



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968

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Volume XXXII

## Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 11173

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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# Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.). The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records from all relevant departments and agencies needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume, which was collected and edited from 1995 to 1997, meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 5 years (1964-1968) of the administration of Lyndon B.

Johnson. The subseries presents in 34 volumes the documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Johnson's administration. The editors of the volume sought to include documentation illuminating the foreign policymaking process of the U.S. Government, with emphasis on the highest level at which policy on a particular subject was determined. The documents include memoranda and records of discussions that set forth policy issues and show decisions or actions taken. The emphasis is on the development of U.S. policy and on major aspects and repercussions of its execution rather than on the implementation of policy.

*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations,  
1964–1968, Volume XXXII*

This volume documents U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic including a period of great crisis that culminated in the decision to send U.S. military forces to that country. The United States then oversaw a reconstitution of the Dominican Government and a Dominican presidential election in 1967. Also covered is U.S. policy toward Cuba, essentially an account of U.S. attempts to isolate Castro's Cuba both diplomatically and economically through sanctions, and the internal Washington debate over the extent and nature of U.S. covert policy toward the island nation. The remainder of the volume does not cover a broad swath of countries, but concentrates on the two most difficult relationships in the area for the United States: Haiti and the British Colony of British Guiana (after 1966, independent Guyana). In Haiti the problem was essentially the mismanagement of the country and repression of the people by dictator Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier. The main questions for policymakers in Washington were how much business, if any, should the United States do with Duvalier, how they could help the Haitian people without helping the regime, and how much contact and support it should give his opponents, all of whom were in exile. Although part of South America, the English speaking country British Guiana/Guyana has been included in this volume based on the similarities of the issues that the United States faced there. In Guyana, the United States sought to prevent leftist Cheddi Jagan from becoming Prime Minister and instead successfully supported Linden Burnham, his principal opponent.

Lyndon B. Johnson made the major foreign policy decisions during his presidency, and the editors sought to document his role as far as possible. In the case of the intervention in the Dominican Republic, Johnson relied heavily upon the recommendations of his key advisers and special envoys, and their role and advice to the President is documented. It will become obvious that during the Dominican crisis—especially through the transcripts of Presidential tapes—Johnson was a hands-on President who after assessing advice, made the major

policy decisions. The role of the President and his major foreign policy advisers, including his hard-to-document Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, are less pronounced in the other chapters in the volume dealing with Cuba, Haiti, and British Guiana/Guyana. This volume follows the pattern of other volumes in the 1964–1968 subseries: focusing on policy formulation in Washington. In the case of the Dominican Republic there is a close connection between events in Santo Domingo and policy in Washington.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. The editors have supplied a heading for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine

if a document has been previously published, and, if so, this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Historical Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. Although the Historical Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, it does monitor the overall process and makes recommendations on particular problems that come to its attention.

The Historical Advisory Committee reviewed the sections of this volume on the Dominican Republic and Guyana and advised on declassification issues.

### *Declassification Review*

The Information Response Branch of the Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 1997 and was completed in 2005, resulted in the decision to withhold 6 documents in full, excise a para-

graph or more in 27 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 66 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate account of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, and British Guiana/Guyana.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library of the National Archives and Records Administration, especially Regina Greenwell and Charlaine Burgess, who provided key research assistance and access to the Johnson Presidential tape recordings. The staff of the Johnson Library also worked with the staff of the Office of the Historian to obtain access to the telephone conversations of Thomas Mann. The editors also wish to acknowledge the assistance of historians at the Central Intelligence Agency, especially Gerald Haines and Scott Koch, who facilitated access to the records of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Carolyn Yee, Daniel Lawler, and Edward C. Keefer collected documentation. Carolyn Yee selected, annotated, and edited the chapter on the Dominican Republic and Daniel Lawler produced the chapters on Cuba, Haiti, and Guyana. They worked under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, then Chief of the Asia and Americas Division, and now General Editor. Vicki E. Futscher, Rita M. Baker, Florence Segura, and Kristin L. Ahlberg did the copy and technical editing and Susan C. Weetman coordinated the declassification review. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

**Marc J. Susser**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

April 2005





# Contents

Preface . . . . .	III
Johnson Administration Volumes . . . . .	XI
Sources . . . . .	XIII
Abbreviations . . . . .	XXV
Persons . . . . .	XXVII
Note on Covert Actions. . . . .	XXXI
Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana	
Dominican Republic . . . . .	1
Cuba . . . . .	546
Haiti. . . . .	762
Guyana . . . . .	851
Index . . . . .	967



# Johnson Administration Volumes

Following is a list of the volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series for the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. The titles of individual volumes may change. The year of publication is in parentheses.

- I Vietnam, 1964 (1992)
- II Vietnam, January–June 1965 (1996)
- III Vietnam, July–December 1965 (1996)
- IV Vietnam, 1966 (1998)
- V Vietnam, 1967 (2002)
- VI Vietnam, January–August 1968 (2002)
- VII Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969 (2003)
- VIII International Monetary and Trade Policy (1998)
- IX International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities (1997)
- X National Security Policy (2002)
- XI Arms Control and Disarmament (1997)
- XII Western Europe (2001)
- XIII Western Europe Region (1995)
- XIV Soviet Union (2001)
- XV Germany and Berlin (1999)
- XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (2002)
- XVII Eastern Europe; Austria; Finland (1996)
- XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967 (2000)
- XIX Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 (2004)
- XX Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968 (2001)
- XXI Near East Region; Arab Peninsula (2000)
- XXII Iran (1999)
- XXIII Congo
- XXIV Africa (1999)
- XXV South Asia (2000)
- XXVI Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines (2001)
- XXVII Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs (2000)
- XXVIII Laos (1998)
- XXIX Part 1, Korea (2000)
- XXIX Part 2, Japan
- XXX China (1998)
- XXXI South and Central America; Mexico (2004)

## XII Johnson Administration Volumes

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- XXXII Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana (2005)
- XXXIII Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations (2004)
- XXXIV Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues (1999)

# Sources

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Most of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Department of State historians also have full access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants, and full access to the records of the Central Intelligence Agency.

## *Sources for Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII*

In preparing this volume, the editors made extensive use of some of the most authoritative sources on President Johnson's policies on the

Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, and British Guiana/Guyana: the Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Within the National Security File (NSF), the Country Files for the four countries covered were the most important. Next in importance in the NSF, and reflecting the strong intelligence emphasis of this volume, was the Intelligence File. Other important files in the NSF were the Aides Files, Files of Gordon Chase, which were valuable for the Dominican Republic and Cuba. Also of use from the NSF were Memos to the President (from McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow), the National Intelligence Estimates File, National Security Council Meetings, Special Head of State Correspondence, and the Agency Files, SIG (Senior Review Group). The SIG oversaw policy towards Cuba in the later part of the Johnson administration.

Of the collections outside the NSF at the Johnson Library, by far the most significant were the audiotapes of President Johnson's telephone conversations, to which the editors had full access for 1964–1968 thanks to the cooperation of the staff of the Johnson Library. Johnson frequently discussed the details of his foreign policy towards the Dominican Republic and Cuba with his key advisers and senior members of Congress. As such, the tape recordings provide an unparalleled perspective on decision-making often missing in more formal documentation. The editors transcribed numerous tape recordings specifically for this volume; these transcripts are printed both as documents and in the annotation as extracts. The Thomas C. Mann Papers, especially the transcripts of his telephone conversations with Johnson, were also valuable in revealing the thinking behind the President's policies.

The records of the Department of State were also indispensable in documenting foreign policy formulation. Although the President made the important decisions, the Department of State was primarily responsible for the development, coordination, and implementation of the administration's policy in the region. The editors of this volume relied heavily upon the Department's "subject-numeric" central files, which contain the essential telegrams, memoranda, correspondence, and other records of U.S. diplomacy. The most valuable subject numeric central file for the Dominican Republic was 23-9 DOM REP, used for rebellion and coups, but, in effect, often a virtual catchall for Department of State documents on the Dominican Republic. Other files of special note for the Dominican Republic were POL 1 DOM REP, POL 2 DOM REP and POL 15 DOM REP. For Cuba the subject-numeric central files were not as significant, in part because there was no Embassy in Cuba and therefore no telegraphic exchanges. The best central file documentation is concentrated in the general POL CUBA-US and POL 1 CUBA-US files. POL 33-4 CUBA-US is the file for the dispute over Cuban fishermen in U.S. waters that escalated into the Guantanamo water crisis. Haitian documents in the central files are spread over a

variety of files, the most significant of which is POL HAI-US, the general file for U.S.-Haitian relations. For British Guiana (after 1966 Guyana) a variety of central files were useful. The ones most cited in the volume are POL 7 GUYANA, covering the visit of Prime Minister Linden Burnham to the United States, POL 14 BR GU dealing with elections in the colony before independence, and POL 15 BR GU the general file for the government of the then British colony. There is also a specific file for the colonial government of British Guiana, POL 19 BR GU, which was also of use. All the central files consulted and cited in the volume are in the list of sources with an explanation of what topics or issues they cover.

The editors also did extensive research in the Department's "lot" files. By far the most significant was a file that is still under the custody of the Department of State, the INR/IL Historical Files: the Department's files on intelligence issues, liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency, and covert operations. Without access to this collection, this volume would have been incomplete. These files were crucial for all four chapters—Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, and Guyana. Also of special significance were the following office files of Assistant Secretaries for Inter-American Affairs: Lot 66 D 65, Lot 70 D 150, and Lot 70 D 295. The Inter-American Affairs Bureau's files for the Caribbean, ARA/CAR, Lot 69 D 158, and the Files for the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, ARA/CCA Files, Lot 73 D 191, were also of special value. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's memoranda of conversations for 1964, Lot 65 D 330, and the Policy Planning Staff's files, S/P Files, Lot 72 D 139, were also of note. All lot files consulted and cited in the volume are in the list of sources.

The files of the Central Intelligence Agency were a crucial source for this volume. In the case of the Dominican Republic and Cuba, accounts of many key inter-agency meetings—including meetings with the President—were found only in CIA files. These were in the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, and Executive Registry Files, Job 80-R01580R and Job 80-B016776R. The National Intelligence Center (NIC) Files, Job 79-R01012A, provided access to National Intelligence Estimates and Special Intelligence Estimates and related documents. All CIA files consulted and cited in the volume are in the list of sources. Related intelligence files for the Johnson administration under the custody of the National Security Council (when the research was done) were also valuable, especially for the Dominican Republic. Department of Defense Files, both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, were consulted for all chapters for 1964-1968. They are cited in the list of sources.

Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of the

agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of these records is in process. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State

**Central Files.** See National Archives and Records Administration below.

**Lot Files.** For lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration, see RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration.

H Files: Lot 83 D 358

Official Correspondence and files of Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., 1947–1969

INR/IL Historical Files

Historical files of the Office of Intelligence Liaison of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research under the custody of the Department of State, 1940s–1980s

PA/HO Files: Lot 71 D 411

Research projects prepared by the Office of the Historian, including research project 481, “History of the Dominican Crisis of 1965”

### National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

#### Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

**Subject-Numeric Central Files.** The subject-numeric system is divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these divisions are subject subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contain four sub topics: POL (Politics), DEF (Defense), CSM (Communism), and INT (Intelligence). Numerical subdivisions further define the sub topics according to the Department Record Classification Handbook. The following are the principal central files consulted and cited in this volume.

AID (US) BR GU: U.S. aid to British Guiana, general

AID (US) 9 BR GU: U.S.-British Guiana economic aid negotiations

AID (US) DOM REP: U.S. economic aid to the Dominican Republic, general policy and plans

AID (US) 1 DOM REP: U.S. economic aid to the Dominican Republic, general policy and plans

AID (US) 1–1 DOM REP: U.S. presidential aid determinations on the Dominican Republic

AID (US) 4 DOM REP: U.S. economic aid agreements with the Dominican Republic

AID (US) 7 DOM REP: U.S. aid to the Dominican Republic, program operation



- AID (US) 8 DOM REP: U.S. grants and technical assistance to the Dominican Republic
- AID (US) 8-4 DOM REP: U.S. grants and technical assistance agreements with the Dominican Republic
- AID (US) 9 DOM REP: U.S.-Dominican Republic economic aid negotiations
- AID (US) 10 DOM REP: U.S. supporting assistance to the Dominican Republic
- AID (US) 15 DOM REP: U.S. PL-480 food aid to the Dominican Republic
- AID (US) 15-6 DOM REP: U.S. PL-480 food aid to the Dominican Republic, surplus commodities
- AID (US) 15-8 DOM REP: U.S. PL-480 food aid to the Dominican Republic, commodity sales for foreign currency
- AID (US) HAI: U.S. economic aid to Haiti, general policy and plans
- AID (US) 8.5 HAI: U.S. aid to Haiti, health and sanitation
- AID (US) 9 HAI: U.S.-Haiti economic aid negotiations
- AID (US) 15-8 HAI: U.S. PL-480 food aid to Haiti, commodity sales for foreign currency
- DEF 12 CUBA: Cuban armaments
- DEF DOM REP (US): Defense affairs between the Dominican Republic and the United States, general
- DEF 1-3 DOM REP: Dominican military capabilities
- DEF 1-6 DOM REP: Dominican civilian defense
- DEF 2 DOM REP: Dominican defense reports
- DEF 6 DOM REP: Dominican armed forces
- DEF 6 GUYANA: Guyana armed forces
- DEF UK: U.K. Defense affairs
- FN 1 DOM REP: Dominican finance, general policy and plans
- FN 1-1 DOM REP: General Dominican finance policy
- FN 2 DOM REP: Dominican general reports and statistics
- FN 4 DOM REP: Dominican finance agreements
- FN 10 DOM REP/IMF: Dominican and International Monetary Fund agreements on foreign exchange
- FN 17-1 DOM REP: Dominican monetary policy
- FT 18 GUYANA: Guyana import of arms
- INT 6 GUYANA: Guyana collection of intelligence
- FN 9-3 HAI: foreign investment in Haiti
- POL BR GU: British Guiana political affairs
- POL BR GU-US: U.S.-British Guiana relations
- POL 1 BR GU: British Guiana, general policy and background
- POL 1 BR GU-US: U.S.-British Guiana relations, general policy and background
- POL 2 BR GU: general political reporting on British Guiana
- POL 7 BR GU: British Guiana visits and meetings
- POL 12 BR GU: British Guiana political parties
- POL 13-1 BR GU: British Guiana labor organizations
- POL 14 BR GU: British Guiana elections
- POL 15 BR GU: British Guiana Government
- POL 15-1 BR GU: British Guiana Head of State
- POL 16 BR GU: British Guiana independence
- POL 19 BR GU: colonial government of British Guiana
- POL 23 BR GU: British Guiana internal security
- POL 23-9 BR GU: British Guiana internal security, rebellion, and coups
- POL 23-8 BR GU: British Guiana demonstrations, riots, and protests
- POL 32 BR GU: British Guiana territory and boundaries
- POL 32-1 BR GU-VEN: British Guiana-Venezuela territory and boundary dispute
- POL 32-2 BR GU-VEN: British Guiana-Venezuela boundary delimitation
- POL GUYANA: Guyana political affairs, general
- POL GUYANA-US: U.S.-Guyana relations, general

POL 1 GUYANA: Guyana, general policy and background  
POL 1 GUYANA-US: U.S.-Guyana relations, general policy and background  
POL 7 GUYANA: Guyana visits and meetings  
POL 14 GUYANA: Guyana elections  
POL 15 GUYANA: Guyana Government  
POL 15-1 GUYANA: Guyana Head of State  
POL 23-9 GUYANA: Guyana internal security, rebellion, and coups  
POL 32-1 GUYANA-VEN: British Guiana-Venezuela territory and boundary dispute  
POL 32 GUYANA: Guyana territory and boundaries  
POL CHILE-US: U.S.-Chilean relations, general  
POL 15-1 COSTA RICA: Costa Rican head of state  
POL CUBA: Cuba political affairs, general  
POL CUBA-US: U.S.-Cuba relations, general  
POL CUBA-USSR: Cuba-USSR relations, general  
POL 1 CUBA: Cuba, general policy and background  
POL 1 CUBA-US: U.S.-Cuba relations, general policy and background  
POL 1 US-CUBA: U.S.-Cuba relations, general policy and background  
POL 2 CUBA: general political reporting on Cuba  
POL 15 CUBA: Cuba Government  
POL 15-1 CUBA: Cuba Head of State  
POL 17 CUBA-US: Cuba diplomatic representation  
POL 22 CUBA-US: Cuba incidents and disputes  
POL 23 CUBA: Cuba internal security  
POL 24 CUBA: Cuba sanctions  
POL 31-1 CUBA: Cuba air space and overflights  
POL 32 CUBA: Cuba territory and boundaries  
POL 33-4 CUBA-US: U.S.-Cuba territorial waters issues  
POL 36 CUBA: travel between Cuba and other countries  
POL DOM REP: Dominican political affairs, general  
POL DOM REP-US: Dominican-U.S. political relations, general  
POL 1 DOM REP: Dominican political relations, general policy and background  
POL 1 DOM REP-US: Dominican-U.S. political relations, general policy and background  
POL 2 DOM REP: Dominican political relations, general reports and guidelines  
POL 2-1 DOM REP: Dominican Joint Weekas (weekly reports)  
POL 2-2 DOM REP: Dominican political summaries  
POL 2-3 DOM REP: Dominican political-economic reports  
POL 2-4 DOM REP: Dominican political-military reports  
POL 4 DOM REP: Dominican political agreements and treaties  
POL 6 DOM REP: Dominican prominent persons  
POL 12 DOM REP: Dominican political parties  
POL 13 DOM REP: Dominican non-party blocs  
POL 14 DOM REP: Dominican elections  
POL 15 DOM REP: Dominican Republic Government  
POL 23-7 DOM REP: Dominican Republic infiltration, subversion, and sabotage  
POL 23-8 DOM REP: Dominican Republic demonstrations, riots, and protests  
POL 15-1 DOM REP: Dominican Republic Head of State  
POL 23 DOM REP: Dominican Republic internal security  
POL 23-9 DOM REP: Dominican rebellion and coups  
POL 30-2 DOM REP: Dominican political exiles  
POL HAI: Haiti political affairs, general  
POL HAI-US: U.S.-Haiti relations, general  
POL 1 HAI: Haiti, general policy and background  
POL US-HAI: U.S.-Haiti relations, general  
POL 1 HAI-US: U.S.-Haiti relations, general policy and background

POL 6 HAI: Haiti biographic data  
POL 15 HAI: Haiti Government  
POL 15-1 HAI: Haiti Head of State  
POL 17 HAI: Haiti, diplomatic representation  
POL 23-7 HAI: Haiti infiltration, subversion, and sabotage  
POL 23-9 HAI: Haiti internal security, rebellion, and coups  
POL 27 HAI: Haiti military operations  
POL 29 HAI: Haiti political prisoners  
POL 30 HAI: Haiti defectors and expellees  
POL UK-US: U.S.-U.K. relations, general  
POL 1 UK-US: U.S.-U.K. relations, general policy and background  
POL 7 UK: U.K. visits and meetings  
POL 15-1 UK: U.K. Head of State  
SIOC 12-1 HAI: churches in Haiti

**Lot Files.** These are the special decentralized files at the policymaking level of the Department of State, including the Executive Secretariat, overseas Foreign Service posts, and U.S. special missions.

ARA Files: Lot 66 D 192

Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin M. Martin, 1963-1964

ARA Files: Lot 69 D 243

Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Covey T. Oliver, August 1967-December 1968

ARA Files: Lot 70 D 150

Subject and country files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1967

ARA Files: Lot 70 D 295

Subject and country files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1965-1967

ARA Files: Lot 72 D 33

Country and chronological files of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1967-1969

ARA/CAR Files: Lot 67 D 8

Files on the Dominican Republic including telegrams, general memoranda, memoranda of conversations, letters and other correspondence, 1964

ARA/CAR Files: Lot 69 D 158

Files of the Office of Caribbean Affairs, 1965

ARA/CAR/DR Files: Lot 70 D 124

Files on the Dominican Republic including telegrams, general memoranda, memoranda of conversations, letters and other correspondence, 1966

ARA/CAR/DR Files: Lot 70 D 442

Files on the Dominican Republic including telegrams, general memoranda, memoranda of conversations, letters and other correspondence, 1965

ARA/CAR/DR Files: Lot 71 D 54

Files on the Dominican Republic including telegrams, general memoranda, memoranda of conversations, letters and other correspondence, 1967

## XX Sources

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ARA/CAR/DR Files: Lot 72 D 1

Files on the Dominican Republic including telegrams, general memoranda, memoranda of conversations, letters and other correspondence, 1968

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 71 D 201

Files of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, including correspondence with the Under Secretary of State, 1967–1968

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 201

Files of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, 1967–1968

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 245

Files of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, 1967–1968

ARA/IRG Files: Lot 70 D 122

Meetings and subject files of the Interdepartmental Review Group on Latin America including office memoranda, policy papers, policy decisions, minutes of meeting, 1966–1968

ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65

Subject and country files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas C. Mann 1964

ARA/LA Files: Lot 68 D 93

Subject and country files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Lincoln Gordon, 1966

ARA/LA Files: Lot 74 D 467

Files of Assistant Secretaries of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer and Covey T. Oliver, 1967–1971

Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192

Records of the Secretary of State Rusk, 1961–1969, including texts of speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversation

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 65 D 330

Rusk's meetings memoranda of conversations, 1964

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# Abbreviations

**A**, airgram

**AG**, Agricultural Bank

**AID**, Agency for International Development

**ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**ARA/CAR**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State

**ARA/CCA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State

**APCJ**, Agrupación Política Catorce de Junio (14th of June Political Movement)

**BG**, British Guiana

**BRUC**, Revolutionary Christian University Bloc

**CAR**, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**CAS**, Controlled American Source

**CG**, Constitutional Government/Caamaño Group

**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency

**CIAP**, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress

**CINCARIBESEAFRON**, Commander in Chief Caribbean Sea Frontier

**CINCLANT**, Commander in Chief, Atlantic

**CINCSO**, Commander in Chief, Southern Command

**C/S**, Chief of Staff

**COMOR**, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

**CT**, Country Team

**DAS**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

**DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission

**Deptel**, Department of State telegram

**DG**, development grant

**DL**, development loan

**DO**, Directorate/Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

**DOD**, Department of Defense

**Doms**, Dominicans

**DR**, Dominican Republic

**Embtel**, Embassy telegram

**Exdis**, Exclusive distribution

**GAWU**, Guyana Agricultural Workers Union

**GNR**, Government of National Reconstruction

**GODR**, Government of the Dominican Republic

**IAF**, Inter-American Force

**IAHRC**, Inter-American Human Rights Committee

**IAPE**, Inter-American Peace Force

**IDB**, International Development Bank

**IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

## XXVI Abbreviations

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**INR/DDC**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Director for Coordination, Department of State

**INR/IL**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Department of State

**IRG**, Inter-Departmental Review Group (Latin America)

**ISZ**, International Safety Zone

**LA**, Latin America

**LASO**, Latin American Solidarity Organization

**Limdis**, Limited distribution

**LOC**, line of communication

**MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group

**MFM**, meeting of Foreign Ministers

**MOD**, Minister of Defense

**MPCA**, Manpower Citizens Association

**MPD**, Dominican Popular Movement

**NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate

**Nodis**, No distribution

**OAS**, Organization of American States

**ODC**, Overseas Development Council

**PAU**, Pan-American Union

**PCD**, Dominican Communist Party

**PL**, Public Law

**PNC**, Peoples' National Congress (British Guiana/Guyana)

**Polad**, political adviser

**PPP**, Peoples' Progressive Party (British Guiana/Guyana)

**PQD**, Democratic Quisqueyan Party (Dominican political party)

**PR**, Reformist Party (Dominican political party)

**PRD**, Revolutionary Democratic Party (Dominican political party)

**PRSC**, Revolutionary Social Christian Party (Dominican political party)

**PSPD**, Dominican Popular Socialist Party (Dominican political party)

**rece**, reconnaissance

**reftel**, reference telegram

**S**, Office of the Secretary of State

**SA**, Supporting Assistance

**SNIE**, Special National Intelligence Estimate

**UCN**, National Civic Union (Dominican political party)

**UF**, United Force (British Guiana/Guyana political party)

**US**, United States

**USG**, United States Government

**USIA**, United States Information Agency

**USIB**, United States Intelligence Board

# Persons

- Adams, Robert W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1964–1965
- Alvarez, Raymond J.**, Officer-in-Charge for Haitian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1967–1968
- Applying, Hugh G.**, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, 1964–1965
- Aristy, Héctor**, adviser to the “constitutionalist” faction in the Dominican Republic, May–September 1965
- Artime, Manuel**, autonomous Cuban exile group leader, 1964–1965
- Balaguer, Joaquín**, President of the Dominican Republic from July 1, 1966
- Ball, George W.**, Under Secretary of State until September 1966; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, June 26–September 25, 1968
- Benítez, Jaime**, Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico
- Bennett, William Tapley, Jr.**, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, March 23, 1964–April 13, 1966
- Bohlen, Charles E.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, February 1968–January 1969
- Bonilla, José Antonio Atilés**, Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic
- Bosch, Juan**, former President of the Dominican Republic; deposed by military coup d’état September 25, 1963; candidate for the Presidency in 1966
- Bowdler, William G.**, Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1963–1965; member, National Security Council staff, 1965–1968
- Broe, William V.**, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency after June 1965
- Bruce, David K. E.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1964–1968
- Bundy, McGeorge**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966
- Bunker, Ellsworth**, Representative to the Organization of American States, January 29, 1964–November 7, 1966
- Burdett, William C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 1964
- Burnham, Linden Forbes Sampson**, leader of the People’s National Congress Party; Premier of British Guiana, December 1964–May 1966, first Prime Minister of independent Guyana from May 1966
- Busby, Horace**, Special Assistant to the President until October 1, 1965
- Caamaño-Deno, Colonel Francisco**, President of the “constitutionalist” faction in the Dominican Republic, May–September 1965
- Califano, Joseph A., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the President from July 1965
- Carlson, Delmar R.**, member, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, January–February 1964; Consul General in British Guiana, March 1964–May 1966; Ambassador to Guyana, May 1966–September 1969
- Carter, Albert E.**, Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 1964
- Castro Ruz, Fidel**, Premier of Cuba
- Cater, S. Douglass, Jr.**, Special Assistant to the President, May 1964–October 1968

- Chase, Gordon**, member, National Security Council staff until January 1966; thereafter McGeorge Bundy's personal assistant
- Cobb, William B.**, Officer-in-Charge for British Guiana, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1965–1967
- Connett, William B.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy in the Dominican Republic, November 1964–February 1966
- Crimmins, John Hugh**, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1963–1966; Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, June 29, 1966–April 16, 1969
- Crockett, Kennedy M.**, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, June 21, 1964–October 10, 1965
- Cury, Jottin**, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "constitutionalist" faction in the Dominican Republic, May–September 1965
- D'Aguiar, Peter S.**, leader of United Force Party of British Guiana/Guyana
- Dean, Sir Patrick**, British Ambassador to the United States
- Denney, George C. Jr.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 1964–1968
- Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- Douglas-Home, Sir Alec**, British Prime Minister
- Figueres-Ferrer, José Pepe**, former President of Costa Rica
- Fischli, Alfred**, Swiss Ambassador to Havana from January 1967
- FitzGerald, Desmond**, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency until June 1965; Deputy Director for Plans, June 1965–July 1967
- Fitzgerald, John F.**, Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1966–1967; Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, 1967–1968
- Fortas, Abe**, adviser to President Johnson
- Fulbright, J. William**, Senator (Democrat–Arkansas), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- García-Godoy, Héctor**, President under the provisional government established by the OAS, September 1965–June 1, 1966
- Gaud, William S.**, Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development, February 27, 1964–August 1966; thereafter Administrator, Agency for International Development
- Gordon, A. Lincoln**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and U.S. coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, March 9, 1966–June 30, 1967
- Greenwood, Anthony**, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 1964–1968
- Guzmán-Fernández, Silvestre Antonio**, prospective candidate for President of the Government of National Reconciliation of the Dominican Republic
- Harriman, W. Averell**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large
- Helms, Richard M.**, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency until June 1965; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until June 30 1966; thereafter Director of Central Intelligence
- Hill, John Calvin, Jr.**, Director for North Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1965–1968
- Hoover, J. Edgar**, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Hughes, Thomas L.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 1964–1968

**Imbert-Barrera, Antonio**, one of the two surviving assassins of Trujillo, and member of the Council of State governing the Dominican Republic, 1962–February 1963; General, head of the Dominican Government of National Reconstruction, May–September 1965

**Jagan, Cheddi B.**, Premier of British Guiana until December 1964

**Johnson, U. Alexis**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, September 27, 1965–October 9, 1966

**Johnson, Lyndon Baines**, President of the United States

**Katzenbach, Nicholas deB.**, Under Secretary of State, September 1966–January 1969

**Kohler, Foy D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1966–December 1967

**Leddy, John H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, June 1965–February 1969

**Long, Edward T.**, Director, Office of Caribbean Countries, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1966–1968

**Luers, William H.**, Director of Guyanese Political Affairs, 1967–1968

**Luyt, Sir Richard**, Governor of British Guiana until May 1966

**Mann, Thomas C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January 3, 1964–March 17, 1965; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 18, 1965–May 31, 1966

**Martin, John Bartlow**, former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, March 9, 1962–September 28, 1963

**Mayobre, José Antonio**, personal representative in the Dominican Republic of the United Nations Secretary General

**McNamara, Robert S.**, Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968

**McCone, John A.** Director of Central Intelligence until April 28 1965.

**Melby, Everett K.**, Consul General in British Guiana until March 1964

**Mora-Otero, José Antonio**, Uruguayan, Secretary General of the Organization of American States

**Muñoz-Marin, Luis**, former Governor of Puerto Rico

**Oliver, Covey T.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, July 1, 1967–December 31, 1968

**Osborne, Melville E.**, Officer-in-Charge of Haitian Affairs, Department of State, 1966–1967

**Palmer, General Bruce, Jr.**, USA, Commander of U.S. Forces and Deputy Commander of General Inter-American Peace Force, Dominican Republic, 1965

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**Ray, Manuel**, autonomous Cuban exile group leader

**Read, Benjamin H.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary, Department of State

**Reid Cabral, Donald**, Head of the Triumvirate until April 1965

**Ross, Claude G.**, Ambassador to Haiti, June 1967–October 1969

**Rostow, Walt W.**, Special Assistant to the President, April 1, 1966–January 20, 1969

**Rowan, Carl T.**, Director, United States Information Agency, February 28, 1964–July 10, 1965

**Rusk, Dean**, Secretary of State

**Sayre, Robert M.**, senior member, National Security Council staff, April 1964–April 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from April 1965; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, July 1, 1967–December 31, 1968

**Sandys, Duncan**, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1964

**Shlaudeman, Harry W.**, Chief, Dominican Affairs, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State, March 1963–July 1965; Assistant Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs from August 1965

**Shullaw, J. Harold**, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, March 1964–1967

**Solomon, Anthony M.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, June 1, 1965–January 10, 1969

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**Stevenson, Adlai E.**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965

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**Steward, C. Allan**, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1965

**Steward, Michael**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

**Stewart, Michael N. F.**, British Foreign Minister

**Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, Ambassador at Large, October 1962–December 1966

**Thurn, Elizabeth von**, Officer-in-Charge of Haitian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1964–1965

**Timmons, Benson E.L., III**, Ambassador to Haiti, January 1964–May 1967

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**Tyler, William R.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, September 1962–May 1965

**Vaky, Viron P.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1968

**Valenti, Jack**, Special Assistant to the President until May 1966

**Vance, Cyrus R.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until June 30, 1967; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from August 1, 1967

**Vaughn, Jack H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, March 22, 1965–February 28, 1966

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**Wheeler, General Earle G.**, USA, Chief of Staff, October 1, 1962–July 2, 1964; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 3, 1964

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**Wilson, Donald**, Deputy Inspector General, United States Information Agency from October 1965

**Wollam, Park**, Deputy Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1967–1968

**Yarmolinsky, Adam**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964–1965

**Yost, Harry W.**, Officer-in-Charge of British Guiana, Agency for International Development, 1965–1966

# Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Presidencies.

## *Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency*

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.<sup>1</sup>

CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

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<sup>1</sup> NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations."<sup>2</sup>

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.<sup>3</sup> In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare.<sup>4</sup> The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally dele-

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<sup>2</sup> NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, "Implementation of NSC-10/2," August 12, 1948, printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

<sup>4</sup> NSC 10/5, "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations," October 23, 1951, in Michael Warner, editor, *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 437-439.



gated to advise OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

*NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee*

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.<sup>5</sup>

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.<sup>6</sup> The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group;

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<sup>5</sup> William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; the text of NSC 5412 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1960, Development of the Intelligence Community*.

<sup>6</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147–148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50–51. The texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1960, Development of the Intelligence Community*.

initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.<sup>7</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.<sup>8</sup>

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.<sup>9</sup>

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President John-

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<sup>7</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>9</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. X, Documents 270 and 278.

son assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.<sup>10</sup>

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.<sup>11</sup>

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, vol. VIII, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 56.

<sup>11</sup> For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

<sup>12</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

# Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

## Dominican Republic

### 1. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

SNIE 86.2-64

Washington, January 17, 1964.

#### INSTABILITY AND THE INSURGENCY THREAT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

##### Conclusion

We believe that the security forces of the Dominican Republic can control any subversive activities likely to occur during the next few months. Nevertheless, leftist leaders probably can increase hit-and-run terrorism in urban areas and, over time, may be able to resume guerrilla activity in the mountains. If they show ability to sustain such operations, Castro will probably supply them clandestinely with small amounts of material aid, and they may attract the support of other Dominican elements, including erstwhile moderates. Thus, over the longer run, the insurgency danger could increase, perhaps sharply. This development would be facilitated if the regime failed to show progress in meeting demands for restoration of political freedoms and for social and economic reforms.

##### Discussion

#### *I. Background*

1. The Dominican Republic<sup>2</sup> is one of the Latin American countries least prepared for representative government. Its past has been characterized by a succession of foreign occupations, coups, and despotic administrations. In particular, the thirty years of Trujillo's

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Dominican Republic. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on January 17.

<sup>2</sup> The Dominican Republic, with some 18,800 square miles, has about the area of New Hampshire and Vermont combined. About 50 percent of the land is arable and the

dictatorship, ended only by his assassination in 1961, warped the political and economic framework of the country. Over the years, many Dominicans have come to doubt that they can accomplish anything by themselves; there are few who have the experience, honesty, and backbone to play effective roles as government leaders.

2. Along with this unfortunate political legacy, Trujillo left an economic jumble of major proportions. His economic policies were designed primarily to funnel funds into the coffers of the Trujillo family. As a result, most of the enterprises now operating in the Dominican Republic are unsound, having inefficient administration structures and swollen payrolls. The Haina sugar complex, the Dominican Republic's most important producer for export, is a case in point. Moreover, some of the country's best land—formerly Trujillo-owned—is still lying fallow.

3. None of the governments which have ruled since Trujillo's death—including the Bosch administration which held power from February to late September of 1963—made appreciable progress toward solution of the country's political and economic difficulties. Although Bosch began with a strong popular mandate, he did not consolidate his electoral victory by decisive and constructive action. On the one hand, he failed to attract the cooperation of influential opposition elements in the business community, among the large property owners, in the military and church hierarchies; on the other hand, he failed to organize his mass popular following into an effective supporting political force. Bosch reacted vigorously against Communists and Castroists only when he thought they posed direct challenges to his own position. His refusal to adopt a strong anti-Communist posture left him vulnerable to rightist pressure for his removal. For many of those working for his overthrow, the Communist issue was the excuse; their own self-interest was the motive.

4. The extreme leftists waited for the dust to settle after Bosch's overthrow before undertaking a campaign of violent opposition. This began in November and has consisted of a number of scare-bombings in the cities and the establishment, for a brief time, of several small guerrilla units in the mountains.

## *II. The Present Regime*

5. The military coup of 25 September was incited by anti-Bosch politicians and carried out by the top-level of the Dominican officer

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ratio of population to land is favorable. The population of about 3.3 million is 13 percent white, 67 percent mulatto, and 20 percent negro; 64 percent of the adult population is literate. The economy remains underdeveloped (GNP: US\$780 million, \$236 per capita) and heavily dependent upon exports of sugar, coffee, and cocoa. [Footnote in the source text.]

corps. The key military leaders<sup>3</sup> were strongly anti-Communist and inclined to believe that reformers and moderate leftists were actually Communists. The coup provoked surprisingly little popular reaction.

6. Upon assuming control, the military leaders called in the heads of six minority parties, only one of which has a significant popular following.<sup>4</sup> In consultation with these party chiefs, the military leaders named a triumvirate of respected, basically apolitical men to head a provisional regime.<sup>5</sup> The military leaders then invited each of the six participating political parties to name one or more of the members of the new cabinet—a process which produced a very mixed bag of ministers in terms of competence, honesty, and political judgment. The other parties, including Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)—which had polled some 60 percent of the votes in the December 1962 elections—have been given no role or representation in the present government. Bosch himself, and some other leaders of the moderate left, as well as a number of extreme leftists, have been deported and his party has been the object of official harassment.

7. The present regime has developed no clearly defined program to ease the country's basic economic problems—widespread poverty, low productivity, and growing unemployment. The triumvirate has, however, made sensible policy statements and has undertaken some constructive measures, along with many dictated by expediency.

