his views as expressed above represent a flash judgment rather than a considered judgment arrived at with all facets of the problem laid before him.

John A. McCone
Director

351. Supplement 2 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 21¹

October 21, 1962

SUPPLEMENT 2
TO
JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA
NOTICE

This supplement up-dates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba.

DEFINITIONS

An Emergency Operational Capability exists when a site could launch some missiles should a decision be made to do so.

A Full Operational Capability is achieved when a site has reached a steady state of readiness with the ability to salvo its first missile load within about 6 to 8 hours and with the ability to refire within 4 to 6 hours.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The comparative photographic coverage indicates that, while an emergency operational capability could exist at several offensive mis-

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct-22 Oct 1962).

sile sites, the Soviet objective in Cuba is to attain full operational capability at all sites as soon as possible, rather than to prepare each site for an emergency launch capability as soon as the missiles and equipment arrive in the area. (See Figure 1.)

2. There are clear indications that at least five Soviet offensive missile regiments, each with eight launchers and at least sixteen missiles, will become operational in Cuba. (See Table 1.) This will represent a first salvo potential of 40 missiles with a refire capability of an additional 40 missiles. It should be noted that this threat against the U.S. is approximately one-half the currently estimated ICBM missile threat from the USSR.

352. Memorandum for the record, November 14¹

October 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Mission to Paris

1. The special party departed Andrews Air Force Base 21 October at 1145 EDT. It consisted of Mr. Dean Acheson, the President's special emissary to President De Gaulle, Ambassador Dowling, Chester L. Cooper, R. Jack Smith, Edward Fack (courier), and myself, of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. The first briefing we undertook was on the plane when we unpacked our materials, including one set of graphics, and read Messrs. Acheson and Dowling in on the full story of the military buildup in Cuba. They in turn informed us as to their instructions, a matter concerning which we had been in complete ignorance.

3. Ambassador Bruce and Archie Roosevelt, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] met us at Greenham Common AFB (a SAC base). While the plane was refueling, all of us met in the Commander's command post. Ambassador Bruce and Mr. Roosevelt were given a preliminary briefing.

4. Mr. Acheson and I flew on to Evreux where we were met by Cecil Lyon, Ambassador Finletter, and [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

¹ Report on Acheson's mission to Paris, October 22–24. Secret. 21 pp. CIA Files: Job 84–00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A, 29 May 72.

Paris, and an armed courier. It was then about 0130 local time. Mr. Acheson, with Messrs. Lyon and Finletter, proceeded directly to Lyon's residence. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] courier, and I went to the Embassy to put the materials in the vault.

5. 22 October. On this day I conducted or participated in three briefings, as follows:

(a) *Meeting With US Officials*

A working luncheon at Mr. Lyon's house. Present were: Lyon, Norbert Anschuetz of the Embassy, Mr. Acheson, Ambassador Finletter, US representative to NAC; Minister Durbrow, Deputy US representative to NAC; Minister Lawrence Levy, Defense Department representative to NAC; General J.P. McConnell, USAF Deputy CincEur; General James Moore, USA Chief of Staff, SacEur; Walter Stoessel, Polad, SacEur; Rear Admiral J.M. Lee, USN, ISA, Department of Defense; [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. I briefed in considerable detail, taking as much as half an hour. I had all the briefing materials with me. The two generals were obviously much interested in the technical military aspects of the Cuba buildup. Both of them took very extensive notes throughout. (General Norstad was in the UK.)

After the briefing, General Moore brought up for discussion the matter of "alerting" US forces in Europe and putting NATO forces into a "condition of increased vigilance." He indicated he had been in touch with General Norstad on the draft of a message from CincEur to NATO Commanders in Europe.

(b) *Meeting With President de Gaulle At the Elysee Palace*

At 4:40 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] appeared at Mr. Lyon's residence where two modest automobiles from the Elysee Palace awaited us. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lyon, with a presidential escort officer, took one; [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I the other. We entered the Elysee through the regular entrance on the Rue du Faubourg St. Honore. I do not believe that there had been any special measures to clear the street of spectators but there was scarcely anyone within 50 yards of the entrance who was not in some kind of uniform. Once within the first courtyard we followed a tortuous course from court to inner court to inner court and were finally brought up to an unprepossessing doorway under guard. We proceeded down small corridors, up small stairways, through more corridors and stairways until we finally fetched up at a large room adjoining the President's private office. My guess is that if this were not the Cabinet Room it served some such purpose. There was a very large oval table which would have seated perhaps 20 people. The four Americans and the escort officer were here joined by another Frenchman who turned out to be an emergency interpreter. After a few minutes' wait—which would have been a minute or so after 5—Mr. Lyon and Mr. Acheson were

ushered into the General's office. Mr. Lyon has reported on what took place by cable. (State from Paris, No. 1901, dated 22 Oct 62.) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] waited for perhaps 20 minutes than the two of us were invited in.

The Presidential presence is quite something. I was, of course, prepared for his vast height but not for his bulk. He is surely one of the largest men alive. My second impression was, of course, his eyes which lie behind at least a half an inch of glass.

He had risen from his small desk—not much larger than our photographs—and gravely shook hands with both of us. He gave me the nod to begin. My topic sentence was something like: “Mr. President, the subject of this briefing is the recent military build-up in Cuba which began during the early summer on a primarily defensive level and has now taken on a demonstrably offensive quality. I refer principally to the recent emplacement of 1100 and 2200-mile surface to surface ballistic missiles capable of carrying multimegaton warheads.” Claude le Bel who had been Minister in the French Embassy in Washington for a number of years acted as interpreter.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] the large photograph of the map of Cuba which I put before the General. Still standing, he bent over it as I began to talk about the defensive phase. I mentioned first the arrival of large numbers of Soviet personnel, quantities of transportation, communications and electronic equipment. Next I came to the SAMs, pointing out the SAM symbol on the map. To my great comfort he at once identified the symbol and with his own finger pointed to a number of the others. I then showed him the photograph of a SAM site which he seemingly identified at once. I passed on the photograph of Santa Clara airfield, pointing out the MIG-21s. There was a reading glass which he picked up and put into the proper position, looked at the swept-wing aircraft, and indicated that this was a remarkable photograph. I quickly showed him the Komars and the surface-to-surface cruise missiles. The word “cruise” was the only technical term Le Bel did not cope with instantly. He snapped a finger in annoyance and then realized that salvation lay on the graphic itself for this photograph had as an inset a diagram of the little winged missile.

I then indicated that I would pass to the offensive phase, showed him the IL-28 crates being carried as deck cargo, showed him the San Julian airfield, pointed out the crates, the assembled IL-28 and the two uncrated fuselages. Again he picked up the reading glass and examined the picture carefully. I then went to MR-1 at San Cristobal and the MR site at Saqua la Grande. Next came the IR site at Guanajay. Coming back to the map again I toted up the number of confirmed sites, the number of probables plus the possibles at Remedios. I then went over our estimates of degree of readiness and gave him a worst case estimate

as of the moment of speaking and another worst case as of early 1963. I discussed briefly nuclear warheads, the fact that we could not positively identify any but noted the high degree of probability that they were in Cuba and the highly suspicious storage areas were being readied. I called his attention to the storage site at Guanajay. I noted our estimate of the yield of these warheads as two to three megatons for the MRs and three to five for the IRs. I closed with a reminder that as of early 1963 my worst case estimate could augment present Soviet first strike capabilities with missiles by some 50%.

Not once in the course of my briefing was there any hint of incredulity on the part of the General. If he was not perfectly satisfied that the pictures were scenes from Cuba and the weapons those which I asserted them to be, he gave me no inkling of doubt. Furthermore, if he had expressed doubts to Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lyon, I am sure they would have reported it.²

[illegible in the original] left the room with the completion of the briefing. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lyon followed in a few minutes. We all of us waited in the big room until some other visitors were out of the way and then proceeded as we had come in. I do not believe that Mr. Acheson was recognized by anyone but insiders from the moment he left Lyon's house until the moment he returned. Obviously I was not.

(c) Meeting with the North Atlantic Council

During the day the station received the USIB-approved briefing note to be read to the NAC. Mr. Acheson got a copy and had read it. Meanwhile we hopefully awaited the full text of the speech which the President would deliver at midnight local time. The NAC meeting was scheduled for 10 PM. By the time I had to leave the Embassy only Part 1 of 4 had been received.

Once again to Mr. Lyon's residence where I met Mr. Acheson and Mr. Durbrow and proceeded in Mr. Durbrow's automobile to the NATO building. No one was in the lobby when we arrived and Mr. Acheson reached Mr. Finletter's office unobserved. General Moore, Mr. Levy and Mr. Stoessel were there. There was some conversation about General Norstad's message to the NATO commanders in Europe and it was agreed that General Moore would come down to the meeting but would wait in an anteroom until called. Mr. Acheson, Mr. Finletter

² After I had completed the first draft of this memorandum I saw Mr. Acheson who told me the following about his discussion with De Gaulle. After he had conveyed his message he told the General that there was an intelligence officer waiting outside to brief him on the evidence. General de Gaulle's response was that he needed no such evidence; he was satisfied with Mr. Acheson's account; after all, President Kennedy obviously would not have sent a man of Mr. Acheson's eminence to give him misinformation.

and I entered the roomful of permanent representatives and shook hands all the way around. The Acting Chairman was Colonna of Italy. He introduced Mr. Acheson as needing no introduction to the group, noting that he was on a special mission for the President of the US. Mr. Acheson sat at the right of the Chairman. I sat at his right and Mr. Finletter at my right. Mr. Acheson began by briefly discussing the nature of our mission, read some excerpts from the portion of the President's speech that he had at hand and then indicating that he wished to read a statement, introduced me as Assistant Director, CIA, who was there to answer questions when he finished reading his prepared text. He then read the text. There were a few questions on the estimated performance of the MRs and IRs, a general question about their state of readiness, and after the meeting an aide of the German permanent representative followed us to Mr. Finletter's office to ask the estimated yield of the warheads. I indicated low multimegaton. There was no question remotely bearing upon sources and methods, and there were, of course, as per USIB instructions, no graphics whatever with one exception. I passed around the map from GMAIC, JAEIC, NPIC report of 19 October. I had cut this from my own copy and cut all the code words and designation of classification off it. Some member of the North Atlantic Council now has a souvenir; it never came back. I had also removed the map of Cuba which showed how the SAMs covered air space. This I kept securely in my pocket throughout. Not only were there no questions about the sources of our information but no questions whatever to indicate any doubt that Mr. Acheson's story was not in fact a true story.

I do not know what would have developed had M. de Staerke not changed the subject. It seems that as he was on his way home at 7:30 that evening he had heard on his radio that General Norstad had on his own authority put all NATO forces on an alert. He, rushing on as if he were in possession of the truth, had some very acid remarks about issuing such orders without consulting this body. After all, he mused, was it not for just such matters that this body existed? Before anyone could put him to rights he was joined by the representative of the Netherlands who said much the same thing adverting to the necessity to consult with even the small powers. No one knows how long this would have gone on had not Mr. Finletter insisted on the Chairman's attention and said that General Moore was in the outer office with a statement which he felt would clarify the situation. No one has ever had it so good as General Moore. He came into the meeting and speedily read the text of what General Norstad had sent to the NATO commanders. The word "alert", of course, did not appear in it anywhere. The commanders were merely urged to a position of vigilance, the most drastic part of which was increased intelligence activities. M. de Staerke,

well back on his heels, did not exactly apologize, but did the next thing to it. He said to the Chair that he wished to withdraw his remarks and was joined in this sentiment by the Netherlands. Contrition was apparently quite deep because at this moment the Netherlander said, turning to Mr. Acheson, something like, "Given this state of affairs, what do you wish us to do?" M. de Staerke re-echoed the sentiment. One or two others joined in.

Mr. Acheson, in great good humor, indicated that if he were Secretary of State of the United States, he would give them the benefit of his thinking on the matter, but since he was no more than a private citizen, he would offer no suggestions. Some closing phrase of his deflected the conversation to the forthcoming discussions in the OAS and the UN Security Council. About this time M. de Staerke, looking at the clock and seeing that he had 20 minutes to alert his government to the President's speech, moved for adjournment. All were in accord and the room emptied very, very promptly.

We returned to Mr. Finletter's office briefly and then went down to the front door. There Mr. Acheson's cover was penetrated. Doty of the *New York Times* and a CBS man were loitering in the lobby and immediately recognized him.

I returned to the Embassy to stow the documents and heard the last third of the President's speech. This was the longest day.

6. 23 October. I could have returned to Headquarters this day but was given to understand that Headquarters wished me to brief General Jacquier and his top staff at the SDECE. [less than 1 line not declassified] I arrived at SDECE about one o'clock and had luncheon with the two officers [less than 1 line not declassified]. The five of us then went to General Jacquier's office, shook hands and went with him to a small room next door which had a good sized table in it. The officers present were those who had been previously cleared for sensitive intelligence. [less than 1 line not declassified] went through the briefing with the graphics in considerable detail. General Jacquier's English is, of course, excellent, [less than 1 line not declassified] and I did put the briefing into French for some of the others. Here again, there was absolutely no hint of doubt with respect to the genuineness of the photographs. There was no question even to the photographs of the IR site and the S/S cruise missiles, which to be sure required more faith even than good eyesight.

a. *The Briefing for the French Press*

We returned to the Embassy by about 3:30 to find that USIB had authorized the briefing of the French Press, had supplied a briefing text and instructions with respect to the use of the graphics. Mr. Lyon, the DCM, had his doubts about the desirability of this action. I think

his principal concern was how the President of the Republic would react when, next morning, he realized that things told to him in terms of utmost secrecy and by a man of Mr. Acheson's eminence, within 36 hours had been dumped into the public domain. He worried over this decision until it seemed too late to get the news into the morning papers. This I judged to have been the estimate of John Mowinkle, the USIA man. It was further decided to call a Press conference for 10:30 the next morning. Mowinkle himself would not do the briefing but would entrust the job to a young man named Lowe who had a greater familiarity with military matters than Mowinkle himself. It was further decided, and this was entirely satisfactory with me, that I would make no appearance before the newspaper men but would confine my activities to reading Lowe in on the subject and making sure that the graphics were keyed into his spoken statement in a foolproof manner.

It will be recalled that USIB's instructions re this briefing were as follows: the briefer was to follow a USIB-approved text which was at hand. The briefer was to refer to certain stipulated graphics. The number was perhaps no more than half of the total number of graphics in the kit. All place names, locational data, and numbers were to be removed from the graphics. Members of the Press could study the graphics but could not reproduce them. Graphics were not to be allowed outside the Embassy building.

In the light of these instructions I personally selected the graphics as indicated, cut off the headings at the top of the prints, removed the little box in each photograph which contained the orientation map of Cuba with its designating arrow, the classification, and where indicated obliterated locational information and numbers.

Two graphics had to be improvised. These were a map of the Western Hemisphere showing approximate ranges of the MRs and IRs and a map of Cuba showing that Cuban air space was under protection of the SAMs.

I went over the briefing note carefully, patched up a needless obscurity in paragraph G and keyed the graphics to the text.

7. 24 October.

(a) With my breakfast arrived a copy of the Paris edition of the *New York Herald Tribune*. To my very considerable surprise, smack in the middle of the top half of the front page and three or four columns wide, was the photograph of the SAM site referred to in paragraph G of the briefing note. A few minutes later, upon arrival at the Embassy, I was informed that the whole kit of photographs had been released to the British Press the night before, that they were appearing in the London papers this morning and indeed had appeared on two British TV programs last night. A few minutes later I was shown two Paris morning papers, one of which carried the SAM site above mentioned,

the other, the picture of the SAM support area which I had not been authorized even to show to the French Press. I conferred with [less than 1 line not declassified] as to the best procedure and we agreed that I should call Washington for permission to release reproductions of the graphics which were to be shown to the French Press at 10:30 this morning. There was some difficulty in getting through to Washington and it was not until about 9:50 AM local time that I reached the CIA Watch Office. Ten or fifteen minutes later they called back authorizing the release if OK with the DCM. I promptly conferred with Mr. Lyon who, still with some reluctance, authorized the release of four pictures. An Embassy pressman accordingly scotch taped the four pictures in question (MR-1, IR-1, the IL-28s at San Julian and the MIGs at Santa Clara) to the floor and photographed them with a handheld 35 mm camera using only natural light. I did not see the results but I can imagine most French newspaper readers had much to take on faith when they saw what appeared in the afternoon papers.

(b) Mr. Lowe of USIS did the briefing in Mr. Mowinkle's presence. As per prior decision, I was not present. I have no idea what newspapers were represented nor the names of their representatives.

(c) At about 11 AM, having been in touch with Colonel Sherrard, the G-2 at EUCOM, [less than 1 line not declassified] I went out to EUCOM to give him the word. The only news EUCOM had received thus far regarding the situation in Cuba was what General McConnell had reported on the basis of my briefing of 22 October. Colonel Sherrard took [less than 1 line not declassified] Colonel Roland Spritzen, USMC, and me to the Senior Officers' Mess for lunch and I answered questions put to me by General McConnell and others. Shortly thereafter in a briefing room I ran through the briefing in detail with about 20 senior officers of EUCOM. I did not have the graphics. [less than 1 line not declassified] returned straightway to Paris, largely for me to prepare myself for a meeting with Andre Fontaine of *Le Monde*.

(d) As is well known, *La Monde* is France's leading afternoon paper. For some peculiar reason understood only by the French, it is dated one day after its appearance. Thus the issue appearing in the afternoon of 22 October bears the date 23 October.

(e) Fontaine had had time to hear and study the President's speech of midnight, 21 October, and to write an unsympathetic front page column on US policy toward Cuba. His articles are usually signed; this one was not. The 2nd paragraph banged into the credibility of the evidence. "One would like to be sure of the accuracy of the information" upon which the President has acted. "But unhappily, experience shows that the American intelligence services sometimes make mistakes." This set the tone. Later on he again obliquely challenged the evidence in the fourth paragraph which contains the sentence, "If the Russians

have not really delivered and do not have the intention of delivering. . . ." In short, M. Fontaine was from Missouri and had rather persuasively set forth his doubts about the evidence and his views—totally unsympathetic to the US—for the edification of France's best educated and probably most conservative reading elite.

(f) Mowinkle who knew Fontaine well was most anxious that I see Fontaine and go over the script and graphics with him. The DCM agreed. I was presented to Fontaine under a pseudo as a Department of Defense civilian temporarily in Paris. Accordingly I gave him the word.

(g) I began by calling his attention to the fact that neither he nor I were expert enough in the PI's art to identify the terrain as Cuban or some of the weapons and sites as to what they really were. I told him that if he thought that I was about to embark upon a snow job with fabricated graphics I was prepared to call it off right there; that if he were willing to take on faith the fact that this countryside was Cuban and the weapons in fact what I said they were, we would proceed. Interestingly, he then said, "No. I am prepared to believe you because Castro himself in a speech of yesterday proclaimed that American aircraft had been violating Cuban air space. This is good enough evidence for me to believe that you have been overflying Cuba and photographing it from the air." With these formalities over, I ran through the exercise with the sanitized pictures. Almost the only question he asked was the altitude from which the pictures were taken. He presumed that this was secret. I indicated that it was indeed secret and let it go at that. I left Paris before *Le Monde*, dated 26 October, was printed. I would be interested in seeing how much of the briefing stuck.

(h) Ambassador Bohlen had arrived at Le Havre on the night of 23–24 October. He had driven to Paris with one of the Embassy officers during the 24th and had gone straight to the residence. We received a message during the day that he wanted me to give him the briefing and would I be available to come to the residence at 7 PM. Paris evening traffic being what it is [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I left for the residence at 6:30. We arrived on the tick of 7. The DCM arrived a few minutes later. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I ran through the briefing and talked generally with the Ambassador and Mr. Lyon until about 8:30. The Ambassador indicated that he would like to see me the next morning shortly before 9.

(i) It was during these late afternoon hours of 24 October that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] received the message from Headquarters requesting my speedy return. The transportation people checked on space available and discovered that the best that could be done was a DC-6 or -7 out of Amsterdam late that night. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] decided that in the light of Mr. Bohlen's request that I see him in the morning I would be wiser to spend the night in Paris, see

Bohlen, and catch a noon TWA flight which had its own connector between Idlewild and Washington.

(j) Accordingly I did just this. In my final meeting with Mr. Bohlen two matters are of high importance. One, his feeling that the Soviets would not like one bit to have Russians killed in Cuba. "They are a primitive people, they don't like this sort of thing and in the event that Russians are killed we should be prepared for a very direct and strong response." The other, his very great interest in being kept up to date with the progress of the Soviet buildup in Cuba. After all, his information was almost a week old upon his arrival in Paris.

(k) Bad weather in Europe delayed the departure of TWA Flight 803 until about 2 PM. Because of head winds ranging from 110 to 140 knots it took eight hours to make the flight from Paris to Idlewild and it did not arrive in Washington until 8 PM.

Sherman Kent

Assistant Director

National Estimates

353. Excerpt from Ambassador Bruce's diary, October 21-25¹

October 21-25, 1962

October 21, 1962—Sunday

I thought this would be a day of quietude. Such is not the case. I received a message from Washington early in the morning, asking whether I expected to be in London today and tomorrow. A couple of hours later, I began to get telephone calls and messages transmitted through three separate Embassy channels, indicating that something unusual was astir in Washington. Telegrams brought out to me were not especially enlightening until supplemented by a conversation with Bill Tyler in the Department, who said I was to meet a military plane at twelve o'clock tonight, at Greenham Common Airport. There I was to be briefed on what would later be required of me, before the plane went on to Paris and other destinations. A telegram that followed

¹ Acheson's meetings in London. No classification marking. 10 pp. DOS, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327.

mystified me slightly by naming as one of the passengers on the plane Dean Acheson.

Archie Roosevelt and I motored out to the airfield, near Newbury, a trip of over two hours. This is a SAC base. The ship, one of the President's three jets, arrived ahead of time. Aboard it, amongst others, were Red Dowling, Dean Acheson, Sherman Kent, and Chet Cooper. They told us there had been a great commotion for several days in Washington, as a result of the discovery that the Soviets had been busily developing a missile potential in Cuba that would be useful for offensive purposes. In fact, many missiles were already in place, and a large number of airplanes, including twin-engine bombers ready to fly. The most dangerous thing about this capability was that medium-range ballistic missiles, with a range of 1100 nautical miles, could reach as far as Washington, and southward beyond the Panama Canal. The intermediate RBM's, with a range of 2200 nautical miles, could blanket the United States, with the exception of an area near Seattle, as well as reach south deep into Latin America.

The President had been considering this threat closely for some days. In fact, the abandonment of his campaign tour on the grounds of having a cold was a pretext for returning to Washington to face this unexpected development. The intelligence was ascertained by high altitude reconnaissance photography, the validity of which is not in doubt. I was instructed to see the Prime Minister tomorrow afternoon at four o'clock, while Acheson is to brief General de Gaulle and the NATO Council later that day, and Dowling is to report the affair to the Chancellor tomorrow evening. At midnight tomorrow (7:00 p.m. American time) the President is going on the air to declare how he intends to handle the crisis.

It appears there has been violent contention at home about what should be done. Some advocated the hard line of wiping out the bases and equipment, but a temporizing policy seems to have won the day. It is rather unclear as to what this consists of, but the President's talk will serve for elucidation.

Archie, Chet Cooper (who is to brief us more fully tomorrow) and myself returned to London about three a.m. The plane went on to Paris, and thence to Bonn.

October 22, 1962—Monday

The signals were changed this morning. I was told to see the Prime Minister at noon. I was also told I would be furnished with a draft of the President's proposed speech, so that Macmillan could consider it and communicate any ideas it evoked from him to the President.

Accordingly, Cooper and myself went down to Admiralty House, but had not yet received the promised draft. I had a long discussion

with the PM, attended also by Lord Home, and Philip de Zulueta. I reported the gist of it in this telegram:

"Have delayed sending this telegram in anticipation receipt President's public statement which not yet here almost four hours later, except for first of several parts.

Primin still anxiously awaiting text since he wishes to communicate with President after reading it.

Cooper accompanied me, and helped brief Primin. Latter accepted validity evidence existence offensive capabilities and considered situation grave. Lord Home sat in on most of conversation.

Both British officials speculated about Soviet reaction to any embargo. They thought K might retaliate with embargo against American access to Berlin. Or he might reply by some form of harassment our foreign, especially Turkish, bases. They suspected K might suggest meeting with President and drag matter out.

But in absence knowledge contents speech such conversation was hypothetical. Primin will consider text immediately upon receipt and comment shortly thereafter."

We expected the President's speech to be ready at any moment, but as the hours dragged on, nothing was forthcoming. Several calls to the Department obtained only the reply that things had become fouled up, and they could not understand why we had not received the text. Finally, in desperation, we suggested that the private channel between Macmillan and Kennedy be used. This was done, and about seven o'clock tonight we had the humiliation of receiving from the British the copy of the speech, which had been promised for delivery to us before noon today.

Meanwhile, General Norstad, who arrived here this morning to visit some of the leading figures in the British Government, had been inadequately briefed on the proposals adopted in Washington. I sent Roosevelt over to fill him in for his forthcoming conversations with Mountbatten and Home. Thus far this has been a messy affair ill coordinated as respects this Embassy, which is surprising, in view of its serious and dangerous nature.

I had an engagement to lunch with Ken Galbraith today, but he was suddenly called away, under instructions to return to India at once, where the difficulties between the Chinese and the Indians have erupted into war.

Reginald H. Pettus, of Charlotte Court House, came to see me this afternoon, with his daughter. He is a delightful fellow, and as Commonwealth's Attorney has done a fine job in the county. I promised last year to give a considerable sum of money toward the reconstruction of the Court House if the local Board of Supervisors would carry out the plans advocated by Pettus. This is now being done.

As a result of briefing by Cooper and the others, I prepared notes for discussion this morning with the Prime Minister, as follows:

The letter from the President to Macmillan, on which my conversation with the latter was founded, was a recital of what steps Mr. Kennedy expected to take, and invited the PM to take the opportunity, should he wish it, to discuss the situation between themselves, by means of their private channel of communication.

October 23, 1962—Tuesday

My morning started about midnight, when Al Wells called me regarding the Cuban affair. At one o'clock, the Prime Minister telephoned me, saying he had just had a telephone conversation with the President, and indicated that the British Government would go along with us. The PM was warm and friendly, as he was earlier in the day, and said we would be discussing these matters again shortly. At about the same time, though I was unconscious of it, there was a demonstration in front of the Embassy office building on Grosvenor Square, protesting against the President's speech, which in London time, was delivered at midnight. The British morning papers did not have time for editorial comment, nor will there be much such until tomorrow morning.

E and I lunched at Buckingham Palace, where the Queen entertained in honor of Laurie and Isabel Norstad, and their daughter, Mrs. Craw. The other guests were Lord Mountbatten, (Prince Philip not being present), the Homes, Antonia and Hugh Fraser, Sir Michael Adeane, Sir Mark Milbank, and Lady Margaret Hay. There was the usual excellent Palace food with a good 1959 Moselle. I sat between the Queen and Antonia Fraser, the former of whom displayed a lively interest in the Cuban imbroglio.

The Embassy was picketed all day by placard carriers with such signs as *Cuba si, Yankees no*. Some of them had to be bodily removed from the lobby by the Police.

Eugene T. Kinnaly, Administrative Assistant to Speaker John McCormack, came with a friend to see me this afternoon. Since he had been associated with the legislative branch for almost 45 years, he had many stories, some of them droll, about happenings in the House of Representatives.

Robert Lutyens came to see me this afternoon. I have long considered having him paint my portrait, since I must leave one behind when I quit this post. He is an old friend, the son of Sir Edwin Lutyens, the famous architect.

At six o'clock, I went to Archie Roosevelt's house to meet Hugh Gaitskell and George Brown who were to be briefed on Cuba by Chet Cooper.

I called Joan Koch de Gooreynd this morning, to inquire about Peter. He had telephoned me yesterday in a state of evident excitement,

saying he was under the influence of sedatives and would have to go to hospital later this week, for the removal of "part of one arm". The chief reason for his call was in reference to an article by Ian Fleming, in yesterday's OBSERVER, commenting on the book "The Quiet Canadian". In the course of his remarks, Fleming referred to Sir Stewart Menzies having been Chief of MI6 during the war. De Gooreynd, as one of Menzies' deputies, took umbrage at this, saying it was the first time the identity of his Chief had ever been disclosed. I consider this an inaccurate statement, since it was well known after the war to many people that Menzies, known and addressed in his own organization only as "C", had been carrying on such work.

Joan Koch de Gooreynd said Peter had already gone to the hospital, where he would remain for two months, much of the time under sedation. She did not speak of an operation, so I begin to suspect he may be slightly off his rocker.

The Embassy sustained a massive assault this evening. About 2,000 people had gathered in Grosvenor Square, amongst them tough elements probably belonging to the Communist Party. The manifestation was ostensibly the work of the Committee of One Hundred (Lord Russell's anti-bomb people). The crowd attempted to break through the plate glass doors of the ground floor, but were repulsed by the Police. The Police Force was augmented by officers brought in from other parts of London. It finally consisted of almost 300 Bobbies. The Commandant of the Metropolitan Police District appeared in person, called away from a dinner at Claridges. Findley Burns telephoned me an account of the fracas. Several policemen were injured; about 145 protesters were removed in Black Marias, a couple of which were stoned as they drove through the streets. Had the demonstrators succeeded in breaking in, we might have had a nasty time.

October 24, 1962—Wednesday

I spent most of the morning on the subject of protecting the Embassy. I congratulated Mr. Kemp, our new Security Officer, and Sergeant Goodwin, the Non-Com heading our US Marine personnel, for the excellent way in which they handled matters last night.

The PM sent for me to meet him at Admiralty House at noon. We had a long talk, at the conclusion of which he asked me to ascertain from the US Government what classified information he would be free to use tomorrow when he must respond to questions in the House of Commons. I telegraphed home about this; at the same time, Chet Cooper put the same inquiry for me through his channel. Some hours later we received a reply, which I communicated to Philip de Zulueta.

Our people were generally agreeable to the draft passage proposed by the Prime Minister. The changes suggested were woven into the text received from him, and came out as follows:

I lunched with Douglas Fairbanks at Bucks, a hurried meal. He was to go to see Page Smith immediately after lunch, to discuss the Cuban episode.

This afternoon, I opened the Embassy orientation course, by exhorting them to be good boys and girls, worthy of their privileges.

Findley Burns brought in Commander H. J. Evans, of Metropolitan Police District No. 1, a fine looking chap, whom I thanked warmly for the splendid work of his men last night in protecting the Embassy.

Frank Pace came to see me. He is here for two purposes (1) as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Board, and (2) as a Director of TIME-LIFE. In the latter capacity, he expects within a period of eighteen months, to visit almost every country in the world, and make recommendations as to how TIME-LIFE reporting might be improved.

Draft passage for the Prime Minister's statement on October 25, 1962

"In his message and through the United States Ambassador in London President Kennedy made it clear to me on Monday, October 22 that he had become very concerned about the Soviet supplies of offensive weapons to Cuba in recent weeks. It is of course true that the United States authorities had known for some time the location of a number of surface to air missile sites in Cuba, but these missiles, even though carrying nuclear warheads, may be regarded as of a defensive nature. Very recently, however, at least eight ballistic missile sites have been definitely identified in Cuba. Normally each such site has four launchers and each launcher has two missiles. This indicates a capability of delivering a total of 64 MRBM and IRBM missiles. Reports from all American intelligence sources confirm that at least 30 missiles are already present in Cuba. MRBM missiles, with their range of over a thousand miles, could reach a large area of the United States including Washington and nearly the whole of Central America and the Caribbean including the Panama Canal. Intermediate range ballistic missiles have an operational range of 2200 nautical miles. Further sites for both types of missiles are being constructed. All these missiles are designed to carry and must be presumed to carry nuclear bombs. In addition, Russia has supplied Cuba with IL 28 aircraft, of which over twenty have been definitely identified. These bombers are of course offensive and not defensive weapons. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union do not appear to have denied the presence of these missiles in Cuba and indeed it may be difficult for them to do so since the United States believe that there are at least five thousand Soviet military personnel already on the island."

We had a cocktail party tonight for:

Mr. and Mrs. George Crawford
Mr. and Mrs. Harris Nelson (Barron's)
Mr. and Mrs. Julian Allen
Mr. Kenneth Fox (Kansas City Star)
Mrs. Mildred Dilling (Harpist)
Doreen Lady Brabourne
Mr. Charles Harding (Art dealer)
General and Mrs. Puryear
Mr. and Mrs. Jackson Smith
Mr. and Mrs. Frazier Meade

In connection with Embassy security, we have given strict instructions to the Marines, as well as to the rest of our personnel, that under no circumstances are they to use pistols, even if attacked. We have sent to Frankfurt for a supply of tear gas, and would expect with it to repulse any attempt by rioters to penetrate above the first floor of the building. I do, however, want to reconsider whether for the protection of the code room we should not, as a last resort, open fire.

October 25, 1962—Thursday

Chet Cooper returns to Washington this morning. In the aftermath of his visit we are still having repercussions from the release of some of the air reconnaissance pictures to the London newspapers. After midnight two days ago, Mike Forrestal called me from the Operations Room at the White House to inquire into which photographs had been shown. It seems there was a question as to whether the release in the United States should not be simultaneous. As a result of a misconstruction of what occurred, Bill Clark, our PAO, has now been referred to in the *Washington Post* as the "errant USIS Officer in London" who made a mistake. Russ Wiggins, of the *Post*, is coming to see me this afternoon, and I shall straighten it out with him.

Walter Stoessel, SHAPE Liaison Officer, came over to see me this morning, on instructions from Laurie Norstad, to give me a paper recording certain features of Norstad's private conversation with the Prime Minister. It was kind of the General to have gone to this trouble. He has conveyed the substance of what he told me to the President. As I had heard it directly myself from Macmillan, we can let the matter rest.

354. Memorandum for the file, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting with the Vice President on 21 October 1962

On Sunday night, October 21 at 8:30 I briefed Vice President Lyndon Johnson at the request of the President, conveyed through McGeorge Bundy.

The briefing involved a review of photography by Lundahl paralleling briefings given to General Eisenhower and others.

We then discussed policy and details of the proposed speech by the President in considerable detail.

The thrust of the Vice President's thinking was that he favored an unannounced strike rather than the agreed plan which involved blockade and strike and invasion later if conditions warranted. He expressed displeasure at "telegraphing our punch" and also commented the blockade would be ineffective because we in effect are "locking the bars after the horse was gone".

I followed the position and the arguments used in my briefing paper of 20 October. The Vice President finally agreed reluctantly but only after learning among other things the support indicated by General Eisenhower.

John A. McCone

¹ Briefing of Vice President Johnson on October 21. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

355. Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

SUBJECT

The Crisis

I was called last night to a two-hour White House meeting at 10:15 p.m., chaired by Mac Bundy, to consider problems and steps beyond the President's speech. The Attorney General, Nitze, Rowen were there, among others. I list briefly below certain concrete ideas which may or may not prove viable. The purpose of last night's exercise was to surface such possibilities.

In general, I should like to ask your permission to use systematically a part of the time of the members of my Council to develop possible initiatives and courses of action around the world as this crisis develops. It is clear that those with operational responsibility, both military and civil, will be very much tied up with exacting current business; and a tactical reserve of the kind the Council represents could be helpful. If you think this is a useful idea, you may wish to designate someone to whom I should regularly report with these suggestions—preferably yourself, although you may be too hard pressed.

Following are some preliminary notions.

1. *Berlin and the Alliance.* Until we have evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the new moves in Cuba were designed to force us into action which would weaken or destroy the Alliance basis for a Berlin confrontation. Moves to strengthen the Alliance and to increase the credibility of our Berlin position are, therefore, urgently required:

a. We should consider bringing the three Berlin headquarters under one roof—which the American elements in Berlin, in any case, urgently desire, as I discovered last week.

b. Building on the Four-Power Ambassadorial Group, we should consider bringing to Washington, on an *ad hoc* Combined Chiefs of Staff basis, some higher level civil and military officers from London, Paris, and Bonn, so that they may directly share in decisions concerning Cuba, Berlin and other areas that may be drawn into the crisis. Wraps should be lifted on information required for them to perform as full members of the team. We are likely to require economic officers as the crisis unfolds, with trade and balance of payments positions affected.

¹ Possible initiatives and courses of action around the world as the Cuban crisis develops. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, General & Historical Information, 10/20/62-10/25/62.

c. We should consider asking de Gaulle to move his armies forward into Germany; and we should be prepared to make certain nuclear concessions to him and—if the Alliance agrees—to the Germans, for the duration of the crisis.

d. Although there are evidently two sides to this, we should think hard about putting some tactical nuclear weapons into Berlin itself, to minimize the likelihood of a Soviet *coup de main* which, I can attest, Watson fears. We should announce that they would be withdrawn when the crisis was settled.

2. *United Nations approach.* We should try to dramatize the crisis to the maximum extent possible as not a Cuban crisis but a worldwide Communist thrust with equal danger and interests for all. The Chinese Communist thrust against India increases the credibility of this posture, even though Moscow and Peiping are not working in full harness. If this view is accepted, the weight of the United Nations may strongly be towards calling for no further aggressive moves. We should consult bilaterally with the Indians to this effect. With this United Nations approach in mind, we might consider these two last-minute additions to the speech.

Page 2, add after the first full paragraph the following:

“Let it be remembered: the United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements. The nations in this hemisphere have long since decided to exclude the military presence of extra-continental powers.”

Page 8, after the first full paragraph, add the following paragraph:

“These recent moves in Cuba, the threat which overhangs Berlin, the Chinese Communist thrust on the Indian borders, and the dangerous state of affairs in Southeast Asia have brought us close to a situation of general war. This is not merely a matter of Cuba that we now face. I call on all nations and peoples who treasure the peace now to bring their influence to bear to end this crisis promptly and peacefully and in ways which make clear that aggression and blackmail do not pay.”

3. I saw photographs of the missiles in Cuba last night. It occurred to me that one way to get rid of them was by attacking these sites with Lazy Dog. As you may know, Lazy Dog consists of packages of non-explosive pellets (of the kind we used to shoot out of BB guns) which, when dropped in high density, have great penetrating power over a considerable area. This kind of an attack could be mounted virtually covertly and would quickly convert both the missiles and their installations into worthless junk, without a pound of high explosives being used. The Pentagon people will be considering this possibility technically this morning. You may wish to consider it from the point of view of your responsibilities.

356. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

**NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS**

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Monday 22 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

Briefing by Gen. Carroll (Director DIA): Of the six mobile MRBM sites, four are operations and the other two will be so within 3 to 5 days. Of the two fixed MRBM sites, one will be available for emergencies by 15 November and fully operational by 1 December. The other two will be in emergency operation by 1 December with a [illegible in the original] capability on 15 December.

JCS meeting with SecDef at 1330.

CJCS: Some decisions were made at [illegible in the original] (1/8th airborne alert for SAC, dispersal of B-47s and CONAD interceptors). [1½ lines not declassified] the time of the President's speech.

SecDef: The President wants a message sent to USCINCEUR saying in effect, make sure the Jupiter warheads in Turkey and Italy are not released if missiles come under attack, and if they are in danger of being taken by our angry allies, destroy them.

¹ Briefing by General Carroll (Director DIA) on the MRBM sites in Cuba and U.S. responses to a missile attack. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

SecDef: The President asked for our views on how we should respond if the Cubans launched a missile, authorized or not.

DepSecDef: We won't know if it came from Cuba.

SecDef: Right: it could come from a submarine. I think we should tell the Soviets we will hold them responsible and fire missiles in retaliation. What we want is for the Soviets to send out a message like the one we just sent out to USCINCEUR. (See msg. [illegible in the original] 6666 to USCINCEUR)

CNO: disagreed; a public warning to the Soviets would bring stronger adverse allied reactions. JCS agree we should not say exactly what our retaliation would be.

JCS meeting at 1620:

VADM Sharp (Deputy CNO, Plans and Policy): The President doesn't want us to take overt steps indicating that we are getting ready for invasion. Thus requisitioning ships is out. We wanted 111 ships: 30 in one day; 50 more in 10; 31 in 12 days.

Gen. McKee (Vice CSAF): DepSecDef said there would be no callup of C-119s and interceptors in view of what the President said.

CJCS: If we can't lick the Cubans with what we already have, we are in terrible shape.

357. Memorandum for the record, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 22 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided. I forgot to check the DEFCONS, and will report them tomorrow.

2. The only subject which Bundy covered was the Cuba business. The points arose in approximately the following order:

a. The President's speech tonight on television will probably be at 1900. Bundy said that everyone should submit comments on the draft directly to Sorensen.

¹ Daily White House Staff Meeting on October 22 on Cuban crisis. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.–Nov. 1962.

b. Bundy announced that “for the duration” Kaysen would handle all the NSC staff matters other than the Cuba business. This reminds me of the way the State Department worked last summer and fall—i.e., Foy Kohler was Mr. Berlin and Mr. Berlin Task Force while his Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bill Tyler, handled all the workaday matters for Western Europe less Berlin. Bundy has some idea in the back of his mind about possibly breaking down the NSC Staff into one group which would closely follow the Cuba business and another group which would keep tabs on the rest of the world. In military terms, it rather made me think that he was conceiving sort of an Operations Division on the one hand, and a Plans and Policy Division on the other hand. Finally, he also has in the back of his mind the idea of a White House Duty Officer, presumably to be rotated by roster from among the NSC Staff.

c. Bundy said that as far as the White House is concerned, the political campaign will be over as of the time of the President’s television speech tonight; no more trips, no more speeches. The trip to Brazil will probably also go by the wayside.

d. Bundy said that Admiral Anderson is acting as “Joint Commander”, by which I imagine he means executive agent for the Joint Chiefs. Commander McCabe at this point interjected that “Griffin, Sharp, and Ricketts” (all Vice Admirals in OPNAV) would be Admiral Anderson’s alter egos.

e. Bundy and Clifton then got into a discussion of KY-9 versus KY-1 telephones. They apparently settled on making the KY-1 net the effective net, since the President, General Taylor, and other key points in the picture all have KY-1s. Bundy asked that one be put in his office.

f. Bundy then announced that two meetings would take place in the White House this morning. The first would consider what “policy track” we would follow in the UN. It appeared that our initial position in the UN would be very angry and very self-righteous. Arthur Schlesinger was the key White House staff officer on this and was supposed to go to New York today after this first meeting. The second meeting was to be one on Berlin contingency planning and how our approach to it should be synchronized and orchestrated with this Cuba business. As a matter of fact, Mr. Nitze’s office telephoned to invite me to attend his meeting at 1015 over in the Pentagon, which I did. I also rode back to the White House with Mr. Nitze and Dee Armstrong, and participated in the Fish Room discussion among Bundy, Nitze, Hillenbrand, Cy Weiss, Dave Klein, and Armstrong. At about 1145, Bundy,

Nitze, and Hillenbrand went into the Cabinet Room to meet with the President.

Legere

358. Telegram 6848 from the JCS to CINCLANT, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

Blockade of Cuba.

1. In accordance with the orders of the Secretary of Defense, prepare plans for blockade of Cuba in accordance with the following:

A. [illegible in the original]

The objective of the blockade is the prevention of entry to Cuba of offensive weapons hereinafter referred to as prohibited material, and ultimately the withdrawal of such weapons [illegible in the original] in the Island. A tentative list of prohibited material includes: patrol craft, motor torpedo boats or other craft with armament provisions, and their armament, including surface-to-surface missiles and torpedoes; land-based surface-to-surface missiles; bomber and fighter-bomber [illegible in the original]; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other items hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense.

B. *General Rules*

1. General guidance contained in Section III, Part 6, paragraph 1, JCS 985951 is superseded by this instruction; para 2 will apply except as modified herein.

2. Guidance for conduct of engagement between US forces and ships and aircraft of other registry of ownership is covered below.

C. *Visit, Search, Seizure and Diversion*

1. Ships, including submarines, both Soviet and non-Soviet, designated by CINCLANT on basis of information available to him will be intercepted by US ships. If CINCLANT or the Commander of the intercepting ship believes the ship may be carrying prohibited material,

¹ Instructions to prepare for the blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 10/22/62.

a visit and search will be made, in a manner similar to that described in paragraph [illegible in the original] of NWIP 10-2.

2. Ships which after being intercepted signal their intention to divert to non-Cuban ports may be released without visit and search. Surveillance will be maintained over these ships. Any ship which fails to proceed as [illegible in the original], or which attempts to proceed to a Cuban port, will be stopped and searched. If a satisfactory explanation for his failure to proceed as elected is not promptly forthcoming, his ship will be seized and diverted to a US port designated by the Blockade Force Commander or other authority as designated by CINCLANT for disposition.

3. Ships which are to be visited will be stopped. In signifying his intent to stop a ship, the US Commander will use all available communications, including international code signals, flag hoists, blinking lights, radio, loudspeaker etc. Failing this, warning shots across the bow should be fired. Failing this, make use of minimum force, taking care to damage non-vital parts of the ship, such as the rudder, and to avoid injury or loss of life if possible.

4. Visit and search of a stopped ship shall consist of examining the manifest and inspecting the cargo. In the event visit is refused, the ship may be escorted. This can be done by placing a boarding party on board. A special boarding and control of the ships operation may be necessary. If boarding meets with organized resistance, the ship will be destroyed.

5. If it becomes necessary to destroy a ship, give ample warning of intentions to permit sufficient time for debarkation of the passengers and crew. Assistance shall be given to the maximum extent permitted by the operational conditions.

6. Ships which have been searched and found to be carrying prohibited material shall be directed to proceed to such non-Cuban port as the owners or master may elect. Surveillance shall be maintained over these ships. Any ship which fails to proceed as elected, or which attempts to proceed to a Cuban port, will be handled as detailed in paragraph 2 above.

7. If a ship is visited but search is refused, the commander of the ship or force conducting the visit will [illegible in the original] if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting the ship to be carrying prohibited materials. It will be diverted to a designated US port for disposition.

8. Nothing in the above shall be construed as preventing or interfering with the right of visit and search by any US ship. Specifically:

a. Any ships, including surface warships, armed merchant ships or submarines, which interfere or threaten to interfere with a US ship engaged in visit and search will be treated as hostile and may be engaged to the extent required to terminate the interference.

b. Any ships, including surface warships, armed merchant ships, or submarines, which place themselves in a position or take actions which can reasonably be considered as threatening a US ship engaged in visit and search may be subjected to attack to the extent required to terminate the threat.

D. Blockade of aircraft

1. Plans should be made, to apply whom ordered by higher headquarters, to prevent aircraft enroute to Cuba which are believed to carry prohibited material from reaching their destination. Responsibility for action against such aircraft, when ordered by higher headquarters, will pass to CINCLANT when they enter his area of responsibility.

2. In taking action against such aircraft, every effort will be made to avoid interference with or inconvenience to innocent traffic.

3. In preventing an aircraft carrying prohibited material from entering Cuba, the following steps shall be taken.

First, attempts by every possible means shall be made to direct the pilot to land the aircraft at a suitable airfield under US control.

Failing this, aircraft shall be dispatched to intercept. Upon interception, and after positive identification, they shall maneuver to direct the pilot of the suspected aircraft to follow to the airfield. In making the intercept and in maneuvering care shall be taken to avoid danger of an accidental collision.

If the suspected aircraft fails to follow the intercepting aircraft, shots or a rocket or flare may be fired, in such a manner that the aircraft is not endangered but that the pilot cannot fail to see it. If time is available this action should be repeated.

Failing this, the base or force commander of the operation shall be contacted by the interceptor pilot for instructions. The interceptor pilot shall take hostile action against the suspected aircraft only upon receipt of positive authenticated instructions from his commander or from higher authority.

II. Concept of Operations

A. General. It is contemplated that maximum use will be made of all available assets for collecting, reporting and interpreting intelligence relative to merchant shipping and aircraft engaged in trade with Cuba to identify these which might be carrying prohibited material. Intelligence indicates that the majority of prohibited material is carried in Communist bloc ships.

B. Conduct of Blockade Patrols and Air Surveillance

Until further directed planning for these operations will be carried out on the basis that normal position of intercept will take place outside the effective range of aircraft known to be operational from their established bases.

C. Diversion Ports

US ports designated to receive ships diverted as described in part I.C.2 above will be chosen with due regard to the desirability on remaining outside the effective range of aircraft known to be operational in Cuba with the availability of US air protection.

III. Defense of Guantanamo

A. General

Establishment of the blockade described above may lead to attack or threat of attack by Cuban forces on the Naval Base Guantanamo or against ships or aircraft approaching or leaving Guantanamo. Prior to establishment of the blockade, dependents will be evacuated. Suitable force dispositions, including the stationing of naval forces and troop reinforcements, will be taken as appropriate upon receipt of this message. Any attack against the Guantanamo Naval Base or against ships or aircraft approaching or leaving will be repulsed by offensive action against the attacking aircraft or ship or ground-installation. Only in the event that it is absolutely necessary in order to protect American lives will U.S. forces be authorized to attack the bases from which the aircraft or ships are operating.

B. Special Rules of Engagement

In addition to the rules of engagement previously referenced, permission is granted coincident with establishment of the above described blockade to immediately engage and destroy any KOMAR Class PGMG which makes a hostile approach on US Naval forces or US merchant shipping.

IV. Control and Protection of American Flag Merchant Shipping

A. Coincident with establishment of the blockade, institute protection for U.S. shipping in Florida Straits, Yucatan Channel, and Windward Passage. Use air cover and surface forces as necessary. It is not desired to institute control of shipping measures although advisories as to preferred routings such as passage close to the Florida Keys and Mexican coast and use of Mona vice Windward Passage may be desirable in the interest of economic use of forces.

V. Availability of Allied or Friendly Forces

Prior to or immediately following the Presidential Proclamation of a blockade of Cuba, efforts will be made to enlist the aid of allied or friendly nations in enforcing the blockade. CINCLANT should cooperate fully with such nations and take every advantage of their contributions to increase the efficiency of the blockade and to reduce the commitment of US forces.

VI. Hot Pursuit

Pursuit, attack and destruction of any Cuban naval craft or airplane, attacking or attempting to attack U.S. territory, shipping, aircraft or naval unit is authorized. Attack on the bases of such craft or airplanes is not authorized except as stated in III.a. above.

VII. Reports

Prompt reports to higher headquarters on all incidents are absolutely essential.

**359. Circular telegram 706 to selected ARA diplomatic posts,
October 22¹**

October 22, 1962

Refcirtel 700. For Ambassador from Secretary. Info: USUN Eyes Only Stevenson. Following is text letter from President Kennedy to Chief of State which you should deliver in accordance with instructions contained Depcirtel 700: QUOTE

Dear Mr. President:

We face the necessity and the opportunity in this Hemisphere of determining by the wisdom of our joint action in the next few days what may be the whole future of man on this earth.

You will see from my statement to the American people the grave nature of the threat to the Western Hemisphere which the present regime in Cuba has permitted the USSR to establish on its soil.

But this is not just a matter of a military threat to us. Such action by the Soviet Union in the face of our well-known and long cherished Hemisphere defense and security arrangements, its continuance in the face of my warning of September 4, well-known to them, and the repeated Soviet denials in public statements and private conversations that any such action was being taken or even contemplated, all make clear that the Soviets are issuing a bold and warlike challenge to all free peoples.

We must respond to this rash move with a united resolve. Otherwise the Soviet Union will move to more and more flagrant violations

¹ Transmits text of letter from President to respective chiefs of state about the U.S. response to the Cuban missile crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-2262.

of the requirements of international peace and liberty, until we shall have no choice left to us but complete surrender or the initiation of a nuclear holocaust.

We must make a stand now; the whole world will be watching us. Issues on which we in the Hemisphere may have marginal disagreements as well as political divisions among our peoples, become insignificant in the face of this threat to the peace.

I hope in these circumstances you will feel that your country will wish to join my own in expressing its outrage at this Cuban and Soviet behavior, and that you will want to express publicly what your people feel.

I hope also that you will agree with me on the urgent necessity of calling an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System under the Rio Pact.

The United States will propose to that body, once assembled, the adoption of a resolution to deal effectively with this new and dangerous situation, the proposed text of which my Ambassador will be able to give you. The placing of offensive weapons with a nuclear capability in Cuba, clearly "endangers the peace and security of the continent in the terms of Article 6 of that Pact. I am sure you will agree that such a resolution is urgent.

I am also requesting an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council. I have asked Ambassador Stevenson to present on behalf of the United States a resolution calling for the withdrawal of missile bases and other offensive weapons in Cuba under the supervision of United Nations observers. I hope that you will instruct your representative in New York to work actively with us and speak forthrightly in support of the above program in the United Nations.

I also wish to invite you to have your military officials discuss with mine the possibility of participation on some appropriate basis with United States and other Hemisphere forces in any military action which the developing situation in Cuba may require.

I feel confident that by a common approach to this threat through wise measures, which combine the firmness and the restraint which the nature of the crisis calls for, we shall move onto a new plane of progress for the free world, with reduced fear of world domination by international communism. In this sense after pointing out the dangers to world peace of the course the Soviet Union has followed in Cuba, I have written

360. Telegram 1199 from Bonn, October 22¹

Bonn, October 22, 1962

Depcirtel 1047. I saw Adenauer at 7:15 this evening and after brief exchange of greetings gave him the President's letter. He had scarcely finished reading it before exclaiming, "This comes as no surprise. I have been worried about Cuba, and I can see that the President had to do it."

I gave him brief outline of recent events, and he again commented, "It had to happen. The President is absolutely right. Khrushchev knows the free world rests on American strength, and if it can be eliminated, there will be nothing left."

We then went through briefing with the Chancellor, who was obviously impressed with material shown him. He said he hoped we could some day make public some of the evidence we had, and also commented that if we could seize Soviet ship en route to Cuba with military equipment he thought it would make overwhelming impression on world opinion.

At conclusion of discussion Adenauer again expressed his approval of the President's action, and I told him I was sure the President would be grateful for his confidence and support. He said he would write the President tomorrow.

Dowling

¹ Briefing of Adenauer on Cuban crisis. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.3722/1-2261.

361. Memorandum of conversation between Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Merchant, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting with Prime Minister Diefenbaker to Deliver Copy of President Kennedy's Letter of October 22 on Cuban Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Diefenbaker
Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs
Douglas Harkness, Defense Minister

Ambassador Livingston Merchant
Ivan White, Chargé d'affaires, American Embassy Ottawa
Rolfe Kingsley, Attaché, American Embassy Ottawa
Mr. Tidwell, Central Intelligence Agency

The meeting was held at 5:00 p.m. on October 22 in the Cabinet Room adjoining the Prime Minister's office in the East Block. It lasted about an hour and a half. The Prime Minister had invited the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, and Defense Minister Douglas Harkness to attend him. Mr. Robert Brice, Secretary of the Cabinet, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Norman Robertson, Chief of the Joint Staff Committee, Air Marshal Frank Miller and Mr. McCordle, Coordinator for Intelligence Matters in the Department of External Affairs waited in an anteroom throughout the meeting, but at no time were brought into the room. Ambassador Merchant was accompanied by Mr. Ivan White, Chargé d'affaires, Mr. Rolfe Kingsley, Attaché of the U.S. Embassy, Mr. Tidwell and another technician from CIA.

At the outset, the Prime Minister appeared harassed and worried. Ambassador Merchant opened the conversation by saying that he had been personally dispatched by President Kennedy to inform the Prime Minister of certain extremely grave developments with respect to Cuba. The evidence was now conclusive that Cuba was in the process of being transformed into an offensive base under the Soviets. After a week of the most serious and secret deliberations, the President had decided upon a course of action which he would reveal in his televised speech at 7:00 p.m. to the American people.

The Ambassador went on to say that in light of the need for absolute secrecy, normal channels of communication could not be used and that

¹ Meeting to deliver President's October 22 letter on Cuba. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-262.

because of his desire that the Prime Minister be informed at the earliest possible moment, it had been decided to send a personal emissary. Former Secretary of State Acheson had similarly been dispatched to Paris to inform General DeGaulle and the North Atlantic Council. Prime Minister Macmillan and two or three other heads of government among our Allies were being similarly and concurrently informed. The Ambassador concluded by saying that he had with him a draft of President Kennedy's speech which, of course, was still open to editorial changes and a personal letter from the President to the Prime Minister. He said that he had with him certain photographs which would reveal some of the evidence on which the President has reached his decision and he emphasized that the Soviet action had grave implications for the entire Western Hemisphere, including Canada, and the entire free world since it represented the clandestine intrusion of strategic nuclear weapons into the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, Mr. Gromyko's denial personally to the President the previous Thursday and Mr. Khrushchev's similar denial to Ambassador Kohler in Moscow a few days earlier that the Soviets were doing what it was now clear they were doing was subject to an ominous interpretation.

The Ambassador then handed the Prime Minister the President's message which he read hastily and passed to his two cabinet colleagues.

The Prime Minister then asked somewhat brusquely what were the main points of the President's speech. The Ambassador said that he thought the visual evidence might usefully be presented at this time, but the Prime Minister insisted. After briefly summarizing the main points of the speech, the Ambassador read the text of the speech aloud.

In various interruptions, the Prime Minister inquired whether the quarantine would include airplanes. He was told this was under continuing consideration and not excluded, but that it was not applicable under the terms of the President's speech. He then asked how the United States Government could invoke a quarantine before presenting the matter to the United Nations. The Ambassador replied that time was of the essence as the photographic evidence would show and that the United States in its own interest and that of the entire free world could not brook delay once the situation had been assessed by the President and a course of action decided.

The Prime Minister inquired what the attitude of the United Kingdom would be to the quarantine or blockade and the accompanying search of ships on the high seas in view of its traditional policy of freedom of the seas. Mr. Merchant answered that on the grounds of principle one could not expect the British to particularly like this form of action, but that he was satisfied more important considerations would be controlling in the British response to this threat.

While Ambassador Merchant was reading the draft of the President's message, the Prime Minister expressed a strong reaction to the sentence in the speech which referred to the President's conversation with Gromyko the previous Thursday and in draft form read: "That statement also was dishonest and dishonorable". Mr. Diefenbaker said this language was unnecessary and provocative and was tantamount to the severance of diplomatic relations.

Defense Minister Harkness said that he took it that the implementation of the quarantine would involve the boarding of vessels. He inquired "what about submarines?". Mr. Harkness suggested that warheads could be brought in by this means.

Mr. Merchant replied that he had no specific knowledge as to the intended action against submarines, but that he confidently assumed that the U.S. Navy was competent to deal effectively with any possible transport of nuclear warheads by sea. Mr. Tidwell pointed out that the approaches to all Cuban harbors capable of receiving such cargo was so shallow as to make it a reasonable assumption that submarines could be intercepted on the surface.

External Affairs Minister Green referred to the President's statements of September 4 and 13 and observed that we were now jumping from one position to another. He inquired why the change was so rapid. Mr. Green also inquired as to how we knew that there were so many strategic missiles in Cuba.

Ambassador Merchant said that the President's speech in relation to his earlier statements in September reflected a momentous change in the position and that Mr. Green's questions would be answered when he studied the photographs.

At this point a background intelligence briefing was given, including visual presentation. The Prime Minister wanted to know when the earliest "ground report" of strategic missiles in Cuba had been received. The nature, timing, etc. of various refugee and agents' reports was explained to him. The Prime Minister scrutinized all of the photographs, with special reference to the dates when they had been taken, and inquired whether we had any photographs before October 15 of the missile bases. Mr. Green raised the question and was answered as to which bases had 1000 nautical mile range missiles and which ones had 2000 mile missiles. The Prime Minister asked if the United States planned to stop the suspected missile ship, *Poltava*. He was given an affirmative answer. Mr. Harkness inquired whether the vessels would be boarded forcibly. He was told the quarantine would be effective whether or not it encountered resistance.

At this point the Prime Minister reverted to the language in the draft characterizing Gromyko's statement and said that it was a provocation to war after 24 hours. The Prime Minister then said Canada was

prohibiting overflights of Soviet planes but there was a legal question in connection with Czech and Polish planes because of the fact that they were members of the ICAO Convention. Mr. Green confirmed this.

The Prime Minister then commented that with the speech there would be panic and inquired what is the reaction to the speech going to be. The Ambassador replied that there was not the slightest doubt in his mind that the reaction of the American people to the President's speech would be calm and resolute. The Prime Minister then added he didn't like the words "dishonest and dishonorable". Gromyko was in much the same position as the two Japanese before Pearl Harbor. The Prime Minister went on to inquire why the President had not confronted Gromyko with the evidence of the missile bases on the occasion of the Thursday meeting. Green commented that Gromyko may not have known.

Ambassador Merchant said that naturally he could not say exactly what was in the President's mind in not facing Gromyko with the evidence, but that it should be borne in mind that the evidence was accumulating photographically from day to day and that it was his impression that the evidence was not considered incontrovertible, until the following day or even two days after Gromyko's call. He also pointed out that the President had been in communication with Khrushchev and that a further message had been sent to Khrushchev this very day.

Mr. Diefenbaker, after inquiring as to when the President's message was delivered to Khrushchev and after commenting that he was himself a politician, said "let us face facts; an election is on in the United States"; that he could understand that the President might find his speech to be politically helpful but that the quarantine was dangerous and a threat to Allies of the United States. The United States was not only informing the Soviet Union of what it knew, it was challenging the Soviet Union. The Ambassador said that it was unthinkable and inconceivable that the President was influenced in any way by domestic political considerations. Mr. Diefenbaker whose attitude during the discussion and following the photographs had been gradually changing, at this point seemed to have swung around from his original skepticism bordering on antagonism to a more considered, friendly and cooperative manner. Reflective of this, the Prime Minister then said that the President's speech on the whole was temperate, except for the statement characterizing Gromyko which he considered provocative. These words were ill-timed and they shocked him.

Mr. Merchant said that he would urgently communicate to the White House the Prime Minister's reaction to this phrase as soon as he returned to the Embassy.

Mr. Green inquired why the United States did not go to the Security Council first; he understood that the American people had to be

informed, but why not the Security Council before taking action on a blockade.

The Ambassador said that in light of the seriousness of the development and its suddenness, the President owed his first duty to the American people.

Mr. Harkness inquired as to the reaction of the American people to the speech; would they not demand an invasion. The Ambassador said that he had not the slightest doubt that the American people would wholeheartedly support and follow the President, and he said he foresaw no possibility of the President being placed under or succumb to public pressures to go beyond what he felt was right.

The Prime Minister observed that we were moving into a highly emotional period, and said it wasn't clear to him how the blockade would remove the threat of the missiles already in Cuba; that you would live in constant fear if those already there remained. Green thought it would be no problem to get inspectors for at-site inspection. Harkness inquired "when?". Mr. Harkness thought that a general war would be less likely with an invasion of Cuba than with a blockade stopping Soviet ships. In general discussion, replies were given at length to these and certain other questions which were raised.

The Prime Minister commented that the speech would arouse the American people. He asked Ambassador Merchant to communicate one thing to the President for him: "the two words dishonest and dishonorable were most challenging and provocative. They should come out." This was the only thing in the President's address to which he objected. Mr. Green added that without these words the onus would be on Gromyko.

The meeting then began to break up and at its conclusion, Ambassador Merchant was under the impression that Mr. Green had been less shocked and less vocal than would be expected; that Mr. Harkness was cheered by the decisiveness of the President's course of action and fully supported it; and that the Prime Minister was sobered and upset but that his earlier doubts had been dissipated and in the end he would give strong support to the United States. It was interesting, however, that at no point, despite pointed questions, did he make a commitment in this regard.

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for Ambassador Merchant's special trip and also complimented Mr. Tidwell on the clarity of his intelligence briefing. It was arranged that those waiting in the anteroom would be given an intelligence briefing. The Prime Minister was also told that whereas Ambassador Merchant's mission was secret up until the time when the President spoke, there was no need thereafter to hide it and that the Prime Minister was at liberty to

publicize it if he thought it would be helpful to reveal this method of communication.

Livingston T. Merchant

**362. Telegram 221822Z to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
October 22¹**

October 22, 1962

From: Pres US The White House

To: Secretary of State

(CINCNAVEUR NOT ADD PASS TO GEN NORSTAD EXCLUSIVE). CITE CAP 5492–62 JCS PASS TO USCINCEUR FOR GENERAL NORSTAD.

Dear General Norstad: By this time you have full information on the situation confronting us in Cuba. As this situation has developed, I have given much thought to its impact upon NATO and your tasks as SACEUR. I have regretted the inability to widen the circle of discussion during this period and particularly to enlist the support of NATO governments for the course of action which the United States has been obliged to take. While I know that our action creates a difficult situation for you, both in your role of SACEUR and CINCEUR, I have every confidence in your leadership and experience to help us over this critical period in our NATO relationships. Undoubtedly, a Soviet objective in undertaking to create a military base on Cuba has been his long time desire to split the NATO alliance. This we must not allow him to do and I know that your persuasive voice will carry great weight with our allies in presenting the logic and necessity of the American action. With warm personal regards, sincerely, John F. Kennedy.

¹ Transmits letter from the President to General Norstad explaining U.S. actions in Cuban missile crisis and importance of NATO alliance. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2262.

363. Memorandum from Acting Director of the Office of National Estimates Smith to McCone, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

SUBJECT

Soviet Reaction to Certain US Moves

1. The President's statement may leave the Soviets in some doubt as to whether the US will in fact take direct military action against the missile bases. They will probably believe that they have some time and opportunity to influence the next US move. Their aim will be to forestall US military action.

2. We do not believe that they will promise to withdraw the missiles. The USSR will certainly denounce the US quarantine and the US surveillance as violations of international law and acts of imperialistic aggression against the interests of a small country. It will probably issue dire threats, alert its own forces, increase the sense of world crisis, and try to mobilize support in the UN for some UN action which will inhibit further moves by the US. We suggest the possibility that Khrushchev will come at once to New York, calculating in this way to tie US hands for the time being.

3. For the first few days at least, the chances are that the Soviets will delay testing the quarantine while the political situation develops. Likewise, we think the Soviets for a time will probably not shoot down a US reconnaissance plane.

4. Beyond this Soviet actions will depend greatly upon their reading of US intentions. If they judged that the US was determined to eliminate the missile bases by force if necessary, they would probably proceed with caution and leave open a line of retreat. If they see indications of ambiguity in the US position they may further engage themselves in commitments to Cuba. Thereafter they would find it difficult to avoid some form of sharp retaliation perhaps military, to a US air strike.

Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman

¹ Soviet reaction to certain U.S. moves. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.

364. Telegram from White House Situation Room to the Department of State, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

For s/s Duty Officer Secreteriat, Attn: Mr. Little. From Situation Room. Mr. Bundy instructed that the following message from the President to Prime Minister of Great Britain be passed to you and asked that we point out that para. two is for action within the Department of State.

To the Prime Minister from the President.

Dear Friend:

First let me say how sorry I am that the proposed text of my statement has been so slow to get to you. We must use our own machine in such cases.

I am instructing our experts to confer at once with yours to provide the best possible legal case, which will rest in the first instance on the Rio Treaty. But you are certainly right about the wider issues which arise in the nuclear age, and our people feel a strong case can be built on them.

It is this whole series of wider issues that has governed my initial decision. I fully recognize the hazards which you rightly point out, but I have had to take account also of the effect of inaction in the face of so obvious and deep a Soviet challenge. This is not simply or mainly a matter of American public opinion, and as for living under a missile threat, we too have been doing that for some time. But this is so deep a breach in the conventions of the international stalemate that if unchallenged it would deeply shake confidence in the United States, especially in the light of my repeated warnings. It would persuade Khrushchev and others that our determination is low, that we are unable to meet our commitments, and it would invite further and still more dangerous moves.

I recognize the particular hazard of a riposte in Berlin, but in the wider sense I believe that inaction would be still more dangerous to our position in that outpost.

I assure you most solemnly that this is not simply a matter of aroused public opinion or of private passion against Cuba. As I am sure you know, I have regularly resisted pressure for unreasonable or excessive action, and I am not interested in a squabble with Castro.

¹ Transmits letter from President to Prime Minister Macmillan for Department's information and action. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UK—Cuba.

But this is something different: The first step in a major showdown with Khrushchev, whose action in this case is so at variance with what all the Soviet experts have predicted that it is necessary to revise our whole estimate of his level of desperation or ambition, or both.

The particular points which you raise about European public opinion are understandable and have been much in our minds. We have some thoughts about meeting them about which we must be in touch. I also agree that we must keep in the closest touch about Berlin and that we can do this best when we have the first Soviet reaction.

Our naval commanders are instructed to use the very minimum of force, but I know of no sure escape from the problem of the first shot. Our best basic course is firmness, now. I look forward to our talk.

**365. Telegram 222308Z from the White House to Rusk,
October 22¹**

October 22, 1962

For S/S Duty Officer Secretariat. Attention: Mr. Little from Situation Room. Cite CAP 5497-62.

My Dear Friend

Ambassador Bruce called to see me this morning and gave me evidence of the Soviet build up in Cuba. I quite understand how fiercely American public opinion will react when it knows these facts. I have this moment received through our teleprinter the text of your proposed declaration tonight. Let me say at once that we shall of course give you all the support we can in the Security Council. I hope that you will provide us immediately with the best legal case that can be made in support of the broad moral position so that our representative can weigh in effectively. Of course the international lawyers will take the point that a blockade which involves the searching of ships of all countries is difficult to defend in peace time. Indeed quite a lot of controversy has gone on in the past about its use in wartime. However, we must rest not so much on precedent as on the unprecedented condition of the modern world in a nuclear age.

If, as I assume, the Security Council resolution is vetoed the only appeal is to the Assembly. What the result will be there no one can

¹ Transmits text of Macmillan letter to Kennedy re Soviet build up in Cuba to the Department. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2262.

tell but I doubt whether they will be in favor of any conclusive action or even if they are I do not see how they will enforce it. What I think we must now consider is Khrushchev's likely reaction. He may reply either in words or in kind or both. If he contents himself with the first he may demand the removal of all American bases in Europe. If he decided to act he may do so either in the Caribbean or elsewhere. If he reacts in the Caribbean his obvious method would be to escort his ships and force you into the position of attacking them. This fire-first dilemma has always worried us and we have always hoped to impale the Russians on this horn. No doubt you have thought of this but I would be glad to know how you feel it can be handled. Alternatively, he may bring some pressure on the weaker parts of the free world defense system. This may be in South-East Asia, in Iran, possibly in Turkey, but more likely in Berlin. If he reacts outside the Caribbean—as I fear he may—it will be tempting for him to answer one blockade by declaring another. We must therefore be ready. Any retaliatory action on Berlin as envisaged in the various contingency plans will lead us either to an escalation to world war or to the holding of a conference. What seems to be essential is that you and I should think over and decide in what direction we want to steer things within the alliance and elsewhere. We should take counsel as soon as we have the Russian reaction.

While you know how deeply I sympathize with your difficulty and how much we will do to help in every way, it would only be right to tell you that there are two aspects which give me concern. Many of us in Europe have lived so long in close proximity to the enemy's nuclear weapons of the most devastating kind that we have got accustomed to it. So European opinion will need attention. The second, which is more worrying, is that if Khrushchev comes to a conference he will of course try to trade his Cuba position against his ambitions in Berlin and elsewhere. This we must avoid at all costs, as it will endanger the unity of the alliance.

With warm regard, Harold MacMillan.

366. Supplement 3 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

NOTICE

This supplement up-dates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on photographic coverage through Mission 3117 of 20 October 1962. (See Figure 1)

SUMMARY

1. There are no changes in the estimates of operational readiness for the nine offensive missile sites. (See Figure 2)
2. No new missile sites have been identified.
3. The observed missile and launcher count is increasing as estimated. Three additional MRBMs and four additional MRBM launchers raise the totals to 33 missiles and 23 launchers. No IRBMs have been identified. (See Table 1)
4. One additional SAM site is now considered operational, bringing the total individually operational sites to 23 of the 24 active sites so far identified. (See Table 2)
5. No new intelligence information has been received which modifies the nuclear storage situation since the last joint supplement.

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct-22 Oct 1962).

October 23, 1962

367. Circular telegram 726, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

In view situation described President's radio-TV statement this evening (communicated separately) you instructed seek appointment immediately at highest feasible level and by such means as may seem most likely achieve purpose, to endeavor persuade government to which accredited take such actions as indicated in following paragraphs to prevent Soviet Bloc military equipment reaching Cuba.

US considers its own safety and world peace jeopardized by confirmation of offensive nuclear build up on Cuba. You should emphasize in your discussions that Government has before it critical opportunity take decisive action for preservation of peace as well as positive demonstration its friendship for U.S.

All African Ambassadors accredited Washington, along with others will be fully briefed by Secretary at State Department this evening and will presumably urgently communicate gist.

Briefing will include critical proofs reasons our concern. Needless to say Government should be made aware deadly serious nature this démarche.

If you believe your démarche should be followed up by Presidential communication to Chief of State, advise immediately.

Review:

The following African countries have civil aviation agreements with Soviet Bloc: UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Senegal and Sudan. In addition, overflight rights have been requested from Chad, Libya, Niger, Somalia and Tunisia, with the following results: Niger, request approved; Chad, Somalia and Tunisia, have not replied to the Soviet request; Libya has stated that overflights will be considered individually.

At present time, flights from Khartoum to the West Coast of Africa have been blocked by Chad's refusal to grant overflights.

¹ Instructions to meet with highest available official to persuade government to which accredited to take actions to prevent Soviet Bloc military equipment from reaching Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-2362.

General Tactics:

A. CA-674, sent to Rabat, Dakar, Lagos, Paris, should be implemented as quickly as possible and cabled responses sent soonest.

B. In countries where agreements now in force, high level approach should be made seeking prohibition of through flights direct to Cuba or to Cuba via South America. Should it prove impractical to secure these blanket assurances our retreat position should be to urge denial of onward flights carrying military equipment of any type. This particularly true where Czechs and Polish airlines unlike Soviet have legal rights overfly and make technical landings such as in Senegal.

C. All governments involved should be urged to deny special rpt special Soviet Bloc flights which appear to be destined for South America and Cuba.

D. Urge governments who have not yet granted overflights to refuse such as request if made.

For Fort Lamy: Government should be immediately urged continue its policy and not rpt not reply to Soviet requests for overflights.

For Rabat: Morocco a key control point between Belgrade or Cairo and Dakar, Conakry or Bamako. Refusal by Morocco authorities to permit landings or onward flights of Bloc aircraft carrying military equipment would contribute immeasurably to successful blocking of shipments by air.

For Khartoum: While onward Western flights under Soviet agreement not yet implemented because of Chad refusal permit overflight GOS could make maximum contribution this effort by refusing Soviet rights military laden aircraft land Khartoum.

For Accra-Bamako-Conakry: In view of the avowed policy of non-alignment of the Government of Guinea (Mali and Ghana) and consequent intention to avoid scrupulous involvement in the Cold War, the U.S. Government is confident that the Governments of Guinea (Mali and Ghana) will not (rpt not) permit the use of its territory, including overflights for the transport by aircraft of the Soviet Union and its allies of arms, munitions and other implements of war destined for Cuba. To assist the Government of Guinea (Mali and Ghana) in identifying material of this type the U.S. Government would be willing to make competent technical personnel available.

For Lagos & Monrovia: While it doubtful Soviets will plan use routes through Liberia & Nigeria nevertheless U.S. request to refuse overflights should be made.

For UAM States: Niger & Senegal only UAM countries in which Soviets have air agreement or overflight permission. However, same approach as indicated above for Lagos and Monrovia should be made by Niamey. Dakar Embassy should make strongest possible representa-

tions as to key airport from which principal air shipment may jump off for Cuba.

For Paris: France should be urged influence UAM countries approve U.S. request and act accordingly. This is of maximum necessity in Niger and Senegal.

End.

Rusk

368. Memorandum for the record, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 23 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided. DEFCON 3 is, of course, in effect world-wide. (However, I saw a cable from Stoessel in the Situation Room this morning which indicated that General Norstad has not applied DEFCON 3 to US forces in Europe. I have not yet officially received this cable, however.)

2. The following matters arose:

a. Bundy very rapidly explained that a "Committee of the NSC" would be meeting daily at 1000 until further notice. He went so rapidly that I missed some of the names and titles, but this group will include besides the President, the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman JCS, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Bundy, and, as I say, some others that I missed. He said this committee would confine its attention to the current Cuba crisis as much as possible but could probably not avoid overlapping into other related areas and problems.

b. Carl Kaysen referred to the Executive Order on trade with Cuba which I mentioned several times in my staff meeting memoranda of last week. Even though this Executive Order is dwarfed by current crisis actions, it was agreed that it should be issued so as to complete the follow-through and keep the records straight.

¹ Daily White House staff meeting, Bundy presiding re handling of crisis actions. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.–Nov. 1962.

c. Bundy then very rapidly ran over his preliminary thinking on the initial arrangements for internal White House organization and handling of crisis actions. For transmittal of information, Captain Shepard is the prime contact with the Pentagon. Problems requiring decision will issue through and from Secretary McNamara, and it appears that Clifton will be in on this act somehow. For White House staff handling of these matters for decision, Bromley Smith is the key person, with Chuck Johnson backing him up. Within the NSC staff, Bundy announced that Forrestal, Klein, Komer, and Legere would function as duty officers on the civil side; the implication seems to be that Shepard and Clifton will be cranking up some arrangements for parallel duty officers on the military side. Bundy told Forrestal to give particular attention during these coming days and weeks to the UN and OAS aspects; he told Klein and Legere to continue giving particular attention to the Berlin aspects; he told Legere to establish close liaison with ISA on these crisis matters; he told Komer to act as "demonologist" (meaning analyst of Soviet motives and possible moves); he told Kaysen and Belk to cover the rest of the world. This is all pretty loose so far, but my reading of it is that Bundy will very much continue to sit on top of the important policy matters himself, and that the rest of us over here will try to keep him informed and man the graveyard shift in the Situation Room.

Legere

369. Notes from transcripts of JSC meetings, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

¹ Low-level reconnaissance; U.S. reaction to possible U-2 shootdown; blockade of Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Tuesday, 23 October

JCS meeting at 0900 (CJCS and SecDef were attending a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee at the White House):

JCS decided that low-level reconnaissance was necessary. Then the SecDef called from the White House to ask how many flights were wanted. They replied that six were needed to cover the MRBM sites. The CJCS telephoned approval from the White house at 1057.

The JCS also discussed how to react to a U-2 shootdown. They agreed that, if a U-2 was downed, 1-2 flights daily should continue until another U-2 loss occurred. Then, determine whether the projected attrition rate was acceptable. If so, continue the flights. If not, attack all SAM sites and then resume U-2 flights. But, at 1125, CJCS brought back somewhat different guidance from the White House. This was sent via Msg. JCS 6958 to CINCLANT. 241922Z Oct 62.

CJCS debrief of ExComm meeting: President approved extension of tours of duty for Army and Marine Corps personnel. SecDef told the President that authority to requisition shipping was not needed today; he also said that S-Day (beginning of air strikes) would be the right time for the C-119 callup.

JCS meeting at 1400:

CNO: SecDef says that the quarantine will be imposed effective 241400Z. Message directing the generation of SAC forces will not be dispatched until the Quarantine Proclamation is made public (see Msg. JCS 6917 to CINCSAC, 232306Z Oct 62).

370. Memorandum of meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

PRESENT

The President, Vice President, Secty. McNamara, Secty. Gilpatric, Gen. Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Secty. Ball, Secty. Johnson, Amb. Thompson, Attorney General, DCI

1. McCone gave a brief intelligence report as covered by the attached documents. (Descriptive note attached). Lundahl displayed the most recent photographs and a map showing 97 per cent coverage of the island.

2. Robert Kennedy stated that the question had been raised as to why the situation was not reported earlier, what was wrong with our intelligence. It was agreed that the rapidity with which the MRBM site construction took place, and other events took place, accounted for the suddenness of the findings and that the leadership and selected press should be contacted privately.

Action: DCI was requested to contact Fulbright, Russell, Vinson, Halleck, Dirksen, and Hickenlooper, and for the press, Alsop, Krock and David Lawrence.

3. McNamara raised questions of when blockade proclamation will be issued, become effective, and discussed plans for the intercept of the first ship which would be the *Kimovsk*. It was decided that if OAS acted on Tuesday, the proclamation would be issued, effective Wednesday morning, October 24. Probably the first intercept would be made on that day.

4. The President discussed the program, defending the steps taken, stated earlier action would not have been supported and would not have shut off the possibility of missiles, emphasized that mobile missiles can come in at any time and be set up rapidly.

5. McNamara discussed several military actions, including extension of tours of duty of Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and these were approved.

6. McNamara then raised question of reaction to firing on a U-2, indicated pilots instructed to take evasive action. It was decided that we would be immediately informed through JCS to the Secretary of Defense and a prompt decision for retaliation would then be made by

¹ Intelligence report, blockage, possible military actions, firing on a U-2, air intercept capability, and low-level flights. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01265A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.

the President. Taylor reported eight attack aircraft are maintained in hot alert and can destroy SAM sites within two hours or approximately the time that the U-2 would get back if the attack on it failed. McNamara confirmed that air-sea rescue was continuing. It was decided that if the President was not available, McNamara would have authority to act.

Action: General Taylor agreed that he would take up and confirm today CIA request that our representatives be stationed with JCS planning staff and in the Flag Plot and in the JCS War Room. If there is any delay on this please inform me so that I can again communicate with Taylor.

7. McNamara noted that they had no air intercept capability and would not attempt at this time to develop their plan of air intercept.

Action: It was requested that CIA and Defense carefully analyse air traffic and report currently so that if there is a marked build-up, the Committee will be advised and appropriate action can be taken.

8. McNamara then presented the need for shipping, indicating between 125 and 130 Merchant ships were needed to support an invasion and that a few had been chartered as of yesterday. He felt perhaps 20 more could be secured promptly, but this would leave about 100 short, and this would involve extensive requisitioning. McCone pointed out the serious consequences to American business, intercoastal and coast-wise shipping, the Northwest lumber industry, et cetera, et cetera. McCone suggested consideration be given to taking foreign flag ships on a bare boat basis. Defense was asked to explore the possibility of temporary waiver of laws regulating operation of foreign flag ships, et cetera, et cetera.

9. McCone and McNamara raised the question of low level flights.

Action: Six flights were approved and General Taylor ordered them off immediately. It was presumed that they will return not later than 1:00 o'clock today.

Action: It is very important that NPIC and DCI's office receive prints at earliest moment. DDCI to follow. Also important that if the photography is productive of new and more convincing information, prints should be sent to Governor Stevenson at once.

10. The President raised question of security of our own air fields in Florida during surprise strafing, etc. McNamara and Gilpatric assumed responsibility.

11. After a brief discussion of communications Bundy stated that subject under study by Dr. Wiesner, and urged State, Defense and CIA communications specialists to contact Wiesner.

Action: Following meeting McCone, Wiesner, Smith and Edwards met and reviewed the CIA Latin American communication system. Subject left for further discussion today.

Action: This whole communication problem is to be followed up energetically by CIA with Wiesner and all appropriate actions taken.

12. Secretary Ball reported Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy felt they did not have enough information to make a convincing case before the UN Security Council. They requested (1) a large map marked in color, showing the actual locations of a few of the sites, possibly one MRBM site, one IRBM site and one or two air fields; (2) pictures of the sites showing progressive construction with dates indicated; (3) indication, but not necessarily the numbers, of all of the sites; (4) a pre-May 1, 1960 U-2 picture of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM site to show similarity.

Action: The Committee left matter of disclosure to McCone, despatch of Lundahl and Cline to New York for discussions, and assistance in developing Stevenson's scenario. McCone authorized items one, two and three above but refused item 4. Also agreed transmit low-level product to Stevenson if same useful.

13. Bundy explained idea of creating a staff to support the Committee indicating each member should have a working staff member, details to be worked out later.

Action: DDCI should consider appropriate assignment after conferring with State and Defense and determining their nominees. This will be more or less full time and this staff man can handle Agency representation and also support me.

John A. McCone
Director

371. Memorandum for the file, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

SUBJECT

Meetings with Senator Russell, Senator Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson

1. At the President's request I contacted several members of the leadership of the Congress with the following results. In a meeting on October 23rd, Senator Russell indicated a less critical attitude toward Administration policy than was evident at the leadership meeting the night before. He in general approved the plan of actions, indicating strong reservations concerning the effectiveness and the utility of the blockade, expressed serious concern over the Soviet/U.S. confrontation which would result from the blockade, and accepted the course of action only because it would lead to the next phase which would be that of taking the missiles and offensive weapons out of Cuba at a time and by means of our own determination. Russell favored more positive action against Cuba which would involve not only air strike but invasion. In the initial part of the discussion he felt the President's speech had not established a clear-cut right for military action; however, by careful reference to the speech (a copy of which I had with me) he agreed that the wording did give the President right of action without further notification. In general, Russell's attitude was considerably different than the leadership meeting and might be summed up as reserved approval.

During the conversation, I outlined my feelings that our purposes must be to remove the missiles and also to remove Castro as is outlined in a separate memorandum.

2. Senator Hickenlooper approved the speech, the action, and the anticipated further action without reservation. He expressed confidence in the President as did Senator Russell but serious reservations concerning some of the President's advisors who he felt would influence the President to follow a very weak and compromising line. However, it appeared to me that Hickenlooper was greatly relieved by the speech and more satisfied with our Cuban policy than was evident at the leadership meeting.

3. Chairman Vinson stated that he thought the speech was good. He approved it but he had concluded that military action would be

¹ Meetings with Senators Russell, Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson to notify them of administration policy and get their positions. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01265A, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

necessary and this he heartily approved. Vinson feels that we must dispose of the Castro problem as well as the missiles. In this regard, I outlined my feelings as covered by separate memorandum. Vinson tended to review the activities of the Navy with Admiral Anderson and others, insisting that we must be sure that we are going to do enough, that our blockade is going to be effective, and that if we invade, we must invade with great force, an assured victory, quick victory, otherwise Cuban resistance will be rallied and our casualties will be great. He stated that 250,000 men would be not enough, that it would take 500,000 men; that we should land at least 10 or more points in Cuba at one time, and if we did this, the entire Cuban population would come to our side.

Note: Both Vinson and Russell were very inquisitive as to the position of the Joint Chiefs. I explained this as expressed by Taylor, pointing out that their position of a sudden unannounced military strike was reasonable in view of their responsibilities, however, it must also be recognized that civilians with broader responsibilities, i.e. military and political as well, necessarily had to moderate the JCS view. I stated that I felt the JCS view would insure the most successful military operations with the least American losses but that I opposed it and felt that the military handicaps resulting from our course of action (in military operations) must be reverted to, can be overcome by increase in the weight of the military operation. None of the three felt that we should have undertaken a surprise attack; however, Russell in particular felt that a warning and a following military operation might have been preferable to the blockade. I pointed out that the warning now had been given and action could be taken now "at a time of our own choosing and by means of our own determination" and after again reviewing the wording of the speech, Russell agreed this was correct.

John A. McCone

372. Memorandum from Acting Director of the Office of National Estimates Smith to McCone, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

SUBJECT

Effect on Cuba of a Blockade Covering all Goods Except Food and Medicines²

1. A blockade excluding all shipments into Cuba except food and medicines would be unlikely, in and of itself, to bring the Castro government down unless it were extended over many months. The imposition of a blockade would confront the regime with formidable problems of management and economic reorganization. The supply of heavy petroleum products, based on current rates of consumption, would last some three to four months; light products, including jet fuel, about two months. The petroleum supply could be stretched out longer if—as would be likely—the regime confined its usage largely to emergency power and military requirements. Sugar production could be continued, but industrial production would be sharply reduced, and many manufactured items would soon become unavailable. Any effective sabotage or harassment designed to use up supplies would, of course, accelerate the process. The effectiveness of the military forces would gradually be impaired after POL, spare parts, and other essential supplies were cut off. There would be much confusion and disruption of life, but for some months the regime would be likely to be able to prevent economic chaos and meet the basic needs of the population.

2. The general pattern of political alignments would be unlikely to change significantly in response to a blockade at least initially. The opposition would take heart but shepherd its strength for use at the time of an anticipated US invasion. As the Cuban economy ground to a halt, Castro would face formidable organizational and political problems, but, with increased security precautions, would probably be able to stay in control. As the effects of the blockade became increasingly perceptible in the daily life of the population, nationalistic sentiment and anger against the US would tend to balance off encouragement of the opposition and tendencies to lay the blame against Castro. However, if a US blockade were effective and the Soviets either accepted

¹ Effect on Cuba of a Blockade covering all goods except food and medicines. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62–11/12/62.

² This memorandum has been coordinated with the representative of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

it or failed in attempts to break it, the faith of many Castro supporters in the wisdom of his policies would be severely strained and trouble within the regime would become a significant possibility.

3. In general, the imposition of a US blockade would be likely to stiffen the backs of those who wholeheartedly support Castro and it would arouse the hopes of those who are committed to opposition. Recruits to both political extremes would come from the generally apathetic group in the center. Castro supporters and some of the formerly uncommitted would believe that the US blockade demonstrated the truth of the warnings of hostile US intentions which the regime has been declaiming for months. Those in opposition would interpret US claims and actions as evidence of Castro's having sold out to the Soviets and as giving added reason to expect US intervention.

4. In the final analysis, we believe that the Cuban population would tend to divide between the two extremes. Some oppositionists might initiate revolutionary action in the hopes of precipitating US invasion. Most of the anti-Castroists, however, would, in our opinion, be unlikely to act forcefully against the regime unless they saw evidence on Cuban soil of US action against the regime or unless they concluded from what they knew of the international situation that action on their part would lead quickly and directly to the overthrow of Castro.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman

373. List of issues raised at Rostow group meeting, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

1. Need for Strategic Guidelines

It was felt people are becoming immersed in operational details, without any clear concept to unify the numerous separate efforts on pieces of the problem which are springing up all around. Therefore the need for some strategic guidelines to identify central problems and

¹ Strategic guidelines, missile trade-off, offensive nature of missiles in Cuba, Soviet personnel in Cuba, inspection issue, initiative thinking, Cuban objectives, Tobin-Greenfeld paper, systematic review of possible contingencies. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. II.

insure that separate efforts are not pulling in opposite directions. Apart from preparing a paper on Strategic Guidelines, it was felt the group might be useful as a mechanism for keeping track of who is doing what.

2. *Missile Trade-off*

Most of group expressed concern about the way the notion of trading-off missiles (e.g., missiles in Turkey and/or Italy for missiles in Cuba) was making headway in the government with little apparent thought to political costs, strategic asymmetries, etc.

It was felt the problem needed better exploration in the context of our overall foreign and military policy, even though everyone agreed the direct military value of say, missiles in Turkey, was low.

It was pointed out that the Soviets could be handed a very cheap political victory if the idea got around (to Turks, e.g.) that we were willing to sell out the security interests of our far-away allies because we had the wind up about Cuba.

It was also felt any talk of missile tradeoffs must *not* be confined to overseas bases, but must include Soviet-based MRBM/IRBM's which threaten security of countries all around its periphery—Turkey, the rest of NATO, the sub-continent, Far East.

3. *Making Persuasive Case on Offensive Nature of Missiles in Cuba*

It was noted that there is considerable skepticism (among some Americans as well as allies and neutrals) about how “offensive” the missiles really are, how sizeable the threat they pose, etc. There is a need to make a more persuasive case, particularly before Soviets/Cubans take measures to conceal these installations or move the missiles to other locations, etc. How much disclosure to make is a moot point. It was understood this question is currently receiving high level attention.

4. *Soviet Personnel in Cuba*

It was felt everything possible must be done to pin down hard evidence (particularly useable evidence) that organized Soviet military units have come into Cuba to operate missiles and other complex weapon systems. More bearing down on this point—with or without producible evidence—would also be useful to help counteract the Soviet line that this is essentially a Cuban affair—and that they are merely furnishing means to the Cubans to defend themselves. A better knowledge of the Soviet command arrangements in Cuba would also be useful—for a variety of reasons, in addition to establishing the degree of their control.

5. *Inspection Issue*

There was considerable discussion of various possible developments if the matter of inspection for the presence of “offensive weap-

ons" should arise concretely. We might be asked, for example—by a UN resolution, a neutral proposal, etc.—to hold off or lift the blockade until a UN inspection of sites in Cuba would be made.

This might well provide opening for proposals that overseas bases everywhere be thrown open to inspection for "offensive" missiles, etc.

It was strongly felt that the UN was not a good forum or instrument for any inspection proposals that might come up. It would be far better in this case to have OAS, on the principle of regional security arrangements which is firmly embedded in the UN charter, conduct its own inspection and policing—to keep this a "family matter".

A factor against this approach is that it would run somewhat contrary to the thesis that this is essentially a US-Soviet issue, and not the big US versus little Cuba. However, this objection might be met by picturing the issue as the American states versus the Soviet Union's incursion into this Hemisphere.

6. *Need for "Initiative" Thinking*

There was some criticism of the tendency to think mostly in terms of contingency planning to react to moves the Soviets might make. It was urged that more thought be given to initiatives we could take to make the Soviets uncomfortable, forestall contingencies, and play the situation in the interest of our long-term goals.

7. *Question of our Cuban Objectives*

In connection with possible initiatives and exploiting of opportunities, the question arose as to what was being done to estimate the possibilities of anti-Castro unrest and to prepare to exploit it. This also raised the question of defining what our objectives in Cuba are—to get removal of missiles as a minimum and stop there, or to go further—and how far—toward liberation of Cuba.

In connection with the above, Bill Jordan's project to stimulate revolutionary sentiment was briefly discussed. Apparently it has been knocked in the head, but it was felt the group might urge its revival.

8. *Tobin-Greenfeld Paper*

This is a second version of original Tobin paper dealing with trading of Jupiters in Turkey. First paper was rejected. Bill Jordan will furnish us a copy of the second paper tomorrow.

9. *Need for Systematic Laying out of Various Contingencies, Soviet Reactions to our Moves, Etc.*

Many piece-meal items have been circulating, but there has been no systematic effort—guided by any structural concept—to lay out the range of alternatives for orderly review, selection of priority areas for attention, etc.

It was asked that Ray Garthoff and Tom Wolfe undertake such a project, working in parallel and presenting results for comparison at 24 October meeting at 1600.

**374. Memorandum from Katzenbach to Attorney General
Kennedy, October 23¹**

October 23, 1962

SUBJECT

Proclamation re Cuba

Under the proclamation as presently drafted all ships bound for Cuba, or in that general direction, could be stopped, boarded and searched. If found to have contraband it would be told to head for another port or would be taken into custody if it refused to do so.

Ships not headed for Cuba would not be searched and boarded, and if a ship headed for Cuba were to alter course so as to go in a totally different direction it would not be subject to search.

You have inquired whether or not it would be possible to search Russian vessels even though they were not headed for Cuba. I think this might be accomplished in two ways: (1) We could search all vessels within a prescribed zone and this zone could be as large as reasonable. The British included all the North Atlantic in World War II. But it would hardly seem reasonable for the United States to create a zone that large. (2) I think it would be possible to search a Russian vessel, even though it altered and changed course, if we had evidence that it had previously been bound on a course for Cuba. This would be justified on the basis that the alteration of course was a ruse and that the vessel intended to proceed nonetheless to Cuba.

To accomplish this, however, we would have to proceed quickly to visit and search any such vessels before they had clearly altered their course and maintained their new course for a sufficient length of time to indicate a change of mind. In addition, the order would require some minor change of phraseology to accomplish this, and we would have to detail presently some Naval vessels to the place where the Cuban boats now are.

¹ Proclamation re Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Misc. Papers Regarding Cuba, 20 Oct.–25 Oct. 1962.

375. NSC Executive Committee Debriefing, October 23¹

October 23, 1962

Debriefing given by

G—Mr. Johnson

Debriefing attended by:

S/AL—Mr. Thompson

INR—Mr. Hilsman

Mr. Scott

ARA—Mr. Martin

EUR—Mr. Hillenbrand

P—Mr. Rowan

S/P—Mr. Rostow

G/PM—Mr. Kitchen

Defense—Mr. Rowen

S/S—Mr. Brubeck

S/S—Miss Moor

G—Mr. Hackler (latter 15 minutes)

G—noted first intercept of Soviet vessel 1800 miles from Cuba (later info from INR opened up discrepancy in the info—never clarified) to be made by cruiser.

G—said Secretary of Defense amendment under authority of paragraph at top of page 3 of Proclamation must get to Moscow.

ARA—Martin questioned—

- 1) were zones to the outlined?
- 2) what about black and white list?
- 3) what about Panama Canal?
- 4) what about “out” for Soviets

S/AL—Thompson—noted schools of thought—proof necessary

G—noted that Secretary of Defense fully aware of political facets of military operations—also excellent rapport with Secretary of State

INR—Hilsman—no ships have turned back but many unbroken messages intercepted

ARA—Martin—wanted to know what other Soviet ships would arrive between now and first intercept and what cargoes (this info when received caused confusion as nearest Soviet ship to Cuba was to be first intercept which had previously been pinpointed as 1800 miles from Cuba) shouldn't this be clarified?

¹ Blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 75 D 165, NSC Debriefings 1962.

INR—Hilsman—stated that his briefings both here and at UN had gone well—Rikkyye reaction excellent.

Big question was matter of nuclear warheads being brought in to Cuba on Soviet planes. Were we going to stop planes? If not, why not?

G—said McNamara was to look into rules of engagement to minimize the effect of a possible boarding of a Soviet vessel.

G—said it was decided that the requisitioning of U.S. flag vessels would not be applied to coastal shipping.

G—said Civil Defense capabilities would be discussed tomorrow.

Ambassadorial Group (under Ambassador Thompson) will consider implementation of Berlin Contingency plans. Hillenbrand questioned what this meant. Possible convoy probe?

Rostow Group formed—

“long-term” planning

Defense-White House-Treasury

(check minutes to clarify terms of reference for group)

Johnson-Gilpatric-Bundy agreed to Kitchen-General Riley form group for contingency planning “political component of operational planning.” We have no plans beyond Johnson plan which brings us to this point. What if Iran is attacked? or Turkey? or U.S. ships are stopped? Coup de main in Berlin?

G—agreed to discuss on an urgent basis the need to hold Cuban refugees in check.

October 24, 1962

376. Supplement 4 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on U-2 photographic coverage through Mission 3119 of 22 October 1962 (see Figure 1). Some of Mission 5002, the low altitude photographic coverage of 23 October 1962, arrived during the preparation of this report and preliminary comments have been incorporated in the discussion of the Guanajay IRBM sites. Analysis has just started and will require many hours for completion.

SUMMARY

1. There are two changes in the estimated dates of full operational capability. San Cristobal MRBM Site 2 and Sagua La Grande MRBM Site 1 are now estimated to achieve this status on 25 October instead of 22 October as previously estimated.
2. No new missile sites have been identified (See Table 1).
3. No IRBMs per se have yet been identified.
4. Seven Soviet ships with cargo hatch openings of 75 feet or longer have now been identified as possible ballistic missile carriers. They have made 13 trips to Cuba to date, and three are currently enroute to Cuba.
5. No new intelligence information has been received which modifies the nuclear storage situation.

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct-28 Oct 1962).

377. Telegram 987 to Moscow, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Request following regulation of Secretary of Defense be transmitted to Soviet Government:

“Pursuant to Proclamation of the President of October 23, 1962, on the ‘Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba’ the Secretary of Defense has today issued the following submarine surfacing and identification procedures when in contact with US quarantine forces in the general vicinity of Cuba. US Forces coming in contact with unidentified submerged submarines will make the following signals to inform the sub that he may surface in order to identify himself:

Signals Follow—Quarantine Forces will drop four or five harmless explosive sound signals which may be accompanied by the international code signal “I D K C A” meaning “rise to surface.” This sonar signal is normally made on underwater communications equipment at the 8 XS frequency range.

Procedure on receipt of signal:

Submerged submarines, on hearing this signal, should surface on easterly course.

Signals and procedures employed are harmless.

Other governments being similarly informed.

Rusk

¹ Transmits regulation of Secretary McNamara re submarine surfacing and identification procedures used by U.S. quarantine forces in vicinity of Cuba for transmittal to Soviet Government. Unclassified. 2 pp. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 23–24, 1962.

378. Telegram 1205 from Bonn, October 24¹

Bonn, October 24, 1962

Eyes only for the Secretary.

Acheson and I spent almost two hours with Chancellor late yesterday. He had obviously reflected further on course of action re Cuba announced by the President and had concluded it would be insufficient to check Soviets. He did not at first say so, however, but after indicating his support for and confidence in the President, urged that we do more to create greater unrest in Cuba. Despite Acheson's explanation of how difficult this would be under Castro's police system, Chancellor pursued discussion at length, in course of which he referred to telegram from German UN observer explaining limited nature of US quarantine action, and said we should consider all possible actions for elimination of Castro regime and Soviet influence in Cuba, including rapid tightening of quarantine restrictions.

Acheson eventually moved discussion away from question of unrest in Cuba by explaining courses of action which had been available to the President, and reasons why current policy was decided upon. Adenauer listened most attentively, and at end seemed reassured but he was obviously still convinced of necessity for further firm measures at early date to achieve our purpose. He ended by saying "above all, no paper war".

Chancellor referred several times to his gratitude that Acheson had taken time for visit to Bonn. It was evident that he appreciated opportunity for thorough discussion with old friend. He indicated also how much he anticipated his visit with the President next month.

Dowling

¹ Briefing Chancellor on U.S. courses of action in Cuba and Chancellor's reaction. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2462.

379. Memorandum for the record, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 24 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided. All DEFCONS were still at 3, but Cdr. McCabe noted that SAC would be going on DEFCON 2 at 1000 hours today.

2. The following matters arose:

a. Captain Shepard introduced CDR Walker who provided about a five minute briefing on what the Navy was doing by way of preparation for intercepts. He stressed the attention being given to the *Kimovsk*, which can probably be intercepted this afternoon (and probably will be because of its 70-foot hatches), and the *Poltava*, for which the intercept appears likely early tomorrow morning, 25 October. After the meeting Shepard explained to me how SecDef–JCS have carefully selected these two ships for initial attention so as to be able to stand on a good example at the beginning of this business—i.e., avoid stopping a ship loaded with food or medicine, for example.

b. Admiral Lee had telephoned me before the meeting, and consequently I announced to the group that the Nitze Berlin–NATO Subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee would be meeting at 1100 right there in the Situation Room and would almost surely be doing so every day into the somewhat indefinite future. Attached is a list of the names which Admiral Lee furnished me this morning.

c. In response to my announcement, Bundy noted that Walt Rostow has also set up a subcommittee. His group will address itself to “advance planning”. The nominee from the NSC staff will be Komer. Bundy told Bromley Smith to talk to Colonel Ewell about the possible assignment of a Joint Staff representative to this Rostow subcommittee. I gather there are reasons for and reasons against such an assignment.

d. Bundy was obviously very eager to break off the meeting so as to begin preparing himself for the 1000 meeting of the NSC Executive Committee. On the other hand, everyone on his staff was and is obviously inclined to find out what is going on and what everyone is supposed to be doing. Bromley Smith and I stuck our necks out with a couple of questions, but were somewhat cut off by Bundy because

¹ Daily White House staff meeting covering Navy preparations for intercepts, Nitze Berlin–NATO Subcommittee, Rostow subcommittee, duty officer assignments. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, Oct.–Nov. 1961.

of his very understandable preoccupation with the larger meeting coming up at 1000.

e. In case it has not come out clearly above, it may be useful to remember that as of this moment the duty officer who, in Bundy's night-time absence, will apparently be carrying the ball, was Forrestal on the night of 23-24 October, and it is supposed to proceed and rotate through Klein, Komer, Legere, and back to Forrestal.

Legere

Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11 A.M. 24 October 1962

Situation Room

Hon. Paul H. Nitze	OSD/ISA
Ambassador Thompson	State
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand	State
Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel	State
B/Gen. Hamilton A. Twitchell	JCS
Mr. Willard Matthias	CIA
Mr. Charles Sullivan	Treasury
Mr. Raymond J. Albright	Treasury
Mr. Donald Wilson	USIA
M/Gen. David W. Gray	JCS
RADM John M. Lee	OSD/ISA
Colonel D. C. Armstrong	OSD/ISA
Captain John H. Cotton	OSD/ISA
Colonel Wilbur E. Showalter	OSD/ISA
Mr. David Klein	NSC/WH
Colonel L.J. Legere	NSC/WH

380. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Wednesday, 24 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

CJCS debriefs on ExComm meeting at 1800 last night: President was concerned about the problem of stopping a ship that did not want to be boarded. Will the Navy fight its way on board? The President always wants to be ready to send a battalion-size probe up the Berlin autobahn within two hours. The SecDef doesn't think we know enough about ship movements: where they are, what each is doing, and the pattern. He wants a recommendation on this.

CJCS says SecDef has photos of crowded Florida airfields.

Should the planes disperse?

CSAF: Let's stay on concrete and not go to the dirt. There are 450 planes, 150 per field.

JCS agreed to send the SecDef a memo saying that the tactical advantages of having units positioned forward far offset the risks of loss in a surprise attack.

¹ Debrief on ExComm meeting; ship movements; advantages of planes ready at airfields in Florida. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

CJCS: Are you going to announce a quarantine line and pick up ships as they cross it?

CNO: We will pick them all up, and not announce a line.

CNO: President and SecDef believe we are generating forces to be ready for invasion seven days from yesterday, but we have never sent the message out. JCS agree that the message should now be sent.

Around 1030, a report came in that three Soviet ships were turning back from the intercept line.

**381. Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy,
October 24¹**

October 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Report Number One of Planning Subcommittee

1. As of this morning the planning exercise is inaugurated.
2. We suggest that the following decisions by the Executive Committee of the NSC may be urgent:
 - a. Press and diplomatic guidance on turning back of certain Soviet ships. It seems essential that no one throw his hat in the air at this point. It may be merely buying time to set up a more serious military confrontation; and, in any case, it leaves open the question of the capabilities still on the island.
 - b. The issue of taking out the missiles and installations already in Cuba increases in urgency. The Soviets may try to deflate the present crisis quickly and settle for what is in the island and what they can subsequently deliver by clandestine means. If we are going to act, we should consider acting very soon. Harry Rowen is in charge of work at the Pentagon on alternative methods. The Executive Committee may wish to review those alternative methods today.
 - c. If the ships do turn back, a prompt, quiet approach to Castro may be an urgent appropriate next step.
3. The following subjects are now the subject of planning:

¹ Report 1 of Planning Subcommittee: Blockade and future planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Planning Subcommittee, 10/62-11/62.

a. The shape of a political settlement under the leadership of Henry Owen. He will be in touch with the bureaus and the Disarmament people.

b. Rules of engagement for a protracted war at sea: DOD and JCS.

c. Increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative means for taking out missiles and installations: DOD and JCS.

d. Clarification of doctrinal basis for our position: W. Jorden, working with P, L, and USIA.

4. In accordance with the President's instruction, Henry Owen, Mose Harvey, and I have begun work urgently on contingency track for a Summit meeting.

5. A general, interim appreciation of possible Soviet intentions will come forward this afternoon.

**382. Telegram from General Norstad to McGeorge Bundy,
October 24¹**

October 24, 1962

TO: DA for SHAPE LN LCOL George.

Please deliver the following message to Mr. McGeorge Bundy and to him only, unless he specifically designates someone else to receive it, after you have advised him that it is a TOP SECRET EYES ONLY letter for the President. No one else should be shown a copy of this message nor should any copy be retained by either the Communications people, by your office, or by any other individual or agency in the Pentagon. Message begins:

"TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY

"Dear Mr. President:

"There are a few points which developed during my visit to London which will be of interest to you. I am using this means to report them to you but because of their sensitivity I will not repeat this letter in writing. I have directed that there be no other distribution of this message and that no copies be retained.

"The most interesting point developed in my final talk with Macmillan, after the luncheon with the Queen yesterday, at which time he

¹ Transmits letter to the President reporting on Norstad's trip to London. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Kennedy, John F.

reverted to the subject of possible follow-up action in Cuba should the quarantine involve the use of force or prove ineffective. He had touched on this the night before, but in general terms. I was impressed by the fact that he again raised this point and in such terms that it was clear he had given considerable thought to it and had probably discussed it with the Cabinet and others. In his conversation with me, Macmillan quite definitely accepted the possibility of the United States taking over Cuba by military action. He stated that there might be very substantial European opposition to such action, but if the reason were clear enough this would be overcome by prompt success. He is influenced by two factors: one, the absolute need for success; and the other, the difficulty of negotiating with Khrushchev when he holds two high cards in his hands, Berlin and Cuba. In discussing this subject, he did so against the background of the Suez experience and the errors made by the British at that time.

"The Prime Minister referred many times to the need for unity in the Alliance, emphasizing that Khrushchev must not be permitted to divide us into two or three groups. In this connection he twice stated that he was very favorably impressed with the strong and positive position which de Gaulle had indicated to him in their exchange of messages. On the other side, he stated that there was going to be Labor Party opposition in the U.K. and that he was seeing Gaitskell yesterday afternoon at five o'clock on this point.

"I was impressed in all my talks in London, and now also here in Paris, with the strong and general feeling on the need for unity. Even where there may be questions as to what should be done or how it should be done, there appears to be the strongest feeling that nothing must be permitted to divide us. This, I believe, is an important factor in the growing support for your action.

"A high British official asked me whether in negotiating with the Russians we would trade missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba, and to this I gave as emphatic a 'no' as possible. I believe that he was simply trying to find an answer to a question which has arisen in the U.K., but which I am quite sure does not suggest the trend of official thinking.

"At the risk of being presumptuous, may I say that I hope we spare no effort in preparing ourselves for ultimate action in Cuba and that we act promptly in case we are finally forced to resort to such a step. My thinking is conditioned by the fact that I 'sweat through' the Suez operation six years ago when mighty words were followed days after the ultimatum had been served by a weak and ineffective effort. Opposition built up, as you know, and even those who sympathized with France and the U.K. lost their taste for the exercise.

"To report the private and confidential words of one Head of Government to another is full of danger, but after careful thought I

felt that I must inform you of the sense of Macmillan's conversation with me, since it may have a bearing on the great decisions you must make at this critical time. Because of my relationship with the Prime Minister, his talk to me must be considered as an expression of personal rather than official views. I am sure that you will seek directly his opinion should it be a critical factor at any time.

"Faithfully,

Lauris Norstad
General USAF

383. Telegram 1458 from USUN to Rusk, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Pass White House. Policy. Re Cuba.

Following is second message from SYG to President just delivered to me:

"Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I would be grateful if you would be so kind as to transmit the enclosed message to the President of the United States John F. Kennedy."

"Message to President Kennedy

"I have today sent a further message to Chairman Khrushchev expressing my grave concern that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba might challenge the quarantine imposed by your government and produce a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels, which could lead to an aggravation of the situation. I have also stated that what concerns me most is the fact that such a confrontation and consequent aggravation of the situation would destroy any possibility of the discussions that I have suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement. I have accordingly expressed to him my earnest hope that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba might be instructed to stay away from the interception area for a limited time only, in order to permit discussions of the

¹ Message from U Thant to President Kennedy re U Thant message to Khrushchev expressing concern over Soviet ships challenging the U.S. quarantine. Confidential. 2 pp. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 23–24, 1962.

modalities of a possible agreement which could settle the problem peacefully in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

"In continuation of my message of yesterday and my speech before the Security Council, I would now like to appeal to your excellency that instructions may be issued to United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident. If I could be informed of the action taken by your government on the basis of this appeal, I could inform Chairman Khrushchev that I have assurances from your side of your cooperation in avoiding all risk of an untoward incident. I would express the further hope that such cooperation could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of which the quarantine measures themselves could be called off as soon as possible.

"U Thant Acting Secretary-General."

Stevenson

384. Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk and Ball, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

SUBJECT

Cuba in the Security Council

1. The Security Council will reconvene around 5:00 this afternoon. Meanwhile, all the leading members of the UN will be stirring around looking for a way out of an extremely dangerous situation.

2. Three mediation efforts can be currently identified:

a. The UAR (together with Algeria) is floating a draft "restrain yourselves and talk" resolution. There have been some changes since yesterday. The resolution, showing the changes is attached at TAB A.

b. The Brazilian and Mexican delegates have approached Arthur Dean and asked whether it would be useful for them to try to get the Cubans and Soviets and to agree to a package that would call for no more introduction of offensive military equipment, the stationing of UN observers in Cuba, and, in return, the lifting of the quarantine. (Their package does not seem to include a ban on further development

¹ Discussion of Cuba in the UN Security Council. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.

of missile bases, with matériel already in Cuba. It certainly does not come anywhere near “dismantling and withdrawal.”)

c. U Thant has not yet started to mediate, but in response to the urging of a large group of neutrals will shortly issue what he describes (to Ambassador Stevenson) as a “balanced” appeal to the President and Mr. Khrushchev.

3. We face now the problem of whether to press to a vote the US resolution, and therefore also the Cuban and Soviet resolutions. (Texts of the U.S. and Soviet resolutions are at TAB B). My present view is that it would not be wise to press for a vote forthwith. The Security Council is a better umbrella for behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Soviets than the General Assembly would be. We can control the voting on procedural and substantive matters much better if we stay in the Security Council. If we press our resolution to a vote, collect our seven votes, and draw the promised Soviet veto, it would be hard to avoid going on into the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Shifting the venue to the General Assembly would heat up the political atmosphere, which is what we do not need.

4. If we decide that the matter should remain in the Security Council for the moment, and we do not press our resolution to a vote there today, there are several levels on which we can operate. They are not mutually exclusive, and some combination of them may prove to be the best arrangement:

a. We can agree to a bland resolution that merely asks the parties to get together or asks the Secretary General to get them together. I think we would have to assume that, for some purposes at least, the “parties concerned” now include all members of the OAS.

b. We might agree, as an interim measure, to some form of stand-still resolution but it will have to be one which clearly left our quarantine in effect until there are some arrangements for dismantling and withdrawing the missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba.

c. We might discreetly encourage an immediate broadening of the issue, to include the whole problem of nuclear missile capabilities at future bases. A way of doing this is illustrated by the resolution at TAB C, which might be put forward by the Irish and/or other appropriate neutrals.

d. We might use the crisis atmosphere to try to get a substantial leap forward in the whole field of arms control. This could take the form of a Heads of Government meeting, at Geneva, of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee, which could provide the occasion for agreement on an atmospheric test ban, an intensification of the work on avoiding surprise attack, and an exercise in summitry. A provision along this line is also included in the draft resolution at TAB C.

5. As of 2:00 p.m. today, my recommendations would be:

- a. To keep the matter in the Security Council for the time being;
- b. To encourage a broadening of the discussion to include the Turkish and Italian base problems;

c. To insist on withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba before lifting our quarantine (i.e., not to be willing to trade our quarantine for a more standstill arrangement); and

d. Do everything we can to use the crisis atmosphere to intensify practical discussions of arms control.

Harlan Cleveland

**385. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President,
October 24¹**

October 24, 1962

David Ormsby-Gore came in to tell me what will be on the Prime Minister's mind when he talks to you at 7 PM our time. It is not his speech tomorrow but the question of possible next steps on the political track.

1. At what point should there be an initiative for political conversation? At some point there will clearly have to be a conference if there is not going to be a war. Whose initiative would be helpful here—US? Secretary General? or some other power, perhaps the UK?

2. What should be the framework of discussion? The discussion might be framed in terms of exchange of military bases, but the Prime Minister and Lord Home think that is not too good. It would look like a rather cynical exchange and a weak ending to the U.S. beginning.

Therefore he thinks the preferred course is to get discussion on disarmament (with the recognition that something about bases might come up along the way).

1. In this context would the President see value in a Kennedy-Khrushchev summons to a meeting aimed at agreement on stage 1 of the general disarmament program. (David thinks this is not a good idea because the two sides are too far apart and because it leaves no room for the French.

2. Before such a conference there might have to be a standstill involving no import of arms and no blockade. (David thinks you should make it very plain to the PM that this is not an acceptable position and that the US cannot stand down its blockade without progress toward the removal of the missiles.

¹ Briefing information for a call to the President from Macmillan; possible next steps on the political track. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).

In summary, what is on the Prime Minister's mind is when and in what context conversations can be started.

David and I agreed that you would also want to bring him up to date on the present situation and on your own view of the immediate future.

McG.B.

386. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Bundy—My understanding for tonight is that we are not going to start our interception in the hours of darkness. Is that your understanding too.

Ball—Yes, that's right.

Bundy—Walt's very good memorandum does not have Presidential standing. What he approved was the spokesman's statement and nothing else.

Ball—I understood this was a memorandum *for* the President, which I presume he has not seen. Is that right?

Bundy—Which one?

Ball—Walt's memorandum.

Bundy—Yes, it was a very good memorandum and a very helpful one, but the President was concentrating on the announcement and not on anything else. Roz and I talked a little while ago. Bob was tied up with the press and my distinct understanding is that the orders are to let the night go by and to examine in the morning who we stop, when, in what order and how much we can control it.

Ball—I think that's fine. There is a newspaper story that our press people have had that the President was quoted by one of the people who was at the Congressional briefing as having said that we were not going to stop tankers.

Bundy—No, what he went [*meant*] was that there was no quarantine for tankers. Your boss just said to me that he didn't really know

¹ Timing for interception of ships at sea. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

that he wanted to have a confrontation of a tanker that had gone 3 weeks before that almost surely did only contain oil.

Ball—He and I have not settled this argument between us.

Bundy—I understand so, and I think we just ought to leave that indeterminant. The only thing the President can have meant is the way the background that is.

Ball—That it didn't include POL.

Bundy—That the quarantine did not include POL, as the Proclamation now stands, and as the Sec. of Defense's supplementary instructions now stand. Don't you think that's the way to do that?

Ball—Yes.

Bundy—I wasn't at the_____and maybe I'll see what he did say. And give you a warning.

Ball—I will be here all night. If there is nothing different let me know one way or another.

Bundy—I will. Ted Clifton will be the senior man at the WH tonight.

Ball—OK. Fine.

387. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Cleveland and Ball, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Cleveland—Adlai is kicking like a steer over this statement.

Ball—Why? It is a good statement.

Cleveland—I think so too. He wants to indicate some softening of our position. At the moment of agreeing to talks. He interprets this letter as saying that we won't even talk unless we get guarantees against the further introduction of offensive weapons and discontinuance of development work, and UN observers, and all the rest of it. I say no. We are saying (a) we are prepared to talk but (b) we don't like the basis of talking that you suggested so here is the basis of talking that we reiterate from the position that we have already taken through Stevenson. He doesn't like it, and I think his recommendations will probably be that we hold it overnight the question of what the President

¹ Stevenson's position on U.S. statement before the United Nations. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

says so he can argue about it. I asked him to call either you or me when Thant gets through. He will start speaking in a few minutes, and I will do that. I will wait it out.

Ball—All right, I am going to call the President if he wants to make a big issue out of it.

Cleveland—At this moment, he is in a mood to make a considerable issue of it. He says all this will ruin us and everybody will think we don't want to talk, etc. If you can trass (?) it with what he wanted to say.

Ball—All right. When U Thant gets through speaking, why don't you come on up.

Cleveland—All right, I will.

388. Supplement 5 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status, or changes therein, of the offensive missiles in Cuba. This report is based on photographic coverage through Mission 5005 of Tuesday, 23 October 1962 (see Figure 1). The quality of the recent, low-altitude photography permits positive identification of many types of missile associated equipment.

SUMMARY

1. As yet there is no evidence of change in the pace of construction activities.
2. There are no changes in the estimated dates of operational capability for the MRBM and IRBM sites (see Figure 2).
3. No additional missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1).
4. No new missile sites have been identified.

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962).

5. No IRBMs per se have yet been identified. [*text is not declassified*]
 6. There is increasing evidence of the use of camouflage at several sites.
 7. Three of the Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic missile carriers enroute to Cuba are reportedly altering their course.
 8. We have analyzed the capability of the Soviets to transport nuclear warheads for these missiles from the USSR to Cuba using submarines and aircraft. While submarine transport is possible, air transport is more likely. A TU-114 can fly non-stop from Olenya in the Soviet Union to Cuba with up to 10 nuclear warheads on an approximate great circle route which would not pass over any other country.
 9. New, low-altitude photography of 23 October confirms previous estimates of the general characteristics and rate of construction of the probable nuclear warhead bunkers at several sites. We are at this time unable to determine whether these bunkers are for storage or checkout of nuclear warheads, or for both of these functions.
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389. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Ball—Just for your information, we have just had a message in from K to the Pres. It is a long hysterical document and actually the first 2/3 part, I haven't been able to decipher fully because it is still garbled, and we are getting it corrected. In general he takes the line in the first 2/3 that he is doing this for domestic political purposes and you know better, and you know we can't abide by this and that we aren't interested at all in what the OAS is doing and do you find any morality in what you are doing, etc. The significant part is the last paragraph which as best as I can make out reads something like this. GWB reads last paragraph. He has really kind of laid the gauntlet down.

McNamara—He says he is going to clear out the offensive weapons ships and he is going to probe the quarantine with non-offensive weapons ships.

¹ Khrushchev message to the President; interception of ships at sea. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

Ball—Whether this means submarines, or whether it means he runs them through and lets us take the responsibility for shooting.

McNamara—I think that is what it means.

Ball—I talked to the President about it. I told him I would get hold of you and Dean and simply call your attention to this. I don't think we have any option but to go ahead in the morning. This is something we might well have expected so I don't think that it's anything very exceptional.

McNamara—I don't see any problem tonight with it. There are so few Soviet ships left out there.

Ball—What is likely to be the first pick-up in the morning is a tanker.

McNamara—Yes.

Ball—Does it look as though we would get a friendly ship before we got one of theirs, or what.

McNamara—It is hard to tell. I think we got a ship with a Coast Guard vessel today—a Greek ship. The plan is to query friendly ships as to destination, cargo, name, etc. and allow them to proceed at that. We can do the same thing to the Soviet ship if it is obviously a tanker.

Ball—That kind of makes nonsense of the quarantine, doesn't it?

McNamara—No, I think that if it's a tanker without a deck load it doesn't make nonsense of the quarantine. You can't put anything down in the holes of a tanker. Most tankers, at least, have entry ports that are so small that you can't get anything down there. They'll have to examine it. The Soviet tanker is different. There's one tanker in particular that has a tremendous deck load on it. It looks to me at least to be missile fuel. Great big tanks that look like _____ tanks which is what they declared it to be when they went through _____.

Ball—Where is that.

McNamara—Interestingly enough, it is in the Cycee (?). He got a message, but he hasn't turned completely around; he just turned to northwest from southwest. He is just roaming around out there, at the present time as best we can tell.

Ball—I think it is important that at some point we establish the quarantine by really going on and inspecting one of their ships. What are the chances in getting to that tomorrow.

McNamara—I think it is largely up to us. There is only one Soviet ship within range of the blockade and that is the tanker without the deck load and I wouldn't think that is a very good case to start on.

Ball—No. I think that is right. I do want us to get the principle established.

McNamara—We establish the principle by going along side and hailing it. If it refuses to respond then we have got a good case to go on board.

Ball—Is that likely to be fairly early?

McNamara—It is likely to be early in the morning but the Commander of the ship is likely to intercept, we don't know because the ocean is so large and it is difficult to say precisely where he is. The Commander of the ship has no authority to board, he has only authority to query. In order to board, he has to get authority.

Ball—I think we just go ahead on that basis and see what happens.

McNamara—I do too. If this intercept occurs during the night, I will be awakened.

Ball—I will be here all night.

McNamara—I think we can keep in close communication.

Ball—OK.

**390. Circular telegram 743 to all diplomatic and consular posts,
October 24¹**

October 24, 1962

Inform Consuls.

There is urgent need for clarity and consistency in our statements explaining our action against Soviet bases in Cuba. What follows is intended as guidance for US officials at home and abroad in their public and private discussions of this matter.

We should have clearly in mind what the problem *is* and what it *is not*. We can expect a massive effort at distortion from Moscow and it must be countered at every opportunity. Moreover, we should be using actively every opportunity to explain our position rather than waiting to react to Communist or Cuban accusations.

Our present course of action is directed against the following:

1. the sudden and secret introduction into the Western hemisphere of aggressive weapons by Soviet Union;
2. the expansion of aggressive military power by a state whose avowed aim is imposition of an alien doctrine on free men;
3. abrupt alteration of already delicate balance of military forces in world, imperiling countries and peoples heretofore free from threat of attack by nuclear weapons;

¹ Guidance for U.S. officials at home and abroad for public and private discussions of Soviet bases in Cuba. Confidential. 13 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2462.

4. creation of a new and obvious threat to peace of hemisphere and of world.

Our response is:

1. that of free men and free governments in interests of their own defense and security;
2. that of Western Hemisphere against introduction of Soviet power;
3. that of a region replying collectively to a new and serious threat;
4. a restrained and limited reaction against a specific danger.

Measures now launched are *not*:

1. effort to impose our political system on Cuban people;
2. attempt to control or restrict Cuba's right to arrange for its legitimate defense requirements;
3. confrontation between US and Cuba;
4. act of war or attempt to force Cuba to her knees.

It should be clear that we deplore the fact of foreign domination over Cuban people, abandonment of Cuba's national interests for those of alien power, imposition of an ideology and a system opposed by vast majority of Cuban people. But we are confident that Cuban people, with wisdom and courage, will correct this situation in their own way and in their own time.

We should not permit confusion between objectives of our present course of action and our long-range hopes for restoration of freedom and independence in Cuba. We must hammer home this message to every audience, most particularly to Cubans themselves.

Historical Base

Our present course is firmly rooted in history. We must try to clarify for our friends unique relationship that has developed inside this hemisphere over years. Essence of Monroe Doctrine is well known, at least among sophisticated audiences. We should point out, however, that opposition to intrusion of outside power into hemisphere has been as much an element of Latin American political thought and tradition as it is of our own. The great Latin American liberator, Simon Bolivar, expressed himself often and forcibly on this matter.

This tradition—of unified opposition to foreign tyranny and foreign power—is at root of special relationship that binds American states. It has been formalized in Organization of American States and in many declarations of policy and attitude subscribed to over years by all governments in hemisphere, including Cuban Govt before it placed itself under foreign masters.

Special ties of tradition, history, culture, religion, language, and the like are not unique to Western Hemisphere though they are more firmly established here in terms of political organization. We can rea-

sonably ask our friends around world to relate sentiment that prevails in our hemisphere on this matter with their own special feelings of affinity with their neighbors or others. Even Russian audience might get a better appreciation of our position if they contrast it with their own feeling of special interest and attachment to Central Europe.

Exposition of our case on basis of history, tradition or special ties should be carefully tailored to audience at hand, drawing on parallels that are meaningful and convincing.

Legal Base

Quarantine against shipments of offensive military equipment to Cuba is being carried out in accordance with a recommendation of OAS. It is an action clearly authorized by Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance). Moreover, it is consistent with provisions of UN Charter.

Rio Treaty has as its fundamental purpose "to assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and . . . to deal with threats of aggression against any of them." Emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba is regarded by all other American States as such a threat.

Treaty provides for collective action not only against armed attack but also against "any other fact or situation that might endanger peace of America." Measures which may be taken under treaty specifically include "use of armed force."

Present course adopted by American family of nations against Soviet threat in Cuba is consistent with earlier statements of policy adopted by OAS. In 1960, at meeting of American foreign ministers, Organization "condemned intervention or threat of intervention of extra-continental communist powers in hemisphere." At Punta del Este, in 1962, foreign ministers went further. They declared that "continental unity and democratic institutions of hemisphere are now in danger." Source of danger was specified: "the subversive offensive of communist govts."

Organization agreed to prohibit all trade in arms with Cuba. It excluded the Castro regime from participation in organs of Inter-American system.

On Oct. 2-3 of this year, foreign ministers of American States met informally in Washington and reiterated that "Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatens unity of Americas and its democratic institutions." Foreign Ministers agreed that developments called for "adoption of special measures, both individual and collective."

It was against this background of repeated warnings and statements of policy toward Soviet intervention in Cuba that OAS acted on

Oct. 23. Without a dissenting vote, OAS recommended that its members "take all measures, individually and collectively including use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that Govt. of Cuba cannot continue to receive from Sino-Soviet powers military matériel and related supplies which may threaten peace and security of continent and to prevent missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to peace and security of the Continent."

Quarantine of Cuba is being carried out in accordance with this clear statement of policy on part of Inter-American family of nations.

Question may be raised whether this kind of action by a regional grouping of states is in accordance with UN Charter. Answer is: yes.

UN Charter recognizes and approves existence of regional organizations of states provided their actions are consistent with purposes and principles of UN. Measures being undertaken against secret and dangerous stationing of aggressive Soviet force in Cuba represent, in words of UN Charter, "effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats to peace."

Importance of regional groupings in maintenance of peace was recognized in earliest conceptions of UN. Draft prepared at first conference at Dumbarton Oaks is virtually same as Chapter VIII of UN Charter.

Subject was discussed in detail at founding conference at San Francisco in 1945. And in course of discussion, Inter-American system was examined and approved as precisely kind of regional grouping anticipated in Charter.

In summary, (1) quarantine of Cuba is an action within competence of OAS and is consistent with objectives specified in Rio Treaty; (2) action under Rio Treaty accords with provisions of UN Charter.

It may be argued that Cuba has been excluded from Inter-American family and is, therefore, not bound by decisions of OAS. It may be argued, too, that under the Rio Treaty no American state is bound to carry out action without its own approval.

First, it should be noted that Cuba itself has not been expelled from OAS but only present puppet govt of that unhappy state. Second, Castro regime has not to date repudiated its membership in Inter-American Organization. In any event, Cuba remains in Western Hemisphere. Like it or not, a citizen with smallpox becomes a legitimate concern for community as a whole and must be subject to certain limitations and controls. Introduction of aggressive and dangerous weapons in hands of alien authorities and located within hemisphere is a source of rightful concern—and reaction—for neighboring states.

Disagreement is not between Cuban people and their neighbors. It is between an extra-hemispheric power with expansionist aims and

members of Inter-American family. If there were not aggressive Soviet weapons at Soviet bases in Cuba, there would be no quarantine directed at their removal.

Meaning for non-Communist world

Other nations, allied with US or unallied, have an interest in Cuban developments that may not be apparent to them. Some may be inclined to see no immediate threat to their own interests or to argue that surely the powerful US can take care of any danger from Cuba.

First, it should be noted that the presence of a Soviet nuclear missile capability could, if allowed to continue, represent a significant change in already delicately balanced forces in world. Unless this danger is eliminated before it is allowed to grow, it would mean diversion of significant resources—in manpower, matériel, and weapons—to counter this new threat to free world's security.

Our resources, great as they are, are not inexhaustible. Money, men and missiles that might have to go into effort to counter Soviet presence in Cuba would then not be available for other areas and other friends.

In addition, introduction of Soviet missile power into Western hemisphere would significantly increase Moscow's potential for nuclear blackmail against country that is bulwark of defense for its 40-plus allies and for all free men.

In terms of Soviet effort, one medium range missile in Cuba is equivalent of one intercontinental missile in Soviet Union at a fraction of cost. Heightened threat to US, to Panama Canal and to all countries in Caribbean region should be obvious.

Question is not whether US can "take care of Cuba." It can. But it could not counter Soviet threat from Cuba without either a significant new investment in resources or diminution of its present efforts elsewhere. The implications for all free peoples should be apparent.

Case Against Symmetry

It is likely that in their propaganda—and in any possible future discussions—Soviets will try to draw a parallel between their missile bases in Cuba and our establishments in allied countries. A similar parallel may be drawn between Cuba and Berlin. This effort can draw on some of comment and speculation that has appeared in American press.

We might recall Winston Churchill's observation that: Russians do something that they shouldn't do in the first place, then they stop doing it under pressure, but only on payment of something else to which they are not entitled.

Analogy between Soviet bases in Cuba and ours elsewhere is a false one. We shall pay dearly if we permit ourselves to fall into this trap.

We should expose this approach wherever it appears as false and dangerous. We should contrast two along following lines:

1) Our bases abroad were established in cooperation with our allies in face of threat of Soviet expansion and aggression as exemplified in Eastern Europe, in Greece and Turkey, in Iran and in Korea. No such threat exists against Cuba from her neighbors.

2) Our missile bases in such countries as Italy and Turkey followed a series of open Soviet boasts and threats, beginning in 1957. Note these allied missile base agreements came only in 1959.

3) Our base arrangements have been made in open and announced agreements with sovereign govts under universally known alliance agreements. Soviet missiles have been placed in Cuba in secret, without any public statements and without any alliance.

4) Our bases on allied territory are manned and serviced jointly with allied personnel; Soviet bases were established without knowledge of Cuban people and are manned by Soviet personnel.

5) Our bases were established abroad to redress an imbalance created by Soviet aggressiveness and threatened expansion; Soviet bases in Cuba have created a new and serious imbalance in power situation, thus imperiling world peace.

6) American bases abroad are recognized by peoples concerned as being a vital element in defense of their independence and security; Soviet bases in Cuba have increased not lessened dangers to Cuban people and were set up without their approval or even knowledge.

7) US bases have served to strengthen the sovereignty and independence of those states where they are located; Soviet bases in Cuba are a symbol of that unhappy country's subjection to alien control and domination.

8) US bases abroad were part of free world's answer to threats of continued Soviet expansion; Soviet bases in Cuba mark a new effort at such expansion.

9) If allied missile bases suddenly appeared in Bulgaria or Byelorussia, there might be a rough parallel between them and Cuban bases in Cuba. To try to make such a parallel existing allied bases in allied countries under long-standing and open arrangements is absurd.

It should be noted, and underlined, that any indication on our part that we accept this suggested analogy or that we might be considering a "trade" on this basis could have disastrous political effects in the countries concerned.

Parallel between Cuba and Berlin is even more patently false than that between overseas bases. For example: (1) we are in Berlin under valid international agreements as well as by right of wartime conquest; (2) we have no missiles there; (3) we are there to defend the independ-

ence and freedom of the Berliners; (4) it has been demonstrated repeatedly and unmistakably that we are there with enthusiastic approval of people themselves. None of these is true of Soviets in Cuba—and Soviets and world know it.

Rusk

391. Memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Ball, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Pres.—I have had this letter read to me. Should we answer that?

Ball—There is no point to answer it until we see what happens tomorrow morning. Bob McNamara says thing which they are likely to get tomorrow is a tanker and we will halt it and ask it where it is going.

Pres.—If it does not respond?

Ball—Then we stop it. There really is not a we answer here.

Pres.— sympathetic.

Ball—I don't think we should hesitate at all.

Pres.—Appeal to reasoning, but I wouldn't know whether we might give that back to him. I wouldn't want to hesitate. It seems to me that this record will be published. my two letters to him and his two to me. This is a sympathetic appeal. Imagine what you would do if you were in my position. Who have we got around here who can write a letter?

Ball—Harlan Cleveland is here and myself. We can do that.

Pres.—It wouldn't have to be too long. "As I stated in my speech, reassurances that these weapons are not being sent. That is the reason we are taking this stand, and it is a source of regret to me." This thing is supposed to come through at 2 am.

¹ Response to Khrushchev message; possible interception of tanker at sea on the morning of October 25. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

Ball—The way the situation stands is that the ship which we would stop is a tanker. We are not authorized to board or take any action if the boat refuses to stop.

Pres.—Let's assume that this tanker is not going to stop for us. We ought to have a first case a tanker or another ship, a cargo ship.

Ball—He sent all the cargo ships back and left in this situation. Unless we make an issue of the first ship, they will think in Moscow that we have chickened out.² Let me talk further with McNamara about that tonight.

Ball (con't.) If we wait two or three days, they may think we do not mean it.

Pres.—Let me talk to Bob and come back to you. If we are not going to check this one. In view of his wire, we can probably afford to be more fuzzy about our answer to U Thant.

Ball—We could hold off an answer to U Thant tonight and give it to him in the morning.

Pres.—the press will not do it.

Ball—It might we just as well to put it off until we see what will happen to the tanker in the morning.

Pres.—Then take another look at it. I wouldn't see any advantage in this tonight. Is that what Adlai wants.

Ball—I talked to Dean. I have not been able to reach Adlai.

Pres.—I will be back in a minute.

² *Pres—. . .

Ball—Adm Ricket said he thought we could stop it without having any trouble.

Pres—If we wouldn't want to have this as our first one then we should stay away from this one.

Ball—I have the impression that there isn't going to be anything else going through tomorrow w/out this tanker. Cont on p. 2

392. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Ball—Have you talked to the Pres. recently?

Bundy—Not lately. I talked to Bob just after he talked to him, and I understand this process is to give a challenge and if we get an acceptable answer, let her go.

Ball—That's right. Now the President is concerned about this.

Bundy—I'm just going over to talk to him. Can I call you back?

Ball—Let me fill you in before you go. What we tentatively talked about was this. That we might try to get Stevenson rather than giving the reply to U Thant which we had talked about.

Bundy—Yes, which we did not deliver.

Ball—Not yet anyway. To try to get Thant tonight to send a message to K saying that he is concerned that there will be a confrontation at sea in the morning or tomorrow. That this could be a situation which could escalate; that he, therefore, ask K to hold his ships away from Cuba until there is a chance for a discussion as to the modalities of the negotiation.

Bundy—Stevenson would go to Thant to do this tonight?

Ball—Yes.

Bundy—Have you suggested that to the President?

Ball—The President and I talked about this, and I told the President I would explore it with Stevenson.

Bundy—Have you done so?

Ball—Not yet. I just checked it out with Rusk, and he is agreeable.

Bundy—I think it is worth trying. On that basis however, we ought to let Bucharest alone through the night.

Ball—Oh, we would. As a matter we weren't going to do it tonight.

Bundy—No, they are planning a challenge.

Ball—At what hour?

Bundy—At 0200

Ball—Let me call Bob

¹ President's concern over challenging ship at sea; possible message for U Thant to send to Khrushchev. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

Bundy—Let's wait til you get your, I'll talk to the President and I'll call you back. The instructions at sea are to intercept and report for orders.

Ball—All right. Do you want in the meantime for me to get hold of Stevenson?

Bundy—Try Stevenson and I'll go over and talk to the Pres. and call you back.

Ball—OK.

393. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24¹

October 24, 1962

Bundy—We are arranging not to have anything fancy happening during the night. The President is drafting for discussion and consideration one more answer to K because he thinks this one is the height of hypocrisy. I talked to Tommy and you will be interested to know that his opinion is that that last paragraph signifies local counteraction. That's his curb stone reaction. It's queer if it is true that they would want a naval war, but that's what he thinks.

Ball—But that could be submarines, couldn't it?

Bundy—That's what he thinks.

Ball—submarines could be very serious it could indeed be serious and

Bundy—it could lead to trouble. Have you talked to Adlai?

Ball—No. He is in route back to his apartment; he will be calling me in another five minutes. Is the President still disposed to try that with U Thant?

Bundy—Sure, there's no reason, if U Thant will send one that is satisfactory from our point of view, it cannot do any harm.

Ball—Yes, I can't imagine him as buying it.

Bundy—If they hold the ships up, we can talk.

¹ No action planned during night of October 24–25; message to Khrushchev through U Thant. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

Ball—That's the line. I think that U Thant's idea would be that, he is concerned with great possibilities of some confrontation tomorrow that this could escalate and be very serious.

Bundy—Obviously, we can't ask U Thant to send that message if we are going to do anything tonight.

Ball—That's right. We are not going to do anything tonight.

Bundy—Right.

October 25, 1962

394. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

Stevenson—I got him out of bed. He said that he was afraid that there was no communications facilities tonight but he would call and see what he could do tonight. In any event, he would get off a message first thing in the morning, to persuade him to hold off his ships while we discuss modalities. I didn't reveal that we had the message; I said that I had news which was alarming about the possible confrontation of force tomorrow and I thought he might give his own proposal for working if he were to take this further step because his message to us has been delayed until 6 o'clock this evening and I suspected that his message about his speech to the Security Council hadn't got to Moscow yet, and I think he had better follow it up. He said he didn't understand all of this, but he said he would do it. I think if tomorrow you can let me have that material.

Ball—It's has already gone up on the wire.

Stevenson—I said can I assure Pres. Kennedy that you will send such a message, and he said yes you can assure him that I will send it but I can't assure that I'll send it tonight. I think that is all clear.

Ball—Do you have what you dictated to him.

Stevenson—I said to him: I suggested that he say: "Pending consideration of my proposal in the Security Council tonight, I would hope that you could hold off ships from Cuban waters pending determination of an acceptance which looks favorable by the US and discussion if you accept modalities of implementation" or something like that

Ball—It doesn't look favorable that we accept his proposal as made.

Stevenson—He wanted to know what our reaction was and I said that I think if we can get it on the condition that we talked about, it is favorable and he felt he had to say something to K that indicated that there was some basis here for his wiring him. Tomorrow I will talk to him as to what I think we should say. I have sent you now three alternative drafts on what we should say, and I think the Pres.

¹ Report on Stevenson's conversation with U Thant on message to Khrushchev to hold off Soviet ships for discussion of situation. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

shouldn't say it. I think I should announce it when I speak in the Security Council after we have got it all clear. That will be at 4 o'clock.

Ball—Do you think you will get from him first thing in the morning what he will send to K.

Stevenson—Yes, I think I can get it from him.

Ball—Would this be a public message to K? or private?

Stevenson—No, this would just be a personal message from him.

Ball—I see. I think that is

Stevenson—about all you can do now.

Ball—You haven't reported this to Bundy or anybody, have you?

Stevenson—I haven't reported it to anybody.

Ball—OK, fine.

395. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and McGeorge Bundy, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

Bundy said that the President wants to go along with Ball's version. He said that since we can't get any agreement on the longer version, they will go along with the short version. Bunday said that they will have to get across to Adlai—

Ball said he was talking with Cleveland and that he doesn't think we can soften it any. Ball said that we are going to have to think about getting McCloy down—Bundy agreed that Ball should ask McCloy to come down.

Bundy said that the President just came into the room and he said that he thought the first clause of paragraph 3 . . . in order to give time might mean we willing to give_____. Can't we leave that out?

Bundy and Ball agreed that the 3rd and 4th paragraphs could be put together.

¹ Response to Khrushchev message. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

396. CIA memorandum prepared for the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600
25 October 1962

FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. No change has been noted in the scope or pace of the construction at the IRBM and MRBM missile sites in Cuba. Cuban armed forces continue their alert, with military aircraft on standdown since the morning of 23 October. There are indications that known and suspected dissidents are being rounded up.

II. As of 0600 EDT at least 14 of the 22 Soviet ships which were known to be en route to Cuba had turned back. Five of the remaining eight are tankers. Two of the dry cargo ships not known to have reversed course may be carrying non-military cargo, but the BELOVODSK, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] has 12 HOUND helicopters. Changes in course appear to have been executed in midday on 23 October, before the President signed the proclamation establishing the quarantine.

III. We still see no signs of any crash procedure in measures to increase the readiness of Soviet armed forces. Bloc media are playing up Khrushchev's 24 October statement that he would consider a top-level meeting "useful."

IV. There is as yet no reaction to the turn-around of Soviet shipping, which had not become publicly apparent. Attention remains centered on neutralist efforts in the UN to find machinery for easing tension. Canada has searched a *Cubana* airliner flying from Prague to Havana. Latin American countries are beginning to offer military units for the quarantine, and there is generally little adverse reaction in the hemisphere.

¹ The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memos Series, Excom, Vol. I, Mtgs 1–5.

397. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

McNamara—They are going along famously. We got that *Bucharest*. We Hailed her, and she responded and told us her cargo, and we passed her on through, and we are shadowing her.

Ball—Teriffic.

McNamara—I am trying to go through a little strategy session, and I am listening to the various things that have happened that indicate that K is proceeding very, very cautiously, no matter what he says.

Ball—You saw this letter last night.

McNamara—I did. The letter last night, and I am checking to be perfectly sure that I interpreted this correctly in relation to that letter. The letter says our instructions to our sea captains are to proceed according to the norms of sea and not to respond to the blockade procedures. I believe I am correct in saying that the norm of the sea is for ships passing at sea to identify themselves. Soing-so, who are you? The ships respond “I am soing-so, from soing-so, going to soing-so.” It is not a norm of the sea to say what are you carrying, and the vessel to respond I am carrying POL. If I am correct, they have already deviated from the norms and responded to our quarantine. Now the question is what to do next, and this is what we are talking about.

Ball—What ships are inside.

McNamara—Nothing of any interest to you. Therefore we can’t do much by that procedure in the next few hours—24 to 48 hours. The criteria I would apply is (a), they need to be legal, (b) they need to be such that they put pressure on K, and (c) they need to be done in a way that doesn’t lose our support of our allies or neutrals.

Ball—At the President’s request last night, I got Stevenson to talk to UT about getting some kind of fast appeal, but I’m sure I don’t want to kill that this morning.

McNamara—Maybe you would want to hold it until 10 o’clock. There are a lot of things we can do here with just my three criteria and we can escalate this. My whole thought of a blockade argument is that we escalate it as we choose.

Ball—We establish it first.

¹ Report on first intercept at sea; response to Khrushchev message. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

McNamara—Right, and that stops the offensive weapons. Now what we want to do is get the weapons out. How do we do that?

Ball—I am wholly with you.

398. Memorandum for the record, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 25 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided. DEFCONS no change.

2. The following matters arose:

a. Chuck Johnson noted that the President had authorized the King Fish shot and that the current testing series is scheduled to go at least until 10 November.

b. Captain Shepard gave a short map briefing of the Soviet Bloc shipping headed for Cuba. His emphasis was on two tankers, the *Bucharest* out of Odessa and another one considerably closer to Cuba. The *Bucharest* is being tailed by one of our destroyers but there appears to be no contact with the other tanker which is closer in. The *Bucharest* has identified itself as being out of Odessa with destination Cuba. If this dope has any significance, it seems to me that it lies in the fact that today we are worrying about tankers which may be carrying jet fuel or even liquid oxygen, both of which can be used on nice defensive surface-to-air missiles or short-range fighter planes.

c. For the first time this week Bundy opened himself up to an expression of views from people around the table. There was an initial inclination to keep silent, but I opened it up by saying that we had better re-read the President's speech of Monday evening so as to be sure we do not lose sight of our primary objectives in this exercise and go harrying after a few tankers or other marginal ships just in order not to lose face with the newspapers. The Soviets, it seems to me, have already knuckled under considerably, and in case anyone is interested (as I told the group), the Legere view is that we must not go off half-

¹ Daily White House staff meeting including discussion on Soviet Bloc shipping headed for Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Group, Oct–Nov 1962.

cocked on marginal issues, but show our willingness to talk turkey in matters that do not affect the more or less “vital interests” that were initially staked out. As the staff meeting discussion proceeded, I think it is fair to say that the position summarized above was roughly the majority sensing of the group.

d. Bundy noted that three subcommittees are operating under the general aegis of the NSC Executive Committee: (1) Mr. Nitze’s Berlin–NATO Subcommittee; (2) Mr. Rostow’s “Advance Planning Subcommittee”; and (3) a “Communications Subcommittee” which Bundy identified by saying that Dr. Wiesner is the White House representative, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) the pivot, and Mr. W.H. Orrick, Jr. (Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration), the Chairman.

Legere

399. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

¹ Soviet acceptance of quarantine; procedures for boarding ships; reconnaissance flights; air blockade. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Thursday, 25 October

JCS meeting at 0900, attended by SecDef:

SecDef: I talked to the President and evidently things are going fine; the Soviets apparently have accepted our quarantine. All except one passenger, five tanker and five cargo ships have turned around; the tanker *Bucharest* identified herself when asked. What to do next? I suggest we establish the boarding precedent by boarding, say, a British ship and, immediately thereafter, board a Soviet ship, preferably one carrying offensive weapons. The only ship let through thus far is a Greek tanker.

SecDef: Do the JCS favor boarding two ships today (one non-Soviet Bloc, one Bloc) and beginning low-level surveillance today?

Gen. Burchinal (Dep CSAF, Plans & Programs): A Cubana airliner passed through Goose Bay, Labrador with aircraft spares aboard and has now reached Havana.

SecDef: I say no air blockade today. (He and CJCS then left for a White House meeting.)

CNO, some time later: We have just been authorized to board a non-Bloc ship. When we report back they will authorize boarding a Bloc ship.

CSAF, at about 1040: CJCS just called me to say they had authorized eight flights for today, including low-level reconnaissance. Also, the criteria of targets have been changed: 11–28s, MiGs, KOMARs, targets of opportunity, SAMs, surface-to-surface missiles.

CNO: New instructions have been telephoned by DepSecDef: (1) do not stop or harass the *Bucharest*, just trail it; (2) stop a non-Bloc ship today; (3) stop and board the *Grozny*.

CJCS returned from the ExComm meeting at 1200 and debriefed: Last week they were talking like the blockade would bring down Castro. Now Rusk is saying that that the blockade is only to keep out offensive weapons and if we do that we have accomplished the mission.

JCS meeting at 1400:

CJCS: I lunched with the SecDef, and he is not for pushing an air blockade. SecDef said it is OK for the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to sail from the West Coast, using cover story about “going on maneuvers.”

LGEn Wm. Blanchard (Inspector General, USAF) reported on the status of air defenses and airfields seen on his visit to Florida: Air defense is formidable and good; it wasn’t so two days ago. There are 250 fighters in Florida; HAWKS are unloading in Key West and

Homestead AFB. In Cuba there are 100 MiGs and 11 B-26s. As of last night, SAC aircraft are all out of Florida bases. (See MFR, "Summary of Presentation by LTG Blanchard to JCS on 25 October Concerning Air Force Posture in Florida")

400. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

Ball—Adlai insists on calling the President on the addition of a final paragraph, which would read as follows: "If satisfactory arrangements become effective the United States will be ready to negotiate the settlement of issue raised by the situation. We do not believe there should be insuperable difficulties in reaching a peaceful solution."

Bundy—Would you give it to Alice. I am against it myself, what do you feel?

Ball—I think we have gone as far as we can go in wanting this damn thing out.

Bundy—I couldn't agree more. Would you read it to her and I will get a direct negative from him.

¹ Additional paragraph for response to Khrushchev letter from Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

**401. Memorandum from Klein and Legere to McGeorge Bundy,
October 25¹**

October 25, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Nitze Subcommittee (October 25)

Today's meeting revealed basic organizational problems and some lack of clarity of the Subcommittee functions. Although there was a consensus that its functions had to be dovetailed with the Executive Committee, there are clear differences of outlook on operation. Some tend to see the group as an instrument for galvanizing action on projects that otherwise would not easily clear through the bureaucracy; others are just as clearly reluctant to move on anything until they have a full bureaucratic consensus. Some of this should shake down during the next few days as the problems come more clearly into focus; others probably will just continue.

On the substantive side, there were few decisions. Paul Nitze raised for consideration possible denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa to provide an umbrella for resolving the Cuban problem. Those of us who have worked with the Germans wondered about the impact of such a step on our Central European clients. Moreover, what is the *quid pro quo* from the Soviet view? Perhaps a non-diffusion approach might better serve our broader purposes. The information was volunteered that ACDA was doing something along these lines, but how this would reach the Executive Committee was not clear. In this connection too (and this occurred outside the meeting) several of us discussed the references now being made to a possible tie-in of the Cuban and the Turkish bases (e.g., Walter Lippmann this morning). And it occurred to us that disarmament might be the better vehicle for such purpose than the formula cited by Lippmann.

There was some discussion of the problems connected with a possible severing of our relations with the Soviet bloc. No conclusion was drawn. However, the intelligence community raised strong objections to the proposition, arguing that such action would destroy the important intelligence collection mechanism we now have in Eastern Europe and seriously undermine our early warning capabilities.

There was no progress on the Berlin military buildup paper. This is essentially an intra-departmental Defense problem. JCS apparently

¹ Meeting of the Nitze subcommittee on Berlin-NATO. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Germany, Berlin.

is not prepared to accept in its present form the ISA paper on the subject, arguing that more substance is needed for governmental decision-making and commitment, and before any progress can be made a clear DoD position is needed.

The paper dealing with the problem of possible Soviet inspection of Allied traffic to Berlin was approved. It is ready for Executive Committee consideration but we promised to hold it temporarily until State and Defense give us the go-ahead.

David Klein
L.J. Legere

402. Memorandum from Kitchen to Nitze, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

I urge your early attention to the attached memorandum. I fully share the concerns expressed in it and, in particular, the requirement for great diplomatic skill required in dealing with a “soft” Soviet reaction.

Jeff Kitchen

Attachment

SUBJECT

Concern over the Course and Outcome of the Cuban Crisis

I am increasingly disturbed over indications that in all of our planning for the development of the Cuban crisis we have to our peril neglected one particular contingency: that the Soviets would react mildly and with great caution. A week ago we were concerned about strangulation of West Berlin, missile firings and exchanges of cities within the US and USSR, and other drastic and dangerous possibilities. Now the danger that looms large is not exchange of cities, but exchange

¹ Enclosing memorandum from Raymond Garthoff to Rostow. Concern over the course and outcome of the Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 092 Jan—.

of bases—at the extreme, the unhinging of our whole overseas base and alliance structure. It would be a remarkable thing if the Soviets were able to make substantial gains in achieving their main objective of weakening the alliances militarily and politically simply by exhibiting caution and indecision in the face of our initial stand. I can think of nothing that would more encourage the Soviets to create new Cuban and now distant military bases and local conflicts than would a net gain from their Cuban venture.