8. In the political field, the regime has taken a strong anti-Communist and anti-Castroist position and has acted to curb Communist and other extreme leftist activities. Under much press, internal and external, to hold elections soon, it has announced a five-phase scheme which would begin with several limited local elections and put off national congressional and presidential elections until mid-1965. Government spokesmen claim that the plan would provide "do-it-yourself"

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<sup>3</sup> Secretary of state for armed forces, Maj. Gen. Victor Vinas Roman; chief of staff of the army, Brig. Gen. Renato Hungria Morell; chief of staff of the navy, Commodore J.A. Rib Santamaria; chief of staff of the air force, Brig. Gen. Miguel A. Luna; chief of staff of the armed forces training center, Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, and chief of the national police, Brig. Gen. Belisario Peguero. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>4</sup> Five of the six parties are to the right of center; the conservative National Civic Union (UCN), the only one with much popular support, obtained some 30 percent of the vote in the December 1962 elections. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Emilio De Los Santos, a 60-year old lawyer and former President of the Central Elections Board was named presiding officer of the triumvirate. Manuel Enrique Es-paillat, a 39-year old US-educated engineer and former Director of the Dominican Industrial Development Corporation, is noted for his pro-US attitude; he is the member of the triumvirate concerned particularly with economic matters. Ramon Tapia Espinal is a 37-year old lawyer who served as secretary of the Presidency of the Council of State government and at one time assisted in the organization of the UCN party. He has the reputation of being highly emotional though fairly intelligent. [Footnote in the source text.]

training for the populace in democratic procedures; the earthier motivation seems to be the opportunity it might afford for parties participating in the regime to improve their machinery and expand their following. It would be likely, however, to have an unsettling impact on the general political situation; beginning with the campaigning for the elections at the lowest local level in the fall of 1964, there would be voting every two or three months—and electioneering almost constantly—until the summer of 1965.

9. US recognition had a bolstering effect for the triumvirate, but its situation is still a very difficult one. The triumvirate has no independent base of support, is unable to exercise effective control over the actions of the military and police, and is subject to pressure from many sides. The Dominican military leaders retain the power to remove it at any time. Moreover, the triumvirate has been under fire from the extreme right as well as from the left, the ultrarightists accusing it, among other things, of failing to act vigorously enough to expel “Communists” from official positions.

10. Under these circumstances, De Los Santos, the triumvirate’s presiding officer, became increasingly restive; he resigned when the military—against his strong urgings, but apparently with the approval of the triumvirate members—used what he regarded as extreme brutality in dealing with a group of leftist insurgents. The governmental crisis provoked by his resignation was met by reconstituting the triumvirate with Donald J. Reid Cabral, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, as the new member.<sup>6</sup>

11. The revised triumvirate has made a number of changes in the cabinet, narrowing its base essentially to two conservative parties (the UCN and the Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard). This will probably reduce political cross-currents within the cabinet and thus make it somewhat easier to work with; however, the new appointments and the shuffle of ministerial posts appear unlikely to bring any significant improvement in competence. The other four of the original six “in” parties, seeing their position and influence undermined, have shifted into opposition.

12. It now appears that the triumvirate, with the support of certain key military figures, is moving to displace the chiefs of staff of the three military services. Commodore Fedirico Betances Pierret has already replaced Commodore Rib as chief of staff of the navy. The primary target, however, is the air force chief of staff, Brigadier General Luna, who may try to resist. There is some danger that these devel-

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<sup>6</sup> A former member of the Council of State, Reid has long been close to US embassy officials; his political views are generally in line with those of the UCN. [Footnote in the source text.]

opments may precipitate an open power struggle within the military leadership.

### *III. Leftist Subversion and Insurgency*

13. The 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) is the most potent of the organizations of the extreme left.<sup>7</sup> Its members and supporters probably number several thousand; this contrasts with the Communist-Castroist Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) and the regular Dominican Communist Party, which command the support of no more than a few hundred. The APCJ benefits from its role as a non-partisan underground group which fought against Trujillo. Ever since the extreme leftists gained control of the group in 1961, after Trujillo's death, it has planned for eventual subversive and guerrilla action. Since its resort to active insurgency, it has been outlawed by the government.

14. The APCJ has been the dominant force behind the guerrilla effort in the countryside as well as the frequent but ineffective bombings in the cities. A few members of the MPD have also been directly involved and others may have assisted in procuring weapons. Some of the captured insurgents have denied any Communist allegiance and insisted they were fighting simply for a return to constitutional government.

15. The total number of active guerrilla fighters was about 200, organized into six small groups in various mountainous areas of the country.<sup>8</sup> The groups were not well prepared for any serious fighting and did not take any offensive action. They apparently hoped they could quickly attract significant support from other disaffected civilian and military elements. This was not the case. The government's security forces have managed to mop up almost all of them and to scatter the others. Manuel Tavares Justo, the principal APCJ leader, and several other key APCJ figures have been killed.

16. The guerrilla effort followed the Castro model. A few APCJ members had earlier received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Havana press and radio were quick to provide propaganda support to the "insurrection" and to quote the APCJ's claims about its scope. We have no firm evidence that the Castro regime has, as yet, furnished material support to the Dominican insurgents, but Castro would probably

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<sup>7</sup> The other parties of the extreme left are the orthodox Communist Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano (PSPD); the heterodox Communist Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario (PNR); and the Communist-dominated, pro-Castro Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD). Other, comparatively moderate, leftist parties are Bosch's Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) and the bitterly anti-Bosch Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (PRSC). [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>8</sup> As in Cuba, the terrain is favorable for guerrilla warfare. See map. [Footnote in the source text. The map is not reproduced.]



supply them clandestinely with small amounts of such aid if they appeared capable of sustaining a program of violent opposition. The short distance involved—less than 200 miles from eastern Cuba to the western part of the Dominican Republic—would facilitate clandestine supply operations by small boat or by aircraft.

#### *IV. Security Forces*

17. The Dominican Republic's security forces are considerably more able and better equipped than is typically the case for a small Latin American country. Total strength of the military and security forces is 28,100: 10,500 in the army, 1,700 in the armed forces training center (which has the armor), 3,700 in the air force, 3,100 in the navy, and 9,100 in the national police. The army has three counterinsurgency-trained battalions, and the air force has two counter guerrilla security squadrons. Dominican personnel have received specialized counterinsurgency training from US instructors, and the national police has expanded its program of training for riot control. Key weaknesses affecting the overall capability of the Dominican military are insufficient field training and inadequate communications and transportation equipment.

18. The amount of subversion and insurgency the Dominican security forces have had to deal with to date has not provided a major test of their capabilities, but they have been effective in such fighting as has occurred. We believe that they will be able to cope with any insurgency likely to arise, unless it should be extensively supported from outside or combined with widespread civil disturbances.

#### *V. The Outlook*

19. For the immediate future at least, the leftists pose no serious threat to seize control. The present regime, in one form or another, may be able to hold on to power for an indefinite period. If this does not prove to be the case, the most likely alternative would be an extreme rightist government established through a direct military takeover. This might take place if the triumvirate resigned under pressure; it might come about as a military response to charges by ultrarightists that the present administration is soft on communism; it might occur through an increase in friction among the leading military men and a decision by one or more to take full control. The resulting new government would be even less likely than the present one to fulfill domestic demands for reform.

20. In any case, the extreme leftists will probably concentrate for the time being on trying to increase terrorism in urban areas, hoping gradually to build a new capability for guerrilla actions at a later date. Much of their support comes from the youth in the cities. They could almost certainly step up their bombing program; they might also un-

dertake occasional shooting affrays, acts of arson, and other destructive measures. They may be able to attract additional Dominican supporters by exploiting a martyrdom issue; the belief has become widespread that the military, in one of its mop-up operations, murdered insurgents who had surrendered.

21. Perhaps the leftists' strongest card is the instability of the present regime and the magnitude of the problems that face it. These include the difficulty such a regime is likely to have in convincing the populace that it intends to undertake constructive social and economic programs and to provide for an eventual return to representative government. Some friction is probable among top-level military officers, along with a gradual increase in restiveness on the part of middle-ranking and junior officers. If official harassment of the PRD and other opposition parties continues, there will almost certainly be a tendency for some of the moderate civilian opponents of the regime to shift to a sharper opposition role. The extreme leftists' program of violent resistance might attract such erstwhile moderates. Thus, over the longer run, the present limited threat of insurgency could increase sharply.

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## **2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 6, 1964.

Attached is a memorandum which I received from a businessman who has been a close observer of the Dominican scene since before the Bosch election.<sup>2</sup> I have found him to be a reliable reporter in the past, although he has relatively few contacts and is therefore weak on student labor and popular democratic parties. He did not get out in the countryside during his recent trip.

This report plus the traffic which I have seen in recent weeks suggests to me that it is time we sat down to map out a program for the Dominican Republic which is geared to developments that are occurring there since the coup. I would suggest that a draft plan of action be prepared by the Desk which could be reviewed here in Washington

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL DOM REP. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

before Bennett goes down to Santo Domingo.<sup>3</sup> Bennett might take this plan down and test it against his own appraisal of the situation as he observes it.

My concern about Santo Domingo is as follows:

Obviously, the situation is extremely fluid and could go in a number of different directions. One of these is a deterioration in political and economic conditions which could lead to a Castro-type takeover. In short, I believe that we must develop a plan which has a positive objective and not simply react to the situation as it develops. I recognize that the formulation of a plan and development of a program to implement it is not a guarantee against deterioration.<sup>4</sup>

**RAD**

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<sup>3</sup> Bennett was appointed Ambassador to the Dominican Republic on March 4 and presented his credentials on March 23.

<sup>4</sup> Mann responded to Dungan in a February 12 memorandum in which he agreed that a plan of action for the Dominican Republic should be readied for discussion with Ambassador Bennett and stated that “one is now being developed.” This plan of action, however, has not been identified. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL DOM REP)

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### **3. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

A-315

Santo Domingo, February 16, 1964.

SUBJECT

Balagueristas Discover Plot to Overthrow Reid

There is enclosed a memorandum of a recent conversation between two leaders of Joaquín Balaguer’s Partido Reformista and an Embassy officer.<sup>2</sup> The balagueristas alleged the existence of a plot on the part of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman on February 14 and approved by DCM Spencer M. King.

<sup>2</sup> The attached memorandum of conversation, February 14, among Augusto Lora, President of the Partido Reformista, Hector Garcia Godoy of the Partido Reformista, and Political Officer Harry Shlaudeman is not printed.

Rafael Bonnelly, Ramón Tapia,<sup>3</sup> Antonio Imbert and others to depose Triumvirate President Donald Reid Cabral as a means of preventing the issuance of a law granting general political amnesty and the consequent return to the DR of Balaguer.

The Embassy is inclined to doubt that Bonnelly and Tapia are contemplating another golpe. However, the balaguerista charges are another indication that serious dissension has arisen within the GODR over the amnesty issue and the problem of Balaguer. Reid had correctly sensed the political necessity for some kind of amnesty gesture and, in all probability, sees it as a means of advancing his own political fortunes. (Reid continues to stand surprisingly high with a good part of the opposition which sees him as better intentioned and more honest than his colleagues.) On the other side Tapia (and probably Manuel Tavares), backed by Imbert and the radical right of Rafael Bonilla Aybar oppose any concessions at this time to political prisoners and exiles. Unión Cívica Nacional favors a limited amnesty but bitterly objects to extending it to the party's old enemy Balaguer. In all, the amnesty issue carries with it the elements of a political crisis, one that could be on us shortly if Reid is serious in his plan to pass a law February 27.

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

**HWS**

*Second Secretary of Embassy*

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<sup>3</sup> Rafael Bonnelly was President of the Dominican Republic and of the Council of State that governed the Republic from 1962 until February 27, 1963. Ramón Tapia was Secretary of State for Presidency under the Council of State, 1962–February 27, 1963, and member of the Triumvirate after Juan Bosch's overthrow in September 25, 1963.

4. **Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

A-320

Santo Domingo, February 19, 1964.

SUBJECT

Conversation With Donald Reid

Enclosed is the memorandum of a recent conversation between Triumvirate President Donald Reid Cabral and an Embassy officer.<sup>2</sup> On the subject of elections Reid revealed what the Embassy has long suspected: that he is in no hurry to begin the electoral process. With regard to the issue of amnesty for political prisoners, Reid asserted the political necessity for such a measure and described his ideas on the subject. He acknowledged strong opposition from the other members of the Triumvirate to his proposals on this score and said that the situation had led to serious dissension. Reid also blamed jealousy and pernicious outside influences for his current troubles with Manuel Tavares<sup>3</sup> and Ramón Tapia. Reid discussed possible forthcoming changes in the Cabinet<sup>4</sup> and indicated that he was particularly anxious to rid the government of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana because of that party's corrupt practices. On the potentially explosive issue of Joaquín Balaguer's return to the DR, Reid expressed the opinion that the ex-President represented a greater threat outside of the country and should be permitted to come home as soon as the political campaign begins.<sup>5</sup> Finally, Reid brought up the question of AID, stating that the GODR urgently needs help in hospital, school and foreign scholarship programs.

*Comment:* It is sometimes difficult to believe that Reid is the same man who served on the Council of State. Of late he appears much calmer, more pragmatic and more sensible. He is still indiscreet and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 2 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman on February 18 and approved by DCM Spencer M. King.

<sup>2</sup> Attached memorandum of conversation between Reid and Shlaudeman, February 17, is not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Member of the Triumvirate after Juan Bosch's overthrow in September 25, 1963.

<sup>4</sup> Reid specifically sought replacements for the Secretaries of Education and Justice.

<sup>5</sup> During their conversation Reid explained to Shlaudeman that Balaguer in exile "represented a rallying point for golpistas who could use [him] as a front man," and if he were in the Dominican Republic Balaguer would become "vulnerable to attack as a trujillista relic of the past and could be expected to lose much of his present appeal."

basically rather cynical but, perhaps alone among Dominican politicians, he seems to have learned something during the past two years. In any event, his marked political instinct and avocation for government provide an encouraging contrast with the emotionalism and naïvité which Tavares and Tapia display all too frequently.

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

**Harry W. Shlaudeman**  
*Second Secretary of Embassy*

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**5. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 21, 1964, 2 p.m.

1053. For ARA. Subject: Prospects for the Dominican Republic.

1. On conclusion of my first eight weeks in this tormented country, Dept will perhaps be interested to have from me a preliminary analysis of the situation here and its portents for United States policy.

**Continuing State of Crisis**

2. During this period since late March the country has been rocked by three major crises, two of which were political and either of which could easily have ended in a military takeover. One did end with change in governing triumvirate. Govt is attempting to face up to financial crisis, and some initial measures have been taken; but we are still in early stretch of long road. Sufficient to say that with crises recurring so constantly little gets done. Political malaise is perhaps more serious than economic, and the various forces emerge from one crisis to prepare for the next.

**Embassy Activity**

3. In this 8-week period American preference has been fully reestablished here. While our personnel situation is still seriously short, we are gradually, perhaps too slowly, building back to strength of last [garble—July?]. AID Mission has been reactivated, as has MAAG, and both new chiefs are now assembling staffs.

4. We have been involved in considerable substantive activity, when we could find a day quiet enough to take action. Such projects

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FN 2 DOM REP. Secret; Limit Distribution.

as 4-million-dollar EXIM Bank loan for road maintenance machinery, 900-unit workers' housing in San Pedro de Macoris, 600-unit middle-class housing in Santo Domingo and release for on-going projects of funds totaling more than \$1.1 million to assist educational activities, labor cooperatives, etc., have been signed or announced. Numerous scholarships and travel grants covering wide variety of interests and training have been put in motion. I have given a number of formal speeches, together with many informal talks, and have made three major trips to north and east sections of the country, plus shorter trips to nearby towns and in and around the capital. I have also visited numerous Peace Corps volunteers on station, including several who live in the most depressing slum areas of Santo Domingo and Santiago and whose work in a broad range of fields cannot be praised too highly. All these activities have been well received and have received appropriate publicity.

5. Quite aside from govt contacts—and there is almost daily exchange here with top level due to informal atmosphere in which triumvirate governs and the seeming necessity of getting even minor decisions made by them—there have been conferences, meetings and discussions with professional, cultural, business, agricultural, political and military leaders and with labor and youth groups. In short, the country knows we are back in business here. Written and spoken comments at all levels and representing all sectors of opinion (except Communist) indicate great relief and satisfaction that U.S. is back.

#### Economic Misery

6. As a result of sampling this wide cross section of Dominican opinion, I am convinced that country's major interest at the moment is finding jobs and food, i.e. getting on with economic development. With perhaps a third of the working force unemployed and many others underemployed, urban slums I have visited are Asian-like in their overcrowding and squalor (they lack even such basic necessities as water, sanitation, and garbage collection). They are seething with unrest and frustration. Economic misery, as distinct from political tyranny, strikes me as much more prevalent now (drift to cities dramatizes it, of course) than when I served in this country over twenty years ago during the Trujillo period.

#### Political Apathy

7. One of the things which has impressed me most in my travels and conversations about the country has been the almost total lack of interest in talking politics with me. This excepts, of course, the several party leaders here in the capital whose profession it is to keep the waters boiling. In conversations with others, however, the more sophisticated emphasize development needs and propose projects, large and small, government and private. Less educated people stress jobs and

housing. I am repeatedly surprised at how rarely politics comes up. On two separate visits to San Pedro de Macoris, for instance, which offered informal talks with full range of income groups from top to bottom, not once was a political matter mentioned. Despite shrillness of individual political leaders, each of whom has his devoted cadre of acitlarts and some of whom have no further following, most observers agree the country is largely apathetic at this time as regards political matters. This does not mean, however, that Dominican politicians are going to give up playing politics.

#### Leftward Drift

8. On other hand, the poor and the unemployed, most of whom scrape through on a minimum subsistence diet and have trouble even getting water, while not active politically, appear to be steadily drifting leftward in their sympathies. They are, of course, on receiving end of heavy stream of radio and word-of-mouth propaganda from extreme left. My Peace Corps friends who live in slum areas tell us that many of their neighbors sympathize with Castroite 14th of June movement. Comments made to me on my own visits to these sections indicate, despite the appealing simplicity and easy friendliness which still characterizes the average Dominican, a general sense of abandonment at hands of society. Perverted as it is in its aims, the 14th of June at least shows interest in their misery and promises them help.

#### Lack of National Purpose

9. Disorders (including bomb tossing and stone throwing in such normally quiet provincial towns as La Vega) during recent taxi drivers strike, which had no economic justification and was in fact a political effort manipulated by both right and left for separate (but often converging) ends, showed how close to the surface violence is in Dominican life today and how tension grips rich, poor and govt authority alike and influences their actions toward extremism. Part of this represents general spirit of revolt against authority—any authority—which is aftermath of long Trujillo tyranny; and part unfortunately represents those more endemic Dominican characteristics of inordinate suspicion one of another and lack of sense of national purpose (despite homogeneous population) or feeling of individual responsibility to act in national interest—traits which have so often been commented on over the years by observers of the local scene. The difference now is that time is shorter than it was.

#### Need For Urgent U.S. Action

10. Given the above factual situation, what should be the U.S. posture? My own conviction after eight years here is that we have less time even than we thought during Washington consultations in March. If we are to influence Dominicans in ways we want to see them go and counter leftist efforts to poison popular mind, we must lose no time in



getting under way with full-scale Alliance for Progress program. Despite rather somber picture drawn above, I do not believe body politic here is as yet deeply infected with Castro–Communist venom, notwithstanding intensive efforts mentioned above. There is rather touching trust and faith that the United States can solve all Dominican problems; there is, in fact, over-dependence on us.

11. The time for us to act is now. AID Director Carter Ide is presently in Washington, and I hope he can be given urgent and sympathetic support in getting approval of program along lines worked out during his recent consultation here. We believe emphasis should be in fields of (1) agriculture (agricultural productivity has simply got to be increased to meet needs of rapidly increasing population and to offset effects of measures to counter balance of payments problem) and (2) education, but with sufficient flexibility to take on desirable projects that may be offered in other fields. There is critical need to put people to work here, and we should have some impact projects of sufficient scope to be impressive and have effect on local consciousness.

#### Support for Self-Help

12. Our program should place stress on encouraging and assisting self-help efforts of Dominican Govt and private entities and to maximum extent feasible should be implemented step by step as needed reforms are instituted. While many activities necessarily have to be carried out in conjunction with govt, we should make strong effort to avoid tying ourselves too directly to any one administration or any one group. To extent we can do so in accord with sound operational and fiscal procedures, we should seek to work with communities and with private professional, business and labor groups. In that connection, one of most hopeful aspects of local scene involves Community Development Associations which are now being organized all over the country and which are anxious to work with us. These associations are being sparked by the excellent Santiago Committee, which is worthy of similar activity in an American city of its size and already has a number of positive successes to its credit. These efforts indicate that at long last at least some Dominican citizens are becoming aware of their private responsibilities for public progress. Labor organizations and agricultural cooperatives also offer possibilities as suitable vehicles for direct cooperation. We should encourage them. In short, we must tie our programs to people and local initiative and act so as to convince the entirety of the Dominican public that the American people and Govt have an abiding interest in their progress toward social betterment and higher standards of living.

#### Political Effects

13. What are the political effects of all this? We cannot forget—and we should not let Dominicans forget—that the standards of this

hemisphere require Dominican Republic to work its way back to constitutional govt. At the present time, however, except for self-serving declarations of political leaders, most of whom agree only on getting the ins out and wishing themselves in national palace, there is widespread popular apathy. Not one of the various political leaders with whom I have talked gives the impression of having national stature or being capable of giving this country leadership needed. This includes present leadership of the democratic left.

Bosch & Balaguer

14. Oddly enough, the two individuals most often mentioned and credited with stature of presidential possibilities are outside the country, Juan Bosch in Puerto Rico and Joaquin Balaguer in New York. As for Bosch, his own political party, whatever its public posture, is by no means united in desiring his return, there is no widespread public demand for it. And quite apart from whether Dominican armed forces would or would not agree to his coming back, there are sound grounds for believing that Bosch himself much prefers the comfortable martyrdom of Puerto Rican exile to the pains and aches involved in attempting to govern this distressingly ungovernable country. Those who know Bosch best hold that he has no intention of attempting a comeback. Comments of Piera quoted Embtel 1037<sup>2</sup> are latest of a series.

15. Balaguer may well represent at this time the largest common denominator of support for the Presidency, since he has the large PR party behind him and enjoys the backing of important right wing elements in the armed forces and the church and at least some popular favor within groups such as the taxi drivers to whom he gave free taxicabs during his previous incumbency. (He also has bitter enemies who threaten his assassination in event of his return.) However, Balaguer's proven combination of political charlatanry and economic profligacy, together with his record of close association with the Trujillo dynasty, would scarcely seem to recommend him as in the U.S. interest. In final analysis it is not so much Balaguer's personal qualities that make him undesirable. It is fact that his return would open way for re-imposition throughout country of interlocking Trujillo mechanism of governing. It is still less than three years since Trujillo. Those people are still around and they are anxious for another chance.

Donald Reid Cabral

16. That brings us to Donald Reid Cabral, leading member of the governing triumvirate and professedly apolitical. I have not the slightest doubt that Reid Cabral has the smell of politics deep in his nostrils. He has already begun maneuvers to find his way to a longer term,

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

preferably alone and preferably constitutional if he can find a formula. These intentions are already suspected of him by his peers, and there will be increased rumblings, together with efforts to block him, as his presumed intentions become clearer. It is perhaps worth bearing in mind in that connection that he is not the first interim Latin American leader nor, it can be safely wagered, will he be the last to conclude he is the man to lead his country onward.

17. Reid is something of a bantam cock in personality, is strong-willed and impulsive and is at times erratic; he is not well organized personally, with the result that plans and promises often outrun performance. There is a great deal of spur-of-the-moment shifting of gears. However, there seems no doubt of his good intentions nor of his strong desire to improve conditions in his country. He does not lack for personal courage and he is personally honest. He greatly admires the United States and its way of life. While lacking a “popular” background (he will always be subject to the charge of belonging to the oligarchy) and not a rabble-rouser, he can be effective in a crowd; he was, for instance, impressive at a large labor gathering on May Day in which I participated. In sum, from standpoint U.S. interests we could do a lot worse in a country like this in which there is such a paucity of possibilities.

#### Problem of Illegitimacy

18. As an interim executive Reid suffers from the stain of political illegitimacy and he can expect no help from the practicing politicians in removing it or forgetting it. However, if he can prove himself to the people in the months ahead and earn their support for an acceptable formula for return to constitutionality, I see no grounds on which the United States should object. The trick, in light of the political jockeying and plotting which goes on incessantly behind the scenes here, will be for Reid to gain the months in which to prove he can do something for the people and earn their support, i.e. fill today’s vacuum of popular support with himself.

#### Views of Papal Nuncio

19. I should like to comment parenthetically that Monsenor Clarizio, Papal Nuncio, an enlightened and progressive man who is a force for good in this country, shares the views expressed above regarding political prospects and alternatives in this country.

#### Dark Horse

20. Crises ripple here with speed of summer lightning. According to his political opposition, Reid’s radio speech of May 15 has had effect of causing parties to intensify their efforts find unity on single national candidate so as to increase pressure for elections. Given nature of party and individual rivalries this would be neatest trick of week, but if such efforts should prosper result might be turn toward Bala-

guer. Or an individual might be found whose name has thus far not appeared in speculation. Certain it is that, regardless of extent of political apathy in country at large, party leaders have no intention of giving triumvirate any peace or tranquillity. Giving the matter a purely pragmatic view, however, so long as Reid holds the support of the armed forces he will have his office and his opportunity. At present he has that support, and he works hard to keep it.

#### The Military Problem

21. Given the realities of the military position in the Dom Rep, Reid is in fact in the midst of a most discreet operation. He is softly stroking the military in hopes it will purr in response; so far it is docile, although it is an uncertain and dangerous instrument. He is simultaneously engaged in the delicate task of (1) reducing Trujillista influence (still strong, and Balaguer-oriented) and (2) removing from the general military establishment some of the undue privileges it enjoys, while at the same time striving to prevent a split among the several different factions which could easily deteriorate into armed conflict with unforeseeable consequences for the country. It is possible, of course, that he may slip off this tight rope and fall into the military pocket. It is quite probable that it will look that way from time to time, but I believe he is alert to this danger. In my opinion he deserves our sympathetic understanding in his effort to work out a more rational place in Dominican society for the men with the guns. He deserves it the more in view of the constant effort of some political elements to serve their own ends by inciting the military to more active intrusion in the affairs of state.

#### The Prospects

22. If our own activities meet with success—and we have a staff with good teamwork and high morale which is prepared to work hard at the job—some of this success will perhaps rub off on govt in power (as will failures). There is no way to get away from fact that any positive program our part will be taken by many as evidence our support of whatever regime in power at time. However, to serve our long-range interests in this country, I repeat the view that we should insofar as we can avoid tying our program to any one individual or administration and base it as much as possible on broad cooperation with private groups and community activities. Our approach should remain sufficiently flexible to enable us to cut loose from any particular govt formula that may develop badly. We should never cease to stress publicly that our activities are long-range and our interest the welfare of the whole Dominican people.

23. In this throbbing tropic atmosphere, where the realities are often sordid and the atmosphere usually oppressive, the situation does not seem to me to lend itself to brilliant theorizing or to elaborate

operational plans which are dependent for their execution on sophisticated reactions simply not to be found in this politically primitive environment. Rather it seems to me we are faced with meeting each day's problems as they arise, measuring them against our constant objectives and tackling them on that basis. We shall be misunderstood, and we shall be attacked by those who want revolution immediately and by those who want no changes at all. Our daily fare will probably contain as much failure as success, but with luck we may advance a bit now and then. Our problem is largely one of infusing as much reason as possible into an atmosphere in which reason has been resisted and defied for most of history.

24. With sufficient commitment on our part I believe the problem here is manageable, although I do not underestimate the difficulties and the uncertain prospects. We learned all too recently here that we do not, despite our great influence, have the last word; we are dealing with human material which does not always respond logically or even in its own long-range interests. When the chips are down it is the Dominicans who make their own final decisions—largely on the basis of their own self-generated pressures.

25. There are many larger problems than the Dominican one, and many which would appear to be basically more insoluble. But the Dominican Republic is on our doorstep and, let us have no illusions, the Dominican problem is urgent.

**Bennett**

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**6. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, June 5, 1964, 8:30 p.m.

1106. For Assistant Secretary Mann and Crockett ARA.

1. We have become increasingly concerned in recent days over behavior of Reid Cabral. Meeting which King, Bramble and I had with triumvirate June 3 (reported Embtels 1091 and 1097)<sup>2</sup> on IMF discus-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10 DOM REP/IMF. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 3 and 4. (Ibid. and FN 10 DOM REP, respectively)

sions (Deptel 660)<sup>3</sup> may have accomplished purpose but it was distinctly an unpleasant affair. Reid's almost hysterical reaction to suggestion that DomRep has serious financial problems, and his outburst of anger when we made point Dominican delegation seemingly not coming to grips with IMF problem were response of tense, unstable man, in fact quite irrational at times.

2. In past two weeks it has become increasingly difficult to have serious conversation with Reid, and his tendency hear only what he wants to hear has grown more marked. I have found this myself and a variety of contacts both local and foreign report similarly. He is apparently listening to no one and brooks no advice, even from old friends and well wishers. He is driving himself to exhaustion with attention to every detail of administration while at same time rushing about over the country in his "vigorous program" and making all manner of promises for grandiose projects which cannot possibly be filled in any reasonable time. Both Nuncio and British Chargé have commented to me on his irascibility in conversation. All elements of Mission are receiving reports similar to above, and we have had several local approaches this week asking us to "talk to Donnie."

3. Hal Hendrix, for instance, told me yesterday he fed up with Reid and returning to Miami to write story for Scripps-Howard which he says will "cause Donnie to strike me off his list of friends." Hendrix expressed himself as thoroughly disillusioned with Reid and local situation and seemed particularly upset over evidences of broad extent graft and corruption he found pervading local scene. He did not accuse triumvirate personally of this, but various American and foreign businessmen resident here for many years have approached me and other members of staff in recent days to express their view that graft worse now than under Trujillo. There is marked increase of complaint and triumvirate being held responsible even if not personally involved.

4. This deterioration in Reid's behavior has been precipitate. Our telegram 1053<sup>4</sup> called attention to erratic, strong-willed aspects of his nature and he seems to have given these qualities full rein in last two weeks. His cocky overconfidence has grown apace. I believe this is due to a variety of factors: his elation over his govt's success in handling recent taxi strike and the approving *New York Times* editorial in

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 660 to Santo Domingo, June 2, the Department reported that discussions in Washington with Dominican Republic representatives on a draft IMF standby arrangement for \$25 million had nearly reached an impasse "over apparent Dominican unwillingness come to grips with financial problems they face." The telegram further stated, "unless Dominicans willing to implement meaningful program of reforms, prospect is for rapid deterioration of already serious financial situation." (Ibid., FN 10 DOM REP/IMF)

<sup>4</sup> Document 5.

connection therewith, on top of his feeling which he has expressed to more than one visiting newsman that he now has both Dominican armed forces and U.S. Govt in his pocket.

5. I believe he has overestimated our recognition of his regime, favorable decisions on several economic matters coincident with first weeks of new U.S. Ambassador's presence in country and support he justifiably received in connection taxi strike. He seems to have taken all this to mean that he has full U.S. support to do what he pleases on political scene (including some highly dubious radio censorship actions, and ominous complaints beginning to emanate from high sources about press criticism of regime actions). He appears, despite cautionary talk from me, to be convinced his promises will be paid for by us (his aid ideas are obviously exaggerated). It is becoming a matter of conjecture among the informed as to how long this can go on unless Donald Reid can be pulled back off this kick.

6. We have reported (Embtels 1078 and 1081)<sup>5</sup> mutterings within armed forces. These are continuing. Yesterday's and today's papers carried stories of "subversive group" discovered within police (we understand Reid participated personally in grilling of enlisted personnel involved). As of now our attachés do not regard Reid's military support so united and secure as Reid apparently thinks.

7. I believe most effective step that can be taken at this time would be for you to have frank and vigorous talk with Bonilla. Bonilla has strong influence on Reid and, as we know, has steadily encouraged him in his political aspirations. We feel here that Bonilla often misleads Reid (witness IMF discussions) and that his reporting seriously offsets our efforts here. So long as Reid is being fed overoptimistic accounts by Bonilla, as we believe, about his (Reid's) high standing in Washington and U.S. Govt's readiness to back him all the way, I am afraid our efforts here to put matters in perspective are lightly regarded and taken with resentment.

8. I urge you to see Bonilla without delay and stress our concern over trend of situation here. You could take as point of departure Dept's surprise over Reid's statements to press during recent Samana visit that new port works would be built with Alliance, i.e. U.S. money (without slightest mention of project before or after to Embassy) and his comments reported front page yesterday's papers following our June 3 meeting primarily for IMF matters but during which he listed without discussion some of projects he expected U.S. pay for (para 6 Emb-

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<sup>5</sup> Dated June 1 and 2. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP)

tel 1099).<sup>6</sup> Without any further ado Reid told press U.S. financed Alliance program would include roads, ports, hospitals, etc. It would be desirable to make point to Bonilla that reports of concern over Reid handling matters here are coming in from various sources, including press and business (i.e. not confined to Embassy).

9. I hope you can talk with Bonilla over weekend so that his report can reach Reid before our Monday<sup>7</sup> meeting (which I shall attempt postpone until Tuesday). I expect hard knuckled discussion in view Reid's exhilarated state and am fully prepared do my part in making him face facts. It should be made clear to Bonilla that we cannot do business on basis of Reid promising and then expecting us to pick up the check (he devoted table-pounding emphasis in June 3 discussion to what he "deserves" in way of U.S. aid) and that Alliance program is meant to raise living standards rather than serve as political vehicle. It could also be stressed that U.S. does not wish be associated in eyes of public (as we are being more and more tied in with Reid in local opinion) with govt in which graft and corruption so rampant—and growing according to all reports of those who have to do business on local scene. Shaking Bonilla up would, I hope, have effect of infusing a little more reality into Reid. You will have to douse Bonilla with ice water for it to come out cold on Reid. I don't want to exaggerate in view paucity of alternatives here. However, unless we can get Reid back on path, and quickly, I am afraid all signs point to serious trouble.

10. All senior officers, including [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and attachés, share this assessment and join in these recommendations.

**Bennett**

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<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> June 8.



7. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1964, 3:53 p.m.

667. For Ambassador from Crockett. Embtel 1106.<sup>2</sup>

Reftel arrived at particularly opportune moment. We had already scheduled interview with Bonilla for this morning in order explain nature contemplated AID program and U.S. objectives under Alliance per your tel #1099.<sup>3</sup> Reftel provided valuable additional ammunition and help in focusing on problem Reid's unrealistic expectations and rash public pronouncements this respect.

Asst. Sec. Mann out of town today but will see Bonilla on June 8 to reinforce today's representations.<sup>4</sup> In this regard, agree you should request one or two day postponement of scheduled Monday meeting with Triumvirate to allow time for Bonilla to report to Reid after conversation with Mann.

Following is summary Crockett's talk with Bonilla today:

1. Bonilla reported that Dom financial delegation has now reached full meeting of minds with IMF and believes stand-by can be signed June 8. (We have not yet been able confirm this with IMF and have no details on what specifics agreement may entail.) In response this good news, Crockett emphasized that stand-by only first step on difficult road; that agreement will only prove beneficial if Triumvirate now hews line on fiscal and other reform measures necessary to put Dom economic house in order.

2. This led to point that Triumvirate's very *raison d'être* is its presumed capacity to take difficult measures for good of nation without undue regard for transitory political considerations. It was recalled that Council of State and Bosch regimes proved reluctant to grapple with country's real problems because of political pressures but that Triumvirate has publicly recognized that it has no excuses this regard.

3. At same time U.S. fully aware of difficulties faced by Triumvirate, particularly severe pressures created by widespread unemployment. Reid's anxiety to show visible, immediate results in terms of public works projects therefore understandable. Nevertheless, in our

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10 DOM REP/IMF. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Shlaudeman and approved by Crockett.

<sup>2</sup> Document 6.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Mann was scheduled to meet with Bonilla on Monday, June 8; see Document 8. No other record of this meeting has been found.

opinion, would be error of first magnitude to pump money into employment-creating projects of this type which did not at same time increase country's capacity to produce. Result would be compounding of current financial problem which has its roots in excess of consumption in relation to production.

4. Referring to Reid's extravagant and misleading promises re U.S. assistance, Crockett emphasized that aid of the type he apparently envisages cannot be justified. In addition damage it would do in terms of DR's financial situation, building of hospitals for which there are no nurses, schools for which there are no teachers and gaudy bridges for which there is no need would be essentially wasteful. Bonilla was told in clearest terms that U.S. has no intention embarking on a program of this sort and that Reid's statements can only cause mutual embarrassment.

5. It was then explained just what U.S. does hope do: assist in raising agricultural production, in improving education, in getting country launched on constructive self-help projects, and, generally, in establishing technical and educational base for genuine development. Crockett singled out Bonilla's own project for rural education as one which fits within framework.

6. Bonilla reacted most favorably. Said he agreed entirely; that our approach coincided with his thinking and that these representations would strengthen his hand in attempting influence Reid. He expressed desire for interview with Asst. Sec. to go over same ground so as to be able impress Reid even more strongly.

7. Referring to Reid's recent statements, Bonilla observed that former is inclined toward rash indiscretions and is at times victimized by bad advice, particularly from his uncles the Cabrals. Bonilla reviewed his own efforts over the months to prevail on Reid to lay aside empty words and make his mark with constructive action. As example, Bonilla asserted he had counseled Reid bring in qualified foreign economist and formulate economic policy on basis this expert's advice.

8. Throughout Bonilla emphasized his belief that Triumvirate must adopt practical programs for promoting basic education, increasing agricultural production, encouraging small industries and attracting foreign investment. Said he would continue urge his views (which appear remarkably similar to our own) on Reid.

In forthcoming conversations with Bonilla we will attempt strengthen these convictions (presuming they are genuine) by discreet coaching and re-emphasis of points made today. Bonilla intends return Santo Domingo next week following conclusion IMF negotiations. Judging from your own estimate of his influence on Reid, he should prove helpful. You may therefore wish follow up our efforts with representations of your own after he arrives.

**Rusk**

8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, June 8, 1964, noon.

1108. For Crockett ARA. Embtel 1106; Deptel 667.<sup>2</sup>

Much heartened by receipt your 667. We must hope Bonilla will talk in same way to Reid as he does to us. I believe best way to forward that project is for Mann to keep pressure on Bonilla. You might go so far in this evening's meeting with Bonilla as to suggest that, since aid discussion scheduled for tomorrow 4 p.m. between triumvirate and our team has been announced to press by Reid as "invitation of formal negotiations on program U.S. aid for Dom Rep," it would be useful have him to advise Reid of Washington discussions before meeting here.

Reid took initiative yesterday to have lengthy conversation with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], later joined by other two attachés. I consider this was a most useful encounter, since they got down to brass tacks on graft, corruption in armed forces and elsewhere. Reid asked for it and he got it in accord with lines worked out among us beforehand. Reid was in sober state of mind and his manner indicated realization his part things not going well lately. I believe our team made some first downs.

In view Reid's frank admission yesterday's conversation extent of graft in local society and his professed desire to take steps to correct situation as he mentioned some definite plans being readied, I believe it would be useful for Mann to touch on this issue, as discussed paragraphs 3 and 9 my tel 1106. It is admittedly delicate subject and one hard to prove (although attachés did not fail to give Reid some specific cases yesterday), but representation could be made to Bonilla on grounds that aid program will lose value, as well as moral validity, and will not achieve desired results for either side if its administration is attempted in atmosphere of squandering and corruption.

**Bennett**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10 DOM REP/IMF. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 6 and 7.

## 9. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, July 16, 1964, 9 p.m.

62. For Asst Secy Mann. Embtel 57.<sup>2</sup>

1. Loath as I am to encumber you with Dominican problems on eve of Cuba MFM,<sup>3</sup> I consider we are at a point of fundamental decision as regards this country. I refer to proposed IMF standby agreement and connected measures to put Dominican financial house in order, with attendant political strains which can be expected ensue from serious reform effort.

2. Largely through their own ineptitude and false confidence and despite our warnings, Dominicans missed July 1 deadline for putting standby into effect. It was not until end of June that Reid, heretofore shielded by faulty advice, became aware for first time of full implications of situation (Embtel 1221).<sup>4</sup> For past two weeks he has been negotiating vigorously and seriously with IMF representative here on specific measures to be undertaken by GODR in connection standby although they have not settled on final details of agreement. We now understand that negotiations have been proceeding satisfactorily between USG, IMF and New York banks along lines para 4 mytel 1221. It seems important to us, in view Reid tendency step out high and handsome after favorable news, that final action not be taken Washington until Reid commits himself here to take further actions necessary. Otherwise money might well be spent to clear up arrears but without basic, long-term correction. For that reason we sent Embtel 57

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. I, 6/64-4/65. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 57 from Santo Domingo, July 15, Bennett informed the Department that efforts by the Dominican Republic to meet the provisions of the proposed IMF standby agreement had not been successful due to bureaucratic weaknesses, political pressures, and further delays in implementation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FN 1 DOM REP)

<sup>3</sup> The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, serving as Organ of Consultation in application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was held at Washington July 21-26 to consider Venezuelan charges of Cuban intervention and aggression. For documentation on the meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XXXI, Documents 20-23. For excerpts of the Final Act signed July 22, 1964, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964*, pp. 328-334.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1221 from Santo Domingo, June 30, recounted a June 28 meeting between Reid and Bennett about problems involved with the IMF standby agreement. Reid commented that his knowledge of these problems was inadequate to deal with them effectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FN 10 DOM REP)

yesterday, with para 4. General situation is urgent and I am counselling delay only long enough in order to get firm undertakings by Reid.

3. If Reid goes through with commitments he has agreed to in principle with IMF rep, there will be tightrope situation here. Reaction of forces of both right and left to first tentative steps toward austerity in Law 221 in May, resulting in taxi–dockworkers strike, offers evidence of what to be expected. Fears expressed to us by Reid in meeting requested by him July 14 that politicians and commercial people will immediately on imposition of controls begin efforts to suborn military with view to causing his ouster are probably not exaggerated.<sup>5</sup> This will be a distinctly unpopular program imposed by a govt which has little or no popular base; and govt will be confronting venal, selfish groups who can be expected react sharply for their own self-serving purposes. Whatever our role or however much controls are exercised under IMF formula, U.S. can also expect draw criticism from affected circles for “imposing” Draconian measures on Dominican people.

4. In our July 14 meeting Reid again reiterated in strongest terms his determination “take every action except devaluation.” However, to counter expected reactions, Reid insisted he would need assistance from us in form:

(A) Statement by USG at time austerity program put into effect that we applaud GODR’s willingness face up to financial difficulties and wish them well in their effort put house in order. Reid urged that for maximum effect locally statement come from President Johnson himself; however, this request made without knowledge of information received later that USG will be contributing financially to total package, a form of support that will speak for itself. Nonetheless, this program will constitute risky and courageous action on part of weak government and the higher the level our indication of sympathy—White House if possible—the better in my opinion.

(B) Announcement of agreement on aid program with us under Alliance for Progress of generous proportions, for purpose reassuring general public that broad-gauged attack on national problems beginning. There is a firmly based mystique here in both govt and private circles of “magic figure” of \$50 million. However illogical this figure may be, I have come to conclusion that tangible and substantive evidence now of our long-range commitment to country’s future and sympathetic assistance in its very real problems of development, in addition to direct and immediate need of bulwarking insofar as possible a program of fiscal reform so necessary but so politically unpalatable to country, is in our own national interest. Accordingly, I propose we

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<sup>5</sup> This meeting has not been further identified.

move urgently on AID program loan for \$25 million for announcement concurrently with initiation standby-austerity program, which may be as early as next week. We realize that such dollar funds are not essential for the first stages of the stabilization program, but they will be needed during the next three to ten months if the stabilization developments as projected.

5. The financial program and the need for balance of payments assistance are the economic justification of the loan. Disbursement of the dollars would be tied to effective implementation of the financial program. Disbursement of pesos would in addition depend on mutual agreement on sound programs.

6. What I have in mind is announcement which will offer dramatic evidence of our determination assist Dominican people at a time when they are seriously disturbed over direction of events, i.e., a positive U.S. approach to supplement the very negative bite of austerity measures. We are caught here in a situation which grows increasingly grave, unless we are prepared to move rapidly, we may well see changes before long which will not be in our interests. Without positive evidence U.S. support, present govt, which appears ready make this effort, may not survive.

7. Nor do we consider that such a course would force the U.S. to do more than we have been thinking of. Due to inherent delays in re-establishment AID Mission here after 6 months lapse and endemic problems of Dominican bureaucracy, there has not yet been sufficient staff or time to work our programs in detail; but we have already identified fields of sound activity and specific programs (Embtel 1065<sup>6</sup> showed guide lines and work now underway to flesh this out) total of which will easily exceed figure of \$25 million. When Reid in July 14 talk proposed announcement of such program together with understanding no pesos would be released except on agreed projects, Ide and I pointed out difficulties and warned that disbursement of any such funds would have to be tied to sound stabilization program and made only in step with performance under it. Reid expressed full agreement with this concept. What proposed therefore is course which will offer Dominicans evidence of timely and generous U.S. policy, together with strict implementation in protection our own interests. We would spend no money until satisfied with soundness of detailed programs, but meanwhile, when needed most, we get benefit of dramatic impact of our announced intentions. I am persuaded that we tend become prisoners our own very valid planning process; by announcing each project only when it is finally and completely wrapped up, we lose public

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<sup>6</sup> Dated May 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (IDB) 9 DOM REP)

relations effect of totality of our general intentions and get little or no credit for the very fine things we do. And it is not enough to put out tabulations afterwards; I have seen the yawns go up in various countries as our statistics have been issued. Here, it seems to me, we have the opportunity of maximum public effect at no cost to sound procedures. I hope this can be done.

8. Admittedly we would all prefer to have more time to work these things out. Situation, however, is urgent. July 1 deadline on standby was missed and Aug 1 must not be allowed to go same way. Public already aware and concerned over problem and enough dope stories have appeared in press to make current uncertainty and speculation a decidedly negative factor in political as well as economic field. Reid is being accused more and more of "going way of Bosch" in sense of promises without performance.

9. As reported in previous messages we consider Reid has approached problems in soberer mood in recent weeks. Other foreign observers have indicated to us similar impressions. His approach to aid matters now parallels our own and he has given up his exaggerated public promises. These changes in him seem to have coincided roughly with resignation of Tavares from triumvirate and Reid's own belated awareness in late June of full dimensions local fiscal crisis. While I would not be so foolhardy as to predict a steady course ahead by Reid, he is at present in sounder and more serious mood than any time since my arrival here in March.

10. There seems to be a sensing of this among some local forces as well; or perhaps they are primarily motivated by concern over what would happen if Reid went. At any rate within recent days there has been a certain coalescing around Reid of some influential elements of what might be called the local "establishment." For the first time in my stay here Bonnelly has begun appearing at social functions and talking at length with Reid publicly. Imbert, until recently a strong advocate of early elections, now argues that all "sound people" must rally behind Reid, provided he takes action on economic front. Amiama is described as holding similar views. These are at least heartening signs of some influential support for austerity program, and the two leading newspapers have been demanding it for some time.

11. In view of Aug 1 IMF deadline, time is of the essence. We need decisions, favorable I hope, on two proposals above in 4A. and B. within week's time in order allow announcement stabilization program and aid loan as standby becomes effective. I realize this amounts to recommendation for strong U.S. support of weak de facto govt which has not always acted responsibly and will probably not always do so in future. We are, however, confronted with Hobson's choice, and weak fabric of this country is burdened, as I have pointed out earlier, not with

economic problems alone nor with political problems alone but with both simultaneously. If military should decide to turn on Reid—and there are some renewed rumblings—we know of no Castello Branco on local scene. It is the Trujillista elements of military who want Balaguer back and it should be remembered that latter's demagogic economic policies while in office contributed considerably to current state of affairs.

12. I deplore as much as anyone that in recent years we seem to get involved recurrently in this country with "rescue" operations. It is regrettably, after 33 years of Trujillo, that kind of country, but at least it still offers hope of rescue. This combined program may or may not work. If it does work it will not dispose of all our problems, notably political ones, but we have got to get through the present in order to be able to work on the future. If we do not confront the situation vigorously, there will be increasing possibility of some form of blow-up here in not too distant future. We all know who would have to pick up the pieces in such event. We had better batten the hatches, for the hurricane season is approaching.

**Bennett**

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#### **10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 23, 1964, 7:10 p.m.

69. Joint State/AID. For Ambassador from Mann. Your 62.<sup>2</sup>

I very much appreciate having your thorough and well-balanced assessment of the current Dominican picture and future prospects there. My staff and I have given a great deal of thought to the complexities of the situation and to the proposal you have made. We are in general agreement that our interests will be served to the extent that we can reinforce the Dominican government's determination to put the country's financial house in order. We agree that a meaningful statement in support of the upcoming effort to accomplish this would be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. I, 6/64-4/65. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Crockett; cleared by William D. Rogers (AA/LA), Anthony Solomon (ARA), and Robert W. Adams (ARA); and approved by Mann.

<sup>2</sup> Document 9.



productive and that the statement should: (1) detail what we are doing now to be helpful and (2) outline in specifics the program being evolved for the near and mid-term future to complement the effort of the Dominican government as it is carried out.

A statement aimed at accomplishing this is being transmitted separately.<sup>3</sup> It has been designed to overcome problems we see in minor aspects of the proposal you have made. I want to discuss these problems in this message.

We feel that any statement made should originate with the Embassy. It could be released here simultaneously as an Embassy statement. Reid's desire to have the President associated with his effort is understandable but we are not prepared to recommend that the President commit himself. GODR has not yet demonstrated through performance that we would be justified in tying ourselves to a figure.

We cannot at this time justify approval of a \$25 million program loan to the DR. Even though disbursements under such a loan would be tied to sound performance as you suggest, it has been our experience that once an announcement of this kind is made, it is all but impossible to stick with the terms as time passes. Unexpected elements enter the picture and pressures mount for release of funds "committed" to cope with "unanticipated crisis situations". Additional major element of uncertainty is impact of stand-by implementation on future balance of payments deficit. Knowledge that funds are available for disbursement very often weakens the resolve of prospective recipients to implement the measures to which they have committed themselves. These and other reservations seem particularly pertinent in the Dominican context. It is therefore our feeling that it would be prudent to avoid associating a dollar figure with a statement of our conditional, future intentions. When the Dominicans have pressed us here for an overall dollar figure, we have responded that there are no specific limitations on future US assistance. We are prepared to look with sympathy and serious intent at any proposal which contributes to the attainment by the Dominican people of the goals of the Alliance for Progress and which will not be counterproductive to the Dominican austerity program. A similar response could be used by the Embassy when this question is raised by Reid and others, including the press.

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 68 to Santo Domingo, a joint State/AID message, July 23, authorized the Embassy to announce at the conclusion of negotiations that the Governments of the United States and the Dominican Republic had concluded agreements for loans totaling \$10.25 million in support of the stabilization program. The Embassy should also announce that the two governments were reviewing various short- and long-term projects to further improve the economic and social development of the Dominican Republic. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 1–1 DOM REP)

As our proposed statement reflects, we hope shortly to add \$4 million in AID funds to the Treasury's \$6.25 million for immediate use of the GODR in dealing with its balance of payments problem. Although no counterpart pesos for the AID program will be generated by the \$6.25 million from Treasury, the \$4 million in AID funds will generate pesos which can be so applied, while future projects are developed and processed.

We believe this method of approaching the overall problem has several distinct advantages. (1) We are substantially forthcoming now for impact purposes. (2) Our future intentions are stated in specific terms but without tying us to a fixed dollar figure. (3) We maintain maximum leverage for the future in dealing with an individual and a government not notably resolute or effective.

I believe this response to your recommendations represents the most workable and realistic course of action under the circumstances and hope that it meets with your approval. Please let me know.<sup>4</sup>

**Rusk**

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<sup>4</sup> The Embassy's response has not been found.

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## **11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 21, 1964, 5:14 p.m.

125. Embtel 177.<sup>2</sup> Dept shares your view that disruptive oppositionist political activities by Balaguer and Bosch on U.S. soil are undesirable at this critical juncture. Prospects for future political stability and economic development in DR depend to large degree on successful implementation of stabilization program. Obstacles to carrying out program are presently formidable enough without adding stepped up harassment of GODR by Balaguer and Bosch from U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 30-2 DOM REP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Shlaudeman and approved by Crockett.

<sup>2</sup> Dated August 17. (Ibid.)

View foregoing we propose, subject your concurrence, to approach Balaguer and Bosch directly to counsel restraint. (Crockett would see former, Shlaudeman latter.)<sup>3</sup> We would make following points:

(1) U.S. has given strong support to DR since Trujillo's death and cooperated closely with govts of both Balaguer and Bosch in interests Dom people. We made our opposition to Sept. coup crystal clear, and offered hospitality to leading members of deposed regime.

(2) We continue hope for earliest possible return to constitutional and representative government. Interim Reid Govt. knows this and when conditions are propitious we will exert our influence in every way possible to encourage such a return. However, Bosch and Balaguer as realistic men surely recognize that prerequisite conditions for meaningful elections or return to constitutional regime do not presently exist. As patriotic men they wish to see country once again enjoy a democratic order. First order of business in creating necessary climate is overcoming financial crisis. Balaguer and Bosch, along with U.S., therefore have real stake in success of stabilization program.

(3) Fall of Reid regime at this time could benefit no one except perhaps small clique of power-hungry trujillistas and reactionary military. Dom people would be the victims of this step backward. Neither Bosch nor Balaguer can hope for advantage from political overturn under these conditions. (In using this line we assume latter is sincere in professed refusal consider coming to power except through democratic methods.)

(4) U.S. has committed resources and prestige to stabilization program, not to further interests of any politician or political group, but because program is necessary to future well-being of Dom people. We are therefore particularly concerned by activities on U.S. soil which endanger program and which many undoubtedly believe we sanction, but which abuse our hospitality. In making this point we refer specifically to activities on U.S. soil. Publications and broadcasts within DR are internal matter. We are gratified to note that freedom of expression continues exist to large extent in DR and have assurances from GODR that it will not interfere with publication of opposition views which do not violate Dom libel laws or are not patently seditious. (FYI—Bonilla has given us such assurances. He has also stated that playing of taped broadcasts made abroad by Balaguer and Bosch will be permitted in DR if two men observe libel laws, refrain from open calls to sedition and cease using foreign media and radio stations for agitation. You may wish check this point with Reid.)

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 12. No record of a meeting between Shlaudeman and Bosch was found.

These are general points only. Approach will vary somewhat considering differing interests and personalities of two men and according to how conversations go but intent will be to make clear to each individual that speeches and broadcasts they have made in U.S. involve the U.S. in internal Dominican politics, which we cannot condone.

Foregoing method of dealing with problem through Bosch and Balaguer themselves appears most feasible in view complexities involved in attempting to approach stations involved and in view constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.

Will appreciate reply ASAP.<sup>4</sup>

Rusk

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 14.

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## 12. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 21, 1964.

### SUBJECT

Dominican Political Situation

### PARTICIPANTS

Joaquín Balaguer, ex-President of the Dominican Republic  
Kennedy M. Crockett, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs  
Harry W. Shlaudeman, Chief, Dominican Affairs

(*Note:* The substance of this conversation was reported in the Department's telegram #146 to Santo Domingo.<sup>2</sup> This memorandum amplifies that message and covers additional points of interest in the conversation.)

1. Following an exchange of pleasantries, Dr. Balaguer said that he particularly wanted to talk about what he regards as the grave general situation in the Dominican Republic. In his view, the Reid regime

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman. Copies were sent to ARA/CAR, INR, and the Embassy in Santo Domingo.

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 1. (Ibid., POL 14 DOM REP)

completely lacks popular support. As a consequence, there is a continuing state of unrest in the country. The people are uncertain of the future and suspicious of Reid's intentions. On one point a real national consensus exists: the government must announce elections. Elections represent the only solution to the problem.

Mr. Crockett asked Dr. Balaguer if he were suggesting that elections should be held immediately. Dr. Balaguer said he realized this would be impossible but saw no reason why they should not be scheduled in three or four months. Dr. Balaguer then went over much the same ground as previously with regard to the absolute necessity for an elections' announcement. However, he ended this time by offering the opinion that perhaps eight months to a year would be a good time frame. Finally, in the face of no response from Mr. Crockett, and after several additional assertions that the announcement of a firm date is the most important thing, Balaguer settled on December, 1965 as possibly the most appropriate time for elections. The elected government would take office in February, 1966, thus giving the Reid regime some 18 months to work on the nation's problems.

2. On several occasions Balaguer sought to elicit an indication that the USG would be prepared to intervene in the problem of elections. He suggested that we would be in the best position to bring pressure on the Reid regime to announce elections. Mr. Crockett painstakingly explained our position, going over it twice in Spanish and once in English so that there could be no misunderstanding: (1) The United States hopes for a return to representative government as soon as feasible and the present Dominican government is fully aware of this position. (2) We cannot, however, become involved in the strictly internal problem of how this return is to be accomplished. The Dominicans themselves must work out the details. (3) Once a reasonable plan has been evolved with the support of the majority of responsible elements in the Dominican Republic we are certain that public opinion here and throughout the hemisphere will strongly approve.

Balaguer indicated that he understood this position. He would, under the circumstances, not wait for the US but would himself take the initiative. It was at this point that he brought up the plan (described in Deptel 146) to call a meeting in the United States.

3. With regard to Bosch, Balaguer used the word "obstinate" (*terco*) on two occasions. He also referred to Bosch as a "romantic." In his view, there is no possibility that Bosch would agree to a formula for elections, even if all the other parties were to fall in line. Bosch inflexibility holds the position that only a return to constitutionality in the form of reinstating the 1963 Congress can be accepted. In all honesty, Balaguer remarked, the position does coincide with Bosch's own personal political interests inasmuch as he could scarcely par-

ticipate in elections. Balaguer added, however, that representative leaders of the PRD can be prevailed upon to join in an agreement on elections.

4. Asked what other parties he would expect to be represented in the proposed meeting of political leaders, Balaguer mentioned Luis Amiama's PLE, Read Vittini's PDC, Ramón Castillo's PPDC and other undesignated "legitimate" parties. He dismissed Juan Isidro Jimenes Grullón [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and asserted that there would be no reason for UCN participation inasmuch as whoever came on Reid's behalf would also automatically represent that party. In his opinion, the government and the UCN are one and the same. Balaguer remarked that all the parties he had mentioned (including the UCN but apparently not the PRD) are minuscule and of no real importance as political entities. He had a kind word for Read Vittini as a young man of some substance. Castillo, however, is another [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

5. As for his own plans, Balaguer said that he would return and participate in the campaign once there is agreement on an electoral formula. He spoke, in the manner usually employed on these occasions, of his duty to his supporters. Subsequently, however, he commented that as a political figure he must think primarily of his own political interests. Thus, his public pronouncements should not always be taken at face value, bearing in mind the necessity for preserving a political position.

6. Balaguer made only one passing reference to the Dominican military during the conversation, remarking that nobody can be sure just what is now the real position of the armed forces.

#### *Comment*

Neither Balaguer's manner nor what he had to say gave cause for surprise. He appeared anxious to please and to show himself as a reasonable man. It remains to be seen how far this will go. Past history indicates that Balaguer can really only be relied upon to pursue his own interests.

13. **Telegram From the Joint Army/Navy/Air Force Attachés to the Chief of Naval Operations (McDonald)<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 26, 1964, 1455Z.

Joint msg C-40. Appraisal Current Political/Military Situation.

1. In view Emb [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] reporting of current widespread rumors of attempt overthrow of government by army San Cristobal group, believe a run-down of military attitudes may be helpful.

A. Rumors that San Cristobal group interprets current strike as excuse overthrow triumvirate and install military junta being generally discussed in all military circles as well as by people on the street. Carbuccia, Air Force Chief, states group nothing more than debating society and should mind its own business; Wessin of training center states he would like San Cristobal group make move as excuse to eliminate them once and for all; Rivera of Navy states he will move two destroyers into position to bombard army camp if they get out of hand; Peguero, Police Chief, disdains the probability coup effort. Point is, rumors, whether or not based on fact, have caused split in armed forces unity—a very effective Communist or oppositionist maneuver.

B. Attachés maintain belief that rumors are just that, and there is no group within army, or military, planning or plotting overthrow of government. San Cristobal group openly discussing requirement for Reid announce schedule of elections on ground that such action would ease political pressure now on triumvirate. Group strongly Balaguerista and are convinced when elections held Balaguer can win. Unquestionably other factions within armed forces, other than San Cristobal group, are restless and discontented, principally amongst junior officers of all services. Discontent stems from unfair promotion policies, disgust with graft and incompetence of senior officers, and pressures exerted by politicians. Attachés do not, however, find any cohesion among factions, nor any single group, including San Cristobal group, having sufficient strength undertake golpe on its own.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. I, 6/64-4/65. Confidential. Also sent to CSAF, DA, USAFLDCTYGP FTBELVOIR, and DIA and repeated to the Department of State, CINCLANTFLT, CG FMFLANT, COMUSAFSO, OSD/ISA WASHDC, COMCARIBSEAFRON, USCINCSO, CG ANTCOMD USARSOUTH, and COMUSMILGP DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Printed from the copy sent by the JCS to the White House. A handwritten notation by Gordon Chase on the first page of the telegram reads: "Mr. Bundy, State expert on Dominican Republic agrees with this assessment. He feels that odds are 2 or 3 to 1 against coup during next few months. GC."

C. Current strike, rumors, and public discontent unquestionably making military restless. For moment attachés see no sign change of military attitude towards Reid and believe they will follow him through current crisis. San Cristobal group views towards elections, however, may catch on. With the remainder of the military and coupled with the already existing pressures for elections from the politicians, become a serious issue that Reid will have to face and resolve.

2. Fld coord: Amb. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]

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#### 14. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, August 29, 1964, 11 a.m.

221. For Crockett, ARA. Deptel 125.<sup>2</sup>

1. I welcome idea of approach to Balaguer and Bosch but believe we would be on sounder ground in talking with them if we avoided taking as open a position on elections as suggested in para 2 reftel. Other points re importance stabilization program and disinterested nature our help could well be made.

2. For one thing I believe it is asking too much to expect them, especially Balaguer, to agree that conditions for elections or "return to constitutionality" do not exist. Both men, along with certain other politicians, have been insisting that political "solution" is sine qua non for any successful economic stabilization program, that financial crisis is essentially fault of present regime, and that changing government is first order of business. Although he seems unlikely to return under present conditions, Bosch was after all the elected President and is not likely accept argument of this type which he would regard as action our part to protect regime which overthrew him. To the extent that underprivileged Dominicans have active political interests now, he may still be the most popular figure.

3. As for Balaguer, he probably believes conditions are ripening for him. He may be right. Embassy continues believe him a divisive force here due past association with Trujillo and his record of submissiveness to military and of economic demagoguery (his policies contributed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. I, 6/64-4/65. Secret; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> Document 11.



greatly to present fiscal problems); but we must bear in mind that, like him or not, we may have him to deal with again one day. His appeal is considerably broader than merely to Trujillistas, and extends into agricultural, business, labor, and military elements. Presumed intent of reactionary military group, if it were able carry out coup so much discussed here during recent days, would be to take over govt and then piously proclaim early elections in confidence Balaguer would win. Against this background it does not seem likely to me Balaguer would agree with alacrity to suggestion on our part that he postpone indefinitely what he must regard as good prospects.

4. Given attachment of Dom Rep, along with other countries of this Hemisphere to ideal of elections and constitutional govt, US should in my opinion avoid bad posture of being on public record as opposed to elections. Conversations in that vein with country's two leading public figures, each with his own interests to further, would be public knowledge in short order. On other side of coin I find it equally disadvantageous to make implied commitment to either of these two that at some point we will help them return to country to participate in elections. Our present formula that US of course favors return to constitutional govt in Dom Rep but consider Dominicans themselves must make decision re type and timing of elections, I believe, serves our interests about as well as any we might devise. It preserves our flexibility and does not tie us to any one individual or solution. It is in the nature of the environment of a country like this one that we cannot escape being charged by the outs as favoring the ins, going on record re postponing elections would confirm what is now only an allegation.

5. Nor do I believe we will meet with any great success in ensuring publication and broadcast rights within Dom Rep for the two B's, as suggested in para 4 reftel. I frankly do not think Bonilla's assurances in this regard are worth much—nor would any I might get from Reid be any more enforceable. Latter is thin-skinned and often tends regard legitimate difference of opinion with his proposals as base political machinations against him personally. He would see sedition much more quickly than we. In short, we could not deliver to Balaguer and Bosch with respect handling given within this country to their expressions of opinion, and I recommend we not get involved beyond stating our continued support of freedom of expression here.

6. A further point on which we should be careful in my opinion is the extent of our commitment to Reid. We should avoid overcommitting US to him. We should have no illusion that Reid is now a popular political figure. He is not. A principal reason for his survival this past week was not so much positive support for him and his policies as fear on the part of responsible elements over what would take his place. While he has thus far shown considerable responsibility as re-

gards stabilization program, his administration of govt remains erratic and marked by actions which often alienate very elements who should and would like to support him. As reported before, there is instability in his make-up and he is strong-willed. Circumstances could lead him to take authoritarian turn if he considered he had carte blanche from us and full control over local military, many of whom think in such terms anyway (it is my opinion that, while he has thus far done adept job in balancing military, diverse ambitions this group make it an uncertain element and Reid is perhaps inclined to overestimate his mastery of them). There could well be actions and decision with which we would not want to be identified. We are giving and should continue to give Reid support to extent he deserves it, but I believe we shall get better results through keeping him on fairly short rein and not tying ourselves to him irrevocably.

7. Agitation for some action on political problem is rising again. While apathy and distrust of politicians may rule countryside, political, press, and other elements including some in military are beginning to heat up electoral issue. We can expect more of it as September 25 anniversary of coup approaches. We are already being reminded by some that US recognition of triumvirate was based on promise of election schedule to begin this fall. Next crisis here may well revolve around the electoral issue. Agitation is not so much for actual elections as for the setting of a date for them. We may find it in our interest before much longer to add our voice to those who are urging that at least a date be set.

8. For all these reasons I believe approach to Balaguer and Bosch, which I heartily support, should be based on very legitimate grounds of their abuse of US hospitality through their indulging in political activity from US territory. It has long been accepted among Latin Americans that political exiles do not engage in home politics from their place of exile. Current agitation in Brazil over Goulart's activities in Uruguay is a case in point; and Mexico would not sit idly by if anti-govt broadcasts were beamed from Laredo or El Paso. However, rather than have approaches made by political level of Dept—with all that local rumor mill here would make of them—it would seem preferable to have matter raised by Justice Dept officials or Dept security officers and treated as straight violation of US hospitality. If latter not considered feasible, then I would still favor restricted approach along above lines by political officers in order put some restraint on Balaguer and Bosch.

9. It seems to me we have strong case here in making clear we cannot condone activities from US soil which involve us in internal Dominican politics. To the extent that we take position with them as regards elections, then it appears to me we involve ourselves in precisely what we wish to avoid.

**Bennett**

## 15. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1964.

### SUBJECT

Dominican Political Situation

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, Ex-President of the Dominican Republic  
Kennedy M. Crockett, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs  
Harry W. Shlaudeman, Chief, Dominican Affairs

Dr. Balaguer called on Mr. Crockett at his own initiative. He said he had come simply to “exchange views” on the current situation in the Dominican Republic.

Balaguer was of the opinion that things have been going from bad to worse. Although the Triumvirate did announce elections, nothing is being done to create a climate in which elections can be held. The “majority parties” (PRD and PR) are prevented from using the radio or staging public manifestations. On the other hand, “extremist” groups such as the Social Christians and the 14th of June do have access to the radio and continue to agitate. Antonio Imbert has been going about the country handing out arms for a “campaign of terror” against Balaguer’s supporters. A new black list of those who are prohibited from entering the country (including Bosch and Balaguer) has been published. Some of the most dubious elements on the list are actually in the country at the moment—a strange state of affairs. There has been a wave of police brutality. Two persons apparently murdered by the police were recently left out in a public park.

Discrimination against the PR and the PRD has led Balaguer to conclude that the political truce proposed by the Triumvirate is to be completely one sided. While the leftists, the “pocket parties” such as Vanguardia, and the UCN continue doing business as usual, the responsible opposition is to be repressed. In essence, Balaguer thought that these developments indicated an intention by Reid and his entourage to maintain themselves in power indefinitely.

Mr. Shlaudeman remarked that we had not previously heard that the 14th of June enjoyed access to the radio. Dr. Balaguer explained that he had meant indirect access through other groups which propagate the 14th’s line. He mentioned the Social Christians in this regard.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman.

With respect to Imbert, Mr. Crockett said we had the impression he was operating on his own account, not the government's, and that he was giving trouble to everyone concerned. Mr. Crockett also questioned the reports that Imbert was handing out quantities of arms. Balaguer insisted that Imbert and his cohorts had collected large stocks of arms during the time of the Council of State and quoted a communiqué issued by the 14th of June to the effect that Imbert had offered weapons to the "revolutionary youth."

Mr. Crockett reiterated our hope for a return to representative government through elections and our intention to leave the working out of the details to the Dominicans themselves. He commented that progress made now in solving the country's economic and financial problems would, to a large extent, determine whether a proper climate will exist next summer for an electoral campaign. Balaguer agreed.

Balaguer asked if Francisco "Pancho" Aguirre had any connection with the United States Government. Mr. Crockett assured him that no such connection existed.

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**16. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 15, 1964.

SUBJECT

Dominican Republic

I have been following the Dominican situation closely, but in view of your memorandum of October 10 to Desmond FitzGerald,<sup>2</sup> I thought I ought to do some more specific checking.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. II, 1/64-4/65. Secret. A copy and the attachment were sent to Bundy.

<sup>2</sup> In this attached October 10 memorandum to Desmond FitzGerald of the CIA, Dungan recalled his earlier request for the latest information on "Communist infiltration to the D.R." Dungan wrote that he now "understood that the Agency had verified the presence of a significant number of Communist activists who were not in the D.R. several months ago . . . [and that he] would be very interested to know what, if anything, the U.S., through your Agency or otherwise, was doing to: (1) monitor this activity, (2) control it, and (3) perhaps eliminate it." Dungan concluded: "As you know, this is part of my deeper concern with what I believe is a drift in U.S. policy in the D.R. I do hope that you and your colleagues will continue to push for clarification of U.S. policy and short term objectives in the D.R."

I find a little more optimism on the Dominican situation than there has been for some time. This apparently stems from two factors:

a. Donny Reid recently had a confrontation with the Trujillista element in the armed forces (San Cristobal group) and bested them. He thereby strengthened himself within the government and with the Dominican people. Since the San Cristobal group was supporting Balaguer, this confrontation also hurt Balaguer's position. Balaguer feels it, and is toying with the idea of returning to the DR. He has also talked about going via Haiti. His reasoning on Haiti is hard to see, but it would create tension between the DR and Haiti and probably blow-up any chance of an improvement in relations, which the OAS is trying to work out. The end result would probably be to strengthen Reid even more.

b. Reid is carrying out an economic stabilization program with vigor. AID, State and the IMF were all pessimistic about the chances of pulling this one off. IMF doubted the wisdom of even starting, and leaned toward devaluation instead. There is some hope now that the program may work.

I do not find anyone really confident about the Dominican situation. There are only a few Dominicans qualified to help run the government. When you are that thin, it does not take much to upset everything.

AID is working on a program which will probably cost \$15 million in 1965. Its main thrust is in agriculture—the idea is to put more money in the farmer's pocket; cut imports of foodstuffs and save foreign exchange; and possibly improve exports and earn some foreign exchange.

The question of Communist strength is a mixed up one, and not as urgent as either of the two factors above. When the Government broke up the guerrilla movement and killed a number of its leaders, it dealt a severe blow to Communist strength. It also deported a number of activists—in fact got rid of two more last week. At the same time, some are coming back. The only explanation at the moment seems to be that they are from "good" families in the Dominican Republic and the Government has not resisted the pressure from these families. Nevertheless, Ambassador Bennett raised the issue with the Dominican Government last week. His [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has put together a list of those that have filtered back, and both the Ambassador and State plan to urge the Government to take necessary precautions.

Robert M. Sayre<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## 17. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

A-250

Santo Domingo, December 5, 1964.

### SUBJECT

The Reid Government, January–November 1964: A Review

### FOREWORD

The following review of events in the Dominican Republic under the governing Triumvirate headed by Donald J. Reid Cabral covers the period of the past eleven months and represents a joint effort on the part of the Political, Economic, Military, AID, and USIS elements of the Mission.

While Reid has clearly been the dominant member of the Triumvirate since his accession to it in the last days of 1963, the group was marked by dissensions and rivalries until the resignation of Manuel Tavares Espaillet at the end of June.<sup>2</sup> From January through June the Government managed to hold things together in a highly fragile situation, but very little positive was accomplished. It is only during the past five months that Reid can be said to have had a free hand in policy. While Ramón Cáceres Troncoso, the other member of the now truncated Triumvirate, has special competence in the field of fiscal policy and is generally helpful as a balance wheel, it is clearly Donald Reid's administration.

It is undeniable that there has been forward motion in the country since June on urgent national problems. The formidable commercial arrears problem has been liquidated, and right on schedule. Commitments to the International Monetary Fund have been effectively met. An austerity program involving new tax measures and other belt-tightening activities has been put into effect to correct the fundamental imbalance in the country's balance of payments situation. It is far from being a perfect program, but in the Dominican context it has required political courage and skill to do what has been done; and the operation goes forward. There have been gingerly but steady steps to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 DOM REP. Confidential. The foreword was drafted by Bennett; the other sections were drafted by A.E. Breisky with contributions by J. Nepple (AID), J. Bushnell (ECON), Lieutenant Colonel L.F. Long (Attaché), J.F. Quilty (MAAG), and M. McLean (USIS). Cleared and approved by Bennett. The Department of State received the airgram on December 9.

<sup>2</sup> Manuel Tavares resigned on June 27 because of strong differences with his fellow Triumvirs over the political direction of the country.

bring the undisciplined military and police establishments under better control and to reduce the graft and corruption so characteristic of influential elements of those forces. Along with these necessary but essentially negative measures there has been positive and increasing activity on the part of the Government in the field of economic development, particularly in the fields of agriculture and education. In the private field considerable initiative is being shown, notwithstanding widespread uncertainty over the future and a distressingly high level of unemployment.

Against the background of Dominican life, with so little sense of community obligation on the part of the more privileged group, with general lack of technical and organizational skills and with petty venality underlying the whole structure of society, any motion at all requires strong determination and considerable talent for maneuvering on the part of the head of government. Throughout its history the Dominican Republic has alternated between dictatorship and chaos. Ingrained habits persist today, with a group of political leaders who are with discouragingly few exceptions self-seeking in the extreme and who show little or no interest in offering a positive program to the country, but rather prefer the more exciting pastime of trying to organize revolutions or persuade the military to pull off yet another coup d'état. The Dominicans' tendency to dramatize their problems being what it is, it is often said that Reid almost alone among current Dominican political figures has learned anything from the political torment of the Trujillo period and these first three years of its aftermath.<sup>3</sup> Certainly today, beset by trujillista elements and others on the right on one side, and by Bosch followers and those of the more extreme left on the other, Reid emerges as the moderate in the local scene.

There is general acceptance of Reid's personal honesty, however much criticism there is of corruption at other levels of the Government—a corruption unfortunately all too prevalent in the private sector as well. Of secure economic and social position himself, Reid is deeply concerned over the problems of his country and is highly motivated to do something about them. He considers himself something of a latter-day Franklin D. Roosevelt in that he wants to improve the lot of underprivileged Dominicans against the disinterest and often the opposition of his own class. It must be said in that connection that, although democratic in his social outlook, he often tends toward paternalism in his approach to the poor and their problems.

Reid is a legitimate child of his own society and bears the psychological scars of the Trujillo experience as do so many of his coun-

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<sup>3</sup> The following handwritten notation appears in the left margin next to this sentence: "why does one follow the other?"

trymen. In that connection, few if any have a cleaner record than he as regards the Trujillo years.<sup>4</sup> As is characteristic of Dominicans, he is erratic and impulsive; when things are going well his self-confidence sometimes indulges itself in a form of cockiness which irritates those whom it would be in his interest to cultivate. He is strong-willed and can be high-handed; at times he insists on his own way when compromise would improve the general atmosphere and thus further his own long-range objectives.

A man of formidable nervous energy, he drives himself day and night. Better personal organization would make his schedule slightly less strenuous and the course of governing more orderly. While he has gradually assembled around him in the Government a group of able and even dedicated young men, his popular base remains much too narrow. Although young and attractive himself, and one who shared personally the Trujillo oppression, he has not as yet built a bridge to youth in this young-man's country.<sup>5</sup> While an individual of wide-ranging interests, he seems to find little appeal in intellectuals; and conversely he has not much appeal for them. A poor public speaker, he is more effective in small groups than at large public gatherings.