I am, as you know, in fullest accord with the objectives so resolutely outlined in the President's address. Yet I can not escape the conclusion that unintentionally we may be moving in a direction which in the eyes of Moscow, the American people, and history could make mockery of the statement that "further steps" may be necessary; it was presumed, of course, these would be further steps forward if they were necessary to achieve the objective of the "withdrawal or elimination" of the missile bases in Cuba. But a rush to find concessions that we can offer to achieve this objective could, to change the arithmetic in Lenin's phrase, mean "one step forward, two steps backward."

Negotiation is vastly to be preferred to direct military action, so long as it can achieve our objectives. That it is sometimes necessary to brace our diplomatic stand by resort to carefully considered military measures is, of course, manifest in the quarantine action itself. There are also still available means of increasing the pressure which we can bring to bear on the other side short of direct military action, in particular, broadening the blockade or commando raids on the missile bases. But any irresolution in enforcing the present quarantine, or in accepting a "freeze" on the present situation (thus closing off all options for intensifying pressure), or premature indications that we would "trade" other bases, would weaken greatly such strength as we now have to bring to bear in negotiation.

At the time of the President's address, and perhaps still today, the Soviet leaders have probably been quite uncertain as to whether the "initial step" was in fact only the first of a "one-two punch." Their caution to date has been a result of this uncertainty. But this is a wasting asset, if indeed not already a wasted one. When they realize the other shoe is not going to drop, they are likely to be emboldened in their actions and certain to raise their price in negotiations. If we seem to display a certain fear in our own actions, Soviet fear of these actions cannot fail to be lessened.

The terms for eventual negotiation might well include some give by the United States as well as by the USSR. But unless we are very careful, the business of letting the Soviets "save face" may come to involve losing our arm. The Soviets simply will not expect the United States to be offering concessions at a time when they have brought no

counterpressure to bear on us in response to the quarantine. Any such indication (and the press is already rife with such rumors of trading off bases in Turkey, etc.) will mean to Moscow only that the United States is *not* prepared to *compel* the retraction of Soviet offensive power from the Western Hemisphere. One doesn't buy what is already his. If we concede that we must purchase the Soviet withdrawal, we undermine our right to compel it. The longer we haggle over terms, the more this is so. Moreover, the Soviets may be able to "sell" their missile bases in Cuba several times over. They can play us along on a deal exchanging Turkey for Cuba and then insist on broadening it out to include more and more United States bases—having already achieved most of their purpose simply by stimulating lack of confidence in the US alliance commitments. The missile bases in Turkey and Italy are not militarily important; this is, however, almost irrelevant. The Turks and Italians have already shown alarm at unofficial indications of possible trade-off, and this alarm will both deepen and spread out to other areas, no matter how we seek to present the case in terms of suddenly acknowledged obsolescence and of renewed efforts to provide more modern long-range missile support from other locations and by multilateral agreements. There is a real danger that some of our Allies may believe that the United States is not only excessively concerned about the military threat to itself, but also that it is prepared to sacrifice some elements of its power and of its commitment to them in order to allay a selfish concern about a base near our shores.

I believe that the United States should make very clear that our objective remains the dismantling of present offensive bases in Cuba. We should emphasize our continuing readiness to discuss broader disarmament and other arrangements; and also our willingness to permit a United Nations presence to monitor the dismantling of existing offensive bases—but without raising the quarantine before the patient is cured. Discussions in a Summit meeting or other appropriate diplomatic interchange would almost certainly have to involve broad questions such as nuclear non-diffusion. However, it seems to me that we should approach such negotiations from a position of strength rather than a feeling of weakness. If we maintain the original resolve to use whatever means are necessary, though not more than are necessary, to effect the withdrawal of Soviet striking power from Cuba, I believe that the Soviets will in fact recognize that the United States does have the high cards.

CC: G—Mr. Johnson

G/PM—Mr. Kitchen

403. Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

SOVIET STRATEGY IN UN DISCUSSIONS OF CUBA

Khrushchev's acceptance today of U Thant's bid for a two-week standoff on Cuba raises the question of Soviet strategy in UN discussions of Cuba.

Objectives. The prime Soviet objective at the UN and elsewhere is to maintain the Soviet missile bases in place in Cuba, at least for the time being. For the present the Soviets may not have given up hope of keeping them there indefinitely. But even if Moscow assumes that the Cuban base may lose its strategic value if it cannot be built up to its originally planned strength, the Soviet Union may hope that continued presence will tend to establish its legitimacy and maximize its value as a bargaining counter.

To this end the Soviets hope to generate the maximum political pressure upon the US to drop its quarantine and to inhibit further US actions which might make the Soviet position in Cuba untenable.

At the same time the Soviet Union is procrastinating in order to determine whether the US case against the Soviet missile deployment will be accepted by world public opinion or whether the communist argument that Soviet military aid is justified by the existence of US bases on foreign soil may be persuasive. The possible quid pro quo which the Soviets might be able to command in negotiations for the removal of their missiles will depend on the outcome. In addition the Soviets are waiting to see exactly how the quarantine will be implemented before determining on what counter-measures they may take.

Tactics. The Soviets will attempt to focus the attention of the UN and of the world at large upon the US actions rather than upon the Soviet missile deployment which gave rise to them. To this end Moscow has refused to admit that it has stationed Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Soviet Union will continue to attempt to create the impression that a grave threat to the peace is created by American actions while the Soviet Union and Cuba are peace loving and willing to negotiate. The Soviets will seek to promote "compromise" proposals which tend to undercut the US position.

¹ Soviet strategy in UN discussions of Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).

**404. Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy,
October 25¹**

October 25, 1962

SUBJECT

Report Number Two of the Planning Subcommittee

1. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Thursday morning, October 25, 1962. It wishes to call to the attention of the Executive Committee of the NSC the danger that our fundamental objectives, as stated by the President, may be corrupted unless we maintain momentum in our pressure on Cuba. Specifically, it is recommended that we add missile fuel to the list of prescribed items which might lead on, if necessary, to a general POL blockade should steps not be taken to eliminate the existing missiles and other offensive installations from Cuba. The political pressures mounting against us may leave us, unless we maintain momentum while we talk, with either a residual offensive military capability in Cuba, which could be beefed up by clandestine delivery of components, or in a negotiating position where assets in the Free World might have to be bargained away at the expense of our allies, to attain our Cuban objective.

2. Following is the status of planning problems referred to in Report Number One of October 24.

a. Papers touching on a political settlement are going forward to the Secretary of State.

b. The Navy is starting work on rules of engagement for a protracted war at sea; political consultation will take place through Mr. Kitchen.

c. Political consultation will take place on DOD-JCS papers concerning increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative means for taking out missiles and installations.

d. A circular telegram was dispatched by the Department of State, clarifying the doctrinal base for our position.

e. The paper on the "Cuban base problem in perspective" went forward on October 24, 1962, to the Executive Committee.

3. The following additional planning tasks were initiated:

¹ Report No. 2 of Advance Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).

a. The drafting of guidance, on a contingency basis, explaining precisely why it was necessary to force a presumably innocent Bloc vessel to stop and submit to search, should, in fact, force be required.

b. A supplementary and simplified guidance paper on the Cuban crisis, placing it in the context of other postwar reactions to Communist aggression.

c. A sharpening of contingency planning with respect to a revolt in Cuba against Castro, including the possible political and psychological role of leaflet drops and a widened use of over-flight aircraft.

d. A paper to supplement “the Cuban base problem in perspective,” focussing on the implications of Soviet moves in the past twenty-four hours.

e. An assessment of Free World reactions and pressures arising from our initiative, with recommendations on how they may be met in ways which do not obstruct and, if possible, reinforce the objectives stated in the President’s address.

405. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

Bundy—The President has now seen your exact text and he points out that the first clause of paragraph three: “In order to give the parties time” may look as if we were willing to accept a pause at this stage, which we are really not, unless we have a whole lot more in it. Can’t we just leave that out?

Ball—Sure.

Bundy—“In your statement you have made, your message makes certain suggestions, you have invited preliminary talks and I’ve been” perhaps those two paragraphs could be collapsed together.

Ball—Right.

¹ Changes in draft message to U Thant. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

406. Paper prepared by Dillon's group, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

Prepared for Secretary Dillon's group at Bundy request. For possible discussion 5:00 meeting 10/25/62.

Final Draft

Scenario for Airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

ADVANTAGES

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to U.S. and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of U.S. momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that U.S. has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-à-vis Berlin).

2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.

3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.

4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.

5. Signals clearly that U.S. not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.

6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.

7. Removes a military threat to U.S. from Cuban territory.

8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.

¹ Scenario for airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Air Strike, Cuba.

DISADVANTAGES

1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.

2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.

3. Adverse effect on U.S. image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.

4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range U.S.-Cuban relations.

5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.

PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION

1. Veto of U.S. resolution in Security Council.

2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cuba in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

ACTIONS PRIOR OR SIMULTANEOUS TO STRIKE

1. White House statement that offensive build-up is continuing, a dangerous and provocative act, which increases gravity of situation. Repeats warning for those engaged in this work.

2. Delivery of copy of White House statement to Cuban representative at UN.

3. Evacuation warning (as long as militarily feasible) to personnel in strike areas by leaflet drop. A strike plan designed to accomplish mission with minimum damage to non-military targets.

4. Inform OAS (Chairman) shortly in advance of strike.

5. Arrange for Ambassadors to notify Latin American heads of state at zero hour.

6. Inform NATO Allies and others at appropriate time.

7. Letter to K delivered at zero hour, describing action and indicating regret that continuation of work at offensive sites had forced action, limited nature of operation, our effort to limit personnel losses, and calling for immediate consultations to reduce world-wide tensions.

FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

1. Continuation of close air surveillance.
 2. Be prepared to hit SAM sites and airfields if reconnaissance planes attacked.
 3. Immediate report to Organ of Consultation (OAS) and adoption of resolution requesting Soviets to evacuate offensive forces from Cuba under international inspection.
 4. Report to UN Security Council explaining limited nature of operation and requesting immediate despatch of UN observer team to Cuba.
 5. Maintenance of blockade extended to include POL until clear evidence is available that offensive bases have been eliminated.
 6. Major Presidential address including special message to Cuban people.
 7. Appropriate leaflet drops over Cuba.
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407. Paper prepared in the Department of State, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

POLITICAL PATH

This path has several branches, both as to the forum in which negotiations are carried out, and with regard to the steps to be taken.

With respect to the forum, we are already in the UN and this could be combined with private approaches on the side. We could follow up the U Thant proposals in order to get into prompt discussion with the Soviets. This is almost essential since the Soviets will almost certainly not put forward or indicate agreement to proposals publicly made.

Another method would be to propose or have someone such as U Thant propose a direct meeting with Khrushchev. He has publicly indicated his readiness for such a meeting in his letter to Bertrand Russell and could not have been expected, at this stage, to have made proposals directly to the President for fear of a rebuff. It would be difficult, however, for him to refuse an invitation from the President. A direct meeting would have to mean the continuance of the quarantine

¹ Political path including three political actions for consideration by the Executive Committee. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Action.

and would be difficult for us unless there was progress on proposals to ensure a standstill under UN control. It would probably involve discussions over Berlin or, as a minimum, our missile base in Turkey. A prompt proposal for an agreement to a meeting with Khrushchev might defer or avoid strong Soviet reaction to our stopping one of their ships.

As a background for political action that would have any hope of success, it would be important to minimize, so far as possible, any forceful action against Soviet vessels in carrying out the quarantine.

The following political actions might be considered:

1. A proposal in some forum to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba. This might be expressed in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory contiguous or in proximity of the territory of the other.

2. An alternative approach might be to have a proposal for the UN to send teams to Cuba and Turkey to take control over the missiles there pending the outcome of negotiations. U Thant might be put up to advancing such proposals.

3. *Approach to Castro*

An approach would be made to Castro through a Latin American representative in Cuba, probably the Brazilian Ambassador, pointing out that Cuba was merely being exploited in the interests of the Soviet Union and that any of the possible paths by which the Cuban crisis can be expected to develop will result in the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction. It could be pointed out that President Kennedy has stated that only two subjects were not negotiable between the United States and Castro: military ties to the USSR and aggressive actions of any kind in Latin America.

If the Castro Government considers it has no freedom to act because of the presence of Soviet technicians, we would be prepared to undertake to deal with this problem. We would have to give some assurances, regardless of whether we intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves undertake to overthrow the regime or support others trying to do so.

408. Executive Committee record of action, October 25¹

Meeting No. 5

October 25, 1962

1. Mr. McCone presented the intelligence briefing which contained no major new information.

2. The Secretary of Defense reported on the current military situation. The Lebanese ship which was to be boarded turned back and therefore no ship so far had been boarded.

3. The Secretary of State reported on the political situation, calling attention to one suggestion, namely, the denuclearization of Latin America, which he thought would be supported by a large number of UN members. He referred to preliminary discussions which are to take place during the next two or three days between U Thant and Zorin on the one side and Stevenson and U Thant on the other. He felt that any talks could not go on very long because the missiles in Cuba were becoming operational and the IL-28s would soon be dangerous.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended, and the President approved:

- a. A low-level air reconnaissance tomorrow.
- b. Planning for a low-level reconnaissance tomorrow night which would be achieved by dropping flares to obtain photographs as well as to produce a psychological effect.
- c. Permitting the East German passenger ship *Volker Freundschaft* to enter Cuban waters.

5. Three draft analyses of the next major move were discussed in a preliminary way—a military path, a political path, and an intensified economic path.

6. The President, referring to the second message which he has just sent to U Thant, said any incident should be avoided until after we heard, probably tomorrow afternoon, whether Khrushchev had accepted or rejected U Thant's latest proposal. A decision as to whether to stop the tanker *Graznyy*, if it continues on its course toward Cuba, can be made at that time.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Military situation; political situation; military recommendations, message to U Thant. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5.

409. Memorandum for the record, October 29¹

October 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Mission to London

1. In the paragraphs below, there is a summary of my substantive activities while in London; at Annex A, a chronology of my activities from the time I arrived in the UK just before midnight, Sunday, 21 October, to my departure on Thursday morning, 25 October; and at Annex B, an account of the circumstances surrounding the release of the air photos on Cuba.

The Prime Minister

2. On Monday, 22 October, I accompanied the Ambassador to the Admiralty to assist him in briefing Mr. Macmillan on the situation in Cuba. The letter from the President had been sent to the Prime Minister's office earlier in the day. We delayed our session with the Prime Minister for half an hour, hoping to bring with us an advance draft of the President's message.

3. The Prime Minister was alone except for his Private Secretary. It was evident that the Prime Minister had some advance general knowledge of the developing situation in Cuba (as indeed he should have since we had briefed various members of the British intelligence community several days before in Washington). However, Mr. Macmillan obviously had no idea of the extent or precise nature of Soviet offensive capabilities in Cuba. His first reaction, which he addressed more to himself than to the Ambassador, was to the effect that the British people, who had been living in the shadow of annihilation for the past many years, had somehow been able to live more or less normal lives and he felt that the Americans, now confronted with a similar situation would, after the initial shock, make a similar adjustment. "Life goes on somehow." He was obviously concerned that this observation might be misinterpreted, and went to considerable length to explain to the Ambassador that this was more of a philosophical commentary on human nature rather than any indication on his part that he was not sympathetic with the US position or shocked at the news.

¹ Summary of Cooper's activities during his mission to London, October 21–25. No classification marking. 7 pp. CIA Files: Job 84–00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A, 29 May 72.

4. After my recitation of the present Soviet offensive strength in Cuba, Mr. Macmillan said that, if the President were convinced that a meaningful offensive capability were present, "that was good enough for him." He did not spend more than a few seconds on the photographs. Although the Prime Minister did not develop this theme in my presence in detail, he did indicate that he felt that a blockade would be difficult to enforce and that the US would have problems in getting solid UN support. He also ruminated about whether it would not have been better to have confronted Khrushchev privately with our evidence and given him a private ultimatum.

5. Lord Home then joined the Prime Minister and the Ambassador for a discussion of policy matters and I was excused. I was quickly followed by the Private Secretary who stressed the necessity for making our evidence as convincing as possible to the British public. He implied that the government would have a difficult time in giving us strong support, unless Parliament and the British people were convinced that the threat referred to by the President was genuine and unmistakeable.

6. My further dealings with the Prime Minister and his office were confined to working on his speech to the House of Commons (delivered on Thursday, 25 October). On Wednesday afternoon, I edited part of the speech with the objective of making it as strong as possible in terms of evidence of a buildup, while keeping it within the bounds of information that could be released at that time. Just prior to leaving London, I worked on a revised draft with the Prime Minister's Private Secretary updating the information as of Thursday morning.

Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Brown

7. On Tuesday evening, I briefed Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Brown. Also present at this session were Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Al Irving (First Secretary of the Embassy), Mr. Roosevelt [*less than 1 line not declassified*], and myself. I spent approximately one and a half hours with Messrs. Gaitskell and Brown. Ambassador Bruce left for another appointment shortly after Mr. Gaitskell arrived. After my briefing and a discussion of the photographs, Mr. Gaitskell confessed that he had previously told Brown the President was confusing the issue of the Soviet buildup by making it appear that surface-to-air missiles were offensive weapons. He admitted that these suspicions were ill-founded and that the Soviets had clearly built up a significant medium and intermediate range missile capability in Cuba. He was visibly shaken. He made much of the analogy between Cuba and Turkey and brushed aside most of the standard arguments about the difference between the two. However, he seemed much impressed with the fact that the Cuban missiles were outside the BMBWS system. He felt that this did, in fact, represent a change in the *status quo* and in the "balance of

terror" equation. Brown pressed hard on whether we had more or less missiles in Turkey than the Russians had in Cuba and whether the Russians could get early warning from our Turkish bases. I confessed ignorance on both of these questions, but promised that I would attempt to get the answers prior to the debate in Commons. Brown indicated, and Gaitskell assented, that if we did, indeed, have fewer missiles than the Russians, and if the Russians could get early warning, the argument about the equivalence of the Turkish and Cuban bases would be weakened.

8. Gaitskell said that he had been with the Prime Minister just prior to our discussion and that the Prime Minister expressed annoyance about the lack of advance knowledge of US actions. I pointed out to Gaitskell in fairly strong terms that there were two aspects to the question of advanced knowledge: one was the developing situation in Cuba and the other was US intentions with respect to Cuba. In connection with the former, I told Gaitskell that we had occasion to discuss Cuba with several important people in the British intelligence community who happened to be in Washington during the week of 15 October, and that several of them had been given a formal briefing on Friday, 19 October. We could only assume that they notified their government of the developing situation in Cuba. With respect to US intentions, I noted that we had hoped to get an advanced copy of the President's statement to the Prime Minister 12 hours before the broadcast, but that this was not possible because the President himself had not decided on the precise language of his statement until fairly late in the day. As a consequence, the Prime Minister had between eight and nine hours advance notice. This was unfortunate, but in the nature of the circumstances, was all that could have been done.

9. I had some time alone with George Brown after this session. Brown said that he was pleased that I "gave Gaitskell hell," saying that Gaitskell was being most difficult now that he "had the taste of office in his mouth." He said he had been thinking of resigning from the shadow cabinet because he was in such disagreement with Gaitskell. He implied that one had to take Gaitskell's reports of his conversations with Macmillan with a considerable amount of skepticism since Macmillan and Gaitskell had gotten to the point where they didn't trust each other. However, he said, Gaitskell's statement in Commons would be mild.

10. I had further contacts with Brown primarily in connection with the debate on Thursday afternoon. I passed on the information I received from Washington with respect to US missiles in Turkey and I also informed Gaitskell, through Brown, that the Prime Minister would, in his own address to Commons, indicate a more substantial Soviet offensive capability in Cuba than I had discussed in my briefing

on Tuesday night. I was concerned that Gaitskell would regard the Prime Minister's statement as an exaggeration of the missile threat and was anxious to emphasize that the Prime Minister was speaking from more recent evidence that I had at my disposal a day before.

The British Intelligence Community

11. After returning on Monday afternoon from our session with the Prime Minister, Ambassador Bruce and I agreed that it would be wise to brief the JIC as early as possible. Mr. Roosevelt got in touch with Sir Hugh Stephenson, Chairman of the British JIC, and indicated that we would be prepared to brief the JIC either that afternoon or 10 o'clock the following morning. Sir Hugh felt that it would be better to have a special meeting of the JIC after the President's speech rather than before, and suggested 10 o'clock on Tuesday morning. We then got in touch with Sir Dick White, Head of the MI-6 and indicated that, since we had already given Sir Hugh and General Strong (Director of the JIB) a briefing in Washington, he might wish to have a similar briefing in advance of the JIC meeting the following day. Sir Dick requested that we provide him with a briefing that afternoon and Mr. Roosevelt and I met with him at 5 o'clock. Sir Dick had obviously been given the sense of the briefing that had been provided the British in Washington on the previous Friday (Mr. Oldfield, MI-6 representative in Washington had been present at the Friday briefing). We spent an hour with Sir Dick and he was clearly impressed with the evidence and gravely concerned about the implications of the buildup as it reflected upon over-all Soviet intentions. He felt that the Soviet motivation must have been primarily to provide the President with a *fait accompli* some time in late November at which time Khrushchev hoped to come to some definitive settlement of the Berlin question and probably of the question of foreign bases generally.

12. Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Graham, and I met with the JIS at 10 o'clock on Tuesday, 23 October. There was no evident skepticism of the validity of our evidence, but it was clear that the Air Ministry was anxious to get the photo take for analysis by their own PI's (a team of Air Ministry officers was provided an opportunity for closer examination of the photos later in the afternoon). There was, naturally, considerable speculation as to Soviet motives. To the extent that there was any consensus in the JIC, it was very much along the line propounded by Sir Dick the previous evening and recorded above.

13. Following the JIC meeting, I returned to the Embassy and briefed key members of the Embassy staff including the Military Attachés. I then joined Stephenson and White for lunch. At this time they indicated that the Prime Minister had had a Cabinet meeting and that Lord Home would make a major speech that evening (Tuesday)

at which time Lord Home would indicate strong support of the US position and condemnation of the Soviet Union. Much of the discussion at lunch was devoted to Soviet reactions to the US action. Both Stephenson and White felt that a blockade of Berlin (or at least a blockade of US access to Berlin) was a likely form of Soviet retaliation. Lunch was a most hasty affair (33 minutes from pink gin to port), and I got the impression that there was to be an emergency JIC meeting that afternoon.

Sir Burke Trend

14. On Wednesday evening I met with Sir Burke with whom I spent about an hour. (Sir Burke is presently Second Secretary of Treasury and has among his responsibilities the funding of the British intelligence community. On 1 January 1963, he will replace Sir Norman Brook as Secretary to the Cabinet.) Sir Burke was in Washington during the week of 15 October and had heard the briefing provided for certain members of the British Intelligence community on Friday, 19 October.

15. Most of my discussion with Sir Burke was devoted to a description of my activities in London, an updating of his information on Cuba, and a discussion of Soviet motivations. With respect to the latter, Trend agreed wholeheartedly with the theory first advanced by Dick White and subsequently developed in the JIC, that Khrushchev had been hoping to present the President with a *fait accompli* so as to obtain leverage in discussions with respect to Berlin, bases, and disarmament.

16. Because of Sir Burke's present and future position in HMG, I took great pains to discuss the question of advance warning and consultation. Sir Burke appeared to be convinced that HMG had received as much advance knowledge as was feasible under the circumstances. He expressed satisfaction with the fact that the Agency had sent a representative to London to brief the Prime Minister and the JIC. He also suggested that I return to the UK for an early follow-up session.

The Press

17. Because of the adverse or skeptical press reaction to US claims that the USSR had offensive missile bases in Cuba, the Ambassador and the Public Affairs Officer were anxious to have a press briefing as early as possible on Tuesday. At 5:00 p.m., Tuesday, a press conference was held for representatives of all the dailies, BBC, and ITV. The conference was chaired by Evans, the [illegible in the original], and attended by Minister Jones and myself. After indicating the ground rules (backgrounder, no attribution, etc.), Mr. Evans briefly described the situation in Cuba and indicated that I, a Department of Defense consultant, would show the photographs and explain some of the background of the buildup. I did this, guided by the instructions I had

received from Washington. The questions which followed were friendly and I had the feeling after the conference was over (it lasted about an hour) that the press representatives were genuinely convinced of the US case. I released the photographs, without the identification of their precise locations, to the press. (A fuller description of the circumstances of the release of the photographs is attached at Annex.)

18. Later Tuesday evening both the BBC and ITV had major programs dealing with the Cuban crisis. The BBC broadcast the Foreign Minister's speech and documented his remarks by the use of the photographs which I had supplied to the BBC.

Chester L. Cooper

410. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Cleveland, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

Ball—Since the Security Council is not going to be meeting tomorrow, what are the chances of your coming down in the morning? I think it would be terribly useful to us if we could get a chance to talk some of these things out.

Stevenson—I've got this problem. We had the Latin Americans all summoned for 10 o'clock to explain to them what we are doing and why and what is now involved so we will be going in the same direction. That is on inspection of the ships and also on inspection of base construction. The next thing is at 11:30, U Thant has sent for me. He is going to start this business by taking all three of us—Cuba, Russia and us—separately and each one lay down his conditions so that I suppose I could, I rather think I should be here in the morning and then maybe I could, I don't know what to say. It is an awful bad time to go.

Ball—I think it is essential that we all get on the same wave length right now. I think if we would have a chance to talk these things out we could save a lot of problems in the course of the dialogue.

Stevenson—I think I really, now that we have said that we will meet probably, I think I am pretty well committed to go over there to

¹ Request that Stevenson come to Washington for discussions with the President and Rusk. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

see U Thant. Now, Maybe I could ask Yost to do that and we could lay out conditions in the morning, and then he will make the first contact. I don't think U Thant will like it very well.

Ball—Except you could explain to U Thant; you are coming down to see the President and the Secretary.

Stevenson—Do you think I could be back late tomorrow afternoon.

H. Cleveland—It seems to me. By some time later tonight we are going to have a draft of what amounts to your instructions for these talks with U Thant. I think it would be very useful if while they are still in flux and before they go to the President, you could participate in the process.

Stevenson—Would that be our first presentation to U Thant? Because he has asked me to come in tomorrow morning at 11:30.

Ball—If you could put that off until the end of the afternoon and come down and spend part of the day here, I have a feeling then you could speak with a lot more

Stevenson—Let me call him and see if I could do that. I see the advantage in coming down there. I don't want to act as having been the one who has been demanding speed to look as though I am now casual about it.

Ball—I think that's right. On the other hand, if you could tell him that you would be able to speak with him with complete authority having checked with the President.

Stevenson—I suppose I could be back by

Ball—We will get you a plane if necessary.

Stevenson—I could get back by 4:30, say

Ball—Sure. We can get you a plane if you want.

Stevenson—I could tell him that I could probably be in to see him by 4:00.

Ball—Sure.

Stevenson—All right, I will plan to do that, meanwhile I will come down on the, I will get the 8:30 and have Charlie go see him at 11:30 to find out what it is he wants and explain that I am in Washington and that I'll be back at 4:00.

Ball—Good.

411. Memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Ball, October 25¹

October 25, 1962

Ball—I wanted to tell you that I talked to Adlai at some length tonight and I've asked him to come down first thing in the morning, because I really think we've got to get in the same wave length.

Pres.—I think that is right. He is supposed to see U Thant at 11:00 isn't he?

Ball—Well, but he's going to put that off until 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

Pres.—Well, that's pretty late, isn't it, if we are going to do anything about any of these ships.

Ball—The only thing is that I'm very much, what U Thant has asked him to come in to do is something different which is to outline what he wants to do on the whole negotiations and I don't think that should be done until we have had a chance to talk to him.

Pres.—All right, fine. What time will he be here.

Ball—He's going to take an 8:30 plane. I thought I might bring him over for the 10 o'clock meeting.

Pres.—OK. Fine.

Ball—I'm talking to Jack McCloy right now and we are going over this whole thing and we are getting up some written instructions tonight.

Pres.—OK, good, fine.

¹ Report on Stevenson's planned trip to Washington. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

October 26, 1962

412. Supplement 6 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis is placed on the READINESS status, construction pace and any significant changes at the offensive missile sites in Cuba. This report is based primarily on preliminary analysis of the 25 October low-altitude photography, portions of which arrived during the preparation of this report (see Figure 1).

SUMMARY

1. The 25 October photography of four MRBM sites shows continued rapid construction activity at each site. This activity apparently continues to be directed toward achieving a full operational capability as soon as possible. Camouflage and canvas covering of critical equipment is also continuing. As yet there is *no* evidence indicating any intention to move or dismantle these sites.

2. There is one change in the estimated dates of operational capability. San Cristobal MRBM Site 2 is estimated to achieve a full operational capability on 26 October instead of 25 October, probably as a result of the heavy rain that has recently hit this site (see Figure 2).

3. No additional missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1).

4. No new missile sites have been identified, although continued analysis of previous photography has revealed some road improvement activity in the Remedios area which is considered indicative of plans for the second IRBM site estimated for this area.

5. The three Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic missile carriers continue their eastward course towards the USSR.

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).

413. Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee,
October 26¹

October 26, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. Surveillance of 25 October shows that the construction of IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba is proceeding largely on schedule; now level photography confirms that the MRBM bases will use the 1,020-nautical-mile SS-4 missile. No additional sites, launchers or missiles have been located, but there is road construction around Remedios which suggests the fourth IRBM site we have been expecting there. We estimate that it would cost the USSR more than twice as much and take considerably longer to add to its ICBM strike capability from the USSR as great an increment as the potential salvo from Cuban launching sites.

II. Only two Soviet freighters—and five tankers, one of them already past the quarantine line—still are headed for Cuba. The BELOVODSK, with twelve MI-4 helicopters, is in the North Atlantic; the PUGACHEV appears to have slowed or stopped several days west of the Panama Canal. A total of 16 dry cargo ships now are carried as having turned back toward the USSR on 23 October.

Two Soviet civil air flights are scheduled for Havana with passengers; cargo, if any, is not known. One may be turned back [*less than 1 line not declassified*] today. A TU-114 is scheduled [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to reach Havana 1 November.

III. There are further indications that some Soviet and satellite elements, particularly air and ground elements in Eastern Europe and European Russia, are on an alert or readiness status. No major deployments have been detected, however, [*1 line not declassified*]. There is some evidence that additional tactical aircraft have been placed on five-minute alert in East Germany, where two areas along the West German border have been closed off for exercises.

Moscow highlights Khrushchev's acceptance of U Thant's appeal in a bid to start US-Soviet negotiations. Peiping, however, is irritated that the Soviet response to US action is not stronger. The Communists still deny there are any offensive weapons in Cuba.

¹ The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10.

IV. There is no major change or significant new development in non-bloc reaction to the crisis. Most of the OAS nations have offered to participate in some form in the quarantine, and NATO members have agreed with minor reservations to deny landing and overflight rights to Soviet planes bound for Cuba.

414. Memorandum for the record, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 26 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided over a very brief meeting. DEFCONS no change.

2. The following matters arose:

a. Mr. Bundy, who was very much preoccupied with events and anxious to get away, spoke very seriously on the matter of security in general and talking to the press in particular. He said he knows that there was a lot of information possessed by a lot of people who could leak stuff to the press, but that because of the nature of some of the press stories in the last day or so, he is convinced that some people in uniform have been talking to the press. I dare say this will come up at the Executive Committee meeting this morning, and what it must mean is that there are certain naval details concerning actual and potential interception, etc., which he feels must have come from uniformed people. I am unable to evaluate this judgment of Mr. Bundy's.

b. There was a very brief discussion of the boarding of the *Marucla*, to include some expression of regret that it had to be a Lebanese ship, even though it was under Soviet charter.

c. Pierre Salinger entered the meeting at this point, and the subject became the telegram from Lord Russell to Higher Authority. It appears that Salinger lost or misplaced the telegram, and Bundy said he thought that was a very excellent "ploy". Anyhow, Lord Russell has now been gracious enough to repeat his telegram and old Pierre wanted to know what to do and say. The inclination all around the table, from Bundy

¹ Daily White House staff meeting including discussion on press leaks, boarding of the *Marucla*, telegram from Lord Russell to the President. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct–Nov 1962.

on down, was not to answer Lord Russell at all, or at least confine any answer to a sort of courteous acknowledgment of receipt. Anyhow, for the immediate future, meaning today, Salinger is going to be able to say to the press that, since the telegram has only now been received, it is "being evaluated and studied", etc.

3. Everyone can sleep soundly tonight; Legere has the Bundy staff duty.

Legere

415. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Friday, 26 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

CJCS debriefs on White House meeting the previous evening: There is enthusiasm for round-the-clock reconnaissance to find out if work on the sites is going on at night.

¹ CJCS debrief on meeting at the White House the previous evening; blockade issues; air reconnaissance; MRBMs. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

CNO: We are getting ready for the *Grozny* tomorrow. Right now she is lying dead in the water; the ship is supposed to have missile fuel.

CJCS: The SecDef is anxious to act on grabbing a Russian ship; State would be happy not to.

JCS instruct CINCLANT to abandon OPLAN 314 and concentrate on OPLAN 316.

JCS meeting at 1400:

CJCS debriefs on White House meeting: No air reconnaissance tonight. It was decided not to add POL to the quarantine list. They feel we are off to a very good start. The White House's present concept is to carry out a limited attack upon six missile sites and the II-28s, the objective being the lowest level of force at the lowest possible price.

CM-55-62 lists four concepts for JCS consideration and calculation about sorties required:

I: Limited attack above, favored by SecDef.

II: Destroy or neutralize all MRBMs, favored by SecTreasury.

III: Render all SAM sites inoperable, suggested by CJCS.

IV: Attack all offensive weapons, the JCS recommendation.

416. Memorandum for the file, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

SUBJECT

Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee, 26 October, 1962 10:00 A.M.

IN ATTENDANCE

All members plus Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy

McCone gave an intelligence briefing which included reading the Watch Committee report of 10/26, distributing and highlighting an Intelligence Agency Memorandum of 10/26, copy of which was distributed; reviewing summary conclusions of GMAIC, JAEIC, NPIC Supplement #6; summarizing Miskovsky's report on the prisoner exchange (OGC 62-2597); summarized CIA report on non-Bloc ships enroute to

¹ Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee including intelligence briefings and discussion of operational problems. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.

Cuba 10/26; and pointed out that non-Bloc ships could quite possibly carry Soviet arms and they would be just as secure as Soviet or Bloc ships if engaged on bare-boat charter; reviewed briefly Cuban internal reaction to the U.S. quarantine as contained in report of 10/26.

McCone then posed two operational problems. One, the CIA plan to have ten teams go into Cuba by submarine to gather intelligence on missile bases and other points of interest. McCone stated that CIA was prepared to use its assets to support MONGOOSE operations under Lansdale's direction; that the objective was to take Cuba from Castro and turn it over to the Cuban people or alternatively to secure intelligence in support of possible military activities and, in this instance, the requirement should be established by SecDef and JCS.

McCone stated there was an organizational problem with Lansdale under current conditions and a meeting had been called for this afternoon to resolve this problem and to establish a course of action on the Lansdale MONGOOSE organization. The President stated that he felt the Lansdale organization should be used and suggested it might serve as a Subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee.

McCone also advised the President that plan for political organization of Cuba in event of an invasion was under study and would be considered at the 2:30 meeting.

There followed an extended discussion of operational matters, details of which are covered in the attached notes.

McCone brought up the problem of the USS OXFORD as covered by Blake memorandum of October 25th, Serial N 1623. It was decided that the location and the security of the OXFORD should be part of the responsibility of the blockade operation and therefore should be considered by Admiral Anderson and his staff.

NOTE: In this connection, I wish NSA to keep me currently informed as to whether the OXFORD is being used to maximum advantage for intelligence purposes and is properly protected.

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment to original:

DCI's notes—3 small sheets on White House note paper

417. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 26¹

Meeting No. 6

October 26, 1962

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action,
October 26, 1962, 10:00 AM

1. Mr. McCone presented the intelligence briefing, including the current status of Soviet air readiness.

2. The President raised several questions about other planning for Cuba and directed that existing groups be tied together to undertake integrated planning in these matters.

3. Mr. Bundy reported that three subcommittee are at work—one on Berlin, one on forward plans, and a third on worldwide communications problems. He called attention to the civil defense problem and obtained agreement that no crash program would be undertaken now, although preliminary measures would be initiated. Referring to the problem of sensitive information appearing in the press, he urged that the utmost care be taken to keep secret all discussion of future measures.

4. The Secretary of Defense reported on the status of the quarantine. It was agreed that the Defense Department would release information on the boarding of the *Marucla*. Day reconnaissance was authorized, and a decision to carry out night reconnaissance measures over Cuba was deferred.

5. There followed a preliminary discussion of the next steps to increase the pressure on the Cubans and Russians and the relation of these steps to the talks between Ambassador Stevenson and U Thant.

6. Secretary Rusk discussed political measures, including the 24–48 hour Stevenson/U Thant negotiations, an atom-free zone in Latin America, and the proposed approach to Castro.

7. Ambassador Stevenson discussed the immediate negotiation with U Thant, as well as the longer talks which would follow if agreement could be reached. Instructions to Ambassador Stevenson are to be worked out during the day, under the Secretary of State.

8. The President asked that a statement be prepared for issuance by a White House spokesman today announcing that missile development work is continuing in Cuba and recalling the President's insistence that such work cease.

¹ Planning for Cuba, status of quarantine, political measures, negotiation with U Thant. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. I, Meetings 1–6.

9. Approval was given to the preparation of leaflets for dropping in Cuba—and the use of the best possible reconnaissance photographs was authorized.

McGeorge Bundy

418. Rough notes of Rostow committee meeting, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

—A. Rostow outlined three courses of US action, to be pursued concurrently.

1. The political line. This begins with the latest version of the U Thant proposal and includes the Brazilian resolution on a nuclear-free zone and a possible summit. The objective is to get the missiles out, to give up nothing for it, but to provide the Soviets with such face-savers as we can. Within Rostow's purview, Henry Owen is chief planning officer on this.

2. The military line. This is a series of actions leading up to an air strike, which should in the meantime be ready on an emergency basis. A further elaboration is needed of an Executive Committee paper which states the pros and cons of a strike plus the political pre-conditions for undertaking it. Jeff Kitchen is responsible for this scenario, will work with DOD, and will draw on today's ISA paper as a source of suggested intermediate steps.

3. The economic line. This is based upon a POL embargo. Rostow believes that existing estimates underrate the economic effects of this. He lays more stress, however, on the political effects of this move as demonstrating our determination and setting a terminus for the regime which will influence the immediate and continuing estimates of Castroites and the Soviets. Thus this line is designed to crack Cuba politically from within. Bob Hurwitch is in charge.

—B. "Scenarios" on all these lines are to be prepared today and thereafter, perhaps tomorrow, a unified scenario will be done. The common elements or guiding principles governing all three courses are: a focus on the existing missiles as the issue; a steady increase of pressures; a political position which offers the Soviets not concessions

¹ Three courses of U.S. action—political, military, and economic—to pursue concurrently. Top Secret. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.

but some face-saving device, and the failure of which would justify unilateral action.

—C. Hurwitch has an additional task: to head a continuing inter-agency assessment of stability in Cuba. This is to include representatives of the DD/P and DD/I and is to have completed by c.o.b. today an assessment of the situation in Cuba in the light of events of this week and recommendations for the exploitation of vulnerabilities. INR and USIA are to participate.

—D. CIA was asked to prepare a short statement on the ability of the Cubans to operate the Soviet missiles, either conventional or nuclear, if they overwhelmed Soviet guards. I have passed this on to OSI (through Gail Stringham) with instructions to send replies directly to Rostow and Henry Rowen.

John Whitman

419. Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

SUBJECT

Khrushchev's Conversation with Mr. W. E. Knox, President Westinghouse Electrical International, Moscow, October 24

Following are the Khrushchev remarks relating to Cuba made to Mr. Knox at the above conversation according to Mr. Knox's report:

1. Khrushchev was loath to think that what occurred on October 22 was done for electoral reasons. It appeared to stem from hysteria. The President was a very young man; in fact Khrushchev's own son was older. Khrushchev had had his differences with Eisenhower but was confident that Eisenhower would have done things differently.

2. Except in time of war, a blockade is illegal. If the US stopped and searched Soviet ships, this would be piracy.

3. Khrushchev repeated several times that Soviet ships were unarmed, that some may turn around and that some would be stopped,

¹ Khrushchev's conversation with W.E. Knox, President of Westinghouse Electrical International, in Moscow on October 24. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, General, Vol. VI(A), 10/26–27/62.

but sooner or later the Soviet Union would send its submarines to sink the ships that were stopping the Soviet ships.

4. The United States is now unable to take over Cuba.

5. To Mr. Knox's comment that the President was infuriated because he had been assured that the Soviet Union would not send offensive weapons to Cuba and found that he had been lied to, Khrushchev replied with a half hour discussion on the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. The US said that its Turkish bases were defensive but what was the range of the missiles there.

6. Khrushchev then stated specifically that the Soviet Union had no anti-aircraft missile in Cuba as well as ballistic missiles with both conventional and nuclear warheads. The Cubans were too temperamental to turn over these weapons to them; for this reason all sophisticated military equipment (sic) were under direct, 100 per cent Soviet control. They would never be fired except in defense of Cuba and then only on the personal instructions from Khrushchev as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Khrushchev added that if the United States did not believe this it should attack Cuba and it would find out the answer. Guantanamo would disappear the first day.

7. Khrushchev would like to talk with the President. He had planned to attend the United Nations this fall, but the United Nations is a place for arguing, not a place for negotiating. He would be delighted to visit the President or for the President to visit him or a rendezvous at sea or anywhere else. A summit was desirable and it should not be a circus.

8. What occurred on October 22 was particularly disappointing because Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko had practically agreed on the nuclear test problem, on the Polish-German and Czech-German frontier, and on non-dissemination of hostile propaganda in both East and West Berlin.

9. Khrushchev told his familiar story about a man who had learned to get along with a smelly goat even though he did not like the goat. The Soviet Union had its goats in Italy, Greece, etc. and was living with them. The US now had its goat in Cuba.

10. Khrushchev stated that he had been making an effort to get China and India together and had persuaded Chou En-Lai to write to Nehru a proposal for a 20-mile pull back of both sides and for negotiations.

Participants in the conversation in which Mr. Knox gave the above report were: Mr. Richard H. Davis, EUR, Mr. John Guthrie, SOV, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], CIA, and Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, INR.

Mr. Knox is scheduled to see Mr. McGhee at 3:30 this afternoon.

420. Memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

McGB:

Forward Planning Thoughts

1. While intelligence consensus is that Soviets will try and hold on to Cuban bases at least for bargaining purposes, let's keep an eye on the possibility Soviets will secretly remove missiles, even dumping them in sea. We've discussed this among planners and it would be hard to do (especially removing traces of sites), but worth a word to intelligence people.

2. "Planning" level remains obsessed with importance of keeping up momentum, because the more time passes the better for Soviets and the more other pressures on us mount.

3. Therefore WWR group most worried lest U Thant appeal lead to protracted parleying in which steam goes out of US initiative, and it become much harder for us to escalate again if necessary. Unanimous consensus is Soviets playing for time in this sense.

4. By same token blockade options (WWR now enamored of POL cut-off), involve real timing problems. Can we reasonably expect to sustain them over indefinite period (say at least 30–90 days) against rising pressures and possible Soviet countermoves.

RWK

¹ Forward planning thoughts on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, vol. II.

421. Memorandum from Komer to Rostow, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

In our forward planning, let's face up to the question of what to do about *Cuba itself*, as opposed to Cuban MRBMs.

Of course, one of our objectives in this crisis is to dispose of Castro if we can. But we may have to (or decide to) settle for a lot less. Implicit in the President's speech, and in our crisis diplomacy as it develops, is the idea that our target is the missile threat, not Cuba itself.

This makes propaganda sense, especially as the Soviets are making every effort to portray the issue as the US vs. Cuba, and a lot of world opinion has reacted the same way. In short, we look better abroad if we continue our present line that bases, not Cuba, are the target.

On the other hand, a solution which left Castro firmly in control could be bad from a domestic political point of view, unless covered by other, far larger successes. Indeed, certain solutions, via either negotiation or pressure, might entail in effect our guaranteeing the Castro regime, and giving up Guantanamo. This might happen, for example, if we struck a deal with Castro to boot out Soviets.

Certain other courses (i.e. invasion or insurgency), would solve this problem while creating others in its place. Even successful POL blockade, harassment, air strike could so weaken Castro as to lead to internal revolt, either during the crisis or subsequently.

Where I end up is that we should clearly sort out our objectives and the prices we are willing to pay for them. Obviously, best course would be to leave things fuzzy, but this too entails a cost. We may want, in order to justify greatly intensified pressures on Cuba, to proclaim certain "war aims" which would in effect guarantee Castro if he submitted. We could do so in expectation that even so he would be so weakened as to be ripe for internal revolt. At any rate let's look carefully not just at what we'd like but what we can afford to pay.

R.W. Komer

CC: McGB
Carl Kaysen
Henry Ramsey

¹ Forward planning on Cuba vs. Cuban MRBMs. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, vol. II.

**422. Memorandum from Kitchen to U. Alexis Johnson,
October 26¹**

October 26, 1962

SUBJECT

The Memorandum on Negotiation

The attached memorandum on "Negotiation" is submitted by the Rostow group. We believe that it makes several excellent points, and is in general a useful guide. However, there are two related points in it which we think have grave disadvantages which far outweigh the possible advantages.

Paragraph 5(b) on page 3 proposes that we should seek an "immediate" Allied decision to set up a NATO Southern Command multilateral seaborne force. In conjunction with this move, we would then urge the Turkish and Italian governments to place on the record their intent to phase out the Jupiter IRBMs.

Similarly, in paragraph 6(a) (ii), it is proposed that the US and USSR declare their intent not to facilitate procurement of MRBMs for land deployment in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This would appear to be of doubtful desirability in view of the fact that the Soviets have stationed no such weapons in the European Satellites, and would gain no advantage from doing so. On the other hand, while this might be used to strengthen NATO interests in a multilateral seaborne force, it might also be considered by some NATO powers as an unnecessary gesture limiting the future freedom of action of NATO. An agreement on such joint declarations might be an acceptable US concession as part of a broader US-USSR package agreement, but does not appear to be desirable in and of itself.

The chief difficulty that we see with both of these proposals is that they will stir up alarm and concern on the part of our Allies, probably without offering any compensatory inducement to the Soviet Union insofar as the Cuban missiles are concerned.

They would both violate the valid and important principle stated in paragraph 3(b) on page 2 of this very paper: "It is essential to avoid any implication that we are trading off pre-crisis allied or US interests to secure removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba. Failure on either of these fronts could undermine the alliance."

¹ Rostow subcommittee memorandum on negotiation. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Negotiations.

There is one other point in this paper to which we should like to draw your attention. On page 3, paragraph 5(a), it is suggested that: "assuming that negotiations take place before the Cuban issue is settled, we should make clear that, if negotiations do not succeed, we will take early action to remove Soviet offensive weapons." We believe that this would be a desirable and significant step.

Ambassador Thompson shares our concern, and has told me that he intends to speak out against any kind of Turkish trade-off deal, including one transparently masked as a step toward a multilateral force. At the Rostow committee meeting which discussed this paper, Bill Tyler also expressed reservations on this point and NEA was very strong on the adverse reactions to be expected from the Turks. Ray Garthoff, who attended the meeting for G/PM, noted that the Turkish view (if not completely adverse) might be that a multilateral seaborne force would be a fine addition to NATO, while strenuously objecting still to any dismantlement of the Jupiters in Turkey.

This paper has gone from S/S to S, and will probably be acted on by the Secretary this morning. You may, therefore, want to note your comments to him at the earliest opportunity.

I should like to add one more comment on the proposal for US and USSR declarations against land deployment of MRBMs in Europe. The proposal as framed allows unlimited deployment of MRBMs in the USSR and the US, but this is a specious balancing since MRBMs in the US are obviously of no use, while the several hundred in the western USSR pose the major threat to western Europe. I believe that there would have to be strong compensatory advantages in any arms control arrangement that would include such a measure in order to offset the disadvantages of it.

423. Telegram 936 from Rome, October 26¹

Rome, October 26, 1962

Eyes Only Secretary and Ambassadors Finletter and Hare. Reference: Deptel Eyes Only 865.

(1) Removal Jupiters from Italy would probably be manageable but we should consult GOI in early stages if it seems likely that they

¹ Italian Government position on withdrawal of Jupiter missile installations from Italy. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter—Cuba.

might form part of negotiated settlement. I would strongly recommend we do this before making final affirmative decision in our own minds, so as give us more accurate basis for estimating consequences in Italy of action, and for assessing means for best accomplishing objective in harmony with Italians.

(2) Public awareness of Jupiter installation in Italy is, considering all circumstances, minimal. Even Italian Communists have thus far given installation relatively light attention. Deliberate policy of GOI from beginning has been to maintain security on inter-governmental agreement involved and to play down to minimum any attention to nature, purpose or even location of actual installation. This policy was probably motivated primarily by desire to head off political opposition until local impact was fully absorbed, in both negative and positive terms, e.g. concern over vulnerability to retaliation, creation of jobs in construction phase, etc.; but from first Italians may well also have had in mind time when installation could be removed.

(3) GOI agreed to Jupiter installation primarily because we wanted it do so. Additional but incidental consideration was prestige factor and leverage which presence of installation in Italy gave her within NATO. But from very beginning GOI leaders were not entirely persuaded installation had critical military value and clearly have given subject periodic consideration since. Andreotti agreed readily to Secretary McNamara's suggestions in Washington last month for annual reappraisal of military value of installation and for its disestablishment when no longer needed. In occasional references to "next generation missiles," knowledgeable Italian officials have shown obvious and almost eager preference for seaborne strategic weapons, which by avoiding land-based installation do not entail political problem. This general aspect of how GOI leaders view problem would obviously be accentuated by current association of essentially neutralist NENNI Socialist party in governing process.

(4) GOI and general public attach great psychological importance to readily apparent evidence our own commitment to defense of Italy. Size of U.S. forces present carries more weight with public than nature of facilities or weapons. This has in past been extremely important factor in contribution to relative political stability. Jupiters probably of relatively little significance in this regard because they have created thus far only slight public impression because they are in a remote area and, as an Italian installation, they necessitate presence of very small number of Americans.

(5) Our tentative assessment is that GOI would agree to withdrawal of Jupiters under combination of offsetting circumstances such as these:

(A) Clear demonstration that security of Italy and overall military posture of NATO were not adversely affected, with specific (and pre-

sumably public) indication of how present military requirement was being otherwise met. Also, GOI might find attractive opportunity present Jupiter withdrawal as Italian contribution to relaxation East-West tensions.

(B) Assurances and occasional publicity on presence of Polaris submarines in Mediterranean would help to serve above purpose. More effective would probably be kind of "big power consultation" on which Italians were so insistent two and three years ago, which we found difficult and sometimes tiresome to accord them, but which nevertheless then paid, and would again pay, substantial dividends. If means can be found to give effect to European desire for greater share of "control", this too would help this aspect of problem.

(C) Public emphasis on Italy's role in NATO in order to counterbalance loss of value which missiles have for Italy in calling attention to its role and position in alliance, an aspect to which Andreotti referred in most recent talk with McNamara.

(D) Continuation of American participation in SETAF at present level, and postponement of further "Italianizing" of this force. This would be important part of package, since withdrawal US ground combat forces from northern Italy (even though relatively small numbers involved) at same time as Jupiters were being liquidated would have cumulatively bad psychological effect, especially on Italian armed forces and on so-far reliable sector of political leadership.

(6) From point of view of Italian problem and under above circumstances, we see little value in talking of possibility of multilateral sea-borne nuclear force. While GOI prefers sea-borne to land-based missiles for political reasons, it is doubtless staggered by cost to Italians of participation in a multilateral force, especially in relation to heavy competing domestic requirements. In any case we believe GOI may be expected to be content, at least so long as there are not a number of other European members of alliance making further progress in national nuclear capabilities, to leave to US task of providing strategic forces of alliance.

(7) In spite of cautious official position of Italian Government and political parties, we sense widespread approval in Italy of US determination to oppose Soviet intrusion into area of vital American interest. They respect display of strength on grounds which can be readily understood. Any phase-out of Jupiter missile installations would have to be very carefully handled so as not to undercut favorable effects of our present posture.

Reinhardt

424. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Nitze and Ball, October 26¹

October 26, 1962

Nitze—They are working on the Turkish problem, is that right?

Ball—Yes, there is a group working on it.

Nitze—We take a very dim view. We have to contemplate now, in this kind of a thing, negotiations apart from Cuba would just ruin us all the way around.

Ball—Let me be quite clear—we have no intention of seeing it pushed into negotiations. I am doing this at the President's request to see what it would be, if later on he wanted to consider it. The Department is no happier about it than you are.

Nitze—Not that we love these things. We wanted to get rid of it before. It is really the political military thing.

Ball—Did you see a telegram I got in from Finletter this morning on this thing?

Nitze—Yes, I have it before me now. I just wanted to get my oar in while you are at this stage of the game.

Ball—The President work done on it.

Nitze—Sure. Thanks George.

¹ U.S. missile installations in Turkey. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

425. Telegram 587 from Ankara, October 26¹

Ankara, October 26, 1962

Eyes Only Secretary and Ambassadors Finletter and Reinhardt.
Reference: Department telegram 445.

As recognized reference telegram removal Jupiters from Turkey in context Cuban situation would present major problem not only in terms of bilateral Turkish-American relationships but also NATO association. Problem would be partly psycho-political, partly substantive; psycho-political, in sense that Turks are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise. It is this quality of steadfast, even stolid, courage in both spirit and policy, together with traditional Turkish military skill which is actually their greatest asset to US and to West generally and by same token it is here that we would have most to lose if in process of Jupiter removal Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being *traded off* in order to appease an enemy. Furthermore, as brought out in conversation with Foreign Minister Erkin yesterday, Turks deeply resent any coupling of Turkey and Cuba on ground that situations completely different and that suggestions to that effect, especially when coming from western sources, are both inexcusable and seriously damaging; and all the more so when associated with idea that Turkish relationship with US can be equated with stooge status of Cuba with USSR.

Problem is also substantive in sense that Turks, as we well know, set great store on arms which they feel necessary meet their needs and were adamant in refusing our suggestion last year that Jupiter project not be implemented. No indication in meantime that their position has changed and can therefore be assumed that *if we insist* to contrary, demand for arms to fill vacuum would be specific and sizeable.

In so briefly outlining Turkish side of matter, I am of course mindful of significant non-Turkish considerations and that *in particular the idea* of being able to use what some regard as a dubious and waning asset in the *form of* Turkish Jupiters as a negotiating counter to effect removal of immediately dangerous Soviet missiles in Cuba has strong attractions. In bolstering this point of view, I would also venture to suggest that, as a bargaining asset, Turkish Jupiters might be a more potent factor in Soviet eyes than they are in fact for simple reason that propinquity tends to magnify as we have repeatedly seen in Soviet reaction to

¹ Embassy assessment of removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for Soviet removal of missiles in Cuba. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2662.

military installations on their periphery irrespective of their defensive purpose. It is also recognized that timing is an important element since assets of terminal value must be exploited, if at all, sufficiently in advance of expiration of usefulness, either real or imagined.

Unfortunately this is situation where attempt illuminate essential facts tend emphasize obscurity of road ahead. However, following alternatives are suggested in order of increasing difficulty.

1. Easiest solution would be resolution of Cuban problem without bringing Turkish missiles into picture. Not only would this avoid causing complications in Turkey's US and NATO relationships but it would also be in accord with officially announced policy to effect that "there is no relation between the situation in Cuba and the situation elsewhere in the world" (Circular 738, October 24) which missions authorized to use in denying validity of reports that the US might be willing to negotiate bases in Cuba for bases in Western Europe but which, in view of general character of reply and Turkey's NATO membership would also be equally valid in respect of Turkey.

Realized, of course, that reference telegram was differently directed but believed desirable emphasize that this is solid position from which deviations present varying degrees hazard.

2. Second alternative would be a phasing out of Jupiter program and replacement by some presently non-existent but prospective alternative such as seaborn multilateral nuclear force within NATO mentioned in reference telegram. Understood, however, that although this idea might be sold to Turks on merits, it would have limited bargaining value with Soviets since (a) implementation would take place later and (b) it would have to be kept secret and would therefore have no public relations value.

3. Third alternative would be directed to earlier and more specific dismantling of Jupiters and in more obvious relationship to Cuban situation but would be on strictly secret basis with Soviets. Fact that Turks have chosen keep Jupiters secret so far could be of some help but problem of negotiations with Turks would be difficult since we would necessarily be venturing on to the sensitive ground of coupling Turkey and Cuba and stipulation of secrecy might not be too convincing since would involve good faith of Soviets who would always have option reveal to detriment US-Turkish relations. However, proceeding dubious assumption that these non-substantive hurdles could be overcome, would be foreseeable that Turks would feel need of material filling of void created by loss Jupiters. Possible that in that case they might have some interest in Polaris or seaborn nuclear force but doubtful if they would feel adequate compensate for loss of Jupiters and foreseeable that alternative or supplemental requests for military hardware would be made.

4. Fourth alternative would be arrangement where there would be relationship, implicit or otherwise with Cuban situation and where, although there would be effort handle discreetly, publicity would be anticipated. This would be most difficult of all. Not only would we have difficulty reconciling with our own principles but hard see how Turks could stomach and retain their self respect, not to mention compensation in form of additional military assistance which might be expected.

As regards tactics in respect of any of these alternatives it is suggested that the following additional points should be borne in mind.

1) Given Turkish attachment to NATO a matter of basic policy, it would be desirable, perhaps even necessary, to present any idea re Jupiters in a NATO context.

2) British abandoning of Thors and possible Italian agreement dismantle Jupiters could be helpful in approaching Turks.

3) In order be effective, argumentation for dismantling Jupiters and means of remedying resulting situation should be given primarily military rather than political emphasis. SACEUR could be helpful since both Norstad and Lemnitzer well and favorably known here.

4) In opening Jupiter issue, we should be prepared for subsequent demands in respect of our other installations in Turkey to which we attach high priority. Such demands could come from either Soviets or Turks depending on type or proposal made.

To conclude, it is my feeling that, if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Problem is in finding means but, try as I can, I have been unable to hit upon a suggested solution other than gradual elimination which would not present acute difficulty in terms of our own relationship with Turkey and the maintenance of its position as an ally of the West, as well as the chain reaction which so doing would have not only in Turkey but also elsewhere. I say this most regretfully since I have no brief to make for Jupiters. However, to suggest their elimination in terms of the Soviet-Cuban conspiracy presents problems of substance and principle which seem to be inescapable and to involve inescapable consequences.

In submitting this appraisal, I realize that other minds are focussed on this problem and would anticipate that different ideas might be generated from other points of view, possibly for instance in framework some broader disarmament scheme. If so, I should be happy, with benefit of such information, to dig into question further.

Hare

October 27, 1962

426. Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 27¹

October 27, 1962

NOTICE

Emphasis continues to be placed on the READINESS status, pace of construction and any significant changes at the offensive missile sites in Cuba. This report is based primarily upon detailed analysis of the 25 October low-altitude coverage (see Figure 1).

SUMMARY

1. Detailed analysis confirms the rapid pace of construction reported in our last supplement. As of 25 October there was *no* evidence indicating any intention to halt construction, dismantle or move these sites.

2. There are no changes in the dates of estimated operational capability for the MRBM and IRBM sites. Five of the six MRBM sites are now believed to have a full operational capability and the sixth is estimated to achieve this status tomorrow—28 October (see Figure 2). This means a capability to launch up to 24 MRBM (1020 nm) missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to do so, and a refire capability of up to 24 additional MRBMs within 4 to 6 hours (see Table 1).

3. No additional MRBM missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1). To date, we have observed a total of 33 MRBM missiles.

4. No IRBM missiles, missile transporters, erectors or associated equipment have been observed to date.

5. No new missile sites have been identified; there has been no high-altitude coverage suitable for searching the Remedios area for the suspect second IRBM site since Mission 3118 of 22 October (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

[text not declassified]

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.–28 Oct. 1962).

7. Photography (Mission 5012 of 25 October) confirmed the presence of a FROG missile launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios. (The FROG is a tactical unguided rocket of 40,000 to 50,000 yard range, and is similar to the U.S. Honest John).

8. There has been no [*less than 1 line not declassified*] evidence of attempts at interdiction of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.

9. Despite Krushchev's statement to Mr. Knox of 24 October, we still lack positive evidence that nuclear weapons are deployed in Cuba.

10. The probable nuclear bunkers adjacent to the MRBM sites are not yet ready for storage, assembly or checkout.

**427. Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee,
October 27¹**

October 27, 1962
[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. Based on the latest low-level reconnaissance mission, three of the four MRBM sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua La Grande appear to be fully operational. No further sites or missiles have been identified.

The mobilization of Cuban military forces continues at a high rate. However, they remain under orders not to take any hostile action unless attacked.

Steps toward establishing an integrated air defense system are under way. On the diplomatic front, Cuban representatives are trying to plant the idea that Havana would be receptive to UN mediation. They indicate, however, that a prerequisite must be "proof" that the US does not intend to attack Cuba.

II. Despite Khrushchev's declaration to U Thant that Soviet ships would temporarily avoid the quarantine area, we have no information as yet that the six Soviet and three satellite ships en route have changed

¹ The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10.

course. A Swedish vessel, believed to be under charter to the USSR, refused to stop yesterday when intercepted by a US destroyer and was allowed to continue to Havana.

III. No significant redeployment of Soviet ground, air or naval forces have been noted. However, there are continuing indications of increased readiness among some units. Three F-class submarines have been identified on the surface inside or near the quarantine line.

IV. There has been no distinct shift in the pattern of reaction. In Western Europe, further support for the US has come from several quarters and unfavorable reactions are decidedly in the minority.

Official London seems intent on checking premature optimism which is showing up in widely scattered parts of the world, particularly among the neutrals. French support for the US is hardening.

There are reports that anti-US demonstrations have broken out in several Latin American capitals, including Buenos Aires, Caracas, and La Paz.

428. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 27¹

October 27, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

¹ Briefing by General Carroll and Hughes of DIA; Soviet military personnel in Cuba; OPLANs 312 and 316; U-2 lost over Cuba; President's message to Khrushchev; Jupiter missiles in Turkey; retaliation for U-2 shot down over Cuba; photographic verification of nuclear weapons in Cuba; reconnaissance. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

NORAD: North American Air Defense
OAS: Organization of American States
RCT: Regimental Combat Team
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile
TAC: Tactical Air Command

Saturday, 27 October

JCS meeting at 0900 (CJCS left to attend White House meeting):

Briefing at 1000 by Gen. Carroll and Mr. Hughes of DIA: There is evidence of possible Soviet ground forces with modern equipment, of continued construction at MRBM sites, and of surface-to-surface missiles among the Soviet equipment.

Gen. Carroll: AsstSecDef Nitze called me yesterday. The SecDef was in Rusk's office. Rusk was requesting advice from experts who were to go to New York today to advise Amb. Stevenson on how to get and present evidence, particularly how to certify that devices have been rendered inoperable and how to inspect to see that this is the case. The inference was that inspection should be by photo interpretation.

CJCS called from White House: Eight flights authorized this morning, eight more this afternoon.

CSAF: We should write a simple paper taking the latest intelligence into account, and again recommending execution of full-scale OPLAN 312 followed by OPLAN 316.

Drafting of a paper begins.

JCS meeting, 1330–2000 (SecDef attended from 1330–1420):

DJS tables a paper recommending early and timely execution of OPLAN 312 with readiness to execute OPLAN 316.

SecDef: I want the Joint Staff to prepare two plans. First, move one Polaris off the Turkish coast before we hit Cuba, telling the Russians before they have a chance to hit Turkey. Second, assume we hit the missiles in Cuba and Soviets then attack the Jupiters and knock them out; I think this is a very real possibility.

Turning to the paper tabled by the DJS, SecDef asked exactly what was meant by "early and timely execution of OPLAN 312"?

CSAF: Attacking Sunday or Monday.

SecDef: Do JCS agree upon attack at first light?

CMC: No.

CJCS: Would you agree that, if there is no stoppage in missile work, Chiefs recommend a strike after a reasonable period of time?

SecDef: I would accept that statement. You don't have to say how long. But I would not have accepted a recommendation for attack "now."

SecDef: CSAF has just learned that a U-2 is lost off Alaska; I must tell Rusk at once. SecDef leaves at 1341, returns five minutes later.

Col. Steakley (Joint Reconnaissance Group, J-3) enters at 1403 to say that a U-2 overflying Cuba is 30–40 minutes overdue. At 1416, SecDef and CJCS left for a White House conference. JCS then turned to the DJS draft. CSAF and Adm. Ricketts (VCNO) favor executing OPLAN 312 on Sunday morning or Monday morning at the latest, unless there is positive proof of dismantling. CSA and CMC agree. They also want to add a passage about executing OPLAN 316. For agreed-upon wording, see JCSM-844-62. This recommendation was transmitted to the White House, where CJCS read it to the ExComm.

Col. Steakley reports on pilot debriefings at 1800: All but two planes were fired at. Intercept says the Cubans have recovered body and wreckage of the U-2.

At 1830, CJCS gives debrief of White House meeting: He reads President's reply to Khrushchev. CJCS says President has been seized with the idea of trading Turkish for Cuban missiles; he seems to be the only one in favor of it. "The President has a feeling that time is running out." I read the Chiefs' memo to the meeting, saying that we should attack no later than 29 October. Then we got word of the U-2 loss. No air reconnaissance tonight, but everyone feels we should undertake reconnaissance tomorrow, so as to get a better background for attack on Cuba.

CJCS: Should we take out a SAM site?

CSAF: No, we would open ourselves to retaliation. We have little to gain and a lot to lose.

CSA: I feel the same way. Khrushchev may loose one of his missiles on us.

CJCS: Gentlemen, you all recommended retaliation if a U-2 was downed. If this was wise on the 23rd, it should be just as wise on the 27th. (Note: This is not an accurate recollection of the JCS position on 23 Oct.)

CSA: Intelligence this morning showed concrete pads; I'm afraid they have nuclear weapons there.

JCS agreed: There should be no U-2 flights tomorrow, but there has to be some kind of reconnaissance tomorrow. If an attack is to be made on Monday, there is no need for further reconnaissance.

Briefing at 1940 by Mr. Hughes of DIA: Photography from today's missions show that the canvas is off the launchers, that the missiles are on the launchers, and that a reload capability is ready.

Reconnaissance decision was made later that night: A C-97 with fighter escort would do peripheral photography without getting in range of SAMs.

429. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27¹

Meeting No. 7

October 27, 1962

1. Director McCone presented the intelligence briefing, highlighting the information in the first two pages of the CIA Cuba Crisis Memorandum.

2. Secretary McNamara reported on the positions of Soviet Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He recommended, and the President approved, two daylight reconnaissance missions over Cuba today—one in the morning and one this afternoon. He again recommended that a reconnaissance mission be undertaken tonight. In response to Secretary Rusk's request for delay of this mission, the President said the reconnaissance planes should go on alert, that an announcement of the mission should be drawn up, and that a final decision would be taken this afternoon.

3. It was agreed that the Russians would be informed of the extent of our quarantine zone area privately. Khrushchev could then decide whether to turn back the Soviet tanker *Graznyy*, which will be entering the quarantine zone late today. If the *Graznyy* continued, a decision could then be made as to whether it would be allowed to proceed to Havana or whether it should be stopped, searched, and released, if, as expected, it had on board no prohibitive material. A decision would also be required as to what action should be taken if the tanker refused to submit to search.

4. At this point in the meeting the partial text of the Soviet public statement was received. It became clear that the terms of the public statement varied considerably from the proposals made by Khrushchev in his personal letter to the President last night. The President approved the release of the attached public statement, which was drafted during the meeting. A second and longer statement was to be prepared. (This was later abandoned.)

5. A draft message to Khrushchev was discussed and a final version will be completed for transmission this afternoon.

6. Copies of a proposed leaflet to be dropped in Cuba was circulated at the meeting, but a decision to drop them was deferred.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Soviet ships moving toward Cuba, size of quarantine zone, Soviet public statement, draft message to Khrushchev. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meeting, vol. V, Meetings 6–10.

430. Telegram 1970 from Paris, October 27¹

Paris, October 27, 1962

Eyes Only for Secretary from Ambassador.

In a brief conversation after the presentation ceremonies, de Gaulle (accompanied by Couve De Murville) said that the Cuban affair was US business and that France understood and will understand whatever actions we might be forced to take. He said that France was not directly involved, but they did not “blame” us for the actions we had taken and would not in the future. He then asked me to transmit to my government the assurance that if developments in this affair should unfortunately lead to war, the US could be sure that France with its limited means would be at our side in the war. He admitted that we all hoped that a solution could be found that would avert war and he knew that this was our wish, but he wished to give us this firm assurance in the event of the worst. He expressed the strong hope that we would keep French Govt fully informed of our views and intentions although repeating that France had no intention of taking any initiative in this purely American affair.

He said that he had read with greatest attention the communications between the President and Khrushchev for which he was grateful and while he noted that in Khrushchev’s second message—the [illegible in the original]—he had refrained from invective he had obtained an impression of firmness on both sides. He added that the French for centuries had lived with threats and menaces, first from the Germans and now from Russia, but he understood the US had not had a comparable experience.

I replied that this was historically true but particularly because this inherent nuclear threat to the US came from a quarter where our warning and alert systems were not well developed, we saw a very real and special threat to the military posture of the US from these Cuban bases. He spoke slightly of the UN but said he could understand that our “affection” for this institution had led us to put the matter before it. I replied that in addition to US public opinion, a recourse to the UN might give the Russians a pretext for less drastic action, with which he agreed.

In conclusion, he said he had wished to take this occasion in circumstances the outcome of which could not be foreseen, to give to the US the strongest reaffirmation of solidarity and support.

¹ De Gaulle position on U.S. actions in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/1–2762.

I thanked the General for his statement and promised to transmit it immediately to my government.

De Gaulle's statement was direct and obviously sincerely meant. I hope you will keep me informed to the greatest extent possible so that I can keep him up to date.

President De Gaulle will be away from Paris at Colombey les-Deux-Eglises from now until Monday.

Department to distribute as desired.

Bohlen

**431. Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy,
October 27¹**

October 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Report Number Four of the Planning Subcommittee

1. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Saturday morning, October 27, 1962.

2. The preliminary assessment of the various diplomatic signals from Moscow suggests, on balance, a greater willingness than had previously been assessed for Moscow to disengage from the Cuba crisis without extracting any net advantage and barely saving face. They will, of course, assess the U.S. and Free World reactions to their various initiatives and be quick to exploit any hesitancy or weakness on our part and any substantial schisms that may emerge in the Free World front.

3. While we engage in various forms of communication, it is judged essential that we maintain a focus on the missile sites and bombers in Cuba, escalate modestly our current pressure and forecast more decisive action unless the Cuban crisis is quickly settled on terms which sacrifice no Free World asset, except the lifting of the blockade.

4. The Planning assignments under 3 a, b, and c in Report Number Three (POL, air strike, and negotiating track) have all been completed and sent forward to the Executive Committee. Item 3 d (political action

¹ Report No. 4 of Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV(B).

vis-à-vis Cuba) is under way under ARA responsibility. The daily assessment of Soviet intentions and a suggested appropriate posture for the U.S. will continue. The Navy continues the task of defining rules of engagement for conflict in defense of the integrity of the blockade; and Mr. McNaughton is completing an analysis of the ships now en route to Cuba with possible courses of action.

5. Since planning for more drastic measures, should they be required, is well in hand, the Planning Subcommittee has begun to turn to courses of action which might be followed if the crisis is quickly settled on terms which meet our fundamental position. If this outcome should emerge, it is strongly felt that: (a) a fresh assessment of the Soviet position, in the light of its thrust for Cuba and reaction to our moves, is essential; (b) we should move rapidly to exploit our success by moving urgently to consolidate the Atlantic partnership; to consolidate gains in the OAS; to accelerate the Alliance for Progress; and to seek out other ways to exploit the interval of momentum such success will open to us.

432. Memorandum of conversation between Georgi Kornienko and Richard H. Davis, October 27¹

October 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Delimitation of "Interception Area" Around Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy

Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

SOV—David Henry

I handed the attached letter on the above subject to Counselor Georgi Kornienko today at 3:00 p.m.

¹ Transmittal of text of letter from Stevenson to Secretary General U Thant re delimitation of "interception area" in the waters around Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 381, Jan–Oct.

Attachment

Dear Mr. Kornienko:

I have been instructed to convey, for the information of Ambassador Dobrynin, the text of a message handed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant, by Ambassador Stevenson on October 27. The text is as follows:

"My Government has instructed me to inform you that the 'interception area' referred to in your letter of October 25 to the President of the United States and in his reply of October 26, comprises (a) the area included within a circle with its center at Havana and a radius of 500 nautical miles, and (b) the area included within a circle with its center at Cape Maysi (Maisi), located at the eastern tip of the Island of Cuba, and a radius of 500 nautical miles.

"You may wish to pass the above information to Chairman Khrushchev so that he can proceed in accordance with his October 26 letter to you, in which he stated that he had ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba but not yet within the interception area to stay out of the area."

The text of this message is also being sent by the American Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sincerely yours,

Richard H. Davis
*Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs*

433. Memorandum from Kitchen to Nitze, October 27¹

October 27, 1962

I am passing on the attached memorandum which Ray wrote immediately after Khrushchev's proposal. I think you will find this analysis of Soviet motivations and likely course of action of real interest.

¹ Transmits memorandum from Raymond Garthoff on Khrushchev's proposal for a Turkey-Cuba tradeoff. Secret Attachment. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962.

Attachment

SUBJECT

The Khrushchev Proposal for a Turkey-Cuba Tradeoff

Khrushchev now recognizes that his position is weak. The whole Soviet play with Cuban missile sites was probably based on a three-level course of action.

First, the Soviets hoped for, and probably expected, US acquiescence in the buildup of a Soviet missile complex in Cuba which would substantially augment Soviet strength in negotiations over Berlin, and in general. The appreciable military gain, while not seriously affecting the strategic military balance, could have been converted into a high card at the negotiation table.

Second, as a first-line fallback position, the Soviets could react to a US blockade or similar pressure short of direct military invasion or attack on the bases by proposing a trade of the Turkish, Italian, and UK IRBMs for those in Cuba. It is the lower end of this range of action to which the Soviets have now fallen back.

Third, at worst, the Soviets would react to US military action against the bases by whatever forms of political protest were warranted by world reactions—even up to breaking diplomatic relations. The Khrushchev message of October 27 strengthens the conclusion that the USSR would not resort to direct military confrontation or reprisal—on the seas, in Cuba, or in Turkey. To date, the world reactions have not been what Moscow had hoped for; in particular, the unanimous OAS action must have been a severe disappointment.

The third course is still the remaining Soviet recourse if we reject their offer at the second level. The Soviet statement clearly evades any commitment to military action if the US should decline its offer and eliminate the missile site by unilateral military action. It states that the missiles in Cuba are in Soviet hands and would be used only if there were (a) an invasion of Cuba, or (b) an attack on the Soviet Union or any of her allies. It can scarcely be an oversight that the contingency of a strike to neutralize the missiles is not included in this commitment. The Soviets can probably still be compelled to withdraw the missile bases if they see the only alternative will be our destruction of them. However, even that outcome would almost certainly not provoke even limited Soviet military escalation.

The Turks have already made abundantly clear that they do not want to be compared with the Cubans, used as a pawn, or shorn of the Jupiters which have always been to them a proud symbol of their ability to strike back if they are hit. Hasty surfacing of long-held US

military evaluations of the obsolescence of the Jupiters would be ineffective in meeting these strongly held views. The Jupiters are not important as a military-strategic asset—but, then, neither is Berlin. Yet both have elemental significance as symbols of the integrity of the Alliance and especially of our commitment to stand by the interests of each of its members.

The United States can, while solving the Cuban base question with determination, forcefully reaffirm its readiness to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament. We could thus indicate our pursuit of peace at the same time that we disposed of the latest Soviet disruption of the peace.

The United States has a unique opportunity to deal a major setback to the Soviet leaders, and once and for all to disabuse them—and others—of any illusion that the alternative to any Soviet gamble for high stakes will be not fallback advantages, but a defeat. Precisely such an outcome is the way to discourage such ventures in the future.

434. Memorandum prepared by Raymond Garthoff, October 27¹

October 27, 1962

SUBJECT

The Military Significance of the Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba

1. The presence of 24 1,020 n.m. MRBM launchers and 12 or 16 2,200 n.m. IRBM launchers in Cuba provides a significant accretion to Soviet strategic capabilities for striking the continental United States. In view of the relatively limited numbers of Soviet operational ICBM launchers—at present an estimated 75—the missiles in the Caribbean will increase the first strike missile salvo which the USSR could place on targets in the continental United States by over 40 percent.

2. At present, 20 of the 24 MRBM launchers are believed to be fully operational, and the remaining four will be within a few days. The first 4 IRBM launchers will probably reach an emergency capability on November 15, and full operational status on December 1. The 8 other confirmed IRBM launchers will probably reach emergency capability by December 1, and be fully operational by December 15. An additional

¹ The military significance of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2762.

four IRBM launchers will probably be completed, but it is possible that the quarantine has stopped them. The current threat is thus 24 MRBMs; by December it will—unless construction is effectively stopped within a month—be augmented by at least 12 and up to 16 IRBMs. Each launcher is assumed to have the standard two missiles, allowing one reload (for refire in 4–6 hours). In at least one of the nine bases more missiles than launchers have been positively confirmed, and in general the number of identified MRBM missiles at least is sufficient to man all the launchers for an initial strike. Earth-covered bunkers suitable for storage or checkout of nuclear weapons are under rapid construction, and at least two of them now appear to be complete. There is one such bunker for each pair of launch sites.

3. The strategic significance of the Cuban missile complex is due not only to the substantial quantitative increase in megatons deliverable in a surprise first strike, but also by their effect on the US deterrent striking force. Approximately 40 percent of the SAC bomber force is now located on air bases within range of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, and almost all of it is in range of the IRBMs. If the present base complex in Cuba is completed late in 1962, and taking into account the estimated Soviet ICBM force for the end of 1962, a Soviet attack without warning could destroy an appreciably larger proportion of over-all United States strategic capability than it could if the Cuban complex were not included. The number of US *weapons* surviving and ready to retaliate on targets in the USSR would be decreased by about 30 percent, and would thus leave only about 15 percent of the number in our pre-attack force. This force could still cause considerable destruction in a US retaliatory strike, the Soviets could not rely on the degree of surprise assumed in the above calculation, and it is very unlikely that the Soviets would be tempted toward resort to war by the change in the military balance. Nonetheless, this represents a serious dilution of US strategic deterrent capability.

4. The reasons for the strategic significance of the Cuban bases are: (a) the size of the Soviet ICBM force does *not* allow coverage of SAC bomber bases and soft ICBM sites; the addition of the MRBM/IRBM force already on the island of Cuba *does* permit coverage of *all* such points, thus bringing under fire an *additional* 26 US ICBMs and over 100 B-47's; (b) the Cuban based missile systems have high reliability (80 percent), accuracy (1 to 1.5 n.m. CEP), and warhead yield (up to 3 megatons each for the MRBMs, and up to 5 megatons for the IRBMs); (c) the United States does not have [illegible in the original] MEWs or other early warning radar on the southern approaches; and (d) as taken into account earlier, many SAC bomber bases are concentrated in the South and Midwest.

5. All of the discussion above is concerned with the missile complex now being completed in Cuba. There is no reason why the Soviets

could not, if unimpeded by an effective quarantine, literally multiply the number of launchers to a force large enough to threaten the entire strategic balance of power. The Soviets have deployed over 500 MRBMs and IRBMs on their own territory, and the lesser cost compared to ICBMs would make a major expansion in Cuba very attractive.

Raymond L. Garthoff

*Special Assistant for Soviet Bloc,
Office of Politico-Military Affairs*

435. Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, October 27¹

October 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Moscow Ups the Ante in Cuba Negotiations

We seek in this memorandum to update the estimate in our memorandum of early this morning in light of today's public letter from Khrushchev, proposing a trade-off of missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba.

After privately offering what seemed on the face of it a surprisingly cheap bargain for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba yesterday, Moscow today publicly insists that the US must also withdraw "its" missiles from Turkey. In making the proposal, Khrushchev in effect admits for the first time publicly that Soviet missiles are in Cuba, though he attributes the characterization "offensive" to the US. Indeed, Khrushchev for the first time explicitly indicated that the missiles based in Cuba were part of the Soviet Union's own strategic striking force.

A number of pitfalls are immediately apparent in the Khrushchev proposal:

- 1) The Soviets probably calculated that a mere mention of the possibility of negotiations would disturb US-Turkish relations as well as the NATO alliance.

- 2) The reference to Britain and Italy suggest that at some point in the talks, the USSR might attempt to raise the ante again and propose inclusion of other countries in the arrangement.

¹ Khrushchev's proposal for trade-off of missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2762.

3) The proposal is ambiguous concerning the time limit, and the period mentioned apparently concerns the end of the negotiations and not the length of time for dismantling the bases.

4) The inspection proposal, although forthcoming on the face of it, opens up the usual questions concerning terms of reference and veto power.

5) The assurances to Cuba raise the same problems as the previous letter with regard to the legitimacy of the Castro regime and US relations with Cuban exiles.

In terms of Soviet objectives in this confrontation, this latest development strengthens the estimate that the USSR is seeking to gain time for its missiles in Cuba to attain operational effectiveness while fostering a political atmosphere in which forceful US action becomes increasingly difficult. The proposal continues the Soviet effort to make dismantling of the missiles a subject rather than a precondition for negotiations.

Soviet Motivations in Responding

Moscow would be under considerable pressure to respond to the US destruction of an element of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. It would wish to do so to preserve Cuban confidence, to avoid making a show of weakness in US eyes, and if possible to achieve the aim of interdicting US reconnaissance over Cuba.

However, a countervailing factor would be Moscow's reluctance to see military action in Cuba escalate into a local war which the Soviet Union could not hope to win, or worse yet a general war.

The Soviets would also wish to preserve their posture of being the reasonable party expressing willingness to negotiate peacefully while the US was preparing to take aggressive action. To some extent this pose would be undercut, if the Soviets were themselves to do the escalating.

Soviet Reaction

Given the strong forces operating both to impel and restrain the Soviets, the USSR's reaction cannot be predicted with certainty.

Moscow's first reaction might be merely to repeat the shooting down of a subsequent US plane without taking further action. The Soviets might hope that the US would desist rather than trade U-2's and SAMs one for one. However, Moscow could not long play a trading game; Soviet air defense of Cuba would soon be debilitated and the risk of US invasion might be greater.

Subsequently Moscow would be more likely to seek other forms of retaliation. Harassment, perhaps by the Cubans of US ships or planes in the immediate area is a possibility. The Cubans might shell selected targets on Guantanamo. Or, the Soviets might seek to attack US forces elsewhere, e.g. peripheral reconnaissance missions.

**436. Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to Rusk,
October 27¹**

October 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Probable Soviet Response To US Retaliation Against An SAM Site

How would the USSR react if the US decided to take out the offending SAM site in retaliation for the shooting down of a U-2 aircraft today?

Purpose of the Shooting Down of a U-2

The most likely purpose which the USSR might have sought to achieve by the incident was the interdiction of US reconnaissance. The Soviets may well have calculated that interdicting US reconnaissance would be likely to drive the US into negotiations on terms favorable to the Soviets.

(1) A show of force would lend new urgency to the situation.

(2) The shooting down of an "illegal" U-2 is an action involving high military capability, maximum justification, and wide propaganda potential.

(3) If the US were deprived of its surveillance capabilities; it would no longer have its present degree of confidence that it knows the location and state of readiness of the Soviet deployments and would be more anxious to enter into negotiations for their removal.

(4) The interdiction would also preserve some degree of Soviet military secrecy (the Soviets may estimate we still have unfulfilled intelligence requirements which they would prefer to have remain unfulfilled).

The Soviets may have shot the plane down as a means of contributing to the confidence of the Cubans who appear to be growing suspicious of Moscow's propensity for negotiations with the US and are fearful of invasion. Indeed, at the present time we do not know the details of how the plane was brought down and cannot eliminate the possibility that it may have been destroyed by a Cuban or Soviet MIG 21 (if the Cubans have a pilot of their own for it) firing while zooming upward.

¹ Probable Soviet response to U.S. retaliation against an SAM site. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2762.

437. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27¹

Meeting No. 8

October 27, 1962

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action,
October 27, 1962, 4:00 PM

1. Secretary McNamara gave fragmentary reports of today's daylight reconnaissance mission. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.

2. The President directed that the planned night reconnaissance mission be held up until the full report on the daylight mission was received. The night mission was later called off.

3. The President ordered the immediate dispatch to U Thant of the following message:

"A number of proposals have been made to you and to the United States in the last thirty-six hours. I would appreciate your urgently ascertaining whether the Soviet Union is willing immediately to cease work on these bases in Cuba and render the weapons inoperable under UN verification so that various solutions can be discussed."

4. Secretary Rusk summarized the air incident in the Far East involving a U-2 overflying the USSR due to navigational difficulties which resulted in Soviet fighters being scrambled from a base near Wrangel Island. The President decided not to say anything about the incident unless the Soviets publicized it.

5. A letter from the President to Khrushchev was discussed and approved.

6. General Taylor reported on current military planning, recommending that air surveillance be continued. The President directed that the day air reconnaissance mission be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. However, if MIG planes attack the reconnaissance planes, U.S. fighters will attack them. Planning is under way for a general air response and for an attack on any SAM site firing on U.S. planes. A decision on the appropriate response will await reports as to whether tomorrow's reconnaissance missions encounter opposition and upon replies to messages sent to U Thant and Khrushchev.

7. There was a general discussion of how to handle the response to Khrushchev's public letter to the President, including the question of missiles in Turkey.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Reconnaissance missions; message to U Thant; U-2 overflying the USSR; letter from the President to Khrushchev; military planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6–10.

438. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27¹

Meeting No. 9

October 27, 1962

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action,
October 27, 1962, 9:00 PM

1. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, the callup of 24 air reserve squadrons, involving 14,000 personnel.

2. The President directed that Ambassador Stevenson tell U Thant that a Soviet tanker was approaching the quarantine zone and reminding U Thant of the Soviet statement that Soviet ships would not enter Cuban waters.

3. There was discussion of next steps including the calling up of U.S. ships and the addition of POL to the list of prohibited goods.

4. The President read a message from General Norstad which presented the difficulty for NATO of any trade tying Cuban missiles to Turkish missiles.

5. There was a general discussion of a draft message to Ambassador Finletter giving him guidance as to his presentation to the NATO meeting of Permanent Representatives called for tomorrow. (Copy of message to Finletter attached.) It was agreed that this NATO meeting should be limited to reporting on actions we have taken and reviewing NATO problems arising out of Khrushchev's public letter.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Call up of air reserve squadrons; message for U Thant; calling up U.S. ships and adding POL to list of prohibited goods; message from General Norstad; message to Finletter. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10.

October 28, 1962

439. Supplement 8 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 28¹

October 28, 1962

NOTICE

This report is based primarily on detailed analysis of low-altitude photography taken on Friday, 26 October, as well as preliminary evaluation of the results of similar missions from Saturday, 27 October 1962 (Figure 1). The primary emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness, pace of construction, and changes in the deployment program (Table 1). This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States.

SUMMARY

1. We still have no direct knowledge of thermonuclear warheads in Cuba, but believe it prudent to assume that the Soviet missile force there is so armed.

2. We estimate that all 24 MRBM launchers are now fully operational, representing a capability to salvo 24 1000-mile missiles within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to launch.

3. The present and estimated operational capability of all Soviet defensive missiles in Cuba is summarized in Figure 2.

4. No new MRBM or IRBM sites have been detected in the past day, although we have not had high-altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962.

5. Construction at the Soviet IRBM sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace and missile support equipment is now being moved to the vicinity of Guanajay Site 1. No IRBM's per se have yet been observed.

6. The entire missile-launching force at the Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba is being checked out on a rapid basis. This provides an increasing, integrated, operational readiness posture.

7. Automatic anti-aircraft weapons and personnel trenches for protection against air attack are now evident at many of the MRBM sites.

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).

These weapons have been introduced in the last few days and probably account for the ground fire now being noted on the low-level photographic missions.

8. Camouflage against aerial photography is being extended at the missile sites and is becoming more effective. Force dispersion is also evident.

9. A missile propellant offloading and transshipping facility has now been identified at the double-fenced area at Punta Gerada in Bahia Honda. This was suspected formerly of being a port of entry for nuclear weapons.

10. We now estimate an integrated operational capability for the SA-2 air defense network in Cuba [*text not declassified*].

[*text not declassified*]

12. The loss of the U-2 over Banes was probably caused by intercept by an SA-2 from the Banes site, or pilot hypoxia, with the former appearing more likely on the basis of present information.

13. Microwave relay towers have been noted at some of the MRBM and IRBM site areas covered on 27 October, indicating that an integrated microwave command and control communication system will be utilized in Cuba. However, the use of high frequency radio is also indicated by the presence of high frequency antennae at Sagua La Grande sites 1 and 2.

14. Construction of probable nuclear storage facilities was continuing on 26 and 27 October. None of the bunkers observed at probable nuclear storage sites are yet believed to be in operation although that at Guanajay IRBM Site No. 1 is essentially complete.

15. A new, probable nuclear storage facility has been identified at Sagua La Grande MRBM Site No. 2. Construction materials were being moved into this area on 27 October. The existence of a second, probable nuclear storage area at the Sagua La Grande launch complex indicates that each launch site is probably intended to have individual, permanent nuclear storage.

440. Telegram 1234 from Bonn, October 28¹

October 28, 1962

Reference: Deptel 1082. When I saw Chancellor this morning and gave him the President's letter, together with summary of contents TOPOL 578 (repeated Bonn 1081), there ensued long discussion of events recent months. Drift of Adenauer's remarks was that we should have moved earlier against Castro, and that even now as matter of tactics we should build him up as principal villain in piece. Chancellor seemed to feel that by doing so we might rally support among Cuban people, and at same time make it easier for Khrushchev to stand aside while we dealt with Cuban problem by military means. I debated with him, but he was not swayed, saying among other things that we should at latest have gone to military solution when US plane was shot down yesterday. Chancellor implied "paper war" with Khrushchev had gone on too long and should be discontinued. I finally was able to ask him directly what he thought we should do now. Boiled down, his views are as follows:

1. We should issue ultimatum to Castro, and follow up by invasion unless he responds affirmatively within brief period to our demand for removal Soviet missiles.

2. If further incident occurs, even before ultimatum, we should take whatever military actions seem appropriate, not excluding invasion.

There followed some discussion between Globke, who was also present, and Chancellor as to whether it would be easier for Khrushchev to accept invasion of Cuba or aerial destruction of missile sites, with Globke arguing for aerial destruction and Chancellor insisting on invasion, which he thought was only ultimate solution to Cuban problem and hence had better be done at once. They were agreed, however, on Chancellor's basic view that our response now must be military one.

Re NATO consultation, Chancellor said he would consult Carstens and have necessary instructions sent to German Permanent Representative, although I cautioned him that NAC probably already met. He said German participation would have to be through Deputy (Salm) since Walter had left Paris and Grewe not due there until tomorrow. I told him I would brief Carstens as soon as I could reach him.

Dowling

¹ Chancellor Adenauer's views on what actions United States should take now. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2861.

441. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 28¹

October 28, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Sunday, 28 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

CSAF: I want to see the President later today, and I hope all of you will come with me. Monday will be the last time to attack the missiles before they become fully operational.

CJCS: If you want a meeting, I will put in your request.

CSA: My people tell me that all MRBM sites are now operational. If the warheads are with the missiles, they can be made ready to fire in 2½ to 5 hours.

JCS discuss the low-level reconnaissance plan for today: six planes going over sites not defended by antiaircraft artillery, so they will not cover MRBM sites.

At about 0930, a tickertape of Moscow Radio's broadcast was passed around: "I appreciate your assurance that the United States will not invade Cuba. Hence we have ordered our officers to stop building

¹ Request for meeting with the President; MRBM sites operational; Khrushchev message (Moscow radio broadcast) that Soviets will stop building bases and dismantle equipment. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

bases, dismantle the equipment, and bring it back home. This can be done under UN supervision.”

SecDef, DepSecDef and AsstSecDef Nitze joined the meeting.

CSAF: The Soviets may make a charade of withdrawal and keep some weapons in Cuba.

CNO: The no-invasion pledge leaves Castro free to make trouble in Latin America.

SecDef, DepSecDef and AsstSecDef reply that withdrawal of missiles leaves the US in a much stronger position than the USSR.

SecDef: Before Khrushchev’s message came in, I was considering additional actions to pressure the Soviets: extend tours of Army and Air Force personnel; set up a submarine intercept zone; add POL to the contraband list; and requisition shipping. CSAF still wants to go to the White House, but other JCS members decide to wait and see whether reconnaissance flights meet opposition and what their pictures show.

**442. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy,
October 28¹**

October 28, 1962

SUBJECT

October 27 Paper on Negotiations

Attached for the use of the Executive Committee are copies of an October 27 paper on “Negotiations” done by the Rostow Subcommittee.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

¹ Transmits Rostow subcommittee October 27 paper on negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol IV(B).

Attachment

SUBJECT

Negotiations

1. Khrushchev's letter is more likely, in our view, to reflect a decision to disengage from offensive weapons in Cuba, saving as much face as possible, than to represent a tactical maneuver or gimmick.

2. In a larger sense, this decision might portend a major shift in Soviet policy. A few months ago we had said that Khrushchev was reaching a point in his post-Sputnik offensive where, if he could not score an early success, he would probably seek some relief from the pressures which that offensive had placed on him. We had anticipated that he might seek such a success in either Cuba, Berlin, or weapons development. We had also anticipated that, if we stood firm and denied him that success, the chances would be increased of his seeking relief from these pressures through relaxation.

3. Against this background, our posture in the present crisis should be designed to:

(a) make clear that the Cuban issue must be settled by the prompt elimination of Soviet offensive weapons, and without any offsetting concessions other than pure atmospheric, e.g., a Latin American nuclear-free zone;

(b) make equally clear that we are prepared to undertake immediate negotiations with the USSR on arms control and other issues, that we are ready to go to a Summit on these matters as soon as Cuba is out of the way, and that we would be willing to concert now about the specific items to be taken up at a Summit—even while Cuba was being got out of the way.

4. A memorandum is attached which outlines the approach that might be made to a Summit meeting under the strategy discussed above. Its substantive treatment of the issues to be taken up at a Summit is the same as that contained in the October 26 paper on "Negotiations" which was co-ordinated with the interested regional Bureaus and ACDA.

W.W. Rostow

443. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 28¹

Meeting No. 10

October 28, 1962

1. The full Tass text of Khrushchev's reply to the President offering to withdraw Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba under UN supervision was read by those present.

2. Secretary McNamara reported that the Soviet tanker *Graznyy* was standing still and that no other Bloc ships would be entering the quarantine zone today.

3. The President directed that no air reconnaissance missions be flown today, that no action be taken against Bloc ships today, but that every effort be made to get the UN to fly reconnaissance missions Monday. The President authorized the release to UN officials of classified information on Soviet armaments in Cuba in order to facilitate the UN inspection task.

4. The President approved a public statement welcoming the Soviet decision to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. He agreed that we should read offensive weapons to include bombers, but should not get hung up on this issue.

5. The President asked all those backgrounding the press to be reserved in all comment. Although we welcome Khrushchev's reply, we are under no illusions nor can we reach any general conclusions about how the Russians will act in the future in areas other than Cuba. Khrushchev's decision has to be implemented and many serious problems will be encountered in the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba.

6. The President directed that a reply to Khrushchev be drafted for delivery today. The reply was later approved by the President and released to the press.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Khrushchev message; blockade; air reconnaissance missions; public statement on Soviet decision to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba; press relations; reply to Khrushchev. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excon Meetings, vol. I, Meetings 6–10.

444. Debriefing by U. Alexis Johnson, October 28¹

October 28, 1962

Attended by:

EUR—Mr. Tyler
IO—Mr. Cleveland
S/P—Mr. Rostow
INR—Mr. Hilsman
G/PM—Mr. Kitchen
G/PM—Mr. Weiss
S/S—Mr. Brubeck
S/S—Miss Moor
NEA—Mr. Talbot

Mr. Johnson emphasized that there should be no euphoria pointed to Castro's insistence upon obtaining Guantanamo. Mr. Hilsman added that 24 missiles are now operational, that the defense network inside Cuba is now tied in completely to the Soviet network, there is a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to Cuban communications networks, and a single code work, unbroken, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Moreover, we also know that there is tremendous confusion inside the governmental apparatus with no consistent decision yet with regard to firing or not firing, etc. Moreover, feverish work has continued on the missile sites and on various defense arrangements, obviously geared toward a possible invasion. Mr. Johnson said the ExCom had decided that there should be no reconnaissance today. There would, however, be a reconnaissance tomorrow either by the UN or by us. A team has gone to New York (Chryk, Forrestal, Sisco, Cleveland) to work out with the UN a UN reconnaissance mission. Alternatives are:

1. U.S. Aircraft with a UN personnel on board
2. Loaning a plane, pilot, etc with UN insigna (The difficulty here is that there is not time to paint on the insigna. If the paint is not thoroughly dry the friction from the high speed of these plans peels it off.
3. Sell a plane to the UN
4. Have the UN Charter the planes from Fairchild.
5. Use Canadian Planes

Mr. _____ said that after the meeting further discussion led to 3 alternatives at this point; namely, a two step arrangement with the UN. The first few days the UN would in effect hire the U.S. Air Force. The second step would be in the next few days after that to

¹ Current situation in Cuban missile crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 75 D 265, NSC Debriefings 1962.

have multilateral teams using U.S. equipment. If it is clear that there will be no retaliatory firing on the reconnaissance planes _____ could be used. The Executive Committee decided to send Rikkye all intelligence data on missiles it is possible to get together.

Guidance was given with regard to a reply to Khrushchev's letter received this morning. The President at a noon meeting stated that a formal reply will be issued at about 3:00 p.m. Ambassador Thompson will prepare the basic reply. Mr. Johnson will prepare the language with regard to Khrushchev's complaint about U2 flights. Foster will prepare a language on disarmament. Mr. Johnson said that CIA—Ray Cline—and Defense—Bill Bundy—would see the draft of the letter but not be involved with the drafting.

U Thant is replying to Soviet Union, U.S. and Castro presumably accepting gratefully our willingness to negotiate.

Stevenson called the President this morning giving an account of his conversations with U Thant. McGeorge Bundy is bring a copy over to Mr. Johnson at 1:30 p.m. today. The Secretary will speak to the OAS at 5:00 p.m. today to get agreement to our new moves.

Castro's subversion was brought up. Our statement in the letter should be similar to our previous statements; namely, that we will not attack the island as long as they behave.

Mr. Johnson also announced that Kuz Nep Sov [*Kuznetsov*] is arriving at the UN tonight.

Attachment

Carol:

I typed this up in *very rough* draft since there were several places that I didn't get or couldn't read. Sue

445. Telegram 1517 from USUN, October 28¹

October 28, 1962

Re: Cuba. Stevenson and Yost called on SYG this morning at 10:00 to discuss situation following latest Khrushchev letter to President.

Stevenson suggested that, in order to clearly and definitely pin down favorable developments, SYG might wish to address letter to three states concerned stating his assumptions of what had been agreed, including suspension of construction and assembly of bomber aircraft, and inoperability of weapons. He might also announce his intention to proceed promptly to Cuba in order verify implementation of agreement and to sound out Cuban Govt on form of assurances of territorial integrity to be offered by U.S.

SYG agreed letters of this general character would be desirable though he did not commit himself as to exact content. He did however agree to show us draft letter today. He said it would be helpful if he could have before his departure reply from Pres Kennedy which might inter alia indicate character of assurances to Cubans U.S. is prepared to offer.

Thant said he proposes depart from Havana morning Oct 30. When Stevenson suggested earlier departure SYG explained his desire take with him 6–10 neutral military technicians who might immediately commence verification. He felt it would be easier to introduce such technicians promptly if they came with him but thought he would require another day or two to assemble them. He mentioned Gen Rikhye and an Ethiopian with U.S. military training on UN staff and other officers from neutral UN Missions, such as Sweden. View was also expressed that Sovs will desire to evacuate and dismantle bases as rapidly as possible and that it would probably be politic to give them couple of days to get this operation well under way before insisting on inspection on the spot. However on-spot inspection could commence day of SYG's arrival, accompanying observers proceeding immediately to sites indicated on maps and photographs we are supplying to Gen Rikhye. Further to his visit to Havana SYG indicated intention to travel neither on Cuban nor U.S. plane but to seek neutral aircraft either by charter or loan. Canadian Air Force plane or Brazilian commercial plane were mentioned as possibilities. SYG also indicated intention to establish separate and secure UN communications facilities with Havana.

¹ Stevenson and Yost conversation with SYG on situation following latest Khrushchev letter to the President. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2861.

As source of additional inspectors to be despatched later Gen Rikhye presented list which included Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sweden, Yugoslavia, UAR, Brazil, Mexico and Switzerland. Stevenson expressed some doubt whether Nigeria and Ghana at least had sufficiently-trained personnel for this duty.

Stevenson mentioned that U.S. had called off air reconnaissance for the moment but that problem of earliest possible verification of dismantling is of course most urgent. SYG strongly welcomed stoppage of reconnaissance and said he was sure this would help strengthen favorable atmosphere and reduce possibility of incidents. Question was raised whether would be possible for U.S. to announce suspension of blockade at moment when SYG arrives in Havana. He felt this would be extremely helpful to him in discussions with Cubans.

SYG and his colleagues expressed very great gratification at substitution Kuznetsov for Zorin, with which Stevenson most heartily concurred.

Stevenson

**446. Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Alphand,
October 28¹**

October 28, 1962

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Hervé Alphand, Ambassador of France

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

The Secretary gave Ambassador Alphand a rundown of the developments up to and including the latest message from Khrushchev. He stressed that no commitments whatsoever had been made by the United States Government to Khrushchev beyond those related to the situation in Cuba. Ambassador Alphand asked whether the Secretary could explain the discrepancy between Khrushchev's letter of Friday, October

¹ Latest developments in Cuba including Khrushchev's recent letter. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

26, and the message of Saturday the 27th, in which the Soviet Government had attempted to link the Turkish IRBMs to Cuba. The Secretary said he thought that Khrushchev had written the October 26th letter personally, but that he had perhaps not coordinated his reply with his colleagues. The latter had perhaps upbraided him for not having tried to obtain concessions from the United States in exchange for a deal on Cuba, and the result was the second letter of October 27th. The Secretary said that it was much too early to consider ourselves to be out of danger. We must be cautious and we must not relax our preparations until and unless we are assured beyond all possible doubt that work has been stopped on the bases, that the weapons have been dismantled, and that they are leaving Cuba.

Ambassador Alphand speculated at some length on the significance of what had been going on in the Kremlin. He said that Khrushchev's letter of October 26 (which he was given to read) showed symptoms of hysteria and mental disequilibrium. He said he thought that the situation was still very dangerous, as one could not tell what would happen within the counsels of the Soviet Government. The Ambassador added that if things continued to go in the present direction, this was a tremendous achievement on the part of the United States, with very great implications for the posture of the Free World in relation to the Communist Bloc. He said that the United States enjoyed the full support of its Allies in what it was trying to do.

447. Telegram 7065 from JCS to CINCLANT, CINCONAD, and CINCSAC, October 28¹

October 28, 1962

Your attention is invited to latest Soviet proposal. The JCS are of the opinion that this may be an insincere proposal to gain time. Hence, there should be no relaxation of alert procedures.

Herbert D. Riley
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

¹ Instruction not to relax alert procedures despite latest Soviet proposal. Top Secret. 1 p. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 25–31, 1962.

448. Letter from U Thant to the President, October 28, enclosing text of Secretary General's reply to Castro¹

October 28, 1962

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I should be grateful if you could transmit the following message to President Kennedy:

"Yesterday I sent to Mr. Stevenson a copy of the reply dated 27 October sent to me by Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. Today I enclose a copy of my reply to the Prime Minister of Cuba.

Mr. Stevenson has also given me a copy of your letter dated October 27 addressed to Chairman Khrushchev. I am very happy to note your spirit of cooperation and your concern for peace. In particular, I note that in this letter you have stated as follows:

'1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate UN observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2. We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the UN to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.'

I would also like to be able to convey to Premier Fidel Castro the assurances contained in your letter to Chairman Khrushchev that upon the establishment of adequate arrangements to insure the carrying out of the objectives mentioned as the first condition in your letter to Chairman Khrushchev as quoted above, the U.S. Government would remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and also give assurances against the invasion of Cuba, in which other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to join.

I hope that my understanding of the lines on which a satisfactory solution of this problem could be reached is correct."

¹ Comments on President's spirit of cooperation and concern for peace. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.

449. Supplement 9 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 28¹

October 28, 1962

NOTICE

This report is based primarily on detailed analysis of low-altitude photography taken on Saturday, 27 October 1962. (See Figure 4 for tracks.) The primary emphasis is placed here on a technical evaluation of force readiness, pace of construction, and changes in the deployment program (Table 1). This report does not attempt to estimate Soviet intent to attack the United States.

SUMMARY

1. All 24 MRBM launchers are believed to be fully operational. (See Figure 2.)

2. Activity was continuing at all the MRBM and IRBM missile sites covered on Saturday, 27 October. (See Figures 1 and 2.) Camouflage and covering with canvas and natural concealment was continuing at the MRBM sites and is becoming more effective.

3. No IRBM missiles, missile transports or erectors have been identified. However, we have identified oxidizer trailers and possible fuel transporters among the support equipment near Guanajay IRBM Site 1. These fuel transporters are larger in size than similar fuel transporters at MRBM sites.

4. No new MRBM or IRBM sites have been detected; however, we have had no high altitude coverage appropriate for search since 23 October 1962.

5. *[text not declassified]*

6. There is more evidence of the intent to have nuclear warhead bunkers at each launch site.

¹ Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).

October 29, 1962

450. Memorandum for the record, October 29¹

October 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 29 October 1962

1. Mr. Kaysen presided throughout the meeting. The DEFCONS all remain at 3, except for SAC which is at 2, and USCINCEUR which is shown as being at 5. Actually, General Norstad has ordered the implementation of a certain number of specific readiness measures by both the US and Allied forces under his command so it is not quite accurate to peg USCINCEUR as being at DEFCON 5, but it is probably close enough to do so.

2. The following matters arose:

a. Captain Shepard quickly briefed the group on quarantine developments in the Caribbean noting that the so-called "quarantine line" is now being modified so that it is no longer the extensive arc of a circle whose center is at the eastern tip of Cuba, but rather a general line out from and more or less parallel to the line of the Bahamas.

b. The group briefly discussed the idea of the President's going on TV after the return from Cuba of U Thant and those who will be accompanying him. There were arguments both ways, and certainly nothing conclusive emerged, but I would say that the consensus was not to plan on such a TV move, but to remain flexible and able to react to events connected with the U Thant mission as they occur.

c. Another general consensus which emerged from an inconclusive discussion was that Berlin is now likely to become a hot spot once again. It was noted that the Chancellor is still planning to arrive on 7 November, and I dare say that the planning for his visit will now step into high gear.

d. Ralph Dungan announced that the representative group of policy-makers from AID would be spending this coming weekend at Camp David in order to take an initial look at where we should try to head during FY 64. Dungan continues to be concerned because the AID

¹ Daily White House staff meeting including discussion of quarantine developments; Presidential TV statement; Berlin; AID in FY 64; aerial reconnaissance of Cuba by UN; critique of crisis. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct-Nov 1962.

people seem constitutionally unable to take a big, over-all, integrative policy look at US objectives world-wide and the appropriate amount of foreign aid to support them. Kaysen continues to resist the Dungan idea that all or some members of the NSC staff could help in this matter; Kaysen feels that the Bureau of the Budget is a more logical and effective forum for this kind of review. In short, this Dungan-Kaysen discussion also really got no place.

e. Mike Forrestal noted that somebody (I think he himself, and maybe Arthur Schlesinger) went up to New York yesterday to explore the idea of having the UN take over the problem of Cuban surveillance by putting UN observers on US planes painted white. U Thant turned down this idea last evening (Sunday); meanwhile we are, of course, continuing US surveillance. Tom Parrott noted that no one really knows what happened to the missing aircraft, but the presumption is that it was shot down.

f. Ken Hansen tried to create a little interest in conducting a "Lessons Learned" kind of critique—e.g., in the so-called "intelligence failures", in the so-called emergency procedures of the government, and in the civil defense area. Kaysen's reaction was that, despite the obvious shortcomings and gaps which the crisis of last week exposed, we would not do anything substantially differently even if we were to start all over again from scratch. I think what he means is that, in civil defense for example, we would still decide not to go into a big national-level crash program because the disadvantages and negative arguments are still as effective as they were before.

Legere

451. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 29¹

Meeting No. 11

October 29, 1962

1. Director McCone summarized the current intelligence, calling attention to evidence that Cuban forces had been ordered not to fire unless fired upon.

2. The President read and approved the announcement of the establishment of a Coordinating Committee to take care of matters involved in the conclusion of the Cuban crisis.

3. There was a general discussion about the continuance of the quarantine and aerial reconnaissance. The President decided:

a. U.S. ships are to stay on station, pending satisfactory UN arrangements. Ships entering the quarantine zone will be hailed and, if they identify themselves, will be allowed to proceed to port, where UN inspectors will verify the ships' statement of their cargo. In response to press questions during the next twenty-four hours, we will attempt to leave the status of the quarantine ambiguous; but we will not say that it has been called off.

b. The call-up of the air reserves is not to be rescinded.

c. Low-level, but not U-2, air reconnaissance will be prepared for today, subject to a final decision by 2:00 PM. The plan is that notification of the reconnaissance will be given the Cubans, Russians and U Thant in advance. U Thant will be told that the U.S. will not fly further missions after today if UN arrangements for verification of the cessation of the work on the missile sites and their dismantlement can be arranged promptly.

4. The President directed that the new Coordinating Committee should:

a. Urgently work on arrangements for the long-range inspection and verification of armaments in Cuba.

b. Make certain that the problem of hemispheric subversion is dealt with in the UN discussions because, even though it is not specifically mentioned, it can be tied in to the reference to peace in the Caribbean.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Current intelligence on Cuba; establishment of Coordinating Committee; quarantine and aerial reconnaissance; air reserves call-up; UN arrangements for verification; agenda for new Coordinating Committee. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings, 11–16.

452. Memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 29¹

October 29, 1962

McGB:

Planning Group this morning was seized by near euphoria. Most talk was on how to exploit our victory.

I'm less euphoric. We've given K. a bloody nose in a way very hard for USSR to take without attempting in some way to recoup. Whole image of Soviet "invincibility" will be eroded if K. doesn't do something.

On other hand, key lesson of Cuba "test of wills" is Soviet caution in a showdown. Hence I don't see early Berlin showdown as sensible gambit (though Soviets could do plenty in Berlin short of this).

At any rate, it is to our advantage to keep Soviets talking, rather than acting. *Why don't we now press for a Summit?* We'd be dealing from a strong position, and could offer a few small cards on Berlin in exchange for broad *modus vivendi*. Such a move would look peaceful and statesmanlike at a time when everyone now knows our strength.

Also, we'll never be in a better position to bring our allies along with anything we want. I'd argue for moving fast. Why doesn't President announce invite in speech, if he gives one.

RWK

¹ Report on Planning Group meeting and proposal for a U.S.-Soviet summit. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. I.

453. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 29¹

October 29, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Monday, 29 October

JCS meeting at 1400, attended in part by SecDef:

SecDef: There is no Cuba-Turkey deal at present, but problem of removing Jupiters from Turkey and probably Italy on grounds of obsolescence soon will require attention.

CJCS gives guidance resulting from latest ExComm meeting:

President wants a paper describing the effects of advanced Soviet ground equipment upon an invasion, with casualty estimates. (Response is CM-85-62 [illegible in the original] 2 Nov) US representatives at the UN do not expect the UN to take over inspection and surveillance as quickly as Washington hopes. One solution suggested is reconnaissance flights by C-130s manned by Indonesian crews. The White House believes Khrushchev is going to stand behind his offer, but sober recognition of problems to be worked out has replaced the initial exhilaration.

SecDef guidance: The US should do nothing that would suggest to the Soviets that our readiness posture is being reduced.

¹ Jupiter missile deal; UN inspection and surveillance; U.S. readiness posture. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

SecDef favors continued US air reconnaissance but doubts flights will be authorized after today, so he favors quick institution of UN reconnaissance.

454. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Rusk, October 29¹

October 29, 1962

M said they just came back from Thant and understands Ball gave the Sec a rundown but M will fill in more: There may be a time element—he wanted announcement to go out about the freezing of the quaranting (read it). M asked it has gone out yet and Sec said no—thought tomorrow a.m. M thinks that does not matter. Thinks it should be in that form and only that and no talk about its coming back on. Sec said trouble is he is not going to get to see the sites. M said that is the reason—anxious to have you put in accordance with his request. . . .

Kuznetsov said re Red Cross they would permit them to inspect cargoes to see no arms at all coming in from the Soviet Union to Cuba but did not want personnel to be boarding from American men-of-war—should be from a Russian or neutral vessel. Re operating within the ports—o.k. with him if Castro agrees. Sec said would Red Cross take on a political job like that? M does not know but there was a communication with someone and the upshot was they were anxious to be of service and so perhaps they would be ready. K said he did not make it a condition but prefers personnel should be composed of neutrals or non-aligned people. Sec said make it Swiss then. M said o.k. and thinks they would be competent. We did not commit on Red Cross. M thinks you might get good personnel from Swiss rather than otherwise—this for inspection at sea or at port if Castro agrees. M said they made it clear there is a problem in the interim because Kuznetsov made it definite there could be no on-site inspection until dismantling had been done. M said we can't be sure they are gone until there is inspection. It ended by our indicating to him we would reserve our right through a UN reconnaissance satisfactory or us or our own air

¹ Quarantine inspection at sea; UN weapon inspections in Cuba; disarmament. No classification marking. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, (McN Working Papers).

reconnaissance during the period they were saying they were dismantling and then see re on-site inspection thereafter. M replied this was K but thinks he was talking about on-site. They agreed we could work out some arrangement on that. M said to Thant we have to make up our mind whether we would be satisfied in the interval with aerial reconnaissance minus assurances on site. M thinks air is better but on site could supplement aerial. Whether K is ready to take that or whether he is just talking about on-site inspection, M does not know but T thinks he would(?) object to aerial inspection. Those are the salient features of this.

Re Cubans: He wanted to make it clear they had made no commitment whatever to the existence of UN body on the Island. They would welcome Thant to talk about it but would negotiate out what they were prepared to do. In conv with Thant re guarantee to Cubans—he saw a copy of letter Stevenson sent yesterday—talking about continuation of absence of weapons: would it mean *permanent* inspection? If you ask for that he felt the Cubans would ask for the right of UN visitation of CIA establishments around the Caribbean. Sec said it would involve a lot of inspection in Cuba. T said if you don't mean *permanent* he does not think we will face the problem and he won't bring it up.

M said Yost was with him and checked to see if he left anything out. JOHNSON indicated he was on the extension and asked what weapons were included? M said we would give him a list of weapons which Sec said Khrushchev mentioned. J sent to Ball some notes on this which might be of help. M said they would watch for those. M said it was clear when he talked about Red Cross inspection he was talking about *any* weapons. M said the procedure would be when Russians had completed their dismantling and removal they would go to SC and say we have completed this and we propose a UN body go down to confirm the fact that all our commitments have been fulfilled—then there would be a resolution. Sec asked did they say how long? M talked about it at considerable length—our estimate is a month. Thant said he got the contrary impression from K of a week. They did not ask when specifically—this is only an impression. Sec said if so they must have ships around. M said there are—about 13. M said we have to communicate with him whether we would be willing to take a suitable Red Cross inspection on ships. Also have to tell him whether we would be satisfied for an interim period with merely an aerial reconnaissance. Sec said when does he want to know. M thinks before he leaves tomorrow. Sec said we will not know about our takes until early a.m. and should see those before making up our mind. M agreed—wondered if we can communicate when he gets there. He will leave at 10. Sec thinks we may be able to do it by then. M said could do it

now on Red Cross. Sec said yes but should give both answers at the same time. Sec asked re atmosphere from Cuban talk. M said they had the idea they might be sticky about conditions. They mentioned Guantanamo and Castro's speech. We were emphatic we would have to have some sort of verification of this during interim period. We could not take the chance. M replied he thinks Thant agreed with that. Modalities had to be discussed and K spoke about how Red Cross would be brought into action etc. M replied their preference for boarding is from neutral or Russian vessels. Sec asked if Thant has asked the Red Cross and M said he will wait until we say it will be satisfactory to us.

M said through his disarmament line he got word this p.m. from Zorin's assistant that K would like to see him. Wondered whether he ought to see him—thinks Stevenson will see him for lunch but he is apparently clandestinely indicating he wants to talk with M. M does not want to go out of line. Sec said to go to see what is on his mind. If we could make moves on disarmament so much the better. M thinks Stevenson is not in accord with this but will talk it over with him.

455. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 29¹

Meeting No. 12

October 29, 1962

1. Secretary Rusk reported on developments during the day in the UN, including a summary of the Soviet position on inspection as stated by Kuznetsov to U Thant.

a. International Red Cross officials could inspect all cargoes going to Cuba to insure that no Soviet arms are landed—inspection to be at sea from non-U.S. ships or in Cuban ports.

b. No on-site inspection until Soviet missiles are removed, which possibly could be accomplished in a week.

2. The President agreed to asking the International Red Cross to take over responsibility for the inspection of all ships from Bloc ports proceeding to Cuba.

¹ UN developments; IRC inspections; on-site inspections; lifting of U.S. quarantine; inspection system; political developments. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol II, Meetings 11–16.

3. The President agreed to accept Acting Secretary General U Thant's request that the U.S. quarantine be lifted for two days during his visit to Cuba, scheduled for tomorrow and Wednesday.

4. The President directed that no air reconnaissance missions be flown during the next two days. He said we should tell U Thant that after his visit to Cuba we intend to fly reconnaissance missions until the UN makes satisfactory arrangements for aerial surveillance of Cuba.

5. The President directed that urgent study be given to the elements of an inspection system which would be satisfactory to us.

6. Secretary Rusk stated that political developments today appeared to support the belief that Khrushchev's proposal to withdraw his missiles is sincere, but pictures from today's reconnaissance mission will reveal whether work has stopped on the missile sites.

McGeorge Bundy

456. Telegram 909 from Rio de Janeiro, October 29¹

Rio de Janeiro, October 29, 1962

Embtel 902. The best laid plans can go awry. When I called on Goulart Monday afternoon to ask him about telephones (DEPCIRTEL 780) he first brought out some whiskies to toast the American victory and then said General Albino rather than Bastian Pinto would be having the talk with Fidel in Havana. Instructions to Albino, in addition to our points, are to tell him that Goulart astounded and dismayed by way in which Fidel had put Cuba in position of being mere merchandise of USSR to be traded for Turkish bases regardless of Cuban sovereignty or Cuban popular desires. Goulart had been trying defend position of Fidel and Cuban integrity but could not defend obvious position of Russian satellite.

This not bad in itself, but I would have far more confidence in Bastian than in Albino to get our desired message fully across. As it is we can only hope for results, which Goulart promises report to me promptly Wednesday after Albino's return tomorrow night.

Goulart also said he thought tremendous propaganda opportunity for US in showing Cubans how they were being used by Russians

¹ General Albino to visit to Havana to talk with Castro. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2962.

while indicating sympathy with Cubans in any real efforts for independent Cuban development. I pointed out, apart from Soviet bases, continuing problem remainder of Cuban subversive OARs. Goulart replied that after last weekend's developments, such activities would be far weaker and Brazilian Communists today were hiding heads in shame.

Gordon

457. Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, October 29¹

October 29, 1962

SUBJECT

Post Mortem on Cuba

The basic point, it would seem to me, would be to set forth some general considerations about the value and limitations of force in foreign policy under the guise of a report to the nation on the rise and resolution of the Cuban crisis. The speech should interpret the nature of the victory in such a way as to accustom the nation to the future use of limited force for limited purposes while at the same time pointing out that our success in Cuba does not prove that force can solve everything. The speech might also deal with specific Cuban problems, emphasize our insistence on thoroughgoing verification of the armistice terms and justify the guarantee given to Castro.

I would suggest the following main points:

1. Our troubles are not at an end; but significant steps have been taken in the last 48 hours to lift the threat of war from the western hemisphere and the world. This has been made possible by the unity of the American people (including Republicans) behind a firm policy; by the unswerving support of our allies (especially by the OAS); by the framework for world discussion provided by the UN; and—it must be added—by the belated recognition of Chairman Khrushchev that his adventure was a dangerous miscalculation which was bringing the world close to war.

¹ Post mortem on Cuba. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. IV(B).

2. The concluding problems are yet to be worked out. We will continue our vigilance and surveillance until international bodies are prepared to take over these responsibilities. Every step in the resolution of this crisis will be rigorously verified. As for the guarantee against invasion, this step is fully consistent with our American traditions. The events of the last weeks have fully exposed Castro; and we are confident that the forces of change will take care of his regime more effectively than invasion ever could.

3. What do we learn from this experience? We learn first that firmness in defense of our vital interests is the central guarantee of security and peace. If we aren't prepared to be firm, we can expect neither security nor peace.

4. We learn, second, that the two extreme views on the proper role of force in international relations are wrong—the view which rejects force altogether as an instrument of foreign policy; and the view which supposes that force can solve everything.

5. If we had not reacted at all, we would have acquiesced in a drastic revision of the world balance of power. Our use of force was effective for several specific reasons—because our objectives were limited; because our force was precisely adjusted to these limited objectives; because Cuba does not lie within the range of Soviet vital interests or within the reach of Soviet conventional power; because the Communists knew that they were in the wrong and could not sustain their action before the world (your law of equity); because, above all, the Soviet action represented a drastic threat to the delicate and precarious equilibrium of power in the world—the complex and accepted if never explicit agreement by which nations live and let live—which is the present foundation of our uneasy world peace.

The Soviet Union must expect any future interference with this world equilibrium of power to be met with an equally stern and united response.

6. Because force worked in this context does not mean that it will work in all contexts—that it will work if we on our part should seek to upset this precarious equilibrium—that it will work where the Soviet Union considers that its case is sound and that its vital interests are directly involved.

7. Our object is to use limited force to prevent the use of unlimited force. It is to confine the world contest to competition in the ways of peace—competition in advancing the welfare and freedom of ordinary men and women. In this competition, we can be confident of the superiority of democratic institutions and values.

8. The Cuban crisis, we hope, marked an end and a beginning—an end to violent adventures designed to overturn the equilibrium of

world power; and a beginning of fresh initiatives for peace, including a new attack on nuclear testing, disarmament, overseas bases (?), and on world social and economic problems.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

October 30, 1962

458. Memorandum for the record, October 30¹

October 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 30 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided. DEFCONS no change.

2. Before the meeting began I happened to be talking with Bob Komer in his office when he received a telephone call from Bundy. From the end of the conversation which I heard, it was apparent that Bundy was asking Komer's opinion on what we should do concerning aerial surveillance, given the fact that yesterday's photographs seemed to have been inconclusive. Komer said that his *Fingerspitzgefühl* was that we should inform U Thant before his take-off from New York this morning that, due to the inconclusiveness of yesterday's effort, we propose to continue surveillance today. Bundy apparently said "Thank you", and hung up.

3. The following matters arose in the meeting:

a. Reference paragraph 2 above, Bundy told Komer he had decided that the best thing to do was "to wait until we see the evidence", which I interpreted as meaning that the Executive Committee would, based on yesterday's evidence, make the decision at its 10 o'clock meeting this morning.

b. Hansen and Bundy engaged in a cryptic exchange concerning certain recommended improvements in our communications with Latin America, including especially Panama. This may have been something that has come out of the Communications Subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee. In any event, Hansen said that the basic improvement recommended in Latin American communications would come to about \$100 million, and those with Panama separately an additional \$50 million. Bundy referred to the \$20 million ceiling on expenditures which Secretary McNamara has apparently been authorized to make more or less informally, and I gathered that Hansen was going to check all this out with Defense Comptroller Hitch.

¹ Daily White House staff meeting including discussion of aerial surveillance; communications with Latin America; Executive order on shipping restrictions to Cuba; press leaks; press speculation re intelligence gathering; Cuban exiles; Adenauer visit; Nitze Subcommittee. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Box 25, Chairman's Staff Meetings.

c. Kaysen once again referred to the famous Executive Order on shipping restrictions to Cuba, which, of course, antedated the present crisis by a week or so. Actually, this Order has never been formally published and is therefore not yet in effect, although other countries are acting as though it were. Decision: Kaysen will see that "a State Department spokesman" issues a statement between now and Thursday to the effect that, due to the complications of the current crisis, it was necessary to rework and reassess the Order; he will also prepare a short paper along the same lines for the President in anticipation of a possible question at the Thursday press conference.

d. Kaysen said that the *Times* of New Delhi is reporting that American arms are already enroute to India, but that this statement is not true since we are still shuffling our papers in this matter.

e. Either Bromley Smith or Clifton reported that the President was disturbed by the Max Frankel column in this morning's *New York Times*, since it purports to reveal Administration thinking and motivation prior to the definitive beginning of the crisis as signaled by the President's speech of Monday, 22 October. Somebody noted that the President had spoken to Congressional leaders about the gamut of available alternatives, and everyone sort of relaxed because it seemed so obvious that any leak could be attributed to one of these Congressmen.

f. Tom Parrott warned that we could now expect a spate of journalistic speculation on the reliability and effectiveness of our intelligence gathering—e.g., for example, why did we not know earlier that SSM sites were being constructed? Arthur Schlesinger referred to Senator Keating in this context, and Parrott said that although Keating's information was almost surely based on refugee information, he was just lucky enough to have some refugee information that fell into the 5% that can usually be considered reliable.

g. Bundy asked if anyone had any bright ideas on what to do about "our Cubans". A very cryptic Bundy-Kaysen exchange then ensued, with a reference to Andros Island that I did not understand, but if I had to guess would say that there is some scheme abroad to relocate (voluntarily, of course) Cuban refugees on Andros Island. Andros belongs to the UK, but I suppose that need not stand in the way. Bundy ended this discussion by saying that at least six agencies of the Government which should have been doing something about the Alpha 66 group, have now been told to do something in fact—meaning, I suppose, come up with some ideas.

h. The discussion then turned to the Adenauer visit scheduled to begin on 7 November. It was felt that the first day might be devoted to listening to Adenauer tell the President: "I knew you had it in you all the time", but that this would logically lead to a second day devoted to Adenauer's expecting the President to demonstrate equal and

equally timely toughness on Berlin-Germany. I asked what had happened to the idea of having Thompson-Tyler-Hillenbrand come up with an appropriate brief agenda and list of papers by 1 November, and it appears that, despite the press of the recent and continuing Cuban crisis, such a list will become available (presumably to the White House) by the end of this week—just a few days late, in other words. I would certainly think it appropriate for General Gray or somebody else in JCS to try to tie discreetly into whatever effort is going into this agenda exercise.

i. The discussion on Adenauer's visit led to mention of the reorientation of the Nitze Subcommittee. After yesterday's meeting of the Nitze Subcommittee, which I attended, Nitze saw Bundy, and the outcome of their conversation seems to have been that the Nitze Subcommittee will hereafter remove its principal focus from Berlin contingency planning aspects to a broader and more analytical look at long-range proposals for a Berlin settlement. If I read this fancy language correctly, it means that the Nitze Subcommittee is getting into the business of US negotiating positions for use with the Soviets. At yesterday afternoon's meeting, Mr. Nitze enunciated a few new and startling ideas; although Ambassador Thompson was at first inclined to think that the US should not at this time take any Berlin initiatives, his opposition seemed to diminish when Mr. Nitze said that the Subcommittee could merely work at establishing agreed positions within the US Government, without any commitment to the content or timing of tactics, including the tactics of it, when, and how to approach the Soviets or to wait for them to approach us.

Legere

459. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 30¹

Meeting No. 13

October 30, 1962

1. Director McCone presented the current intelligence and reported that incomplete interpretation of the pictures from yesterday's reconnaissance mission did not reveal whether work on the missile sites had halted or whether dismantlement of the missiles had begun. Mr. Salinger was authorized to inform the press that it was too early to make any judgment.

2. Secretary McNamara reported he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

3. The President reaffirmed his directive that no air reconnaissance missions be flown over Cuba today or tomorrow.

4. Secretary McNamara informed the President that there were a dozen issues involved in the conclusion of the Cuban crisis which would be studied today and reported on at tomorrow's meeting.

5. The President asked that members of the Executive Committee avoid all discussion with reporters, except with his specific approval, and approved in principle a plan being drawn up to ensure that the Departments of State and Defense and the White House give a consistent story of the Cuban crisis.

6. The President decided not to issue the draft Executive Order covering ships engaged in the Cuba trade and asked the State Department to background the press as to the reason, i.e. the draft shipping orders were to deal with a situation quite different from that created by the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

7. Acting Director Wilson reported that Cuban exiles might buy time on U.S. radio stations to make inflammatory statements about current policy toward Cuba. He was authorized to discuss with the FCC some way of dealing with this problem without appearing to be asking for radio censorship.

8. The President expressed his hope that insofar as possible refugee groups be prevented from taking actions in Cuba which would upset negotiations under way to conclude the Cuban crisis.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Current intelligence; U-2 flights; press restrictions; Executive order on Cuban shipping; Cuban exiles. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16.

460. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 30¹

October 30, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Tuesday, 30 October

JCS meeting at 1400:

Briefing by DIA: Yesterday's photography covered 14 of the 24 launch pad areas, 13 of 14 erectors have been moved out of position. This is not positive evidence of dismantling. Moving erectors out does not mean firing capability is degraded.

¹ Briefing by DIA re October 29 photography of missile sites in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

**461. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara,
October 30¹**

JCSM-851-62

October 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Points to be Considered in Current Negotiations (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following points should be included as conditions to negotiations on the removal of Soviet offensive capabilities from Cuba:

a. The elimination of any and all surface-to-surface missiles (including ship-based), bomber aircraft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles, warheads for any of the above weapons, mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items, and missile fuel. This category must exclude from Cuba all nuclear-capable delivery systems.

b. The continuing right of the United States to conduct adequate aerial surveillance, to include a guarantee of noninterference by surface-to-air missiles, aircraft, and other air defense weapons, during negotiations, and as long as the United States has in any manner guaranteed noninvasion of Cuba.

c. The immediate cessation of construction of all missile sites and bases for bomber aircraft.

d. The right to continue, and if necessary, to increase, the quarantine and other protective measures until the United States is satisfied that any threat is removed.

e. Members of any UN inspection team cannot be drawn from Communist Bloc countries, should come from neutral or nonaligned countries, and must have technical competence adequate to carry out this task. The inspection must include not only missile sites but ports and airfields.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following are matters against which we should guard in negotiations, and that the US negotiators should exclude these matters from discussion:

a. The involvement of Guantanamo base rights, aircraft landing rights, and water supply guarantees.

b. The involvement of any other multilateral or bilateral alliance agreements and collective security arrangements such as NATO, CENTO, SEATO, the problem of Berlin, the matters of JUPITER and THOR bases, SAC bases, and POLARIS support facilities. In short, the discussion must be limited to Cuba alone.

¹ Points to consider in current negotiations on the removal of Soviet offensive capabilities from Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, OASD/ISA Files; FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 381 Jan-Oct.

c. Any arrangements for the withdrawal of US forces or reduction in the present buildup until after the United States is assured that all of the offensive weapon capability has been eliminated from Cuba.

d. Any arrangements which would restrict the rights of the Cuban people, wherever they may be, to determine for themselves the political future of their country.

For the Joints Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**462. Memorandum from McCone to the Attorney General,
McNamara, Rusk, and General Taylor, October 30¹**

October 30, 1962

This is to advise you that there are at the present time 20 intelligence collecting infiltration and guerrilla warfare teams who have been carefully trained and equipped with communication facilities available for such use as the JCS may indicate. These teams are all Cubans, there are no Americans or other foreign nationals included, they have been carefully selected by men familiar with the Cuban community and the tradecrafts involved and are ready to go. In addition there are a number of others who are partially trained that could be brought to a reasonable level of efficiency in a short time.

At a meeting on 26 October it was decided that General Lansdale would determine JCS requirements from General Carroll and State requirements for political information from Secretary Alexis Johnson and then determine what resources were available and what actions would be desirable to accomplish the needed results. CIA is awaiting word from General Lansdale. In the meantime, with General Lansdale's concurrence, CIA has taken steps to inform CINCLANT and several other Commands of the availability of the above assets.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Information on intelligence collecting infiltration and guerrilla warfare teams. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62–11/12/62.

463. Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, October 30¹

October 30, 1962

SUBJECT

Guarantees from Cuba with respect to Subversive Activities

The question has been raised as to whether or not in connection with our assurances not to invade we should seek assurances not only with respect to offensive weapons but also with respect to subversive activities against Latin American countries from Cuba or by the present Cuban regime.

It is recommended that no attempt be made to secure such assurances for the following reasons:

(1) The initiative with respect to subversive activities of a communist character against existing regimes in Latin America comes from Cuba, from other Soviet bloc countries and from indigenous communist or Castro-sympathizing groups. While it would be of significant help if activities from Cuba were stopped, it would not be at all impossible to step up initiatives from other Soviet bloc countries to take Cuba's place. It does not seem feasible to seek assurances from all bloc countries to stay out of Latin America. There would still remain the indigenous communist forces to be dealt with and, therefore, the communist problem in Latin America would by no means disappear.

(2) Such assurances might give cause for Latin American countries to relax present inadequate but still helpful efforts to control communist subversion within their boundaries and this would be most unfortunate, since, for reasons given above, one could still expect substantial efforts to upset present regimes and defeat their programs.

(3) The definition of subversive activities to be stopped and the enforcement of any such agreement as defined would be extraordinarily difficult. On the one hand it is difficult to draw a line between information and educational activities and subversion, between the selling of arms and the provision of arms for guerrilla forces and civil violence, between providing funds for cultural and education purposes and providing funds for subversive organizations. On the other hand it is extraordinarily difficult to detect and prove those activities which everyone would agree were subversive. It would be a massive undertaking with constant argument and little result.

¹ Guarantees from Cuba with respect to subversive activities. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-3062.

(4) To secure any such commitment from Cuba the United States would almost certainly have to accept commitments to refrain from subversive activities against the regime in Cuba. It would also have to agree to seek similar commitments from other Latin American countries. Such a commitment on our part has a number of strong disadvantages:

(a) It would go strongly counter to United States policy and to Hemisphere policy as agreed upon at Punta del Este and elsewhere to tie our hands with respect to a communist regime in the Hemisphere with ties of any kind to the Soviet bloc.

(b) It would be impossible for the United States to have any assurance that the other Latin American countries would be willing or able to enforce such an agreement on their citizens and the United States would be blamed for violations by them.

(c) The United States itself would undoubtedly comply much more honestly than the Castro regime and thereby put itself at a serious disadvantage with respect to a regime which we would like to see disappear. At the same time that major activities by us would be curtailed, we do not have the capacity to completely control the activities of the exile groups. They would continue to mount pin pricks which would subject us to criticism at the same time that we were getting no benefits from a major effort.

(d) Not only with refugee groups but with our own citizens, we would have great difficulty in view of our traditions of free speech in convincing those responsible for enforcing such an agreement that there was a legitimate distinction between the activities of the government and those of United States citizens. In other words our governmental system would ensure that we would be in constant hot water with our own people on the one hand and international bodies on the other without accomplishing anything very substantial.

For all these reasons it seems highly desirable to avoid any discussion of reciprocal commitments with respect to any aspect of the question of subversion and confine commitments to strictly military matters.

CC: U—Mr. Ball

G—Mr. Johnson (seen)

DOD—Colonel McNaughton

464. List of Outstanding Issues prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, October 30¹

October 30, 1962

The attached is the approved list of outstanding issues prepared for the use of the NSC Executive Committee at its meeting 6:00 p.m., October 30, 1962, in the State Department.

Attachment

Cuba [illegible in the original]

- I. Theory of operation.
 - A. What is to be removed? (Maximum objective breaking military tie with Moscow on removal of strictly offensive weapons.)
 - B. How to determine what has been removed.
 - 1. To convince U.S.G.
 - 2. To convince U.S. public and others.
 - 3. Precedents.
- II. Short term verification requirements.
 - A. Shipping.
 - 1. Inbound.
 - a. UN port surveillance.
 - b. UN sea surveillance
 - c. US standby position and conditions for change.
 - 2. Outbound.
 - a. Extent UN verification.
 - b. US standby capability.
 - B. Activities in Cuba.
 - 1. UN verification.
 - a. Specified identified sites.
 - b. General inspection.
 - c. Techniques—air—ground.
 - d. Timing—air—ground.

¹ List covers: theory of operation; short-term verification requirements; long-term verification requirements; political arrangements. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV(b).

- 2. US verification.
 - a. Sites vs. general inspection; i.e., requirement for US aerial reconnaissance.
- III. Long term verification requirements.
 - A. Duration of UN arrangements.
 - B. Inauguration of OAS or nuclear free zone arrangements (Brazilian resolution).
 - C. US standby requirement.
- IV. Political Arrangements.
 - A. Extent of U.S. guarantees.
 - 1. Not to invade.
 - 2. Regarding subversion—insurrection in Cuba.
 - 3. In multilateral framework.
 - B. Reciprocal obligations of Cuba.
 - 1. Regarding Latin America.
 - 2. Regarding Guantanamo.
 - 3. International obligations.
 - C. Multilateral arrangements.
 - 1. OAS.
 - 2. UN.
 - D. Handling of refugees.

October 31, 1962

465. Memorandum Prepared for the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council, October 31¹

[less than 1 line not declassified]

October 31, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Further analysis of low-level photography of 29 October provides clear evidence that construction and concealment have continued at the MRBM sites in Cuba since 27 October. Limited and poor photography precludes a positive assessment of construction activity at IRBM sites. There is no evidence that the Soviets are dismantling or vacating any of the sites.

Many of the missile erectors at the MRBM sites have been moved from their hardstands and are no longer visible. There is evidence that at least one of these erectors and most of the missile-associated equipment have been concealed in the woods. As long as missile erectors remain near the MRBM sites, their full operational capability is not affected.

Launch stands, cabling, and other launching components remain in place at each of the MRBM sites. Removal of the cabling would probably be the first step in dismantling operations.

Construction activity at probable nuclear warhead bunkers has continued since 27 October at Sagua La Grande MRBM Site 2 and at San Cristobal MRBM Sites 1 and 3.

There is increasing evidence that a comprehensive air defense system manned by Soviet personnel is reaching full operational status in Cuba. The communications and control structure of the system, probably not yet completed, now includes at least 14 facilities including radar stations, radio stations, and filter centers. *[text not declassified]*

[text not declassified] The presence of automatic anti-aircraft weapons and associated radars at some locations, including the ballistic missile sites, reflects efforts to achieve a defensive capability against low-flying aircraft.

¹ The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 8 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6-11.

Analysis of Soviet merchant ship movements indicates that it would take a minimum of two weeks, and more probably three, to assemble in Cuban ports those Soviet dry-cargo ships with hatches suitable for loading missiles.

Dismantling and movement of essential missile facilities to port areas could probably be accomplished within about 24 hours, but about a week would be required for loading.

Inside Cuba, the armed forces remain mobilized. Cuban radios have announced military exercises, which began yesterday and are to continue through 2 November. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] continuing efforts to consolidate ground force defensive positions. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a unified armed forces command in Oriente province, probably under the direct command of Raul Castro. The Kronsadt-class subchaser that went aground near Banes on 28 October has still not been refloated.

[*1 line not declassified*] bitter disappointment at the Cuban end of the conversations that the US invasion many Cubans had expected did not materialize. The CIA station in Florida reports that the morale of the Cuban exile community there has not been at such a low ebb since the failure of the April 1961 invasion.

The possibility of a Cuban reaction against the USSR or of some kind of problem within the Cuban leadership is suggested [*text not declassified*].

DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

U Thant's conversations with Castro yesterday went badly, [*1½ lines not declassified*] the Cubans refuse any form of inspection or any foreign presence in their territory. U Thant still has hopes of "shaking them out" of this position in meetings set for this morning. If not, he may call a Security Council meeting for Thursday to seek more guidance.

Cuban propaganda themes yesterday strongly suggest that Castro is insisting that his "five points"—demands for major US concessions before any US non-aggression guarantee would be acceptable to him—be injected into UN discussions of the issue. Soviet propaganda media have begun to refer to these as "just Cuban demands."

[*1½ lines not declassified*] President Goulart's special emissary, Brazilian pro-Communist General Albino da Silva, was received by Castro immediately on arrival on 29 October. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] da Silva's objective is to "restore the prestige" of Castro in Cuba and Latin America by returning the Cuban crisis to the level of a bilateral US-Cuban problem.

Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov yesterday again assured Ambassador Stevenson "emphatically" that the offensive mis-

siles in Cuba would be dismantled and removed, after which verification could be undertaken by any means the US desired. He said Khrushchev had told him dismantling would take two or three weeks.

Kuznetsov referred several times to removal of US "bases which threatened the Soviet Union as they had removed their base in Cuba which threatened the US."

The UN Secretary-General's office has already been in touch with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has agreed to inspect shipping reaching Cuba. The ICRC is thinking in terms of a staff of 30 which would be briefed in New York before beginning its work.

Foreign Minister Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler yesterday that the USSR wants to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the basis of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters.

Soviet UN officials appear to be trying to convince neutralist representatives that the lesson of the Cuban crisis is "the sinister nature" of all foreign bases and the need for their liquidation, in particular Guantanamo.

In the Geneva talks on a nuclear test ban, a Soviet delegate argued that the Cuban settlement reduces international tension to a point where the West should drop its demands for international controls and on-site inspection.

REACTION AND PROPAGANDA

Moscow propaganda expresses concern that the US still harbors aggressive intentions against Cuba and that Cuban exile groups are plotting against the Castro regime. Moscow has warned that the crisis has not ended and has called for "strict fulfillment" of US pledges of "noninterference in the internal affairs of Cuba."

Soviet propaganda thus far gives no clear indication of policy decisions concerning future diplomatic efforts. A Moscow commentator, however, has endorsed Castro's five demands of 28 October as "just proposals," and the East German *Neues Deutschland* also has called for the US to evacuate its Guantanamo base.

Additional themes which have received a fair amount of emphasis in Soviet broadcasts are calls for removal of the US quarantine of Cuba and for the removal of US missile bases in Turkey.


Izvestiya yesterday gave readers a relatively clear picture of Soviet withdrawal in the face of US threats, but otherwise Moscow has shown considerable sensitivity to suggestions of a Soviet retreat, hailing the settlement as "a major victory for Soviet policy."

Chinese Communists are making their opposition to Soviet policy on Cuba increasingly clear. The editorial in today's *People's Daily* says

that President Kennedy has given nothing but "empty promises" and that his "so-called assurance" against invading Cuba is only a "hoax."

Usually reliable sources report that Latin American Communist parties are encountering considerable rank-and-file criticism of the USSR over the Cuban settlement. A Communist leader in Panama felt Khrushchev should have "sacrificed" Cuba in such a way as to provoke sympathy for Cuba and condemnation of the US. A leader of the pro-Castro Chilean Socialist party noted that public opinion has suddenly turned against Cuba, and the party is reconsidering its pro-Castro stand.

BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA



SOVIET MILITARY STATUS

No significant changes have been noted in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces.

[text not declassified]

[1½ lines not declassified]

SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

As of 0600 EST there are five Soviet tankers (LISICHANSK, MIR, KARL MARX, GROZNY and VLADIMIR), four Soviet dry-cargo vessels (BELOVODSK, E PUGACHEV, MICHURINSK and CHERNYAKOVSK) and one Czechoslovak dry cargo vessel (KLADNO) en route

to Cuba. As of 2100 EST last night, the GROZNY and the BELOVODSK were waiting, dead in the water, near the quarantine line. Kladno was hove to in the same area on 29 October, but we have no later position report.

[1½ lines not declassified]

466. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 31¹

October 31, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Wednesday, 31 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

DIA briefing on photo readout: Construction continues in at least two launching sites, and extreme effort is being extended on extensive camouflage.

¹ DIA briefing on latest photographs; State instructions for UN negotiations; reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

CJCS tables State Dept's draft instructions to the UN delegation about verifying missiles' withdrawal, then leaves for White House meeting.

JCS were particularly disturbed that State's draft had no provision for follow-on guarantees against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. JCS telephoned this to CJCS at the White House. When CJCS returned, he said additions probably would be made. (Note: Msg, SecState 1147 to USUN, 31 Oct, was amended by Msg. SecState 1153 to USUN, 31 Oct)

CJCS also said the President had agreed to resume reconnaissance flights on 1 November. (Note: Flights had been suspended during UN Secretary General U Thant's visit to Cuba on 30–31 October.)

467. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 31¹

Meeting No. 14

October 31, 1962

1. Director McCone stated that aerial photographs taken on October 29 were inconclusive.

2. Secretary Rusk reported that although discussions with Soviet officials indicated that the Russians were prepared to go along with general inspection procedures we think necessary, Castro, in his conversations yesterday with Acting Secretary U Thant, was adamant in his opposition to inspection.

3. Secretary Rusk recommended, and the President agreed, to postpone the President's press conference with the background explanation that Cuban opposition to acceptable inspection procedures created a situation which he did not wish to discuss publicly at this time.

4. The President approved draft instructions to our UN Mission in New York which spell out Cuban inspection procedures acceptable to us. The third phase of inspection covering procedures acceptable to us after the removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba will be discussed with the President at a later meeting.

5. The President directed that reconnaissance missions be flown tomorrow unless significant progress is made in the U Thant-Castro

¹ Inspection procedures; President's press conference; draft instructions to UN Mission; reconnaissance missions; quarantine. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11–16.

discussions. He agreed to informing the Soviets that Cuban opposition to procedures satisfactory to the Russians was causing us serious difficulties which might call for a U.S.-USSR agreement on aerial reconnaissance, rather than UN arrangements, if Castro continues his opposition.

6. There was a general discussion of the future status of the quarantine. The International Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspection measures so long as Castro is opposed to such measures. Consideration was given to broadening the blockade, including POL, in order to bring pressure on the Cubans to accept inspection measures. This proposal would involve the hailing and passing through of Russian ships, but the halting of non-Bloc ships carrying goods included in the broader blockade.

7. The President asked that the OAS be told of Castro's opposition to inspection procedures so that, in the event he continues his opposition, the Latin American countries would be geared up to support future actions we may be required to take.

McGeorge Bundy

468. Memorandum of conversation between Llewellyn Thompson and Zhukov, October 31¹

October 31, 1962

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation—Yuri Zhukov and Mr. Bolshakov—Ambassador Thompson, Wednesday, October 31, 1962, 2:00 p.m.

Zhukov began the conversation by saying that at the meeting he had attended in Andover, the suggestion had been put forward from the American side that President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev, and Premier Castro [illegible in the original] should meet to resolve the Cuban crisis and he asked my opinion about such a proposal. I replied that I could not understand how anyone who knew of the feeling in this country about Mr. Castro could imagine that the President would be willing to meet with him, particularly in present circumstances.

¹ Summit meeting; Soviet Cuban policy; quarantine; verification measures; Indian-Chinese dispute; test ban treaty. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. IV(B).

Zhukov said he agreed that such a meeting would be unwise and said he had suppressed any mention of this in the communiqué on the Andover meeting.

Zhukov then asked my opinion on the advisability of a meeting between the President and Mr. Khrushchev after the Cuban crisis was liquidated, saying he had in mind a meeting in about a month's time. He suggested that in the light of the Cuban affair, both sides would realize the necessity of resolving problems in dispute and preventing any further confrontation of a dangerous nature. Among the questions he mentioned by way of example were disarmament, atomic tests, and NATO-Warsaw Pact problems. He did not mention Berlin in this connection but added proliferation of atomic weapons when I mentioned it.

I said that I thought everyone at the top of this Government had been so preoccupied with the current crisis that they had had little time or energy to think about future steps. I said I thought there was a feeling, which had existed even before the Cuban crisis, that every effort should be made to find a way of avoiding confrontations of this sort. I said I could only express my personal opinions on the question he had raised and went on to say that it seemed to me more important than ever that the President and Mr. Khrushchev should not meet until there was assurance that a positive result would follow. I pointed out that the President welcomed Mr. Khrushchev's proposal for a settlement as a statesman-like act and that we had tried to discourage any tendency here to portray a settlement of the Cuban crisis as a victory or a defeat. I said he should realize, however, that there were many in this country who were describing it as a defeat for the President. He must be aware that a segment of public opinion in this country thought we should have dealt with the Cuban problem before and were now saying that had we done so this crisis could not have arisen. I also pointed out the extremely difficult position in which the Soviet action in sending missiles to Cuba had placed the President. He had gone on record in the midst of an election campaign as saying that Cuba had only defensive arms and his political opponents were making the most of this. I pointed out that this did not provide a very good setting for a meeting. In any event, I thought the first thing was to liquidate the Cuban crisis quickly. I said my own thinking along the lines of the thought he had in avoiding situations where the two nuclear powers meet head-on, was that the field of disarmament might be the most promising and I understood that our people who were concerned with these problems were looking at this aspect.

I then asked Zhukov if he could account for the sudden reversal in Soviet policy when Mr. Khrushchev had on October twenty-sixth sent the President a letter which indicated a solution along the lines

of the settlement eventually reached and the very next day publicly proposing an entirely different course related to missile bases in Turkey. I said that our press had speculated that Mr. Khrushchev had made the first proposal and had been overruled. Zhukov immediately said he was certain this wasn't the case and that Mr. Khrushchev was still the boss. He said he was not in Moscow at the time but his guess would be that the talk in this country and elsewhere both by the press and others that there was a possibility of a Cuban-Turkish deal had led the Kremlin to put this forward in their interests in finding a solution. Mr. Bolshakov emphasized that there was much talk around New York about this matter.

I said that in the light of the circumstances, we had been obliged to consider the possibility that this was simply a stalling technique. I pointed out that we did not know why these missiles had been secretly sent to Cuba and that we could not ignore the possibility that the intention was to fire them once they were in place. I pointed out that this was still a problem since we had no real evidence that they had been dismantled. I said I thought it important to them and to us that we have such evidence at the earliest possible time. Zhukov said he noted that we had said nothing in the press about the aerial reconnaissance on Monday. I said I understood that this showed some construction work had gone forward since our previous reconnaissance and while the evidence was not conclusive, there was certainly nothing on which we could rely to indicate that Mr. Khrushchev's order, which I pointed out he said had already been issued at the time of his letter of October twenty-eight, was being carried out. I suggested that the Soviets should find means to show us that this was being done and implied that until this happened we would have to find out for ourselves. Mr. Zhukov seemed to understand this and in summarizing our conversation just before leaving he stressed this point.

When Zhukov asked about lifting the quarantine, I said we understood that the Cubans had not yet shown any indication of agreeing to the necessary UN measures. I said we had no desire to embarrass them over the quarantine but said that if the Cubans continued to be recalcitrant, the quarantine might be useful. At this point I referred to Mr. Mikoyan's trip and said that I did not envy him his task. Mr. Zhukov asked if any official was going to meet Mr. Mikoyan in New York. I said my understanding was we had never been officially informed of his visit but only had received a request for his plane to stop in transit. I said that Mr. McCloy was available in New York and I thought that if Mr. Mikoyan so desired, Mr. McCloy or Mr. Stevenson would probably be available, but I said that in view of the fact that his stopover was very short and that he would have to spend considerable time with Mr. Kuznetsov, I would be surprised if Mr. Mikoyan wished to have any official conversations at this time.

In the course of the conversation, I pointed out that we had no desire in connection with verification measures to have any access to Soviet technology concerning their missiles but said it was important to know that all the ones we knew were there had gone. When Mr. Zhukov expressed the opinion that there has not been any nuclear missiles in Cuba, I referred to Mr. Khrushchev's conversation with Mr. Knox, and this seemed to "rock" Mr. Zhukov. He said he simply could not believe it.