Reid can be criticized for poor personal organization, for concentrating too many details in his own hands, for acting in a spirit of improvisation rather than careful planning in meeting the needs of the country—and this is a country with such a variety of needs that everything needs to be done at the same time—and for being over-cautious in cleansing the military structure. He is indeed criticized for all these things, and for other things as well.

Reid's faults and imperfections must, however, be judged against his own society and relative to the performance of others who have sat or aspire to sit in the same seat of responsibility. A judgment on this basis results clearly in his favor. However halting his steps with respect to some of the more unsavory aspects of Dominican life, he is the first post-Trujillo governor to take on, for instance, the all-important but highly delicate task of cutting back to size as primitive a military establishment as exists in this Hemisphere. If he seems to make haste slowly, it is, after all, his own slender neck he is risking in pitting his wit against the brute force of the Trujillo-trained men in uniform.<sup>6</sup> And he is doing it. In the financial field he has shown a readiness to face

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<sup>4</sup> The following handwritten notation appears in the left margin next to this sentence: "questionable."

<sup>5</sup> The following handwritten notation appears in the left margin next to this sentence: "true."

<sup>6</sup> The following handwritten notation appears in the left margin next to this sentence: "good point."



up to the unpleasant and unpopular task of more taxes and more restrictions in order to restore fiscal balance to the country. This is a primary problem but it was ignored by the bulk of his predecessors and, in fact, heavily contributed to by some such as Balaguer. His economic development program may suffer from lack of planning and coordination, but it is at least underway, and it is well oriented toward Alliance for Progress objectives. In sum, Reid, with faults and slippages which are partly his own and partly inherent in the Dominican scene, is now governing the country more effectively than it has been governed since Trujillo whipped it into order and lashed it into productiveness. Given Dominican history and realities, Reid is governing with a minimum of violations to civil liberties. There is full freedom of the press.

Reid's courage is not in doubt and he has great determination. He is pro-American and pro-Western by strong conviction. He has shown the toughness of mind and the flexibility which are essential to govern in this country which so dislikes to be governed. There has been considerable growth in him in recent months. The governing group he has put together and their vigorous interest in attending to the country's needs in agriculture, education and health are reminiscent of Figueres and his associates in Costa Rica<sup>7</sup> (the writer was Costa Rican desk officer in 1948 and closely associated with the Figueres revolution). Hopefully, despite formidable economic problems ahead and an always dangerous political instability, the corner has been turned from the confusions and dangers of the immediate post-Trujillo period and the shock of the failure of the Bosch experiment.

The Embassy study makes the point that Reid's major handicap is his political illegitimacy. Had he won an election, he would probably be considered one of the more hopeful leaders in the Caribbean area today. How to make himself constitutional—how to obtain that moral base which looms so importantly in a Latin country, even one like the Dominican Republic which patently gives constitutionality more lip service than loyalty—that is the question. From his present course it seems clear that Reid is attempting to play over the heads of the politicians and establish direct rapport with the people, especially the rural population, as a leader who gets things done for the little man.

While Reid can hardly be said to have wide political popularity, recent events do tend to indicate a considerable acceptance of his administration, in part from general apathy and disillusionment with politics and in part due to the preoccupation of many that any change now would result in something worse. It is too early as yet to gauge the effect of Reid's trips around the country to win popular support,

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<sup>7</sup> The following handwritten notation appears in the left margin next to this sentence: "interesting."

but the professional politicians are howling, and they can be counted on to try means both fair and foul to block him. The coming months should be interesting.

[Omitted here are Section I, an overview of the period, and Section II, evaluating in greater detail economic, foreign, and military assistance, and public affairs.]

e) *Political:*

The arrival of a new American Ambassador in the D.R. in late March after a six-month vacancy<sup>8</sup> in the post came at a time when the Dominican political outlook was discouraging. The post-coup regime had produced no real progress and, indeed, even among those who had lavishly praised the coup doubts were sprouting. The Triumvirate itself was divided and ineffective. The country seemed politically apathetic, but violence was close to the surface and there was a noticeable political polarization in process. The world price of sugar was falling, and the economic profligacy of previous months and the errors of previous administrations were coming home to roost. Endemic ills such as the lack of national purpose and civic consciousness, overdependence on the U.S., and the lack of durable institutions all contributed to a bad situation. On top of this, active subversive efforts were being made by several political groupings and the tide of balaguerismo was rising. At the peak of this pyramid of sand sat Donald Reid, a politically ambitious and at times erratic, but basically well-intentioned and determined man. His Government was de facto, had no broad base of popular support, was troubled with graft, and had had to resort to restrictions on public liberties.

A decision was required as to what the U.S. posture should be in this situation. That decision favored rebuilding rapidly the U.S. presence in the country, with a heavy emphasis on economic assistance which would get the country over its short-run hurdles while getting underway on long-range development.

By June Reid was clearly in the driver's seat, with adequate military support to give him some freedom of action. He "kept the lid on" politically—although not always in ways to our liking—and attacked economic and administrative problems vigorously. By the fall the problems were still formidable, but the regime for the first time was showing real signs of moving forward, and without simply turning to the United States for solutions to all problems. Although the GODR's own pace would necessarily regulate the pace and scope of our assistance,

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<sup>8</sup> Full diplomatic relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic were suspended when President Juan Bosch was overthrown on September 25, 1963. Ambassador Martin left Santo Domingo on September 28, 1963; he was replaced by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., who arrived at post on March 23, 1964.

there was continued reason to help this Government put its house in order and face the triple political, economic, and military threat facing it. A refreshing contrast to the bad leadership endemic in recent Dominican Government was being provided in several instances, most notably in the very important agricultural sector. The military and political problems, not the least of which were Mr. Joaquín Balaguer and perhaps to a lesser extent Mr. Juan Bosch, would bring further and probably frequent crises, and the sugar problem seemed all but insolvable in the short run. At least, however, the country was moving ahead again, and in truth the alternatives to this Government did not seem good.

This regime has been subjected to a war of words perhaps even more intense than that experienced by its immediate predecessors, with public commentary ranging from charges that it is a dictatorship reminiscent of Trujillo to earnest claims that this is an essentially democratic, if necessarily firm, regime which for the first time in years is sincerely moving to get this country on its feet. This wide and vocal disparity has been reflected in the U.S. press as well. A balance sheet would include at least the following:

*Opposition Charges*

1) *Restriction of Public Liberties:*

- a) Constitutional guarantees pertaining to arrest and arraignment remain suspended (a measure taken prior to Reid's assumption of office).
- b) Outdoor political rallies prohibited.
- c) Political radio programs repeatedly put off the air (for often vicious attacks on regime and invitations to subversion); permission to broadcast speeches by Bosch and Balaguer denied.
- d) Sporadic police and military brutality (hardly a new story); occasional killings by armed off-duty police and military.
- e) Refusal of trials to jailed guerrillas and other evidences of domination of the judiciary by the executive.
- f) Use of exiling as political weapon against extreme left and occasionally (largely prior to January 1964) against non-extremist opposition.

2) *Widespread corruption* at all levels below the Triumvirate itself, generally believed to have increased after the coup (this trend seems now to have peaked).

- a) Military self-enrichment, especially through contrabanding according to popular opinion, has been displayed without shame, e.g., in luxurious new houses being built with police/military labor.
- b) Padding of Government expense accounts, civilian contrabanding, generalization of demands for kick-backs.

3) *Misuse of Control of Bureaucracy:*

- a) Special favors for certain power interests, arranged with apparent approval at highest levels of regime. Awarding of contracts without required competitive bidding.
- b) Padding of diplomatic establishment.

c) Sidestepping of demands for social reform, with limited exception of agrarian reform. Dealing with the masses in patronizing manner long typical of local oligarchy.

d) Economic stabilization program tailored so as not to incur active opposition of big business interests, with smaller businessmen suffering proportionally greater hardships.

e) Country being mortgaged with excessive foreign borrowing.

f) Excessive nepotism in high office.

g) Little genuine austerity to date in Government—many cuts being only paper cuts of bloated 1964 budget.

4) Cronyism, arbitrary Government by decree, and excessive politicking by Triumvirate.

a) Country being run by small inner circle, including such as foreigner "Pancho" Aguirre, who is generally believed to be getting \$150,000 yearly payment.

b) Refusal to name third Triumvir in order to eliminate any possible opposition to Reid at top level. Personal ambition on part of Donald Reid violates purpose of interim regime. Limited faith in regime's political intentions.

c) Regime often seems more interested in impressing (the U.S. as well as Dominicans) than in real progress. Witness Reid's frequent trips around the country and lengthy list of promises, hosting of international conferences for publicity purposes, construction of an unnecessary luxury air terminal.

d) The regime demonstrates no political philosophy beyond its desire to stay in power.

5) Perhaps most basic to all the above, the regime is politically illegitimate. It is violating the trust placed in it by temporizing on its obligation to return the country to representative Government.

### *Defense*

1) The coup against Bosch was necessary to stop the Communists, and to change a hopelessly ineffective regime with much corruption.

2) The regime has had to act in the face of overwhelming odds.

a) The collapse of sugar prices.

b) Political subversion and even Communist guerrilla warfare.

c) The economic and political sins of Trujillo and Balaguer are bearing their bitter fruits today.

3) There is freedom of speech and press in the D.R. and the police are behaving better all the time. Certain limitations on individual liberty are required temporarily in order to create the stability needed if pressing problems are to be faced up to responsibly. The country is not ready for elections.

4) Bosch regime talked, but this regime is acting.

a) Community development is being put into practice all over the country;

- b) More farmers are getting land under the agrarian reform program;
- c) The military are building a civic action program;
- d) More and better construction, including workers' housing, is in process now than ever before;
- e) The Agriculture Department is at work in a serious way for the first time in years to build productivity, conserve the nation's forests, and so on;
- f) Farm-to-market roads are being built;
- g) Education is being improved with new schools, educational TV, and a new educational credit institute;
- h) An industrial incentive law has been passed since the coup. Private investment is slowly increasing;
- i) The economic stabilization program is being carried out with determination.

5) The top leadership of the country is dedicated and honest, and has demonstrated considerable courage under fire. Its efforts to reform the military, however halting, exceed those of its predecessors.

6) Contrary to predictions after the coup, the Communists have not gained in strength and have been ever less able to mount anti-regime activity. Some restriction of liberties is necessary to do this in the D.R. The drift to the left, if happening, is not of alarming proportions.

7) This Government is perhaps the most pro-U.S., pro-Western Government this country has seen for a long time. Witness its support for U.S. positions in international forums.

8) In the words of the Government's own "Information Bulletin" (August–October, 1964 issue): "Undoubtedly the Triumvirate is an unpopular Government. The majority of the Dominican people, without stopping to think of the reasons behind . . . measures, consider the Triumvirate a Government which has done absolutely nothing to gain popular support and sympathy. And this is the great truth. The Triumvirate acts in favor of the people, even if against the will of that people . . . There lies the difference between the present Government and others which preceded it."<sup>9</sup>

Truth and self-serving statements can be found in both lists. Many of the situations complained of are inherent in Dominican life and would be there under whatever Government. Many unpleasant realities in this country derive naturally from more than 30 years of a harsh dictatorship, and will be corrected only with time.

Moreover, the range of choice for the U.S. has been limited. The alternatives to working with this regime have at no time since September 1963 been inviting. We have moved ahead with support, and

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<sup>9</sup> The following handwritten notation appears on the left margin next to this paragraph: "incredible."

have tailored that support to the willingness of the regime itself to apply itself to the formidable tasks at hand. This approach has produced some forward motion and would seem to offer the best hope for the immediate future.

### III. Prognosis

At the time this report was being written serious labor troubles, subversive political efforts, and coup rumors were again (one tends to lose track of the number of such sequences in the past few years) stirring up the country. Political peace here is a very relative thing; there is no way to avoid living from day to day.

The present regime, although it has made progress in important areas and deserves acknowledgment for doing so in the face of formidable odds, suffers from important faults. The most basic of these is its political illegitimacy. It operates from a much too narrow power base and depends, however necessarily in the realities of the Dominican experience, far too greatly on the military. It suffers from cronyism. And so on. It can be expected that its life will continue to be troubled. Although it is operating with reasonable effectiveness in the light of local circumstances, and seems stronger now than in the past, its strength could change in a matter of hours with the wavering of a few key persons (especially in the military).

We cannot be certain that, should Reid survive the coming months politically, he will in fact lead the country to the elections now scheduled for September 1965. Reid himself may well not be entirely sure in his own mind what he plans for that—by Dominican political standards—far-off time.

Reid is, however, a reality—the reality with which we have to work or sacrifice to a change over which we would certainly not have full control and which well might (e.g., Balaguer) prove far less in the interests of either the Dominicans or ourselves.

Hopefully by moving cautiously ahead with Reid, making our actions at each step of the way dependent on continued indications of his own willingness to move the country toward sound economic development and a feasible return to representative government, our efforts will bear fruit. Perhaps there is greater reason to be optimistic over the basic situation now than at some times in the past, for Dominicans themselves are at last showing some signs of understanding that they must gird themselves for a long pull. They are perhaps beginning to realize that the fruits of progress and democracy are not there for effortlessly plucking off the tree of liberty which for so many years was watered with their blood but kept beyond their reach.

**W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.**

**18. Letter From the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic (Bennett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, February 2, 1965.

Dear Tom:

I hope Washington does not underestimate the military changes which occurred here last week.<sup>2</sup> It is not exaggerating to say that Reid Cabral made the shifts at the risk of his very life—in several cases he was dealing with gunmen of the Trujillo era. I myself consider last week's events the most significant step here in cleansing the structure and putting Dominican society on a more rational basis since the departure of the Trujillo family in late 1961.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the politicians and the newspapers which are against Reid have been loath to give him credit. Many of the same people who ten days ago were accusing Reid of being under the domination of the military and in league with the corruption so prevalent in the Police leadership and certain quarters of the Armed Forces now view with pious alarm their sudden finding that the military is now dominated by Reid. They were clamoring for civilian authority to assert itself, but now, seeing that the move has redounded to Reid's personal prestige, they see incipient dictatorship.

The fact is that the list of names of those retired, reassigned, or shelved reads like an Ian Fleming rogue's gallery, and those involved would have long since figured in a police lineup in a more well-ordered country. There are quite naturally smoldering resentments among some of these saurian elements and the situation, as the cables to and fro indicate, is still not without some danger. However, as of now the changes, which were of such a scope as to affect all four services and the police, seem to be being absorbed. Our military people are

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 295, Dominican Republic, 1965–1967. Confidential. The following handwritten notation appears on the first page of the memorandum: "Kennedy Crockett has copy—expects to come up with program to discuss with T[homas]C[M]ann on Wednesday, February 10." No record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>2</sup> On January 27 Reid removed a number of key military officers, including Air Force Chief of Staff Miguel Atila Luna Perez, Navy Chief Julio Rib Santamaria, Army Chief Salvador Augusto Montas Guerrero, and Police Chief Belisario Peguero Guerrero. Reid himself took over the Minister of Defense. In telegram 766 from Santo Domingo, January 29, Bennett reported that these military changes "constituted major step forward in continuing struggle to eliminate or neutralize Trujillo-minded elements in Armed Forces, reduce military contraband and graft, and stabilize military base of support for government which will enable it to get better on with its business, particularly crucial economic program." (Ibid., Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP)

for instance very much heartened over reforms already being instituted by the new Chief of the Air Force. They are right in line with what we have been urging for some time. The Minister of Finance has told us that they have already been able to find economies in the military budget which will save \$100,000 a month, and that their goal is to get this up to \$300,000 a month. That is significant saving in these latitudes, and we shall do our best to see that they are carried through. At the same time, I am counseling that they not move so fast as to provoke a counter-reaction that could not be controlled.

In connection with local events, you will recall our conversation in Washington about Juan Bosch.<sup>3</sup> It seems to me that the time has clearly come to move on him. In line with Kennedy Crockett's request, we are sending forward in this same pouch some examples of Bosch public speeches in Puerto Rico and his more flamboyant statements which are regularly published here. I have no doubt whatever that he is grossly abusing his status as a political asylee on our shores. The pace and tone of his activities has stepped up markedly in recent weeks, and his latest activities (reported in our telegram 781)<sup>4</sup> of attempting to rouse the Dominican military against Reid seems to me to go far beyond the limits of acceptable activity. After all, this is a Government with which we have normal, even close, relations and whose Chief of State has on numerous occasions complained of the Bosch activities.

As I wrote to Kennedy Crockett not long ago,<sup>3</sup> Bosch followers are continually going back and forth from here to see him—only an hour's flight each way—and he is constantly sending instructions and exhortations, both public and private, to his followers here. One of his principal lieutenants told our political section recently that the PRD was resolved on violence and disorder for the spring months. We know that Bosch sent word to the PRD in December to go all out in the strike attempted at that time. Of late he has become more and more bold in his activities, and this week two PRD-sympathizing radio stations joined in the effort to rouse up the military, on direct orders from Bosch I am told.

At the very least, I do not see why he should be allowed to make public speeches in Puerto Rico attacking this Government with which we have friendly relations and with which we are working at forced pace to try to keep a very critical economic situation in balance. The Chase Manhattan manager in Puerto Rico, a top-flight man who used to be in charge here, spoke to me three days ago in perplexity over the

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Dated February 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 DOM REP)



free hand we give Bosch to make trouble and to try to tear down something we are attempting to build. We have required other Dominican political leaders who go to and from the United States to register as foreign agents on the basis of activities on their part which are minuscule as compared with those of Juan Bosch. I do not know that this would actually be much of a sanction for him, although the general feeling seems to be that he does not wish to register.

My own feeling is that Bosch is basically anti-American. This feeling is shared by members of the Embassy who were here during the Bosch period as President and by some of my Latin American diplomatic colleagues in whose views I have confidence. The pact he has just signed with the violently anti-American Social Christian leadership, reported in Embtel 781, certainly gives grounds for questioning Bosch's personal orientation. One can speculate that he may have done this so that the Social Christians can jab and kick at Uncle Sam here in the Dominican Republic day in and day out while Bosch sits in his privileged sanctuary in Puerto Rico at no damage to his American reputation while hopefully profiting from his friends' campaign of defamation against us.

I hope that you, after looking over the material, will agree that action needs to be taken with respect to Juan Bosch. While I realize there are some domestic difficulties for us in dealing with him and it is perhaps not feasible to move him out of Puerto Rico, I hope something can be done to put a halt to his political activities on our soil. If he wants to go away to Venezuela or farther, that would be all right with me. That would at least put an end to his calculated program at present of implying that the Embassy at Santo Domingo may be "supporting" Donald Reid Cabral, but that the American Government's real heart lies with Juan Bosch. Many Dominicans will continue to buy that assumption as long as he is permitted to operate unchecked from such a close vantage point and, by so doing, suggest subtly that he enjoys American official support.

Yours very sincerely,

Tap

**19. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic (Bennett)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 25, 1965.

Dear Tap:

We, too, have been impressed with Reid's resolute and deft handling of his military people. As you point up in your letter of February 2,<sup>2</sup> Reid is gaining experience and growing in the job. It is unfortunate that so many of the more articulate people in the Dominican Republic are disappointed he is making a success at it. This will not inhibit us in working with him so long as he continues to do the right things for his country and his people.

The problem of what to do about Juan Bosch is a difficult one. I do not think we can come up with a final answer at this time. Kennedy has briefed me on Bosch's recent activities and we have examined options open to us for dealing with him. Unfortunately, there is very little room within which to maneuver.

From a legal standpoint, we have no evidence that Bosch has violated or conspired to violate any U.S. laws. What he has done is exercise the right of free speech. I can understand why the Dominicans find reason to complain about the way he's done it, but there isn't any law against it. Nor is there legal basis, or basis in precedent which would support a finding that Bosch's activities have constituted an abuse of his status as a political asylee in the U.S. I'm afraid this would be true even if Bosch had made statements which could be identified clearly as incitation of Dominicans within the Dominican Republic to rebel against the Dominican government. Although we can agree that this is what he hopes to accomplish, after going over the statements we can attribute to him, we would also have to agree that he has carefully phrased what he has said to avoid anything approaching outright or clear-cut incitation to rebellion.

This leaves us with only one way to clamp down on Bosch. We could make a finding that his activities are prejudicial to the public interest within the meaning of Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>3</sup> But given the background and circumstances which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 295, Dominican Republic, 1965-1967. Confidential; Official-Informal. Drafted by Shlaudeman and Crockett on February 24.

<sup>2</sup> Document 18.

<sup>3</sup> P.L. 414, June 27, 1952. (66 Stat. 184)

have led to his being out of a job and in the United States, we could expect a hue and cry from liberals in the United States and Latin America at large if we decided to make such a finding. This certainty would have to be weighed against the damage which Bosch's continued presence in Puerto Rico is likely to cause our interests in the Dominican Republic. There are other considerations to be taken into account as well.

Bosch is an unpredictable man, but we do know he's a political gambler, sometimes a reckless one. He plays what we might call a forcing game, as the series of crises he deliberately provoked during 1962 and 1963 demonstrate. It would be in character for him, then, to force us into a showdown.

Also, as you know, Bosch likes the underdog role. For years he has looked for ways to appear as the persecuted champion of democracy—just he and the people against the powerful forces of reaction. This is his style and it won the 1962 elections for him. He has also been effective in the pose of defender of national honor, dignity and independence.

We think the foregoing suggests that Bosch would seek to extract maximum advantage out of what he would picture as U.S. persecution on behalf of an illegal and unpopular government. His only chance to regain power probably lies in some kind of upheaval within the Dominican Republic. Under the circumstances, why should he hold back? At this point Bosch needs an issue. The best new tack available to him might well be to tag the Triumvirate with the U.S.-lackey label—another colonialist regime sold out to big brother. This could be particularly effective at a time of acute economic difficulties and it is not entirely improbable that he has had just this possibility in the back of his mind during recent weeks.

The possible effect on Bosch's own political position is also worth our attention. We gather there is at least an outside possibility that some of his following might, under favorable circumstances, be attracted to a more moderate and responsible candidate in the September elections. The question then arises whether a new martyr's role for Bosch might not work against this desirable development. We realize that Bosch's removal from Puerto Rico would weaken his grip on day-to-day PRD affairs but that this would result in a similar weakening of his popular appeal and ability to influence basic party policy appears doubtful to us.

Finally, let me give you some of our thinking on the larger aspects of the problem. Bosch's claim to an exalted position among the hemisphere's democratic leaders has obviously been seriously eroded by events and by his own actions. Similarly, he is no longer quite such an attractive figure to liberals in this country as he once was. Reid, for his

part, has had increasing success in conveying a responsible and progressive image to the U.S. press. These are gains which a move against Bosch could jeopardize.

In making these observations, I don't wish to leave the impression that we do not give considerable weight to the Embassy's arguments. We do not feel we should close the matter either way at this time. Our inclination at the moment is to take no action but we will be pleased to have whatever further thoughts you may have on the subject. You can at least be certain that we will give the problem another hard look when Bosch comes in for his next extension of stay in April.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas C. Mann<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**20. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Carter) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1965.

SUBJECT

ARA—Agency Meeting April 14, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Mr. Vaughn, Mr. Adams, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Crockett, Mr. Shlaudeman;  
Agency—Mr. FitzGerald, [2 names not declassified]; INR/DDC—Mr. Carter

*Dominican Republic*

[2 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

In FitzGerald's opinion we have three alternatives:

1. Let Bosch and Balaguer run.
2. Postpone the election for a year to allow time to "quiet down" the Bosch and Balaguer factions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1965. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on April 16. Also sent to George C. Denney, Jr. and Allan Evans (both INR/OD).

3. Have “stretched out” elections, beginning with municipal elections in the Fall and following with congressional elections in the Spring. The presidential election would come still later.

Crockett commented that if the choice were between Bosch and Balaguer, he would readily take Balaguer. [*name not declassified*] said this was also his position.

Vaughn expressed the opinion that for the present “the economic bind” has been eased a bit and asked if there was “nothing on the horizon to strengthen Reid?”

Crockett responded that he favored Reid but saw “no way to make it wash.”

Vaughn wanted to know if we could build Reid up in a year. Agency representatives thought that Reid is getting weaker rather than stronger and Crockett pointed out the elections are presently scheduled for September.

The question was raised as to whether we might use the DR military to put pressure on Reid should we want him to stand aside. FitzGerald commented that Adolph Berle has developed a relationship with Wessin y Wessin (DR Army Chief). Crockett cautioned that Reid “may not roll over and play dead even if we ask him to.”

Vaughn wanted to know what kind of cabinet Balaguer could muster. Crockett thought it would be a good one.

[2 paragraphs (5 lines of source text) not declassified]<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]

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<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Bennett left Santo Domingo for consultations in Washington on April 23. He stopped in Georgia to visit his parents, intending to go to Washington the night of April 25. (Martin, *Overtaken By Events*, p. 645) Bennett, Vaughn, Mann, Sayre, and Read met with Secretary Rusk on April 26 at 11:40 a.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of the meeting has been found.

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**21. Telegram From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson at Camp David<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 25, 1965, 1658Z.

CAP 65134. Following is State Department report on the situation in the Dominican Republic as of noon today:

The Embassy in Santo Domingo has reported that Donald Reid, respectively President and member of the triumvirate which has governed the country since September 1963, resigned this morning and turned power over to General Montas Guerrero, ex-Army Chief of Staff who has been serving as Minister of Interior. General Montas in turn, is forming a three-man military junta. No information is yet available on the identity of the officers who will make up the junta.

Reid and Caceres, who have been providing the country with responsible and reasonably effective government, resigned in order to prevent further bloodshed. Key units of the army revolted yesterday and, although the other services at first seemed loyal to the triumvirate, it became apparent this morning that the government could only survive at the cost of civil war. The rebellious units moved into Santo Domingo, the capital, some sporadic fighting occurred and the military units loyal to the regime began to waver. Crowds of anti-government demonstrators were active and there were reliable reports that the rebellious troops were distributing arms to their civilian sympathizers. Under the circumstances, Reid had little choice but to resign.

The movement against the triumvirate was initiated yesterday by a mixed group of disgruntled military, students and political agitators. The leaders included at least two prominent members of ex-President Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party: Jose Francisco Pena, a skilled and eloquent agitator, and Miguel Soto, who directs the party's affiliated labor federation. Both are identified with the party's left wing and both have been suspected of ties to the extreme left. Available information indicates that individuals identified with the pro-Castro 14th of June political movement were also involved, along with representatives of extremist student groups. It does not appear, however, that either the official Communist Party or the Popular Dominican Movement, a party oriented toward the Chinese Communists, was directly involved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Dominican Republic, White House Cables, 4/65-7/65. Secret. A handwritten notation on the first page of the telegram reads: "Seen by the President 25 Apr 65."

The more radical supporters of Bosch, who have long been agitating for the overthrow of the triumvirate, were joined by some middle-grade and junior officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men in the army. The motives prompting this military participation were mixed. There has been mounting evidence during the last year of growing dissatisfaction among younger officers over the armed forces' command structure which seemed to perpetuate incompetent and venal officers in the positions of greatest authority. In addition, sentiment favoring ex-President Joaquin Balaguer has been particularly prevalent in the army. Recent Press interviews by Reid in which he indicated his intention to prevent Balaguer from returning to the Dominican Republic to participate in the elections scheduled for next September undoubtedly increased military disaffection. Finally, Bosch supporters for the past eighteen months have actively been proselytizing young officers and enlisted men, urging them to help overthrow the triumvirate and restore "constitutional government." These elements combined to create divisions within the armed forces and eventually to undermine the position of the top commanders who supported Reid.

With the government now in the hands of a military junta, the key problem is restoring at least a measure of unity within the armed forces. Continuing dissension would open the way for the extremist elements who have attached themselves to the anti-triumvirate movement and would bring the possibility of further bloodshed. If unity is restored, it seems probable that the junta will call early elections. The available evidence indicates that Joaquin Balaguer would probably win such elections. He has a history of demagoguery and was closely associated with the Trujillo regime. However, Balaguer is firmly anti-Communist and enjoys the support of some of the country's best people. We could cooperate with him, as we have in the past.

Failure to resolve the dissension among the military would cause a dangerous situation. However, it seems likely that the quarrels can be patched up on the basis of self-interest in preserving the armed forces as an institution.

**22. Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1965, 9:35 a.m.

President: What is the report on the Dominican Republic?

Mann: Well, it isn't good this morning. We were hoping last night that the Army would be able to get together but they are split. The Wessin group and the Air Force are in one camp; a large part of the Army that is in Santo Domingo, the capital itself, is supporting the rebel government and the loyalties of the troops outside the capital are still uncertain. They have not gone over to the rebels yet and presumably they will split too. The Wessin forces are separated from the center of town by a river which is commanded by the rebels—the bridge over the river—there is only one. The guns controlling the bridge are being strafed by the Air Force and Wessin has not yet tried to move across the bridge with his main troops. Looting is going on in the city and a lot of chaos. They have got about 1400 Marines on board these ships standing offshore. I just asked if we might alert Defense, we might have to airlift in case things got very bad, some people out of the southern part of the U.S. assuming the Marines could get control of.

President: Southern part of the U.S.?

Mann: Well, by air.

President: Repeat the statement.

Mann: We've alerted Defense against the possibility of having to airlift some additional people down in case the 1400 are needed and are not enough. I do not think that there is anything that we can do right now except wait it out. I do not know how it will go. They are not likely to do too much shooting—at least they never have in the past. Either the troops on one side or the other are likely to cave. We heard last night late that they were moving over to Wessin's side and it apparently stiffened during the night and early this morning.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, Tape F65.10, Side B, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President Johnson placed the call to Mann, which lasted approximately 9 minutes.



President: I went out to see Abe Fortas last night<sup>2</sup> just to visit with him on the general picture. He had had a call from a fellow that Bosch lives with or visits down in Puerto Rico and Abe is their lawyer. He said Bosch wanted to know whether he should go back or not. He had about concluded that he could not go back because the fields are closed and it might be dangerous so he was going to stay in Puerto Rico for awhile.

Mann: I don't think he could get in right now. I don't think anybody can get in right now.

President: What about our Ambassador. Is he cut-off right now?

Mann: Well, he was asked to come up on consultation by the Bureau<sup>3</sup> which was worried about the deteriorating situation but they did not expect it to come so soon.

[Omitted here is a 2-minute discussion on the negotiations for a new Panama Canal Treaty.]

President: We are going to have to really set up that government down there, run it and stabilize it some way or another. This Bosch is no good. I was down there.<sup>4</sup>

Mann: He's no good at all. And the tragedy behind all of this is the price of sugar which you can't do much about—even try to raise the price of sugar—without putting Castro firmly in the saddle. They are both sugar economies. I think what we are going to have to do is pour even more money into Santo Domingo to offset this low sugar price right now. This is what's hurting them. And if we don't get a decent government in there Mr. President, and we get another Bosch, it is just going to be another sinkhole.

President: Well, that's your problem. You'd better figure it out.

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<sup>2</sup> On April 25 President and Mrs. Johnson departed the White House at 8:03 p.m. to have dinner at Abe Fortas' home. They arrived back at the White House at 9:38 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Abe Fortas, an attorney to the President, and a trusted friend for over 20 years had wide-reaching and high-level contacts in Puerto Rico, an area in which he had long possessed a strong interest. He offered to assist the President in contacting Juan Bosch, the ousted President of the Dominican Republic who since September 1963 was in exile in Puerto Rico. One of Fortas' contacts was Jaime Benitez the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico and Bosch's friend. (*Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice*) From this point on in the crisis Fortas becomes one of President Johnson's most trusted advisers on the Dominican Republic.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 20.

<sup>4</sup> On behalf of then President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson attended the inauguration of President Juan Bosch on February 27, 1963.

Mann: I think we will know in the next 6 to 8 hours how this comes out. If Wessin comes out on top, the man to get back, I think, is Balaguer. He is the one that ran way ahead in the polls.

President: Well, try to do it; try to do it some way.

[Omitted here is discussion of a press report alleging U.S. Government support of the rebels and President Johnson's request of Mann to notify the press to set the record straight.]

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### **23. Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1965, 7:17 a.m.

Mann: Last night about 9 o'clock we got a statement from both sides. The Navy is absent in all this but both of the combatant sides would permit an orderly evacuation as far as they were able to do so. As far as they were concerned. They could not speak for the other side. And early this morning they have assembled some 400 or more Americans, mostly tourists in the Hotel Ambassador, and they are ready for evacuation. We did not want to try to get them out at night because of all the Communists running around at night. We thought it was too dangerous. Early this morning we hear reports that the Navy, which has gone back with the Wessin Air Force group, is threatening to deliver an ultimatum—not to start shooting but to deliver an ultimatum—somewhere between 7 and 9, our time, this morning to bombard the city in a very intensive way. They could get maybe as many as 30 planes in the air and if the Navy turned their guns on, it could be a pretty messy thing. So I have just talked to the Secretary—what I think we should do, if you agree, is to tell our Navy to come into the port of Haina, this is about 7 miles from the center of town—this is where the Embassy wants them to come in because they are not supposed to be shooting—get in touch immediately with the Dominican Navy and since land lines are out we cannot communicate this morning with the Air Force people or the Wessin people—and find out whether they can communicate over the Naval radio (Dominican Naval Radio) with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, Tape F65.11, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President Johnson placed the call to Mann, which lasted approximately 11 minutes.

those bases and tell them what we are doing and that we insist on a cease fire until we can get these Americans out and if they can't get in touch any other way, to send them a helicopter if this is necessary, to the San Isidro Air Base. We already have the word of the Commander [Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin] and make sure that this cease fire and this ultimatum and bombardment doesn't start until we are through evacuating, then use this time to try to get a 'junta' set up of some kind which will stabilize the situation. Does that make sense?

President: Yes. Yes. Why would they want to be bombarding the city until we got our people out, they agreed it's all right to take them?

Mann: Well I think they are desperate. The Navy and the Air Force and Wessin's force are cut off from the city and they cannot get in and they do not have the strength to get in. They cannot get across this bridge and this is about all they can do. They strafe and bomb. It looks like to me a measure of desperation, and designed I think to break down the morale of the rebels and regain control ultimately in the city. This is what the design would be. Must be a pretty bitter feeling between the two branches of the Armed Forces by this time.

President: This is awful, isn't it?

Mann: Yes, it is awful.

President: How much did we know about all this, Tom?

Mann: Well, we knew that it is a graft-ridden place and this guy [Donald] Reid [Cabral] has done a very courageous job in firing unnecessary people trying to balance his budget and doing all these unpopular things like taking taxes from the rich; eliminating graft in the military forces, and that sort of thing. They had duty free entry privileges, and brought in scotch and selling it twice for what they paid for it. They just tried to establish a little order out of chaos down there. It pinches everyone's toes who were used to all these unusual privileges. The price of sugar dropped and we knew they were going to have a drought; we knew that things were not going well, that is why Tap Bennett was up here to tell us that we had about 2 or 3 weeks to try to do something about it.<sup>2</sup> We have put in a good deal of money but money does not do everything we hope it will sometimes. They had 30 years of a very strong rule and they just do not know how to manage their own affairs now that they have the responsibility themselves. It is a complex thing.

President: Does it mean, do you think, that this is another Castro government?

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<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Bennett left Santo Domingo on April 23 for consultations in Washington; see footnote 2, Document 20.

Mann: Not yet. No. It is hard to tell what comes out of one of these messes and who comes out on top, but we do not think that this fellow Bosch understands the Communist danger. We do not think he is a Communist but what we are afraid of is that if he gets back in, he will have so many of them around him; and they are so much smarter than he is, that before you know it, they'd begin to take over.

President: What is it that they see in him, why do you have this Bosch?

Mann: Bosch is a kind of literary man. He writes books but he is the most impractical fellow in the world—sort of an idealist floating around on Cloud 9 type—he is a handsome man and a good orator and the people just do not have the maturity to distinguish between words and deeds. He makes a lot of promises to them and so forth. That is the way he got elected by being a good orator.

President: What should I say about him in this press conference?<sup>3</sup>

Mann: That the situation is fluid; that we are evacuating Americans. There's some kind of baker's convention there; a lot of tourists there and we are getting them out. We are going to ask the Embassy if we should get the wives and families of our official people out and that we have been promised a cease-fire so that this can be accomplished and we are in touch with both sides hoping to do what we can to stop the bloodshed.

[Omitted here is discussion regarding Mann's failure to contact Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, due to Munoz-Marin's attendance at a meeting on the death of Albizu Campos, an independent leader in Puerto Rico.]

President: Now let's go back over what we're doing again.

Mann: We will tell the Navy we have this OK from both sides to get in touch immediately with the Navy at the Port of Haina and make sure everything is safe and that they are expected and unless some trouble develops, to let us know immediately, otherwise go on in as fast as they can, and get in touch with the Embassy. We will tell the Embassy the same thing and establish communication as best they can with the Air Force and the Wessin Forces across the river either by land line or by naval/military radio or if necessary by helicopter and tell them that we are starting to evacuate and to hold off on any shooting.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a news conference on April 27 at 4 p.m. in the East Room at the White House during which the President summarized the situation in the Dominican Republic. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I*, pp. 448–457)

President: Is it likely that we might start moving our people out and they'll start shooting?

Mann: I think there is certain risk in this kind of situation that somebody will shoot. As long as you have all these Communists and everything else around, and there is a chance for misunderstanding, I think there is always a certain risk. That is why we did not want to do it in the middle of the night. Communications are very poor but certainly with these threats of bombardment.

President: Where do you get those reports threats? Who tells us that? Gossip?

Mann: No, no. These are reports that the Embassy has whether they are listening to them over the radio or something, I just don't know, I suspect it is just a radio threat. They said they're going to announce it between 7 and 9, and give them a little time to think about it and then presumably start. That would put them up around 10 or 11. But I think the sooner we get started this morning the better.

President: How long does it take to get our people out?

Mann: Well, this we don't know. The Port of Haina is about 7 miles. I presume the Embassy can get enough cars to get these 400 or more people down to Haina and then presumably they'll have to be lifted either on helicopter or on these boats which would take several hours. But once they get to Haina, they're 7 miles away from the center of town.

President: I would get them out as quick as I could.

Mann: Will do.