Mr. Zhukov then turned to the Indian-Chinese dispute, saying he was to see Mr. Harriman next and wondered if he were in charge of massive arms deliveries to India. He pointed out that the Soviet-Chinese alliance was the cornerstone of the socialist camp and that if India received mass shipments of arms, the Soviet Union would not be able to resist demands from its allies. He thought that in the interests of both our countries that this dispute be settled on a political and not military basis and that we should press Nehru to negotiate. I said that I had nothing to do with this area and was not knowledgeable about it but could point out that Mr. Nehru was a peace-loving man who had enormous economic problems in his own country and I could not imagine that he would ask for any more arms than he considered absolutely necessary. I said I was sure we would not try to force any on him. I pointed out that India, more than almost any large country other than China, had desperate need to devote itself to its economic development. Zhukov said he had been shocked at Nehru's appearance on TV and doubted if he could physically survive the strain of this crisis. He said that if Nehru disappeared there might be chaos in India and this would be bad for everyone concerned.

Before leaving, Zhukov turned again to possible questions that might be resolved and said that we would never get anywhere on non-proliferation of atomic weapons until we had a test ban agreement, as otherwise other countries could acquire an atomic capability which could change the whole situation. He said both our countries had made such progress in atomic technology that we needed to test. He also said that the Soviets could not afford underground tests, which were very expensive. I said that as a result of the present crisis the American public and Congress would be more insistent than ever on being certain that any agreement was not violated.

On leaving, Bolshakov complained of a particular picture published in "U.S. News and World Report" showing the President talking to Gromyko and Dobrynin which labeled the Soviet officials as liars. Bolshakov said that he could assure me that neither Gromyko nor Dobrynin knew of this development (presumably the installation of medium-range missiles in Cuba.)

469. Circular telegram 807, October 31¹

October 31, 1962

In his conversations with Castro yesterday and today U Thant was unable to persuade Castro to permit any form of verification by the UN or under its auspices of the removal of offensive military weapons by the USSR from Cuba. This is despite the fact that the USSR has made clear its willingness to have such verification take place.

You are requested soonest to approach your Foreign Minister to urge his government would wish to indicate to Cuban Government that if this defiance continues it will be impossible to continue diplomatic relations with Cuba or at very least most strongly protest Cuban intransigence. You should point out that practically the whole world has welcomed the arrangement agreed upon in principle between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to surmount the threat of nuclear war which the presence of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba presented. For Castro to flout the desire to settle this problem and the UN efforts to do so would seem to make it most difficult to maintain normal relations with his regime. Should be presented factually and not as US pressure.

FYI Similar messages are being sent to most nonbloc countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba. END FYI

For Bern: Above should be passed Swiss Fonoff for info and any steps Swiss Government feels it can usefully take.

Rusk

¹ U Thant discussions with Castro re verification measures. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-3162.

470. Memorandum from Stevenson to McCloy, Ball, and Gilpatric, October 31¹

October 31, 1962

RE

Next Steps in Cuban Crisis

I will be back by 2:30 or 3:00—I hope! We should discuss next steps on several assumptions:

(1) Castro refuses any surveillance during dismantling, but permits verification at end.

(2) Castro refuses even verification.

(3) Castro introduces new matters—refugees, Guantanamo, etc.

(4) U Thant wants prompt Security Council meeting to report his failure and get instructions—possibly on Friday.

(1) If we demand right to aerial reconnaissance during the interval, we should consider the position we would be in if at least neutral non-aligned attitude is that we should trust Soviets to comply, that we are getting all they promised by verification, that we are unreasonable, or enlarging the deal, etc., and, therefore, should we accept and see if we can work out undisclosed deal with Soviets not to shoot if we run occasional high level reconnaissance? What about oblique photography along the coast as Kuznetsov suggested? What if we can't work out such an undisclosed deal with the Soviets? What does the President say when asked about protection during the two-three week period?

(2) If Castro rejects even ex-post-facto verification, could we inspect the outgoing ships at sea and proceed with air reconnaissance as above?

(3) If Castro drags in Guantanamo, refugee activities, inspection in the US, quarantine, etc., should we take the position that we have an agreement with the Soviets on total withdrawal and guarantee of Cuba's integrity, and nothing else? That we will keep our bargain and expect the Soviets to do so too, regardless of Castro's position?

(4) A Security Council meeting with inevitable wrangling and recrimination should be avoided. But if we can persuade U Thant to merely report the failure of his appeal and say that he is proceeding with negotiations in an effort to find ways to implement the Soviet-US agreement, and ask for no debate and no resolution, a meeting might be tolerable. (See Amb. Yost's memo attached).

¹ Next steps in Cuban crisis. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.

If U Thant takes the position that his appeal has failed because one of three parties won't play—and that he is seeking further instructions from SC, we should consider what form of resolution to offer or support. A resolution confined to the simple deal—removal of weapons, lifting of quarantine, guarantee of Cuba—and including nothing about the details of inspection, verification, etc., and calling on U Thant to continue his peace-making role, might be possible.

(5) Until U Thant returns, which may not be until tomorrow, and until Mikoyan has been here, I have some misgivings about any negotiations or exploration with Kuznetsov.

471. Telegram 1153 to USUN, October 31¹

October 31, 1962

Info: AmEmbassy, Moscow. Subject: Cuba: New York Negotiations. Confirming telcon, following for record, are approved changes in instructions communicated DEPTTEL 1147.

1. Section No. 3 should now begin as follows:

INITIAL TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.

The US envisages *multiple* phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures.

2. Insert at end of Section No. 3 QUOTE Arrangements for the third and final phase relating to commitment of the Soviets not to reintroduce offensive weapons will be covered in subsequent instructions UNQUOTE.

3. Insert in Section No. 4 as new third sentence QUOTE One possibility might be aircraft manned by nationals, presumably impartial, designated by UN. Another possibility might be reconnaissance using crews consisting of a representatives of the US, Soviet Union, Cuba and UN representatives under UN aegis. UNQUOTE

4. In Section No. 4, second paragraph, insert QUOTE would be prepared UNQUOTE in lieu of QUOTE will wish UNQUOTE.

5. In Section No. 4 paragraph 4 insert QUOTE in phase 1 UNQUOTE before QUOTE visual monitoring UNQUOTE.

¹ Instructions for New York negotiations on Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Department of Defense, OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct 25–31, 1962.

6. In Section No. 4 paragraph 5 second sentence, after QUOTE accept UNQUOTE add at end of sentence QUOTE not only because SYG will probably not regard Canadians as sufficiently neutral but also because RF-101 is a military aircraft. UNQUOTE

7. In following sentence same paragraph, replace words QUOTE two week period trained UNQUOTE by QUOTE two to six week period could check out already trained multi-engine UNQUOTE.

8. In same paragraph insert new penultimate sentence QUOTE Australia may therefore also have some capability UNQUOTE.

9. Entire following paragraph, i.e., Section No. 4 paragraph 6, should be removed and replaced by following:

QUOTE A reasonably satisfactory substitute would be the F-27 which could be modified to provide the necessary high and low photographic capability. Crews experienced with F-27s might be obtained from a number of countries, including Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Modification to incorporate the necessary photographic equipment could be completed in ten days after a decision to employ them. UNQUOTE

10. Section No. 5 QUOTE Incoming Cargoes UNQUOTE should be replaced entirely by following:

QUOTE As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspections incoming cargoes on all ships of whatever flag embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, the USSR will need to schedule a total of about 100 ships shortly to arrive in Cuba during the next 3–4 weeks in order to accomplish removal of dismantled equipment. (In addition to 60 ships normally used for offensive equipment, USSR would have to adapt about 40 others for purpose). Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will be about equal whether inspection on sea or shore. At sea less inspectors required per ship because cargo holds cannot be penetrated and surreptitious off-loading not possible but more inspectors in transit shuttling between vessels at sea. In port, transit time eliminated but more inspectors required to watch for surreptitious off-loading and to examine in detail cargo coming out of holds. Because port inspection much more comprehensive, every effort should be made to obtain authorization to inspect in port. Estimate ten personnel needed for each ship entering each port per day. Personnel should be of adequate technical competence to recognize offensive equipment.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes aboard to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action. UNQUOTE

11. In Section No. 6 paragraph (a) first sentence insert QUOTE including storage facilities UNQUOTE after QUOTE any other area UNQUOTE.

12. In Section No. 6 paragraph (b) sentence 4 insert after QUOTE 60 men UNQUOTE add (QUOTE in addition to airport personnel) equipped UNQUOTE.

13. Paragraph No. 6 (c) first sentence after QUOTE nations UNQUOTE replace QUOTE who UNQUOTE by QUOTE which UNQUOTE.

Rusk

472. Memorandum prepared by McCone, October 31¹

October 31, 1962

SUBJECT

Soviet MRBMs in Cuba

1. On August 10th at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room attended by Rusk, Johnson, McNamara, Gilpatric, Bundy, Gen. Taylor and a number of others for the purpose of discussing General Lansdale's Phase II activities, McCone reported on the sudden importation of matériel—at that time the characteristic of which was unidentified—and Soviet personnel, and at that meeting speculated that this

¹ A history of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba with a September 11 attachment entitled "Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba." Top Secret. 11 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 September-31 December 1962.

could be electronic equipment for use against Canaveral and/or military equipment including medium range ballistic missiles.

2. On August 21st at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office attended by the same group, McCone again reviewed the situation as it developed since August 10th, reported definite information on surface to air missiles and again speculated on the probability of medium range ballistic missiles.

3. On August 22nd McCone gave the same information to the President, including certain details concerning the number of Soviet and Chinese personnel who had recently entered Cuba as reported by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] who had just returned from Havana.

4. On August 23rd in a meeting with the President, Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, General Taylor, Bundy and others, McCone again reviewed the situation and questioned the need for the extensive SAM installations unless they were to make possible the concealment of MRBMs.

5. The same reasoning was applied in discussions with Senator Russell's Subcommittees, Chairman Vinson's Subcommittee and in private talk with Chairman Cannon prior to McCone's departure on August 23rd.

6. On Saturday, August 25th, McCone urged General Carter, Acting DCI, to propose low level R 101 flights over certain Soviet-Cuban installations in order to obtain detailed technical information.

7. On September 7th, McCone wired General Carter as follows:

"Question very much if C-package will be helpful Cuba and urge frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance operations which Gilpatric advises informative. Also I support use of R-101 if necessary. My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable type in Cuba which could command important targets of southeast United States and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas. You might suggest to Rusk that we develop joint policies for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean, South-American states as an alternative to seeking unanimous OAS action which most certainly will be an ineffective compromise solution if past history is any indicator."

8. On September 10th McCone wired Carter [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as follows:

"Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consistent with other policies such as refugees, legal travel, etc. Appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest BNE study motives

behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed these provided most satellites.”

9. On September 13th McCone received communication from Carter stating that the BNE continued to feel that the installation of SA 2s is most reasonably explained by other than a desire to hide MRBM build-up. To this McCone responded on September 13th as follows:

“Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapon capability and once this is done the implementation of our policy as reported in the press might be extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers. I would like to talk with you on [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from Norstad’s headquarters to the White House or Pentagon situation room tonight (13 Sept.) between 1700 and 1800 your time. Unless I hear to the contrary from you by twelve noon today your time I will proceed Paris this evening and make arrangements for this sail.”

10. On September 16th McCone cabled Carter as follows:

“Also believe we must carefully study the prospect of secret importation and placement of several Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us if Cuban defenses deny overflight. In reflecting on my observations of Thor installation in Britain and Jupiters in Italy I can envisage a Soviet plan to package missile, control and operating equipment in such a way that a unit could be made operational a few hours after a site cleared and a modest concrete pad poured. Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community must keep government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuban defense system operative. Thrust of press reports reaching me is that there exists a clear demarcation between defensive and offensive preparations and I question if we can be sure of this. I recognise Cuban policy decisions most delicate and beyond Agency or my competence. However believe we must give those making decision our best estimate of possible developments and alternative situations which might evolve and unexpectedly confront us.

11. On 19 September Carter communicated the summary of the conclusions of Cuban SNIE of that date, paragraph D stating that in the opinion of the BNE, establishment of MRBMs in Cuba would be incompatible with Soviet policy—and indicate a greater willingness to increase risk in US/Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed so far—.

12. On September 20th McCone responded as follows:

“Ref DIR 37228: Suggest most careful consideration to conclusion last sentence paragraph d. As an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet Cuban base will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take an unexpected risk in order to establish such a position.”

13. It is reported that during McCone's absence, Acting DCI, at a meeting held in Mr. Bundy's office on 10 September, proposed an overflight which would cover the entire north and south perimeter of Cuba east of Havana and out to the eastern tip of Oriente Province except for an area in the immediate vicinity of Santa Clara where four SAM sites were known to exist and had been photographed. The purpose of this flight was to make a final determination as to how many SAM sites existed or were under construction. It is reported that because of Rusk's concern for the safety of the U-2 in view of the Sakolin violation on 7 September and the ChiNat loss on 10 September, the sense of the meeting (particularly that of Secretary Rusk) that CIA be permitted to make 4 flights against Cuba, two peripheral and two overflights of limited penetration, including the Isle of Pines. These flights were executed between 26 September and 7 October. On the 14th of September the meeting of the Special Group, JCS representative outlined capabilities for low level coverage. Secretary of Defense indicated he did not wish this operation considered until the results were obtained from CIA reconnaissance as approved on September 11th.

14. On October 4th McCone noted to the Special Group that there had been no coverage of the center of Cuba and more particularly the entire western and of the Island for over a month, and all flights since 3 September had been either peripheral or limited and therefore CIA did not know, nor could advise, whether an offensive capability was being created. DCI objected strenuously to the limitations which had been placed on overflights and there arose a considerable discussion (with some heat) as to whether limitations had or had not been placed on CIA by the Special Group. NRO and Colonel Blakely were requested to prepare a comprehensive plan for aerial survey of Cuba and to submit the plan at a meeting scheduled for Tuesday, October 9th.

15. On 9 October Special Group (Augmented) met. Reviewed NRO and JCS proposals and it was agreed that a U-2 flight flying from south to north across the western part of Cuba where at least two SAM sites were known to exist should be undertaken promptly and that a number of similar sorties might be mounted if this flight did not activate ground-air fire. (Higher authority approved this one mission and left consideration of further missions until the results of the approved mission were determined.)

16. This mission was flown on October 14th. It was successful and encountered no resistance. On October 15th at a Special Meeting (and prior to receipt of the results of the October 14th flight), two additional U-2 missions to cover all of Cuba were approved and this was concurred in by higher authority.

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment

RECENT SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

I. New information from highly reliable sources confirms extensive Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in recent weeks.

A. These have included surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, guided missile boats, at least one and probably more MIG-21 (FISHBED) jet fighter aircraft, and additional land armaments.

II. Twelve SAM sites are being set up, and SAM equipment has been tentatively identified at one additional site. One probable missile assembly area has been identified.

A. The small amount of permanent construction at these sites and the speed of the work indicate that the program is proceeding on a crash basis.

B. Some of these sites could be operational very soon.

C. At least 125 technically trained personnel will be required to operate each site, which includes six launchers and radar and electronic gear.

1. This figure excludes security and support personnel.

2. We have seen no indication that Cubans have been trained for operation of SAMs. Soviet personnel will doubtless man the sites for at least the 9 to 12 months while Cubans are being trained.

III. The Soviet SAM system is estimated to have a slant range of about 25 nautical miles.

A. The high altitude capability of the system would be in the region of 60,000 to 80,000 feet—or, if the newest version has been supplied to Cuba—in the region of 80,000 to 100,000 feet.

B. Low altitude capability is estimated as low as 2,500 feet, but maximum effectiveness of the system would probably be between 10,000 and 60,000 feet.

IV. Additional SAM sites probably are being or soon will be set up in Cuba.

A. The pattern now emerging suggests that as many as 24 sites—enough to provide modern anti-aircraft defense for the entire island—may eventually be set up.

1. The 12 sites already confirmed could cover almost the entire western half of Cuba.

V. At least eight Komar-class missile boats have been delivered to Cuba in recent weeks.

A. These PT-like boats have a maximum speed of 43 knots and a radius of about 325 nautical miles at 20 knots.

1. They carry two missile launchers each; the missiles are primarily designed to attack surface vessels but can be used for shore bombardment. The useful range of the missiles is 15 to 17 miles. They carry 2,000 pound high-explosive warheads.

2. Some Cuban naval personnel have received training in the USSR, but it is not known whether they received Komar training.

B. These boats are in addition to 13 or more motor torpedo boats and six Kronshtadt-class subchasers delivered by the USSR to Cuba earlier this year.

VI. Highly reliable sources also report the presence of one Soviet-made MIG-21 (FISHBED) jet fighter aircraft at a Cuban airfield. We have indications that there may be at least 13 more still unassembled at this airfield.

A. This is the first confirmation of a MIG-21 in Cuba.

1. The MIG-21 has a speed in excess of 1,000 miles per hour and is normally armed with two air-to-air missiles as well as rockets and cannon.

2. Prior to the recent arrivals, Cuba is believed to have had about 60 MIG fighters, including MIG-15's, MIG-17's, and at least a dozen supersonic MIG-19's (FARMERS).

B. No Soviet-made bombers have been noted.

VII. Soviet military deliveries show no sign of letting up.

A. More than 15 Soviet dry-cargo ships are now en route to Cuba, of which at least ten are probably carrying military cargoes.

1. The total number of military or military-related shipments to Cuba since the current deliveries began in mid-July may be as high as 65.

2. Routine Soviet shipments of economic aid and trade goods to Cuba are now largely coming on chartered Western vessels.

VIII. At least 1,700 Soviet military personnel arrived in Cuba in late July and early August.

A. Most of them appear to be involved in setting up the SAM facilities, but thus far we cannot conclude that this is their only purpose in Cuba.

B. Over 1,000 more personnel have arrived in Soviet vessels since late August; there have been no reports on their activities.

1. Still more may have arrived on Soviet cargo ships.

C. Prior to the beginning of the influx in late July, there were an estimated 500 military technicians and several thousand economic specialists from the Soviet bloc in Cuba.

IX. Using the prices quoted in Soviet-Indonesian arms contracts, we estimate that the SAM sites already confirmed and for the Komar boats probably will cost Cuba more than \$50 million.

A. Current shipments may ultimately total well over \$100 million and bring total Soviet military aid to Cuba to more than \$300 million.

B. Although little financial information is available on the Cuban-Soviet military arrangements, it appears likely that the terms probably include substantial discounts from the quoted prices and a credit to be repaid in Cuban goods over a period of about ten years.

X. Moscow's pronouncement yesterday that a US attack on Cuba could lead to global war is the strongest display of verbal support for Castro since Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy in April 1961 which warned that the USSR would do whatever was necessary to repulse such an attack.

A. The tone of the Soviet statement (which is tough) and its thrust (which is to disclaim that Moscow is doing anything more than the US is doing in areas sensitive to the Plee) suggests the Russians are anxious to deter the US from taking any drastic action against Cuba.

B. There is no sure way of telling whether the Soviets are bluffing, but we note they have left themselves some convenient loopholes in the implied pledge to defend Castro.

1. Thus, while they talk of taking "all measures to ensure that our armed forces are brought to the highest state of military preparedness," they have been careful to add the caveat that "however, there are exclusively precautionary measures."

473. NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 31¹

Meeting No. 15

October 31, 1962

1. Secretary Rusk reported on the unsatisfactory talks between U Thant and Castro. A full report is expected when U Thant reaches New York later tonight.

2. The President decided that tomorrow:

a. No U-2 flights would be flown over Cuba.

b. Up to fourteen low-level sorties would be made, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. The President said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as the UN provides

¹ U Thant-Castro talks; aerial surveillance; quarantine; USIA broadcasts to Cuba; discussions with Russian officials. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol, II, Meetings 11-16.

a satisfactory substitute. He added that this should be a matter of priority for us because, if a U.S. plane is shot down, we may have to take retaliatory measures. Kuznetsov will be informed of our aerial reconnaissance plans for tomorrow, but no public announcement will be made.

3. The President authorized the reinstitution of the quarantine at dawn tomorrow, subject to final clearance following a report later tonight from Secretary Rusk on the U Thant-Castro talks. U.S. ships will hail all ships entering the quarantine zone. If their reply as to name, port of origin and cargo is satisfactory, they will be allowed to proceed to port. If the reply is unsatisfactory, no ship will be boarded without specific authorization of the President which the Secretary of Defense is to obtain after consulting with the Secretary of State. Announcement of the resumption of the quarantine will be made as soon as the final decision is made.

4. Acting Director of USIA Wilson reported on themes being used in official broadcasts to Cuba. The President stressed the importance of making clear that the present situation involved all Latin American countries joining with us in opposition to Cuba rather than merely a U.S.-Cuba confrontation. He asked that for this week we play down public attacks on Castro.

5. The President directed all government officials talking to Russian officials to discuss only Cuba and the removal of the offensive weapons. If the Russians raise other matters, they should be told that we are prepared to listen now and talk later, but first we must conclude the Cuban crisis.

McGeorge Bundy

**474. Memorandum of meeting of NSC Executive Committee,
October 31¹**

October 31, 1962

McCone distributed CIA memorandum 10/31 and summarized the content as per the attached summary. DCI stated that he felt the conclusion, final sentence paragraph one, page one was overly positive as evidence that some of the launchers had been moved from the MRBM sites could be construed as a first step at dismantling. Furthermore, DCI pointed out that photographs were compared with those taken on Saturday and orders to cease and desist were probably not issued until Sunday night or Monday morning. Nevertheless, there are evidences of construction work since men were noted actually engaged on buildings, etc., on several sites. The question was raised of the Hanson Baldwin article of the intelligence gap. McCone reported that discussions in New York in which two questions were raised, (a) would Cuba be left a sanctuary for Castro and (b) was there an intelligence gap or was information withheld. McCone then expressed concern over the Cuban SNIE of Sept. 19th stating that portion of the estimate dealt with the probability of Soviets placing MRBM's in Cuba as covered in paragraph d of the conclusions trouble him as the United States Intelligence Board and the BNE in reaching this conclusion have not in DCI's opinion fully appraised the refugee, emigre and agent reports indicating the presence of weapons other than SAM's and this information has very largely been overlooked. The President asked Bundy for the SNIE.

McCone then reported on the Columbia crisis, Soviet action in summoning Bloc leaders to Moscow, a schedule of Mikoyan's trip to Havana, and the fact that Soviets conducted an additional nuclear test of about 500 KT's on October the 30th at Novaya Zemla.

The meeting then turned to other matters and first reviewed the guidelines for the negotiations in New York as prepared by State. These were approved with modest modifications.

Balance of the meeting; is covered in the penciled notes.

It was decided to resume at 6:00 p.m. to study the results of the U. Thant/Castro talks of this day.

John A. McCone

¹ Report of photographic evidence of movement of missiles in Cuba; discussion in New York. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-31 December 1962.

November 1962

475. Telegram 1585 from USUN, November 1¹

November 1, 1962

Department pass to White House. Cuba. Following is summary of SYG's preliminary report of Cuban visit given this evening to Stevenson, McCloy and Yost and already telephoned to Secretary.

At first meeting yesterday SYG found Castro in impossible and intractable mood. He was extremely bitter at Soviets, particularly because Khrushchev had not consulted him before despatching his letter to President Sunday morning. Castro made his five-point declaration three hours later in order to complicate situation for Soviets. SYG foresees showdown when Mikoyan arrives. Castro declared categorically that there could be no inspection of any kind or any outside agency on Cuban soil. It was also clear there are not and have not been any Cubans on missile sites from which they have been rigidly excluded. Castro said UN could inspect on high seas, but not in Cuban territory and was furious with Khrushchev for making verification commitment and made it clear he would not permit even inspection of what is left behind after sites dismantled and evacuated. He was very strongly opposed to aerial reconnaissance, even by UN, as violation Cuban sovereignty.

Yesterday SYG asked Soviet Amb when dismantling started and how long it would take. Amb replied he would seek answers from military. He and Soviet general called on U Thant this afternoon and replied as follows: Instructions were received from Khrushchev between 1 and 3 pm on Sunday and dismantling started at 5 pm. Dismantling will be completed by tomorrow night or at latest by Friday. At that time all equipment will be packed and at the ports. On Friday sites including pads will be bulldozed. They claimed bases already do not exist. They have asked for ships and said Kuznetsov would be able to provide SYG with shipping schedules.

There was no specific mention of Soviet aircraft but SYG had impression that these were also being evacuated, particularly since they believe Cubans are unable to fly Beagles. It was General Rikhye's belief that any equipment that the Soviets manned will go as well as all Soviet military. He was not sure whether SAM anti-aircraft manned

¹ Summary of U Thant's preliminary report of his visit to Cuba. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Psalm Documents.

by Soviets or Cubans although Castro claims all anti-aircraft manned by Cubans and that they shot down U-2. Rikhye presumes that if SAMs are manned by Cubans they will remain.

Reverting to first meeting with Castro SYG said he had been terribly tense and nervous and that he (Thant) had never had more trying encounter in all his experience. Castro had constantly repeated US radio reports that SYG had come not to discuss problems but to inspect. Thant interrupted meeting after two and one-quarter hours.

Next morning Castro, accompanied by Dorticos and Roa, was a little better but still adamant, insisting Cubans would fight to last man, that no one would be allowed to infringe their sovereignty, and that if Security Council is to discuss Cuban problem it may do so only on basis his five points. He made clear he was ready for long-range problems involving Cuba to be discussed in UN context but not immediate problem of inspection.

On other hand, he was conciliatory concerning Major Anderson, saying that he would be happy to return him alive if he were alive but that he will return his body under UN auspices.

SYG expressed personal view that continuation US blockade is no longer necessary. General Rikhye was confident Soviets will not bring in any more missiles. Soviet military are fed up and want to get out as quickly as possible. There is, moreover, no shortage of conventional hardware—artillery, anti-aircraft and machine guns. What is needed in Cuba is food not hardware. SYG emphasized particularly incredibly bad economic situation in Havana. He felt continuation of blockade would simply make Cubans more desperate and more susceptible to Castro's influence.

Thant and Loutfi both expressed strong conviction that all offensive weapons and all Soviet military will depart. In reply to our inquiries he was unable make any suggestion in regard to verification. He obviously, however, had in mind at least some US overflights since he urged we not make any before Friday when dismantling will presumably be complete.

Narasimhan inquired whether it is still our desire that UN proceed to organize Red Cross inspection and we informed him that it is. He was interested to know how this would be financed.

Stevenson

**476. Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee,
November 1¹**

[less than 1 line not declassified]

November 1, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

CUBAN CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

U Thant's preliminary report of his encounters with Fidel Castro on 30 and 31 October stressed his impression that Castro is furious over Soviet agreement to dismantle the missile bases and determined to do all in his power to prevent any inspection of Cuban territory either before or after removal.

Castro told U Thant there had been no Soviet-Cuban consultation before Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy was released on 28 October. He acknowledged that the subsequent statement of Cuba's demands had been made to complicate the situation for the Soviets.

Soviet General Stazenko, identifying himself as commander of all Soviet military personnel in Cuba, told U Thant and his military adviser that Khrushchev's order to begin dismantling the bases had been received between 1300 and 1500 on Sunday, 28 October, and that dismantling began at 1700.

According to General Rikhye, Stazenko said that all missiles and major equipment items would be removed by Friday, when remaining "bits and pieces" would be "bulldozed." Crating and movement to ports would take some additional time. Stazenko expects to leave Cuba with the equipment.

There was no mention of the disposition of the Soviet BEAGLE jet bombers now in Cuba, but U Thant and Rikhye "had the impression" that these would also be evacuated.

The Soviet officer was described as showing little concern over the prospect of continued US aerial surveillance of the missile sites. Castro reportedly was very strongly opposed, even under UN auspices. The Cubans told Rikhye that they would resist any further violations of their air space and left the impression that they had analyzed the standard pattern of such reconnaissance flights. Rikhye was left uncertain as to which anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba were in Cuban hands

¹ Cuban Crisis Negotiations: the situation in Cuba; Soviet Bloc shipping to Cuba; 2 annexes. Top Secret. 13 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6–11.

as opposed to Soviet hands; he was certain that those weapons controlled by Cubans would definitely go into action against US overflights, but did not know whether those manned by Soviet personnel would also do so.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told US negotiator McCloy during the course of a one-hour meeting in New York on 31 October that all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba, including the SAM sites, were in Cuban hands. There is ample evidence in clandestine reports, Cuban refugee accounts, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that the SAM sites are under exclusive Soviet control. Such evidence includes numerous independent reports of the systematic exclusion of Cubans from all SAM sites, [*2 lines not declassified*].

Soviet leaders are showing concern that Castro's attempts to block an agreement could revive the danger of US military action and thwart Soviet efforts to salvage the USSR's position in Cuba. The immediate purpose of Mikoyan's urgent trip to Havana via New York is very probably to exert pressure on Castro so that an early agreement can be concluded. He is also probably under instructions to work out coordinated negotiating tactics with the Cuban government.

In his efforts to hasten Castro's cooperation, Mikoyan may make new offers of assistance. Several members of the delegation accompanying Mikoyan are Soviet economic and trade specialists. Khrushchev's 28 October letter made it clear that the USSR will not "absolve ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people."

Soviet propaganda supporting Castro's "just demands" stops short of suggesting that the USSR is demanding fulfillment of Castro's proposals, and Mikoyan almost certainly will not endorse Castro's insistence on the return of the Guantanamo naval base and termination of US economic sanctions.

He may, however, agree to support Castro's attempts to obtain US guarantees extending beyond President Kennedy's offer of assurances that the US will not invade Cuba. In an effort to end US support for the activities of Cuban exile groups, the USSR and Cuba may call for reciprocal pledges by the US, Cuba, and the latter's Western Hemisphere neighbors to respect each other's sovereignty and to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs.

[*1½ lines not declassified*] suggests that the USSR had at that time dropped its earlier unwillingness to permit UN inspection prior to the completion of the dismantling and removal of the missiles in Cuba.

Kuznetsov had told U Thant prior to the latter's departure for Havana that the Soviet missiles were being dismantled and shipped out, and that when this process was completed, the USSR would report to the UN Security Council and propose that a UN team could conduct

on-site verification. Yesterday, however, Moscow instructed its ambassador in Havana to inform U Thant before his return to New York that he and his associates would be permitted “to look at whatever they want to . . . in Cuba.”

This apparent concession to US insistence on the necessity of inspection throughout the process of dismantling would seem to provide further evidence of Moscow’s anxiety that Castro’s obstructionist tactics may provoke the US to resort to military action to neutralize the missile sites. On the other hand, the USSR may feel it can afford to make this ostensible concession at no costs to Soviet interests and rely on Cuban rejection of any UN presence. U Thant’s preliminary report does not indicate whether the Soviet Ambassador in Havana made any offer to let him make such an inspection.

Soviet propaganda continues to avoid linking the Cuban situation with the Berlin issue, and Moscow is evidently ordering its propagandists to play down traditional militant themes in its slogans for the 7 November anniversary of the revolution.

Peiping continues its criticism of Khrushchev’s retreat. An article in the 1 November issue of the authoritative party journal *Red Flag* described UN involvement in Cuba as interference with the independence and sovereignty of Cuba. *Red Flag* also asserts that only by having unshakeable faith in the revolutionary fight “can one avoid being cowed” by US military pressure or “deceived” by its flowery words. The article describes the Chinese people as the “most loyal and most reliable” comrades of the Cubans.

THE SITUATION IN CUBA


Castro is expected to break Cuba’s official silence on the outcome of the negotiations with U Thant in a major nation-wide radio-TV address this evening. He may be expected to reiterate both his demand that no inspection of Cuban territory be undertaken and his insistence that his five conditions—including the evacuation of the Guantanamo Naval Base—be met by the US before any non-invasion pledge is “satisfactory” to him. Cuban propaganda media continue to give heavy play to statements that Castro’s five points are natural and necessary demands. Soviet endorsement of the demands as “just” has been seized upon and publicized by Cuba as evidence of the USSR’s “vigorous support” of Cuba.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] personnel in Havana saw no evidence in a 30 October automobile trip from Havana to Mariel and back that Soviets were then dismantling their missile sites. There was no sign of the transportation of such equipment to port areas of Havana or Mariel; on the contrary, there was evidence of considerable Soviet activity including the movement of building materials for an unknown purpose.

Soviet General Igor Stazenko told General Rikhye that the UN information on Soviet missile installations in Cuba (provided to the UN by the US) was "about correct." He said that although none of the IRBMs were operational, "six or eight" MRBMs "had been" operational. Stazenko said there were about 5,000 Soviet military personnel and 3-5,000 Soviet civilian construction workers in Cuba, and gave the impression these would be evacuated along with the missile equipment. Rikhye appeared convinced of Stazenko's good faith.

[text not declassified]

BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA



BLOC MILITARY STATUS

No significant changes have been noted during the past 24 hours in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces.

[text not declassified]

SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

With the departure of the East German dry-cargo vessel THEODOR KOERNER from Stettin on 29 October, the number of Bloc vessels en route to Cuba has been increased to eleven. These consist of five Soviet tankers (LISICHANSK, MIR, KARL MARX, GROZNY, and VLADIMIR), four Soviet dry-cargo ships (BELOVODSK, E. PUGACHEV, MICHURINSK, CHERNYAKOVSK), and two satellite dry-cargo vessels (KLADNO and THEODOR KOERNER). Of these, the BELO-

VODSK, GROZNY and KLADNO, which arrived at the quarantine line several days ago, still have not proceeded beyond it.

The KARL MARX and MIR are expected to reach the quarantine line tonight.

The Czechoslovak dry-cargo vessel KLADNO left her position on the quarantine line yesterday, and rendezvoused at a position about 400 miles northeast with the East German passenger vessel VOELKER-FREUNDSCHAFT, now en route from Cuba to Rostock, to transfer a sick KLADNO crewman.

[text not declassified]

Annex

EVIDENCE ON POSSIBILITY CUBANS MAY BE MANNING SA-2 SAM SITES IN CUBA

1. Clandestine sources within Cuba, Cuban refugees arriving in Miami, *[1 line not declassified]* make it clear that the SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba have been assembled and are being manned exclusively by Soviet personnel.

2. The speed with which the SAM sites have become operational precludes any significant participation of Cuban personnel in the firing batteries, fire control elements, or support elements.

a. *[text not declassified]*

3. We have had many reports that Cuban personnel are excluded from SAM sites. Most reports suggest that the sole function of Cuban nationals is to provide security personnel and some support facilities.

4. For the Cubans to man these sites, it would at a minimum have been necessary to send a special cadre of officers and technicians to the USSR for several months for initial training and then return to Cuba to train Cuban troops. There is no evidence this has been done.

a. It is estimated that personnel for a SAM firing unit can be checked out and equipped at the Kapustin Yar SAM range in three or four weeks—but this time would require considerable advanced military training and classroom work. In toto, close to a year's training would be required.

b. There has been no SAM training facility located in Cuba, and we have no evidence to suggest the existence of a Cuban SAM training program which could have produced by now the personnel required to man the 24 SAM sites now identified in Cuba.

c. Each such site in the Soviet Union is believed to require about 250 men, about half in support and security roles which in the present instance could be filled by Cubans. Hence, the SAM system in Cuba could have as many as 3,000 to 6,000 Soviet troops.

5. It now appears that all Cuban SAM sites will all be using the most advanced model of the fire control radar associated with the widely deployed Soviet SAM systems. [*text not declassified*]

Annex

EVIDENCE ON CUBAN INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS SABOTAGE OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

1. There is evidence that the Castro regime has issued at least some instructions for anti-US demonstrations and sabotage operations as a result of US actions in the current Cuban crisis.

2. Our strongest evidence is [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from a transmitter somewhere near Havana, instructing unknown Latin American addressees to destroy “any kind of Yankee property.” One day later saboteurs blew up four electrical substations of a US-owned oil operation in Venezuela.

3. [*text not declassified*]

4. According to a clandestine report, leaders of the Nicaraguan Communist Party met on 29 October to decide on a plan of action to support Cuba.

a. [*1 line not declassified*] two Nicaraguan Departmental Commanders ordered strict vigilance because “we have information that enemies of our government plan to sabotage and burn gasoline tanks of the different gasoline companies during unloading of the ships.”

5. This past June, according to several clandestine reports, certain Soviet and Latin American Communists agreed to organize strikes and sabotage against any governments that supported the United States if counterrevolution broke out in Cuba or if Cuba were attacked. These plans reportedly call for violence against US citizens and property in Latin America.

6. Another clandestine report quotes a Guatemalan Communist as saying within the past week that “aggression” against Cuba will be the signal for sabotage of US firms and installations and attacks on US personnel.

7. Castro still has at his disposal five embassies—in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, and Uruguay—which could be used to pass instructions to area Communists. He also has the large Radio Havana facility which beams intensive propaganda at Latin America, and he operates the Prensa Latina press network abroad.

8. Castro himself has spoken publicly over Radio Havana only once since the start of the current Cuban crisis; he did not at that time call for any anti-US violence in other Latin American countries.

477. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, November 1¹

November 1, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Thursday, 1 November

JCS meeting at 1400:

CJCS debrief on ExComm meeting that morning: Authorization for reconnaissance flights today as obtained only with difficulty. Amb. Stevenson in NY was objecting, but the SecDef made a strong and successful presentation.

CSA relates guidance given by the President yesterday: He wants forces to be of such size that an operation against Cuba can be executed swiftly. It is a matter of prestige, and he feared there might be a tough fight. President feared that, if we bogged down in Cuba like the British in the Boer War, people would ask why we had forces in the US that were not being committed. If more troops are needed, President is willing to take a chance about degrading capability for a Berlin contingency. If trouble did develop, he would authorize the use of tactical weapons in Europe immediately.

CJCS: President knows I disagree with him, but he seems very uneasy about it. I will discuss this with him.

¹ Debrief of Executive Committee meeting November 1; reconnaissance flights; preparations for operation against Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

478. Telegram 1606 from USUN, November 2¹

November 2, 1962

Re Cuba. FOL is letter sent Mikoyan this A.M.

"One thing that Mr. McCloy and I neglected to discuss with you last night was the list of items that the US considers in the category of offensive weapons within the meaning of the exchange between PRES Kennedy and CHMN Khrushchev. Such a list is appended to this letter. We trust that the weapons you plan to remove include all those on this list.

"With the thanks of Mr. McCloy and myself for our dinner with you last night and the opportunity to talk with you, I am"

Enclosure:

"List of weapons deemed offensive by the US in accordance with exchange of letters between PRES Kennedy and CHMN Khrushchev:

"1. Surface-to-surface missiles including those designed for use at sea and including propellents and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

"2. Bomber aircraft.

"3. Bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles.

"4. Warheads for any of the above weapons.

"5. Mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items such as communications, supply and missile launching equipment including Komar class motor torpedo boats."

Stevenson

¹ Encloses text of letter and enclosure Stevenson sent to Mikoyan re U.S. list of offensive weapons. Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.

**479. Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee,
November 2¹**

[less than 1 line not declassified]
November 2, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Soviet offensive missile units are closing down their launch sites in Cuba and removing their equipment, but the assembly of IL-28 bombers is continuing.

Analysis of photography of 1 November shows that the missiles and basic launching equipment have been removed from all the MRBM launch areas. Camouflage has been taken down and support vehicles assembled for movement. The launch sites have been partially destroyed, apparently by bulldozing.

It is not yet clear from photography or other intelligence where the missile equipment is being taken.

Construction at the IRBM sites has stopped and some of the installations at Guanajay have been destroyed. Work on the probable nuclear warhead bunkers apparently has also ceased.

None of the Soviet cargo ships now in Cuba has hatches and holds suitable for handling IRBMs or MRBMs. The seven ships which we believe delivered the missiles to Cuba could return to Cuba between 16 and 25 November. Loading of the missiles after the ships' return would probably take about a week.

The photography shows that in contrast to the dismantling of the missile sites, there has been further progress in the assembly of IL-28 bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield. One fully operational IL-28 was observed taxiing on the ground, and personnel were seen working on other bombers.

Monitors agree that Castro appeared nervous and hesitant last night during the major portion of his radio-TV speech, reading a transcript of his talks with U Thant. He was somewhat more confident and forceful in the concluding part when he spoke in his customary extemporaneous manner. Throughout the speech he appeared to belch

¹ The situation in Cuba; Bloc developments; Bloc military status; Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba; and one annex. Top Secret. 9 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6–11.

frequently. As reported in the press, Castro reiterated his "five points," stressing the demand for evacuation of Guantanamo; announced the USSR had "some time ago" canceled all Cuban obligations for arms; and claimed Cuba still has "powerful means of defense" since all but "strategic weapons" were to remain in Cuba. He said Khrushchev's decision gave his regime "reason for discontent," but added: "We respected the decision since these weapons were not under our command." He confined Cuban refusal of inspection to the transcript of his talks with U Thant.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] as of 31 October Soviet personnel were still active in the Cuban air defense system. [*1½ lines not declassified*] Cuban tactical aircraft were involved in takeoff and landing training, indicating some relaxation in the alert status.

During the entire crisis period, there have been only scattered and minor reflections [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of internal resistance or sabotage activities. One instance, reported [*less than 1 line not declassified*] 31 October, involved the cutting of a telephone wire from a Soviet "base" in Camaguey province, possibly a SAM site or related barracks area.

[*text not declassified*]

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] reported on 30 October that officials in the Cuban foreign ministry were "subdued," and very sensitive to any mention of the Soviet role in recent events. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] three middle-rank officials in the Ministry of Industries appeared "outraged" at the ridiculous role Cuba had played and considered the offer by Khrushchev to trade Cuban for Turkish bases especially humiliating. They felt the whole episode showed the bankruptcy of Castro's policies, and said Cuba would sooner or later have to come to terms with the US under a modified leadership. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] however, that less well educated Cubans are being influenced by Castro's propaganda, which is seeking to make recent events look almost like a Cuban victory.

Cuban exile leaders report the Cuban community in Florida to be depressed, heartsick, and convinced that the only hope is to provoke Castro "into some mad action."

Usually reliable sources in the Communist parties of Chile and Uruguay report continuing evidence of a decline in Soviet and Cuban prestige among Latin American Communists and other pro-Castro groups as a result of the events of the past week.

[*2 lines not declassified*] Castro might modify his rejection of international inspection in Cuba if such inspection were also to cover other territories in the Caribbean area where Cuban exiles might be training.

The 27 October Cuban message sent by an illicit station near Havana to an unidentified station outside Cuba, calling for the destruction of US property, was repeated on 28 and on 30 October.

BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

We have no reports as of 0700 EST on the New York conversations of Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan.

There has been no significant change in Moscow's propaganda treatment of the situation. Soviet media continue to emphasize that the USSR is strictly honoring Khrushchev's pledges to President Kennedy. Moscow claims Cuba is ready to cooperate with the UN in working out a peaceful settlement, and continues to show sensitivity to foreign views that Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missiles was a sign of weakness.

Moscow has denounced the resumption of the US quarantine and charged that "unprecedented war hysteria" still prevails in the US.

Soviet commentators yesterday became markedly warmer in support of Castro's five demands, but they carefully avoided any suggestion that a settlement is contingent on US acceptance of these demands. A Moscow broadcast to Cuba endorsed Castro's position that the US must halt the quarantine, economic sanctions, subversive activities, and overflights. Moscow hedged, however, on Castro's demand for the return of the Guantanamo naval base, saying only that this question "should be decided by negotiations."

The Chinese Communists have, in effect, urged Castro to resist Soviet pressures for an early settlement. A note delivered [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in Peiping rejected as an "imperialist viewpoint" the suggestion that Cuban demands should be ignored in a settlement between the "big powers." Peiping promised resolute support "regardless of how complicated the circumstances may be."

At a meeting of the presidium of the World Peace Council in Stockholm, the Chinese delegate is reliably reported to have characterized Soviet behavior in the Cuban crisis as "cowardly."

[*text not declassified*]

[*text not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified*]

BLOC MILITARY STATUS

No significant changes have been noted in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces.

[*1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified*]

The level of flight activity of Long Range Air Force units based in the western USSR continued to be lower than normal. Weather was probably a contributing factor.

Although much of the military force probably remains in a state of precautionary readiness, some signs of normalcy have been noted.

Western attachés now have traveled through key rail junctions in Belorussia and from Helsinki to Moscow through Leningrad without observing any unusual military activity or rail movements. Some military personnel may be on leave in the Leningrad area. Elements of two Polish army divisions probably are continuing to aid in the harvest. There are continued indications that the Soviets may proceed with the normal year-end release of GSFG military personnel.


Out-of-area submarine activity continued at a comparatively high level in the Atlantic. The combined exercise continued in the Baltic. There are indications that a relatively large-scale exercise is impending in the Sea of Okhotsk, where submarines have deployed. At least three of the seven Northern Fleet ships which appeared in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] are moving southward along the Norwegian coast. Two of these are probably destroyers. [*1½ lines not declassified*] the ships might either move into the Baltic or exercise with Baltic Fleet units which have departed the Baltic.

SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

Two bloc ships which have been lying dead in the water near the quarantine line have resumed their courses and now are within the quarantine zone en route to Cuba. These are the Soviet dry-cargo ship BELOVODSK, which is being accompanied by a US destroyer, and the Soviet tanker GROZNY. The Czech dry-cargo ship KLADNO, which stopped near the line for several days, has not returned from her rendezvous off Bermuda with the East German passenger ship VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT. The Soviet tanker MIR crossed the quarantine line at about 0100 EST.

There now are 13 bloc ships en route to Cuba. The latest additions are the Soviet dry-cargo ship ZYRYANIN, with general cargo from the Black Sea, and the tanker BALAKLAVA, with a cargo of crude oil from the Baltic.

BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA



Annex

NUMBER OF SHIPS REQUIRED TO REMOVE SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM CUBA

1. We believe the main components of the Soviet offensive weapons systems now in Cuba (as defined by Presidential Proclamation 3504 of 23 October) could be returned to the USSR in a total of 20 to 25 shiploads.

2. The MRBM and IRBM equipment presents the most formidable shipping task. We do not know exactly how many trips were required to deliver the missiles now in Cuba, but believe that their return will require between five and eight trips with ships having hatches large enough to permit stowage of the ballistic missiles. The principal components of the missile systems probably would amount to about another four shiploads. Some of the supporting construction equipment such as bulldozers, trucks, and cranes probably would be left behind, inasmuch as Cuba is receiving such equipment as economic aid.

3. The 29 BEAGLE (IL-28) jet bombers known to be in Cuba probably were delivered by three ships, and could be returned by the same number.

4. The 12 KOMAR guided-missile boats now in Cuba arrived as deck cargo on four separate ships, two carrying two each, and two others carrying four each. Thus three or at the most four trips would suffice to evacuate this equipment; the missile and support gear would fit easily in the holds of the ships carrying the KOMARs on deck.

5. We believe the three identified cruise-type coastal defense missile installations could be sent back in three shiploads.

Missiles:	5	to	3
Missile installations:	4		
Jet bombers:	3		
KOMAR ships:	3	to	4
Coast Defense Missiles:	3		
Total:	18	to	22 shiploads

480. Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, November 2¹

November 2, 1962

SUBJECT

The Situation in the Light of the Mikoyan Talks and Castro Speech

1. Castro has apparently accommodated himself (no other choice being open to him) to (1) the dismantling of the Soviet missiles and the removal of IL-28s and (2) the Red Cross inspection of incoming Soviet ships at sea to verify that no arms are being carried.

2. Castro has not agreed to any form of foreign verification of the dismantling process on Cuban soil and though unable to stop it he continues his objection to aerial surveillance. Moscow refuses to guarantee the safety of the planes.

3. The Soviets are making a determined effort to renegotiate the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement by embodying in it Castro's five points and making Castro a party to the negotiation. Mikoyan gave no assurance that, even if this were done, Castro would agree to verification activities on Cuban soil, but presumably the Soviets are trying to suggest that US concessions on the five points might get us something on verification.

¹ Situation in light of Mikoyan talks and Castro speech. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Actions.

4. This Soviet position does not appear to be final. That is, Mikoyan may well try in his talks with Castro to get him to accept some form of limited verification (limited verification is also very much in the Soviet interest), in return for new dosages of Soviet economic support, continued maintenance of defensive weapons systems, and assurances that the US will be pressed to give something on the five points.

5. Meanwhile, the Soviet missile sites are being dismantled and low-level aerial surveillance provides our only present means of determining what is happening to the dismantled equipment. Our level of assurance on this matter is not as high as it should be, and we must consider seriously whether at least additional forms of air surveillance providing greater search capability and continuity should be instituted immediately.

Obtaining Agreement on Verification

6. The next problem is what pressure toward satisfactory verification procedure would be effective if Mikoyan fails in getting Castro's agreement to it (or if Mikoyan chooses not to exert great pressure to this end). Inducing the Soviets to push Castro in the direction of agreement remains the most promising course open.

7. The greatest incentive for the Soviets to mount pressure on Castro is the prospect, or presence, of new US pressure on the Soviets. This can be conveyed by (1) maintaining our military readiness, and (2) holding up on relinquishing our quarantine to the Red Cross and threatening to include tankers in the proscribed list, (3) making clear that we will regard failure to obtain adequate assurance that the missiles and IL-28s are leaving as tantamount to failure to remove them, (4) stepped up aerial surveillance can also contribute to the US posture of mounting pressure not only on the USSR but on Castro as well.

8. These US actions, in addition to confronting the USSR with the continuing possibility of a direct clash with the US, would also have the maximum implications for Castro. He would face the prospect of continuing economic deterioration in a crisis atmosphere with the further prospect that our assurances against invasion could become invalid. Under such circumstances the problems of the regime would include maintenance of political coherence and stability in the face of US-induced Soviet pressure and whether a meaningful relationship with the USSR could be maintained in the aftermath of the crisis.

Conclusion

9. We conclude that whether Castro is independently balking at verification, or whether he is doing so with Soviet connivance, pressure must continue to be put on Castro via Moscow. Castro must be made to think—through Moscow—that he confronts the threat of extinction

in war, or at a minimum of complete isolation including a cessation of meaningful Soviet support. Moscow must also be made to realize that Castro's failure to grant the verification which *we* deem adequate, could lead to the vitiation of the entire Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement and all the consequences this entails. We believe that only if these two messages can be got across, is there a good chance that the Soviets will do the necessary arm-twisting in Havana.

481. Telegram 1177 to USUN, November 2¹

November 2, 1962

Eyes Only Stevenson and McCloy. Re: Deptel 1159 and USUN 1604. The President considers it important that following questions be clarified soonest in further conversations with Soviets:

1. We must, as set forth para 7 Deptel 1159, tie down Soviets to inclusion of IL-28s among offensive weapons to be removed. Your letter to Mikoyan (USUN 1606) was good move this regard. FYI As you know, yesterday's reconnaissance was inconclusive on whether SOVs taking any steps disassemble and crate IL-28s. End FYI.

2. President considers Khrushchev's commitment to UN verification on the ground as binding and integral part of understanding on which it is Soviet responsibility to deliver or provide substitute acceptable to US. If Soviets not able carry out this commitment for UN inspection on ground, a less satisfactory but possible alternative might be their making available to ICRC manifests of weapons together with sufficient ICRC inspection of outbound vessels to permit ICRC certify accuracy of such manifests.

3. Soviets should understand that, while we are sufficiently satisfied as to character of cargoes Soviet cargo vessels now in vicinity quarantine area and therefore willing to permit them to pass under hail procedures of which you have informed Kuznetsov, it would be impossible for us to continue such a procedure for vessels of type that have in past carried offensive weapons and will presumably be required to remove such weapons. Therefore, such vessels should not seek enter quarantine area until ICRC procedures are in effect unless they are prepared to accept US inspection.

¹ Transmits questions to clarify in conversations with the Soviets. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1953-1963.

4. President also very much has in mind that his exchange of letters with Khrushchev contemplates that, after completion removal present weapons, continuing arrangements will be required to assure against reintroduction of such weapons into Cuba (see President's letter of October 27 to Khrushchev). If the ICRC arrangement is not kept in place and the Cubans will not cooperate, some other measures will have to be devised. Such measures particularly necessary in view domestic problem. USG is prepared to face with respect its undertakings on invasion. Further instructions will be sent you in this regard.

Rusk

482. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Gilpatric, November 3¹

November 3, 1962

Gilpatric said he had talked with McCloy particularly because of the telegram that went to him and Stevenson last night. There was a sentence to the effect that Thursday's photographs were not conclusive. Gilpatric thought it was pretty conclusive with one more plane and with two planes in flying condition. But certainly today's photography of what they have seen showed another plane out of the crates. Gilpatric told Jack that so far as McNamara and Gilpatric were concerned the evidence was conclusive; that the work was going forward, not stopping or going backward on the IL-28s and that Gilpatric thought that word should be gotten to Kuznetsov before Jack sees him tomorrow. Kuznetsov is coming out to Jack's home alone to spend part of the day with him. Jack very much wants to get guidance from us as to what things he should bring up and what his responses should be on various subjects if brought up by Kuznetsov. Gilpatric said he had his apartment telephone number and his home telephone number in Connecticut which he will give Ball when he sees him. Gilpatric suggested State might be working up some guidance for him for his meeting with Kuznetsov tomorrow. He is particularly interested in getting the Department's position if it develops on just what he can say about selling out the assurance on invasion beyond the language in the President's letter. He is going to get word one way or another to Kuznetsov

¹ Status of IL-28s in Cuba; planned high-level flights over national waters. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

this morning that we know from our photography that the IL-28s are being worked on, that more are being assembled and the ones assembled are being brought to flying condition—two of them are obviously in flying condition now. Kuznetsov will then have time between now and tomorrow perhaps to get in touch with Mikoyan. Ball said he agreed entirely. What was the picture otherwise?

Gilpatric continued that they show the port of Mariel(?) there are oxidizer trucks, erectors, launchers and equipment. The port is by no means choked up yet, but obviously there is a lot of equipment there now. Of course it was not coming off the ships and not going on. Gilpatric thinks it is pretty clear as being assembled for out-shipment. There were also shots of the area they thought was a nuclear entry; actually it is an oxidizer storage area—the one with the double-security fence on the last one which showed the trucks and oxidized tanks being moved. The Chiefs are now discussing today's flights. Gilpatric thought Bob had already called Dean. We have to get the U-2 and the C-97 off if we are going to do it. It will be peripheral, over national waters. The C-97 is the old strato-cruiser which flies at 6,000 feet altitude and should get pretty good pictures. Of course, if they want to fire on, they could do so as it is over national waters. However, Gilpatric thinks it is unlikely. The Chiefs and General Taylor are very strong on getting those two peripheral flights off. Then they will discuss in the meeting with the President the low-altitude flights.

Ball suggested he thought it would be useful for Jack to emphasize that we are not just sitting down now and thinking about the IL-28s. The thing about it in the letter was that it did not relate to the proclamation. Gilpatric said that he had emphasized that to Jack; that the proclamation is the source of what Russia thinks we mean when we say offensive. Ball agreed; that was the point that didn't emerge in the letter. It was not strong enough. McCloy is going to go back to that and point to it hopefully that the word will get to Mikoyan in case there is any doubt about it.

483. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and McCloy, November 3¹

November 3, 1962

McCloy told Ball Gilpatric thought the readings on the IL-28s were disturbing, and Ball told him he had already spoken to Gilpatric on this subject.

McCloy said he thought they would get word over to Kuznetsov this morning telling him that this is the result of our surveys and that we are very much concerned about the activity and say we hope they are part of the offensive weapons and that he will get his attention drawn to those right away. Ball agreed we might tie it explicitly back to the proclamation list. The letter did not refer to the proclamation but simply said these were the things we consider. It might be useful in talking to Mikoyan to say this is what they have always had as the offensive weapons. McCloy thought it was time to put something in writing rather than in talk and Ball agreed.

McCloy asked that State work up something. McCloy has some question as to whether he should be getting in touch with him today in accordance with the instructions in #1159 until more is gotten out of Cuba and we can be a little bit more definitive before tomorrow's session. Ball replied he would be inclined to do that. Just let him know about the IL-28s this morning and the other stuff could wait until tomorrow. McCloy said that was what he was inclined to do; he would rather tie it all up after he hears from Ball. Ball told him they were meeting at 10 this morning to go over the things that might be put up to him then. McCloy said in the meantime they will plan to get this stuff over to him about the 28s.

¹ Status of IL-28s in Cuba; notification to Soviets of unacceptable IL-28 activity in Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

**484. Memorandum from General Joseph Carroll to McNamara,
General Taylor, and the Director of the Joint Staff,
November 3¹**

November 3, 1962

SUBJECT

(U) Status of Soviet Offensive Weapons in Cuba

1. Photographic reconnaissance conducted on 2 November does not furnish conclusive evidence of Soviet intention to remove offensive missile systems from Cuba. Further, it indicates clearly that work continues to bring the BEAGLE/IL-28 force to operational status.

2. Although some missile-associated equipment was photographed at Mariel yesterday, the amount and type provides no conclusive evidence that equipment which had been removed from the MRBM sites on 1 November has actually arrived at Mariel. Former MRBM/IRBM sites were not covered on the most recent photography 2 November. It must be considered that the present location of the material formerly on MRBM sites is now unknown and the possibility or redeployment to alternate sites still cannot be excluded.

3. Positive evidence of a continued buildup of the BEAGLE capability was obtained. Two additional BEAGLE fuselages had been uncrated since the time of the previous day's photography. Two aircraft are considered flyable and five others (in addition to the two newly uncrated fuselages) were apparently in varying stages of assembly. Nineteen fuselage crates were dispersed about the field, indicating the presence of as many as 28 BEAGLES at San Julian.

4. It is clear that we are now confronted with the problem of not knowing where the Soviet offensive missile systems are located. Thus, our intelligence requirements are in the nature of a search. This underlines the pressing need for a combination of high level, low level, and peripheral photographic reconnaissance.

Joseph F. Carroll
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

¹ Status of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.

485. Memorandum for the record, November 3¹

November 3, 1962

SUBJECT

Executive Meeting of the NSC, 10:00 A.M., 3 Nov '62.

Just to summarize the situation briefly, I went over your summary. I explained [*less than 1 line not declassified*] report on the caves. I showed the (first) and the map that you gave me and stated that we could by no means be sure that these caves were not used to hide missiles; missiles and their launching devices and whole complex of equipment could be hidden in one or more of the large caves which were in the vicinity of the various sites we have seen. I said that we did not put too much confidence in this fellow [*less than 1 line not declassified*] nevertheless the use of the caves was by no means (. . .). And I also said that there was some suitable absence of traffic on the roads as indicated by various agent reports which gave us concern. I called their attention to the (Paris) Manufacturing Company. I told them we are working with the FBI on that. Maybe we should follow through on that. Someone should be assigned to do that right away.

I then went into the Annex I, the Cuban SAM program, and its unprecedented nature, pointing out the differences between what had been done in other countries, and I think this should be highlighted in a paper which I'll tell you about. I think that we ought to check this pretty carefully to see whether we could make a statement. We're going to have to make a statement this afternoon to open up a meeting between the Washington group and the whole UN group who are coming down. The purpose of this discussion is to prepare for that.

I emphasized the fact that we had not seen the Eastern part of the country (. . .). I then reviewed the effect of the quarantine as stated in Annex II. I spoke about the caves and highlighted this paper and then I went over the Watch Committee report. And then went into some considerable detail on what we observed in the IL 28 buildup because of the statement which had come from someplace, whether it was out of the UN or elsewhere, that there was some question as to whether photography had clearly demonstrated that the work was continuing on the IL 28s. Rusk took a very strong position. He felt the buildup of the IL 28s was alarming and that we must overfly San Julian every

¹ NSC Executive Committee meeting including discussion of hidden missiles in Cuba; Cuban SAM program; effect of quarantine; overflight program; inspection arrangements; no invasion guarantee. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.

day to tell them what's going on. He didn't have any doubt in his mind, nor did anybody else, that the IL 28s were building up.

I then went over supplement 13 of the Joint Evaluation and I read paragraph 9, pages 3 and 4, but emphasized that we couldn't tell whether the stuff was discharging or there for loading. . . .

That was about the sum and substance of the meeting. Now, McNamara reported on his overflights program for today. It was decided there would be three (. . .) planes, targeted on San Julian, Banos and San Fuegos and the U-2 would be flown on peripheral flight although he didn't think . . . but they want to see what happened anyway.

Then Rusk brought up the question of the inspection arrangements. He said they were pursuing International Red Cross on inspecting incoming cargo and that the ground inspection had not been settled.

The President raised the question then as to whether we're going to inspect outgoing cargo and Johnson expressed the view that this was being worked on and he thought that perhaps if we inspected the outgoing cargo by merely counting the cases in the cargo and taking a sample look, that that would be sufficient. I, at that point, brought up the objection stating that we felt from our analysis of the incoming cargo there might very well be 48 missiles in Cuba.

We've seen some 33 missiles and we have stated publicly that there were in the order of 30, that therefore if they loaded up 30 cases (. . .) missiles, this didn't give us a guarantee. President then asked what to do about it, and I said I saw no security except in continually developing a mosaic of the country at regular intervals and the entire ground inspection which might not locate these things if they were hidden out in caves but at least would protect any movements through usable areas. This is about all we could do—we needed both.

Rusk at that point said that he was extremely concerned that there was too much currency being given to this "no invasion" and he said he thought that we should be alert to the fact that the Soviets and the Cubans have not lived up to their part of the bargain and that we had no obligation whatsoever on this point and this was his concern over the position of the United Nations and it was at this point that it was agreed that the only thing we could do would be to get the United Nations personnel down and give them a good thorough face-to-face set of instructions, not by a cable, not by sending Gilpatric and Ball up, but by getting them down and having the President look them right in the eye and tell them flatly. The President facetiously said I guess I ought to handle this fellow at the UN, scare them that we in Washington go off and do something without them knowing about it. There was no defense around the table as to the seriousness of the situation and the fact that we have to take a hard line. I at this point brought in this paper of yours, Ray, which was most useful, on the

speed with which these things could be put in operation. I referred to the tempo that we observed and from our analysis of the progressive (. . .) and came to the conclusion if MRBMs and all of the complex of launchers, missiles and fuel trucks and so forth, were concealed in the caves that they might be moved onto a prepared site, preparation of which we could not detect from either ground inspection or aerial inspection and the thing could become operational missiles within 24 hours (and to Ray Cline: actually your estimate was 18 hours; I say 24 hours). I said there is the (. . .) to the problem. This is added to what is already a pretty solid position. Now, what we've got to do is three things. They'd like me to present a paper on the situation, what we know, what we can find out from various intelligence sources, what we recommend as to inspection procedures and how secure they are and how dependable—that they will give to us a dependable appraisal of just what's being removed and all the rest. We want to bring in any related things, indications that the Soviets are on the one hand dismantling missiles and on the other hand are doing various things which indicates some intention to continue the utilization of Cuba for defensive purposes and projecting their doctrines into Latin America. Or (complete) any evolving information such as these communications facilities without disclosing the sensitivity of it. So what has happened, on the one hand, they're going to remove them; on the other hand they are doing some other things that are quite ominous in view of our defense and the US delegation at the UN must appreciate this. And this paper, I think it can be pulled together; it doesn't have to be very long—two or three pages—a short paper I want to read. The second paper is being prepared by Alexis Johnson and McGeorge Bundy and that is an analysis of the interchanges between Kennedy and Khrushchev on just what the commitments are. This is the paper you did; and I gave Alexis Johnson a copy of your paper and he's working on it and I offered to have somebody work with him but they thought with your paper and with their knowledge of it, it wouldn't be necessary.

Third, is a set of instructions as to just what we expect and what we're going to do because it's very likely that we'll find ourselves in three days from now in just as bad a spot as we were before except the missiles will be in caves rather than—. And the IL 28s will be further along. (Question: Has anyone asked the Russians why the IL 28s are still being—?) DCI answers: Well this is part of the problem in really getting these things right out in front of Kusnetsov and Mikoyan—. . . that definitely we mean business because you say "talk," and you find out they haven't said very much and so forth. I would like in this paper if you have a chance, a paragraph devoted to this SAM business, the unprecedented nature, how it differs from—(Tape broke

here so part missing.) and our conclusion that the army operated by the Russians and why. I think we have to be careful because not everybody is cleared—you see I think the only two people that are cleared for all phases of contact with Stevenson and McCloy (. . .) Yost and (. . .) so we have to be a little careful from that standpoint. . . . From my experience, apparently the way Stevenson operates is that he—Here the tape was cut off.

John A. McCone
Director

486. NSC Executive Committee record of actions, November 3¹

Meeting No. 18

November 3, 1962

1. Director McCone presented the intelligence summary and called attention to preliminary indications that a submarine base may be under construction in Cuba.

2. Secretary McNamara reported that the President had earlier this morning authorized a peripheral U-2 flight. He recommended and the President authorized six low-level sorties, one over the IL 28 base, another over the Banes area and a third over the San Julian port area. A proposed flight over the port of Havana was deferred.

3. There followed a discussion of inspection arrangements satisfactory to us. The President emphasized the importance of inspecting Soviet ships returning missiles to the USSR in order to reassure us that all Soviet missiles are taken out. He reaffirmed the importance of ensuring that the Russians did not construct a submarine base or continue a military establishment in Cuba.

4. The President asked that the New York UN group meet with the Executive Committee later today to discuss inspection arrangements which we will insist on in negotiations with the Russians and the U.N. Secretary General.

¹ Low-level sorties over Cuba; inspection arrangements. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.

5. A draft announcement of the ending of our current nuclear test series was discussed. A revised announcement will be given to the President for final approval this afternoon.

McGeorge Bundy

487. Draft instruction to USUN for consideration by the Executive Committee, undated¹

undated

CUBA: INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

We do not yet know whether Cuba will be willing voluntarily to have international inspection on his soil, either to verify dismantling and removal of offensive weapons or to assure such weapons do not later reappear. However, Mikoyan visit could conceivably soften Cuban policy on this point. Moreover, door is not necessarily closed to some agreed form of inspection provided it is not limited to Cuba but covers a broader area. We understand SYG had impression Castro found interesting SYG's argument that UN presence in Cuba in itself constituted deterrent to invasion of Cuba.

On these assumptions, following are procedures that are being considered after general review of the matter here.

1. *PHASE I* (now).

Hopefully we can quickly implement ICRC arrangement operating from vessels outside three-mile limit. This inspection of incoming vessels would make possible suspension of enforcement of quarantine, but U.S. ships would stay on station. ICRC, operating as agent of SYG, would continue until full verification of dismantling and removal made it possible for U.S. to lift quarantine altogether. At that point, ICRC arrangement presumably would lapse.

2. *PHASE II* (*beginning* when Soviets say the offensive weapons are out of Cuba and ending with Security Council confirmation.) There are two alternatives for inspection, depending on whether Cuba acquiesces in inspection procedures or not.

¹ Inspection arrangements for Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba.

a. If Cuba does *not* acquiesce, we would:

(1) Call a meeting of the council of the Organization of American States, acting as its Organ of Consultation, to pass a resolution explicitly recommending to OAS members that "pending the establishment of adequate arrangements for surveillance and inspection under the auspices of the United Nations . . . there be undertaken such aerial and other appropriate surveillance of Cuba as may be necessary to assure that all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability are dismantled and withdrawn from Cuba and that such weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba." This would provide an OAS umbrella for the comprehensive air reconnaissance which will be required in absence ground inspection to give OAS members, including U.S., some reasonable assurance that Soviets have in fact removed weapons from Cuba and also give a sanction for continued air surveillance if no other measures are devised to give continued assurance against their reintroduction.

(2) Upon completion of removal of the weapons, the Secretary General would make a report to the Security Council, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. make declarations on what has been done to carry out commitments contained in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters, and the Security Council President would sum up what has been said in a consensus statement. This procedure and the statements would of course have to be negotiated in advance with the Soviet Union. This procedure would not involve any Security Council Resolution.

b. If Cuba *does* acquiesce:

(1) UNSYG would, with Security Council authorization, place in Cuba a UN presence to conduct ground inspection along lines of general negotiating instructions (paragraph 6 of Department's 1147). As indicated in those instructions, systematic aerial reconnaissance would be necessary part of process in this period, and we should encourage SYG to develop capability to do all or part of necessary aerial surveillance.

(2) Upon satisfactory completion of such UN inspection, there would be a meeting of the Security Council at which the Council would take note of the SYG's report that offensive weapons had been removed from Cuba, and the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would make complementary declarations. It would probably be necessary that the U.S. declaration make reference to a prior OAS action with respect to "invasion".

3. *PHASE III.* (This phase would begin with the completion of Security Council action confirming the removal of the weapons from Cuba and would continue through whatever period Cuba may be dominated by a Communist Government.) There appear to be two alternatives for continued inspection during this period to assure that the weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba:

a. If Cuba does *not* acquiesce it would be possible under the OAS resolution mentioned in paragraph 2 to continue the aerial surveillance program.

b. If Cuba *does* acquiesce it should be possible to provide an arrangement under the Brazilian Latin American Denuclearized Zone proposal which is now in the General Assembly to establish a system of inspection covering all of Latin America, including Cuba.

**488. Memorandum from Llewellyn E. Thompson to Rusk,
November 3¹**

November 3, 1962

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation—Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR, and Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State, 12:00 noon, Saturday, November 3, 1962

After a discussion of other subjects, Ambassador Dobrynin said that based on his conversation with Mr. Mikoyan in New York, the Soviets had the feeling that their part of the agreement on Cuba was being carried out in detail, but that we were shying away from any attempt to spell out our commitment. He indicated that the Soviets expected this to be done in some form whether by a protocol, an exchange of letters, or declarations.

I said that negotiations were going forward in New York on this matter and I could not get engaged in any negotiation on it here. I was, however, glad to give him any background I could on our thinking about the problem. I said it seemed to me that there were two basic factors which were still not clear. One of them was whether or not the Soviets were going to remove any military capability they had in Cuba and not use Cuba as a military base in this hemisphere. The second was to what extent the Cuban Government was not only going to try to frustrate the implementation of the United States-Soviet agreement but also to what extent Cuba was going to continue to carry on what we considered subversive activities in this hemisphere. I referred to

¹ Notes of a conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson on November 3 re verification arrangements. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II.

the blowing up of oil well installations in Venezuela as the kind of activity I was referring to. I stated that the President had made clear his willingness to give assurance against invasion as part of an agreement between us, but it was not clear how this agreement was going to be carried out and to what extent. I referred to the article in last night's "Washington Star" alleging specific information that Soviet missiles were being put into caves and said that this made the problem of verifying that Soviet missiles in Cuba were taken out very important both for the United States Government and for public opinion.

Dobrynin indicated that one of the things he had in mind in raising this question was the fact that we have not lifted the quarantine. I drew his attention to the relationship of this to the fact that the Cuban Government had publicly taken a stand against any verification either now or presumably in the future. I said that so far as incoming shipments were concerned that this could be handled by the International Committee of the Red Cross and he indicated that this was already entrained. I pointed out, however, that there would remain the question as to whether there were any offensive weapons remaining in Cuba and said I thought it was up to the Soviets and in their interest to find some means of satisfying us on this point.

With respect to subversive activities, I drew to Dobrynin's attention the virtual impossibility of spelling out in detail any agreements on this subject and reminded him of the difficulties we had over their proposal in Geneva for an agreement against the carrying out of any war propaganda. I said we could not be in a position to control speeches or even radio broadcasts completely in this country, let alone Latin America, without changing radically our whole system of government. I said I was certain, however, that if the Soviets gave up any attempt to use Cuba as a military base, and if the Castro Government in fact did not threaten the other governments of this hemisphere, he could be sure that the United States would not only not invade, but would be scrupulous in not supporting attempts by anyone else to do so.

At the end of the conversation, as he was leaving, I said that he must have been in a very awkward position over this whole and he said that this was quite true, and declared categorically that he had not known of the Soviet operation in Cuba. I said that I believed his statement and felt sure that Secretary Rusk did also.

489. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 3¹

Meeting No. 19

November 3, 1962

1. Director McCone read a summary of the latest intelligence on Cuba. The President authorized Mr. McCone to prepare a sanitized version for Mr. McCloy to use in his conversation with Soviet Representative Kuznetsov.

2. The President read aloud and later approved an instruction to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba which contained a restatement of our basic policy and purpose. (A copy of the instruction was sent electrically to each Committee member, to our UN Mission, and to our major embassies abroad.)

3. Ambassador Stevenson summarized the negotiations under way in New York with respect to the verification of the removal of Soviet offensive weapons. There followed a discussion of our next steps, including our insistence on on-site on-the-ground inspection of missile sites and missile-related equipment.

4. The President reaffirmed his view that the basis of all negotiations should be his letter to Khrushchev and that our posture, both public and private, should be one of firm insistence on the carrying out of the specific terms of this letter.

5. The President revised and approved an announcement to be made tomorrow at the conclusion of our current nuclear test series.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Presidential instruction on present negotiations on Cuba; progress on inspection negotiations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17–24.

490. Memorandum from Cline to McCone, November 3¹

November 3, 1962

SUBJECT

Time Factors in Construction of Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba

1. The type of IRBM site which appeared to be under construction in Cuba would have required about two and one-half to three months after the time of the initial site survey to achieve full operational capability. With good quality photography, the first identification of this type of IRBM site could be made within two or three weeks after the survey, or nine to ten weeks prior to full operational status. None of the three identified IRBM sites in Cuba had reached an operational capability prior to withdrawal.

2. The MRBM sites in Cuba were of a field type, requiring a minimum amount of construction prior to the emplacement of equipment. These sites appear to have reached full operational capability in about three to four weeks after arrival of basic equipment at the site. Positive identification of the type of MRBM sites observed in Cuba would be difficult even with good quality photography prior to the arrival of the missile trailer and launcher-erector equipment at the site. In Cuba, this critical point in the delivery of equipment appears to have occurred about two weeks before the site became fully operational. Camouflage, concealment, or deception efforts could make positive identification more difficult.

3. Under optimum conditions, it would take no more than a week to complete the initial site survey, site preparation, and installation of equipment necessary for the type of MRBM system deployed in Cuba to achieve full operational status. With good photography, a site for such a system could be identified upon arrival of the missile equipment, which could occur within the first three to four days, or as late as 18 hours prior to full operational capability. At any time during site preparation an emergency capability to launch at least one missile could be achieved in about 18 hours after the missile unit arrived at the pre-surveyed site. Such an emergency effort was never made in Cuba.

Ray S. Cline*Deputy Director (Intelligence)*

¹ Time factors in construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962.

491. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 5¹

Meeting No. 20

November 5, 1962

1. Mr. McCone presented the intelligence summary, including a comparison of our estimate of the number of Soviet missiles and missile sites in Cuba with figures given by Soviet representative Kuznetsov to Mr. McCloy yesterday.

2. Secretary McNamara reported on the aerial reconnaissance missions of yesterday and those planned for today. The President authorized specific high level and low level flights for today. It was agreed that there would be no release today to the press of either pictures or information obtained from yesterday's flights.

3. There was a discussion of policy questions raised during the McCloy-Kuznetsov conversations yesterday. Among these are: a permanent UN presence in Cuba, including the possibility of some UN inspection in the U.S.; the continuance of U.S. or UN aerial reconnaissance flights; the elimination of the IL-28 bombers from Cuba; the guarantee that no Soviet submarine base will be established in Cuba; and the relationship of a system to guarantee that Soviet missiles will not be reintroduced into Cuba to the implementation of the conditional U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.

4. A cable will be sent to McCloy giving our answers to questions raised by Kuznetsov. A final U.S. position is to be prepared following a report on the Mikoyan-Castro talks.

5. The President scheduled the next Executive Committee meeting at 5:00 PM Tuesday.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Aerial reconnaissance missions; McCloy-Kuznetsov discussions at UN. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17–24.

492. Memorandum of NSC Executive Committee meeting by McCone, November 5¹

November 5, 1962

1. McCone reported on the intelligence report, summarizing CIA memorandum of 5 November, attached, with the deletion of Item 8 and the addition of Items 9 and 10. DCI included the NPIC summary and the status of their work as indicated—all Saturday's flights and all low level flights on Sunday had been read out completely and the Sunday high level flights were in process. DCI also summarized the SAO daily report of significant changes dated 5 November, the Watch Committee report, and the special memorandum of comments on offensive missile strength in Cuba, SC 11157/62.

2. DCI also reported on the most recent Soviet nuclear test, the Soviet MARS probe and the satellite leaders visit to Moscow, per the attached notes.

3. The balance of the meeting was covered by pencilled memorandum attached.

4. The following actions are necessary:

a. The effectiveness of the inspection procedures and the U.S. government position on all other matters covered in McCloy report in telegram 1289 of 5 November, attached. This telegram to be analyzed in detail by State and a directive prepared; Cline should arrange for CIA's views to be incorporated.

b. The question of reciprocal UN inspection was raised, the President feeling that if Cuba agreed to UN ground inspection they might rightfully demand inspection of refugee facilities in the United States, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere. CIA was questioned as to the consequences and our views must be developed.

c. Effective safeguards covering the future introduction of missiles and other offensive weapons into Cuba must be considered. In this connection the continuation of the SAM sites as a shield should be considered.

d. The President requested an evaluation of the report out of Vienna.

e. Question raised as to the detection of the removal of warheads using black boxes and other means.

¹ Overflights of Cuba; inspection procedures; reciprocal UN inspections. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, Box 6, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.

5. Following the meeting in a private discussion with the President, he made three points.

a. CIA should as a matter of standard practice interrogate every public statement of a refugee to determine authenticity of statement and issue a memorandum which could be used by appropriate people for government comment.

b. The President authorized DCI and others to meet with Mr. John Dille of LIFE to discuss his article which will include a great amount of refugee comment. Mr. Dille is to come to the building at 3:00 o'clock and then to call on the DCI at his residence this evening.

c. The President requested a review of raw intelligence in the hands of the entire community and the extent to which it, if properly evaluated would have permitted a more accurate forecast of developments we have witnessed.

John A. McCone

493. Paper by George B. McManus, November 5¹

November 5, 1962

1. When the President, in his letter to Khrushchev of 27 October, gave "assurances against invasion of Cuba" in consideration of the Soviet removal of offensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision, Operation Mongoose was on its death bed. When the President stated in his letter of 28 October to Khrushchev, "I consider my letter to you of 27 October and your reply of today as a firm undertaking on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out" Operation Mongoose died.

2. If these agreements are carried out it seems clear that Cuba will be dealt with as another denied area in a manner differing not greatly from that in which CIA handles other denied areas. If the agreements are not carried out, military action cannot long be delayed. In either event the Mongoose structure as it has existed in Government is through.

3. Looking back to the origins of Mongoose one finds the Attorney General and Mr. McNamara seeking primarily to remove the political

¹ Demise of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.

stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure. Both the A.G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for political reasons that some action be taken with respect to Cuba to insure the President's future. In a nutshell, they were out to dump Castro or to make him cooperate.

4. During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved, outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was Maxwell Taylor. Others like the Attorney General, McNamara, Gilpatric, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly political light. Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it has to us, that a Chief of Operations (i.e. Lansdale) was never actually needed.

5. At present no senior U.S. Government official around town is interested in a future "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Bundy has already suggested the creation in State of an "Office of Cuban Exile Affairs" or "Free Cuban Affairs" which in itself is a move outside of the Mongoose structure. All clandestine activities on the part of TFW continue at a stand down. Significant steps have been taken by the Agency together with the military for contingency planning. USIA has moved into the propaganda field under State guidance without relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoose can only live again through "resurrection."

6. Given these circumstances and in the light of great pressures elsewhere in the world CIA, internally, should move with great rapidity to distance Task Force W from any external access. This would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TFW in order that this unique group which has been available to Lansdale as a "whipping boy" becomes a normal part of our monolithic Agency structure. By such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyone else could get at these resources without going through regular channels. Within CIA we would return Cuba to the Western Hemisphere and treat Cuba as a denied area and relate it to over-all WH problems. (Throughout Project Mongoose, this is precisely the manner in which State has handled the problem. As a result Lansdale never felt that he had troops in State as he did in CIA.)

7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a corporate one. We should not go through bankruptcy which would have to be announced, but rather pass TFW through an unpublicized receivership and reorganization. The need to realign manpower and assets for demands in other areas would be sufficient reason in itself. The current stand down is a perfect setting for such a change in structure.

8. Concurrently, the DCI should endorse Bundy's suggestion and he should encourage the immediate establishment of an Office of Cuban

Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA of one of the most annoying and insoluble problems we have faced. This would place problems of proposed Cuban Government structures, provisional governments, platforms, exile politics, and the like, right where they belong—in the Department of State.

9. Absolutely no attempt on our part should be made to unseat Lansdale. Remember that the Attorney General was fighting Lansdale's battle as recently as two weeks ago. Secondly, McNamara and Gilpatric still look upon Lansdale as something of a mystic and are on the defensive by virtue of his relationship with the Attorney General. Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that Lansdale has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor are not impressed with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously have his number as do we. With a political solution to the Cuban problem in hand reflecting great credit on the part of the President, the A.G. will drop Lansdale like a hot brick. Therefore, while awaiting the outcome of the Cuban talks, we must at once deny Lansdale direct access to TFW. Lansdale can have access as to all other CIA components through the DCI during the stand down period.

10. Lansdale's reaction to any reassignment is apt to be a violent one. He undoubtedly realizes that he never again will be in the position of a special advisor to the two most powerful men in the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CIA and put TFW beyond his reach without delay (except through the DCI) he might be able to inflict serious damage to CIA's standing before his eventual demise.

11. To summarize, the following action is required:

a. Internally, institutionalize TFW. Graft it into WH. (Defense will then look to DIA for intelligence and DIA to us.)

b. Push (through the DCI and Bundy) for the immediate establishment of the Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in the Department of State.

George B. McManus

494. Telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5¹

November 5, 1962

Eyes Only for Stevenson and McCloy. As indicated in Deptel 1194, we want to be able to see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment and there is promise in procedures suggested by Kusnetsov provided it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential. In this connection, following is guidance, as followup suggestions by Kuznetsov, indicating kind of inspection procedure we believe would be necessary to check outgoing cargoes. Procedures worked out by inter-agency panel. We would strongly prefer QTE on board UNQTE procedure but prepared to accept QTE along side UNQTE procedure if necessary provided equipment is on top of deck. In discussing these procedures with Kuznetsov you should make clear our continued insistence on UN on-site inspection in Cuba to guard against hiding or reintroduction of offensive weapons.

1. *Problem.* Recommend a procedure which will provide adequate verification that the USSR has in fact removed offensive equipment from Cuba.

2. *Background.* Kuznetsov has communicated to McCloy the willingness of the Soviet Government to work out a verification procedure as follows:

a. If Castro should give his consent to an on-site inspection verification of shipments might be made at the docks in Cuba;

b. In the event that this procedure cannot be worked out, inspection at sea or other eventualities would have to be planned for;

c. The USSR is prepared to give U.S. photographs of the sites in dismantled form;

d. USSR is prepared to give the U.S. its schedule of removal of missiles to the ports and its shipping schedules;

e. USSR is prepared to permit U.S. vessels to come along side Soviet ships, the missiles loaded in such a way as to enable the U.S. to see and count the missiles;

f. USSR is further prepared to give the U.S. photographs of 42 missiles on the way out.

3. *Frame of Reference*

a. The USSR is expected to have complied fully with the commitments undertaken in paragraphs c, d, and f above.

¹ Guidance for procedures for adequate verification that USSR has removed offensive equipment from Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-562.

b. In addition, it is expected that the USSR will have complied with the position of the U.S. Government that IL28s are also to be removed from Cuba as offensive equipment.

c. The commitment to remove missiles is considered to include the removal of such associated items as appear on the list at the end of this message.

d. Photos of weapon crates or empty missile sites can be falsified as to time or location and therefore, although of value, are not foolproof.

e. The U.S. Government needs to determine how Soviets propose to demonstrate no nuclear warheads or bombs remain in Cuba.

f. The question of fighter-bombers, KOMAR motor torpedo boats and missile fuel has not been answered.

4. *Required Verification in Cuban Ports*

a. Inspection of equipment prior to loading is much to be preferred over inspection after loading on board ship.

b. Although from the standpoint of verification it is preferable that inspection of all components should take place prior to crating, nevertheless, reasonable assurance of removal (which gives consideration to the concern of the USSR re espionage) can be achieved without inspection before crating.

c. Sufficient uncrating should be accomplished to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography.

5. *Required Verification at Sea*

a. Loading of Soviet ships will be carried out in such fashion that visual inspection of each crate is feasible. As an alternative, there could be partial unloading at another designated port to allow visual inspection. In either event a loading plan for each outgoing vessel will be provided to facilitate inspection. This is to be a detailed plan giving location and identity of offensive weapons components.

b. Soviet ships will be instructed to rendezvous with U.S. inspection vessels and to have completed appropriate uncrating in advance of rendezvous. In the event weather makes such uncrating infeasible, a delay in time or change of rendezvous will be signalled by the inspecting ship.

c. *Inspection on Board*

(1) This form of inspection is much to be preferred over inspection from along side and should be requested.

(2) If the USSR has located any of its offensive equipment below deck, on board access to these ships will be mandatory in order to obtain adequate verification.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascer-

tained. This should include physical access and photography. (There must also be sufficient uncreating of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein.)

d. *Inspection from Along Side*

(1) It will not be possible to eliminate all possibility of spoofing without physical inspection on board. However, reasonable assurance can be obtained by alongside inspection, when coupled with other indications; to permit the USG to accept the mode as a fall back position.

(2) If the US is limited to inspection from along side a vessel, all items of offensive equipment must be located on or above main deck.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit photographs and visual viewing, in order to identify from among the components listed on the attached inventory, the specific component involved. (There must also be sufficient uncrating of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein).

(4) Hovering helicopters above the inspected vessel must be authorized in order to permit more comprehensive visual and photographic coverage.

6. *Expertise.* Each inspecting US Navy ship and boarding party will contain experts able to identify components of offensive equipment.

[illegible in the original] *OF SIGNIFICANT SPECIAL MISSILE
EQUIPMENT*

TO BE USED IN MAKING UP A CHECK-OFF LIST

1. Missiles and missile transporter
2. Tracked prime mover for transporter
3. Erector vehicles
4. Fuel tank trailers
5. Wheeled prime movers for fuel vehicles
6. Oxydizer tank trailers
7. Tracked prime movers for oxydizer trailers
8. Launch stands
9. Power generators
10. Electronics vans
11. Theodolites on Pedistals

Rusk

**495. Draft letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev, November 5,
enclosing draft telegram to USUN¹**

November 5, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter which I received yesterday you should suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we considered offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation. At the time of our agreement, constituted by my letter of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth, the list of the weapons we considered offensive had already been made public by my proclamation establishing the quarantine on the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba, as well as an amendment to the list by the Secretary of Defense as provided in the quarantine proclamation. Earlier, in my press conference on September thirteenth, I had made clear my general position on this problem. At that time for example, I stated that the United States would act "if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive action against the United States" and in the same statement I said that we could not accept to have Cuba "become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union." It seems clear, therefore, what the United States considered to be "offensive weapons" or, as stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh, "weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." I think there can be no doubt that we always considered the items listed in my proclamation as "offensive weapons" and if this were not the case and if, for example, you should consider bomber aircraft as not covered by our agreement, the consequences would indeed be serious. On the other hand, I recognize, for example, that the language in the proclamation "mechanical or electronic equipment to support the above items" is capable of wide interpretation and I have no desire to take advantage of this rather sweeping language to cause difficulties for you. I am, therefore, instructing my representatives in New York to discuss this problem with Mr. Kuznetsov to ascertain what particular difficulties may be involved in this or other items on the list and can assure you that within the limitations imposed by my very clear public statements as to what was involved in this issue and in our agreement to settle it, we will make every effort to reach a quick solution in order to enable our agreement to be carried to completion.

¹ List of weapons in Cuba that the United States considers to be offensive. Secret. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Subjects File, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I–C, 11/3/62–11/16/62.

In order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, although I doubt that there could be any, I wish to comment upon a further point in your letter. You state that I gave assurances "that no invasion of Cuba would be made, not only by the United States but by other countries of the Western Hemisphere either." The position is, of course, as stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh, that under certain conditions we would agree "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise." There is, of course, an implication here that the United States would use its influence with the other countries of this Hemisphere and this is indeed so. I must tell you, in all frankness, however, that these are sovereign countries and that their willingness to give similar assurances will depend upon the extent to which they consider that Cuba will in fact cease to be a threat to their security. This, of course, belongs to a later phase of the settlement of this problem and I agree with you that we should proceed promptly with the current measures upon which we are engaged.

Attachment

DRAFT TELEGRAM

TO: USUN

Eyes Only Stevenson and McCloy. We have received from the Soviet Ambassador here a confidential indication that the Soviet Government is quite disturbed at the list of weapons we consider offensive in accordance with the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev which you furnished to Kuznetsov. (Yourtel 1606, November 2)

The Ambassador gave no clear indication of what particular items the Soviets find objectionable.

You should promptly endeavor ascertain from Kuznetsov what particular items are of concern. We would be prepared to apply a narrow definition to "mechanical and electronic equipment" in para five reftel. You might explain that what was intended was that electronic and other equipment for missiles, for example, should not be available so that all that was lacking were the missiles themselves to re-establish offensive missile bases. Soviets are probably particularly concerned at the inclusion of "communications equipment" and we would be prepared to drop this and return to the language of the proclamation. We might also be prepared to drop reference to the Komar-class motor torpedo boats but you should refer back before any

final agreement on this. Perhaps compromise on the latter item might be to leave Komars already there if additional vessels of this type not furnished.

You could explain that at the time agreement was reached by the President's letter of October twenty-seventh and Khrushchev's reply of October twenty-eight, the list of what we considered offensive weapons had already been made public by President's proclamation and by the President's press conference of September thirteenth, as well as President's address on October twenty-second.

If you consider useful you could also state that we have not included any items on the list with a view to obtaining access to Soviet technology. The one item on which we must be absolutely clear is that the IL-28's must be eliminated and for the present at least that submarines would be considered offensive.

The general limitation so far as the rest of the list is concerned is imposed by the fact that the list in the proclamation has been made public. Within this limitation we would be prepared to remove any legitimate Soviet difficulties.

496. Memorandum from McNaughton to Nitze, November 5¹

November 5, 1962

SUBJECT

The U.S. "Anti-Invasion" Guarantee in the Cuban Settlement

This memorandum addresses four questions in attempting to suggest the manner in which the United States should give its "anti-invasion" assurances in the Cuban settlement:

- What is meant by "invasion" of Cuba?
- What provisos qualify the U.S. assurance?
- What procedural arrangements would constitute "suitable safeguards" and "adequate arrangements" with respect to Soviet and Cuban performance of the quid pro quo?
- How and when should the U.S. assurance be given?

¹ U.S. "anti-invasion" guarantee in the Cuban settlement. Top Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical Files, Cuba, November 1962.

The “text” to which we must refer in construing and articulating the U.S. “anti-invasion guarantee” is of course the statement made by the President in his October 27 letter to Chairman Khrushchev. In it, he said:

“As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposal—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows:

“(1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

“(2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.”

1. *What is meant by “invasion” of Cuba?*

a. *Not included:*

—U.S. unilateral aerial surveillance (or other methods of obtaining intelligence unilaterally)

—economic pressures (including the “stick” as well as the “carrot”—e.g., the 4-Point Executive Order barring U.S. business and ports to shipping engaged in Bloc-Cuba trade would be all right, as would even a thoroughgoing economic blockade)

—propaganda (including propaganda designed to encourage overthrow of Castro)

—return to Cuba of civilian refugees

b. *Doubtful:*

—failure to stop Alpha-66-like activities

—food and supply drops to guerrilla forces

—Bay of Pigs-type operation

c. *Included:*

—armed seizure by U.S. forces of part or all of Cuba

2. *What provisos qualify the U.S. assurance?*

a. *Express provisos:*

—Soviets and Cubans must “remove these weapons systems² from Cuba”

² The meaning of “these weapons systems” is not entirely clear. The Soviets have been confining the description to IRBMs and MRBMs and associated equipment. We have made an issue of IL-28s (which are clearly covered by the list in the Presidential Proclamation). Also obviously included, but only recently emphasized, is warheads. Not clearly included are missile propellants, missile-capable MTBs and missile-capable submarines. And not included are SAMs, MIGs, or Soviet troops and technicians. We probably should press for the removal of all of these doubtful items, especially submarines and facilities for submarines. Presumably the United States would not tolerate a Soviet submarine base in Cuba.

—Soviets and Cubans must “halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba”

—there must be established “adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments”

b. *Implied provisos:*

—Cuban behavior in the Hemisphere must be held down to nose-thumbing and propaganda activities, with Cuban-directed sabotage falling in the “doubtful” category, and direct Cuban invasion of a Latin American country and Cuban-led uprisings by Cuban-trained indigenous forces being proscribed.

—Soviet behavior elsewhere in the world must be held down sufficiently so that all bets are not off

3. *What procedural arrangements would constitute “suitable safeguards” and “adequate arrangements”?*

a. *Re removal of weapons systems now there:*

—clear commitment by Soviets to comply

—declared inventory (checked against unilateral intelligence) minus ground- or sea-count of items removed (checked against unilateral intelligence)

—overflights confirming ship deck loads and residual situation in Cuba

b. *Re halting further introduction of such weapons systems:*

—clear commitment by Soviets to comply

—ICRC high-seas inspection of incoming ships, presumably beyond the date of removal of existing systems, until a sufficiently reliable substitute procedure for verifying “purity” of incoming shipments is created

—UN (or OAS or Caribbean Peace Commission) “presence” in Cuba, with terms of reference and capability to perpetuate assurance that objectionable systems have not been reintroduced (presumably this would require reciprocal “presence” in neighboring Caribbean countries).

—US unilateral (or perhaps UN negotiated) aerial surveillance of incoming ships, parts, and likely sites

c. *Re Cuban behavior in the Hemisphere:*

—UN “presence” in Cuba (described above) with mandate broadened to cover, e.g., training of invasion forces (this presumably would require reciprocal UN “presence” in neighboring Caribbean countries)

—express qualification of US anti-invasion guarantee by notation that the US commitment “of course” is not intended to impair our inherent right of collective and individual self-defense (via Arts. 51 and 52 of the UN Charter) per Arts. 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty

d. *Re Soviet behavior elsewhere in the world:* No reference need be made to this proviso. If the situation gets bad enough overseas, all bets with respect to the Cuban settlement will be off.

4. *How and when should the U.S. anti-invasion assurance be given?*

a. *How:* By (1) repetition of the words of the October 27 letter (which is clearly limited to “invasion” and which is clearly contingent upon Soviet-Cuban fulfillment of removal-of-weapons conditions) plus (2) guarded reference to the “obvious” implicit qualification to the effect that the nations of the Western Hemisphere “of course” maintain the inherent right to defend themselves as required by the situation.

b. *When:* Be prepared to describe the terms of the assurance, if necessary, during negotiations regarding inspection of outgoing cargoes and regarding the creation of a UN (or other) “presence” in Cuba. Be prepared to give the assurance itself at the Security Council meeting at which removal of objectionable matériel from Cuba is certified by the UN.

John T. McNaughton

497. Memorandum from Forrestal to Bundy, November 5¹

November 5, 1962

SUBJECT

Cuba

I was very happy to see the Presidential instructions on the Cuban negotiations. I agree that it is terribly important not to allow the Soviets to chop away at the fundamental U.S. interest which I would describe as a refusal by us to accept in any form an extension of Soviet strategic military power in this Hemisphere. The political and economic intrusion of Soviet influence into Cuba is a matter that we can deal with over a longer period of time and by essentially non-military means; but the use of the Island as a forward Soviet strategic base is something we cannot tolerate.

If this concept could be brought home to the Soviets as harshly as possible, we might avoid being dragged into a haggle over what constitutes “offensive weapons systems.” There may even be value in leaving some doubt in the Soviet mind about the point at which we

¹ Comments on Presidential instructions on Cuban negotiations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. V(A).

would react again to their activities in Cuba, provided the doubt was on the side of over-estimation.

I would think that this point would have to be made to the Soviets at all levels of communication, although I realize that the first step is the one you have already taken, i.e. hardening our attitude in official negotiations. Once we have the first Soviet diplomatic reaction, however, you might consider getting the message repeated to them through other channels. Among these might be a press backgrounder by you and a talk by Bobby to whomever he knows in the Soviet community.

Here, as in most dealings with them, much more can be gotten from the Soviets in substance than in form. Dickering over hardware permits them to chip away at our position and probably has a bad political effect both here and in the Soviet Union. A clear statement of what we want in substance would give us, I think, more flexibility in deciding at what point we wanted to make a strong reaction. It also has the advantage of keeping the nature of our guarantee reciprocally flexible, i.e. the guarantee not to invade Cuba operates only so long as there is no Soviet strategic presence there.

Michael V. Forrestal

498. Telegram 1642 from USUN, November 6¹

November 6, 1962

Eyes only for Secretary. Dept pass White House. Subject: Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy had a three-and-a-half hour meeting with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich today. Following summary based on uncleared memcon.

1. Stevenson and McCloy referred to Kuznetsov's conversation with McCloy yesterday, in which former expressed misgivings re inclusion IL-28 aircraft in armaments subject to removal. Kuznetsov, frequently drawing upon prepared text, stated following:

- a. SOV GOVT displeased with Stevenson's Nov 2 letter to Mikoyan;
- b. SOVS surprised IL-28 aircraft regarded by US as offensive, because they basically obsolete in view their low ceiling and low speed.

¹ Report of 3½ hour meeting Stevenson and McCloy had with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich. Secret. 4 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.

These aircraft, which 15 years old, belong to coastal defenses and cannot be used in combat over enemy territory;

c. US demands this respect can be regarded only as attempt delay solution of problem and continue tense relations between US and USSR;

d. USSR conducting present negotiations in good faith and wishes speedy agreement and normalization situation in Carribean; if US also honest in its pledge re non-invasion, it should not be disturbed by existence IL-28 aircraft in Cuban hands, since they defensive and subsidiary arms;

e. Cuba sovereign state and can determine itself its defensive needs; no offensive weapons exist in Cuba;

f. Negotiations should center on main problem at hand and raising additional questions can only complicate matters.

Stevenson and McCloy stressed question IL-28 aircraft not new, since President's October 22 statement, quarantine proclamation, as well as October 28, letter contained either specific or general reference to offensive weapons other than missiles. Pointed out jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads could hardly be qualified as obsolete. Noted such armaments in hands of man like Castro could create gravest situation, and LA countries deeply concerned by this. Denied Kuznetsov's insinuation US seeking obstruct negotiations by raising this very important question. After prolonged exchange, in course of which Stevenson and McCloy continued press for removal IL-28 aircraft and Kuznetsov reiterated essentially same points as listed above, Kuznetsov contended negotiations must not depart from President-Khrushchev agreement, substance of which he described as follows:

a. US is to give assurances against invasion of Cuba either by US or by its allies, or by any state in Western hemisphere; Kuznetsov commented US trying evade this subject;

b. As evident from Khrushchev's message, USSR will remove missiles which President regards as offensive. He commented there no question that missiles had been subject President-Khrushchev exchange, Security Council debate, and current talks.

In response to direct question whether USSR would include IL-28's in arms to be removed, Kuznetsov replied in negative, stating they not offensive arms and SOVGOV would act accordingly. Suggested both sides report problem to their GOVTS.

2. Kuznetsov referred to schedule of removal, saying first Soviet vessel, *Labinsk*, due to leave November 6, with eight other ships, *Bratsk*, *Leninskiy Komsomol*, *Kurchatov*, *Anosov*, *Divnogorsk*, *Volgoles*, *Polzunov*, *Alapayevsk*, to leave November 7. Said he had no information whether this would complete removal operation.

3. Kuznetsov said USSR had decided make SOV vessel *Almata* available for verification inbound ships by ICRC. Details re signals and identification would have be worked out and appropriate information had been given to member UN Secretariat. This vessel would be stationed north of Cuba and all SOV ships bound for Cuba would use only northern route, although southern route might be used after November 12.

McCloy and Stevenson pointed out no commitment had been made re US willingness accept Soviet ship, and noted neutral, i.e., Swedish, ship could also be used. Kuznetsov professed surprise, claiming US had not objected to Soviet ship. McCloy reiterated he had expressly stated he could not commit US GOVT re use of Soviet ship.

4. McCloy then raised subject of removal of warheads, pointing out this very important matter, and wondered how USSR could satisfy US re their removal. Kuznetsov asserted this question of detail; USSR's actions clearly indicate that all equipment related to what US calls offensive missiles will be removed. Thus, there should be no doubt re warheads, if warheads are indeed in Cuba. USSR intends fulfill all these commitments in good faith, but US raising these questions in order postpone final solution of problem. Stevenson and McCloy stressed importance removal warheads, pointing out that with some modification they could also be used on bombers. Suggested verification removal of warheads could perhaps be done on see-and-count basis as Kuznetsov had suggested for missiles. Stevenson noted problem of warheads highlighted importance ground inspection, and wondered what progress Mikoyan had made in Havana. Asked when Mikoyan returning, Kuznetsov replied he did not know. McCloy said President regarded McCloy-Kuznetsov conversation yesterday as useful and indicating progress, to which Kuznetsov replied he gratified hear this and observed such appraisal fully justified, particularly since USSR doing everything necessary to resolve problem ASAP. Reiterated that as to warheads, USSR would remove from Cuba everything related to QUOTE so-called UNQUOTE offensive missiles, but noted he could not say anything beyond that.

5. In summing up conversation Stevenson listed following questions as remaining open: removal IL-28 aircraft, nationality inspection ship, and verification removal of warheads, although Kuznetsov had given assurances warheads would be removed. Kuznetsov disagreed, saying there no open question from SOV standpoint. Concluded US should consider Soviet deeds and respond in kind.

Stevenson

499. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 6¹

Meeting No. 21

November 6, 1962

1. The President revised and approved a private letter to Premier Khrushchev regarding the Cuban situation, which was later delivered to the Soviet Ambassador here.

2. Following a discussion of what should be told to the press about the current status of the Cuban negotiations, the President decided no official comment should be made tonight about our efforts to get the Russians to withdraw the IL-28 bombers from Cuba.

3. The Acting Director of USIA and the Chairman of the FCC recommended that two 50-watt medium-wave radio stations, one operated by the USIA and the other by the Navy, begin broadcasting to Cuba this weekend. The President approved the recommendation. He also agreed that the airborne TV operation should not be initiated at this time.

4. The President authorized the following air reconnaissance mission for tomorrow:

- a. Three U-2 flights over Cuban ports;
- b. Six low-level flights over the IL-28 field and Cuban ports other than Havana.

5. The President asked that recommendations be prepared promptly as to our course of action in the event a U.S. reconnaissance plane is fired upon or shot down in Cuba.

6. The President called attention to refugee reports being widely printed in the press alleging that the Soviets are hiding missiles in Cuban caves. Upon being informed that the sources of the reports were unable or unwilling to substantiate their stories, the President asked that this fact be brought to the attention of appropriate news editors.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Approved letter to Khrushchev; IL-28 bombers; broadcasts to Cuba; air reconnaissance mission; refugee reports on Soviet missiles hidden in Cuban caves. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17-24.

500. Memorandum of telephone conversation among Gilpatric, Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, November 6¹

November 6, 1962

Gilpatric: Kuznetsov is coming over here at 4 p.m. Adlai and I will meet with him then. I don't know if he will have someone with him. This meeting is at our request. We will, I assume start out with the things we want to raise. I have talked to Bob and wanted to be sure our conception of the immediate urgency corresponds with those in the Department.

The first point Bob thought should be raised is a protest against their activating the SAM sites at the start, which caused us to start the U-2 missions.

GWB: Yes, I agree.

GILPATRIC: If our right of aerial inspection at this time is interfered with we will have to take steps to eliminate interference, which would be serious, and we don't conceive the Soviets did not control the SAM sites.

GWB: They are in position where they are in complete support of Cuba right now, and you ought to point that out. Castro can't live without them.

GILPATRIC: Right. No matter how they choose to accept it, we should tell them we will have to take steps if they don't deal with the SAM sites interfering with our surveillance.

2. A reiteration of our position on the IL-28s. Adlai's talk before the UNSC fortunately is very good on this. There would be no question of bad faith; they knew it.

BALL: The President's speech is as clear a statement as we could have.

GILPATRIC: Right.

3. At the moment there is some doubt as to whether Kuznetsov has instructions permitting him to act.

BALL: We are moving on that. I think there will be a message out on that today.

GILPATRIC: On the outgoing missiles, give our ships opportunity to go alongside, take photographs and account for the 42 missiles. There are 16 unaccounted for as of today. Bob feels that if we actually

¹ Preparations for meeting with Kuznetsov: SAM activations; aerial inspection; IL-28s; verification; re-introduction of arms assurance. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

have this verified by photographs that that constitutes at the moment all we can expect in the way of verification.

BALL: The idea would be that our people would point out a missile and ask that the tarp be removed.

GILPATRIC: Right, on each ship. We would have pictures of the deck loading.

BALL: That could be done from a ship or a helicopter?

GILPATRIC: Right. We would reserve the right for either mode.

On warheads, we should ask that they tell us when they are going to be shipped and how they are going to be shipped. We could have some kind of geiger counter verification of what is inside the boxes.

JOHNSON: And if they say they are already on the ships and are gone?

GILPATRIC: In that case, we will have to say how we are going to verify that, where it is going to be done, in what ports, etc. if they have already left. They have made no statements on warheads yet. Bob didn't think it necessary to go on that today. Adlai, Yost and I have been talking about nuclear bombs for the IL-28s or for the MIGs-21—as to whether our position was clearly offensive. I don't know whether it is desirable to table that at the moment. I don't want time to go by without having been specific.

JOHNSON: Have we raised MIGs-21 specifically with him?

GILPATRIC: No, and not the possibility of the MIGs carrying them for aerial delivery (small nuclear bombs). In the proclamation we have had both warheads and bombs. I don't think we should raise the question as such. In talking about warheads, it might just as well be that in order to avoid charges of bad faith if we didn't indicate the term "bomb" applies to all kinds of nuclear bombs.

JOHNSON: Yes.

GILPATRIC: The question Bob raised was whether this would be the time to go into how we are going to be assured on re-introduction of arms. This leads us into the formulation of our guarantee against invasion, and I would not bring that up today.

JOHNSON: I think you are right. We are not in position to do so yet. I have been working on this question today, so that we can talk about it this afternoon with the President. People's ideas are not clear enough on this yet.

GILPATRIC: If they press again for formulation of our guarantee against invasion, it seems to me we can say that is counterpart to the undertaking of the introduction of safeguards and we have not seen that yet.

JOHNSON: That is right.

GILPATRIC: We will proceed along these lines and report down to you as soon as we are through.

JOHNSON: A debating point possibly—somebody mentioned New York, in reporting on the first conversation with Mikoyan, Stevenson and Menchikov on Nov. 2, Telegram #1604, 3rd paragraph from the end says that the Soviets estimated their time in which to remove was 10–15 days, including the IL–28s. This may have been careless reporting.

GILPATRIC: I am sure it was.

BALL: It was a mistake in reporting. We talked at length with them afterwards and they were clear on the IL–28s.

GILPATRIC: If you have any more thoughts between now and 4 p.m. I will be with Adlai from 2:30 until the time of the meeting.

BALL: The Executive Committee meeting has been put over until 6 p.m. This will give us time to get a report from you before the meeting.

501. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings; November 7¹

November 7, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Wednesday, 7 November

JCS meeting at 0900:

CSA reports on his visit to Army units in the field: I have never seen more impressive and imaginative training.

Certainly, we could never be more ready.

Briefing by DIA: Thirty missile transporters have come into port areas. However, the assembly of IL-28s is continuing; four bombers are now totally assembled. We also know that the Soviets took over the air defense of Cuba as of yesterday.

CJCS: At the ExComm meeting at 1700 yesterday, I said it was “now or never” for intensive reconnaissance if we wanted to know whether the missiles are actually loaded aboard the ships. Rusk opposed increased reconnaissance for political reasons. He won, and now verification is up to the Navy. The JCS recommended five U-2 flights and 14 low-level flights (an increase over the current level) to cover ports, the Isle of Pines, and seven caves suspected of being weapon storage sites.

¹ General Wheeler visit to Army units in the field; briefing by DIA; reconnaissance; OPLAN 316. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

CSA: I talked to the President about OPLAN 316, and he brought up the same points that were in his memo of 5 November. He was concerned lest there be mistaken optimism “that one Yankee could always lick ten Gringos.” (sic) The public would never understand if we got a bloody nose in Cuba while there were three divisions in the United States.

CSAF: Air attacks alone would cause Castro’s popular support to collapse and make the invasion a “walk-in.”

502. Memorandum for the record, November 7¹

November 7, 1962

SUBJECT

Briefing of General Eisenhower, 7 November 1962—Gettysburg

On Wednesday, November 7th, I called on General Eisenhower to brief him on Cuban developments.

I reviewed in some detail the current situation as outlined in my memorandum of November 3rd and the current developments concerning dismantling and shipping as reported in several CIA Daily Memoranda of the USSR/Cuban crisis, including that of 7 November.

I then reviewed the President’s instructions to Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy of November 3rd and the highlights of the recent meetings between McCloy, Stevenson, Gilpatric and Kuznetsov, Zorin, etc., as reported in State cables of November 5, 6 and 7 (#1630, #1642, #1660, respectively).

I then summarized Khrushchev’s letter to President Kennedy received November 5th and President Kennedy’s reply of November 6th.

In summary I advised Eisenhower that it appeared to me that the Soviets had dismantled the ten missile bases known to us and that they were shipping out launching equipment and covered objects that presumably were missiles on a crash basis. They appeared to be filibustering the inspection processes and I expected that by the time Mikoyan

¹ Briefing of former President Eisenhower at Gettysburg on Cuban developments. Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept–31 Dec 1962.

returned from Cuba, he would announce that all missiles and related equipment had left Cuba. However no action has been taken on the IL-28s and no indication given that they would be removed and the MIG-21s and the SAM sites with their related radar and communication equipment had not entered into the discussions.

Moreover no provisions had been agreed for on-site inspection and no arrangements had been agreed to guarantee us against the reintroduction of weapons. In this connection I expressed concern over the purpose of leaving the SAM sites intact and operational, indicating that I felt they were there for the purpose of shielding Cuba against future aerial observation by our U-2s, thus permitting the Soviets and Cubans to reintroduce offensive weapons at a future time if they thought this in their interests.

Eisenhower expressed great concern that we had given Castro a sanctuary by guaranteeing him against invasion and subversive activities and from this sanctuary Castro could increase the tempo of his subversion, insurgency and sabotage operations in the Western Hemisphere. I pointed out that the agreement not to invade was contingent upon certain actions by the Soviets including the removal of weapons under UN verification and the establishment of means of verifying that missiles would not be reintroduced and, since these conditions had not been met, I questioned very much whether we were obligated under our statement of "no invasion". At this point I read to Eisenhower the pertinent sentences in the President's message to Stevenson, McCloy, etc. Eisenhower said he felt the public had a different impression of our commitment, that there was a popular and in his opinion growing impression that we had in effect provided a sanctuary and this was very distressing to a great many who had communicated with him.

Throughout the conversation Eisenhower dismissed as probably unattainable any means of adequate verification by on-site inspection. He expressed some concern over the possibility of hiding some missiles and related equipment in caves or jungle and generally held to the view that as long as Castro existed with a strong alignment with Moscow, a real danger existed in the Western Hemisphere. He therefore suggested as he had in the past, precipitous military action should Castro's conduct and his provocation give us an excuse. Eisenhower is *not* in favor of air strikes alone. He believes in invasion on a very large scale and thinks if it is done properly, it will all be over in a minimum time and with a minimum of loss. He is convinced that the U.S. will gain rather than lose in world opinion by such positive action and this will be particularly true in the Western Hemisphere. Eisenhower recognizes that invasion must be preceded by air strikes to neutralize Cuban air capabilities but thinks that the time lapse between the strikes and the landing should be minimal.

With regard to his interpretation of public opinion, Eisenhower expressed the view that on the Monday evening of the President's speech there was a great surge of pride that this country was taking a strong stand. Since then the delays and inaction, the public's observation of the U Thant visit to Castro, the Kuznetsov delaying action, the Castro demands and now the Mikoyan visit, all had had their disillusioning and discouraging effect.

In reflecting on Eisenhower's observations, I feel that he had not carefully studied the situation personally, he obviously had not read the Khrushchev/Kennedy exchanges, he has been consumed with political matters, and that his views reflected to a very considerable extent the views of fault-finding politicians. For this reason I would not consider the opinions outlined above as representative of the judgment upon which Eisenhower would act if he was in a position of responsibility.

John A. McCone

Director

Attachment

1. DCI memorandum of 3 November on missile removal.
 2. Instructions of 3 November to Stevenson and McCloy.
 3. Meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov on 4 November.
 4. Stevenson and McCloy three and one-half hour meeting with Soviets on 6 November.
 5. Five and one-half hour meeting with Soviets in New York on 6 November.
 6. Letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy.
 7. Letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev.
 8. OCI memorandum on the current situation.
- (Documents retained by Mr. Elder)

**503. Memorandum from Nitze to the NSC Executive Committee,
November 7¹**

JCSM-872-62

November 7, 1962

A suggested course of action re the contingency one of our surveillance planes is shot at or destroyed.

1. Time permitting we should lay an appropriate base of public understanding of the current situation as a foundation for future action. As soon as we have confirmation that the ships carrying Soviet missiles have actually departed Cuban waters, the public should be informed that the Soviets have carried out only a portion of their obligations pursuant to the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters and that they have given no indication as yet of intending to fulfill other essential portions of those commitments. Specifically, they have refused to acknowledge that IL-28's are weapons systems "capable of offensive use". They have not made it possible for the UN effectively to verify the dismantling and removal of all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use, and have concurrently denied the legitimacy of U.S. surveillance in the absence of effective UN verification. Together with the Cuban regime, they appear to be frustrating the development of effective safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons systems. Until we have evidence of a definite program in resolving these three issues, the U.S. in its own defense and in the defense of the security of the Hemisphere must take those steps called for by elemental prudence, including a continuance of aerial surveillance.

2. In the event one of our surveillance planes is shot at or destroyed, we should first establish the facts beyond any reasonable doubt.

3. We should then communicate to the Russians, reiterate our understanding of the original exchange of commitments, cite the history of our warnings to them with respect to interference with surveillance, and inform them that, unless they will give us prompt and specific assurances that our planes will not be interfered with, we will have to take appropriate measures to protect our surveillance flights and reimpose and extend the quarantine.

4. Simultaneously we would announce to the public that one of our planes had been shot at or destroyed and indicate the nature of the position we were communicating to the Soviet Union.

¹ Suggested course of action if a U.S. surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62-11/23/62.

5. After the elapse of sufficient time for the message to the Soviet Union to have reached Moscow and for them to have instructed their people in Cuba, we should resume surveillance flights.

6. If it becomes necessary to act to defend our surveillance planes, the specific action taken would depend upon the circumstances of the interference. If a U-2 has been shot down, the appropriate action would be first to eliminate the particular SAM site or sites responsible for the action, then to communicate a second time with Moscow, and finally, in the absence of satisfactory assurances, eliminate the remainder of the SAM system. If MIGs are involved in an isolated incident, the appropriate action would be against MIGs whether in the air or on airfields. If short-range anti-aircraft were responsible, this would presumably be action by Cubans not Russians, and action directly against those positions would be appropriate.

7. After evaluation of U.S.S.R. and Cuban counter-action to our actions under Paragraph 6 above, the quarantine could be reimposed and extended to include POL, at least until such time as we receive satisfaction that the removal of the IL-28's and the security of our surveillance pending adequate and continuing safeguards have been assured.

504. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, November 7¹

JCSM-872-62

November 7, 1962

SUBJECT

Recommended US Reaction to Hostile Attack of US Reconnaissance Aircraft over Cuba

1. In the meeting of the Executive Committee, National Security Council, on 6 November 1962, the President asked for comment as to what action should be taken in the event that a US reconnaissance aircraft were either fired upon or shot down over Cuba. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have discussed the question in detail and would recommend the following sequence of actions:

¹ Recommended U.S. reaction to hostile attack of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962.

a. First, we should establish to our own satisfaction whether or not the hostile act represents an isolated incident or is a clear indication of deliberate intent to resist US air surveillance over Cuba.

b. Concurrently, we should protest the incident to the USSR representatives at the UN and endeavor to determine the Soviet attitude.

c. If we adjudged the incident to be an isolated one, we would take appropriate limited retaliatory action, preferably against the specific weapons, weapons site, or airfield, which could be held responsible for the attack upon our aircraft.

d. On the other hand, if we adjudged the incident to be evidence of a deliberate intention on the part of the Cuban authorities to resist surveillance, the US reaction would be full attack on all airfields and air defense weapons systems in Cuba. At this point, consideration should also be given to including IL-28's in the attack, if they are still in Cuba, and to the institution of a complete blockade of Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are impressed with the variety of situations which may arise in this field and the difficulty to prejudge the proper reaction in advance of the event. There is no question in our minds, however, that if the Cuban authorities demonstrate an intention to resist our overflights we must react promptly against the entire air defense system.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

505. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 7¹

Meeting No. 22

November 7, 1962

1. Deputy Director Carter summarized the current intelligence, reporting that three ships have loaded seventeen Soviet missiles, eleven of which are on two ships on the high sea. Secretary McNamara added that we are obtaining pictures of these missiles which will give us very strong evidence of their removal.

¹ Current intelligence; Naval checking of Soviet ships; reconnaissance missions; surveillance; unresolved issues. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17-24.

2. The Defense Department was authorized to state publicly that arrangements are being made for the U.S. Navy to check the Soviet missiles which Russia has announced are being shipped out.

3. Secretary McNamara reported there was no reaction to today's aerial reconnaissance missions. Authorization was given for tomorrow's missions comprising five U-2 flights, if weather permits, and twelve low-level flights, some to photograph cave areas.

4. The President asked for a description of the kind of continuing surveillance required for our protection after offensive weapons are withdrawn, with and without some on-the-ground inspection.

5. There was a discussion of our response if one of our surveillance planes is shot at or destroyed. A Defense Department paper was circulated and General Taylor summarized the views of the Joint Chiefs.

6. The President asked for a list of actions we can take to keep pressure on Castro without a quarantine which halts Soviet ships at sea.

7. There was a general discussion of unresolved issues, including future U.S. aerial reconnaissance and the importance of the removal of the IL-28 bombers in relation to any broader negotiations with the USSR.

McGeorge Bundy

506. Telegram 1684 from USUN, November 8¹

November 8, 1962

Eyes Only for the Secretary—pass White House. Re: Cuba.

Yost and Wellborn met this morning with Morozov and Mendelevich to clarify certain aspects of (1) "alongside" inspection of outgoing SOV vessels, and (2) ICRC procedures.

As to first, we pointed out that SOV vessels DIVNOGORSK, KURCHATOV, BRATSK and LABINSK are proceeding eastward from Cuba rather than through Straits of Florida in accordance with procedure communicated to USUN last evening by Mendelevich (OURTEL 1681). SOVS expressed surprise, confirmed that their instructions provided

¹ Report on meeting between Yost and Wellborn and Morozov and Mendelevich to clarify aspects of alongside inspection of outgoing Soviet vessels and ICRC procedures. Top Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (TS, Exdis, etc.)

all SOV ships carrying missiles are to proceed via Straits of Florida, and emphasized it is sincere desire SOV GOVT that this procedure be carried out as agreed in order give U.S. full assurance that missiles have left Cuba. They said they would immediately report deviation from agreed procedure by 4 SOV vessels in question and we gave them chart showing approximate location these vessels as of early this morning. They inquired whether it would be possible to carry out agreed alongside inspection these 4 vessels on course which they are apparently following and Wellborn replied that this could be done.

On ICRC system we said we understood it was SOV view this system required only until NOV 10 or 12 and that we also understand ICRC sees no purpose in attempting to organize inspection for so short a time. SOVS asked our position on duration ICRC system which we explained at some length, emphasizing (1) that U.S. quarantine would remain in effect until obligations listed in first numbered PARA of President's OCT 27 letter and accepted by Chairman Khrushchev had been carried out, (2) that ICRC system is intended as temporary partial substitute for quarantine and would involve suspension of quarantine in regard to such vessels as submitted to ICRC inspection, and (3) that ICRC system should continue until quarantine lifted which, since NEGOTS concerning carrying out commitments undertaken in exchange of correspondence are still in progress, might be some little time.

SOVS argued briefly that there would be no need for U.S. quarantine and hence for ICRC system after their missiles evacuated and evacuation verified through "alongside procedure" now being carried out. They said however they would report our view to Kuznetsov seeking clarification. They emphasized their desire to put ICRC procedures promptly into effect and attempted to place responsibility for delay on U.S. because of our failure to accept offer of SOV vessel for Red Cross inspections. They also pointed out Ruegger had said Red Cross would require "a good week" after agreement interested parties to put system into effect. We expressed hope ICRC could move more rapidly if pressed to do so.

Stevenson

507. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 8¹

Meeting No. 23

November 8, 1962

1. A press release was discussed and approved which summarizes our current knowledge of the removal from Cuba of Soviet missiles and related equipment.

2. There was a discussion of: (a) long-term surveillance requirements; (b) courses of action in the event a U.S. reconnaissance plane is shot at or destroyed; and (c) ways to keep pressure on Castro other than by reinstituting the quarantine.

3. Secretary McNamara reported there was no reaction to today's aerial reconnaissance mission. Tomorrow's missions were authorized comprising five U-2 flights and ten low-level flights.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Press release; long-term surveillance requirements; courses of action in event a U.S. reconnaissance plane is shot or destroyed; ways to keep pressure on Castro; aerial reconnaissance mission. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17–24.

508. Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, November 8, covering a memorandum from Hurwitch to Martin¹

November 8, 1962

I agree with the conclusion of the attached memorandum that Lechuga would be a good channel to use, probably the best available to us, if it should be decided to pursue this particular track further.

¹ Approach to Castro through Carlos Lechuga. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11–862.

Attachment

SUBJECT

Approach through Carlos Lechuga

Lechuga has been with Castro from the beginning. He falls in the nationalist, rather than communist or pro-Soviet category. He is a polished gentleman and a capable diplomat—superior all-around calibre to Garcia Inchaustegui, for example. When Cuba left the OAS post Punta del Este, there was genuine regret on the part of many of his Latin American colleagues to see him, as a person, depart. I understand that his wife is anti-communist and it is possible that indications that Lechuga might defect originate with her.

I think we could be reasonably certain that Lechuga would listen carefully and transmit accurately and discreetly to his principal. I doubt that he would risk making recommendations.

An alternative might be the Canadians. The Secretary hinted broadly in that direction recently to the Canadian Ambassador here.

I am inclined to feel that there may be merit in our going through a Cuban rather than confrontation with Castro through a third party: (1) we could be certain that our pitch had accurately been given to at least one Cuban; (2) Castro might be less likely to react instinctively (i.e., against the proposition); and, (3) if Castro should reject the proposition, at least one Cuban, other than Castro, would have known of our offer and might, under certain circumstances in the future, be able to make use of his knowledge to our benefit.

Recognizing that the chances of success are very probably against us, in any event, I believe we have relatively little to lose in an attempt through Lechuga and perhaps something to gain even if Castro rejects the proposal.

509. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 9¹

November 9, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Friday, 9 November

JCS meeting at 0900:

JCS concurred in a paper by AsstSecDef Nitze on “Long Term Surveillance Requirements.” There would be complete high-level coverage every 30 days plus either low-level flights or on-site inspections of suspicious locations. Concurrence was telephoned to Nitze.

CJCS asks: Would you rather have the IL–28s out of Cuba and a no-invasion guarantee given, or have the IL–28s remain and do not give any guarantee?

JCS say they favor the latter.

CJCS: There is a feeling that the President owes something to Khrushchev for taking the missiles out. I think we will probably wind up keeping surveillance but lifting the quarantine and taking away the no-invasion guarantee.

¹ Surveillance requirements. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

510. Telegram 1703 from USUN, November 9¹

November 9, 1962

Eyes Only for Secretary. Dept pass White House. RE: Cuba.

Ruegger and Borsinger (ICRC) called on McCloy and Yost this afternoon. After final mtg with SYG they return tomorrow to Geneva to report to ICRC.

They informed us that Cuban Govt consent to proposed inspection operation has been received and that preliminary draft agreement covering operation has been worked out with UN Secretariat. However in view definite SOV statement to them yesterday that operation would be unnecessary after completion SOV withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, and that that withdrawal would be completed Nov 10, they saw little use in proceeding with operation. We reported subsequent conversation with Morozov in which he had not flatly rejected possibility of longer duration but agreed that change in SOV position is unlikely, and that in absence such change there would be no point in proceeding. Ruegger said it would take about one week to set up operation after it had been approved. However this time might be shortened slightly.

Incidentally Ruegger mentioned that according to what he had been told, both by SYG and by Morozov, idea of using Red Cross in this operation originated with SYG in fol manner: He proposed to SOVs temporary inspection of incoming vessels through any one of 3 instrumentalities, UN itself, neutral Ambs in Cuba, or ICRC. SOVs chose latter.

Comment. In absence change in SOV position in regard to duration of ICRC operation and in view of fact continuance US quarantine permits such inspection as we deem necessary, we agree with present position of SYG and ICRC that proposal for inspection incoming shipments by the latter need not be pressed any further at this time.

Stevenson

¹ Meeting between Ruegger and Borsinger (ICRC) and McCloy and Yost re Cuban consent to proposed inspection operation. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-962.

511. Telegram 1709 from USUN, November 9¹

November 9, 1962

Eyes Only for Secretary—Dept pass White House. Subject: Cuba.

Kuznetsov called on Stevenson at own request 1:30 PM today. Stated he had very urgent instructions from SOVGOV in connection very unpleasant events which had taken place with respect SOV ships sailing from Cuba to USSR. SOVGOV had received report from three SOV ships their masters had been asked by US destroyers to open holds, and threat of force had been made if those illegitimate demands were not complied with. Such action on part US vessels was in gross contradiction with US-USSR understanding that ships carrying missiles could be photographed from air and observed visually from US ships. Kuznetsov said ships involved were *Aleksandrovsk*, *Divnogorsk*, and *Volgoles* and gave their positions 1400 hours Moscow time as follows: *Aleksandrovsk*—25.20 N, 60.20 W; *Divnogorsk*—25.26 N, 60.19 W; *Volgoles*—32.14 N, 77.37 W. Stated *Divnogorsk* and *Volgoles* were ships carrying missiles and had already been visually observed by US vessels. As to *Aleksandrovsk*, it not included in SOV list of ships subject to visual observation. USSR expected US vessels concerned would be instructed promptly not interfere with SOV ships in manner inconsistent with understanding reached. Kuznetsov emphasized interference had occurred outside quarantine zone, and requested speedy reply to his representation for transmission to SOVGOV.

Stevenson and McCloy said would report to government and opined there had been some misunderstanding. Promised reply today.

In response query, Kuznetsov said he had no info re Mikoyan's return from Havana.

Stevenson

¹ Kuznetsov allegations that three Soviet ships sailing from Cuba to USSR were improperly searched by U.S. vessels. Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84–84–001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953–1963.

512. Telegram 1710 from USUN, November 9¹

November 9, 1962

Eyes Only for Secretary—Dept pass White House. REF: 1709. Subject Cuba.

In accordance telecon McCloy/Gilpatric 6 p.m. McCloy immediately called Kuznetsov to advise that, while we had been unable obtain complete report re SOV allegations impropriety in procedures used checking some outgoing missile bearing ships, orders outlining agreed procedures had been reconfirmed include no stopping of SOV ships and no opening of hatches.

McCloy advised Kuznetsov that interpreter available on USNS *Perry* was not well qualified in Russian and that any misunderstanding re opening of hatches probably resulted from poor translation.

McCloy advised Kuznetsov that when complete report of incident was received, it would be provided.

McCloy then pointed out that, since some of SOV ships carried different number of missiles than we had been advised, they should be liberal with us as to what ships we observed. McCloy said that one ship, the *Labinsk*, was to have carried two missiles and had none and another had one more missile than number furnished us by SOVS. McCloy stated further that we had observed 38 of 42 missiles SOVS had reported.

Stevenson

¹ Report of follow-on conversation between McCloy and Kuznetsov based on telephone conversation between McCloy and Gilpatric re Kuznetsov allegations that U.S. vessels improperly searched Soviet ships. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.

513. Memorandum for the record, November 13¹

November 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Discussion with Secretary Rusk on Saturday, November 10, 1962, at 11:30 a.m.

Four subjects were covered.

1. FUTURE OF CUBA

I reiterated to Secretary Rusk my fears that Cuba would evolve as a strong Castro-Soviet base for the conduct of clandestine, insurgent operations against all of Central America, Mexico, and the northern tier of Latin America. I pointed out to the Secretary the removal of the missiles and IL-28s (if they are removed) would leave Castro with a very formidable array of military equipment of a most modern and lethal type, together with an amphibious capability heretofore non-existent which would be useful for the support of insurgents and their equipment to any country he chose as a target.

I called the Secretary's specific attention to Appendix "B" of SNIE 85-4-62 and urged that in developing policy, making commitments concerning "no invasion", and other moves designed to secure the removal of the missiles and bombers, that we not dismiss the long range threat. I pointed out that I had brought this up repeatedly in meetings with the Executive Committee and the Principals and wished to emphasize the point to him.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Record of November 10 meeting between Rusk and McCone re the future of Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.

**514. Memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,
November 10¹**

November 10, 1962

RECENT CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

1. Preliminary analysis of low-altitude photography of 9 November has disclosed that the status of the IL-28 (BEAGLE) aircraft at San Julian and Holguin airfields had not changed since 7 November.

2. As of 1400 EST all of the nine ships designated by the USSR to remove the ballistic missiles and associated equipment from Cuba were on their way. Seven of these ships have had their deck cargoes verified by US naval forces.

3. Verification of the cargoes on the IVAN POLZUNOV and the FIZIK KURCHATOV should be completed within a few hours. After prolonged pursuit and air search, the FIZIK KURCHATOV was located by naval aircraft at about 1100 EST. The USS BLANDY hoped to make contact with her at about 1500 EST. An early dawn sighting of the IVAN POLZUNOV indicated that she carried at least five canvas-covered missile transporters on deck. Verification of the cargo by the USS VESOLE was delayed pending arrival at the scene of two plane-loads of press representatives. The press planes should be on the spot now and the verification is probably taking place.

4. We have our first indication that nuclear weapons may be being transhipped from Cuba to the USSR. A helicopter with a device for detecting fissionable material hovered over the BRATSK at 0736 EST on 9 November. The instrument gave a strong positive reading indicating the presence of fissionable material. The BRATSK left Mariel on 6 November with a subsequent stop at Havana, reportedly for bunkers. Visual observation has confirmed that she is carrying two missiles and associated equipment.

¹ Recent Cuban developments: analysis of low-altitude photography and verification of cargoes on Soviet ships. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62.

515. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 12¹

November 12, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Monday, 12 November

JCS meeting at 0900:

CJCS: The SecDef is talking about extending the blockade progressively to achieve withdrawal of the IL-28s and other aims. But Ambassador at Large Thompson thinks such moves would be very tough on Khrushchev.

CSAF wants a meeting between the JCS and the President: other JCS members concur.

After CJCS left for a White House meeting, Service Chiefs continued the discussion. They laid out a course of disengaging the Soviets, making the IL-28s a Cuba-US-OAS problem, then going to air attack and invasion.

¹ Blockade; disengaging Soviets from Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

516. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 12¹

Meeting No. 24

November 12, 1962

1. The President asked about the state of readiness of U.S. forces. General Taylor replied that DefCon 2 is still in effect. Secretary McNamara said he would raise with the President later this week whether the existing SAC alert should be modified and whether the reserve air defense units called up last month should be released.

2. Director McCone presented a summary of current intelligence and called attention to a special estimate of Castro's subversive capability in Latin America.

3. Secretary Rusk reported there had been no change in the political situation over the week end, and, as yet, no new information on the Soviet position with respect to withdrawing IL-28 bombers from Cuba nor any report on the Castro-Mikoyan negotiations in Havana.

4. Ambassador Stevenson reported on the deadlocked negotiations with the Russians in New York. He recommended that our final position be presented to them promptly in a package which they could accept or reject, thereby advancing or bringing to an end discussion of this part of the Cuban crisis.

5. The President asked that recommendations as to our next political move be made to him later this afternoon.

6. There was a discussion of the form of an assurance against a U.S. invasion of Cuba. The President asked that the assurance should not be referred to as a guarantee and that it not be made to appear as a new undertaking but rather a restatement of undertakings in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.

7. The President asked that a press statement be prepared for discussion later this afternoon which would summarize the current situation. (A decision was made later not to issue a statement.)

8. The President directed Mr. McCone to arrange that so far as possible every refugee making a public statement about offensive missiles in Cuba should be promptly asked to give the source of his information. All useful information obtained in this way should of course be promptly followed up, but when a refugee is unable to give any significant substantiating information, the President directed that

¹ U.S. forces state of readiness; current intelligence summary; political situation; negotiations with Russians at UN; form of assurance against U.S. invasion of Cuba; reliability of refugee reports; arrangements to ensure that Soviet offensive weapons cannot be secretly introduced into Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NFS, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.

news media giving substantial attention to such statements should be advised privately of the irresponsible character of the report to which they were giving circulation. The President further directed Mr. McCone to seek means of encouraging responsible news media to check the reliability of refugee reports before giving them wide circulation.

9. There was a general discussion of the importance of establishing arrangements which would reassure the American people and our Latin American allies that Soviet offensive weapons cannot be suddenly and secretly introduced into Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy

517. Memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, November 12¹

November 12, 1962

SUBJECT

Suggested DOD Position on Ball Memoranda to the President

1. "We would tacitly or explicitly accept the fact or fiction (whichever it might be) that Khrushchev had complied to the extent of his ability and thereafter concentrate on pressure on Cuba."

DOD concurs; but recommends making the shift explicit through Presidential or State news release. Furthermore, we should have the Russians state publicly that the remaining weapons belong to Cuba. We should also press the Russians to withdraw their personnel from operational control or active support of existing weapons. This is essential because without Russian support the SAM sites would be inoperable and furthermore a possible subsequent U.S. action against SAM's, anti-aircraft, or IL-28's would then not be a U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation.

II. Discussion

The basic Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement calls for the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba and the establishment of adequate inspection. Our principal criticism of the Ball paper is that it emphasizes the problem of the removal of the IL-28's, and does not adequately

¹ Suggested DOD position on Ball memoranda to the President. Top Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962.

cover the problem of obtaining ground inspection. In our opinion, the removal of the IL-28's is secondary to the problem of inspection.

While the achievement of our goals *is not essential* within a day or even a few days, *it is essential* that the United States maintain pressure on Castro until these agreements are fulfilled or a significant change in the Cuban regime is achieved.

III. *Alternative Courses of Action*

As noted by Mr. Ball the four remaining courses of action are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, we propose to comment on the four courses separately and then propose a course of action which combines two and possibly three of the four alternatives.

A. *Direct Military Action*

While we believe that the possibility of action as outlined in Mr. Ball's memorandum should remain open and the destruction of the IL-28's may be more difficult at some future date than it is today, we should not undertake direct military action at this time. While action now would destroy the bombers, it would undoubtedly make inspection in Cuba impossible short of invasion, or revolution.

B. *Quarantine*

The quarantine which was put into effect by Presidential proclamation of October 23 to date has proved to be an effective and flexible instrument for applying pressure in Cuba. Enforcement procedures have and will provide tactical flexibility, enforcement can be suspended, maintained or if necessary extended (to POL). It is by far the most effective instrument available in the present crisis. We believe *the quarantine should not be "removed" until the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements are fulfilled.*

Arguments Pro

The removal of the quarantine, short of complicity with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements, would make it difficult to justify re-establishment of the quarantine at a later date.

There is at the present time broad NATO-OAS support for U.S. demands for adequate on-site inspection. If we remove the quarantine with that issue unresolved, we will find it difficult if not impossible to reopen this sanction as an appropriate pressure two or three weeks from now. We could not then expect to have the broad international support which we have today.

C. *Reinforced Aerial Surveillance*

Mr. Ball suggests that "instead of reimposing the blockade, we should undertake a systematic and unremitting air reconnaissance over Cuba both high and low until such time as:

- (1) Castro yielded on inspection and the removal of the IL-28's,
- (2) Castro was overthrown or,
- (3) The reconnaissance provoked an armed response that justified our taking direct military action.

While the Ball proposal is superficially attractive because it eases present tensions, in fact, it merely postpones the difficult decisions. We believe it extremely unlikely that Castro will be brought down merely by overflights. Therefore, after a few weeks of continued low level harassing flights, we would find ourselves in a position where either (a) Castro has not taken action against the aircraft and the United States is no nearer its objective, or (b) our reconnaissance aircraft have been fired upon, possibly losing one or more aircraft with a resulting heightening of domestic and international tensions.

It is very likely that Castro would withhold his fire and make a political appeal against "imperialistic U.S. aggression", claiming (quite truthfully) that such harassment far exceeded any legitimate requirements for aerial inspection. (Current Defense Department studies show that adequate inspection could be achieved by approximately 8 high altitude flights per month and a limited number of low altitude flights to check suspicious events. The wide discrepancies between this type of surveillance and the large number of low level flights necessary to provoke major reaction in Cuba is both real and obvious.) The continued positioning of IL-28 aircraft at present airfields and their inactivity would serve to undercut any need for such a large low level reconnaissance effort.

There are innumerable details which would have to be carefully planned if the masquerade of surveillance was to be maintained to justify the low level flights. For example, we would have to gather a very large portion of existing reconnaissance aircraft. If we use non-reconnaissance aircraft, the Cubans might be expected to recognize the difference and shoot at our fighters so as to make a propaganda point that these aircraft were not "reconnaissance aircraft".

In any case, if Castro would not return our fire, we would have to start a new track involving re-establishment of the quarantine or other suitable initiatives. Any of these courses will be more difficult two or three weeks from today than they are today.

In regard to (b) above, if for example U.S. aircraft are shot down (in eastern Cuba near Guantanamo), a response a day later against the bomber base in reprisal would appear to be what it is, an artificially contrived situation. In fact, as soon as it becomes clear that the U.S. contemplates action against the bombers, it is very likely that the Cubans will disperse the bombers, either by flying them to many different airfields or actually dismantling the aircraft to hide beneath trees, camouflage, etc., in different parts of the island. Thus, the removal or

destruction of the bombers will probably be more difficult not only politically but operationally.

We should maintain a posture that is in accordance with our position as the major responsible world power. The removal of the quarantine coupled with harassment flights in response to Castro's rebuff of the UN request for ground inspection is not a course of action that dignifies our position.

D. Solution through Security Council Arrangement. The Proposal of Ambassador Stevenson.

Ambassador Stevenson's approach does not cover the problem of long term assurances beyond an ex post facto check of the proposed Soviet and Cuban statements. Therefore, we propose to change point 4. as follows:

4. We will temporarily suspend enforcement of the quarantine and provide short term assurances to Cuba against invasion despite only partial Soviet performance. Such assurances will be operative while important progress is being made toward the achievement of long term safeguards. These could be achieved through assurances and appropriate inspection worked out on a regional basis. On the completion of successful negotiations to achieve such a regional arrangement, the United States will remove the quarantine and will provide suitable long term guarantees in keeping with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.

IV. *Summary*

The Ball paper places major emphasis upon the problem of bomber removal. It does not provide any solution to the problem of obtaining verification through ground inspection or long term safeguards. Provocative reconnaissance leading to attack on the IL-28's would almost surely make the obtaining of long term inspection and adequate guarantees impossible. On Friday, November 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-affirmed their views on ground inspection: "There is no adequate substitute for on-ground site inspection in Cuba." We concur in this view. If pursued, State's plan would weaken our most effective instrument, the quarantine, for harassing aerial flights, an action which may not even solve the IL-28 problem.

V. *Recommendation*

A. The harassing flight proposal be rejected.

B. Immediate action:

(1) Release Presidential or State Department release, earlier coordinated, restating U.S. objectives and suspending enforcement of the quarantine for a short time.

(2) Authorize Governor Stevenson to attempt to seek agreement such as he proposed, subject to the modifications outlined above.

C. Contingency Action

In order of priority depending on Cuban behavior:

(1) Enforce the *existing* blockade. A contingency statement should be prepared for SecState or SecDefense in case Castro makes a public statement that he will not cooperate under any circumstance. Recommend action immediate declaration that U.S. quarantine will be enforced, beginning 48 hours later. This should permit Khrushchev to disengage gracefully if he wishes to do so.

(2) If necessary, extend the blockade to POL.

(3) If the above measures fail, air attacks against the bombers.

Paul H. Nitze

Tab I

A Rebuttal of Mr. Ball's Arguments Against Quarantine

1) Quarantine "fails to meet the criteria—an action directly operating only on Cuba."

I will meet this criteria if Russia does not attempt to penetrate during any period of blockade enforcement.

2) "Khrushchev could not afford the humiliation of doing so a second time."

a) By maintaining the quarantine we do not force him to accept it a second time, but rather to [illegible in the original] to accept the continuation of the quarantine.

b) The K-K agreement tacitly recognized the existence of the quarantine and its removal upon the completion of the terms. It is far easier for Khrushchev to fulfill the agreement by tactical acquiescence in US action in fulfilling the agreement along present lines than to acquiesce in new US actions.

c) "The USSR would not (let Cuba be) slowly strangled." This case is unlikely, in any case the US position would be clear; verification [illegible in the original] and bombers out and the quarantine would be lifted.

3) "Khrushchev was willing to pull back his ships carrying sophisticated weapons . . . (but not) tankers filled with POL."

Mr. Khrushchev diverted *all of his ships from the US quarantine* not just missile carrying ships until we clarified [illegible in the original] procedure and it is likely that he would do so again. This suggests

that we should allow some time, say 24–48 hours from enforcement announcement and until enforcement begins so that any USSR ships can clear the area if they so desire.

**518. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy,
November 12¹**

November 12, 1962

SUBJECT

Form of "No Invasion" Guarantee

In response to the President's request that we examine the form and substance of our "no invasion" pledge with respect to Cuba in the event the IL-28s are removed and satisfactory on-ground verification is achieved, there is attached the draft of a proposed statement to be made in the UN Security Council. It will be noted that this statement also anticipates a prior OAS Resolution.

This draft has been reviewed by Secretary Rusk but has not yet been coordinated with the USUN.

U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary of State

Enclosure

UNITED STATES DECLARATION IN SECURITY COUNCIL
(On assumption satisfactory verification Soviet
removal of offensive weapons.)

On October 27, 1962 President Kennedy replied to a letter sent by Premier Khrushchev on the preceding day, and in his reply stated that the proposals of Premier Khrushchev regarding a solution to the Cuban problem seemed generally acceptable. President Kennedy summarized the key elements of the proposals as follows:

¹ Draft of proposed statement prepared for UN Security Council re "no-invasion" guarantee with respect to Cuba in the event the IL-28s are removed and satisfactory on-ground verification is achieved. Top Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI(A).

(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use; and the USSR would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba; and

(2) The United States would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba; the President expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

On October 28, President Kennedy addressed a further letter to Premier Khrushchev, in answer to the Premier's message of the same day. The President said: "I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on part of both our Governments which should be promptly carried out." It is the understanding of the United States Government that the Soviet Government regards these undertakings in the same light.

The United States notes the statements made by the Soviet Union that offensive weapons systems have now been removed from Cuba and that no such systems will be re-introduced. We welcome these assurances.

The United States also notes the arrangements, which have been worked out by the Acting Secretary-General with the Soviet Government and the Government of Cuba, for international verification of the removal of offensive weapons systems. The United States appreciates the measures taken and the arrangements made, and expresses its satisfaction that it has been possible to provide these assurances to the peoples of the Western Hemisphere that the threat of offensive weapons against them has been removed and will not recur.

The United States Government, on its part, has taken the initiative in the Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to secure action terminating the effectiveness of the resolution adopted by that Organization on October 23 at such time as arrangements would have been completed to carry out the undertakings reached between the United States and Soviet Governments on October 27 and 28. At the conclusion of this meeting of the Security Council, the United States will notify the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States that the arrangements in question have been completed and, accordingly, the effectiveness of the resolution of October 23 should be considered as terminated.

In these circumstances, the United States will lift its defensive quarantine of shipping going to Cuba, and will terminate the proclamation of October 23 by which the quarantine was established in pursu-

ance of the resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation. The United States Government also gives assurances against an invasion of Cuba, in the light of the arrangements that have been made and on the understanding and condition that no offensive weapons systems are stationed in Cuba. The Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance has also, in its resolution of November ———, given expression to like assurances on the part of all of the member States.

The assurances against an invasion of Cuba have been given in connection with the carrying out of undertakings between the United States and Soviet Governments. Those assurances are in conformity with the commitments of the American Republics under the Inter-American system, and do not alter the commitments of the United States or other countries of the Hemisphere under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or actions taken by organs of the Inter-American system in pursuance of the relevant Inter-American treaties. These commitments and the statement of the President of the United States of September 13 remain integral parts of United States foreign policy.

519. Memorandum of Executive Committee meeting by McCone, November 12¹

November 12, 1962

All members were present and in addition Ambassador Stevenson, John McCloy and Clyde Yost from the UN.

Mr. McCone reported briefly on intelligence matters summarizing the Intelligence Memorandum of 12 November, calling specific attention to the fact that assembly of Beagles was continuing and the differing interrelationships and the report [*less than 1 line not declassified*] concerning statements made by Fidel Castro. The DCI also called particular attention to SNIE 85-6-62, noting Annex B listing the military equipment delivered to Cuba since August 1st; that which was there prior to August 1st, and the total, and stated that [illegible in the

¹ Military equipment in Cuba; aerial surveillance; Cuban refugee report re number of missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1961.

original] million of equipment and spares had been delivered since August 1st.

DCI then emphasized that as a result of those deliveries Castro had in his hands capability to supply insurgency groups operating against any of the Caribbean and Central American countries, Mexico, and the northern tier of Latin American countries. He stated that delivery of maritime equipment, while insufficient to support an invasion force, was sufficient to support insurgency forces to a far greater extent than Castro had heretofore.

During the exchange of discussion concerning aerial surveillance, McCone pointed out that if the Soviets lit up the SAM sites, which they were capable of doing, then we can only proceed with aerial surveillance at great hazard, and probably this means of inspection would not be affective.

During the meeting, the President was advised that a Cuban had appeared on "TODAY", an NBC show, and stated he knew positively there were 82 missiles in Cuba; that only 42 had been removed, and that the balance had been hidden in caves. The President asked for a report, and also for continuing surveillance of this type of report which is presumably based on rumor and gossip. The DCI reviewed discussions with AP-UP and the *Washington Star* and said this particular report would be handled immediately.

The remainder of the meeting is covered by hand-written notes attached.

John A. McCone
Director

520. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 12¹

Meeting No. 25

November 12, 1962

1. Mr. Bundy summarized Chairman Khrushchev's reply to the President's message of November 6th. Following a discussion, the Pres-

¹ Khrushchev's reply to Kennedy November 6 letter; safeguards against offensive weapons in Cuba; aerial reconnaissance missions for November 13. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NFS, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 25–32A.

ident authorized the dispatch of an interim response dealing with the removal of the IL-28 bombers.

2. The President requested further study and recommendations as to courses of action with respect to safeguards against offensive weapons in Cuba and conditions in which we should and should not give an assurance against invasion.

3. The President authorized tomorrow's aerial reconnaissance missions comprising up to five U-2 flights and ten low-level sorties.

McGeorge Bundy

521. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, November 13¹

November 13, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Tuesday, 13 November

JCS meeting at 0900:

CJCS gives debriefing on the ExComm meeting of 12 November:
At the morning meeting, Amb. Stevenson and Mr. McCloy said that

¹ Chief JCS debriefing of November 12 and 13 Executive Committee meetings; UN negotiations; courses of action in Cuba crisis; Khrushchev's letter. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

the U.S. should present a negotiating package now, before the Soviet position solidifies. They recommended removing the quarantine and giving a no-invasion pledge in return for withdrawal of IL-28s and warheads. Rusk opposes offering the package immediately. What if the Soviets reject this package? SecDef favors a blockade. Including POL, and continued surveillance. The President opposed the SecDef, feeling that continued surveillance would be dangerous; President was alone in feeling this way. At the afternoon meeting, all agreed that the quarantine should be lifted if Khrushchev pledges withdrawal in, say, 30 days.

The JCS will meet with the President on 16 Nov.

JCS meeting at 1400:

CJCS gives a debrief of the ExComm meeting on the morning of 13 Nov: President was absent. The SecDef proposed:

1. If the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28s, the U.S. would lift the quarantine, continue unannounced air surveillance, and withhold a no-invasion pledge until suitable safeguards are agreed upon (e.g., some international presence in Cuba and a reciprocal feature of inspection of suspected refugee training areas in Central America.)

2. If the Soviets refuse to withdraw IL-28s, continue a limited quarantine by boarding first Free World and finally Soviet ships, continue unannounced air surveillance, and treat the no-invasion promise as not being in effect.

Then ExComm members were shown a copy of Khrushchev's latest letter: The IL-28s were obsolete and manned by Soviet not Cuban pilots. But, if the U.S. insists, you can take a gentleman's word that they will be removed after we solve our other problems, which are: (1) removal of the quarantine; (2) mutual pledges in the Security Council; (3) guarantee of the sovereignty of Cuban air space and a no-invasion pledge; and (4) a post in the Caribbean for UN inspection, which would include denuclearization.

522. Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk and Ball, November 13, enclosing a draft Cuban contingency paper¹

November 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Cuban Contingency Paper

Attached is a draft paper on action to be taken if the Soviets seem to be turning us down or unduly stalling on the IL-28's.

This is the paper Secretary McNamara suggested at the end of the NSC ExCom meeting here in the Department this morning.

The Defense Department (Paul Nitze's office) would like to see it. Can we send them two or three copies to look at?

Abe Chayes has drafted the OAS Resolution, and has gone over the rest of the material. Ed Martin has approved the OAS Resolution and the covering paper. The covering paper has also been cleared by Alex Johnson.

Attachment

NEXT STEPS ON THE IL-28's

Assuming no cooperation on the IL-28's, the following actions would be taken in the order indicated.

1. A "last chance" private message to Khrushchev, making perfectly clear how seriously we take the matter of the bombers, and indicating that further measures such as the reinstitution of the quarantine, together with other measures, might have to be employed.

2. *Political pre-conditions* to further action:

(a) Bilateral diplomatic efforts to get others still represented in Havana to tell the Castro Government that the maintenance of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba would be an occasion for breaking off diplomatic relations.

(b) An OAS resolution, reviewing the incompleteness of the Soviet and Cuban performance under the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, and calling for continued close aerial surveillance and tightening of the blockade. The OAS would report its action, together with a formal complaint to the Security Council of the United Nations. (Tab A)

¹ Courses of action if Soviets stall on removal of IL-28s from Cuba. Top Secret. 13 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Psalm Documents.

(c) Action in the UN, designed to dramatize the incompleteness of Soviet compliance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, and designed to get a UN exhortation to Cuba to cooperate with the UN. (Tab B) This involves bringing to the surface as much as possible of the efforts U Thant has made to get Castro to cooperate; U Thant has already threatened to make public his offer of two days ago, to use the five Latin American embassies as a UN “presence” for verification purposes.

(d) Public announcements and statements by the President and other Administration leaders, contrasting sharply with the relative silence of Administration officials on Cuba during the last two weeks.

3. Tightening of the blockade

(a) Suspending the “Suspension of enforcement”.

(b) Stopping ships, starting with bloc chartered ships, then bloc ships, then Soviet ships.

4. Other actions

(a) Breaking of diplomatic relations and the imposition of trade embargoes by Latin American states and if possible other free-world nations whose relations with Cuba are still significant.

(b) Widening the prescribed categories under the blockade to include POL.

(c) “Harassing surveillance” from the air. Regular aerial reconnaissance would of course be continued right along. Up to a point this surveillance can be intensified as a measure of psychological warfare. But using aerial reconnaissance as a means of provoking attack on our planes, which would in turn justify retaliation from the air on Cuban targets (including the IL-28’s on the ground), is not regarded as an appropriate form of action, at least until all of the above steps have been played out.

Tab A

Draft OAS Resolution

WHEREAS,

The Council of the Organization of American States, meeting as the provisional Organ of Consultation on October 23, 1962, determined by incontrovertible evidence that the Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, had secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

At that meeting the Organ of Consultation called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability and recommended that the member states take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the

Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military matériel and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capabilities from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;

The Organ of Consultation also informed the Security Council of the United Nations of its resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations and expressed the hope that the Security Council would, in accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment;

The President of the United States proclaimed that, in accordance with the resolution of the Organ of Consultation, the forces under his command were ordered, beginning on October 24, 1962, to interdict the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba;

The Governments of Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela are aiding in the interdiction of offensive weapons to Cuba;

In correspondence between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, it was agreed that:

(1) The USSR would remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use; and the USSR would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba; and

(2) The United States would—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—

- (a) remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect; and
- (b) give assurances against an invasion of Cuba;

[Despite these undertakings, it has been determined that medium-range bombers, which constitute offensive weapons, have not been removed from Cuba;]

The Government of Cuba has failed to cooperate in arrangements to ensure that all offensive weapons are removed from and not reintroduced into Cuba;

As a result of these facts, the threat to the peace and security of the Continent created by the presence in Cuba of offensive weapons has not been effectively terminated, and satisfactory arrangements have not been made to prevent the recurrence of this threat;

THEREFORE,

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MEETING AS THE PROVISIONAL ORGAN OF CONSULTATION, RESOLVES:

1. To recommend that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, individually and collectively, in order to bring about the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba and to safeguard against their reintroduction into Cuba, consider taking additional measures, including, but not limited to the following:

- (a) Sever diplomatic relations with Cuba;
- (b) Sever economic relations with Cuba;
- (c) Intensify aerial surveillance of Cuba;
- (d) Intensify quarantine measures against Cuba;

2. To reaffirm in all respects its resolution of October 23, 1962;

3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations;

4. To continue to serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation and to request the Member States to keep the Organ of Consultation duly informed of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph 2 of this resolution and paragraph 2 of the resolution of October 23, 1962.