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## 24. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 27, 1965, 11:37 a.m.

644. Establishment of Provisional Government.

A. Our primary objectives are restoration of law and order, prevention of possible Communist takeover, and protection of American lives. We understand provisional government under Molina Urena is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sayre and cleared by Rusk and Vance.

not in control of situation. We also understand that situation has materially changed since yesterday (April 26) and that position of Wessin and de los Santos and company now seems more evenly balanced with that of rebel forces.

B. Believe you should contact military leaders of contending forces and suggest to them establishment of military junta to act as provisional government. This junta would have objectives of restoring law and order, preventing Communist takeover, and holding free and democratic elections as promptly as feasible. You should not become involved in details of formation of junta but should urge there be no preconditions on participation in junta and there should be assurance from both sides that there would be no reprisals.

You should make whatever arrangements are feasible to get Ambassador Bennett to Santo Domingo as promptly as possible.<sup>2</sup> We believe presence of Ambassador could make difference in bringing contending forces together as outlined above.

**Rusk**

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<sup>2</sup> At the time this telegram was sent, Ambassador Bennett had not yet arrived in Santo Domingo following a 48-hour visit to Washington for consultations. He arrived in Santo Domingo at 12:40 p.m. (Martin, *Overtaken By Events*, p. 653)

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**25. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1965.

**SUBJECT**

Dominican Situation as of 2:30 PM

1. State reports that the bombardment of Santo Domingo by loyalist forces has begun in several areas of the city. So far the bombardment has not affected the evacuation, in line with earlier pledges given to the Embassy.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Memos and Miscellaneous, Vol. II, 1/64-4/65. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 23.

2. State has received word that the evacuation of people from the Hotel Embajador area to Haina is virtually completed. The timing was fortuitous because the Embassy has received a report that rumors are circulating around Santo Domingo that U.S. planes are doing the bombing and that people are being urged to move against the Hotel Embajador and the Embassy.

3. Ambassador Bennett is in Santo Domingo and has taken charge. He has personally checked on the evacuation program.

4. A message (copy attached)<sup>3</sup> has gone [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] concurred in by State, stating:

a. Today appears to be Wessin's last chance to take military action to dominate the situation.

b. Nothing should be done to discourage or impede Wessin's reported moves and consideration should be given to any Embassy actions or expressions which could assist Wessin without actually siding with him openly or intervening actively.

c. Consideration should be given to passing to appropriate rebel leaders data on the identities, activities, arms caches, strong points and plans of communist leaders and groups, with a view to getting them to take strong action at once against communist elements.

**WGB**

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 271723Z, April 27, was repeated to the Department of State and the White House for McGeorge Bundy who received it at 5:34 p.m. This telegram was not found attached. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Dominican Republic, Cables, Vol. 1, 6/64–4/65)

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## **26. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, April 28, 1965, 0316Z.

1128. Joint State/Defense message. Molina Urena, appeared at Embassy shortly before 4 pm, accompanied by gaggle of some 15 or 20 whom he introduced as his principal political and military advisers.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CAR Files: Lot 69 D 158, Dominican Republic, 1965. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADS and COMCARIBSEAFRON and DOD. Passed to the White House and CIA.

(FonMin Lovaton reportedly had already taken refuge in foreign embassy and collapse some other leading military already reported.) Cols. Hernando Ramrez and Caamano were with him. Following security practice I have instituted, I required all weapons to be checked at entrance.

Molina Urena, nervous and dejected, was trying hard to carry himself as constitutional President and failing miserably. While all emoted democratic principles and some sought breathe fire, it was clear they realized forces arrayed against them were superior and they said they prepared negotiate settlement.

In a meeting lasting almost one hour, various members of group asserted their people still prepared resist, but they felt their action necessary in interest preventing further bloodshed. I made clear our emphatic view senseless shedding of blood must end, at same time reminding them that it was their action on Saturday<sup>2</sup> which initiated this fratricide and called forth counter-reaction. I recalled to them US had loyally supported Bosch to end of his government and beyond and had made clear its emphatic disapproval of his overthrow. That had happened, however, more than eighteen months ago. Latest effort to restore Bosch was obviously unsuccessful and at some point one had to start anew. I made clear to them we were talking in similar terms to both sides and, while meeting was going on, word was brought in that navy–air force bombardment had ceased. I suggested it was high time they approach other side for talks.

Both in full group and in private conversation with Molina and one or two civilian cohorts, I underlined and reiterated there was no question Communists had taken advantage of their legitimate movement, having been tolerated and even encouraged by PRD. I noted that in spite of fact PRD democratic party, they had in effect given Communists free rein, especially through military distribution of arms to civilians in large numbers, their tolerance of widespread looting, and physical mistreatment of innocent persons. I said there was much talk of democracy on their part, but this did not impress me as road to get there.

At one point I told Molina Urena, with whom I have always had good personal relations, I was sorry for him as regards the way all this had turned out, but that he could not deny serious Communist infiltration and influence in recent events. His answers and those his colleagues were specious and unconvincing, although I found little give in their position and no willingness admit such was case. I recounted incidents to him on local TV over weekend of Castro-type “barbudos” spouting pure Castroism. He said I was trying to talk details. I replied

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<sup>2</sup> April 24.



to him I wanted to make clear my government considers this kind of detail of great importance.

During meeting message came re danger posed for American citizens in La Romana through action rebel forces in handing out arms to civilians. I called this to group's attention as example of just what we were talking about. They indicated concern and offered use marine helicopter to go to La Romana and stop it. This has however, been worked out through Police Chief Despradel.

As regards their request that we dissuade Wessin from crossing bridge and get air force to call off bombing, I reminded them Embassy staff had been successful four times yesterday in getting air force to hold back and had thought early this morning truce had been worked out. They had, in fact, tried to take advantage of each situation. Then I came down strongly on disgraceful incident at Hotel Embajador where American lives were wantonly placed in peril this morning.<sup>3</sup> Was this an example of democracy in action?

During meeting, Martinez Francisco called back (Embtel 1118)<sup>4</sup> asking to speak to Molina and saying he was going to make strong effort with him to give up. They had long talk by phone, contents of which not discussed with us.

I declined courteously proposal made by Molina that I attend negotiations along with Dean of DipCorps and representative of church. I said I had no authority to participate, and that US view was accord should be reached by Dominicans talking to Dominicans. I said we looked forward to early elections, hoped they would be entirely free, and that perhaps they could be supervised by OAS if Dominicans wanted it that way.

Meeting finally dragged to close with Molina leaving accompanied by small group, and several others, principally military, lingering as though they trying to avoid going out again into cruel world. There was some evidence navy–air force group ready to talk with them and I urged them to get together. We have not yet heard results.

**Bennett**

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<sup>3</sup> At about 7 a.m. on April 28 a shooting incident occurred in the evacuation area at the Hotel Ambassador when rebel patrols entered the grounds on a false rumor that one of their opponents, Rafel Bonilla Aybar, an anti-Bosch journalist, was among the evacuees. The patrol departed after firing several hundred shots. No evacuees were reported injured.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1118 from Santo Domingo April 27, 1820Z, Bennett reported that he had just spoken to Captain Mario Pena Taveras, leading member of the revolt, and Martinez Francisco, Secretary General of the PRD. Bennett recounted that he had told them in part that the "USG wants cease-fire to give opportunity to form government which can effectively govern country." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)

## 27. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, April 28, 1965, 1718Z.

1146. Joint State/Defense message. It is our combined judgment that communications equipment is most critical lack in current situation. Air force, navy, Wessin and Montas forces are at separate points and hours go by without direct contact.<sup>2</sup>

Attachés feel this the critical point and could well mean difference in results of present confrontation. Superiority of combined forces does not necessarily avail if it is separate, as here, in distinct pockets, with inadequate communications between them, and with each ground element facing leftist forces with heavy psychological propaganda of "people's struggle for liberation." Equally serious, in attachés' opinion, is effect on morale of air force and others if we seem to deny them this item of equipment which, after all, has civilian as well as military uses. They are not asking for offensive weapons, merely means to talk.

While I regret as much as anyone that, once again, we have to rely on military solution for political crisis engendered by confused democratic left, all valid elements of which now either in asylum or hiding, as much from extremists who have come to dominate rebel situation, as well as from opposing military forces. However, plain fact of situation is that while leftist propaganda naturally will try to fuzz situation as fight between military and people, issue here now is fight between Castro-type elements and those who oppose it. We should be clear as to situation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CAR Files: Lot 69 D 158, Dominican Republic, 1965. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADS and COMCARIBSEAFRON. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> The request for 50 portable radio communications sets came from General de Los Santos, Dominican Air Force Chief of Staff, who wanted them for use by military forces and police in mopping up operations. (Telegram 1136 from Santo Domingo, April 28) In this telegram Bennett strongly recommended that the sets be made available from stocks in Puerto Rico and that they be flown to San Isidro that morning. At 11:05 a.m. Under Secretary Mann told Vaughn informally that he had decided against moving the walkie-talkies in at that time but was instead in favor of moving the walkie-talkies to the USS *Boxer*. (Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Research Project No. 939, "The Response of the Department of State to the Dominican Crisis of April–May 1965," pp. 15–16)

I do not wish to be over-dramatic, but if we deny simple communications equipment and opposition to leftist takeover here loses for lack of heart or otherwise, we may very well be asking in near future for landing of Marines to protect U.S. citizens and possibly for other purposes. Which would Washington prefer?

**Bennett**

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**28. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, April 28, 1965, 1900Z.

1149. Joint State–Defense message. Col. Benoit, member of junta,<sup>2</sup> just telephoned Embassy to ask that U.S. land 1200 Marines “to help restore peace to this country.” Benoit did not elaborate simple request and he was given no encouragement. I do not believe situation justifies such action at this time and agree with Navy Attaché that Marines should not be used in any event for street clearing operations. Preponderant military forces are on side of Joint Chiefs of Operations, although they are separated geographically and, I repeat, without adequate communications between them. Psychological advantage still rests with rebels. Logically the junta’s forces should bring situation under control, but situation not really very logical and severe test of nerves now in process. In view conditions described my talk with Vaughn this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CAR Files: Lot 69 D 158, Dominican Republic, 1965. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, DOD, and CTG FOUR FOUR PT NINE. Passed to the White House and CIA at 3:30 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> At noon on April 28, Radio San Isidro announced the formation of a military junta comprised of three Colonels representing three service branches: Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit of the air force; Colonel Enrique Apolinar Casado Saladin of the army, and Captain Manuel Olgo Santana Carrasco of the navy. The junta announced that its principal purpose was to prepare the nation for free and democratic elections.

morning, Dept's 657<sup>3</sup> is perhaps drawing unduly optimistic conclusion. Further, we learned Wessin has not advanced this morning beyond bridgehead this side Ozama River and, all in all, not making very aggressive showing. Junta army organization confused and Air Force carrying burden. In short, attachés at this stage consider outcome still in doubt.

Department may wish do some contingency planning in case situation should break apart and deteriorate rapidly to extent we should need Marines in a hurry to protect American citizens.

**Bennett**

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<sup>3</sup> The morning of April 28 Bennett telephoned Vaughn at approximately 10 a.m. to convince him of the need for communication sets. Bennett telephoned Vaughn again at approximately 11:45 a.m. repeating his request for the walkie-talkies, which the Department deemed unnecessary at this time. In telegram 657 to Santo Domingo, April 28, the Department summarized its position and stated that it did not wish to intervene unless the outcome of the struggle in Santo Domingo was in doubt. The Department wrote that it appeared as though the anti-rebel forces were winning, and that it would be only a matter of time until they dominated the situation. (Office of the Historian, Research Project No. 939, "The Response of the Department of State to the Dominican Crisis of April-May 1965," p. 16) Later the same day during a telephone conversation among Mann, McGeorge Bundy and President Johnson, the President approved the transfer of the walkie-talkies and instructed Mann to inform General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to start flying them in. (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965)

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## **29. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Director of the National Security Agency (Carter)<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, April 28, 1965, 2015Z.

Critic 4. Following is text of request by newly formed junta for US military assistance:

Military junta of government, conscious that present revolutionary movement against democratic institutions junta represents, is directed by Communists and is of authentic Communist stamp, as shown by excesses committed against population, mass assassinations, sackings of private property, constant incitations to continue fight

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Confidential. The telegram printed here is the copy repeated to the Department of State, which was received at 4:54 p.m. Passed to USIB agencies.

broadcast by Radio Habana, and which movement, if victorious will convert this country into another Cuba we request, with responsibility and in categorical manner, that United States Government lend us its unlimited and immediate military assistance so that such grave situation may definitively be controlled.

**Bennett**

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### 30. Editorial Note

During a 5:15 p.m. telephone conversation on April 28, 1965, between President Johnson and Mann (see footnote 3, Document 28), President Johnson also asked Mann “to be sure we are right on our predictions.” Furthermore, the President said he “[didn’t] want the rebels to win; he had just about lived down the Bay of Pigs and he [didn’t] want Mr. Mann to get him involved in another spot like that.” (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965)

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### 31. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 28, 1965, 5:45 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Mann  
The President  
Secretary Rusk  
Mr. Bundy

Mr. Mann said that he thought the consensus here is that we have got to go with the judgment of those on the spot. The military commanders would have to decide on the best place.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965. Extra Sensitive. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Johnson was in the lounge of the Oval Office from 4:45 to 6:01 p.m. on April 28 meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Moyers (Ibid.) Presumably this 5:45 p.m. conference call occurred during this time.

Mr. Bundy asked if Mr. Mann could telephone the Ambassador and make it the Ambassador Hotel. Mr. Mann said he thought we should make a statement saying we are there to evacuate the 2,000 Americans and any other nationals who want to leave. Second, call on both sides to send representatives to wherever we land—the Ambassador Hotel or wherever—to negotiate terms of a cease fire and agree on the way we restore law and order and a democratic government.

Mr. Bundy asked if we wanted to take on the role of peace maker. Mr. Mann said there is a possibility that the mere landing of Marines will serve to strengthen the will of the Wessin side. The first thing is to go in and say we are there to evacuate. The second thing is to let them come and negotiate.

The President said that we were not going to announce anything until they have landed. Mr. Mann said that was correct. The President said we did not want them waiting there to shoot at us when we landed, like they did to the Belgians in the Congo.

Mr. Bundy asked who was holding the Hotel Ambassador now, and added that he assumed it was the friendlies.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Mann said we could not be sure because the Ambassador is saying that the loyal troops cannot guarantee the route from the Hotel to Haina. Mr. Bundy said in any event the recommendation was clear: we give the order and then we begin to draft the statements.

The President said he would tell the commanders to take off in the helicopters and he would tell the riders to get their statements prepared so when they do land we can say they are there to evacuate and to bring these citizens of ours out and then he would follow up with the riders. He would have the airplanes over the islands immediately—he would have the helicopters off and we would have people drafting their statements explaining we were there to evacuate.

Mr. Bundy said one thing they wanted is a clear message to Bennett asking him to get the request rephrased in these terms and not in terms of the communist threat.

Mr. Mann said he had not recognized the new Junta. He said there are political problems and we may want to call in both sides.

Mr. Bundy said if we could get the Junta to inform us that they cannot guarantee to protect the Americans.

The President said that we could say that help is on the way in response to his request to evacuate the Americans. We have been informed that the Junta can no longer do it.

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<sup>2</sup> The Constitutionalist forces.

Mr. Mann said that what the President wanted was a clear statement that they could no longer protect the American lives. The President said that this has already been said but he would say help was needed to protect the lives of the Americans and not refer to the communist angle. The existing government says that it wants us know it can in no way be responsible for American lives, it has reached a point where these lives are in danger, and therefore help is urgently requested. He added that in the meantime they will be on their way.

Secretary Rusk said that he thought Mr. Mann should consider giving an alternative to the Hotel Ambassador if, as a matter of fact, they cannot get in without serious losses. He said he thought the military commander should have some discretion. Mr. Mann agreed.

Mr. Bundy said that the military [illegible—and the?] military commander—and the Ambassador—should be in touch about that before they land. Mr. Mann agreed but said that we do not tell them anything until we are there. Mr. Bundy said except to coordinate with the friendly who are holding the area. Mr. Mann said if we told them it would leak all over town. Secretary Rusk said that we would not tell them until they are actually coming in.

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**32. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Director of the National Security Agency (Carter)<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, April 28, 1965, 2040Z.

Critic 5. Joint State/Defense message.

Regret report situation deteriorating rapidly. San Isidro pilots who have been principal element in junta forces tired and discouraged. Army leadership disorganized although Montas just named Commander in Chief armed forces, in effort mobilize army effort. Police Chief Despradel informs his mopping up operations have met such violent resistance he can no longer continue and that his maximum capability now is defense of few key installations. Wessin still expresses confidence, but obviously weary and speaking of need for more men.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Confidential. The telegram printed here is the copy repeated to the Department of State, which was received at 5:16 p.m. It was incorrectly identified as “Critic Four”; a handwritten correction on another copy of the telegram indicates it is “Critic Five.” Passed to USIB agencies.

Rivera Caminero worried and discouraged. De Los Santos and Montas still full of fight.

Chief MAAG just returned from San Isidro where most above officers now gathered found general atmosphere dejected and emotional, with number of officers weeping. Belisario Peguero there also in hysterical mood urging "retreat."

Benoit of junta sent formal request U.S. supply troops, told MAAG Chief that without help they would "have to quit." In view this report and recent messages through [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Country Team unanimously of opinion that, now that we have request from military junta for assistance,<sup>2</sup> time has come to land the Marines.

American lives are in danger. We suggest, subject conditions at moment, Marines establish beach head in Hotel Embajador vicinity centering on polo field which can be used by helicopters for landing. We would also be glad have detachment take possession Embassy grounds. If Washington wishes, they can be landed for purpose protect evacuation American citizens. We have just been told by police chief, for instance, that he cannot provide protection route Haina Naval Base which has been used until now for evacuations.

I recommend immediate landing.

**Bennett**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 29.

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### **33. Transcript of Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

April 28, 1965, 2230Z.

Present: Under Secy Ball, Deputy Under Secy Mann, Ass't Secy Vaughn, Deputy Ass't Secy Sayre, Mr. Kennedy Crockett, Executive Secy Ben Read

Subject: Dominican Situation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret.



*SecState Item 1 28/2242Z*

We have authorized task force 44.9 to land Marines in necessary strength to establish secure point or points for evacuation U.S. nationals and other foreigners. Task force will execute on Ambassador's orders.

Secure point or points will be maintained for duration of emergency situation.

We intend issue statement here explaining:

(1) This action taken as result of notification given us by Dominican authorities that they are unable to safeguard American lives.

(2) We continue to deplore situation in Dom-Rep and call on both sides to cease fire.

(3) We hope it will be possible for them to sit down and reconcile differences.

Provide current sitrep. *End Item 1.*

*[SDOM] Telecon Note 1*

Marines have landed and in good time since evacuation area already under fire from irregular forces.

*Item 2 28/2300Z*

First draft of announcement to be made here follows:

"The United States Government has been informed by military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger, that the authorities are unable to guarantee their safety and that the assistance of United States military personnel is needed for that purpose.

Accordingly, I have issued instructions to the Secretary of Defense to take necessary steps to proceed immediately with the evacuation of the several hundred Americans still in the Dominican Republic. Our assistance will also be available to nationals of other countries residing in the Dominican Republic some of whom have already requested assistance.

I am sure that the Dominican people in this hour of their tribulation will understand that we continue to hope and to work for a cessation of hostilities, the restoration of law and order and the speedy return to the normal processes of government." *End Item 2.*

*SDOM Item 2*

Have established direct comm[unication] from Emb and are communicating without difficulty. *End Item 2.*

*SecState Item 3 28/2305Z*

Are you in touch with task force commander. Your answer this query should precede all others. *End Item 3.*

*SDOM Item 3**Current SitRep*

Present situation is that second increment 300 Marines now landing at Embajador Hotel to protect Americans who are under fire there and who have asked for authority to shoot to defend themselves, which we have given them. Apparently platoon earlier sent there was not adequate to cover both heliport at polo field and hotel. We hope that with additional reinforcements this will be possible.

One platoon Marines came by car from Embajador to guard Embassy Chancery and are now in position along with some 38 policemen. They claim they can defend perimeter against small arms attack, but will have difficulty containing situation if rebels bring in mortars, artillery, or tanks, all of which they have at their disposal. *End Item 3.*

*SecState Item 4 28/2307Z*

How many U.S. citizens are still in Santo Domingo—official and private?

Are there concentrations at locations other than the Hotel Embajador?

Do you wish to evacuate official dependents? *End Item 4.*

*SDOM Item 4 (ref)*

Approx 1000 all of which do not desire to leave. Many permanent residents reluctant.

No other concentrations than at Hotel Embajador.

Some people are in Emb Chancery and will give refuge in residence tonight to extent possible.

In event additional Marine platoon now supplementing Emb security guard is able to cover residence on same property as well.

Evacuation route through Haina no longer being used.

Many official dependents have already departed.

I have told Dean of Diplomatic Corps that we would offer protection to any members corps who might wish go to Embajador.

Colombian Amb. has asked whether we can supply Marines for protection other embassies. But I am telling him we do not have enough Marines for that purpose.

**34. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Director of the National Security Agency (Carter)<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, April 28, 1965, 2302Z.

Critic 6. Joint State/Defense message. Sec State for Mann.

1. Further re my earlier statement American lives in danger. Police Chief Despradel has informed us he can no longer guarantee safety Americans en route evacuation area.

2. Have just had following message from Col. Benoit of junta relayed over carrier communications net:

“Situation deteriorating rapidly. Request urgent reply my official request for assistance.”<sup>2</sup> He is 16 miles away and only communication over open channel. Am therefore sending AirAtt by helicopter to get statement from him. I have no doubt whatever he will give it.

3. Delegation resident American citizens just left my office having advised no protection their residential areas and their belief Americans will be logical target of leftist mobs who have been sacking so many Dominican homes.

4. Police unable fill requests for additional guard duty even last night. Their numbers are strapped already, as reported earlier, and it obvious they cannot protect individual homes. We are recommending Americans assemble Embajador Hotel for evacuation. Naturally, many permanent residents not anxious take this step.

5. AID office just broken into. Evacuation area being fired on by rebels.

**Bennett**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Confidential. The telegram printed here is the copy repeated to the Department of State, which was received at 7:29 p.m. Passed to USIB agencies.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 29.

### 35. Minutes of Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 28, 1965, 7:27–8:10 p.m.

#### MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP ON DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

##### IN ATTENDANCE

###### *From the Executive*

The President, The Vice President, The Secretary of State, The Under Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, The Ambassador to the United Nations, The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

###### *From the Senate*

Mansfield, Dirksen, Long, Kuchel, Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Saltonstall, Smathers

###### *From the House*

McCormack, Albert, Boggs, Ford, Arends, Dr. Morgan, Mrs. Bolton

###### *From the White House*

Moyers, Valenti, Reedy, O'Brien, Watson, Busby

The President began the meeting at 7:30 p.m., EDT, calling on the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State: Mr. Rusk reviewed developments of the past several days in the Dominican Republic. He explained that the PRD moved to overthrow Donald Reid Cabral, successfully ousted him quickly. However, some elements of the Army were determined not to allow ex-President Bosch to return to power. By Tuesday afternoon, a consolidation of the situation had apparently been accomplished and several of the military leaders declared a junta. Mr. Rusk recited the findings of a recent poll among the Dominican people regarding their preferences for President in a popular election.

Mr. Rusk explained that it appeared, as of the previous day, that the armed forces and police would be able to establish order. However, during the afternoon, there had been a deterioration. A number of civilians in the city of Santo Domingo had been armed by Rebels, including some Castro-trained Communist supporters. Law and order had broken down as a result. Approximately 1,100 Americans were taken out of Santo Domingo on Tuesday<sup>2</sup> and approximately 1,300 remained.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Meetings Notes File, 4/28/65 Meeting with Congressional Leaders on Dominican Republic. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> April 27.

The Ambassador had been informed by the junta that American lives were in danger and that further protection was needed for them because the military and police could not guarantee protection.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency: Admiral Raborn reported that there had been positive identification of three ring-leaders of the Rebels as Castro-trained agents.

The Secretary of Defense: Because of the danger in the Dominican Republic situation, the President had instructed the Department of Defense to place troops in position to take the necessary measures for protection of the lives of American citizens. Mr. McNamara reviewed the deployment of units of the fleet, including the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Boxer*, with its complement of Marines and helicopters. He reported that approximately 2,000 Marines were in position to be ashore within a time span of one to ten hours. He reported also that two divisions of paratroopers were on alert at Ft. Bragg, N.C. Mr. McNamara said that all forces had been put in position and placed on alert to meet contingencies in the Dominican Republic.

The President: The President reported that Ambassador Bennett had advised Washington that authorities in Santo Domingo were no longer able to provide protection for American lives.<sup>3</sup> The President reviewed the fact that we had repeatedly asked for a cease-fire by both sides. Since activities were continuing there, however, he had on the advice of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense asked that helicopters and other essential supporting equipment be in position to act as necessary.

The President reported that it would shortly be announced—within the hour—that the United States has sent Marine units ashore to protect and escort American citizens to safety. This action, he explained, was being taken on the basis of unanimous decisions of our country team in the Dominican, the recommendation of the Ambassador, and on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President reported that shortly several hundred of our military forces would be landing in Santo Domingo.

Senator Fulbright: The Senator asked if there were any way in which the Organization of American States could help.

The Secretary of State: Mr. Rusk replied that there was concern within the OAS both for the safety of the nationals of the member states present in the Dominican capital and for the implications of the developing situation in the Dominican Republic.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 32.

The President: At this point, the President read to those present the messages received in Washington from Ambassador Bennett on the scene in Santo Domingo, D.R.

Senator Dirksen: The Senator related a telephone call he had received the previous night from Miami, reporting that the Dominican Vice Consul there was advising persons that Castro was making a concerted effort to take over the Dominican Republic. Senator Dirksen commented that without regard to the reliability of the information he had received, it was necessary to take into account the factor of Castro.

The President: He observed that there was no alternative to the actions being taken by the United States in view of the unanimous recommendations received from all responsible officials in regard to the advisable course for this government to pursue.

Senator Dirksen: He observed that, speaking for himself, if this proliferates, it seems imperative that the United States go to the heart of the matter and lay it out at them. Speak our piece, he said, and demand respect for it. He expressed his hope that actions taken would be vigorous and adequate and said "I will stand up for you."

Speaker McCormack: It seems obvious that this situation is not consistent with our national interest. He asked the question, Can we afford another Castro situation of this sort?

The President: He reviewed the various influences contributing to escalation of the situation in Santo Domingo and observed that we can't waste one moment in taking action. He asked the Congressional leadership if there was support or criticism for any of these actions.

Senator Smathers: He asked whether it was the plan to put the Marines in and take them out immediately—or allow them to remain there?

The President: We haven't crossed that bridge yet.

The Secretary of State: This is not a 24-hour operation.

Representative Arends: How many civilians are there?

The Secretary of State: 1,300 or, maybe 1,000<sup>4</sup>—all of whom do not want to leave.

The President: At this point, the President read to those present a preliminary draft of the statement he planned to deliver on television network broadcast shortly.<sup>5</sup> The President asked if there were objections or suggestions.

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix material for corrected figures. [Footnote in the source text. According to the appendix 2,865 Americans were estimated to be in the Dominican Republic as of April 27; of these 1,115 were evacuated April 27–29.]

<sup>5</sup> See Document 33. For the final statement read by President Johnson at 8:40 p.m. from the Theater of the White House, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book I, pp. 461–462.

Senator Mansfield: Suggested that mention be made of the OAS.

Ambassador Stevenson: Concurred in Senator Mansfield's suggestion.

The President: The President agreed with the suggestion and directed that appropriate language be included. He again asked if there were comments, criticisms or objections to the statement or action. None were expressed.

Adjourn: The meeting adjourned at 7:57 p.m. Senator Mansfield, Ambassador Stevenson, Mr. Bundy and others reviewed the statement, making the changes directed by the President.<sup>6</sup> The President, The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Admiral Raborn individually briefed various late arrivals, including Senator Hickenlooper, Representative Ford, etc.

The President left the room at 8:25 p.m.

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<sup>6</sup> At 8:10 p.m. on April 28 President Johnson, Mann, and Ball held a telephone conversation in which they discussed the draft statement on the Dominican Republic. During this conversation President Johnson asked about the sentence: "I assure the Dominican people that in this hour of trial the United States remains fully pledged to support peace and freedom in their country." Mann said he "saw no trouble with this. The very fact that we have gone in there is going to do it. If we are going to be hanged, let's be hanged for a wolf instead of a lamb. We are for peace and freedom, why don't we say it." (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965)

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### 36. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Director of the National Security Agency (Carter)**<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, April 28, 1965, 2327Z.

1155. Joint State/Defense message. In view of rapid deteriorating situation here I have just asked Boxer to provide helicopter evacuation of Americans assembling in Embajador Hotel, including company for security purposes in view of sniping going around Embassy building, I have also requested Pathfinder Platoon to land on Embassy grounds for protection of chancery. I hope this action will give some heart to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Confidential; Flash. The telegram printed here is the copy repeated to the Department of State, which was received at 7:52 p.m. Repeated to CINCLANT and CINCSO for POLADs, COMCARIBSEAFRON, DOD, and CTG FOUR FOUR PT NINE and passed to the White House and CIA.

loyal forces. Breakdown of all government authority and possibility that remaining forces available to it may soon tire or become physically incapable of maintaining their present position, I recommend serious thought be given in Washington to armed intervention which would go beyond the mere protection of Americans and seek to establish order in this strife-ridden country. All indications point to the fact that if present efforts of forces loyal to the government fail, power will be assumed by groups clearly identified with the Communist Party. If the situation described above comes to pass, my own recommendation and that of country team is that we should intervene to prevent another Cuba from arising out of the ashes of this uncontrollable situation.

Pending this decision we recommend that additional military units be dispatched to this area since present forces available are considered inadequate to perform the mission I have suggested as our last resort.

**Bennett**

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### **37. Editorial Note**

At 8:31 p.m. on April 28, 1965, President Johnson and Thomas Mann held a telephone conversation during which the President instructed Mann to divide up a list of all Latin American Ambassadors with Vaughn and Sayre and call the ambassadors to explain the reasons for the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. The President told him to stress the fact that the United States repeatedly asked for a cease-fire. The President also instructed Mann to send a telegram to all U.S. Ambassadors asking them to reach the highest authority of their respective countries to explain the actions of the United States. (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 20, 1965)

Circular telegram 2066, April 28, drafted by Mann and sent to all posts began:

“In speaking to Latin Americans about today’s evacuation avoid any suggestion that U.S. is supporting or opposing any particular political faction or group. Emphasize that purpose of operation is to evacuate Americans and nationals of other countries wanting to leave and that this action taken only after authorities had stated that lives of U.S. citizens were in danger and that government could not guarantee their safety.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)



**38. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 28, 1965, 11:45 p.m.

The President said he had been talking with Abe Fortas.<sup>2</sup> According to him, Bosch was saying that our Embassy was directing the thing for the other side and that we were responsible for it and everything and that we had furnished them with equipment and he didn't know what else. The President said he did not tell him anything about what we had done. Bosch said that he wanted to go back but he would not go back until after elections, if we could get them to agree, cease fire, etc. Mr. Fortas said he would be standing by to do anything we wanted him to. The President said he thought Mr. Mann should have this information.

Mr. Mann said he thought we would know tomorrow. He said it seems that we have two or three possibilities. He said that the consensus was that the presence of the Marines would calm everyone down. He added that this would have been true before the commies came but what we don't know is what difference the commies will make. He said if it all quiets down the anti-communist forces will get control and we can guide it. If, on the other hand, we have to fight or go in and clean up it is possible that we will be in trouble, in terms of international organizations. He said we had been giving thought to which one of the various routes we should take if we go get in trouble. He explained about the Rio Treaty<sup>3</sup> and a confrontation between two countries vs the situation if someone else invokes it. He said we therefore had to balance off the advantage of taking the initiative against the advantage of winning the battle. He said we do not know if they will attack us in the UN but they could. He said we are losing a little bit by not taking the initiative in the OAS because we could say that they had already "seized" but if we take the initiative we lose a lot of our freedom of action.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a April 28, 10:20 p.m., telephone call from Abe Fortas to President Johnson, which lasted approximately 9 minutes. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, Tape F65.11, Side A, PNO 4)

<sup>3</sup> The Rio Treaty, or Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947. (4 Bevans 559)

Mr. Mann said that as far as Bosch is concerned, he did not see that he would help us a bit. He said he is against us, he is criticizing us, saying we were supporting the other side which is not true. Mr. Mann added that he thought Bosch had been heated up ever since he was thrown out and he thought we would have to play it by ear. The President said Mr. Mann should have time to think about it. Mr. Mann said he would like to think about it over night and then see what has happened in the morning.

The President asked how many they thought they would evacuate tonight. Mr. Mann said he did not know whether they would be able to carry on in the dark. He said he assumed that since the number is up to 4,000 now it is going on during the dark and he would say they have evacuated 700 to a thousand. He said we were not sure.

Mr. Mann said that the real trouble would come when we are finished with the evacuation—when we have to find a reason to stay on and he thought we would probably have to say that there are 2,000 Americans in the country—outside of Santo Domingo, and begin to stall a bit some time tomorrow. Mr. Mann said we would have a lot of decisions to make tomorrow.

The President asked Mr. Mann what he thought would happen between the two competing forces. Mr. Mann said he did not know what had happened between noon yesterday and noon today because when he talked to the Ambassador last night around 10:30 or 11:00,<sup>4</sup> the Ambassador thought it would be all over within five hours. Mr. Mann said the only thing he could figure was that the troops themselves must have become fed up with the shooting at Dominicans and just sort of refused to carry out orders—maybe there have even been mass defections.

The President said that Bosch claimed he had 17,000 troops in the Army that would back him up, and that would be ready to fight. Mr. Mann said that the figures he had seen were closer to 7 or 8,000. He said AP had an item saying 10,000—and this was composed of all the rag-tags, scum, riff-raff and commies, everybody they could fool. He said he would not be surprised if he had 2,000 but he would be surprised if he had 10.

The President asked what the population was and Mr. Mann said he would guess around 4 million.

Mr. Mann said he was a little worried. He said the Ambassador had asked that the Marines be landed and Mr. Mann felt that perhaps the anti-communist troops were not as weak as the Ambassador thought. However, the Ambassador had said they were necessary and

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

we had no alternative. Mr. Mann said it was one of those situations where you have to rely on the people in the field. He said it was not only the Ambassador's recommendation—the Country Team recommended it and that includes the three military attachés, political section chief, economic section chief, agriculture, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], etc. Mr. Mann mentioned that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] were ahead of us on this all the way. They were sending in memos predicting doom if we did not send in the Marines. The President said he did not know that. Mr. Mann said it was true, even when things appeared to be going pretty good.

The President asked about the Ambassador's background and Mr. Mann said he was a Georgia boy, in the service twenty years, fine record, solid, level-headed, believes as the President believes.

The President asked Mr. Mann who did the talking on the backgrounder. Mr. Mann said that Mr. Ball had led off but he supposed that he himself did most of the talking. He said there were no hard questions. It was the White House group. He said we would have had a hard time if some of the leftwing Latin correspondents had been there. He said it was easy and we made all the points. We told them we did not know all the details because the fighting was still going on and had been violent. We painted a picture of the thousand people being loaded on the boat and how the commies had come before this to the hotel, separated the men and women, sent the women back into the hotel and then lined the men up (we took a change on that because we were going by reports we had received and these people were now in Puerto Rico). Without mentioning the commie side we said that the insurgent movement was more anti-government than it was pro-anything.

Mr. Mann told the President that all of Bosch's people went into asylum today—they thought it was all over. The President asked who kept the fire going and Mr. Mann said he thought it was the commies. He said he thought they had been building up strong points in the poorer sections of town. He said however that we do not know because no one can circulate around without getting shot. He told the President that we had informed the press about the Embassy Residence being sprayed with machine-gun bullets. He added that we had not gone into detail about the notes we had been sending but that we had stressed the safety angle and stressed that this was an evacuation. We said we were not in there to help or hurt any particular group but were there to evacuate Americans and printed a pretty clear picture of what actually went on. Mr. Mann told the President they had given them a good background.

The President said he had better not plan on going home tomorrow. Mr. Mann said he did not think he should. He said tomorrow will be the day. The decisions that will be made tomorrow will be much more important than the ones he made today.

**39. Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence Raborn and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1965, 8:47 a.m.

President: What's the news this morning?

Raborn: Well, the news is about the same as it was last night. We have about 500 Marines ashore. The rebels have heavy weapons and are holed up and barricading themselves in the center of the city. And the police force are relatively ineffective against these people because they can't deal with these heavier weapons. They found a tank which was promptly knocked out by a bazooka. There was no report of any contact or any fighting by our Marines. That's in Santo Domingo.

[Omitted here is a situation report on Vietnam.]

President: Back to the DR thing. Do we have any evaluation of the relative strengths of what really happened yesterday that turned this around?

Raborn: Yes, we do. We have identified 8 hard-core, Castro-trained guerrillas that are—they came in, they pushed aside the Bosch people and took command of the forces. The Bosch people well, they might be slightly pink, but were not the kind of terrorists that the Castroites were. Now they took over the situation rapidly. They raided the police station, took their arms, took their uniforms, and are sort of in command of the city in spots. The regular army, their tank units and so forth just sat on their bitty box over there and haven't done a darned thing about moving in. I think he's afraid of the gasoline bombs and the bazookas in the hands of the rebels. The army officers are holed up inside the city in one or two places and seem to have lost their nerve against the hard-core and hard-nosed guerrillas. I think they lined up a bunch of people and shot them and this sort of terrorized the other folks. In my opinion this is a real struggle mounted by Mr. Castro.

President: What do you think we ought to do about it?

Raborn: I think it's clear we have got to take more positive action to clean these people out. Otherwise it's liable to drag on and on, and eventually these other folks, Castro types, will get the top hand and then we'll have a mess on our hands. Then we will restore order and turn things back over to the Junta. We had a member of the junta who begged us to do this.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Admiral William Raborn, Tape F65.11, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President Johnson placed the call to Raborn; he and Raborn talked approximately 7 minutes.

President: That will put us in pretty much trouble internationally with all the international organizations, OAS and United Nations, won't it?