Tab B

Action in the UN

It would be difficult to mobilize opinion in the UN to exert pressure on the USSR to get the IL-28s out of Cuba since Communist arguments regarding their obsolete character, limited range, and the apparent disequilibrium between such weapons and our own, would make an impact on a good many countries. We can expect that a substantial number of members of the UN will adopt the view that the Soviets have acted in good faith and have fulfilled, to the degree possible, their part of the bargain.

It will be less difficult to dramatize Cuban intransigence and non-cooperation with the UN. Our strongest point is to emphasize the need for a UN presence to verify that all offensive weapons are out of Cuba and, more particularly, to safeguard against their future reintroduction.

If this point can be bolstered by a report of the Secretary General on his unsuccessful efforts to get the Cubans to agree to some form of inspection, we could muster the required support in the Security Council (but the Soviets would doubtless veto the US resolution). We could expect that the UAR and Ghana with the support of the Soviet Union would seek to broaden the Security Council consideration to include Castro's five demands. Amendments to our resolution incorporating these demands are probable. Moreover, while we would get the

required seven votes in the Security Council, our friends in the Council will not be as firm in support of the United States now that the USSR has removed 42 missiles and related equipment. In short, we would be confronted with a general feeling that in large measure the nuclear peril to the Western hemisphere has ended.

Any US proposal would have greater support if we called for UN inspection for a limited period pending the establishment of arrangements by the Latin American countries of a denuclearized zone designed to get at the long-range aspects of the problem.

Even so, there are serious doubts that the US position would receive broad support in the General Assembly if we should carry the matter to the Assembly after a Soviet veto in the Council.

On these assumptions the scenario in the Security Council would be as follows:

1. Our purpose in the Security Council would be to build up pressure on the Soviets to get out the IL-28's; to build up pressure on Cuba to admit UN inspectors; to help prepare the political climate for possible stronger measures such as tightening the blockade; and to help justify continuing US aerial surveillance.

2. The United States would take the initiative in calling a Security Council meeting at which:

- (a) The Secretary General would make a report on his efforts to secure agreement of the Cuban Government to a UN presence;

- (b) The USSR would take the line that it had fulfilled its part of the understandings contained in the exchange of letters between the President and Chairman Khrushchev; and

- (c) The United States would underscore the incompleteness of compliance as evidenced by failure to withdraw the IL-28's and to establish a UN presence in Cuba to guard against future reintroduction of offensive weapons.

3. It would be preferable though not essential for the OAS, prior to the Security Council meeting, to have adopted a further resolution calling for close aerial surveillance and tightening of the blockade.

4. In the Security Council the main stress should be laid by the United States on the need for a UN presence to verify that all offensive weapons are out, and the need to safeguard against a future nuclear peril in Cuba, rather than on the IL-28 problem. The Soviets would make some headway with their arguments on the IL-28's—their relatively obsolete character, limited range, and so forth. But Cuba's unwillingness to cooperate with the UN is our most persuasive debating point in a UN body.

4. There would be no exchange of declarations between the US and USSR. In the Security Council, we would submit a resolution along the following lines:

The Security Council

Noting the exchange of letters of October 27–28, 1962 between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev;

Noting with satisfaction that certain offensive weapons and related facilities have been removed from Cuba;

Deeply concerned that there still remain in Cuba weapons with offensive capabilities;

Believing that the threat to the security of the Western hemisphere and the peace of the world would be removed by withdrawal of IL–28 bombers under appropriate verification;

Believing further that steps should be taken to safeguard against the future reintroduction of offensive weapons in Cuba;

1. *Calls upon* the USSR, pursuant to commitments undertaken by Chairman Khrushchev, to remove from Cuba under appropriate UN observation and supervision all remaining offensive weapons; and to refrain from reintroducing such weapons into Cuba.

2. *Authorizes and requests* the Acting Secretary General to establish and dispatch a UN presence, with appropriate technical staff, with a view to verifying the removal of all remaining offensive weapons and to assure against their future reintroduction into Cuba;

3. *Calls upon* the government of Cuba to agree forthwith to the establishment of such a UN presence, pending the establishment of the arrangements envisaged in paragraph 5 of this resolution.

4. *Calls* for termination of the measures of quarantine directed against military shipments to Cuba at such time as the Secretary General reports compliance with this resolution;

5. *Endorses* the resolution adopted by the General Assembly recommending that countries of Latin America negotiate arrangements to establish a denuclearized zone with appropriate verification and urges that discussions on this matter among the countries concerned start forthwith;

6. *Commends* the Secretary General for his efforts and requests him to continue to render such assistance as may be appropriate to all concerned.

523. Memorandum for McNamara, November 13¹

November 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Quarantine operations (U)

1. *Situation.* Our quarantine was imposed on 23 October to stop importation of offensive weapons into Cuba and this quarantine has not subsequently been lifted. However, ships on station have been directed to hail ships bound for Cuba, but not to board them. Because of this declaration, sixteen Bloc ships reversed course and returned to the Soviet Union and no ships with suspicious cargoes attempted to pass the quarantine line.

2. We now have sixteen Soviet ships and one East German ship headed for Cuba. The East German ship and twelve Soviet ships are cargo ships and thus could carry suspicious cargo below decks. Two of these Soviet ships, the OKHOTSK and the ORENBURG, are ships with 72 foot hatches, capable of carrying missiles below deck.

3. *Requirements.* If the quarantine is to remain effective, to continue to insure that offensive weapons are not imported into Cuba, it will be necessary to visit and search Bloc and Free World ships which could be carrying offensive weapons. This particularly applies to the Soviet ships with large hatches, the OKHOTSK and the ORENBURG. OKHOTSK's estimated arrival at the quarantine line is 16 November, ORENBURG 17 November.

In view of the lapse of time since a Bloc cargo ship has transited the quarantine line, it should be made known that we still intend to enforce the quarantine by search when necessary. This could be accomplished by announcing that we had boarded a ship enroute to Cuba. On 12 November, the Norwegian ship TRAJAN enroute to Cuba was boarded by USS PERRY. While this ship was boarded at the request of the master, this fact should not be announced.

4. It would next be desirable to board a Free World non-Bloc chartered ship enroute to Cuba. This will be done if time permits.

5. We should next board and search a Bloc (non-Soviet) ship. The most likely candidate seems to be the Yugoslav tanker IZ, due at the quarantine line 14 November.

6. The next step should be to visit and search each of the Soviet cargo ships as they arrive at the quarantine line. The first one will be

¹ Quarantine operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files, Black Book, Cuba, Vol. III.

the ATARSK, which is due at the quarantine line 15 November, and the second one will be the OKHOTSK, which is due 16 November. It is especially important that the OKHOTSK be searched, since she has the 72 foot hatches.

7. *Recommendation.* It is recommended that visit and search as outlined above be authorized and that news releases be made, couched in language which indicates the quarantine is continuing, announcing that SS TRAJAN has been boarded and then others as the event occurs.

524. Memorandum for the record, November 13, prepared by Colonel Julian J. Ewell, covering a JCS paper entitled "Assessment of Increased Conventional Military Capabilities of Cuban and Soviet Units in Cuba"¹

November 13, 1962

Captain Shepard, Naval Aide at the White House, called on 13 November 1962 and said that the President, after noticing in the latest NIE the long lists of conventional equipment which the Soviets had sent to Cuba, had inquired as to any studies which might be in existence that pin down as to what these weapons meant in increased conventional capabilities for Cuban and Russian forces. Shepard had inquired of Mr. McCone who said he was aware of none in his shop which covered this specific problem.

I told Shepard that this appeared to be a JCS/DIA problem, that there were several studies and actions under way which cut at the problem from various directions and that we would take it in hand.

The thought occurred to me that the review of contingency plans generated by the President's and Sec Def's memos of 5 November might be considered responsive to this question or if they don't hit it right on the nose, a brief, accompanying paper might be added to address it specifically.

Julian J. Ewell

Colonel, USA

Executive to the Chairman

¹ Secret. 10 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.

Attachment

ASSESSMENT OF INCREASED CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF CUBAN AND SOVIET UNITS IN CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the increased conventional military capabilities of Cuban forces and Soviet units in Cuba.

SUMMARY

1. The introduction of massive quantities of Soviet ground, naval and air equipment during the military buildup in Cuba has substantially enhanced the conventional combat capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces. In addition, Soviet technicians, advisors, and ground and air elements in Cuba have significantly contributed to establishment of a much stronger military posture² and to development of Soviet/Cuban capabilities for defense of the island and for maintenance of internal security.

2. US contingency plans with respect to Cuba have been reviewed by the Joint Staff and CINCLANT in the light of the military buildup and recent intelligence. It has been concluded that, despite the very substantial increase in Cuban combat capability, CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, in a non-nuclear environment and when preceded by CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62, is considered a valid workable plan.

THE ESTIMATE

3. Although strategic missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba, the Castro regime has emerged with a formidable military capability as a result of the influx of other modern weaponry and accelerated readiness training that accompanied the buildup. Castro retains an impressive array of sophisticated weapons provided to his forces by the Soviets, tabulated in Annex B.

4. During the past year, there has been substantial increase in both the quantity and quality of heavy ground force equipment in Cuba. Quantitatively, there are now three times as many tanks and assault guns as in late 1961; seven times as much medium artillery (122-mm and 152-mm); three times as many light artillery and antitank guns (57-mm, 76-mm, and 85-mm); three times as many mortars (82-mm and 120-mm); and three times as many motor transport vehicles. Quali-

² See Annex A for detailed evaluation of probable Soviet ground combat forces in Cuba and Annex B for comparison of selected Soviet weapons in Cuba in late 1961 with current inventories.

tatively, heavier and more modern types of equipment have been introduced into the inventory: T-54 medium tanks, SU-100 assault guns, truck mounted multiple rocket launchers, and amphibious personnel carriers. As a result, the firepower and mobility of the ground forces in Cuba has increased markedly. Along with the equipment buildup, training activities have been intensified, thus significantly improving the capabilities of Cuban personnel to utilize the Soviet equipment.

5. The Cuban Navy has been augmented by 16 P-6 PT boats; 6 patrol craft; and 12 KOMAR guided missile boats, each equipped with two short-range cruise type missiles and largely manned by Soviets. Naval capabilities for coastal security have been significantly enhanced.

6. The Cuban air capability has also increased materially. There are now three times as many jet fighters and helicopters and about twice the number of transports as a year ago. The Cubans will seek to retain the 42 IL-28's estimated to be in Cuba. Accompanying these numerical increases, the qualitative improvement of Cuban air units has been even more significant. The added jet fighters are mostly of the supersonic MIG-19 and MIG-21 types. Air-to-air missiles have been provided for the MIG-21's. A fully integrated air defense missile system, now manned by Soviet personnel and comprising 24 SA-2 sites, each with six launchers and associated modern radars, has been established. At the present time, Soviet Bloc personnel are believed to be flying the MIG-21's and are generously diffused in other Cuban air units as instructors.

7. The probable introduction into Cuba of Soviet combat forces was intended not only to defend their sensitive installations against invasion but also to secure them against "counterrevolutionary" activity. Their presence would also provide the Soviets a potent source of influence on the internal Cuban scene. Retention of these units in Cuba, after the withdrawal of strategic missiles, would indicate that Moscow has not fully abandoned the concept of developing Cuba as a potential strategic Soviet military base.

Annex A

SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA

Analysis of recent photographic coverage of four major military camps in Cuba suggests that they contain highly mobile composite Soviet Army ground combat forces of reduced regimental size, with a possible nuclear capability. These units had earlier been equated to four reinforced medium tank battalions, a FROG artillery rocket battalion, and a SNAPPER antitank missile unit, with a total estimated strength of about 1,200 men. It is estimated now that these composite

groupings contain a total of about 4,000 troops. The presence of Soviet Army units in such strength would reflect the extent of Moscow's determination to create and maintain a strategic base in Cuba. With the removal of the missile bases, ground combat units might also be withdrawn, although no preparations for their departure have been noted.

All four of these camps evidently have been established since the beginning of the Soviet buildup in July, and they have certain similarities. While most of their facilities are of a temporary character, construction of permanent buildings similar to those at the missile sites has started at some of the camps. Modern, sophisticated equipment, including types not known to have been released to any non-Soviet units, has been identified at each of these camps. At one—Santiago de las Vegas—Soviet Army emblems, including the "Guards" unit badge, the armored insignia, and the Red Army Star, have been prominently displayed on the ground.

The disposition of these units also reflects their probable Soviet identity; all are in areas which contained sensitive military installations of prime interest to the Soviets. Three are near the former offensive missile bases, and the fourth is adjacent to the strategically significant airfield at Holguin in eastern Cuba.

Since there are some differences in the types and quantities of equipment identified at these camps, the exact composition and strength of the units has not been established. The pattern, however, appears to be that of a composite, heavily armed grouping consisting of a medium tank battalion, an armored reconnaissance company, an armored infantry unit of company or possibly battalion strength, a multiple rocket launcher battery, a nuclear-capable FROG artillery rocket battalion with two launchers, a SNAPPER antitank missile battery, an antiaircraft unit, and an engineer (sapper) unit. At least one of the groupments (Holguin) also includes a mortar company with 10 pieces and a 57-mm antitank platoon. A formation of this composition would comprise about 1,000 troops.

Although this structure does not equate exactly with any known Soviet Army formation, the Soviets are known to have been developing regimental task forces in their efforts to adapt to modern warfare. Changes toward this end have been noted in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, where training in recent years has emphasized the employment of a reinforced regimental formation specially designed to conduct independent operations. Combat division headquarters have been used as field commands to co-ordinate and support widely dispersed regimental groupings. The composition and disposition of the Soviet units in Cuba suggests this concept.

Annex B

*INVENTORY OF SELECTED WEAPONS IN CUBA IN LATE 1961
COMPARED WITH CURRENT ESTIMATES*

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	
	<u>1961</u>	<u>Current</u>
<i>Armored Vehicles</i>		
JS-2 Heavy Tanks	21	40
T-34 Medium Tanks	104	185–210
T-54 Medium Tanks	—	95–120
SU-100 Assault Guns	50	75
Armored Personnel Carriers, BTR-152	—	40
Armored Personnel Carriers, BTR-50 (Amphib)	—	40
WHD Amphib 4x4 w/dart-like rockets	—	18–29
ZIL-485 Amphibious Vehicles	—	30
K-61 (Tracked Amphibians)	—	30
<i>Artillery</i>		
152-mm Gun-howitzers	—	180
122-mm guns	24	120
122-mm howitzers	52	120
85-mm guns	72	300
76-mm guns	120	200
57-mm antitank guns	72	300
57-mm antiaircraft guns	—	120
37-mm antiaircraft guns	90	120
30-mm twin antiaircraft guns	—	90
<i>Mortars and Machine Guns</i>		
160-mm	—	Some
120-mm	72	180
82-mm	200	600
14.5-mm quad AA machine gun	—	100
12.7-mm quad AA machine gun	—	350
<i>Transport Vehicles</i>		
Prime movers, trucks, jeeps	2,400	7,500–10,000
<i>Naval Vessels</i>		
<i>Patrol craft</i> Kronstadt-class sub-chasers	—	6
<i>Motor Torpedo Boats</i> (P-6)	—	16
PGMG (KOMAR guided missile boats, 2 missiles each)	—	12

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	
	<u>1961</u>	<u>Current</u>
<i>Jet Fighters</i>		
MIG-15/17/19	35	62
MIG-21	—	39
<i>Jet Light Bombers</i>		
Beagle (IL-28)	—	42 ³
<i>Transports</i>		
IL-14	—	14-16
AN-2 (Utility)	10	15
<i>Helicopters</i>		
MI-4 (HOUND)	12	44
MI-1 (HARE)	11	26
<i>Prop Trainers</i>		
Zlin-326	—	12
<i>Guided Missiles</i>		
Air Defense (SA-2)	—	500
Coast Defense (Cruise type, 35 n.m.)	—	40
<i>Unguided Missiles</i>		
Short-range Tactical FROG	—	8-20
<i>Radars</i>		
TOKEN	—	15
KNIFE REST	—	15-20
SPOON REST	—	30-40
FRUIT SET	—	24
FIRE CAN	—	20
BAR LOCK	—	15
FLAT FACE	—	15
WHIFF	—	Unknown
ROCK CAKE	—	Unknown

³ See Annex A for detailed evaluation of probable Soviet ground combat forces in Cuba and Annex B for comparison of selected Soviet weapons in Cuba in late 1961 with current inventories.

525. Telegram 1762 from USUN, November 13¹

November 13, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Cuba. Following is summary of four-hour meeting today between customary SOV and US negotiators.

Kuznetsov began by reading protest against US reconnaissance flights over Cuba. He said continuation such overflights could only make negots about normalizing situation in Caribbean more difficult, that categorical objections on part of Cuba are well founded, overflights are violation of Cuban sovereignty and that it is reasonable to stop flights since all SOV commitments in exchange of correspondence between President and Khrushchev have been fulfilled. Stevenson replied by pointing out, in absence UN observation and supervision as provided for in exchange of correspondence between Pres and Khrushchev, no other means of verification available to US and that it would be necessary for US rpt US to continue overflights as long as other satisfactory means of verification unavailable. McCloy added that overflights reduce rather than increase tension since they to some extent reassure US and LA public as to what is transpiring concerning offensive weapons in Cuba.

Kuznetsov declared Khrushchev had agreed in principle to UN inspection of dismantling and removal of offensive weapons but had made clear in letter of Oct 27 this would be only with consent of Cuban Govt. However SOVs had taken many steps to satisfy US such as alongside inspection with uncovering of missiles, etc. obligations undertaken by Soviet Union had therefore been fulfilled. IL-28's are not offensive weapons.

Stevenson read two numbered paras from President's letter of Oct 27 and second sentence of second para letter of Oct 28 and urged quick settlement on basis of undertakings listed in these paras. Kuznetsov replied SOVs desire quick settlement but US lags behind. He reread second numbered para Pres's Oct 27 letter but gave abbreviated translation of clause between dashes which seemed to imply only commitments which UN obliged to ensure relate to dismantling and withdrawal of missiles, which has already been accomplished. Therefore it is now up to US to fulfill its obligations under exchange of letters and to embody agreements and arrangements in document to be presented

¹ Summary of 4-hour conversation between U.S. and Soviet negotiators on UN inspection and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-1362.

to SC. Kuznetsov agreed with Pres's reference to "firm undertakings" in second sentence second para his letter Oct 28.

Stevenson outlined what in our view remains to be done by SOVs to bring about quick settlement:

- (1) Remove IL-28's,
- (2) Give assurances all nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs have been removed,
- (3) Obtain Cuban Govt agreement to observation and supervision of compliance,
- (4) Give assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons systems and present their suggestions as to suitable safeguards for ensuring against such reintroduction.

In response, as provided in Pres's letter, we would lift quarantine and would give assurances against invasion. We added that we are in fact prepared to do more. If US receives from SOVs assurances that IL-28's will be removed from Cuba within reasonable time, say, three weeks, we will promptly lift quarantine. McCloy emphasized that SOVs have not met all their commitments. They have not removed IL-28's nor have they given assurances concerning removal of nuclear weapons or components other than those associated with missiles.

After reiterating SOV position that IL-28's are defensive, Kuznetsov referred to his proposal of presentation of agreed document to SC and said it would be helpful if US could join in working out such document as foreseen in exchange of letters. He said that assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons should be considered in that context along with other guarantees envisaged in correspondence. He emphasized Sov Union will strictly observe commitments made by Khrushchev in his letters to Pres. He said now is time to commence negots on long-term arrangements, to consider together all outstanding problems connected with Cuban question. He said SOVs would study new suggestion by US in regard to removal IL-28's and lifting of blockade but that he could not at present do other than repeat SOV position that IL-28's are defensive.

Stevenson noted Kuznetsov's agreement to study proposal on IL-28's and his reference to Khrushchev's commitment against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba and repeated our desire to hear SOV position on removal of nuclear bombs. He emphasized that US would adhere strictly to terms of Pres's letter on assurances to Cuba against invasion. As to procedure before SC, when US and USSR have agreed on all outstanding points, including safeguards for future, US will make declaration in SC incorporating our agreements. We had assumed SOVs would wish to make similar declaration. We would be glad to discuss contents of declarations. However, he pointed out, if

quarantine had already been lifted pursuant to proposal involving IL-28's which he had just put forward, US declaration would need to deal only with assurances against invasion of Cuba. Wording of such declaration and question of action by other Western Hemisphere states are being considered in Washington.

In conclusion Stevenson summarized once again outstanding issues:

- (1) Removal IL-28's which would result in US lifting quarantine;
- (2) SOV assurances of removal of all nuclear components;
- (3) How compliance with undertakings is going to be verified in Cuba;
- (4) Assurances against reintroduction offensive weapons and discussion of safeguards against reintroduction in future by any state;
- (5) If blockade already lifted, all that remains on US side is declaration against invasion. We cannot now discuss language of such declaration but could in near future if SOVs also prepared to discuss how to complete their undertakings.

Kuznetsov did not comment on this summary other than to repeat once again he would report to his govt new US proposal on removal IL-28's, however he must continue to emphasize SOVs consider this aircraft defensive.

Comment: While no new points were agreed, we feel this mtg was very useful in that all outstanding issues, particularly those with which we are most concerned, were very clearly identified and spelled out. There should henceforth be no room for misunderstanding and ground is cleared for real progress at next mtg if SOVs prove at all conciliatory.

Dept's latest thinking on long-term safeguards and wording our assurance would be helpful.

Stevenson

526. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Gilpatric and Ball, November 14¹

November 14, 1962

Gilpatric: I just got a long account over the phone from John.

GWB: He has just been talking with me.

Gilpatric: Maybe you got the story direct, so I won't repeat it. Paul and I agree if the way can be seen clear to do it, it might be good for Jack to have another talk.

GWB: My instinct is in favor of it. I told Jack that I would talk with the Secretary in a minute, but I thought I would talk to the President about it. I am going over there for the Adenauer business. I think if he had a talk and really put it to him on this basis, it might be healthy right now.

Gilpatric: It seems to be completely consistent with what I thought was the consensus yesterday—a sort of prelude to any further direct action. That is the view here. I was also interested in Jack's impression that Kuznetsov was more or less pro forma in his reference to the aerial reconnaissance.

GWB: Jack said he wasn't sure. My own interpretation of it last night was that this was probably a reflection of something they had to do for Mikoyan.

Gilpatric: Yes. I would expect them, and have expected it before and surprised they haven't made the point. Course, it may be again a prelude to linking it up some way, although they must recognize, as you said yesterday, that is something we can never expect them to agree to and they never can expect us to agree not to do it.

GWB: That is right; I would think that would be the case. Let me talk to the President about it. I am glad to have your reflection as well as Bob's. It is certainly my own, and I will check it with Dean.

Gilpatric: Right.

¹ Status of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on UN inspection and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. No classification marking. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272.

527. DOD/ISA draft paper, November 14¹

November 14, 1962

SOME LESSONS FROM CUBA

In drawing lessons from the Cuban experience one should generalize with caution. The Cuban case, like all cases, was unique. Developments were influenced by a number of peculiarities not apt to reappear in the next crisis. Thus, the problem of controlling the development of events, for example, was in some respects simpler here than can be expected as a rule. A lot of operational information was quickly at hand to us but not to the Soviets, the focal military actions had few effects outside the immediate area which was dominated by U.S. power, and escalation barely got started. Each feature aided control.

Two limits of the observations to follow deserve notice. First, they cover only a portion of the lessons learned, being concerned mostly with political-military aspects at the national level. Lessons of importance for policy makers and bearing on the integrated use of national power are sought here. Many other lessons of a different sort no doubt are there to be learned. Second, the data on which the material below is based have some gaps. Some of the more closely held material may bear other lessons or have impact on these.

1. Soviet Objectives

It seems likely that the Soviet decision makers agreed on putting missile and bomber bases in Cuba without agreeing completely on the objectives for doing so. The list below includes some plausible, consistent, objectives:

a. To display to the world, and especially to our allies, that the US is too indecisive or too terrified of war to respond effectively to major Soviet provocation, even when possessing great local superiority backed by nuclear superiority. US acceptance of Soviet action in Cuba would then set the stage for action on Berlin and would weaken US alliances.

b. To step up suddenly the Soviet ability in a first strike to deliver nuclear weapons against our nuclear strike forces, especially our command and control systems.

c. To contrast an expanding USSR with a receding US:

(1) by breaking through the ring of US bases around the USSR.

¹ "Some Lessons From Cuba." Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI (A).

(2) by suddenly creating a base posture more nearly symmetric to that of the US.

(3) and by seeming to make up deficiencies in intercontinental nuclear capability.

d. In the course of making a forward step toward Berlin to discover empirically in a less explosive arena the US determination to fight.

e. To deter a US invasion of Cuba—or, at least, to use this argument with Castro.

f. As a fall back position, in the face of a strong US reaction, to enter into a negotiation on Soviet bases in Cuba vs. US bases abroad.

Finally, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would have undertaken this Cuban excursion without thinking there was enough of a chance of only a feeble US reaction. Something for us to reflect on is what in our behavior over the past year led them to think they could get away with it or would not be badly hurt by trying.

2. Renewed Credibility of Soviet Expansionism

In the last few years, the West has tended to fear Soviet expansion less and less. In Cuba, the Soviets made their first long distance leap into “third areas,” first politically, then in concrete military power. Moreover, this deployment threatened the main nuclear force of NATO. Now not only their Premier travels across oceans but also their missiles. They deployed forces to threaten the Atlantic deterrent, a major military move to signal a dramatic shift in the “relationship of forces” on a world scale. No longer are the Soviets confining their expansionist activities to political, economic, and military efforts against only the underdeveloped regions. It should now be clearer to our European Allies that the Russians were willing to make a major move with significant military implications against the West.

3. US Nuclear Threshold

The US did not launch nuclear weapons, nor come close to doing so. It did apply limited, non-shooting force, and it was actively preparing to launch non-nuclear combat operations. It was of course prepared to face such risks of escalation by the Soviet Union as these actions might bring. The Soviets, our Allies, other nations, and we ourselves have seen that nuclear retaliation by the US requires more serious provocation than the sudden appearance of a nuclear base 90 miles from our shores.

4. How Far the Nuclear Writ Runs

Our nuclear strength was a continuous restraint on the Russians against a nuclear attack or, perhaps, a markedly broadened non-nuclear operation. However, over-all, and especially local, US nuclear superior-

ity did not deter the Soviets from military and nuclear intrusion into Cuba.

5. *How Far the Non-nuclear Writ Runs*

Nor were the Soviets put off by the immense US superiority in non-nuclear strength usable locally. At the outset, the Soviets clearly lacked conviction that the US was determined to use force on this issue. Once we decided to use force, however, we faced the Soviets with an impossible military problem locally. Moreover, they could not be certain how far a local conflict would escalate, and they know it to be generally true that any direct US-USSR conflict would be carried out against the background of a possible nuclear war. Demonstrated US willingness to begin non-nuclear combat action against a nuclear-armed opponent surely made evident to the Soviets that the US was willing to take risks of nuclear consequences.

6. *Soviet Advance and Withdrawal*

The Soviets undertook a limited-objective, limited-means operation. By deploying nuclear strike forces, they used bold means to widen the struggle with the US, but they took care not to let widespread shooting start (they did shoot down a U-2). In making the confrontation military and injecting the nuclear element, they evidently did not credit an immediate US nuclear reply. When opposed with the certainty that we would use non-nuclear force they backed off, probably because (a) in non-nuclear combat in the area of Cuba, defeat was certain; (b) there was a high risk of escalation into nuclear war if conflict were extended to areas where the local balance of forces was favorable to them.

It is possible that some Soviet actions were responses to signals that we did not intend to send. One example might be the straying of the U-2 over Russia, and another the apparent interpretation by a Soviet ship captain of night photography with a flash cartridge as an attack on him. On the other hand, one signal that was intended to be heard loud and clear was sent by the President on September 4th and repeated on September 13th: the warning that we wouldn't tolerate bombardment vehicles in Cuba. This signal was met initially by an elaborate attempt at deception probably accompanied by a belief that faced with a *fait accompli* we would back down.

On withdrawal, the timing of their decision gives us probably our best clue. It did not come on the heels of the President's speech, with its mention of "full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union," and the immediate SAC alert which followed. It came instead when non-shooting coercion had already been applied, and when it must have seemed unmistakable that the US was on the point of using shooting force to enforce the quarantine and probably either to destroy Soviet systems in Cuba or to invade the island. It is probable that the most

impressive thing was confirmation through their intelligence channels that we had taken all the measures consistent with serious military action.

The Soviets saw they were going to face conflict in Cuba and lose.

7. Our Views of Soviet Advance and Retreat

The crisis highlighted some contrasting American views of likely Russian calculations. On one view of the Kremlin, when the Russians advance and then withdraw, one faction in the Kremlin pressed the advance and another led the retreat. An alternative interpretation regards decisions on advance, and retreat in the event the advance is unsuccessful, as mutually consistent policy. There is undoubtedly disagreement in the Kremlin, but it is not necessary to assume that Khrushchev is in either an "advance" faction or a "retreat" faction.

Divergent views on how the Soviets calculate in withdrawal, particularly, led to contrasting US policy recommendations as to concession, standstill, or pursuit of the Russians in retreat.

According to the first view of the Kremlin in retreat, as the magnitude of the withdrawal increases, so does the psychological cost of the act—until the readiness to retreat gives out. Hence we must be careful not to ask for too much, or we must soften deprivations with indulgences (for example, the "pledge" not to invade, commendations of the other side, Lippmann's proposal to trade Turkish bases) if we want to have the opponent retreat at all.

In the other conception Soviet leaders view it as impermissible to concede an iota more than the situation "forces" them to do, it is also obligatory to engage in whatever degree of withdrawal is required to prevent even worse damage or annihilation. The graver the penalty we impose on them for not withdrawing, and the more certain we make it appear the penalty will actually be applied, the more probable becomes their compliance and in fact the easier we make it for them to withdraw.

Clearly, a wide variance in policy recommendations resulted.

8. Nuclear Risks

While Khrushchev could know that he was not going to use nuclear weapons and that he would lose in Cuba, the US Government was obliged to take into account other possible outcomes. The possibility of nuclear war drew therefore a share of attention proportionate perhaps to its gravity but greater than was warranted by its likelihood, given the assumption that Soviet policy conforms to Soviet interests and known strategy. Concern with remote nuclear possibilities not only prompted consideration of some highly improvident courses of action but also counseled hesitation on pursuing our interest on immediate inspection and on withdrawal of IL-28's.

Certainly our public statements exaggerated the risks of nuclear war. We could get our way without initiating the use of nuclear weapons. This burden was entirely on Khrushchev. And for him such a decision would be suicidal. Our public stance should have de-emphasized the nuclear risks to the extent possible (even if we weren't entirely sure).

9. Analogies with Berlin

Berlin, like Cuba, provides a testing point for the East-West confrontation. In neither case is the immediate prize of the first importance for its own sake, but the stakes riding on the local outcome, in both cases, but especially in Berlin, are great.

Tactically, the same principles which underlie the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict were applied in the Cuban operation. Phases I and II were executed and Phase III lay just ahead at the denouement. We first established definitely for ourselves and the world that Soviet action had endangered our vital interests (Phase I). We then began an integrated, ascending program of political, economic, psychological, and non-combatant military moves against a background of military preparations for combat (Phase II). Our aim was a limited one from the outset, not conquest of territory nor destruction of enemy forces, but simply the removal of certain delivery systems. We kept the Soviets aware that our objective was this limited one, and that by granting it they would bring an end to US military action. But they could hardly mistake our preparations to move into Phase III, the application of non-nuclear combat force toward that objective. And, inevitably, any conflict with the USSR would involve some heightened risk of nuclear war—and our alerting action gave point to this possibility.

Berlin, like Cuba, is an island surrounded by superior opposing forces. But Soviet non-nuclear military power in the Caribbean area is minute by comparison with US and NATO strength in Central Europe. We had leverage in Cuba that the Soviets don't have in Berlin. (Moreover, the waters surrounding Cuba are politically neutral, while GDR territory surrounding Berlin is politically explosive.) Neither side should expect to be able to keep conflict or near conflict concerning Berlin under the tight control of Cuban actions. There would be very much more uncertainty as to events and objectives, side effects, greater communications problems, and much more complex Alliance coordination problems.

In Cuba, the Soviets had no great interests at stake, but we do in Berlin. To be short, in Cuba we have dominance; in Berlin the Soviets do not.

10. *The Role of Intelligence*

We had timely, reliable intelligence data, and it helped immensely. Soviet performance was probably hampered by a paucity and slowness of intelligence. And thanks to our continuing prior surveillance, we had a solid factual basis for evaluating new material. Both in laying the intelligence base and in getting the new facts swiftly, air reconnaissance was a priceless asset. US conduct of future crises elsewhere would be substantially helped if a similarly solid base of intelligence data were created before that geographical area attracted intense interest.

11. *Reconnaissance and Stability*

In the last few years, it has been common for peacetime surveillance to be called provocative. The Cuban experience has abruptly changed the world's image of outside surveillance. Reconnaissance and inspection are widely viewed today as major tools toward preventing violence. Our reconnaissance aided control and stability. For a time the US should be able to conduct, and urge others to conduct, fuller reconnaissance of more areas. Aerial reconnaissance of China, for example, is less likely to meet with widespread opposition if the matter were to become public; the common good could be more plausibly argued than before Cuba.

12. *Control*

Control over the Cuban operation was affected by many unique features. Developing swiftly, and initially in deep secrecy, with US forces vastly overmatching those of the Soviet, the Cuban problem permitted continuous, intense, central control. Before military moves had much more than begun, Washington and Moscow were exchanging notes. The military actions provided time for communications, had delimited scope and well-defined terminal points, and the method of exchanging notes provided time for thought and evaluation. (This suggests that the purple telephone, between President and Premier, might not be an unmixed blessing.) All this made the control problem simpler, as did the exceptionally good intelligence and operational information available. But it still was not easy, even with centralized control, for decisions to be made and translated into action at the pace required to keep the US in control of the situation.

In most military operations of a large scale, it will ordinarily be necessary and more efficient to decentralize control over execution to a greater extent than in Cuba. Especially will this be true where overseas operations are involved. But the Cuban operation points up some difficulties that delegation would bring. Even where the interconnection of political and military aspects is thoroughly appreciated, not all significant political and military information can be quickly accessible in the

field. Even where workable packages of delegated control have been arranged, accidental or unforeseeable events may interrupt the process. It is often useful to design operations so that control can be transferred, new instructions issued, and communications with opponents occur. In all such operations there is the problem of clarity about what matters will be dealt with at what levels. Cuba shows how helpful it would be to have in advance a common understanding on whether, for example, the executive agent concept will be used for command of military forces, and, if so, what matters will be decided above, at, and below the executive agent. Delegation is also less easy to manage where Allies are intimately involved, and especially their military forces. The desirability of Allied agreement that the US President must in serious crises act as Commander-in-Chief for the Alliance as a whole has become still more evident.

13. *Allied Reactions*

The NATO Allies were remarkably willing for the US to manage the Cuban operations, with fewer complaints about our putting them into jeopardy than seemed likely before the event. This was true despite rather than because of our consultation which was little and late. The relatively favorable NATO reactions stemmed mostly from the attitude that this was an American show, despite the fact that their interests were very much at stake and that they might have become directly involved at any time. Fortunately, the US had become, through continuing contacts and discussions in NATO, reasonably well equipped to judge the acceptability to its Allies of various courses of action. This was essential, for we needed one, and only one, hand on the valve to apply increasing pressures with the least risk of unwanted escalation.

The Latin American attitude was determined by shock at the Soviet move, fear of what might follow, the deflation of Castro's pretensions, and respect for the vigorous action by the US. This attitude is unlikely to persist in full strength, but perhaps it will last long enough to help bring about change in Cuba. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that a high degree of unity cannot be generated in similar situations in the future.

14. *Politico-Military Inseparability*

The military and the political aspects of every action of both sides were closely interwoven: at the outset, our assessment of Soviet objectives, our reconnaissance activities, expected Soviet reactions, and timing of our moves. As the political situation developed through OAS action, initial UN discussions, and first Soviet reactions, it was considered politically desirable to make detailed changes in such military matters as rules of engagement, instructions for conduct of the search,

and even the selection of which approaching vessels to handle first. The planning of possible strikes or assaults was subject to many specific political restrictions, owing to expected effects on the Cuban people, the Castro government, the OAS, NATO governments and populations, and US public opinion.

Thus, at no stage in the operation as executed or foreseen did the problem ever seem wholly political or wholly military. Advisors and decision-makers at the seat of government, whether diplomats, military men, or political officials, at every stage found it essential to take into account factors which might ordinarily seem beyond their individual spheres of cognizance. It was not possible to predict at what point a political detail would require change in minor military details normally left to be decided in the field; similarly, military detail at unexpected times necessarily altered political decisions and actions, large and small. In the basic policy decisions at high levels, there was complete interdependence of military and political factors. The selection of the objective was a combined problem. Only out of the interplay of military capabilities and limitations with the political elements of the setting could courses of action be set up and choices made.

15. *Alliance Indivisibility*

The defense of the Alliance is not geographically divisible. Although the Caribbean is outside the NATO area, Soviet action there affected the US not only as homeland but also as Alliance arsenal. The US was acutely aware that Alliance nuclear strength was threatened and that Berlin repercussions might follow US actions over Cuba. The Soviet attempt to connect their bases in Cuba with NATO bases in Turkey underlined the fact of indivisibility.

16. *Inspection and the United Nations*

The crisis has prompted the spontaneous emergence of *ad hoc* arms control proposals from many sources. Both internal and external pressures have developed for their hasty implementation unsupported by prior analysis and planning. These pressures contrast strikingly with the lack of preparations for rapidly implementing even temporary inspection arrangements with competent neutral observers and adequate modern equipment. One of the lessons of the crisis is that many proposals for international inspection considered abstractly are, in the event, woefully inadequate to meet our needs for information in a crisis. Once again the United Nations has been proved not a reliable or quickly responsive device to verify Soviet performance of an agreement. Even when we push an exceptionally strong case with insistent force, the results are inadequate. The neutral powers are eager to avoid enmity and damaging responses from great powers. The UN Secretariat is not in a position to act against member nations without their consent

and in any case lacks the technical capacity to inspect. Perhaps the latter defect can be corrected.

17. *Secrecy in Planning*

It has been shown possible to conduct over a period of at least a week an intensive analytic and planning activity at a high level without having its nature revealed in the press. Furthermore, judging from the apparent confusion produced in Moscow by the President's speech of 22 October, it would appear that Soviet intelligence was surprised. In the climactic stages of the planning, many people and many widely separated locations were involved, yet security still remained very tight. The effect of this was to deny to the Soviets much opportunity for political pre-emption, by announcing commitments or conditions prior to the President's speech. Such actions by the Soviets, putting us in the position of reacting rather than initiating, could have restricted US freedom of action and substantially changed the effect produced on Allied governments and public opinion. Several conditions offered unique opportunity for avoiding press attention over the first five or six days. That the problem itself was unknown to the public was foremost. The special system for handling key intelligence information helped greatly. Perhaps third was the fact that the problem quickly became an operational one involving the risk of American casualties; people were therefore much more conscious of security than normally. It would be imprudent to conclude from the Cuban experience, fortified as our security was by luck, that this degree of secrecy is routinely attainable. It should be noted that security deteriorated rapidly when the problem passed into the stages of finally closing the deal; here the press was less restrained.

However, secrecy was achieved at a cost in effectiveness. Severe restrictions were applied to the dissemination and availability of sensitive information. The result was some reduction in coordination, in governmental capacity for analysis of events and trends, and in the possibilities of intelligent initiatives.

18. *The Importance of Communications and Information*

It is important that information of importance to national decisions move with great speed to the locations where these decisions are made. Part of the problem is mechanical. Effective execution of much political planning on Cuba was hampered by imperfections in the communications system. Major improvements in communication, especially for the State Department, are clearly called for. But there is also need for discrimination. Sending too much information to the top slows not speeds the process. And operating levels need to know what policy levels are concerned about. This need conflicts with the need for secrecy.

While it is not a cardinal necessity that all advisors whom the President consults have the same information, it is highly undesirable

that their advice diverge merely because some lack certain key facts. Whether this actually ever occurred in the Cuban operation is not so significant as the fact that it was certainly possible. The handling of factual data in Washington is susceptible of much improvement, particularly at the boundary where diplomatic and military data intersect. Improvements here could prevent future troubles, possibly serious ones.

19. *Prior Analysis of Contingencies*

Each of the high-level decisions during the Cuban operation involved a choice among alternatives, but more searching contingency planning beforehand would have permitted more informed, thorough comparison. Actions to cause removal of offensive weapons from Cuba have effects upon the tenure of Castro, the orientation of the Cuban people, and the general question of how far we can go toward aiding resistance in Communist satellites, for example, as well as upon more direct and crucial issues of US-Soviet power confrontation. These and other relationships were noted during the recent decision-making processes, but in the heat of immediate problems they were often treated anxiously not analytically, without benefit of as balanced and searching an examination as prior planning would permit.

20. *Overseas Bases*

Judging by the repercussions in the Communist world, the Soviet setback in Cuba was more than a local one. And not because of the importance of the base in Cuba. Retreat in Cuba suggests retreat closer to home. The lesson for us should be clear. No matter how valueless an overseas base, the time to give it up is before or well after a crisis—not during it—if we want to have allies believing that association with us is to their interest. With few exceptions, however, ridding ourselves of bases should not be a consuming concern; as we increase the emphasis on non-nuclear forces to meet the more likely contingencies abroad, overseas bases will become more, not less, important.

21. *Power at Sea*

The ease with which the US was able to apply its will on the high seas, little hampered by prospects of local enemy action, shows vividly how immense is our superiority at sea. While this is especially so in the Caribbean where our naval power is supplemented by shore-based air power, everywhere, except in waters subject to Soviet-based air control, our naval superiority is very pronounced indeed. Cuba in particular is a hostage to the US Navy. US manipulation of a few among the great many available non-nuclear naval moves, in concert with a carefully managed program of political moves, forced the Soviets into a reactive position. Our power at sea, visibly capable of destroying

enemy sea forces but used instead to apply political-military pressures, permitted us to retain the initiative and to succeed.

22. *The Moral Element*

It can be argued that the US broke the strict bounds of past legal interpretations in invoking the quarantine, or would have been in such a position had the OAS not ratified the October 23rd Resolution, but the world quickly recognized that it was acting with great restraint to defend an important national and regional interest in the face of blatant provocation. This increased the strength of public support. More importantly, the action is not likely to leave bad after-effects when there is time for reflection and discussion about its morality. A similar recognition abroad similarly expanded the base of the whole-hearted support which Allied governments gave.

528. Telegram 1781 from USUN, November 14¹

November 14, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for Secretary. Cuba.

At mtg with SYG this morning Stevenson and McCloy gave him account of present status US-SOV negots.

SYG responded by reporting on his recent negots with Cubans and SOVs on UN verification. Thant said he had sounded out Lechuga informally Nov 8 on acceptability five LA Ambs in Cuba for dual purpose of verifying withdrawal offensive weapons and of serving as liaison between UN and Cuban Govt in regard to solution Cuban crisis. On Nov 11 Lechuga informed SYG his govt's response to first function proposed for LA Ambs was negative and its reaction to second proposed function was positive. When SYG inquired whether Castro objects to Latin Americans performing these functions, Lechuga replied in the negative but added that his govt is unhappy about action LA countries in OAS on Oct 23.

Consequently on Nov 12 SYG made formal proposal in writing to Lechuga proposing, in place LA Ambs, group of Ambs from "non-aligned" countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and LA to perform same two functions, i.e., verification and liaison between Cuba and UN.

¹ Status of present U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1462.

No reply has yet been received to this second proposal and Lechuga appeared to expect his govt's reply would be identical with its reaction to first informal proposal, that is negative on verification and positive on liaison.

SYG continued that, while he, like US and USSR, feels SC mtg is undesirable at this stage, he nevertheless feels obligation to report to SC in near future since almost three weeks has elapsed since his appeal to interested parties in Cuban crisis. He was thinking in terms of written report to SC Nov 16 following receipt of Castro's reply to his proposal. Both US reps and his own colleagues (Bunche and Loutfi) discouraged idea of written report to SC at this point while negots are still in fluid state and SYG appeared willing to delay.

In response to query he explained that what he had in mind in proposing non-aligned ambassadorial group in Havana serve as liaison between UN and Castro was that, partly through their good offices, Castro might be gradually pulled out of all blocs and into militarily non-aligned position which he had apparently aspired to when he participated in Belgrade Conference last year.

There ensued considerable discussion of verification arrangements during which Stevenson and McCloy attempted to draw clear line between immediate verification withdrawal offensive weapons and longer term safeguards against reintroduction such weapons into Cuba. SYG emphasized that Castro insisted on reciprocity in regard to any measures of verification or inspection and that he, Thant, doubted it would be possible to carry out either short or long term measures of this kind without reciprocal features. There was mention of possible inspection solely of Cuban exile camps in US and elsewhere as *quid pro quo* for verification withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba. US negotiators emphasized in latter connection that mere inspection of vacant missile sites would not be sufficient and that inspectors must have freedom to investigate reports of concealed weapons in caves or elsewhere. As to long-term safeguards Narasimhan suggested that UN commission, constituted from non-aligned Ambs or otherwise, might be charged on the one hand with assuring that there was no reintroduction of offensive weapons and on other hand of policing assurances against invasion of Cuba by US and others. After some discussion of this proposal it was agreed UN should formulate it in writing and submit it to US for study. Stevenson emphasized importance we attach to long-term safeguards and recalled that those suggested so far include (1) SOV assurances of non-reintroduction, (2) continued US aerial reconnaissance, (3) LA nuclear free zone with appropriate inspection, and (4) UN inspection against reintroduction and invasion as just suggested by Narasimhan. McCloy suggested UN aerial surveillance in Caribbean as possible variant. UN officials expressed considerable

doubt whether nuclear free zone could be organized without delay of several months.

In conclusion there was brief discussion of conduct and procedures in final SC mtg on Cuba. Thant said possibilities he had mentioned to SOVs were (1) traditional SC form of res, (2) declarations by parties concerned, in which case US statement should have been previously endorsed by OAS, which might be reported to SC by Chile and Venezuela, (3) joint protocol agreed before SC mtg, (4) combination of res and declarations whereby res might welcome some points in declarations and take note of others. After some discussion view was generally expressed that it would probably be impossible to obtain agreement on either protocol or res and that joint declarations would be simplest solution. Stevenson pointed out that US is of course not in position to predict what OAS action might be. We would suppose OAS might, after SOVs had complied with their commitments, repeal its res of Oct 23 but we cannot yet know what other action OAS might take.

Stevenson

529. Memorandum for the NSC Executive Committee from Nitze, November 14¹

November 14, 1962

SUBJECT

Relationship of Cuban Objectives to Present Decisions

1. *Problem.* To analyze the relationship between present decisions on what to do next re Cuba and long term objectives.

2. *The Soviet Perspective.*

a) Regardless of the motives behind the original Soviet initiative in emplacing missiles in Cuba, it seems reasonable to assume that a retention of the optimum foothold in Cuba remains, at this time, as an important objective. At this writing the Soviets probably see the situation in the following light:

1) The Soviet Union was overextended and did not wish to face up to a direct and full scale confrontation over Cuba.

¹ Relationship of Cuban objectives to present decisions. Top Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).

2) Their withdrawal of IRBMs and MRBMs, coupled with their cooperation in the outgoing inspection, has defuzed the situation to eliminate whatever danger of immediate major conflict previously existed. Further, given the political context of the US, this move has stopped the US from immediate and outright invasion of Cuba.

3) The retention of IL 28's in Cuba represents a politico-military tool for use in securing Soviet objectives. These can be bartered away to obtain concessions from the US, if they must be; or they can be used to soften the impact upon the Cubans of the Soviet retreat by turning the bombers over to that government, if circumstances permit. In the latter case the Soviets could be expected to use the IL 28's to win certain concessions from Castro.

4) The US has the power to eliminate the Soviet presence in Cuba but must operate within constraints imposed by partial Soviet performance and by the realities of the power equation elsewhere.

5) Therefore the thrust of Soviet negotiations with the US and with Cuba must be to lay the foundations by a series of probes for possible posture for themselves in Cuba, without provoking the US to apply that degree of power which would deprive them of their Cuban base.

b) Ideally the Soviets want to retain in Cuba a capability for a wide spectrum utilization of their position. A listing of their objectives might have the following priority:

1) Retention of a Communist oriented regime in Cuba—the minimum requirement for long term utility for any purpose—their first significant advance beyond the Eurasian mainland and into the Atlantic Community.

2) Retention of a base for subversion of Latin America, disruption of OAS, and frustration of US objectives.

3) Retention for several reasons of a Soviet military presence.

4) Retention of US accepted “defensive weapons” including MIGs, Komars, antiaircraft artillery, etc.

5) Retention of Cuba as a potential submarine refueling and refit base.

6) Retention of bombers in Cuba.

c) Soviet strategy in the light of the foregoing considerations would seem to require the step-by-step surrender of the lower priorities above in order to retain the maximum number in the higher priority that US pressure will permit. It would seem further to require that every effort be made to insure the sovereignty and integrity of Communist Cuba by:

1) Resisting, or cultivating Cuban resistance to, on-the-ground inspection.

2) Resisting US aerial reconnaissance over Cuba.

3) Winning acceptance of the OAS and the US to some form of Soviet bases in Cuba.

4) Seeking to normalize the situation as soon as possible.

5) Winning a more effective and formal commitment against invasion.

d) None of the five points above would preclude Soviet tactical intransigence (e.g. publicly pressing the 5 Cuban demands, etc.) to provide a radical position from which to compromise with the US. Moreover, the Soviets would need to consider constantly what other pressures to bring to bear elsewhere in the world should the US press beyond a certain minimum on the priority list above.

e) Beyond the present confrontation the Soviet Union would undoubtedly be planning to place a “victorious” connotation on whatever settlement is achieved. If the bombers remain in Cuba their task in this regard will be an easy one.

3. *The US Perspective.*

a) The US, prior to the recent Cuban episode, had held that the presence of a Communist regime and a Soviet military presence in Cuba was not negotiable.

b) The discovery of missiles and bombers in Cuba, after US warning of the consequences, placed the USG in a position from which a resort to force, or the threat of it, became necessary. As a result the missiles were removed.

c) The fact that the bombers remain establishes a *prima facie* case in favor of continuation of the threat of force until their removal. However, internal and external pressures upon the government make a reconsideration of the importance of this objective a necessity.

d) If the US signs off on a post-crisis Cuba which not only retains its Communist regime and its on-the-ground territorial integrity, but also its bombers, the Communist bloc can make a plausible case before the world of a great “peaceful” victory for their cause. Cuba would have emerged from the crisis a more secure and stronger political base than it was before the missiles were emplaced. Moreover, the Latin American nations would see (in the increasing liaison between a Communist Cuba and their own Leftist parties) a real political threat in this situation which would weaken the US image and harm US objectives.

e) In actual fact, the retention of the bombers in Cuba presents a basis, in the post-missile environment, for a more forceful approach to our longer term goals—i.e., the elimination of the Communist regime and the restoration of Cuba to the hemisphere. Had the Soviet Union removed both bombers and missiles in the initial withdrawal, such complete acquiescence might have made it politically infeasible to do more than accept the return to status quo ante. In the present circum-

stances we have not only the need (as an immediate objective) but also the opportunity (for longer range objectives) to initiate action to carry us beyond that status quo ante. We should apply our threat of force or the force itself against the presence of the bombers in such manner as to advance these long term interests—i.e., removal of the Soviet presence from Cuba and reorientation of the Cuban regime.

4. *US Objectives.* The US objectives in view of the USSR and US perspectives discussed above should be as follows:

- a) To obtain removal of remaining offensive weapons.
- b) To obtain removal of USSR military presence (troops, MIG pilots, SAM personnel, etc.).
- c) To obtain removal of Castro and/or reorientation of Communist regime.

Of the foregoing, our minimum goal at the present time should be the accomplishment of the first two objectives and actions taken should seek to insure this minimum. The achievement of these two objectives will place the US in a position where the accomplishment of the third can be a lower key matter to be accomplished over a longer-term period.

5. *Recommended Action.*

a) *The carrot.*

- 1) Continue to offer a return to the hemisphere to the Cuban people.
- 2) Seek to establish communications with the Cuban Government designed either to woo Castro away from the Soviets or to overthrow Castro.

3) Suspend the quarantine if the IL 28's are removed, pending resolution of the problem of verification and adequate safeguards.

4) Seek to work out an acceptable denuclearized zone through modification of the Brazilian resolution. The minimum requirement for this approach is to have an arrangement which permits on-the-ground access to Cuba. The optimum is to have an arrangement which requires removal of foreign (non-hemispheric) presence and personnel from Latin American territory.

b) *The stick.*

1) *Adhere to the original US demands.*

(a) *Removal of bombers and nuclear weapons.*

(b) *Adequate safeguards against re-entry of offensive equipment.* The details of these safeguards are the subject of a separate paper. However, it is important to recognize the relationship between the accomplishment of our objectives and the degree of severity of these safeguards. For example, insistence on only a navicert or unilateral announcement by USSR for the nature of her incoming cargos would be much easier for her to accept than would US insistence on inspection of unloading

in Soviet ports or offloading at Cuban ports. Also, the timing of our spelling out of the meaning of adequate safeguards is important. It is recommended that the US communicate no details until the bombers have been removed. At that time the USSR should be given a detailed plan best calculated to force her to give up, in combination with other pressures, her military presence in Cuba.

(c) *Verification of removal of offensive equipment.* Here again the details of verification are the subject of a separate paper, but the relationship between severity of US demands/timing and accomplishment of our first two objectives is pertinent. It is recommended that the US communicate no details until the bombers have been removed. At that time the USSR should be given a detailed plan best calculated to force her to give up, in combination with other pressures, her military presence in Cuba.

2) *Continue aerial surveillance.* The objective here should be to obtain full coverage and to extend the precedent but not to incite air defense retaliation. (That option should be reserved for later use, if needed.)

3) *Tighten the blockade.* This mechanism has been the instrument of force to date. In present circumstances the US has a plausible case before the world that the Soviet Government has provided only partial performance. The “hail and pass” procedures should give way to actual visit and search. If more force is needed the quarantine should be extended to POL. This tightening of the quarantine will keep up the US momentum while adding to the credibility of the US position.

c) *The orchestration.*

1) A combination of carrot and stick pressures should be so played as to force out the offensive weapons and Soviet military presence while weakening the Cuban Communist regime.

2) The focus of these pressures should shift primarily to Cuba if the USSR removes the IL 28's.

3) If it appears to the USSR that we will insist on our original demands, including full and continuing safeguards and verification, they could have to evaluate Castro's survival as extremely dubious. In that case their course would probably be to disengage their prestige and evacuate their people and sophisticated equipment with as much haste and dignity as the situation permitted.

530. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 15¹

November 15, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING
WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Thursday, 15 November

JCS meeting at 1300:

A J-5 Talking Paper for the meeting with the President is tabled. The CJCS criticizes it as being full of platitudes and condescending: “We’re saying, ‘Now see here, young man, here is what we want you to do’.” The CJCS then read a Talking Paper of his own. The JCS agreed that it should be used as the framework for their discussion with the President.

¹ Talking paper for discussion with the President. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

531. Telegram 1795 from USUN, November 15¹

November 15, 1962

Dept pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Re: Cuba.

UN working paper transmitted ourtel 1780 brings out difficulties effecting implementation undertakings concerning either short-term verification or long-term safeguards. SYG's latest proposal for one-shot final verification in Cuba by group of non-aligned Ambs has today been rejected by Castro. SYG's first inclination was to submit UN working paper to Cubans as alternative proposal. We have however told him this paper creates very serious problems for us and that we wish to discuss it fully with him before he submits it to others. He has agreed but hopes to receive our views by tomorrow at latest.

UN working paper is based on SYG's conviction that either one-shot verification in Cuba or long-term safeguards are feasible only if elements of reciprocal inspection are introduced. Proposed UN observation group seems to us however open to following serious objections: (1) definition of Caribbean would presumably include part of continental U.S. as well as Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands, (2) freedom of movement for such group in those areas would be hardly acceptable, (3) presence of nuclear weapons in whole Caribbean area, including above-mentioned U.S. territories, would presumably be forbidden, (4) bombers such as IL-28's would not be covered, (though exclusion all bomber aircraft from LA countries on Caribbean would be in any case unfeasible), (5) activities UN observation group would presumably be subject to SC veto, (6) UN observation group composed of reps Asian, African and European non-aligned states, as well as some LA's, would inject considerable long-term external influence into Caribbean area, would detract from prestige OAS and would probably be unacceptable most LA's.

Some of shortcomings UN working paper could be corrected by redrafting but it is difficult to see how any UN group acceptable to Castro with broad mandate to "normalize" situation in Caribbean could be other than buttress to Castro and could fail to create for us and LA's many of problems suggested in preceding paragraph. Better alternative would seem to be LA denuclearized zone as envisaged in Brazilian res but this is already encountering serious LA opposition and we doubt that zone with requisite inspection system could be established at best for several months.

¹ Mission comments on UN working paper on safeguards and verification. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.663.61/11-1562.

McCloy suggests bringing up in connection with long-term safeguards entire elimination from Cuba of SOV military personnel as essential element of forward SOV military base. Reciprocity might be provided by U.S. and LA willingness to permit inspection on their territories limited to ensuring there are no refugee training camps preparing for attack on Cuba. This might alternatively be considered as possible quid pro quo for one-shot verification in Cuba. We are however very seriously concerned whether any inspection inside U.S. or LA Caribbean countries (except in connection with nuclear free zone insofar as latter are concerned) would be politically tolerable from viewpoint domestic opinion in U.S. and LA.

We should appreciate receiving soonest Dept's reaction to UN working paper. If UN observation group of this kind unacceptable and LA denuclearized zone proves impracticable for immediate future, we should also have for discussion with SYG and SOVs clear picture of character both of one-shot verification and long-term safeguards which Dept considers necessary and feasible under existing circumstances, as well as price we would be willing to pay for such verification and such safeguards.

Stevenson

532. Telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15¹

November 15, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only. Verbatim text. Cuba.

Fol is text SOVs and Cuban proposed protocol given us by SYG this evening:

Quote

By the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of Cuba.

This protocol has settled an agreement reached between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the Republic of Cuba and of the United States of America as a result of exchange of messages between Chairman N.S. Khrushchev of the USSR Council of Ministers and President John F. Kennedy of the United States, the

¹ Transmits verbatim text of Soviet and Cuban proposed protocol. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-1562.

statement of October 28, 1962 of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of the Republic of Cuba as well as the negotiations carried out among the representatives of the abovementioned governments with the participation of Acting Secretary-General U Thant of the United Nations.

Part I

Article 1

The Government of the United States shall discontinue all measures it effected from October 24 onwards, regarding ships bound for the Republic of Cuba.

Article 2

The American Armed Forces concentrated in the south-east area of the United States in connection with the measures carried out by the United States in the Caribbean area shall be withdrawn as soon as possible.

Article 3

The Government of the United States shall reaffirm its assurance made by President John F. Kennedy of the United States in his letter of October 27 to Chairman N.S. Khrushchev of the USSR Council of Ministers on the renunciation by the United States of invasion of Cuba, and the confidence of the Government of the United States that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will be ready to act likewise. The Government of the United States shall restrain those who intend to commit aggression against Cuba from the territory of North America.

The Government of the United States shall not also permit the use for aggression against Cuba of the North-American weapons sold or given to other Latin American governments.

Article 4

The United States shall strictly respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba, the integrity of its borders which includes its air space and territorial waters, and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba.

Article 5

The Government of the United States declares that it will take necessary measures for and see to the termination—both in the North-American territory and in the territory of other states of the Western Hemisphere—of all subversive activities against the Republic of Cuba, shipments of arms and explosives by air and by sea, organization of invasions, sending of spies and saboteurs.

Article 6

The Government of the United States shall not interfere with the free trade and other economic ties of the Republic of Cuba with other countries.

Article 7

The Government of the United States shall agree to conduct negotiations with the Government of the Republic of Cuba regarding the removal of the Guantanamo Naval Base.

Part II

Article 8

The Government of the USSR states that it stopped in the territory of the Republic of Cuba all the work for deploying installations intended for launching medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, it dismantled these weapons and withdrew them back to the Soviet Union.

Article 9

The Government of the USSR, according to the mutual agreement, gave the opportunity to the Government of the United States to satisfy itself that the Soviet side had fulfilled the obligations to remove from Cuba weapons mentioned in Article 8 of this protocol.

Part III

Article 10

The Government of the Republic of Cuba states its agreement on dismantling and removing from the territory of Cuba the weapons referred to in Article 8 of this protocol.

Article 11

The Government of the Republic of Cuba shall reiterate that the basis of its foreign policy is the strict compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter including the principle of non-interference into internal affairs of other states.

Part IV

Article 12

The contracting parties have agreed to accept a plan regarding the presence of the United Nations in the Caribbean area through establishing observation posts by the representatives of that organization in order to achieve the fulfillment of the purposes of the present agreement. This plan will be worked out in detail by the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties concerned.

Article 13

An agreement has been reached that negotiations will continue between the parties concerned with the aim of working out mutually acceptable solutions of the questions connected with a further normalization of the situation regarding Cuba as well as of other questions

referred to in the messages of Chairman N.S. Khrushchev of the USSR Council of Ministers, President John F. Kennedy of the United States and in the statement of October 23, 1962 of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of the Republic of Cuba.

Article 14

The parties have agreed to submit this protocol to the Security Council for adopting appropriate measures according to the United Nations Charter.

This protocol is made on this _____ day of November 1962 in the City of New York, United States of America, in Russian, English and Spanish languages with all texts being equally authentic.

By authority of the Government of the USSR. _____

By authority of the Government of the Republic of Cuba. _____

By authority of the Government of the United States of America. _____

Stevenson

533. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 16¹

Meeting No. 26

November 16, 1962

1. Director McCone presented the intelligence summary.
2. Upon being informed that Castro's letter to the UN Acting Secretary General had been released to the press, the President authorized the immediate release of a statement covering our continuing aerial surveillance of Cuba. The President asked that any reply to Castro's letter be made by the OAS.
3. The members read a summary of the current status of the negotiations on the removal from Cuba of the IL-28 bombers.
4. There was a general discussion of both short-term and long-term arrangements required to ensure that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba. The State Department was asked to draft a verification plan for the long-term, including inspection of Cuba, other Caribbean countries, and possibly specified areas in the U.S.

¹ Aerial surveillance; status of UN negotiations; long-term verification; policy re invasion of Cuba; daily aerial reconnaissance; courses of action in event surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32A.

5. The President asked that a statement covering our policy toward invasion of Cuba be prepared promptly. A decision is to be made later as to whether the content of the statement can be given informally by McCloy to Kuznetsov on Sunday and whether the statement would be volunteered at Tuesday's press conference.

6. The President authorized high-level aerial reconnaissance missions over Cuba for today and tomorrow. There are no low-level flights today and a decision was deferred as to whether low-level flights would be made tomorrow.

7. There was a discussion of our courses of action in the contingency that a surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed. A final decision on proposed courses of action was deferred.

McGeorge Bundy

534. Memorandum of meeting of Executive Committee of the NSC by McCone, November 16¹

November 16, 1962

All members were present, and in addition, Mr. McCloy of New York.

McCone gave an intelligence briefing, reviewing the daily memorandum.

Secretary Rusk reported on the Castro letter to U Thant, the Stevenson meeting with Kuznetsov, and several other communications of the last 48 hours. He summarized the situation by indicating there were three problems unresolved, namely, the removal of the IL-28s, verification that all missiles had been removed, and a plan to verify on a long-term basis that the missiles will not be reintroduced into Cuba.

Rusk urged that we press for the removal of IL-28s in exchange for the removal by us of the quarantine, and that we not attempt to solve the remaining problems too hastily. Various views were expressed; it was generally agreed that we should follow Rusk's suggestions; the status of the IL-28 negotiation as covered by the November 16th memorandum by Mr. Bundy.

¹ Discussion of intelligence briefing by McCone; report on recent communications by Rusk; removal of IL-28s; high-level reconnaissance flights; Soviet military strength in Cuba; and four actions for CIA. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.

Secretary McNamara reported plans for high-level reconnaissance flights but no low-level flights today and possibly tomorrow because the JCS had no specific urgent targets. Reference was made to the attached memorandum from Paul Nitze of 9 November on courses of action in case a surveillance plane is shot down or destroyed.

McCone reviewed in some detail CIA memorandum of November 15th on Soviet military strength in Cuba, emphasizing the viewpoint that the Soviets evidenced every intention of maintaining, and possibly building, their base as a bridgehead into Latin America. This was a repetition of the position taken by DCI consistently since October 14th, and before. In the discussion DCI again raised the question as to why the Soviets insisted on maintaining the SAM sites, pointing out that they would when “lighted up” shield Cuba from U-2 photography, thus permitting the covert installation of offensive capabilities.

CIA was requested to take the following actions:

1. Develop all possible means of determining by observation current shipping activities, most particularly the cargoes that arrive on the several ships now bound for Cuba which have the very large holds and therefore might be carrying missiles or other armament. DCI agreed to undertake an intense operation utilizing all agent and refugee resources, [*1½ lines not declassified*].

2. The President requested a report by Monday, November 19, on the caves of Cuba. This report should be prepared so as to give him necessary information for his use in discussions, and most particularly to answer questions at his Tuesday press conference.

3. CIA was asked for an analysis of the effect of the Soviet-ChiCom altercation on the Communist parties throughout the world. The question was posed as to whether this altercation has influenced free world Communist parties such as those in Japan, Italy, France, Latin America, India, etc., to favor more strongly the Soviets, or conversely, to favor the Chinese Communists, or if the net effect has been to divide and weaken the free world Communists. This report to be prepared by CIA and carefully coordinated with Hilsman.

4. In the absence of critical low-level targets of interest to JCS, I believe that CIA, through our several resources, should directly or through COMOR, establish a list of priority low-level targets, such as areas in which extensive unexplained construction has been going forward, and convey this list to the Secretary of Defense through the DCI. Note: Of particular interest would be the Trinidad area mentioned to me [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

John A. McCone
Director

535. Telegram 1288 to USUN, November 16¹

November 16, 1962

Ref: USUN's 1780.

1. Thoroughly agree with your reaction to UN working paper (URTEL 1795).

2. As we read proposals, Castro would get internationally verified assurance against invasion in exchange for verified removal and non-reintroduction of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Concept of UN inspection of non-invasion assurance goes well beyond exchange of letters between President and Khrushchev. We believe, as apparently do number of Latin Americans, that Castro would be exacting an unacceptably high price if we were to agree to SYG's proposal. At any rate, do not believe we should encourage SYG to believe that we might fall back to position of discussing internationally verified assurance against invasion of Cuba.

3. It is clear that three different kinds of verification are mixed up in Thant's proposal and clear distinctions should be made between them.

A. Short-term problem: verification of withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba;

B. Longer-range safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba; and

C. Longer range safeguards against invasion of Cuba and broader schemes for maintenance of peace in the Caribbean.

4. *Verification* is required performance under the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, i.e., to make sure that offensive weapons systems have been dismantled and removed from Cuba. There is no question of reciprocity or mutuality here. The Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding had to do with offensive weapons *in Cuba*, and verification must take place in Cuba alone.

5. When it comes to *safeguards against the reintroduction* of offensive weapons, the problem is primarily a matter for action inside Cuba. The President's letter to Khrushchev (OCT 27) indicated he understood that an agreement not to reintroduce offensive weapons systems into Cuba would be undertaken with suitable safeguards. With respect to nuclear weapons, this might well be broadened to involve mutuality and reciprocity with other Latin American states (but not the US);

¹ Comments on UN working paper on safeguards and verification. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1662.

indeed, this is just what is envisaged in the Brazilian denuclearized zone proposal.

6. Cubans and Soviets are evidently raising a new third problem: safeguards to insure that US and other OAS countries abide by whatever non-invasion assurances are to be given. Every attempt to think through just what would be inspected, by whom and where, in such a safeguards system, makes clear that this is a mare's nest, full of undefinable concepts and indeterminate geography.

7. What is wrong with the UN proposal is that it collapses together all three of these proposals (verification of weapons removal; safeguards against reintroduction; safeguards against invasion of Cuba).

8. We do not see the point to U Thant's making proposals to the Cubans that include point six above. We should insist on Cuban acceptance of the quite reasonable proposals SYG has made on one-shot verification (PARA 4, above), and most rapid possible progress toward some system of safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons (PARA 5, above) which is clearly part of Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding.

9. Therefore we should push for proposal of Latin American denuclearized zone. But even here, there is no point in pushing this hard until there is some indication that Cuba will agree to become a part of it. Brazilians have been sounding Cubans out on this; is there any news from that quarter?

10. We are developing here a planning paper showing how a general Caribbean security system might be established, if the attitude of the Cubans mutate in a direction that makes it useful to discuss that subject at all. Essence any such plan would be that UN presence in Cuba is best assurance against invasion of Cuba.

11. Re McCloy suggestion of reference telegram. While it is obviously desirable to tackle before long problem of eliminating Soviet military personnel from Cuba, believe it would be confusing to throw it into current negotiations before we have secured adequate performance from Soviets and Cubans even on the original understanding between Kennedy-Khrushchev.

12. In view hardening stand by Soviets and Cubans, we believe SYG should be reminded that only real alternative to their acceptance reasonable proposals would be necessity for US to deal with the continuing threat in other ways.

Rusk

536. Telegram 1833 from USUN, November 16¹

November 16, 1962

Dept pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Cuba (Deptel 1288).

1. Yost saw SYG this afternoon to convey Dept's comments on UN working paper in accordance reftel.

2. At outset of meeting SYG inquired about last night's meeting with Kuznetsov. Yost filled him in along lines USUN 1818. SYG then said Kuznetsov had given him similar report with different emphasis. Kuznetsov had stressed necessity of Cuban participation in discussions and had asked whether SYG had given any thought to elaboration of UN role under Article 12. SYG said Kuznetsov still seemed to want protocol and did not yet appear to be convinced US had rejected idea. Yost said we had been very clear.

3. Re UN role as envisaged in Article 12, SYG said he told Kuznetsov that he had not yet worked out plan and would not put anything on paper until consent of parties had been obtained as to scope of responsibilities UN would have, e.g. whether one, two, all, or whatever number of elements referred to in protocol. In this connection SYG had pointed out that if UN responsibilities affected other LA govts their consent would be needed too. He outlined to Kuznetsov his general ideas, i.e. that there would be an observer group with headquarters in NY, that group would come from unaligned countries, and that its chairman would be of international eminence.

4. Yost then reviewed US difficulties with SYG's working paper. He told SYG it included one package of three different things—verification of withdrawal, safeguards against introduction of nuclear weapons, and assurances against invasion. On verification of withdrawal Yost said mutuality not involved or acceptable as this was SOV commitment in letters for on-site inspection of removal in Cuba only. On long-term aspects some form of reciprocity might be necessary, preferably something along lines of Brazilian denuclearized zone res although Cuban speech of today complicated things and posed unacceptable conditions. We could not accept limitations on our nuclear capability in US territory, including Puerto Rico, when other nuclear power (USSR) would have no obligations. Re long-range safeguards Yost said if reciprocity is to be involved, it should not relate to offensive weapons

¹ Report of Yost meeting with SYG on U.S. difficulties with UN working paper: verification of withdrawal, safeguards against introduction of nuclear weapons, and assurances against invasion. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1662.

throughout Caribbean area but to non-introduction of weapons into Cuba on the one hand and non-invasion on the other. Dept was considering how and whether general Caribbean security system along these lines might be established, including UN presence in Cuba. We hoped this might be available by Monday at which time we would discuss it with SYG.

5. Narasimhan felt it was unavoidable that some US territory be included in a UN presence in Caribbean covering the invasion problem. He thought we should consider long run advantages establishment of such system would have for US as precedent in other areas where we wanted inspection vis-à-vis communist countries.

6. Re USUN 1800 reporting yesterday's meeting with U Thant, last para should be corrected to read "Lechuga also informed U Thant that the Secretary General's letter to Castro proposing verification by non-aligned Ambs in Havana had been rejected. . .".

Stevenson

537. Telegram 1835 from USUN, November 16¹

November 16, 1962

Dept pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Cuba.

Fol are proposed text of letter and draft declaration for submittal shortly to Kuznetsov in effort move quickly toward agreement on all outstanding points. These are designed to be initial bargaining position from which we would expect be forced recede in certain respects, and we would need to give very careful thought as to extent and timing of any concessions as part of bargaining over these texts and USSR text of its own proposed declarations.

We see advantages, however, in presenting at an early date text along these lines without waiting for decision on bargaining tactics, possible concessions or alternatives.

"Dear Mr. Kuznetsov:

"At our meeting on Nov 15, you asked for the specific language of a US declaration in the SC, which together with a Soviet declaration

¹ Proposed text of letter and draft declaration for early submission to Soviets at UN in effort to move toward agreement on all outstanding points. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 73756.361/11-1662.

would conclude the controversy over the introduction of weapons capable of offensive use into Cuba.

"I enclose a draft declaration which we would be prepared to read in the SC after yours has been read. It is based, of course, on the assumption that the Soviet declaration would contain appropriate assurances with respect to the fol:

"1. That all medium and intermediate range missiles (and related equipment) have been removed from Cuba.

"2. That all sites in Cuba for such missiles have been dismantled (and the launching pads and connected construction demolished).

"3. That all bombers have been removed from Cuba.

"4. That all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba.

"5. That no weapons systems capable of offensive use will be introduced into Cuba in the future.

"6. That compliance with the foregoing has been (or will be) verified in Cuba by observers appointed by the Acting SYG of the UN.

"7. That the Soviet Union has concurred in arrangements for UN safeguards against future introduction into Cuba of weapons capable of offensive use.

"We trust that you will send us as soon as possible your draft declaration covering the above points. We will then be available at your convenience to discuss both draft declarations with you, with a view to their prompt presentation to the SC and conclusion of this agreement."

In the letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962 firm undertakings were made regarding a settlement of the Cuban crisis.

These undertakings were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27 along the following lines:

(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

(2) The United States would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(A) To remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (B) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba: the President expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The United States notes the statement made by the Soviet Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons

and components, and all IL–28 bomber aircraft have been removed from Cuba, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. It also notes the statement of the USSR, concurred in by the Government of Cuba, that no weapons capable of offensive use will be further introduced into Cuba. We welcome these assurances.

The United States also notes the arrangements made by the Acting Secretary General, and concurred in by the governments of the US, the USSR, and Cuba, for the United Nations to verify that the above weapons systems with offensive capability have been removed from Cuba and the missile sites dismantled, and for United Nations safeguards to ensure that there is no further introduction of weapons systems capable of offensive use into Cuba.

In consequence the United States announces that it has already removed the quarantine measures which it put into effect in accordance with the resolution adopted by the organ of consultation of the Organization of American States on October 23, 1962.

On the understanding and condition that the United Nations, in accordance with the agreed arrangements, verifies the removal from Cuba of all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components, all IL–28 bombers and the dismantlement of all medium and intermediate range missile sites in Cuba, and that there is continuing compliance under the agreed safeguards, with the obligation that no weapons with offensive capabilities are further introduced into Cuba, the United States herewith gives its assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The United States will recommend that under the same conditions, other nations of the Western Hemisphere do likewise.

These assurances are given in connection with the carrying out of undertakings between the United States and Soviet Governments. Nothing herein contained impairs the rights and obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and under the inter-American system. They do not impair the rights or obligations of the United States under the Charters of the United Nations or the Organization of American States or under the inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Stevenson

538. Memorandum from J.J. Ewell to General Taylor, November 16, covering a draft memorandum for the President in response to a request for further information on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba¹

November 16, 1962

Attached is an estimate prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency in response to Captain Shepard's telephone call that the President was still looking for further information on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba.

It is a nice looking job and evidently reflects considerable effort. I think it could very well be sent forward. It is a little unusual in that the last paragraph of the summary (see paper clip) reflects an operational evaluation which is hardly appropriate for DIA; however, it is an accurate reflection of JCS papers on the subject. I do feel that the estimate is to a certain extent a tabulation of available information and does not represent too much deep thinking into the subject. My main reservations are reflected in the attached memorandum for the President. It also occurs to me that the estimate does not reflect the location and time-space factors involved in the use of the Soviet task forces in Cuba, the known or deduced organization of the Cuban Army and its ability to use the equipment, or the extent by which the Cubans or the Communists could protect themselves against air attack by active or passive means during the implementation of Plan 312 prior to the execution of 316.

If a quick answer to the President is what is desired, I would say the estimate is completely adequate. On the other hand, if a more thorough job is required, DIA could be requested to go into some of the elements raised in the draft memorandum and above.

J.J.E.

Attachment

Memorandum for the President

I have been informed that you still have some questions in your mind as to the effect of any increased quantities of conventional equipment which have been introduced into Cuba.

¹ Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.

The attached Defense Intelligence Agency Estimate, "Assessment of Increased Conventional Military Capabilities of Cuban and Soviet Units in Cuba," has been prepared to meet this need. It is based on available intelligence and summarizes latest JCS thinking as to the effect on our operational plans.

I would like to add two comments:

a. First, it is quite clear that there are in Cuba at present about four Russian armored combat groupings of larger than battalion size. These groupings very probably have a nuclear capability. Although our operational plans are such that these units could be handled with reasonable facility, it should not be overlooked that the presence of four highly trained Russian units with the most modern equipment gives the Communist forces in Cuba a very useful general reserve in the event of combat.

b. The quantities of equipment which have been shipped to Cuba are quite large considering the size of the country and of the Cuban forces. This is particularly true in the case of armor and artillery. This can only be based on speculation but one might harbor the thought that the Russians have deliberately sent more equipment than is necessary with the thought of establishing stockpiles in Cuba, either for the purpose of future shipment to other Latin American countries or to support the rapid introduction of Soviet military personnel in some future contingency. I am asking Defense Intelligence Agency to pursue this thought further with a view to testing out its validity.

It is also useful to speculate on the effect of the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel. I think it can be stated that if the operational personnel, particularly in the armored task forces, the air defenses, communications and air units, were withdrawn in the near future, the Cuban forces would be unable to maintain or operate much of the equipment. If all Soviet personnel, including operational and technical advisors and trainers, were withdrawn, the ability of the Cuban forces to utilize any of this equipment, except the most basic types, would be quite limited.

539. Letter from Rusk to McCloy, November 17¹

November 17, 1962

Dear Jack:

I am sending you for your guidance in connection with your meeting with Kuznetsov tomorrow, copies of the most recent communications between the President and Khrushchev.

We have just had a talk about your meeting tomorrow, in the NSC Executive Committee, and the following points represent the most useful guidance for that discussion.

1. For the moment, we should continue on our present course, which is to get Soviet assurances that the IL-28's will be withdrawn in a limited period of time, in return for which we would be prepared to lift the quarantine. This does not preclude a larger package later on with additional elements thrown in from both sides. But we would much prefer to settle the bomber-quarantine deal before going on to other matters.

2. The President will be having a press conference on Tuesday. You should point out to Kuznetsov the difficult position in which the President will find himself if he has to formulate a public statement to the American people in the absence of Soviet agreement to get the bombers out of Cuba. Under these conditions, the President would undoubtedly have to say something that would call into question whether we really have a deal with the Soviets—and anything the President says along this line will hardly be helpful to Khrushchev at this juncture.

3. You should know, as the Soviets will be aware, that for the past two days we have not been making low-level flights over Cuba. While there is no objection to your using this information in the discussion, you should carefully avoid any implication that this is a guide to our future behavior, which it isn't.

4. If Kuznetsov talks about the so-called "protocol" presented jointly by the Soviets and the Cubans you will, of course, say that it is obviously unacceptable, and not worth discussing. It drags in all sorts of elements that were not part of the understanding between the President and Khrushchev, and depends entirely on trustful good faith for its implementation. You might even want to remark that while it may have been necessary to co-sign this curious document in order to

¹ Guidance for McCloy's meeting with Kuznetsov on November 18. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1762.

get Mikoyan out with a whole skin, they can hardly expect us to take it seriously.

5. The letter which Adlai Stevenson suggested might be sent to Kuznetsov is an admirably clear restatement of the U.S. position and you may want to use the substance of it in your discussion. We have gone over it here, and done a little editing which is reflected in the copy I am attaching to this letter for your convenience. However, we think it would be best to await the results of your Sunday walking and talking with Kuznetsov, and the Soviet reply on the IL-28's before writing Kuznetsov a formal bargaining letter.

Good luck with your talk, and let us know as soon as you can of any shift you perceive in the Soviet position, particularly on the IL-28's.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

540. CIA memorandum prepared for the Executive Committee of the NSC, November 19¹

November 19, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

The only US photographic mission over Cuba Sunday, carried out at high altitude, returned without incident in spite of evidence that the Cubans have decided on a concerted effort to shoot down reconnaissance planes.

Preliminary analysis of Sunday's mission provided little new information. Vehicles and equipment at the Soviet encampment at Remedios included two probable FROG rocket launchers, six probable FROG missile transporters, nine probable SNAPPER rocket launchers, and 192 trucks. No significant change from previous missions was noted at the Remedios IRBM site, at the Sagua la Grande MRBM sites, or at the two SAM sites observed. There were still about 50 vehicles at Sagua

¹ The situation in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA—Cuba.

la Grande site 1, and the concrete bunker had not been dismantled, but there was no noteworthy activity at the other bases covered.

[text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

We have [1 line not declassified] no indication that Cubans control any of the SAM sites capable of reaching the high-altitude missions.

[text not declassified] All foreign commercial aircraft coming to Cuba were required, beginning yesterday, to file flight plans 24 hours in advance of departure.

[text not declassified]

Photographic reconnaissance missions of 16 November reveal that the SAM site closest to Guantanamo—13 nautical miles away—has apparently been abandoned. A new SAM site is under construction about 23 n.m. from the base. It is probable that the equipment noted at the new site was taken from the abandoned one. Other SAM sites in Cuba have been moved previously. There is no indication that proximity to the base dictated this change.

Cuba has apparently acquired three Soviet-made IL-18 transports for its civil airline. *Cubana* flights between Prague and Havana had frequently been cancelled due to the poor condition of the Britannias now in service. Cuban authorities are seeking authorization for overflight of West Germany and Belgium and for technical stopovers in Ireland and Iceland between 19 and 25 November.

SOVIET POSITION

In his meeting on 18 November with Mr. McCloy, Kuznetsov indicated no movement from the USSR's position that while it is prepared to consider removing the IL-28s, this must be done in connection with the settlement of other problems relating to Cuba. Moscow, he said, would like to have removal of the bombers coincide with a final Cuban solution.

Kuznetsov again charged that the US was stalling in the negotiations in order to avoid giving formal assurances against an invasion of Cuba. He said the US should undertake to stop overflights of Cuba at the time the IL-28s were removed. Kuznetsov also pressed for US acceptance of U Thant's proposal for reciprocal UN observation in the US as well as in Cuba.

The meeting closed with no definite agreement on future meetings. Kuznetsov said he had no definite word on Mikoyan's plans for leaving Cuba.

The public quarrel between Moscow and Peiping over Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban crisis continued with major articles in *Pravda* and *People's Daily* on 18 November. Boris Ponomarev, a secretary

of the Soviet party central committee, replied to direct Albanian and indirect Chinese charges of Soviet appeasement by asserting that the Albanians had “openly taken a course of disrupting peaceful coexistence and pushing humanity to a thermonuclear war.” Peiping charged that the claim that the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba had saved the peace is “pure nonsense.” A *People’s Daily* editorial said “Tito and his like” had tried to force Cuba to “accept terms which impair its rights and sovereignty so as to meet the insatiable aggressive demands of US imperialism.”

BLOC MILITARY STATUS

There has been no significant change in the disposition or alert status of major Bloc forces.

[text not declassified]

SOVIET SHIPS RETURNING MISSILES FROM CUBA
(as of 0700 EST 19 November)

Five of the Soviet ships—carrying a total of 28 ballistic missiles—returning to the USSR from Cuba are en route to the Black Sea. Two, possibly three, others—transporting the remaining 14 missiles—now appear to be headed for Soviet ports in the Baltic Sea. In addition the three ships hauling associated equipment for the missiles probably are en route to the Baltic.

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>En Route</u>
DIVNOGORSK	4 MRBM's	Black Sea
FIZIK KURCHATOV	6 MRBM's	Black Sea
LABINSK	2 MRBM's	Black Sea
LENINSKY KOMSOMOL	8 MRBM's	Black Sea
METALLURG ANASOV	8 MRBM's	Black Sea
VOLGOLES	7 MRBM's	Baltic Sea (?)
BRATSK	2 MRBM's	Baltic Sea
IVAN POLZUNOV	5 MRBM's	Baltic Sea
ALAPAEVSK	Associated equipment	Baltic Sea
ALEKSANDROVSK	Associated equipment	Baltic Sea
[illegible in the original]	Associated equipment	Baltic Sea

541. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 19¹

Meeting No. 27

November 19, 1962

1. Director McCone summarized the weekend intelligence and commented on Cuban orders to their antiaircraft units to fire on reconnaissance planes.

2. Secretary Rusk reported on yesterday's McCloy-Kuznetsov talk.

3. Following a general discussion of the need for overflights and the effect of such flights on the Cubans and the Russians, the President authorized high-level reconnaissance missions today but no low-level sorties.

4. There was a discussion of the President's press statement for tomorrow. The President asked that two drafts be ready this afternoon; one for use if the Russians have replied on the IL-28 bombers and another if no reply has been received or if the reply is ambivalent.

5. The President reviewed the political and military actions which may have to be taken this week. He requested that recommended courses of action be presented later today for his consideration.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Summary of weekend intelligence; McCloy-Kuznetsov latest talk; high-level reconnaissance flights; Presidential press statements; review of political and military actions. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32A.

542. Telegram 2645 to Paris, 1203 to Bonn, November 19¹

November 19, 1962

Following is text of personal message from the President to de Gaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan. Paris and Bonn should deliver soonest and discuss drawing on Depcirtel 939 as necessary. For info London message has been transmitted by White House wire to Macmillan. Bruce may make copy available Fonoff and/or offer discuss with Macmillan.

Begin text

I think it is time for me to give you a further account of the situation in Cuba and our present intentions with respect to it. I shall be discussing this matter on Tuesday evening at 6:00 in my press conference and it seems to me important that you should have an up-to-date report before that time.

It is still possible that between now and Tuesday evening the Soviet Government will indicate clearly its readiness to remove the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively conciliatory tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, to announce that the quarantine can now be lifted, and concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary to focus attention upon this Soviet failure to carry out an important part of the understanding. In that case I expect to announce that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States is being called this week so that we can make a full report on the measures taken under the Resolution of October 23rd, which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed force.

Meanwhile, we are considering further actions, which may involve response from the air to any attack on our surveillance, or a reimposition and extension of the naval quarantine, or perhaps both in combination. The logical way of extending the quarantine would be to add oil

¹ Transmits text of personal message from Kennedy to de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

products to the list of prohibited items, since these are directly related to the operation of bombers.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, and the over-all situation is somewhat less dangerous than it was in October because Soviet missiles are no longer operational in Cuba. On the other hand, we have to face the fact that a second backdown for Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of our pressure against direct Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are considerably stronger than we earlier estimated. We have identified elements of four Soviet ground combat units, with a total strength of perhaps 8,000 men, and the whole Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12 to 16 thousand men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is possible while a Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I expect to indicate clearly Tuesday that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro, pending the establishment of better safeguards. Our precise choices among the numerous courses of action available to us will evidently be affected by what the Soviets and Cubans actually do.

In this general situation, while we believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the firm support which you and our other major allies have given. If we have to go forward again, your continued support will be of the greatest importance, and meanwhile I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your own thoughts on this problem. End text.

Rusk

**543. Memorandum for members of the NSC Executive Committee
from Brubeck, November 19¹**

November 19, 1962

INR Papers

Attached are three INR papers for your information and use.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment

SUBJECT

Soviet/Cuban Reactions to US Retaliation for Attack on US Reconnaissance
Aircraft

We have examined likely Soviet and Cuban reactions to possible US actions undertaken in retaliation for a Communist attack upon a US reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. Bearing in mind Castro's November 15 threat (in his letter to U Thant) to take violent countermeasures against intruding US aircraft, we conclude the following:

- 1) Attack on US reconnaissance aircraft under present circumstances is unlikely in view of the high degree of Soviet control over the Cuban air defense system;
- 2) Soviet SAM attack against U-2's is improbable;
- 3) Independent Cuban attack against low-flying aircraft is possible;
- 4) Probable uncertainty as to responsibility for any attack and exploitable differences between the Soviets and Cubans suggest the desirability of tailoring US assertions of responsibility to the circumstances of the incident.

Who Operates the Cuban Air Defense System?

There is strong evidence that overall control of the Cuban air defense system is in Soviet hands and that the SAM sites (most effective against high-flying aircraft) are Soviet manned. Anti-aircraft artillery (effective against aircraft at lower altitudes) could be in either Cuban

¹ Transmits three INR papers entitled: "Soviet-Cuban Reactions to U.S. Retaliation for Attack on U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft"; "Prospects for Overthrowing Castro From Within"; and "Negotiations on Cuba: The Advantages of Stalemate." Secret. 18 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926 Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).

or Soviet hands but we believe the bulk of such weapons are Cuban operated.

Cuban or Soviet Responsibility?

If we are correct in believing the main Cuban air defense system to be under Soviet control, any attack launched by that system might logically be considered as Soviet instigated. In any case, it was clearly the Soviets who provided the weapons and created the situation in which reconnaissance was necessary and thus subject to interdiction. In the actual case of an attack (particularly a successful attack) on a US reconnaissance aircraft, however, responsibility may be less than clear.

If a U-2 were shot down from high altitude, we could assume that a Soviet-manned SAM was responsible, but we might not be able to exclude the possibility that a Cuban-piloted MIG-21 had zoomed upward and downed the aircraft. Who had manned conventional anti-aircraft artillery which downed a lower flying aircraft would be equally ambiguous, but the weight of presumption would rest with Cuban responsibility. Another possibility would be the accidental crash in Cuba of a US aircraft with the US unable to determine whether accident or enemy action was the cause.

In sum, uncertainty may well characterize our assessment of who or what was responsible for the loss of a US reconnaissance plane over Cuba. It is, therefore, not unlikely that we may, in justifying retaliation, have considerable freedom of choice in selecting the responsible party—the Cubans, the Russians, or both.

Are the Cubans and Soviets in Agreement?

Castro's assertion that intruding US reconnaissance aircraft will risk destruction does not have explicit Soviet endorsement. While there is ample reason for the Cubans to be annoyed by continued US surveillance and for the Soviets to wish to support the Cubans in efforts to stop it, we believe it on the whole unlikely that Moscow would wish to face the risks of deterioration in the Cuban situation which would ensue from violent measures to end such surveillance. In his statement, in fact, Castro even suggests the unilateral nature of his threat by tying it to intruding aircraft "within the reach of our anti-aircraft," which suggests he was not including SAMs. It thus seems likely that for the time being, at least, the Cubans and the Soviets are not in agreement on the desirability of firing on US reconnaissance aircraft. This implies that Cuban words may not foreshadow Cuban actions, particularly in view of the probable high degree of Soviet control over the Cuban air defense system. Maverick Cuban action against low flying aircraft cannot, of course, be excluded.

Reaction to US Retaliation

For the purpose of analysis we assume that the US accepts the principle of limited retaliation appropriate to the offense (e.g., elimina-

tion of a SAM site in response to destruction of a US aircraft by a SAM). We further assume that the USSR will be willing to run even fewer risks in defense of its present military installations in Cuba than it was willing to face over its surface-to-surface missile sites. We, therefore, do not believe there is any great risk of triggering a Soviet military reaction, within or without the Cuban context, even if Soviet personnel are killed in our retaliatory action.

Under these circumstances Soviet and Cuban reactions to possible US retaliation can be described as follows:

1. *Reaction to verbal protest against unsuccessful attack on US reconnaissance aircraft.*

A warning to the Soviets and to the Cubans that we would, if another effort were made to shoot down a US reconnaissance aircraft, retaliate immediately would give both of them cause to reconsider their courses of action. If we are correct in believing that the Soviets would not at this time wish to exacerbate the Cuban crisis and, therefore, would not indorse or carry out the attack, it is likely that Moscow would exert what pressure it could on the Cubans to resist from any further such actions. Whether or not we asserted Soviet as opposed to Cuban responsibility would not in this case basically affect the Soviet response although ambiguity on our part or assertion of Cuban responsibility could enable Moscow to avoid more gracefully a rise in US-Soviet tensions. As far as the Cubans are concerned, the protest and warning might induce some slightly greater degree of caution in their behavior although the original decision to attack would already have demonstrated some disregard for risk. Castro might calculate that a heightening of US-Soviet tension over the surveillance issue might work to his advantage in terms of ultimate arrangements between Cuba and the USSR as well as between the Communist side and the US. He would probably be eager to claim "credit" for the attack. The Soviets would be faced with the distasteful necessity of creating Soviet-Cuban ill-will to the extent they criticized the Cuban action.

2. *Reaction to Specific Retaliation as a Result of Destruction of a Low-Flying US Reconnaissance Aircraft.*

We assume that the specific action of retaliation would involve destruction of a Cuban anti-aircraft artillery complex or of hostile aircraft. Such action might or might not be accompanied by warnings to both Moscow and Havana against repetition of the incident. In turn the warnings might or might not specify responsibility for the original attack despite our belief the Cubans would most probably be responsible.

If our analysis is correct, it is likely that the object destroyed in Cuba would be Cuban-manned, although the possibility that some

Soviets might also be done away with cannot be excluded. In this case the Soviets would protest violently against the "piratical US action," but at the same time would be likely to use their influence with the Cubans to prevent a further incident even if we kept flying.

As in the case of an unsuccessful attack, a US warning to Moscow and Havana against repetition of the attack would provide Moscow with greater flexibility of action and would be more likely adversely to affect Soviet-Cuban relations if Cuban responsibility were asserted. The Cubans would hope for Moscow's full support and would be annoyed to the extent they failed to get it or were pressured by the Soviets to cease their attacks. A US failure to specify responsibility in the warning would achieve about the same results in terms of Soviet-Cuban relations and, at the same time, would imply some Soviet responsibility. In this sense, ambiguity might usefully offer greater inducement to the Kremlin to exert pressure on Castro despite whatever ill effects this might have on Soviet-Cuban relations.

A US retaliatory action unaccompanied by warnings to Moscow and Havana might have much the same practical effect but would obviously be less controllable in terms of interpretation by either the Soviets or the Cubans.

3. Reaction to Specific Retaliation as a Result of Destruction of a US Surveillance Aircraft by a SAM.

Destruction of the offending SAM site would almost certainly be the most critical retaliatory action (short of invasion) we might take if we are correct in believing the SAM sites are Soviet manned. The original attack on a US aircraft almost certainly would have been ordered by Moscow and would represent a Soviet decision to increase deliberately the degree of US-Soviet confrontation.

At the same time the lack of Soviet desire to engage in strategically unfavorable escalation in the Cuban area (clearly demonstrated by Khrushchev's decision to withdraw his missiles) makes it probable that any such Soviet decision would have very limited objectives. Moscow might feel that shooting down one US aircraft over Cuba would, despite an expected but limited US retaliation, serve to underline the dangerous nature of US insistence on overflying "sovereign" Cuba and thus to build political pressures in the UN and elsewhere which might force cessation of surveillance. Such an incident might also seem to the Kremlin to be persuasive to Castro as a demonstration of continuing Soviet support.

Under these circumstances a US warning to the Communists against repetition of the act which placed responsibility on the Cubans would probably be helpful to Moscow in attaining its ends. Castro would not be loath to accept responsibility and would presumably

believe he had a high degree of Soviet support. On the other hand, a US warning which stated Soviet responsibility (or even joint Soviet-Cuban responsibility) would be less useful from Moscow's point of view. The Soviets would probably believe that their limited political objectives (inducing the US to stop surveillance) were hampered to the extent that the US successfully described retaliation as something other than US aggression against a small neighbor.

In the unlikely event that a Soviet decision to interdict US reconnaissance was intended to protect some new Soviet attempt to build up an offensive capability in Cuba, the probability of Moscow's running greater risks of escalating incidents would obviously increase.

Attachment

SUBJECT

Prospects for Overthrowing Castro from Within

This paper examines cracks within the Castro regime and how the United States might exploit them. It is based on the assumption that, except for invasion, the only effective move to throw out Castro must come from within Cuba itself. It further assumes that a Cuban mass revolt is unlikely, and that therefore the only force capable of expelling Castro lies within the regime.

Competing Groups within the Castro Regime

The two main components of the "Marxist-Leninist" regime in Cuba—the old Communist Party members and the "new communist" *fidelistas*—are subdivided into informal groupings that vary in their degree of commitment to the Soviet Union. Ranked from most to least committed, five groups can be singled out;

1) Moscow-oriented veteran Communists, probably including Blas Roca and Lazaro Pena as well as Anibal Escalante;

2) Pro-fidelista veteran Communists: those who owe greater allegiance to Fidel (and/or the Revolution) than to Moscow, including apparently Carlos Rafael Rodriguez;

3) Communist Fidelistas: Raul and Che Guevara, for example;

4) Pro-Communist Fidelistas: persons, not trained Communists, who find Communism very attractive and useful. Fidel is No. 1 in this group.

5) Leftist nationalists owing strong allegiance to Fidel who are "Communists" by circumstance rather than by conviction.

In the past year *two* lines of cleavage within this heterogeneous grouping have been observed: one that separates the trained, Moscow-oriented Communists (group 1) from the others, and one that separates the "leftist nationalist" fidelistas (group 5) from those more heavily

tainted with Communism. The groups at the two extremes have, with Fidel's mediation, been able to get along. Fidel halted the old Communists' program for gaining control of all responsible positions in the regime's structure in early 1962, but he has not driven the old Communists out. The leftist-nationalist fidelistas still have grounds for resentment.

Given time and continued Soviet protection, odds are that the center groupings can forge a smoothly working coalition which will create a more monolithic regime by filling the government apparatus with the rising generation of recruits to communism.

The Leftist Nationalists in the Regime

The leftist nationalists in the regime constitute the only source for a coup and a break with the Soviet Union. They have less and less of a role in the new Cuba as long as it continues on its present course, and many of them have arms at hand.

We lack specific intelligence for a comprehensive picture of the names, numbers and power roles of regime supporters who dislike the Communist takeover of Cuba, but there are many indicators that displeasure exists. Numerous reports during 1962 rate displeasure in lower regime levels as widespread. Only in the Army is there much evidence of resentment at higher levels of authority. Lieutenants, captains and even majors (top rank in Cuba) have on occasion been reported as dissidents.

Resentment among the Army officers results from a three-way squeeze: 1) the old Communist thrust for control over the military; 2) Soviet takeover of critical military functions; 3) threat of displacement by indoctrinated young Communists. This unrest led internal resistance groups plotting a revolt during the summer to hope they might be joined by a large percentage of the Army.

However, in the four-year history of the regime, no coup plot has reached an advanced stage. Besides being deterred by the secret police and informer network, positive loyalty has kept leftist nationalists in the Army within the regime. Perhaps more than other groups, the military leaders—old Sierra Maestra men—owe personal loyalty to Fidel Castro, who put them where they are now. While he is the communizer of Cuba, he, oddly enough, still represents their bulwark against inundation by "the Communists", as he showed by checking the old Communist drive in early 1962. Trusting in him, they have accepted with a certain amount of difficulty the wisdom of his alignment with the USSR and, more easily, his hostility toward the US. So long as these feelings were fixed, action from this group has been unimaginable.

Paving the Way for a Coup

Underpinning all elements in the regime has been confidence in Soviet power and will to protect Cuba, a belief steadily increasing since early 1960. The USSR's unilateral decision to withdraw its strategic missiles in the face of US pressure seriously shook that confidence. In the still fluid situation created by the missile crisis, those least committed to the Communist course of the Revolution might be brought to reject alignment with the Soviet Union as well as rejecting Castro and regime leaders should they continue to favor this alignment.

Implications for US Policy

If the above analysis of the situation is correct, it might be possible for the US to promote resistance within the regime and eventually coup action by moves along the following lines:

1) *Creating an attractive alternative.* Leftist nationalist action would depend upon the creation of an appealing alternative to the Soviet alliance and to support for Fidel. At present the leftist nationalists see no place for themselves in a post-Castro Cuba, which they feel either would be "recaptured" by the US for the exiles or dependent on the Soviet Union in the face of continued US hostility. The US would have to:

a) convince them they could take charge of the Revolution after Castro;

b) assure them that in exchange for breaking their dependent ties with the Soviets and reestablishing a national Revolution they would get immediate normalization of relations with the West—perhaps through an OAS pledge.

2) *Reducing Confidence in Soviet Protection.* An important element in encouraging resistance would be the outcome of US-Soviet negotiations. The more the outcome weakens Cuban confidence in Soviet protection, the greater will be the effect in stimulating anti-Castro action within the regime. (See RSB-185, "Negotiations on Cuba: the Advantages of Stalemate," for a discussion of the implications of a failure to reach agreement on Cuba.)

US moves which lend themselves to being interpreted as concessions (e.g. cessation of overflights) extracted by Soviet negotiators would tend to confirm the "wisdom" of Cuba's present policies. On the other hand, certain military threats—such as threat of invasion or actual exile raids—would tend to draw regime supporters together, as they are still committed to the defense of Cuba against foreigners or "counter-revolutionaries."

3) *Undermining Faith in Castro's Leadership.* Faith in Castro has been shaken in recent weeks because of his identification with the missile episode. His stubborn insistence on the "five points" is an effort to

recover lost ground, and it opens him to a further setback as these are ignored or flouted by such US actions as the following:

- a) stepping up economic pressures through shipping blacklist and denial of markets;
- b) strengthening Guantanamo forces; and
- c) mobilizing additional OAS units in naval patrol operations.

Any weakening of Cuban confidence in Soviet support would contribute to reducing faith in Fidel. An OAS guarantee of normalized relations once Castro was overthrown and Soviet ties cut would put a price on his head, help to isolate him, and build him up for the role of scapegoat.

Attachment

RSB-185

SUBJECT

Negotiations on Cuba: the Advantages of Stalemate

We have analyzed recent Soviet diplomatic overtures and Moscow's propaganda linking a Cuban settlement with prospects for negotiations in other fields.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that a stalemate in the Cuban talks might actually be more beneficial to US interests in Latin America, in Cuba and in broader negotiations with the USSR than a settlement.

(1) The US would preserve its freedom for future action to force the downfall of Castro and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Latin America if a suitable opportunity presents itself.

(2) Continued Soviet presence in Cuba would be made as difficult as possible and relatively useless. Eventually, Moscow might even question the value of remaining in Cuba under such circumstances, though that result cannot be clearly foreseen at this time.

(3) There would be an incentive for the Soviet Union to engage in productive negotiations on other issues, because the Soviet Union may wish to create a political climate which would impede further US action against Cuba.

Soviet Objectives in Cuba

In emphasizing peaceful coexistence, the possibility of an East-West détente, and the improving climate for negotiations, Moscow appears to be pursuing two separate sets of objectives.

In the immediate future the Soviets hope to secure an optimum settlement on Cuba. The Soviet Union has now made clear the outlines of what it wishes to achieve in a Cuban settlement.

—It hopes to create a political climate in which the US has the least possible justification for further action against Cuba.

—It clearly wishes to drive the best bargain it can get on US assurances to the Castro regime. And no matter how qualified the non-invasion assurance it finally obtained might be, the Soviet Union would attempt to interpret it in a fashion calculated to create a presumption that the US was acting in bad faith if any untoward events occurred in Cuba.

—It seeks to reduce to an absolute minimum, and would wish to avoid entirely if it could, any provision for on-site inspection or continuing UN presence in Cuba.

—It intends to maintain a presence in Cuba, and would prefer to maintain a military presence there.

—However, Moscow is apparently willing to trade off at least some elements of its actual or potential military presence (the IL-28s, for example) if it can thereby end the quarantine, minimize verification and maximize the acceptance of the Castro regime.

The Soviet Union almost certainly expects Castro to be disgruntled at the conclusion of the crisis. The Soviets probably estimate that even the most favorable terms which they can hope to obtain from the US will not leave the Cubans content, and Castro will continue to feel that he has been sold out by the Soviets. But the Soviets probably also calculate that their best chance for improving relations with Castro is to obtain a negotiated settlement with the US. If the Soviets can assure the safety of the Castro regime, they probably believe that they can in time use economic aid and political support to re-establish satisfactory rapport with the Cubans.

At the same time the Soviet Union will have succeeded in preserving a communist regime in Latin America as a foothold and as an example to other potential communist regimes. If the Soviet Union can thus assure Cuban security, it will do much to offset the damage to Soviet prestige involved in the missile withdrawal. The Soviets probably reckon that bloc critics would have less cause for thinking the USSR had been defeated if it could demonstrate that retreat was a sound tactic for preserving a communist foothold in Latin America.

Soviet Objectives in Other Negotiations

More broadly, the Soviets appear to be interested in using a Cuban settlement as a starting point from which to pursue other objectives vis-à-vis the West. These broader objectives are far less clearly visible than Soviet goals for a Cuban settlement; they may, in fact, still be under review in Moscow.

For the moment the Soviet Union has advanced only two more or less concrete negotiating proposals, on the temporary presence of

Western troops in West Berlin under a UN flag and on the use of "black boxes" to monitor a testban. These proposals had evidently been planned for some time prior to the Cuban crisis.

Moscow's present emphasis on the possibility of negotiated settlements could be nothing more than a tactical ruse to lure the US into a more favorable Cuban settlement. At the other extreme Moscow could conceivably have radically altered its view of the world in the three weeks since it decided that it would have to withdraw its missiles from Cuba; the Soviets may have concluded that given their strategic inferiority and the grim prospect of an endless and economically debilitating arms race, the time has come for a far-reaching settlement of outstanding issues such as Berlin and a start on general disarmament.

While neither of these extreme possibilities can be entirely ruled out on the basis of the evidence presently at hand, both appear improbable. On balance, past Soviet performance and the few indications of Soviet intentions that we have, point to an effort to engage the US in negotiations on a series of topics both for the sake of the atmospheric gains to be derived from the negotiating process itself and in the hope of obtaining some agreements on acceptable terms. While Moscow appears willing to make some initial concession in order to get negotiations started, there is as yet little indication of how far the Soviets may be willing to go in order to secure agreements.

Negotiated Settlement

Broadly speaking there are two principal alternatives by which the present negotiations in New York may be concluded—either a negotiated agreement or a stalemate in the talks.²

A negotiated settlement of the Cuban crisis would provide the Soviet Union with much or all that it could hope to achieve in Cuba under present circumstances.

Initially Castro's dissatisfaction would be maximized. He would regard any Soviet concessions in the negotiations as selling out his interests to the US.

But the Castro regime would be substantially safeguarded from invasion, and by implication, at least, from other US actions against it. Soviet presence in Cuba, as a donor of economic assistance, a sponsor of subversive activities elsewhere in the hemisphere, and probably as a military protector as well would be assured. The cause of Castro's dissatisfactions would be a single event which would tend to be

² We omit as infeasible under present circumstances a US invasion of Cuba. Obviously, in case of invasion the USSR would have to withdraw from meaningful negotiations with the US for a protracted period of time.

obscured by subsequent developments, and with time Castro would have little choice but to reconcile himself to the *status quo*.

Communist China would doubtless support and encourage Castro in any charges of Soviet duplicity and disloyalty to principles of international communism. But as Castro's relations with Moscow improved, there would be less opportunity for Peiping to attempt to manipulate Soviet-Cuban differences for the purpose of attacking Soviet policies. Similarly, Peiping's ability to play up Moscow's withdrawal of its missiles as a defeat for Soviet policy would be reduced as the demonstrable fact of continued communist presence in Latin America gradually overshadowed the withdrawal itself.

Moscow would be free to use the Cuban settlement as a point of departure for other negotiations, but once they had gotten what they could in Cuba the Soviet Union would feel little need to make concessions to the US on other issues for the sake of Cuba.

"No-peace-no-war"

The other major alternative would be to leave the Cuban crisis unresolved. Since the US is not likely to obtain its maximum demands for on-site inspection and continuing UN presence in Cuba, it could refuse to issue a non-invasion guarantee.³ Depending on whether or not the IL-28s were removed, the US might lift or maintain the quarantine on offensive weapons. Aerial surveillance would of course continue. The US would neither take immediate action to upset the present *status quo* to which Moscow's prestige is heavily committed, nor would it commit itself to the preservation of the Castro regime and the Soviet presence in Cuba. In effect, the present crisis with the possibility of further US action against Cuba would be perpetuated. The talks in New York would soon be obviously futile and would probably be allowed to peter out.

Effect on the Soviet Position in Cuba

There would be little immediate effect on the Soviet position in Cuba. While the Soviets would almost certainly prefer the advantages of a clear-cut settlement and some form of explicit US commitment to Cuba's safety the basic Soviet interest in maintaining a presence in Cuba would not at the outset be affected. There might well be no occasion for a dramatic response on Moscow's part as the New York

³ The US would be spared the problems which a guarantee for Castro would create for US policy in Latin America. No matter how carefully it was worded, a guarantee for Castro would be regarded by many Latin American governments as a recognition of the legitimacy of the Castro regime and as a tacit acceptance of communism in Latin America.

talks drifted into a stalemate, and the US took no direct action to upset the *status quo*.

This approach would not be calculated either to force the Soviets out of Cuba or to bring down the Castro regime. For the present, little short of invasion, the disappearance of Castro himself, or a major split in the Cuban ruling combination could be counted on to have that effect. For a discussion of the prospects of such a split see Research Memorandum RAR-45 which is a companion piece to this report. However, the US would be free to maintain as its ultimate goal the downfall of Castro and the end of the Soviet presence in Latin America, and would in the future be free to take whatever action it might find desirable.

As time went on the Soviet presence in Cuba would be made more expensive and difficult. Castro would have less immediate cause for dissatisfaction than he would under a negotiated agreement, but the sources of his discontent would remain, and over the long run Cuban-Soviet tensions would be reinforced.

Failure to obtain a guarantee of Cuba's security from the US would tend to encourage Soviet-Cuban differences over policy toward the US and the degree of Moscow's commitment to the defense of Cuba. Precisely because the future was uncertain, Cuba would seek more assurance from Moscow while the Soviets would be chary of extending commitments which they might be reluctant to fulfill.

Continuation of US surveillance, and the quarantine if maintained, would be another source of Soviet-Cuban differences. Castro would doubtless demand action which the Soviet Union was unwilling to take. The continuation of overflights and the quarantine would of course subject the US to a risk of incidents. These activities would however, provide a higher degree of assurance that Soviet offensive weapons were not reintroduced than would be afforded by any foreseeable agreement, and they could by changes in frequency, procedures etc be manipulated to stir up contention in Soviet Cuban relations.

Continued tension would tend to maximize the economic burden of Soviet aid to Cuba. Moscow would find itself in more frequent need to bribe the Cubans as disputes on other issues continued. At the same time there would be less possibility of Cuban trade with the free-world, and the burden of maintaining Cuba would fall exclusively to the bloc.

If Soviet-Cuban differences continued, Peiping would almost certainly wish to exploit them and the Cubans might seek to play off Moscow and Peiping.

At the same time the utility of Cuba to the USSR would diminish. Under the constant threat of US counteraction Moscow would have to be more circumspect about attempting to use Cuba either as a base for

Soviet military forces or as a staging area for subversion in Latin America.

If the Soviets found themselves sufficiently uncomfortable in Cuba, and the utility of their remaining declined, the Soviet Union might at some future point decide that the game was no longer worth the candle, though that result cannot be assured by the simple expedient of perpetuating a chronic crisis.

Effect on US-Soviet Relations

At first glance it might seem that continued tension over Cuba would not be conducive to negotiations on other issues. Obviously, Moscow would prefer a more secure toehold in Cuba, and the Soviet Union might at some early point wish to show its displeasure by putting off some negotiations in which it had only a limited interest in order to make a point of alleged US bad faith.

But Moscow has important interests to be served by negotiations with the West (in many instances this is true even of negotiations which the USSR does not expect will eventuate in any agreements), and the Soviets will not long allow potential diplomatic advantages to be wasted for the sake of interests which are more Castro's than the Soviet Union's. And if Moscow has in fact made a fundamental and radical reappraisal of the desirability of far-reaching settlements with the West (which we doubt), the USSR would be all the more impatient to get down to negotiations.

Whatever Moscow's aspirations for agreements with the West may be, continuation of a simmering crisis over Cuba would impel the Soviets toward creating an atmosphere of *détente*, and giving at least an appearance of being forthcoming in negotiations. For so long as the threat of further US moves against Cuba remains, the Soviets will have a motive for attempting to maintain a political climate in which the US might be inhibited from taking action.

544. Cuba Contingency Plan, November 20¹

November 20, 1962

This memorandum consists of the following parts:

PART I - Advice to NATO and OAS Governments regarding possible Cuban developments and US action.

PART II - Overflights and responses.

PART III - Additional steps to be taken in the event IL-28s not removed.

PART I**ADVICE TO GOVERNMENTS**

We should set in motion machinery to provide advice to the OAS and NATO Governments Tuesday—preferably in advance of the President's press conference. This would involve sending out telegrams Monday night—assuming that, prior to that time no word had been received from Khrushchev indicating a willingness to withdraw the IL-28s.

A. Advice to our Embassies in NATO and OAS Capitals.

1. Ambassadors should arrange meetings with heads of governments or foreign ministers as early as possible on Tuesday, November 20.

2. Governments would be advised as follows:

(a) The United States has still been unable to obtain satisfactory performance from the USSR with regard to the withdrawal of the IL-28s.

(b) Nor have adequate arrangements been made for ground inspection in Cuba and adequate safeguards against the presence and reintroduction of offensive weapons.

(c) Recent reconnaissance has confirmed the presence in Cuba of organized Soviet military units with the most modern field equipment. These cannot be dismissed merely as "Soviet technicians".

(d) Castro has now announced that he intends to fire on US reconnaissance planes. Continued US reconnaissance is essential action authorized by OAS resolution.

(e) Since the United States must continue surveillance, there is serious possibility of an incident against which the United States is determined to take retaliatory measures.

¹ Consisting of three parts: "Advice to NATO and OAS Governments regarding possible Cuban developments and U.S. action"; "Overflights and responses"; "Additional steps to be taken in the event IL-28s not removed." Top Secret. 13 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Vol. VI (B), 11/16/62-11/20/62.

(f) The situation is fluid and may take one of several courses. The Soviets may act against Castro or, in any event, may not support him in exchanges that might follow his interference with US reconnaissance. On the other hand they may provide military support to Castro. The nature of the future US action will naturally depend upon which option the Soviets elect.

(g) Continued refusal on the part of the USSR to withdraw the IL-28s, or active Soviet military participation in action against necessary surveillance, might well require the re-establishment of the quarantine and its extension to POL.

(h) The President intends to make clear to the nation and the world on Tuesday afternoon the present posture of affairs and to indicate that an early resolution of the remaining problems must be achieved. This approach would of course be altered materially if a favorable answer were received from Khrushchev on IL-28s before press conference.

(i) The United States expects to be able to count on the full cooperation of its Allies in the event it becomes necessary to reimpose the quarantine—with or without an expanded prescribed list—or to take other appropriate action to deal with the situation.

B. Presidential letters containing the substance of the above message would be delivered by our ambassadors in Paris, Bonn, and London. (In addition, the latest pictures are being sent to Paris for possible use with General de Gaulle at the same time.)

C. A briefing would be arranged for Tuesday afternoon with the NATO Atlantic Council.

D. Meeting of OAS Ambassadors.

1. Meeting to be called for Tuesday to advise the OAS Ambassadors of developments to date.

2. Full meeting of the Organ of Consultation to be called this week, at which time efforts would be made to obtain resolution along the lines of Annex A.

PART II

OVERFLIGHTS AND RESPONSES

A. High level overflights would be maintained on a daily schedule through Wednesday and the decision as to the schedule thereafter would be made in light of responses to low-level flights. No low-level overflights before Wednesday, November 21.

B. In the event that a U-2 is fired upon—and whether or not brought down—an immediate protest would be made to the Soviet Government and action would be taken to eliminate the offending SAM site.

C. The targets for the low-level flights on Wednesday, November 21, would not be those associated with the IL-28s (i.e. St. Julian or Holguin) but would be some other target of military interest, such as a port where newly arrived Soviet ships are unloading.

D. It may be presumed that fire against low-level overflights would come from Cuban sources. Low-level reconnaissance flights on Thursday would be provided with an armed escort which would fire against the source of the fire against the reconnaissance planes. If a low level plane is shot down, retaliatory action would be taken as soon as possible against appropriate Cuban military targets, preferably in sparsely populated areas.

E. If overflights are continued, particularly at low level, the Cubans may attempt to interfere or may not do so. If they do attempt to interfere and US responds as indicated above, the Soviet Union will be faced with a choice whether or not to support the Cubans by military action—or whether to disengage. They can support the Cubans by participating in the attacks on US planes, utilizing their SAMs. They can also react by military action in other areas. Alternatively they can confine their reaction to diplomatic protests which might indicate their intent to disengage.

The US must plan its own lines of action based on any of the above contingencies. However, to the extent it proves feasible, we should pursue lines of action tending to encourage Soviet disengagement.

First Assumption. That the Soviet Union would support Cuban action by firing surface-to-air missiles. In the event that a US plane is brought down by a surface-to-air missile we have the option either of attacking one or more of the SAM-sites or of reinstalling the quarantine on an extended basis. In either event, we would be interfering directly by force with the Soviet Union—assuming that the SAM-sites are, in fact, in their hands in spite of their disavowal.

Second Assumption. That the Soviet Union would support Cuban action by reacting elsewhere. US action would have to be generally in line with the contingency planning for the location where the Soviet reaction occurred.

Third Assumption. That the Soviet Union would give vocal and diplomatic, but not physical, support to Cuban action against our aircraft. In this instance, our policy should be designed, so far as possible, to encourage further Soviet disengagement. This would seem to indicate a withholding of any action—such as the reinstitution of the quarantine—that might result in a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we could permit the air action and counter-action to escalate to the point where we might be able to take effective military steps against the Castro regime.

PART III

ADDITIONAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT IL-28s ARE NOT REMOVED

If the IL-28s are not removed we can again follow one of two courses: We can get at them through Castro or confront the Soviet

Union more directly. The natural means of pressure on Castro would be through intensive surveillance and air action. The alternative would be the reinstitution of some form of quarantine. This section is directed mainly to the question of ways and means of using the quarantine against the IL–28s.

A. Form of Quarantine.

The emphasis of the quarantine should be on the interdiction of imports of POL. Quite possibly we could employ a hail-and-pass procedure for most dry cargo ships, requiring the inspection only of particularly suspicious vessels. We could justify interfering with imports of POL on the ground that POL was directly related to the utilization of the IL–28s.

B. Objective of Quarantine.

The minimum objective of the quarantine should be the removal of the IL–28s. However, a substantial argument can be made in favor of conditioning the termination of the quarantine also upon effective and continuing on-site verification—something which Castro would find very hard to accept.

It is not recommended that the termination of the quarantine be tied explicitly to the continuing maintenance of Cuba as a Soviet military base, since this would amount to an extension of the initial terms of the understanding.

One clear incidental benefit of the quarantine would be its adverse effect upon the Cuban economy and, hence upon Castro. If continued any length of time, the quarantine would require the adoption of such restrictions on the use of POL—both domestic and military—as to accelerate the economic deterioration of Cuba.

C. Means of enforcing the quarantine.

These means would be essentially the same as in the last case; however, it would be desirable to increase the presence of other hemisphere naval forces on the line of blockade.

D. Priorities of Enforcement.

In the eventual application of a POL quarantine it would be best to begin with non-Bloc tankers under Bloc charter, proceeding to Bloc tankers, and then to Soviet tankers, in that order.

E. Assumptions under which quarantine recommended.

The above discussion suggests that we should probably not reestablish the quarantine unless the Soviet Union gives military support to Cuban action against our reconnaissance planes.

Once this had been ascertained by events, the desirability of going forward with the quarantine would then have to be determined on the basis of a prediction as to whether or not the Soviets would acquiesce in the quarantine or forcibly resist it. (In the Knox interview, Khrushchev is quoted as saying that he might permit one or two ships to stop and be searched but would sink the American vessel that obstructed the third one.)

The quarantine offers the advantage that it need not immediately involve a physical confrontation—although the credibility of the American action would be gravely weakened if, in this second chapter, we did not act with reasonable decision. Presumably, however, some time might be permitted in which to make it possible for Khrushchev to agree to remove the IL-28s.

Arguments can be marshalled both for and against the contention that Khrushchev would acquiesce. In support of such contention, it could be maintained:

(1) The Soviet Union might be willing to withhold the further supply to Cuba of items on the proscribed list and let the Cuban economy deteriorate, since it may regard Cuba as a wasting asset.

(2) Khrushchev backed down when he was in a much stronger position than he is now. At that time he had missiles operational in Cuba; now he has no such bargaining counter.

(3) By acquiescing the second time, Khrushchev could again seek the propaganda value of being the peace-maker.

Against these arguments it can be asserted:

(1) Khrushchev yielded to the threat of our quarantine once by turning his ships around; he could not afford the humiliation of doing so a second time—especially after the missiles have been removed and he has thus claimed to have complied fully with his undertakings.

(2) Khrushchev was willing to pull back his ships carrying sophisticated weapons in order to safeguard USSR technology. He would not have a similar motive for holding back tankers filled with POL.

(3) The USSR could not stand idly by while the economy of a Socialist state was slowly strangled; the loss of face and the appearance of impotence would be too high a price for Khrushchev to pay.

(4) We cannot be sure that the Soviets would have acquiesced if we had actually boarded and searched a vessel. After all, we were imposing a limited form of quarantine; we let their tankers through.

The resolution of the question posed by these competing contentions is important but not necessarily controlling. Even if it appeared probable that Khrushchev might insist on running the blockade the proponents of the quarantine could still argue that the reaction would probably be limited to a restricted arena. There would be less danger

of escalation in a sea action than in the reprisal for an air attack and in the event of sea action we would have clear superiority.

545. Telegram 1862 from USUN, November 19¹

November 19, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for Secretary. Cuba. Reference: USUN 1835.

I. We have given further careful thought to probable course negotiations with USSR to wind up current Cuban crisis. As a result we have come to fol conclusions:

1. That while it is conceivable USSR will within next few days agree to remove IL-28's in return for lifting quarantine, we should continue to plan on assumption they will hold out for full agreement.

2. That USSR will, however, take out IL-28's in connection with final agreement including appropriate declarations in SC, and it will not insist on Cuban demands being included.

3. That meaningful inspection or verification in Cuba can realistically be obtained only at price of some mutual inspection on invasion problem which would include inspection rights in continental US, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo, as well as in other Caribbean states.

4. That such inspection would probably be politically impossible for US and unacceptable to other Caribbean states, at least unless effectively under OAS control, in which case it would be unacceptable to Castro.

5. That therefore UN verification of withdrawal or UN long-term safeguards in Cuba re in fact most unlikely.

6. That if we can thereby assure removal of IL-28 bombers and obtain tacit SOV acquiescence in continued U-2 overflights, it would nevertheless be worthwhile for US to repeat an assurance, in appropriate qualified terms, against an invasion of Cuba, but not go beyond explicit terms contained in letters between President and Khrushchev.

7. That as price for our willingness to do this we might ask for USSR's tacit acceptance of overflights in lieu of their failure to comply with their undertaking on verification. Means of carrying out this

¹ Probable course negotiations with USSR will take to wind up current Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1962.

“tacit” acceptance might be removal of SAM’s and/or withdrawal SOV military personnel and technicians from Cuba. We would be willing to see this accomplished through private understanding rather than public commitment.

Therefore, end result of final negotiation initiated along lines USUN 1835 would be declaration on our part along lines Part II of this message.

II. Final declaration to which we would recede in accordance Section I this tel, including SOV acceptance of overflights, would be along fol lines:

In letters of Pres Kennedy on Oct 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and Pres Kennedy on Oct 28, 1962, firm undertakings were made regarding settlement of Cuban crisis.

These undertakings were stated in Pres Kennedy’s letter of Oct 27 along following lines:

(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate UN observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

(2) The US would agree—upon establishment of adequate arrangements through UN to ensure carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba; Pres expressed his confidence that other nations of Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The US notes statement made by Sov Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed, that all IL-28 bomber aircraft will be removed from Cuba within four weeks, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. We note also that the [illegible in the original]. It also notes statement of USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be further introduced into Cuba. We welcome these assurances.

Those aspects of undertaking for UN verification of removal of missiles and bombers and destruction of sites and for UN safeguards to ensure that there is no further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been accomplished. Minimum inspection procedure was arranged, however, under which US naval vessels have verified that SOV vessels leaving Cuba carried out number of missiles which USSR certified to US as having been in Cuba. The USSR has also agreed to similar verification of the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers.

In absence of fulfillment of full undertaking for UN verification we will have no choice but to continue to be alert through our own

resources about any possibilities that such assurances have not or will not in future be complied with.

Evidence directly available to US Govt does not at present lead us to conclude that any medium or intermediate range missiles or IL-28 aircraft remain in Cuba nor that any weapons with offensive capability are currently being introduced.

On condition that the SOV assurances are being and continue to be complied with, US herewith gives its assurance that it will not invade Cuba.

The quarantine has also been removed as of November 20.

Nothing herein contained impairs rights or obligations of US under Charters of UN or OAS or under Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

III. If on other hand USSR should in next few days agree to removal of IL-28s in return for lifting of blockade, we will then face question of whether having already obtained satisfaction on bombers we given assurances in absence UN inspection. One possible solution under these circumstances would be to continue negotiating indefinitely and ultimately perhaps accept stand-off in which there was no inspection and no US assurances would be given. There would be number of advantages in fol this course of action. But we think it more desirable to close out present confrontation with USSR at early date and if this is conclusion reached, we would suggest continuing to press for agreement on SAM and/or SOV personnel removal as quid pro quo. Proposed declaration above could be easily modified to suit this situation.

IV. In meantime we also need have US proposals for verification measures on withdrawal and continuing safeguards to present together with initial declaration along lines USUN 1835 in first mtg with Russians. We suggest something along fol lines:

(1) SOV proposal for invasion inspection. We would reject SOV proposals for UN inspection on invasion issue as going beyond scope of verification agreed to in correspondence between Pres and Khrushchev.

(2) Verification of removal. We would propose one-time on-the-spot inspection by military observers under SYG in Cuba of all missile sites and of airfields capable of accommodating IL-28 bombers and of any places where SYG determines that substantial allegations have been received of possible concealment of missiles, bombers or nuclear weapons; such observation to be completed within period of four weeks from its initiation.

(3) Long-range safeguards against further introduction. We would propose stationing of UN military observer corps under SYG in Cuba at all ports and airfields with authority to inspect cargoes of incoming planes and ships to assure there is no further introduction of weapons

capable of offensive use into Cuba, together with Cuban participation in denuclearized zone including other LA states and accompanied by mutually agreed verification (i.e., Brazilian initiative and no rpt no inclusion of US territory).

Stevenson

546. Telegram 1865 from USUN, November 19¹

November 19, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for Secretary. Cuba.

We have considered carefully section of draft Presidential statement forwarded to Stevenson by Johnson on November 17. Our main concern is that Pres not freeze US position at this particular stage in negotiations by publicly stating our present firm negotiating position. This concern relates to last para of draft sent to us. As indicated in our previous tel we feel that tolerable solution to this problem is possible without full UN inspection and verification which may be impossible. If Pres makes firm statement tomorrow night that we will not give assurances regarding invasion unless we have UN inspection, our flexibility will be hampered and it may be more difficult to persuade country later that inspection is not only satisfactory way of solving problem.

We propose, therefore, suggested changes in proposed statement as indicated below, first on assumption that USSR has agreed to removal of IL-28s and second on assumption that it has not.

I. On assumption USSR has agreed to removal of IL-28 bombers:

1. Delete last paragraph of draft statement and substitute something along these lines: "I have also instructed Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy to continue negotiations with Mr. Kuznetsov on the remaining aspects of the undertakings between Chairman Khrushchev and myself".

2. On first page; numbered para 1, we would suggest that phrase "weapons systems capable of offensive use" be used. This is phrase used in Pres letter of October 27 also the word "undertaking" is one used in correspondence, rather than "understanding".

¹ Concerns on draft Presidential statement forwarded to Stevenson by Johnson on November 17. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 373.56361/11-1962.

II. If the USSR has not agreed to take the IL–28s out:

Delete paras starting “Chairman Khrushchev” to the end and substitute following:

“We have also insisted on removal of Soviet IL–28 bombers. Their removal was clearly contemplated by my exchange of correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev and in Governor Stevenson’s presentation in United Nations. While protesting that these aircraft should not be classified as offensive weapons, Soviet Union has stated that it is prepared to consider their withdrawal, but not until agreement has been reached on remaining questions. Because of importance we attach to prompt removal these bombers we have offered end the quarantine when Soviet Union agrees to remove bombers within fixed period of time and I am eagerly awaiting Soviet response.

Final verification of completed transaction by United Nations in Cuba has not been arranged in accordance with agreement. Again, while Soviet Union has given assurances that offensive weapons will not again be introduced into Cuba, no suitable *continuing* safeguards have yet been arranged.

I have instructed Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy to continue negotiations with view to bringing this matter to an early and satisfactory conclusion. Not until then can we give assurances against invasion of Cuba which were also included in original understanding. While we have no desire or interest take military action against Cuba as long as there is no threat to security of this hemisphere, United States will use whatever means it has confirm compliance until suitable safeguards for future can be worked out.

III. If any reference is made to proposals of Secretary General which have not yet been made public, we would wish clear with him in advance.

Stevenson

**547. Memorandum of meeting of the NSC Executive Committee
by McCone, November 19¹**

November 19, 1962

The following were considered:

1. A tentative draft of the task force working on Cuban contingency plan dated 11/19 was reviewed, modified and SecDef agreed to resubmit a redraft of Part II for further consideration.

2. Proposed message to DeGaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan was reviewed, modified and approved.

3. Proposed resolution to the OAS was reviewed, and it was decided that the OAS meeting should be "informative", and in all probability a resolution should not be submitted.

4. Briefing paper for President's press conference was not considered pending receipt of written statement by Sorensen.

Note: On Tuesday morning McCone took exception to the attached Questions and Answers on the grounds that they provided too much of an implied endorsement of Castro, and therefore would disenfranchise the United States from many OAS states.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Cuban contingency plan of November 19; proposed messages to de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan; proposed resolution to OAS; President's press conference. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A.

548. Telegram Polto 577 from Paris, November 20¹

Paris, November 20, 1962

For Tyler from Finletter. Policy. Ref: Topol 659.

Ball presentation created excellent effect. He divided subject into two main parts. First was historical, going over ground which Acheson had presented October 22 and carrying it through changes of events

¹ Report on Ball presentation on Cuba situation to the NAC. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-2062.

since that time, including agreement to withdraw missiles and steps actually taken to accomplish withdrawal, and giving figures of missiles withdrawn and our estimate as to effect this withdrawal. He also dealt with IL-28s, MIGs, and fishing port. Second part of presentation dealt with US position that was necessary for future in which high points were determination that all offensive weapons should be removed; that Cuba is not to be Russian base; and that whatever steps necessary to accomplish foregoing would be taken. Mention was specifically made of possibility increased quarantine measures.

Ball presentation did not deal with matters relating to general east-west confrontation. It dealt strictly with Cuba. After briefing during question period photographs were presented by Navy commander from EUCOM and explanations were made by him with supplementary comments by Ball.

Way is therefore open to you to: First, bring to NAC any new pictures and news as to situation in US and any attitudes on Cuba which will have developed since Ball presentation; and secondly, to take up questions of broad confrontation of east-west. It may be of course that between now and your presentation Cuban events may have become so important you may want to concentrate on them in your presentation. But failing such events, Alliance would be very much interested in knowing your views on future of east-west confrontation and whether or not Cuba and Sino-Indian conflict have created new atmospheres affecting east-west relations; and if so, what our appraisal is of possibilities constructive action.

Some of Alliance believe that Cuban affair and Sino-Indian conflict have created opportunity for new thinking and even possibility some amelioration relations between east-west. We here inclined not overdo this ray of sunshine, but at same time we do not think it would be desirable to reject possibility that conditions may have changed, possibly for better, as result of these two major happenings. Our judgment is that full presentation by you of moves we might consider taking in view of these two events would be helpful and welcome.

In order to counteract some of wishful thinking some members, would be very worthwhile if you could give special emphasis to fact (A) Soviet backdown Cuba due large extent solidarity of our allies, (B) need therefore to solidify interdependence within NATO, and (C) special need to step up efforts build defenses which must be ready and solid if we hope make any gains in getting Soviets to be more reasonable on major issues.

Ball presentation was at special "tea party" arranged along lines proposed by Secretary in 1961. There were present only PermReps, Colonna, one interpreter, and one engineer. PermReps agreed that all reports would be transmitted to their governments only by hand of

an official diplomatic or military courier and not through ordinary post or via electrical means or by cipher however reliable. Do you want same set-up? Suggest your answer should be held until last minute in order you decide how highly classified your views will be. My preliminary judgement is that your presentation, even though it may not add especially highly classified Cuban facts, will bring up such important matters of east-west consultation that it should be given at one of these very restricted "tea parties." However we can decide this at last moment, since it may depend on how many of your counterparts may attend.

Finletter

549. Memorandum for the record, November 21¹

November 21, 1962

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 21 November 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout. DEFCONS no change.
2. The following matters arose:

a. It appears that Ralph Dungan may be the one who planted the story in the *New York Times* this morning concerning the potential availability and excellent qualifications of former Ambassador Bunker for the AID job.

b. There followed a considerable discussion on Cuba. Chuck Johnson, who usually does not command a very respectful hearing within this group since he is definitely non-New Frontier, said that he thought our present status on Cuba vis-à-vis the public was bad because it was a complex "middle" kind of status that is very hard for the great unwashed American public to understand. Somewhat surprisingly, Ralph Dungan supported him on this, which immediately increased Bundy's interest in the opinion. Dungan felt that the Secretary of State, or some equally appropriate candidate, should make a speech or issue a statement summing up the Cuban status in a considerably more detailed and explanatory manner than the President did on TV last

¹ Daily White House staff meeting: Public opinion on Cuba; Latin Americans position re Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Group, Oct-Nov 1962.

evening. Bundy told Arthur Schlesinger that Ambassadors Stevenson and McCloy were eager to try to wrap this thing up somehow or other during the next few days, whereas Bundy felt that it was going to continue to require a lot of delicate orchestration for at least several more weeks. Bundy in effect admitted that we were unlikely to attain absolute fulfillment of the formal terms incorporated in the President's 27 October message to Khrushchev. He feels that we have got to sweat out the Soviet angles (missiles, technicians, etc.) over the next several weeks, and then, and only then, be prepared to address ourselves to Castro.

c. In continuation of the same discussion, Dungan said that he thought the Latin Americans were more confused than anyone at this point as to just what United States policy is supposed to be. Schlesinger added that the trouble was that half of the Latin Americans wanted us to throw Castro out bodily, whereas the other half wanted us to keep calm and seek a *modus vivendi* with Castro. Dungan said that, while Schlesinger's observation was probably correct, he still thought it important that we clarify our present position to the Latin Americans. Bundy said that we are simply not going to "get Castro out", at least not in the immediate future; he feels that the best we can do meanwhile is to hold the OAS to the letter and spirit of their resolutions supporting our late October action in Cuba. Clifton wound up this portion of the discussion with what I thought were a few sound observations of the likely course of the press during the next few days. (As I have mentioned before, he is almost always very good on this subject.) He says that so far the press has only had the opportunity to report the President's TV speech as hard news, especially since there was no advanced text available for some of the press pundits to think over. He predicts that the "think boys" will have just about enough time between now and Saturday to prepare analytical articles which are likely to be not too favorable.

Legere

550. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 21¹

Meeting No. 29

November 21, 1962

1. There was a discussion of the next steps in the New York negotiations with the Russians. The President approved instructions to Stevenson and McCloy, including a proposed non-invasion statement, which are aimed at closing out this phase of the Cuban crisis promptly.

2. An interim reply to the most recent message from Moscow was approved by the President.

3. Secretary McNamara reported that he would be recommending to the President an aerial reconnaissance plan for the immediate future which would call for a limited number of high-level flights, probably two per day accumulative but not more than five in any one day. He subsequently presented exactly this high-level regulation and the President approved it; low-level flights remain to be authorized by the President.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ UN negotiations with the Russians; aerial reconnaissance plan. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32A.

551. Memorandum for the record, November 21¹

November 21, 1962

At approximately 4:30 PM this date, Mr. McCloy called Kuznetsov to advise him of the efforts that were being made to provide as soon as possible a draft of the proposed US declaration assuring against the invasion of Cuba.

Mr. McCloy emphasized that beginning at 4:00 PM this date the President was meeting with his principle advisors on this matter and

¹ Report of telephone call to Kuznetsov from McCloy re draft of proposed U.S. declaration assuring against the invasion of Cuba. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, IA, October/November Meetings.

that as soon as the draft was resolved, it would be provided to Mr. Kuznetsov.

Mr. McCloy indicated that while he would like to do this this evening or tomorrow, that it might not be possible in view of the fact that tomorrow was the Thanksgiving holiday. He did assure Mr. Kuznetsov, however, that every effort was being made to finalize this draft as soon as possible and that it would be provided to the Soviets just as soon as it was ready.

552. Letter from McCone to McGeorge Bundy, November 22¹

November 22, 1962

Dear "Mac":

Although almost no one should give advice when he is departing the scene of activity for a few days off in the sun, nevertheless I am compelled to urge deliberation in the matter we discussed yesterday and which will be discussed today.

I appreciate the force of the argument advanced by Ambassador Stevenson and John McCloy; however, I believe we should be very careful with respect to the terms of any "non-invasion" pledge, and under no circumstances make it without qualification concerning inspection and verification.

I know from our reports that the Latin American countries are deeply concerned over the possibility of our providing Castro with a sanctuary for the continuation of his subversive activities against many Central and South American governments.

Also, I feel that the American public are equally concerned, and only last night Ambassador Alphant expressed a most forceful hope that we would not give our pledge except under satisfactory terms for verification. This may be his personal view, but on the other hand quite possibly represents the thinking of our allies.

My office will be in instant communication should you wish to reach me.

Best regards,

John McCone

¹ Non-invasion of Cuba pledge. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI (B), 11/21/62–11/30/62.

553. Memorandum from Cleveland to Ball, November 22¹

November 22, 1962

I'm attaching for your convenience the two main versions that still seem to be extant after our discussions of this morning:

TAB A—The last three paragraphs of DEPTTEL 1339, sent to USUN last night.

TAB B—The "McCloy draft" as edited by the Secretary.

TAB C—The "Bundy draft" as slightly edited here this morning.

I've left in both TABS A and B the proviso that Cuba does not attack or support an attack upon any other country of the Hemisphere. I think it is very important that this not be dropped out. What we are drafting here is an exchange of assurances between the United States and the USSR, contingent on Cuban behavior. Consequently, the reservation on Cuban behavior must be in the text of our exchange of assurances with the Soviet Union.

Harlan Cleveland

Tab A

(Last three paragraphs of 1339 to USUN)

In the absence of Cuban agreement to United Nations verification and safeguards, the nations of the Organization of American States have no choice but to continue to be alert through their own resources to any possibility that offensive weapons systems remain or are reintroduced into Cuba.

In consideration of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date, the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, has been lifted on November 20, 1962.

Provided no nuclear weapons or weapons systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points, and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declaration is made on the representations of the Soviet

¹ Transmits three drafts of the two main versions of the non-invasion pledge still under discussion. Top Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, General, Cuba, Vol. VI (B), 11/21/62–11/30/62.

Union here in the Security Council and does not alter any of the rights or obligations set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Pact.

Tab B

McCloy Draft

In view of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date:

the United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962;

and provided no nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not attack or support an attack upon any other country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

This statement is made on the understanding that by reason of the refusal of Cuba to permit arrangements contemplated to assure the carrying out and continuation of the commitments in regard to the maintenance and introduction of such weapon systems in Cuba, the United States will, until such time as such arrangements can be effected, continue to employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary.

The undertakings stated herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, to both of which the United States is a party.

Tab C

On the evidence of action taken and the assurances now presented, the threat of offensive weapons is receding and in this situation the invasion of Cuba is neither required nor justified. On the understanding that offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of Cuba in the future, the United States is therefore able to give assurances against invasion of Cuba. In the absence of the verification and safeguards contemplated by the President's letter of October 27, these assurances can be sustained only if there is no interference with other means of obtaining satisfactory continuing information on the absence of offensive weapons systems. It is in the interest of all that there should be no fear of a repetition of the events of September and October.

It must also be understood that the United States Government remains dedicated to the principles of the Rio Treaty and the UN

Charter, so that nothing in the present declaration can alter the obligations assumed under those treaties to deal with any threat to the peace of the Hemisphere.

**554. Memorandum from Sorensen to President Kennedy,
November 22¹**

November 22, 1962

SUBJECT

Wrapping up the Cuban Crisis

Alternative approaches to quickly “drawing a line” under the Cuban crisis which will neither sap hemispheric nor domestic confidence in our resolve or convince the Soviets that it is useless to bargain with us in good faith:

Alternative I—Nothing more is needed.

Persuade the Soviets that the President’s press conference statement, and the President’s letters of October 27 and 28, constitute all the non-invasion assurance that is needed or feasible, if Congress is not later to upset it and in view of the Soviets’ own inability to make good on the type of inspection and safeguards envisioned in U Thant’s letter of summary.

Alternative II—Further informal statements only.

For same reasons, offer a speech or statement by Ambassador Stevenson to United Nations General Assembly which does not have the status of a formal government document and which is based on the President’s press conference statement.

Alternative III—The Security Council.

If a Security Council meeting is deemed absolutely essential:

(a) How informal can we keep our statement or declaration?

¹ Wrapping up the Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961–64, Cuba—Subjects, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62–11/23/62.

(b) Do we need to risk getting involved with either the UAR Chairman's summation or a Security Council resolution noting the declarations?

(c) How many of the following condition clauses ("if..." or "subject to..." etc.) can be included in any non-invasion pledge, in addition to the completion of the weapons' withdrawal and their non-reintroduction?

(1) Our rights and obligations under the Rio Treaty and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(2) Our ability to be certain that there are no offensive weapons remaining in or returned to Cuba.

(3) The efforts of the Western Hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, and our hopes for the freedom of the Cuban people.

(4) Cuba fulfilling her United Nations Obligations not to export aggression.

(5) No sudden or secret provocation as occurred this fall.

Theodore C. Sorensen

555. Telegram 1942 from USUN, November 25¹

November 25, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Our-tel 1941.

Kuznetsov phoned McCloy this morning to ask several questions concerning proposed U.S. declaration.

First, he asked McCloy to identify reference in second para U.S. draft to Actg. SYG's letter of October 28, and inquired reason for this reference. Second, he wished to have identified "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance" referred to in final paragraph. McCloy told him this was Rio Treaty. Finally he asked McCloy to repeat description of alternative procedure we had suggested, that is Presidential statement in lieu of SC declaration. McCloy did so, adding that this statement might subsequently be reported to SC which could simply take note of it.

Kuznetsov also made further reference to Castro's five conditions but McCloy once again had impression this was largely for the record.

¹ Kuznetsov-McCloy telephone conversation re Soviet questions about proposed U.S. declaration. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-2562.

Kuznetsov added, incidentally that he had slept badly last night and liked U.S. draft even less this morning than he had last evening.

Kuznetsov mentioned that Mikoyan arriving about 2 pm tomorrow and asked whether McCloy wished to meet with him. McCloy said he had no reason to ask for meeting but if Mikoyan wished to see him he would of course be available, adding, however, that he would be in Washington Tuesday afternoon. Kuznetsov said Mikoyan would be extremely busy Monday but that perhaps he might wish to meet with McCloy Tuesday morning.

Yost

556. Telegram 1953 from USUN, November 26¹

November 26, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only for the Secretary. Cuba.

McCloy, Stevenson and Yost saw SYG this afternoon to bring him up to date on Cuban developments. McCloy reviewed latest conversation with Kuznetsov along lines USUN 1941, 1942.

US draft declaration given to SYG with warning we had not yet revealed publicly we had given any document to USSR and did not regard it as commitment until we heard from them and worked agreement out.

SYG's reaction was good. Only comment he made was that next to last para on overflights would cause difficulty with USSR. Bunche suggested first part of sentence, referring to "understanding" might be deleted and para left as statement of US position.

SYG also seemed to favor in lieu SC meeting, possibility separate declarations by President and Khrushchev which would then be sent to him for circulation as SC document. He saw this as opportunity to avoid difficulties which otherwise would be raised by Cuban insistence on speaking in SC. On other hand, he agreed that this procedure would not prevent Cuba from later calling for SC meeting on overflight question, unless Russians were able to persuade them not to ask for meeting. Neither SYG nor associates showed any objection to overflights.

Stevenson

¹ Reports on meeting with Secretary General about latest Cuban developments. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF 737.56361/11-2662.

557. Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 28¹

November 28, 1962

Dept pass to White House. Eyes Only for Secretary. Cuba.

Part I of II.

Stevenson, McCloy and Yost met for three hours this morning with Mikoyan, Zorin, Kuznetsov and Mendelevich. There was considerable clarification and clearing away of underbrush on both sides but no further points were agreed. Sovs principal objections to US draft declaration were (1) extensive conditions applying to assurances against invasion and (2) paragraph on overflights. They also repeatedly urged dropping all reference to Rio Pact as not being pertinent to this declaration.

Mikoyan started off referring to fact that Sov protocol presented 10 days ago, SOV Govt anxious terminate Cuban matter, has impression US wishes delay but hopes is mistaken. Believes protocol is best form for termination but since US doesn't like it are prepared adopt declarations which will be presented to SC for approval. However US draft declaration is "a bad one" for following reasons: (1) Some important points in exchange of letters are omitted or not presented fully. (2) New conditions are attached to insurance against invasion. (3) Effort is made to legalize one-sided violation of Cuba air space and to obtain UN sanction. This cannot be done. (4) Proposals submitted jointly by USSR and Cuba are avoided. Though these proposals were not included in exchange of correspondence they follow spirit of that exchange.

In further explanation these points Mikoyan argued that according to US draft, if Cuba takes any act which US considers jeopardizes security of Caribbean, US obligation against invasion would lapse. This is direct retreat from statement in President's letter. There is no word in declaration about subversive activity against Cuba though Castro supported by Sov Union proposes that subversive activity be stopped by all countries.

As to inspection, should be divided into two parts; inspection of dismantling of missiles and IL-28's has already been taken care of by alternative method acceptable to both sides. US has right to ask for inspection in relation to non-introduction of weapons but Cubans also have right of inspection against invasion preparations. Sovs support reasonable suggestions set forth in Castro's Nov 26 letter, that is, multi-lateral inspection by UN observers. Whole of US would not be inspected

¹ U.S.-Soviet meeting re U.S. draft declaration. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/1-2862.

but only certain parts, including Puerto Rico, where camps of invasion bands are located. Whole territory of Cuba would be subject to inspection as well as certain neighboring countries. One-sided inspection is impossible and Sov Union would not support. Mikoyan then read five points as set forth in Castro's letter of Nov 26 and attempted to justify them. He argued *inter alia* US need not at once abandon Guantanamo but should enter into negotiations with Cubans about its disposition. This was justified under international law and very moderate proposal. In general Mikoyan argued that if US not prepared to normalize relations with Cuba at present we at least say that we are prepared to negotiate later. Finally he said wording in US declaration about withdrawal Sov weapons is not correct and should be described as in exchange of correspondence.

Part II of II.

Mikoyan objected to reference in our declaration to US agreement such as Rio Pact which he claims have no relation to UN. He also referred to fact President's letter Oct 27 had said not only US would not invade but was confident other states would give similar assurances. This point does not appear in US declaration and is therefore another retreat from exchange of correspondence.

As to procedure, when we have agreed on text of two declarations these should be submitted to SC for approval. Soviets would not wish however proceed to SC before there is agreement between US and themselves. Soviets are thinking of draft resolutions to be adopted by SC approving two declarations and hoping US will also consider this point.

Stevenson replied US eager have Cuban affair settled and eliminate this source of friction between us. He noted we prepared to proceed by means of declaration. He hoped to receive SOV draft soonest.

Stevenson said it appears principal points outstanding between us are Castro's five points. We have repeatedly noted that according to our interpretation "suitable safeguards" referred to in exchange of correspondence dealt with those to prevent re-introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba and that according to President's letter Oct 27 this was to be delegated to UN observers. There was no objection by Khrushchev to President's letter on this point. Since such observation in Cuba has not been possible we have said frankly and honestly in our draft declaration that until such safeguards are provided we must use our own means. We would of course prefer UN observation. We think we have made substantial concessions in offering assurances against invasion without inspection. We don't ask Soviets to agree to our unilateral means of inspection but simply point out to them we have no other choice.

US has also gone further than exchange of correspondence envisages by saying not only that we would not invade Cuba ourselves but that we would not support such invasion.

We have discussed Castro's points several times before and can simply repeat they are not covered by exchange of correspondence, we cannot discuss them and it is better to adhere to simply US-Sov terms of agreement. If all these new matters introduced into negotiations we doubt they could ever be concluded. We understand Sovs feel obligated to support Cuba's demands but we also have numerous demands from other American Republics which we are not introducing into negotiations. Of course we look forward to time when eventually relationships among all American Republics, including US and Cuban relationships can be normalized.

As to Rio Pact, this is one of regional agreements envisaged in Chapter 8 of UN Charter. As to assurances other American Republics against invasion of Cuba, President merely expressed opinion they would be willing to give such assurances. Mikoyan interjected that statement to this effect should be in our draft declaration. Stevenson replied he would consider this as suggestion but in practice would have to wait to see what other American Republics prepared to do.

As to procedures, Stevenson believed best course is to proceed by agreed declarations in SC as proposed. If declarations cannot be fully agreed they could at least be presented separately to SYG to be submitted to SC and have Cuban affair concluded in this manner. Kuznetsov inquired whether this would envisage any SC action and Stevenson replied that we could not foresee at this time. Mikoyan noted best solution would be to present agreed documents.

McCloy reiterated objective both sides is to finish promptly. If we haggle over wording and there is no agreement there will be uneasiness in US, Sov Union and around the world. We should try to finish this crisis and proceed to other problems in order to avoid other crises.

McCloy reiterated Stevenson's arguments that US had gone beyond letters of agreement in raising quarantine before safeguards worked out, in including a reference to our willingness not to support invasion and in demobilizing and sending back to their bases US forces in Florida. He also emphasized US-SOV agreement would not involve settlement with Castro. As to subversion, other American Republics are threatened by Castro's activity in this field. There are in Cuba camps training men for subversion in Latin America. If we try to deal with all these matters in our declarations we will never agree. When Castro eventually ceases to be a threat to the Western Hemisphere we are willing to normalize relations with him and help Cuba economically as we have in the past. We cannot waste our time talking of Castro's conditions when US and SOVs have such important matters of common

concern to settle between themselves. (Incidentally McCloy mentioned Mikoyan had presented Castro's points better than Castro himself could have done. Mikoyan replied that it is impossible to imagine what an eloquent man Castro is.)

McCloy noted that inspection of US and Puerto Rico would be comparable to inspection of Soviet ports to detect offensive weapons being despatched to Cuba. He reiterated Stevenson's insistence on necessity of overflights in absence UN observers. However language our para might perhaps be improved. Presumably we would not continue overflights indefinitely as suspicion died down but would be foolhardy not to continue until confidence restored.

As to UN procedure McCloy saw no objection to presenting declarations in SC but saw grave danger getting into haggle with Cuba, complaining LA's attacking Cuba, Soviet Union defending Cuba and so on. He pointed out US and Soviet Union now have record of compromise and conciliation on Cuban question and it would be pity to spoil it. In conclusion he mentioned reference U Thant letter in first para of declaration could be dropped since this letter merely reiterated what President had said.

In reply Mikoyan reiterated several points previously made. He said Soviets would prepare draft declaration for SC but that its contents would be similar to that of protocol. McCloy replied this would be waste of time and hoped Castro's points could be excluded from SOV declaration.

Mikoyan referred once more to inspection and said suggestions made by U Thant seemed reasonable. Groups of observers stationed at UN headquarters could be sent to certain bases in case of complaint. They would not inspect military installations in US and Puerto Rico but merely training camps. US reps again reiterated that reciprocal inspection of this kind, unless it included Soviet Union, was unacceptable. Mikoyan noted inspection Soviet Union was unacceptable except in connection with broader disarmament arrangements, safeguards against surprise attack and so on.

As to Rio Pact, US negotiators pointed out that this is firm US obligation which must be referred to since its omission might be interpreted as its abandonment, which would cause US serious difficulties with Congress and with other American Republics. Mtg concluded with repeated mutual assurances of desire to finish matter quickly and to study points made by both sides on this occasion. It was agreed to meet again Friday.

Stevenson

**558. Letter from Henry S. Rowen to Fred S. Hoffman,
November 28¹**

November 28, 1962

Dear Fred,

Many thanks for your quick response to my request for estimation of the threat posed by Soviet IRBMs if stationed in Cuba. We had assumed that they were inherently more accurate, and so it is good to know in some precise terms what this meant.

As you anticipated, the stationing of IRBM's in Cuba was too tempting to the Soviets. In mid-September Albert asked me if I were sure the Soviets weren't putting IRBM's into Cuba. He had a hunch they might. My answer was sort of a non-sequitur. They'd be crazy to do it. We were both right.

These missiles added to the Soviet ICBM capability might have reduced by 30% the vehicles, and by 40% the weapons that the US could deliver against the Soviet Union. This assumes that SAC has dispersed.

Again, we appreciate yours and Mike Arnsten's efforts to take a quick fix on the problem and send in the data.

Sincerely,

Henry S. Rowen
Deputy Assistant Secretary

¹ Expresses appreciation for Rand Corporation's quick response to DOD request for estimation of the threat posed by Soviet IRBMs if stationed in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962.

559. Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee,
November 29¹

November 29, 1962

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

BLOC MILITARY FORCES

General: Following the 21 November announcement that the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries were cancelling the special military preparedness measures put into effect on 23 October, there have been clear indications of a return to a normal readiness state. It appears likely that all commands have resumed routine activities.

[text not declassified]

BLOC SHIPPING TO AND FROM CUBA

Ten ships identified with the removal of offensive missile systems from Cuba have arrived at Soviet ports. Nine of the missiles have been delivered to the port of Kaliningrad on the Baltic. One ship still en route will deliver an additional five missiles to that port. The remaining 28 missiles have been delivered to Black Sea ports, 20 to Odessa and 8 to Nikolaev.

Technical surveillance of the LABINSK as it passed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] gave some very inconclusive indications of the presence of neutron-emitting (plutonium) materials.

Since 10 November, when the withdrawal of the 42 designated missiles was completed, four additional Soviet ships have loaded missile-associated equipment for return to the USSR. Three of these ships are destined for Baltic ports, and the fourth is bound for the Black Sea.

Details of the voyages of all the ships involved in the removal of missiles are shown in the attached table.

SHIPS EN ROUTE TO CUBA

As of this morning, there were 20 Bloc ships en route to Cuba, including 11 Soviet dry cargo ships, 5 tankers, and 2 passenger ships, and 2 Satellite dry cargo ships. One of the Soviet ships, the KIMOVSK,

¹ Bloc military forces; bloc shipping to and from Cuba; Cuban internal situation; Soviet position. Top Secret. 7 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 60 D 438, OA—Cuba.

is a large-hatch ship, one of the 16 ships that turned back to the USSR when the US quarantine was established.

SHIPS IN CUBAN PORTS

There are 12 Soviet dry cargo ships, 3 tankers, and 2 passenger ships in Cuban ports, plus 2 Satellite dry cargo ships. Five of the Soviet ships are large hatchships, and they alone represent more than enough capacity to remove the 42 IL–28s to the USSR.

*Soviet Ships Involved in Removal of Missiles and Associated
Equipment from Cuba*

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Departed Cuban Port</u>	<u>Arrived Soviet Port</u>
<i>A. Up to 10 November</i>		
ALAPARVSK	Isabela, 8 Nov. with associated equipment	Kaliningrad, 23 Nov.
BRATSK	Mariel, 7 Nov. with 2 missiles	Kaliningrad, 24 Nov.
DIVNOGORSK	Mariel, 5 Nov. with 4 missiles	Odessa, 22 Nov.
FIZIK KURCHAKY	Casilda, 7 Nov. with 6 missiles	Probably called Nikolaev on 21 Nov.
IVAN POLZUNOV	Havana, 9 Nov., after loading 5 missiles at Mariel	En route, probably to Kaliningrad to unload around 2 Dec. and then to Leningrad
LABINSK	Havana, 9 Nov., after loading 2 missiles	Nikolaev, 26 Nov.
LENINSKY KOMSOMOL	Casilda, 9 Nov. with 8 missiles	Odessa, 25 Nov.
METALLURG ANOSOV	Mariel, 7 Nov. with 8 missiles	Odessa, 22 Nov.
VOLGOLES	Mariel, 8 Nov. with 7 missiles	Kaliningrad, 25 Nov.
ALEKSANDROVSK	Mariel, 5 Nov., with associated equipment	Unidentified northern port—probably Arkhanglsk or Murmansk

ALMETEVSK	Isabela, 10 Nov., with associated equipment	May have arrived Kaliningrad 23 Nov.
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B. Ships Removing Associated Equipment since 10 November

AMATA	Unidentified port— probably Mariel—19 Nov.	Bound for Baltic; ETA Kattegat 6 Dec.
BELOVODSK	Mariel, 16 Nov.	Bound for unknown port, probably in the Baltic
CHERNYAKHOVSK	Unidentified port— probably Mariel—23 Nov.	Bound Baltic; ETA Kattegat, 8 Dec.
EMELYAN PUGACHEV	Unidentified port— probably Casilda—25 Nov.	Bound for Black Sea. We estimate arrival on 18 Dec.

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION

The IL-28 bombers are being dismantled. At the same time, work continues on improving or constructing more permanent facilities at some of the Soviet military installations on the island.

Preliminary analysis of high-level photography taken on 27 November shows that all nine IL-28 fuselage crates previously observed at Holguin airfield in eastern Cuba have been removed. At San Julian airfield in western Cuba, photography of 25, 26, and 27 November shows clearly that dismantling of the 13 IL-28s previously observed in various stages of assembly is under way. The additional 20 unpacked IL-28 fuselage crates which have been at San Julian airfield for several weeks were still there on 26 November, but only 13 were seen on the following day.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] Cuban pilots in the USSR were probably continuing their training in IL-28s as recently as 23 November, several days after Moscow and Havana had agreed to withdraw the aircraft from Cuba.

Construction is still under way at the bases of some of the four Soviet armored groups in Cuba. At the Remedios base, for example, work was in progress on 12 barracks as of 26 November. At the Artemisa military camp, foundations for 10 buildings were under construction on 25 November. These buildings may be intended to replace tents, which now provide the main form of shelter at the ground bases.

The 24 Soviet-controlled SAM sites in Cuba remain fully operational, and buildings are still being constructed at some of the sites.

Construction also continues on the La Sierra coastal defense cruise-missile site near Cienfuegos in southern Las Villas Province. The other three cruise-missile sites appear to be completed.

The MIG-21C fighters, which are almost certainly operated solely by Soviet pilots, are still operational. Of the 39 MIG-21Cs known to be in Cuba, 37 were observed on airfields near Santa Clara and San Antonio de los Baños on 26 November. Full operational activity has also been maintained on the Cuban early warning radar network, in which Soviet personnel are also participating.

The 12 KOMAR missile patrol boats are still active and are based at the Mariel naval port in western Cuba and the Banes naval base in eastern Cuba. These boats have been operated by mixed crews of Cubans and Soviets.

No Soviet submarines have been detected in waters near Cuba since the four F-class submarines left the area and headed back toward the USSR about two weeks ago. [2 lines not declassified] It cannot be determined whether more Soviet submarines are scheduled to come into the area.

[1½ lines not declassified] continuing demobilization of the Cuban armed forces and the placing of various units in reserve status.

[text not declassified]

The Cuban civil airline has acquired three Soviet-made IL-18 transports to replace the old Britannias it had been using in its international service. Difficulties in obtaining technical landing and overflight permission from Western governments have delayed Cuban efforts to ferry the planes to Havana.

Cuba's official "answer" on 25 November to President Kennedy sought once again to lay the blame for the "so-called Caribbean crisis" entirely on the United States. Issued shortly after Mikoyan's "farewell" speech in Cuba, the statement warned that Cuba reserves the right "to acquire arms of any kind for its defense." The claim was made once again that Cuba would accept international inspection only if the UN were to inspect the territory of the US, Puerto Rico, and "other aggressive sites." The communiqué also described Castro's five points as "indispensable for the real solution of the crisis."

Cuban exiles reacted with mixed feelings to ending of the quarantine. Many initially expressed bitterness and the feeling that the US had let them down. Some of the more activist leaders, and those who regard Castro as primarily a problem for Cubans to deal with, expressed gratification and confidence in Castro's eventual overthrow. One leader declared that plans for further hit-and-run raids on Cuban targets would now be resumed.

SOVIET POSITION

In his 28 November discussion with US officials, Mikoyan made it clear that the USSR's principal objections to the US draft declaration were:

(1) The extensive conditions the US was now applying to assurances against invasion of Cuba.

(2) US insistence on the need for continued aerial reconnaissance of Cuba. Calling the US draft declaration a "bad one," Mikoyan charged that the US position on guarantees against invasion, as now stated, was a "direct retreat from the statement in the President's letter (27 October)." He specifically cited the US stipulation that if Cuba takes any action which the US regards as jeopardizing the security of the Caribbean, then US obligations against invasion would lapse.

During the discussion, Mikoyan continued to maintain that the wording in the US draft declaration should conform to the language used in the exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

Communist China continues to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute with its oblique attacks on the Soviet Union for retreating in the face of the US stand in Cuba. A 29 November *People's Daily* editorial, in support of Castro's 25 November demands for reciprocal inspection and insistence on the cessation of US aerial reconnaissance, implicitly scores Moscow for being intimidated by "US nuclear blackmail."

560. NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 29¹

Meeting No. 31

November 29, 1962

1. Director McCone presented the intelligence summary, highlighting our knowledge of the remaining Soviet military presence in Cuba.

2. Following a discussion of publicity continually being given to refugee reports of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, the President asked that further efforts be made with news media to relate such reports to hard evidence available to us.

¹ Refugee reports of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba; New York discussions with Mikoyan; longer-range plan to keep pressure on Castro; overflights of Cuba; press interest in post-mortem of Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62.

3. Secretary Rusk reported on the New York discussions with Mikoyan and summarized his recommendations as to positions to be taken with Mikoyan here.

4. The President directed the preparation by the State Department of a longer-range plan to keep pressure on Castro and to bolster other regimes in the Caribbean, the timing of implementation to be related to the outward movement of Soviet bombers and personnel.

5. Secretary McNamara raised the question of overflights of Cuba, recommending that in general low-level flights should only be flown when necessary to clarify high-level pictures revealing suspicious activity. An overflight guideline paper is being prepared for later discussion.

6. There was a discussion of continuing press interest in postmortems of the Cuban crisis. The importance of limiting discussion of this subject with the press was re-emphasized and the designation of authorized White House sources was reaffirmed.

McGeorge Bundy

December 1962

**561. Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President,
December 2¹**

December 2, 1962

SUBJECT

Alsop-Bartlett Story and Stevenson

The Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson seems to be wrong in almost every particular. I attach the relevant excerpts on a separate sheet.

1. The story states "only Adlai Stevenson . . . dissented from the Executive Committee consensus". This is false. In the course of the deliberations, he made certain proposals, though none so incompatible with the consensus as the proposals made by several others for an air strike; but no more than they did he dissent from the eventual consensus.

2. The story states that there was "disagreement in retrospect over what he really wanted" and goes on to attribute to "a non-admiring official who learned of his proposal" the following statement: "Adlai wanted a Munich. He wanted to trade the Turkish, Italian and British missile bases for the Cuban bases."

This statement is wholly wrong. In both papers I showed you yesterday morning, Stevenson specifically opposed doing anything at this point about the Turkish and Italian bases. He wrote: "Turkey and Italy should not be included in the initial offer. Their inclusion would divert attention from the Cuban threat to the general problem of foreign bases. Furthermore, Turkey and Italy should be consulted in advance." And again: "The effect in Turkey, particularly if there is not careful advance preparation, might be very serious."

The British bases are not mentioned in any of Stevenson's proposals.

3. The story states that there is "no doubt that Stevenson preferred political negotiation to the alternative of military action." This statement is wholly wrong too. Stevenson emphasized that the political offer must take place "within the scope of vigorous US military action to defend our security." He added: "An offer in effect to exchange

¹ Refutation of Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson's dissension from the Executive Committee consensus. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba 1961-1963.

Guantanamo for the Soviet sites *in the absence of US military response to the Soviet moves* [Stevenson's italics] would be weak."

4. Alsop and Bartlett apparently never discovered what Stevenson, in fact, proposed, which was a neutralization of Cuba involving the termination of all foreign military build-up and the dismantlement and evacuation of all foreign military installations, all under UN observation. Stevenson wrote, "By 'neutralization' we would mean a result along the Austrian type. . . . Such neutralization and demilitarization would immediately and drastically reduce the troublemaking capability of the Cuban regime, and would probably result in its early overthrow." Neutralization would, of course, have meant, in effect, a trade of Guantanamo for the Soviet bases.

Stevenson also favored making this proposal in the initial presentation before the Security Council rather than at a later stage in the discussions.

Both the proposal and the timing were rejected—and rightly so. But the suggestion in the Alsop-Bartlett story that Stevenson favored a Caribbean Munich is grossly unfair—and shows the number of people who still have their knives out for him.

Clayton Fritchey and I have worked out the following statement which would be issued by "a spokesman for Governor Stevenson" in response to press inquiries:

"The story is false and malicious. It rests on the allegation that Governor Stevenson 'wanted to trade the Turkish, Italian, and British missile bases for the Cuban bases.' This is a total fabrication. It further charges that Governor Stevenson 'dissented' from the consensus of the Executive Committee and preferred 'political negotiation' to the policy of the quarantine. This is also wholly untrue."

Unfortunately I have to go to Maxwell Field, Alabama, this afternoon to speak at the Air War College tomorrow morning. I will be back tomorrow afternoon. If you have any thoughts or misgivings about the statement, you might want to communicate them to me before four o'clock or to Clayton thereafter. Stevenson is out of town; and, when Clayton discusses the matter with him tomorrow morning, he would like to be able to say that you had seen the statement.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

Attachment

Excerpt from the Alsop-Bartlett piece

Only Adlai Stevenson, who flew down from New York on Saturday, dissented from the Executive Committee consensus. There is disagreement in retrospect about what Stevenson really wanted. "Adlai wanted a Munich", says a non-admiring official who learned of his proposal. "He wanted to trade the Turkish, Italian and British missile bases for the Cuban bases."

The [illegible in the original] maintains that Stevenson was only willing to discuss Guantanamo and the European bases with the Communists after the neutralization of the Cuban missiles. But there seems to be no doubt that he preferred political negotiation to the alternative of military action. White House aide Arthur Schlesinger was assigned to write the uncompromising speech which Stevenson delivered at the UN on Tuesday and tough-minded John McCloy was summoned from a business conference in Germany to work with Stevenson in the UN negotiations.

In any case, the President heard Stevenson out politely and then gave his [illegible in the original] final approval to the McNamara plan.

562. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Ball, December 3¹

December 3, 1962

McCloy: I hear Adlai is down there. What is up?

Ball: I didn't know he was.

McCloy: We have a session with Kuznetsov this morning at 11 o'clock; I just heard from Yost that Adlai was called to Washington last night.

Ball: It's news to me. There is a meeting of the Executive Committee this morning, but it is to hear Harriman's report on India. Unless they want him there for that; it could be they sent out a general request for

¹ Request by McCloy to wrap up negotiations with Kuznetsov. No classification marking. 1 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

the Executive Committee and it caught him. It has nothing to do with this other thing.

McCloy: Kuznetsov tried to see us over the weekend, and we ducked it.

Ball: I think you will have to see him; it is the only thing to do.

McCloy: I will do it. What I would like to get is this morning's guidance as to whether we are going to try to close this thing up or not. I don't believe we are very far apart. I think with a couple changes or so—the overflights, and how you state that. I think he is reaching for some way to state it that does not bind him in the acceptance. Another is the threat to the security business, which he says is loose language, and you can claim a threat at any time. There is a lot of truth in that, and he wants to make it a little more definite. Maybe if you went back to attack on that and relied on the Rio pact which has some very loose language in it, you might be able to get over that one. The third one is the intent business rather than the language of the letter which we argued so much about at Hyannisport. I wouldn't be surprised we could hold that, maybe—I don't know.

Ball: I will get back to you before your 11 o'clock meeting.

McCloy: I would like to get back whether I should try to close it up this morning.

Ball: I will talk to the President about it.

McCloy: Yes, see what he says. I think I ought to get a pretty good slant on it. In regard to the drafting and the language of the thing, I don't think you are going to get ten people to agree on an exclusion clause in regard to the overflights. I know how to draft that. And if I get you to say OK; you waste a couple days getting it through the Pentagon. This is kind of silly.

Ball: Let me see if we can't short-circuit that one.

563. Memorandum of meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC by McCone, December 3¹

December 3, 1962

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

The meeting then turned briefly to Cuba. Stevenson explained there were three areas of disagreement with the Soviets: (1) The manner of expressing the right to verify events in Cuba. (2) The language of preserving peace, and (3) The manner in which the invasion commitment was expressed—that is, whether we stated we had no intention of invading, or alternatively, made a firm undertaking that we would not invade. It was pretty well agreed at the meeting that we could not agree with the Soviets and therefore two separate and different papers would be filed with the Secretary General, one by the Soviets and one by ourselves.

Later in the day I met with the President privately and pointed out to him my concern over the Soviet conduct in Cuba. Specifically I referred to three items reported in the Check List, as covered in the attached memorandum of December 3. The President asked for more details and these were transmitted to him in the afternoon in the form of the two documents attached (Department of State cable #2026, dated November 29, 1962, and FBIS #70, dated November 29, 1962).

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Stevenson's report on the three areas of disagreement with the Soviets, and McCone's expression of concern over Soviet conduct in Cuba to the President at a later meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B012285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.

**564. Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President,
December 3¹**

December 3, 1962

SUBJECT

Alsop-Bartlett Story

Both network commentators on the 5 o'clock news today featured the claim that the White House had not denied the charges in the *Saturday Evening Post* article.

The President and Salinger refused to deny today the allegations and charges contained in the *Saturday Evening Post* article.

—Sandy Vanocur

It is notable that the White House does not deny the accuracy of the charges.

—Ray Scherer

This is the point which is currently being played up around town and which will presumably dominate the press stories tomorrow. Everyone is drawing the comparison with the downfall of Chester Bowles, which, as you will recall, was also preceded by a Bartlett article. For whatever reason, the press seems determined (as was evidenced in Pierre's briefing) to take the White House statement as a deliberately pallid defense of Stevenson and to regard the whole affair as a prelude to Stevenson's dismissal. All this naturally impairs Stevenson's position and authority in the UN.

I think that something more should be done to deal with the situation. Here are two possibilities:

1. You might put out a statement along the following lines: "If any misunderstanding remains about Governor Stevenson's role in the Cuban deliberations, let me say once and for all that he did not propose trading the European bases for the Soviet bases in Cuba, that he did not dissent from the Executive Committee consensus, that he did not oppose the quarantine, that he did not prefer political negotiation to the alternative of military action and that he has today, as he has always had, my full confidence and respect as a member of the National Security Council and as United States Ambassador to the United Nations."

2. I (or someone) might leak to the *New York Times* the following quotations from the Stevenson memoranda:

¹ Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, 1961–1963.

On the subject of the Turkish and Italian bases: "Turkey and Italy should not be included in the initial offer. Their inclusion would divert attention from the Cuban threat to the general problem of foreign bases. . . . The effect in Turkey, particularly if there is not careful advance preparation, might be very serious."

On the subject of political negotiation as against military action: any political offer must take place "within the scope of vigorous U.S. military action to defend our security"; any offer "in the absence of U.S. military response to the Soviet moves would be weak."

The objection to this counter-leakage is that it would provoke a demand for the full text of the memoranda; but no doubt this could be dealt with.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

565. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Ball, December 3¹

December 4, 1962

McCloy: . . . the condition being to the word "threat"; that this could be interpreted any way we pleased. The big argument about the Rio pact referring to Article 5 6 is being in violation of the UN Charter. All of the argument on what we've had before about the Rio pact, and the Rio pact really wouldn't be consistent with what we had agreed to do in the 27th–28th exchange. Then he talked about a number of other things—one was the clause about the continuation of our negotiations to try to improve conditions, not only around the world but in the Caribbean. Then there was a good bit of emphasis on the words "capable of offensive action". And he said that was a new phrase—didn't like that phrase. That what we were talking about was the nuclear weapons; that any kind of weapon if it was in the right spot at the right time could be capable of offensive action. And I said that was a phrase, I suppose, that any weapon or pistol that was carried into the United States and killed the President would be offensive action, but that we weren't talking about that—we were talking about things he knew about. And he said I think that language has to be changed so that it conforms more with the exchange that we had—

¹ McCloy report of 5-½ hour conversation with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelovich. No classification marking. 5 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

namely offensive weapons and weapons that you consider to be offensive. He repeated the President's thing on that, and I said I didn't know that that was a point of really grave concern. But they seem to be quite agitated over the weapons capable of offensive action—that would mean anything. Then he started in this whole business about the fact that we were not doing anything; but we finally knocked that out without much difficulty, and he finally ended up by saying both sides had done a good bit but we had to continue this spirit. But he must advise me that if we continued to insist upon the inclusion of the Rio pact, the overflight clause, and the "threat" word, we would have great difficulty in trying to reach any agreed statement that this would have a big effect both ways. If we did, the atmosphere would be fine for further talks about other world problems between the US and USSR. He put more emphasis on that than heretofore. I told you about all this business about the Rio Pact being contrary to the UN Charter, and he read from Article 8 of that Treaty and Article 6 of that Treaty; and that this was a depreciation of our commitment not to invade if we included that, and I said the more he talked about that the more he convinced me that it was absolutely essential to keep the Rio Pact in, because he was urging what we were doing modified it; that would immediately have to go to the Senate to get a modification of it— $\frac{2}{3}$ consent, etc. and that was fantastic. It was neither in his interest, nor in our interest. Obviously, I think that Mikoyan has clipped his wings a little bit.

GWB: Yes, that is perhaps right.

McCloy: That seems to be quite clear. He was a little more amenable until he got here. Mikoyan bawled him out for a couple of things apparently when he was here. Zorin was present this afternoon. And then he brought up again the Castro condition in the protocol. We again jumped on those. I think it was pretty proforma on that. He said that they never committed themselves to an on-site inspection without Castro's consent. I referred to the President's letter which said that our conditions were dependent upon that. He didn't seem to object in the conditions that are contained in there that provided "threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere". He put a great deal of emphasis on that. I wouldn't be surprised that if we went back to attack it would be helpful, and I am inclined to think that though they dug in pretty hard on this, there is some basis for trade in those three things—the Rio Pact, the overflight and the word "threaten". He talked about some minor things and didn't really mean much, the U Thant business; and he didn't like the word "minimum" form of inspection—it is a little inconsistent which provided substantial verification and they have taken out what they said they brought in. So I was inclined to strike that out, cause we really derogated from that anyway. That doesn't

really mean anything. He didn't object to the other part—Then he said "you're talking about past history" every time I brought up deception and that this was the price which they had to pay for their false assurances and he squirmed every time I said that, but I made it clear that was an element in the whole picture that they had to take into account and that we would not forego the use of the overflights as long as we didn't have other satisfactory means of checking, and he said this is very very difficult and I said we weren't necessarily asking that they should agree to it. Maybe there was some other language. But it should be perfectly clear that it was our intent to use these and that the world should know it. I told him we were getting a lot of intelligence to the effect there was some stuff stored down there and that this posed a problem not only to American people but we had to have something other than the reliance upon Castro's word; he bore down on the U Thant business again; it was a formal proposal; that the introduction of reciprocity was out; the Soviet Union would also be involved. That the President expressed confidence that the other nations would be prepared to do likewise; that there wasn't a word in here as to what he was prepared to do. He ought not only to be confident of it, but he ought to undertake to restrain other countries from attacking Cuba, and I said this was merely an expression of opinion and was not in the operating clauses, but what did he propose to do. He was fishing around there for something other than the expression of confidence; that he was going to use his good offices, or something like that.

Ball: Did he give you a draft of any kind?

McCloy: No, he said they were working on it and would give it to us within two days.

Ball: Mikoyan handed Rusk a draft of something, but I don't quite know as to just what it was.

McCloy: He said they were still working on it. And he brought up again the military units and reaffirmed their commitment to take them out but emphasized that this is a new condition and should not be conditional upon our stating the assurance. He reaffirmed again that they were going to take them out. With regard to the continuation point, something should be said in there about the continuation of negotiations (which would be a cover to bring back the Castro conditions.) I said you are talking in terms of world problems with you, and I don't suppose we object too much to continue to negotiation, but we can't talk about continuing to negotiate the Cuban thing after we liquidate it. How much he may continue to press that, I don't know. He talked about reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba and made a great to-do about the President's statement we are going to continue with economic sanctions—that this is terrible, etc. It ended up really with unless we consented on those three things, we would

have difficulty in getting an agreement. I am not sure whether if we changed the wording here and there he would stick by that, but he seemed to be digging in harder on that than he was with me the other night.

Ball: This must be the result of the Armenian thing.

McCloy: I think that is right. Quite clearly he was anxious to get in the record I think for his own purposes a little firmer attitude as a result of the Mikoyan visit. But those things, together with the emphasis upon how this was done, and what it might lead to in our other relations—that this was going to really have an effect on Berlin or (he didn't use Berlin).

Ball: He was setting it up so Zorin would send a good telegram back.

McCloy: I think that is right. They do seem to be anxious to get us into the UN—get an agreed statement and get to the UN. They don't like the idea of separate statements and so they have agreed to disagree. Then have a resolution adopted by the UN commending their man and our man for statesmanlike position they have taken and an expression of the hope that this would lead to a solution of some of the cold war problems.

Ball: We had a meeting of the Executive Committee this morning, which was addressed to India primarily. Adlai was there and perhaps is back in New York by this time. He would, as a result of the discussion this morning, . . . (reads conversation Khrushchev had with Canadian Ambassador in Moscow) he made a much stronger and tougher line on the Berlin situation and general East-West relations than he had with Roberts. It gave some indication that we may be heading for rockier times. There was a feeling that under the circumstances it might be just as well for us not to have closed this Cuban thing out immediately but to nurse it along and see if they feed this other thing out—then we won't be in position of locking ourselves in on Cuba. Adlai's suggestion was that what we ought to think about was possibly going as far as we could in discussions, and I am not sure we aren't approaching that point, then possibly not having a meeting of the SC, agreeing with them on as much as we can and each get up two separate statements to the SC simply reporting on this. I think he will want to talk with you about this possible line, since this would not lock us in as any formal arrangement of the SC would do, and at the same time we would have shown some areas of agreement between us and can express them. The President is very reluctant to get locked in and to make any concessions which might result in an agreement that would give the impression that the Cuban thing was completely disposed of and that our hands, to some extent, were tied down there if we are going to go into another hot period with them. This is a kind of a fine

tactical concession we have to make. I think it would be helpful if we saw just what they were going to propose themselves. This draft Mikoyan handed the Secretary, and I don't know the history of it, on Article 3 of the draft Protocol. This is, at least, what they're thinking about, and I will put it on the wire for you. (reads it to him)

McCloy: I would say the net result of this that we are pretty much further away from an agreement that I thought I might be able to make. I think there is nothing for us to do but sit back and wait for their draft now and then let nature take its course. They are dying to get something before the UN. It's just that we might be able to make a trade on those three points. This is the picture. They were putting a good deal of emphasis on "Do this and we'll be more amenable, etc."

Ball: It's just a natural kind of bargaining thing.

McCloy: We'll be sending down a telegram on this.

566. Telegram 2104 from USUN, December 4¹

December 4, 1962

Dept pass White House. Eyes Only Secretary. Re: Cuba.

Narasimhan (UN) handed us today Cuban draft declaration set forth below which had been given to SYG earlier today by Lechuga for transmission to us:

Unofficial translation.

Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations.

DRAFT DECLARATION BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF CUBA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In making this declaration the Revolutionary Government of Cuba takes into account the exchange of messages between Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Mr. J.F. Kennedy, President of the United States, on 27 and 28 October 1962 and, more particularly, the statements made by the Cuban Government regarding the so-called Caribbean crisis, namely, the declaration of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of 28 October 1962 containing the five measures or points essential for a stable solution of this crisis and the

¹ Transmits verbatim text of Cuban draft declaration. Secret. 5 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC: 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.

joint declaration of the National Directorate of the ORI and the Council of Ministers of 25 November 1962. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba also takes into account the negotiations carried out through the mediation of U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the fact that as a result of all this an agreement has been reached whereby the parties assume the following obligations:

The United States of America:

a) The United States has lifted the “quarantine” which it imposed with effect from 23 October 1962 on ships proceeding towards the Republic of Cuba.

b) The United States Armed Forces which were concentrated in the South-eastern area of the United States in connection with the so-called Caribbean crisis will be completely withdrawn, the said concentration of forces thereby ceasing.

c) The United States of America has given an assurance that it will not invade Cuba or support any plan for an invasion by its allies and especially by other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

d) The United States of America will strictly respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba and the inviolability of its frontiers, including its air space and territorial waters, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba.

e) The United States will take all necessary steps to ensure the cessation, both in the territory of the United States and in that of other States of the Western Hemisphere, of all subversive activities against the Republic of Cuba, the launching of weapons and explosives by air and sea, the organization of invasions and the infiltration of spies and saboteurs.

f) The United States will not obstruct the development of free trade and other economic relations between the Republic of Cuba and other countries, all measures and endeavours implying economic pressure against Cuba being considered terminated.

g) The Government of the United States has undertaken to open talks with the Government of the Republic of Cuba to discuss the future evacuation of the United States naval base existing at Caimanera, Guantanamo.

h) The Government of the United States has agreed to the proposal for the establishment of United Nations control posts in the countries of the Caribbean Sea area, including the corresponding part of the United States.

The implementation of this proposal would meet the need for the verification of the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by the three countries.

The Government of the USSR, bearing in mind that the United States of America has assumed the obligations set forth above, agreed as follows:

a) To withdraw from Cuba under appropriate control the rocket weapons which were described by the President of the United States in the exchange of messages as "offensive", namely, the medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

b) The USSR subsequently declared its agreement to withdraw the IL-28 bombers from Cuba.

c) The USSR also declared that it was prepared to withdraw the military personnel servicing the above-mentioned rocket weapons and IL-28 aircraft.

d) The USSR further declared that it would not introduce into the territory of the Republic of Cuba the weapons concerning the withdrawal of which agreement was reached, namely, medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and IL-28 bombers.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba, bearing in mind the obligations contracted by the United States of America, declares:

a) That it has not obstructed the withdrawal of the rocket weapons agreed to by the Soviet Union, nor will it obstruct the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers from the territory of the Republic of Cuba.

b) It reiterates that the basis of its foreign policy consists in a strict compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, including that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

c) The Government of the Republic of Cuba also accepts the proposal for the establishment of United Nations control posts in the countries of the Caribbean Sea area, including the corresponding part of the United States.

Further, as an alternative, the Government of Cuba would agree to any other system of multiple verification in the Caribbean Sea area including the corresponding territory of the United States, as a means of checking the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the three Governments.

The Government of Cuba reiterates its firm determination to solve all conflicts and tensions which may arise and exist between Cuba and the other countries of the Western Hemisphere through peaceful negotiations in which the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba is fully respected.

Stevenson

567. Telegram 2106 from USUN, December 4¹

December 4, 1962

Department pass White House. Eyes Only Secretary. Re Cuba. Fol is report of latter part of mtg with Sovs this afternoon on Cuba.

Stevenson said that we had received just a few minutes before from UN Secretariat copy of declaration delivered to SYG by Cuban Amb of draft declaration which Cubans propose to make in SC. Stevenson said he was beginning to wonder whether under these circumstances there could be an SC mtg. If Cuba presented documents along these lines U.S. would have to object vigorously and prolonged controversy in SC would fol. Stevenson recalled that Mikoyan had in earlier mtg opposed controversy in SC and we had agreed. Stevenson said we had hoped that we could agree with Sovs on 2 declarations to be presented in SC but that he now fears that if Cuban declaration of this character is submitted any SC mtg on this subject would be unwise.

Kuznetsov did not reply directly except to say that he understood Cuban draft declaration contains same points as in draft Sov-Cuban protocol which Sovs of course support. They had favored protocol as means of solving crisis and preventing its repetition [illegible in the original] U.S. objected. Sovs did not insist but agreed to have 3 repeat 3 separate declarations. These should of course correspond to agreements between President and Khrushchev and also to statements made by Cuban Govt Oct 28 and Nov 26.

At yesterday's mtg they had explained sort of document they considered necessary in order to reach agreement. So far negots had been very disappointing. U.S. draft declaration does not deal with some elements of agreement between Pres and Khrushchev and on other hand introduces new elements not found in that agreement. There is no sign on U.S. side of intention to expedite fulfillment of its obligations and completion of crisis. Sovs on their side have carefully fulfilled all obligations and wish to end crisis as soon as possible, work out declarations on basis agreement between Pres and Khrushchev and then submit these agreed documents to SC for its approval.

Stevenson inquired whether SOV draft declarations has yet been completed.

Kuznetsov replied that Sovs working actively on their draft but hoped in meantime U.S. will reconsider its own draft and take into account Sov comments.

¹ Report of afternoon meeting with Soviets. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-462.

Stevenson replied that if we could get inspection on the ground in Cuba there would be no serious difficulty in reaching agreement but in absence such arrangements U.S. will have to take its own measures. He feared we could not reach agreement on all details of 2 declarations and thought perhaps best we would be able to do is to make separate declarations outside UN and to file them with SYG. He added however that it may be too soon to reach such conclusion until we have seen Soviet draft declaration. We would of course study Soviet objections to our draft. He merely wished to suggest that we may not be able to reach agreement and have to agree to disagree. He hoped however this would not be the case.

Stevenson

568. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, December 5¹

December 5, 1962

GWB: I went over and didn't see the Boss; he had a series of meetings and didn't have a minute to crowd in. I had a long talk with Bundy, and as you know there is a letter that is coming up with Arthur which with the intention it be leaked out of New York this afternoon.

S: I heard he was coming; but I didn't know about any leaks.

GWB: He is bringing a letter, which is a very good letter.

S: Have you seen it?

GWB: Yes.

S: Do you think it is all right.

GWB: I think it is a very good letter. I have talked to Clayton about it and he is working it out with Salinger so that it will be given out to the press on an informal basis from New York this afternoon. I think this should go a long way to stop this nonsense. If it doesn't, then we will have to do something else, but I think . . . We have canvassed all the other possibilities of the President making some statement, etc. The whole feeling was that if a letter of this sort is a solidier thing than for him to responding under pressure and doing something which called

¹ Letter from the President to Stevenson as possible solution to the Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.

attention more than the letter word. It is a matter of judgment. I have checked it out with our own press people here, and they go both ways on it.

S: Well, I think if the letter is strong enough it will do the business. Since I talked to you this morning, I have been to the UN for lunch and it has been shattering. I had no idea the effect it had.

GWB: I think this letter plus the editorials this morning will do the work. We are going to watch it and if it needs something more we will get it. I wanted to say to you there isn't the slightest doubt in the world as far as the President is concerned that (1) he had not talked to Bartlett, and this is said categorically. He did not know what Bartlett was going to write until it had been written and published; and (2) that he desperately wants you to stay. This is a matter of strong feeling with him. He has not the slightest doubt that you are the best man in the world for this task of yours.

S: I appreciate that. I still don't want to do anything that will in any way embarrass him. If this will take care of it, fine. One other thing I had in mind. I am speaking there tomorrow night at the Kennedy Foundation dinner. If he cared to say anything there, following the letter, it might help. The suggestion was made to me by a newspaper man.

GWB: That is good. Let's see what it looks like in the morning after this thing has broken.

S: All right, thanks a lot.

569. Letter from the President to Stevenson, December 5¹

December 5, 1962

Dear Adlai:

This is just a note to tell you again how deeply I regret the unfortunate fuss which has arisen over the statements contained in the *Saturday Evening Post* article. I think you know how greatly we have all admired your performance at the United Nations in general and during the Security Council debate and private negotiations connected with the

¹ Expresses regret over statements in the press by Alsop and Bartlett and support for Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. Princeton University, Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, John F. Kennedy.

Cuban crisis in particular. Both of us are accustomed to receiving the slings and arrows of those in the press or elsewhere who delight in stirring needless controversy—and I know you share my confidence that this furor will pass as have all the others.

The fact that Charley Bartlett was a co-author of this piece has made this particularly difficult for me—perhaps you have had the same problem with personal friends in the newspaper profession. In this particular case, I did not discuss the Cuban crisis or any of the events surrounding it with *any* newspapermen—and I am certain that the quotations in the *Saturday Evening Post* article with respect to your role did not come from the White House, as is clear from its obvious inaccuracies alone. While I realized when Bartlett started this piece that everything controversial in his article would be laid at my door, whether I talked to him or not, I did not feel I could tell him or any other friend in the press what subject to write or *not* write about.

However, both of us have much more important matters to concern us and the continued success and significance of your role at the UN will soon wash out any doubts others may be trying to plant.

Sincerely,

John Kennedy

**570. Memorandum of Executive Committee meeting by McCone,
December 6¹**

December 6, 1962

McCone gave a very brief intelligence resume, commenting on the subjects treated in the Check List of 6 December, and significant items of interest resulting from further study of recent photography.

Secretary Rusk reported that Mikoyan had stated he had extreme difficulty in Cuba, that Castro refused to see him for nine days, that he had made his arrangements with the greatest of difficulty, and when he threatened to leave, Castro immediately stated he was prepared to make an arrangement with the Chinese Communists. Rusk therefore

¹ Intelligence briefing; Mikoyan visit to Cuba; UN negotiations; U.S. actions in event of Cuba-supported insurgency or civil war in Cuba; position paper. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.

felt the Soviets may be inclined to leave substantial forces in Cuba to forestall a ChiCom takeover.

Note: There is an important cable covering Rusk's comments which I should get and read.

Stevenson then reviewed the negotiating procedure and strongly recommended that a revised draft of the U.S. position as outlined in the attached mimeographed statement be tabled prior to receipt of the Soviet position. Both Stevenson and McCloy felt this was a preferential negotiating approach. They readily forecast that we would not reach a common agreed position with the Soviets, and in the final analysis we would have to file an independent position with the Security Council to parallel the Soviet's independent position, and when this was done, our statement could be much "harder" than the attached. There was considerable debate, with Rusk opposing this procedure but with the President somewhat persuaded by the Stevenson-McCloy arguments.

The President raised innumerable questions concerning the limitations placed on U.S. action in the event of Cuba-supported insurgency in Latin American countries, Soviet takeover of Cuba, ChiCom takeover, substantial increase in the number of MIGs, our actions in the event of the establishment of a Soviet submarine base, et cetera.

The President also raised questions as to what our latitude would be for action in the event of a civil war in Cuba, or the establishment of a new legal government in Cuba which has our support. He then asked what rights we would have if the Soviets blockaded Berlin or took over Berlin. The answers to all of these questions were inconclusive; the indications were that actions by Castro, the Soviets, or the Chinese of the type indicated would give us latitude to act irrespective of the no invasion commitment, and if the Soviets broke existing agreements in connection with Berlin, obviously agreements with respect to Cuba and elsewhere would be out.

There was considerable discussion concerning proposed changes in the position paper; finally agreed upon the wording as indicated by the changes that are written in pencil.

John A. McCone
Director

571. Telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6¹

December 6, 1962

Eyes Only for Stevenson and McCloy. The following modifications in the draft U.S. statement on Cuba as contained Deptel 1339 as modified by Deptel 1360 were approved by the President on December 6 for immediate presentation to Soviet negotiators:

1. In paragraph 2, omission of the clause QTE and quoted in the Acting Secretary General's letter of October 28. UNQTE.

2. In paragraph 6, the second sentence to begin, QTE A procedure was arranged in cooperation with the USSR UNQTE . . .

3. In paragraph 9, the proviso on offensive weapons to read, QTE provided no nuclear weapons and no offensive weapons systems are present in or reintroduced into Cuba UNQTE . . .

In the same paragraph, the clause on Cuban action against the Western Hemisphere to read, QTE and provided Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation of the Western Hemisphere. UNQTE . . .

4. The next to last paragraph to be replaced by the following:

QTE Pending such time as arrangements can be effected to provide the safeguards necessary to ensure that no such weapons systems are maintained or reintroduced into Cuba, the United States will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary. UNQTE

5. The final paragraph to read as follows:

QTE The undertakings stated herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations of the United States under all existing treaties to which it is a party. UNQTE

6. The President further indicated his willingness to accept modification of the sentence in paragraph 5 relating to withdrawal of all Soviet military units and personnel, but only in the event that there was progress toward agreement on other aspects of the draft declaration.

7. It was further understood that in the event of failure to reach early agreement on this revised draft, the United States would reserve the right to reframe its entire declaration in the light of Soviet refusal to reach such agreement and other Soviet positions that might be advanced.

¹ Transmits modifications in U.S. draft statement on Cuba for presentation to Soviet negotiators. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF 737.56361/12-662.

Immediately following telegram gives, for your use, complete statement as altered by above.

572. Telegram 1512 to USUN, December 6¹

December 6, 1962

Eyes Only for Stevenson and McCloy. Re Deptel 1511.

Draft US Statement on Cuba in Security Council

In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962, firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.

These undertakings were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27 along the following lines:

(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

(2) The United States would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The United States notes the statement made by the Soviet Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed from Cuba, that all IL-28 bomber aircraft will be removed by December 20th, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. (It notes also that the USSR has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed there for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems.) The United States notes further the statements of the USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be introduced into Cuba in the future. We welcome these statements and assurances.

¹ Transmits draft U.S. statement on Cuba for presentation in Security Council. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-662.

The undertakings in the President's letter of October 27, that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites, and that United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use, have not been fulfilled. A procedure was arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have received substantial verification that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried away the number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar form of verification of the impending withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft introduced into Cuba.

In view of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date:

the United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, and the United States further gives assurance that, provided no nuclear weapons and no offensive weapons systems are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at his press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

Pending such time as arrangements can be effected to provide the safeguards necessary to ensure that no such weapons systems are maintained or reintroduced into Cuba, the United States will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary.

The undertakings stated herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations under all existing treaties to which the United States is a party.

573. Memorandum from Bromley Smith to members of the NSC Executive Committee, December 6, covering an FBI report on Mikoyan's briefing of the Soviet delegation in New York¹

December 6, 1962

Secretary Rusk referred to the attached report during yesterday's Executive Committee meeting and asked that it be circulated to Committee members. Mr. Hoover has requested that the existence of this report be closely held.

Bromley Smith

Attachment

[text not declassified]

¹ Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, NSC Executive Committee.

574. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, December 6¹

December 6, 1962

GB: Should we try to work something out for tonight or have you . . . on this flap?

AES: I don't know. I thought the letter did it pretty well. I don't know whether any more is necessary or helpful, or whether he has in mind doing anything. I would not want to ask him to do anything.

GB: Unless you think it is really vital, I would prefer to leave it to him. I think his instincts are pretty good in this situation, and if there is a good opportunity tonight he will make it clear. I am a little reluctant to do anything.

¹ Outcome of President's letter of support to Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN—Cuba.

AES: I wouldn't press on it or call him up and ask him to do anything. I think you should perhaps leave it where it is and if he sees fit to do anything as the evening wears on, all well and good. I am ever so grateful to you for intervening in the thing.

GB: I was never so angry about anything as that. The more I think of it the more . . . the piece was so vicious.

AES: It was, you know, and it did incalculable damage. I think it can be retrieved all right, and I think this has gone a long way to do it—this sort of sharp, explicit letter.

GB: There is one fellow who is burning quietly, and that is the VP. As a member of the Executive Committee he never even got mentioned.

AES: Maybe he was lucky. Let me know when you are coming up and stay a night with me if you have a chance. I would like to have a long talk with you if you ever have a moment.

GB: I would love too.

575. Draft telegram to USUN, December 6¹

December 6, 1962

Eyes Only for Stevenson and McCloy: New York Negotiations.

We have carefully reviewed the record of your last two conversations with Kuznetsov (urtels 2106 and 2086) and the Cuban draft declaration (urtel 2104). You are commended for particularly effective ripostes to Soviet complaints about our draft declaration and for response which you made regarding Cuban draft.

We find little new in Kuznetsov's attitude toward our draft. We do find Soviet position anomalous, to say the least, in complaining about lack of evidence of US intention to expedite wind up of crisis when they still procrastinating in presenting us with draft declaration of their own. Department fully concurs in your judgment that we should not seek any further meetings with Soviets on this subject until they have draft to give us. From our viewpoint there can be no advantage in pursuing question further, with Soviets continually nibbling away at our declaration until they present concrete counter of their own.

¹ Instructions for negotiations with the Soviets. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-662.

We can only interpret presentation Cuban draft as setback to efforts to close out this episode quickly and satisfactorily. It consists merely of regurgitation of standard Cuban position as contained in USSR/Cuban QTE protocol UNQTE and various Cuban statements. It is totally unacceptable, and we do not propose treat it as negotiating document. Unless and until Cuba is prepared to accept the terms of the agreement contained in Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27 (which now seems practically impossible), we are not interested in having a Cuban declaration put before the Council which the Council would be asked to note. We have assumed that probably Cubans would make a speech to the Council members but we have not entertained idea—and do not propose to do so—of embarking on course of tripartite negotiations where we would be asked to seek least common denominator with Cuba and the USSR. Accordingly, in any conversations on this subject, you should dismiss Cuban draft out of hand as not being germane to our efforts to get satisfactory settlement with USSR.

Latest conversations and injection of Cuban draft confirms that we are now reaching point where we must choose between two major options open to us for winding up the problem:

1. Continued efforts to get parallel declarations put before Security Council, where minimum stated position of each side is tolerable to the other;
2. Wind up problem by issuing unilateral government statements delineating respective positions.

First course appears increasingly more difficult, less desirable, and less likely of attainment. We do not intend to confine exposé of our position before the Security Council to a watered-down version which fails to cover basic ingredients such as our determination to continue surveillance of Cuba as long as necessary in the absence of acceptable international verification system. We fully recognize, of course, that it will be exceedingly difficult for the Soviets to swallow SC consensus which notes such a declaration. At same time, USSR seems to set considerable store by having formal wind-up of affair before Security Council with full Council endorsement. It will be up to USSR to determine whether or not it wishes to pursue this course in knowledge that we can not go beyond (a) present draft declaration, with possibly minor modifications, or (b) actual text of President's Nov. 20 press conference statement.

Of course, we will study Soviet draft when received, and it is premature at this point to decide in absence such text whether continue negotiations for agreed Council presentation or to saw off such negotiations and conclude affair with unilateral statements. (We could use President's Nov. 20 statement). However, if Soviet draft does not, in your judgment, reflect serious effort to reach accommodation with us,

believe you should weigh conversation heavily in favor of abandoning Security Council approach.

For possible rebuttal to Soviets in your next negotiating session, following as requested telephonically is detailed argumentation regarding reference to Rio Pact in our declaration.

1. President's offer of Oct. 27 QTE to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba UNQTE was not to be understood as isolated from and unrelated to all existing arrangements for international security. Offer was to forswear invasion as a policy choice for United States, and did not comprise undertaking to use no armed force against Cuba regardless of circumstances. Conduct of Cuba in pursuing or refraining from aggression would clearly affect actions of US and other American Republics under United Nations Charter and Rio Pact. If situation remained unchanged after removal of offensive weapons from Cuba, and if Cuba did not undertake new aggressive activities, US would not proceed to invade Cuba. However, if Cuba undertook new acts of aggression, US and other American Republics could not be expected to be bound by no-invasion assurances when Cuba itself was engaged in fresh violations of its international obligations.

2. Cuba has refused on-site verification to assure that offensive weapons are removed and to safeguard against any reintroduction of such weapons. As a result, US-Soviet commitments of October 27 and 28 have not been and will not be fully carried out. In light of these facts, and considering questions which Cuban refusals raise as to intentions and reliability of Castro regime in relation to Western Hemisphere security, it is clearly reasonable for the United States, in expressing its assurances against invasion to place these in their proper context, which includes both United Nations Charter and Rio Pact.

3. Cuba has prevented full implementation of US-Soviet commitments. United States in its draft declaration has included an additional element of assurance which was not contained in commitments of October 27 and 28: US draft declaration states that United States does not intend QTE to invade Cuba *or support an invasion of Cuba*. UNQTE Particularly with addition of this further assurance, Cuba cannot reasonably object to assurances against invasion being placed in context of existing treaties.

4. No objection has been made to mention of United Nations Charter in US declaration. Any declaration which did not also contain mention of Pact would be clearly incomplete. Rio Pact is basic security treaty applicable to the Western Hemisphere. Regional arrangement constituted by American Republic is given clear recognition in Chapter VIII of United Nations Charter, and drafting history of Charter shows that Inter-American System was foremost in contemplation at San Francisco when Charter provisions on regional arrangements were being drafted and negotiated.

5. Point can be made with Latin Americans that it is important to continue to deal with problem of Cuba within framework of Inter-American System. Having this in mind, we would not want to make formal declaration which appeared to pass over and perhaps by implication exclude continued functioning of Inter-American machinery with respect to problems of peace and security in the Americas caused by Castro regime.

6. Kuznetsov has claimed that Rio Pact violates United Nations Charter. United States believes the two instruments are entirely consistent. Compatibility of Inter-American collective security arrangements with United Nations Charter was considered and affirmed at San Francisco Conference. Discussion of this is contained at pages 6 and 7 of Department of State legal memorandum entitled QTE Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba. UNQTE

7. Kuznetsov has specifically claimed that Rio Pact authorizes an armed response which is not in accord with Article 51 of UN Charter. Article 51, however, does not lay down any prohibitions or restrictions, but states affirmatively one situation in which armed force may be used by individual States under the United Nations Charter. Article 51 does not purport to rule out use of force in all other cases.

8. Kuznetsov further criticizes Rio Pact as authorizing use of force without approval of Security Council under Article 53. This subject is also dealt with in State Department legal memorandum, at pages 9–12. Believe this material could be provided Soviets or any others raising point.

9. Omission of all mention of Rio Pact from formal US declaration would lend itself to contention that assurances against invasion were to be considered absolute and without any relationship to relevant regional security arrangements. We would not want to provide any ground for such a contention. So far as effectiveness of Rio Pact is concerned, United States could not alter or impair its provisions for coverage without formal amendment of Pact through treaty process.

**576. Memorandum from Gilpatric to the Secretary of the Army,
December 8¹**

December 8, 1962

SUBJECT

Future Plans for Cuban Volunteer Inductee Program

The basic political reasons for which the Cuban Volunteer Inductee Program was originally designed are still valid, and in fact may have a greater validity in the light of recent developments. The successful accomplishment of this program is still considered an important objective.

Mr. McNamara and I are aware of the difficulties inherent in conducting this program, and appreciate the thoroughly professional fashion with which the Army has handled it to date. As a result of reports from representatives of the Department of the Army and a personal inspection by a member of my staff, however, we realize that the program is now at a critical stage, particularly because of the increasingly low morale of the Cuban volunteers.

It should be understood that the Department of the Army has complete responsibility for the Cuban Volunteer Inductee Program. To facilitate the successful completion of the program, the following guidelines are provided:

a. The Cuban Volunteer Inductee Program should be continued in its present form with the 22-week training schedule followed by a two-week resettlement period.

b. As units of Cuban inductees complete their full training cycle, they should be placed, on an individual basis, in a ready reserve mobilization pool. There is no requirement in this program to train Cuban officers, Cuban NCOs or Cuban common specialists. Those individuals, however, who upon completion of their training desire to remain in the active Army, and who meet the appropriate prerequisites, should be allowed to do so.

c. Special handling of Cuban volunteer inductees at armed forces induction and examining stations will be terminated upon induction of approximately 2,400 Cuban volunteers. In any case, however, such special handling will be terminated by 1 February 1963. To achieve this objective as expeditiously as possible, the Army will raise the age limit for induction of Cuban volunteers as required. Thereafter, Cubans

¹ Future plans for Cuban Volunteer Inductee Program. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 72 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program.

desiring to enlist in the Army will be handled in a similar fashion to U.S. enlistees, except that the Army is authorized to assign them to Fort Buchanan for initial individual training, including English language training. A public announcement of this action will be coordinated with the Department of State and with my office.

d. Steps should be taken to bolster the morale of the trainees and to strengthen their resolve to complete the program.

e. Use should be made of the Cuban refugee leaders in bolstering the morale of the Cuban trainees and in encouraging them to remain with the program until they have successfully completed it.

f. The Department of the Army is authorized to transfer the Cuban training program from Fort Knox to a location with a warmer climate.

g. The Department of the Army should deal with disciplinary problems arising during the remaining portion of the program through whatever means it finds necessary. As a last resort, and then only on an individual basis, the Department of the Army is authorized to discharge a trainee for the convenience of the Government.

h. The Department of the Army is authorized to deal directly with the Department of State in connection with this program.

Roswell L. Gilpatric

577. NSC Executive Committee record of action, December 10¹

Meeting No. 34

December 10, 1962

1. There was a general discussion of how to bring the New York negotiations on Cuba to an acceptable conclusion. Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy reported on the current status of the discussions with the Russians.

2. The President authorized CIA, in coordination with USIA on policy matters, to resume the broadcasts of Cuban refugees on transmitters under Agency contract.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ UN negotiations on Cuba; broadcasts by Cuban refugees. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meeting, Vol. III, 33–37, 12/6/62–12/17/62.

578. Telegram 2291 from USUN, December 12¹

December 12, 1962

Dept pass White House. Eyes Only Secretary. Ref: Deptel 1593. Cuba.

In interests of condensation we made several drafting changes in text set forth in reftel before submitting it to Kuznetsov today, as reported in USUN 2292 paras 2, 3, 4 and 5 of that text were altered to read as fol. Other paras unchanged.

"The Soviet Union states that it has dismantled all of the missile sites which it constructed in Cuba, and that it has removed from Cuba all of the missiles, 42 in number, all of the IL-28 bombers, also 42 in number, and all nuclear weapons, missile components, and launching apparatus which it introduced into Cuba.

"The Soviet Union, in cooperation with the US, arranged a procedure for substantial verification at sea of the removal of all of said missiles and bombers which the Soviet Union declared it had introduced into Cuba, and their removal was verified by the US.

"In connection with the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, the Soviet Union states that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those of other weapons systems of a similar or comparable offensive character.

"On the basis of these statements and acts of the Soviet Union, the US on Nov 20, 1962 lifted the quarantine against the introduction of further arms, which it had imposed around the island of Cuba on Oct 24, 1962."

Stevenson

¹ Transmits changes to shorten the draft text before submitting joint report to Kuznetsov. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-1262.

**579. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy,
December 17¹**

December 17, 1962

SUBJECT

Planning for Contingencies of Uprisings within Cuba

Although fragmentary and inconclusive, there have been a number of intelligence reports indicating the possibility of uprisings in Cuba. The following would appear to be among the possibilities in any one of which some of the elements involved in Cuba might request our military support:

1) A single point insurrection with anti-Castro elements seizing a town such as Santiago, or a mountain redoubt.

2) An outbreak of many small insurrectionary actions scattered over the island but with little or no liaison or coordination between anti-Castro elements (Measles).

3) A palace revolution by disaffected 26th of July elements against Castro elements in Havana and provincial capitals. (Hard-to-identify antagonists fighting at close quarters.)

4) An insurrectionary attack against the Soviet troops or a move by the Soviet troops to support hard-line communist elements in any one of the foregoing situations.

There may be other possibilities not included in the foregoing list. If we were suddenly confronted with such a situation, especially while substantial Soviet military strength remains in Cuba, it would, of course, present us with the necessity for expeditious and grave decisions. While all the possibilities cannot accurately be foreseen, subject to the views of the members of the EXCOM, it is suggested that State, Defense and CIA should undertake broad outlines of coordinated politico-military contingency planning against these possibilities, and that the intelligence community be requested to keep these and any other contingencies under especially close scrutiny.

U. Alexis Johnson

¹ Planning for contingencies of uprisings within Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (A), 12/62.

580. Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk, December 18¹

December 18, 1962

SUBJECT

Cuba

I have thought a little more about the Kuznetsov proposal and discussed it further with Jack McCloy. As I understand it, the proposal is to file ("register") with the Secretary General a package consisting of four letters—Chairman Khrushchev's messages to the President of October 27 and 28, and the corresponding letters from the President to Khrushchev dated October 27 and 28. Kuznetsov also spoke of the Cubans submitting something, but it was a little unclear what the Cubans could submit that would be in parallel with these already published documents which contain the understanding between the President and the Chairman.

In the later telephone conversation with Mr. McCloy, he and I were agreed that it would be appropriate to ask Kuznetsov for clarification on two points:

a. Is it really necessary for the Cubans to submit anything as a part of this scenario? Since the Cubans really don't have any old document parallel to the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange, their submission would presumably contain new material, and would thereby force the other participants to submit unilateral statements of their own. In order to avoid this, wouldn't it be better for the Cubans not to be a part of the scenario at all? (Naturally the Cubans can submit anything they want to the Secretary General at any time, but we don't have to admit that it's part of our negotiations with the Russians as long as the Russians will not claim that it is.)

b. Would it be within Kuznetsov's instructions for the four letters in question to be submitted separately—the two Khrushchev letters by the Soviet Delegation and the two Presidential letters from the United States Delegation? This would avoid any implication that we were signing on to any of the Khrushchev letters, or lending them any dignity they did not have before. This is particularly important in the case of the reference in Khrushchev's letter of October 27, to the question of Turkish bases.

My preliminary view is that we could take a procedure for separate but simultaneous submission of these letters to the Secretary General, with an indication that that was an end to the current negotiations.

¹ New Soviet proposal for settlement of Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/12-1862.

Outside the UN context, we would then have to make three things clear, at a minimum:

a. We would need to remind the world that we had not bought, or even considered, bargaining with the Turkish missiles. This could readily be done by reminding the Press about the White House statement pouring cold water on the Turkish missile idea shortly after the Khrushchev message of October 27 was received.

b. We would need to indicate publicly that, in view of non-performance on internationally inspected verification and safeguards, the U.S. would need to continue to use other means of keeping Cuba under observation.

c. We would need to make clear that nothing had happened that affected in any way our rights and obligations under treaties to which we are a party, including the Rio Treaty and the United Nations Charter.

Mr. McCloy's preliminary view is that we could live with this. He is going to discuss it with Ambassador Stevenson as soon as he can.

If this seems sensible to you, we could send a message tonight or tomorrow to Nassau, giving the President the benefit of your reaction to the Kuznetsov proposal.

Harlan Cleveland

581. Telegram 2416 from USUN, December 19¹

December 19, 1962

Re: Cuba. At the invitation of Kuznetsov McCloy had lunch (with him and Mendelevich) at Soviet Mission today. K emphasized luncheon purely social affair not negotiating luncheon.

McC said that though disappointed at proposal they made yesterday it did contain one important favorable element—avoidance further attempts introduce new papers which would require further drafting and discussion; that he felt that under circumstances, though impossible for us to sign joint statement transmitting letters he suggested, might be possible for us to sign separate letter transmitting certain statements from our side leaving him to transmit in separate form statements from his side; that he particularly had in mind two letters

¹ Discussion of Soviet proposal at luncheon at Soviet Mission. Secret. USUN Files: NYFRC: 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings.

from Khrushchev to the President to which he had already referred; that if K wanted to include October 26 letter this was all right with us.

K then asked McC what statements we had in mind.

McC told him there would be four: 1–President’s letter October 27; 2–White House statement October 27; 3–President’s letter October 28; and 4–November 20 press statement in regard to Cuba.

K winced over November 20 statement stating it repeated provisos and overflights which were very difficult indeed for them.

McC said would not recommend we conclude talks on any other basis than by inclusion November 20 statement; that if K re-read November 20 statement he would find it in good tone and embodying really all that anyone could ask a Chief of State to say in respect to Cuba.

K also referred to use of word “register”. McC pointed out this was formality which might cause us some constitutional difficulties and that inclusion of this large number of documents could scarcely be considered type of international agreement that section 102 contemplated.

K replied they had looked up authorities on section 102 and found some very informal statements had been registered with Security Council and, inasmuch as Chairman had specifically used term himself, this might be difficulty with them. McC said they could presumably register what they wanted to but that his impression was that we would not use term but would request Secretary General send it to President Security Council for circulation, repeating that we had to have our reservations stated in equal dignity with assurance against invasion. McC has impression K disposed to recommend procedure McC outlined and that he was going to pass suggestion on to Moscow. McC emphasized that this was own brainchild; that it did not commit the President who was deeply interested and by reason of absence in Nassau had given no authority to present this as position of the United States; and that McCloy might have to recall it.

McC also took occasion to state substance of DEPTTEL 1687.²

Stevenson

² DEPTTEL 1687 is USUN 7302 (TOPSEC).

**582. Note from General Clifton to General McHugh,
December 20¹**

December 20, 1962

Mr. McCone asks that the President see these memos which were prepared in response to questions put to him.

Attachment

OCI No. 3622/62

SUBJECT

Rising World Sugar Prices and the Effect on Cuba

1. The rise in the world sugar price from last January's 2.3¢ per pound to today's 4.3¢ reflects a weak supply outlook for 1963 combined with an anticipated normal consumption increase. Dealers on the international sugar market anticipate reduction in Cuba's production even below the 1962 figure which was probably about 4.8 million tons, against an average of six million. In addition, production will also be below 1962 levels in Western Europe, Mexico, and the United States. The US Department of Agriculture's call this week for import of an additional 90,000 tons of sugar over the existing quotas will contribute to the rising trend in the world price. In short, the outlook is for a tight supply condition throughout 1963.

2. Unless its sugar production drops off drastically, Cuba should benefit from the rise in the world price, but much will depend on Soviet policy and on Cuba's ability to find markets outside the Bloc. The Soviet Union and Communist China agreed in 1961 to pay a price of 4.0¢ for Cuban sugar, a level between the low world price and the high US premium price which ranged from 4.5¢ to 4.8¢. With the world price now above the special Soviet price to Cuba, Cuba is probably demanding an "adjustment." A clandestine source in contact with Soviet embassy officials in Havana early this month has reported, in fact, that one of the purposes of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez' current mission in Moscow is to obtain a higher price for Cuban sugar, or some other compensation for the higher world price.

¹ Transmits McCone's request that the President see the attached memorandum. Rising world sugar prices and the effect on Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. III.

3. If Cuba does not receive what it regards as a satisfactory "adjustment" from the Soviet Union, it will almost certainly seek to sell to free world customers on a greater scale than last year. Such a move, if it were successful, would tend to weaken sugar prices but probably not enough to prevent some benefit to Cuba.

4. If Cuba's 1963 sugar crop is about the same as this year's, there will be about 4.4 million tons available for export beginning early in the year. This year approximately 85 percent of Cuban sugar exports went to the bloc. If the same division prevails next year, the 15 percent sold in the free world would bring Cuba approximately \$63 million in foreign exchange at present prices. If Cuba were to sell half of the 4.4 million tons to the free world in 1963 at present prices, foreign exchange earnings would rise to about \$208 million, a gain of about \$145 million. Cuba receives some convertible currency from its sugar sales to the bloc. Twenty percent of the value of an unknown portion of Cuban sugar sold to the bloc is paid for in pounds sterling; the remainder is paid for in barter. This year Cuba received at least \$18 million and possibly as much as \$50 million from this source.

5. Cuba already has commitments to sell sugar to Morocco, Chile, the UAR, and certain other free world countries, and is attempting to obtain commitments for more sugar purchases in the Middle East. Japan, a traditional Cuban market taking up to a half million tons of sugar yearly, has cancelled its intended purchases for 1963. This probably would leave Western European markets as the principal targets for Cuban sugar salesmen.

**583. Memorandum from General Taylor to McNamara,
December 26¹**

JCSM-1021-62

December 26, 1962

SUBJECT

Reassessment of the Alert Posture for Forces Committed to Cuban Operations

1. With your approval, the reduced readiness levels for forces committed to Cuban operations, as contained in JCSM-955-62, dated

¹ Reassessment of the alert posture for forces committed to Cuban operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962.

28 November 1962, subject: “Readiness Posture Requirements”, were placed in effect on 28 November 1962. In light of the Soviet withdrawal of the IL-28 aircraft from Cuba and a continuing reassessment of the Cuban situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a further reduction to approximately normal readiness levels should be effected.

2. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following alert posture criteria to be appropriate at this time.

a. *Overflight reconnaissance*

(1) High Level. Alert posture which will permit an average of two U-2 flights per day cumulative from 21 November, and not more than a maximum of five U-2 flights on any one day.

(2) Low Level. Four aircraft on 12-hour alert and eight aircraft on 24-hour alert, and similar readiness for all aircraft which support the foregoing reconnaissance missions (i.e., Fighter escort, CAP, SAR, ELINT, etc.).

b. Reimposition of the quarantine of Cuba: 72 hours.

c. Partial or full implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62: 72 hours.

d. Execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62: 18 days

e. Air Defense: Resume normal posture with the exception of those air defense forces currently deployed in the Florida-Key West area.

f. Strategic Forces: Maintenance of normal alert levels.

3. Changes in current criteria effected by adoption of the above are deletion of (1) a 24-hour alert posture for local reprisal strike aircraft, and (2) a 48-hour alert posture for attacks on SAM sites, IL-28's, and/or all air defenses in Cuba, and inclusion of these OPLAN 312-62 optional missions in the 72-hour alert time frame of paragraph 2 c above. In this connection, it is considered that any partial or full implementation of OPLAN 312-62 should be predicated not only upon the capability of US forces to conduct air strikes but also upon the time required to reinforce Guantanamo and to evacuate dependents therefrom. As any US act of reprisal probably would generate a Cuban counter-reprisal, with Guantanamo a likely target, a 72-hour period between a decision to strike and S-Hour of any version of OPLAN 312-62 would provide time for the initial reinforcement of the naval base and more than adequate time for evacuation of dependents.

4. With regard to paragraph 2 e above, air defense forces currently deployed to Southeast United States, unless replaced by units of similar capabilities, will be retained in present positions until receipt and resolution of CINCONAD's recommended requirements for the permanent air defense of Southeast United States. CINCONAD's recommendations on this matter are expected by 2 January 1963.

5. Your approval of the alert posture criteria as set forth in paragraph 2 above, is recommended as a basis for further action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**584. Memorandum from L.J. Legere to McGeorge Bundy,
December 28¹**

December 28, 1962

SUBJECT

Alert Posture for Forces Committed to Cuban Operations

1. In the attached memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend, with respect to Cuba, "a further reduction to approximately normal readiness levels. . . ." Paragraphs 2.a.(1) and 2.a.(2) did not strike me as being too clear, so I have spoken with the action officer who prepared the paper. What it means is that, if the Secretary approves the JCS recommendations, high-level reconnaissance flights will continue on an average of two per day; low level flights, however, will be ready to go on 12-hour alert for four aircraft, and 24-hour alert for eight aircraft.

L.J. Legere

Attachment:

JCSM-1021-62 dtd 26 Dec 62

¹ Alert posture for forces committed to Cuban operations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (A), 12/62.

585. Telegram 2541 from USUN, December 31¹

December 31, 1962

Department pass to White House. Cuba.

Stevenson, McCloy and Plimpton met this a.m. at Sov mission with Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and interpreter (USSR) for two hours.

1. Kuznetsov said he had given “sincere examination” of US draft handed him on Dec 28, referring to the White House Press Statement of Oct 27 and the President’s statement at press conference on Nov 29. He appreciated that draft was a step forward in that it did not ask for the statements to be circulated, but that the draft was not acceptable since the Sovs do not agree to the reservations contained in the statements.

2. Referring to “behavior of Cuba” reservation in the Nov 28 statement, he said that it had not been mentioned in Oct 27 and 28 letters and that, together with other statements by US officials, indicated that US wants to weaken its obligation and to have a free hand to continue its aggressive policy against the Cuban Republic on easily available pretexts. He begged that we not insist on reservation.

3. As to reservation in Nov 20 statement as to US pursuing “its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba”, he repeated contention that U-2 over-flights violation of international law and Charter, and asked what kind of a world we would have if each govt could violate international law and Charter whenever it decided it was necessary to protect its interests.

4. Stevenson said grateful for frank expression of Soviet views which advances understanding. He went on to say that neither US nor any country could give unqualified statement that it won’t use military action to defend itself or its partners, and US obligations to do so ante-date Cuban crisis. US reservation in this regard is frank public recognition of the facts, and that better to give clear picture of those facts now than by subsequent explanation. No weakening of US commitment involved, merely statement of antecedent facts.

5. McCloy said that reservations were not intended to weaken US commitments and that Sovs mistake spirit of US reservations. He also referred to US constitutional problem, in that only Congress has the right to declare war and that only a treaty ratified by the Senate could completely and unqualifiedly foreclose US military action.

¹ U.S.-Soviet discussion on latest Cuban developments including U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-3162.

6. As to inspection, McCloy said that Sovs had been very cooperative in removals and that he believed no weapons remained, but that reports continue as to hidden weapons, and it clear that there is enormous military build-up in Cuba including substantial Red Army units in cantonments, and future surveillance necessary until situation calms down. Planes not armed and no threat of invasion; indeed they constitute insurance against invasion through removing suspicions and giving sense of confidence.

McCloy also pointed out that US drafts had offered tighter language as to Nov 20 statement which SOVs had not accepted.

7. Stevenson said that pledge against invasion was not considered either an enlargement or a minimization of US obligations under OAS Treaty, but a reaffirmation of that obligation to USSR. In drafts narrowing Nov 20 statements, US had tried meet Sov viewpoint but it did not agree.

8. McCloy said Sovs making fundamental mistake as to US statements, which were not subterfuge but an honest desire to set forth US position.

9. Kuznetsov said that if there was nothing new in the Nov 20 statement, US should not insist on mentioning it.

10. He went on to say that Sovs could not agree to any references to the reservations in US separate letter, and that if the US should send in separate letter containing references to the White House statement of Oct 27 and Presidential Press Conference statement of Nov 20 Sovs would have to send in separate letter containing language such as follows:

Begin verbatim text. The White House statement of Oct 27 and the Presidential Press Conference statement of Nov 20 over-step the limits of the understanding fixed in the letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy of Oct 27 and 28. Therefore they cannot be considered as valid. End verbatim text

11. McCloy suggested possibility that Sov language might read:

"The White House Statement of Oct 27 and the Presidential Press Conference statement of Nov 20 are unilateral documents and consequently they cannot be taken as varying the commitments contained in the letters of Oct 27 and 28 between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy".

Kuznetsov took suggestion down, but did not comment or agree to it.

12. Kuznetsov made further comments on Dec 28 draft of US separate letter:

(A) In first para Sovs would not accept "in connection with the introduction of certain offensive weapons in the Island of Cuba", but

would accept language such as “in connection with the Cuban crisis” contained in earlier US drafts.

(B) In the subsequent para he questioned the phrase “for the Council’s record”. McCloy said did not constitute registration and merely was intended to ensure circulation. All agreed that intention was that US letter and the Presidential letters of Oct 27 and 28 were to be circulated to SC members.

(C) He questioned reference in fourth para to Cuban item on SC agenda. McCloy said intended to avoid new SC mtg with resultant Donnybrook Fair. Kuznetsov said they did not insist on an SC mtg.

13. McCloy said he would redraft separate letter and submit.

14. Kuznetsov said Sovs did not want Khrushchev letter of Oct 26 mentioned, because secret and because it in turn referred to prior secret letters. McCloy pointed out that since Kennedy Oct 27 letter referred to Khrushchev Oct 26 letter, Congressional committees would want to see it, at least in Executive Session. Kuznetsov said Khrushchev probably would not object.

15. As to draft of short form joint letter submitted by US on Dec 28, Kuznetsov made following comments:

(A) Sovs have not come to any final decision as to whether they like short form joint letter.

(B) Kuznetsov would like to see added some reference to hope that steps taken by two govts may lead to constructive efforts as regards other differences.

(C) Kuznetsov queried use of word “regret” in second para.

(D) He suggested possibility of adding in second para “the understanding reached between us and” after the words “in view of”, McCloy made no comment.

(E) Kuznetsov also questioned use of word “considerable”, but on explanation that it was weaker than “substantial”, appeared to be satisfied.

16. McCloy said he would redraft suggested joint statement and submit.

17. Suggested redrafts of separate US letter and joint letter follow in ourtel 2542.

Comment: Kuznetsov at end of session gave slight impression of pliability.

Stevenson

January 1963

586. Telegram 2558 from USUN, January 2¹

January 2, 1963

Pass to White House. Re: Cuba.

1. Kuznetsov (USSR) late last evening called McCloy and asked him drop by early this a.m. McCloy did so and was told by Kuznetsov that SOV GOVT greatly preferred short form draft letter.

2. Kuznetsov handed McCloy following draft:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT.

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

On behalf of the GOVTS of the Soviet Union and the United States of America we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in rendering assistance to avert the serious threat to the peace which arose in the Caribbean area.

The USSR and USA GOVTS believe that in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean area there is no further need for this item to occupy the Security Council's attention at this time, though it has not been possible fully to resolve all of the problems that have arisen in connection with this crisis.

The USSR and USA GOVTS express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connection with the crisis in the Caribbean area will lead to further constructive efforts by the USA and the Soviet Union to adjust the differences existing between them and generally to ease the tension that could cause a further threat of war. END VERBATIM TEXT.

3. Confirming TELECONS McCloy, Stevenson and Secretary, McCloy prepared transmit to Kuznetsov following draft as US preference:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT.

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

On behalf of the GOVTS of the Soviet Union and the United States of America we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our GOVTS to avert the serious threat to the peace which resently arose in the Caribbean area.

¹ Transmits verbatim text of Soviet letter to UN Secretary General. Confidential. 3 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.

While it has not been possible for our GOVTS fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the considerable progress that has been made, it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the SC at this time.

The GOVTS of the Soviet Union and the United States of America express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead to further constructive efforts for the adjustment of differences existing between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war. END VERBATIM TEXT.

4. If SOVS object to second PARA, McCloy prepared to agree to substitution of following:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT. (Second PAR)

The GOVTS of the Soviet Union and the United States of America believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis, there is no further need for this item to occupy the attention of the SC at this time, although it has not been possible fully to resolve all of the problems that have arisen in connection with it. END VERBATIM TEXT.

5. McCloy unable reach Kuznetsov all day. We informed he has appointment with SYG this afternoon.

6. Stevenson told SYG, while discussing Congo, that agreement was expected shortly on short joint letter and told SYG what substance would be.

Stevenson

587. Telegram 2587 from USUN, January 4¹

January 4, 1963

Pass to White House. Subject: Cuba.

Confirming Plimpton-Johnson TELECON last evening:

1. McCloy and Plimpton met with Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and interpreter (USSR) at 5:00 p.m. yesterday afternoon at SOV Mission.

¹ U.S.-Soviet discussion on U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. 3 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.

2. Kuznetsov deplored omission from US draft of JAN 2, 1963 (USUN 2558, PARA 3) of reference to "understanding", and said it was to the interest of both sides to include the word. He said there *was* understanding, through the letters at the end of OCT, and that, if there had not been one, the results would have been very different. Surely US could not deny that there was an understanding.

3. There followed discussion as to Russian word for "understanding". SOVS said that their word was "dogovorenmost" which could be translated either "understanding" or "agreement", but was a weaker word than their ordinary word for agreement, "soglashenye", which they had not used in their draft. Their strongest word is "dogovor", meaning "treaty". They do have a weaker word "ponimenye" also translated as "understanding", but this would be awkward and unacceptable in the Russian text. Apparently it is roughly the equivalent of the French word "entende".

4. Kuznetsov then presented new draft of second PARA as substitute for second PARA of US draft of JAN 2, 1963 as follows:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT.

While it has not been possible for our GOVTS fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and of the progress in the implementation of this understanding it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy farther the attention of the SC at this time. END VERBATIM TEXT.

5. Kuznetsov pointed out SOV draft closely followed second PARA of US draft. He called attention to omission word "considerable" as applied to progress and, in answer to McCloy question as to reason for omission, said that there was no corresponding Russian word, and that nearest equivalent word mean substantial which unacceptable to SOVS.

6. McCloy said he was disappointed that the Russians had not accepted US draft of JAN 2, which he had gone to great pains to get approved by US GOVT, that the SOV draft was not substantially different from its earlier drafts, and that he was disposed to stand by the US draft.

7. All agreed to substitute "not" for "no longer" at end of PARA.

8. Kuznetsov asked for omission of "by them" in third PARA. McCloy agreed.

9. All agreed that last few lines of third PARA awkward, and should be rewritten. McCloy tentatively suggested revision to read: "to further constructive efforts for the adjustment of differences existing between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war".

10. McCloy said he would consider SOV draft and let them know answer.

11. In off-the-cuff discussion of signing arrangements, if letter could be agreed upon, it was suggested that in the letter in English, US should precede SOV, whereas in letter in Russian, SOV should precede US, and that two copies of each letter should be signed by US and SOV, one of each to be sent to SYG and other sent to other party.

12. Kuznetsov now planning stay until JAN 7 or 8, planning to go SOV Embassy Washington on some other matter.

Plimpton

588. Telegram 2600 from USUN, January 4¹

January 4, 1963

Pass to White House. Subject: Cuba Re Deptel 1889 (USUN 1996).

1. Confirming McCloy-Johnson TELCON, McCloy gave [illegible in the original] over telephone second and third PARAS as stated in REFTTEL, and [illegible in the original] with omission of “fully” in second PARA.

2. In second PARA [illegible in the original] did not object to [illegible in the original] but resisted “degree” and [illegible in the original] McCloy said yes. [illegible in the original]

3. Kuznetsov [illegible in the original] revised second PARA to [illegible in the original].

4. Kuznetsov intends sign on behalf of SOVS, [illegible in the original] McCloy sign on behalf of US. McCloy said he not [illegible in the original], since he merely Chairman of Coordinating COMITE and not [illegible in the original] to UN or authorized by US to sign, and that only US REP to UN could sign.

Plimpton

¹ Confirmation of changes made in U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.

589. Memorandum of telephone conversation among Rusk, Ball, and U. Alexis Johnson, January 5¹

January 5, 1963

Ball—There is one thing that I wanted to clear up and that was did you talk to the Boss about the Cuba business—the Pan American flights?

Secretary—Yes.

Ball—Is he for it or against it?

Secretary—He doesn't mind if we try to work this out with the prisoners.

Ball—All right. Alex is going to get on.

Secretary—We don't want to do it on the basis of any direct deal because the basis of opening up the flights would be for our reasons. On the other hand to see if Donovan cannot spring these other fellows on the basis of economic possibilities. Did you see the papers on the subject?

Johnson—Yes, I did.

Secretary—John McCone was down. If he is back in Washington you might want to talk to him about it.

Johnson—He was there when you were talking about it?

Secretary—Yes. What was your idea about timing, Alex?

Johnson—The timing is the problem. The Swiss were at us again this morning. They have had some more riots down there. We have got three problems—we have got the Cubans who have visas who want to get out. We have the Americans who are not imprisoned who want to get out. We have the Americans who are imprisoned. Castro has said that he will let the Americans go—those who are around who are not in jail—and apparently he is willing to let the Cubans go. These Cubans are in bad shape. They had to give up their property and do all this when they got their visas, and now they haven't been able to go. These are the people that are rioting around the Swiss Embassy down there. And then there is the American prisoner question.

Secretary—I think you had better decide exactly how and when and then just ring him back on that. The general idea of doing it is all right provided it is not simply the responsibility of Castro but that it is done in a way to make it for our own purpose.

¹ Release and transport of prisoners and Americans in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

Johnson—I get the point. I will go ahead on that and then we had better let him know how we are planning to do it.

Secretary—If McCone is back in town, talk to him about it.

Johnson—Did you talk about economic sanctions, any of that business?

Secretary—I left with him the paper on the OAS stuff.

Johnson—Fine.

590. Telegram 2617 from USUN, January 5¹

January 5, 1963

Pass to White House. Subject: Cuba.

Confirming Plimpton-Cleveland TELECON.

1. Mendelevich and [illegible in the original] (USSR) met with Plimpton and [illegible in the original] Officer at US Mission this afternoon.

2. SOVS said SOV GOVT accepts US draft joint letter without change.

3. SOVS would have liked to have signed today, but on Plimpton's explaining that US needed time explain [illegible in the original] to NATO before signature, agreed that satisfactory to have letter signed by [illegible in the original] and delivered to SYG Tuesday, on understanding that there would no change in letter and that there would be no publicity by either side until after SYG announced receipt of letter.

4. SOVS agreeable to have Kuznetsov sign Monday a.m. and Stevenson sign Monday afternoon in Washington, with documents returned Monday night for presentation to SYG Tuesday a.m. SOVS agreeable to accepting Plimpton signature, but Plimpton feels much preferable for Stevenson sign.

5. Agreed that two English texts would be signed by both and two Russian texts signed by both, that original English signed text would be sent to SYG and other signed English text retained by US, and that one original signed Russian text would be sent to SYG and other signed Russian text retained by SOVS. [illegible in the original] Each would [illegible in the original] an unsigned copy of the English text [illegible

¹ Arrangements for signature of U.S. draft of joint letter. Confidential. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.

in the original] for [illegible in the original], and SOVS would convey [illegible in the original] unsigned Russian text and send the copy to USUN. [illegible in the original] Mendelevich said that [illegible in the original] had no [illegible in the original] of [illegible in the original] of [illegible in the original] or revealing any of the [DOCS—illegible in the original] involved in the [illegible in the original] and [illegible in the original] they regarded the joint letter as finishing the [illegible in the original] documents. If Mendelevich is asked questions as to the [illegible in the original] as a whole, he will of course have no hesitation in explaining the Russian position [illegible in the original] does not [illegible in the original] to say [illegible in the original] other than the final joint letter.

7. Plimpton said that we had no intention of [illegible in the original] negotiations or [illegible in the original] to any of the [illegible in the original] and that we could say that the joint letter speaks for itself, presumably [illegible in the original] something to the effect that US position remained as stated by the President in news conference of NOV 20.

7. Russian and English texts being pouched tonight to Washington.

8. COMMENT: We believe SOVS may well produce [illegible in the original] or news conference [illegible in the original] SOV support of Cuba and [illegible in the original] of US position.

Plimpton

591. Memorandum for the record, January 7¹

January 7, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting of DCI with James B. Donovan

1. Mr. James B. Donovan met with the Director of Central Intelligence at Mr. McCone's residence on the evening of 7 January 1963. Also present were Robert Hurwitch of State Department and *[less than 1 line not declassified]* of CIA. Mr. Donovan gave a brief summary of the

¹ Meeting between McCone and James B. Donovan re outstanding issues in Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-01258A, Box 2, Memos for Record.

negotiations which resulted in the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. Donovan emphasized that his mission was still unfinished as there were Americans still imprisoned in Cuba. He said that he had recently sent a cable to Premier Castro thanking him for the courtesies extended during the recent negotiations and assuring him that future deliveries of Red Cross goods to Cuba were on schedule.

2. Mr. McCone asked Donovan about the effect recent stories about Government involvement in the prisoner release and the President's speech in the Orange Bowl had on Donovan's future relations with Castro. In terms of his status these events and stories were not particularly helpful, Donovan thought, particularly if Castro is listening to his dedicated Communist advisors. On the other hand, because he did not participate in the Orange Bowl ceremonies and has disassociated himself from the Government role in the prisoner exchange, he feels that the effect on his future negotiation role will be minimal. Donovan emphasized that in all of his negotiations he made it clear to the Cubans that his role was as a private citizen with no connection with the United States Government. Overall, because of his public disassociation, he feels that his position with Castro may be strengthened.

3. After a discussion of the present status of Red Cross shipments to Cuba, Mr. Donovan said that Castro had asked him to look into the resumption of Pan American service to Havana. According to Donovan, Castro gave no reason for his great interest in this service. The Director then explained to Mr. Donovan that he was very interested in these facts because he would like to come to some decision as to the next move with regard to the release of the Americans, the resumption of Pan American flights, and the future flow of refugees from Cuba. Mr. Donovan said that partial information on these points could be gained by cable communication from Donovan to Castro stating that Donovan believed there was a good chance of resuming Pan American service. Mr. McCone, however, felt that the best way for accomplishing those enumerated objectives would be for Mr. Donovan to meet personally with Premier Castro, particularly in view of Castro's personal invitation for Donovan to vacation in Cuba. Donovan agreed. Donovan pointed out that he has received a great deal of mail asking about the release of the American prisoners in Cuba. Donovan believes that the fate of these Americans is of the highest priority in any negotiations in Cuba.

4. Donovan summarized some of his impressions on the personalities of Minister of Economic Planning Boti and Commandante Vallejo, who is an advisor to Premier Castro and who, Donovan believes, is sympathetic to better relations with the United States. Mr. Donovan also gave some background on the question of his talks with Castro which are the basis for Castro's invitation to Donovan to come to Havana to discuss philosophy of future relationships between the

United States and Cuba and "other things." Mr. Donovan said that he had passed to Castro information on Toure's disillusionment of Soviet aid and advisors, which information Mr. McCone had given to Donovan in October. According to Donovan, Castro told him that he wished to study this information. Donovan also said that he made a point in dealing with Castro, Boti, and Vallejo to make it clear that he considered them Latins and not Marxists. However, Donovan said that he had emphasized throughout his negotiations that he was not there to talk politics and therefore had little opportunity to discuss Cuban involvement with the Soviets.

5. Donovan agreed to initiate arrangements for a return to Havana with a target for his arrival shortly after the "Shirley Lykes" off-loads the second shipment of Red Cross goods in Havana. It was agreed that Donovan should go again as a private citizen to conclude certain arrangements which had been discussed in connection with the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. The priority of his objectives in his talks with Castro shall be (1) the release of American prisoners (2) the resumption of Pan American flights to Havana and (3) the approval of the Cuban Government of travel to the United States of Cuban refugees. In connection with those three objectives the United States Government is most interested in any information Mr. Donovan can get from Premier Castro on the future alignment of Cuba.

6. According to Donovan, Castro told him that he was interested in the return of three Cubans facing trial in New York on charges of sabotage.

7. The initial move in Donovan's return to Havana will involve Berta Barreto, who is in New York and a close personal friend of Celia Sanchez. Mrs. Barreto will be asked by Donovan to arrange permission for him to return to Cuba. Mr. McCone told Mr. Donovan a focal point for all Cuban problems including Donovan's mission will be a new Office of Cuban Affairs. In summary Mr. McCone said the President had requested him to talk to Mr. Donovan about going to Cuba, and with the past history of negotiations and the fact that Donovan had done so well personally with Castro it suggested that Donovan should continue his successful rapport with Castro to the benefit of the United States. Mr. McCone said he realized that Mr. Donovan's services were creating a personal financial hardship and hoped that something could be done to alleviate it, at least to extend the period over which taxes can be paid. Mr. Donovan will keep in regular contact with Messrs. Hurwitch and [less than 1 line not declassified] on developments.

[text not declassified]

592. Memorandum for the record, January 9¹

January 9, 1963

SUBJECT

Leadership Meeting—8 January 1963

I attended the meeting and made the remarks as in the attached paper. There were no significant questions.

Secretary McNamara briefed on South Viet Nam, expressing an optimistic point of view.

Secretary Rusk reported on the Cuban negotiations, summarizing the situation as it had been reported without any deviation. He also reported on the Congo situation, giving the meeting all information included in dispatches received in the late afternoon. There was no significant question.

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment

CUBA

I. By a careful examination of all photography and other intelligence sources, we have concluded that the Soviets have withdrawn 42 strategic missiles and 42 jet bombers and their related equipment, and about four or five thousand personnel probably associated with the maintenance and operation of this equipment.

A. We believe, but we cannot prove by aerial reconnaissance, that this represents all the strategic weapons placed in Cuba by the Soviets.

1. The strategic missile bases have been dismantled and no IL-28 bomber aircraft remain in sight.

B. Several categories of missiles remain in Cuba. These include surface-to-air, short range surface-to-surface coastal defense, and missiles for KOMOR type coastal ships. Quantities of these missiles may be stored in caves in Cuba together with other items of conventional armament. However, we doubt that attempts have been made to hide

¹ Leadership meeting on January 8. Attached DCI Briefing on latest overview of Cuban developments. Top Secret. 5 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings With the President, 1 January–31 March 1963.

intermediate range strategic missiles in caves but this can not be proven by the aerial reconnaissance which we are carrying on each day, weather permitting. Our program of aerial reconnaissance which calls for a complete coverage of the entire Island every week will, in our opinion, reveal any effort to reintroduce strategic missiles or reactivate strategic weapons systems.

II. Nevertheless there is still a substantial Soviet military presence in Cuba.

A. From all intelligence sources, including photographic reconnaissance, agent and refugee reports and other intelligence assets, we conclude that:

1. Many thousands of Soviet military personnel remain—from known table of organization of Soviet units, and from other sources, this number may be in the order of 17,000.

2. the Soviets are operating the advanced MIG-21 fighters in Cuba,

3. Soviet pilots flew 26 of the 42 aircraft that appeared in the January 2nd demonstration,

4. The Soviets continue to man the 24 surface-to-air missile sites and the related sophisticated communications systems. (Although these SAMs remain operational and their radars occasionally are activated against our U-2s, no missile has to our knowledge been fired since the shootdown of a U-2 on 27 October.)

5. the Soviets are maintaining four mobile ground units of some 1,500 men, each fully equipped with tanks, mobile field pieces, short-range surface-to-surface tactical missiles, and other unit equipment.

6. permanent barracks and other facilities are under construction to house these units.

III. We have witnessed no introduction of new military equipment into Cuba since late October.

A. However, we have indications that one ship, which passed Gibraltar 5 January, probably is carrying military equipment and supplies.

B. Soviet Bloc shipping continues at an average of about one ship per day; this is comparable to the rate of deliveries during the first half of 1962, but considerably below the rate maintained during the military build-up.

IV. In addition to the military equipment in the hands of the Soviets, we note large concentration of tanks, trucks, mobile field pieces, etc., which are at the disposal of the Cuban themselves.

V. There is no detectable change in the Castro regime's goals or methods.

A. Some reports indicate sharp differences between Castro and the Soviets over the withdrawal of offensive weapons but these differences have not reached a breaking point, nor have they impaired Castro's control of the political life of Cuba and its economic program.

B. Castro's hatred for the United States and his determination to foment revolutions in Latin America were repeated in his January 2nd speech.

C. Castro's decision to release the Cuban prisoners was based on his judgment and the judgment of his advisers that the arrangement represented a good deal from his standpoint, though there is some evidence that it brought criticism from the hard-line Communists within his organization.

VI. We see no evidence of a Soviet decision to make major withdrawals of military equipment and personnel from Cuba. However, this is a possibility with the passage of time. We note for instance that a few short-range rocket transporters have recently been loaded on an outbound ship.

At the present, however, we summarize the situation in Cuba as follows: Castro remains in control, his attitudes seem unchanged, but the Soviets have retained sufficient military capability in Cuba to give them powerful leverage on Castro should he oppose their policies too actively.

593. Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, January 9¹

January 9, 1963

SUBJECT

V.V. Kuznetsov's Call on You January 9

You have agreed to receive Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov at 5 p.m. January 9. He will be accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin. Ambassador Thompson will also be present.

We regard this as primarily a courtesy call following the completion of Kuznetsov's mission in New York. Nevertheless, there are certain matters which you may wish to raise or which Kuznetsov may raise.

With regard to the New York negotiations, you may wish to say that you appreciate the helpful and courteous attitude which Kuznetsov displayed throughout, which contributed importantly to the constructive atmosphere in which the negotiations were conducted.

¹ Briefing memorandum for Kuznetsov's call on the President January 9. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 033.1161/1-963.

You may also wish to say that you have noted how the U.S. press and radio have been interpreting the joint letter submitted to the U.N. Secretary General as a withholding on our part of your pledge not to invade Cuba. You may wish to say that you are sorry these stories have appeared and to reiterate, as you did with Mikoyan, that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba, unless there is some aggressive act by Castro, and is not moving back from any position agreed to in your correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev. There has been no change on the part of the United States from the position you set forth in your press conference of November 20 (which Kuznetsov and others have said they understood).

Kuznetsov may seek to ascertain what United States policy will be toward Cuba now that the United Nations is no longer seized of the problem. You may wish to say that much will depend on the attitude of the Cuban Government which so far has not been constructive. If pressed, you may wish to state further that the United States is opposed to Communist control of Cuba and to the military association of the U.S.S.R. with Cuba. We are prepared to support any free choice the Cuban people may make following Castro and to hold out a hope to the Cuban people that the United States would be sympathetic to a change in Cuba. The United States does not, however, intend to invade Cuba in furtherance of this goal.

Kuznetsov may also raise the subject of the Nassau Agreement. Should he do so, you may wish to say that this agreement exemplifies United States determination to perfect with its allies the defense of the West, which is dedicated to the proposition that the West should draw ever closer together for the protection of common values. The agreement marks a further step along the road toward the unity of the West. In common with other Western defensive steps, this agreement was made against a background of belief that there must be a peaceful solution to outstanding problems. It leaves open the opportunity and the possibility of examining relentlessly and continuously the possibility of disarmament, however discouraging the prospects may be at any given time. The agreement is also in keeping with our policy of preventing the development of independent national nuclear capabilities.

On the general subject of disarmament, you may wish to say that you were encouraged by the letter which you received from Chairman Khrushchev in mid-December because Chairman Khrushchev apparently has accepted the principle of on-site inspections. This is very important because it goes to the heart of a reliable agreement ending nuclear testing and contains the element of assurance which is so vital to the broader development of peaceful relations between our two countries. There are, of course, many questions still to be worked out

such as the number of on-site inspections (in which the U.S.S.R. is still talking about two or three when the United States has come down from a number between twelve and twenty to a number between eight and ten), inspection of events in an area in which there are not usually earthquakes, and the number and location of unmanned seismic stations in the U.S.S.R., but none of these appear to be insoluble. You understand that a representative of the U.S.S.R. is planning to meet with Mr. Foster in the near future and you hope that some progress can be made towards resolving these questions.

The United States and the U.S.S.R. are now faced with two choices. The first, which offers long-range security to neither of us, is a continuation of the arms race. The second is to turn down the arms race by working out meaningful measures of disarmament. The working out of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests is a start down this latter path but there are other measures that we should be working on. These include measures preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them, measures prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction and finally measures to reduce the risk of war and to guard against surprise attack. Finally, while both countries should work towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, we should not forget that in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (negotiated by Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin) we agreed to seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date and to try to obtain agreement on measures of disarmament which could be obtained without prejudicing progress on the total program. As a result it might be fruitful for us to consider what disarmament measures of an intermediate nature might constitute the widest area of agreement which it would appear to be feasible to implement at an early date.

It is suggested that you briefly mention that you have also heard from Chairman Khrushchev with respect to Southeast Asia and that you intend shortly to get in touch with him on the matter as you remain seriously concerned at the apparent intention of the North Vietnamese to continue to stir up trouble in Laos and South Vietnam. The United States is fully conforming to our Geneva commitments in spite of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese charges. We have withdrawn all our military personnel from Laos and we are prepared to withdraw all those who are assisting the South Vietnamese as soon as the North Vietnamese stop their efforts to take them over.

It is suggested that you not take any initiative in raising Berlin or other questions.

Dean Rusk

594. Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Kuznetsov and other U.S. and Soviet officials, January 10¹

January 10, 1963

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

*U.S.S.R.*Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov,
First Deputy Foreign
MinisterAnatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet
AmbassadorLev Isaakovich Mendelevich,
Assistant to KuznetsovViktor Pavlovich Karpov, First
Secretary of Embassy
(Interpreter)

Kuznetsov thanked the Secretary for the opportunity of seeing him. He said that the Secretary, of course, knew why he had been sent here by Chairman Khrushchev. After two and a half months the talks on the Cuban situation in New York had concluded and it was therefore considered useful for him to meet the Secretary now. At his meeting with the President yesterday, the President had expressed the opinion that while the results of the New York talks had not been everything which might have been desired, the text of the joint letter to the UN Secretary General did represent progress. The Secretary interjected that both the President and he appreciated the genuine effort Kuznetsov had made to achieve agreement in New York. Kuznetsov replied that the United States representatives had also been very expert and frank, expressing U.S. positions very clearly. The resulting general atmosphere had been business-like and this was encouraging.

Looking back to the end of October, Kuznetsov continued, we may say that an important conclusion should be drawn in order that we might move ahead and that U.S.-Soviet relations will be even better. He had agreed with the President's statement that relations between the two countries should be good. The important conclusion which clearly emerges from the crisis is that when our two mighty powers display sincere efforts to reach agreement on important problems affect-

¹ U.S.-Soviet relations. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

ing the fate of mankind, they can agree. During the crisis constructive steps had been taken by the Soviet Government and Khrushchev in his exchanges with the President. The President had also taken constructive steps and as a result agreement was reached which permitted a solution to the crisis. This very important circumstance has been noted in Moscow. But with this, it is worth saying that it took only five days to agree to avert thermonuclear war but two and a half months to agree on a document reflecting the essence and spirit of the basic agreement.

Kuznetsov said that he wished to stress that the role of our two countries is outstanding as the whole world recognizes. It is, therefore, important to try over and over to improve our relations and to combine our efforts for the solution of bilateral and international problems in the interests of maintaining and consolidating peace. The Soviet Government agrees with the President that now that the New York negotiations have been concluded, the way has been paved to a certain extent to give more attention to other international problems. With regard to our relations, there is still something to do and the USSR is not satisfied with the present status. Khrushchev has made quite clear the sincere desire of the USSR to do everything possible to improve relations in order to remove obstacles in the path to the betterment of relations and then to unite our efforts to solve other problems. The Secretary probably realizes, Kuznetsov said, that the relations between us play an important role in international affairs and the world situation depends to a great extent on our relations. Kuznetsov said he had no particular problems in mind but believed the Secretary knew what they were. He did mention that our economic relations, specifically trade, are unsatisfactory and that our cultural relations, although some results have been achieved in this field, could be still further improved. The Soviet Government would like to do its best to clear away obstacles.

The Secretary said that he was very interested in Kuznetsov's views. We are interested in improving our relations, as the President said. We do not doubt that the President and Khrushchev bear very heavy historical responsibilities in this phase of world history. Both men understand this. This is one reason why the President has sought to maintain effective channels of communications between us. But the historical importance of our relations for good or ill makes us feel we must maintain effective communications channels and not just in the physical sense. The Secretary observed that when he became Secretary he had not dealt with Soviet affairs for some 10 years. He has observed one noticeable difference between the two periods inasmuch as it was now possible to talk with some degree of understanding across the ideological gap which separates us. One of our great problems, the Secretary said, is that we must recognize our very important ideological differences. We both try to understand our differences and we must

also try to enter into the other side's thinking. There was still much to be done in this area.

Twelve to 14 years ago, the Secretary observed, he had talked with Jakob Malik in New York and had agreed with him to talk about what each did not like about the other's policy. We should try to explore genuine common interests objectively considered and attempt to establish real communications with each other. While he had been speaking about the general subject of communications, the Secretary said he also wished to talk about the problem of physical communications. Recently the United States Government had offered to establish on a reciprocal basis radio transmitters in the Embassies in Moscow and Washington. For the United States this represented simply a desire to improve our technical communications with our Embassy. Rapidity of communications is a matter of joint interest. The Secretary noted that the Soviets have two leased lines to the United States whereas we have none to the USSR.

Kuznetsov said that he did not know the details of this problem but promised to take it up upon his return to Moscow. With regard to the Secretary's comments on the general spirit of our relations, Kuznetsov asserted that people in the USSR live in a magnificent and happy period. Khrushchev is a very real man who knows the spirit and thoughts of the rank and file. He is a most devoted fighter for good relations between our two countries and for the maintenance and consolidation of peace. Your President, therefore, has a good partner, Kuznetsov said, and you were lucky that you had Khrushchev as the head of the Soviet Government in October.

However, there are some groups in the U.S. who were not interested in having good relations with the USSR. This is not the case in the Soviet Union so that the U.S. has more difficulty in this sense than does the USSR. It is important not to look backward in the search for peace. Unfortunately, such tendencies do exist in the U.S. and it is up to the United States Government to handle this situation. Sometimes even United States officials show signs of this pressure. For example, in December at a press conference the Secretary had said that the system in Cuba was inconsistent with Western Hemispheric ideals. This sentiment reflects backward views and impressions.

The Secretary opined that it might be well for the two Foreign Offices to make up a group of four or five people, yours to try to think like Americans and ours to try to think like the Soviets. As for his December 10 press conference, the Secretary noted that the President had stated a year and a half ago that there were two points in regard to Cuba which were not negotiable: its political-military alliance with an outside power and interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Kuznetsov observed that mutual understanding was very important but asked the Secretary whether he did not think that at this

stage each side understood something about the policies of the other. Ideological differences cannot be solved. However, the USSR freely admits that even in the light of this basic difficulty we can solve important problems in the interest of peace and humanity. United States official policy is based on the understanding that a country's social system is not part of its legal system. In the United States there is a theory that the Western Hemisphere is a special place which should only be bound by the ideals now found there. Not everyone will agree with this, Kuznetsov said. The situation in Latin America is not so ideal that it does not require change. Indeed, many governments in the Western Hemisphere seek change. The Soviet Union wishes for friendly relations with other countries, especially the United States, and it does not wish ideology to interfere.

595. Memorandum for the record, January 12¹

January 12, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting in Mr. Bundy's office—12 January 1963—attended by Mr. Bundy, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson and General Taylor

AND MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING THE ABOVE.

1. There was a general discussion of the OXCART surfacing problem. Consideration was given to the issues raised by the Killian Board as reported in DCI memorandum of 12 January, McNamara suggested the matter be held in abeyance pending further study on his part, discussion with McCone and possibly discussions with the Killian Board.

2. General discussion of DCI memorandum of January 11th on continued aerial surveillance of Cuba. Differences arose concerning policy reaction if a U-2 was shot down, desirability of resorting to the alternatives outlined in the paper rather than risk a U-2 incident and the desirability and effect of aborts as proposed under Recommendation 4.c. In general, DCI and Secretary Rusk took the position that an

¹ Discussion during a meeting with the President of Cuban aerial reconnaissance. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January–31 March, 1963.

abort would be a manifestation of weakness and that we should sanction one or two at the most, and furthermore we should consider a response to a U-2 shoot-down as a "must". McNamara, on the other hand, favored extreme caution, was not concerned over the number of aborts, did not want to see a U-2 incident precipitated, and advocated resorting to alternatives, most particularly the use of drones.

3. General Taylor and McNamara continue to object to the use of System 14 for reasons previously stated.

4. It was agreed to proceed with a. and b. It was also agreed that CIA would prepare to place the defensively equipped aircraft at the disposal of SAC but not actually move them to Del Rio until further orders.

5. It was further agreed to intensively study the whole idea of an abort procedure. The question was raised as to how many missions (actual planes) would have aborted in the last 30 to 45 days if a procedure had been established calling for an abort when the signal was received to the effect that (a) FRUITSET radar had swept the U-2, or (b) FRUITSET was locked on and therefore the U-2 was in danger.

ACTION: A review should be made by DDR of signal intelligence which might develop this information.

6. Defense were disinclined to accept Recommendation 4.d. However it was agreed to fly drones over specified U.S. targets to test photographic and operational feasibility.

ACTION: DDR should see that this is done and that NRO, NPIC and other interested parties are brought into the exercise and evaluation.

7. Following this meeting, subject was briefly reviewed with the same group and the President and the Vice President. No decision was requested nor reached. The President, however, seemed inclined to the view that if the Soviets or Cubans are to attempt to take down a U-2, we ought to find it out right away and respond. He seemed to share the Secretary of State's views that aborting missions would demonstrate a certain weakness but agreed we might consider policy after the first abort.

8. Question was raised as to whether an abort procedure could be developed with existing facilities and prior to the installation of system 12s in U-2 aircraft. No one knew whether this could be done. I would like DDR to let me know whether present signals which are received by aircraft and naval ships can serve as a warning and can be communicated to the U-2 pilot advising him that he was under radar surveillance and instructing him to abort.

9. Questions were raised concerning the COMOR recommendation for around-the-clock photography at 4-hour intervals on the incoming

ship SIMFEROPOL. McCone stated that if weather permitted, U-2 photography would suffice during daylight hours and that CIA had alerted all clandestine resources as well as liaison organizations to develop information on night movements by observation. DCI stated that this would produce some intelligence although he could not guarantee that the information would be comprehensive, and therefore useful. DCI reported that he would not know the destination of the ship. This would probably be determined the evening of the 14th or the morning of the 15th. The ship probably would go to either Havana or Mariel.

10. In general the consensus was against low level photography with McNamara strongly opposing low level under any circumstances. Rusk and McCone wishing to take a look on Monday afternoon. It was agreed that this subject should be discussed Monday afternoon or, at the latest, Tuesday morning. In the meantime the following actions are to be taken:

- a. DCI to be sure every possible step is taken by clandestine efforts.
- b. General Taylor to prepare for frequent high level or low level flights, if and when ordered.

John A. McCone
Director

**596. Memorandum from McCone to McGeorge Bundy,
January 15¹**

January 15, 1963

With reference to the surveillance program for photographing the discharging operations of the SIMFEROPOL, the following are my views:

1. The SIMFEROPOL apparently is enroute to Havana or Mariel and should reach port Wednesday midnight.
2. Under clear weather conditions, high-level U-2 photography will identify objects discharged during the day and resting on the dock at the unloading point, with dimensions of 2 to 3 feet and this resolution will permit photo-analysts to identify with reasonable accuracy all

¹ McCone's views on surveillance of the Soviet ship Simferopol. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. III.

objects of military significance of interest to us. Therefore it is my opinion that under the circumstances mentioned, i.e. good weather, low-level photography would not be a requirement during the daylight hours.

3. If weather is overcast, then low-level photography is necessary if we are to determine, by photographic means, the cargo being discharged.

4. Night photography will require the use of illuminating flares. The quality of such photography will probably reveal night discharging operations although it is to be noted there is some uncertainty concerning aerial photography conducted under these procedures and conditions.

5. All clandestine assets have been alerted to report on the discharging activities of this ship, most particularly those conducted at night, and reports received from intelligence resources should be of some value. However if the Cubans or Soviets take the unusual precautions such as those previously taken, which included exclusion areas, unloading fully loaded trailers covered with tarpaulins, etc., it is doubtful whether clandestine source reports would give us the firm evidence of the particulars of the cargo discharged.

It is my recommendation that we fly high level flights from daylight to dusk at 4-hour intervals if weather is good, low level flights during this period if it is not good, and depend upon clandestine resources at night unless the read-out of the day time flights (which should be made under most expeditious arrangements) indicates the overriding necessity for reconnaissance.

John A. McCone
Director

**597. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
January 15¹**

January 15, 1963

SUBJECT

Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs—Progress Report

The Committee has been quite active. The following is a status report on Sterling Cottrell's work and the work of the Committee.

1. Pan American/Prisoner Exchange Package

Although the outcome is not yet clear, so far, the wheels seem to be turning fairly smoothly and quickly.

PAA appears cooperative. Mr. Adams, in a meeting on Saturday with Bob Hurwitch, said (1) that PAA does not expect U.S. Government financial support for future flights to Havana, and (2) that PAA will resume flights whenever the Government gives the word. Mr. Adams added that while he hopes that Mr. Donovan will help PAA in working out a better payments arrangement with Castro, the resumption of flights is in no way contingent on such an arrangement.

Mr. Donovan hopes to talk to Castro next week about the release of the American prisoners and the resumption of PAA flights (Castro has asked Mr. Donovan to make inquiries about the resumption of PAA services). Mr. Donovan has asked for a Castro meeting (via Mrs. Bareto/Celia Sanchez/Castro communications system). He has not yet had a reply. If Castro does not reply soon, Mr. Hurwitch plans to ask Mr. Donovan to contact Castro again.

2. The Brigade

The Committee had a meeting this morning regarding the future status of the Brigade. The advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of action were discussed. The discussion was not completed and will be resumed on Wednesday.

Attached for your information is a memorandum which outlines the points presented by the Brigade leaders when they met with Mr. Cottrell on Friday.

¹ Progress report of Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs: Pan American/Prisoner exchange package; the Brigade; future policy toward Cuba; press interest. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.

3. *Future Policy Toward Cuba*

The Committee met this afternoon to discuss the future policy toward Cuba; Secretary Vance represented DOD and Mr. Helms represented CIA. A revised version of the policy, not including the covert section, was drafted. It will be available on Tuesday; this, as well as the covert annex, will be discussed Thursday. (Mr. Vance wants to clear the draft first with the JCS.)

I mentioned your concern to Mr. Cottrell and Bob Hurwitch about the absence of the Florida dimension in the policy paper. The matter was discussed briefly at the meeting and the consensus seemed to be that the Florida dimension was a complicated one, that it required a lot more study, and that it should not unnecessarily hold up the policy paper. After the meeting, I spoke to Bob Hurwitch and asked if he would give me a brief note of his views on the subject; it will be here today.

4. *Press Interest*

Mr. Cottrell mentioned that the press is becoming increasingly interested in his work. He warned against leaks and suggested that Committee members only go as far as to admit that our Cuban policy is under study; Committee members should feel free to buck questions to him.

How should the White House play this? Can we buck everything over to the Coordinator?

5. *Schedule of Committee Meetings*

The Committee's schedule of meetings over the next few days is as follows:

Tuesday, January 15, 1963	—10:00 AM	—Actions in OAS
	—2:00 PM	—DOD Contingency Planning
Wednesday, January 16, 1963	—10:00 AM	—The Brigade
	—2:00 PM	—The Miami Office
Thursday, January 17, 1963	—10:00 AM	—Open
	—2:00 PM	—Future Policy Toward Cuba, including the Covert Annex

Gordon Chase

**598. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
January 17¹**

January 17, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuban Coordinating Committee—Progress Report

1. The Brigade

The Committee held another meeting on the Brigade Wednesday morning at which the advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action were discussed. Mr. Cottrell's office will circulate a draft paper in the next day or so which will discuss these courses of action and which will include his recommendation. At this moment he and Bob Hurwitch seem to be leaning in favor of not doing anything very special for the Brigade. At most, it would be retained as a military reserve unit (periodic meetings) of the U.S. Army which other Cuban refugees could join if they wished. In addition, the original Brigade members would receive certain special benefits over and above those already being given to Cuban refugees. These benefits, in so far as possible, would have an obvious connection to their invasion experience (e.g., special health benefits) and probably would not irritate other Cuban refugees.

I want to sleep on this one some more, but my initial reaction is that it is a sensible approach.

2. The Miami Office

The Committee discussed the Miami office on Wednesday afternoon. John Crimmins was introduced to the Committee as the chief of the office. My first impression of him was a favorable one. While he gives a physical appearance of being somewhat dull, he is not. At the meeting, he struck me as being alert and sound. He is certainly not "mousy."

The Committee heard descriptions of present U.S. Government activities in Miami (a fact sheet will be available shortly).

The duties of the new Miami office were not discussed in depth. The general consensus of the Committee was that Mr. Crimmins should act as a sort of chief of mission, coordinating and giving general policy direction to agency representatives in Miami (e.g., Defense, CIA, Justice,

¹ Progress report of the Cuban Coordinating Committee: the Brigade; the Miami Office; OAS resolutions. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.

HEW). This consensus, however, was not unanimous. The CIA representative did not view Mr. Crimmins' work in a broad sense and obviously was reluctant to see him getting involved in CIA business. He preferred to interpret paragraph 5 of NSAM 213 in a narrow sense ("The coordinator will name a full time representative who will open an office in Miami to represent the U.S. Government in relations with Cuban refugee organizations and coordinate in implementation of all federal programs being carried on in the area relating such programs to state, local and private programs").

The entire Miami situation still needs a lot more study.

3. *OAS Resolutions*

On Tuesday morning, the Committee drew up a revised list of possible actions which might be taken by the OAS against Cuba. Ward Allen, the OAS specialist in State, plans to have a paper out on the subject on Thursday.

4. *Some Timings*

(a) *EXCOMM*—Mr. Cottrell is aiming to have the following papers ready for an EXCOMM Meeting by about Tuesday of next week—a general policy paper, a paper on proposed U.S. action in the OAS, a paper on our policy toward the Brigade, and an outline of remaining subjects to be handled.

(b) *Defense Contingency Plans*—DOD will have a revision of the Cuban Invasion Plan (Plan 316) ready for the Committee in about 3 weeks. The plan will include an annex covering the use of Latin American forces, in conjunction with U.S. forces, in an action against Cuba.

(c) *Miami Office*—Mr. Cottrell plans to open the Miami office before February 1st. Space problems are now being investigated.

Gordon Chase

599. CIA Current Support Brief, January 19¹

CIA/RR CB 63–10

January 19, 1963

**THE CUBAN ECONOMY IN 1961 AND 1962
AND PROSPECTS FOR 1963 THROUGH 1965***Summary and Conclusions*

The Cuban economy during 1963 probably will not decline further in total output and may show some improvement in comparison with 1962. Cuban GNP in 1962, measured in 1958 prices, is estimated to be 25 percent below the 1958 level. The total supply of available goods, however, was only about 20 percent lower than in 1958 because Cuba ran a trade deficit in 1962 that was substantially higher than the deficit in 1958.

Total agricultural output will not increase much during 1963, for the sugar harvest probably will decline slightly from last year, largely off-setting moderate gains in other crops. Industrial production will increase to some extent as Cuba's new managerial class gains experience and the economy begins to regain some of its lost efficiency. Investment also probably will expand as a number of new industrial projects are started during the year. The dynamic upward improvement of prices in the world sugar market probably will raise Cuba's export earnings in 1963 above the 1962 level. The increase will not be enough, however, to finance the required volume of imports, and Cuba will still require large balance-of-payments credits from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

It appears probable that the Cuban economy will continue to improve during 1964 and 1965. The government is making vigorous efforts to expand agricultural production. The traditional failure of most Communist regimes to achieve satisfactory results in agriculture, however, precludes the prediction of any dramatic successes for Castro in this sphere during 1964–65. Continuing improvement at the managerial level may well yield further increases in industrial production. Investment activity also probably will continue to expand. Finally, the outlook for export earnings suggests that Cuba will remain dependent on the Bloc for large industrial and balance-of-payment credits.

I. 1961 and 1962

The past several years have provided a considerable body of evidence reflecting some of the main features of the Cuban economy since

¹ "The Cuban Economy in 1961 and 1962 and Prospects for 1963 through 1965." Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label.

the Cuban revolution. Until recently, however, the evidence has been too general and impressionistic to permit even a tentative quantitative measurement of the economy's performance [*1½ lines not declassified*].

[*less than 1 line not declassified*], it would appear that, during 1961, output of all goods and services in Cuba dropped to a level about 15 percent below that of 1958. During 1962 the level of total output probably fell further to about 25 percent below that of 1958. In absolute terms, this decline means that Cuba's gross national product (GNP), measured in 1958 prices, fell from \$2,555 million in 1958 to about \$2,150 million in 1961 and further to about \$1,950 million in 1962.

In both 1961 and 1962, Cuban ran a considerable surplus of imports over exports. Consequently, the total supply of available goods was higher than GNP in both years. The foreign trade deficit in 1961 was about \$100 million, approximately the same as that of 1958. The trade deficit increased sharply in 1962, however, to more than \$200 million. Thus the supply of available goods during 1961, measured in 1958 prices, was about \$2,250 million, whereas in 1962 it was approximately \$2,150 million, compared with the 1958 level of about \$2,675 million.

The heavy foreign trade imbalance of 1961 and 1962 occurred primarily in Cuba's trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and was covered by financing provided by the Bloc. A small part of the deficit was covered by various low-interest economic development credits extended by the Bloc to enable Cuba to purchase industrial plants and equipment. Most of the deficit, however, has been covered by Bloc balance-of-payments support under credit terms that are presently unknown.

The general balance-of-payments aid rendered by the Bloc has enabled Cuba to maintain imports of producer goods, such as industrial raw materials and capital equipment, at levels comparable to those of the last few years of the prerevolutionary period. That these inputs into the Cuban economy have been maintained at former levels may be reconciled with the estimates of reduced output given above by evidence pointing to gross mismanagement of the economy. Castro adherents, who now run the Cuban economy, were initially inexperienced in the planning and operation of such an economy. In addition, low productivity from a disorganized and increasingly apathetic labor force led to waste of raw material resources, thereby producing a situation in which inputs remain high while output declines. Nevertheless, it would be easy to overstate the effect of mismanagement and inefficiency.

II. Prospects for 1963

The Cuban economy during 1963 probably will not decline further in total output and may show some improvement in comparison with 1962. Production of sugar is not expected to increase; prospects for

other crops indicate modest gains. Industrial production probably will remain at about the 1962 levels, with some improvement possible, and it appears that the supply of consumer goods will not change much from 1962. In the investment sector, however, there are indications that activity will increase as work is carried forward on existing projects and as new projects are started. In the foreign trade sector, imports probably will remain at about the 1962 level. With respect to exports, the substantial improvement in the world sugar market should make it possible for Cuba to increase its export earnings. The increase will not be sufficient, however, to match the anticipated level of imports, and Cuba again will be faced with a considerable foreign trade deficit in 1963.

1. Agriculture

There appears to be little or no possibility that Cuba will harvest more sugar during the coming year than was brought in from the disappointing crop of 1962. The main difficulties that limited the 1962 harvest have not been overcome, and even government spokesmen have admitted publicly that the 1963 crop will be a poor one. A maximum estimate would place production at about 4.8 million metric tons (mt), the level achieved in 1962, with 4.5 million mt a more likely figure.

The prospects for the nonsugar sector of agriculture are somewhat better. A greater application of fertilizer and an expansion of the Cuban irrigation system can be expected to yield at least limited positive results during the coming year. The full effects of more intensive agricultural techniques will come only gradually, however, and it would be difficult to predict much increase in nonsugar crops during 1963.

The total production of crops in 1963 probably will be somewhat below that of 1962. Because sugar represents such a large share of the total agricultural output, the probable decline of this product will more than offset the moderate gains in other crops.

2. Industry

Prospects for industry depend on three principal factors, as follows: the level of managerial ability, morale within the labor force, and availability of spare parts to maintain the industrial establishment. The evidence indicates that inexperienced management probably has been the principal cause of the decline in industrial production apparent during the last 2 years. Apathy and disaffection within the labor force also has been an important contributing factor. The US embargo on spare parts in combination with Cuba's shortage of the foreign currency needed to buy spare parts in other countries has increased the cost of parts but probably has not been a major factor in reduced output thus far.

As time goes on and as Cuba's new managerial class gains experience, the factor of mismanagement gradually should decline, and the quality and the volume of output will tend to increase. On the other hand, the shortage of spare parts will become more serious as industrial equipment continues to age so that this problem will become more of a limitation. It is difficult to make any judgment concerning the labor problem, and it is assumed that this problem will remain during 1963 but probably will not be any greater drag on the economy than it was in 1962. The total effect of all of these factors probably will produce some moderate increase in industrial output during 1963.

The investment sector of the economy probably holds the best prospect for gains during 1963. Cuban planning documents indicate that many industrial projects are scheduled to begin during the coming year. There is evidence that since these documents were prepared, Cuban planners have shifted priorities away from industry to some extent and are now placing greater emphasis on investment in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, there are indications that, even with the decline in emphasis on industrial development, investment activity probably will be greater in this area than in 1962.

3. Foreign Investment

The prospects just outlined are based in part on the assumption that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will continue, as it has during the past 2 years, to finance Cuba's foreign trade deficit. Cuba is likely to run a deficit of at least \$130 million in 1963, an amount that is less than the 1962 deficit by almost \$100 million. A decrease of this magnitude in Cuba's deficit would permit a reduction in Bloc balance-of-payments aid of about the same extent.

The forecast for the 1963 trade deficit turns principally on the outlook for Cuban export earnings. These prospects have been greatly improved by the recent rise in the world market price for sugar, which, based as it is on a tight supply condition that will last at least until the next European and US harvests begin in late 1963, probably will persist through most of the coming year. There are certain factors, however, that will limit Cuba's ability to take advantage of the new market situation.

First, Cuba will not have as much sugar available for export during the coming year as it had in 1962. The 1962 level of sugar exports was achieved only by the sale of Cuba's reserve stock of about 1 million mt. With this reserve exhausted and with no increase in production in sight, exports during the coming year should fall by at least 1 million tons.

Second, Cuba's ability to profit from the high world price also may be restricted by the fact that its foreign trade is now conducted mainly

with the Bloc. If Cuba continues to sell sugar to the Bloc in the same quantities and on the same terms as in the last 2 years, it will derive very little benefit from the new market situation, for the fixed price paid by the Bloc in the past is now about 25 percent below the world market.

Cuba's export earnings in 1963 almost certainly will not exceed \$620 million. Achievement of this level of earnings would require the world price for sugar to remain at its recent level,² Cuba to harvest a full 4.8 million mt of sugar and to export all of its sugar—including that shipped to the Bloc—at the world market price, and the Bloc to import in 1963 about as much sugar as it did in 1962. One or more of these requirements probably will not be met, in which event exports will be less than \$620 million. Under the least favorable conditions, Cuba would sell sugar to the Bloc at the former price and in the same amounts as in 1962. Under this set of conditions, Cuba's export earnings could fall below \$500 million. In 1962, export income was only \$530 million, the lowest in more than a decade.

Even the maximum export income of \$620 million will not be enough to meet Cuba's import requirements. There appears little possibility that Cuba can reduce the 1962 level of imports without restricting the rate of economic activity. Although it might be possible for Cuba to reduce food imports on the basis of some increase in its production of food crops in 1963, this import substitution probably cannot be very large. Furthermore, efforts to expand investment probably will require the import of more capital goods than in 1962. On the whole, if the economic prospects outlined above (see p. 4, above) are to be fulfilled, particularly the outlook for more investment activity, then imports must remain at least at the 1962 level.

In 1962, Cuba imported about \$750 million worth of goods and ocean freight services. If Cuba can export as much as \$620 million worth of goods in 1963, it will still need about \$130 million in balance-of-payments support and long-term credits from the Bloc. If export receipts fall toward the minimum, Cuba will need total credits at least as large as the approximate \$220 million supplied by the Bloc in 1962.

The calculation of Cuba's probable credit needs from the Bloc ignores the fact that the US is delivering about \$55 million worth of goods as ransom for the Bay of Pigs prisoners. Because the US intention, as far as possible, was to ship only goods that would be of minimum utility to the Cuban economy, it was assumed for purposes of analysis that the ransom goods would not fall within Cuba's basic import

² The estimate of \$620 million as the maximum level of export earnings is based on the current spot sugar price of 5.25 cents per pound. At present, however, the market is still rising. To the extent that it continues to rise and is able to maintain the higher levels, the estimate of maximum export earnings will have to be increased.

requirements. In fact, however, some of these goods do fall within the basic import category and to that extent the ransom will provide Cuba with a substitute for Bloc credits.

If the Bloc is unwilling to supply credits amounting to at least \$130 million during the coming year, Cuba will be forced to cut its imports in order to reduce the trade deficit. In the past the Castro government has appeared very reluctant to restrict the import of foods, industrial raw materials, and fuels, even when cuts in aggregate imports were necessary. It is probable, therefore, that forced import retrenchment would fall primarily on capital goods. A reduction in the import of these goods in 1963 would have little immediate effect on the level of industrial and agricultural production and, therefore, would not affect the short-run outlook for the supply of consumer goods. The restriction of investment activity, however, would reduce GNP in 1963 and also would reduce the possibility of longer term growth for the economy.

III. Factors Shaping Prospects for 1964 and 1965

A number of factors could result in a substantial increase in Cuban agricultural production during the years following 1963. The island clearly has a great agricultural potential that never has been fully tapped. The revolutionary government is making vigorous efforts to exploit that potential. An extensive replanting program for sugar cane has been started. Efforts are being made throughout agriculture both to extend the area of cultivation and to apply more intensive methods. Furthermore, Cuba has undertaken a broad program of training for agricultural technicians. Several thousand young Cubans have been sent to the Bloc for training, and many of these have already returned to Cuba. Probably more than 1,000 Soviet agriculturalists have come to work on Cuban farms. To a more limited extent, specialists have been brought in from various Free World countries to help with the agricultural problem.

It is difficult to predict that the Cuban agricultural potential will be effectively exploited, in view of the conspicuous lack of success that most Communist countries have had with their agricultural economies. Inasmuch as Cuba may place greater emphasis on investment in agriculture than has been the usual Communist practice, Communism in Cuba may thus avoid at least one of the pitfalls that have afflicted other Bloc societies and thereby may achieve greater success in agriculture than did its European and Asian partners.

The industrial sector of the economy in 1964 and 1965 will continue to be shaped by the two conflicting factors discussed in II (p. 5, above). The level of managerial ability will continue to rise, tending to increase production. On the other hand, the shortage of replacement parts for aging industrial equipment will worsen. In the 1964-65 period, how-

ever, some increase in production from industrial plants imported from the Bloc will help offset the deterioration of older industrial equipment of Western origin. On balance, the prospect is for a gradual increase in total industrial output, given Bloc willingness to maintain recent levels of economic assistance.

The size of the increase will tend to be limited by several factors. First, there is no chance that production of electric power can be increased until some time in 1965. In addition, given the present outlook for exports, the level of imports of fuels and raw materials probably cannot be increased through the end of 1965. Thus the total level of input into the Cuban economy will remain at about the current rate. There is, however, considerable room for improvement within the present rate, for it is evident that mismanagement and inefficiency are wasting a significant amount of the raw materials and power available to the economy.

Cuba will continue to need aid from the Bloc during 1964 and 1965 in about the same amount as in 1963. Cuba's import requirements probably will remain at the present levels. Improvement in agriculture will lead to some import substitution in foods and fibers. On the other hand, present plans call for expansion of investment that will require more capital goods imports. Consequently, the aggregate volume of imports will change little. Exports show little prospect of increasing in 1964 or 1965 in comparison with 1963. Sugar exports will increase in volume, but prices can be expected to return to more normal levels, so that total export earnings will be relatively unaffected.

**600. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
January 21¹**

January 21, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuban Co-Ordinating Committee—Some Draft Papers

Enclosed are three papers (policy, OAS actions and outline of Cuban problems) which I received yesterday. These papers, along with

¹ Transmits three draft papers of the Cuban Coordinating Committee for use by the Executive Committee. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.

a paper on the Brigade, are for the EXCOMM Thursday. In sending them over, Bob Hurwitch emphasized the fact that they were still in draft, that they have not been cleared in the Department and that work still had to be done on them. The final versions of all four papers will be sent to you on Tuesday afternoon.

The policy paper is the most interesting one and I might make the following observations at this time: First, Secretary Vance has evidently won his point; the paper contains two possible courses of action. However, Bob Hurwitch tells me that Mr. Vance is not entirely happy. Evidently some people in DOD would like a couple more weeks to develop, in detail, overt and covert annexes for Course No. 1. Mr. Cottrell has decided against such a delay—see page 4. Second, Bob Hurwitch tells me that Secretary Vance has still not decided which of the two alternatives he likes best. He will undoubtedly do so at the meeting (which I plan to attend) on Monday afternoon.

Gordon Chase

**601. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy,
January 21¹**

January 21, 1963

SUBJECT

Your Discussion Before the NSC Tomorrow

The following topics are set down in random order and you will surely want to organize them your own way.

1. *Cuba*

This is surely the biggest event of 1962, and no one has yet heard your personal judgment of its meaning for the Executive Branch. The following are questions that I for one would ask:

A. What do we expect and not expect as a result in our own attitude toward the world—are we in fact more determined to act on our own best judgment?

¹ Topics for President's discussion before NSC at January 22 meeting including President's personal judgment of the events in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 508, 1/22/63.

B. What balance do you assess as between restraint in action and determination to act firmly where necessary?

C. How do we estimate the behavior and response of other Governments—The British, the French, the OAS, the Soviets themselves?

D. Would you be willing to say a word about the way the whole Executive Branch responded to this crisis? It is true that each part responded in its own way—the JCS with plans for war and the USUN with plans for negotiation—but in fact they all responded and worked in single-minded support of policies which you set, and this is really more important than any difference of judgment. Even the press behaved in a highly cooperative way until the pressure was off and the post mortems began.

E. We still have Cuba with us, and the fact is that a series of rather low-key recommendations will be coming to the Executive Committee from Cottrell's new office. You may want to give some hint of your own judgment of this problem.

F. The post mortem problem is still with us and will have been stirred tomorrow by Stewart Alsop's Post Script. You may want to say a word about your view of such post mortems.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

McG. B.

602. Talking Paper for the Chairman of the JCS, January 24¹

January 24, 1963

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for his use at NSC Executive Committee meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 PM

SUBJECT

Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4 p.m. (U)

Background—On 8 Jan 63, NSAM 213 established the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba with Mr. Cottrell as chairman. Mr. Cottrell is also the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs within the State Department. The Secretary of the Army was appointed the DOD representative.

¹ Papers for NSC Executive Committee meeting on January 25: U.S. policy toward Cuba, the use of the OAS, U.S. policy toward the Cuban Brigade. Top Secret. 5 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, NSC Actions, 19 Nov. 62–28 Feb. 63.

—Recently the JCS have advised the Secretary of the Army generally as follows:

a. *US Policy Toward Cuba.* JCS favor a course that actively pursues the supplanting of the Castro/Communist regime by one compatible with US objectives and sharing where possible the aims of the Free World. (JCSM 67–63 and 69–63)

b. *The Use of the OAS.* JCS view is that withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba should constitute a basic tenet of hemispheric policy, the Council of the Organization of American States/Organ of Consultation (COAS/OC) should continue in being under the 23 October Resolution and that action should be initiated now leading toward establishment of a relationship between the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). (JCSM 71–63)

c. *US Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade*—JCS believe that the Cuban Brigade, as such, is of very limited military value either as an active or reserve unit and that no attempt should be made to retain its identity with a US military force. Concerning the third course of action, as modified in Enclosure C hereto, existing programs for induction of Cuban volunteers into the Army and Navy are considered appropriate and should provide sufficient opportunity for interested individuals to serve in the Armed Forces. (JCSM 70–63)

—On 22 Jan 63 a memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy was circulated with copies to all members of the NSC Executive Committee on the subject: “CUBA—Back-up Papers and a Summary of Recommendations of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs”. Included therein were papers on US policy toward Cuba, the OAS and the Cuban Brigade.

—On 24 Jan 63 two revised papers were circulated on “Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations” and “United States Policy Toward Cuba”. Also a new page 8 for “United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade” was transmitted.

Discussion—The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee wishes to obtain approval at the 4:00 p.m. meeting, Friday, 25 Jan 63, of his revised papers as well as the two other papers that remained unchanged “United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of the American States” and “Current Problems Concerning Cuba.”

—There remain some major and minor differences between the views expressed in the subject papers being circulated and those of the JCS. The enclosures hereto contain specific recommendations for revision of certain parts of the State Department papers:

A—Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations

B—US Policy Toward Cuba

C—US Policy in Cuba in the OAS

D—US Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.

Recommendations—It is recommended that the Chairman, JCS use the revisions proposed in the enclosures hereto at the Friday, 4 p.m. meeting, 25 Jan 63 of the NSC Executive Committee.

Opinion as to Recommendations:

Director, J-5 _____ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Director, Joint Staff _____ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Talking Paper prepared by: Colonel D.C. Pollock, USMC
Western Hemisphere Branch, J-5
Extension 77556

Enclosure A

PROPOSED REVISIONS TO “SUMMARY OF COORDINATOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS”

Revise paragraph on page 4 as follows:

“The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U.S. military program for Cubans. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

Reason: The Cuban Brigade, as such, is of very limited military value either as an active or reserve unit and no attempt should be made to retain its identity with a U.S. military force. A reserve unit specifically identified with the Brigade would inevitably become the focal point for Cuban exile activities. Any impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the US reserve forces, could be a source of embarrassment to the United States.”

Enclosure B

PROPOSED REVISIONS FOR “UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CUBA”

1. Revise paragraph on Page 1 as follows:

“United States Policy

On ~~November 20~~, 31 December 1962, the President set forth the broad guidelines on United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

~~“As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate~~

verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, "we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere". *"It is a policy of the United States to work for a change in the communist regime in Cuba. It is not our intention, under present conditions, to invade Cuba, obviously, or to begin a war against Cuba, providing Cuba lives in peace with its neighbors, or providing Cuba does not engage in aggressive acts."*

Reason: The President on 31 December 1962, in the background briefing conducted in the Paul Home, Palm Beach, Florida, said, "So I think that all we can set down now is a general attitude of the United States toward Castro, which I think we have indicated, our opposition to Castro, and also an indication of our willingness to support any free choice that the Cuban people may make following Castro, to hold out a hope to the people in Cuba, in and out of the government, that the United States would be sympathetic to a change within Cuba. We can't, it seems to me, under present conditions, go further than that."

The foregoing is a more flexible statement of policy and does not preclude the possibility of the United States taking unilateral action at some time in the future.

2. Revise paragraph 5a, page 6 as follows:

"An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, ~~condemning the presence calling for withdrawal~~ of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and ~~terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis~~ continuing the COAS/OC in being under the 23 October Resolution, together with"

Reason: It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Cuba should constitute a basic tenet of hemispheric defense policy.

Further, they also recognize the valuable role of the Council of the Organization of American States/Organ of Consultation (COAS/OC) during the recent crisis, and believe that the Organ of Consultation should continue in being to consider the resolutions under review in the paper. Furthermore, it is considered that the Soviet offensive threat which occasioned the convocation of the COAS/OC could reappear at any time. Soviet armed forces remain in Cuba. Surveyed and secure missile launching sites, essential artillery equipment, and skilled personnel for missile warfare are on hand in Cuba. The missiles themselves could be rapidly reintroduced, perhaps by air. Thus in a matter of hours, a new direct Soviet threat could materialize.

603. Memorandum from Cottrell to the NSC Executive Committee, January 25¹

January 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, at 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT

Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

To determine the future of the *Cuban Brigade* (participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion recently released from Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who participated in or trained for the invasion. To determine the future of existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over 1100 were released.

A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and other Cubans trained militarily by the U.S. must logically proceed from whatever over all policy the U.S. adopts toward Cuba.

A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively marginal military value because of its quantitative limitations and restricted military capability, but its politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be weighed.

COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action appear feasible with respect to the Brigade's future.

(1) *Induce the Brigade to disband as a military unit, with no further U.S. special assistance.*

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and their families would be eligible for the benefits now accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area (approximately 105,000). These benefits are

¹ Future of the Cuban Brigade. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/1–2463.

equivalent to those received by American citizens in Dade County, Florida who are in need. The principal ones include: financial grants of up to \$100 per month for a family and up to \$60 a month for an individual; hospitalization and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities; employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied children; special English and refresher courses for doctors and lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program for Cubans attending U.S. universities provides up to \$1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part of special language courses and vocational training; and physical examinations and inoculations at time of entry into the U.S.

DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the U.S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program for the Navy covers ages 18–26). The program provides 20–22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they are transferred as individuals to U.S. Reserve status. They are not required to know English. A two week period for resettlement is also provided at the termination of the training.

Another DOD program enables former officers of the Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly selective basis for programs in the U.S. Armed Forces. Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is necessary. The officers are in civilian status. They receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer available.

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for service in the U.S. Armed Forces and their language, skill and country knowledge could be distributed through various U.S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade as a result of Administration statements and actions; it would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would probably engender some adverse political reaction domestically as well as from the Brigade and its sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect

on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the Free World concerning the determination of the United States to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to arguments that the U.S. may be leaning toward coexistence with the Castro regime.

(2) *Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve component of the U.S. Armed Forces.*

Considerations:

Under this course of action whatever “mystique” the Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile community.

It would constitute an immediate political and psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin Americans, the U.S. determination to establish a striking force symbolic of U.S. intent to overthrow the present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and *esprit* among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with the statements and actions of the Administration in connection with the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and morale, discipline and *esprit* would be difficult to maintain over the long term without early employment to retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups in the U.S. armed forces reserve component. There is a risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the U.S. reserve forces, could be a source of serious embarrassment to the U.S.

(3) *Tailor a special civilian and military program for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue as a “fraternal” unit similar to the “Flying Tigers”. Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current military training program for Cubans to establish a Brigade military reserve component which other U.S. militarily-trained Cubans could join.*

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the following additional benefits for Brigade members in need, over and above those now offered: special employment counseling and placement service; extended student loans to provide for all institutional costs such as tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds \$1,000 per year (living costs to be provided by another agency); expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased financial assistance to needy persons while in training; increased distribution of surplus food (with approval of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be undertaken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such action would contribute to the defense and security of the United States or advance its foreign policy interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for vocational training anywhere in the United States, an expanded training program similar to a G.I. Bill of Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost of these additional programs assuming an expenditure of \$2,500 per person per year would be about \$2.5 million.

A military component of a specially tailored program would enable Brigade members to enlist in the U.S. Army in the same manner as have other Cuban refugees (about 2000 are now at Fort Jackson, South Carolina). Special arrangements could be made for professional military officers who desired officer training, similar to that now being offered Cuban exile officers in the U.S. armed forces. Individuals trained in this manner might later create or join units, and serve to perpetuate the Brigade unity and "mystique".

Considerations:

A specially tailored program would fulfill any "moral" obligations of the U.S. toward Brigade members and mitigate inevitable complaints.

It would give members their choice of selecting a useful civilian occupation or service in U.S. Armed Forces, weeding out the Brigade and allowing those who want to continue the Brigade as a military unit to pursue this desire through joining a reserve unit after training, thus preserving their core.

It would tend to disperse Brigade members geographically and in different activities, thus effectively disbanding the present entire Brigade as a unit.

Cuban refugees in general might resent special assistance given Brigade members, but probably not if this assistance included the health and educational fields.

HEW would have to set up a special benefit structure, and it should be noted that the additional cost of these programs would have to be met out of current operating funds.

Establishment of additional programs, after a Presidential determination, would increase costs even more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary" privileges for Brigade members.

COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION

1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored program for Brigade members.

2. I recommend against a Presidential determination providing broader privileges for Brigade members.

3. I recommend no change in existing U.S. military training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should be permitted to join.

4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange consultation with them immediately if this course of action is approved.

Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the future desire the presence in the U.S. Armed Forces of militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade members to enlist in the existing military training program for Cubans and to enter a U.S. Reserve Unit thereafter.

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

604. Memorandum from Cottrell to the NSC Executive Committee, January 25¹

January 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963 at 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT

Current Problems Concerning Cuba

1. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
2. Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.
3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus Mr. Robert Geddes, British subject married to a U.S. citizen.
4. Cuban subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere.

¹ Current problems concerning Cuba. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 737.00/1-2463.

5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan.
 6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a political weapon against the Castro regime.
 7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
 8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic paper on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.
 9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in intensified intelligence collection; Policy on illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
 10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia flights to Cuba.
-

605. Memorandum from Helms to Cottrell, undated¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Reaction in the Cuban Exile Community and Brigade to the Attorney General's No Air Support Statements

1. The following information and opinion from reliable Cuban exile sources in Miami, is for your information. Because of the sensitive nature of the information, it is passed to you on an "Eyes Only" basis:

a. The Attorney General's statement that no air support was ever promised for the Playa Giron invasion has had a very bad affect on the Cuban exile community. They were taken completely by surprise and feel the matter should have been left alone as history needs time. They feel the statement dealt a mortal blow to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) because if the CRC was entirely responsible for the invasion the CRC should not have permitted the invasion to take place. Manuel ARTIME and Jose PEREZ San Roman are also being criticized for having permitted the Attorney General to convince them to agree to such a statement. Antonio VARONA's rebuttal was received quite favorably with many appreciative comments. Admiration for VARONA is growing as it is felt he was not afraid to answer the Attorney General. This, coupled with the fact that VARONA refused to accept

¹ Reaction in the Cuban exile community and Brigade to the Attorney General's no air support statements. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/1-2563.

offers of money from American companies for the ransom of his son, is leading people to believe that VARONA would have been a better head of the CRC than MIRO. Everyone in the exile community is awaiting an answer from MIRO, and it is felt that if he does not answer he is finished. If MIRO is to retain any respect among Cubans, he must state the facts and not permit anyone to believe he allowed the Brigade to invade Cuba without support.

b. Col. Wendell Johnson, the liaison officer to the CRC, reports that MIRO is under pressure from the members of the Council to make a public statement on behalf of the CRC refuting the Attorney General's statement. MIRO is finding it increasingly difficult to avoid making such a statement.

c. The morale of the Brigade remains high but the members are disturbed and preoccupied by their ultimate destiny as Brigade members. They are looking forward to a briefing by Jose PEREZ San Roman on his return trip from Washington. Dagoberto DARIAS del Castillo, a Playa Giron veteran from the ship *Rio Escondido*, who recently attacked the administration on TV, is preparing another propaganda attack to be released soon. He will attack the Attorney General's recent statements that the U.S. promised no air support.

d. Many Cubans in the exile community view the establishment of Sterling Cottrell and his office in Miami as an act of U.S. determination to "shunt aside" the CRC and take away its authority. They hopefully anticipate this as the first step to achieve overall Cuban unity preparatory to the liberation of Cuba.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

**606. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
January 28¹**

January 28, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba

I went over to State this morning. Here are some of the latest developments.

1. Donovan's Trip to Cuba

Attached is a memorandum from Mr. Cottrell to the Secretary describing Mr. Donovan's meeting with Castro on January 26. As of this morning, the Secretary had not yet seen this memorandum.

2. The Brigade

Bob Hurwitch had an exploratory-type meeting with the Brigade leaders this week end and also spoke to Miro Cardona, the head of CRC. Bob sees problems. Essentially it is that the Brigade wants independence while Cardona wants them to be dependent upon the civil organization, CRC. After Bob spoke to the Brigade, Brigade members got in touch with the Attorney General and indicated that their talks with Bob Hurwitch did not make them happy.

Bob feels that it is important that the Attorney General understand thoroughly the CRC dimension. Mr. Cottrell will be meeting with the Attorney General tomorrow evening and, probably, Bob will go along.

3. Intelligence Problems

I spoke to Mr. Cottrell briefly and mentioned to him how essential it is that he have all the intelligence information at his disposal. He sees the problems and is considering the desirability of having a CIA man assigned full-time to his office.

4. Cuban Coordinating Committee Meetings

A number of meetings are scheduled for this week, which I plan to attend. They will cover such subjects as the Brigade (this afternoon) and Military Contingency Planning.

Gordon Chase

¹ Latest developments at the Department of State on Cuba: Donovan's trip to Cuba, the Brigade, intelligence problems, Cuban Coordinating Committee meetings. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.

**607. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
January 30¹**

January 30, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba

Here are some of the latest developments in the Cuba situation.

1. The Brigade

The Attorney General, Mr. Cottrell, et al met with the Brigade leaders Tuesday night. Mr. Cottrell tells me that the first thing the Attorney General did was to take the Brigade leaders to one side and give them the word about the intelligence item which referred to Brigade members making speeches about the Bay of Pigs.

Evidently, the Attorney General is becoming well acquainted with the complexities of the problem. One ticklish aspect is Arttime. An ambitious, young Cuban exile, he has hitched his political fortune to the Brigade as its civil agent. Since it is in his interest to see the Brigade as an independent, going concern with political overtones, he is apparently fighting hard to keep the Brigade from falling apart.

Bob Hurwitch is meeting today with Arttime and Cardona. The climax should come Thursday night when the Attorney General and Mr. Cottrell meet with Brigade leaders, Arttime, and Cardona.

2. Psychological Program

Mr. William Jorden has agreed to head a sub-group to prepare a psychological program in support of U.S. policy toward Cuba. He is now drafting a paper describing how he thinks his sub-group should operate. The paper will be completed this week.

3. Planning

Mr. Cottrell held a meeting today in which contingency planning and other planning were discussed. At the end of the meeting he asked that each of the agencies concerned give him the following information:

1. A report on what the agencies are now doing and what they should do in the future to further the objectives listed in the policy paper.

¹ Latest developments in Cuba situation: the Brigade, psychological program, planning, meetings. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.

2. A report on what contingency plans the agencies already have and what further contingency papers they need to meet the Cuban situation.

4. Meetings

There will be a meeting tomorrow on our program against Cuban subversion in the hemisphere.

On Friday there will be a meeting on our policy toward exile groups in Florida. I have urged very quick action on this one in light of recent rumblings that Alpha 66 is going back into action in the near future.

Gordon Chase

608. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, January 30¹

January 30, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba Shipping

You will recall that, in response to the question I raised at the January 25 EXCOM meeting on guidance required by the Department of Agriculture on PL 480 shipments, it was agreed that Agriculture would be given policy guidance along the lines of the fourth paragraph of the draft shipping orders—that is, such cargoes should not be shipped “on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc”. I promised to suggest a method of handling this decision.

On investigating the matter further, it became clear that consistency would require that shipments of AID, GSA (stockpile barter arrangements, etc.), State and DOD should be treated in the same manner as those of Agriculture. It also became clear that, as Poland and Yugoslavia have only one state-owned shipping line, application of the proposed rule would prevent all further shipments of PL 480 cargoes on any vessels of those countries, thus further adding to the problems of our relations with them, particularly Yugoslavia.

¹ Cuba shipping. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220.

Thus after considering the matter, I recommend that, instead of a literal application of the fourth shipping order only to Agriculture, we adopt the policy set forth in the suggested draft NSAM. You will note that this draft contains the following principles:

1. It applies only to the ship rather than to all vessels of the same line.

2. It, however, permits any vessel to “purge” itself if the line gives assurances that thenceforth *all* vessels under its control will stay out of the Cuban trade.

3. It applies not only to bloc-Cuban trade but to all trade with Cuba. In this sense it is wider than the original proposed order but is consistent with the general position we have been taking in our conversations with foreign governments. This does not close United States ports or apply other sanctions to vessels engaged in “innocent” trade between non-bloc countries and Cuba but only says that the United States Government will not reward and facilitate such trade by shipping United States Government cargoes on such vessels.

4. It sets the beginning date at January 1 of this year. This avoids penalizing vessels which were previously engaged in the trade and have subsequently been removed. This date is also consistent with the public warning that was given by the President in his press conference of December 12 that we were considering measures with respect to ships engaged in the Cuba trade.

5. The instruction is directed to the Departments of State, Defense and Agriculture and to AID and GSA, and only with respect to shipments from the United States. These Departments and agencies are the major shippers of United States Government-financed cargoes. I have discussed this with each of the Departments and agencies concerned and the problems of administration, although varying in complexity, are manageable. To seek to apply the instruction to the relatively few shipments originating overseas or between third countries overseas would present administrative difficulties entirely out of proportion to the problem.

As, especially in the case of AID and Agriculture, foreign governments and individuals enter into shipping arrangements affecting such cargoes and therefore must be informed of the “rules of the game”, it is not practicable to effectuate this policy without some publicity. However, I believe it is the sense of the EXCOM that any such publicity should be in as low key as possible. It will also be desirable to give advance information to selected members of the Congress.

As this is a White House instruction applicable to a number of Departments, I suggest that the necessary publicity be originated in the White House. Accordingly, there is also attached a suggested text

of a statement to be made by the White House, together with additional background briefing material for the press.

In order to permit prior notification to the Congress as well as to the NAC, I would appreciate approximately twelve hours' notification prior to the issuance of this NSAM and the White House statement.

I would also like to discuss with you the serious problem of the union (ILA).

U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosures:

Draft NSAM

Draft White House statement, with background briefing material

February 1963

609. Memorandum from McCone to General Taylor, February 1¹

February 1, 1963

I have read General Carroll's recommendation of January 29th for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba and General LeMay's letter of January 25th urging low-level reconnaissance and specifying certain targets.

I concur in the plan for the reason that I have repeatedly suggested low-level reconnaissance during recent months, both as a means of improving our intelligence gathering effort and for psychological reasons also. However, to date the COMOR Committee of the United States Intelligence Board has felt that U-2 photography was giving all desired information and that no unusual situation had been noted which would warrant a request to me, and from me to the President, for authority to conduct low-level missions. As recently as 23 January '63, in response to my suggestion for low-level missions over Guerra, the COMOR Committee reported that low-level photography would reveal nothing not revealed in the U-2 photography then being conducted.

This morning I spent a considerable time reviewing recent photography with a member of the U.S. Senate and was convinced, as was he, that our U-2 photography was giving us a very comprehensive picture of what is going on in Cuba.

Therefore in supporting the recommendation of General Carroll, I am obliged to take exception to statements in General LeMay's letter in which he states, "The literal fact is that we do not really know what is going on in Cuba", for I do not feel this statement is correct; and I also take exception to General Carroll's statement in which he says, "We find ourselves in somewhat the same position we were in in the latter part of September", for by this statement General Carroll has indicated that our current program of U-2 photography is non-productive in the sense we flew no flights in the latter part of September except two peripheral flights on the eastern end of the Island.

I therefore propose that the records show that low-level photography is desired to supplement a very comprehensive and informative high-level program which has been carried on now since mid-October.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Memos for the Record, Box 2.

610. Circular telegram 1365 to all Latin American diplomatic posts, February 5¹

February 5, 1963

Upon receipt of follow-up telegram indicating White House approval, you should at your earliest opportunity convey following to appropriate host government officials:

USG, Congress and American public remain concerned over Cuban shipping question. We appreciate that many Free World countries have made efforts to assist US by discouraging ships in Cuban trade and that shipping has declined since October. Despite this cooperative effort by our Allies, shipping to Cuba unfortunately continues. For example, since end of US quarantine on November 20, total of 47 Free World ships have arrived at Cuban ports. We do not wish make US official cargo available to ships that engage Cuban trade and thereby make their trade more profitable. US has thus found it necessary issue following administrative regulations. (You need give only second and third sentences): QUOTE: At its meeting on February 5, 1963, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council considered US policy with respect to shipments financed by the Departments of State, Agriculture, DOD, GSA, and AID on foreign flag ships engaged in the Cuba trade. It was decided that such cargoes should not be shipped from the US on a foreign flag vessel if such vessel has called at a Cuba port on or after January 1, 1963. An exception may be made as to any such vessel if the persons who control the vessel give satisfactory assurances that no ships under their control will, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the USG to discourage such trade. The Secretary of State will be consulted on the form and content of any such assurances.

The Secretaries of State, Agriculture and Defense, the Administrator of AID, and the Administrator of GSA were directed to take such steps as may be necessary to effectuate this policy.

The Secretary of Commerce should currently make available to the affected Departments pertinent information which he may have on ships engaged in the Cuba trade. END QUOTE.

Full text of foregoing administrative directive and accompanying explanation will be conveyed by Department to appropriate to COAS

¹ Message over U.S. concern over Cuban shipping question to convey to host government officials. Confidential. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense Cable Files, Cuba, 1963.

committees and OAS representatives. Brief White House announcement re directive will probably be made February 6.

If asked about relationship above administrative directive to four-point shipping action (OT TEL 589), you should reply that this directive represents an adaptation of the fourth point. Action on other aspects of the then-proposed four-point shipping actions has been deferred for time being in hope voluntary action further reduce free world shipping in Cuba trade will continue.

Following clarifying points may also be used if required:

1. Above administrative directive applies only to the ship rather than to all vessels of same line.

2. However, ship may be restored to eligibility if those in control of ship give satisfactory assurances that thenceforth *all* vessels under their control will stay out of the trade.

3. It applies not only to bloc-Cuba trade but to all trade with Cuba.

4. It applies only to cargoes shipped from US, and will not affect off-shore procurement.

5. By setting beginning date of January 1 of this year, it avoid penalizing vessels which were previously engaged in Cuba trade but which subsequently have been removed.

As indicated above, we will inform you immediately upon receipt White House approval.

Rusk

611. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to McNamara, February 5¹

February 5, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba Shipping Restrictions

At the EXCOM meeting on January 25, 1963, the President approved the following shipping restrictions as guidance to the Department of Agriculture with respect to PL 480 shipments.

¹ Cuba shipping restrictions. Confidential. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, Foreign Policy History Files: FRC 330277–131, Chron File—Cuban Affairs.

"Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc."

On January 30, 1963, Alexis Johnson recommended that EXCOM approve an NSAM with the following shipping restrictions:

"... It was decided that such cargoes [shipments financed by the Departments of State, Defense and Agriculture, GSA and Agency for International Development] should not be shipped from the United States on a foreign flag vessel if such vessel has called at a Cuban port on or after January 1, 1963. An exception may be made as to any such vessel if the persons who control the vessel give satisfactory assurance that no ships under their control will, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the United States Government to discourage such trade. . . ."

The main differences between what was approved at the EXCOM meeting and the Alexis Johnson recommendation are:

- (1) The Johnson recommendation applies only to the ship carrying the cargo, not to all vessels of the same line;
- (2) The Johnson recommendation permits any vessel to "purge" itself if the shipping line in control of that vessel gives assurances that all vessels under its control will stay out of Cuban trade in the future;
- (3) The Johnson recommendation applies not only to Bloc-Cuban trade but to all trade with Cuba;
- (4) The Johnson recommendation is directed to several Government departments; the earlier recommendation applied to any shipment of the Department of Agriculture.

The reasons given by Alexis Johnson for his recommendations are:

- (1) Consistency requires that the restriction apply to several Government departments and not merely to Agriculture, and
- (2) Since Poland and Yugoslavia have only one state-owned shipping line, application of the earlier recommendation would prevent all further shipments of PL 480 cargoes on any vessels of those countries and this would further add to problems in our relations with them.

Mr. Johnson's reason for applying the restriction to individual vessels, rather than all ships controlled by a particular line or country, is to permit Poland and Yugoslavia to carry PL 480 shipments on their vessels. However, the Johnson recommendation as now written permits any country with a state-owned shipping line or any privately-owned shipping line in a country to use certain of its ships exclusively for trade with Cuba and keep its other ships free of any of the proposed shipping restrictions. Mr. Johnson probably drafted his proposed NSAM in this manner to avoid the political problems of carving out a special exception for Poland and Yugoslavia with no comparable

provision for any pro-Western, Latin American, or neutral country. Thus, the judgment to be made with respect to this portion of the Johnson recommendation is whether the creation of a large loophole in the shipping restriction is justified by the need to avoid problems with Poland and Yugoslavia with respect to PL 480 shipments.

The Johnson submission to McGeorge Bundy is attached at Tab A; the papers considered by EXCOM at the January 25 meeting are attached at Tab B. The portion of those papers dealing with shipping restrictions on Cuba is marked by Tab C.

Cyrus R. Vance

Attachments

As stated

612. Report prepared for the Executive Committee, February 5¹

February 5, 1963

SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

Personnel

I. From a few hundred technicians in the summer of 1962, the Soviet military presence in Cuba has grown to include regular troops manning the tanks and other weapons of mobile army groups, radar and missile specialists in charge of an extensive air defense system, and a large number of communications, air force, naval, and other personnel.

A. Although some 5,000 to 6,000 troops associated with the offensive missile systems have left, we believe 17,000 Soviet military personnel remain.

1. These troops operate equipment which the Cubans are not yet able to operate or which the Soviets do not intend to give to Cuba.

2. They are a tangible expression of Soviet concern for the preservation of a Communist state in Cuba.

¹ Soviet Forces in Cuba. Top Secret. 12 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. IV, 34–42.

- a. They help defend Castro regime against internal attack.
 - b. They may also serve as brake on Castro adventurism.
3. There are no indications of major Soviet troop withdrawals from Cuba, either planned or in train.
4. DETAILS: Major components and estimated strengths are:
- a. Air and air defense: 7,500
 SAM system—3,500
 AAA and radars—3,100
 MIG fighters—900
 - b. Army ground forces: 7,500
 Armored groups—5,000
 Headquarters, engineers, training—2,500
 - c. Navy: 2,000
 Cruise-missile units—1,000
 KOMAR guided-missile boats—200
 Headquarters, communications, security—800

Air Defense System

II. To defend their MRBMs and IRBMs, the Soviets planned and largely achieved before the missile withdrawals an integrated air defense system employing both surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and jet fighters, backed by an extensive radar and communications net.

A. Efforts to improve the SAM system continue.

1. Since the withdrawal of the MRBM and IRBM units, three SAM sites have been involved in major relocations. In each case, the SAM site was moved away from the coast and closer to an important military objective.

2. On 30 January, a new SAM site under construction was photographed southeast of Havana near a military airfield. This may indicate that an existing SAM site near the coast in the same general area will shortly be moved.

3. DETAILS:

a. 24 operational SAM sites, each with 6 launchers and approximately 20 missiles. Total SAM missiles—approximately 500.

b. SA-2 missile (Guideline) has an estimated range of 25–30 n.m. with a 500-lb. HE warhead. The SA-2 is considered effective against aircraft operating between 3,000 and 80,000 feet, with limited effectiveness down to 2,500 feet and up to 100,000 feet.

c. The SAM sites appear to be manned entirely by Soviet personnel. Although some training of Cubans in operation of SAM equipment may be planned, there are no indications that this has begun.

B. To supplement surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets have brought in 104 MIG fighters.

1. Of these, 42 are MIG-21 (Fishbed) aircraft, manned entirely by Soviet personnel.

a. The MIG–21 is a highspeed (Mach 2) aircraft which can be used both for ground support and air defense. Its armaments includes infrared homing air-to-air missiles. It has a combat radius of 350 n.m.

b. The MIG–21 aircraft probably is capable of carrying nuclear weapons. [*text not declassified*]

c. If a nuclear weapon was attached to this aircraft, its radius of action would be seriously restricted, to about 200 nautical miles and then only under visual flight conditions.

d. There is no evidence, from our continuing photo-reconnaissance of Cuban airfields or other sources, of any special security or other activity which would take place if nuclear weapons for these aircraft were in Cuba.

1. The Soviets run their own communications with little or no help from the Cubans or Cuban facilities.

2. Cubans appear to work conjointly with Soviets in some reporting aspects of the air defense network. They have no controlling function over the missiles themselves.

3. DETAILS:

a. [*text not declassified*]

b. [*text not declassified*]

Cruise Missiles

III. Although the Soviets brought in approximately 150 coastal defense missiles during the build-up, they have thus far established only 4 operational sites.

A. The large number of cruise missiles which remain in crates suggests that the Cuban crisis interrupted a Soviet program to deploy several more sites.

B. DETAILS:

1. There are 4 operational units, with 8–10 missiles each, at Sigua-nea, Santa Cruz del Norte, Banes, and Campo Florida (a standby and training site). Total missiles: 32–40.

2. Cruise missiles are believed to be in crates observed at:

Guerra (just west of Mariel)—46

Mayari Arriba (in eastern Cuba)—48

Santiago de Cuba (west of Guantanamo)—21

a. This makes a total of 115 cruise missiles still in crates, enough to establish about 15 more sites.

3. The coastal defense missile observed in Cuba is a surface-launched version of the AS–1 air-to-surface, anti-shipping missile. In this version, it has an estimated range of 30 to 40 nautical miles, with a 2,200-pound conventional warhead.

Soviet Armored Groups

IV. In late August and early September, the Soviets established mobile armored groups at camps in the general vicinity of the offensive missile sites. These units were probably meant to provide local defense for these sites in event of US invasion or guerrilla sabotage attempts.

A. Each encampment—at Remedios, Santiago de las Vegas, Artemisa, and Holguin—contains about 1,500 officers and men and their organic equipment.

1. The four groups have a total of 40 heavy tanks, 340 medium tanks, and 15 amphibious tanks, as well as assault guns, mortars, and infantry rocket launchers.

2. There are about 24–32 FROG tactical rockets, an anti-personnel weapon with a range of about 50,000 yards.

3. The Soviet mobile armored groups are also equipped with 28 SNAPPER wire-guided anti-tank rockets.

Missile Patrol Boats

V. To complement the coastal defense capabilities of the cruise missiles, the Soviets brought in 12 KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats.

A. These units are being operated by mixed Soviet and Cuban crews.

B. DETAILS:

1. The boat is a Soviet P-6 motor torpedo boat hull modified to carry two missile launchers. It has a top speed of 43 knots with maximum range of 650 n.m. at 20 knots.

2. The missile has a range of 10–15 nautical miles (limited by radar line-of-sight) and carries a conventional warhead of about 2,000 pounds.

3. All 12 KOMAR's are now in Mariel-Havana area, although 4 have operated out of Banes at times in the past.

Attachment

SUMMARY OF DCI'S STATEMENT TO MAHON COMMITTEE ON SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA

I. On 1 July 1962, shortly before the Soviet buildup began, we estimated roughly 500 bloc advisors and technicians in Cuba.

A. This was based on the extent of training programs underway and Soviet practice in other countries like Egypt and Indonesia.

II. After the buildup began, we added to this figure on the basis of arrivals of passenger ships known to be carrying military personnel, assuming they were normally loaded.

A. Our figures progressively rose to 2,000 on 1 August, 2,300 on 1 September, and 4,000 on 19 September.

B. We knew some additional Soviets had come on cargo ships, but could not say how many.

C. These estimates were what the intelligence community could agree on. We now know they were much too low.

III. Once we received the photography of 14 October, we were able to shift our methodology. By 22 October we had a rough estimate that a minimum of 8,000–10,000 Soviets would be needed to man the Soviet weapons systems then known to be in Cuba.

IV. At this time we were giving first priority to the strategic weapons systems. The question of personnel numbers was of lesser importance.

A. We were however, accumulating a mass of additional information from many sources. As time permitted detailed analysis, we progressively raised our estimate until we now believe there were about 22,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba at the height of the buildup. (Apparently the passenger ships were troop loaded and substantial numbers came in on cargo ships.)

B. This figure included the four armored groups which were only identified in November.

V. Some 5,000–6,000 Soviets departed in November and December, leaving our present figure of 17,000 now there.

A. We think this figure is the best that can be reached. We have covered Cuba exhaustively.

B. Some individual sources have reported figures considerably higher than these. Recognizing that neither we nor anyone else can make a head count, we only report those figures which can be verified by available intelligence resources.

Annex A

SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

	1 July 1962	1 November 1962	1 February 1963
MRBMs	0	42	0
Tanks	160	345	395
Field artillery and AT guns	770	1,320	1,320
AAA guns	560	710	710
FROG rockets	0	24–32	24–32
Military vehicles	3,800	7,500–10,000	7,500–10,000
SAM sites	0	24	24
SAM missiles	0	500	500
Cruise-missile sites	0	4	4
Cruise missiles	0	150	150
Air defense radars	0	About 160	About 200
Jet fighters	35	101	104
Jet light bombers	0	42	0
Helicopters	24	About 70	About 85–100
KOMAR cruise- missile boats	0	12	12

Annex B

ESTIMATE AS OF DATE LISTED OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA (EXCLUSIVE OF CIVILIANS)

1 July 1962	500
1 August 1962	at least 2,000 ²
1 September 1962	at least 2,300 ²
19 September 1962	about 4,000 ²
22 October 1962	8,000–10,000 ³
1 December 1962	15,000–22,000 (present at height of buildup)
15 December 1962	17,000 (present after departure of missiles and bombers)
1 February 1963	17,000

² Agreed intelligence community estimates based on known normal passenger capacity of ships.

³ Retrospective analysis shows 22,000 present at this time.

**613. Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence,
February 6¹**

February 6, 1963

**STATEMENT ON CUBA BY DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

In view of the many conflicting rumors and reports concerning Soviet missiles and troops in Cuba, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John A. McCone, has issued the following statement on the current status of Soviet military forces and equipment there. This statement represents the agreed views of the United States Intelligence Board, of which Mr. McCone is Chairman. This board is made up of the chief intelligence officers of the United States Government.²

It rests on the most up-to-date and reliable data available to the United States Government and is derived from all of the intelligence gathering resources at its disposal, including daily aerial surveillance.

STATEMENT

Hundreds of reports on Soviet forces in Cuba are received weekly by United States intelligence agencies and each of them is checked carefully for reliability and credibility by trained and experienced intelligence analysts. The totality of information derived from all sources, including extensive photographic coverage, gives the best picture available in the United States of the Soviet military presence in Cuba today.

At the President's direction the situation in Cuba has been regularly reviewed and information has been made available through the Department of Defense over the last several months.

As has been frequently reported, there was a substantial buildup of Soviet military equipment and military forces prior to the "quarantine" of October and November 1962. The USSR had in fact supplied

¹ Current status of Soviet military forces and equipment in Cuba. No classification marking. 9 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.

² The members of the United States Intelligence Board are: General Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Rogers Hilsman, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force; Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake, Director, National Security Agency; Major General Richard Collins, Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Assistant General Manager for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

a great deal of military equipment to Cuba prior to July 1962, including tanks, field artillery pieces, anti-tank guns, and jet military aircraft, all of which had been positively identified. On 1 July 1962 there were about 500 Soviet military technicians in Cuba advising and training the Cuban armed forces, then estimated at about 75,000 regulars, 100,000 militia and 100,000 homeguard.

In mid-July 1962 began the influx of Soviet military equipment and military personnel which was detected by our Intelligence Community and monitored into the crisis period of September and October, when the offensive nuclear weapon systems (missiles and bombers) appeared. This build up ceased on October 24th, with the establishment of the quarantine. We are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, as has been stated by the Department of Defense, that all offensive missiles and bombers known to be in Cuba were withdrawn soon thereafter. Photography of ships loading in Cuban ports and at sea proves to our satisfaction the withdrawal of 42 medium range missiles and 42 bombers, their related equipment and attendant personnel. Reconnaissance has not detected the presence of offensive missiles or bombers in Cuba since that time.

Many rumors and reports of the continued presence of the offensive weapons in Cuba have been received. For instance, there have been a number of reports that offensive weapons have been concealed in caves. Some of these reports evidently derive from the known Cuban practice of using caves for storage of small-arms, ammunition and other items of military hardware. All statements alleging the presence of offensive weapons are meticulously checked. So far the findings have been negative. Absolute assurance on these matters, however, could only come from continuing, penetrating on-site inspection.

Prior to the 24th of October, however, very substantial quantities of Soviet military personnel and Soviet equipment, in addition to the offensive missiles and bombers, had already reached Cuba. The inventory of tanks, jet aircraft, military trucks and field pieces more than doubled during this period. In addition many sophisticated Soviet military items appeared for the first time.

Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

From a few hundred military technicians in the summer of 1962, the Soviet armed forces in Cuba grew by October 24th to include regular troops manning the tanks and other weapons of mobile armored groups, specialists in charge of an extensive surface-to-air missile system, and a large number of other air force, naval and army personnel.

Our current evaluation, based on all sources including known tables of organization of Soviet units, is that a total of about 22,000 Soviet troops were in Cuba during September and October. Since then

about 5,000 troops associated with offensive missile systems have left. Some 17,000 Soviet military personnel now remain in Cuba.

Air Defense System

The USSR also planned and largely built an integrated air defense system employing surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, complex radars, anti-aircraft batteries and jet fighters. There are 24 operational SAM sites, each with 6 launchers. There is probably a total of about 500 SAM missiles in the system. The SAM sites appear to be manned entirely by Soviet personnel.

To supplement surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets brought in additional MIG fighters, reaching a total of about 100, including 42 MIG–21 aircraft, a modern high-speed (Mach 2) interceptor which can be used both for ground support and air defense. About 200 modern Soviet radars were installed to tie the systems together.

Cruise Missiles

The Soviets have brought in approximately 150 coastal defense missiles and have thus far established 4 operational sites. A large number of these cruise missiles are still in storage, which suggests that the Cuban crisis interrupted a Soviet program to construct several more sites. There are probably missiles enough to establish 15 more sites. These coastal defense missiles have an estimated range of 30 to 40 nautical miles and hence the entire installation would provide a formidable coastal defense system.

Missile Patrol Boats

In addition, the Soviets brought in 12 KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats. These units appear to be operated by mixed Soviet and Cuban crews. They are Soviet motor torpedo boats with the hull modified to carry two missile launchers. The missile employed has a range of 10–15 nautical miles (limited by radar line-of-sight).

Soviet Armored Groups

The Soviets also introduced four mobile armored groups deployed at camps throughout Cuba. These four units have a total strength of about 5,000 officers and men. They also have tanks, armored personnel carriers, assault guns, mortars, and infantry rocket launchers. In addition there are several advanced-type tactical rocket launchers, anti-personnel weapons with a range of about 25 miles.

Shipping to Cuba

The U.S. intelligence agencies are closely observing Soviet ships calling at Cuban ports. The massive Soviet military deliveries to Cuba ceased on 23 October. At that time more than 15 ships at sea, undoubtedly fully loaded with military cargoes, turned back to the USSR.

Fifty odd Soviet-dry-cargo vessels have arrived in Cuba since 1 November. Of these only one has delivered any significant amount of

military equipment to Cuba although small quantities may have arrived in other ships. An arms-carrying ship, the *Simferopol*, delivered a cargo on 17 January which we believe was exclusively military, but which, we know from dependable sources, did not contain offensive missiles or aircraft. Another ship with a similar cargo is probably now en route between the USSR and Cuba. The remaining Soviet and Bloc ships now en route to Cuba appear to be carrying principally commercial cargo. Soviet bloc shipping to Cuba is substantially higher than a year ago, and though free world shipping has decreased sharply, the total cargo tonnage now being received in Cuba is about the same as a year ago.

From all of this, we must conclude:

- a) there remain large quantities of Soviet tanks, guns, aircraft and troops, most of which arrived before the quarantine; and
- b) a relatively small amount of Soviet military equipment has reached Cuba in the period since the quarantine.

The intelligence community of the United States Government continues to keep under close surveillance and to report currently on this extraordinary deployment of sizeable Soviet military forces into the Western Hemisphere. All evidence reaching us, including reports from Cuban refugees but also including photography and other reliable sources, is carefully sifted and weighed. The United States Government must be provided the most accurate, responsible and balanced evaluation of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Significant information concerning conditions in Cuba received by citizens or government officials should be transmitted to the intelligence community promptly for evaluation in our continuing close scrutiny of this grave situation.

614. Memorandum for record, February 6¹

February 6, 1963

At 4:00 o'clock on February 5th, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC was held attended by all, including Cottrell, Salinger, Sylvester and Mr. Jordan of State. The Cuban situation was discussed, overflights were denied despite recommendations by General Taylor

¹ Meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC re Cuban situation including overflights, incoming Soviet ship. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963.

supported by DCI, for seven low-level missions, and final appeal by DCI for the Cayo Francis mission. DCI expressed one reservation, which was the possible effect of low-level reconnaissance on the Donovan mission, which had not been fully explored. The President ruled there would be no low-level overflights until after a Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange.

The President asked, and DCI responded, that the incoming ship suspected of carrying armament was under careful surveillance and this would continue: DCI would make recommendations concerning low-level reconnaissance of unloading when ship arrived at port, indicating that if the ship went into Havana, low-level reconnaissance would not be productive because of the proximity of receiving warehouses to the dockside. On the other hand, if the ship docked at Matanzas or Mariel, low-level photography would be productive.

ACTION: DD/P should recruit all resources; CIA should ensure that the Navy is following the ship closely at sea; DCI should receive regular reports in order to approach the President for a policy decision.

It was agreed that DCI should make a public statement and that DIA should arrange a background briefing, and that CIA's special committee chairman should be advised of the proposed public statement.

There followed a general discussion of the Cuban situation, the Common Market, NATO problems. Those interested in Cuba were excused and Ambassadors Dowling, Bruce and Kohler, Governor Herter and Dean Acheson attended this part of the meeting.

The President raised questions and circulated a memorandum posing a number of penetrating questions on European affairs.

The President questioned whether the multilateral arrangements would in the final analysis prove satisfactory to any NATO country because of our right of veto. He asked that this be studied, feeling it would be better not to proceed too far down this road if, in the final analysis, it would meet objection from one or several NATO partners.

Ambassador Dowling commented on the Franco-German treaty, stating that this treaty will not be acted upon in Bonn for three or four months, that it can not be defeated but it might be amended if we exercise proper influence.

There was general discussion of the possibility of a British Common Market Association and its effect on U.S. economy. This was considered a definite possibility now that the British Common Market negotiations had been broken off. The President asked an appraisal of the economic implications of such a development.

John A. McCone
Director

**615. Memorandum from President Kennedy to McNamara,
February 11¹**

February 11, 1963

[illegible in the original] on my intelligence [illegible in the original] that [illegible in the original] photographic [illegible in the original] the matter. [illegible in the original] impression was [illegible in the original] reconnaissance flights would [illegible in the original] quick in and quick out trips. [illegible in the original] that [illegible in the original] over Cuba for a total of [illegible in the original]—12 minutes. It is possible that [illegible in the original] over the [illegible in the original] more than once. [illegible in the original] operation.

Our [illegible in the original]
[illegible in the original]

John F. Kennedy

¹ Request for views on reconnaissance flight instructions. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 1896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963.

616. Memorandum for record, February 14¹

February 14, 1963

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 14 February 1963

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

4. Of course the question of Cuba came up, with emphasis on the presence of Soviet troops there. Bundy advanced an explanation which he claims to have conceived only yesterday, although it does not strike me as particularly original. He says that his theory is that the Soviets have been keeping their troop units in Cuba in order to “protect” their SAMs and generally to keep an eye on the Cubans—for example, with

¹ Daily White House staff meeting: Soviet troops in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, Feb 1963.

respect to permitting our aerial surveillance to proceed unhindered. Bob Amory said he thought that there might be a little of the “plate glass window” philosophy behind this troop presence, similar to the effect produced and purpose served by the Allied garrisons in Berlin. Mr. Chester Cooper said that, of course, these Soviet troops also served Khrushchev as a bargaining counter.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

Legere

**617. Aide-Mémoire from the Soviet Government to the U.S.
Government February 18¹**

February 18, 1963

AIDE MEMOIRE
(Informal Translation)

In the course of the exchange of messages between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, and the President of the U.S.A., J. F. Kennedy, concerning the settlements of the crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea the parties reached agreement and undertook fixed obligations which permitted liquidation of that dangerous crisis and created conditions for the further normalization of the situation in that area of the world. The Soviet Union has fulfilled its obligations honestly. The Soviet Government will in the future uphold the agreement which was reached proceeding naturally on the assumption that the Government of the U.S.A. will likewise strictly and unswervingly fulfill the obligations which it took upon itself.

In the Soviet Union attention has been turned to the fact that recently American representatives including Secretary of State D. Rusk, U.S. Ambassador in the USSR F. Kohler and others in conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington expressed the desire that some of the Soviet military personnel found there be withdrawn from Cuba. It was further given to understand that this question is disturbing the President creating for him certain difficulties and is exerting an

¹ Notification of Soviet withdrawal from Cuba of several thousand Soviet personnel before the middle of March. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, General, 1/63–3/63.

undesirable influence on the further development of Soviet-American relations and on the possibility of settling other international questions. The President himself at his press conference of February 7, 1963 this year expressed the concern of the Government of the U.S.A. in connection with "the continuing presence of Soviet military personnel" on Cuba, noting however that there had been a significant reduction of the numbers of this personnel.

As is known the Soviet military personnel servicing the rocket installations left Cuba together with the weapons.

It is also known that the Soviet Government informed the Government of the U.S.A. of the intention of the Soviet Union to withdraw from Cuba in due course those groups of Soviet military personnel devoted to the protection of the types of weapons withdrawn from Cuba.

Now the Soviet Government wishes to inform the Government of the U.S.A. and the President personally that it has taken a decision to withdraw from Cuba Soviet military personnel connected with the protection of the types of weapons withdrawn from Cuba and likewise some of the military specialists involved in the training of Cuban troops. It is intended to recall from Cuba in the nearest future—before the middle of March—several thousand men.

The Soviet Government considers that this decision will lead to a normalization of the situation around Cuba.

The Soviet Government sincerely hopes that this act of good will on its part will be properly evaluated by the Government of the U.S.A. and the President personally as a demonstration of the readiness of the Soviet Union to seek a further reduction of international tension and an improvement of relations between the USSR and the U.S.A. and will be correspondingly taken into consideration in the foreign political actions of the U.S. of America.

**618. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
February 18¹**

February 18, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuban Coordinating Committee—Progress Report

Here are some of the latest developments.

1. Contingency Planning

Attached is a report of a possible revolt in Cuba on February 20. While State and CIA view the likelihood of the revolt actually taking place as small, State and Defense are now cranking out some contingency plans. A draft will be ready Tuesday.

2. The Brigade

A civilian and military program for Brigade members has been worked out which has both the approval of the CRC and the Brigade, as well as the U.S. Government. The Brigade members are being given the opportunity to opt for a military program, or a civilian program. It is expected that the programs will be underway by early March.

Sterling Cottrell mentioned one new problem. A group of non-Brigade Cuban Navy people, who participated in the invasion, recently wrote to the AG asking—what do we get? Cott is working this out with the AG.

3. American Prisoners

Mr. Donovan is going down to Havana at the beginning of March to talk some more with Castro.

4. Cuban Subversive Training of Latin Americans

Mr. Cottrell had a meeting on this subject last Wednesday where a number of methods were discussed to control travelers to Cuba. It was decided that the most efficient way to get at the problem would be to concentrate on the transportation services to Cuba. In this regard it was agreed that the following steps should be more thoroughly explored:

a.) To persuade the men to stop air services between Mexico and Cuba.

¹ Cuban Coordinating Committee progress report: contingency planning, the Brigade, American prisoners, Cuban subversive training of Latin Americans, action in the UN. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII(B), 2/63.

- b.) To discourage Venezuelans from allowing KLM to resume services to Cuba.
- c.) To prevent unscheduled Cuban flights in Latin America.
- d.) To stop the Canadians from carrying passengers in their freight flights to Cuba.
- e.) To discredit and keep under surveillance those Latin Americans who had received training in Cuba.

I understand that Ambassador Thurston's group now has this problem in hand. They are meeting with Ralph Dungan this afternoon.

5. Action in the UN

Mr. Cottrell said that State is preparing a paper (near completion) outlining our case in the event Castro decides to complain at the UN about U.S. reconnaissance flights.

Gordon Chase

**619. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to General Taylor,
February 19¹**

February 19, 1963

The President notes in a Cuban Task Force report on contingency planning for Cuba that it would take 18 days from the moment of alert to make an invasion of the island, and he told me to ask you for a comment on this delay and on the ways and means which might be available for shortening it. His impression is that the principal problem is shipping, but he would be glad to have an up-to-date account from you.

McGeorge Bundy

¹ Transmits the President's request for ways and means to shorten the 18-day lead time in contingency planning for an invasion of Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. VII(B), 2/63.

620. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Hilsman and Ball, February 20¹

February 20, 1963

GB: The Secretary had a call from McCone last night saying that what Lipscomb objected to in my testimony was not apparently covered in your discussion with him, which is absolute nonsense.

RH: That's right.

GB: And indicated, as I understood it, that he disagreed with you, nor discussed with you the numbers of things that were down there.

RH: That is not correct. What is correct and where he is vulnerable on is that he is going all over town saying that he told everybody again and again and again and he never once mentioned it to us.

GB: You mean about his doubts?

RH: Yes, that's right. He discussed numbers with me. I read him the whole damn statement and I specifically said to him that I talked to him and he said "Well that was just everything else and doesn't mention missiles." But I said its title is as I read to you "Summary of weapons in Cuba". If you thought there were missiles there, you are agreeing to something that doesn't make sense for you to agree to something that leaves out the single most most important fact. He thought it over between calls and is starting to back out.

GB: The next time I tell him anything, I'm going to get it signed in writing and notarized.

RH: By the way, I had dinner last night at the Netherlands Embassy and Frances Bolton, who I have considered a good friend of mine for a number of years, she said: "You know, John McCone testified before our Committee and I was just so pleased because several times he volunteered his view point on developments in Cuba, agreeing with those of us on the Republican side who are dissenting, and it was so refreshing." This was only yesterday. I'm trying to get that testimony now.

GB: We should have it.

RH: I think we should, too.

GB: I rather think they are going to centralize all testimony over in Bundy's shop. I think I'll write John a letter and say I would assume that you will have no objection to my sending the following letter to the Committee; that I find it . . . and let it go at that, don't you think so?

¹ Numbers of weapons in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

RH: I think it's a good idea.

GB: Because he's not going to do a thing.

RH: No, he's not. This thing is really weird. I would like to sit down with you and Alex on this problem, because something happened this morning that if I am to protect you and the State Department and get our views in—McCone had this memorandum, aide memoire, from the Bolsheviks, you see. You know I had never seen it. I tried to fake it, but nevertheless it puts me in a position where I can't be effective. I would like to talk with you and Alex for about a half-hour.

GB: All right, let's see if we can do it tomorrow.

RH: Very good. I'd like Tom Hughes in on it, too.

GB: OK.

621. Memorandum for the U.S. Intelligence Board, February 21¹

February 21, 1963

SUBJECT

Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba

REFERENCE

USIB-D-41.14/12 (COMOR-D-24/47), 20 February 1963

1. The United States Intelligence Board, at a special meeting on this date, considered the referenced report on the subject by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, and approved it subject to certain amendments.

2. The report, in the form approved by USIB, is attached hereto.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

¹ Transmits approved report entitled "Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba." Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963.

Attachment

SUBJECT

Requirements for Low-level Reconnaissance of Cuba

1. The minute of the meeting of the Special Group on 15 February 1963 requested a comprehensive study of low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. The minute stated that “such a study would include consideration of the strategic significance of proposed targets.” COMOR has reviewed its previous recommendations for low-level photography and sets forth below its present thinking pursuant to the above injunction.

2. Of major concern to the United States Government is the introduction into Cuba of offensive weapons (MRBMs or IRBMs and bombers) or the release from concealment of any such equipment which may not have been removed from Cuba and which might be deployed to already prepared basic installations. There is therefore a continuing requirement to investigate suspect and unexplained military activities which might be associated with offensive weapons systems and nuclear energy activities.

3. Two categories of targets which might give us information concerning the presence or introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba are ships suspect of carrying military equipment and personnel, and a number of unidentified installations, which include underground or unusual facilities.

a. *Ships*: We consider the monitoring of large-hatch ships (suspect of carrying offensive weapons) and other ships designated of “special interest” (e.g., troop carriers) entering Cuba to be of major importance. FAR photography while the ship is approaching the island and high-level photography while the ship is in port have not thus far and probably will not permit us to monitor these cargoes adequately. COMOR considers that while these ships are in port they should be covered during the daytime by low-level photography to supplement high-level coverage. In addition and based on recent experience, COMOR is convinced that suspicious military equipment will be unloaded at night and, therefore, believes that nighttime photography will likewise be required.

b. *Unidentified Installations*: A number of unidentified installations, the majority of which include underground facilities, have been isolated by high-level coverage. These installations (listed at Tab A) are strongly suspect as being established for weapons storage of some sort. With high-level coverage and with some low-level coverage in the past we have not been able to explain the enigma which these facilities present. However, we do know that in many cases an appraisal of the photography over a period of time shows the growth and expansion of such facilities. We consider their existence and continued development as sinister. We also believe that low-level photography can contribute to explaining the uses for which these facilities are intended. We again recognize that in the course, depending upon the nature of our findings,

nighttime or other types of photography (such as camouflage detection may be required and justifiable.

4. In addition to surveillance of any offensive threat the number of Soviet personnel and the amount of [illegible in the original] equipment presently located in Cuba is a cause of major concern. [illegible in the original] battle for ground forces, including the presence of such modern weapons as the FROG cannot be fully established from high-level source photography or apparently from collateral sources. Low-level photography if carried out comprehensively and simultaneously might [illegible in the original] to make a more valid appraisal of the extent of Soviet deployment including indications of the introduction or pull-out of personnel and equipment or turnover of equipment to the Cubans.

5. Surface-to-air missiles are not an offensive threat although the nature of their deployment may indicate they are intended for the protection of offensive installations. Originally this was the case for some of the SAMs in Cuba but such redeployment as has been accomplished since the departure of the IRBM-MRBMs for the most part suggests strategic defense of the territory of Cuba. At the moment we do not nominate SAMs as low-level targets although this may change.

6. Cruise-missile sites have been covered regularly through high-level reconnaissance and no ominous force level changes have been revealed. As for the crates which have been associated with cruise missiles, a comprehensive and simultaneous low-level coverage of all [illegible in the original] periodically repeated would be needed to be more [illegible in the original] on this question. It is our opinion that at this time, the [illegible in the original] missile activity is only a defense against invasion and is not significant in terms of an offensive threat against [illegible in the original] United States. This may change in which case [illegible in the original].

7. If cruise-missile sites are deployed so as to pose a threat to Guantanamo, the Board may wish to include this within the concept of an offensive threat against the United States. In that case cruise-missile sites in the vicinity of Guantanamo must be justified for low level reconnaissance.

8. *Recommendations*

a. That high-level photography of activities related to impending movement of Soviet personnel and equipment be supplemented by low-level photography and where particularly required, photography at night. This coverage should include the ships in port identified as suspect and the associated encampments listed in Tab B. There is an immediate need to cover 4 passenger and 4 cargo ships.

b. That high-level photography be supplemented by low-level photography at the unidentified installations listed in Tab A in the order of priority indicated as soon as practicable.

**622. Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 85–2–63,
February 21¹**

February 21, 1963

SUBJECT

SNIE 85–2–63: Reactions to US Low-Level Overflights of Cuba

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet and Cuban reaction to the resumption of US low-level reconnaissance of Cuba on the basis of 3–4 missions a week for a two-week period,² and to estimate reactions to a more extensive program on a continuing basis.

THE ESTIMATE

1. Soviet and Cuban forces both generally refrained from hostile action against the program of low-level flights last fall. No hostile action was taken against the two low-level missions of 9 February. This policy may be influenced by Soviet Cuban estimates that their capabilities against low-level intrusions are poor, but the controlling factor probably has been their almost certain belief that armed action against a US plane would invite prompt and serious reprisals, thereby reopening a crisis in which the US would again enjoy major military advantages.

2. It does not automatically follow, however, that the Soviets and Cubans would adhere to this policy in the face of repeated low-level intrusions. They recognize that the more effective photographic coverage obtained from these missions would prevent them from concealing many activities which they might hope to hide from high-altitude reconnaissance. More important, low-level penetrations are far more conspicuous than high-altitude overflights and could not be so easily ignored. Considerable numbers of Cubans would be aware of these infractions of sovereignty, and Castro and the Soviets would be reluctant to be revealed as unwilling or unable to counter them. In addition, repeated low-level flights would introduce a new factor into the situation because, unlike the case of high-altitude penetrations, the Soviets would no longer have a monopoly of the means of military response.

¹ "Reactions to U.S. Low-level Overflights of Cuba." Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.

² i.e., an approximation of the number of missions required to cover the fixed targets recommended by COMOR in a separate paper.

3. Soviet and Cuban reactions would depend in part upon their estimate of their capabilities to shoot down a low-level intruder. If they regarded their chances of shooting down a flight as virtually nil, then their alternatives for counteraction would be a general political outcry against the US or some form of Soviet reprisal elsewhere. However, we think it unlikely that the Soviets would be willing to take major action against US interests elsewhere, mainly because effective reprisals against the US in such areas as Berlin carry too great a danger of a general crisis and military escalation.

4. In the remainder of this estimate, we assume that Soviet and Cuban forces can take hostile action against low-level penetrations, and thus regard themselves as faced with the decision of whether to do so.³ Further, we assume that Castro can take such action independent of Soviet cooperation. The judgments which follow, moreover, are subject to continuing review based on our appraisals of Soviet Cuban reactions to the program undertaken.

Reactions Under Various Circumstances

5. Soviet and Cuban reactions would vary in accordance with several factors. In addition to the possible influence of developments elsewhere in world affairs, the chances of a hostile response would rise with the frequency of overflights, the use of night photography, the number of Cubans exposed to overflights, the publicity given the program by the US, and the length of time which the program [illegible in the original].

6. In the case of three or four missions a week for a two-week period, we believe that Soviet and Cuban reaction would be minimal. They probably now expect low-level flights to verify their announced troop withdrawals and will not actively oppose such observations. During this phase the Soviets could not be certain whether the US was only verifying withdrawals of personnel and equipment or was carrying out a new program directed against other intelligence objectives. Their suspicions about the purpose of the flights might be aroused by the specific targets, but we doubt that this would influence their reaction, nor do we believe they would halt the withdrawals.

7. After the scheduled withdrawal was completed, if the flights continue at about the same frequency, we do not believe that either the Soviets or the Cubans would immediately take hostile action. They would be likely to conclude that the US was still trying to collect specific intelligence information rather than delivering a calculated political affront. Moreover, the cost to their prestige and dignity would not be too great in tolerating a program of this scope for a few weeks.

³ See the attached vulnerability study.

8. If this program continued without interruption, or if the frequency of missions increased, the pressures on both Cuba and the USSR for an active response would grow. Castro for his part would be inclined to interpret a prolonged period of overflights on an increased scale as a US attempt to encourage passive resistance by demonstrating US power and the regime's impotence to the Cuban population. His fears of an invasion would be intensified, and he would probably feel himself under mounting pressure to make some effective and demonstrative response. The USSR, more concerned with the dangers of escalation and less concerned with injured Cuban pride, would probably respond to Castro's demands for counteraction by counselling continued restraint.

9. In these circumstances, the USSR would probably try to temporize for a time, perhaps privately warning the US that it could not be responsible for Castro's actions. If overflights continued on a fairly frequent basis, however, the Soviets would suffer some loss of prestige and face a major aggravation of their relations with the Cuban regime, all the while running the danger that they would be involuntarily committed by unilateral or even irresponsible, trigger happy Cuban action. It is entirely possible that they would seek to end overflights by cooperating with Cuban forces in an attack upon a low-level intruder, but we do not believe that they would choose this response unless they had somehow persuaded themselves that they could keep the resulting tensions within manageable limits. We continue to believe that the USSR would not accept serious risks of general war over Cuba.

10. Alternatively, the Soviets might resort to a major political and propaganda campaign, hoping to gain a UN resolution condemning US overflights. Or they might explore the possibility of concessions to US demands if they came to feel that it was essential to put a stop by some means to systematic low-level overflights; these might take the form of even more withdrawals of Soviet forces made in the hope that they could persuade the US to cease its program. Another possibility is that they would limit themselves initially to a reopening of diplomatic conversations on Cuba, holding out the prospect of further reduction in Soviet forces if the US first halted low-level reconnaissance.

11. If Castro were faced with a program of frequent flights and a Soviet refusal to take military counteraction, he probably would at some point order Cuban forces to act against low-level penetrations. We are unable, however, to predict at what point he would attempt a unilateral response.

12. While the Soviets and Cubans would weigh their actions in the light of the risks involved, there is always the possibility of an unauthorized shootdown, or the accidental loss of a plane over Cuba. In these circumstances the US might be unaware of the cause of loss and could accordingly be faced with an ambiguous situation.

13. *Night Photography*. Detonation of the flash cartridges used in night photographic missions would considerably increase the chances that air defense units would believe that they were under attack, thus considerably increasing the chance of their spontaneous hostile response.

623. Memorandum from McCone, February 27¹

February 27, 1963

The attached paper and its enclosure is for background use only. It will not be used as a verbatim briefing paper.

Attachment

SUBJECT

U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962

The August 29th flight flew over most of the island and photographed much of it. The photography revealed that eight SAM sites were under construction in the western half of the island. The flight also discovered an installation at Banes in the eastern end of the island that was not familiar to the photo interpreters. Subsequent research by the interpreters, comparing the August 29th photography with that of two similar installations recently noted elsewhere, had by September 14th enabled them to identify the installation as a cruise missile site.

The finding of SA-2's in Cuba on the August 29th flight presented us with a new problem in planning U-2 flights over Cuba.

Today, there is general acceptance of the fact that we are carrying out overhead reconnaissance of Cuba and that we will continue to do so as long as our national security requires it. This almost universal approval of U-2 flights over Cuba is an attitude that has existed only since the middle of last October. Prior to the finding of offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, quite a different public attitude existed.

In planning for any U-2 operations over well-defended, denied territory we were always aware of criticism that attended the U-2

¹ Transmits background paper on U-2 overflights of Cuba from August 29 to October 14, 1962. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis, Miscellaneous.

incident over the USSR in May of 1960. The two incidents involving the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on August 30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th served to sharpen the already existing apprehensions.

Within the intelligence community there was always at the backs of our minds the knowledge that in the event of a mishap we would have to be able to explain, convincingly and in detail, the justification—in terms of the highest priority intelligence needs—for having undertaken the mission.

Elsewhere in Government and among persons whose stated views strongly influence public opinion there were serious reservations regarding the use of the U-2. There were expressions of extreme concern from some public leaders over the increase in tension that might result from overflights, and others voiced the opinion that such flights were illegal or immoral. Although many public figures conceded the necessity of the United States securing intelligence by whatever means required, they were quick to caution that the use of the U-2 was quite a different matter from the classical use of spies and agents.

The vulnerability of the U-2 to Soviet SA-2 systems and the discovery of those systems in Cuba contributed further complicating factors in weighing risks against the need for hard intelligence.

The situation as of September 1962 must be viewed against this background of universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme uneasiness regarding overflights.

Because of the widespread apprehension over use of the U-2, we took particular care to ensure that each flight produced the maximum of information of value to the entire intelligence community. Each track was drawn to cover high priority targets agreed upon by an inter-agency group known as the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, a committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

We were also concerned with the conservation of the asset. The U-2 is not a sturdily-built aircraft. It is designed for one purpose—long flights at very high altitudes and at relatively low speeds. We had very few of these planes. Therefore, before we committed one to a mission we wanted to be absolutely certain that the intelligence need was great enough to justify the risk of loss of the pilot and aircraft. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance was the intelligence community's vehicle for making the target studies.

All CIA overflights were programmed through the medium of the CIA Monthly Forecast. At the time the Soviet arms build-up began in Cuba, flights over Cuba were being forecast and flown at the rate of two per month.

Because of the need to husband our resources and to ensure that highest quality photography was obtained from each U-2 flight, it was

the practice not to launch a mission unless weather over most of the critical targets was predicted to be less than 25 per cent overcast.

After reviewing the result of the August 29th mission, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, in undeniably good judgment, recommended that the next mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed on the August 29th flight and that particular attention should be paid to the then unidentified site at Banes. It was important to learn whether the Soviets had made a limited deployment of SA-2's to Cuba or whether an island-wide defense was being built.

The next mission was successfully flown on schedule on September 5th over the eastern and central portions of the island. Three additional SAM sites were detected in the central portion of the island. Unfortunately, the flight encountered heavy cloud cover over eastern Cuba.

Late in August, Mr. McCone suggested to General Carter, who was acting as DCI during Mr. McCone's absence, that low-level reconnaissance of Cuba be proposed. General Carter requested the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to consider the kind of information that could be obtained thus. The Committee met on September first and third and reported its views on what might be accomplished through low-level flights.

As a result of the Committee's deliberations and because of the heavy cloud cover encountered over eastern Cuba on the September 5th mission, General Carter, on September 10th, 1962, addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that the Secretary initiate the necessary action to provide for employment of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes, which was still unidentified, or other targets identified by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance as being suitable for low-level reconnaissance. The Secretary of Defense felt it preferable not to mount a low-level reconnaissance of Banes until the results of CIA high-level reconnaissance became available. As noted in the first paragraph, continuing research had by September 14th identified the Banes installation as a cruise missile site.

Now, let us return to the matter of the September U-2 flights. One mission had already been flown on September 5th. One flight remained yet to be flown in September. A special meeting was held on September 10th to consider the specific track for that second flight. General Carter presented a CIA proposal for a single high-level flight designed specifically to photograph the Banes area, where earlier photography had not been conclusive, and generally to search for SAM sites in those areas of central and eastern Cuba that had not been covered since the September 5th flight.

This meeting followed closely on the heels of the two U-2 incidents previously mentioned: the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on August

30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th.

The Secretary of State expressed concern at CIA's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account the plan was changed and four flights were substituted for the one. Two flights were to be wholly peripheral, involving no land overflight. One was to cover the Isle of Pines, and the other was to overfly the eastern end of the island targeted against Banes and Guantanamo.

There was a three-week period from the 5th to the 26th of September during which only one flight was flown (on September 17th), and it yielded no useable photography. We finally acquired a moderately complete mosaic of the SA-2 defense of Cuba by piece-meal photography search carried out in late September and early October. The delay in completing the photographic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period.

Much of Cuba was under heavy cloud cover throughout most of September, and the cloud patterns were rapidly and continually changing. The few periods of acceptable weather were so fleeting that they had passed before flights could be mounted.

The weather was checked for a possible mission every day beginning on September 6th. There was a one- or two-day period around the middle of the month when the forecasts were moderately favorable. A flight to the northeast was scheduled for the 16th. It went to the final briefing on the 15th, but was delayed for 24 hours because of weather and was cancelled when the weather continued unfavorable. Planning for a flight over the Isle of Pines was under way on September 15th. At the final briefing on the 16th, the forecast remained favorable. The mission was flown on September 17th, but by then the weather had turned sour and no useable photography was acquired.

Another mission was under consideration between September 18th and 21st, but the weather was bad and the mission was cancelled.

The mission to cover the Guantanamo and Banes areas was under consideration beginning 22 September. It went to alert daily, but weather was not acceptable until the 26th. On that date the mission was successfully flown and three SAM sites were discovered. This was the first of the four flights agreed upon on September 10th, and it was the first day on which weather permitted a successful flight.

One of the four tracks was originally approved to cover only the Isle of Pines. Mr. McCone called Mr. U. Alexis Johnson on September 28th and got approval to include coverage of the Bay of Pigs area. The flight was successfully flown on September 29th. The SAM and the cruise missile sites at Sigüanea on the Isle of Pines were discovered.

Two of the three remaining missions for September were considered during the period September 29th through October 2nd. Both were cancelled because of bad weather.

The next flight under consideration was that along the periphery of the southeastern coast. It was delayed because of weather on October 3rd. It was briefed on October 4th and successfully flew the mission on the 5th. One additional SAM site was discovered.

There was good weather along the northeastern coast on October 6th. A flight was launched but it aborted because of aircraft fuel problems.

The flight along the northeastern coast was successfully flown the next day, October 7th. Four more SAM sites were discovered.

The mission of October 7th completed the September flight program.

As the September overflight program progressed, identifying additional SAM sites, it became apparent that an island-wide SA-2 defense was being constructed. The next step was to discover how far advanced the earlier SAM sites were. This information could be obtained only by taking the risk of overflying an SA-2 site that might be operational.

At an interdepartmental group meeting on October 4th, the DCI made a strong representation for extensive overflights of Cuba. The group requested NRO, JCS, and CIA to examine all alternative means of conducting aerial reconnaissance and to report back as soon as possible. A meeting was called on October 9th to hear this report, and at this meeting the flight was planned which was actually flown on the 14th of October.

Additionally, from September 18th through October 2nd, [illegible in the original] agent and refugee reports [dovetailed sufficiently to] create a suspicion that there might be something of unusual importance going on in an [definite] area west of Havana and that this unusual activity might be concerned with MRBM's. These reports, however, were not of sufficient credibility to warrant their being used in intelli-

gence publications. Nevertheless, the track of the flight planned at the October 9th meeting to test the operational readiness of the known SAM sites was drawn to cover the suspicious area [in which MRBM's were suspected].

The weather was checked daily on October 10th, 11th and 12th, but the forecasts were unfavorable. On October 12th, operational control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was transferred to the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force. The weather forecast continued unfavorable on October 13th. The mission was successfully flown by SAC on October 14th over the suspect area west of Havana and near the SAM site thought most likely to be operational. The flight was the first to discover the presence of MRBM's.

As of October 16th, blanket authority was given for unrestricted overflights of Cuba.

Attached at Tab A is a summary of weather forecasts and the status of missions, 5 September through 14 October 1962.

**624. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
February 26¹**

February 26, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuban Coordinating Committee—Progress Report

Here are some of the latest developments.

1. *American Prisoners*: Bob Hurwitch tells me that Mr. Donovan spoke to Castro's interpreter on Sunday and argued in favor of an early release of the prisoners. The interpreter was very encouraging and promised to call Mr. Donovan back in a day or two. Mr. Donovan hopes to go to Havana this week end.

2. *The Brigade*: Evidently the Brigade has been running into some snags recently. Among other things the enlisted men have complained that a Private's pay is not enough to live on; they want a supplement from HEW (this problem is being worked on). Also there was a hassle about the recovery of Brigade files (this is solved now—the Brigade

¹ Progress report of the Cuban Coordinating Committee. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B) 2/63.

has their files). A deeper problem is that the Brigade is apparently disintegrating. The No. 1 and No. 2 Brigade leaders are discouraged and frustrated—they cannot retain their discipline over the Brigade. They want to resign; the No. 1 Brigade leader told State people that he is mentally ill, has many personal problems and is unable to cope with Brigade problems. In effect the leaders have asked the U.S. to take over, (this is probably a good thing).

The Attorney General has been active in all this and met with Brigade leaders Monday. He is reportedly relaxed about the situation.

Gordon Chase

625. Memorandum of discussion among McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson and McCone, February 28¹

February 28, 1963

Following the Special Group meeting yesterday, I talked with Bundy and Alexis Johnson concerning our policy in Cuba. I stated that I had been repeatedly asked by Congressional Committees how we were going to deal with the Soviet presence in Cuba, how we were going to (. . .), how we were going to remove the Castro government or control it so that it will not be used effectively for subversion and guerrilla activities against other Latin American states. I pointed out that we have stated publicly the situation was intolerable, the President had done this and also the Secretary of State in a recent speech. However, what was lacking was an agreed, understood course of action to bring about corrections in a situation we had declared to be unacceptable. This discussion was inconclusive. There were no suggestions, or no answers to the questions raised by me.

I then spent a few minutes with Mr. Bundy in his office and raised the question again. I said I thought there was a serious gap in our policy, the Cottrell committee had put forth some papers which had not been accepted and that we were (dead in water) as far as our Cuban policy was concerned. I said this presented me and a great many others with difficulties in discussing Cuba on the Hill. Bundy seemed to feel that this gap was unimportant and seemed to think there was no reason

¹ Situation in Cuba and U.S. long-range plans for dealing with Castro and the Soviet presence in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2.

for any problems and that I or others could very easily dismiss the whole subject by saying the matter was up to the Secretary of State and if the Committee wished to probe into our policy toward Cuba, they should call him up and talk with him. He felt it was beyond the scope of my competence as DCI or any representative of the intelligence community to deal with policy matters of this kind. I told Bundy I would be guided accordingly, but I again reminded him that irrespective of who says what we simply did not have a policy on repressive action this government could and would take to bring about the stated purpose.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

March 1963

626. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McCone, March 6¹

March 6, 1963

SUBJECT

U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October, 1962

We have reviewed your memorandum of February 27 prepared for background use on the foregoing subject and offer the following comments and suggestions.

As a general observation, I wonder whether it would not be practicable and desirable, in testifying on and discussing this subject, for everyone to adopt the same general principle that the President set forth with regard to the discussions in the NSC Executive Committee during the Cuba crisis, that is, there would not be any discussion of the various positions taken by the various individuals or institutions concerned. As in the case of the deliberations of the NSC Executive Committee, this need not and should not inhibit discussion of the issues and the various considerations involved in reaching decisions while avoiding the inevitable difficulties involved in trying to reconstruct in a public or semi-public way all of the views and positions of the individuals and institutions involved. If we are to maintain within the Government that degree of frankness and freedom to state views out of which sound decisions can be reached, particularly on sensitive intelligence matters, it seems to me that we should seek to preserve the anonymity of our advice and deliberations.

Thus, my own preference would be toward revision of the memorandum to delete all reference to personalities and institutions as well as debatable subjective judgments such as those in the last paragraph on page 2 and the second paragraph on page 3, and to confine the memorandum to a straight factual account of events. This could be done by deletion of the last paragraph at the bottom of page 1, all of page 2, the first two paragraphs at the top of page 3, the first line of the third paragraph on page 3, the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 4 through the first full paragraph on page 5, all of page 6 beginning with the first full paragraph, and the first paragraph on page 7. This might require some slight rewriting to provide transition, but

¹ State Department changes to McCone's February 27 memorandum on U-2 overflights of Cuba, August 29–October 14, 1962. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV.

generally it seems to me the remaining material contains a full factual account. However, with respect to the last paragraph on page 10, we would suggest changes. I believe that the present language creates a misleading impression that there were more raw reports indicating offensive missiles than there actually were, that they “dovetailed” more than they actually did as to suspect area, that these reports were considered at high levels in the government (which to the best of my knowledge they were not), and that “MRBM’s were suspected” as though this was a generally accepted view between September 18 and October 15. I suggest the following reworked version as a substitute for this final paragraph on page 10:

“Additionally, from September 18th through October 2nd, certain agent and refugee reports created a suspicion among the analysts that there might be something of unusual importance going on in an area west of Havana and that this unusual activity might be concerned with MRBM’s. These reports, however, were not of sufficient credibility to warrant their being used in intelligence publications. Nevertheless, the track of the flight planned at the October 9th meeting to test the operational readiness of the known SAM sites was drawn to cover the suspect area.”

If, however, it is the opinion of the President that the views of individuals should be included, the Secretary of State requests that the views attributed to him in the last paragraph on page 6 be corrected to read as follows:

“The Secretary of State expressed concern over the flight plan as proposed by CIA, involving as it did extensive peripheral coverage as well as two segments directly over Cuba. He said that such a long flight incurred exposure unnecessarily because the substantial peripheral portions could be flown as peripheral flights and that the portions involving direct overflight of Cuba could be handled with less exposure time if they would not combine with a peripheral mission. He recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that, should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.”

With respect to Mr. McGeorge Bundy’s memorandum of February 25 addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, you will note that he refers to the top secret code word report prepared by you for the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board with respect to intelligence on Cuba before and during the October crisis as a “coordinated report”. In this connection, it is

my understanding that, while other agencies assisted in the drafting of the report, you did not seek nor obtain their concurrence in the final draft but rather considered it your personal report to the Intelligence Advisory Board. This was certainly entirely proper on your part and accordingly the Department of State did not insist that a number of suggestions and amendments, which it offered but were not accepted by you, be made prior to submission of the report. Thus, if you concur, I suggest that Mr. Bundy's understanding of the exact status of the report be clarified.

U. Alexis Johnson

627. Memorandum from McCone to U. Alexis Johnson, March 7¹

March 7, 1963

With reference to your memorandum of March 6th, subject "U-2 overflights of Cuba—29 August through 13 October," it is not practical to make any changes in my memorandum of February 27th, as it was distributed on that day to members of the United States Intelligence Board to supply background information for their guidance in testifying before committees of Congress. Since most of the recipients have concluded their testimony, no useful purpose will be served in making extensive modifications to the memorandum. In reading the transcripts of the intelligence officers who testified, none to my knowledge have spoken of the position of any individual or Department in connection with the planning or execution of flights during the period. However, as a discretionary measure, I will advise the recipients of the memorandum to avoid any such references in possible future testimony.

With respect to the final paragraph of your communication, I am surprised at the position taken with respect to my report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The preparation of the report was considered by USIB with State's representative present. USIB agreed to the establishment of a Working Group under CIA's Inspector General, but with representation from State, DIA and NSA and this Working Group spent some 30 days in research and drafting.

¹ Reply to the State Department's memorandum commenting on McCone's February 27 memorandum on U-2 overflights of Cuba, August 29–October 14, 1962. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.

The Working Group operated under the direction of a committee composed of myself, General Carter for CIA, General Carroll for DIA, General Blake for NSA, and Mr. Hilsman for State, and this committee met a number of times to give the Working Group guidance and to monitor their progress and, finally, the committee met for a great many hours developing the final draft of the report and the conclusions.

Finally, the USIB in executive session on 3 January 1963, with State's representative present, concurred in my advising the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that the draft report submitted to it on 26 December 1962 should be considered the final report. With this background, I continue under the impression that the report is the product of a joint effort and the final draft representative of the coordinated viewpoint of the intelligence community. I therefore feel that Mr. Bundy's understanding of the status of the report is correct.

John A. McCone
Director

628. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 9¹

March 9, 1963

SUBJECT

United States Air Surveillance of Cuba

This memorandum is in response to your oral request to Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell for the legal aspects of United States air surveillance of Cuba, and the handling of the Cuban air surveillance issue in the United Nations should it be introduced there by the Castro government.

Legal Aspects

Under present circumstances, aerial surveillance of Cuba, including overflight of Cuban territory, is consistent with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the Rio Treaty) and with international law. It has been authorized by the Organization of American States. It is also consistent with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, since photographic surveillance is not a "threat or

¹ U.S. air surveillance of Cuba. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL 31-1 CUBA-US.

use of force" as prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter, nor could aerial surveillance be considered "endorsement action" as that term is used in Article 53 of the Charter.

Possible Action in the United Nations

The Cubans and/or the Soviets could quite readily raise the question of our aerial surveillance over Cuba either in the Security Council or the General Assembly. In such circumstances, it might be desirable for the United States to put forward a proposal which would once again call for the establishment of UN on-site inspection in Cuba to ensure against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. Such a resolution would be an effective counter to a Soviet-Cuban proposal calling for an end to aerial surveillance. The likely result would be a stalemate with neither proposition being adopted by the United Nations.

/s/ **Robert Kent**
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

UNITED STATES AIR SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA

One of the means to verify implementation of the undertaking by Chairman Khrushchev to dismantle offensive missiles and missile sites in Cuba has been continued air surveillance by the United States. At least in part such surveillance has involved flights over Cuban territory.

Under general international law, the air space over the territory of a state is subject to the sovereign power of the state. The state controls entry into its air space, and intrusions without its consent are unlawful. This general rule is, however, subject to any arrangement to which a particular state may be a party. In the case of Cuba, those include the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the Rio Treaty).

The Organization of American States, acting pursuant to the Rio Treaty, has authorized the continued surveillance of Cuban military activity by the United States. It is our conclusion that under present circumstances aerial surveillance of Cuba including overflight of Cuban territory is consistent with the Rio Treaty and with international law.

By its Resolution of October 23, 1962, the Council of the Organization of American States, acting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty of 1947, unanimously agreed:

1. To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;
2. To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Article 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;

It is to be noted that the overflights are directly related to the objectives set forth in the Resolution cited. That Resolution related not only to immediate dismantling and withdrawal of present missiles, but to assurances that Cuba could not continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military materials which might threaten the peace and security of the Continent.

It is to be noted also that the cited Resolution authorizes "all measures" consistent with Article 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty. These Articles read as follows:

6. If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

8. For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radio-telephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.

While aerial surveillance is not specifically listed in Article 8 among the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree, it is clear that a treaty which contemplates the use of force as the ultimate sanction must be interpreted to authorize lesser activities associated with military action. The facts of the overflights—and indeed photographs taken in the course of those flights—were before the Organ of Consultation when it was considering the Resolution of October 23, and it is clear that the member countries acted in anticipation that those flights would continue pursuant to the Resolution.

Aerial surveillance of Cuban military activity, including overflight of Cuban territory, is also consistent with the Charter of the United

Nations. Photographic surveillance is not “a threat or use of force”. Therefore, the prohibition of Article 2(4) of the Charter does not reach this activity. Nor could aerial surveillance be considered “enforcement action” as that term is used in Article 53 of the Charter. Moreover, no organ of the United Nations has in any way called this practice into question.

CONCLUSION

Overflights and surveillance of Cuban territory are consistent with the Rio Treaty and have been authorized by the OAS. Cuba has not expressly consented to such overflights and might contend that decisions taken by organs of the OAS without its participation cannot lend validity to invasions of its sovereignty. However, this argument has not thus far been made, and it is no different from the argument that could be made against any of the collective measures taken by the Inter-American System in response to the Cuban threat. It is obviously the view of the members of the OAS that overflights of Cuban territory for reconnaissance are consistent with international law and with rights and obligations under the Inter-American System. Such activity is also consistent with the obligations of the United Nations Charter.

Abram Chayes
The Legal Adviser

Attachment

CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE UN CONSIDERATION OF CUBAN COMPLAINT AGAINST US AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

This memorandum is addressed to two principal questions: (a) how might Castro bring the question of US aerial surveillance to the United Nations; and (b) how would the United States deal with such a Cuban complaint in the UN.

Cuban Complaint to UN

The Cubans could request consideration of the Cuban situation either by the Security Council (either under the Cuban item still “technically” on the agenda or a new one) or the General Assembly. The Cubans would probably contend that our aerial surveillance is interference in Cuban affairs, a violation of Cuban air space, the use of force contrary to the Charter, and “aggression” by the United States against Cuba. The thrust of any Soviet-Cuban resolution would be to call for cessation of our aerial surveillance.

We would be in a reasonably strong position to deal effectively with such a line of attack as long as Castro remains adamant in his opposition to on-site inspection under the aegis of the United Nations.

As you will recall, in the two statements made by Ambassador Stevenson in the Security Council last fall, we purposely avoided getting into a legal justification of our position. There was and is no political profit in the United States taking the initiative in spelling out in the United Nations a legal justification for our position. Any legal rationalization along the lines stated in the Legal Advisor's memorandum of February 14 should be undertaken in the Council only if we find it necessary and helpful to our friends on the Council.

Our strongest arguments are political. We would reiterate that the reason for relying on our own resources in conducting surveillance over Cuba is because of Cuban refusal to agree to United Nations inspection. We would recall that Khrushchev committed himself to inspection but could not carry it off because of Castro's intransigence. We would continue to call for UN inspection.

As to formal Security Council action, it might be desirable for the United States to take the initiative in putting forward a resolution containing two principal elements: (a) a reminder that Cuba has been unwilling to agree to international inspection; and (b) a request that the Secretary-General establish an on-site inspection team to assure against the reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. We would be expected to state in the Council our willingness to terminate aerial surveillance at such time as effective UN on-site inspection was established. Such a resolution would be an effective counter to a Soviet-Cuban proposal calling for an end to aerial surveillance. The likely result would be a stalemate with neither proposition being adopted. While even some of our friends would have doubts about the strength of our legal case, they would support us on political grounds. Our resolution would get the required seven votes, but would be vetoed by the USSR. The Soviet-Cuban resolution would fall short of the required majority. (In addition to the five permanent members, the Security Council includes: Ghana, Philippines, Brazil, Venezuela, Norway and Morocco.)

It is doubtful that the matter would be pursued further in the Assembly. If it was, essentially the same strategy could be followed in the Assembly with results probably similar to those in the Security Council.

Ambassador Stevenson concurs in the above.

629. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the National Security Council, March 11¹

March 11, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting on Wednesday, March 13, at 4:30 PM

The President has asked me to call this meeting for the purpose of having a general discussion of U.S. policy in two large areas, Latin America and Europe. It is not his purpose in this meeting to attempt detailed analysis of immediate questions such as the program for the San Jose meeting or the next steps in the post-Nassau negotiations. He desires instead to have a broader exchange of views, in which it would be open to any member to propose quite new levels or directions of policy as deserving further study.

Members of the Council are familiar with the main lines of current policy in these two areas, but the two papers which are attached may be of some interest to those who have not seen them. One is a talking paper on Cuba used by the Secretary of State in a recent talk to the Cabinet. The other is an abridgment of an informal talking paper on European policy presented to the President by Ambassador Bruce. The documents do not have the authority of formal State papers, but each is a responsible statement of the main lines of our present course; alternative views might well respond to them. It should be added that the Secretary of State's paper, in that it centers on Cuba, covers a field less broad than that of hemispheric policy as a whole. It is the broad field that the President has in mind for the first item on this simple agenda:

1. Latin American Policy
2. European Policy

McGeorge Bundy**Attachment**

REVIEW OF THE CUBAN SITUATION AND POLICY
(Talking Points)

I Policy Objectives

(a) We shall continue to safeguard the security of the United States through whatever measures may be necessary. Our purpose is to

¹ Background material for March 13 meeting of the NSC. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509.

achieve security, not only for the United States but for the Hemisphere. In this effort we shall work so far as possible through collective action. Our interest is in practical results and not flamboyant measures.

(b) We shall continue to fight against the spread of Castroism through Latin America not only by intensifying existing efforts directed specifically toward this task, but also by helping to eliminate poverty and inequity which is the building ground for infection. This we shall do through an expansion and development of the Alliance for Progress.

(c) On the basis of the progress of the great strides already made toward increased inter-American cooperation we shall continue to tighten the noose around the Cuban economy and to increase the isolation of the Castro regime from the political life of the hemisphere until that regime becomes a complete pariah.

(d) We will not be satisfied until the Cuban people have been assured the opportunity of freely choosing their own government.

II Success of our Policy So Far

1. We have substantially isolated Cuba from access to the industrialized nations of the free world:

(a) Trade with Cuba between the Atlantic Community and Latin America during 1962 dropped to one-third of what it was during 1961.

(b) The year 1963 will undoubtedly be the worst year economically that Cuba will have known in recent times.

(c) As the Cuban economy continues to deteriorate Cuba will become an even greater economic burden for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We estimate that Cuba is currently costing the Bloc at least \$1,000,000 a day.

2. We have substantially reduced the availability of free world shipping for Cuba (either direct or under charter to the Soviet Bloc). The number of free world ships calling at Cuba ports has dropped from 128 in January 1962 to 12 in January 1963. We are continuing to reduce the number of free world ships in the Cuban trade by achieving the cooperation of Free World nations and through various shipping measures.

3. We have brought a major reduction in the political influence of Castroism in the Hemisphere:

(a) During October 1962 complete hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue was achieved for the first time by a unanimous vote in support of our quarantine.

(b) In January 1962, at Punta del Este, the United States effectively excluded the Castro Government from the Inter-American System.

(c) Fourteen Latin American countries have broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and only five (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia) continue to maintain such relations. The Federal Republic of Germany was the latest country to break relations.

(d) Significant gains for the democratic forces have been shown by recent student and labor elections in the Hemisphere during the past two years. They show a significant decline in Castro/Communist influence.

(e) As a result of economic chaos which has been produced in Cuba as a result of Communist mismanagement and Cuban isolation from the rest of the Free World, Latin America has been given a visual demonstration that Communism has little to offer it. This demonstration has been reinforced by growing evidence of the subservience of the Castro Regime.

4. We have made great progress in countering Cuban subversion and propaganda efforts:

(a) The cooperation of the Organization of American States (OAS) has been successfully enlisted in countering subversive activities. The OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security has just submitted its report. It has made recommendations to Member States regarding measures to counteract these activities.

(b) We are actively working with Latin American countries in developing programs to counter subversion. This includes our whole police and counter-insurgency program.

(c) We have substantially strengthened the United States Information Program beamed to Cuba and the Hemisphere. The Voice of America has stepped up its broadcasting in Spanish from one hour a day in 1960 to nine hours a day at the present time. We have delivered 8 million copies of anti-Castro books as well as films and TV programs describing the nature of Castroism in Cuba.

5. We have insured the protection of our national security by the legitimizing of our aerial surveillance of Cuba. This has been achieved on the basis of OAS action.

630. Telegram 2241 from Moscow, March 11¹

Moscow, March 11, 1963

Embtel 2234. Khrushchev-Trevelyan talk March 6.

Cuba. Khrushchev opened on Cuba by referring to criticisms directed at him for concessions he had made on Cuba. He said it was true that he had made concessions whereas President Kennedy had not. When Trevelyan demurred at this, Khrushchev replied they were now saying in US that Kennedy had not undertaken any commitments with respect to Cuba. Khrushchev said this was “very dangerous and could have fatal consequences”. This might kill the embryo of confidence in a statesman’s world. Trevelyan said he had had impression that liquidation of Cuban affair had established some renewed confidence. Khrushchev replied he had thought so too but now SOVs had to reconsider a little.

Sir Humphrey said he had impression with respect to Cuba that Khrushchev was nervous about finding himself on spot, between US on one side and Chinese Communists on other.

Kohler

¹ Report on conversation between Trevelyan and Khrushchev concerning concessions Soviets made to the United States in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 17-1 UK-USSR.

631. Memorandum for the record, March 13¹

March 13, 1963

Memorandum of discussion with the President today at 4:15 p.m.

McCone reviewed in considerable detail his final meeting with the Stennis Committee summarizing the presentation made, the committee reaction and the decision for the committee to make an interim report,

¹ Discussion between McCone and the President on latter’s final meeting with the Stennis Committee on criticisms directed toward the CIA during the Cuban missile crisis. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January–31 March 1963.

the effect of which would be to vindicate CIA and extinguish criticism of the so-called intelligence photographic gap and other criticism which has been directed towards CIA. The opinion was unanimous. The views expressed were positive and without reservation.

The President asked whether my statements would create other types of problems and other criticisms. What he seemed to be inferring was, while the intelligence community, CIA or McCone were vindicated, perhaps the vindication would bring criticism on him or other segments of his Administration. I responded by stating that I did not believe this to be the case; that I had been very careful in my statements, and that no one could possibly draw a false conclusion from anything I said.

Note: It seemed to me that the President's questions concerning possible "other implications" indicated a growing concern on his part of the publicity given (erroneously) to differences that existed between the Administration and me, with McNamara, and with the President himself concerning Cuba.

We then discussed in detail policies towards Cuba (which I later discussed with the Executive Committee), policies toward Latin America, my visit with Mr. Padniak, Defense Minister of India, at which time I suggested the President might see Mr. Padniak.

I advised the President I would be away for a week.

632. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, March 13¹

March 13, 1963

SUBJECT

McCone's Report on Cuban Intelligence prior to the October Crisis

Mr. McCone telephoned me yesterday morning and, referring to the last paragraph of my memorandum to him of March 6, asked what our objections were to his report to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He said he did not want to exchange any more memoranda but wanted to [illegible in the original] "bothering us".

¹ McCone's report on Cuban intelligence prior to the October crisis. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 38, Miscellaneous.

[illegible in the original] in the course of which [illegible in the original] (1) the problem [illegible in the original] of the juxtaposition of your suspension on September 11 of our flights, together with the [illegible in the original] statement on the limited number of flights [illegible in the original] delays, as [illegible in the original] with it the implication that you were seeking to delay [illegible in the original], whereas anyone had [illegible in the original] jointly agreed to your suggestion and did not then nor later even point out that any delay was involved. I also noted that the [illegible in the original] to you at that time was not correct and that a correct version was contained [illegible in the original] in my memorandum of March 4.

[illegible in the original] it the way the object of the [illegible in the original] refugee reports on [illegible in the original] throughout the [illegible in the original] the impression that they [illegible in the original] for a “strong suspicion” that MRBMs were in Cuba and then “the decision-making levels of the Government” were not aware of this suspicion prior to October 14. I said that, to the best of my knowledge, this was not the case and that the application in the report that it was the case could raise the question concerning the [illegible in the original] faith of the statements [illegible in the original] made by Government officials on the absence of [illegible in the original] errors in Cuba [illegible in the original] including McGeorge Bundy’s statement of October 14.

[illegible in the original] I [illegible in the original] of the on that the [illegible in the original] sufficiently to the [illegible in the original] re a fair [illegible in the original] in view of the [illegible in the original] installation reports in the [illegible in the original] were distributed until after the October/November 19 as [illegible in the original]

With respect to the first point, Mr. McCone said he did not propose in his testimony before the Stennis Committee that afternoon to deal with what the Secretary or other individuals said, and he thought it was “fair for the Secretary to take the position that no one at the September 10 meeting warned him that his insistence on four flights might cause a delay”. He discussed at great length the “climate” in Washington at the time adverse to U-2 flights. He did not feel that “the responsibility for the photographic gap was necessarily the total responsibility of any particular individual or any particular agency, but was due to the climate [illegible in the original]. In this connection he referred to the “famous telephone call” to [illegible in the original] prior to the September 12 meeting from Tom Parrot who said he was willing on Mac Bundy’s behalf stating that Bundy [illegible in the original] questions that would be asked by the Secretary of State:

1. Was the intelligence necessary?
2. Was there any other means of getting it?

3. Was [illegible in the original] trying to create a U-2 incident over Cuba?

I replied that I had no recollection or [illegible in the original] call. With respect to the substance, it seemed to me that the [illegible in the original] and I did not [illegible in the original] as far as I was [illegible in the original] could I recall that Mr. McCone had sought to justify U-2 flight on the basis of the suspected presence of missiles, but rather at the October 10 meeting [illegible in the original] simply in terms of areas in the west which [illegible in the original] for some time. He said that the [illegible in the original] collateral report on missiles which had been brought to my attention had carried a [illegible in the original] that the report was probably seen an [illegible in the original] existed, they certainly [illegible in the original] checklist but, [illegible in the original] McCone said he [illegible in the original] the reports in the [illegible in the original] personally had the reports called to our attention we would not have done anything about them". He said that, in view of what he (McCone) had said at the August 23 meeting at the White House and the issuance of [illegible in the original] on what they said prior to [illegible in the original] out the presence of missiles in Cuba.

On the "climate question" I said I felt that, as far as my personal knowledge was concerned, I thought he was laying too much emphasis on this. Everyone was of course concerned over the possibility of the loss of a U-2 as the Soviets completed the installation of their SAM sites in Cuba and everyone was interested in doing all they could to minimize the possibility of such a loss. However, I was certainly not aware of any "climate" adverse to obtaining all the intelligence we easily could on Cuba. If the "suspicion" on missiles in Cuba had [illegible in the original] clearly brought out during that period it would of course [illegible in the original] our attitude on the risks. Nevertheless, [illegible in the original] of any respect for [illegible in the original].

In view of this conversation, in which I clearly recorded our dissent with these portions of McCone's report to the Intelligence Advisory Board, I do not propose to reply in writing to his memorandum of March 7.

I would appreciate your passing this memorandum [illegible in the original]. If you are agreeable, I plan to show a copy to Mac Bundy.

633. Telegram 2321 from Moscow, March 17¹

Moscow, March 17, 1963

Eyes only. Deliver Brubeck only.

Regret Embtel 2315 was not preceded by service message, as had been requested in service messages from Newton, as result error here. Trust our operational immediate service sent immediately upon receipt your 1968 was received in time to assure proper handling.

From Moscow point of view, fact I was able utilize occasion call on Kuznetsov to deliver protest on overflights provided complete cover and forestalled even curiosity whether other points involved. I informed Kuznetsov my statement this was purely private communication for Chairman from President which would not be published. However, should point out we are now in hands of Soviets, should Khrushchev decide to come back hard and publicize. Consequently believe we should all be alert to this possibility.

Kohler

¹ Meeting between Kuznetsov and Kohler re President's private communication to Khrushchev. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL CUBA-USSR.

634. Memorandum from FitzGerald to McCone, March 19¹

March 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Outline of a Program to Exacerbate and Stimulate Disaffection in the Cuban Armed Forces

1. This memorandum is for your information and in response to your request for a program to split the military establishment from the Castro/Communist regime with a view to the replacement of this

¹ Outline of a program to exacerbate and stimulate disaffection in the Cuban Armed Forces. Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.

regime by one acceptable to the United States. This memorandum is intended for "in-house" use in its present form.

2. It is the consensus of observers of the Cuban scene that it is unrealistic to expect a popular uprising in Cuba of sufficient size and "staying power" to constitute a threat to the Castro/Communist regime. Even should a large uprising occur, the Administration would be confronted with the dilemma of U.S. military intervention before the uprising is crushed or of standing helplessly by while a Hungarian-type bloodbath is carried out under our noses. Both these alternatives would entail the gravest military and political repercussions for the United States and are therefore assumed to be undesirable except as a last resort.

3. For the purpose of this paper, the following assumptions are made:

a. A mass popular uprising is neither likely to occur nor should it be encouraged under present circumstances;

b. Current policy excludes the overt use of U.S. military force to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime, except under circumstances in which Cuba again becomes (or is about to become) an offensive threat to United States and for Hemisphere security.

c. Castro and his followers are unlikely to break with the Soviets in order to make a deal with the United States; nor are they likely to take actions, such as taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, which would cause the Soviets to withdraw their economic and military support to Cuba.

4. Given these assumptions, the only potentially effective course of action open to the United States is a pincers strategy of economic strangulation to weaken and undermine the regime in conjunction with an intensive probing effort to identify and establish channels of communication to disaffected and potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime. With regard to the covert aspects of an economic strangulation program, I intend to submit to you in the near future a request for policy approval to mount sabotage operations against Cuban-owned ships and cargoes as the first stage of a broader sabotage program. As you know, only last week we secured Special Group approval for a psychological warfare program to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage in Cuba.

5. With regard to the other arm of the pincers—the power center of the regime—we propose to devote our main effort against key officers in the armed forces and militia. There is a steady, but as yet unconfirmed, flow of reports alleging that a number of these officers are disenchanted with Castro's management of Cuban affairs and appalled at the growing infiltration of doctrinaire Communists into significant positions in the Cuban Government. They are also reported to be increasingly disturbed at the growing subservience of Cuba to

Soviet domination. To the extent that these officers are motivated by ideological considerations, they are allegedly opposed to Castro because he has “betrayed the original aims of the Revolution.” (These aims are defined in President Kennedy’s speech to the Cuban Brigade in the Orange Bowl on 29 December 1962 as follows: “The Cuban people were promised by the revolution political liberty, social justice, intellectual freedom, land for the campesinos, and an end to economic exploitation.”) Still others may be disaffected for purely personal reasons, i.e., because they have been by-passed for promotion or other honors, or they may feel that they are on the wrong bandwagon because in the long run Castro cannot survive the intense economic and political pressure of the United States, even with Soviet aid.

6. We propose to identify and seek out these officers and, whatever their motives for dissidence might be, try to convince them that their future lies only in disposing of Castro and establishing a new government which could be returned to the OAS family of nations. It seems reasonable to assume that, under proper circumstances, a group of these officers would be ready to carry out a coup against Castro and his immediate entourage and establish a new non-Communist government which will take immediate steps to bring about Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. (The proposed operations outlined in this paper will require a relatively long lead time to reach fruition; it is probable that by then the issue of Soviet combat troops in Cuba will have been resolved and therefore, to the extent that these troops constitute a deterrent to a coup against Castro, this deterrent would probably no longer exist.) At this point, one might well ask why there has not been to date any significant visible evidence of dissension in the Cuban armed forces and militia either before or since the arrival of large numbers of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Moreover, there have been almost no noteworthy defections to the West of military personnel since April 1961, although there have been numerous opportunities for officers to escape from Cuba or defect while on trips abroad.

7. Undoubtedly, the continued presence of Soviet forces in Cuba contributes to their reticence to act against Castro, but we believe of even greater importance is the fact that there exists no acceptable alternative to Castro for these people at the present time. To justify the risks entailed in attempting a coup against Castro, it seems to us they would require that the following conditions be met:

- a. Alternative leadership;
- b. A belief that they would receive U.S. and OAS recognition and military assistance should the coup reach a stalemate or should the Soviets threaten to or attempt to retaliate against the rebels;
- c. U.S. will provide economic aid and political support to the new government to replace that of the Soviets and, in general, will not try to “turn the clock back” (“the Revolution Yes; Communism No”).

- d. Assurance that those who bring about and support the coup will not be persecuted by U.S. authorities and Cuban exiles because they remained in Cuba as key officers of Castro's military establishment;
- e. Assurance that the United States will accept and support the free will of the Cuban people as expressed in free elections when feasible.

8. Against this background and in full recognition of the fact that we are dealing with a probing operation rather than a reliable blueprint for overthrow of the Castro regime, Special Affairs Staff will, with your approval, proceed as follows:

a. *Propaganda/Psychological Warfare Operation*

We will intensify already established CIA-controlled radio broadcasts, mailing operations, and other actions addressed to the armed forces and militia, urging them to organize and act while there is still time before they are shunted aside by loyal Communists. Previous appeals to military personnel have had little impact because there has been virtually no convincing authoritative evidence of U.S. readiness to meet the conditions outlined in paragraph 7 above. The only notable exception to this is the statement made by the President in his Orange Bowl speech on 29 December: "Under the Alianza Para el Progreso, we support for Cuba and for all the countries of this hemisphere the right of free elections and the free exercise of basic human freedoms. We support land reform and the right of every campesino to own the land he tills. We support the effort of every free nation to pursue programs of economic progress. We support the right of every free people to freely transform the economic and political institutions of society so that they may serve the welfare of all."

... "And I believe these are the principles of the great majority of the Cuban people today, and I am confident that all over the island of Cuba, in the government itself, in the army and in the militia, there are many who hold to this freedom faith, who have viewed with dismay the destruction of freedom on their island and who are determined to restore that freedom so that the Cuban people may once more govern themselves."

We hope to correct this deficiency by working through Mr. Cottrell's group to have prominent Administration spokesmen, if not the President himself, make public statements elaborating upon the President's remarks of 29 December, directing their appeals at the armed forces of Cuba to assure them that the United States would accept and support a change in regime brought about internally by a coup, provided Communists are excluded from government and the Soviet Union is required to withdraw completely from Cuba.

We also intend to request USIA to have VOA devote special attention to its military audience inside Cuba, playing up the assurances described above.

A large variety of variations on these themes can be developed, all of which are designed to create an atmosphere responsive to OAS urgings that Castro be thrown out and Cuba return to the Hemisphere family of nations.

b. *Singleton Clandestine Operations*

Concurrent with the propaganda program outlined above, we will make an intensive effort to identify, seek out and establish lines of communication with disaffected or potentially dissident key personnel in the armed forces. This will permit us to determine whether and under what circumstances they would be prepared to act against Castro. The real payoff will come when we are able to gain access to and negotiate with key military personalities who are ready, willing and able to dispose of Castro and his immediate entourage.

We are now conducting a survey of all our existing covert collection and action assets, both inside and outside Cuba, to obtain leads to key Cuban military officers who have reason to be disgruntled with Castro or who are vulnerable in some way. To refine our targeting, we are simultaneously bringing up to date our inventory of key officers in the Cuban Armed Forces and militia.

While this is in progress, we are making arrangements to recontact a number of former 26th of July adherents, now in exile, who participated in the revolution until it became apparent that Castro had betrayed them. We hope, through these former 26th of July men, to establish contact with those military officers still active in the regime. In this connection we are reviewing all available contacts who are knowledgeable of the military personalities inside Cuba and we will renew our debriefing of these contacts on a systematic basis to discover operational leads into the Cuban military organization. Other alleged leads to 26th of July oriented dissident elements inside Cuba provided by journalists such as Tad Szulc (*New York Times*) and other well-wishers are being fully explored.

We feel that greater use can be made of friendly Latin American military attachés resident in Havana to assist us in spotting and possibly establishing contact for us with Cuban military personnel. We will explore this possibility in cooperation with WH Division.

Finally, we will, of course, follow closely the activities of Mr. James Donovan and other opportunities that may arise to support our efforts.

9. I can assure you that the highest priority has been assigned to this program within Special Affairs Staff. While it is much too early to give you a valid reading on what can be expected of this program, I am most hopeful that progress can be made without too great delay. I will keep you apprised of our progress or of obstacles we might meet along the way.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

635. Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, March 27¹

March 27, 1963

SOVIET RESPONSE TO TWO ATTACKS ON
THEIR FREIGHTERS OFF CUBA

On March 17 and again on March 26 Cuban emigre organizations have attacked Soviet freighters near Cuba.

Weak Protest on First Incident. The mild tone of the Soviet protest note of March 27—ten days after the event—suggests that, as has been the case with Soviet troop withdrawals from Cuba, the USSR is prepared to suffer some measure of national indignity as a price for keeping the Cuban crisis from erupting once more. Indeed, the sequence of events raises an outside possibility that Moscow might not have broken its official silence over the March 17 incident had it not been for the second attack last night.

Second Incident A Test Case. Moscow may well look upon the second incident as a test case. Even if the Soviets assume that the US heartily disapproves of the incident, (and we doubt that they assume this) they probably believe that another weak response will embolden the US to subject the Soviet presence in Cuba to further and more damaging harassment. Thus, the Soviets will presumably feel under a compulsion to respond firmly to the apparently even more serious March 26 incident.

Possible Soviet Actions. There are a variety of approaches which the Soviets might take.

—Moscow will probably prefer to use the incident as an occasion for securing a public US commitment that it will not support such efforts in the future. One means which it might use would be to take the matter to the UN where in addition to deploring “piracy” the Soviets might hope that a compromise resolution (to which the US might agree) deploring such free-booting activity might result.

—Moscow may supplement such efforts by exerting pressure on the US by stalling their troop withdrawals or urging the Cubans to stall the Donovan talks.

—The Soviets (perhaps together with the Cubans) might institute Komar boat convoys or aerial patrols to protect their shipping. They would thus utilize these incidents as a pretext for further Soviet trawler and patrol activity in the Eastern Atlantic.

¹ “Soviet Response to Two Attacks on Their Freighters Off Cuba.” Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exiles—3/63.

—We doubt, but cannot exclude the possibility, that the Soviets may undertake actions entailing a more substantial measure of risk in retaliation for the attacks. The Soviets might begin to fire upon U-2 flights over Cuba, to fire upon US ships or planes engaged in surveillance of shipping to Cuba, or to harass US shipping elsewhere in the world. If the Soviets did undertake such high-risk actions, they would presumably do so with the intention of using the incidents to launch a major drive against continued US surveillance of Cuba and, more basically, to obtain definitive US acceptance of the *status quo*.

**636. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
March 27¹**

March 27, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba Coordinating Committee

1. *Activist Cuban Exile Groups*

FBI and CIA are now working on the problem of coordinating intelligence on the activities of the activist exile groups. Preliminary information (I will know more today) indicates that each agency sees the other as primarily responsible. The outcome probably will be that the FBI will assume primary responsibility for maintaining contact with these exile groups.

The adequacy of our intelligence on these exile groups will also be examined. If it is insufficient, we may want to put more resources into the effort. On the other hand, we may not, since, by and large, these groups are relatively ineffective and inactive.

The Cottrell Committee also discussed the extent to which we should try to stop the raids of the exile groups. Cott is now writing a paper which will probably recommend that we try somewhat harder to prevent further raids (they could hurt us marginally and they don't help us). This will probably involve approaching activist exile leaders quietly to let them know we are concerned and increasing the attentiveness of U.S. Customs (up to now, they have not been trying too hard).

¹ Cuba Coordinating Committee. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, VII CC, 3/63.

At the same time, there will be no effort to throw the book at the exiles. The general consensus of the experts is that these groups lack resolve and relatively mild action will probably do the trick.

2. *American Prisoners*

Bob Hurwitch tells me that one ship has definitely been laid on to take ransom goods to Cuba (a fairly small ship). It will sail on or about April 1.

Justice was working yesterday afternoon on gimmicks to find the balance of the shipping.

3. *Briefing Book for Congressmen*

Art Wexler (H area of State) tells me that his office is putting together a 20–30 page briefing book on Cuba for Congressmen. Among other things, the Congressmen will be able to use it as a reference work in answering public inquiries.

I asked Art to clear the book with us before sending it out.

Gordon Chase

**637. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
March 27¹**

March 27, 1963

SUBJECT

Raid by L-66

The President was briefed by General Clifton this morning on the raid. Here are some facts on the present status.

The President has the following information from CIA. The raider ship advised a land-based radio: (1) that a LIFE photographer allegedly was present; (2) that the operation was a success; (3) that the L-66 suffered no casualties; (4) that the boat was returning to its secret base until the press furor died down; (5) that L-66 would return to Miami if nothing new developed. CIA does not know where the land-based

¹ Secret raid by L-66 exile group. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.

radio is and does not know where the “secret base” is; they assume it is on one of the Keys.

2. FBI will be providing whatever information it has to Bromley this afternoon.

3. State is drafting a public statement on this raid. It will be cleared with you.

4. The Secretary will send a memorandum today or tomorrow to the President stating that he doesn’t want the activist exile group running our policy and recommending ways and means of stopping the raids (presumably this will take the place of the Cottrell paper which I mentioned in my memorandum to you this morning).

Gordon Chase

638. Telegram 2422 from Moscow, March 27¹

Moscow, March 27, 1963

Following is Embassy translation Note No. 17/USA delivered by messenger on March 27:

BEGIN TEXT:

No. 17/USA

MFA of USSR states following on instructions Soviet Government.

On night March 17, 1963, Soviet Cargo Vessel “L’GOV”, which was in Cuban Port Isabela La Sagua, was fired on from cutter which approached vessel from direction of sea. Ship was fired upon with several bursts from heavy-caliber machine gun;

On March 19, heads of counter-revolutionary Cuban organizations declared at press conference, organized in capital USA, Washington, that Soviet vessel fired on by their group. They also declared US not preventing such activity their part, and that groups will continue attacks.

US Department of State published statement same day, which, while not denying that Soviet vessel fired on by Cuban counter-revolutionaries, not only did not condemn this sort provocation in area of

¹ Transmits text of note from Soviet Government re attack on Soviet cargo vessel in Cuban port. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.

Caribbean Sea, but contained statements which in fact encourage bandit activities.

Surely clear that, without material support of US Government and without supplying of American weapons and ships, group of traitors to Cuban people, sheltering on territory USA would not be able undertake these kinds provocation. American officials have repeatedly acknowledged fact counter-revolutionary groups are financed by US and enjoy its full protection.

By offering Cuban counter-revolutionaries territory and material means for organizing piratical attacks against Republic Cuba, USA is actually bringing about dangerous aggravation situation in area Caribbean Sea and throughout world.

Completely evident Government USA bears full responsibility for actions of Cuban counter-revolutionaries, including attack they committed against Soviet vessel "L'GOV". Encouragement such actions by USA is not only crude violation generally accepted norms international law regarding freedom navigation and basic principles UN Charter, but also contradicts agreement between Governments USSR and USA on settlement of crisis in area of Caribbean Sea.

Soviet Government protests to Government USA piratical attack on Soviet vessel "L'GOV" and expects Government USA will take decisive measures prevent similar provocative actions in future.

END TEXT.

Decontrolled following publication by Soviet Government.

Kohler

**639. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
March 28¹**

March 28, 1963

SUBJECT

Activist Exile Groups

1. Cott gave me some of the recommendations, which are aimed at cutting off the raids and which the Secretary will be sending to the President today. (He was not available last night to sign off on it.)

- a. Intelligence community will increase its efforts.
- b. Coast Guard and Customs will intensify their search for vessels.
- c. CIA, FBI and Customs will inform suspects that we intend to turn on the heat.
- d. FCC will locate and close down the radio transmitters used by the raiders.
- e. State will inform the British Government of our plans and convey our understanding that they are considering similar action.

There may also be a recommendation for a meeting of high U.S. officials on the subject if inter-agency clearance proves hard to get.

2. My conversation with Justice yesterday indicated that the FBI is not doing a stellar intelligence job; they seem to know remarkably little about the activist exile groups. However, I have been told that the FBI has been shaken up by this episode and that solid FBI contributions will be forthcoming today. (I will needle them.) Attached is an *internal* Justice memorandum which, inter alia, partly reflects FBI's resolve to produce more intelligence.

FBI is apparently not the easiest outfit to deal with. I suspect that Bill Geoghegan, an energetic assistant of Nick Katzenbach, has not been having an easy time in dealing with the Bureau. While Bill is restrained in his comments, I get the impression that the Bureau is set in its ways, lacking in initiative, energy and imagination, and very tough to move.

Gordon Chase

¹ Activist exile groups. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.

**640. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
March 29¹**

March 29, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba Coordinating Committee

Here are some of the latest developments.

1. *American Prisoners*—Bob Hurwitch tells me that the problem of shipping the balance of the ransom goods to Cuba has been solved. U.S. Lines will operate two vessels as many times as necessary to complete the deal. The shipping Association has agreed to pro-rate the cost among its members.

Bob also told me about the latest Donovan/Vallejo (Castro's interpreter-friend) telephone conversation. Vallejo was pleased to learn that Dr. Scheele (former Surgeon General) was going down to Havana on March 28th to examine some faulty drugs which the Cubans have been complaining about. Vallejo also told Donovan that he should come down to Cuba on April 4th. At that time he would have "good news" for Donovan. (We've heard that one before.)

2. *Psychological Subcommittee*—Bill Jorden called the first meeting of the Psychological Subcommittee on March 27th. Bill has the Murrow/Martin memo regarding a post-Castro Cuba high on his agenda. He will be working very closely with USIA on producing another draft of the paper. He hopes to have something within the next couple weeks.

The group discussed events that should be considered by the Psychological Subcommittee. One of the most important is the Cuba May Day; the Subcommittee will start working on themes which we want to convey at that time.

Gordon Chase

¹ Cuba Coordinating Committee—latest developments. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII CC, 3/63.

641. Current Intelligence Memorandum, March 29¹

OCI No. 1210/63

March 29, 1963

SUBJECT

Movement of SAM Launch Sites in Cuba

1. Since mid-October 1962, when all 24 Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites became operational, there have been six instances of SAM units shifting location. In two instances—occurring in mid-October 1962—the shifts were minor and temporary to permit construction of permanent facilities. In the remaining four cases, relocation has changed the pattern of effective coverage.

2. In three of the four significant movements, the SAM sites were shifted away from the coast and closer to an important military objective. Relocation in better terrain appeared to be a secondary, but important, consideration, since electronic interference has in some cases hindered radar operations. The changes appeared to be also related to Soviet-Cuban experience gained in acquiring and tracking targets coming within the 20–25 nautical mile (n.m.) effective range of the SAM sites. Details of these three movements are as follows:

a. Between 15 November and 4 December the SAM site originally at CABANAS was shifted generally west about 10 n.m. to the present site at MALDONADO (2012N–7528W). The present site closes a gap in coverage to the north and west, and is farther away from the US naval base at Guantanamo than the former location. Terrain hindrance of acquisition or guidance radar as well as drainage problems at the original location could also have been factors in the move.

b. Between 27 December and 4 January the SENADO site was moved about 18 n.m. southwest to its present location at CAMAGUEY (2122N–7750W). This move appeared to be directed exclusively at providing better protection for the Camaguey military airfield and communications center.

c. Between 12 and 20 January the CHAPARRA site was moved approximately 15 n.m. south to the present site at HOLGUN (2052N–7627W). The new site is farther away from the coast and provides better protection for the Soviet armored camp at Holguin as well as for the Holguin airfield.

3. The most recent significant redeployment of the SAM system occurred between 17 and 25 March in Pinar del Rio Province. On 25

¹ Movement of SAM launch sites in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV.

March a new SAM site was established at MAJANA (2241N–8249W), about 10 n.m. south of the Soviet armored camp at Artemisa. Six launchers, 3 hold positions, and an occupied guidance area have been observed at the new site. The equipment apparently came from the SAM site at BAHIA HONDA (2257N–8317W), which was evacuated between 17 and 23 March. If this movement is a permanent redeployment of the Bahia Honda site to Majana—a distance of about 30 n.m.—it is a longer move than has been made in the past, and is the first such major relocation in the western half of the island.

4. Possible factors involved in establishing a SAM site at Majana are as follows:

a. The new site provides increased air defense coverage of the military installations at Artemisa, the major airfield at San Antonio de los Banos, and the port of Mariel. In all three cases the new coverage overlaps with that already afforded these installations by the MARIEL (2300N–8249W) or the HAVANA (2309N–8213W) sites. However, both Artemisa and the Mariel port are now protected by two instead of one site, while the San Antonio de los Banos airfield is now within the perimeter of three sites. This airfield is the headquarters of the Cuban Air Force. Since 15 March 40 of the 42 known MIG–21 jet fighters in Cuba have been deployed there.

b. The abandoned BAHIA HONDA site protected a part of the northern coast of Pinar del Rio Province under the perimeter concept of SAM coverage. The only military installations protected by the site were the four former San Cristobal MRBM sites—two of which are now covered by the MAJANA site. It had also provided secondary and marginal protection for the Guerra cruise-missile site in addition to the primary coverage afforded that installation by the SAM site at MARIEL. The abandonment of the BAHIA HONDA site opens a gap along the northern coast, but one that includes no important military installations.

5. The major SAM site movements to date and especially the BAHIA HONDA to MAJANA redeployment are evidence of a change in the perimeter concept of air defense coverage to the more traditional Soviet SA–2 practice of “point defense.” In line with this, further redeployments of SAM units can be expected.

6. On 30 January a new SAM site was identified at MANAGUA (2259N–8215W). By 4 March permanent facilities were completed, although no missile or related equipment has been observed to date. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the establishment of the MANAGUA and the new MAJANA sites is related and forms an eventual new pattern of air defense. The slow pace and apparent thoroughness of the construction at the MANAGUA site and its location, which affords virtually identical coverage with that of the


HAVANA site and access to heavy air traffic, strongly suggest the new facility may be employed as a training site for Cubans. Collateral reports have also indicated that training of Cubans in SAM operations may be undertaken in this area.

Attachment

MAJOR RELOCATIONS OF SAM LAUNCH SITES IN CUBA

<u>Date</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Distance and Direction</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
13 Nov–4 Dec	CABANAS	About 10 n.m. West	MALDONADO	Fills gap in coverage to N and W of original location, and is farther away from US base at Guantanamo. Terrain may also have been a factor.
27 Dec–4 Jan	SENADO	About 18 n.m. Southwest	CAMAGUEY	Provides better protection for Camaguey airfield and commo center.
12 Jan–20 Jan	CHAPAREA	About 15 n.m. South	HOLGUIN	Provides better coverage for Soviet armored camp at Holguin and airfield.
23 Mar–25 Mar	BAHIA HONDA	About 30 n.m. Southeast	MAJANA	Improves coverage of Soviet armored camp at Artemisa, San Antonio de los Danos airfield, and Mariel port.

NOTE: Several additional SAM units have made local, short distance moves from unrevetted to revetted sites, and for such reasons as better drainage, more effective radar coverage and as apparent military exercises.



April 1963

642. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 1¹

April 1, 1963

SUBJECT

Prevention of Pin-Prick Raids against Cuba

The Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs has supplied me with the enclosed memorandum which he has prepared for the Attorney General.

In accordance with the Deputy Coordinator's request, I am forwarding it to you for your information.

/s/ C.C. Moor
for

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

SUBJECT

Actions and Recommendations to Prevent Pin-Prick Raids against Cuba

At the Miami meeting (March 29–30), the group learned that ten exile raiding operations were planned for the immediate future and recommended the following actions:

1. Authorize Coast Guard to dispatch aircraft to watch over Norman Key in the Bahamas, from which action appeared imminent.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Aircraft dispatched.

2. Obtain British cooperation in preventing action from the Norman Key and other Bahama islands and seek British permission for Coast Guard to land men as necessary.

Current Status: Approved by White House. British Ambassador, informed of U.S. concern over raids, was receptive to suggestion of British cooperation. CIA and FBI arranged to provide British Intelli-

¹ Transmits memorandum from Hurwitch to the Attorney General on actions and recommendations to prevent pin-prick raids against Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 30–2 CUBA.

gence continuing information regarding proposed raids that might involve British territory. British Embassy action officer undertook to act immediately on intelligence. Twenty man Bahamian police force landed at Norman Key at dawn March 30 and detained two Americans and one Cuban (names not yet known) who arrived by airplane while police were there. Still closer arrangements with British will be pursued. Miami Coordinator will go to Nassau this week.

3. Authorize INS to impose departure controls over suspected Cubans and Americans.

Current Status: Approved by White House. List of 29 highly suspect Cubans agreed upon by Miami intelligence agencies. INS served 25 with warnings not to depart U.S. and, in case of parolees, not to depart Dade County, Florida. State and Justice legal staffs agreed upon procedure for controlling departure of suspect Americans; policy officers will consider implications.

4. Authorize Coast Guard and Customs to impound suspect boats.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Coast Guard and Customs informed.

5. If personnel involved in contemplated raids are parolees, authorize appropriate agencies to warn and/or detain suspected parolees. (INS can detain suspected parolees for brief or extended periods for having violated the condition of their parole).

Current Status: White House approved warnings but not detention. INS should be permitted to detain suspects who ignore warnings. *Decision requested.*

6. Warn all exile suspects that U.S. desires raids to stop and is prepared to take necessary action.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Suspects are being informed.

7. Issue policy statement as soon as possible.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Joint State-Justice policy statement issued March 30.

8. Initiate intensified surveillance of prime suspects.

Current Status: Approved by White House. Intensified surveillance being conducted.

9. Study question of prosecution of suspects who are generally undesirable.

Current Status: Approved by White House.

The Miami group also recommended the following sustained actions to diminish the number of raids over the long run, *for which approval is required.*

1. Authorize Coast Guard to conduct daily air surveillance of the Bahamas.²

2. Authorize Coast Guard to maintain continuous boat surveillance of the Bahamas.²

3. Issue periodical statements to educate the public on United States policy, as elaborations upon the March 30 basic statement.

4. Publicize raiding plans of exiles as they become known.

5. Authorize INS to detain suspect raiders.

6. Prosecute selected cases.

7. Continue intensified intelligence collection.

8. Request Customs, Coast Guard and INS to intensify present programs.³

9. Warn persons who may assist raiders, such as boat charterers and fund contributors.

10. Develop guidance for more fruitful exile activities.

11. Include Puerto Rico in all foregoing programs. (As the Miami area tightens, many suspects will shift to Puerto Rico; additional funds, personnel and equipment would be needed to control activities there.)

Robert A. Hurwitch
*Deputy Coordinator of
Cuban Affairs*

² Coast Guard now has 4 Albatross aircraft and would need 4 to 6 more (possibly from Navy). Coast Guard has 3 helicopters and would need 4 more. Coast Guard now has two 95-foot patrol boats and would need 6 more. With additional equipment Coast Guard believes it would have a 50% chance of detecting raids.

³ If Customs is to pick up and hold on to suspect boats, it would need 65 more men in order to cover the 500 mile coast line. Coast Guard gave Customs one 30-foot boat on March 30 and Customs urgently needs one more 35-foot boat for the Key West area.

643. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to Dungan, April 2¹

April 2, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuban Exiles

Bob Hurwitch called to pass the following information:

1. *The "Violin" Affair*

Bob tells me that the British have informed us that the "Violin" is not yet seaworthy and will not be released today. The Bahamian authorities will let us know when it is ready to go and will also insure that there is no ammunition aboard. The U.S. Government plans to take the following actions when the "Violin" returns to Miami: (1) the boat will be impounded, (2) the American and the aliens, who are not parolees, will be questioned and released after a couple of hours, and (3) the parolees will be questioned and released after 24 or 36 hours.

Bob wants your clearance on the above 3 courses of action which he feels meet our foreign policy objectives. Also, he recommends that parolee ringleaders on the "Violin" be added to the current list of people restricted to Dade County. He feels that the list should not be a closed one.

In talking to the British Counselor of Embassy this afternoon about the "Violin" affair in general, Bob asked whether the British had been offended by our public disclosure that we had passed information to the British. The Counselor replied that the British were not offended in any way. As a matter of fact, when the British Ambassador meets with the Cuban Foreign Minister this afternoon on another matter he plans to admit to U.S. intelligence assistance if the subject comes up.

2. *Reply to Our Note Regarding the "Floridian"*

Bob tells me that the Czech Ambassador is coming into the Department this afternoon with Castro's reply to our protest on the Cuban attack against the "Floridian". Grapevine information indicates that the note is sweet and reasonable and that the Cubans regret the incident.

Gordon Chase

¹ Cuban exiles. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exiles 4/63.

644. Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group, April 2¹

April 2, 1963

SUBJECT

Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops

REFERENCE

Subject: Covert Propaganda to Stimulate Passive Resistance and Low-Risk, Simple Sabotage in Cuba submitted to the Coordinator by CIA dated 8 March 1963;
From: Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to The Special Group

1. To supplement and intensify the Referenced subtle sabotage program approved by the Special Group on *15 March*, it is proposed that Cubans within Cuba be incited to commit psychological harassment, physical attacks and acts of sabotage against Soviet military personnel and civilian technicians, with a view to making the Soviet presence in Cuba increasingly more onerous, counter-productive and untenable.

2. It is contemplated that this campaign would start in “low key” with radio broadcasts and mailing operations urging Cubans to demonstrate their opposition to the presence of Soviet forces in Cuba by means of “Russians go home!” slogans scrawled in public places. This would be followed by unattributable mail propaganda calling upon Cubans to take more aggressive measures against Soviet personnel and installations in order to hasten their withdrawal. Such measures would include sabotage of Soviet equipment, attacks on Soviet personnel and damage of Soviet housing and installations. Radio broadcasts will replay genuine or fabricated incidents in order to draw attention to and cause others to emulate this type of resistance activity.

3. *Coordination*

This proposal has been concurred in by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs and the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba.

¹ Propaganda inciting Cubans within Cuba to attack Soviet troops. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General Vol. VIII (A), 4/1–4/20/63.

**645. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President,
April 3¹**

April 3, 1963

SUBJECT

Alpha 66 raid of March 17–18, the press conference held by Cubans in Washington, and the San Jose Conference

1. What we know about this raid comes mainly third hand, but it appears that two outfits called “Alpha 66” and “The Second Front of the Escambray” joined in a small boat raid on a harbor on the north coast of Cuba on the night of March 17–18. These raids have only a hazy sense of target, and the leaders generally shoot at whatever is the biggest object within reach. In this case it appears to have been the Russian merchant ship, *L’gov*.

2. On March 19 in Washington (at the Roger Smith Hotel) the two groups held a joint press conference announcing the attack and issuing a war communiqué. This announcement appears to have exaggerated the meaning of the raid in a number of ways: it was asserted that a landing and attack were made against a Russian encampment, and here information is wholly negative on any such episode; that the Russian merchant ship opened fire on the commandos and was damaged by return fire—our information is that any damage done to the merchant ship was minimal; that there were about twelve Russian casualties and two casualties among the leaders—while we do not know, and we do not see how Alpha 66 can know, what casualties, if any, were caused to the Russians.

3. The press conference was held in our capital city during the second day of a major international conference in San Jose. It was thus obviously designed as a political instrument, and it was an effort to serve some ulterior political purpose on the basis of a single, wholly unproductive and ill-planned adventure. This episode, in which there was so much more talk than action, and so much more publicity than performance, is an example of the kind of action which does not advance the interests of the U.S. or those of a free Cuba, and it is a good example of the sort of thing against which the statements and actions of this Government have been directed in recent days.

(The statement of March 30 is attached.)

¹ Alpha 66 raid of March 17–18; the press conference held by Cubans in Washington; the San Jose Conference. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.

(It is also a fact that a LIFE photographer was carried along on this raid, but so far this fact has not surfaced, and the State recommendation is that you not be the one to break it. I agree, because it would only stir LIFE to some form of hostile comment.)

McG. B.

646. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Greenfield, April 3¹

April 3, 1963

Ball—There is a telegram—La Paz 947—quoting a La Paz press carrying an AFP story dateline Madrid about a conversation between Donovan and Castro. Have you seen it?

Greenfield—No, I'll take a look at it right away.

Ball—You might want to show it to the President as he goes in. It is quoting _____ Cubans "regarding conversation between Donovan and Castro which would lead to coexistence between Castro and US under condition Castro cuts ties with Russia and grants amnesty for 55,000 political prisoners, restores certain expropriated American property . . . and carries out general elections. Castro allegedly agreed to all but last point. Bolivian Minister Government told Embassy that story places him . . . and other Latin American countries in awkward position while they are trying to take anti-Castrista actions in their own countries to extend domestic connections and permit US . . . negotiate with Castro under conditions which do not even mention Castrista subversive efforts in Latin America. Minister Government said he hoped US would deny substance . . . story and urge USIA take necessary action soonest." The best way to knock it down is to plant a question.

Greenfield—Yes, but I don't know if we can or not, but I can see what we can do though.

Ball—I think you had better alert the White House on this one.

Greenfield—I will.

¹ Report out of La Paz on a conversation between Donovan and Castro, which would lead to coexistence between Castro and the United States if Castro met certain conditions. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

Ball—Because in the first place—and you had better check it out with Martin—I have a feeling that Donovan is perfectly capable of having talked this way.

Greenfield—Yes, and he is uncontrollable.

Ball—He's uncontrollable, but I think we're going to have to cut him down to size on this thing.

Greenfield—I agree. The Miami people have now checked—you know the 16 people who were picked up in the Bahamas (16 Cubans)—on all of them. Eleven of them came from the Miami area, and five from the New York area for this raid, which I think is pretty interesting. I called that over to the White House too.

Ball—OK.

Greenfield—I'll get on this right away.

647. Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, April 5¹

April 5, 1963

KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE

I. Possible Causes.

A. There have been indications that Soviet military have become more assertive toward Soviet leadership. The Soviets have an inferiority complex. The military, who have a sensitive pride, doubtless feel they have been exposed to a series of humiliations—viz:

1. Blockade actions during Cuban crisis.
2. Close and repeated surveillance by us of Soviet ships.
3. Continued overflight of Soviet military installations in Cuba.
4. Penkovsky spy affair.
5. Soviet military may have reluctantly agreed to three atomic test inspections under pressure from Khrushchev who may really have believed this would achieve agreement.
6. Message to Khrushchev delivered by Kohler probably considered by Soviets as adding insult to injury. It is one thing for us to overfly Cuba with tacit Soviet tolerance, another to remind them in official statement that we are and will continue to do so.

¹ Analysis of possible causes and motives behind Khrushchev's message passed to the Attorney General on April 3. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files, 1963.

7. Two attacks by Cuban emigres on Soviet ships and our statements and actions indicating that Soviet military must withdraw.

B. Khrushchev pushed by CHICOMS and may be in a corner even with his own colleagues. He is faced with a whole series of failures—viz:

1. Cuban affair.
2. Bad handling of Chinese dispute.
3. Agriculture failure.
4. Cultural thaw which got out of hand.
5. Iraq and Syria.
6. Franco-German Treaty.
7. Multilateral Force prospects.
8. Berlin.

C. Khrushchev's defense of his Cuban policy dependent upon survival of Castro at least until CHICOM dispute settled or until meaningful agreements reached with the United States. He is doubtless concerned that we may bring Castro down before that time. Moreover, our actions are making his support of Cuba expensive and burdensome in many ways. As Soviets train Cubans to operate SAM sites, Cubans have probably become more aware of extent and frequency of our overflights. Castro may be threatening drastic action such as turning to the Chinese unless Khrushchev stops overflights.

D. Khrushchev might have MRBM's in caves in Cuba and want to stop overflights in order to get them into place for a showdown over Berlin or on other questions.

II. *Possible Motives.*

A. Some of Khrushchev's possible motives are implicit in the foregoing but to summarize:

1. He may be under pressure from his military or his party colleagues for forceful action and may wish to provoke a strong reaction to his message in order to deal with them.
2. He may hope to influence our position in the Berlin negotiations.
3. He may hope to stimulate stronger action by us against hit-and-run raids and/or to weaken our actions against Castro.
4. He may be using this message to bring about a Summit or high-level meeting to deal with the points mentioned above as well as other issues such as a test ban in order to decide how to handle his CHICOM problem.
5. He may really be backed into a corner in which he sees a possibility of losing power and be gambling that we will back down on overflights of Cuba.
6. Khrushchev may want to bring the question of overflights, and possibly our actions against the Castro regime, before the U.N.

648. Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, April 6¹

April 6, 1963

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation Between Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR and Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State, Saturday, 10:00 a.m., April 6, 1963.

I explained to the Ambassador that the postponement of the talks on Berlin was entirely due to the Secretary's heavy schedule and said the Secretary thought that in view of the very short time he would have, it would be better to wait until they could have a more thorough discussion. When I started to describe what the Secretary's schedule had been in the last few days, the Ambassador interrupted to say he was well aware of this and completely understood the reason for postponement.

I then went on to say that he had occasionally asked for personal advice from me on various questions, and that today I would like to consult him on the same personal basis. I said I had been informed of the conversation he had had a few days ago and that it seemed clear from this and from other indications that misunderstanding between our two countries was increasing and seemed to me to be quite serious. I had been considering recommending to the Secretary and the President that the President send some high-level official in whom he had complete confidence and who was privy to his thinking to see the Chairman for an informal talk with the objective of clearing away as much of this misunderstanding as possible. I said this, of course, did not indicate any lack of confidence in Ambassador Kohler, but that this sort of thing could only be done by someone who was in close contact with the President. I did not wish to make such a recommendation if it would not be helpful, and I found it difficult to make up my own mind. I said that I realized that on both sides there were difficult problems just now and that I could understand that the timing might be awkward for both of us.

Dobrynin said, without hesitation, that he thought it would be a very good idea. He pressed very hard to know what specific person I had in mind. I tried to put him off by saying simply that it should be a high-level official who was in a position to know what was in the President's mind on various problems. He continued to press for a

¹ Memorandum of conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson, April 6. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files, 1963.

name by way of illustration and I finally mentioned the Secretary, the Attorney General, and Mr. Harriman. I had previously mentioned the Laos problem and said that it could be that developments would be such that a visit by Mr. Harriman, ostensibly on this problem, would be easiest to explain. I said I thought that if the Secretary should go, there would have to be some problem that could be dealt with successfully. I said that if it were the Attorney General, there would have to be some excuse, and I mentioned the possibility of visiting the Leningrad and Moscow Universities where we had students, and pointed out that the Attorney General had made previous trips abroad particularly in connection with universities and youth problems. I inquired if he knew of any event coming up in the Soviet Union which might be used in this connection. Dobrynin inquired about timing, and I said I thought this would depend upon developments, but I should have thought some time within a month. He repeated he thought it would be an excellent idea for someone to go and would think about the matter and let me know if he had any further thoughts.

I also told the Ambassador that I understood the President would probably send Mr. Khrushchev a personal letter, probably some time next week.

I then asked the Ambassador what his guess was as to what particular issues were bothering the Chairman. He mentioned first the Cuban affair and said that he was sure, from his own experience in Moscow, that they would interpret the emigre raids as having been condoned if not actually run, by the United States Government. He did not mean necessarily the President but perhaps one of the other agencies. He [illegible in the original] thought this had been interpreted as a deliberate effort to embarrass the Soviet Union. He also said that outside the Government, particularly in the Foreign Office, people in Moscow did not distinguish between statements made by prominent Senators, for example, and responsible members of the Executive Branch.

Dobrynin referred to the Soviet troop withdrawals and the statements by Senator Keating and others which made it look as though the Soviets were withdrawing under pressure. He said that from having attended meetings in Moscow, he knew that they were particularly sensitive to any thought that they were being pushed around or yielding to pressure, and said that while our Government might react the same way, he thought they were particularly prone to this in Moscow. I said I could assure him that while I could not speak for every individual, I knew that no agency of the Government condoned these raids, much less connived at them, and referred to the vigorous action we were taking to stop them. The Ambassador indicated he understood this.

The Ambassador then referred to the disarmament discussions and particularly the negotiations on a test ban. He said he had actually

seen the telegram which Kuznetsov had sent reporting his conversation with Dean, who referred to two to four inspections, but stressed the importance of an acceptance in principle. He said he was sure that the Soviet Government and he himself had been convinced that the Chairman's letter accepting two or three inspections had solved the matter, and that when we had come back with a proposal of eight, the Soviet Government considered it had been led into a trap, and that this had been a deliberate effort to play games with them. I pointed out that Mr. Dean had categorically denied having made the statement attributed to him and, quite apart from this, I could assure him that there had never been any thought of our agreement to any such number. The Ambassador replied he was not discussing this but simply trying to explain the reaction in Moscow. He added that when he had delivered the Chairman's letter to the Attorney General, the latter remarked that this was fine, and the Ambassador had been convinced himself that the matter was settled.

In this connection, the Ambassador referred to the readiness with which the Chairman had agreed to receive Norman Cousins, who had told the Ambassador that he had seen the President, that he had no mandate whatever from him, but would like to talk to Khrushchev about testing in order to explain the thinking of the American people, as well as what he understood was in the mind of the President and other officials. I said I hoped he understood that Norman Cousins was not particularly close to the President nor the Secretary and probably not in a position to give any authoritative account of their thinking, although he was a man of good will. The Ambassador said he thoroughly understood this and had explained it to the Chairman. He merely cited it as indicative of the Chairman's interest in trying to understand our thinking and reach agreement on this problem.

The Ambassador asked me what subject would be covered in the President's letter, and I said I did not know, but imagined it would cover more than one subject as there were a number of serious issues between us.

649. Memorandum for the record by McCone, April 10¹

April 10, 1963

SUBJECT

Executive Committee of the NSC Meeting—12:00 noon—10 April 1963

IN ATTENDANCE

The President, Secretary Ball, Governor Harriman, Amb. Thompson, Mr. Bundy, Admiral Anderson, Secretary Johnson, Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and others

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

7. I then had a private meeting with the President. At this time I read my memorandum of April 10 covering the initial report on the Donovan negotiations. He noted numbered paragraph 2 with considerable interest and raised the question as to Castro's future in Cuba, with or without Soviet presence. I told him this matter was under study, that I felt the Donovan relationship was valuable, and my intent to send Donovan back on April 22 to secure the freedom of the remaining Americans and also I intended to keep the channel of communication open.

I expressed concern over the delay until April 22, indicating to the President that this might very well be a ploy and that there was a possibility of a confrontation in connection with our aerial surveillance. The President said we must continue aerial surveillance and be prepared to act if a plane is shot down. I stated that while this was a possibility, an alternative might be that Cuba, with or without the Soviet Union, would go before the United Nations and insist that we stop violating Cuban air spaces. The President said he felt this was a definite possibility, that he thought we could meet such a diplomatic maneuver, and that under any circumstances we must maintain aerial surveillance.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ Executive Committee of the NSC meeting including: Donovan negotiations; aerial surveillance. 3 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI McCone Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April–30 June 1963.

650. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara,
April 11¹

April 11, 1963

SUBJECT

U-2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans (C)

1. A joint Department of State/Department of Defense draft paper has been prepared which lists courses of actions available to the United States in the event a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft is attacked over Cuba.

2. This paper emphasizes the political desirability of a prompt military response in such an event. It points out that the United States should be in a position to launch an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the same day a U-2 is destroyed and that prompt retaliation would deny Khrushchev the opportunity for bellicose threats or actions before the US response becomes a *fait accompli*.

3. It is militarily feasible to strike a SAM site in 12 hours from present posture, provided weather conditions and remaining daylight permit. In this regard, it is significant to note that planned attacks, which would be conducted at very low levels during daylight, require weather and light conditions of at least 400 feet and 5 miles visibility to assure positive target identification and accuracy. A lesser reaction time could be established by increasing alert measures for specific forces involved. However, it must be recognized that with US forces in their present DEFCON 5 condition, overt military action against Cuba in the context described above entails risks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that if the suggested courses of actions in the State/Defense paper are approved, the military establishment should take the following measures:

a. Increase readiness to evacuate non-combatants from Guantanamo. The normal non-combatant population for the base, for purposes of evacuation plans, is 2400 individuals. At present, the planned capability to evacuate Guantanamo is from [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The time spread reflects fluctuations in the availability of shipping. If one AKA and four DDs are in port, evacuation could be accomplished in [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. With advanced warning and prepositioning of one AKA, this time could be reduced to one hour.

¹ U-2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—.

b. Increase the world-wide alert posture of US forces concurrently with the decision to attack a Cuban SAM site.

c. Reinforce the garrison at Guantanamo.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that minimization of risks and adequate preparation for effective attack are more important considerations than a specific requirement that the retaliatory attack be made the same day.

5. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be given an opportunity for detailed comment on any subsequent draft before official use thereof.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

George W. Anderson
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**651. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President,
April 12¹**

April 12, 1963

I have been very slow in sending this memorandum on long-range planning aspects, prepared in Walt Rostow's office and forwarded at the end of February by Dean Rusk. The reason is that I just could not find a time when I thought you were likely to give it the attention they would like. But perhaps now you could have a quick look and agree to have a meeting with Walt and the Secretary and a very few others next week on these planning problems. My own guess is that what is needed for Walt is a real sense of your own interest and some sense on priorities, and beyond that we could probably organize the consideration of some of these long-range problems in the Standing Committee which you, Bobby and I have been discussing.

That Committee is now, incidentally, agreed around town and will begin operation next week. Its title will be "Standing Committee of the NSC" and we intend to have absolutely no publicity about it in order to avoid useless chatter about seizing the initiative from the State

¹ Time to begin long-range planning aspects for Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group, 4/63–5/63.

Department or restoring the OCB, or otherwise reorganizing ourselves in the spring of our discontent.

McG. B.

652. Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, April 13¹

April 13, 1963

SUBJECT

Miro Cardona Statement

I hope that our public comment on the Miro Cardona statement will be on the restrained side. A possible line to take, it would seem to me, would be to say that Miro Cardona is naturally interested in Cuba and Cuba alone, while the United States Government must take into account the problems of an entire world; that, as a natural consequence of seeing only the Cuba problem, Miro is impatient, dissatisfied and frustrated; and that this understandable emotional concern has led him to recall and enlarge only the encouraging words in his conversations with American officials, and to repress and forget the many words of caution and restraint.

I would favor this approach rather than one of castigation and contempt

1) because Miro Cardona has not told all he knows, and, if driven into a corner, could do us a lot more damage (you will note his statement in his account of the interview of April 10, 1962, "The interview, it is obvious, also included other matters which I am not in a position to reveal"); if goaded into it, Miro could give a hopelessly squalid picture of our covert dealings with the exiles; and

2) because Miro Cardona is basically a high-minded and decent man, who has behaved fairly well for two years, who has been sorely tried and under great pressure, and who is still, I believe, genuinely doing what he thinks best for his country. We may disagree with his policy, but I do not think it would be right to impeach his motives or character.

¹ Miro Cardona statement. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba II.

Most of my talks with Miro took place before the Bay of Pigs and are not referred to in Miro's statement. However, I have sent Gordon Chase of Bundy's office notes of conversations which Dick and I had with him on September 9 and October 24, 1961.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

653. Memorandum for the record by L.J. Legere, April 15¹

April 15, 1963

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting, 15 April 1963

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

7. Once again the subject of Senor Miro Cardona came up, and once again the concern of Mr. Bundy was obvious that this man will implicate several highly placed members of the Government if he decides to go all out in making an indignant statement. The President wanted to know how it happened that we did not have any notes available covering Miro Cardona's call or calls on the President himself; Bundy said that it was really hard for him (Bundy) to restrain himself in the face of this statement, since, of course, Bundy is always trying to persuade the President to permit the attendance in his office of responsible staff officers who might take a few notes.

Legere

¹ Daily White House staff meeting, including: Miro Cardona statement. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group March–April 1963.

**654. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
April 17¹**

April 17, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. I understand the President spoke to Bob Manning this morning regarding the Secretary's speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors tomorrow afternoon. Senator Keating will be speaking before the group prior to the Secretary's appearance.

The President asked Manning to get the following points into the Secretary's speech:

(a) Raids by exiles—put this in perspective (e.g. effectiveness of invasion by motor boat).

(b) Free World shipping to Cuba (there has been an increase recently)—State should be in a position to show that we have noted the increase, are studying the situation, and are contemplating further action to discourage Free World shipping to Cuba.

(c) Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba—restate our position on the removal of Soviet troops.

The President also told Manning that our handling of press inquiries about the Miro resignation remains the same. We have stated our position and have nothing further to say.

2. The statement about cutting off U.S. financial support to the CRC evidently did not originate either at Palm Beach or in State (at least intentionally).

3. The President asked Bob Hurwitch about today's press stories regarding Bob's conversations with Miro last week. The stories apparently originated with a Cuban UPI man in Miami named Merino. Bob is now writing a memorandum for the President who may use it to crack UPI over the head.

4. I talked to Andy Hatcher about the Miro problem. Palm Beach remains generally calm. Andy agreed that there is no immediate rush on the Schlesinger statement.

Gordon Chase

¹ Rusk's speech before American Society of Newspaper Editors; Miro resignation; support to CRC. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (D), 4/1-4/20/63.

655. Paper prepared by the CIA, April 17¹

April 17, 1963

PROSPECTS FOR AND LIMITATIONS OF
A MAXIMUM COVERT ACTION PROGRAM AGAINST THE
CASTRO COMMUNIST REGIME

Outline

Requirements, Assumptions, Intelligence

Objectives and Limitations

Program: (1) General Sabotage and Harassment

(2) Exploitation and Stimulation of

Disaffection in the Cuban Armed Forces

Risks in Using Exiles

Proposed "Rules of Engagement" for Use of Exiles

Characteristics of "Rules of Engagement"

Comment

This paper was prepared by the CIA in response to a request made by the President and the AG at the April 3 meeting that CIA "survey all possibilities for aggressive action in Cuba over the next six months assuming that the Agency could be given a free rein to proceed." The paper is not responsive. The "program" discussed has undesirable elements of inflexibility (if undertaken and then halted, it "cannot be resumed," p. 8) and is not subject to adequate control. Mr. FitzGerald realizes that the paper is not responsive, but he apparently considers the preparation of a responsive paper meaningless at this time.

From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
to the Special Group

SUBJECT

Prospects for and Limitations of a Maximum Covert Action Program Against the
CASTRO Communist Regime

1. CIA has been requested to submit a covert action program directed against the CASTRO Communist regime, assuming "unlimited policy and funds." The parameters of this program have been set by the following terms of reference and assumptions:

¹ "Prospects for and Limitations of a Maximum Covert Action Program Against the Castro Communist Regime." Top Secret. 11 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0131, Book I—Special Group.

a. The program deals exclusively with covert action operations unrelated to any broader U.S. policy. It does not, therefore, consider the obvious alternative of deliberately creating a situation by means of covert action which can be used as a pretext for overt military intervention by U.S. armed forces.

b. The program excludes actions which, though covertly inspired and unattributable to the United States, could escalate into a direct confrontation between U.S. and Soviet forces.

c. The proposals contained herein, particularly those involving paramilitary action and sabotage, are confined to a size and character which can reasonably assure unattributability or at least plausible denial by the U.S. Government. Thus, operations on or approaching the scale of the Cuban Brigade invasion of April 1961 are not considered in this program.

d. A mass popular uprising is neither likely to occur within the foreseeable future nor should it be encouraged under present circumstances.

2. In addition to the terms of reference and assumptions noted in paragraph 1 above, the following estimate with regard to the internal Cuban situation has influenced the scope and content of the program:

a. Barring CASTRO's death or a decisive change in the U.S. posture, the CASTRO regime is likely to be more firmly established a year hence, despite possible economic setbacks. The mere passage of time tends to favor CASTRO as the population and elite groups in Cuba become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and the security organs become more efficient. Over the longer run, the existence of an organized party apparatus as well as a stable governmental machinery could reduce the indispensibility of CASTRO's personal leadership and provide the Moscow-oriented Communists with an opportunity for a non-violent takeover of Cuba.

b. The critical point in Soviet-Cuban relations, brought about by the missile crisis, seems to have passed and they have probably reached at least a short term recommendation on major internal and international issues. Above all, CASTRO and the Soviets have probably agreed on the need for a period of relative calm in U.S.-Cuban relations in order to permit time for the consolidation and stabilization of the internal Cuban political, economic and security situation. Their overall immediate objective, it would appear, is to demonstrate, principally for the benefit of Latin Americans, that a Communist revolution supported by the Soviet Union cannot be reversed by the United States. Additionally, it would serve CASTRO's immediate interests to stimulate and maintain unrest in Latin America, if only to present to the world a Cuban facade of relative security, order and stability in contrast to the chaos that exists in those countries of Latin America, not yet "liberated" from imperialism.

3. Based on the assumptions in paragraph 1 above and the estimate of the situation in paragraph 2 above, it must be emphasized at the outset that a program dependent exclusively on covert action operations cannot be predicated on the assumption that it can bring about the overthrow of the CASTRO Communist regime, even with maximum utilization of manpower and resources and “unlimited policy and funds.” Thus, any covert action program submitted for consideration must have limited albeit valid objectives. If the estimate is correct that barring a decisive change in U.S. posture, the CASTRO regime will be stronger a year hence, we believe that a valid and realistic objective of a covert action program over the next year is to attempt through harassment and internal disorder to obstruct or slow down the pacification of the population and the consolidation and stabilization of the CASTRO Communist regime.

4. It should be noted that execution of this program is not contingent upon the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba. The operations contemplated can proceed without regard to the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. In fact, the presence of Soviet “occupation” forces in Cuba can be exploited politically and propagandistically and perhaps serve as a catalyst to convert passive disaffection to more active forms or opposition to CASTRO by the population at large and, more importantly, by key officers in the Cuban armed forces.

5. The covert action program will concentrate on two principal categories of operations, much of which is already underway or in the planning stage:

a. *General Sabotage and Harassment*—

The objective of these activities is threefold:

(1) To weaken the regime economically by attacking a variety of industrial, transportation, public utilities, and communication targets.

(2) To provide a favorable operational climate more conducive to the conduct of covert operations and to the growth of internal resistance by weakening the economic, military and internal security controls of the regime.

(3) To give hope and meaning to internal resistance by demonstrating that determined opposition to the regime not only exists, but is also willing and able to act, and thus inducing the Cuban populace to cooperate to the maximum with opposition elements.

The operation will be conducted either by externally held assets now available or by existing internal assets or those to be developed. Assets trained and controlled by CIA will be used as will selected exile groups over which we may only be able to exercise nominal influence. Initially the emphasis will be on the use of externally held assets with a shift to internal assets as feasible.

The operational details of this category of activity are being treated in separate papers submitted to the Special Group via the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba.

[text not declassified]

6. Heretofore, CIA has utilized only fully controlled and disciplined agent assets as a safeguard against unilateral and irresponsible action by Cuban exiles intent upon the liberation of their country. Because of the need for selectivity and the high investment of experienced manpower, training facilities and logistic support required for CIA controlled operations, these are only possible on a relatively small scale, certainly not of the magnitude needed to accomplish even the limited objective stated in paragraph 3 above. If, therefore, it is desired that these activities be undertaken on a larger scale, it will necessitate acceptance of the risks involved in utilizing autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. If policy clearance is granted for the mobilization of such groups and individuals, CIA proposes the following "rules of engagement" to govern the conduct of these autonomous operations:

a. It is a keystone of autonomous operations that the acts proposed are performed by Cubans and that CASTRO can only be overthrown by Cubans. The United States, therefore, must be prepared to deny participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the rumors or accusations of United States complicity or may be charged even within the United States.

b. Recognition that although these operations would be influenced by CIA, they are not completely controlled by the Agency and therefore, it is inevitable that acts will be performed which are not in conformity with current U.S. policy. If it is deemed that the purpose of the proposal is in U.S. interests, relatively minor deviations from the details of U.S. policy must be condoned.

c. The program proposed will cost Cuban lives, probably many. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, we are in the position to halt the program, over a period, by entirely withdrawing support; but once halted, it cannot be resumed.

d. It is probable that the more successful the operation becomes, the more the United States will be pressured to intervene. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the United States representative would make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily except to counter intervention by the Soviets.

e. Any such autonomous operation would be mounted outside the territory of the United States. A Latin American country which furnishes a base for these operations will also attempt to secure additional U.S. support for its purposes; such support should be confined to only that which has been indicated above.

7. Within these "rules of engagement," it is envisaged that autonomous operations would have the following characteristics:

a. Personnel engaged would be Cuban nationals exclusively, preferably led by individuals with established reputations for active resistance against the CASTRO regime after it became clear that the idealistic aims of the revolution had been betrayed by CASTRO.

b. The groups operating from bases outside the United States would have to be given wide latitude to carry out their projects even if their operational methods do not measure up to CIA standards.

c. The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds, training, technical advice and logistic support to the extent that the latter is not available on the open or black market. He could not be responsible for the conduct of operations or for controlling the behavior of the group.

d. These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule. To the extent that the CIA liaison officer can influence the decisions of the group leaders, the operations would be executed only when training and equipment requirements have been met and operational conditions are right.

656. Memorandum from Sherman Kent to McCone, April 19¹

April 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Comments on Proposed New Covert Policy and Program towards Cuba

1. The following comment was prepared by Messrs. Kent, Smith, Huizenga, and Whitman of this office. We are in general agreement with this paper's estimates of specific Soviet reactions to specific measures against Cuba. In this connection, our only general comment is that reactions would probably be sharper to measures taken from outside Cuba (D1, 2, and 3) than to those mounted internally (d 4), since these latter could not be so successfully represented as US-inspired in Soviet political exploitation. With respect to anti-shipping measures (D1, 2), it is possible that reprisals would be taken against US ships in Latin American ports where local Communists have significant sabotage capabilities, e.g. Venezuela.

¹ Comments on proposed new covert policy and program toward Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.

2. Turning to more general reactions, we think that the paper and its Annex are deficient in failing to consider how both the USSR and Cuba would interpret basic US policy toward Cuba in the light of actions such as those proposed here. We believe that, at the present juncture, both the USSR and Cuba wish to bring about a period of calm in the Caribbean, reduce the constant threat of a crisis, and in this way work for a stabilization of Cuba's position and its *de facto* acceptance by its neighbors. We think they probably intend to continue this policy until they are satisfied that Cuba can again be used as a Communist base for forward action without excessive risk. They realize that the US is unreconciled to the present regime, but they probably hope that the US will limit itself to measures of isolation, and will refrain from more active and direct measures. In this, they are probably somewhat encouraged by the absence of low-level overflights and, to a greater extent, by US declarations and measures against independent exile attacks.

3. The unfurling of a program of more aggressive sabotage, harassment, and resistance activities would at some point cause the Soviets and Cubans to question whether a period of calm could be achieved. As incidents mounted, they would be increasingly inclined to believe that the US could not be induced to let the Castro regime survive, and that tactics of non-provocation would not divert the US from its increasingly manifest intention to bring down the regime by indirect action. Fears of direct US action, including even an invasion, would be revived. We have no basis for predicting at what point the Soviets and Cubans would reach these conclusions, but it is likely that Castro would be more concerned, and earlier, than the USSR, with consequent strains in Havana-Moscow relations. Castro might at some point use his own military forces in a way designed to force the USSR's hand.

4. The Soviets, in these circumstances, would look for ways to arrest a trend which appeared to point toward the ultimate fall of the Cuban regime and, in the meantime, was complicating their relations with Castro. One of their first acts might be to communicate privately with the President in a way which combined [illegible in the original] of direct retaliation with hints that Soviet-American relations as a whole were at stake in the Cuban confrontation. In fact, under these circumstances, the Soviets probably would harden their attitude on other international issues; at a minimum, they would find it difficult to conclude major agreements at a time when US pressures on Cuba were high. This might be thought of as a disadvantage if we expected that any gains on other issues would result from US efforts to promote a more relaxed atmosphere. At the present phase, however, it does not seem likely that Soviet attitudes on matters like Berlin and disarmament will be much affected by such considerations.

5. If the Soviets found that such measures failed to deter the US, and it appeared to them that covert action posed a real threat to the Cuban regime, the USSR would have to decide whether to take greater risks to arrest this trend. If they chose to do so, the issue of aerial surveillance would offer an appropriate confrontation. They might believe that continuing reconnaissance plus a rise in sabotage and harassment from outside Cuba offered a promising case for resort to the UN in an effort to force a major reversal of US policy toward Cuba. To dramatize their case, they might shoot down a U-2, absorb the likely US retaliation, and thus seize the UN with a major crisis. From the Soviet viewpoint, however, the latter would be a hazardous move offering an uncertain outcome, and a decision to court such a show-down would depend upon numerous factors which are themselves constantly changing.

6. If the USSR were unwilling to incur high risks, it would probably seek to meet US activities locally and directly by aiding Cuba's efforts to protect its shipping and installations and to suppress internal elements. If the USSR adhered to this policy, and Castro was in fact seriously weakened, it would probably content itself with trying to maximize the political costs to the US of having restored "imperialism" in Cuba.

Sherman Kent
Assistant Director
National Estimates

657. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, April 19¹

April 19, 1963

McNamara—George, I feel so strongly on this low level that I just wanted to say that I feel I must go to the President on it.

Ball—We are holding in that course.

McNamara—I thought you were.

¹ Low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

Ball—I think this is a problem which has got to be resolved between you and Dean and the President and possibly McCone. I hated to get all those people—

McNamara—That's why I didn't want to speak up on it either.

Ball—That's why I was taking the view let's not decide it now.

McNamara—The reason for my call is to say that unless one of two conditions is present, I am opposed to it. One of the conditions would be that we think something might be happening there that has some true military significance in the sense that it would effect our military planning. The second condition would be that even if the first condition weren't present, that there would be no price that we would be paying for the low level in its effect on our Soviet relationship.

Ball—Right.

McNamara—I can't see the second condition being met.

Ball—I can't either.

McNamara—I'm not aware of any situation that fits the first requirement.

Ball—That's right. The only thing that seemed to us really worth any of the risks of looking at were the underground installations and John put those lower on the priority list than these camps.

McNamara—I am not even familiar with underground installations.

Ball—They are just storage facilities. They look as though they are for cruise missiles. I agree with you entirely. This was a little ploy on my part not to get into a full-fledged discussion.

McNamara—I was sure that's what it was. I just wanted you to know the way I feel about it, and I assumed State felt this way, and I fully support State on it. I think—as you could tell in the later discussion—that we have got to be careful what we do with low level to be certain it doesn't cross one of these other tracks.

Ball—That's exactly right.

McNamara—I can't conceive of low level under present circumstances strengthening our relations with the Soviets. So the probability is there's a real price to pay. Well, may I leave it in your hands to, at some point, get Dean and me together on it.

Ball—Yes.

McNamara—Or, if he's gone, you and I can get together and talk to the President.

Ball—Fine. Dean is going the end of the week.

McNamara—All right, there'll be time this week.

**658. Memorandum from Hurwitch to the NSC Standing Group,
April 19¹**

April 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Special Report on Cuba for Meeting of April 23, 1963

Sections 1 through 9 of a Report on Cuba were transmitted to Mr. Bundy yesterday for consideration by the Standing Group at their meeting on April 23 at 5 p.m.

Section 9 of the report, our present covert policy, is enclosed herewith.

Enclosure

PRESENT POLICY

1. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to our basic policy objectives (No offensive weapons reintroduced into Cuba, removal of Soviet forces, no aggressive Cuban military action, reducing subversion in the hemisphere, divorcing Castro from USSR, replacing present regime, maximizing cost to USSR, political isolation of Cuba and preparing for military contingencies).

2. Intensifying covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime.

3. Supporting the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and b) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and 3) secure intelligence.

4. The use of variety of propaganda media to stimulate passive resistance and low-risk, simple sabotage actions by the populace of Cuba.

5. The placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives with suitable time delay within the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban vessels and/or damage their cargoes while on the high seas.

¹ Special Report on Cuba for meeting of April 23. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).

6. Introducing abrasives or other damaging materials into propulsion, communication and other systems of the ship to inactivate the ship.

659. Annex 3 to printed Document 320, revised April 18¹

April 18, 1963

Annex 3

CURRENT SITUATION

A. INTERNAL ECONOMIC SITUATION

During 1963 the Cuban economy is continuing on the declining trend that began in 1960–61. Production of sugar from the current harvest as of March 30, 1963, was an estimated 2.2 million metric tons, compared to 2.7 million tons in 1962 and 4.3 million tons in 1961 at the same date. The final crop is estimated at about 4 million tons, well under the low 4.8 millions in 1962, and only 60% of the 1961 production of 6.8 million tons. Production could be further reduced by new technical or political difficulties or by unseasonable rainfall. With unfavorable conditions, total production might drop to 3.6 million tons.

In 1962 Cuba's gross national production (GNP) was an estimated 25% below the 1958 level. Cuban GNP in 1962 was less than \$2,000 million (in 1958 prices), as compared to more than \$2,500 million in 1958. Cuba has been able to compensate for lagging output by imports from the bloc on credit, but probably had 20% less goods available in 1962 than in 1958. Che Guevara recently asserted that Cuba has reached "the lowest rung in the production of sugar" this year, and that errors in "sugar policy" have been rectified. However, the sugar economy and the economy in general seem to be far from recovering the efficiency and momentum lost in the Revolution.

The shortfall in available consumer goods is particularly serious because Cuban consumers have more money to spend. Despite rationing, extended from basic foodstuffs to clothing and shoes, the consumption of goods by the poorer classes has declined, and blackmarketing

¹ Current Situation: Internal Economic Situation; Internal Political Situation; Soviet Forces in Cuba. Secret Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).

is widespread. In an attempt to stem inflation, the regime announced price controls on a wide range of goods and services in early April 1963, greatly extending the previous system also by controlling prices at producer, wholesale and retail levels. Distribution of foodstuffs has apparently improved somewhat. However, there is a widespread refusal to work manifested in a shortage of workers to harvest crops, inattention by labor to quality control, and work slowdowns and absenteeism. Many Cubans find poor performance a way of expressing anti-regime feeling, and others understand the Revolution to mean freedom from work.

Meanwhile, Cuba is almost entirely dependent on the communist bloc economies. Cuban trade with the free world has declined to around 10% of imports and 20% of exports. Cuba will do well to deliver as much tonnage to the Free World in 1963 as in 1962, although export values could be greater because of higher world sugar prices. The bloc is continuing to supply essential goods to maintain the economy and is providing consumer goods on credit to compensate for the shortfall in Cuban exports. However, bloc aid for economic development is still largely in the planning stage. It has yet to have an effect in helping to restore the economic momentum lost in the Revolution.

B. INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

Four years after his ouster of Batista, Fidel Castro remains the unchallenged leader of Cuba. He is no longer the widely popular figure he once was, but his assets are more than sufficient to assure his control. Castro is still a compelling inspiration to the youth of the country and there are many Cubans—such as those in the bureaucracy—whose lives are now too closely identified with Castro to permit them to pull out. The security network established since 1959 is vast, well-ordered, and effective. While there is grumbling among the part-time militia, the regular military is overwhelmingly loyal to Castro, there having been few defections. Political life in the country has been for some time highly organized and the new state party (PURS), involving some 50 to 60,000 people, is about ready to take over from its able predecessor, the ORI.

The mass of the Cuban people seem resigned to their situation and unwilling to accept the risks of open opposition to Castro. Internal resistance is still small-scale, and poorly coordinated and equipped. In recent months there has been some increase of resistance in the eastern provinces, but this is in part seasonal and related to opportunities presented to opponents of the regime by the lagging sugar harvest.

The missile crisis had little if any ill effect on Castro's situation within Cuba, even though it soured Cuban-Soviet relations for a time. On the contrary, the way in which Castro stood up to the Soviets and

the US and got away with it probably bolstered his position at home. Moreover, developments with regard to the missile crisis seem to have made the old line, Moscow-oriented Communists more willing than before to accept Castro's leadership.

C. SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

The original estimate of Soviet personnel in Cuba at the height of the crisis—22–23,000—was arrived at by estimating the personnel requirements of the various Soviet activities in Cuba we could identify. The 22–23,000 figure represented a fairly firm minimum, but it was always recognized that the total could be higher by several thousand. The *Time-Life* reporter in Moscow, Stevens, for example, who spent several weeks in Cuba, reported Cuban estimates of 35,000 Soviets as a maximum figure.

Whatever the actual total, we are fairly confident that about 5,000 missile technicians left in November, and that an additional minimum of 4,600 Soviet personnel left between mid-February and mid-April. Most of these we believe to have been military personnel.

Only a few new arrivals have been observed, about 300, although we have unsubstantiated refugee and agent reports of many thousands. Most of these reports can be discounted on internal evidence alone on dates of arrival, ship names, and the like. Taking only the most reliable evidence, we would estimate arrivals of new troops and technicians at between 300 and 1,000 since January 1.

There have been some changes in the physical layout of the Soviet armored camps but nothing that would point conclusively to Soviet withdrawal from these or any other facilities in Cuba. There have been no significant equipment withdrawals in 1963, and there is no observable and significant Cuban participation in the activities we estimate to be primarily Soviet controlled—most notably air defense and SAM facilities. There are indications that the Cubans are being trained in MIG 21's, SAMs, and other operations. But it is clear that the turnover has not yet taken place and that, when it does, it will be gradual.

Our information on the Bloc civilian presence in Cuba is very spotty. Stevens estimated that 5,000 civilian technicians might be there. This is a reasonable estimate but one we cannot prove. The majority of civilian technicians are undoubtedly Soviet.

The Soviets have announced their intention to build a Cuban fishing industry and to this end have embarked on a port development project and fish processing facilities. Several hundred Bloc agricultural specialists (most of them Soviet but including about 200 Chinese Communists) have been sent to Cuba in the last year. Soviet, East German and other Bloc industrial technicians are engaged in a variety of factory building

projects including power plants, a petroleum refinery, a textile combine, and several light industrial plants. It is likely that several hundred technicians are also engaged in the maintenance of Soviet military equipment in Cuba particularly in the electronics and communications field. Other things being equal, the number of civilian technicians from the Bloc is not likely to go down and may very well increase.

For the future, we would expect Soviet military withdrawals to continue slowly. If the Soviet armored units were put into Cuba to protect the missiles—and we believe they were—their continuing presence is militarily unnecessary. They might be useful in certain circumstances—for example to prevent or support a palace coup directed against Castro—but they would not be powerful enough to put down a major Cuban insurrection if the Cuban army were ranged against them, nor could they hope to stem a determined military invasion of Cuba. These troops have some utility as a trip-wire and deterrent to such an invasion, but only if the Soviets are willing to react to such an invasion by nuclear war. Since they cannot (in case of hostilities) be readily protected, resupplied or reinforced and since they are not apparently needed to protect Soviet material in Cuba or to maintain order, their eventual withdrawal appears likely.

The remaining Soviet military personnel i.e. SAM, air defense, communications, naval and air personnel constitute a somewhat different case. Some of them are undoubtedly training Cubans and, as training is completed, may withdraw. We would expect the SAM's to be turned over to Cuba eventually, but at the same time we would assume that the Soviets and the Cubans would want to maintain the air defense system at near peak efficiency. Withdrawal of these personnel therefore will probably be very slow since the training cycle alone is likely to take six months to a year.

Given the complexity of the military equipment now in Cuba and the current indications that much of it will stay rather than be returned to the USSR, it is likely that a large number of Soviet military technicians will remain in Cuba indefinitely. This number might run into a few thousand initially, even though few of them had direct responsibility for operating the equipment. Reductions in this number would depend on variable factors of the political climate, the introduction of newer equipment, and the proficiency of Cuban trainees.

660. Annex 6 to printed Document 320, undated¹

undated

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S
STANDING GROUP*Annex 6*

ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS

a) *Shipping*

The results of our démarches to cut down Free World shipping to Cuba are best explained by figures. During the period January 1 to March 31, 1962 a total of 337 Free World vessels entered Cuban ports. During the same period in 1963, only 62 Free World vessels entered Cuban ports. A proposal is presently before the President to expand NSAM No. 220 to bar U.S.-financed cargoes to all vessels owned or controlled by persons owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade. Such a measure will affect several hundred vessels and we anticipate it will result in a further decline in Free World shipping to Cuba.

Other measures being considered include closing OAS ports to all vessels engaged in the Cuban trade on continuous voyage, requesting U.S.-owned oil companies to voluntarily deny bunkers in the Western Hemisphere to ships known to be engaged in the Cuban trade, reassessment of the definitions within the terms of Section 107 (B) of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1963 and closing United States ports completely to certain classes of vessels.

b) *Civil Aviation*

Before the missile crisis, five international airlines served Cuba with about 20 frequencies weekly. Through our efforts, all Free World international airlines except IBERIA (Spain) have ceased operations to the island. IBERIA has one-to-two flights per month.

CUBANA (Cuba) has a bi-weekly service to Mexico City. The Mexicans have taken several measures to tighten the controls on this service.

These are the only scheduled links Cuba now has with the Free World.

¹ Economic Restrictions: Shipping; Civil Aviation Trade; Strategic Commodities. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).

Continued efforts by CSA (Czechoslovakia) and CUBANA to obtain servicing and/or passenger rights in other Free World cities have been thus far successfully blocked by Departmental efforts.

Any requests for transit, servicing or passenger privileges by CUBANA, CSA or AEROFLOT at any point are strenuously opposed on a continuing basis.

c) *Trade*

The decline in Free World trade with Cuba has materially affected her ability to maintain the former relatively high standard of living enjoyed before the Castro take-over. The 4th quarter 1959 GNP of \$2.391 billion pesos has declined an estimated 25% to about \$1.790 billion pesos (Est. 1962) while the population has increased roughly 6% from 6,661,000 to 7,068,000 in 1962. From these data it appears that the per capita GNP has declined from about 360 pesos in 1959 to 253 pesos per annum in 1962. This decrease in income and the rise in prices caused by the increasing shortage of consumer goods has further reduced the average Cuban standard of living, causing widespread discontent. Some selected trade figures may be illustrative of the effects of the United States efforts.

Trade with Cuba
(Millions of dollars)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1959</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1962 (Est)</i>
USA	881	49	7
Canada	27	35	13
United Kingdom	52	28	27
Japan	38	36	54
Latin America	86	22	15
Fed. Rep. of Germany	44	14	11
France	23	6	4
Netherlands	25	15	13
Spain	14	13	9

Geographic Areas
(Millions of dollars)

<i>Area</i>	<i>1959</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1962 (Est)</i>
North America	908	849	20
Europe	228	108	107
Latin America	86	22	15
Near and Far East	<u>67</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>118</u>
	1,289	315	260

d) *Strategic Commodities*

We are continually endeavoring to halt the flow of strategic commodities which formerly were supplied to a great extent by the United

States to Cuba. We have recently through the combined efforts of State, Commerce and private industry successfully blocked the exportation of 500 small tractors from Britain to Spain to Cuba and the sale of 2.5 million tons of Egyptian oil.

Additionally, several shipments of bright stock (oil additive) have been denied Cuba. In several instances export sales of Cuban sugar were blocked.

Efforts to further disrupt Cuba's economy through cutting off needed imports and prevent the earning of badly needed foreign exchange by reducing sales of sugar, tobacco, molasses and other products are being carried forward on a continuing basis.

661. Annex 7 to printed Document 320, undated¹

undated

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STANDING GROUP

Annex 7

EXILE PROBLEMS

1. The Cuban Revolutionary Council and Dr. Miro Cardona

The Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), headed by Dr. Miro Cardona, has, since March 1961, covertly received about \$3,000,000 from the United States. The Council is composed of about a dozen exile groups which represent the main anti-Castro non-Batista political stream in the exile community. It should be noted that at last count there were estimated to be over 400 exile groups, the great majority of which are splintered groups consisting of a "leader" and a few of his friends. The United States has regarded the CRC as its main point of contact with the exile community. The CRC and a few important exile groups outside the CRC (also financially assisted by us) have engaged in propaganda and other activities with our support.

¹ Exile Problems: The Cuban Revolutionary Council and Dr. Miro Cardona; Alpha 66 and Similar Pin-Pricked Raids; The Cuban Brigade; Resettlement of Cuban Exiles. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).

We have refused Miro's demands that we form an alliance with him for the purpose of military action against Cuba, and he has resigned. His resignation will probably be accompanied by that of most of the Council members and the Council may well disappear. We currently think the Council's disappearance would be a desirable development. We shall be evolving policy recommendations regarding our future relations with the exile groups. Attached is a copy of the Department's press statement regarding Dr. Miro's resignation.

2. Alpha 66 and Similar Pin-Pricked Raids

There is attached a copy of the joint State-Justice press release on this subject.

We are currently considering what if any fruitful anti-Castro activities such groups may be persuaded to undertake.

3. The Cuban Brigade

We have established a program of military and civilian opportunities for the members of the Bay of Pigs invasion brigade. Some 400 members of the Brigade have enlisted in the military program (22 week training, or officer training, or an eight week training course for those over 35). The civilian aspect of the program is, after several obstacles have been overcome, now getting underway. This portion of the program offers qualified Brigade members loans for full academic expenses at the university level, a vocational training program including English, and special employment counseling. The monthly compensation for Brigade members is scheduled to terminate with a check for the month of May.

4. Resettlement of Cuban Exiles

We have pursued a policy of voluntary resettlement of Cuban exiles out of the Miami area. To date somewhat over 50,000 refugees have been resettled through the HEW-Voluntary Agency Program. An estimated 125,000 refugees remain in the Miami area. Even before the current Miro resignation, tensions between the local Miami population and the Cuban exiles had arisen. Congressional representatives from Florida expressed concern that further influx of refugees to Miami could result in unpleasant incidents. At the present time refugees inflow has been reduced to a trickle due to the absence of transportation between Cuba and United States. HEW is redoubling its efforts to persuade refugees to leave the Miami area. After the Miro Cardona affair dies down, many Cuban refugees may be more favorably disposed toward the resettlement program.

662. Tab 7 to printed Document 320, undated¹

undated

MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING*Plans Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

1. [2½ lines not declassified]
2. [2 lines not declassified]
[11 lines not declassified]
3. [4 lines not declassified]
4. [3½ lines not declassified]
5. Reconnaissance Plans:
 - a. "BRASS KNOBS"—U-2 (high level) reconnaissance.
 - b. "PEG LEG"—Low level reconnaissance.
 - c. "GREY WOLF"—Armed reconnaissance to search for missing PEG LEG aircraft.
 - d. "BLUE MOON"—Reconnaissance to support surface blockade/quarantine.

Plans or Studies under Review and Development

1. [1½ lines not declassified]
2. Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case I—Spontaneous Revolt).
3. Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case II—Contrived Incident).
4. Consideration of the Use of Latin American Forces in Connection with U.S. Contingency Plans to Assist Latin American Nations Which May be Seriously Threatened by a Communist Takeover.

¹ Military Contingency Planning—CINCLANT OPLANS for Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).