Raborn: It could sir, and I notice the OAS is meeting this morning.<sup>2</sup> But there is no question in my mind that this is the start of Castro's expansion.

President: How many Castro terrorists are there?

Raborn: Well, we have positively identified 8 of them. And I sent a list over to the White House about 6 o'clock. It should be in the situation room—who they are, what they are doing and what their training has been.<sup>3</sup>

President: What has been our problem with intelligence down there? Have we known this thing was in this shape?

Raborn: From my review of the material I think we have been pretty much on top of this. Forces are being pre-positioned and all that and ready to move in was part of the deal. I think there are some deficiencies in our ability to get a regular broadcast-sized radio aboard ship. We probably should have some aboard ship so we can reassure the population and all that sort of thing. The local radio station went off the air and the only thing they heard was from Puerto Rico. It looks to me like we ought to equip ourselves with regular household radio transmitters so the house radio could broadcast information directly to the people if we so wished.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the conversation with Raborn confirming that walkie-talkies had been distributed the day before.]

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<sup>2</sup> At a special session of the Council of the OAS convened at 10:30 a.m. to discuss the Dominican Republic crisis Ambassador Bunker explained that the landing of U.S. Marines was to protect U.S. citizens and to secure their evacuation. Ambassadors from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Costa Rica expressed distress at the turn of events in the Dominican Republic and indicated their concern over U.S. unilateral action. The Council requested the convocation of a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS for May 1 and called on the Apostolic Nuncio, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio to help arrange a cease-fire.

<sup>3</sup> A list of the eight alleged "Cuban-trained Dominican extremists" was presented in a Central Intelligence Agency memorandum, OCI No. 1208/65, April 29. The memorandum states: "While there is no evidence that the Castro regime is directly involved in the current insurrection, it is nevertheless clear that Cuban-trained Dominican extremists are taking part. It can be demonstrated that at least 45 extremists had returned to the Dominican Republic since last October after receiving training in Cuba and/or elsewhere in the Communist bloc. All or most of these people can be presumed to be active in the current fighting which has a number of aspects reminiscent of Castro's revolutionary tactics." (Johnson Library, NSC Histories, Dominican Crisis 1965, Chron 4/24–9/21, Background Documents)

**40. Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1965, 9:48 a.m.

Bundy: Have you seen the over-night things or had a chance to talk to Tom Mann?

President: I have not talked to him.

Bundy: There is no real news. It's perfectly clear that the rebels have dug in down in the city with in-town guerrilla techniques—bazookas and mortars. There is going to be a very tough fight unless they are starved out. We don't know very much about the tactical situation. Our own people are all right. Bennett doesn't want more than the 400 he has got at the moment. We are backed up with good strong forces that are available at intervals of up to about 8 hours now for more battalions from outside the area. We have got another 1,000 men right offshore if we want them, and 2,000 more 8 hours away and another 2,000 at one day intervals from there on. We are not going to need that force unless Buzz Wheeler is very much surprised. But the political front is the one that is hotting up. There will be a meeting in the OAS this morning. Leoni has pitched in pretty hard with the clear implication that we are against dictatorships on both sides. If there is this kind of violence by Castro-types in the city, I think we can expect very good support in the OAS because it is just what about two thirds of those governments are afraid of. The Castro people have taken out after us pretty hard on the radio and the Soviets are beginning to do so, although they haven't yet zeroed in very hard.

We have a problem with a request for asylum from Reid and Caceres, who are two of the triumvirs who have been thrown out. We are trying to get them taken care of either by the Papal Nuncio or by some other Embassy so we won't be in the particular position of protecting unpopular people but they would get stabbed in the back by the Commies if they were caught so we have a certain obligation there. We will simply be dependent upon information from there as the day goes forward. My guess is that we now have a sufficient force on the ground. We will have to wait and see if the Dominicans can handle it for themselves with this moral support. But we'll have to keep a sharp eye to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcript of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.11, Side B, PNO 2 and 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President Johnson placed the call to Bundy; they talked for approximately 10 minutes.

be ready to take stronger action if it looks as if the Communists were beginning to win. Our own people of course have only perimeter defense and evacuation orders. They have taken 2 or 3 hundred people out as of last night. That still means, if my figures are right, 800 odd Americans who aren't ready to leave or who haven't asked to leave or who are not in an area where they can be removed. We have enclaves at the Embassy, Hotel Ambassador, polo field. The Task Force Commander is sending a senior officer ashore, probably has him there now, to be in touch both with the military authorities, the friendly ones and with the Embassy. Our situation in terms of our own position is strong, but the situation on the other side is simply indeterminate. That at least is the way it reads to me after talking to people around town this morning.

President: Do the rebels have much strength? I thought the General [Wessin y Wessin] had done pretty well with his tanks.

Bundy: But one of his tanks got knocked out, and they aren't in a hurry to go through the town as I understand it now. I think that we're in a situation where the rebels are pretty well into pockets. But if the police lose their courage or if the rebels extend their holdings in the city, you could have yourself a very tough cleaning up operation. And it wouldn't be a happy decision to have to ask the Marines to do that, but I don't think it will come to that in the course of the day. I'll be surprised if it does.

President: We want to be very, very careful not to sit here and let them augment their forces. Where are these Castroites coming from? The inside?

Bundy: This is all inside as I understand it so far. And I'm quite sure I think we ought to make sure the Navy is watching. But I will be very surprised if the Cubans try anything in the way of an invasion. We certainly ought to watch for it because it's not a surprise we want to have get away on us.

President: I sure don't want to wake up a few hours later and say we're awaiting developments and find out Castro's in charge. Now who are we depending on to avoid this? Bennett?

Bundy: Bennett and the Agency; we have a double check. Now the Agency was extremely slow in informing us yesterday and we climbed up and down their back. It's not Raborn's fault but some of his technical people were protecting their goddamn codewords and it took one of their very important messages 5 hours to get here. Bennett, fortunately, was not interrupted; it was very, very good work by Bromley Smith who was feeding that stuff into us yesterday afternoon that allowed us to take those decisions so the troops were in before night-fall. It would have been damn hard to have put them in if we hadn't done it that fast. So we just made it yesterday and we've got all those wires who have been skinned and bruised during the night.

President: They tell me they have been expecting this and anticipating it and CIA has been telling us about it every day. Is that true?

Bundy: I'll have to do a check, but I'll have to say that there was nothing in it that gave me any sense of alarm.

President: Let's do that.

Bundy: The first I knew of it was when Bennett came up here.<sup>2</sup>

President: They're already saying I told you so.

Bundy: You can count on it. There's always some bastard who wants to play that game. I'll have Bromley do a re-check on that.

[Omitted here is a short discussion about Bundy and the President's schedule later that day. Bundy tells the President that he is expected in New York for lunch but offers to stay in Washington if that is what the President prefers. Johnson decides that Bundy should go to New York as planned.]

Bundy: I really think we've got the contingencies taped here so that it is a matter of picking off the order. The only tough part is how to be sure which is the right order. But we can't be absolutely sure. We'll never be sure that they wouldn't have won without the United States. We only know that we could not take that chance. That will be the same shape of the decision from now on out.

President: I don't think we could have been wrong yesterday, I think we will be wrong when we don't do enough, or we go in and do too much. We haven't done anything now but evacuate. But if we become a party to the fact . . .

Bundy: Our problem is to have our force operate as potential and not as operational. That's the exact shape of the problem. And, therefore, there ought to be plenty on the scene and visible so the moral effect will be decisive.

President: Why did he [Bennett] just want 400?

Bundy: I guess he feels that's enough at the moment. I honestly haven't seen the detail of his report.<sup>3</sup>

President: It looks like to me that that's the only weakness thing; I can well understand why he doesn't want them buzzing around. I would certainly raise the question if you are going to have any moral effect, if you are trying to dig out our own people, and if you're trying to locate them in the hinterland.

Bundy: . . . if you want it perfectly clear who's strong . . . ,

President: . . . and if you want excellent intelligence, I don't see why you keep them on a carrier where they can't see anything.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 23.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.



Bundy: The politics of 400 and of 1,500 are identical it seems to me.

President: I would let them get my intelligence. I'd let them know this and that. You might get some of them killed, that's the only thing. I would think we would likely know more about what's happening, likely to be a greater deterrent; seems to me everything would be in favor of having more people aboard because we could get our people out better, and round them up better.

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**41. Transcript of Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

April 29, 1965, 2240Z.

Participants: Deputy Under Secy. Mann, Ambassador Bunker, Asst. Sec. Vaughn.

Subject: Dominican Situation.

Santo Domingo Ready.

Present: Amb Bennett and Connett.

*Washington Item 1.*

1. Our assessment here is that a rebel victory would probably lead to a pro-Communist government. Do you agree with this?

2. If this assessment correct then we feel it essential to take whatever action required to forestall this result. Do you think that direct military action is likely to be required for this purpose and to protect American lives?

3. If so you should not hesitate to recommend whatever types of action you feel are needed.

4. Obviously we wish to avoid military action as long as there is reasonable chance junta forces can prevail.

5. Please comment.

*[Santo Domingo] Item 1.*

Agreed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Exdis.

[1.] The extremists might according to some reports we have name Juan Bosch for appearance sake but they would dominate him and probably discard him quickly.

[2.] Communications continue to be appalling inadequate but weakness of leadership and lack of coordination is fundamental in problem. You can see sorry situation we are dealing with. While forces of left know what they want and have performed with great tactical and strategic proficiency.

3. We are in full concurrence with additional Marine landings now taking place. Others more qualified than I to decide nature and size of forces needed but obviously now that we are in this we must do the full job as needed.

[*name not declassified*] has joined telecon along with ArmAtt and NavAtt.<sup>2</sup>

4. Perhaps additional Marine support will spur counter forces on we will continue do our best prod them. *End Item 1.*

*Washington Item 2.*

Define by streets the area controlled by rebels. (Use ESSO map if you desire.) What is strength and morale of rebel forces?

Are there any other significant rebel elements outside this defined area and if so where?

What is disposition of alliance forces, their strength and their morale?

Why have alliance ground forces not closed with rebels?

[*Santo Domingo*] *Item 2.*

1. Texaco map in Spanish of DomRep, is one we have used and marked. Area under heavy rebel activity bounded to north by Pedro Livio Cedeno, on west by Avenida Maximo Gomez, to south by Caribbean, and on east by Ozama River. Southeast portion of above area is rebel stronghold.

2. There no significant rebel elements outside this area, although there are groups of snipers.

3. TA air force and Wessin forces just west of Duarte Bridge, less than 1000 men. Rivera Cuestas forces are in northern part of city just west of Maximo Gomez Avenue, number unknown. Portion Montas force occupies palace. Another Montas-Peguero force along coast between fair grounds and conservatory of music; [garble—another

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<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Weyrick and Lieutenant Frederick J. Norris, respectively.

principal] concentration of navy force are of 150 at fair grounds; also naval vessels, available for shore bombardment. Morale is generally low among all units.

4. Discussed in some detail under item 1 para 2.

To summarize: Junta ground forces have not moved toward rebels because of tired unfed troops, lack of adequate communications, and interservice bickering. It looks that way as result weakness inefficiency and indecisiveness of local military leadership as indicated in fact they failed today to take any significant action to close out the situation. Wessin has done little or nothing for last three days but now pleads weariness mechanical troubles with tanks many of his people shot up and troops exhausted. Other commanders take same position and Montas shows complete disorganization as supreme chief of forces. De los Santos has been steadfast but reluctant do any more bombing except in direct support of troops and no action of that type "little or no" has been forthcoming. Army Attaché returned short while ago from San Isidro. His report about same as that of Air Attaché who spent last night there and returned early this morning. Army Attaché found everyone there dead on feet and arguing among themselves as to how job should be done. This is repeat of yesterday (snipers are busy at us again and lights have just gone out). Army Attaché gave those present briefing on classic tactics for securing urban areas they appeared interested and heartened by his briefing and as he was leaving they were actively discussing the points he had made. Whether this means they will do more than talk is somewhat problematical in view of inactivity of yesterday and today despite superiority of forces. At this stage their troops have flagging morale and attachés do not doubt they will be defecting in some numbers tonight. Inaction and indecision has been characteristic of most military commanders on junta side during this crisis. There has been also some San Cristobal political activity going on and with Marine landing yesterday I frankly think they have some feeling—at least some people like Montas Peguero and perhaps Wessin that they can sit back now and let us do an efficient job for them. We should resist getting drawn in this way to maximum extent possible which would not cause operation to fail. In sending Air Attaché to San Isidro a few minutes ago to talk with leadership I instructed him to tell them, in connection with our landings this afternoon, that we do not intend to do their job for them. We can discuss more of that later. When they asked Air Attaché to come to San Isidro just now De Los Santos asked him to set down behind hangars at distance from headquarters this might imply further deterioration in relations between De Los Santos on one hand and Montas group on other. We probably won't know more bout this until Fishburn returns. Naval Attaché returned short while ago from meeting with Navy Chief Rivera. He was with

Imbert Luna and Col Casado (in charge 200 men in National Palace). Morale of these officers much higher and they attempting clean up attack toward east with or without approval Montas. Officers complaining their forces are not adequately equipped to fight tanks and automatic weapons. They appear eager to fight and if given proper equipment and means of communication.

SecState Item 2

Para 4 was answered in sense that ground forces have not moved toward rebels because of tired unfed troops, lack of adequate communications, and interservice bickering. *End item.*

*Washington Item 3.*

If our forces secure area north and west of area defined by you as controlled by rebels could Dominican forces secure area controlled by rebels? If not, why not?

What is situation in rest of country? Should we consider sending forces to Santiago, for example?

*[Santo Domingo] Item 3.*

1. No, unless remedies are found for reasons stated in item 2 paragraph 4.
2. Situation in remainder of country presently not grave, but dependent on immediate success or failure of junta forces in capital. We should not consider further deployment at this time.

*Washington Item 4.*

1. We are considering plans for Marines to establish an international safety zone that would enclose an area including the Embassy and polo grounds and the water front between those two points. Do you think this is feasible and useful?
2. Purpose of such an international zone would be to assure safe area for all foreigners. What kind of statement would you recommend be made for the Dominican people when zone is established?
3. What other steps would you feel were necessary to give status to this zone?

*[Santo Domingo] Item 4.*

Believe safety zone of kind described would not be desirable as announced policy because area involved comprises residential area inhabited mostly by upper classes, this would discriminate against Dominican residents of poorer districts. Same purpose could be achieved by representing our advance as logical move stemming from presence our forces in western outskirts of city in cooperative effort with

Dominican forces proceeding from other directions. Regardless of how mission publicly represented, believe it would not be possible to establish completely secure area of size contemplated with forces presently available.

Item 4 paras 2 and 3 not applicable in view of foregoing.

*SecState Item 5.*

Correct list of confrees following have just arrived:

Secy. Rusk

Under Secy. Ball

Secy. McNamara

Gen. Wheeler

Adm. Raborn *End Item 5*

*SecState Item 6.*

On basis confused situation do you have a recommendation as to action we should take within next 6 to 12 hours?

Answer this question prior all others. *End Item 6.*

*[Santo Domingo Item 6].*

Most important action which can be taken within next 12 hours is to commit sufficient troops to do job here rapidly and effectively. This should be complemented by immediate action for large scale logistical supply for needs Dominican people, including military, which suffering from critical shortages of food and medical attention and supplies. This need will increase to very large proportions if present situation is prolonged.

*SecState Item 7.*

1. We would like your political judgement and military judgement of task force commander as to feasibility of operation tonight to seal off downtown section containing heaviest Communist concentration.

2. Would additional forces be needed for operation?

3. Political concept would be to create cordon sanitaire thus establishing enforced cease fire. OAS would then be asked to negotiate political settlement between conflicting sides with United States influence applied to avoid Communist solution.

4. Would appreciate your comments. *End Item 7.*

*[Santo Domingo] Item 7.*

1. From purely political standpoint would be very desirable to seal off downtown section tonight. Military judgement task force commander not available to us since he located on [USS] *Boxer* and we can-

not communicate with him rapidly except by non-secure voice channel. Suggest you communicate with him directly.

2. Chief MAAG and NavAtt, both Marine officers, consider additional forces would be needed.

4. [sic] We had ourselves been thinking of operation to seal off downtown section, leaving clean-up there to Dominican forces. However, must emphasize that this western section of city is infested with roving bands and snipers. Marines have just killed fifth of latter on perimeter Embassy grounds. As for negotiation political settlement, bitterness of struggle has hardened both sides against negotiation. We should bear in mind that we are dealing with mad dogs now as regards leftist forces. We should avoid any settlement which would give this group status or foothold in arrangements looking toward legitimate government.

Police Chief Despradel tells us he has been informed from La Romana (south Puerto Rico sugar town) that all is secure there. There is some street fighting but situation under control. 175 there have requested evacuation and we will arrange have boat put in there on route Puerto Rico. Despradel states situation Santiago and other areas apparently secure at this time. He has not heard from Fortaleza Ozama and our military see no way supply it with food.

Situation Latin American Embassies slightly improved through information just received that Imbert furnishing two hundred his men as guards. Ecuadoran told me short while ago he had no one at his Embassy despite many asylees then commented perhaps it just as well to have no one outside to draw attention. He was thinking of police.

*SecState Item 8.*

Nothing further from this end.

If you do not have anything further to send us Washington wishes terminate conference as of 30/0035Z

Advise immediately.

Conferees this end wish you all best of luck.

[Omitted here are comments from Santo Domingo indicating that telephone service was to stop at midnight and a query regarding the arrival in Santo Domingo of an OAS committee.]

**42. Editorial Note**

On April 30, 1965, from 8:30 to 10:45 a.m., a meeting on the Dominican Republic took place in the White House Cabinet Room. Until 9:40 a.m., when President Johnson entered the meeting, Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, General Wheeler, Bromley Smith, Bundy, Valenti, Moyers, Ball, Martin, Dick Goodwin, Mann, and Vance discussed the April 29 OAS meeting (see footnote 2, Document 45); U.S. efforts to send an OAS contingent to the Dominican Republic; and the possibility of sending Martin to the Dominican Republic. Valenti's handwritten notes of the remainder of the meeting follow:

"Martin: Has doubts about the Communists in charge—CIA has no doubts. Rebels are not all of the same stripe. With [American] troops in the country it is difficult to talk with the rebels.

"LBJ: I am not willing to let this island go to Castro. OAS is a phantom—they are taking a siesta while this is on fire. How can we send troops 10,000 miles away and let Castro take over right under our nose. Let's just analyze—we have resisted Communists all over the world: Vietnam, Lebanon, and Greece. What are we doing under our doorstep. We know the rebel leaders are Communist, and we are sitting here waiting on OAS. We know Castro will hate us. We got rid of the dictator and we will now get a real dictator.

"Rusk: We can move through the OAS and achieve what you want. Martin can communicate on two levels 1) with rebels, and 2) with groups who can oppose rebels.

"LBJ: (to McNamara) Why don't you first find out what we need to take that island. Rusk, why don't you determine what it takes to make this take on the right color.

"Bundy: We have no international cover. We have no real legitimacy.

"McNamara: Danger of rebel troops and uprising in the countryside.

"Ball: Danger of junta renouncing us because they sense anti-Communist sentiment.

"McNamara: One to two divisions can clean up the island. We can have one division in 30 hours.

"Bundy: We ought to wait a day. By that time we can have some legitimate cover.

"LBJ: 2 dangers: 1) wind up with [illegible] support with Castro government, 2) or Castro-dominated in a short time. We have done little in the past several days.

"Bundy: We have done a great deal. We are talking about a division going in and we couldn't do that several days ago.

"LBJ: I think enough leaders are there to make it Castro. Not all Cubans were Communist. I am ashamed of the little we have done.

"Ball: But we have done considerable; we have put men ashore without real angry response.

"LBJ: I want McNamara to get ready so that Castro cannot take over.

"McNamara: Before we move, open press corps—show evidence of Castro takeover—evidence irrefutable. Until we act, Castro will be in command of the island—China Reds. Call on Latin American countries to join us in support to crush Communist threat. Call on Dominican Republic citizens to organize their own government. Must have some government to get behind. Asked us to come in to save their island from communism.

"LBJ: I want us to feverishly try to cloak this with legitimacy. We cannot stand with our hand in our pocket and let Castro win. Military get ducks in a row. Diplomats see if we can do anything to get observers in here or troops from other Latin American countries. We are willing to do whatever is necessary to put the pistols down. We will have one of 3 dictators: 1) U.S., 2) Moderate dictator, 3) Castro dictator.

"Bundy: Here are some thoughts that may or may not be helpful to you. One thing is clear: a Castro victory in the D.R. would [be] the worst domestic political disaster we could possibly suffer. But in order to quash Castro in D.R. we need above all else to get hemispheric public opinion on our side. We can do it this way: Before we move call an open press conference. 1. Show indisputable evidence that Castro-Communists are in control in the D.R. (CIA ought to prepare full dossiers) Vital that this [be] proven without a doubt. If can be linked to Chinese reds all the better. 2. Call on D.R. citizens to rise up (if at all possible, a group of responsible D.R. Citizens should cry out for us to save them from Castro). 3. Call on Latin-American countries to join with us—if we can announce 2–3 or 4 countries who are with us all the better). 4. Give the choice: stand by [and] do nothing, let Castro take over or with the OAS and local entreaties move in to quell the Castro people and save this island from black darkness. We must lay the public opinion base—a clear choice: freedom versus Castro; citizens cry out for help versus Castro reds." (Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes)

Sections of Valenti's notes were included in an April 30 report to the President on the Dominican Republic. (Ibid., National Security File, Defense, ND 19/CO 62, 1/1/65–5/5/65)

At 10:05 a.m. on April 30 President Johnson received a telephone call from Abe Fortas who reported that he had talked to Munoz-Marin, Jaime Benitez, and Sanchez-Villejo, the current Governor of Puerto Rico, about the Dominican situation. During their 7-minute conversation,



Fortas recommended that President Johnson pursue four specific lines of action: obtain a cease-fire; get OAS observers to the Dominican Republic; form an “international military peace keeping operation under an OAS team to work toward elections;” and get “Castroites” out of the Dominican Republic. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.12, Side B, PNO 1)

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### 43. Editorial Note

According to a history of this crisis prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after the April 30, 1965, meeting on the Dominican Republic (see Document 42): “General Wheeler reviewed Admiral Masterson’s (Commander of Joint Task Force 122, directly under CINCLANT) plan and concluded that assigned forces, particularly the ground elements, were too weak for the task. He alerted the MEB and the airborne divisions and, (the entire 82nd Airborne Division with the 101st Airborne Division ready in reserve) with McNamara’s approval, moved some amphibious shipping from Virginia to North Carolina, near the Marine base at Camp Lejeune. The JCS decided that Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr. USA, should go to Santo Domingo and take command, under CINCLANT, of all US ground forces in the Dominican Republic. At 1130, Gen. Wheeler gave Gen. Palmer an oral briefing. Gen. Palmer reached San Isidro airfield at midnight. The next morning, May 1, Palmer received the following instructions from General Wheeler:

“Your announced mission is to save US lives. Your unannounced mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going Communist. The President has stated that he will not allow another Cuba—you are to take all necessary measures to accomplish this mission. You will be given sufficient forces to do the job.”

A footnote to the preceding paragraph reads: “Msg, JCS 1113 to CINCLANT, 30 APR 65, C, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic (DATA Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). *Stability Operations, Dominican Republic*, Vol. I, Pt. I, Ch. II, p. 1, S, JMF 9128.4 (4 May 65) sec 1A. Interv, W.S. Poole with GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Ret.), 4 Sep 84.”

In April 1965 Lieutenant General Palmer was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and under orders to become CG, XVIII Airborne Corps in June. On 7 May he formally took command of all Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force units ashore. When he became Commander, US forces in Dominican Republic, JTF 122 was dissolved. (*JCS and National Policy: 1964–1968*, pages 460–461)

#### 44. Telephone Conversation Between Abe Fortas and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 30, 1965, 10:50 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion during which Fortas reported that he had just spoken to Jaime Benitez who had in turn spoken to Bosch. Bosch himself had been talking to Caamaño, the rebel leader. Benitez told Fortas that Caamaño had just captured Fort Ozama and 21 tanks. Abe said Bosch had told Caamaño that he would announce “a military victory” from San Juan and also call for a cease-fire. At this point in the conversation, President Johnson excused himself for a moment to try to get McNamara on the line, but McNamara had just left his office.]

President: I had tried to explain to [McNamara] that I hoped for some prospect of internationalizing this thing: a. To get the OAS to meet again today. They just adjourned until tomorrow and said they decided to sleep today. And try to get some of the sympathetic liberal forces in the hemisphere to send an observer or send a military contingent. We’ve been doing all this for a week; they don’t do it. They’re killing our people and as you say they have captured tanks now; they’re taking over the police marching them down the street and they got a hundred of them as hostages. Our CIA says this is a completely led, operated, dominated—they’ve got men on the inside of it; it’s a Castro operation. It started out as a Bosch operation but he’s been moved completely out of the picture. They shoved them out and completely took over.

Fortas: Mr. President this may very well be true. I don’t doubt it. I have a very simple point which is that our first objective is to make it clear that Bosch is calling for a cease fire.

President: Well if we can do that before they take everything they’ve got and set up their government.

Fortas: It [the cease-fire] should be happening right now.

President: That’s good. I want you to tell [McNamara] this.

[At this point Fortas tells President Johnson that Benitez had told him that Bosch had contacted Caamaño and wanted him to accept a cease-fire.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.12, Side B, PNO 2 and 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. Abe Fortas placed the telephone call to President Johnson; they talked for approximately 15 minutes. This conversation occurred immediately after a meeting on the Dominican Republic in the White House Cabinet Room; see Documents 42 and 43.

President: The difficulty, though, is if Bosch is their [the rebels'] captive. Where are the American interests, what do we do?

Fortas: I think the first thing we should do, Mr. President, is to show that this is a Castro-Communist operation. The most dramatic way of doing this is to have Bosch call for a cease-fire and let those damn guys continue fighting.

President: Not going to be anything to fight though, Abe, because they [rebels] will have it [the Dominican Republic.]

Fortas: This is right now.

President: Yes, as I say, if they got the tanks and if the people are capitulating, and if they got all the police, will there be anybody left to fight? It looks like they will have it.

Fortas: Mr. President, if Bosch calls for a cease-fire and Wessin agrees to it, they'll continue fighting, the Communists [will] continue fighting.

President: They won't; they'll just take charge and start running the government, I think.

Fortas: I don't see how they could do that [inaudible].

President: We're not stopping them from running the government. Since last Saturday,<sup>2</sup> Bosch lasted for a few hours, then Castro started operating; they got 45 more in there last night—trained, Castro-trained, Castro-operated people. We're doing nothing to them. They started firing, they came in here last night and said to me at 7 o'clock that we've got 900 men, the most elite force in Santo Domingo holed up here in prison.<sup>3</sup> Now, what do we do about it? I said let's protect them. "No, we can't do that," because that would be partiality. I said, well let's get them out and evacuate them and get them to another part of the island. Oh, we can't do that because that would be sending our Navy in and the Ambassador says that would be showing partiality. And then I said, let's get the Dominican Navy to evacuate them from the Communists. They said all right, we'll do that. [At] 2:30 they called me and said they couldn't get the Dominican Navy because it was in machine gun fire and the Dominican Navy didn't want anything to do with it.<sup>4</sup> So, I get up this morning and they take 900 of the people who are not Communists, the best police we have got on the island, and the Com-

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<sup>2</sup> April 24.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably President Johnson is referring to an April 29 meeting on the Dominican Republic held in the White House Cabinet Room from 7:30 to 9:10 p.m. In addition to the President, Rusk, Raborn, Mann, General Wheeler, Helms, Vaughn, Bundy, and Moyers attended the meeting. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

munists have taken them. So they had added 900 to their strength of 1900 and marched them down the streets of Santo Domingo with guns to their backs and they're taking a hundred of them and saying "we're going to kill you" unless these people quit and give up. They haven't eaten in three days and are about ready to give up. The question is what does the United States do? We've done this now for a week—nothing; we've done nothing because we don't want to be partial. But they are firing consistently every hour on our Embassy and when we can locate a sniper we shoot at them and we kill four or five. But the OAS spent all night denouncing us. We finally got a cease fire out of them.

Here's what I think we ought to do: I think we ought to get the CIA to give us name, address, chapter and verse—I don't mean to surface all that, but I mean to show that we got proof so that a lawyer like you [could] say that this is a case of Cuba doing this job; that's number one. Number two, we ought to have our military forces in sufficient quantity, an adequate number appropriate ready to take that island. If we can get any other forces to join us well and good. Before we act we'll try that, but to take that island so that Castro doesn't take it. Next thing, we ought to try to get a cease-fire. Next, we ought to try to get the OAS to send a team in today instead of sleeping through the day. Next, I think we ought to invite the OAS, any of their countries, or anybody else for that matter who wants to prevent bloodshed and to preserve peace to go in and join with us to be sure it's not just a United States operation. But if all this fails I'm not going to sit here and say I think down the road I can work it out after a Communist government sets up and starts issuing orders.

[Omitted here is discussion between McNamara and Fortas who recounted to McNamara what he had earlier told the President regarding Bosch and his agreement to call for a cease-fire. They also discussed who would contact Latin American Ambassadors such as Venezuela's Leoni to garner their support.]

**45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1965, 11:36 a.m.

695. Following are high points of US policy towards current crisis:

1. Last night OAS Council called for a cease-fire.<sup>2</sup> You should therefore use your influence to persuade Junta forces that no useful purpose will be served by rash or ill-advised military action. This does not mean of course that they should not defend themselves against attack. Their most important immediate risk is to preserve their existence as organized Dominican force as base for earliest possible effective expansion.

2. Junta should understand that crisis is entering a political phase and they should make every effort to capitalize on their position as the only existing organized authority in the Dominican Republic. They should use this position in order to ensure that OAS action will not result in ascendancy of communist groups to political power in the Dominican Republic. Our tactics will be designed to support Junta in the achievement of this objective.

3. We are seriously concerned with change in Junta attitude regarding role of US military forces. It may be that Junta believes that US intends to attack and eliminate rebel forces in the city. US immediate objective is to establish safety zone referred to in last night's OAS Council resolution. In so far as US military forces in San Isidro are concerned, immediate objective is to secure their position there and Ozama bridges leading to it. Strictly FYI: Subject to later developments, second phase of plan would be to establish a defensive line around rebel held portion of city so as to contain them there and give Junta forces opportunity to rest and re-group and to establish its authority over balance of city and countryside. End strictly FYI.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Mann.

<sup>2</sup> By request of the United States, the OAS Council of Ministers met on April 29 in Washington from 10 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. and adopted two resolutions. The second called for an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of "an international neutral zone of refuge" in the Santo Domingo area. This resolution was introduced by the United States and was adopted by a vote of 16 to 0, with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela). (*American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1965*, pp. 958–959) The first resolution adopted called, in part, for a "Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS May 1, 1965" and "to approve as the agenda for this Meeting the serious situation created by the armed strife in the Dominican Republic." This resolution, introduced by Chile, was adopted by a vote of 18 to 1 (Uruguay), with 1 abstention (Dominican Republic). (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 17, 1965, p. 739)

4. You should point out to Junta leaders that OAS last night made an "urgent appeal" to "permit the immediate establishment of international neutral zone of refuge encompassing the geographic area of the City of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the Embassies of foreign governments". Point out to Junta that our hope is that the establishment of such a zone by US forces will not be opposed by rebel forces and that such a zone will considerably reduce the perimeter which the Junta itself is obliged to defend. Junta cooperation to this end is essential.

5. You should solicit assistance Diplomatic Corps to carry out last night's appeal of COAS for cease-fire and for establishment of safety zone.

**Rusk**

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**46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1965, 12:03 p.m.

696. We have been informed by Mora that Nuncio in Santo Domingo has agreement of Colonel Benoit, Bosch and Molina Urena for a cease-fire subject to following two conditions:

1. Guarantee of personal safety of all individuals on both sides regardless of ideology or band with which operating including those in jail or in asylum.

2. A commission of the OAS should act as arbitrator between the two sides.

Mora asked on behalf of Nuncio that we make available helicopter to transport Nuncio to San Isidro for conversations with Junta representatives. You will recall that Nuncio in trying to arrange cease fire is acting pursuant to COAS request.

We share your apprehensions expressed to Mann this morning by telephone that Nuncio may undermine moral of Junta forces and leaders.<sup>2</sup> We are particularly concerned that Junta may regard Nuncio as

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Mann and cleared by Grant G. Hilliker (S/S). Repeated to CINCLANT and DOD.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

US spokesman if he covers points other than those mentioned above. You should therefore contact Wessin and key leaders in Junta, including especially those now at San Isidro, and inform them of firm US determination to prevent communist take-over in Santo Domingo and strategy outlined in Deptel 695.<sup>3</sup> Once Junta leaders are fully informed of our position and once you have made clear that we do not know and would not necessarily support all suggestions that Nuncio may make, you should make helicopter available to Nuncio. All of this should be done as quickly as possible as USG does not wish to be in position of impeding Nuncio's efforts to carry out COAS request. Nuncio being advised through Mora to contact you.

**Rusk**

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<sup>3</sup> Document 45.

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**47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1965, 12:18 p.m.

698. Department just informed that Bosch has, or shortly will, make a radio appeal to rebel forces in Santo Domingo for a ceasefire. Our reports are that he will boast of rebel victory but state that further bloodshed is unnecessary.

If Bosch does appeal for a ceasefire, this will be consistent with our own policy and with strategy outlined in Deptel 695.<sup>2</sup>

You should immediately inform Junta officials, including particularly Wessin, of foregoing and recommend to them that Junta make a similar appeal for a ceasefire including as appropriate expressions of Junta confidence that democracy will prevail and expression of confidence in strength of Junta armed forces.

You should also request Admiral Masterson to send best qualified officer on his staff to Junta headquarters for purpose of improving their

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Mann, cleared by Read, and approved by Ball. Repeated to CINCLANT and DOD.

<sup>2</sup> Document 45.

morale, act as general adviser on military tactics, and arrange for whatever supplies and equipment Junta may be urgently in need of. Adequate communication facilities between Junta headquarters and Task Force headquarters should be established soonest by US military. Instructions are being issued by Defense direct to Masterson.

**Rusk**

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#### **48. Editorial Note**

On April 30, 1965, President Johnson held several telephone conversations with his top advisers between 5 and 7 p.m. on a proposed statement to the press regarding Communist involvement in the Dominican crisis. In the first of these conversations with Secretary of Defense McNamara at 5:05 p.m., McNamara expressed his strong belief that the President of the United States should not be the person to "point a finger to the Communists' participation in this." McNamara thought President Johnson would have "a pretty tough job proving that the Inter-American system was being menaced by powers outside the republic and were trying to gain control." President Johnson responded, "We all know they are. What is wrong with my saying it?" McNamara said, "The rest of us can say things like that and we don't have to prove it, but you have got a handful of people there but you don't know that Castro is trying to do anything. You would have a hard time proving to any group that Castro has done more than train these people, and we have trained a lot of people and he has trained a lot of people. I think it puts your own status and prestige too much on the line. The rest of the statement I think is excellent, but to say you as President [have] personal knowledge that powers outside the hemisphere are trying to subvert this government or those people, I don't think you are in a very strong position to say that."

President Johnson asked if the CIA could document Castro's involvement and McNamara replied that he didn't think so. He thought the CIA might show certain people were trained in Cuba, but not that Castro was directing the training. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, Tape F65.14, Side A, PNO 6)

At 5:40 p.m. McNamara and President Johnson resumed their telephone conversation about the press statement. President Johnson opened the conversation by saying, with a sense of urgency, "I have this feeling if we don't take over that island within the next 24 hours



or before the last man folds, we never will. I may be wrong, but if I am wrong I want you to tell me." McNamara responded by again expressing his objections to a statement that includes a sentence "people trained outside [the Dominican Republic] are seeking to gain control." Bill Moyers, who was in the President's office at the time of this conversation, added that he thought such a sentence was unnecessary and to include it "would raise the prestige and status of the Cubans because it declares publicly that "we believe the Communists are behind this." (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, Tape F65.14, Side A, PNO 7)

By 6 p.m. when President Johnson talked to McGeorge Bundy on the telephone, the final draft of the press statement was still not approved by the President's top advisers. During their conversation Bundy promised the President that he would have a statement before the close of business that evening. President Johnson fearing that would be too late responded:

"I think while we were talking yesterday we ought to have been acting. I think we ought to have been doing yesterday what we did today. I think we finally got some people doing something today. I think they're going to have that island in another 24 hours. I think we've got no basis for any action. I think this statement is a predicate and kind of puts your hand up your dress. Morse has just made his speech; he compliments us but he said our only basis of action is to keep the Communists from taking over. We won't even admit that there's anybody down there, that there is any conspiracy. We have run under the table and hid and told them nothing . . . I know that when we go all day in a hot situation like this without saying anything, and wait until late in the evening until they [the OAS] act, I know that we are going to look like we are just a bunch of interveners and not peacemakers at all."

Bundy replied that he still felt the President could get his point across by "hinting to these things . . . by sticking to our existing position." The conversation ended with the President saying he really wanted to deliver a statement and hoped his advisers would soon reach agreement on a draft. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.14, Side A, PNO 10)

At 6:25 p.m. McNamara placed a telephone call to President Johnson. Again they debated the contents of what would become the fourth paragraph in the final version of the statement. President Johnson informed McNamara that Rusk had voiced his objections to the President's statement saying "there are disturbing signs" in the Dominican Republic because to do so would be to "take on the liberals" and "the Communists." McNamara agreed and advocated that the President deliver a statement without reference to the line in question, even if it was "just a handout to the press." But President Johnson did not completely agree. He said: "What worries me, Bob, is that I'm not being

quite honest with them. I think we do know and every citizen of this country knows that there are disturbing signs there, and there are people trained outside in there, and I think if I don't say so it looks like I'm concealing it and trying to cover up." McNamara said that with or without the sentence in question he thought any statement would be worthwhile. The conversation ended with President Johnson undecided about whether he should deliver the statement. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, Tape F65.14, Side B, PNO 2)

At 6:30 p.m. President Johnson telephoned Rusk to seek his approval on the latest version of the statement. This version replaced the word "powers" with the word "people" in the sentence "powers trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control of the rebel movement," a veiled reference to Cuba. Rusk said he agreed with this change because "it separates the Bosch people from the Communists." Mann and Ball who were in Rusk's office at the time of this telephone call concurred. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, Tape F65.14, Side B, PNO 3)

President Johnson held one last telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy at 6:35 p.m. before he decided to deliver his statement at 7:07 p.m. in the Theater at the White House. The text of the statement is in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book I, pages 465–466. During this conversation Bundy told the President he still felt that the latest version of the statement might commit the President to a "civil war against Communists that aren't in charge." Bundy said that although the CIA had identified eight Communist-trained rebels, "nobody has yet said that anyone of these Communists is actually in command of a column." Bundy said he "wasn't sure that these Communists were that much in control of this messy movement," and he "wouldn't this evening point the finger that hard at the Communists." After Bundy and the President "doctored down" the language by removing the words "disturbing" and "dangerous elements" from the fourth paragraph, the President asked one last question: did Bundy think delivering the statement would "handicap" them. Bundy said, "no, not too much." With that response the President ended the conversation. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.14, Side B, PNO 4) The portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

**49. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 1, 1965.

*The General Situation at My Desk at 6:30 PM*

1. I talked to Fortas,<sup>2</sup> and he talked to Bosch. His general conclusion is that Bosch is essentially out of control and probably that Colonel Camano is also out of control. Bosch is bitter and lays all of the responsibility to our failure to communicate, to Ambassador Bennett's vindictiveness, our failure to respond to Colonel Camano's complaints of firing by our troops, and to Ambassador Martin's failure to communicate effectively between the Commanding General and Colonel Camano.

Abe told him that all this was irrelevant and that the essential point now is that the rebels are still firing in a time of cease-fire and that no one could answer for the consequences if this firing did not stop. Abe does not think we can expect much from this and suggested a desperate effort by John Martin to re-establish contact in the city and press for observance of the cease-fire. Earlier in the day we sent Martin a flash message to this purpose.<sup>3</sup> Tom Mann is now sending him another.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, both State and Defense have asked their men on the spot for their immediate recommendations on action this evening, but my own belief is that we must stick with the cease-fire, unless all hell breaks loose in a quite literal sense, until after we get the OAS Commission on the spot.

2. We have sent strong personal messages using your name to Gordon in Brazil, to Harriman in Colombia, and to Bernbaum in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X, 4/15–5/31/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> On April 30 at 12:45 p.m. President Johnson informed Mann during a telephone conversation that Abe Fortas was being "transferred" to him. Essentially this meant Fortas was now to work closely with Mann and other top Presidential advisers on the Dominican crisis. (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965)

<sup>3</sup> Not found. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John B. Martin who left Santo Domingo on September 28, 1963, arrived in Washington from Connecticut the morning of April 30 on request of President Johnson, and met with the President and other advisers in the White House Cabinet Room from 8:30 to 10:45 a.m. that morning (see Document 42). During this meeting the President wanted Martin "to help the OAS and the [Papal] Nuncio [Monsignor Clarizio] get a cease-fire, stop the bloodshed and to report the facts to the President." (Martin, *Overtaken By Events*, p. 661) It was decided that Martin would be most helpful if he were in Santo Domingo. Martin and Shlaudeman arrived in Santo Domingo at 4:45 p.m., April 30.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

Venezuela.<sup>5</sup> (Moscoso had his talk with Leoni and went right back to Puerto Rico, to my great astonishment.)<sup>6</sup> We have no answer back but we should know more by morning. Mann has done a similar job in other countries and is sending you a separate report.<sup>7</sup>

3. I talked to Kilpatrick of the *Post* and Frankel of the *Times*, and Bromley talked to Gulick of the AP, to brief on our intelligence that Communists are more and more active and Bosch's own party more and more scattered to asylum and hiding. This was all "Government sources," not White House. Bromley gave Gulick the figure of 58—Gulick had tried 53 on him first.

We spend much of the day trying to find the first Costa Ricans for the right Liberal to speak to, and Tom Mann and I finally settled on John Reilly of Hubert Humphrey's office. Reilly is to go to Costa Rica at once. He is friendly with the men who are said to have most influence with Orlich,<sup>8</sup> and he is to make the strongest possible pitch for token troops—Costa Rica has no Army but a few police would be a great help.

4. The task force you ordered is set up and at work. It met at 3 this afternoon and meets again at 9:30 in the morning. Its members are Bundy, Mann, Vance, Wilson, Helms, with one expert each.<sup>9</sup> This

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<sup>5</sup> A May 1 memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy indicates that these messages conveyed a request from President Johnson to Latin American governments for contributions of ground, air, or naval units to the American forces already present in the Dominican Republic. Read informed Bundy that Brazil and Venezuela had agreed to contribute troops to an Inter-American Peace Force, but Chile had not. Read also told Bundy that Colombia's response had not yet been obtained by Ambassador Harriman who had just arrived in that country to speak with its President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III)

<sup>6</sup> A meeting between Teodoro Moscoso, consultant to President Johnson and former U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, and Raul Leoni, President of Venezuela, took place in Caracas on April 30. According to telegram 1439 from Caracas, May 1, President Leoni favored an "OAS Evaluation Committee" comprised of Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, and was very interested in the idea of an "OAS Trusteeship" for the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Dominican Crisis 1965, Background Documents)

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> Francisco Orlich, President of Costa Rica.

<sup>9</sup> A meeting on the situation in the Dominican Republic was held in the White House Cabinet Room on May 1 from 8:40–10:35 a.m. In addition to President Johnson, who joined the meeting at 9:40 a.m., the following attended: Marvin Watson, Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Carl Rowan, Bunker Ball, General Wheeler, Mann, Valenti, Moyers, Richard Goodwin, Bromley Smith, McGeorge Bundy, and Averell Harriman, who left the meeting at 9:35 a.m. During this meeting President Johnson expressed his unhappiness with "the CIA information coming in" and wanted a task force made up of Helms, Mann, and Vance to "study the situation everyday." Handwritten notes of this meeting taken by Jack Valenti are in the Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes, Meeting in Cabinet Room, May 1, 1965, 8:40 a.m. Participation in this task force included other high-level advisers on the Dominican Republic from the CIA, the Department of Defense, USIA, AID, and other agencies as necessitated. The "Dominican Task Force" usually met in the morning at the White House and because Bundy was its chairman it was also known as the "Bundy Committee."

afternoon we settled a number of odds and ends like gas and the draft statement. We also ordered contingent military planning for both a tight cordon inside the city and a wider cordon outside the heavily built-up area. On the political side we cleared the revised instructions to Bunker and reinforced existing efforts for longer-range planning.<sup>10</sup> But after considerable discussion we agreed with Mann that the situation on the ground is decisive and we will have to play the political moves by ear, and day-by-day. Mann went off to see Betancourt, and I strongly urged him to give Betancourt encouragement and keep the Betancourt plan<sup>11</sup> in the air. Tom himself is very skeptical on this but he agreed not to throw cold water on the plan.

McG. B.

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<sup>10</sup> Not found.

<sup>11</sup> Two telegrams, 010729Z and 810239Z, both dated May 1, from the CIA to the Director of the National Security Agency reported that José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, and Romulo Betancourt, former President of Venezuela, discussed the previous day the possibility of introducing a motion to the OAS Council on May 1 calling for the establishment of a four-nation (Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, United States) military and governmental command in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III) In a May 1 memorandum on the Betancourt proposal to McGeorge Bundy, Bowdler wrote: "In reflecting on this proposal, I think it is unrealistic to believe that the OAS would authorize a given number of countries to form, in effect, a government to administer the DR. The proposal would be more palatable and sellable to the Latins if it were carried out behind the facade of a Dominican Provisional Government asking for OAS administrative and military support, the lion's share of which we would furnish." (Ibid., NSC Histories, Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, Background Documents)

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## 50. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

OCI No. 1496/65

Washington, May 2, 1965.

### SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

#### 1. *Military Position*

The rebel forces continue to dominate the military situation and are apparently using the tenuous cease fire to strengthen their posi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, CIA Situation Reports, 5/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "President has seen."

tions. Numbering between two and five thousand, they are concentrated in the southeastern area of the city. The rebels appear to be well armed, adequately supplied and determined to continue the fight.

## *2. Loyalist Forces*

The loyalist forces are completely inadequate even to police the cease fire. Most of the troops under Brigadier General Wessin y Wessin, numbering about 1,250 men, have withdrawn to the east side of the Duarte Bridge for their own safety. Brigadier General Salvador Montas Guerrero with about 200 men has apparently abandoned the National Palace leaving the entire southeastern area under rebel control. Army Chief Rivera Cuesta is commanding about 400 troops in the northwestern part of the city and 1,200 naval combat troops are deployed around the fair grounds. Approximately 2,400 police are defending their headquarters and the police radio station. There are no other loyalist troops in the city.

## *3. US Forces*

As of 0430 EDT US military forces in the Dominican Republic totalled 7,874—including 2,955 Marines and 4,919 Army troops. Marine casualties are two killed and 20 wounded; Army casualties are one killed, another probably killed and 16 wounded. A large gap still remains between the 82nd Airborne and the Marine phase line in the western part of the city. Many of the Army casualties occurred early last night when a patrol was sent from the Army beachhead at the Duarte Bridge to the Marine phase line.

## *4. The Interior*

Various reports show that the interior generally remains calm and this may indicate a lack of sympathy for the rebel cause. The longer the present situation exists, however, the greater is the chance that the countryside will grow more restive. A report via ham radio last night from the US Consul in Santiago, the country's second largest city, stated that while all communications are out, conditions in the consular district are generally good, with Dominican military and police units in effective control. The highway to Santiago remains closed since rebels reportedly overran a police post at Villa Altagracia yesterday.

## *5. General Political Situation*

Neither the rebels nor the loyalists now appear to have the ability or the means to form an effective instrument of national political control. The rebels, aside from their insistence that the "constitutional forces" take over the government, are believed to be thoroughly divided over how this should properly be done and who should play what role. This fragmentation serves only the purposes of the Communists and extremists who now dominate the rebel movement.

Another factor favoring the Communists is an apparent lack of widespread popular support for Bosch himself to return and take over the government. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* yesterday found more enthusiasm for “constitutionality” per se than for Bosch during their talks with Dominicans in Santo Domingo hospitals. In addition, the loyalist force and its junta have no one in whom the public has any confidence.

#### *6. Latin American Reactions*

Reaction thus far has generally been fairly restrained, except in the case of Castro's Cuba, but an increasingly active role by US military forces now present in the Dominican Republic would probably result in an almost universal condemnation of the US and in a flurry of violent attacks on US installations around the hemisphere. Most informed Latin American officials at the moment probably have little or no sympathy for the Communists and extremists whom they have learned are dominating the Dominican rebel forces. By the same token, however, neither do they have any sympathy for the military forces such as General Wessin and other officers leading the loyalist forces. Any sudden change for the better in the loyalists' fortunes would be viewed with deep suspicion by most other Latin American countries.

#### *7. Conclusions*

(a) Neither of the contending forces in the capital is now capable of imposing its will on the other. The loyalists are weak, disorganized, and lack popular support. The rebels, although strongly ribbed by well-trained extremist leaders and in command of the most populous parts of the capital, cannot significantly expand their position in the city as long as US troops remain.

(b) The rebels probably have two immediate goals: (1) to use the present lull to consolidate their positions in the capital and to stimulate provincial areas to declare for them; and (2) to insure themselves a “large piece” of whatever arrangement the OAS authorities are finally able to put together.

(c) As the present situation becomes more fixed, we believe the status of the rebel forces will receive increasing if grudging support from other Latin Americans. Certainly the international repugnance to any effort to “clean out” the rebel area will grow as each day passes. This could, of course, be reversed if the rebels should become aggressive and persistently violate the truce.

## 51. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1965.

### SUBJECT

Meeting on the Dominican Republic—May 2, 1965

### PARTICIPANTS

Secretary McNamara, Mr. Vance, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Mann, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Crockett, Mr. Solomon, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Chase

Attached is a list of the decisions taken at the meeting.<sup>2</sup> The following points were also made, although it should be noted that this may not be a comprehensive report in view of the fact that I was out of the meeting room on several occasions:

1. *Information*—Mr. Bundy and others noted that the President is very keen to get an information operation going at top speed in the Dominican Republic. A number of ideas were discussed. For example, CIA should turn its transmitter over to USIA. *Second*, we should talk to the appropriate people about broadcasting from Puerto Rico; in this regard, we should probably use the station that Bosch is using since people are already listening to it. *Third*, DOD should supply USIA with any additional equipment that USIA might not have readily available. *Fourth*, we should take some action with respect to jamming rebel broadcasts.

One object of the information operation should be to make it clear that we are not tied closely to Wessin. This is hurting us with the Dominican people.

2. *The Military Situation*—It was reported that the President wanted to get two more battalions of troops into the Dominican Republic as soon as possible. In this regard, Secretary McNamara said that the troops in question would be in the Dominican Republic by May 3.

Mr. Vance gave the details on three possible plans to isolate the rebels. *Plan A* would be the tightest perimeter and would close most of the rebels off in the southeast corner of the city. This would take two

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic Planning Group. Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted on May 4 by Chase. This is a record of a "Dominican Task Force" meeting. Although no time appears on the memorandum, Document 49 indicates that a meeting of this group was scheduled to take place at 9:30 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.



divisions to set up, 7 days to complete, and involve heavy casualties. *Plan B*, which would start a little north of the bridge and move west-southwest, would give the rebels more room. It would take one division to set up, 24 hours to complete, and involve medium casualties. *Plan C*, which would give the rebels all of Santo Domingo, would take 3 to 5 days to complete and one division and one brigade to hold. It would involve the fewest casualties.

Mr. Vance reported that General Wheeler recommended *Plan B*, and after considerable discussion, the group agreed. Among other things, the heavy casualties made *Plan A* unacceptable. Among other things, *Plan C* would give the rebels the whole city; they could credibly declare a provisional government. Among other things, *Plan B* was quick, militarily the soundest, and, in fact, could be accomplished by less than a division. It would close in most of the rebels; if there was a subsequent problem, *Plan C* could be added on to *Plan B*.

3. *Role of the OAS Commission*—The group discussed in detail the ways and means of making *Plan B* politically acceptable. The group agreed that we should try to get the OAS Commission to recommend the establishment of a “line of communications.” This recommendation could be a part of a series of such recommendations as the following: (a) a request for a cease-fire; (b) a call for all civilians to turn in their arms; (c) a request for the provision of relief.

4. *Relief*—The group talked about setting up a relief operation in the city. Tony Solomon was chosen as the man in charge and it was agreed that he should receive energetic support from DOD. In this regard, one of the main objectives of the relief operation is to make it clear that our soldiers do other things besides fire weapons at Dominicans.

5. *Political Problems in the Dominican Republic*—The group discussed the political problems brought about by the present crisis. Here are some of the points which were made:

(a) It might be desirable to get a team of such people as Betancourt and Figueres to go to the Dominican Republic and to act as advisors to whatever government is put together.

(b) As a start towards establishing some order, Mr. Mann mentioned the desirability of establishing three councils of the provinces. One advantage would be to ensure that there would not be places in the hinterlands where the rebels are the only points of authority.

(c) The group discussed the problem of how we move away from the junta. It was generally agreed that, while we need a civilian government and while we are not enamored by Wessin, we may not yet want to go too far in leaning away from the junta; it would probably break completely whatever authority the junta still has.

The group agreed that we ought to guard against giving the rebels any political stature at this time.

(d) In discussing possible Dominican leaders, the name of Tony Imbert came up. Mr. Mann said that, even though he is no jewel, he might be one of the best of a sorry lot. While he has played footsie with the Communists, Imbert is not a Communist, is tough, and could never be accused of being a Trujillo man; in this latter regard, he was the man who pulled the trigger on Trujillo.

The possibility of using Balaguer was discussed. Mr. Fitzgerald made the point that if Balaguer were used as an interim provisional leader, he would be out of the running as a long-term leader in the future; this would be too bad. The group decided, however, that the situation is so critical that options involving Balaguer should be explored further.

(e) The group agreed that Bosch should not go to the Dominican Republic. Instead, he should be requested to broadcast, from Puerto Rico, his call to Dominicans to lay down their arms.

6. *Press Handling*—Mr. Greenfield urged that we more openly discuss the Communist angle of the Dominican situation; our evacuation fig leaf is just not all that credible. Most of the group, however, believed that, on May 3 at least, we should speak relatively softly on this angle and concentrate attention on the relief aspects of the Dominican operation.

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## 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1965, 2:42 p.m.

742. Please get in touch with OAS Commission and Mora soonest<sup>2</sup> and inform them on strictly confidential basis (they should understand clearly that this is secret for time being) that US finds it

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Mann.

<sup>2</sup> On May 1 OAS Secretary General José A. Mora of Costa Rica arrived in Santo Domingo at 9 a.m.; the next day the OAS Commission arrived in Santo Domingo at noon. This commission comprised members of five countries: Ambassador Richard M. Colombo of Argentina, Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, Ambassador Alfredo Vasquez Carrisoza of Colombia, Ambassador Carlos Garcia Bauer of Guatemala, and Ambassador Frank Morrice, Jr., of Panama.

necessary to maintain line of communication (line of communication instead of “cordon” or other words is the phrase that should be uniformly used) between the safety perimeter which contains a part of US armed forces and across to Duarte Bridge and on to San Isidro airfield where other part of US armed forces are located.

This line of communication must be maintained for protection of zone and to maintain access to airfield so as to make possible evacuation of persons of all nationalities. Also overland communication between San Isidro and safety zone is necessary for elementary military reasons.

Endeavor obtain from OAS Commission:

(a) Tacit or if possible expressed recognition that maintenance of essential line of communication is not violation of cease fire and is not aggressive in design.

(b) Request that line of communication between San Isidro and safety zone be maintained.

(c) OAS Commission statement to Dominican people to be made by best means available and to be timed not more than fifteen minutes in advance of departure of US forces from Duarte Bridge towards safety zone.

Hopefully this announcement would prevent forces between the bridge and the safety zone from misinterpreting maintenance of communication line as offensive against them and hence reduce bloodshed.

We leave exact hour of announcement to you and General Palmer inasmuch as we do not yet know the exact hour of departure of US forces from Duarte Bridge. Repeat it is important that announcement be coordinated closely with departure so as not to give excessive advance opportunity to hostile forces to group along communication line.

Strictly FYI. Line of communication will be essentially the one scouted yesterday by 82nd Airborne patrol. Establishment of other possible perimeters have been considered and discarded. We understand that Defense wishes that movement be made in daylight hours. If we receive Commission approval in time to proceed this afternoon, this will be done. Otherwise it is planned that movement will take place tomorrow morning. Would therefore appreciate early estimate on when we may expect word from you regarding OAS Commission’s reaction.

We will maintain line of communication irrespective of attitude of Commission. But we think that cooperation of Commission gives us political base and hopefully reduces dimensions of fighting. It would be good if you could get agreement from Commission on all three points but any one of three would be better than none.

Defense is issuing necessary instructions along these general lines to General Palmer. End strictly FYI.

**Rusk**

**53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1965, 6:44 p.m.

752. In addition to subject of Deptel 742<sup>2</sup> you should in your discretion suggest to OAS Committee that it;

1. Repeat appeal for cease-fire.
2. Request all civilians to turn in arms at place or places to be selected and designated by the Committee (police and regular military personnel on both sides to be exempted for time being).
3. If feasible, offer refuge in safety zone to women, children and non-combatants in rebel-held areas and designate point or points of entry where they can be screened. We are hopeful that food, medicines and some facilities may be available for safety zone but do not know when this can be accomplished.
4. Assume responsibility for provision of relief to people of entire country on basis agreeable to Embassy and US military in coordination with Solomon.
5. Call on both sides for a release of prisoners and hostages and to permit asylees in all Embassies to pass through city in safety for evacuation.

The action suggested in this paragraph on the assumption that such a call will not embarrass Junta at this time. Please check this.

**Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Mann and cleared by Vaughn.

<sup>2</sup> Document 52.

**54. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1965.

During the last 24 hours I have taken the following actions to explain and win support for United States actions and policies in the Dominican Republic:

1. The Voice of America, which normally does not broadcast in Spanish from 12:30 a.m. to 7 a.m., was put on a round-the-clock basis. The VOA is clearly audible in the Dominican Republic and the rest of Latin America, both from the two medium wave transmitters in the Florida Keys and from our transmitters in North Carolina which constitute the most powerful single shortwave complex in the world.

2. I stayed throughout the night, along with other senior officers, to direct the writing and editing of VOA commentaries which made major policy points such as:

- a. The humanitarian mission of our troops.
- b. U.S. support for and reliance on the inter-American system.
- c. The U.S. goal of enabling the Dominican people to choose freely a government of social justice and democracy.
- d. The widespread suspicion in Latin America that Communists and Castroites are involved in the Dominican upheaval.
- e. The impartial nature of the activities of American troops in the Dominican Republic.

In addition to the specially prepared commentaries designed to meet the major points of misunderstanding, or Communist propaganda, the VOA made heavy and repeated use of your two statements of last night,<sup>2</sup> with particular emphasis on your declaration that the U.S. does not want the return of a brutal and oppressive despotism.

Samples of the commentaries are attached.<sup>3</sup>

3. Our teletype circuit to Latin America was kept open last night so all posts could be serviced with the texts of the OAS resolution and your two statements. Earlier, we had given heavy coverage on the wire-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, USIA Psychological Situation Reports, 5/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The first statement informed the public that the President was sending additional forces to the Dominican Republic consisting of two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division, approximately 1,500 men, and additional detachments of Marines. The second statement reported on the decision of the OAS to send a committee composed of five member states to the Dominican Republic in an effort to obtain a cease-fire. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book I, pp. 466–467.)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

less file of the facts regarding U.S. provisions of food and medicine for both factions in the conflict.

4. Through arrangements made earlier, several stations in Latin America picked up feeds from the Voice of America and thus helped to spread our story.

5. I reported earlier on the dispatch of a team to the Dominican Republic to coordinate and beef up the psychological program.<sup>4</sup> Last night I dispatched a telegram to Hewson Ryan, head of the team, stressing anew the urgency of his assignment and giving detailed guidance.<sup>5</sup>

Our entire communications complex will continue to give the highest priority to the Dominican problem throughout today and tonight.

**Carl T. Rowan**

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<sup>4</sup> In another May 2 memorandum to President Johnson on USIA activities in the Dominican Republic, Carl Rowan told the President that in addition to the newly augmented USIA team of 9 members, a 58-man psychological warfare team from Fort Bragg had arrived on the scene. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Box 1-2, Valenti, Dominican Republic) In a May 1 memorandum to President Johnson, in which Rowan had advised the President of the need to "beef up the psychological program," Rowan reasoned, "we must be aware that it will be well nigh impossible to justify the presence of 16,000 American troops simply on the grounds that we are protecting Americans and other foreigners. We shall have to devote considerable effort to providing evidence that our actions are to protect the short-range and long-range well-being of the people of the Dominican Republic and the rest of Latin America." (Ibid., Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III, to 5/7/65)

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

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## **55. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 3, 1965.

### **SUBJECT**

Meeting on the Dominican Republic—May 3, 1965

### **PARTICIPANTS**

Mr. Mann, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Crockett, Mr. Vance, General Wheeler, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Chase

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic Planning Group. Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Prepared by Chase on May 4.

Attached at Tab 1<sup>2</sup> is a list of decisions taken at the meeting. The following points were also made although it should be noted that this may not be a comprehensive report in view of the fact that I was out of the meeting room on several occasions.

1. *The Military Situation*—The group agreed that, with the line of communications established and many troops in place, the military situation was in relatively good shape. General Wheeler said that we will probably not have to go beyond the 14,000- or 15,000-troop level.<sup>3</sup>

2. *Latin American Reaction*—Mr. Mann said that the Latin Americans are going to give us a lot of trouble and went on to make the following points with respect to the Latin American mentality on this sort of operation. *First*, over the years, we and the Latin Americans, in a number of documents and in a variety of forums, have expressed a general belief in the principle of non-intervention. At the same time, the Latin Americans, for many years, have recognized the necessity for collective defense against attacks on the Hemisphere. *Second*, the basic problem is that Latin American theology does not reflect the fact that aggression does not have to be armed military attack; it can also come in the form of subversion. Thus, with unpleasant memories of Marines in mind and not really accepting the idea of subversion as aggression which must be resisted collectively, the Latin Americans tend to adhere to the traditional line on intervention and think that we are engaged again in gunboat diplomacy. *Third*, there are, of course, some sophisticated Latin Americans who know what the score is. Privately, they say “good show” but, publicly, they give us no support. The problem here is that secret support does us no damn good. *Fourth*, the sophisticated Latin Americans, who wish us well, probably did not like to see us dilute our evacuation fig leaf and switch emphasis to the anti-Communist argument.

It was noted that Secretary Rusk had seen and the President would be seeing Betancourt in an effort to gain support for the U.S. position in the OAS.<sup>4</sup> It was also noted that one point we are trying to make to

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> According to a JCS history of this intervention, on May 2 the JCS approved the deployment of an additional Marine battalion and the remaining five battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division. When these units arrived in Santo Domingo May 3–4, U.S. strength ashore stood at 12 maneuver battalions, approximately 21,000 men. Because Cuban MiG–17s, 19s, and 21s could cover U.S. air transport routes and even reach Santo Domingo, the JCS on May 6 decided to supplement the F–100s at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, with faster F–104s. (*The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. IX: 1965–1968, Part II*, by Walter S. Poole, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1985, pp. 464–465)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 56 and footnote 5 thereto.

the OAS is that the Communists, in trying to subvert the Dominican Republic, are the ones who are intervening.

3. *Information Program*—Mr. Greenfield said that we must do something about proving the Communist intervention in the Dominican Republic; he noted that the press, with Castro in mind, can accept the argument that a few organized Communists can make a big difference in a small country. All we have to do is prove that there really are some hard-core Communists in the Dominican Republic who are trying to subvert the country in an organized meaningful way.

The group agreed that this is a serious problem and that a task force should be set up to deal with it.<sup>5</sup> In searching about for new ideas, Mr. Mann suggested that we interrogate rebels as they come out of the zone<sup>6</sup> while Des Fitzgerald mentioned that he thinks he can find some still pictures of rebels wearing Fidel Castro caps.

Mr. Vance said that DOD was getting pictures of the evacuation every day. These are real human interest items. Mr. Greenfield said that he would be very interested in getting copies.

4. *Balaguer*—The group discussed the approach to Balaguer and indicated that there were still some questions about the people listed by him as lieutenants. In this regard, see the State paper at Tab 2.

5. *Information Activities in the Dominican Republic*—Secretary Vance reported that the President wants a detailed report on all the informational aspects of the Dominican problem. For example, how many leaflets are dropped? What are they saying? How many radio frequencies are we broadcasting on? Who is listening? What is the impact? As a general point, Mr. Bundy emphasized that the President has a continuing and real interest in this dimension of the Dominican problem and that we should attempt to keep him fully informed on our activities in this area.

6. *The Junta*—The group discussed the desirability of separating the U.S. from Wessin. Mr. Mann felt that we are not particularly happy with Wessin but that we cannot now go too far in the direction of dumping him.

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<sup>5</sup> According to an attached list of actions to be taken, Adams (State), Califano, and Valenti among others would be members of this task force, whose job was to build "as full and well documented a case as can be developed to support charge that the communists have taken over the revolution in the Dominican Republic."

<sup>6</sup> The international neutral zone of safety set up in Santo Domingo on May 1.



## Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>7</sup>

Washington, May 3, 1965

## BALAGUER

Davidson<sup>8</sup> called Balaguer in New York on Sunday,<sup>9</sup> shortly after noon. Balaguer answered the second question first: He is ready to go to the Dominican Republic when it is felt his presence there will serve a constructive purpose.

Balaguer did not wish to answer the second [*first* ?] question over the telephone and according to Davidson, on his own initiative decided to come to Washington. He arrived at Davidson's home at 7:00 p.m. last night and will remain there at least throughout today.

Davidson reports that Balaguer's main contact with the current situation is the elder General Caamano, father of Lt. Colonel Caamano, the madman of the rebel forces.

## Military Grouping Suggested by Balaguer

Col. Caamano, Jr.	}	Rebel Representatives
Col. Hernando Ramirez		
Maj. Giovanni Guttierrez		
Col. Alvarez Alguin		
Col. Juan Lara Fernandez		

Present Junta (Good career men)	}	Present Junta all acceptable
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Major Venicio Fernandez Perez	}	Counter Revolutionaries Force
Major Dominguez—AIF—San Isidro		
Col. Librador Andujar		
Col. Felix de la Mota—Santiago de Cuba		

Balaguer has what seems to be a rather unrealistic plan for establishing an interim government in the Dominican Republic. He says that he would put his weight behind implementing the plan at anytime we give the go ahead and can assure him that non-rebel military forces would cooperate. Presumably he had counted on the elder General

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<sup>7</sup> Secret. Drafted by Crockett.

<sup>8</sup> A pseudonym for Abe Fortas.

<sup>9</sup> May 2.

Caamano to ensure cooperation of the rebel military forces through his son, Lt. Col. Caamano.

The plan would go like this:

1. He would want advance written resignations from former President Bosch and Vice President Tamayo which would be presented to as many members of the 1963 Bosch Congress that could be convened.

2. The 1963 Congress would then be recalled to receive and discuss these resignations.

3. Immediately thereafter, a provisional President would be designated. Balaguer suggests the President of Supreme Court or anyone else acceptable to the Congress.

4. At this stage an early date would be set for general elections.

5. Congress would then adjourn and meet again at the pleasure of and on a request from the provisional President.

6. Salaries for all Congressmen that could be located would be paid effective immediately.

Balaguer wants this formula to bring the country back to constitutionality in a way that would cool the passions and emotions of many who are now in the forefront of the action. All forces would be calmed and reassured, according to Balaguer. Balaguer feels that following this procedure would also head off a confrontation between the U.S. and the Dominican people who are seriously concerned over our present role, having been misled to believe that we are supporting the forces of military repression.

The elder Caamano is apparently in regular contact with his son. Davidson reports that they spoke by telephone twice on the evening of May 2 from Davidson's residence. Young Caamano told his father that he is fighting for principles and ideals. He wants to return to constitutionality—free elections—an opportunity for the people to oust corrupt leaders and vote for the candidate of their choice. Young Caamano reports, according to Davidson through the old General, that there is greater and growing anti-U.S. feelings among the young and idealistic men who make up the rebel forces. Young Caamano tells his father he has 50,000 followers who will fight the U.S. Marines to the end.

Crockett has avoided speaking directly with Davidson since Balaguer arrived in Washington but is committed to call him "sometime later today."

## 56. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 3, 1965, 11:31 a.m.–12:24 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Situation in the Dominican Republic

### PARTICIPANTS

*For the United States:*

The President

The Chief of Protocol, Lloyd N. Hand

Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

*For Venezuela:*

Former President Betancourt

The President outlined chronologically the events that preceded the sending of Marines to the Dominican Republic: increased chaos on Saturday,<sup>2</sup> convening of the O.A.S. Peace Committee on Tuesday,<sup>3</sup> meeting of the O.A.S. Council on Wednesday,<sup>4</sup> rapid deterioration of the situation on Wednesday afternoon, and decision to send the Marines late that same afternoon. He said that the failure of the O.A.S. to take any steps left the U.S. with no choice but to send in troops, in view of the announcement by the local authorities that they could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans residing in the Dominican Republic. He said that any President of a Latin American Republic would have made the same decision if his nationals were in danger.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, President's Memoranda of Conversations, January–March 1965. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes and approved by the White House on May 17. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) Former President of Venezuela Rómulo Betancourt was in Washington to attend various OAS meetings on the Dominican crisis. At the time of this meeting, President Johnson was considering a proposal first suggested by Abe Fortas for a committee of "Wise Men" to act as trustees or overseers of the effort to bring about a resolution in the Dominican Republic. Fortas dictated this idea to President Johnson's secretary on May 1 at 11:15 a.m. Fortas said: "This is a very secret and confidential message. If the OAS does not move, it seems to me you might consider the following after careful checking with Bosch and everybody else, the designation of Betancourt, Figueres and Marín as an interim committee, might be attempted. This is my own idea, not communicated or checked with anyone." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.16, Side A, PNO 3) The proposal was later abandoned in part because of opposition from some Latin American governments and from the existing five-nation Special Committee of the OAS; see footnote 2, Document 52.

<sup>2</sup> April 24.

<sup>3</sup> At 4 p.m. on April 27 the Inter-American Peace Committee, representatives from Colombia, Argentina, Dominican Republic and the United States, convened to hear Dominican Republic Ambassador Bonilla give a report on the revolt's origins and developments.

<sup>4</sup> On April 28 at 10:30 a.m. a regular meeting of the Council of the OAS was held to discuss the Dominican Republic situation.

The President also said that within hours of the landing of the Marines the U.S. had names, addresses, and other information concerning Communists and Castroites who were in the rebel ranks. The primary reason for the decision to send troops, a decision that had to be taken immediately, was to protect the lives of Americans and other foreign nationals who were in danger.

The mission of the American forces was to guarantee the safety of foreign nationals, including American, to keep bloodshed at a minimum, and to provide medical and food supplies to everybody in the Dominican capital.

Mr. Betancourt said that no matter how urgent the decision to send Marines had been, time should have been taken to call in the Latin American representatives to the O.A.S., even if just to announce to them the need for sending troops. This would have reduced the reaction of Latin American Presidents and Congresses, who have accused the U.S. of unilateral action.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Betancourt said that he had been pleased to hear Secretary Rusk state that the U.S. was not thinking in terms of Wessin y Wessin or of any other Dominican military figure that had been equally rejected by the people as a basis for a government.<sup>6</sup> He said that he, together with José Figueres and Luis Muñoz Marín, would use their good offices to convince Juan Bosch not to run for office again. He felt that Bosch, as he had said before, was a good man and an anti-communist democrat, but was naive, and did not have the ability necessary to govern his country.

Mr. Betancourt said that this Dominican experience should serve to illustrate the dangers of de facto governments in Latin America, and that what had happened on this island could also happen in Ecuador, Honduras, or Guatemala. He said that it was important that the inter-American conference that was to meet in Rio pass a vigorous resolution to have existing de facto governments call for elections, and to discourage those who might be thinking of a coup d'état.

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<sup>5</sup> During a meeting at 10:10 a.m. on May 3 Betancourt told the Secretary that "the United States had committed a serious error; it should have called a meeting of the OAS, be it midnight or dawn, to inform the Latin American Ambassadors that Marines were on their way and why they were being sent . . . to avoid Latin America being faced with a *fait accompli*." (Memorandum of conversation, May 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP) Rusk informed President Johnson of Betancourt's position during a telephone conversation that began at 11:15 a.m. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, Tape F65.18, Side A, PNO 7)

<sup>6</sup> During Rusk's meeting with Betancourt (see footnote 5 above), the Secretary admitted "privately" that he thought, "no members of the present Junta, or Wessin y Wessin, could form a government, since they had no popular support." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP)

President Johnson said that it was obvious that the O.A.S. did not move rapidly, and that there were occasions, such as the one in the Dominican Republic, when action had to be taken promptly, in view of the danger to the lives of so many people, as well as the menace of the extremists in the rebel ranks. Mr. Betancourt, after listening to the explanation by President Johnson of chronology of events leading to sending of troops to Dominican Republic, agreed that he would have done same thing.

Mr. Betancourt agreed that a communist victory in the Dominican Republic was unacceptable. He said that the events on that island should serve as a warning, to illustrate the fact that the people of Latin America wanted freedom and elected governments. He also said that whatever solution was reached in the O.A.S. required only 14 votes, and that the U.S. should not devote too much effort to obtain the votes of the so-called large countries, such as Mexico and Argentina. If the U.S. had a solution, it could get it approved with the support of Colombia, Venezuela, and Costa Rica, and that no effort should be made to obtain unanimity.

President Johnson asked Mr. Betancourt what possible solution could be found for the Dominican problem, be it a provisional or a trusteeship government. Mr. Betancourt replied that both were possibilities, and that he had considered the idea of a trusteeship government, to include the representatives of Costa Rica (José Figueres), Colombia (Alberto Lleras Camargo), Venezuela (Rómulo Betancourt), with the possible addition of former Governor Luis Muñoz Marín.

President Johnson asked whether Mr. Betancourt could suggest some responsible persons in the Dominican Republic who might be approached in the search for a viable solution. Mr. Betancourt replied that he did not know enough about the Dominican Republic, because of the isolation surrounding the island during the Trujillo era.

The President suggested that any comments to the press speak of the fact that he and Mr. Betancourt had known each other for a long time, that they had discussed Latin America in the twentieth century and the Alliance for Progress. Mr. Betancourt agreed, and said that he would prefer to draft a written press release, which he would send to Secretary Rusk before he gave it to the press.<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Betancourt said that he wished to emphasize the information he had received from the Venezuelan consul in Santo Domingo, whom he regarded as a reliable observer, to the effect that communists

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<sup>7</sup> Not further identified.

were by no means in control of the rebel forces in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Betancourt said that he would be available to the President at any time he was called to make a contribution to good inter-American relations. The President said that he would surely call on him, and that he would be glad to see Mr. Betancourt any time he so desired.

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**57. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1965, 5:57 p.m.

2138. Dominican developments since last sitrep (Depcirtel 2097).<sup>2</sup>

Rebel group has formed government headed by Col. Francisco Caamano. We anticipate group will shortly seek recognition from other American Republics. We believe rebels are heavily infiltrated by Dominican Communists. Rebel group holds only small sector (about one square mile) of Santo Domingo and has no control elsewhere in country. USG opposes recognition of Caamano "government" since it meets none of criteria for recognition.

Bosch partisans appear to have lost control of movement to Castro-Communist elements. There is increasing evidence that Cuban trained guerrilla leaders are now playing a major role in the rebel camp.

Our Embassy reports the continuing lack of any effective government in the Dominican Republic and notes the incapacity of the present military Junta to govern. Country outside Santo Domingo remains peaceful however.

Military situation remains quiet. U.S. troops have established corridor through city to provide access to neutral zone from airfield several miles east of city proper. Army and Marines are assisting in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Eugene Klebenov (ARA/APU) on May 5, cleared by Crockett, and approved by Sayre. Sent to all posts except those in the American Republics.