663. Research memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, April 19¹

RES-15

April 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Effects of Loss of Cuban Sugar on Free World Sugar Market

Declining sugar stocks and rising prices are of growing concern to consumers and importing nations throughout the Free World. This paper analyzes the magnitude of the problem and its relationship to reduced shipments of Cuban sugar to Free World markets and the loss of Cuban reserves.

ABSTRACT

The drastic reduction in shipments of Cuban sugar to Free World markets in recent years together with rising consumption are rapidly exhausting previously large Free World stocks. Sugar prices, already more than 7 cents per pound in April of this year compared with 3 cents last summer, are likely to increase even further unless supplies are increased during the next crop year.

Rapidly rising sugar prices reflect the fact that two-thirds of all exports are sold under special agreements, leaving the remaining 6 million tons of free sugar to respond, price-wise, to market factors or supply and demand. The loss of Cuban stocks which, prior to 1960, were available in the event of shortages, has increased the tendency to price instability in the Free World.

Cuban exports—still roughly one-third of the world total—have increased by about 3.4 million metric tons to the Sino-Soviet Bloc but have declined by about 3.1 million to Free World markets between 1959 and the last two years (1961–62). Larger shipments from the Soviet Bloc to the Free World have made up only about 700,000 tons of this loss. During the same period annual Free World consumption has increased by about 3.5 million metric tons, but output has expanded only moderately.

Further upward movements in sugar prices during the 1963–64 crop year may be avoided if Free World supplies are increased by at least 4 million metric tons, or about 10 percent above this year's availabilities, from either greater production or larger purchases from Communist countries. Although the USSR and, to an even greater extent, Communist China, could utilize more Cuban sugar, the present

¹ Effects of loss of Cuban sugar on free world sugar market. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 50, Cuba—Standing Group.

Soviet policy appears to involve avoidance of dependence on foreign sugar, while China lacks the foreign exchange for increased imports. Indeed the USSR may even sell some of its surplus sugar stocks of a million or more tons to the Free World through European Bloc countries which have had experience in the world sugar market. Moreover, the Soviets seem eager to have greater quantities of Cuban sugar marketed in the Free World. However, Cuba's export availabilities are declining as a result of decreasing production due to the agricultural diversification program, mismanagement, and the disruption of the labor force. Although recent unverified reports from sugar brokers and Cuban refugees predict a 1963 output of 3.5 million metric tons, or even less, information available as of early April 1963 indicates that, barring unfavorable weather or other adverse developments, Cuba's sugar production this year should be approximately 4 million metric tons, as compared with 4.8 million last year.

Although the Free World has the capability of fully replacing Cuban supplies over a period of time, high sugar prices may be expected to prevail in the interim. A concomitant benefit of this situation will be an increase in foreign exchange receipts by Free World sugar exporting countries.

[Here follows the remainder of the paper.]

664. Memorandum from FitzGerald to McCone, April 22¹

April 22, 1963

SUBJECT

Effects of the Curtailment of Exile Hit and Run Raids

1. This paper is for your information only.
2. The decision of the U.S. Government to stop "hit-and-run" raids by the Cuban exile groups will have a variety of effects depending upon from where one is viewing the decision.
3. From Fidel Castro's view it is our belief that he will have mixed feelings. His first will be elation at our having stopped the majority of these raids, but he will soon recognize that we know they have been

¹ Effects of the curtailment of exile hit and run raids. Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.

more spectacular than damaging. Fidel will, we think, recognize that this order will not stop a few determined Cubans just as such an injunction did not deter him in his fight to oust Batista. To a degree Castro will view this order with apprehension. He will probably wonder what we plan instead. Castro may well miscalculate the effect of this order for he may believe that the basic motivation and drive of the exiled Cuban is actually that of the U.S. and not the Cuban himself. He may expect to see the entire exile effort against him collapse.

4. We believe the anti-Castro element inside Cuba will be seriously disheartened. This U.S. policy will be interpreted and loudly proclaimed as a victory for Fidel, and a further accommodation to the existence of Fidel in Cuba. Our effort to recruit or defect officials of the Castro Government should be expected to become even more difficult. A few disillusioned individuals on the inside who have long awaited U.S. action may now be convinced that it is not coming and finally leave a regime they cannot tolerate.

5. The effect on the exiles and their activities will be varied. Basically, their motives are, first, hopefully to embroil the U.S.A. on their side, secondly, to establish their own personal reputation and thus assure a significant position in the future government, and thirdly, an honest desire to remove Castro and his government. The order will cause the non-activist type Cuban exile wherever he is to conclude that the U.S. is unwilling to permit "free-lancing" Cuban exiles to force or create U.S. policy in the Caribbean by their actions. Coupled with this thought will go the conviction that the U.S. is convinced that these raids cannot bring Castro down and short of a full scale military invasion, Castro is presently invulnerable. This leads him unhappily to the conclusion that the U.S. has no immediate, dramatic plan for the restoration of democracy to Cuba. They will use the hard term "co-existence" to describe our policy and some will call it "appeasement." Many Cubans will conclude that the U.S. is right and that they cannot do that which the U.S. judges cannot be done. Some will at long last pack their bags and may leave Miami for various destinations in the U.S. and Latin America, or in just a few cases they may ask to go home.

6. The "activist" Cuban exiles will probably not be deterred by the order. They may even profit by the decree. It will now be a greater honor to engage in operations against Fidel. The double jeopardy arising from the threat of detention by U.S. agents and the chance for martyrdom at the hands of Fidel will be an even greater challenge. Actually the supply of recruits for such hit and run raids may run shallow but not dry. Another advantage arising from the scrutiny of U.S. agents will be the improvement in control and better clandestine security practices on the part of the exiles. But as the U.S. restricts and apprehends these men, confiscating goods and funds, the *loci* of power will have

a tendency to move back to its traditional center: the exiled-monied interests such as the Posches, Prios, Batistas. It must be recognized that the clamp down will deter raids and eliminate the "shoe-string" operator and many others, but it must be expected that occasional uncoordinated raids will slip through any cordon.

7. Politically the exile most apt to profit from this pronouncement will be Manolo RAY of the Revolutionary Junta (Junta Revolucionaria—JURE). It has long been RAY's contention that the Cubans themselves must, in the end, free Cuba and the decision to stop exile raids may have the immediate effect of firmly convincing many anti-Castro Cubans that the freedom of Cuba is after all their problem.

8. From the standpoint of our agents inside Cuba, we believe some will initially be seriously disheartened. They had dreamed that these raids would increase, keep Fidel off balance, encourage resistance internally, and eventually blow the spark into a conflagration destroying Fidelismo. Sobering as the thought of no immediate help from the outside will be, we believe our continued contact and support of these men will prove to them that they have not been forgotten and that our determination to free Cuba has not changed.

9. It is too soon actually to state definitively what the effect of this policy will have on our recruitment program. The Agency's problem is not the number of recruits, but their quality. The unemployed, poorly educated, hungry are always with us. Some of the more discerning type Cubans will avoid recruitment as they are convinced that a principal reason for the U.S. action is to control who fights Castro in order to assure who will succeed him; however, others will desire to work for us regardless of this factor. The preliminary reaction of our WAVE station was to doubt that the order would have any effect on our recruitment efforts.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

665. Memorandum from Kent to McCone, April 22¹

April 22, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba a Year Hence²

CONCLUSIONS

1. Various indications and evidence which have accumulated during the past two months seem to us to form a pattern which permits certain tentative conclusions to be drawn respecting trends in Soviet-Cuban relations and in Soviet intentions respecting Cuba. It now appears that the Castro regime and the USSR have overcome for the most part the difficulties in their relations resulting from the October missile crisis and have managed to devise a common policy aimed primarily at easing tensions over Cuba in order to be able to consolidate the present regime. They probably intend to continue this policy until they are satisfied that Cuba can again be used as a Communist base for forward action without excessive risk.

2. The USSR has evidently decided to supply sufficient economic aid to sustain the Cuban economy at about the current level, and will probably train Cubans in the operation of the Soviet military equipment now in Cuba under Soviet control. It seems likely to us that a year hence most of this equipment, except perhaps for the SAM system, will have been turned over to the Cubans, and the Soviet military presence in Cuba will probably have been further reduced. Such a development would tend to improve considerably the Cuban and the Soviet image in Latin America, though it could not completely offset all the adverse effects of the missile crisis. For the time being, Castro, perhaps on Soviet persuasion, has toned down his inflammatory appeals for violent revolutions throughout Latin America. There is no indication, however, of a basic change in Castro's determination to promote insurgent movements. In his mind Venezuela in particular continues to be a priority target.

3. In our view, if present trends continue, both in the reduction of Soviet forces and the training of Cuban personnel, this would mean that the USSR did not contemplate an attempt to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba. It is true that the risks of detection would be less

¹ CIA Office of National Estimates study entitled "Cuba a Year Hence." Secret. 17 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.

² A National Intelligence Estimate on the Cuban situation and prospects is now scheduled for USIB consideration in May.

than those attending the original operation. The Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods would make it possible to adopt improved measures of camouflage and deception, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence will be relying upon. Thus we cannot altogether rule out an attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce strategic missiles.

4. A year hence (barring Castro's death or some decisive US intervention in the situation) the Castro regime is likely to be more firmly established than ever. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and efficiency. The "year of organization" will result in the further development of the PURS, Castro's all-purpose political machine. The Cuban economy will probably not be much better than it is today, but also probably will not be much worse. Castro's prestige will have been enhanced by the acquisition of advanced weapon systems, and by the consequent demonstration of his "independence."

Military Relations

5. There are several indications that the Soviets and Cubans have resolved some questions relating to the weapons systems still under Soviet control. For example, one report from a high level Cuban military leader states that agreement was reached in mid-February to turn over the SAM system as Cuban personnel became proficient in its operation. Other Cuban officials are reported to have implied that a substantial Soviet withdrawal would gradually be made as training of Cubans was completed. In his speeches of 22 February and 13 March Castro also seemed to forecast Cuban control of all the modern weapons. Moreover, there are increasing indications that Cubans have begun or will begin shortly to train for the operation of the weapons systems still held by the Soviets. The absence of critical comments on Soviet policy in Castro's recent speeches, and his agreement to visit the USSR, suggest that he is probably satisfied with the resolution of various outstanding questions with Moscow.

6. These indications suggest to us that the Soviets have probably promised to begin training programs for Cubans and eventually to turn over the SAM system and other Soviet controlled weapons, thereby substantially strengthening Castro's defensive capabilities. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain some sort of a military presence there. In addition, the new Soviet economic commitments may have had a bearing on Castro's acceptance of the reduction of Soviet forces. These economic negotiations began in December and were not completed until early February, shortly before the USSR

informed the US that “several thousand” Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba.

7. In the transfer of weapons to Cuban control, the SAM system poses special dangers. Soviet inaction against US overflights must be a highly sensitive issue with the Cubans. We think it likely that the Soviets will be very reluctant to complete the turnover of the SAMs before they have attempted to resolve the question of US overflights. They may try to obtain assurances from Castro that he will not shoot down a US plane. But they cannot rely merely on Castro’s assurances, and it is likely that they will delay the transfer of final control, hoping that in an eventually calmer atmosphere the US might desist from overflights. It is possible that they might announce in advance an intended turnover to Cuba and use the interim period to seek a termination of overflights either through some agreement with the US or some dramatic action at the UN, claiming that the reduction in Soviet forces had removed any pretext for US surveillance.

8. Nevertheless, if US aerial surveillance was continued it would still be a major deterrent to any future Soviet attempts to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba. Even if surveillance was discontinued as a regular practice, we believe that the Soviets would not be able to have any solid assurance that they could introduce major weapons into Cuba without detection. We have no evidence that Khrushchev has reappraised the risks of US counteraction to such a venture, and we think that his experience of last October has considerably reduced the chances of a second dangerous misjudgment. Furthermore, we doubt that Castro would be willing to cooperate in another such attempt.

9. Various other measures of increasing the military strength in Cuba are possible. For example, the Soviets might provide Castro with submarines, or use Cuban ports for their own submarines. They might calculate that such moves would not confront the US with such a clear and unmistakably immediate challenge as produced the strong reaction of last October. At some point, they might even attempt to supply Castro with light bombers, but in this case they would almost certainly recognize the great risks of US counteraction.

Current Tactics

10. If the Cubans and Soviets have settled some of their problems, this was probably the result of a more basic agreement on how to deal with the US. They have probably agreed that the situation calls for steps to reduce the constant threat of a crisis. The recent withdrawal of at least some 4,600 Soviet personnel serves this purpose. In deciding on a course of action the Soviets and Cubans may have been also impressed with the arguments of President Goulart, among others,

that the Soviet forces detract from Castro's "independence" and look more like a Soviet occupation. At the same time, however, the Soviets will maintain a military "presence" as an earnest of their commitment to protect Cuba and as a "trip wire" deterrent against a US invasion.

11. In any case, the Soviets probably have convinced Castro that time can be made to work in Cuba's favor, providing the US is not presented with a pretext for direct intervention or drastic measures such as some form of quarantine. Moreover, the Soviets have probably argued that the Cubans should concentrate on the solution of important domestic problems in order to assure the existence of the regime, demonstrate that a Communist revolution cannot be reversed by the US, and prepare the base for future breakthroughs in Latin America. Thus the Soviets probably want a period of calm in the Caribbean. In short, the USSR and Cuba probably intend to play for time, avoid sharp provocations, withhold any unnecessary concessions, repair the damage to their prestige and employ the more flexible tactics in Latin America which prevailed before the crisis.

Political Stability

12. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel. To a vital extent the elan of the Cuban revolution depends on Castro's charismatic appeal. His personal indispensability has enabled him to surmount both a challenge from old-line Communists in Cuba and a crisis in his relations with Moscow. It also enables him to absorb some economic setbacks without serious risk to his regime. While no serious challenge to his power and control seems likely to emerge for some time, the regime's remarkable dependence on his person points to a major vulnerability.

13. Castro's relations with the Moscow-oriented Communists are still uncertain. Castro is probably still suspicious of their relations with Moscow, but a rumored purge has not yet materialized. Most of the old PSP leaders seem to be retaining their public prominence, although only Rafael Rodriguez seems to enjoy Castro's confidence. In present circumstances, it is unlikely that they will attempt to challenge Castro, as they did in early 1962, or that Moscow will want them to. It is more likely that they will work for more power in the apparatus of the new party (PURS) which is coming into being. Castro seems alert to this possibility and the selection of members of the new party reflects some effort to prevent domination by the old PSP leaders. The completion of this party organization should provide Castro with another effective means of control and an important instrument for political indoctrination and exhortation of the populace. But over the longer run the existence of a stable and organized party apparatus could reduce the indispensability both to the Cuban regime and to the Soviets of Castro's personal leadership.

14. Popular attitudes will be a factor affecting the stability of the regime. We have no way of measuring these reliably, but we believe that considerably less than half of the Cuban people now give positive support to Castro, as distinguished from passively accepting his regime. Resistance continues, but it is on a small scale and is ineffective against the regime's security forces. It cannot be either excluded or predicted that larger numbers of people will eventually be willing to take the risks of joining or surreptitiously supporting an opposition struggle. Some allowance should be made for Cuban individualism and indiscipline, and for this reason parallels to the effectiveness of security measures in East European Communist states should not be too readily drawn. Should resistance assume a larger magnitude, it might cause disagreement and factionalism within the regime. Ultimately this could lead in turn to a disruption of the security apparatus and the defection of armed elements. In this way, and probably only in this way, a breakdown or significant change in the regime might be brought about. At present, such developments seem unlikely.

Economic Prospects

15. Stability might be shaken if the economic situation should deteriorate so greatly and rapidly as to disaffect large elements of the populace, but we do not believe that the Cuban economy is threatened by this sort of deterioration. Prospects are for another difficult year during 1963, with no substantial change for better or for worse. Sugar production, the keystone of the economy, may fall to four million tons or less, compared with 4.8 million tons in 1962 and yields well in excess of 5 million tons in earlier years. However, the decline in the volume of export will be offset in some degree by the rise in world sugar prices. As for the other sectors of the economy, there may be slight increases in industrial output during 1963 and in nonsugar crop production. Despite the general decline in the economy over the past years, the situation has not become a critical source of weakness for the regime.

16. The Soviet Union continues to demonstrate a willingness to provide Cuba with the assistance necessary to ease the island's current economic deficiencies and to stimulate its long term economic development. In the past year this assistance has included balance of payments relief and consumer goods shipments—types of aid Moscow normally is extremely reluctant to provide to other countries. The Soviets, however, probably view this emergency assistance as a temporary palliative. They have stressed that Cuba must become self-sufficient in foodstuffs and most consumer goods. Our evidence indicates new commitments by the Bloc to provide substantial import credits; Cuban imports, therefore, will probably be sustained at roughly the 1962 level. While any "showplace" plans for Cuba may now have been shelved,

the USSR appears hopeful the island can be set on the road to economic recovery in a few years.

17. The major economic problems are less a question of Soviet support than of inefficient management and ineffective organization. Unless Castro turns to harsher administrative measures, the problems of worker apathy, absenteeism and non-cooperation will continue to plague the economy. Disappointment with the anticipated economic benefits of the revolution will, in turn, increase discontent and restiveness, but not to a level which would develop into antiregime actions.

18. The longer term prospects for the economy are not clear, since they depend on such factors as more efficient management, worker incentive, and Bloc aid. The Soviets have apparently backed away from some of the more ambitious industrial projects, such as a large steel plant and a petroleum refinery. However, a number of more modest industrial projects are moving ahead. Over the long run, given continuing Bloc aid, there is a good chance that economic conditions will compare favorably with most Latin American countries.

Latin American Policies

19. In the Communist view, the Cuban challenge to Latin America depends only secondarily on the claim of economic progress under communism; it is primarily a political threat, on the premise that economic and social conditions demand revolutionary changes, including an end to US predominance, and that Cuba is the model which will inspire this revolution. This is what Castro had in mind in his speech of 22 February:

“... the virus of revolution is not carried in submarines or ships. It is the ethereal waves of ideas that carry the revolutionary virus . . . Cuba is the example, Cuba is the idea; the force of Cuba is the force of its revolutionary ideas, the force of its example. And how can ideas be isolated?”

20. Castro's more inflammatory exhortations have been muted, at least for the present, and the more orthodox position that “revolution is not for export” has reappeared in his and other Cuban leaders' statements. This reversion to a view more acceptable to Moscow probably reflects in part Castro's profound disillusionment with the revolutionary fervor of Latin American Communists, with the important exception of Venezuela. He probably feels that he has no choice but to bide his time and build up subversive assets for the future, and such a position has probably been strongly urged by Moscow and leading Latin American Communists, e.g. Prestes in Brazil, who fear Castro will upset their own strategies.

21. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with

the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures, with Brazil as the principal target. Subversive training and support will, of course, continue in Cuba, probably at an increasing level. But Moscow has not given Castro a free hand to lead the Latin American Communist movement, and the Soviets still have influence in almost all Latin American parties.

22. The outcome of developments in Venezuela will be a key factor in the Soviet-Cuban rivalry for the leadership of the Latin American revolution; if terrorism, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare are successful, then Castro's ideas will be vindicated and the more moderate Communists discredited. On the other hand, if such tactics fail, then Castro's influence will decline. From Fidel's standpoint it is not only a matter of correct tactics, but survival; he apparently is convinced that violence is the only sure way to power and that Cuba cannot survive as an isolated Communist regime without expanding the revolution to the continent.

23. While we believe that the Soviets and Cubans have come to grips with some of their problems and have probably resolved the more immediate ones, the Cuban situation is clouded by many uncertainties and Soviet-Cuban relations are far from permanently stabilized. Among these uncertainties is the question of US policy. The impact of the Cuban revolution in Latin America has lost much of its force, if only temporarily, because Castro has appeared as a pawn in the struggle between the Great Powers. The Soviets are apparently convinced that this setback can be overcome provided the crisis with the US can be controlled. They probably believe that they possess still some degree of deterrence against direct action by the US to overthrow Castro and that in any case the political inhibition against such a course remains strong. They probably calculate that the continuing reduction of their military presence will further deprive the US of any pretext for direct action. For the rest, they recognize that the US effort to isolate and harass Castro will continue to contain certain dangers, but they probably hope to limit these by careful handling of any incidents. They will also maintain pressure on Castro to avoid provocative actions, arguing that his interest as well as theirs will be best served by gradual consolidation of his regime.

24. We also foresee varying degrees of fiction in Soviet-Cuban relations, regardless of US policy. They are far from a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisal of the situation in Latin America. Castro wants all the benefits of Soviet economic and military commitments but insists on unique position in the Bloc outside Communist discipline and control. In these circumstances the level of economic aid is likely

to be a bone of contention. Further, Castro is probably very resentful of the Soviet policy of tolerating US overflights, and it is unlikely that he will submit to US aerial surveillance indefinitely.

25. For the present, however, we believe that both the Soviets and the Cubans hope to stabilize the situation and gird for a long term effort in Latin America. They have composed their differences in order to concentrate upon building up the Cuban economy and avoiding a crisis with the US. Barring a flareup caused by any of the factors discussed above, we think that any radical change in domestic Cuban trends and Soviet-Cuban relations is unlikely in the near future. In sum, we believe that there is a good chance that Castro's position in Cuba a year from now will be stronger than it presently is and that in Latin America, the Communists will have recovered some of the ground lost in the missile crisis.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

/s/ [illegible]
for

Sherman Kent
Chairman

666. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Martin and Ball, April 24¹

April 24, 1963

GB: The following was passed on to Hurwitch at his home last night: "The President was concerned about the Cuban Revolutionary Council. He wishes by tomorrow a report on financial report to the CIC. How do we intend to cut it off? How will we make it known? The President wishes a reply to these questions before the decision is made."

EM: We have been discussing that. We talked about it late yesterday afternoon. Our general feeling is against continuing, but we will have to get into all the angles of it.

GB: He wants a report today on it.

¹ President's concern about the Cuban Revolutionary Council. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

EM: We'll get something up to you. I think you ought to go over it.

GB: Right.

EM: I got another request that came in late last night from him. He'd like to see whether we can get the OAS to adopt a resolution saying that under the inter-American system, it's illegal to introduce large troops or equipment into the Western Hemisphere. I have just been talking to my staff about that one.

GB: Is there any chance of it?

EM: Yes, if we can show that it would have some effect. We are also worried about US troops elsewhere, and we want to talk to the UN people what the Soviets may come back on. We want to study it a bit.

GB: Yes. This is trying to give application to the new form of Monroe Doctrine.

EM: Yes.

**667. Memorandum from McNamara to the Chairman of the JCS,
April 24, enclosing revision of DOD-State paper entitled
"U-2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans"¹**

I-35505/63

April 24, 1963

SUBJECT

DOD-State Paper, "U-2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans"

Attached is a revision of the DOD-State paper incorporating all those changes recommended by JCSM 325-63 which were acceptable to me and the Secretary of State. You will note that subparagraph 3.d. has been reworded in such a way as to meet the concern of the JCS that there be no precommitment against an invasion of Cuba.

It is anticipated that the paper, in its present form, will be used for discussions with the President at an early date.

Robert S. McNamara

¹ Top Secret. 11 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1903, 000.1—.

Attachment

DOD-STATE PAPER

U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA—CONTINGENCY PLANS (C)

1. *Problem.* The possibility exists that Soviet/Cuban forces may shoot down, or attempt to shoot down, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. The purpose of this report is to develop a series of actions to be considered by the United States in advance of and after the event.

2. *Facts Bearing on the Problem*

a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of approximately two sorties per day.

b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2; thus, the available alternatives would not meet presently stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of IRBMs and MRBMs.

c. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington should have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques. In this case also, information would probably be available promptly. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.

3. *Political Considerations*

a. *Balancing Objectives*—The optimum objective with regard to this contingency is to *deter the attack* on the U-2 by giving private and public assurances that the US reaction to such an attack would be prompt, firm, and effective. The fundamental political judgment to be made in connection with the attack itself involves balancing the opportunity to make progress toward our long-term objective *vis-à-vis* Cuba (the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism from Cuba) with our objectives *vis-à-vis* the US-USSR confrontation. The political and power realities, including the USSR's capability to react in Berlin or elsewhere, argue against arbitrary and unilateral action, without provocation, to eliminate Castro. The exploitation of contingencies is the only politically feasible means for taking steps, in the immediate future, to apply US military power directly to reduce Castro's power and influence. Yet obviously, no single contingency can be said to offer

the last chance to move against Castro. Moreover, in any new major confrontation over Cuba the United States will be facing a Khrushchev who has reflected on the lessons of the missile crisis and who will be less likely to retreat before US power. Thus, the United States must consider the USSR's capability to react to a second Cuban crisis by actions in Berlin or elsewhere.

b. *The context of the attack*—It is judged that the USSR would be likely to deliver an official warning prior to an attack on a U-2. In the event that an attack is conducted, therefore, without advance warning, allowance should be made for the possibility that there was a failure of USSR command and control procedures by providing for a minimum response, initially, while attempting to ascertain Soviet intent by all means available. For the same reason, in a case where USSR responsibility is in doubt, the US might desire to take an *initial* public position that holds Castro rather than Khrushchev responsible.

c. *Advance notification and consultation*—Secretary Rusk has recently informed the North Atlantic Council of US concern that there may be an attack on a U-2 over Cuba. Consultation with our Allies after a Soviet warning or a Soviet attack probably would become known to the USSR. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning thus given to Khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw, thus increasing the dangers of escalation, causing confusion among our Allies, and inhibiting their decision to support the United States. On the other hand prior knowledge acquired by the USSR could provide the deterrent effect suggested above. Moreover, once a specific indication of intent to attack is received, or an attack occurs, the retention of political support of our allies argues for as much notice as possible of our intentions.

d. *Options*—The plans which follow provide for a spectrum of response against the presupposed contingencies. The decision as to the specific degree of force to be applied within this spectrum is a matter for determination at the time of the attack on the U-2 and is dependent on evaluation of latest intelligence and the existing political dynamics. The removal of a facility of the same type (SAM, MIG airfield, AA battery) as the weapon which attacks the U-2 has the virtue of a limited, eye-for-an-eye retribution before the world. Retaliation against a single SAM site regardless of the type of the offending weapon retains the political advantage of a limited response and has the additional feature of orienting action against the weapons system we are most interested in removing.

Both of the foregoing options can be made relatively surgical in nature in order to provide minimum offense to the USSR. The elimination of all facilities of any one weapons system (SAM, MIGs, AA batter-

ies) or all air defense systems would provide progressively larger steps toward the elimination of the Castro regime but might be considered of such proportion by Khrushchev as to make counter Soviet retaliation mandatory. It is also possible that the shock effect of such vigorous response could lead to a decision by the USSR to cut her losses and gradually withdraw from Cuba. US retaliation by elimination of one facility and subsequent large-scale surveillance at low levels deprives the US of required high altitude coverage and cannot safely be continued indefinitely.

Any of the foregoing options could be combined with a decision to reinstitute a partial or total quarantine. Total quarantine, if maintained, could serve to bring Castro down. At the very least, it would provide a negotiable application of force from which to bargain in the Security Council in exchange for Soviet concessions.

The foregoing options might be made more palatable to the USSR by (a) taking the public position that Castro had been the perpetrator of the attack; (b) renewing the US offer to work out on the ground inspection of Cuba and the Caribbean (coupled with a general settlement such as withdrawal of Soviet troops) to eliminate the need for future aerial surveillance; (c) making it clear that the foregoing reprisals were not intended as a prelude to an invasion. This would leave open the decision to invade if required in the event of escalation by Cuba or by the USSR in Cuba or elsewhere.

4. Military Considerations

a. Prompt, but deliberate, retaliatory measures should be taken following the shooting down of a U-2 and, in certain circumstances, in event of an unsuccessful attack against a U-2. After certain precautionary measures are taken, including the evacuation of noncombatants from Guantanamo and the initiation of reinforcement of that base, it is feasible to make a retaliatory attack on a Cuban military facility *or facilities* at first light on the morning of the day following the shooting down of a U-2, weather permitting.

b. US response to an attack by SAM site, MIG, or AA battery should be against one or more Cuban military facilities. Where retaliation is to be taken against a single facility, it should normally be a SAM site selected to meet the following criteria: It should be as close as feasible to the location of the incident but should be selected for accessibility of attack and for isolation from populated areas to minimize noncombatant casualties.

5. *Range of Circumstances.* In the event of the shooting down, or the attempted shooting down of a U-2 over Cuba, a wide variety of circumstances may attend the incident:

a. With public advance warning by the USSR either through press media or through official governmental communications and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

(1) *Pre-attack*

- (a) Public threat only
- (b) Covert indicators or official governmental communications

(2) *Unsuccessful attack*

- (a) Demonstrable and persuasive evidence
- (b) Doubtful evidence

(3) *Successful attack*

b. Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

- (1) Unsuccessful attack
- (2) Successful attack

6. *Courses of Action to be Considered*

a. *With public advance warning by the USSR and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:*

(1) *Pre-attack*

(a) *Public threat only*—If the warning is limited to public threat, unaccompanied by confirming intelligence indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action, the United States should inform Khrushchev that the flights will continue.

(b) *Covert indicators and/or official governmental communications*—If advance warning is obtained through covert means and/or official governmental communications, with or without public warning:

U-2 flights should be suspended while military preparations are initiated by establishment of appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands and readiness is improved for evacuation of noncombatants from and reinforcement of Guantanamo. The fact of increased readiness would almost immediately become public. U-2 flights should be suspended. Enemy intentions may be verified by flying target drones, for a limited time. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights. U-2 flights will be resumed where there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(2) *Unsuccessful attack*

(a) *Demonstrable and persuasive evidence*—In the event that public advance warning or other data provides demonstrable and persuasive evidence that an attack has been made, the United States should:

1. At the time of the decision to take reprisal action, declare appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands (if not already in effect), and initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

2. Initiate military preparations for an attack early the next day.

3. Alternatives: Conduct the attack on one, several or all SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy intentions by flying target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(b) *Doubtful evidence*—In spite of public advance warning, an unsuccessful attack may occur in circumstances which make it impossible to provide demonstrable and persuasive evidence that an attack has in fact been made. In such a case, the United States should assess the situation in the light of circumstances existing at the time and apply flexible, selective measures ranging from no response to those measures specified in subparagraphs (2) (a), 1, 2, and 3, above.

(3) *Successful attack*

(a) At the time of the decision to execute reprisal attacks, the United States should declare an appropriate condition of readiness in all US commands (if not already in effect), and initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) Initiate military preparations for reprisal action early the next day.

(c) Alternatives:

1. Alternative I—Conduct an attack on all SAM sites.

2. Alternative II—Destroy one SAM site; thereafter, until safety of U-2s can be assured, or for a limited time, fly only low-level reconnaissance and photo drones.

b. *Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent Soviet action.*

(1) *Unsuccessful Attack*

(a) In light of assessment made at the time, make military preparations by establishment of appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands and by evacuation of dependents from and preparations for reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) U-2 flights should be suspended while these preparations are being made.

(c) After preparations are made, publicly announce that an unsuccessful attack was made.

(d) Execute reprisal attack against one SAM site; then either resume U-2 flights, or test enemy intentions with target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights for a limited time. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(2) *Successful Attack*

(a) At the time of the decision to attack a site, declare an appropriate condition of readiness in all US commands, initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) Initiate military preparations for and conduct reprisal attack early the next morning on one or more of the SAM sites, depending on the circumstances.

(c) Execute reprisal attack against one, several, or all SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy intentions by flying target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights for a limited time. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights will be limited in time.

e. *Concomitant Political Initiatives.* In each of the foregoing cases, the United States should consider concomitant political initiatives as follows (parenthetical portions that follow are applicable only to those cases in which a retaliatory attack on a site is to be made):

(1) Inform North Atlantic Council (immediately prior to attack).

(2) Transmit Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle, Fanfani.

(3) Inform Organ of Consultation of Organization of the American States of the situation and US intentions.

(4) Transmit instructions to USUN to inform Secretary General, United Nations at time of attack or clear warning and call for immediate Security Council meeting.

(5) Transmit message from President to Khrushchev—giving it simultaneously to Soviet Ambassador in Washington (deliver at time of attack).

(6) Issue public statement by the President, including message to the Cuban people (at the time of the attack).

(7) If the Soviets wholly or partially blockade Berlin in response to US retaliation, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider implementation of “Preferred Sequence” courses of action with respect to Berlin.

d. *Subsequent Military Action.* If strike aircraft used in the retaliatory strike against a single site are shot down, additional retaliation action would be taken against appropriate Cuban targets.

e. *U-2 is missing with confirmation lacking as to cause.* No action should be initiated until there is confirmation that the disappearance is the result of a Soviet/Cuban attack; then the United States should proceed in accordance with subparagraph 6 a (3) or 6 a (2), as appropriate.

668. Paper prepared by Joseph Califano, April 25¹

April 25, 1963

COMMENT ON CUBA PAPER

The following paper contains an outline of the paper, including a list of the specific actions proposed.

The attached paper is virtually identical with the two papers you considered last week, with the exception of Annex B, a brief discussion of the paper prepared by the Assistant Director of National Estimates.

The paper is subject to the same objections as it was last week. There are no specific actions for approval by the Special Group. The paper still appears to be inadequately thought out: (1) the objectives of the proposed program are ambiguous, (2) its cost effectiveness (in terms of men, money and matériel) is insufficiently developed, (3) the program does not offer a sufficiently flexible array of target choices, and (4) the program offers no mechanism for continuous and systematic evaluation.

With respect to paragraph E on page 2, to my knowledge Cy Vance never agreed in the Cottrell Committee to placing devices within the hold of a cargo ship to *sink* Cuban vessels; he merely agreed to the use of such devices to disable Cuban vessels, recognizing that there was a risk that the vessels would be sunk.

I still hold to the belief, which becomes stronger as I work more in this area and discuss the problem in more detail with experts, that the CIA (with our support) can devise a program of covert intelligence collection, hit and run raids, sabotage and resistance activities, carefully keyed to an established but flexible time table (during an arbitrarily selected period, say four or six months) and to existing and potential human and matériel assets. The objective of such a program might be to probe Soviet and Cuban (Castro and the Cuban population) intentions, to test the neutrals, the Latin Americans and our allies, to keep the Castro Regime off balance, to prevent Castro from further stabilizing and consolidating his regime and to effect economic, political and/or psychological damage on Cuba. Such a program could present an array of choices so that varying emphasis could be placed on intelligence, economic targets, psychological targets, etc., during any selected period. Such a program could be devised so that the Special Group

¹ Covert intelligence collection, hit and run raids, sabotage, and resistance activities. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Sabotage/Destruction.

would have an opportunity to select an appropriate mix of covert activities for CIA to undertake during a subsequent time period.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

669. Memorandum from McCone to the Special Group, April 25¹

April 25, 1963

SUBJECT

Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba

REFERENCE

(a) USIB-D-41. 14/35, dated 20 April 1963, subject: Priority Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba

(b) Memorandum for Special Group, dated 23 April 1963, subject: Reconnaissance over Cuba (OCI No. 1428/63)

(c) Memorandum for Special Group, dated 23 April 1963, from DNRO, subject: Request for Approval of Low Level Reconnaissance of Cuba

1. Since mid-March the United States Intelligence Board has stated a priority intelligence requirement for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba based on specific targets developed by its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance. The request for highest level approval of these flights has been deferred since that time in order to avoid any possible interference with the Donovan mission. This mission has now been completed.

2. On 23 April 1963, the request to obtain approval for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba was reconsidered by the Special Group. The basis for this reconsideration was a re-analysis of the requirements by COMOR (reference a) and a CIA study summarizing the intelligence from reconnaissance of Cuba during the past six weeks (reference b). To satisfy the COMOR requirements the DNRO requested approval (reference c) for 6 low-level sorties involving 12 aircraft to cover the priority targets. Action on this request was deferred. The presence of Governor Harriman's mission in Moscow was one reason for deferring action.

3. In addition to the six sorties to cover the 10 priority targets mentioned in paragraph 2 above, there are about 15 installations, facili-

¹ Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April–30 June 1963.

ties or activities which have been identified through high-level photography or collateral intelligence—the exact nature of which cannot be determined. Therefore, it is to be expected that following the successful completion of the six low-level flights and read-out of the product, requests will be made for authority to cover by low-level photography the remaining targets of interest. For this reason the specific priority within the total list of targets of interest (which has been questioned in USIB and elsewhere) is not considered pertinent by the Director of Central Intelligence since it is considered that all such targets should be covered by low-level photography within a reasonably short period of time. After this operation is completed, additional low-level photography will be requested when and if high-level photography and/or collateral intelligence indicate that situations exist which demand exploration by low-level flights.

4. At its meeting on 24 April 1963, USIB reconsidered this problem and unanimously reaffirmed the priority intelligence requirements for low-level reconnaissance as expressed in reference (a). In view of these facts, I should like to strongly recommend that approval be given to carry out required low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Without such reconnaissance the intelligence community cannot exercise the responsibility for providing the desired assurance to higher authority that activities are not occurring in Cuba which could have serious consequences to the security of the United States.

John A. McCone

Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

670. Memorandum prepared by McCone, April 25¹

April 25, 1963

(Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussion at Standing Group prepared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country.)

1. Castro's position—I agree with the ONE estimate that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassina-

¹ Cuban Policy: Various aspects of the Cuban problem and discussion at Standing Group. Secret. 12 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.

tion). His image among liberals and insurgent groups in the Western Hemisphere will improve, though this will not be the case with the Heads of State. Economic hardships and other difficulties, such as insurgency, raids, etc. within Cuba, will complicate his problems but, on balance, it seems to me Castro's situation has improved since about December and will continue to improve. The Cuban people will become "resigned" to his presence and will go about their business expressing their resentment in apathy rather than in active belligerence. This trend can be slowed and possibly reversed if United States action is taken with determination, continuity and consistency.

2. Economic situation—Undoubtedly, the Castro Government is seriously hurt by US economic actions. These actions alone, however, cannot bring Castro down although they will continue to give him trouble and to increase Soviet problems and costs in supporting him. The economic blockade must be kept up and intensified. Great effort must be exercised to shut off supply of parts from Canada, which is now flowing in small but very important quantities. Continuing effort must be exercised with all Western European countries. Moreover, a continuing effort must be exercised with major U.S. corporations, as has been done with International Harvester on tractors from Spain, and with the oil companies in controlling the "bright stock" supply. Trade with Latin America plays a minor role in Cuba's export-import economy, but the Latin American countries should continue their economic boycott which has been effective. The principal and most effective means of "hardening" Castro's economic situation will come through Canada, Western Europe and Japan. Intensified efforts might be effective, but I would expect that the passage of time and the "acceptance of Castro and his Communist government, the pressures of trade, the seeking of markets, the taking advantage of business opportunities, etc., will cause a decided weakening of Canadian-European support of our program of economic sanctions. This has been true of other U.S. efforts of this type in the past, such as trade with the Soviet Union, Chinese Communists and others.

3. The sugar market—Castro's problems and the Soviet cost of supporting Castro is offset to a considerable degree by the dramatic increase in the price of sugar. The increase in the last year, when applied to 75% of estimated 1963 production of sugar, about equals the estimated economic aid the Soviets are required to give Cuba in 1963. Therefore, it might be said that the Free World is supplying the money with which the Soviets are supporting Castro. Careful exploration should be made as to why the sugar market has gone up so dramatically ($2\frac{3}{4}\text{¢}$ in 1961— $6\frac{1}{2}$ to 7¢ now). The United States should break the sugar market if possible. This is a sensitive market and is "made" by middlemen and can be manipulated. An upward movement

of a cent a pound would decrease the Soviet/Cuban dollar income by \$60–70 million this year. Although there are some indications that the demand for sugar exceeds supply it is hard to believe that this factor in itself is totally responsible for the present price of sugar.

4. To use shipping as a weapon is not very effective. There are lots of idle bottoms and the Soviets can employ them for their non-Cuban trade and use their tankers and dry cargo ships for Cuban trade. While our efforts with the Free World countries should be continued, we should not consider this as a very important and effective means of hurting Castro. In fact, to the extent that non-Bloc ships could be conveyors of agents and various sabotage devices, their occasional transit into Cuba might be an advantage rather than a disadvantage from our standpoint.

NOTE: In summary, actions against Castro's economy should be continued and hardened and might make things more difficult for him. But these will not bring him down. Furthermore, it will become increasingly difficult to secure Free World cooperation as the world public gets used to Castro.

5. The Soviet presence in Cuba continues. There has been no appreciable exodus in recent weeks; there are no large passenger ships enroute to Cuba now. Indications are that Khrushchev has met his commitment of removing "several thousand Soviets", and may have called a halt to the exodus. It may be resumed as Cubans become proficient in handling the equipment. Castro apparently expects this, to judge from his statements to Donovan. I really have no assurance this will take place and we should not be deterred from any actions of any kind necessary to slow down Castro's growth or to overthrow him on grounds that this would cause a Kremlin decision not to remove its troops.

6. The Soviet threat. Finally, the presence of the several thousand Soviets in Cuba does not pose a threat to this country. The Soviets would probably not engage themselves in any internal situation within Cuba. Nevertheless, there is no reasonable explanation for the presence of so many Soviets' or for the retention in Cuba of a variety of very sophisticated military equipment, most important of which are the SAM sites. One can only conclude that the SAMs are there to be used at the Soviets' will in depriving the United States of aerial surveillance and our source of knowledge of what is going on in Cuba. The SAMs are not useful in the defense of Cuba. They can be destroyed quickly by low-level attack. Therefore, they are there for some other purpose and this is not adequately explained, in my opinion, by "Khrushchev's pride or loss of face or the Khrushchev/Castro relationship" and other such explanations. As long as the SAMs are there, there is always the possibility they will be used, or we will be threatened with their use,

and this will be done at a time when they are willing to take the risk of another confrontation with the United States. I therefore feel that we must not, under any circumstance, dismiss the possibility of a second confrontation of a type encountered last October. I have the same feeling about the presence of the SAMs in Cuba now as I did last Fall. In our thinking and planning concerning Cuba, we must not lose sight of the fact, however remote, that the Soviets can reintroduce missiles in Cuba, accept the risk of confrontation, and confront us with the prospect of war (which would present a difficult decision to us) or negotiations at higher price than was Khrushchev's original objective. If the situation were reversed, there would be pressure in this country from certain "extremists" to take such a risk of confrontation and I feel that Khrushchev might very well be under exactly the same pressure. For this reason this possibility must not be discounted and all measures of protection against this surprise must be taken.

7. From the above it seems to me that a high priority should be attached to developing measures directed toward removal of Soviet troops and larger items of equipment from Cuba. All possible diplomatic maneuvers should be made. If an opportunity for a "trade" on reasonably favorable terms develops, this should be explored, harassment of installations encouraged, and feints or, for that matter commando raids to steal Soviet KOMAR vessels or SAM missiles, should be considered. Warnings of this possibility might be one means of suggesting to the Soviets that some of their sensitive scientific equipment is exposed and hence they might consider removing it.

8. Sabotage. Carefully planned and well executed sabotage will intensify Castro's problems but will not by itself bring him down. Low-level sabotage, such as minor crop destruction activities, interruption of transportation, etc., will be annoying. Successful major sabotage from within and without will, in my opinion, add to the problems created by the economic measures. This will be particularly true as the flow of spare parts to essential plants (such as power plants) is effectively shut off. A combination of economic pressure and large-scale sabotage will hurt Castro seriously, but it will not bring him down. In addition a variety of other actions can be effectively carried out which would seriously impair relationships between Castro and Latin American countries. Also the Castro-Khrushchev relationship could be affected by developing channels through which the vitriolic and critical statements made by each concerning the other is transmitted. In addition, a program of "misinformation" properly carried out would be effective.

9. Sabotage from within and without will result in

a. Attribution to the United States. Captured saboteurs will confess U.S. implication; there will be criticism in the world press and a very

considerable amount of embarrassment to the United States Government. These programs should not be initiated unless we are willing to accept the results of the attribution and being blamed for acts of sabotage; and

b. Enormous complications for our intelligence efforts; and

c. Possible reprisals in the form of sabotage within the United States (as was recently planned in New York), against United States shipping in foreign ports, and possibly retaliatory action against our aerial surveillance. On balance, I feel we can run these risks, but we should not initiate the program unless we are willing to accept the criticism which is bound to result.

10. The most extreme measures which would be directed against the population are feasible, but I am against them on humane and moral grounds. They would be attributable to the United States. They would stand as a black mark on our record for all time. They would cause untold hardship to thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals who are not responsible for Castro and can do nothing about him, and they would not necessarily answer the "Castro-Communist problem". It seems to me that if the problem is so serious that we must resort to these measures, then we should face up to a direct confrontation, a blockade and an invasion.

11. Bringing Castro down: Measures discussed above will create for Castro and his regime great hardship but as mentioned will not bring him down. However, they will cause distress and dissension within his organization and will tend to destroy its monolithic feature. This would present the opportunity of splitting his regime at the top and catalyzing a revolt on the part of all, or a substantial segment of, his military. The result could be a military take-over typical of Latin America, the establishment of a military dictatorship friendly to the United States and to the Western Hemisphere nations, unfriendly to the Soviets and it would be non-Communist. If successful, the military regime could then force the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel and a great deal of equipment. It could solve this problem but would present us with serious problems of economic aid, sugar quotas, resolving the problem of confiscated property and all the rest. A combination of economic sanctions and harrassment on the one hand, and a successful effort to disenchant his military leadership and cause a revolt and military takeover on the other seems to be the only course open to bring Castro-Communism down and remove the Soviet threat. The prospect of an effective uprising of the people against Castro seems remote if he retains control of his military and security forces. Small uprisings would be suppressed as they are now. Large uprisings would probably result in a blood bath. Therefore, I conclude we must split Castro's military organization to insure the success of a revolt against him.

12. Splitting Castro from Moscow—This might be done. Perhaps Castro's proclamations and embrace of Communism is really a recent development. He is known to have been a radical, a liberal, a revolutionary, but not a hard-core Communist. He disclaims being such at the present time but he has embraced Communism publicly. He claims he is not a satellite, that he is independent, that he will dispose of the Soviets at his convenience, and that he seeks a rapprochement with the United States. Whether this should be done or could be done remains obscure. It is not in the American tradition ever to trust a man who has been deceitful, ambitious, and an avowed enemy. On the other hand, Communists have changed their stripes, e.g., Chiang Kai-shek and Betancourt; and dictators have changed their orientation, e.g. Nasser. All of the problems of sugar quotas, aid, etc., would immediately arise under this plan and would be far less acceptable to the American people and to the Congress than would be the case if Castro were disposed of. Nevertheless consideration should be given to a highly compartmented, carefully planned and managed program to defect Castro from Moscow. An existing channel might be used for this purpose and this effort might be made concurrently with all other steps mentioned above.

13. Relations with the people of Cuba. Constructive, dynamic and positive programs must be developed and implemented to breathe hope into the Cuban people. This is not for the purpose of creating an uprising among the people for it appears to me that as long as Castro controls the military and the internal security forces, a popular uprising that assumed serious momentum might result in a blood bath. The program should be designed to let the people of Cuba know that they have a future and that the United States is determined to provide that future for them. There are many ways of developing such a program and many convincing thoughts which can be projected to the Cuban people by various means of transmission. All of this is essential to the success of any long range dynamic United States program for the removal of Castro and Communism from Cuba.

Attachment

DISCUSSION AREAS CONCERNING CUBA

1. Reaction to low-level flights:

- a. Soviets
- b. Cubans

NOTE: Memo wanted Prior to Special Group on Thursday, 25 April

2. Contingency plan of action if reconnaissance plane is threatened or shot down:

a. High-level

b. Low-level

3. Program for creating in the minds of the Cuban people hope for the future.

a. What should be done?

b. How can it be done?

NOTE: Mr. Murrow of USIA has prepared a preliminary paper on this.

4. Future of the Castro Communist regime in Cuba:

a. With Castro the dominant figure:

(1) With limited Soviet military personnel in the form of a MAAG.

(2) With Soviet units remaining in Cuba.

b. Conditions without Castro, assuming Castro would be assassinated or die:

(1) Who would probably succeed him?

(2) Would political chaos result and, if so, what form would it take?

c. What would be the effect of, and probable courses of action be, of 10,000 or 15,000 Soviet personnel, i.e., could they control the situation?

d. What should U.S. policy be if such a chaotic political condition develops?

(1) Without Soviet military intervention to control the populace?

(2) With Soviet intervention?

5. Actions to be taken to cause Castro difficulties—that is, to slow down the growth of his political strength and economic stability—and what are the prospects of success of such actions, both with respect to our ability to carry them out and to avoid attribution?

6. What added actions are possible or would be required to develop a situation which would actually bring Castro down?

7. What are the prospects of recruiting Castro, defecting him from Moscow and establishing under Castro a regime satisfactory to the United States?

a. Is this practical in view of public and Congressional disenchantment with, and suspicion of, Castro?

b. What economic problems would face the United States such as establishing sugar quotas, giving aid, and so forth?

c. How should you handle such problems as property, settlement of American claims for confiscated property, etc?

d. Should this be a course of action pursued through a channel to Castro (such as Donovan) on a highly compartmented basis?

May 1963

671. Memorandum from Helms to McCone, May 1¹

May 1, 1963

SUBJECT

Interview of U.S. Newswoman with Fidel Castro Indicating Possible Interest in Rapprochement with the United States

1. On *[less than 1 line not declassified]* April 1963 *[less than 1 line not declassified]* U.S. newswoman associated with the *[less than 1 line not declassified]* returned to Miami from Cuba where she had interviewed a number of high-ranking Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Vilma Espin de Castro, Raul Roa, and Rene Vallejo. Her conversations with Fidel Castro totaled about ten hours and included one session on 22 April which lasted from 12:45 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. Following is an account of those conversations and *[less than 1 line not declassified]*s observations concerning the present Cuban situation.

2. It appears that Fidel Castro is looking for a way to reach a rapprochement with the United States Government, probably because he is aware that Cuba is in a state of economic chaos. The October blockade hurt the Cuban economy. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* believes that Castro talked about this matter with her because she is known as a progressive and she talked with him in frank, blunt, honest terms; Castro has little opportunity to hear this type of conversation. Castro indicated that if a rapprochement was wanted President John F. Kennedy would have to make the first move. In response to the statement that Castro would probably have to make the first move, Castro asked what the U.S. wanted from him. When a return to the original aims of the revolution was suggested, Fidel said that perhaps he, President Kennedy, and Premier Nikita Khrushchev should discuss this. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* said that she thought it was a more likely topic for Castro to discuss with President Kennedy. Castro said that he doubted that President Kennedy would talk with him without Khrushchev being present. When *[less than 1 line not declassified]* pressed Castro for further information on how a rapprochement could be achieved he said that steps were already being taken. Pressed further,

¹ Interview of U.S. newswoman with Castro indicating possible interest in rapprochement with the United States. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.

he said he considered the U.S. limitation on exile raids to be a proper step toward accommodation. It is [less than 1 line not declassified]'s opinion that Castro wants to pursue the discussion of rapprochement with proper progressive spokesmen. Based on her discussions with the following persons [less than 1 line not declassified] feels that Guevara, Raul Castro, and Vilma Espin oppose any idea of rapprochement; Roa and Vallejo favor these discussions.

3. Castro asked [less than 1 line not declassified] who had previously interviewed Khrushchev, for an appraisal of him. When [less than 1 line not declassified] said that Khrushchev was a shrewd politician who would break and dispose of Castro when the Soviets no longer needed him, Castro made no comment but only nodded his head as if in skeptical agreement. [less than 1 line not declassified] had no insight or advance notice on Castro's travel to Moscow.

4. Castro appears healthy, has no visible nervous twitches or tics, and was calm, rational, humorous, and non-argumentative during all discussions. Vallejo, Castro's personal physician, also acts as secretary, interpreter, and confidant.

5. Castro is in complete control in Cuba. No major decision is made without him. Neither Guevara nor Raul Castro would be able to rule Cuba if Fidel were assassinated.

6. In discussions with Castro about terror and secret police methods [less than 1 line not declassified] received the impression that he was not completely aware of the extent to which terror has gripped Cuba.

7. Castro refers to Soviet troops in Cuba as "technicals" and indicated that they have a training mission in Cuba. He made the point, however, that if an internal revolt takes place in Cuba Soviet "technicals" would fight with Castro to put down a counterrevolution.

8. [less than 1 line not declassified] said that Emil Stadelhofer, Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, is an overworked, timid man who does not have Castro's ear. She believes that the Swiss need a larger staff in Habana and that Stadelhofer needs recognition for a job well done. [less than 1 line not declassified] also said that in her opinion the Western diplomatic community in Habana has no influence on Castro or his government.

9. While discussing a possible rapprochement Castro asked for full assessments of President and Mrs. Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy, and wanted to know if Adlai Stevenson had power in the U.S. and if his voice was heard in President Kennedy's councils. Castro commented that James Donovan was a good man; it was [less than 1 line not declassified]'s impression that Donovan had not talked politics with Castro but that Donovan had a platform from which he could launch political discussions on the philosophy of revolution.

10. [less than 1 line not declassified] said that she was willing to undertake further discussions with Castro concerning a possible rap-

prochement. Other possible candidates whom she suggested were Edwin M. Martin, Adlai Stevenson, and Luis *Munoz* Marin. She also mentioned Donovan but was not quite certain that he was progressive enough. Lisa Howard is willing to arrange a meeting for any U.S. Government spokesman with Castro through Vallejo, who will be the point of contact.

11. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] definitely wants to impress the U.S. Government with two facts: Castro is ready to discuss rapprochement and she herself is ready to discuss it with him if asked to do so by the U.S. Government.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

672. Memorandum from Cottrell to Martin, May 2¹

May 2, 1963

SUBJECT

Lisa Howard's Interview with Fidel Castro

1. In Lisa Howard's interview with Castro, the following points come through:

- a. The missiles were introduced to forestall U.S. aggression.
- b. The Soviet troops are merely technicians—but would fight if Cuba is invaded.
- c. Schism between hard nosed Commies and Fidelistas has been reconciled.
- d. Castro is no puppet. He has complete self determination. No strings on Soviet aid.
- e. Denies exporting revolution. Says it can't be done.
- f. Blames turn to Communism on suspension of sugar quota.
- g. Receptive to a U.S. commission to talk about compensation.
- h. Abandoned earlier promises of elections, etc. because of changed conditions and state of war.
- i. Would welcome reductions of tensions and rapprochement with U.S.
- j. Will not become the Tito of the Caribbean.

¹ Lisa Howard's interview with Castro. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 15-1 CUBA.

**673. Memorandum from the Deputy Director of USIA to
McGeorge Bundy, May 4¹**

May 4, 1963

USIA has been endeavoring for some time to talk in positive terms to the people of Cuba [illegible in the original] -Castro [illegible in the original]. We seek to assure them that we do not wish to turn back the clock but rather look to the day when [illegible in the original] will rejoin the family of American countries and participate in the industrial [illegible in the original] and social reforms of the Alliance for Progress.

In order to provide an adequate basis for our information programs we need a strong statement from a high USG source explaining [illegible in the original] the [illegible in the original] of this [illegible in the original] that Cuba [illegible in the original], for the first time [illegible in the original] [illegible in the original] [illegible in the original] and U.S. representatives [illegible in the original] the American Republics [illegible in the original]. It is the [illegible in the original] in the U.S. [illegible in the original], at the OAS [illegible in the original] and that the strongest possible [illegible in the original] to the future of Cuba. [illegible in the original]. However, [illegible in the original] will be in [illegible in the original].

[illegible in the original]

At present our position, which is essentially anti-Castro in nature, suffers from a lack of [illegible in the original]. From the Agency's standpoint, the proposed statement would allow us to adopt a much more constructive tone in our output to Cuba. Further, it would not commit us to a fixed timetable and would make our output more sustainable during the intervening period until the fall of Castro.

Attached is a draft statement.

Donald M. Wilson
Deputy Director

¹ Advocating that a high-U.S. Government official make a statement expressing U.S. views of post-Castro Cuba and enclosing proposed statement. Confidential. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63.

Attachment

PROPOSED STATEMENT

During recent months I have said many times that our Cuba policy looks to the day when the people of that unhappy isle shall be truly free. This is our purpose and hope and it is shared by the other republics of our hemisphere.

At San Jose, Costa Rica, in March we joined with the Presidents of Central America and Panama to “reaffirm the conviction that Cuba will soon join the family of free nations”.

In the Declaration of Central America, we said that we had “no doubt that a genuine Cuban revolution will live again, that its betrayers will fall into the shadows of history and that the martyred people of that oppressed isle of the Caribbean will be free from Communist domination, free to choose for themselves the kind of government they wish to have, and free to join their brothers of the hemisphere in a common undertaking to secure for each individual liberty, dignity and well being, which are the objectives of all free societies.”

When the time comes, as it shall, from [illegible in the original] a free Cuba to sweep up the destruction of communist rule and begin the reconstruction of her autonomy and democratic institutions, she can count on the United States not only for sympathy and understanding, but for effective financial and technical aid as well.

Our hopes for a free Cuba point to the future, not to the past. The Cuban people’s choice of government is not limited, as Castro would have them believe, to communism or return to a rightist dictatorship. We would support the legitimate aims and reforms of the early days of the Cuban revolution, before it was betrayed by Castro, and help Cubans to build their future on a foundation of social and economic betterment.

A free Cuba will be invited to join her sister republics in the vast cooperative programs of the Alliance for Progress, through which we support for all the people of this hemisphere, including Cubans, the right of free elections, and the true [illegible in the original] of basic human freedoms. Under the Alliance, we support equitable land reforms; accelerated economic progress to build industries and provide more jobs; programs to provide [illegible in the original] housing to the people; fair wages and satisfactory working conditions for all workers; greatly increased advanced opportunities for all health and sanitation programs; [illegible in the original] to Latin America’s traditional problem of expensive/extensive/expansive price [illegible in the original] exports.

The Cuban people will make their own blueprint. But we expect them to require special help, aside from participation in the Alliance

for Progress, and we will be prepared to give it, with no strings attached and in the spirit of friendship that has been traditional between our two countries.

The post-Castro Cubans will be in immediate dire need of many things. They will require food, medicines, clothes, machinery, tools, transport, and other commodities that Castro's reckless policies have made scarce. We will be prepared to provide these needs promptly, and in substantial amounts.

I am confident that the Organization of American States will offer its good offices to help organize and supervise free elections, so as to assure the exercise of complete freedom at the polling place. OAS technical assistance will also be made available, I am certain, to repair the ravages wrought by the Soviet-dictated military build-up and communist agricultural mismanagement. In the important field of education, the OAS can be of valuable assistance in helping Cuba to regain academic freedom and to [illegible in the original] its educational system [illegible in the original].

There will be many [illegible in the original] the free Cuban people [illegible in the original] can accomplish themselves with little or no assistance from their neighbors. [illegible in the original] of [illegible in the original] communist effort to stifle the spark of democracy, they will want to build a system of law and justice in which all share equally, establish a free press and radio, liberate their once strong unions from the control of the state, and reconstitute their political and economic ties with the other American Republics.

I firmly believe that the majority of the Cuban people, including many thousands who have been forced to appear as supporters of the communist regime, hold to their faith in freedom and are determined to regain their independence. They have learned that the path down which their communist leaders have taken them does not lead to the original goals of the revolution. In freedom, and in association with their fellow American Republics, their revolution is alive again.

674. Paper prepared by the CIA, May 6¹

May 6, 1963

CUBAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF CRUDE OIL AND
REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

1. Cuba's total supply of petroleum, crude and refined, for FY 63 was a total of 93,000 barrels per day (bpd). This was supplied by the Soviet Bloc, principally the Soviet Union.

A. The above 93,000 (bpd) breaks down to a daily average of 77,000 (bpd) of crude which when refined by the three Cuban refineries (formerly Esso, Shell and Texaco) produced 70,000 bpd finished products, which at USSR crude conversion rates produces 28% gasoline, 27% gas oil and kerosene, and 43% fuel oil, or 19,000 bpd gasoline (about 58 octane), 18,900 bpd gas oil and kerosene, and 31,500 bpd fuel oil.

B. The remaining 17,000 bpd are of refined products. The May 1963 planned delivery is a good example of an average month:

<i>Delivery—May 1963</i>	<i>Tons</i>
A [illegible in the original] High Octane Auto gas	10,000
A 93 premium Octane Auto gas	11,000
[illegible in the original] Jet fuel	3,500
[illegible in the original] Aviation oil	1,300
Vapor (industrial oil)	1,200
Machine oil (slow machinery)	3,000
Spindle oil	1,200
Kerosene and gas oil	19,000
Fuel oil	33,200
TONS FOR MAY	83,400

2. The consumption of petroleum products in Cuba in 1959 (the last year of U.S. corporation records) was between 50,000 and 60,000 bpd. Why Cuba is now consuming 86,000 bpd of finished and refined petroleum products is a confusing question both to those working on Cuba petroleum consumption statistics and also to the U.S. petroleum industry.

3. Despite the increase in Cuba's supply of petroleum products over 1959 consumption, our effort to account for the increased con-

¹ "Cuban Supply and Demand of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products." Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.

sumption or locate new storage areas has been unsuccessful. Aerial photographs disclose only slight increase in above ground storage facilities since 1959. The largest expansion is three new crude storage tanks at the Texaco refinery in Santiago consisting of about 60,000 barrels each and four crude storage tanks at the Esso refinery in Havana of also about 60,000 barrels each.

4. Present storage facilities in Cuba, using a consumption rate of 80,000 bpd, would store a sufficient quantity to supply: (a) gasoline for at least six months; (b) fuel oil for at least six months; and (c) gas oil and kerosene for at least six months.

5. The only petroleum products the Bloc probably cannot supply Cuba, without reducing their own needs, are [illegible in the original] and additives for lubricating oil. These Cuba has been trying desperately to obtain from the West.

675. Paper prepared by the CIA, undated¹

undated

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA

ACTION ITEM	REMARKS
1. Create a government-wide task force consisting of representatives of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, CIA, Defense and any other agency which could contribute to a program designed to expand our present limited covert economic action effort and intensify efforts to discourage free world trade with Cuba. Actions under this program would include, among others, the following:	1. On the basis of CIA experience in targeting against a very limited, narrow objective, [<i>less than 1 line not declassified</i>] it is estimated that several hundred people, both here and abroad, have been devoting a good bit of their time to simply keeping track of and preventing the shipment of [<i>less than 1 line not declassified</i>] to Cuba. This has required close coordination by CIA with State and Commerce particularly, with CIA providing the basic clandestine

¹ List of additional covert actions against Cuba. Secret. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.

intelligence as well as supplying limited amounts of money for preclusive buying when necessary. Any new government-wide organization would need, first and foremost, funds and people plus a charter enabling it to move freely and quickly in order to deny vital goods to the enemy.

a. Reconsider the previously proposed tightening of regulations concerning free world shipping to Cuba with a view to issuing those regulations.

a. This would have to be combined with additional new and tougher approaches to all our allies, fully realizing that efforts along those lines could adversely affect the economies of some of our allies which in turn might involve increased foreign aid to them.

b. Preclusive buying and commodity price manipulation as appropriate.

b. Consideration must also be given that once it becomes known that the U.S. was involved in a preclusive buying program our allies would and could take advantage of it, thereby increasing the cost of our operation, which is inherently expensive in any case.

c. Encourage labor groups and other [illegible in the original] obstruct in every way any trade with Cuba and in [illegible in the original] boycott of any kind of [illegible in the original] from their [illegible in the original] as well as [illegible in the original] of any [illegible in the original].

c. Boycott operations could adversely affect some labor groups as well as industries of our allies.

ACTION ITEM	REMARKS
d. [illegible in the original]	d. [illegible in the original] or consideration of biological and chemical warfare against agricultural commodities has been deliberately [illegible in the original]. There are, however, other means of attaining on a [illegible in the original] basis, various Cuban [illegible in the original] is at various Cuba ranges of the [illegible in the original]. Those would of course require additional policy approval.
e. [illegible in the original]	e. [illegible in the original] this type of [illegible in the original] is feasible. It [illegible in the original] involve additional policy approval, [illegible in the original] as it would involve our allies and [illegible in the original] territories.
2. [illegible in the original]	2. This would have a [illegible in the original] on an [illegible in the original] basis. In every case including Castro's [illegible in the original]; Castro's [illegible in the original]. The aim of such operations would be to point out errors that Castro or his regime have made or are making, plus, of course, any contradictions between Castro's claims and the final results.
3. Create a Radio Free Cuba [illegible in the original] the present Radio Free Europe effort.	3. CIA does not conceive this program is desirable unless it is part of a phased program to overthrow Castro. Not only is it expensive in both money and manpower, for example we estimate the initial cost would be

ACTION ITEM

REMARKS

about \$3,000,000, but we do not believe additional radio time is needed under existing policy. In addition to the extensive Voice of America broadcasting, CIA sponsors the following broadcast hours *daily*.

a. Medium wave—23 hours daily on ten frequencies.

b. Short wave—12½ hours daily on six frequencies.

CIA is now exploring the feasibility of increasing this [illegible in the original] using hours on medium wave as two hours on short wave daily. In addition, from a technical point of view, the diversification of frequencies that we use makes them less susceptible to jamming [illegible in the original] would one transmitter, no matter how [illegible in the original] which would be the case in a Radio Free Cuba effort. [illegible in the original].

4. Leaflet drops by both
(a) balloons, and (b) aircraft.

4. (a) CIA believes that balloon operations are both feasible and desirable. However, CIA's previous proposal for balloon leaflet drops was recently disapproved by higher authority. (b) CIA does not believe that leaflet drops by aircraft are desirable although it is technically feasible. CIA believes the use of aircraft for this purpose not only exposes the aircraft to greater risks in terms of being shot down, but could also aggravate the problems of the present reconnaissance overflight program.

ACTION ITEM

REMARKS

5. Deception broadcasts of regulating internal or [illegible in the original] resistance.

5. CIA has conducted such broadcasts from a U.S. submarine in the past and will do so again if CIA believes it to be worthwhile at any time in the future. Additional policy approval will be requested at that time. This type of broadcast is very perishable in terms of its impact, can only be done once or twice [illegible in the original] to design [illegible in the original] purpose in mind.

6. [illegible in the original]

6. [illegible in the original] and in the past with [illegible in the original] (L does not believe in a result justify the [illegible in the original] of [illegible in the original] time [illegible in the original] power diverted in such a program. In [illegible in the original] to [illegible in the original] approved by the Special Forces [illegible in the original] higher authority

7. Deception operation involving the laying down of arms caches containing Soviet, Czech and Chicom arms in selected areas of Latin America, ostensibly proving the arms were smuggled from Cuba.

7. The key consideration in such an operation is the possibility that the "discovery" of such arms caches might lead to embarrassment for the Administration since arms smuggling is one of the points most often stated for the U.S. possibly taking more aggressive action against Castro. This type of operation, while feasible, is an extremely difficult and dangerous one to undertake in terms of making the operation completely plausible and foolproof.

ACTION ITEM

REMARKS

8. Deception operations simulating invasion forces entering Cuba at various areas around Cuba and in various [illegible in the original].

8. CIA believes such operations are feasible and desirable. They would keep the Cuban forces and militia in a constant mobilized ready alert status, with the tendency to wear them down as a result, and most important would keep the Cuban labor force away from work. However, such a program could not be accomplished without a very high international “noise level” and accusations that the U.S. was threatening Cuba. Such deception operations would have to be accompanied by overt actions of U.S. military forces in terms of movement of ships, aircraft and men, as well as call in numerous maneuvers and test exercises in the general area. The economic advantages of keeping the Cuban labor force occupied in military [illegible in the original] would have to be [illegible in the original] the psychological impact on the international community.

9. Station refugee ships on the high seas outside Cuban territorial waters with the purpose of picking up Cuban refugees who are escaping from Cuba. An aggressive psychological warfare program to initiate and encourage the escape of the Cubans would be required.

9. CIA believes this is a desirable effort. However, any such program must consider the likelihood of Cuban counteraction which would require U.S. naval and air patrols to protect the refugee relief ships. Cuban patrol boats have recently picked up refugees attempting to escape by sea and have also harassed U.S. Coast Guard vessels attempting to pick up Cuban refugees on the high seas. The possible consequences of continued and repeated encounters of this type

ACTION ITEM

REMARKS

between U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels and Cuban naval patrols must be considered.

10. Attack and/or stage [illegible in the original] free world and Soviet shipping in and out of Cuban waters.

10. While this has been proposed in the past, it has not been approved. The economic advantages of such a program are obvious. The political disadvantages involving our allies, we believe, are equally obvious. A similar but lesser proposal to stage surface attacks on Cuban ships in Cuban waters was disapproved by the Special Group recently.

11. [illegible in the original]

11. This would require additional policy approval and would require considerable lead time in order to create the necessary air capability. CIA does not favor this program since repeated operations of this type are bound to be attributed to the U.S. In addition such activities could have an adverse effect on our present reconnaissance overflight program.

12. Mining of Cuban waters particularly around major ports.

12. If this were done sporadically it would have the effect of raising insurance rates which would possibly scare off some foreign shipping lines while increasing the cost to the Soviets. Such an operation would be difficult to do covertly. These operations will sooner or later be attributed to the U.S. since some mines will break loose and get into international waters where they would probably be identified as U.S. mines. In addition to the complaints of our

ACTION ITEM

REMARKS

allies who might lose some ships in the process, the U.S. Navy was strongly opposed to this proposal when it was suggested earlier. The Special Group supported the Navy and disapproved the idea.

676. Memorandum from General Taylor to McNamara, May 10¹

JCSM-358-63

May 10, 1963

SUBJECT

US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that although a widespread effective revolt in Cuba is unlikely at this time, potential sources of a spontaneous uprising do exist. They have considered the alternatives open to the United States and have examined our capabilities to provide support in such an event.

2. *[text not declassified]*

3. *[text not declassified]*

[text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

4. Cuban volunteers would be used in these military operations but only as individuals in US units. There is no current program which provides for developing all-Cuban military units, nor should they be created unless their employment is planned for a specific date as part of a larger operation. The formation and maintenance in being of such units against the contingency of spontaneous revolt are not justified.

¹ U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Miscellaneous 63-65.

5. In addition to the problems of timing, amount of force to be applied, and the use of Cuban expatriates, we could be faced with a direct confrontation with Soviet troops. Plans for the rapid application of US military forces, therefore, must consider the neutralization or elimination of the Soviet forces in Cuba, and the attendant possibility of greatly increasing world tensions.

6. Further, US planning is incomplete for post-assault operations which we would have to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum which would be caused by the downfall of the Castro-communist regime. A concentrated effort is required to devise an acceptable [illegible in the original] regime.

7. *[text not declassified]*

8. There are also actions which require attention outside of the Department of Defense:

a. CIA in-country assets for collecting intelligence and supporting UW in Cuba should be augmented as feasible.

b. The Department of State should:

(1) Develop plans for a post-hostilities government in Cuba, in coordination with DOD. These plans should encompass operations in support of military government and the successor interim government in Cuba.

(2) Initiate action to coalesce the many Cuban factions in opposition to Castro.

(3) Devise a policy assigning to Cuban-exiled activist groups an appropriate role in both a revolt and its aftermath, within the framework of the CIA and CINCLANT plans.

(4) Initiate action now to mold public opinion concerning both the revolt and a successor government, and to provide policy guidance for the conduct of US psychological operations, to include objectives and themes.

9. *[text not declassified]* It is recommended that a memorandum, substantially the same as that in the Appendix hereto, be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

677. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Brubeck, May 15¹

May 15, 1963

SUBJECT

U-2 Flights, Cuba Contingency Plans

[illegible in the original]

¹ U-2 flights, Cuba—contingency plans. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights, Contingency Plans.

678. Memorandum for the record prepared by McCone, May 15¹

May 15, 1963

SUBJECT

Discussion with Secretary Rusk, 14 May, 6:30–7:00 p.m.

[Here follows material unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Secretary Rusk and I reviewed the Castro trip to Moscow. Both expressed concern over timing of the trip and its length. Rusk asked if we had noticed any changes or unusual situations in Havana. The answer was negative. Rusk referred to recent statements of Khrushchev's that he was going to "hatch a big egg" and wondered if this related in any way or tied in with Castro's visit. DCI expressed concern over Cuba, the inadequacy of high-level photography, the innumerable ominous reports, the inadequacy of agent and liaison reporting and his general concern and uncertainty over the future.

NOTE: This same concern was expressed to the Standing Group earlier in the day when the DCI was discussing the need for low-level photography.

The discussion with Secretary Rusk was inconclusive in this connection.

¹ Review with Rusk about the Castro trip to Moscow. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Memoranda for the Record.

3. Rusk brought up the question of defecting Castro, suggesting he might be made a "Caribbean Tito." DCI responded that he had had serious thoughts about this, they were somewhat dimmed by Castro's trip to Moscow, that he had developed an approach with Donovan but that making Castro a "Caribbean Tito" would not be satisfactory. On the contrary, what would have to happen would be a direct face-about by Castro, a decision and determination to have the Soviets move out of Cuba, an agreement with the United States to permit free travel through Cuba for inspection purposes, stopping of propaganda and insurgent activities against Latin American states, and assuming a posture compatible with the OAS. Secretary Rusk felt these measures were so extreme that they were probably unattainable. McCone said he thought the question of working with Castro very delicate politically and should be handled with extreme care. No action required on this at the present time.

4. Secretary Ball and Secretary Martin then joined, and we discussed briefly the Haitian situation. Martin seemed convinced that Duvalier would leave Haiti with his family on May 15th. McCone expressed doubt.

Attached to Original

[text not declassified]

**679. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
May 24¹**

May 24, 1963

SUBJECT

Lifting of the NOTAM over Cuba and Non-Resumption of PANAM Flights to Havana

In about a week or so the Cuban Coordinating Committee will probably recommend that we lift our NOTAM over Cuban airspace but not permit PANAM to resume its flights to Havana. Attached is a draft memorandum which gives the reasons in arriving at these decisions. Here are a few additional points.

¹ Lifting of the NOTAM over Cuba and non-resumption of PanAm flights to Havana. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Lifting of NOTAM re Cuba, 5/63-6/63.

1. State is holding up on its recommendations to allow time for a possible Cuban reaction to our institution of the NOTAM against Cuban non-scheduled airplanes.

2. CIA tells me that while the non-resumption of PANAM flights will not help their intelligence-gathering capability, it won't hurt the capability very much either. CIA's other intelligence capabilities (e.g. communications from their own people in Cuba) have been growing and they rely less and less on refugee information, which at best is not very reliable. In the unlikely event that the need for refugee information becomes urgent, we can probably get a boat-load on an ad hoc basis.

3. We will have to handle carefully the press and public on this one; for example, we don't want the lifting of the NOTAM (attached) to be misinterpreted as a softening of our Cuban policy. Here are some of the tentative press guidelines.

(a) The action will be played in low-key.

(b) If we are questioned on the lifting of the NOTAM, our reply can include the following points. First, our experience over the past few months leads us to believe that it is no longer dangerous for PANAM and Braniff Airlines to fly over Cuba. KLM and other foreign airlines have been flying over Cuba without incident. (PANAM and Braniff would probably also be overflying Cuba if it were not for the objections of the Airline Pilots Association.) Second, American business is suffering unnecessarily. Third, it should be noted that PANAM will not resume services to Havana and that the integrity of our isolation and anti-subversion policies will be maintained.

(c) We may want to point out to appropriate non-scheduled American pilots (1) that we require non-scheduled Cuban planes flying over the U.S. to land for technical inspection and (2) that they should be aware of the probability that Castro will do the same thing to American non-scheduled planes which begin to fly over Cuba as a result of the lifted NOTAM.

4. At this point, the adverse consequences of lifting the NOTAM appear to be relatively mild and manageable. First, KLM may regard the move as an invitation to resume its pressure for a renewal of its services to Havana. However, we intend to make it clear to the Dutch that this is not so. We have a convincing case in view of the fact that PANAM will not resume its flights to Cuba. Second, Castro may get mad when PANAM doesn't resume its flights to Havana. However, he cannot legitimately do anything to hinder PANAM's overflight rights without compromising Cuba's status in ICAO (which provides him with many services). At the worst, he can compel American scheduled airlines to use inconvenient routes across Cuba.

Gordon Chase

680. Memorandum from Joseph Califano to Vance, May 27¹

May 27, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs on Friday, May 24, 1963

The meeting was called to discuss U.S. policy with respect to Cuban exiles in the United States. At the meeting, a draft paper was presented and four alternative courses were discussed: (1) give immediate support to a selected group, (2) give no support to any group, (3) support individually those groups with the most effective internal operations in Cuba and (4) a "wait and see" policy (to allow the exiles to sort out their objectives and later determine which, if any, groups have the vitality and deserve the support of the United States). At the meeting, various changes were recommended in the paper, the third alternative was deleted at the request of the CIA (on the ground that it was a covert matter) and it was tentatively agreed that, for the time being, a wait and see policy (subject to covert use of selected groups) might be the best. Mr. Cottrell said that a new draft of the paper would be circulated this week for formal comments.

Mr. Cottrell then announced that he was going to give full time to his job as Ed Martin's deputy and that he would be succeeded as Coordinator of Cuban Affairs by Mr. John Crimmins who had been acting as the Miami coordinator. Mr. Cottrell briefly discussed a list of problems that he had compiled for consideration by Mr. Crimmins and the Committee. These included broadening of shipping restrictions, developing joint State-Defense contingency plans for reaction to an internal revolt within Cuba (General Taylor on May 10, 1963, sent to you a study that the Chiefs had submitted to him on the courses of action which might be taken if a spontaneous revolt occurred in Cuba), problems in the area of Latin American subversion of Cuba, speaking tours of Latin America by former Brigade members, and many of the problems that we have already considered.

Mr. Cottrell noted that the Attorney General was a vigorous proponent of a speaking tour of Latin America by Cuban Brigade members. State and USIA were opposed to such a tour for fear it would raise a series of ugly questions about the Bay of Pigs and because the Brigade members were, in their mind, more a symbol of defeat than of victory.

¹ Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, which discussed U.S. policy on Cuban exiles in the United States. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files.

They believe that any prepared speeches on the horrors of Castro/Communism in Cuba would be overcome by stories about the abortive invasion.

As the meeting adjourned, Mr. Crimmins stated that he would hold another meeting sometime this week to give us a picture of his plans for the future.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
*Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army*

681. Memorandum from Bromley Smith to the NSC Standing Group, May 27¹

May 27, 1963

Attached is a paper which will be discussed at the Standing Group meeting on May 28, 5:00 PM.

Bromley Smith

Attachment

THE WORLD PRICE OF SUGAR

The Situation

The world price of sugar has risen to present levels because of a sharp drop in world supply in the face of steadily rising demand. The poor European beet crops of the last two years coincided with the severe reduction in Cuban production and the loss of most of that production to the communist bloc.

Cuban production has fallen from a 1961 level of 7.5 million short tons² to an estimated 3.8 to 4.2 million this year. Cuba has bartered more than this output to the Sino-Soviet bloc (3.3 million tons to the Soviet Union, 1.3 million to China, and 700,000 to the satellites), but has been permitted to sell about 1.25 million tons in the free world

¹ Transmits paper entitled "The World Price of Sugar." Secret. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group, 5/28/63.

² All figures in this report are in short tons.

market so far this year. Following are world production and consumption figures, in millions of short tons:

Crop year	Production	Consumption	Stock change
1957-58	49.1	49.0	+0.1
1958-59	54.5	51.0	+3.5
1959-60	53.9	53.0	+0.9
1960-61	60.1	55.0	+5.1
1961-62	56.0	57.0	-1.0
1962-63	54.3	58.5	-4.2

While these figures suggest that the 1962-63 decline in stocks is only an adjustment from the earlier buildup, it is complicated by the fact that most of the 1960-61 buildup was in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

As always, the real shortage is intensified by scare-buying. Beginning late last year, sugar users and distributors in this country have added 600,000 tons to their stocks, and the buying rate since April 1 has been up 30 percent. Presumably, inventory-building is also going on in the other developed countries.

At the same time, some supplies are being held off the market in producing countries in anticipation of higher prices.

Among countries with heavy stocks is the Soviet Union, which has been taking most of the Cuban output even though it has not permitted enough rise in consumption levels to utilize the additional quantities. Its stocks at the end of 1962 are estimated at 4 to 4.5 million tons—about 50 percent above normal. Poland also had above normal supplies. The Soviet bloc, before it obtained the Cuban supplies, had been a net exporter of sugar.

Tab A shows recent price movements, Tab B charts world production and consumption, and Tab C breaks the production figures down by countries.

The Outlook

There is no prospect for relief in the tight supply situation until this year's beet harvest, at the earliest, and little prospect for a really easy balance between supply and demand for 3 or 4 years—assuming that a substantial additional Cuban supply does not re-enter the world market. It will probably be much longer before the world sugar price again reaches the low levels of last year.

Unfortunately, this year's beet crop in Western Europe got off to a slow start because of unfavorable weather and the yield may be again less than normal. Current high prices are encouraging some expansion in practically all areas of sugar beet and cane production, but bringing in new cane acreage requires 18 months and new beet acreage almost

as long. No immediate large-scale expansion appears to be underway anywhere in the free world.

Scare-buying has probably not yet ended. At the time of the Korean crisis, inventory-building among U.S. users and distributors reached a million tons, and only 60 percent of that potential over-buying has occurred so far.

When the supply situation eases, prices can move downward as quickly as they have been moving up. The worst should be over when this year's beet crop is harvested in October. But a poor European crop could mean another year of extraordinary high prices. The futures market on deliveries for July and September 1964 has recently been rising rapidly, indicating that traders expect no real relief within 16 months which is far into the future as the market extends.

The Soviet Union could bring the world price down at any time by releasing its excess stocks for sale in the world market. If the world price began to fall without such action, Soviet dumping could accelerate the down trend. We have no evidence now, however, that the Soviet Union contemplates any substantial sales. It has been suggested that if an authoritative estimate of the size of Soviet stocks were made known, this alone might affect price.

Tab B and C project anticipated world production and consumption and production by countries through 1965–66, and Tab D provides a commentary on prospects for expansion in the principal producing countries.

What might be done to alter this outlook is discussed under the headings which follow.

Increasing Domestic Production

All restrictions on sugar beet acreage have been removed for 1963, 1964, and 1965. U.S. production of beet sugar this year should reach a record level of 2.9 million tons—compared to 2.6 million last year—and should increase further in the next two years. Processing capacity is being expanded from 3 million to at least 3.3 million tons by 1965. There appears to be no need for additional incentives beyond the prospective high prices.

Acreage restrictions on mainland cane have been removed for 1963 and 1964. This should result in enough additional production in Florida to fill the mainland cane quota under the Sugar Act. To remove restrictions for 1965, as has been done in the case of beets, would provide additional incentive to produce, but the production could not be marketed within the statutory quota. The producers would probably be willing to take the risk if assured by the Administration that it will recommend the necessary quota increase when the Sugar Act is revised next year.

Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and our offshore possessions have no restrictions on either acreage or marketing.

Increasing Foreign Supplies

This question breaks into three sub-questions:

Long-Range Expansion. Many parts of the world have potential for increased sugar production from cane, but bringing new acreage into production requires about 18 months. Opportunities also exist for expansion of production of beet sugar, which if started now could be accomplished in a slightly shorter time. Construction of processing capacity takes about the same length of time. New investment may take 20 years of reasonably good prices to pay off.

Spurred by present high prices, some countries are expanding production (See Tab D). However, they are held back by, among other things, uncertainty as to markets and prices in 1965 and thereafter. The United States is not in a good position to offer guarantees as to long-range markets. The Sugar Act contains limitations on each country in the form of country quotas. And, the global quota is reserved for returns to Cuba after Castro. We would indeed be embarrassed if we pushed other countries to fill the gap left by Cuba and then had to find room for resumption of Cuban deliveries. We would be embarrassed also if we pressed these countries to expand and the world price in a few years fell to levels approaching those of a year ago, when sugar production was being curtailed in many countries because it was unprofitable.

Even Philippine companies, which enjoy special access to the U.S. market because of a preferential tariff rate and a guaranteed quota until 1974, have been expressing reluctance to expand without assurances beyond that date.

Short-Range Production Increases. On existing acreage, possibilities exist for improving cane yields per acre and increasing the recoverable quantities of sugar per ton of cane—by such means as increased use of fertilizer, modernization of existing mills, increased use of labor and improvement of cultural and factory practices. Moreover, where unused processing capacity exists, using that capacity requires only the investment necessary to add new acreage or substitute more productive for less productive land. With an attractive market opportunity for any increased output, these immediate short-range measures appear to be appropriate areas for United States assistance. AID and USDA are asking the AID missions and agricultural attachés to explore immediately the possibilities of, and need for, dollar and technical assistance for short-range measures. The Export-Import Bank has also been advised of the desirability of actions in these directions.

Pressure for Release of Supplies. Where supplies are being held off the market in anticipation of still higher prices, diplomatic pressure

might be effective. State has already made strong representations to Manila in an attempt to pry loose some stocks that are known to be held there.

Restraints on Demand

Inventory-building and scare-buying are difficult to deal with on a world-wide scale. To impose controls in the United States alone would have an effect on the world price, of course, but besides being highly controversial and unpopular, controls would require legislation and administrative machinery—with all the delay they would involve. The sugar companies have been doing some informal allocation of supplies among their customers, but stocks in the hands of industrial users and wholesalers and retailers are probably close to a million tons compared to a normal level of 400,000.

If housewives were to panic, severe additional price pressures could develop. So of this date, however, there has not been any sustained run on the grocery stores.

Some minor benefit might come from revising regulations, mainly those of the Food and Drug Administration, which limit the amount of sugar substitutes—primarily, corn sirup—which can be used in certain products. However, corn sirup production capacity is currently strained to the point where the principal producers have been declining additional orders—so this avenue offers no major hope of immediate relief.

682. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, May 27, enclosing a memorandum entitled "Possible Soviet Initiatives To End U.S. Aerial Reconnaissance Over Cuba"¹

May 27, 1963

SUBJECT

Memorandum for the NSC Standing Group on Possible Soviet Initiatives to End US Aerial Reconnaissance over Cuba

Enclosed is a memorandum which Paul Nitze and I have prepared to examine the question of possible Communist initiatives against our

¹ Top Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.

aerial reconnaissance, particularly short of shooting down a U-2. We would address the question whether at this time, or under what conditions, the Communists would decide that the need for action was so imperative that they would undertake one or more of those courses of action.

As in the case of earlier contingency studies with respect to Cuba, while we have used few members of our staffs this memorandum has not been fully staffed in either State or DOD nor seen by the JCS, and thus does not necessarily represent the views of our respective Departments. Also, we are presenting this study in accordance with the desires of the Standing Group merely to provide a basis for discussion.

U. Alexis Johnson

Attachment

SUBJECT

Possible Soviet Initiatives to End US Aerial Reconnaissance Over Cuba

Problem:

To evaluate considerations involved and the various options available to the USSR and Cuba in seeking to end US aerial reconnaissance over Cuba.

Discussion:

The Soviet Union, and still more Castro's Cuba, wish the cessation of US overflights of Cuba. The issue at present is only in the background, and the Communists evidently do not feel it is desirable to raise their objection prominently until they think there is something they can do about it. They evidently recognize that the shooting down of a reconnaissance plane would probably provoke active countermeasures to which they could not effectively respond, and moreover not end the surveillance. Assuming that they continue to believe that they cannot with impunity use direct action to end the overflights, they may nonetheless turn to other measures in an effort to compel us to stop further reconnaissance. Moreover, they may believe that some such other measures may, even if unsuccessful in themselves, create a better foundation for shooting down a plane later.

Alternative Courses of Action:

There appear to be six possible lines of political action open to the Communists in attempting to get us to call off the aerial reconnaissance of Cuba:

(1) Cuba could protest in the United Nations General Assembly and/or Security Council, calling for condemnation of the US action and for a cessation of the flights.

(2) Cuba could bring action before the International Court of Justice, or seek UN action requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ, calling for cessation of the flights.

(3) The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere—such as Berlin, privately or publicly tying the new pressure to the continuing overflight of Cuba, and offering to relax the new point of tension in exchange for cessation of aerial reconnaissance of Cuba.

(4) The Soviets could privately offer to withdraw all Soviet military personnel from Cuba in exchange for quiet dropping of aerial surveillance by the US.

(5) The Cubans could publicly propose a trade-off allowing ground inspection in exchange for an end to aerial inspection, but we are sure they would not do this unless they also added in demands for ground inspection in Florida or elsewhere in the Caribbean.

(6) The Cubans could, with discrete Soviet assistance, initiate aerial reconnaissance of some other area in the Caribbean—say, Guatemala or Nicaragua—on the grounds that offensive military action was being prepared in those countries (as it had been before the Bay of Pigs attack), justifying and requiring Cuba to undertake this peaceful aerial inspection. Then, the Cubans could offer to call off their surveillance if we call off ours.

Action in the United Nations:

A Cuban protest in the United Nations, vigorously supported by the other Communist powers, would open up an issue which most people have forgotten. They would probably gain some support for the idea that indefinite aerial overflight and reconnaissance was an undue infringement of sovereignty and should be stopped. The US defense would rest on two bases: The OAS Resolution of October 23 authorizing such action, and the *de facto* resolution of the October crisis in which with forbearance the US settled for unobtrusive aerial reconnaissance instead of insisting on ground inspection. Therefore, it would not be necessary to rest our case on a general right to reconnaissance, and this should hold in line many states which would be unwilling to agree to any position which justified aerial reconnaissance over their own countries.

It seems unlikely that the Cubans could get the necessary two-thirds of the General Assembly or a majority of the Security Council to support them (in the latter case, of course, we would veto). In fact, we believe that the Cubans, and the Soviets, would not expect an initiative in the UN to end the overflights, and probably not even to garner enough votes to be useful propaganda against the US action.

Action by the ICJ:

Cuba has not agreed, and is not likely to agree, to compulsory adjudication by the International Court. If she did, there are a number of counter-suits which the US could initiate (expropriations of US properties, etc.). However, while the Cubans could not be sure of winning their case on the overflights, we could be even less sure of winning. Our defense would be the OAS Resolution of October 23, but if Cuba announced its complete severance from the OAS (which it has not yet done), it is doubtful that we would win.

On balance, we think it unlikely that Cuba would submit its case to the ICJ, but if they did and we conceded jurisdiction to the Court, we could be in trouble.

Counterpressures:

The Soviets could initiate pressures elsewhere. In particular, they could attempt to gain support from our European Allies by making an end of reconnaissance over Cuba the price for warding off a new Berlin crisis. There are certain precedents for the Soviet policy of counterpressures, which would be more likely in a situation where the Soviets could better control the degree of tension than they could, for example, when there was a real crisis over Cuba. Nonetheless, it would appear unlikely that the Soviets would expect, or would succeed in rallying, much support in the West for a sellout on Cuban reconnaissance in exchange for relaxation of artificially generated tensions elsewhere.

Inducements:

If the Soviets and Cubans are sufficiently desirous of ending the overflights, they might approach us privately with an offer of some expendable *quid pro quo*. In particular, if they should decide that the continued presence of Soviet military personnel was not essential, they could offer the complete withdrawal of such personnel in exchange for an end of the overflights. They would, of course, have to consider that if the US refused, they would have tipped their hand on the negotiability of the continued Soviet military presence. Nonetheless, if they are sufficiently concerned, and do not believe they can force their way, they may attempt to buy it.

Presumably, our response would be insistence that the overflights continue until there was also active on-ground inspection, and that Soviet offers to withdraw their military only reflected growing awareness of the untenability of their position in having military men in Cuba in the first place.

Bargaining:

The Cubans could announce with much fanfare their readiness to accept ground inspection if aerial surveillance were ceased *and* if

ground inspection were made of places which they believed were being used to mount offensive action against Cuba: the Bahamas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and perhaps others. If this approach followed protests by Cuba or in the UN, it might persuade some that the Cubans had a reasonable solution as well as a justified complaint.

The US defense would be acceptance in principle of the encouraging Cuban indication of readiness to substitute effective ground inspection for aerial coverage, but rejection of any tie-in of the extraneous matter of alleged support for offensive actions against Cuba, and noting (in background) US clamp-down on Cuban exile activists. The OAS members would probably hold firm with us, but some might be willing to entertain the Cuban offer *plus* inspection against subversive training and export by Castro. All in all, the Cubans would be less likely now than in November to stir up much support for their position, and would probably not effectively create an impression of reasonableness sufficient to provide political justification for unilateral action to stop the overflights.

Sauce for the Goose:

The Cubans could tacitly embrace our own concept for justification, and turn it against us. They could announce that they were mounting aerial reconnaissance over some area where offensive forces had previously been mounted against them. Conceivably, they could carry reciprocal action to the point of announcing in advance their plans to overfly Dade County or Puerto Rico, but recognizing the greater risk in this initiative it seems more likely that they would pick Nicaragua, Guatemala, or the Dominican Republic for MIG-17 or B-26 overflight. They would probably announce their intention in advance in order to undercut our use of presumptive bombing attack as justification for immediate interception. If the United States undertook or supported the interdiction of Cuban reconnaissance flights, the Cubans would have a much stronger basis for an appeal to the UN complaining over Yankee attempts to apply a double standard. If we did not interfere, there would be substantial repercussions outside of Cuba and some pressures to agree to mutual cessation of reconnaissance overflights. Again in this case, the chief US defense would be the OAS Resolution of October 23.

Conclusions:

This quick survey of possible Communist initiatives to end US aerial surveillance of Cuba is not exhaustive, but includes the half-dozen most feasible courses they might consider. None of them appears so sure of success as to be immediately attractive, but such decision is also a product of the intensity of their desire to end the overflights, which it is difficult to measure.

The possible courses of action are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The Communists could concert a carrot and stick combination of

UN action and pressures, for example. They could try several courses in turn. A counterpressure on our access to Berlin would pose greatest danger of direct confrontation with the USSR and would be the course most involving pressures on our NATO Allies.

Attached is an *illustrative* scenario, couched in terms of a memorandum to Khrushchev from his "staff," outlining one way in which the Soviets might combine some of the possible options described above.

683. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, May 28¹

May 28, 1963

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Towards Exile Unity

1. The Cuban Coordinator's paper on U.S. policy towards exile unity is moving along quickly. We should have the approved version in the next couple days.

2. Our present public position towards exile unity is mixed; we are saying and doing things to both encourage and discourage exile unity. Factors which we control and which seem to be encouraging the exiles to unify are the AG's public statement of April 21 (*Tab 1*); to a lesser extent, the President's statement of April 24 (*Tab 2*); and the AG's past conversations with Ruiz Williams. Preliminary readings indicate that Ed Martin's statement of May 22 (*Tab 3*), which qualified our support of unity, has tended to discourage some exiles who were previously in favor of a movement towards unity. Attached as *Tab 4* is a recent cable from Miami regarding recent exile unity movements.

3. As I see it now, I don't think our present position is too far from where we want to be. Two steps seem to be in order. First, everyone should tie on to Ed Martin's relatively non-committal statement. Second, the AG should refrain, on a person-to-person basis, from encouraging the exiles to have elections or to unify (this sort of encouragement is likely to lead to expectations of future U.S. support). As you know, there are indications that the AG may now be willing to do this.

¹ U.S. policy toward exile unity and enclosing a May 22 statement by Edwin Martin before a Senate Subcommittee on the same subject. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 5/63-6/63.

Assuming that exile unity does not serve U.S. interests, we may want to consider the desirability of going a bit further than the Ed Martin statement—e.g. make no value judgment on whether unity is good or bad, but simply say that the unity issue is strictly internal exile business. Such a position leads to the following questions: Is it necessary to go further than the Martin-type statement to accomplish our purposes? Will such a position be palatable in terms of domestic politics? Does such a position have to be consistent with what we have said before on the subject?

Gordon Chase

Tab 3

Statement by Edwin M. Martin Before Senate
Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees
May 22, 1963

As time has passed since the first impact of the March 30 measures and their immediate aftermath, the bitterness and tension in the exile community have diminished as sobering and more responsible second thoughts have taken effect. At the present time, there is considerable ferment within exile groups which has been created by a still somewhat vague and confused desire for devices or organizations that might bring about, or at least symbolize unity. There are several persons and organizations engaged in efforts directed toward finding a broad formula for unity. The search for a single organization stems in part from a psychological need to fill the vacuum created by the decline of the Revolutionary Council following the resignation of Dr. Miro and others and our own decision not to continue to support the Council, even though that body did not represent more than a part of exile opinion. In part, the striving for unity is based on a desire to have a single exile voice which can address governments, international bodies and public opinion. This might raise, of course, the question of a government-in-exile, to which I will address myself later. Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community if it is to have vitality.

684. Memorandum from Kent to McCone, May 29¹

May 29, 1963

SUBJECT

Implications of Castro's Visit

SUMMARY

Castro's visit to the USSR has resolved the main problems in Cuban-Soviet relations since the crisis of last fall. Khrushchev has gained an important trump card for defending Soviet policy against the attacks of Communist China, and in the process he has repaired much of the damage to Soviet-Cuban relations. Castro has taken a long step toward the Soviet side, against China and has generally endorsed Soviet leadership of the Communist movement. In turn Khrushchev has strengthened the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution and recognized the special importance of Cuba's role in developing the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. A generalized pledge of Soviet military support has again been stated in strong terms, even though not formally embodied in a mutual defense treaty. In general, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed. As far as the US is concerned, the visit supports a conclusion that for the present Castro and Khrushchev will pursue a cautious line and attempt to stabilize the situation in Cuba and the Caribbean.

[Here follows the discussion portion of the memorandum.]

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Sherman Kent
Chairman

¹ Implications of Castro's visit to the Soviet Union. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.

June 1963

685. Memorandum from Helms to McCone, June 5¹

June 5, 1963

SUBJECT

Reported Desire of the Cuban Government for Rapprochement with the United States

1. In late May 1963 the subject of possible rapprochement with the United States was commented on by a source [*1½ lines not declassified*] who travels periodically to Habana. Source's reliability has not been fully established but he appears to have access to high-level officials of the Cuban Government and has provided information of value in the past. The source said that the possibility of rapprochement is talked about frequently among Cuban Government officials, who believe that it is the only solution to the Cuban problem but that Latin pride and the U.S. attitude make it difficult to accomplish. Fidel Castro wants the United States to make the first move. It appears that James B. Donovan would probably be acceptable to the Cubans as negotiator, and that some conversations along this line have already been held in Habana.

2. Similar information concerning Cuban desire for rapprochement has been reported by an untested source who has close contacts in Cuban diplomatic circles in Latin America. However, this information should not be considered as confirmation of that in paragraph 1, above, since the possibility exists that the ultimate unidentified informant may be the same for both sources. According to the untested source, a medium-level Cuban diplomat in Latin America has recently commented that the U.S. intransigent attitude and desire for an economic blockade supersede any desire for an amicable settlement. The diplomat, who is probably aware that his statements are relayed to U.S. officials, claims that the Cuban Government is willing to pay indemnities for U.S. properties expropriated in Cuba but states that the U.S. does not understand that Latin pride will not permit Cuba to humiliate itself in the eyes of the world by making the first overture toward rapprochement. However, the U.S., he says, can afford to be charitable and take the initiative.

¹ Reported desire of the Cuban Government for rapprochement with the United States. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.

3. Information in the following reports also suggested Cuban interest in rapprochement with the United States:

a. CSDB-3/654, 439, a memorandum dated 1 May 1963, on the interview of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] U.S. newswoman, with Fidel Castro.

b. TDCSDB-3/654, 700, dated 18 May 1963, containing comments of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Cuba on the reasons for the Soviet invitation to Fidel Castro to visit Moscow.

c. TDCSDB-3/654, 790, dated 24 May 1963, a report received from a high-ranking Cuban official who spoke with top-level Cuban Government personalities, according to which Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa Garcia spoke highly of James B. Donovan.

d. TDCSDB-3/654, 884, dated 1 June 1963, quoting remarks by Carlos Franqui, editor of *Revolucion*, Cuban newspaper, in which he indicated his personal doubt as to the sageness of Cuba's leaving the tutorship of the U.S.

e. TDCS-3/549, 301, dated 4 June 1963, the source of which was a Cuban economist who is a Communist Party member and advisor to a high-level Cuban Government official, reporting on a discussion by Cuban Communist leaders regarding suggested U.S.-Cuban policy.

f. TDCS-3/549, 367, dated 4 June 1963, according to which Castro had allegedly indirectly informed Juan Peron in Madrid that, at the request of Khrushchev, Castro was returning to Cuba with the intention of adopting a conciliatory policy toward the Kennedy administration "for the time being."

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

**686. Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group,
undated¹**

undated

SUBJECT

Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

REFERENCE

Memorandum for the Standing Group of The National Security Council, dated 8 June 1963, SUBJECT: Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

1. Submitted herewith for consideration and approval is a covert program for the support of an autonomous Cuban exile group. This program is an implementing measure of the previously approved course of action F in reference memorandum, which calls for support of autonomous anti-Castro groups as part of the integrated program of action towards Cuba.

2. It is proposed that non-attributable support in the form of funds, matériel and guidance be furnished to the action element of a Cuban exile group known as Comandos L which is an offshoot of the exile action group originally known as Alpha 66. This support would only be furnished if a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi* can be agreed upon which does not conflict with current U.S.G. policy. Comandos L have been conducting fund drives and the money collected appears to have been properly handled and applied to anti-Castro propaganda and action operations. The group's present primary action program calls for maritime operations, e.g., attacking shipping in Cuban waters and making commando-type attacks on targets in Cuba. To date they have conducted at least one such operation in Cuban waters; in this operation which took place in March 1963 the group fired on an unidentified ship (which turned out to be a Russian freighter) in the Cuba harbor of Caibarién. The group has been relatively inactive since the recent restrictions were placed on the movement of certain Cuban activists and their boats but recent reports indicate that Comandos L is attempting to establish a staging base [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and may already have sent several boats and some personnel to the base. There are also reports that several factions of the action element of Comandos L have had discussions with Luis Somoza of Nicaragua

¹ Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. Secret. 7 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131. Misc. 63, 64, 65.

and are considering operation out of Nicaragua if Somoza will support them.

3. The general lines of the proposed program would be as follows:

A. *OPS CONCEPT*:

The conduct by Comandos L of a series of anti-Castro maritime operations along the north coast of Cuba; particularly during the light of the moon period when unilateral CIA maritime operations are not being conducted. These operations would provide valuable support to the CIA operations by wearing down Cuban coastal defenses and by preventing the establishment of any discernible operational pattern. The successful execution of these operations would also make a significant contribution to the objectives of reference program in that such operations will stimulate internal resistance and weaken Castro/Communist efforts to consolidate the position of the regime.

B. *SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE*:

No more than two operations per month would be conducted with the targets being Cuban patrol vessels and/or Cuban owned shipping in Cuban harbors or waters and coastal installations such as docks, warehouses and other such facilities. The selection of targets for proposed operations will be reviewed by the Cuban front (and thence covertly by CIA) for conformance with whatever policy framework may obtain at the time. Any deviations from approved proposals will be dealt with on an ex post facto basis in line with paragraph 3F below.

C. *MODUS OPERANDI*:

A wealthy American who has been deeply involved in Cuban and Latin American affairs for many years and who has cooperated closely with CIA in the past, would be asked by CIA to present the program to an eminent and respected Cuban exile who in turn would be asked to act as a funding and cover front for the support to be furnished to Comandos L. The Cuban front would then approach the leadership of the Comandos L action element and indicate funds come from conservative elements of the Cuban exile community and from contributors located in Central America and in the United States. CIA or U.S. Government involvement would not be revealed to any members of Comandos L. The Cuban front would spell out the use of a Caribbean Operations Base and why he wants to concentrate on the North Coast, i.e., accessibility. Additional ground rules would also be established regarding target selection and tactics. The essential point would be made that final authority for all actions rests with the Cuban front or his representative. If Comandos L accepts this proposition, the Cuban front would then go about acquiring a Caribbean Operations Base under guidance from the American cutout. Once a Base is obtained, members of the Comandos L would depart legally from the United

States to a Caribbean country where they would board fishing vessels, provided by the Cuban front, which would then take them to the Caribbean Operations Base. From the Operations Base, strike boats would be towed to close proximity off the North Coast where they would then be released to carry out their mission. After completing a mission, the strike boats would rendezvous with the fishing boats and then return to the operational base. Upon completion of an operation, appropriate relatively low-key publicity releases will be made outside the U.S. in consonance with guidance furnished covertly by the CIA.

D. *[text not declassified]*

[text not declassified]

E. CIA SUPPORT:

We estimate the initial capital investment of approximately one hundred thousand dollars would have to be made to provide, through appropriate cover, for the establishment of the Base camp, procurement of fishing and strike boats, and other required matériel and services. It is estimated that operating costs would be about \$15,000 monthly based on approximately 20 men with two fishing and two strike boats. To the fullest extent possible, Comandos L personnel or the Cuban front will accomplish all their own procurement and other required activities. Any specialized equipment or guidance which must be provided by the CIA will be non-attributable and accomplished by appropriate covert mechanisms.

F. U.S. INFLUENCE:

It is felt that an acceptable degree of U.S. Government influence can be exercised over the Comandos L action operations by having the Cuban front making it clear that any actions not in accordance with the agreements (which CIA will stipulate through the American cutout), will not only result in all support being immediately terminated but in addition such actions would undoubtedly result in *[less than 1 line not declassified]* a maximum effort to restrict future Comandos L activities. In addition, we believe that Comandos L leadership realizes that unless its operations are conducted within the general framework of U.S. Policy in terms of foreign bases, appropriate targets and acceptable publicity releases, they will not be able to operate effectively against Cuba.

5. It is requested that approval be granted for the CIA to proceed with the implementation of the program as outlined above.

687. National Intelligence Estimate 85–63, June 14¹

June 14, 1963

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

I. CURRENT SITUATION

- Military Situation
- Political Stability
- The Economic Situation
- Castro and Latin America

II. OUTLOOK

- Shorter Term Prospects
- Military Prospects
- Long-Run Political and Economic Prospects
- Latin American Policies
- Soviet-Cuban Relations

ANNEX: ESTIMATE OF MAJOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT
IN CUBA

CONCLUSIONS

A. After a period marked by bitterness on Castro's part and by restraint on the part of the Soviets, the two parties now appear to have agreed to emphasize the consolidation of the Castro regime. We believe that the current situation within Cuba favors this consolidation. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in experience. It is unlikely that internal political opposition or economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel, whose charismatic appeal continues to be the most important factor in the forward drive of the Cuban revolution. (*Paras. 1, 15, 18, 31–32, 41*)

B. Dependence on the person of Castro is, however, a major vulnerability of the regime. Without leadership and without goals—and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans—no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the

¹ "Situation and Prospects in Cuba." Secret. 19 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.

outside. But his death could result in one form of disorder or another ranging from power struggles within the regime's leadership to open civil war. Any successor is likely to be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro has been because he will lack Castro's ability to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of Cubans. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops. (*Paras. 15, 42–43*)

C. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis. The Soviet military picture in Cuba is in transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate some of them. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba: indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there. (*Paras. 2, 5, 12–14, 35, 37*)

D. With respect to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risks involved. (*Para. 36*)

E. The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces have been augmented by increased training, new equipment, and some reorganization. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of US invasion, however, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. (*Paras. 8, 12–14*)

F. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance remains a major deterrent. We cannot, however, altogether rule out such an attempt. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods with respect to Cuba would make it possible to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception, during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying on. At some point the Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by

introducing other weapons previously labeled "offensive" by the US. In such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction. (*Paras. 38-40*)

G. The joint Khrushchev-Castro communiqué held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro's earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime's exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. (*Paras. 46-48*)

H. While the Soviets and Cubans have probably resolved their more immediate problems we foresee varying degrees of friction in their future relations, particularly over the long run. They probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America, and Castro appears to insist on a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Nevertheless, Castro has taken a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received a strong boost to his ego; assurances of continued economic support; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed. (*Paras. 49-51*)

DISCUSSION

I. CURRENT SITUATION

1. Significant policy differences between Castro and the Soviet leaders were apparent during the missile base crisis of October 1962 and for three or four months afterwards. Castro's visit to Moscow indicates that these differences have been submerged, though some basic tensions in the relationship are likely to continue. Various indications accumulating over the last several months suggest that there is now agreement on a common policy aimed primarily at consolidation of the Castro regime. A corollary of this policy is some measure of restraint toward the US to minimize the danger of US intervention. Recognition by both the Soviets and Cubans of the necessity for taking

steps to reduce the constant threat of a crisis with the US probably led to the current strategy. Two of its manifestations have been the further withdrawals since February of Soviet personnel from Cuba and the toning down for the moment Castro's inflammatory appeals for violent revolution throughout Latin America.

Military Situation

2. The Soviet military picture is in a state of transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate most of them. The limited capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces are gradually improving as a result of their experience and increased training since last fall and their growing familiarity with Soviet equipment. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis.

3. In the months preceding the October crisis, the Soviet Union accomplished a very substantial buildup of its own military power in Cuba and made sizable deliveries of arms and equipment for the Cuban Armed Forces. As a result of the crisis, the Soviets removed 42 MRBMs and related equipment. IRBM-related equipment, 42 IL-28 jet light bombers and associated personnel, but the rest of the equipment and a substantial Soviet military presence remain. (See Annex, "Estimate of Major Soviet Military Equipment in Cuba.")

4. Identifying Soviet military personnel entering Cuba and estimating their number has been a problem of great difficulty from the start of the buildup in 1962. Their entry was achieved in a manner compatible with the Soviets' desire to hide the arrival of strategic weapons; they wore civilian clothes, in many cases debarked at night at remote ports, and moved quickly to guarded and isolated encampments. To arrive at our estimates of Soviet troops in Cuba, we have used a synthesis of all available evidence, including refugee and in-place sources of varying degrees of reliability. In addition, we have closely measured the passenger and troop capacities of Soviet ships to and from Cuba and have undertaken functional analyses of the Soviet weapons systems in Cuba to determine the personnel required to operate and maintain them. As a result of this examination, the estimate of the number of Soviets assigned to the air defense system, KOMAR boats, cruise missile systems, and MIG fighters was considered to be relatively firm. However, the number derived for ground forces personnel, particularly those at the four armored camps, was based on less firm evidence and could have varied in either direction.

5. *Soviet Forces.* Given these limitations on the evidence, we estimated just prior to the troop withdrawals that began in mid-February 1963, that 17,500 was the most probable figure for Soviet military per-

sonnel in Cuba, but did not exclude the possibility that it could have been several thousand more. A careful evaluation of reports indicates that since that time a conservative minimum of 5,000 Soviet personnel have been withdrawn. Most appeared to be military rather than civilian. We have no reliable evidence that more than a few hundred military personnel have arrived in Cuba since mid-February. Those departing since mid-February probably included personnel associated with the armored camps, MIG fighters, and some elements of the air defense system, although we cannot determine with any degree of certainty the number withdrawn from each weapons system or installation. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more.

6. We believe that there has been a reduction in the Soviet personnel at the four armored camps. Some Cuban military personnel are present and undergoing training at all four of the camps, and a reliable report presents good evidence that one has been evacuated by the Soviets and partially occupied by the Cubans. However, the equipment remains at all the camps.

7. Four full shiploads of military equipment have been identified coming into Cuba since the crisis as against some 100 which arrived between July and October 1962. In addition, other ships have carried material which might be used by the military. This includes the shipment of six helicopters, commercial explosives, parts for IL-14 aircraft, and large quantities of trucks and other vehicles. In sum, the recent shipments appear to have been resupply deliveries composed of munitions, vehicles, replacement parts, and maintenance equipment.

8. *Cuban Forces and Capabilities.* The numerical strength of the Cuban ground forces has been estimated at 175,000, of whom some 75,000 are in the standing army and 100,000 in the ready reserve. In addition there are some [illegible in the original] home-guard militiamen, of little combat significance but useful as a police reserve. The capabilities of the standing army and ready reserve have been enhanced by new equipment, and by further training and experience including the mobilization during the missile crisis. A few divisions may now be capable of tactical operations, although the battalion combat team remains generally the basic tactical unit. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. Their ability for defense against invasion has been enhanced by the organization of an armored brigade and 11 combined arms "anti-invasion shock defense" battalions. Cuban capabilities are still severely limited by lack of training and experience in combined operations and by their general lack of organic transport and logistic support. In the event of US invasion they would have to revert fairly quickly

to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type.

9. The Cuban Navy is estimated to number 4,000–5,000 men. Its capabilities have been enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment, principally motor torpedo boats and submarine chasers, and by increased training in its use, but remain limited essentially to coastal defense and to operations in shipping lanes adjacent to Cuba. The KOMAR missile boats and coastal defense missiles remain under Soviet control.

10. In the field of air defense the Cuban Air Force, with 3,000 men, has a small but increasing role. The most important air defense equipment, the SA-2s, and MIG-21s, is still Soviet controlled. The Cubans operate a jet fighter force composed of more than 60 MIG-15 17 19s and a considerable quantity of antiaircraft artillery.

11. Cuban capabilities for military operations overseas remain severely limited by shortage of the requisite airlift or sealift. The Cubans could probably not undertake an overseas operation on a scale larger than one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature. However, Cuba has sufficient resources for paramilitary operations in the Caribbean area to upset a situation in precarious balance.

12. *Training of Cubans.* The reduction in Soviet military personnel in Cuba since February has been accompanied by increasing indications of Cubans training in the operation of Soviet equipment and systems, which suggests that the Soviets plan a turnover of part or all of these systems to the Cubans.

13. Cuban pilots are flying the MIG-21 aircraft, which are equipped with air-to-air missiles, and some will soon be able to fly them operationally. One class of 22 pilots began training in March 1963, and a second of about the same size is scheduled to begin in September; Cubans are also almost certainly being trained in ground control and maintenance. The Cuban Air Force could man the MIG-21 system by mid-1964. The Soviets are also carrying out a sizable training program for the Cubans in the operation of KOMAR boats and cruise missiles. Cubans are being trained at a number of sites in the operation and maintenance of Soviet ground equipment.

14. We believe that Cubans are also being trained on the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system and may soon begin to operate some equipment at a few sites on a routine basis. In view of the complexity of the system, it would require approximately another year of training before the Cubans could take over the bulk of the maintenance work. Even after Cubans learn to operate the system, the Soviets will probably have to provide training and technical assistance for some time.

Political Stability

15. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel. To an important extent the forward drive of the Cuban revolution depends on Castro's charismatic appeal. His personal indispensability has enabled him to surmount both a challenge from old-line Communists in Cuba and a crisis in his relations with Moscow. It has also enabled him to absorb some economic setbacks without serious risk to his regime. While no serious challenge to his power and control seems likely to emerge for some time, the regime's dependence on his person continues to be a major vulnerability.

16. Castro is still suspicious of the leaders of the prerevolutionary Communist Party (PSP) and of their relations with Moscow. However, they appear to have accommodated themselves to his leadership and some occupy important positions. In present circumstances, it is unlikely that the "old" Communists will attempt to challenge Castro, as they did in early 1962, or that Moscow will want them to. It is more likely that they will work for more power in the apparatus of the new party (PURS) which is coming into being. Castro seems alert to this possibility and the selection of members of the new party appears to reflect some effort to prevent domination by the old PSP leaders. The completion of this party organization might provide Castro with another means of control and an important instrument for political indoctrination and exhortation of the populace. But over the longer run the existence of a stable and organized party apparatus could reduce the indispensability both to the Cuban regime and to the Soviets of Castro's personal leadership.

17. Popular attitudes will be a factor affecting the stability of the regime. We have no way of measuring these reliably, but we believe that an important minority of the Cuban people now gives positive support to Castro, and that the majority passively accepts his regime. Resistance continues, but it is on a small scale and is ineffective against the regime's security forces. It cannot be either excluded or predicted that larger numbers of people will eventually be willing to take the risks of joining or surreptitiously supporting an opposition struggle. The fact that Cuba is now Communist should not lead to the conclusion that security measures there will be as effective as in other Communist States. Should resistance assume a larger magnitude, it might cause disagreement and factionalism within the regime. Ultimately this could lead in turn to a disruption of the security apparatus and the defection of armed elements. In this way, and probably only in this way, a breakdown or significant change in the regime might be brought about. At present, such developments seem unlikely.

The Economic Situation

18. The Cuban economy declined sharply during 1960-1962, and there is almost certain to be some further decline in output during

1963. Nevertheless, the Cuban economic situation is not a critical source of weakness for the Castro regime and is unlikely to become one.

19. The decline in Cuban production has been partially offset by the substantial volume of economic assistance from the Bloc, particularly the USSR. During 1962, the Bloc extended an estimated \$200 million in balance of payments assistance. In addition, the Bloc provided some developmental equipment on credit. Goods delivered on these terms probably accounted for one-third of total Cuban imports. As a result of Bloc assistance, Cuban imports rose substantially in 1962, in spite of a sizable decline in export earnings. Whatever the level of Cuban export earnings in 1963, Bloc assistance probably will permit the maintenance of essential imports—foodstuffs, fuels, industrial materials, and machine parts—at about the 1962 level. Meanwhile the political effects of economic decline have been mitigated by the radical change in the pattern of distribution of available consumer goods and services.

20. Cuba's production of sugar has declined in 1963 and its volume of exports probably will be more than one-third below that of 1962. On the other hand, the impact of reduced supplies will be largely, and perhaps more than completely, offset by the sharp rise of world sugar prices to the highest levels in many years. The 1963 sugar crop amounts to a little less than four million metric tons. This compares with a 1962 crop of 4.8 million metric tons and crops averaging well in excess of five million tons in the pre-Castro years. Cuba has already contracted to ship about 1.0 to 1.2 million tons to the Free World this year; the larger figure would be only 240,000 tons less than in 1962. We cannot predict how much foreign currency this will produce, however, because prices may vary greatly depending on the date and terms of the sales, some of which were made before the sharp rise in prices. Nevertheless Cuba's earnings in the Free World will be greater than last year's.

21. The Soviets agreed during the Castro visit that they would pay six cents a pound instead of the four cent price which they paid last year and which had been the contract price for this year's shipments. In order that Cuba could fulfill contracts it has been concluding since the end of 1962 with Free World countries, the Soviets agreed to Cuba's diverting one million tons of sugar from the USSR trade agreement quota. These seeming concessions put a better face on Soviet-Cuban relationships so far as the Cuban people are concerned. The new terms had been sought by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on a mission to Moscow in late 1962 and their announcement during Castro's visit seemed largely intended to give Castro something to take home plus providing a camouflage for Cuba's economic deterioration.

22. The Soviets have thus removed a major irritant in the Soviet-Cuban relationship caused by the great rise in world sugar prices. They

did this at a reasonable cost. In fact, the two cent differential will go to pay part of Cuba's accrued debt to the Soviets, so that the granting of a higher price represents only a juggling of barter and credit accounts and will not reduce Cuba's need for continued large Soviet balance of payments support this year.

23. In spite of Bloc economic assistance, total personal consumption in Cuba has fallen sharply since 1958–1959, perhaps by as much as one-fifth, although this decline in personal consumption under Castro is partly accounted for by the emigration and impoverishment of the former wealthy and middle classes. Rationing and other distributional controls have fostered a more even distribution of the declining totals of goods and services.

24. There are, nevertheless, many among the lower classes who are worse off than during the pre-Castro period; organized labor in particular has lost much of the wage differentials and other substantial benefits previously obtained. Workers and peasants generally probably are disappointed that the economic improvements expected under Castro have not materialized. Disappointments or increased hardships in regard to personal consumption are somewhat assuaged by the feeling of heightened social status and *dignidad* promoted by Castro's social reforms and effective taboo of propaganda. Nevertheless, considerable economic discontent in Cuba is reflected in worker apathy, absenteeism, and non-cooperation. These traits have traditionally been manifested by Cuban workers, however; and there has been little evidence so far of more dramatic forms of antiregime activity because of economic discontent.

25. Apathy and noncooperation, nevertheless, do impede Castro's efforts toward economic recovery. So far, Castro has relied on exhortation and on reward for outstanding workers as means of increasing worker effort, but with relatively little success. Should Castro turn to harsh administrative measures to get the Cubans to work harder—and initial steps toward the introduction of work norms have already been taken—there very likely would be an exacerbation of the problem of worker discontent.

Castro and Latin America

26. Those Latin Americans, Communists and non-Communists, who are committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help, particularly from his training program in Cuba (1,000–1,500 Latin Americans received Communist indoctrination or training in guerrilla warfare in 1962) and his large-scale dissemination of printed and broadcast propaganda. At this time, pro-Castro revolutionaries are persistently active and aggressive only in Venezuela, Castro's priority target for revolution in Latin America. On balance, the revolutionaries

have lost ground in recent months in their efforts to weaken the Betancourt government through terrorism and sabotage. There is strong sentiment among old-line leaders of the Communist Party of Venezuela for putting more emphasis on recruitment of peasant support and on guerrilla tactics in rural areas as the best means of promoting a successful revolution over the long term. Extremist elements, however, still are committed to a campaign of drastic action to provoke the military into ousting the Betancourt government. In several other countries there have been preparations for violent activity, and in Peru and Ecuador some incidents of violence by pro-Castro revolutionaries.

27. The sense of urgency created throughout Latin America by the missile base crisis has faded, but a considerable residue remains, especially in Central America. Soviet military intrusion into the Western Hemisphere, Soviet exploitation of the Cuban revolution for its own strategic purposes, and Castro's subordination to the USSR were all made strikingly clear to governments as well as to politically-conscious elements of the population. The strength and appeal of Castro Communist forces have been weakened, and the state of readiness to combat the extremist threat remains high among those Latin American Governments which see themselves faced by direct subversive attacks.

28. In virtually every country of Latin America Castro's prestige, which had begun to decline well before the missile crisis, remains low. His image has been most seriously damaged in the eyes of non-Communists, particularly among labor groups and leftist-intellectuals and politicians who had sympathized with his anti-US position. In the immediate post crisis period, discussion among some of the revolutionary left tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and away from alliance with Moscow-oriented Communists and *fidelistas*. Among the public at large, many who formerly had been passive were converted by the crisis to hostility toward Castro. Moreover, the crisis caused moderate center and conservative groups, by and large already anti-Castro, to be more aware than before of the fundamental aims of the USSR in this hemisphere and of the threat posed by Cuba as an operational base for the Soviets.

29. Among the small countries of Central America the crisis heightened pleasures for a definite solution to the Cuban problem. They have intensified their efforts to control and combat subversive activities. In addition, the Mexican Government is beginning to cooperate in efforts to control the movement of Latin Americans to and from Cuba through Mexico. On the other hand, in most of South America, popular antagonism toward Castro for conniving in the introduction of Soviet strategic power in the hemisphere has subsided more quickly and their governments tend now to regard the affair as ended by the US show of resolve.

30. There have been indications of disapproval of Castro's policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties which follow

a more gradual and less violent approach to revolution. Castro has in the past shown himself ready to collaborate with any group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties or to work with dissident elements within them. Some of the regular parties, particularly in Brazil and Chile, strongly resent such tactics. Developments in recent months suggest that Castro, at least for the moment, has accepted a less violent position.

II. OUTLOOK

Shorter Term Prospects

31. We believe that Castro and the Soviets are probably convinced that time can be made to work in Cuba's favor, providing the US is not presented with a pretext for direct intervention or drastic measures such as some form of quarantine. The Soviets have probably argued that the Cubans should concentrate on the solution of important domestic problems in order to consolidate the regime, demonstrate that a Communist revolution cannot be reversed by the US and prepare for future breakthroughs in Latin America. In short, the USSR and Cuba probably intend to play for time, avoid provocations likely to lead to US intervention, withhold unnecessary concessions, and repair the damage to their prestige. Each will continue to employ flexible tactics in Latin America varied according to the political situation in particular countries. We expect that both the Soviets and Castro will adopt aggressive tactics whenever presented with tempting opportunities, and their appreciation of what constitutes a tempting opportunity will probably differ as time passes.

32. If we assume no major circumstantial changes, such as Castro's death, a blowup of Castro-Soviet relations or decisive intervention by the US, we would expect the Castro regime to be more firmly established a year hence than it is today. We believe it unlikely that economic difficulties or internal political opposition will cause the collapse of the regime. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he and the Revolution are here to stay and as his [illegible in the original] gains in experience.

33. A decision to avoid major crises with the US would not mean compliance with US wishes or lack of response to provocation. There is a wide range of unpredictable contingencies. US overflights, which are galling in view of Castro's preoccupation with demonstrating Cuban sovereignty, could produce an incident. Account must be taken of the possibility of a clash with the US over the question of the continued Soviet military presence in Cuba. A revolutionary eruption in Latin America might break the present pattern of restraint in Soviet and Cuban behavior. The present Soviet and Cuban emphasis on consolida-

tion may be diverted by other new opportunities for aggressive actions. There will also remain the possibility of a breakdown of Soviet relations with Castro that could lead to internal conflict within Cuba, or an attempt on Castro's part to carry out an aggressive policy on his own.

34. There have been fragmentary indications of an interest on Castro's part in an improvement in relations with the US. We believe that he has probably considered this as one of a variety of alternatives. Its appeal to Castro, as to the Soviets, probably lies in the hope of lifting the US embargo and otherwise normalizing Cuban contacts with other Latin American countries. They may also feel that a limited rapprochement would reduce the danger of US intervention and permit greater freedom for the consolidation of the Communist regime in Cuba. At present we doubt that either the Cubans or the Soviets have much hope for an adjustment of Cuban-US relations, but it is an option that for their own purposes they will wish to keep open.

Military Prospects

35. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there.

36. With respect to the SAM system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risk involved. The Soviets are probably apprehensive that Cubans might be tempted to shoot down a US overflight if Castro had control of the SAMs. The Soviets cannot rely merely on Castro's assurances not to do so and it is likely that they would make serious efforts to resolve the question of US overflights before giving the Cubans complete operational control of the SAMs. It is possible that they will announce in advance an intended turnover to Cuba and use the interim period to seek a termination of overflights either through some agreement with the US or some dramatic action at the UN claiming that the reduction of Soviet forces has removed any pretext for US surveillance. They might also hope that the passage of time and the possibility of an eventually calmer atmosphere might cause the US to desist from overflights. It is also possible that the Soviets may come to regard the risks involved in a turnover of the system as preferable to the political cost of either withdrawing the system or trying to keep it indefinitely under their own command.

37. The turnover of other weapons systems now under Soviet control would greatly increase Castro's independent military capabilities.

The 42 MIG-21 aircraft, which are armed with air-to-air missiles, would increase the total number of jet fighters in Cuban hands to nearly two-thirds. These fighters also have a theoretical capability to intercept a US high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In practice, however, a successful interception would require a great amount of skill and luck. Although Cuban pilots, and probably ground controllers and maintenance personnel, are receiving training from the Soviets, the operational effectiveness of these aircraft will be reduced for a time by the relative inexperience of these personnel.

38. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic weapons in Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance would still be a major deterrent even if it were discontinued as a daily routine. We believe that the Soviets could have no solid assurance that they could deploy major weapons into Cuba without detection. We have no evidence that Khrushchev has reappraised the risks of US counteraction to such a venture, and we think that his experience of last October has considerably reduced the chances of a second dangerous misjudgment.

39. However, we cannot altogether rule out an attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce strategic missiles. Despite increased US alertness to the possibility of reintroduction, the chances of detection might be less than those during the original operation. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods would make it possible for them to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying upon.

40. At some point the Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled "offensive" by the US. They might calculate that under certain circumstances the introduction of submarines might be effected in a way not to confront the US with such a clear and unmistakable challenge as produced the strong reaction of last October. They might also consider it possible to introduce a limited number of light bombers as replacements for obsolete B-26s in the Cuban inventory on the grounds that they were needed for patrol against raiders. But in such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction.

Long-Run Political and Economic Prospects

41. We believe that the current situation favors the further consolidation of Castro's Communist regime in Cuba. Security forces will probably continue to be highly effective. Internal resistance forces are likely to suffer cumulative attrition. Resistance fighters lost by capture, death, or flight are unlikely to be effectively replaced. As time passes with Castro and the Communists in power, the hope that they can

be overthrown becomes dimmer. Exile raids, sabotage, dropping of equipment and supplies can improve the morale of those Cubans who are opposed to the regime, but are unlikely of themselves to produce an uprising capable of overthrowing it.

42. However, despite the odds against it, the possibility of a significant uprising should not be excluded from consideration. If something should happen to damage Castro's ability to command the loyalty of the Cuban people, for example, as a result of ill-judged measures to discipline workers, the situation could get out of control. In such circumstances a leader or a group with an appealing program might appear and succeed in rallying forces of opposition. Without leadership and without goals—and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans—no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the outside. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops.

43. If Fidel Castro were to die, members and supporters of the regime, including the armed forces and security forces, would probably rally together to maintain the revolution and to defend it against any US intervention. After a short time, however, such solidarity would be likely to weaken. We do not believe that Raul Castro, the designated successor, could hold his brother's position without a struggle for power with other personalities and groups in the regime. It is unclear who would win in such a struggle. On balance we feel that the successor would probably be one of the top leaders of the regime; he would probably be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro, because he would lack Castro's special claim to indispensability—his power to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of the Cuban people. It is also possible that the struggle for power would lead to a chaotic civil war in which the whole present political pattern in Cuba would be changed.

44. We believe that economic recovery in Cuba will be slow; it will take at least several years before the 1958 level of production is regained. There has been little noticeable improvement so far in the key areas of economic organization, managerial efficiency and worker incentives—notable weaknesses in Bloc countries generally. Also, the Soviet Union probably considers assistance to Cuba in the form of balance of payments credits as an emergency measure, and it is likely that any recovery in Cuban production will be partly counterbalanced by reductions in such credits.

45. On the other hand, the Soviet Union probably is prepared to provide developmental assistance to Cuba for a prolonged period. The

Soviets apparently have backed away from some of the more ambitious industrial projects talked of previously, such as a large steel plant and a petroleum refinery; but a number of more modest industrial projects are moving ahead, as are projects for expanding agricultural production and for mineral exploration. Considering Cuba's favorable balance between resources and population, and assuming some improvements in efficiency, and continued Bloc aid, Cuba could in time regain its position as one of the leading Latin American countries in per capita gross national product.

Latin American Policies

46. Many areas in Latin America are vulnerable to revolutionary upheavals because popular aspirations for social programs are not being met. Castro still hopes to convince dissatisfied Latin Americans that the Cuban revolution is a model for them to follow. The joint Khrushchev-Castro communiqué held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro's earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime's exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. In part, this is because of Castro's disillusionment with the lack of revolutionary fervor among Latin American Communists, with the notable exception of Venezuela. More important, he probably feels that he has no choice but to bide his time and build up subversive assets for the future. Such a position has probably been strongly urged by Moscow and leading Latin American Communists (e.g., Prestes in Brazilian) who fear Castro will upset their own strategies. The tenor of the joint communiqué of 23 May would suggest that Castro has accepted, at least for the present, a more cautious and flexible line with respect to revolution in Latin America.

47. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans seeking to avoid a crisis with the US will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures, with Brazil as the principal target. Subversive training and support will of course, continue in Cuba. Castro probably still has high hopes for the ultimate success of armed revolution in Venezuela, especially after the end of Betancourt's term in 1964. However, the Soviets still have predominant influence among Latin American Communists and do not contemplate turning over their controls to Castro. Nevertheless, they have given Castro a certain weight by describing him as the forerunner of Communist advance in Latin America, and therefore his views may tend to be more influential with other Latin American Communists.

48. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. He would probably prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to local insurgents. The danger will remain, however, that a few aircraft or guns supplied by Cuba might determine the outcome in a contest between insurgents and an established government.

Soviet-Cuban Relations

49. While we believe that the Soviets and Cubans have come to grips with some of their problems and have probably resolved the more immediate ones, the Cuban situation is clouded by many uncertainties and Soviet-Cuban relations are far from permanently stabilized. Among these uncertainties is the question of US policy. The impact of the Cuban revolution in Latin America has lost much of its force, if only temporarily, because Castro has appeared as a pawn in the struggle between the Great Powers. The Soviets are apparently convinced that this setback can be overcome provided the crisis with the US can be controlled. They probably believe that they possess still some degree of deterrence against direct action by the US to overthrow Castro and that in any case the political inhibition against such a course remains strong. They probably calculate that avoidance of provocation will deprive the US of a pretext for direct action. In addition, they recognize that the US effort to isolate and harass Castro will continue to contain certain dangers, but they probably hope to limit these by careful handling of any incidents, arguing that his interest as well as theirs will be best served by gradual consolidation of his regime.

50. Castro, while in the USSR, showed a willingness to accept the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence and to recognize the Soviet Union's leadership of the Communist movement. On the other hand, some of the more sensitive points of dispute between the Chinese and the Soviets (e.g., Yugoslavia and the charges of dogmatism versus revisionism) were not mentioned in the communiqué of 23 May. Nevertheless, Castro did take a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received from the Soviets a strong boost to his own ego; assurances of continued economic support, the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution as well as the generalized pledge to give Cuba "the necessary aid" in the event of a US attack; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed.

51. We do foresee, however, varying degrees of friction in Soviet-Cuban relations, particularly over the long run. Castro wants all the

benefits of Soviet economic and military aid but insists upon a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Despite the harmonious tone of the joint communiqué, the partners probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America. As time passes and new conditions develop, they will probably again find themselves in disagreement over the proper course of action to follow. The future level of Soviet economic aid to Cuba is also likely to become a bone of contention between the two countries. For the present, however, we believe that both the Soviets and the Cubans hope to stabilize the situation and gird for a long-term effort in Latin America.

Annex

ESTIMATE OF MAJOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

Tanks	
T-54 tanks and self-propelled guns at the four Soviet Camps and Torrens ^a	200
Tanks and self-propelled guns in Cuban hands	400-500
Field Artillery and AT Guns	1,300
AAA Guns	700
FROG Rockets ^a	30
Military Vehicles	20,000
SAM Sites ^a	24
SAM 'SA-3 Guideline' Missiles	500
Cruise-Missile Sites ^a	4
Cruise-Missiles ^a	150
Air Defense Radars ^a	200
Jet Fighters	
MIG-15/17 'FAGOT FRESCO'	55
MIG-19 'FARMER'	11
MIG-21 'FISHBED'	42
Helicopters	100
KOMAR Cruise-Missile Boats	12
Kronstadt Subchasers	6
Motor Torpedo Boats P-6	16

^a Equipment now under Soviet control.

**688. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara,
June 15¹**

JCSM-458-63

June 15, 1963

SUBJECT

US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft State-Defense plan transmitted by a memorandum by the Director for Arms Control, OASD (ISA), dated 5 June 1963, subject as above.

2. The military course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet the contingency of a spontaneous (non-US initiated) revolt, which shows promise of succeeding, is to provide the insurgent group or groups sufficient assistance to assure their survival until US invasion forces can be mobilized and committed. Considering the increasingly efficient internal security apparatus of the Castro regime, as well as meager US intelligence and unconventional warfare (UW) assets in Cuba, successful revolt without invasion, even with other US support, is unlikely at this time. Moreover, under existing conditions, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in JCSM-358-63, US forces should be committed incrementally in a structured “rescue” only if some or all of the following conditions are met:

a. The uprising gives promise of success if US aid can be provided rapidly, and has a large measure of support among armed forces and the people.

b. Identifiable and dependable leadership of the uprising appears, and is acceptable, to the United States.

c. This leadership requests US military assistance and undertakes to cooperate fully with the US Government.

d. Sufficient areas of Cuba are under control of the revolutionaries to justify the piecemeal implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63.

e. An assessment is made at the time that US military participation constitutes a valid risk.

To commit US forces under other circumstances could (1) invite defeat in detail, (2) heighten the risk of major US-USSR confrontation, because of Soviet initial preponderance of power, and (3) require US combat forces to fight on terms of maximum advantage to the enemy. Optimally, support to resistance elements prior to the invasion would be confined to logistic, UW, and fire support which would detract from the combat power of the invasion forces to the smallest extent possible

¹ U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 38/1-35752/63 15 June 63.

and not alter materially the location or timing of operations planned in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

3. The draft State-Defense plan is unduly restrictive in its concept for use of airpower. It provides, during either the covert or overt phase, for US destruction of the offending nexus of SAM sites or air bases if the SAM batteries or interceptor aircraft brought down a US plane. However, it fails to include during the overt phase of operations the need for the possible suppression and/or elimination of those air defenses which might endanger the air movement of US troops into the area.

4. The draft State-Defense plan is at variance in several significant respects with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who consider that:

a. Although a palace revolt may be the most likely type of revolt, it is unlikely to occur at this time.

b. Portions, or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 31a and 31b, as necessary, should be implemented to support any revolt the United States chooses to exploit.

c. The possible neutralization or elimination of Soviet forces in Cuba, with either lethal or nonlethal munitions, should be included explicitly in US plans for implementation as circumstances warrant at the time.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree that the Soviets should be informed of a US decision to initiate covert operations in Cuba in support of revolt. They recognize that the Soviets should be made aware of the US determination to assist resistance movements in general, but, inasmuch as the very object of initiating covert support is to determine whether the United States should back a given revolt, and to what extent, US intentions should not be revealed before the decision has been made to undertake overt operations.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also do not believe that a Special Representative of the President should move immediately into Cuba to establish direct liaison between the US Government and the "provisional government." Recognition of the insurgents, including their belligerent status under the 1928 Habana Convention, should provide sufficient legal justification for US military support of the insurgents. [*text not declassified*] In any event, final US political commitment to the insurgents should be withheld until their ability to govern is demonstrated, and their political complexion evident. [*text not declassified*] CINCLANT should be the Presidential representative for Cuba. Plans for capitalizing on a revolutionary government, and for providing for the transfer of control from CINCLANT to the Department of State, are among those plans suggested in subparagraph 3 b of JCSM-358-63.

7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that many aspects of the draft State-Defense plan in its present form are not militarily

feasible or desirable and, if implemented, would entail excessive risks. It is recommended that the plan be revised to reflect the comments in the foregoing paragraphs, those forwarded in JCSM–358–63, and the data forwarded by JCSM–360–63, dated 10 May 1963, to the Secretary of the Army for use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the DOD for Policy toward Cuba. A copy of JCSM–360–63, together with its attachment, is forwarded herewith.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

689. Memorandum from McKesson to Bromley Smith, June 25¹

June 25, 1963

Per our conversation

Attachment

Diplomatic note from the Czech Ambassador to Rusk

June 24, 1963

The Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State of the United States of America and, at the behest of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba, has the honor to deliver the following note of protest:

"1. In the early morning of June 10, a group of mercenaries who had been sheltered in the United States, manning a pirate launch armed with machine guns and a 30 mm. gun and proceeding from United States territory, landed at Cayo Blanco, 15 kilometers from Cárdenas Bay, Province of Matanzas, and later staged a surprise attack on a patrol of four seamen who were exploring the place, killing Jesús Fernández Ramírez and capturing Daniel Expósito Torres and Calime-río Ramírez Jérez, and leaving abandoned at the site numerous weap-

¹ No classification marking. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63–8/63.

ons of American manufacture, explosives, food, and various supplies from the same source.

"In their flight toward United States territory, the pirates took possession of the Cuban fishing boat *Elvira*, forcing the boat's crew by threats to take them to Cayo Marathón, where they disembarked, taking the captured persons with them. This act is not consistent with the announcement of the United States Government that it would prevent such attacks against Cuba from United States territory.

"The Revolutionary Government of Cuba hereby registers its protest and at the same time demands appropriate punishment and the return of the kidnapped citizens and of the Cuban fishing boat *Elvira*.

"2. The statements made by Richard I. Phillips, [illegible in the original] officer of the Department of State of the United States, and sent out by the news agencies on June 19, are from all standpoints a clear incitement to sedition and subversion and represent a reiteration of the interventionist policy of the United States with respect to the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba. The Government of Cuba protests against such manifestations, which signify only the continuation of a policy that has cost the United States countless reverses and risks.

"3. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba likewise protests the recent low-altitude flight over Cuban territory made by a military aircraft of the United States for purposes of spying, which the American press itself has made known, and it warns that Cuban gunners have orders to fire at any foreign military aircraft that makes low-altitude flights over our territory.

"4. On June 17, customs agents at Miami, Florida, announced the confiscation, at an abandoned airport in the Everglades area, of a twin-engined aircraft, Beechcraft Bonanza type, at the very time it was preparing to take off for Cuba for the purpose of bombing the oil refinery located in Habana Bay, a load of napalm bombs, explosives, grenades, small arms, and 300 sticks of TNT dynamite having been found in the cabin. The aircraft's six crewmen, five counterrevolutionary Cubans and one American, identified as [illegible in the original] Alpicer, Carlos Hernández Sánchez, René Espinosa Hernández, Víctor Espinosa Hernández, Miguel Álvarez, and Sam Benton, were immediately released, notwithstanding the fact that they were guilty of a flagrant violation of both international and United States law.

"This act, as well as the attack [illegible in the original] late last April on [illegible in the original] Cuban refinery by a plane that took off from United States territory carrying powerful explosive charges, compels us to step up our defense preparations in order to be ready to intercept and shoot down any [illegible in the original] plane that violates our air space at any altitude.

"5. On June 21 the petty chiefs of the counterrevolution openly proclaimed, from United States territory, the accomplishment of infiltration activities and the introduction of arms into the country to carry on aggressive acts against the Cuban people. These arms and agents can only have come from the United States or from other countries than Cuba.

This is in violation of international rules. It creates a [illegible in the original] in the Hemisphere, that [illegible in the original] the law of other countries can [illegible in the original] nothing [illegible in the original] between the United States and Cuba or [illegible in the original] or the [illegible in the original] by the aggressions [illegible in the original] our country.

"It is regrettable that the [illegible in the original] have recourse [illegible in the original] to these rules [illegible in the original] that are in all ways [illegible in the original] story to world public [illegible in the original] with [illegible in the original] concern the [illegible in the original] Cuba that can [illegible in the original]"

Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

690. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kaysen and Ball, June 24¹

June 24, 1963

GB: We've just got a note from the Cubans.

CK: Yes, I have seen the content in another form.

GB: So did I; I think we were expecting it. Now two things—there are references in there to low levels and then to high levels, indicating that they're getting ready to deal with the high levels and as far as the low levels are concerned that they will shoot them down. I think, as I understand it, the low levels are called off until the President gets back.

CK: Let me check on that.

GB: No, I'm going to be talking with Bob, because on the high levels they are putting in planes with different engines.

¹ U-2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba in response to Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

CK: Yes, Alex told me that we were getting an extra 4,000 feet. Let me talk to Bob, too, because I think we should err on the side of caution—it is better to miss a day's information than to have the argument. Do you know what I mean?

GB: Well, we don't want to have the argument while everybody's away.

CK: I mean we don't want one shot down.

GB: That's the point.

CK: Yes, so let me talk to Bob.

GB: I've got to talk to him anyway. What I was going to say was that as far as I was concerned I thought the line we ought to take was that—I don't think—there's no threat in there that they're going to shoot any of the high levels down right away.

CK: No, but let me put it this way. The question I think you have to push at Bob is are you really confident, are you satisfied that that extra altitude does it?

GB: And we have to get something off tonight, I think, to Bonn to bring them up-to-date on the thing.

CK: Absolutely. Alex is drafting something, is he?

GB: No, I told Ed Martin to do it.

CK: I think we ought to put something on our wire which brings the two parts of it together. Will Ed Martin's do that?

GB: That's what it's designed to do—to bring the two parts of it together.

CK: Ed will deal with the operational side too?

GB: Yes. And I thought that after he gets it up, I'll look at it and get it back to you.

CK: OK, fine.

GB: In the meantime, I'm going to give Bob a ring and if you want to talk to him afterwards.

CK: I don't need to do it. I think the big point is the confidence point. Persecute him a little.

GB: OK.

691. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, June 24¹

June 24, 1963

GB: You probably know there was a note delivered by the Cubans this afternoon?

RM: Yes.

GB: which has two rather interesting passages. One of them protests the low level flight (in the singular) over Cuban territory for the purpose espionage by a US military plane which US press has taken upon itself to reveal.

RM: I'm not sure where the revelation comes.

AJ: Let me say on this, Bob, I've been having our people check around, and they are absolutely unable to find anything on it.

RM: When I read that I didn't know whether the Cubans were trying to say in effect we have confessed we had done it or whether they just had that information and no other.

GB: In any event, what they say is they've warned that the Cuban gunners have orders to fire against

RM: Yes. I noticed it said "fire against low level".

GB: Which makes low level flight. Then later in the telegram it says "this event as well as the attack carried out at the end of last April against the same Cuban refinery by a plane which took from US territory, etc. *at any altitude.*"

RM: This is in the Beechcraft context.

GB: Yes, but it mentions at any altitude but it talks about hastening our defensive preparations. It suggests not being able to do it now but they're hopeful of being able to do it later. I wanted to get something off to Bonn tonight just to bring them up-to-date on this and what I propose to say was that as they knew there were not going to be any low-levels until after the President got back and we could take another look at the thing. As far as high levels were concerned it was my understanding that the ones that would be conducted from tomorrow on would be with the engines which would three or four thousand feet.

RM: Well, I wouldn't emphasize that, George. I don't think it would make a lot of difference.

¹ U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba in response to Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

AJ: You don't think they . . .

RM: No, I wouldn't emphasize it.

AJ: Well, should we mention it?

RM: I certainly wouldn't say it's 3 or 4,000 feet; there is some argument about that, for one thing; some say 1500. In any case . . . personally, I wouldn't even mention it.

GB: I see.

RM: I wouldn't even mention it, simply because I don't think it affords any great degree of safety that wasn't there before.

AJ: I see.

RM: Particularly I feel that when I think that the major attack would come from the SAMs, rather than the aircraft.

GB: Well, this does raise one question, Bob, which I think we ought to give a little thought to. That is, whether we ought to stand on flights altogether until the President gets back. There is some risk in this. On the other hand, the consequences of a plane being shot down while he is overseas are very considerable.

RM: Yes, they are. I've thought some of this, but I really don't think. . .

GB: You don't the risks are sufficient?

RM: No. McCone was pushing the other way over the weekend—give up these aborts. We've had three now since the 19th.

GB: Well I think at least we should say to the President that there have been three aborts.

RM: I think that's reasonable, yes.

GB: And that we're going ahead with high levels following . . .

RM: following abort rules that minimize the possibility of attack.

GB: Right.

RM: Yes, I think that's fine.

GB: And not mention the engines, then?

RM: No. I'm not trying to hide the engines. The only reason I wouldn't mention it is I just don't want to give him any extra feeling of safety, because I really don't think it's there.

GB: OK. I just wanted to make sure that you and I were on the same line.

RM: Sure. I really don't know what's going there. I'm inclined to think that they're just practicing. I think they're quite a way from any capability of actually shooting it down. This is a very difficult maneuver. I think they're just practicing.

AJ: And we'll have a slightly added margin, hopefully.

RM: Yes, that's right. There will be some added margin.

GB: Fine. Then I'm sending a message to the President tonight. I'll tell him that you and I talked about it.

RM: Very good.

692. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kaysen and Ball, June 24¹

June 24, 1963

CK: Did you talk to Bob yet?

GB: Yes I have just talked to him. He said don't mention those engines to Bonn; that they don't provide sufficient margin of safety to be worth mentioning. There is a big argument as to what the additional altitude may be—it may be only 1500 feet. He thinks they're rather irrelevant.

CK: So what's his own judgment?

GB: His judgment is that there really isn't a lot of danger from this activity of these jets yet; he thinks they're just practicing.

CK: Yes, but you know the issue here—there's a CIA piece of paper which I don't know whether you've seen yet.

GB: I've got it in front of me.

CK: Then the real question is whether we should engage in some testing by changing our abort rules.

GB: Well, what Bob and I agreed was to say to the President tonight that we intend to continue high levels but under abort rules which would minimize the risk.

CK: Yes, so that if we change our abort rules it's going to be in the opposite direction.

GB: It's going to be that we're going to abort more rather than less.

CK: Right. And Bob, in other words, feels there's no purchase in any technology and the purchases in their behavior.

GB: He says it isn't worth mentioning.

CK: I'm glad, because SAC will say anything. How are you going to do it?

GB: Alex and I are going to redraft. Do you want to see it?

¹ U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

CK: How are you going to send it?

GB: I think you probably ought to send it over your facilities.

CK: That's what I thought. Send it in here and we'll repeat it off. I'll be here until about 8:30.

693. Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCone and Ball, June 25¹

June 25, 1963

McCONE—I was wondering whether you want to give some consideration to that note.

BALL—The Cuban note?

McCONE—Yes.

BALL—We talked about it yesterday and I think it isn't—we didn't regard it as that insulting. Actually it was delivered yesterday as I understand it.

McCONE—I thought it was to be delivered today.

BALL—No, it was delivered yesterday afternoon. It is always a question as to whether you serve your purposes better by tossing it back or not. They have taken the position that they are not going to give publicity to it. If we were to reject it it might incite them into trying to make something more out of it. I just thought that the easiest thing to do was to take it. I don't think it transgresses the limit to that extent.

¹ Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

694. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ed Martin and Ball, June 25¹

June 25, 1963

BALL—What are we going to do about an answer to the Cuban note?

MARTIN—Well, nothing very early. We don't usually do much about answering them. Bob is here going over a telegram to the Secretary on the interpretations of it. We certainly wouldn't do it rapidly, but I suppose at some point we might say something back to them. There is no hurry about it. Maybe when they get back. There is no pattern of rapid exchanges on this. One thing for action that they raised was the two guys return and we have already altered that.

¹ Response to the Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

July 1963

695. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
July 2¹

July 2, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba—Recent Events

Here is a summary of recent Cuban developments which will bring you up to date.

1. *Cuban Protest Note—Overflights*

On June 24, the Czech Ambassador delivered a note to the Cuban Coordinator, which protests various exile activities and which threatens action against low-level and high-level reconnaissance flights. Attached as *Tab 1* are the pertinent documents—(a) the note, (b) a CIA analysis of the note and of the significance of three U-2 abortions, (c) two cables which were sent to the President and (d) the most recent analysis of the three U-2 abortions which concludes (see last two pages) that the MIG 21's were coincidentally, rather than intentionally, near the U-2's.

State is now drafting a reply to the Cuban note. Among other things, the draft will probably reaffirm our intention to surveil Cuba in the absence of on-site inspection.

2. *Return of Two Cuban Militiamen*

On July 1, we returned the two Cuban militiamen whom exile raiders had captured on June 10. I understand that the President wanted them returned promptly. (Pertinent cables are attached as *Tab 2*.)

3. *American Students in Cuba*

Despite our warnings, on June 20, about sixty American students went to Cuba via Prague. It is expected that the group will remain in Cuba for a month. Attached as *Tab 3* are some pertinent cables as well as a couple clippings from the *New York Times*.

Abba Schwartz tells me that this group unsuccessfully tried to go to Cuba from Canada in December, [illegible in the original]. Abba suspects that some of the leaders of the group may be Communist-oriented and the FBI is doing a check. When the group returns, their passports will be picked up. The prosecution question is one for the

¹ Recent events in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.

A.G. to decide. I have asked Justice to keep us informed of their thinking on this one.

4. *Blocking Action against Cuba*

State and Treasury are pretty well cranked up to institute the blocking controls against Cuba. Present planning calls for the announcement of the controls during the week of July 8.

5. *Ejection of Cuba from IMF*

A State/Treasury memorandum to the President probably will be coming over next week which recommends that the President authorize action to eject Cuba from the IMF. State and Treasury are still undecided as to whether it is feasible to have Cuba ejected by the end of this year or whether we will have to initiate action this year and shoot for final ejection action at the annual IMF meeting in Tokyo in the fall of 1964.

6. *Cuban Subversion*

John Crimmins has started to crank up the Subversion Subcommittee; it has been dormant for the past few weeks as John has settled into his new duties. By mid-July, John hopes to finish a number of cables, prepared in coordination with the country desks, which will request our Embassies in Latin America to urge upon host governments a series of anti-subversion actions.

My initial negative attitude about State chairmanship of the Subversion Subcommittee is somewhat dissipated now. John Crimmins strikes me as more of a zealot about subversion than most people in State. There is reason for hope that he will provide the initiative and digging which the field needs.

7. *Future of Cuba*

Bob Hurwitch tells me that a Presidential statement is being drafted regarding the future of Cuba. The plan is to present the statement to the Standing Group at its meeting during the week of July 8. If the Standing Group and the President approve, the statement will be taped and held for delivery on July 26.

8. *Free World Shipping to Cuba*

While we aren't getting any public heat on this one yet, State and Maritime Administration are working on ways to further restrict Free World shipping to Cuba without exacerbating our relations with Yugoslavia. There are several possibilities—e.g. partial extension of NSAM 220, denial of U.S. port services to appropriate vessels, and publication in shipping lists of the names of the owners of vessels engaged in the Cuban trade. (Maritime says owners are skittish about this sort of publicity.)

9. *Miscellaneous Papers*

Attached as *Tab 4* is a letter from Ambassador Barbour (Israel) describing another Castro effort towards rapprochement.

Attached as *Tab 5* is an interesting Rostow memorandum noting that there is a gap between a U.S. air strike on Cuba and an invasion of Cuba and recommending that we do some political contingency planning to cover the gap. After the air strike, proper political moves might eliminate Castro and obviate the necessity of actually conducting the invasion.

Gordon Chase

696. Memorandum of conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, July 3¹

July 3, 1963

Bundy said the President was in favor of the travel restrictions problem, in principle. Ball told Bundy that he had talked to the Secretary about it and that he was coming over at 4. Bundy suggested they meet a few minutes after the 4 o'clock meeting on this. Bundy asked how the Secretary felt about it and Ball replied he raised a few questions and said he wanted to go into it further. Ball does not think he is categorically for it or against it.

Bundy continued that Schwartz told him they were all ready to go. Franckel left word with Bundy's secretary that he was getting so many sniffs of this that he was going to have to write it and he didn't want to have to write it wrong. Bundy felt that if he was about to write and it's edging busting out of the Government, then the thing to do is in fact to go ahead. Actually, Independence Day is a pretty good day to do. One question in the President's mind is likely to be we are absolutely clear that this is something we don't do for Cuba. Ball replied this also was one of the questions the Secretary and he had in mind. Ball said he could see a certain amount of merit in not singling Cuba out. Bundy said his Cuban experts say the problem you then get into is the Latin Americans and anti-subversion efforts and how are you going to prevent them from letting all their students go if the Yankees can go. Ball replied you get into this at some extent even with Red China. This would be taken as an encouragement in many quarters if the US says it's fine.

¹ Travel restrictions to Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

Bundy said the President could just boldly say “I’m against walls of all kinds, and now that I’ve seen one in Berlin I feel more strongly.” Ball said he would get a lot of cheers in a lot of quarters and brickbats in others of course. Ball said he would sound the Secretary out a little more on it. Bundy replied he thought if we were going to have the initiative he thought he had to act, and Ball agreed.

697. Memorandum from Bromley Smith to the NSC Standing Group, July 9¹

July 9, 1963

Attached is a “Contingent Plan for Increasing World Production of Sugar” which was prepared by the Department of Agriculture in consultation with the Department of State, for consideration by the Standing Group. Discussion of the plan is scheduled for the July 16th Standing Group meeting.

Bromley Smith

Attachment

**A CONTINGENT PLAN FOR
INCREASING WORLD PRODUCTION OF SUGAR**

This paper has been prepared in response to a directive from the Standing Group that a plan be developed that would be effective in reducing the world price of sugar.

Whether this plan—or any other plan for the purpose—should be adopted was reserved for later consideration. Accordingly, the scheme outlined herein is presented only as a contingent plan and does not at this point represent a formal recommendation by either Agriculture, State, or AID.

¹ Transmits paper prepared by the Department of Agriculture entitled “Contingent Plan for Increasing World Production of Sugar.” Confidential. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.

A. *The Sugar Price Outlook*

Spurred by the favorable price outlook, world sugar production is rebounding strongly from the decline of the past two years. Even in the absence of any new U.S. programs to provide additional incentive, world production should overtake consumption in the 1963–64 crop year that is now beginning and exceed consumption by 2 million short tons² in 1964–65.

The production-consumption outlook through 1966–67 is shown on the attached chart and table. Assuming that sugar from Cuba and the Soviet satellites continues to enter the free world market in about the current volume, the world market price should drift steadily downward—reaching 5 cents in 1964–65 and 4 cents by 1966–67.

The projected production increase of 4.6 million tons in 1963–64 reflects the emphasis now being placed on obtaining the maximum sugar yield from existing beet and cane acreages. Present and prospective prices appear to be providing considerable incentive for increasing the use of fertilizer and adopting other improved cultural practices, extending the grinding seasons to include lower-yield cane, and expanding and modernizing mill capacity. The projection for West Europe assumes that the weather there will be at least average for the balance of the season.

The projected increases for the United States reflect the removal of acreage controls on domestic sugar beet production through 1965 and cane production through 1964.

Prior to 1962–63, world consumption was increasing 2 million tons per year. The increase was cut in half in 1962–63 because of higher prices. While the price increases thus far have had only limited effect on consumption in the Bloc and in large industrialized countries such as the United States and Western Europe, low income countries, including exporting countries wishing to capitalize on current high prices, are tending to cut down on domestic consumption. But consumption should reach its former rate of increase by 1964–65, as prices decline.

The excess of world production over consumption for the next five years will be entirely in the Bloc. Even by 1966–67 Free World production will be slightly below consumption. The big question is how much of the Bloc sugar will be shipped to the Free World. In the calendar year 1962, such exports totaled about 3.5 million tons. Traditionally, most of the sugar exports from Poland and Czechoslovakia—which together produce over 2.5 million tons—have gone to the Free World.

² All tonnage figures in this paper represent *short* tons.

The exact amount of Bloc sugar which will be transferred to the Free World during the years ahead depends largely upon political decisions. Certainly for the next year or so, the Bloc will be in a good bargaining position as Free World supplies will continue very tight and efforts will be made to build-up reserves. After this period, as Free World supplies again build up, the Bloc will be in a less favorable position.

Such information as we have on Bloc shipments in 1961–62 and 1962–63 indicates that about 18 percent of Bloc production is moving into Free World markets. Should this proportion prevail over the five-year period, a total of 16.2 million tons would be transferred from the Bloc to the Free World. The net effect of such a movement would be to reduce Bloc stocks by 800,000 tons, but most of this drawdown would be in the Soviet Union where stocks are now abnormally high. The figures include an allowance for a small carryover in Cuba by the end of the period. The Cuban carryover at the end of 1961–62 was negligible.

Free World stocks would increase by 6.8 million tons, which would not place them above normal levels. The increase in Free World supplies—production plus imports from the Bloc—in 1963–64 and 1964–65 will not quite offset the drop in the previous two seasons.

B. The Objective: 1.5 Million Tons More

The World market price can be brought down more rapidly only if Free World supplies can be expanded at a rate more rapid than is projected. An increase of about 1.5 million tons in Free World supplies would be required in 1964–65 to lower the price in that season from 5 to 4 cents per pound.

A part of this amount could be obtained from U.S. sources if domestic marketing quotas were increased. The remainder would have to be obtained from friendly foreign countries.

It should be emphasized that the 1.5 million ton figure is far from precise. It is a residual figure derived from estimates of production and consumption and assumptions about Bloc export policy—all of which involve great uncertainties. The USDA is therefore undertaking, in cooperation with other agencies, to revise these projections bi-monthly, or oftener if significant new data appears, to provide a current basis for policy-making. The first revision will be prepared for distribution September 1.

As of this date, however, the 1.5 million ton estimate is the best attainable figure and should be accepted as the objective of the contingent plan.

C. The Contingent Plan

A plan to increase world supplies should consist of two parts:

1. *An increase in the domestic marketing quotas.*

The quotas would be raised to cover a substantial increase in domestic production. Of this amount, perhaps 200,000 tons could be obtained by 1964–65, primarily from Florida cane. Most of the increased output from the beet area would be available at the beginning of the following crop year—that is, October 1965. Domestic political considerations would require that any increase in cane and beet acreage be kept in balance. A total increase for both in the range of 500,000–600,000 tons might be appropriate.

The increased domestic quota would have to come initially from the global quota of 1.5 million tons which is set aside for eventual restoration to Cuba, but in order that the global quota may be reserved for its original purpose it is proposed to borrow from it, with the repayment to come out of future increases in total U.S. consumption.

U.S. consumption rises at the rate of about 170,000 tons a year. Of this increase, 65%—or about 110,000—is allocated to domestic producers and the remainder to foreign countries having quotas. It is proposed that equal proportions of the foreign and domestic shares be applied to repaying the amounts borrowed from the global quota.

If the entire increment could be used, the repayment rate would of course be 170,000 tons a year.

But domestic producers have regarded their share of the increment as barely enough to cover productivity increases and hence would argue against applying their entire share to repaying the global quota borrowing. But it would appear not inequitable to use a major share of the increment for that purpose, and at least half would have to be insisted upon.

2. *Inducement to foreign producing countries to expand production.*

As noted at the outset, considerable expansion of production is taking place, mainly through relatively inexpensive, short-run measures to boost output from existing acreage and mill capacity.

The potential probably exists for achieving the entire foreign share of the 1.5 million tons through such short-run measures, without attempting to induce the heavier and far more risky investment required for new acreage and new refineries. The amount sought, in relation to Free World production by the net exporting countries, is about 8 percent. If just some of the less efficient producers could be brought up toward the average, that alone would produce the necessary results.

It seems clear, however, that the objective cannot be achieved unless the U.S. offers the foreign producers some kind of market and price

guarantee, accompanied by credit and technical assistance as necessary. The latter alone would not do the job.

Moreover, there are important U.S. policy considerations that would militate against our encouraging friendly countries to go heavily into expanded sugar production without market and price protection. The new investment would not pay off, even in the short run, if the price reached or fell below 4 cents, and the U.S. would have to share the responsibility.

The simplest effective way to assure market and price protection for the new investment would be to utilize the country-quota, premium-price system that is in the Sugar Act for that purpose.

It is proposed, therefore, to use additional temporary quota assignments as inducements to producing countries to commit themselves to achieve by 1964–65 a volume of exports higher than that which is now in prospect.

The additional quota allocations would have to come from the global quota. But since the new investment to be encouraged is of the short-run, yield-increasing type, the price guarantees could be short-run also. Hence, the additional quotas, as in the case of the increased quotas for domestic producers, could be *borrowed* rather than assigned permanently.

Since the global quota, by coincidence, is equal to the 1.5-million-ton objective, it could be assigned on a ton-for-ton basis to achieve the desired result. The basic problem is that what is sought is an increase *above that already in prospect*, and the latter figure cannot be established on a country-by-country basis. The best approach to a solution appears to compute the percentage increase in prospective exports for the exporting countries of the Free World, as a group, and to give additional temporary quotas to countries committing themselves to an increase beyond that percentage.

Using a two-year period, 1961–63, as the base, the percentage increase projected for the two years 1964–65 is about 10 percent (although the figure would have to be computed more precisely if the plan is considered further). If a given country agreed to boost its exports from an annual average of 100,000 tons in the base period to 120,000 tons in the two coming years, it would receive 10,000 tons additional allocation as a temporary addition to its country quota. If it projected an increase to 130,000 tons, its addition would be 20,000.

As soon as possible after enactment of the Act, countries would be invited to submit their proposed commitments. If the total additional quota applied for exceeded the total available, it is suggested that all countries receive the same proportionate share—that is, an additional quota equal to the difference between 110% and, say, 125% of their

exports during the base period. This should be modified, however, by an additional allowance for small exporting countries, which should also be worked out on an automatic formula basis.

The additional temporary quotas should be available for the two years 1964 and 1965. However, it should be made clear in the statute that performance under this proposal would be taken into account in future legislation relating to country quotas, leaving the implication that they would be available until such time as Cuba returns to the family of free nations.

It is suggested that the additional quotas be available only to Western Hemisphere countries and such other countries as have supplied sugar to the United States during the year ending June 30, 1963.

In order to give the additional quotas meaning, the import fee in the Sugar Act would be extended through 1966 at no more than the level to which it will rise by the time the foreign quotas in the present Act expire next year—that is, 30 percent of the difference between the U.S. price and the world price.

D. Considerations Against Adopting the Entire Plan

The following considerations weigh against the second element of proposed plan:

1. Economic Warfare.

It would be difficult to disguise the fact that the proposal is economic warfare waged by the U.S. against a small country run by a revolutionary government which we do not like. The Latin American and African countries are very sensitive to actions of this kind, and many of them would condemn the U.S. for this action, even though their own sugar industries were perfectly happy with the scheme.

2. Utilization of the Global Quota.

Under the proposal, the global quota now reserved for Cuba would be largely borrowed, but the beneficiary countries would come to regard it as theirs by right.

3. Damage to our Relations with Friendly Countries.

The U.S. Government through various international forums in the commodity field is presently endeavoring to assure the less developed countries a stable and increasing income from the sale of primary products. For the U.S. to sponsor a program deliberately designed to reduce the world price of sugar to 4 cents per pound, a level below the cost of production of a number of friendly countries, would appear to fly in the face of this policy and be damaging to our relations with the less developed countries.

Moreover, production capacity created by this or any other effective plan would remain in being after the temporary objectives were

achieved. Consequently, if U.S. policy forces the world price to 4 cents in two years there is no assurance the decline would stop there. In all likelihood, it would not.

It can be argued that continuation of premium prices for that part of each country's output sold to the U.S. under quota more than compensates the country for the low prices it would receive for that portion sold on the world market. But the benefits would not be spread evenly, and the Castroites in every country could blame each price decline and production cutback on the U.S.

Even a short-run program could be counter-productive to the economic development objectives in aid-receiving countries. Increased production stimulated by U.S. legislation would likely be interpreted as a change in current U.S. policy which is to encourage agricultural diversification in these countries. A tendency to concentrate resources to stimulate sugar production without permanent price level assurance for the entire output could boomerang and create a situation increasing the demand and need for AID dollar support.

4. Administrative Difficulties.

These include such problems as inadequate or unreliable statistics, the incentive on producing countries to curtail consumption inordinately, and the difficulty of devising and applying penalties for failure to perform according to the commitments for which the quotas were granted.


5. Limited Value to be Gained.

Our efforts would only accelerate the price trend already underway—advancing by perhaps 2 years the date when sugar reaches 4 cents. The difference to Cuba between 5-cent and 4-cent prices on a million tons exported to the Free World is \$22.4 million. If the price were driven down to 3 cents, the loss would be \$45 million. Presumably, Khrushchev would find a way to make up this difference. Do the limited cost and inconvenience to the Bloc justify the risks and difficulties inherent in the program?

E. Possibility of a More Limited Approach

If these objections prevail against adopting the second part of the plan in its entirety, a part of the objective could be achieved through a "crash" program of credit and technical assistance without assignment of additional quota. The first and third of the objections cited above would still apply but to a lesser degree. The additional production that could be obtained through such a "crash" program alone is highly speculative but might be in the range of 200,000 to 500,000 tons.

Perhaps an initial step would be to examine the possibility of such a "crash" program with Brazil and India, where the potentials appear greatest.

WORLD SUGAR PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

World Sugar Production and Consumption
(1,000 short tons, raw value)

	1962–63			1963–64			1964–65			1965–66			1966–67		
	Prod.	Cons.	Diff.	Prod.	Cons.	Diff.	Prod.	Cons.	Diff.	Prod.	Cons.	Diff.	Prod.	Cons.	Diff.
<i>Bloc</i>															
USSR.....	6,900	8,800	-1,900	7,200	9,000	-1,800	7,400	9,100	-1,700	7,900	9,200	-1,300	8,400	9,300	-900
East Europe ...	4,596	3,200	+1,396	4,700	3,300	+1,400	4,800	3,500	+1,300	5,200	3,600	+1,600	5,300	3,900	+1,400
Mainland															
China	562	1,700	-1,138	700	1,750	-1,050	800	1,800	-1,000	900	1,900	-1,000	1,000	2,100	-1,100
Cuba	4,100	390	+3,710	4,600	395	+4,205	4,800	500	+4,300	5,000	600	+4,400	5,200	620	+4,580
Total Bloc ...	16,158	14,090	+2,068	17,200	14,445	+2,755	17,800	14,900	+2,900	19,000	15,300	+3,700	19,900	15,920	+3,980
<i>Free World</i>															
United States ...	5,523	9,800	-4,277	6,165	9,900	-3,735	6,390	10,100	-3,710	6,500	10,300	-3,800	6,650	10,500	-3,850
North America	10,168	12,428	-2,260	11,400	12,659	-1,259	12,290	13,037	-747	12,600	13,432	-832	13,000	13,855	-855
South America .	6,789	5,125	+1,664	7,425	5,275	+2,150	8,200	5,460	+2,740	8,500	5,875	+2,625	8,600	6,100	+2,500
West Europe...	7,978	12,550	-4,572	9,100	12,650	-3,550	9,750	12,850	-3,100	10,150	13,150	-3,000	10,500	13,450	-2,950
Africa	3,302	2,755	+547	3,500	2,756	+744	3,700	2,957	+743	3,900	3,123	+777	4,200	3,334	+866
Asia & Oceania	10,115	10,510	-395	10,500	10,670	-170	10,800	11,250	-450	11,350	11,770	-420	11,950	12,125	-175
Total Free															
World	38,352	43,368	-5,016	41,925	44,010	-2,085	44,740	45,554	-814	46,500	47,350	-850	48,250	48,864	-614
World Total.....	54,510	57,458	-2,948	59,125	58,455	+670	62,540	60,454	+2,086	65,500	62,650	+2,850	68,150	64,784	+3,366

698. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 12¹

July 12, 1963

SUBJECT

*Cuba—Progress Report**1. Reply to Cuban Note Regarding Overflights*

The reply to the Cuban note will be coming over in the next day or so after the Secretary has a chance to look at it. Essentially, it will say that we intend to surveil in the absence of on-site inspections.

The Department apparently has hashed over a number of tactical questions. For example, should we send a copy of the note to the Soviets (among others, EUR and Ambassador Thompson say “no”)? Should we publish the note (general feeling is “no”)? The Cuban note was delivered to John Crimmins: should we answer it at the same or a higher level?

2. Cuban Refugees in Miami

Despite optimistic predictions by HEW, there has, in fact, been little progress in reducing the number of Cuban refugees in the Miami area; since December, the relocation of refugees has been only slightly greater than the inflow and the Cuban refugee population in the Miami area remains at roughly 125,000. While public and Congressional heat on this one still appears relatively mild, there have been indications that our good luck won’t hold out forever.

There may be a way to speed up the resettlement. Bishop Swanstrom, an important man in Catholic resettlement circles and an old friend of Abba Schwartz, tells Abba that 20–40,000 refugees could be moved out of Miami in a hurry. The crux of his proposal is to give the Church more control over the resettlement money than it now has (details still unclear); this would give Bishop Swanstrom more flexibility and leverage in pressing parishes to find more resettlement opportunities for Cuban refugees. Abba says that the proposal, which would involve a lump sum payment from HEW to the Catholic resettlement agency, is perfectly legal and has plenty of precedents.

I have urged John Crimmins to look into this possibility. For a starter, Abba probably will talk informally with Bishop Swanstrom, in

¹ Progress report on Cuba including reply to Cuban note on overflights; Cuban refugees in Miami; Kennedy doctrine. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.

the near future, to find out how many refugees the Bishop could move in X period of time and how much money he would need.

3. *Kennedy Doctrine*

I personally have the feeling that the atmosphere may be starting to heat up a bit on Cuba: things like the OAS subversion report and the imposition of blocking controls have probably contributed to this end. If the Kennedy Doctrine idea is still alive, we may want to consider taking advantage of the warmer temperature (if, in fact, it is warmer) to talk to the Latin Americans in the near future; the Doctrine might appear more credible than it would have appeared a month ago. While I haven't explored it at all, we might also want to think about the possibility of using August 17 (anniversary of the Alliance for Progress) as a hook on which to hang some sort of a jump towards the Kennedy Doctrine.

Gordon Chase

699. Proposed statement, July 12¹

July 12, 1963

I have said many times in recent months that our policy for Cuba looks to the day when the people of that unhappy isle shall be truly free. This is our purpose and our hope; and they are shared by the other republics of our hemisphere.

At San Jose, Costa Rica, in March we joined with the Presidents of Central America and Panama to "reaffirm the conviction that Cuba will soon join the family of free nations."

In the Declaration of Central America, we said that we had "no doubt that a genuine Cuban revolution will live again, that its betrayers will fall into the shadows of history and that the martyred people of that oppressed isle of the Caribbean will be free from Communist domination, free to choose for themselves the kind of government they wish to have, and free to join their brothers of the hemisphere in a common undertaking to secure for each individual liberty, dignity and well being, which are the objectives of all free societies."

¹ U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.

The future of Cuba is, of course, in the hands of the Cuban people; they will make their own blueprint. We know that the great ideals of the genuine July 26 movement—though trampled underfoot—are not dead. But their resurgence will depend above all on the vigor and the dedication of Cuba's youth, of her students and her intellectual leaders, of her militia, of her workers, of her sturdy *guajiros* (wah-HEE-rows). The people of Cuba know what they want, and it is up to them to decide the way of life which they wish for themselves and for their future generations.

The people of the Americas are confident that the Cuban people, disappointed by leader after leader, today betrayed by a demagogue who promised "bread with freedom" and delivered "hunger with tyranny," will look to the future and not to the past. They know that their choice of government is not limited, as Castro would have them believe, to communism or return to rightist dictatorship. They know that the future can bring vast and rapid social and economic improvement without loss of liberty.

After years of a deliberate communist effort to stifle the spark of democracy, they will want to build a system of law and justice in which all share equally, establish a free press and radio, restore academic freedom and university autonomy, liberate their once strong unions from the control of the state, and reconstitute their traditional political, economic and cultural ties with the other American Republics.

The time will come for a free Cuba to repair the havoc that Communist rule has wrought; to begin to reconstruct her democratic institutions and her economy—an economy that, in these last unhappy years, has failed dismally to provide adequate food, medicines, clothing, transportation, and the other basic comforts and needs. In this great task, she may be sure that she can count on the full and sympathetic support of the United States and on the willingness of the American people to share, in the spirit of friendship that has been traditional between our two countries, their material resources with the people of Cuba.

With the drive and imagination for which its people are noted, a free Cuba will not only be a partner in the Alliance for Progress, if it so desires, but also will provide impetus for the great joint effort to assure to all free men of the Americas bread, freedom and dignity. We, and I am confident, the other nations engaged in the vast cooperative programs under the Alliance, will warmly welcome Cuba's participation in the fruits of our common undertaking: the achievement of accelerated economic progress; building industries and providing more jobs; programs to provide decent housing to the people; fair wages and satisfactory working conditions for all workers; greatly increased educational opportunities for all; health and sanitation programs;

sound governmental monetary and fiscal policies; and solutions to Latin America's traditional problem of excessive price fluctuations of basic exports; and the kind of land reform that the *guajiro* wants—the kind he was promised. Only the Cuban *guajiro* working his own land as a free man, well rewarded for his efforts and protected by broad social services, can increase the productivity of the Cuban earth.

I am confident that all true friends of Cuba share my conviction that the day is not too far distant when these aspirations will be fulfilled. I know that in every walk of the island's life—in the fields, the factories, the schools and universities; in the army, in the militia, in the government itself—there are countless people who, though forced to appear as supporters of the communist regime, hold to their faith in freedom and who are determined to restore their homeland to the company of free nations. They have learned that the path down which their communist leaders have taken them does not lead to the genuine goals of the revolution. In freedom, and in association with their fellow American Republics, their revolution can live again.

700. Proposed statement by President Kennedy on July 26, undated¹

undated

I would like to speak today to you, the people of Cuba. I speak to you as a friend on this special day that once, only a few years ago, was the symbol of the great hopes of Cuba; of the Cubans' will to put an end to terror and to begin far-reaching social and economic advances, within a climate of freedom and respect for human dignity.

This July 26, however, does not shine on a prosperous, on a free, or on a happy Cuba in which a sense of brotherhood prevails. It does not dawn on the republic "with all and for all" of which Marti once dreamed. Deep antipathies divide the Cuban family. The great revolutionary ideal of the July 26 movement, the ideal of "bread with freedom" has been betrayed. One tyranny has made way, not for the democracy that the Cuban people wanted, but for another tyranny. The small benefits that some may have derived from that regime have cost the

¹ U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. Confidential. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.

Cuban people their freedom and a high price in blood, tears, and hopelessness.

But this situation will not last. The Cuban people have always loved liberty as deeply as they have honored their country, and they will not accept indefinitely their present condition of servitude. As Marti wrote: "The man who conforms by obeying unjust laws and permits anybody to trample the country in which he was born, and to mistreat his country, is not an honorable man." This is the truth we had in mind when at San José we joined the Presidents of Central America and Panama in saying we have "no doubt that a genuine Cuban revolution will live again, that its betrayers will fall into the shadows of history and that the martyred people of that oppressed isle of the Caribbean will be free from Communist domination, free to choose for themselves the kind of government they wish to have, and free to join their brothers of the hemisphere in a common undertaking to secure for each individual liberty, dignity, and well-being, which are the objectives of all free societies."

The future of Cuba is, of course, in the hands of the Cuban people. The great original ideals of the July 26 movement are not dead. But their vitality will depend above all on the vigor and the dedication of Cuba's youth, of her students and her intellectual leaders, of her militia, of her workers, of her vigorous *guajiros* (wah-HEE-rows). The people of Cuba know what they want, and it is up to them to decide the way of life which they wish for themselves and for their future generations.

It is not for us to tell you, the Cuban people, what you should want. But I trust you will not misunderstand me if I describe today what I firmly believe to be the things that you, the Cuban people, do *not* want.

You do not want to stay in a strait jacket, unable to say or write what you think or to meet with old friends and neighbors for fear of being the objects of suspicion and distrust. This, the Cuban people do *not* want.

You do not want to have a foreign idealogy imposed on you, nor to be a colony at the mercy of the whims of a foreign power and of its political and military interests. This, the Cuban people do *not* want.

You do not want to live isolated from your old friends and neighbors, your sister countries of the hemisphere, whose traditions and historic ideals you share. This, too, the Cuban people do *not* want.

You do not want to go back to a corrupt and tyrannical past, but neither do you want promises of material advantages to be bought at the cost of human freedom. This, the Cuban people do *not* want.

Above all, you do not want that love of country so fiercely felt by militiamen, student and *guajiro* (wah-HEE-row) alike, to be used and

perverted as an excuse for subjecting Cuba to the will of another state and for maintaining by repressive means an authoritarian political system that is alien to Cuba's authentic nationalist and democratic sentiments. This, decidedly, the Cuban people do *not* want.

The revolution of which July 26 is the symbol; the *genuine* revolution of which the July 26 movement dreamed, is a nationalist revolution, a revolution conceived by Cuban minds, planned by Cuban talent and ability, to be developed and carried out by Cuban hands.

This is the *genuine* revolution that would mobilize the energy and idealism of Cuba's youth; that would bring to the long suffering Cuban *guajeros* (wah-hee-rows) what they want for themselves, for their children, for their grandchildren.

When the revolutionary fervor of July 26 sweeps once again through Cuba, you can rely on our understanding and on our cooperation. And not only on ours, but I am confident on that of the entire hemisphere. We will extend a helping hand if you want it and if you need it as you pursue the aims of the genuine Cuban revolution.

The return of a free Cuba to the regional bodies for political and economic cooperation will bring rejoicing to the hemisphere.

With the drive and imagination for which its people are noted, Cuba would not only be a partner in the Alliance for Progress, but also would provide impetus for the great joint effort to assure to all free men of the Americas bread freedom and dignity. It is precisely your present suffering under communist totalitarianism that will enable Cuba to show clearly why social reform must be nourished by political liberty and by profound respect for human rights.

A Cuba engaged in its own genuine revolution would help us all to insure to the men, women and children of the Americas equality of opportunity and those basic sources of security in today's world: *techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela* (tay-cho, trah-bah-hoe, ee tee-err-ah, sahl-ewd ee ess-kweh-lah). We, for our part, always aware that the Cuban people are the only masters of their own destinies, would gladly work hand in hand with them, if they so wish, in the urgent task of rebuilding their economy and of implanting democracy.

Only the Cuban people can, for example, restore to their university its prestige and the academic freedom that the revolution promised. Only the Cuban people can determine what can be taught in the schools and the cultural values that must be inculcated in their young. Only the Cuban worker can build an authentic trade-union movement that is truly free and not the creature of rigid totalitarian control and discipline. Only the Cuban *guajiro* (wah-hee-row) working his own land as a free man, earning fair wages, well rewarded for his efforts and protected by broad social services can increase the productivity of the land. Only

free Cubans, young and old alike, can assure that in their country social advance will go hand in hand with personal freedom, and that Cubans will not be forced, as they are now, to spy on one another.

I am confident that all true friends of Cuba share my conviction that the day is not too far distant when these aspirations will be fulfilled. I know that in every walk of the island's life—in the fields, the factories, the schools and universities; in the army, in the militia, in the government itself—there are countless Cubans whose attachment to liberty is symbolized by the rising sun of freedom on their country's shield; whose valor is rooted in the noble tradition of the Mambises (Mam-bee-says), and who are determined to restore their homeland to the company of free nations. Of one thing you may be certain, my Cuban friends: when that day comes, you will enjoy the friendly support and the cooperation of all Americans.

When the new day of genuine independence dawns; when the Cubans' deep love of homeland asserts itself once again, Cuba will find herself once again an honored member of the hemisphere family, and will become a beacon of progress and of freedom for us all; a neighbor to be regarded, not with suspicion, but with great respect and with affection.

701. Memorandum prepared by McGeorge Bundy, July 16¹

July 16, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STANDING GROUP
RECORD OF ACTIONS

Meeting No. 10/63, July 16, 1963—5:00 PM

1. Following discussion of three papers circulated by Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson on July 13th, the group agreed that:

a. The President should not be asked to make any statement on Cuba on July 26th.

b. Further consideration would be given to asking the President to make a statement on Cuba on August 17th, the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.

¹ NSC record of actions at July 16 meeting. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.

c. The content of a proposed Presidential statement would be discussed again. A final decision would be made, after consideration at the next meeting, on a State Department paper covering possible negotiations with Castro.

2. Mr. Johnson reported that the State Department's views on further measures to restrict free world shipping to Cuba would be sent to the President the following day. It appears that tightening existing restrictions on free world shipping will only be effective in reducing the amount of such shipping if the restrictions are revised so they affect the country whose flag the ship is flying rather than the country of ownership.

3. Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture Sundquist presented a contingent plan for increasing world production of sugar. Following discussion, it was agreed that the plan should not be considered further in view of its disadvantages because of the drop in the price of sugar which has resulted from actions already taken.

**702. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara,
July 22¹**

JCSM-548-63

July 22, 1963

SUBJECT

US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-35752/63, dated 24 June 1963, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the revised draft State-Defense plan transmitted by the reference and have concluded that although it is generally compatible with their views, specific changes as indicated in the Appendix hereto are necessary. One change recommended is to recognize that a US invasion would not invariably be the least desirable course of action from a political point of view. For example, the effect of propaganda accusations of aggression would be significantly reduced or eliminated if any US overt actions were preceded by a call for help from the Cuban insurgents. Also, a serious Castro-communist provocation could provide political justification for

¹ U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive, 1963, 000.1—.

US invasion. For the most part, the other changes are designed to eliminate any ambiguity concerning the concept of overt military operations. The concept should be clear that once the United States is committed to overt support of a revolt in Cuba, the principal course of action should be prompt and orderly execution of preplanned operations in areas of our own choosing and with appropriate forces. Interim operations to sustain the revolt should be considered as ancillary to, and not a substitute for, the principal course of action. Moreover, the objective of all US operations should be the establishment of a government in Cuba acceptable to the United States.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the changes in the Appendix be incorporated in the draft State-Defense plan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

703. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 23¹

July 23, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. *New Cuban Protest Note*

John Crimmins tells me that he rejected the Cuban protest note which the Czech Ambassador delivered at noon today. John says that the President spoke to the Secretary this morning about the note; they agreed that while the note should be rejected, it should be rejected on procedural grounds—i.e., the Cuban Government released the substance of the note to the press before they delivered the note to us.

John said that the Czech Ambassador (1) seemed embarrassed by the Cuban Government's public release of the note, and (2) was generally mild and defensive.

¹ Cuban protest note; free world shipping to Cuba. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.

2. *Free World Shipping to Cuba*

State will be sending over a list of all the Free World ships engaged in the Cuban trade during the quarter April–June 1963, along with a list of the owners. Apparently our previous request to State for such a list got lost in the shuffle. State apologizes profusely; I do too, for not keeping closer tabs on it.

Gordon Chase

August 1963

704. Memorandum from General LeMay to McNamara, August 1, with two appendices¹

August 1, 1963

SUBJECT

US Action in Event of Cuban Attack on US Aircraft/Ships (U)

1. Current policy does not address specifically the matter of US fighter aircraft overflying Cuba while en route to the scene of a Cuban attack on US aircraft or ships operating outside of Cuban territory.

2. However, Rules of Engagement, promulgated by direction of the President on 28 February 1963, prohibit US forces from penetrating Cuban territory in pursuit of Cuban forces which have attacked US aircraft or ships operating outside of Cuban territory. On this basis, overflight of Cuban territory while en route to the scene is not included in the authorized military options for response to an attack by Cuba on US forces operating outside of Cuban territory.

3. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), has pointed out that reaction time for US fighter aircraft to respond to an attack on US forces, for example south of western Cuba and north of eastern Cuba, can be reduced 10 to 30 minutes, with comparable increases in time for action at the scene, if routing over Cuban territory is authorized. CINCLANT considers that incidents of Cuban attack on US forces, where overflight of Cuba would be militarily advantageous, most likely would involve aircraft engaged in reconnaissance efforts but also could involve US shipping and cases where lives of US nationals or national interests are in jeopardy.

4. The option of overflying Cuba in certain instances, and under certain conditions, where US aircraft or ships are attacked by Cuban forces is considered highly desirable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accord-

¹ U.S. action in event of Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships. Top Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1963, Rules of Engagement.

ingly, it is recommended that a memorandum substantially the same as that in the Appendix hereto be forwarded to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Curtis F. LeMay
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

US Action in the Event of Cuban Attack on US Aircraft/Ships (U)

1. At your direction on 28 February 1963, Rules of Engagement were promulgated with respect to action by US forces in event of a Cuban attack on US aircraft or ships operating outside of Cuban territory. These rules prohibit US forces from penetrating Cuban territory in pursuit of Cuban forces involved.

2. On this basis, overflight of Cuban territory while en route to the scene of an attack is not included in the authorized military options for responses to an attack by Cuba on US aircraft or ships operation outside of Cuban territory.

3. Incidents of Cuban attack on US forces operations [illegible in the original] of Cuban territory which are considerate most likely would involve aircraft engaged in reconnaissance efforts, but also could involve US shipping and cases were lives of US nationals or national interests are in jeopardy. Should attacks occur, for example south of western Cuba and north of eastern Cuba, the en route time for US fighter support can be reduced 10 to 30 minutes, with a comparable increase in time for action at the scene, by routing over Cuban territory. This quicker en route reaction time could be the difference between providing an effective defense for US interests or arriving too late for action.

4. In light of the [illegible in the original] may arise [illegible in the original] presence of US forces [illegible in the original] possible [illegible in the original] would be in the best national interests, a draft statement of policy which would authorize overflight of Cuban territory in certain instances, and under certain conditions, has been prepared and is attached.² Its approval is recommended.

² [illegible in the original]

Annex

STATEMENT OF POLICY

ON

*US ACTION IN EVENT OF CUBAN ATTACK ON
US AIRCRAFT/SHIPS (U)*

The following policy is issued pertaining to US action in the event of Cuban attack in the area surrounding Cuba against US aircraft/ships:

a. In specific instances in which adherence to international airspace would delay significantly the arrival of US fighter aircraft at the scene of a Cuban attack against US aircraft/ships operating outside of Cuban territory, overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized subject to the following:

(1) It must be established that the US aircraft/ship is being attacked, or the US aircraft/ship has been attacked and lives of US personnel are endangered.

(2) Overflight times are minimized with due regard to risk to aircraft. While en route every effort will be taken to avoid provocative acts. Engagement will not be undertaken during the overflight except for self-defense against aircraft attack.

(3) From the time of arrival at the scene current rules of engagement will pertain, with return to home or diversion airfield via air space over international waters, if practicable.

(4) The most [illegible in the original] will be used to inform [illegible in the original] flight of Cuba [illegible in the original] action shall be [illegible in the original] same manner.

705. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, August 9¹

August 9, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba—Pending Items

Here are a number of items which are likely to come to your attention while I am gone. At the end of each item, I have noted the names of some of the people who have more than a surface knowledge of the issues involved.

1. Expropriation of American Embassy in Havana

Castro is apparently still wavering in his original resolve to take over the Embassy building, including its contents. He seems relatively sensitive to the reaction of the Swiss who have been taking a very firm position against expropriation on the grounds that it is an unusual violation of established international practice. We have encouraged the Swiss to maintain their firm position and have also encouraged other Free World countries to protest the Cuban action. So far, Ambassador Stadelhofer has had only preliminary talks with the Cubans. He has not yet seen Castro. (Alexis Johnson, John Crimmins)

2. Reply to Cuban Note on Overflights

State is now clearing the reply with DOD; it will be over here in the next day or so. The note is a short, undetailed version, referring to our “well-known, publicly-expressed position on over-flights.” Barring any unusual developments (particularly, with respect to the Embassy expropriation issue), State intends to deliver the note to the Cubans sometime next week. (The Secretary, Alexis Johnson, Ed Martin, John Crimmins)

3. American Students in Cuba

The American students are still in Havana. State has no firm information on when they will leave, but guesses it will be in the next few days. A week to ten days after the return of the students, Justice Department will send to the White House, for clearance, its recommendations for action against these students. Justice estimates that it will be able to start Grand Jury proceedings about three days after its

¹ Pending Cuban items: expropriation of American Embassy in Havana; reply to Cuban note on overflights; American students in Cuba; the Cuban amendment; contingency planning for further Cuban immigration. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. XI (A), 8/63.

recommendations are approved. (Bromley Smith, Abba Schwartz, Assistant Attorney General Walter Yeagley)

4. The Cuban Amendment

The Cuban amendment is included in the House bill which has recently come out of Committee. State is sanguine that the Senate will not include the Cuban amendment in its bill and that the Senate will knock out the Cuban amendment in conference. State has been educating appropriate Senators about the amendment. (Mike Forrestal, Fred Dutton, John Crimmins)

5. Contingency Planning for Further Cuban Immigration

There have been indications over the past few weeks that we may get increasing pressures from Empress Lines (a ferry service hoping to operate between Havana and Miami) and possibly from the Cuban Government itself to resume further large-scale immigration from Cuba. State is opposed to allowing further immigration and Bob Hurwitch is preparing a paper describing our policy. The paper will include the reasoning behind the State position, as well as a suggested public position. The public position should be of some interest to the White House since a closed-door policy on Cuban immigration could cause some level of public heat. (John Crimmins, Bob Hurwitch)

Gordon Chase

**706. Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group,
August 12**

August 12, 1963

[Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 131, Book II—Special Group. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

September 1963

707. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
September 6¹

September 6, 1963

SUBJECT

Exile Raids—Extent of Knowledge Within Executive Branch

I refer to your interest in knowing the extent of knowledge within the Government about the exile raids in which the U.S. was involved. The following will give you a pretty good, general picture of the people who knew a little or a lot about the raids. A detailed list which indicates the names and numbers of all the players (including aides, secretaries, S/S types, etc.) and which indicates the extent of their knowledge, will take some time to run down. Are you interested in such a list?

1. *White House*—The President, you, Tom Parrott, and I knew specifics about the raids.

2. *State*—The Secretary, George Ball, Averill Harriman, Alexis Johnson, Ed Martin, Sterling Cottrell, John Crimmins, and Bill Bowdler (Crimmins' deputy) knew specifics about the raids. The head of the Miami Office, Harvey Summ, is cleared for this sort of information but was aware of our involvement only in the most general way.

Dick Phillips and Jim Greenfield in P, in preparation for press queries, were told for their own background that "we were interested" in the raids.

In INR, the liaison men with CIA, Joe Scott and Al Carter, knew about the raids. Presumably, Tom Hughes, George Denney (Tom's deputy) and John Plank also knew.

3. *Defense*—Roswell Gilpatric knew details about the raids and, presumably, he told Secretary McNamara.

As a member of the Cuban Coordinating Committee, Cy Vance knew details about the raids; he probably told one or both of his two people who work on Cuba—Joe Califano and Lt. Col. Al Haig.

4. *CIA*—On the operating side, obviously, a number of people knew about the raids. Also, a few intelligence people were given general information so that the events would not be over-played in the intelligence reports. For the same reason, a few people in DIA had general

¹ Exile raids—extent of knowledge within the Executive branch. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63–9/63.

information about the raids. Generally speaking, the intelligence people were told about the raids shortly before they occurred.

5. *Miscellaneous*—The AG, Bromley, and other members of the Standing Group, not mentioned above, knew about the raids. Certain Navy elements in the operational area knew where the attack boats were going, but not the details of operation.

A great many people knew there was something special about these raids, although they did not know the details. For example, the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS had to be told to leave the “comings and goings” of the operation alone. Also, a very few people in DOD who had to procure special equipment, (e.g. cannons and mortars) for the group knew that some “hanky-panky” was going on somewhere. Finally, the intelligence watch officers on duty the night of the raids were told that we were aware of the raids; this prevented needless nighttime phone calls.

6. CIA says that information about the raids is given to people who have a real “need to know”; furthermore, a person is given only as much detail as he needs to know. While Tom Parrott regards the above as a pretty tight control, I regard the apparent security of the two attacks as slightly short of miraculous in view of the extent of knowledge around the government. However, I confess that I don’t know enough about the total security set-up to make a judgment as to whether or not it could be made significantly tighter.

Gordon Chase

**708. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to McCone,
September 17**

September 17, 1963

[Source: Kennedy Library. National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63–9/63. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pages (includes 2-page memorandum from Bundy to the Special Group and covering note) of source text not declassified.]

**709. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
September 19¹**

September 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba and the IMF

We have given the Fund Management the green light to circulate an information memorandum to the IMF Board Members that Cuba is in violation of IMF obligations on a number of counts—use of exchange practices without IMF approval, failure to furnish required information, failure to pay increased subscription previously agreed to, and failure to respond to the Managing Director's correspondence; in addition, as of September, 1963, Cuba is in full 5 year default on a \$25 million loan.

While the above step does not yet commit us to a course of expulsion action against Cuba, it does lay some groundwork. State and Treasury are pretty well agreed that expulsion is a good idea and will probably send a memo over here next week, which, at the least, will request White House approval to start some informal consultations with appropriate IMF members during the annual IMF meeting, scheduled to start on September 30. (It is expected that Cuba will not attend the annual meeting, although IMF action does not depend on this fact. The presence or absence of Cuba, [illegible in the original] affect the noise-level.)

Gordon Chase

¹ Cuba and the IMF. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. XI (B), 9/63.

**710. Memorandum from McCone to the Chairman of COMOR,
September 27¹**

September 27, 1963

COMOR's recommendation for high-level photographic coverage of the entire island of Cuba every 14 days has been approved by the United States Intelligence Board and reviewed with higher authority.

You in your capacity as Chairman of COMOR will maintain a continuing review of the coverage of important targets, especially during the current period of bad weather, and report to me as Director of Central Intelligence immediately any hiatus in the coverage of priority targets.

You will also report to United States Intelligence Board in accordance with the standing procedures on coverage of the island.

John A. McCone
Director

¹ High-level photographic coverage of Cuba. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.

October 1963

711. Memorandum from Colonel Haig to Vance, October 2¹

October 2, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting of the National Security Council Standing Group

Purpose: Summarized below is a report of the deliberations of the National Security Council Standing Group during the meeting held on October 1, 1963. Debrief on the meeting was obtained through Mr. Nitze's office.

1. Mr. FitzGerald of CIA presented an overall assessment of the situation in Cuba. This assessment emphasized recent reports [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that stepped-up operations against the Regime had resulted in great uneasiness and perhaps serious doubts about the response of the Soviet Union to forcefully support Castro against these activities.

2. [*text not declassified*]

3. The Group discussed CHICOM SAM equipment. Mr. McCone stated he believes that the CHICOMs have copied Soviet models of SAM equipment and do not necessarily have Soviet manufactured types.

4. The Group discussed Castro's posture in Latin America. There was a general consensus that his image has slumped considerably in recent months but conversely the Group agreed that his subversive activities had increased considerably. It was commented that Castro, in urging dissident action in Latin America, has done so without requiring any ideological standards among the action groups he is approaching.

5. CIA pointed out that Castro is apparently developing his own covert air force by which he will be able to introduce men, arms and matériel into Latin America. Mr. Nitze commented that our ability to combat such a Castro potential is limited and effective measures would be very expensive. General Goodpaster stated that the JCS and CIA will look into this matter.

6. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., was instructed to look into the feasibility of initiating additional pressures designed to prohibit free world

¹ Meeting of the NSC Standing Group: the situation in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, Misc. 63, 64, 65.

shipping to Cuba. The Group realized that the recent wheat agreement with Canada would degrade present effectiveness of this program.

7. Mr. Robert Kennedy raised the question of the estimated date of CHICOM nuclear testing. Mr. McCone stated that despite recent reports of an earlier test date, CIA still believes that such tests will not be held until next year. The Group then discussed the possibility of CHICOM nuclear assistance to Cuba. All agreed that this was possible.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

9. Mr. Bundy emphasized that all ideas pertaining to Cuba should be reviewed and suggested that new ones be generated. At this point, General Goodpaster raised the question of introducing counterfeit currency into Cuba and increasing introduction of arms into Cuba. (This subject was raised last summer by General Goodpaster and CIA was quite upset that General Goodpaster would make such a suggestion without having staffed the matter with them beforehand. Mr. Hand of General Lansdale's office called the undersigned on October 2nd and stated that he was very concerned that General Goodpaster would again raise these two questions without having cleared them beforehand with Mr. Vance and without having a coordinated interdepartmental position available. Mr. Hand suggested that this be brought to your attention so that either you or Mr. Gilpatric could raise this item with General Goodpaster or the Chairman in an effort to prevent such occurrences in the future. There is apparently a strong feeling in CIA that General Goodpaster is trying to "dump work on that Agency which they have previously considered and which they feel would be of no value.")

10. A USIA paper, reportedly addressing the subject of what a new Cuba should look like, was discussed by the Group and apparently criticized as inadequate. (I have called USIA and requested copies of this paper for this office and for Mr. Nitze.)

11. There was a general discussion of the feasibility of stepping-up the pace and intensity of sabotage operations against Cuba. It was agreed that this question would be left to the Special Group (5412/2).

12. The group discussed the price of world and Cuban sugar and it was agreed that the Cuban Coordinating Committee should look into this problem under its revised mission. (Mr. Nitze was not aware of the revised mission of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs. The undersigned volunteered that the establishment of an Economic Subcommittee was probably the revised mission being referred to. This office is verifying this with State.)

A.M. Haig
Lt Col GS

712. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, October 4¹

October 4, 1963

SUBJECT

Guantanamo Base—Visit

Here are some of the high-lights of my visit to Guantanamo on October 1–2. I went with John Crimmins and Joe Califano. (Ed Martin, because of last minute pressures, could not make it.) We tried to educate ourselves on the whole range of Guantanamo problems but focussed particularly on the contingency planning for *likely* Castro actions against the Base.

1. My general reaction was positive. Base morale is high, and generally speaking, the staff seems willing and able to cope with any Castro provocations. Most importantly, Rear Admiral Davis, the Base commander, appears to have a good feel for the political dimensions of his job. He struck all of us as being sober, careful, and politically sensitive; moreover, he seems to have conveyed this sense to his staff.

2. However, there are some problem areas, all of which will be studied carefully over the next couple weeks.

(a) If Castro decides that it is in his interest to retaliate against our increasing activities, he can easily shut off the Base water supply. It would have great nuisance value and would only cost him about \$180,000 per year in foreign exchange earnings.

If Castro cuts off the water, present planning calls for the evacuation of dependents from the Base and the transport of water to the Base from Port Everglades in two water tankers. Evacuation of dependents seems a fairly drastic step and we are looking into ways of avoiding this eventuality.

(b) A recent DOD directive, which aims at reducing the gold flow and saving money, and which calls for a RIF (reduction in force) of local employees at all overseas bases, presents special problems for Guantanamo. Among other things, a reduction of the Cuban work force will allow Castro to get plenty of propaganda mileage out of the apparently harsh treatment of Cubans who have been thrown in their lot with the U.S. Some people will construe the RIF as a U.S. move to phase out of Guantanamo. Many riffed employees probably will exile themselves from Cuba and simply refuse to leave the Base. DOD is now thrashing out this problem.

¹ Highlights of Chase's visit to Guantanamo Base October 1–2. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, Guantanamo Base, 8/16/63–10/4/63.

(c) Even assuming that the DOD directive will not apply to Guantanamo, dependence on Cuban workers still presents a problem. Castro could easily cut off the flow of Cuban workers who live off the Base (over 2000); moreover, this is not unlikely. Although one might argue that Castro would be reluctant to take such a step in view of the fact that Base workers provide him with roughly \$4½ million annually in foreign exchange, it should be noted that Castro is permitting no new people to obtain jobs on the Base; apparently, foreign exchange is not of over-riding importance. Additionally, he undoubtedly knows that a cut-off of Cuban labor would cause us problems.

If Castro takes this step, present planning calls for the transfer of Seabee personnel to Guantanamo to take up the slack. This will be expensive, however, and alternate sources of labor should be explored more fully (e.g. Jamaica and Miami). Alternate sources are already being explored to a limited extent to deal with the normal attrition rate (roughly 5% a year) which has resulted from Castro's ban on new Cuban workers for the base.

(d) [*text not declassified*]

3. Since we obviously cannot foresee all the contingencies (especially minor harassment-type actions) which may arise with respect to Guantanamo, the most important thing is that we have a commander there who is competent and in charge, who is politically sensitive, and who is responsive to Washington. I think Admiral Davis probably fills the bill as well as most.

At the same time, there is a good deal of contingency planning which can, and should be done in Washington. This is in the works.

Gordon Chase

**713. Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group,
October 21¹**

October 21, 1963

SUBJECT

Reappraisal of Previous Proposals for Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

REFERENCE

A. Memorandum for the Special Group dated 13 August 1963, Subject: As above

B. Minutes of the Special Group Meeting 13 August 1963

1. In accordance with reference B, Special Group minutes, the CIA has reappraised reference A proposal for the support of Comandos L, and have concluded that it is no longer feasible to implement the reference A proposal in light of current operational realities in Floridian and [less than 1 line not declassified] waters. Recent happenings such as the [less than 1 line not declassified] incident and the [text not declassified] of these activities to the U.S. Government. In view of the above, the reference A proposal is hereby withdrawn.

2. Inasmuch on the primary purpose of the reference A proposal was to enhance the capabilities of autonomous anti-Castro groups to conduct operations against Cuba, thereby providing a screen for CIA covert operations in addition to furthering U.S. objectives of maximum external pressure on the Castro regime, an alternative proposal is suggested for your consideration. This would consist of a selective relaxation of the current stringent U.S. controls on anti-Castro activities launched from U.S. territory or waters. Such a relaxation would be particularly beneficial at this time, in that the U.S. Government efforts to halt these activities have been so effective that CIA activities are being highlighted inasmuch as they are about the only things going. Realizing that it may not be desirable officially to relax the current U.S. Government policy by appropriate action through FBI, Coast Guard, and other channels, it may be desirable covertly to relax the official policy by authorizing the CIA to accomplish the selective relaxation by advising appropriate U.S. elements that the activities involved are of interest to the CIA and therefore should not be molested. It must be clearly understood that the CIA would furnish no material support, would have no contact other than for intelligence purposes, and would

¹ Reappraisal of previous proposals for support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, Misc. 63, 64, 65.

have no direct responsibility for the subsequent activities of such groups, but would merely act as a screening mechanism in attempting to permit some freedom of movement to certain groups judged to be somewhat responsible and having realistic capabilities.

3. The exercise by the CIA of such selective relaxation, if authorized, would in all cases be accomplished without the knowledge of the concerned anti-Castro groups. There would be no direct knowledge official or otherwise, of the relaxation of the overt policy but informed observers will no doubt surmise that a change has taken place, and the U.S. Government and/or the CIA will be given the credit or blame, as the case may be, for the results of whatever activities ensue.

4. Selective relaxation as outlined above is presented for your consideration and action as appropriate; the CIA neither requests or recommends that it be done.

**714. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara,
October 21¹**

JCSM-809-63

October 21, 1963

SUBJECT

Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Secretary of the Army, dated [illegible in the original] October 1963, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view, previously stated in JCSM-458-63, dated 15 June 1963, subject: US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C), that, although a coup may be one of the most promising types of revolt in Cuba, it is unlikely to occur at this time. They also have serious reservations with regard to the probable effectiveness of the special team which is to be introduced into Cuba after the coup takes place. Within the short time frame contemplated, it is doubtful whether such a team will be able to add significantly to the broad, multiple-source intelligence assessment necessary for the

¹ Draft State-Defense contingency plan for a coup in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—.

critical decision which would commit the United States to the employment of portions or all of the military forces required by CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 315. Further, in the case of a coup initiated by dissident leaders who have agreed to meet the criteria for US support and to whom prior approval had been given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time, the United States would have some obligation to intervene, irrespective of the report of the special team. The introduction of small groups for intelligence, [illegible in the original], and communication purposes after the decision to intervene had been made, however, should prove very useful in providing information on which a subsequent military reconnaissance might be based for the incremental introduction of forces.

3. [illegible in the original] draft State-Defense paper relates probably to US actions following a coup, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no comment on the statements of broad policy considerations cited therein as affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba. These statements have been considered as assumptions for the purpose of the paper, rather than as approved national policy. Further, the draft has been interpreted as presenting a broad concept and, consequently, detailed suggestions for changes in wording have not been made. Appropriate comments can be made on detailed plans to be developed in accordance with the recommendations of the paper.

4. It is noted that the draft paper states, "Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances." It should be emphasized that decision as to size and type of forces to be committed, as well as the advisability of incremental commitment, cannot be prejudged, but will be dependent upon the situation at the time.

5. It is also noted that the draft paper provides that the United States will commence to position forces to implement CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 315 as soon as the decision to introduce a "special team" into Cuba has been made. This provision is important in that it will reduce the reaction time required for overt military support after a Presidential decision to intervene and will provide forces for the suppression of Cuban air defenses as required in order to initiate overt logistical and air support to insurgents. It might also reduce the risk of incremental introduction of forces into Cuba if such were considered. For example, the early commitment of airborne or air-landed forces might entail less risk if the US Naval Base, Guantanamo, had been reinforced and a combat-loaded amphibious force were at sea.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while holding reservations as expressed in the comments above, have concluded that the plan envisaged in the State-Defense paper is militarily feasible.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**715. Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group,
October 21¹**

October 21, 1963

SUBJECT

Proposal for Air Strikes Against Cuban Targets

REFERENCE

Memorandum for the Standing Group of the NSC, Subject: Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Progress of Action Towards Cuba, dated 8 June 1963

1. As approved, referenced program authorized general sabotage and harassment (paragraph 4 E of reference) and support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of this and other courses of action approved in reference paper (paragraph 4 F of reference). Also envisaged in referenced program is the concept that, barring unforeseen international developments, progressively increasing economic, political, psychological and sabotage pressures would be brought to bear against the Castro regime.

2. A variety of reports from diplomatic and intelligence sources in Cuba indicate that the maritime/commando sabotage operations conducted to date have had a limited economic effect and a psychological impact on the regime and population of Cuba exceeding our expectations. There are, however, only a limited number of targets of major economic significance, such as oil refineries and key electric power plants. Many of these strategic targets are not susceptible to maritime/commando raids because of their relative inaccessibility and the strin-

¹ Proposal for air strikes against Cuban targets. Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Sabotage/Destruction.

gent security precautions taken to protect these installations against sabotage.

3. The Santiago oil refinery has been selected as a prime target. It is a major oil refinery accounting for approximately 30% of refined oil products in Cuba. Although heavily guarded on the ground and ringed by anti-aircraft batteries, it is vulnerable to attack. It is located on an isolated projection of land so that residential areas are not likely to be affected; nor will the incapacitation of the refinery inflict any direct additional suffering on those Cubans displaced or otherwise adversely affected by the hurricane. The loss of the Santiago oil refinery plant would further upset Cuban economic planning and force the Soviet Bloc, already straining under commitments made to Castro, to make even greater economic sacrifices for a most unappreciative recipient.

4. We propose to attack the refinery in December with a commando group firing 4.2 mortars. To permit a reasonable change of withdrawal of the commandos to the coast, the range will be approximately 4700 yards. This will be a most difficult operation although the chances of success appear acceptable provided the commando team can reach the firing position without discovery.

5. In recognition of past sensitivity to air strikes as compared to maritime/commando raids, we will first attempt to immobilize the Santiago oil refinery by means of a maritime/commando operation now in the planning stage. A formal request for authorization of this operation will be submitted at a later date. Should it be determined that a maritime raid against the Santiago refinery confronts us with unacceptable risks or should the operation fail, we consider the importance of this target to be of such magnitude as to warrant an air strike against it.

6. The operational concept for this air strike follows:

The air strike against the oil refinery at Santiago de Cuba will be conducted under the auspices of the Manuel Arttime Group. The strike will be launched from an air field in Nicaragua utilizing a U.S. sterile combat type aircraft, with foreign commercial markings, flying at minimum safe altitude and manned by an experienced Cuban aircrew employed by the Arttime Group but unwitting of U.S. interest. Upon completion of the operation, the aircraft will be ditched at sea and the crew picked up by maritime assets of the Arttime Group. As additional cover to mark the origin of the flight and the aircraft employed, the Arttime Group will have been operating an "alibi" plane—a commercial version of the combat craft throughout the Caribbean on logistical support missions. This alibi plane will have the same commercial markings as the bomber and will be noted in a friendly country at the same time that the target is being attacked.

The tactical aspects of the air strike are considered technically feasible and will depend almost entirely on the capability of the Cuban

aircrew which can only be determined after the aircraft has been procured, the mission profile developed and observation of the performance of the Cubans during the familiarization and training period. If in the judgment of CIA the aircrew capabilities are not considered adequate, or if any security or operational factors arise which raise doubts as to the effectiveness and security of the operation, or its absolute deniability by the U.S. Government, the operation will be cancelled.

7. With regard to the risks and security considerations inherent in this air strike, the operational concept confines the risks to acceptable limits and satisfies the requirement for plausible denial for:

- a. The United States;
- b. The Caribbean and South American countries which could have been used as a staging area for the operation; and
- c. Manuel Artime's autonomous group.

Since the plan also offers a high probability of denying to Castro a means of identifying the base from which the operation was launched, he will have no rational pretext for retaliatory action against the United States or any of the Caribbean countries. For additional United States security, the operation will be staged and controlled by the autonomous Cuban resistance group headed by Manuel Artime and no known Americans will have been exposed to any Cubans participating in the operation.

8. In view of the costly nature of this undertaking in terms of funds, logistic support and manpower, it is requested that the Special Group approve:

- a. The development of an air strike capability within the Artime Group and
- b. An air strike operation against the Santiago refinery in the event that a maritime/commando raid against this target is cancelled or fails.

This approval is considered to be necessary before CIA funds are committed to purchase the aircraft and other costly equipment. Should it subsequently develop that appropriate security standards cannot be maintained, the Special Group will be notified and plans for an air strike operation will be cancelled.

**716. Memorandum from General Carroll to McNamara,
October 24¹**

S73, 308/P2

October 24, 1963

SUBJECT

(U) DIA–CIA Assessment of Status of Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

1. In response to a Presidential requirement levied by Mr. McGeorge Bundy [illegible in the original], we have collaborated with CIA in a new assessment (attachment) of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Prime conclusions follow:

2. Since the October crisis of 1962, the Soviets have been engaged in a continuing program of withdrawing military personnel from Cuba. Most of the Soviets still in Cuba are advisers and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating and controlling the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. We believe that no organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba and that the only Soviet ground forces personnel remaining are those advising Cuban military units. Based on our continuing appraisal of Soviet activity, we estimate Soviet military strength in Cuba at present to be about five to seven thousand, although it may be even lower.

Joseph F. Carroll
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

¹ Transmits a DIA–CIA assessment of status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.

Attachment**JOINT CIA-DIA MEMORANDUM**

OCI No. 3158/63

SUBJECT

Assessment of Status of Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

Summary

1. Since the October crisis of 1962, the Soviets have been engaged in a continuing program of withdrawing military personnel from Cuba. Most of the Soviets still in Cuba are advisers and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating and controlling the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. We believe that no organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba and that the only Soviet ground forces personnel remaining are those advising Cuban military units. Based on our continuing appraisal of Soviet activity, we estimate Soviet military strength in Cuba at present to be about five to seven thousand, although it may be even lower.

2. Of the Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba during the military buildup last year, all—with the exception of the surface-to-air missiles, and possibly the coastal defense cruise missiles and FROGs—have either been withdrawn from the island or transferred to Cuban control. The present trend involves continuing efforts to improve Castro's independent military capabilities. By mid-1964, Cubans probably will be trained to operate all remaining Soviet weapons, including the surface-to-air missiles. As Cuban proficiency increases, additional reductions in Soviet military personnel probably will take place until only a Soviet military assistance and technical advisory establishment remains.

Withdrawal of Soviet military personnel

3. Since our last assessment in early October, at least 1,000 probable Soviet military personnel have departed. At least 13,000 and probably closer to 16,000 Soviet military personnel have departed since October 1962. Most of these have been withdrawn since February. We continue to lack verifiable evidence of the arrival of more than a few hundreds of Soviet military personnel since last October.

Status of Soviet weapons under Cuban control

4. Cubans are currently being trained in the use of all Soviet weapon systems remaining on the island. At least [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Cuban pilots have achieved a limited combat proficiency in the MIG-21 jet fighters, and additional pilots are being trained. These aircraft were recently transferred to Cuban control and most of the Soviet personnel associated with the MIGs have been withdrawn. Cuban personnel assumed control of the 12 Komar guided missile patrol boats in August, at which time Soviet personnel associated with these vessels left Cuba except for a small number of advisers and technicians.

5. Most Soviet ground forces personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba. Those ground forces personnel remaining—probably between 1,500 and 2,500—are involved in training Cuban units throughout the island. Available evidence suggests that the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] armored camps have been transferred to Cuban control. The Soviet T-54/55 tanks and other equipment at the camps, with the possible exception of FROGs, have been turned over to the Cubans and some of the equipment moved to Cuban training installations and operational units.

6. The Cubans probably began training in cruise missile operations some months ago and it is possible that the Soviets may have transferred this weapon system to Cuban control. There are probably no more than five hundred Soviet personnel remaining in Cuba associated with the cruise missiles and the number may be substantially lower if the Cubans have in fact assumed some degree of responsibility for the system.

The surface-to-air missile and air defense system

7. The Soviet SAM and air surveillance system in Cuba is currently manned and controlled by about three to four thousand personnel. A large number of Cubans are now receiving classroom training in surface-to-air missile operations and are scheduled to begin operational field training in November. By mid-1964, enough Cubans probably will have been trained to operate the entire SAM system including all of its radar and communications components.

8. A major reorganization of the air defense system is now in progress in Cuba. Since mid-September one third of the SAM sites have been relocated. The pattern of relocations indicates a shift from an island-wide SAM coverage to polar defense of major Cuban cities and military installations. In the process, the SAM guidance radar previously in use is being exchanged for older radar equipment, signifying an intent on the part of the Soviets to transfer the system to Cuban control.

717. Memorandum from J. Larocque to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 25¹

October 25, 1963

SUBJECT

Information Report 00-B 3,279,645, Interview with Fidel Castro

The attached report is forwarded at the request of the Deputy Director (Intelligence). It represents advanced dissemination of a report which will receive normal USIB dissemination next week.

J. Larocque, Jr.
Assistant Director for Operations

Enclosure

This is unevaluated information.

COUNTRY

Cuba

SUBJECT

Interview with Fidel Castro

DATE OF INFO

17 Oct and earlier

DATE ACQUIRED

23 Sep-4 Oct 63

PLACE ACQUIRED

[text not declassified]

SOURCE

[text not declassified]

[1 line not declassified]

1. *[2½ lines not declassified]*, I had two long interviews with Fidel Castro at one of the protocol houses *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

¹ Transmits information report on interview with Fidel Castro. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files; FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.

One interview lasted from 2145 until 0145 and the second extended from 2100 until 0245.

2. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] brought up the question of the US blockade of Cuba. Fidel said that it is in our mutual interest to get the Soviets out of Cuba, but that as long as the blockade continues, he will not consider such a step. Should the US remove its blockade, he indicated that he would agree to evicting the Soviets. He said one of the major reasons for which Cuba needs the USSR is the shipment of Soviet oil, which will not be necessary in approximately five years when Cuba should be able to produce enough of her own.

3. When asked his views regarding the recent USSR-US wheat agreement, he said that although he had not been consulted, he had been promised wheat from the USSR and consequently did not care where it came from.

4. On permitting UN inspection of Cuba, Fidel said he would go along with and permit a multi-lateral inspection but that he would oppose any uni-lateral agreement. He said if the UN inspection committee were permitted to inspect sites in Latin America, the Bahamas and the US, where possible aggressor forces might be trained or located, he would permit the same inspection in Cuba, and would list the exact locations and mission of Soviet troops.

November 1963

718. Memorandum for the record, November 14¹

November 14, 1963

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting to Review The Cuban Program

PRESENT

The President
Secretary of State Rusk
Secretary of Defense McNamara
Attorney General Kennedy
Director of Central Intelligence McCone
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
Mr. Cyrus Vance
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
General Maxwell Taylor
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald
Mr. Bruce B. Cheever
Mr. Theodore Shackley
Mr. Paul Eckel

The meeting convened in the Cabinet Room of the White House at 1040 on 12 November 1963.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba. He highlighted the following points:

- a. Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening.
- b. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some evidences of dissension and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA.
- c. The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and show evidence of increasing efficiency.
- d. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing hardships to the civilian population. This is due to mismanagement, economic sanctions, and Flora.
- e. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal manning for the SAMs. There are recent evidences of considerable

¹ Minutes of the meeting to review the Cuban program. Secret. 7 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-30 November 1963.

rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000 new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease.

f. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including the SAMs. It is not clear whether the SAMs will be turned over to full Cuban control; however, it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of the operating personnel.

g. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMs and certain communication equipment. No military equipment has been withdrawn. There have been some recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.

2. Mr. McCone then stated that the program which had been followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of independent actions.

3. Mr. FitzGerald presented a status report of the six-point integrated program against Cuba. Following is a summary of his presentation.

a. *Covert collection of intelligence for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.*

This element of the program is progressing satisfactorily. At the present time we have 74 singleton agents reporting directly to us. In addition there are 79 identified sub-agents who are part of organized nets. All of these agents and sub-agents legally reside in Cuba. There is one Black (illegal) team successfully operating in the Pinar del Rio area. It has 55 sub-agents in its net. The geographical distribution of agents throughout Cuba has continued to improve. In addition to the above resident agents, we have [1½ lines not declassified]. The Cuban counterintelligence efforts have intensified during the past months. Our losses have increased. This is particularly true with regard to the Black teams. The Cuban control system and ration system make the team's continued existence more and more precarious. We have had to withdraw some teams and we have lost others. In view of this experience we expect to reduce the number of "Black-team" infiltration operations, but to continue to press forward with all other types of intelligence operations.

b. *Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.*

The program includes both mailing and radio operations. Approximately 30,000–40,000 pieces of propaganda are mailed into Cuba every month. There are 32 hours daily of radio programs using seven different radio stations. Radio America on Swan Island broadcasts 13 hours daily. Separate radio programs are keyed to all significant target groups within Cuba, i.e., students, teachers, labor, military leaders, etc. We

believe the propaganda effort aimed to stimulate simple sabotage has, when combined with the other parts of the integrated over-all program, stimulated sabotage and resistance. We have intelligence reports citing 109 instances of sabotage since 1 April 1963. These include such things as derailing locomotives, destroying high-tension poles, burning trucks and factories. Many have been similar to ideas included in our broadcasts and mailing. There appears to have been a slight upturn in instances of sabotage in recent weeks.

c. Economic denial actions on an increased basis.

This is a Government-wide program, one which has probably had a greater impact on Cuba than any of the others. A great deal has been learned regarding Cuban sources of supply. Some we have successfully closed down. The Cuban merchant fleet is so badly managed that we are almost better off by leaving it alone. [text not declassified] The economic denial program should be strengthened wherever possible.

d. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and power centers.

On this key part of the over-all program slow but encouraging progress is being made. Jointly with DIA we have just completed detailed biographic studies of 150 key military personnel. Further analysis of these indicate 45 are of particular interest to us and will warrant further close attention. We currently are in direct contact with three "Heroes of the Revolution" who are either in Cuba or who will soon return there. One basic problem is that individual military figures will talk with us but will not conspire with their fellow officers for fear of compromise. This must ultimately be overcome. The leaders with whom we are in touch have emphasized the need to be reassured that, should they overthrow Castro, they will not be considered in the same light as Castro himself by the U.S. In summary, we have made some progress but we have a long way to go before the ultimate goal can be attained. The effort must be continued and where possible expanded.

e. General sabotage and harassment.

Since the approval of the program four successful externally mounted sabotage operations have been mounted (Santa Lucia—Casi-Ida—La Isabela—Cayo Guin). Three additional were ready to go, but at the last minute were recalled. A chart was shown identifying the proposed targets through January 1964. This included the Matanzas Electric Plant and the Santiago de Cuba Refinery. It was pointed out that with but few exceptions the economic results of any single sabotage operation were only significant for the cumulative economic effect plus the psychological effect in stimulating internal sabotage and resistance. Mention was again made of the 109 internal sabotage acts previously cited. The favorable impact of the successful external raids on the Cuban people was noted. This has an important bearing on the ultimate

willingness of key military personnel to participate in a conspiracy and of other persons to engage in simple sabotage. *[text not declassified]* The continuation of the sabotage and general harassment was specifically recommended.

f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

Substantial progress is being made in this part of the program. Manuel Artime and the MRR are being supported. He is developing bases in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua. He has his ships; his first groups of men are ready to start training. We have had to “prime the pump” and will have to give him a shipment of arms and ammunition. This will be done in a way in which even Artime will not know that it comes from the United States. Artime expects to mount his first operations in December.

Support to the extent of *[less than 1 line not declassified]* per month is being provided Manolo Ray; however, he has not progressed to the extent that Artime has. At present his major problem is to develop a foreign base of operations.

We may recommend support of one or more additional autonomous groups.

The activation of these groups will relieve some of the pressure on our operations which we believe will be most beneficial.

4. Throughout the presentation, a limited number of clarifying questions were asked and answered. At the conclusion H.A. asked what decisions were necessary at this time. The consensus was that the over-all program should continue but there was some divergency of opinion regarding the sabotage program. H.A. raised the question of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our purpose. Mr. McCone stated that no one event will particularly affect the economy. However, a continuous program will have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage by dissident people within Cuba. The previously mentioned 109 sabotage acts were again mentioned.

5. Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length. He stated the infiltration of Black teams for intelligence purposes gave him no problems. He strongly supported the Economic Denial Program. Internal sabotage should be continued, “the more of this, the better.” He opposed hit-and-run sabotage raids stating that he considered them to be unproductive in addition to complicating our foreign relations. Specifically, he stated that such raids could result in the Soviet failure to remove their troops from Cuba and could directly relate to Soviet harassment of Autobahn traffic. He said if we could mount sabotage raids as retaliation for specific identifiable Cuban acts in the Western

Hemisphere, he could go along with this. In this connection, he stated we should concentrate on securing information on what Castro was planning on doing in or against other countries, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. McCone observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-run sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

6. Secretary McNamara stated he could see no real connection between Berlin Autobahn incidents and Cuban operations. He saw many advantages in going ahead with the program but agreed with the necessity of keeping a careful watch on it. He said that he does not believe that the program will result in the fall of Castro but that it serves to maintain pressures on him which would improve chances of either a change in regime or a change in Castro himself.

7. The Attorney General commented that he believed the program had produced a worthwhile impact on Cuba during the past five months and that it was useful in the United States as an indication that something was being done.

8. Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that the proposed sabotage operations could be controlled but that when the autonomous groups started operations this might cause some problems due to the acknowledged lack of tight control. Mr. McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.

9. There was a brief general discussion of the need to expand naval and/or air coverage of shipping in the Caribbean area to identify possible Cuban arms shipments.

10. *[text not declassified]*

11. The meeting ended at approximately 1115.

Bruce B. Cheever
[text not declassified]

**719. Special National Intelligence Estimate 85–3–63,
November 15¹**

November 15, 1963

THE EFFECTS OF HURRICANE FLORA ON CUBA

CONCLUSIONS

A. Hurricane Flora was the worst that ever hit Cuba. Its most important consequence has been to exacerbate the already serious economic problems of the regime. (*Paras. 1–2, 19, 20*)

B. Cuban agriculture was hardest hit, but transportation and communications also suffered major damage. Industrial and military facilities escaped relatively lightly. Oriente and Camaguey, the two provinces which bore the brunt of the storm, suffered heavy losses of homes and personal property. (*Paras. 4–15*)

C. The regime had hoped that economic improvement would follow this year's harvest. Flora must have substantially diminished these hopes and because of damage to sugar cane, has also dimmed prospects for 1963. The estimated 1964 sugar harvest will probably be reduced by about 15 percent. Even so, Cuba may still exceed its 1963 foreign exchange earnings if higher sugar prices hold—as now seems likely. Because of the economic costs of reconstruction economic development will be retarded unless there is an increase in Soviet Bloc assistance. (*Paras. 9, 21, 22*)

D. Cuba's need for greater aid will add to the strains already manifest in Cuban-Soviet relations. We believe the Soviets will not give Castro all the assistance he desires, but that they will continue to provide aid at approximately the current level along with meeting emergency needs. (*Paras. 23–27*)

E. For another few weeks or months, Castro will probably succeed in rallying most Cubans to special efforts and to acceptance of unusual hardships. Thereafter, shortages of goods, the continuation of depressed living conditions, and the regime's resort to draconian measures will alienate an increasing part of the citizenry. Even so, unless there is major dissidence within the military establishment, he and the minority wedded to him will probably be able to maintain control. We believe that Castro will not reduce to any significant degree his incitement of subversion in Latin America. (*Paras. 28, 29*)

¹ "The Effects of Hurricane Flora on Cuba." Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry.

**720. Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk,
November 29¹**

November 29, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuban Contingency Planning

You will recall that during the Cuban crisis and the discussions that followed, it emerged that all of the military planning was based upon a massive assault using the conventional tactics of heavy bombardment preceding the landing, etc. Several abortive attempts were made through the Cuban Coordinator mechanism to engage the JCS in planning for other contingencies, such as an uprising or coup, which would call for graduated responses for support on our part so as to maintain maximum Cuban character to the action. However, the Coordinator was not able to engage the Joint Staff or the JCS in any meaningful way.

Therefore, in agreement with Mac Bundy at the time, Paul Nitze and I agreed that we would undertake such a plan as a joint State-DOD project in the pattern of other contingency planning that we had done with respect to Cuba. This project has been going on for many months on a very restricted basis with the cooperation of a few key personnel in ARA and the CIA, with Paul engaging the Joint Staff and the JCS. I also had an informal discussion on the subject with Page Smith when he took over CINCLANT. I have not sought to force the pace because very early in the exercise it accomplished the purpose of getting the JCS to thinking in terms of graduated responses to varying situations and giving CINCLANT same charter for planning on a similar basis.

However, we have now arrived at the point where the JCS has taken the position that it will not issue the instructions to undertake additional required planning without Presidential or other higher level approval of the concepts contained in the joint State-DOD contingency plan. I have taken the position that it would not be appropriate to seek the President's approval for a contingency plan of this kind, but have agreed with DOD that the approval of yourself and Secretary McNamara would be sought to carry out the additional detailed contingency planning required within the concept of this overall plan.

¹ Cuban contingency planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba, Contingency Planning.

The attached plan, which has now been approved by Paul Nitze, Cy Vance, the JCS, CIA and myself, contains the defects of any such interdepartmental effort but I believe it is basically satisfactory. The essence is that we would be prepared, upon receiving the report of any substantial uprising in Cuba, immediately to dispatch a team into Cuba to make contact and obtain information on which to base our decisions with respect to further action. If the decision were made, initial support would be furnished in a semi-covert manner so as to avoid a public commitment as long as possible. On the decision to make a public commitment on the success of the operation we would move to open logistical and air support of the insurgents while readying and subsequently introducing whatever level of support seemed required to assure success of the insurgents. The plan also provides for laying a political base, especially in the OAS. The entire concept is based upon maintaining the maximum possible character of an indigenous Cuban action rather than an "American invasion".

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize me to inform the DOD that you approve the plan as a base and framework for further detailed contingency planning, as set forth in the recommendations on page 22 of the plan.
2. That on a suitable occasion you inform the President of the existence of this plan and brief him on its outline (I will also make a copy available to Mac Bundy).

Attachment:

Draft contingency plan on Cuba.

December 1963

721. Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, December 2¹

December 2, 1963

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with the President on Cuba

I am attaching a paper [illegible in the original] on which you may wish to [illegible in the original] Cuba with the President [illegible in the original] an expanded version of the paper [illegible in the original].

I understand that, [illegible in the original] approved the paper, you wish it to [illegible in the original] participants in the [illegible in the original]; Mr. McCone; Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bundy.

Attachment

Talking Points for Meeting with the President

CUBA

TALKING POINTS

I. The Ultimate U.S. Objections

The replacement of the present government by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

II. Optimum Situation to [illegible in the original]

By exerting maximum pressure by all means available to the U.S. Government, short of military force, to bring about a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will predispose elements in the military and other power corners of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba.

III. Current Course of Action

An integrated, [illegible in the original] mutually dependent program [illegible in the original]:

A. [illegible in the original]

¹ Transmits talking points for Rusk's December 2 meeting with President Johnson on Cuba. Top Secret. 9 pp. DOS, S/S Files; Lot 66 D 501, Cuba.

1. [illegible in the original] and sources of supplies.
2. Reduction of [illegible in the original].
3. Reduction of [illegible in the original] sources of Soviet [illegible in the original] air [illegible in the original] in Cuba.
4. Pressure, as opportunity offers, to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations or to prevent establishment of diplomatic relations.
5. Efforts (diplomatic, propaganda, covert) to undermine Castro [illegible in the original] and to [illegible in the original] Cuban attempts to [illegible in the original].
 - B. Defense [illegible in the original]
 1. Multilateral:
Through [illegible in the original]
Through special arrangements with Central American countries and Panama
 2. Bilateral:
[illegible in the original] security [illegible in the original] country
 3. Unilateral:
 - A. [illegible in the original]
 - B. [illegible in the original]
 - C. Reduction [illegible in the original] Military [illegible in the original]
 - D. [illegible in the original]
 - E. Covert [illegible in the original]
 1. Exploitation and [illegible in the original] of disaffection in the Cuban military [illegible in the original] power centers
 2. General [illegible in the original]
 - a) [illegible in the original]
 - b) [illegible in the original] outside Cuban territorial limits
 - c) [illegible in the original]
 - d) [illegible in the original]
 3. Support of [illegible in the original] groups in sabotage [illegible in the original] in Cuba- IV. *Balance* [illegible in the original]
 - A. General [illegible in the original]

Our present [illegible in the original] now, or [illegible in the original] in Castro's demands [illegible in the original] with Cuban country [illegible in the original] of communist [illegible in the original] evidence of [illegible in the original] insignificant [illegible in the original]. Dissatisfaction of [illegible in the original] and doubts of [illegible in the original]

the original] increases area, [illegible in the original] evidences of [illegible in the original] had not a [illegible in the original] animated opposition. Should be emphasized, he said, that Castro still retains firm control and regime not now in danger of collapse or overthrow. Nevertheless, Castro's [illegible in the original].

B. Isolation [illegible in the original]

The value of free-world trade with Cuba in 1968 will probably be [illegible in the original] which \$[illegible in the original] million), [illegible in the original] billion figure for [illegible in the original]. Castro [illegible in the original] effort to increase trade with the free world and has made headway with Spain and Japan.

Free-world shipping in 1968 is [illegible in the original] at 30–40 percent of 1962 levels. [illegible in the original] for further reductions in free-world shipping in 1968 is [illegible in the original].

Scheduled free-world shipping to and from Cuba has been [illegible in the original] Pressures [illegible in the original].

Castro's [illegible in the original] leader has been [illegible in the original].

C. Defense [illegible in the original]

Movement of [illegible in the original] 50 percent.

Increased [illegible in the original] and extent of [illegible in the original].

Gradual [illegible in the original] American Communists [illegible in the original] inspired subversion.

On the other hand, Castro is trying to step up subversive activities in [illegible in the original].

D. Soviet Military [illegible in the original]

Approximately 5,000–7,000 Soviet military personnel remain, with [illegible in the original].

Most of Soviets are [illegible in the original].

By mid-64, Cubans will probably be assigned to operate all remaining [illegible in the original] weapons, including the SAM's.

E. Collection of [illegible in the original]

F. Covert [illegible in the original]

Although covert projects have not had sufficient time to demonstrate [illegible in the original] to exploit internal [illegible in the original] internal opposition [illegible in the original] positive on balance.

On other hand, [illegible in the original] and agents.

Guerilla activities [illegible in the original] and isolated.

Preparations by and [illegible in the original] continue for supply and [illegible in the original].

*V. Possible Cuban Government Actions**A. General*

Continuation and, [illegible in the original] political costs, progressive [illegible in the original] of current courses of action.

B. Specific Additional [illegible in the original] to Isolation

1. Amendment of [illegible in the original] 320 to permit arrangement with Mavreleen

C. Specific [illegible in the original] to Active [illegible in the original]

1. Seek to induce [illegible in the original] to join with us and [illegible in the original] in a system of cooperative air and sea surveillance.

D. Possibilities [illegible in the original] Action [illegible in the original] Rio Treaty on [illegible in the original]

1. General

Any decision to [illegible in the original] involves risk of [illegible in the original] Hemisphere on the [illegible in the original] be accessed [illegible in the original].

2. Measures which [illegible in the original] Short of the [illegible in the original].

a) breach in [illegible in the original]

b) partial or complete [illegible in the original] relations

c) partial or [illegible in the original]

d) Provision for cooperative surveillance by interested [illegible in the original] clandestine [illegible in the original] of arms and men.

3. [illegible in the original] involved in [illegible in the original] crisis:

a) Diplomatic [illegible in the original] evidence of [illegible in the original] subversive [illegible in the original] Latin America. [illegible in the original] and risk in [illegible in the original] majority; loss of possibly useful political [illegible in the original] into Cuba; loss of [illegible in the original].

b) Economic [illegible in the original] already has this [illegible in the original] resolution; [illegible in the original] until a [illegible in the original] of [illegible in the original].

c) Break in [illegible in the original] ability to [illegible in the original] action [illegible in the original] improving [illegible in the original] negative effect on Cuban [illegible in the original] morale (closing of [illegible in the original]); probable need to provide alternate means of concerns for diplomatic corps in Habana. (Note: More drastic step of stick in this [illegible in the original] held in reserve).

d) Cooperative surveillance by [illegible in the original]:

Advantage: [illegible in the original] Punta del [illegible in the original] and [illegible in the original] effectiveness of anti-sub[illegible in the original] effect [illegible in the original]; pressure directly related to [illegible in the original].

Disadvantage: [illegible in the original] to many governments, especially Venezuela and Colombia, of [illegible in the original]; of [illegible in the original] on their [illegible in the original] would fall on U.S.

722. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, December 2¹

December 2, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba—6:00 P.M. Meeting

1. Attached are 2 copies of the talking points which State prepared for the Secretary. I assume that the meeting is on again. Is this right?

2. Assuming the meeting is on, the attendance list now stands as follows: (1) The President, (2) Secretary Rusk, (3) Ed Martin, (4) Secretary McNamara, (5) another DOD type, (6) Director McCone, (7) Dick Helms or Des Fitzgerald, (8) Don Wilson, (9) von, and (10) me, as notetaker.

3. In good conscience I should point out that I heard through the grape-vine that Ben Read cut State's invitation list from 5 to 2 in deference to the President's inclination to abhor a crowd. Much as I would like to attend the meeting (I have never attended a Presidential meeting) I will understand perfectly if you feel I should stay home and mind the store. If I do not hear from you, I shall plan to attend.

Gordon Chase

¹ Attendance at the meeting with President Johnson scheduled that day. Top Secret. 1 p. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65.

723. Memorandum, December 9¹

December 9, 1963

SUBJECT

Suggestion for Additional Administration Statements on Cuba to Stimulate Anti-Castro Action on the Part of Dissident Elements in the Cuban Armed Forces

1. The ultimate objective of our covert action program directed against Cuba is to create the conditions which will stimulate non-Communist dissident elements in the armed forces and other power centers of the regime to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist leadership and eliminate the Sino-Soviet presence from Cuba. With this objective in mind, CIA has established and is seeking intensively to expand contacts with disaffected senior military officers in the Cuban armed forces. In so doing, we have been impressed by the unanimity with which these contacts insist on personal and political assurances from the United States as a prerequisite to active conspiracy against the Castro/Communist entourage. These non-Communist anti-Castro dissident Cubans argue that there is no personal advantage or patriotic incentive for them to overthrow Castro when: (1) they run the great risk of being liquidated themselves as high officials in that regime and (2) there is a likelihood that the political clock will be turned back and Cuba will again fall under the rule of Letiots or someone akin to him. They assert that they must have solemn assurances from high level U.S. spokesman, especially the President, that the United States will exert its decisive influence during and immediately after the coup to prevent their personal liquidation and a political regression.

2. CIA has attempted in a general and very limited manner to provide these assurances, but it remains for the President and other Administration person to instill a genuine group of U.S. [illegible in the original] to our efforts. President Kennedy's speech to the International Press Association on 14 November alluded to this [illegible in the original] when he stated:

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign Communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

¹ Suggestion for additional administration statements on Cuba to stimulate anti-Castro action on the part of dissident elements in the Cuban Armed Forces. Secret. 3 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Vol. 2.

3. Our Station in Miami reports that exile conservatives were depressed because they interpreted this passage as U.S. willingness to accept "Fidelismo without Fidel," while leftist oriented groups were encouraged to believe that "anti-Communist progressive and revolutionary elements" have the support of the U.S. Government. Those Cuban exile reactions, however, cannot be taken as reflecting the views of people inside Cuba. It is typical of exiles that they become oversensitive to the innuendoes of official public statements bearing upon their problems. Within Cuba, we believe that President Kennedy's statement probably contributed significantly to providing political assurances to the relatively small number of potential coupeters to whom these remarks are addressed. But we believe that action may be expected to follow only when these assurances are coupled with open recognition from authoritative U.S. spokesmen that many Cubans now serving in the armed forces and other power centers of the Castro regime will have to play a major role in its overthrow. These people need to be assured that the United States is sympathetic to the personal problems they will face in the event of a successful coup. To meet this and related problems, we recommend that the following passages be given some prominence in a Presidential press conference, declaration or speech at the earliest appropriate occasion:

"There are many in the ranks of the Cuban armed forces, and in the Cuban Government itself, who have viewed with sorrow and anger the end of Cuban liberty, the subjugation of the Cuban nation to another state and to a foreign ideology that is alien to Cuba's authentic nationalist and democratic sentiments.

"To these men I say the United States is ready to welcome to discussion without rancor and without reprisal a non-Communist Cuban leadership which truly represents the will of the Cuban people to strike down the barrier of Soviet domination, renounce Communism as a way of life and re-enter the community of American republics. We recognize that many non-Communist Cubans who now appear to be a part of the machinery of tyranny, will ultimately be instruments in destroying it and for this reason should be entitled to special consideration."

4. The President may also wish to refer to a speech celebrating the return of the Brigade members delivered by President Kennedy at the Orange Bowl on 26 December 1962 at which time he declared:

"Under the Alianza para el Progreso, we support for Cuba and for all the countries of this hemisphere the right of free elections and the free exercise of basic human freedoms. We support land reform and the right of every *campesino* to own the land he tills. We support the effort of every free nation to pursue programs of economic progress. We support the right of every free people to freely transform the

economic and political institutions of society so that they may serve the welfare of all . . . and I believe these are the principles of the great majority of Cuban people today, and *I am confident that all over the island of Cuba, in the government itself, in the army, and in the militia, there are many who have viewed with dismay the destruction of freedom on their island and who are determined to restore that freedom so that the Cuban people may once more govern themselves.*"
(underlining ours.)

The President might note that in the intervening year the prospects have improved for a return of Cuba to the OAS family of nations and he looks forward to that day with confidence.

**724. Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson,
December 11¹**

December 11, 1963

SUBJECT

Amendment of NSAM 220 Governing Foreign Flag Shipping in the Cuba Trade

National Security Action Memorandum 220 of February 5, 1963 provides that shipments financed by the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, General Services Administration and the Agency for International Development should not be shipped from the United States on a foreign flag vessel if that vessel called at a Cuban port on or after January 1, 1963. NSAM 220 also provides for removal of a vessel from the periodic Commerce Department list of ineligible ships when its owners give satisfactory assurances that no ships under their control will thenceforth be employed in the Cuba trade so long as that is against United States Government policy.

Basil Mavroleon, British ship operator who owns or controls about half the gross tonnage of British flag vessels engaged in shipping to Cuba, has offered to agree in writing that no vessel under his control will be in the Cuba trade after February 1965. Specifically, he has offered to give assurances to the United States that 50 of his vessels will not henceforth go to Cuba and all 35 of his ships under charter to the Sino-Soviet bloc which permit calls in Cuba will be withdrawn

¹ Amendment of NSAM 220 governing foreign flag shipping in the Cuba trade. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220.

as their charters expire. He has stated that nine of these vessels would be out of the trade by August 1964, an additional nineteen ships by November, and the remaining seven vessels by February 1965. A total of 26 of his ships have engaged in shipping to Cuba since the beginning of this year.

We, for our part, would agree to remove his ships from the Commerce list as their charters expire. The sanction for breach of the agreement would be that all ships owned or controlled by Mavroleon could be placed on the Commerce list.

We have information that other Greek shipowners are interested in discussing similar agreements with us.

NSAM 220 will have to be modified to permit the conclusion of such an arrangement with Mavroleon, and I am enclosing with this memorandum a suggested amendment providing for an exception to the provisions of NSAM 220.

While we recognize that persons critical of our Cuban shipping policy might attack the proposed amendment of NSAM as a relaxation of our position of restricting the Cuba trade, we can show that the agreements which we expect to conclude with Mavroleon and other shipowners would over the period of the next twelve to eighteen months result in the removal of a substantial number of Free World vessels now engaged in shipping to Cuba. Failure to take advantage of such offers could only prolong the present situation in which shipowners renegotiate charters with the Soviets as they expire.

I recommend that you give the amendment favorable consideration at an early date. If approval is given, we will continue our efforts to conclude agreements with Mavroleon and other shipowners. We will inform the appropriate maritime unions of our actions when an agreement with Mavroleon has been concluded. I further suggest that an announcement of your decision be withheld until the Mavroleon agreement has been concluded and the unions informed.

We plan to emphasize in our public treatment of this action that the amendment will result in the sure and substantial reduction over the next months of free world shipping now engaged in the Cuban trade.

The Department of Commerce concurs in these recommendations.

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested Amendment to NSAM 220 of February 5, 1963.

725. Memorandum prepared in the CIA, December 12¹

December 12, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba—A Status Report

Current US Policy With Respect to Cuba

1. Current US policy is to isolate Cuba from the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World and to exert maximum possible pressures, *short of open and direct US military intervention*, to prevent the consolidation and stabilization of the Castro-Communist regime. The CIA covert action program is designed to support other governmental measures to proliferate and intensify the pressures on Castro to encourage dissident elements, particularly in the military, to carry out a coup and eliminate Castro and the Soviet presence in Cuba.

2. Our ultimate objective in Cuba is to replace the Castro regime with one which will be fully compatible with the goals of the US and will cooperate with US efforts to establish friendly and stable regimes throughout Latin America.

Prospects for Achieving US Objectives Under Present Policies and Programs

3. Castro's position within Cuba appears to be eroding gradually and recently he has been forced to adopt increasingly harsh measures to maintain his control. The situation in Cuba is characterized by economic stagnation, depressed living conditions, the loss of revolutionary impetus and the disillusionment of an increasingly large majority of the population. To some extent, this is a result of innate economic deficiencies in Cuba, and more recently, Hurricane Flora, but to a considerable degree the problems confronting the Castro regime have been magnified by Castro's own ineptitude and by the US policy of economic and political isolation, and other harassment and sabotage measures.

4. We believe that apathy and resentment are now widespread in Cuba. But while apathy and resentment might complicate Castro's problems, they do not represent a serious threat to him or his regime. In short, we believe that Castro, with Bloc and a certain amount of Free World help, is likely to weather his present difficulties. He is also likely to intensify his subversive activities in Latin America, where the

¹ Current U.S. policy with respect to Cuba. Secret. 8 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba Meetings, 12/63–3/65.

fragile political situation increases the potential of his limited subversive capabilities.

5. In sum, our present policy can be characterized as one of low risk and low return: we are unlikely to experience a direct confrontation with the USSR or to engender political strains with allied or neutral nations. On the other hand, we are still far from accomplishing our objectives of toppling the Castro regime and of eliminating Castro's subversive efforts against friendly Latin American regimes. This is not to say that a continuation of our present policy will not result in a further deterioration in Castro's position: it is to say that under our present policy Castro might be able to hang on for several years. During this time, through Castro's example or through his direct efforts, our own efforts in Latin America will be vastly complicated or even neutralized.

Possible Future Courses of Action

6. Since it appears that current US programs at their present levels are not likely, barring unforeseen events such as the sudden death of Castro, to result in the early overthrow of the Castro Communist regime, it would seem timely to examine what additional covert and overt measures can be taken to quicken the pace of events. The possible future courses of action which follow are less risky than either an invasion or blockade, but would probably involve a substantially higher "noise level" and risk of confrontation with the Soviets than those presently in effect.

A. Covert Actions

7. The current covert action program, if permitted to operate at the pace originally envisioned, will come close to making maximum use of CIA's resources and policy authorization. Consideration should be given to expanding and intensifying the category of sabotage and harassment, at least for the next year. The importance of incapacitating the critical power plants and oil refineries in the Havana, Mtanzas, and Santiago areas of Cuba has been generally recognized. However, hazardous operational conditions around these installations, and concern over the political repercussions of the capture of commandos sent on these missions, have inhibited mounting maritime raids. A number of these targets, however, may be more effectively attacked from the air under acceptable risk conditions.

8. Two courses of action together with their advantages and disadvantages are submitted for consideration:

a. Relaxation of the present policy banning all independent (non-CIA controlled or sponsored) Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against targets in Cuba from US and urge the British to do likewise for Bahamian territory.

Advantages

(1) Would increase number of raids having some economic and psychological effect, would dramatically highlight the inability of the regime to cope with these raids and tend to demoralize the armed forces.

(2) In addition to some economic damage, would cause the Cuban government to divert its manpower and other resources from pressing economic problems.

(3) Could embolden a number of “wait and see” Latin American countries to support stronger unilateral and multilateral measures against Castro.

(4) Would provide cover for CIA controlled raids.

Disadvantages

(1) Would raise “noise level” and increase risk of incidents on high seas in which US Navy might become involved.

(2) Might cause Soviet reaction in Berlin or elsewhere.

(3) Actions uncontrolled by US both as to timing and selection of targets, possibly striking at Soviet vessels and installations.

(4) US Government would be charged with complicity since American territory being used as base.

b. Authorization to conduct CIA or autonomous group controlled air strikes against selected major economic targets such as the power plants and oil refineries.

Advantages

(1) Same as for a. above and, in addition, would cause major damage to the Cuban economy.

Disadvantages

(1) Same as for a. above and, in addition, could cause revulsion against Cuban exiles and possibly US if target missed and sizeable number of innocent people killed.

B. Overt Actions by Other US Agencies Supported by CIA as Appropriate

9. The main emphasis of overt US programs against Castro is to complete the economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from Latin America and the free world and to build defenses against Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America. These measures have been largely responsible for Castro’s current economic distress, but additional effective economic warfare measures could be taken. These are cited below together with their advantages and disadvantages.

a. President Johnson could issue an early policy declaration on Cuba making clear that the US continues to regard the Castro regime

as intolerable, and that there can be no rapprochement with Castro. Such statements should be designed to stimulate anti-Castro/Communist dissident elements in the armed forces to carry out a coup.

Advantages

(1) Would leave no doubt in minds of dissident Cuban military elements that anti-Castro efforts have the official blessing of the US Government.

(2) Would have a salutary effect on those Latin American leaders who have indicated a willingness to follow a positive US lead in taking more forceful action against Castro.

(3) Statement would have favorable effect on anti-Castro Cuban population and exile community and encourage them to intensify resistance against Castro regime.

Disadvantages

(1) Might be considered to involve the President too directly in operational matters.

b. By an interplay of diplomatic pressure and political warfare to cause the Kremlin to conclude that Cuba had become a liability and disengagement would be in the best Soviet interest. The President and his representatives could place the Soviets on notice via diplomatic channels and in private confidential discussion that US rapprochement with Castro is excluded from consideration, and that the existence of the Castro regime is a serious impediment to détente with the USSR. The US could offer to assist the Soviets in finding a face saving way to withdraw gracefully from Cuba without serious long-term damage to its prestige.

Advantages

The advantages of inducing the USSR to disengage from Cuba are obvious.

Disadvantages

Soviets might attempt to engage the US in protracted diplomatic negotiations with US bargaining concessions in Cuba for US concessions on other critical issues such as Berlin, East-West trade, etc.

c. There is still considerable opportunity for tightening the economic noose around Castro. More severe US sanctions against countries that trade with or ship to Cuba could be imposed. We are particularly concerned with the current trade and shipping practices of Canada, the UK, Spain and Japan.

Advantages

(1) Forces greater dependence on the Soviet Bloc with consequent increased drain on Soviet resources.

(2) Increased economic chaos leading to greater vulnerability for coup and increased disaffection on part Cuban population.

Disadvantages

(1) Probable adverse public and official reaction from free world and other countries affected by US economic sanctions and pressures.

(2) Practical difficulties in applying sanctions, particularly against friendly countries, might prove embarrassing to the United States.

(3) On a longterm basis, forcing Cuba into closer economic integration with the Soviet Bloc would not be advantageous for the US if other measures do not topple Castro (i.e., creates permanent satellite).

d. Seek to obtain OAS endorsement for blanket authority under the Rio Treaty to search and seize selected Cuban and OAS member registry vessels at will, to include the use of force if necessary. The ostensible purpose of this measure will be to quarantine covert arms, equipment and personnel shipments from Cuba to Latin America. In fact, however, these actions would be designed to humiliate Castro at home and abroad and to infuriate and provoke him into irresponsible actions which the US, if it so desired, could use as justification for more forceful measures against Cuba.

Advantages

(1) In addition to advantages implied in the text above, it would have favorable psychological effect on Cuban leaders and people, demonstrating firm OAS position against Castro regime.

Disadvantages

(1) Failure effectively to implement OAS decision might discredit OAS, embarrass US and enhance Castro prestige.

(2) Might cause Castro to commit impulsive act such as attack on a Latin American country which could lead to US involvement and possible confrontation with Soviets.

e. OAS-wide or bilateral agreements with Latin American governments could be negotiated for joint measures, to detect and prevent arms smuggling by land, sea, or air into Latin America. Because of the urgency of the threat, Venezuela and Colombia should be given first priority.

Advantages

(1) Would further isolate Castro and damage his prestige at home.

(2) Psychological defeat for Castro in Latin America.

(3) Would demoralize and weaken revolutionary elements in Latin America.

Disadvantages

(1) Measure is mainly defensive and does little to hasten removal of Castro.

(2) Might involve risk of Soviet retaliation in Berlin, or elsewhere.

In Conclusion

10. The courses of action suggested above will increase Castro's problems and might thereby hasten his downfall. To the extent that these actions have genuine OAS support and participation, they will be that much more effective. In the last analysis, however, there are only two courses which would eliminate the Castro regime at an early date: an invasion or a complete blockade. Both of these actions would result in a major crisis between the US and the USSR (in Cuba and or Berlin) and would produce substantial strains in the fabric of US relations with other countries—allied as well as neutral. To a greater extent than in any of the courses discussed above, OAS support would be important, if not critical, in reducing the risks and in increasing the practical and political effect of an invasion or a blockade.

**726. Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy,
December 12¹**

December 12, 1963

SUBJECT

Cuba—Standing Group Item

1. I am going to New York this afternoon to give a talk to some Peace Corps types, training at Columbia: this is the talk I told you about a couple weeks ago. I will be back on the last shuttle tonight.

2. This afternoon State will be sending over a short memorandum to the President. While it is still being thrashed out over at State, it will probably explain the two options involved in controlling arms shipments between Cuba and Latin America—(1) involving stop and search of Cuban vessels on the high seas (possible use of force, with

¹ Possible courses of action in controlling arms shipments between Cuba and Latin America. Secret. 2 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Vol. A (Gordon Chase File), 11/63–5/64.

escalation implications) and (2) involving the search of suspect vessels in territorial waters (no force and no escalation implications).

The memorandum will probably also attach a draft cable to Mexico City and Rio, asking our Embassys to make informal soundings on host government reactions to the option regarding the use of force. Implicit in the memorandum may be the thought that if the Mexicans and Brazilians are willing, then we are too.

3. It is hard to know exactly what State is going to come up with, but you may want to watch for the following points when the package comes over:

(a) I personally think that the President should, at a minimum, reserve his position on the “force” option. In my humble (and probably lonely) view, the “force” option, which involves possible escalation, should be measured not only against other possible OAS actions, but against other courses of action (unilateral and bilateral) which can bring about escalation; assuming we want to heat up the Caribbean area, it is not necessarily axiomatic that a bad multilateral method is better than a good unilateral method. In this regard, the Standing Group meeting tomorrow should be helpful; as I understand it, bilateral and unilateral courses of action, to make life difficult for Castro, will be discussed.

3. With regard to the cable, I think it is O.K. to make very informal soundings of the Mexicans and Brazilians on the possible use of force; the chances are high that these countries will be quite negative. Yet, there is always the off-chance that they would indicate their willingness to use force if the evidence of subversion is good (and it probably will be). Therefore, in my opinion, the cable should reflect the thought that although we are interested in the Mexican and Brazilian views, we have definitely not made up our own minds on this point. That is, even in the unlikely event that the Mexicans and Brazilians are mildly in favor of (or would abstain) the force option, we are not committed to go ahead with it.

Gordon Chase

727. Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, December 12¹

December 12, 1963

SUBJECT

Transmittal of Documents for Discussion NSC Standing Group, December 13, 1963, 11:00 a.m.

Attached is a draft paper for discussion at the NSC Standing Group meeting to be held Friday, December 13, 1963, at 11:00 a.m.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment

*POSSIBLE FURTHER UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL
ACTIONS TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON CUBA
(SHORT OF USE OF FORCE)*

I. Unilateral

A. Air attacks against carefully selected, important economic installations by autonomous Cuban exile group(s) operating from bases outside the United States.

(Capability to be provided to autonomous group(s) by CIA on "plausible denial" basis. Authorization for such operations has been requested in past but not granted.)

1. Advantages

- Possible substantial direct economic effects
- Indirect economic effects (maintenance of military alert with consequent partial tying up of labor force)
- Positive effects on morale of anti-Castro elements and waverers within Cuba
- Clear demonstration to Castro of determination of opposition

2. Disadvantages

- Technical difficulties and cost of providing capability
- Uncertainty of successful execution

¹ Transmits paper entitled "Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of the Use of Force)" for discussion at the NSC Standing Group meeting December 13. Top Secret. 11 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights—Contingency Plans.

- Risk of attributability
- Direct conflict with our well-known, public opposition to air attacks

- Marked raising of noise level
- Possible Soviet reaction, including negative effect on troop withdrawals

- Possible reaction against air surveillance

B. Selective covert relaxation of U.S. controls against Cuban exile groups in Florida wishing to undertake sabotage and infiltration activities.

(Involves discreet neutralization of obstacles to the operations of such groups established by United States enforcement agencies).

1. *Advantages*

- Possible additional (but minor) direct economic damage
- Possible indirect economic effects
- Provision of some screen for CIA's own operations
- Possible dilution of Cuban defenses of benefit to CIA operations
- Positive effects on Cuban exile morale
- Some positive effects on morale of anti-Castro elements and waverers within Cuba
- Method of signalling to Castro change to "harder" U.S. policy

2. *Disadvantages*

- U.S. acquiescence quite evident
- Direct conflict with our statements and actions concerning U.S.-based exile raids
- Uncertainty of control over choice of targets (e.g., Soviet vessels)
- Raising of noise level
- Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal of military personnel

C. Military Feints

(Movement of U.S. air and surface units over and in international waters near Cuba in manner designed to keep Cuban military force in state of alert and uncertainty. To be effective, movements would have to be extended over time)

1. *Advantages*

- Indirect economic effects of maintenance of military alert
- Psychological harassment of Castro and other leaders
- Opportunities for escalation, if desired

2. *Disadvantages*

- Risk of reaction by Castro, with consequent danger of escalation
- Investment of U.S. forces over time in essentially psychological exercise

—Possible negative effects on morale of anti-Castro elements and waverers within Cuba when nothing substantial happens

—Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal of military personnel

D. *Occasional, selected low-level "reconnaissance" overflights by U.S. aircraft*

(Flight paths would be designed to reduce to a minimum the possibility of effective Cuban counter-action against aircraft)

1. *Advantages*

—Most emphatic method of signalling a change to "harder" policy

—Possible tie-in to need for intelligence on Cuban capabilities for delivering arms to Latin America

—Possible beneficial intelligence side effects

2. *Disadvantages*

—Risk of escalation (Cubans on formal record concerning reaction to low-level flights)

—Possible reaction against high-level flights

—Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal of military personnel

—Possible raising of public and Congressional apprehension that offensive weapons systems have been reintroduced

E. *Free-world shipping*

(Examples: extension of NSAM 220 to cover *all* ships owned or controlled by a firm with ships in the Cuban trade, denial of commercial, as well as U.S.-financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in Cuban trade)

1. *Advantages*

—Some limited reduction of number of free-world vessels in Cuban trade

—Heightened appearance of forward movement because of Congressional and press sensitivity to shipping question

2. *Disadvantages*

—Relatively small practical returns

—Political costs with maritime nations

—Possible legal difficulties involved in some unilateral measures

II. *Bilateral*

A. *General*

Essentially, the effort in the bilateral field would represent a continuation, sharpening and intensification of programs already in effect.

Measures of a bilateral nature, outside and within the Hemisphere, would be strengthened and facilitated by OAS decisions and recom-

mendations emerging from the Venezuelan case. Wherever possible, the OAS resolutions would request the cooperation of other countries.

The basic limiting factor in the intensification of our political and economic pressure on other countries bilaterally is, of course, the balance that must be struck between our interests with respect to Cuba and other broad interests at play in our bilateral relations. For example, Spain's increasing commercial and transportation relations with Cuba are a matter of concern in terms of our Cuban policy, yet the political and economic pressure we can exert on Spain is circumscribed by the need to safeguard our other political and military interests in Spain.

B. Economic Denial

This program involves overt and covert, legal and extra-legal, diplomatic and private, efforts to deny Cuba access to free-world markets and sources of supply for commodities critical or important to the Cuban economy. A major inhibiting element in this effort is the short world supply of sugar which increases Cuban leverage on free-world sugar consumers. In addition, there is a general (but varying) reluctance on the part of free-world countries to interfere with trade in items which are not strategic in the internationally accepted sense (COCOM, Battle Act). This fact puts a premium on direct overt and covert pressures on the companies involved, as distinguished from governments.

Progress has been made in our economic denial program, and effective operations have been carried out cooperatively by State, Treasury, Commerce and CIA. There is, however, considerable additional effort required, especially because Castro is now engaged in a major attempt to broaden trade with the free-world. No new authority is required at this time, but rather an intensification of efforts through the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba.

A more restrictive legal interpretation by the Executive Branch of the various legislative provisions on trade with Cuba could have considerable impact, if we were prepared to accept the costs to our other interests in the offending countries and if we were prepared tacitly to indicate that existing legal interpretations had been in error.

C. Free-World Shipping in Cuban Trade

An additional immediately available step would be the conclusion of an agreement involving the amendment of NSAM 220 with the British shipowner, Mavroleon, to guarantee the withdrawal by early 1965 of all his ships in return for the progressive removal from the blacklist of his vessels as they get out of the trade. This agreement should have beneficial effects on other important ship owners.

A selective refusal to exercise the Presidential waiver of the Cuban shipping provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization act could increase our diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, if we were ready to incur the costs to our broad interests in the offending countries.

D. Air Service to and from Cuba

Our efforts to reduce, restrict and harass air services (free-world and Communist) to and from Cuba should be strengthened by the provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization act, if, again, we are prepared to accept the costs to other interests in the offending countries. On the other hand, a US-USSR civil air agreement could have erosive effects on the always precarious barriers we have established against air services to Cuba.

E. Anti-Subversive Program

Essentially, the problem here is to strengthen both the will and the capability in Latin America to take the politically and technically difficult measures which have been recommended. The basic lines of the anti-subversive program have been laid out, and they are being followed with varying degrees of success in the different countries. Constant follow-up, technical advice and assistance, and training are essential to improvement in the execution of the program.

728. Special report prepared by the CIA, December 13¹

OCI No. 0310/63B

December 13, 1963

FIDEL CASTRO'S GROWING MILITARY POWER

The Soviet Union has undertaken to provide Fidel Castro with the arms and assistance he needs to field an effective army, backed up by a modern air defense system and a versatile coastal defense navy. As a result, the Cuban armed forces have a higher level of combat capability now than ever before. In particular, their ability to maintain internal security has been increased. Castro has taken precautions to attempt to assure the political reliability of the officer corps, even at the expense of military proficiency. Despite the improvements, several weaknesses in the Cuban armed forces remain.

Soviet Aid Since the Crisis

Since the Soviet missiles and bombers were withdrawn from Cuba last year, the USSR has transferred to Cuban control all remaining Soviet weapons except the surface-to-air missiles and possibly the

¹ "Fidel Castro's Growing Military Power." Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label.

coastal-defense cruise missiles and FROG tactical rockets. By mid-1964, Cubans will probably have the ability to operate all of these weapon systems.

Soviet military supplies and equipment continue to arrive, although in greatly reduced quantities since October 1962. Only nine full shiploads of military matériel have arrived this year, as compared with over [illegible in the original] such shipments during the three-month military build-up in mid-1962. Other ships have delivered a large number of trucks, some military equipment, six motor torpedo boats, and several helicopters. Many Soviet military advisers and technicians remain to train Cuban troops and to oversee the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment still on the island.

Ground Forces

Until mid-1960, arms and equipment on hand for use by the Cuban Army ranged from weapons of Spanish-American War vintage to those of the World War II period. The older weapons and vehicles were for the most part in poor condition and badly maintained. There was a critical shortage of heavy weapons and artillery. Many of the US-supplied armored vehicles were useless for want of parts. Communications equipment was inadequate, and there were too few trained communications personnel for large-scale field operations.

In mid-1960, Soviet military equipment and training cadres began arriving in Cuba. Since then, the Cuban Army—traditionally the favored branch of the armed forces—has been extensively reorganized and reequipped. Under Soviet guidance, Castro's undisciplined and poorly trained "revolutionary" forces have been welded into a well-equipped and better trained regular army along the Soviet model.

In line with Soviet practice, counterintelligence and internal security functions—formerly under the military—were transferred to the Department of State Security under the Ministry of the Interior. The use of political officers was instituted in the army. By late 1961, the six army districts had been reorganized into three geographic commands.


Since mid-1961, the revolutionary militia has been largely disbanded. Much of it has been absorbed into active duty units or transferred to the ready reserve. The remainder serves as a home-guard People's Defense Force upon which to draw in time of emergency. In mid-1962, the expanding anti-insurgent (LCB) forces were reorganized.

By the end of 1962, Cuban ground forces had apparently achieved the organizational stature referred to by Castro as "that of a major country." Since then, other units have been organized in response to particular Cuban needs. "Anti-pirate" units have been formed for combating maritime raiders, and several mobile "antilandings" armored battalions have been organized for coastal defense purposes.

Still more recently, three-year compulsory military service was instituted for all males between the ages of 17 and 45. Under this program, some 80,000 men could be inducted into the armed services in the next three years. Many provisions of the new draft law were taken directly from similar laws in bloc countries.

In addition to Soviet technical and advisory assistance, the Cuban Army has received large quantities of Soviet military matériel including 600 to 700 T-34 and T-54/55 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,000 artillery pieces, 700 antiaircraft guns, and some 20,000 military vehicles. As many as 30 FROG tactical rockets with a range of 25 miles, and about the same number of Snapper wire-guided antitank rocket launchers were delivered to Cuba during the military build-up last year. All these weapons, with the possible exception of the FROGs, have been transferred to Cuban control. The FROGs have been moved from Artemisa and Remedios to the Santiago de Las Vegas armored camp near Havana, probably for Cuban unit training or possibly for shipment to the USSR.

Cuban Army Districts



The four Soviet armored camps have also been transferred to the Cubans and most Soviet ground forces personnel have been withdrawn from the island. Those remaining are involved in training Cuban units

in tactical operations and in the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans.

The over-all capability of the standing army and ready reserve has been enhanced by new equipment, extensive training, and mobilization experience. Cuban ground forces appear well able to control internal resistance, and, as they assimilate the Soviet arms and training, their ability to defend against large-scale invasion will increase. The capabilities of the Cuban forces are still limited by lack of training and experience in combined operations, however, and their capability for sustained field operations remains limited by a general lack of organic transport and logistic support.

Air Defense Forces

Prior to 1961, Cuban air forces used a variety of obsolete US fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft. Soviet guidance and matériel assistance have greatly increased the size and potential of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force. A number of Cuban pilots began training in the bloc in late 1960. By mid-1961 the first MIG jet fighters had been delivered to Cuba. Since then, over 100 MIG aircraft and some 100 helicopters have been shipped from the USSR.


In March 1963, the Soviets began training Cuban pilots to fly the high-performance MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighter. Sometime last summer the MIG-21s were apparently turned over to Cuban control. Most Soviet pilots were probably withdrawn from the island at that time. More pilots are reportedly being trained both in Cuba and in the bloc.

Both the Soviet-supplied helicopters and MIG jet fighters have participated in missions against antigovernment forces with increasing frequency in the past few months. The MIGs have been participating in actual search and attack missions. The Cubans have used the helicopters in anti-insurgent operations throughout the island. The helicopters also have been noted operating with patrol craft in search of raiders and defectors.

The surface-to-air missile (SAM) system—the only air defense element in Cuba with an all-weather capability—remains under Soviet control. In November, however, after completing classroom training in SAM operations, a large number of Cubans began field training at individual SAM sites. By mid-1964, the Cubans probably will be able to operate the entire air defense system, including the present 24-site SAM system, with only technical and logistic assistance from the USSR.

The SAM and air defense systems are being reorganized as Cuban training in the systems progresses. Nine SAM sites have been relocated since September to provide better defense of major cities and installations—especially Havana, which now is ringed by five sites. In the process, the more modern SAM guidance radar originally brought in for

Soviet use was replaced by older equipment, probably in anticipation of a transfer of the system to the Cubans. Some early-warning-radar sites have also been relocated.



Although Cuban air defense capabilities have been increasing rapidly in the last few months, the complexity of electronic and other equipment in the air defense system will require a continuing dependence on Soviet technical and matériel assistance. The Cuban air defense forces will probably need a relatively greater number of Soviet technicians for a longer period of time than either the Cuban ground or naval forces.

Naval Forces

The Cuban Navy was almost entirely disbanded in August 1960 as the result of purges in the wake of anti-Castro plotting. At that time it consisted of only five US-made World War II patrol escorts and numerous small craft. By late 1961, however, several hundred Cuban naval personnel had begun training in the USSR, and in January 1962 the first Soviet naval vessels were delivered to Cuba. By the end of that year, 6 Kronshtadt-class subchasers, 16 P-6 motor torpedo boats, 12 Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, and several small craft had been delivered. In June 1963, after Castro's trip to the USSR, 6 fast P-4 motor torpedo boats were shipped to Cuba to bolster the navy's capability against maritime raiders.

The number of vessels is still inadequate for protecting the more than 3,000 miles of Cuban coastline and more Soviet ships are scheduled for delivery in the near future.

With the exception of the Komar boats—which arrived during the military build-up of mid-1962—all of the Soviet vessels were transferred to Cuban control upon delivery. Since then, they have been used for training, escort, and patrol missions.

The Komars were transferred to Cuban control this August, at which time most Soviet naval personnel were withdrawn from the island. Although Cubans have not yet conducted a Komar missile-

firing exercise, the Komar boats are being used on patrol missions off the northern coast.


Cubans have probably been training in coastal defense cruise missile operations since spring, and there are indications that the Soviets have already transferred this weapon system and its four launch sites to Cuban control—possibly to the new Cuban Army “antilandings” forces. When enough Cubans have been trained, ten additional sites could be set up on the island with the 150 cruise missiles delivered during the military build-up last year.

Although unlikely to be used against clandestine raiders, the 35-mile-range cruise missiles would add to Castro’s ability to defend against invasion if operationally deployed about the island in sizable numbers. Effective operation of the missiles will probably depend on Soviet technical assistance for the foreseeable future.


Although maintenance problems continue to plague the Cuban Navy, the operational efficiency of this 5,000- to 6,000-man force has improved under Soviet tutelage. Re-equipped, reorganized, and purged of “unreliable” elements, the Cuban Navy has become a coastal defense force of some ability, increasingly capable of detecting and preventing maritime raids, protecting friendly shipping, and maintaining surveillance of vessels and aircraft in coastal waters.

The Outlook

The Soviets have not stinted in their efforts to provide Castro with an independent military capability. Cuba, for example, has more MIG-21 aircraft, Komar guided missile patrol boats, SAM sites, and cruise missiles than most of the bloc countries. Nonetheless, Cuban military forces are hampered by several serious weaknesses which cannot be easily overcome.



KOMAR Boat in Havana Harbor



Cruise Missiles in Havana Parade

The most serious of these soft spots is dependence on Soviet technical and matériel assistance, a dependence which has increased in proportion to the amount of advanced Soviet equipment introduced. If for any reason this Soviet aid were to be withdrawn, the Cuban military would find itself hard pressed to maintain effective operations, both

for the lack of Cuban technical know-how and the lack of Soviet supplies. The logistical line from the USSR to Cuba is a very long and vulnerable one.

A second serious limitation on Cuban military effectiveness is the tendency to measure ability in terms of political reliability rather than professional competence. Military purges, while generally successful in eliminating anti-Castro elements, have also rid the services of some of their more capable personnel. While the number of faithful Communists in the armed forces is small, most of the officers and men who remain appear to be loyal Fidelistas. Barring an unforeseen deterioration in living conditions and military discipline, there seems to be little likelihood of widespread disaffection within the military.

Inexperience in combat operations is still another weakness. The lack of skill displayed in actual operations against insurgents suggests that only a limited combat capability has thus far been achieved.

Finally, the Cubans lack either the sea- or air-lift capability necessary for conducting overseas military operations. Castro's paramilitary and harassment capability is probably sufficient for exploiting precarious political situations in the Caribbean area, however.

Barring a significant deterioration in Cuban-Soviet relations, Castro's military machine should continue to serve as an effective deterrent to internal dissidence, and will become increasingly effective against exile raids and all external threats short of full-scale invasion. In addition, control of the SAM system—if transferred to the Cubans—will ultimately place Castro in a position to cope with US overflights if he decides to attempt such a move.

**729. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson,
December 15¹**

December 15, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting on Cuba—December 19, 1963

At 11:00 A.M. on Thursday, you will be meeting primarily with State, Defense, and CIA, to discuss further possible measures we can take against Castro, which stop short of invasion and blockade. The following is an attempt to describe the Cuban problem as a whole—where we have been since January, 1963: where we are now; and where we seem to be headed. The paper ends with a brief description of a number of further possible measures we can take against Cuba. State, Defense, and CIA, which, by and large, have reserved their positions on these measures, will be prepared to discuss them with you in detail at the meeting.

I. Current U.S. Policy

The bare minimum objective of our policy is a Cuba which poses no threat to its neighbors and which is not a Soviet satellite. In moving towards this objective we have rejected the options of unprovoked U.S. military intervention in Cuba and of ineffective, total blockade around Cuba—primarily because they would risk another US–USSR confrontation. Instead, we are engaged in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures, both defensive and offensive, which stop short of these drastic measures.

II. Review of U.S. Measures Against Cuba Since January, 1963

On January 2, 1963, the White House set up an interdepartmental task force, headed by State, to coordinate all matters pertaining to Cuba. With the establishment of the Cuban Coordinating Committee, our post-missile crisis measures against Cuba began. These measures have been essentially either defensive or offensive in nature.

A. Defensive Measures

Our defensive measures have primarily aimed at three targets:

(1) *Cuba, the Military Threat*—We have been intent on ensuring that Cuba does not become again an “offensive weapons” (e.g. missiles)

¹ Discussion of further possible measures the U.S. can take against Castro that stop short of invasion and blockade in preparation for the President's meeting with State, Defense, and CIA officials December 19. Top Secret. 23 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63–3/65.

threat to the U.S. or Latin America. To this end we have conducted intensive air and sea surveillance around and over Cuba and have collected intelligence from within Cuba. So far as we know, we have been entirely successful in this effort and Cuba is not now an "offensive weapons" threat to either the U.S. or to Latin America.

But even without "offensive weapons" Cuba remains a powerful military establishment in Latin America. To discourage possible Cuban military attacks against its neighbors, we have put ourselves clearly on record that any such Cuban moves will have dire consequences for Cuba.

(2) *Soviet Troops*—We have been intent, for domestic political, as well as national security reasons on effecting the removal of all Soviet military personnel from Cuba. To this end we have made it eminently clear to the Soviets on numerous occasions that we strongly oppose the permanent assignment of Soviet military personnel to Cuba. As a result of Soviet self-interest and our pressures, there are now 4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel (mostly advisers and technicians) remaining in Cuba, representing a drop of about 65% to 75% from the peak reached in the autumn of 1962: a net outflow appears to be continuing. However, the issue remains a delicate one. At any moment the Russians could arbitrarily decide to send more troops into Cuba. Also, the fact that possibly volatile Cubans will probably control the surface-to-air missile sites by mid-1964 is disturbing.

(3) *Subversion*—We have been intent on impeding and if possible stopping Cuban based and supported subversion in the Hemisphere. To this end we have made a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direct Latin American attention to, and to assist (materially where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problem of controlling internal insurgency and in controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin America and Cuba. On the one hand we have had some success—there is now an increased awareness in Latin America of the extent and nature of the threat along with an increased capability and will in Latin America to do something about the problem. One measure of our success is Venezuelan readiness, in contrast to previous reluctance, to make an international issue out of the discovery of [illegible in the original]. Another small measure of this success is that primarily through the use of travel control by Latin American governments, there has been a 50% drop over the past year in the number of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba.

On the other hand, with Castro still exceedingly intent on producing "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere, and with many Latin American governments still unwilling or unable to cope effectively with subversive efforts, much remains to be done. In this regard proper exploitation

of the recent discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela might take us a long way towards getting wholehearted Latin American cooperation in the fight against subversion. Such cooperation is a vital key to success in this field.

B. *Offensive Measures*

Offensively, our ultimate minimum target is to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. We hope to achieve this by concentrating mainly on three intermediate targets—intensifying Cuba's already-serious economic difficulties; increasing the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets of maintaining Cuba; and stimulating direct and indirect internal resistance to the regime. Our chief weapons for achieving these offensive targets are two—isolation measures and covert measures (which also have an impact on our defensive targets, particularly Cuban subversion).

(1) *Isolation Measures*—The most outstanding characteristic of our isolation measures is that they have been exceedingly difficult to implement—primarily because implementation depends on the cooperation of others and not on U.S. will alone. Nevertheless, while one could have reasonably expected our isolation policy to break up as the world moved away from the heat of October, 1962, in fact, this has not happened.

Instead, while far from performing [illegible in the original] over the past year, our isolation policy generally has held the ground already made in some fields, while making further progress in others. About a year ago, only 5 OAS countries maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba; the number not only remains the same now, but anticipated OAS reaction to the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela gives me reason to hope for further ruptures. The low level of Free World trade with Cuba reached in 1962 has generally been maintained in 1963. Air isolation of Cuba has been fairly successful; a dramatic demonstration of this is the fact that many Latin Americans have had to travel to and from Cuba via Prague. The total number of Free World shipments in Cuba in 1963 is running at roughly 40% of 1962 levels. Prospects for further reduction are good since we now seem to be making good progress with the three principal shipping countries—Greece, Lebanon, and the UK. In this regard, the Greeks have recently issued stiffer laws to prevent their ships from going to or from Cuba, while the Lebanese have drafted (but have not yet enacted) legislation to the same end; and some important British shipping companies (e.g., [less than 1 line not declassified]) have finally decided that they should play ball with us.

But there is plenty of room for improvement. There are still roughly 30 Free World ships per month in the Cuban trade. Free World countries still send many commodities other than [illegible in the original] to

Cuba which Cuba needs desperately. And there are still air routes between Cuba and Spain and Mexico.

The effectiveness of our isolation policy in hitting the target is impossible to gauge accurately. While Hurricane Flora, in a few days, probably hit the target more squarely than our isolation measures did in a year, it is generally agreed that the economic chaos which now in fact exists in Cuba and the enormity of the Soviet aid bill is, in part at least, due to our efforts. Castro's repeated and loud public protestations about our isolation policy and his serious and energetic efforts to break out of Free World isolation substantiate the view that the isolation measures probably hurt him, economically and politically.

(2) *Covert Measures*—Our covert program over the past year has covered essentially six areas. *First*, through a variety of techniques, we have collected intelligence for both U.S. strategic requirements and for operational requirements; the quantity and quality is good but there is always room for improvement. *Second*, CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media, directed at Cuba, have been used to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. *Third*, CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba commodities which it urgently needs. *Fourth*, we have been trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime, with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro; we currently are in direct contact with several people in Cuba who may be of significance. *Fifth*, we have directed four small-scale externally-mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resistance and [illegible in the original] economically. *Sixth*, in order to expand sabotage and resistance activities we have been involved in aiding autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals, who will probably be ready to begin infiltration and sabotage in mid-January, and who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. (A financial breakdown of CIA's covert Cuban operations since 1960 attached at *Tab I*.)

The most outstanding characteristic of our covert action program so far is that its potential for bringing about a basic change in Cuba is still largely unknown. The program which makes use of Cuban exiles and which is not yet fully underway has already achieved a degree of success—e.g. in demonstrating to Cubans that Castro is not invulnerable, in forcing Castro to divert valuable resources for defense against covert activities, in inflicting small, but cumulatively significant economic damage, and perhaps in stimulating to some degree the insurgency which is evident in Cuba. As yet our covert program has not been directed in such a way as to inflict serious economic damage on

Cuba. There are those who believe that much can be done in this regard, as well as in stimulating further resistance. But our covert program presently operates under almost two [illegible in the original]—present policy prevents covert air attacks on Cuban targets and prevents free-lance exile raids on Cuba from U.S. territory.

III. *Where are We Going?*

In theory, at least, our present offensive measures, vigorously pursued and, to a degree, complemented by our defensive measures, could lead finally to one of the following three eventualities, each of which constitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

A. *Overthrow of the Castro Regime*

Most Cuban experts in the U.S. Government regard this as the most likely of the three eventualities. Hopefully, by exerting maximum pressure by all the means available to the U.S. Government, short of military force, we will be able to bring about a degree of disorganization, uncertainty, and discontent in Cuba which will predispose elements in the power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; at some stage of the revolt, it is likely that direct, or indirect U.S. support will be needed to ensure its success. Theoretically, the Cuban people, tired of economic hardship, lack of freedom, and isolation from their Latin American brethren, will embrace the revolt.

B. *Accommodation with Castro on U.S. Terms*

Under this eventuality, Castro would agree to break his tie-line with the USSR, stop his subversion efforts, and perhaps renounce the Communist ideology. While highly unlikely, it is not inconceivable that such factors as (1) U.S. isolation and covert measures, (2) further Cuban economic deterioration, in spite of Soviet aid, and (3) distrust of the Soviet intentions will lead Castro to believe he has no choice but accommodation. Indeed, there is evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these lines. In the past few months he has made a number of accommodation noises and since he undoubtedly has a pretty good reading of our minimum terms, these noises could conceivably indicate that he is willing to go a long way towards meeting them. Che Guevara's reported nervousness at Castro's accommodation tendencies substantiates the view that Castro's desire to negotiate is genuine and not a ploy to reduce U.S. heat on Cuba.

But there are obvious major problems with this alternative. Not the least of these is whether the American people would tolerate accommodation with even a reformed Castro and whether or not we could prove to the American people that we've gotten from Castro what we say we've gotten. Nevertheless, there is rebuttal for such arguments and accommodation remains a distinct possibility, if not for now then for later.

C. A Soviet Decision to Quit Cuba

This may be the most unlikely of the three eventualities, yet such a Soviet decision cannot be dismissed categorically in view of such factors as (1) the lack of real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "show-piece", (2) the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a Soviet "dead end" in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will be permitted), (3) the magnitude of Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how the Russians would view their eviction from Cuba, either by the overthrow of Castro's regime or by a Castro decision to accommodate with the U.S. on U.S. terms. Relief would conceivably mix generously with Russian grief, especially if the Russians could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf.

IV. Current Estimate of Possible Success

The \$64 question—Will our present offensive measures, even if implemented vigorously and flawlessly, ever lead by one way or another, to the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere?—is impossible to answer. Castro's position within Cuba appears to be eroding gradually, while the situation in Cuba is characterized by economic stagnation, depressed living conditions, the loss of revolutionary impetus, and the disillusionment of an increasing large majority of the population; moreover, Castro's stature in Latin America is generally very low. Nevertheless, the general consensus seems to be that Castro still retains control; without stepping up our pressures considerably, the chances are practically nil that we will get to Castro in the near future and only fairly good that we will get to him eventually.

Probably the most we can say for certain is that we appear to be moving in the right general direction; and this, of course, is important. A vigorous, tough, and nasty policy probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the three eventualities which are noted above and which constitute the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. From a domestic political viewpoint, this is probably fortuitous: a tough but no invasion policy is one policy which the American people appear prepared to support at this time.

V. Further Possible Measures Against Cuba

The general consensus in the Government is that we should try to find ways of stepping up our pressures against the Castro regime. One of the most important reasons for this is that the Castro regime continues to constitute a threat to Latin America. While Castro's efforts in Latin America may not be substantial in absolute terms, he is operating in an area which is politically especially fragile.

It is also generally agreed that we are now in a good time-frame to step up our pressures. The recent discovery of the Cuban arms cache

in Venezuela should permit us to raise the general noise level in and around Cuba. Actions which we may have been reluctant to take several months ago, may now be feasible.

The following is a list of further actions, short of invasion and blockade, which we may want to take in the near future. They can conveniently be divided into unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures. The brief description following each measure is meant to give you a flavor for some of the more important implications. At the meeting, State, Defense, and CIA will be prepared to discuss each of the measures with you in depth and in detail.

A. Unilateral Measures

(1) *Air Attacks*—We can authorize CIA to conduct or to equip autonomous exile groups to conduct air attacks against selected major economic targets such as power plants and oil refineries. As a starter, we [illegible in the original] have [illegible in the original] targets in mind. These are considerably more difficult to attack from the ground but planning for a ground attack on one of these targets is already underway. Planning for an attack on the Santiago oil refinery will be completed [illegible in the original] 1964.

While the concrete and psychological advantages of selected air strikes have always been recognized, and while unauthorized air strikes have in fact already taken place over Cuba, up to now it has been our policy to steer clear of U.S. involvement in his sort of activity. Primarily it has been considered a relatively high risk, high noise-level type of operation which would not have a major impact on Castro, which would be hard to control (e.g. innocents might be killed), and which could conceivably lead to a sharp Soviet reaction in Cuba (e.g. shoot down a U-2) or elsewhere.

(2) *Unleashing of Exiles*—We can relax our present policy of not permitting independent Cuban exile groups to base sea and air attacks on Cuba from U.S. territory; [less than 1 line not declassified]. While such attacks might inflict only small concrete damage on Cuban targets, they have some distinct advantages. For example, they would tend to high-light the regime's weakness, cause Castro to divert more resources to defense, lift the morale of the exiles and of the anti-Castro elements within Cuba, and provide cover for CIA-controlled raids.

This also is not a new subject, and, in the past, the disadvantages were believed to be over-riding. Such autonomous raids, which would involve the U.S. directly and which would raise the noise-level in the Caribbean, would be hard to control; it is possible that raiders would attack Soviet vessels and installations and precipitate strong Russian reaction, including, possibly the transfer of more Soviet troops to Cuba. Moreover, encouragement of autonomous raids on Cuba from U.S. territory would be in sharp variance with our publicly and privately

stated position. Since March 30, 1963 we have taken the public position that we will not tolerate the violation of U.S. neutrality laws, even by anti-Castro raiders. Privately, we have said the same thing to the Soviets while maintaining the position that we have no control over raiding activities which originate outside of U.S. territory.

In the best of all possible worlds, we would prefer that these completely autonomous, amateur exile raiders operate from non-U.S. territory. However, we may not have this option. Generally speaking, such amateurs have their homes in Florida and don't want to move. Moreover, the fact that U.S. territory is physically very close to Cuba makes a difference to the relatively poorly-equipped amateurs who would be involved in this sort of raid.

(3) *Military Feints*—We can move U.S. air and surface units over and in international waters near Cuba in a manner designed to keep Cuban military forces in a state of alert and uncertainty.

This is a measure which has not been explored to the extent of the first two. On the positive side, it would harass Castro, cost him resources, and, if desired, offer opportunities for escalation. On the negative side, there is the ever-present problem of possible escalation which we may not want as well as the investment of U.S. forces, over time, in an essentially psychological exercise. Implicit in this measure is the assumption that we would be able to conduct military feints on a level at which the Cubans would get jumpy but the Russians would not.

(4) *Low-Level Flights*—We can reintroduce low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba in such a way as to minimize the chance of Cuban counter-action. Publicly, we can rationalize the resumption of the flights on the grounds that they will give us more intelligence on Castro's capabilities to ship arms to Latin America. In fact, the primary advantages to low-level flights are psychological; they would indicate a tougher U.S. line and would be extremely irritating to Castro—a blatant disregard for Cuban sovereignty.

Much discussed, the reintroduction of low-level flights has been turned down in the past primarily because of the noise-level problem, and because it might lead to Soviet reaction against our U-2 flights and in other areas. Also there is a real possibility that low-level flights might lead to escalation we would not want; the Cubans are on record that they might try to shoot one down.

(5) *Free World Shipping to Cuba*—We can take further unilateral measures to reduce Free World shipping to Cuba. For example, we can close U.S. ports and deny U.S. Government sponsored shipments to *lines* of some or all countries which have ships in the Cuban trade.

This is a subject which has probably received as much attention as any in the whole realm of Cuban Affairs. Briefly put, we have thus

far rejected further unilateral measures mainly because the nature of the Cuban trade is such (small shipping lines with a greater involvement in Cuban trade than in U.S. trade) that our unilateral measures would simply not provide the leverage needed to produce a substantial reduction in Free World shipping to Cuba; the slight reduction we would get would not be enough to compensate for a number of foreign policy losses we would suffer.

Generally speaking, we have instead concentrated on applying intense bilateral pressures on the governments of Free World countries to control their shipping to Cuba; and have had considerable, but not total, success (see also Section V B (2) below). At the same time, we have not entirely ruled out further unilateral sanctions. Some shipping experts seem to feel that if we apply certain unilateral sanctions in March, 1964, the Soviets and Cubans will have to scramble seriously in order to adjust charters and shipping schedules in time to be prepared for the heavy Cuban shipping season which begins in May.

(6) *Public Presidential Statement*—You can issue an early policy declaration on Cuba, making clear that the U.S. regards the current situation in Cuba as intolerable. Such a statement would be designed to stimulate anti-Castro/Communist dissident elements to carry out a coup. It would also have a salutary effect on those Latin American leaders who have indicated a willingness to follow a positive U.S. lead in taking more forceful action against Cuba.

Your statement might also include the point that the U.S. will not permit the establishment of “another Cuba” in the Hemisphere. This point would be designed to make it clear to the Soviets and Castro that they have reached a “dead end” in the Hemisphere.

On November 18 in Miami, President Kennedy included both of the above points in his speech to the Inter-American Press Association (excerpts are attached at Tab 2). Whether or not you would want to take a more vigorous line in your own statement would have to depend on many factors—e.g. upon U.S. willingness to pursue a more active anti-Cuba policy over the next months, upon possible adverse Latin American reaction to a statement which hints of U.S. interventionism and upon domestic political considerations.

(7) *Talks with the Soviets and Cubans*—We can, through normal diplomatic and private channels attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Cubans and possibly, to encourage some Russian thinking in favor of withdrawal and some Castro thinking in favor of accommodation with the U.S. terms. To the Soviets, we can emphasize (a) that we are never going to let things stand as they are in Cuba, (b) that the Soviets, despite considerable expense, are making and can expect to make, no further real progress in Cuba or elsewhere in the Hemisphere, (c) that the existence of the Soviet tie-line in Cuba is a

serious impediment to a U.S./USSR détente, and (d) that the U.S. is prepared to assist the USSR in finding a fig-leaf to cover Soviet withdrawal from Cuba.

To Castro, very well aware that the Russians pulled the rug out from him in October, 1962 and aware that he is making no progress despite massive Soviet aid, the following type of message might have some appeal. It could be confident in tone to mitigate the possibility of relieving Castro of any anxieties he may have which work in our favor.

"Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressures against you until you fall; we are pretty certain that we will be successful. Moreover, you can forget about getting 'another Cuba' in the Hemisphere. We have learned our lesson and 'another Cuba' is simply not going to happen. However, we are reasonable men. We are not intent on having your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people. You know our central concerns—the Soviet connection and the subversion. If you feel you are in a position to allay these concerns, we can probably work out a way to live amicable together and to build a prosperous Cuba. If you don't feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole thing; we are quite content to continue on our present basis."

B. *Bilateral Measures*

Further efforts in this field essentially would represent a continuation, sharpening, and intensification of programs already in effect. A basic limiting factor is the degree to which we are willing to expend credit with our allies to obtain this cooperation in making life difficult for Cuba.

(1) *Free World Trade with Cuba*—We can through overt and covert, legal and extra-legal, diplomatic and private means, make a greater effort to deny Cuba access to Free World markets and sources of supply; extra-special attention can be directed to those Free World commodities which are critical or important to the Cuban economy.

There are some real obstacles to further progress in this field—a world-wide shortage of sugar which increases Cuba's leverage over Free World sugar consumers, and a reluctance among many Free World countries to interfere in non-strategic trade. Nevertheless, there appears to be general agreement that more can be done in this area. Among other things, we can interpret more restrictively various legislative provisions which bear on Free World trade with Cuba; we would have to be prepared, however, to accept political losses in the offending countries as well as the domestic political losses inherent in tacitly admitting that our former interpretations were wrong.

(2) *Free World Shipping to Cuba*—We can increase our bilateral pressures to eliminate the slowly dwindling number of Free World ships

which remain in the Cuba trade. We can try to ensure that the Greeks enforce their new shipping legislation against ships in the Cuba trade. We can press the Lebanese to enact the necessary shipping legislation which has already passed through a number of constitutional processes: a letter from you to the Lebanese Prime Minister might help. Although we appear to have recently found a way to reduce British shipping to Cuba without HMG help (through direct dealings with the shippers), we can continue to press for HMG cooperation, which, if obtained, would be most helpful.

Since our prospects seem to be good with respect to the three major shipping countries, it is axiomatic that we should keep pressure on other Free World countries to ensure that they don't pick up the slack which the Greeks, Lebanese, and selective British shippers will soon be leaving. In this regard, the selective refusal to exercise the Presidential waiver of the Cuban transportation provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization Act (cessation of aid to any country which has not taken steps to prevent the transport of commodities, by plane or ship, to or from Cuba), could increase our diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, assuming of course, we are ready to incur the foreign policy costs involved in this step.

(3) *Air Service to and from Cuba*—We can increase pressure to reduce, restrict and harass Free World and Communist air services to and from Cuba. Strict application of the new Foreign Aid Authorization Act could help in this regard if we are prepared to accept the costs involved in offending certain countries (e.g., Spain). On the other hand, the conclusion of a U.S.–USSR civil air agreement could erode our strong position against Free World air service to Cuba.

(4) *Anti-Subversion Program*—We can continue to press in the direction of strengthening both the will and the capability in Latin America to take the political and technical measures which have been recommended both bilaterally and multilaterally. The basic lines of the anti-subversion program have been laid out and they are being followed, with varying degrees of success, in the different countries. Constant follow-up, technical advice and assistance, and training are essential to the improvement and execution of the program.

We can also make a tough approach to the Russians with evidence of the Venezuelan arms cache. Gromyko in the past, has expressed doubt that we could show evidence of Cuban subversion. We can show it to him now.

C. Multilateral Measures

(1) *Rio Treaty Action Against Cuba*—At present, we are in the process of deciding what Rio Treaty action we can get the OAS to take against Cuba as a result of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela. What we push for will depend, in large part on the hardness of the

evidence presented in an OAS investigating team's report and on the attitude of other OAS countries towards energetic anti-Cuban action. Best estimates are that we will push for and get 4 or 5 of the following 7 measures:

(a) Stop and search, on the high seas, of selected Cuban in OAS-registry vessels. This measure implies a willingness to use force and involves the concomitant risk of unwanted escalation. The ostensible purpose of this measure is to stop arms shipments, but because the quarantine could be easily by-passed and because the chances are good that arms shipments to Latin America from Cuba are minimal, no arms are likely to be found. The real purpose of this measure is to infuriate, humiliate, and provoke Castro.

(b) Stop and search, in territorial waters, of all suspect vessels. This is a variation of the above, which is probably almost as effective in controlling arms shipments and which does not involve the possible use of force. At the same time, it will be easier for Castro to swallow than the "force" option.

(c) The breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba by the 5 OAS countries which maintain them. On the whole, this would be a highly desirable action. It would dramatically demonstrate Castro's isolation and deny to Castro the subversive bases which his missions in Latin America provide.

(d) The breaking of remaining economic relations between Latin America and Cuba. This would be helpful as a means of demonstrating Cuba's isolation and perhaps as a lever to get other Free World countries to break trade relations with Cuba. Of itself, it's not much. Latin American trade with Cuba is already at minuscule levels.

(e) The breaking of air and surface communications between Latin America and Cuba. On balance, this would be quite helpful primarily because it would shut off the Cuba/Mexico air route and would constitute an important step in reducing Cuba's ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. The primary obstacles are that such a step will involve a small (but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities and may involve legal difficulties with respect to bilateral and multilateral civil aviation agreements.

(f) Condemnation of Cuba by the OAS. The OAS certainly will agree to this as one of its actions. But it doesn't mean much.

(g) A renewed call for alert against subversion and an endorsement of previous OAS recommendations outlining specific measures for combatting the threat. OAS approval for this one should be easy so long as the wording does not obligate states to implement the recommendations. In this form, however, such action will be fairly meaningless.

(2) *Other Surveillance Measures*—Outside the context of Rio Treaty action we can try to conclude OAS-wide or bilateral agreements with Latin American governments to take joint measures to detect and prevent arms smuggling by land, sea, or air into Latin America. Because of the urgency of the threat, Venezuela and Colombia could be given first priority.

730. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to holders of NSAM 220, December 16¹

December 16, 1963

SUBJECT

Amendment to NSAM 220 of February 5, 1963 Relating to United States Government Shipments by Foreign-Flag Vessels in the Cuban trade

The following amendment to NSAM 220 has been approved:

An exception to the prohibitions stated in NSAM 220 may be made as to any vessel or vessels if the persons who control the vessel or vessels give satisfactory assurance

(a) that no ships under their control will thenceforth be employed in the Cuba trade, except as provided in paragraph (b); and

(b) that vessels under their control which are covered by contractual obligations, including charters, entered into prior to the date of this directive under which their employment in the Cuba trade may be required, shall be withdrawn from such trade at the earliest opportunity consistent with such contractual obligations.

The assurance given hereunder shall contain an undertaking that any ships covered by paragraphs (a) or (b) will not thereafter be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the United States Government to discourage such trade. No vessel described in paragraph (b) will be eligible to carry any cargo sponsored or financed by any of the agencies listed herein until such vessel has actually ceased to engage in the Cuba trade and has ceased to be under obligation to engage in such trade.

¹ Amendment to NSAM 220 relating to U.S. Government shipments by foreign-flag vessels in the Cuban trade. No classification marking. 1 p. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings 12/63–3/65.

The Secretary of State is to be consulted on the form and content of any assurances given in accordance with this directive. If any assurance given in accordance with this directive is determined to be untrue or has not been complied with, all ships owned or controlled by persons making such assurance may be declared ineligible for the carriage of cargo sponsored or financed by any of the agencies listed herein.

McGeorge Bundy

731. Briefing notes prepared for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, December 18¹

December 18, 1963

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

I. Since the Soviet strategic missiles and bombers were withdrawn from Cuba last year, the USSR has transferred to Cuban control all remaining Soviet weapons except the surface-to-air missiles and possibly the FROG tactical rockets.

A. Cubans have taken over the 42 MIG-21 jet fighters, the 12 Komar guided missile boats, the tanks and equipment at the former Soviet armored camps, and probably the cruise missile system.

B. Cubans now are present in all elements of the air defense system. By mid-1964 at the latest, they will probably be able to operate the SAM system without Soviet participation except for maintenance.

1. Cubans have completed their classroom training in SAM operations and are now receiving field training, probably at all sites.

II. We believe that only about 4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel remain in Cuba, and that this number will remain fairly constant until Cubans complete their SAM training.

A. Most of those Soviets remaining are advisers and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of the Soviet weapons systems, particularly the SAM system.

B. No identifiable Soviet ground combat units remain on the island.

¹ "The Situation in Cuba." Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba Meeting—12/19/63.

III. We have seen no evidence of the re-introduction of any offensive weapons to Cuba. Only ten military shipments have been delivered to Cuba this year.

A. These consisted primarily of ammunition, spare parts, and replacements.

IV. The Cuban military forces constitute an effective deterrent to internal dissidence, and their effectiveness against exile raids and all external threats short of a full-scale invasion probably will increase with time. One of our most promising clandestine sources [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reported earlier this week that the present strength of the Cuban army is about 100,000. Our estimate has been about 75,000.

V. The same [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reports that the Sino-Soviet conflict is very evident in Cuba.

A. He said old line Communists like Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Blas Roca are unanimously pro-Soviet, but that Che Guevara is closer to the Chinese position and considers Khrushchev a "revisionist."

1. Guevara, he says, insists on accelerating revolution in underdeveloped countries.

2. Fidel Castro himself, according to this source, feels closer to the Chinese position, but wants to prevent a split among his supporters in Cuba, and not jeopardize Soviet aid.

B. The source feels that, in general, the old-line Moscow-oriented Cuban Communists are gradually losing influence in high government circles.

VI. This source also stated that Castro's present policy is not to attack President Johnson in public or do anything to irritate him, but rather to wait and see what the President says and does about Cuba.

VII. On the domestic political scene, the Castro regime continues to tighten its grip.

A. Registration for obligatory military service began on 1 December. Opponents of the regime are to be drafted into labor battalions for "rehabilitation."

B. The confiscation of all remaining private farms larger than 167 acres was decreed on 4 October. Owners of smaller farms are being pushed toward collectivization.

C. Labor is being subjected to increasingly stringent controls, such as work norms and longer workweeks, to raise lagging productivity.

VIII. Trends in Cuba since Castro's return from the USSR last spring have not been favorable to his interests.

A. Prospects for significant economic improvement in the foreseeable future were becoming dim even before Hurricane Flora.

B. Living conditions remain drab for the majority of the people. Western observers have sensed growing apathy and hopelessness.

C. It is apparent from Castro's speeches that the Soviet Union has made clear that there is a limit to the support which the bloc is willing to give Cuba.

1. We have detected no decline in Soviet assistance, but Castro has repeatedly stressed that it cannot go on forever, and that Cubans must work harder.

IX. Open resistance against the regime is still scattered and relatively ineffective.

A. There has been an apparent increase, however, in incidents of sabotage in recent weeks. Small scattered bands of guerrillas continue to operate, particularly in the hills of central Cuba, but they are isolated and kept on the defensive.

X. Castro's subversive efforts in Latin America have recently been intensified.

A. The large cache of weapons discovered in Venezuela early last month provides the most solid evidence of Cuban support for Latin American subversives to come to light since 1959. CIA sources also report increased subversive activity in other countries, such as Panama, Guatemala, Peru and Bolivia.

**732. Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 85-4-63,
December 18¹**

December 18, 1963

**SOVIET TRANSFER OF THE SURFACE TO AIR
MISSILE SYSTEM TO CUBA**

PROBLEM

To estimate the likelihood that the Soviets will transfer the surface to air missile system to Cuban control and to assess the implications of such a transfer, particularly with respect to U-2 reconnaissance overflights.

¹ "Soviet Transfer of the Surface to Air Missile System to Cuba." Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.

CONCLUSIONS

A. There is an impressive body of evidence that the Soviets are preparing to turn over operation and control of the SAM system to the Cubans by next summer, possibly as early as April. They must be aware that a turnover of the SAM system to Cuban control would transfer to Castro an additional capability to create an international crisis. Over the coming months the Soviets almost certainly will be reviewing this course of action and reassessing the risks involved. Before coming to a final decision, they might seek to persuade the US to discontinue or to curtail the overflight program, and the Cubans might carry on a parallel diplomatic and propaganda campaign. (*Paras. 2–4, 10–14, 17*)

B. The Soviets still control the SAM system. However, the training of Cubans is well along, and a limited Cuban capability—that is, enough partially trained Cubans in place at some sites to fire a missile—probably is now in being. (*Paras. 2, 3*)

C. Cuban control of the SAM system would increase the possibility of a U–2 shootdown. Hostile action could result from orders by Castro—particularly if he assessed that such action would not result in immediate and serious consequences—or from unauthorized action. (*Paras. 15–18*)

**733. Memorandum for the record prepared by General Carter,
December 19¹**

December 19, 1963

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on 19 December 1963

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson, General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson; Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen, Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Reedy, Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. FitzGerald.

¹ Transmits FitzGerald's memorandum for the record of a meeting with President Johnson on Cuba on December 19. Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November–31 December 1963.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms cache. We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting was that the President would continue to approve smaller FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the ball rolling.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

Attachment

SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963

PRESENT

The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W. Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.

USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.

The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs. George Reedy and Williams Moyers and Gordon Chase.

CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. Richard Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

1. The President arrived at the meeting approximately five minutes early—prior to the arrival of several members of the group including Mr. Bundy. Without a formal introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the activities of the Presidential photographer.

2. The President appeared interested in the number of agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning the program until

the subject of economic denial was introduced. He asked to be told what additional measures could be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the principal soft spots among free world countries appeared at the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain. The President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these three countries together with recommendations as to what could be done to stop these leaks. He requested Under Secretary Ball to prepare to make *démarches* to the governments of these three countries as well as any others engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. He appeared particularly interested in the subject of economic denial and returned to it several times.

3. After hearing a brief description of our progress in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban military, the President said that it did not seem to him that we had gone very far along this line and that one day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself, would have to face the “grand jury” (of domestic public opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out that the program being presented was, with the exception of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and, if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the clandestine services—in other words; that if new and broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they would have to be within the overt field.

4. After a brief description of the sabotage and harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas raid was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the President stated that he did not feel that the present time was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success. He said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly on the U.S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong direction with respect to Cuba, i.e., increase their economic aid or their military presence. Recognizing that a cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly lower economic and psychological impact, should be conducted. He further stated that planning for such operations as Matanzas should be continued. General Wheeler raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets by autonomous groups. This was discussed and it was agreed that in view of the fact that preparations would take at least three months, these preparations should proceed and the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have been perfected.

5. On the question of autonomous groups the President asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars). He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.

6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared by General Carter for the meeting was examined.

7. Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-à-vis Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared for the December 13 Standing Group meeting. Unilateral actions presented were:

(1) Air attacks by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] autonomous groups. No further discussion.

(2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against exile groups in Florida. No comment on Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.

(3) Military feints. No comment on generally unfavorable presentation.

(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the value of keeping open the franchise for low-level flights. Acknowledgement of certain value to the intelligence community. No decision requested.

(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision requested.

(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S. policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-Castro dissidence in the armed forces. Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there was room for a stronger statement than that made by President Kennedy in Miami.

(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not elaborated and no comment.

(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified or elaborated.

734. Memorandum from General Carroll to McNamara, December 20¹

December 20, 1963

SUBJECT

Assessment of Status of Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

Summary

1. Since the October crisis of 1962, the role of the Soviet military in Cuba has changed and the great majority of Soviet military personnel

¹ Transmits a DIA/CIA assessment of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.

has been withdrawn. Most of the Soviets remaining are advisers and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating and controlling the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. We believe that no organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba and that the only Soviet ground forces personnel remaining are those advising Cuban military units. Based on our continuing appraisal of Soviet activity, we estimate Soviet military strength in Cuba at present to be between four and seven thousand. The present number will probably remain relatively unchanged until the program of training Cubans in the SAM system is completed, at which time substantial additional withdrawals probably will occur.