<sup>2</sup> Circular telegram 2097, May 1, informed embassies that the Papal Nuncio, Emanuele Clarizio, had successfully mediated a cease-fire to begin at 11:45 a.m. April 30 Santo Domingo time. (Ibid.) At 2 a.m. on April 30, the Council of the OAS adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire in Santo Domingo and an international neutral zone of safety in the neighborhood of the foreign embassies.

distribution of food to populace and have set up field hospitals to care for wounded civilians. U.S. Forces in D.R. now total 17,000.

Evacuation of U.S. and other foreign non-combatants is continuing. U.S. is assisting any foreign nationals who wish to leave Dominican Republic.

In U.N. Security Council, USSR and Cuba attacked and we defended our actions in the Dominican Republic. The OAS Commission which has been in Santo Domingo since May 2 devoted most of yesterday to attempting to obtain concurrence of Caamano and Junta commands to the "Act of Santo Domingo." Act includes (1) ratification of April 30 cease-fire, (2) establishment of Santo Domingo Security Zone, (3) guarantees of protection and security for all persons in said zone, (4) full cooperation with such international agencies as the OAS may designate for food and medical supply distribution in the Dominican Republic, (5) guarantees for the evacuation of Embassy asylees, (6) respecting of Diplomatic Missions and any asylees who are in them, and (7) recognition of the full competence of the OAS Commission for the purpose of complying with the provisions of the Act.

In the OAS, the U.S. Government has introduced a resolution calling for the creation of an inter-American force to maintain order in the Dominican Republic. As of 1800 hrs, May 4, support for the resolution stood as follows.

Ten L.A., in addition to the Dominicans, have indicated support. They are Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay.

Seven have indicated some opposition. They are Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Colombia.

The MFM has unanimously adopted a resolution urging all member countries to provide relief supplies and trained personnel for the Dominican Republic.

In disaster relief activities, the American Red Cross has begun a program of direct assistance to the Dominican Red Cross.

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Anthony Solomon, is in the D.R. to organize emergency food, medical and other humanitarian relief programs.

**Rusk**

58. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 6, 1965, 3 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Dominican Republic Task Force Meeting—May 6, 1965

## PARTICIPANTS

Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Mann, Mr. Vaughn, Mr. Crockett, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Allen, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Chase

The following points supplement and, in places, overlap the detailed action memo which is attached at Tab 1.<sup>2</sup>

1. *Third OAS Resolution*—The group discussed the desirability of getting a third OAS resolution which primarily would permit a reconstituted OAS Commission (a) to advise the Dominicans on the running of their government and (b) to eventually bring about elections. Among others, the following points were made during the discussion. *First*, the group agreed that we should try to get Figueres, Betancourt, Lleras Camargo and Munoz Marin to constitute the new Commission.<sup>3</sup> *Second*, the group felt that while we probably would be able to get the resolution we want, there will probably be some opposition. Ambassador Bunker said that the Venezuelans may argue that this sort of OAS intervention will bring about a situation even more amenable to the communists. Secretary McNamara thought that the OAS was a couple jumps away from sending a Commission down to the Dominican

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic—Planning Group. Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Prepared by Chase on May 7. The time of the meeting is from a May 6 memorandum from Vaughn to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 295, Dominican Republic Coup—Memoranda, Letters, 1965–1967)

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The proposed commission members were: José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica; Rómulo Betancourt, former President of Venezuela; Lleras Camargo, former President of Colombia; and Luis Muñoz Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico. According to Tab 1 this third OAS resolution should: 1) broaden the powers of the Commission to advise the provisional government, 2) authorize OAS supervision of elections, 3) grant the Commission an effective role in rounding up and exiling communist elements from the Dominican Republic, and 4) give the Commission greater influence in the composition of the eventual Dominican Republic Government. During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Mann on May 5, 5:46 p.m., they discussed the proposed commission members. Mann informed the President that the OAS had not yet approved of the commission which would require passage of a resolution by two-thirds of its members. Mann thought “the sooner we get that Commission going on down there the better off we are going to be.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between Johnson and Mann, Tape F65.20, Side A, PNO 2)



Republic to really govern. *Third*, the group felt that even a relatively weak resolution, gotten quickly, would be helpful. Mr. Bundy noted that the main thing is to get the Wise Men into the Dominican Republic. He added that, in getting rid of the Caamano Government, it would be nice to have people like the Wise Men tell us that this is the right thing to do. *Fourth*, Secretary McNamara thought that we should do some contingency planning in the event we can't get an OAS resolution. Even if we can't get a resolution, it would be good to get the Wise Men to the Dominican Republic.<sup>4</sup>

2. *Unified Military Command*—Ambassador Bunker said that there are variety of countries which seem to be ready to provide contingents for the Dominican Republic crisis—Costa Rica (police), Venezuela (destroyers), Brazil (1000 troops), Argentina and Colombia.<sup>5</sup> The group agreed that the unified command should probably be run largely from the Dominican Republic. In this regard, we can send some lawyers down to the island to help Ambassador Bennett run the U.S. part of the show. The operation will be coordinated with Bill Saunders, the Assistant Secretary General of the OAS.

3. *Withdrawal of U.S. Forces*—Secretary McNamara suggested that we seek opportunities to withdraw some of our forces; this will considerably help our public relations problem. As an excuse, we can say that the effectiveness of the cease fire makes this possible; later on we can say that we are withdrawing because it is clear that the Latin Americans are coming in. The Secretary went on to say that we have 13 battalions in the Dominican Republic and we might think seriously of withdrawing 2 battalions, one at a time, over the next 72 hours.

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<sup>4</sup> McNamara told President Johnson during a telephone conversation at 11:15 a.m. on May 7: We have to "get the 4 Wise Men or somebody down there we can associate with. We cannot remain in association much longer with Wessin . . . the rebels are gaining power, position and prestige every passing day." (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F65.20, Side B, PNO 2)

<sup>5</sup> During a May 5 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS the Ministers considered the establishment of an inter-American military force in the Dominican Republic. At 2 a.m. on May 6 the Ministers approved a U.S.-initiated resolution requesting that American states make military and police contingents available to form an Inter-American Armed Force (IAAF) which would operate under the authority of an OAS Unified Command (UC). This resolution was adopted by a vote of 15-5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), with 1 abstention (Venezuela). Subsequently, on June 2 the Meeting of Consultation adopted a resolution naming the force the "Inter-American Peace Force." According to their own history of this intervention, the JCS had suggested that Latin military contributions consist of small, lightly equipped companies trained in riot control and guerrilla tactics, and that Argentinean and Brazilian battalions be infantry units. Tactical air contributions were not sought but naval contingents were. The JCS asked that these be coastal patrol vessels limited to 1-2 ships per country. The JCS also recommended that the Latin units rely on their own transportation, be as self sufficient as possible, and be capable of receiving and distributing bulk supplies from U.S. sources. (*JCS and National Policy: 1965-1968*, p. 468)

The group heartily endorsed the McNamara view. Mr. Greenfield noted that we will be in a much stronger position if we go to the altar willingly rather than reluctantly. Ambassador Bunker said that it would make his task at the OAS enormously easier.<sup>6</sup>

4. *Junta Forming*—Mr. Mann said that as yet we have not had much luck. When we do get a slate, we should ensure that there are no communists on it, and that we know what the junta prepares to do about the communists in the country.

5. *Communists*—The group discussed at some length the problem of the communists. The communists probably ought to be kicked out of the country; if we don't move fast, however, they will all be underground.

In this regard, we must put more emphasis on rounding up the communists; the problem is that there is no one who can give the order to actually pick them up. About the best we can do is to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] tail them and Defense, when it can, take pictures of them.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that the communist angle, as well as the eventual problem of disarming the rebel-held part of the city, make it clear how much we need some sort of government on the island.

6. *Public Relations*—Mr. Bundy said that while yesterday's effort with the press took us a long way in our effort to look better in this affair, we still have things to do.<sup>7</sup> *First*, we should thicken the case about the communists in the Dominican Republic. *Second*, we should ensure that the Santo Domingo press corps gets suitable matériel on the communist threat. *Third*, Mr. Vaughn should produce a paper spelling out more sharply the chronology of OAS participation in the Dominican Republic crisis.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> In a May 6 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Chase recounted information relayed to him by Vaughn who had met with the President earlier that day at 1:36 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Chase stated that President Johnson thought it "might be unwise to withdraw any troops from the Dominican Republic [because] . . . it would look as if [the United States] thought it had made a mistake [by] putting too many troops in the Dominican Republic." Chase also wrote that "the President would be swayed by Bunker's judgment . . . that a token withdrawal would help him enormously at the OAS." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III, to 5/7/65) In a May 7 memorandum to Bundy, Chase wrote, "General Palmer reportedly feels that it isn't a good idea to withdraw forces at this time for psychological/political reasons. The rebels could take this as a sign that the internationalist heat is getting to us and that we have to pull out." (Ibid.)

<sup>7</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>8</sup> Not found; however, an undated 14-page Bureau of Inter-American Affairs report, entitled "Action of the Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic" is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Dominican Crisis 1965, State-DOD-OAS Chronologies and Narratives.

Mr. Bundy also said that Len Meeker's legal memo,<sup>9</sup> which is good, will be beefed up by last night's OAS resolution and by further consultation with the Attorney General, who has a strong background in international law. Once the memo is in shape, it will be released.

7. *Relief*—The group agreed that this is an area in which we can pull out all the stops. We should sharpen up our coordinating in Washington, just as it has been sharpened up in the Dominican Republic. In this regard, Bill Gaud has the coordinating responsibility in Washington.

8. *Moving Junta Headquarters*—Mr. Crockett said that General Palmer and Ambassador Bennett want to let the junta move from San Isidro to the Fair Grounds. The junta wants to be closer to town, and feels it will have better protection at the Fair Grounds. The problem is that the junta will then be very close to the rebels, and if the rebels attack the junta, we will be faced with a very touchy problem; in effect, we will have to decide between letting the rebels beat up the junta and breaking our "neutrality" and intervening in favor of the junta. The group agreed that the junta could move—on the condition that the OAS Commission has no objection.

9. *Peace Corps*—The group discussed the problem of the Peace Corps people in the Dominican Republic who are giving interviews that are damaging our interests. Mr. Moyers said that Sargent Shriver is dealing with the problem. While the group saw certain advantages in bringing the Peace Corps back to the U.S., they also saw a number of disadvantages—e.g., Peace Corps people would hold their interviews in the U.S., which would also hurt; it would be a blow for the Peace Corps people all over the world if we quashed their right to speak freely. The group went on to agree that we should give the Peace Corps people some background on the Dominican situation and leave them there. Mr. Bundy thought that Ambassador Martin and Harry Shlaudeman would be very good on this.

[2 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

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<sup>9</sup> Dated May 7 and entitled "Legal Basis for United States Actions in the Dominican Republic." (Ibid., Country File, Dominican Republic) Meeker was the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. In a May 6 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Fortas commented on the memorandum: "I could not recommend its publication or use as a defense of the legality of the United States actions in the Dominican Republic . . . it's soundness as a matter of legal analysis is subject to effective challenge." (Ibid., Vol. III, to 5/7/65)

## 59. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 6, 1965, 8:52 p.m.

2161. Subject: Sitrep—Dominican Republic. *Note:* Section One—At your discretion you are authorized to use such information as you feel desirable with local officials. Section Two—FYI only.

### Begin Section One

OAS Commission got both sides to sign "Act of Santo Domingo."<sup>2</sup> Although body of document unchanged, added preamble refers to Caamano group as "Constitutional Government" (quote marks appear in document) and Benoit group as Military Junta of Government. Embassy notes reference to "Constitutional Government" gives Caamano group unwarranted status. Caamano group has sent Cirtel to 36 nations requesting recognition. Request makes false claim rebel group "has complete backing Dominican people" and "control over national territory." Depcirtel 2144<sup>3</sup> gives USG political and legal reasons for non-recognition of Caamano group.

There is still no effective government in the DR.

Evacuations of foreign nationals are continuing with 250 put aboard ship yesterday.

Despite cease-fire sporadic sniper fire at US forces continues. Rebels have been using small boats in river as sniper positions. US forces returning fire sank one small boat and set fire to freighter.

Food distribution proceeding with new distribution centers opened poor districts Santo Domingo. 82nd Airborne distributed 20 tons rice May 5. 85 tons rice flown to capital from north of country. 1000 tons PL-480 foodstuffs unloaded Haina. Major effort also being made to distribute foodstuffs in areas outside capital.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III, Cables 5/65. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Eugene Klebenov (ARA), cleared by Crimmins, and approved by William L.S. Williams (ARA). Sent to all posts except Santo Domingo. Repeated to Hong Kong, USUN, US BER, and CINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCSO for POLADs.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 57.

<sup>3</sup> Circular telegram 2144, May 6, 2:29 p.m., reported that Colonel Francisco Caamaño's claim to the Presidency was invalid. The rebel group he headed controlled only a small portion of territory, wasn't capable of functioning as a national government, and based its claim on the Bosch Constitution of 1963, which was superseded by the reinstated constitution of 1962, a constitution put into effect by the governing junta immediately following the ouster of Bosch in September 1963. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III to 5/7/65, Memos and Miscellaneous)

Four of five member OAS Peace Committee (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala) returned to Washington morning May 6 to report to Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) probably tomorrow. Prior committee's departure group of governors northern provinces called on OAS group to make clear they do not repeat not accept Caamano group as government and to express hope committee would work toward establishment of provisional government made up of respected apolitical leaders.

MFM has approved Inter-American Armed Force for DR.

UN Security Council met May 6 for further debate on Soviet charges. Malaysia recognized that OAS was seized of Dominican question and China supported our position. At urging of Uruguay, Netherlands and Jordan, USSR agreed to postpone until noon, May 7 vote on its resolution calling for condemnation of US and immediate withdrawal from DR.

Section Two—FYI only.

Embassy working intensively on problem of forming viable government with broad base of support. Embassy hopes new Junta will be essentially non-political with three civilian "technicians" participating. Formation of such a Junta being delayed due to desire of civilian nominees to take further soundings before committing themselves.

US forces in DR now total 19,000. Unconfirmed reports indicate three Marines were killed, two wounded and two captured this morning.

Although situation outside Santo Domingo remains generally quiet, reports indicate food shortages causing increasing unrest.

VOA broadcasts improving atmosphere and criticism of US is diminishing.

On matter recognition Caamano group, problem is urgent in Chile where there is strong official feeling in group's favor. Ambassadors Dungan, Harriman scheduled see President Frei 1700 hrs today.

In OAS principal difficulties have been with Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.

**Rusk**

**60. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

No. 1120/65

Washington, May 7, 1965.

**THE COMMUNIST ROLE IN THE DOMINICAN REVOLT****Summary**

It seems clear now as it did in the last days of April that a modest number of hard-core Communist leaders in Santo Domingo managed by superior training and tactics to win for themselves a position of considerable influence in the revolt within the first few days. Their influence within the movement grew day by day, and following the collapse of Molina's government on 27 April there appeared to be no organization within the rebel camp capable of denying them full control of the rebellion within a very few days.

At the same time, the rebel cause, enjoying as it did the backing of Bosch and the continued support of several thousand military personnel, seemed likely to prosper in the face of the ineffective and dispirited countermeasures of the loyalists military.

Thus the prospect at the time of US intervention clearly was one in which a movement increasingly under the influence of Castroites and other Communists was threatening to gain the ascendancy in the Dominican Republic.

[Omitted here are 12 pages that describe in detail the Communist role in the Dominican Republic and two annexes: "Cuban Involvement in Dominican Revolutionary Activities" and "Communist Participation in the Dominican Rebellion."]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, [Valenti File Re: Dominican Republic]. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was sent under cover of a May 7 memorandum to Moyers by Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who wrote: "You may find helpful as a ready reference the attached report, which is a wrap-up of the political evolution of the Dominican Republic revolt. It is based on all the relevant intelligence available to us as of 7 May." (Ibid., Dominican Republic-Communist Participation in Current Dominican Republic Rebellion—5/65)

**61. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 8, 1965, 2:25–3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting in the Cabinet Room at 1400 on 8 May 1965

PRESENT WERE

The President

For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Mann, Harriman, and Vaughn

For Defense: McNamara and McNaughton

For AID: Mr. Gaud

For USIA: Mr. Wilson

For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Chase, and Valenti

For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. This meeting on the situation in the Dominican Republic covered the following items:

A) The military contributions of various Latin American countries to the Inter-American Force at Santo Domingo.

B) An assessment of Balaguer and Bosch in which it was brought up that Balaguer has a longer-term usefulness, whereas Bosch's excessive statement appears to be damaging his cause and going against him.<sup>2</sup>

C) The relief effort in the Dominican Republic was outlined.

D) Mr. Mann presented the scenario of United States Government consultation with the Organization of American States.

E) The President approved a statement explaining why the United States Government would not grant immediate recognition to the Government of General Imbert but emphasized that the wording should be used as a guide for oral briefing, not for official issuance.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Folder 13, Chron as DDCI and DCI, 1 January–31 December, 1965. Secret. Drafted on May 13. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) Another record of this meeting is *ibid.*, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes.

<sup>2</sup> The United States wanted Bosch to recognize the danger of a Castro-Communist takeover and the need to eliminate it, to call for an end to the killing and a resumption of public services, and to accept the presence of U.S. forces for the minimum period needed to maintain order in the Dominican Republic. Instead on May 3 Bosch said that the pattern of 1916 was being repeated: "the U.S. Marines occupy . . . the sacred soil of Juan Pablo Duarte," . . . "force exercised by a powerful country against a weak nation." (Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, p. 679)

<sup>3</sup> This statement has not been found. Telegram 872 to Santo Domingo, May 7, reported: "we welcome formation of Council of National Reconstruction and agree they should assert right to recognition." However, "we regard this as an interim grouping" and "recognition of Council by U.S. would make collective responsibility and action impossible." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)

F) Ambassador Harriman reported on his visit to eight Latin American countries during the preceding week.<sup>4</sup> He underlined the extent to which various chiefs of state and chiefs of government were personally behind President Johnson's action in the Dominican Republic but identified in each case the reasons why local domestic problems prevented these government officials from making public statement to this effect.

G) In the context of discussing other Latin American countries which might have revolts in the immediate future, the President emphasized that he wants important intelligence items marked up for him in such a way that he will be obliged to read them on a priority basis.

(On 9 May, the undersigned met with Messrs. Cline and Graham, of DDI, and with Mr. Lloyd George, of DD/P, to get them to work devising a system, in consultation with Mr. Bundy, as to how priority intelligence items should be brought to the President's attention.)

H) Ambassador Harriman asked, and the President approved, that the Agency circularize all Latin American embassies with the CIA write-up on Communist involvement in the Dominican revolt.<sup>5</sup> It was also agreed that a sanitized version of the first twelve pages of this publication would be promptly made and given to appropriate agencies of Government for use in background briefings.

(As a result of this meeting, extra effort was placed on finishing the sanitization, which was put on the wire by 1900 on 8 May with instructions for its use in the field by Ambassadors and by our Station Chiefs.)

I) The subject of photographing and fingerprinting Communist activists in the Dominican Republic was discussed at various times during the meeting.<sup>6</sup> After much argument pro and con, the President finally approved the working out of an operational plan in conjunction

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<sup>4</sup> According to Valenti's notes of the meeting, Harriman visited Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Panama. Harriman reported that Brazil and Panama were "very friendly," and Argentina and Colombia would "probably send troops." The remaining countries would not contribute troops, but would help in other ways. (Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes)

<sup>5</sup> Document 60.

<sup>6</sup> In a May 8 briefing memorandum to the President, Bundy wrote that Raborn thinks fingerprinting of suspected Communists would be very helpful to the CIA in trying to get solid data on Communists. "All the rest of us think there are severe propaganda disadvantages in having U.S. forces fingerprinting Dominicans on Dominican soil. I have asked Raborn to produce a plan at the meeting which would meet his purposes with absolute minimum visibility, and this matter is one which you will have to adjudicate because there are differences on it at the top levels of the different agencies." (Johnson Library, National Security File, McGeorge Bundy Memos to the President, Vol. X, April 15-May 31, 1965)



with General Palmer whereby a small percentage of those hard-core individuals would be photographed, and, where possible, fingerprinted, as they passed through check points or were detained elsewhere. The President indicated that he wanted the Secretary of State to approve the procedure and desired that, to the extent possible, we get OAS blessing on this approach. It was agreed that in working on this problem we would do everything possible to devise covers for holding people long enough for photography and fingerprinting and that we would do everything possible to engage the cooperation of the Dominican police both in Santo Domingo and throughout the countryside.

**Richard Helms<sup>7</sup>**  
*Deputy Director*

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<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

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**62. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 10, 1965, 0555Z.

1558. Pass White House. From Martin.

A. We have gone through two stages here since my arrival—(1) military cease-fire to stop slaughter; (2) formation of GRN as an entity to counter rebel Caamano “government.” Have now entered third stage: politico-propaganda struggle between rebels and GRN.

B. Rebels Today: Virtually impossible assess rebel situation with confidence. Nuncio and Mora and others believe Caamano realizes defeat inevitable and wants out but is virtual prisoner of hard-core Communists.

On other hand, sources equally reliable and in some ways better informed say that rebels are confident of victory. Is not impossible both views contain truth and change hour to hour.

I have opened several lines to Caamano and one to Aristy and am helping with quiet effort to arrange Caamano’s surrender or at least

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 3:16 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, and CINCLANT at 4:20 a.m.

negotiation with Imbert. Am dubious, as of this hour, but intend pursue vigorously.

Unquestionably, rebels hold propaganda initiative principally through Radio Santo Domingo, and importance of this cannot be overstated. Rebels are organizing large (1200–1500 people yesterday) demonstrations center of town, with speakers emphasizing not Bosch but anti-Americanism, plus pro-constitutionality, anti-Wessin, and pro-Caamano. Rebels, well led, are succeeding in linking in minds of uninformed masses “constitutionality” with food and jobs. In short, rebels are working to consolidate political position as champion of masses against US military—San Isidro military-upperclass and middle-class government. And unquestionably, they are ahead of GRN in this propaganda political war.

C. GRN Today: I spent four days helping form GRN, running through scores of names and pressuring dozens of men to join it. Finding it impossible obtain truly broad-spectrum political group, took what we have. Needless to say, Ambassador concurred throughout. Imbert, though suspected of dictatorial ambitions, is symbol of Dom fight for freedom, since he assassinated Trujillo, and will not double-cross USG on truly basic issues. Benoit seems unusually reasonable, intelligent Dom Rep military man. Postigo was close personal friend Bosch and has irreproachable reputation as civic leader. His personal sacrifice in joining GRN is enormous. Grisolia, though former UCN senator, is stable, reasonable, and cannot be bought. Zeller, though briefly in Reid government, is virtually unknown engineer. Basic advantage of GRN: it provides an entity to counter rebels’ “constitutional government” and it divorces USG from odious San Isidro old general group. Basic weakness GRN: it is attackable—and is under attack by rebels, who call it “*junta civico militar*”—as simply another reactionary business-class “civico” government with military strong-man overlay.

To counter all this, Ambassador and I helped arrange, and attachés helped carry out, deportation today of old generals and tomorrow or tonight that of General Wessin y Wessin<sup>2</sup> who, rightly or wrongly, has become symbol of military opposition to constitutionality and aspirations of masses. (We have no desire to destroy Dom armed forces but to restructure it, and we have told Imbert he cannot put his stooges in and must deport one his closest friends among military. He has done

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<sup>2</sup> Bennett reported in telegram 1575 from Santo Domingo, May 10, that he and General Palmer had met with Wessin the afternoon of May 10. During this meeting Wessin said he would agree to step down now that his pre-conditions had been met—the resignation of seven generals and a Navy Commodore as specified in a May 9 letter he gave Bennett. (Ibid.) On May 9 Wessin gave Bennett a letter promising his retirement if other generals whom he specifically named would do the same.

latter today.) Believe removal Wessin will on balance strengthen GRN's political position. Later on, we can urge, and I believe GRN will carry out, reforms that will benefit people and strengthen GRN.

D. However, the basic political problem remains: the present revolt against the Reid government was, at the outset, almost surely an attempt by PRD leaders and others to reverse the coup against Bosch of September 25, 1963. At the time of that coup, the people did not protest. The ideas of social and economic justice which Bosch promulgated, however, mobilized latent and legitimate revolutionary aspirations of Dom people, particularly among young, they will not down. They are now being mobilized once more by rebels. GRN might meet this problem by instituting reforms and by divorcing self from discredited politicians and generals. Imbert can provide strong hand needed now. All this is good program temporarily.

Looking to future, however, we should consider these alternatives: (Note—all these possibilities assume no rebel surrender.)

1. Full support, including recognition soonest possible, of GRN for indefinite period. (Imbert's influential wife has mentioned four years.)

2. Acceptance of GRN as no more than interim phase in process of taking country to elections, and reconstituting it as soon as practicable by adding to it (or replacing two of its civilian members with) two men who, if not physically in rebel domain now, are unquestionably sympathetic to rebels; possibly obliging GRN to then adopt 1963 Bosch constitution and hold completely free elections (including by name Bosch and Balaguer) under that constitution on schedule December 30, 1966. (In order persuade pro-rebel men to join GRN, it would have to demonstrate its good intentions by deeds.)

3. Acceptance of GRN as interim government which would be followed by major OAS effort (commission of good offices), with our full support, to form politically broad-based or politically independent provisional government to take country to elections.

4. An in-between policy for now: All-out support for GRN short of recognition, meanwhile waiting to see of new political constellations or figures emerge, free of Communist domination, that might mobilize people's aspirations.

My previous experience with commitment to fixed election date or even totally free elections themselves convinces me that such commitment is dangerous in present circumstances. My previous experience with Bosch and Balaguer makes me equally unenthusiastic about them. Since alternative 3 has never been tried in hemisphere to my knowledge, I find it harder to assess but tentatively suggest that while it would help take us off the hook, even high-level OAS commission might find it impossible to form either a broad-based political coali-

tion or an independent government here, given difficulties and deficiencies, so well known to me, in Dom people, and now so harshly exacerbated by recent events. More plainly, I doubt it would work.

Recent holocaust has disrupted if not destroyed old parties and political figures. I would hope new leaders and political groupings might emerge. I therefore recommend we adopt for short run (week or two) alternative 4 above to see if something or somebody turns up. In present unstable situation I suggest we should not get locked into any policy more firm than that. But we should spend that time seeking means of adding non-Communist revolutionary elements to GRN.

Of course, if Caamano surrenders, I recommend we recognize GRN quickly, first getting whatever commitments from it that we want.

E. US Troops: Even though cloak of OAS multilateral force helps greatly, recommend we get US troops out soon as possible and make every effort to avert full-scale military occupation, even under OAS auspices, unless nothing else can prevent Communist takeover. By "soon as possible" I would hope for six months or less—as long as it takes for a Dom Govt to restore order and for us to help it retrain and restructure its own armed forces.

F. Though it may be self-evident, I wish to emphasize that whatever Dom Govt emerges, we shall not only have to keep troops here but also and for much longer period shall have to continue playing strong political role here. Landing our troops prevented country from disintegrating totally. But troops can build nothing politically, and process of disintegration has gone so far that this country cannot alone reorganize its affairs for a long time without vigorous assistance.

G. My Own Plans: Subject to shifting situation and USG instructions, I am thinking of staying only few more days, until (a) Wessin leaves, (b) I have had opportunity discuss immediate courses action with GRN; (c) I have finished talking quietly to US newspapermen; (d) I have exhausted all really promising avenues of quick surrender or accommodation with rebels. End of Martin.

**Bennett**

**63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 10, 1965, 10:22 p.m.

949. Ref Embtel 1558.<sup>2</sup> Of the four alternatives described in Embtel 1558 from Martin, modified second alternative seems to us to be best. Embassy should put its full resources to exploration of possibility of establishing coalition regime in which Caamano and possibly one other non-communist member of his group (acceptable to Imbert and his group) could be added.<sup>3</sup>

Purpose of this would be to split Caamano and hopefully Bosch partisans in rebel zone away from extremists. This would be a further step toward establishment of a provisional government which hopefully could gradually consolidate its control over entire country with broad popular support.

We recognize this is delicate operation from Imbert's point of view, but assume from your messages that idea of coalition not unacceptable to him.

From Caamano's point of view our guess is that more can be gained by appealing to his patriotism and to need for avoiding blood-letting than by any other tactic. However, if additional inducements from us already known to you would in your opinion be productive this could be mentioned also. Caamano's group may be waiting for arrival of "Wise Men" (Betancourt, Munoz-Marin/et al). You may inform him that after several days effort we have not been successful in obtaining OAS agreement to this. All of this is a matter for your own on-the-spot discretion.

In any case we should work for provisional coalition government which could, after establishing control over entire national territory, return the country to normalcy and eventually, under OAS supervision, guide country to a non-communist constitutional government.

One of the issues which apparently has great appeal to Dominicans at this time is constitutionalism. We do not have any clear opin-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Mann and cleared by Vance and Vaughn. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> Document 62.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1626 from Santo Domingo, May 12, Bennett reported that negotiations with Caamaño's forces to form a "broadened collective government" had "produced little reason for immediate optimism," but that moderate PRD member Antonio Guzman had offered to be the "middle man in an effort to form a broad-based junta." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Miscellaneous Reports on the Dominican Situation [2 of 2])

ion about what concessions it would be prudent to make such as proposal 1962 or 1963 constitutions be adopted. This would, of course, be without Bosch or his designee as president. A preliminary investigation here suggests that all previous constitutions contain provisions for suspension of constitutional guarantees under circumstances similar to those which exist now. Clearly this would be necessary at this time. We would like your opinion on this possible bargaining position with Caamano and such others which may occur to you as compatible with our objectives, i.e., prevention of commie takeover and later elections and constitutional regime.

You should take this line with OAS Committee. We will broach this line of thought to those OAS Committee members still in Washington before their departure tomorrow afternoon.

**Rusk**

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#### **64. Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1965, 11:20 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to the Dominican Republic.]

President: Now, Bob, are we, are our military people, the brains that we have, meeting and planning and thinking of every step that might be needed to take so we got adequate contingencies? Let's assume that Abe goes out of business tonight and we know that they are building each day and increasing each day and getting stronger each day, and let's assume then that our people are fired upon, or we're attacked, or we're involved some way or we have to get the radio station. How we do it, and what we do, and whether we can go to get an OAS flag if we had to have it? Or do we just sit there and let events take place? Are we considering every possible thing that might occur and what we do about it?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, Tape F65.22, Side A, PNO 6 and Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President Johnson placed the call to McNamara; they talked for approximately 12½ minutes.

McNamara: I believe we are, Mr. President. We have laid out the plans. They are in considerable detail. The problem is that every one of them is bloody—and very bloody.

President: Yeah.

McNamara: For us and the Dominicans.

President: Yeah. Well, I think the time is going to come before very long when we have to kind of make up our choice to either let Castro have it, or take it. It's—we're hoping that he doesn't have that much influence, but I rather believe he does.

[Omitted here is a query from McNamara regarding a meeting between Abe Fortas and Bosch the night before. President Johnson explained that this meeting did not take place yesterday but would later today.]

McNamara: Well, we're prepared militarily, Mr. President, every way, I believe, we can be.

President: Well, now suppose they—the Caamaño forces and Bosch and them say there is nothing we can do that we could accept. Then suppose that Palmer and Bennett and our other people, Mann, say we got to have the radio station. Have we thought about what we do and how we do it?

McNamara: Yes. Cy—I don't believe he's come back yet; he went to the 10 o'clock meeting this morning<sup>2</sup> and he and I agreed that we should set up a special group that does nothing but work on that radio station. It's, at the moment, a split somewhat between CAS–CIA and Defense. But this is a small project that we ought to be able to, I think, take over ourselves, and that was my suggestion to Cy and he's going to work with the group on it this morning.

President: Now, another thing I wanted to call to your attention. I don't think there would be any question that you will have some extensive grilling on what warnings you had from the services and from the CIA.

McNamara: Yes.

President: And I see from the columns in the *New York Post* yesterday, and others, that they are after the invisible government and they are after the CIA and they want to kind of make a goat out of it like they did with the Bay of Pigs thing. I don't know what the facts are, do you?

McNamara: Well, I know that we had enough warning as far as our military requirements were concerned Mr. President, because, based on, not so much the CIA warnings, but just the events that took

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to a meeting of the Dominican Republic Task Force chaired by Bundy each morning at the White House. No record of this meeting has been found.

place down there, you issued the orders to alert our forces in ample time for us to have them ready to move quickly and close promptly when you wanted them to and you got that.

President: Preceding that; preceding the Saturday<sup>3</sup> take-over, did anybody ever tell you or did you ever envision that this was a very explosive thing?

McNamara: No.

President: That might blow?

McNamara: The answer is definitely no, Mr. President. And one of the reasons is that I rely primarily upon the President's Intelligence Digest, the daily summary which you go, for my information. I have other sources as well that I dig into. But I use that as the primary checklist. And when I see something dangerous in there, then I go and get more detail on it through the other sources. But that, the President's Daily—and checklist—Intelligence Digest, did not carry anything relating to the situation until either the 17th or the 24th, and then it was just an innocuous little item.<sup>4</sup> So the fact of the matter is that we were not properly alerted through that means for the general political problem. But I differentiate here between the alert required to take effective action politically and the alert required to take action militarily. We got ample warning in what we needed for our effective military action, but we got it not from the CIA source, but from the pressure of events down there as reported in the press. And that was why on the Saturday preceding the Wednesday<sup>5</sup>—I don't recall the exact circumstances—but I know we talked to you about it and you said, "Go ahead and put whatever you think is required on alert." We did it on Saturday and Sunday. And the result was, when we had to move Wednesday, we moved within a matter of—we closed within four hours after you issued the order. So militarily we weren't handicapped. Politically, frankly, I think we were very seriously handicapped by lack of notice.

President: Well, now, don't you think that's something that you and Raborn and I ought to talk about pretty soon—what did happen there, and let's get it brought up to date and let's see what Bennett knew, if he knew anything before Saturday. Because we are going to have to tell them what we know, if anything.

McNamara: Yes, yes.

President: I have refused to make anybody a goat. And I have said that we held back to the last moment. Bennett said, "I will not recommend troops at this point, although they are firing on the Embassy."

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<sup>3</sup> April 24.

<sup>4</sup> [text not declassified]

<sup>5</sup> April 28.



But within a couple of hours, he said, “I got to have them to preserve life,” and we did it. And at that time, CIA told me that there were two Castro leaders involved. And a little later, they told me 8, and a little later, they told me 58. Do you remember now—in that room that afternoon—we met at roughly 4:30.<sup>6</sup> I was 5 or 10 minutes late. We talked, we got the message delivered to us, the 3-something message delivered somewhere around 5.<sup>7</sup> We actually made the decision around 6 sometime. Now, where was CIA in that picture? They weren’t meeting with us, were they?

McNamara: No, they weren’t.

President: Did they—they didn’t participate in the decision?

McNamara: No, they did not.

President: Well, where did we get—we got—somebody told me that there were two Castro leaders and then there were eight.

McNamara: I think, Mr. President, that . . .

President: We must have done that on the phone.

McNamara: Well, either on the phone, or about 7 when you had the Congressional leaders there.<sup>8</sup>

President: I know he did at that meeting.

McNamara: And I think he did it at that meeting.

President: Uh, huh. So the important thing is for me to see if I talked to CIA before that meeting.

McNamara: That, that’s right, sir.

President: Uh, huh.

McNamara: But Red’s [Raborn] own analysis of what CIA had reported in these reports confirms the statement that I made a moment ago that you had not received anything other than a very brief notice in either the April 17th or April 24th President’s Digest, and I can’t remember which it was.

President: Mac says it doesn’t say anything except that there’s some problems.

[Omitted here is discussion on potential problems in Bolivia, Colombia, and Guatemala.]

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to an April 28 meeting, 4:45–6:01 p.m., among President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, and Moyers in the lounge off the Oval Office. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) In a telephone conversation with Raborn on May 12 at 4:05 p.m. (see Document 65) President Johnson recalled that they had talked about “Vietnam troops” at this meeting. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and William Raborn, Tape F65.23, Side A, PNO 1 and 2) No other record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 32.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 35.

President: Now, if we don't have a political solution to this thing and we can't get any agreement from Caamaño's people, how long can we wait until he gets that powerful and he gets that sentiment up and he gets where he gets aid from Castro and maybe from foreign sources before we clean up that city?

McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I think we've got to get a political situation.

President: Well.

McNamara: I can't answer your question how long we can wait; but we can wait another 24 or 48 hours.

President: Oh, yeah, we know we got to do that.

McNamara: And in that period, we just have to move ahead. It's not reducing our military capability to take over those rebels by waiting 24, 48, 72 hours.

President: I believe everyday you lose it. I believe you lose—I don't think you lose any of your capab—any of your strength, but I think they get a good deal stronger.

McNamara: Well, maybe.

President: They are going back to work now.

McNamara: Well, I think they get stronger politically, Mr. President, but militarily, they aren't getting much stronger, and therefore.

President: Well, do we know that? Do we know they aren't shipping them stuff?

McNamara: Well, we have a pretty fair check. I can't say that they are not getting any guns, but I can say they are not getting many. And I don't believe that the relative military balance is shifting very much day by day. It's moving a little bit in there.

President: Should we move down there and suggest to them again—the suggestion somebody made yesterday—to try and buy up their arms?

McNamara: No, I think that is unimportant at this point.

President: All right.

McNamara: But I do think we ought to keep pushing on buying Caamaño and keep pushing on Bosch. We just have to get a political situation here.

President: Well, if they are controlled by the Castroites, they are not going to give it to you.

McNamara: I don't think they are. How the hell can 58 people control them when they've got several hundred. I just don't believe the story that Bosch and Caamaño are controlled by the Castroites. I don't mean to say they aren't influenced, Mr. President, not at all. But I don't believe that 58 people—or 200 people for that matter—can militarily control, physically control, this other bunch.

[Omitted here is brief discussion on *The New York Times* and its influence on the American people.]

McNamara: That's all I'm saying about Caamaño. And therefore, it's still worthwhile to push and work on him. And I haven't really dug deeply into who is talking to Caamaño—who is offering him the money and so on. But I think that maybe later today Cy or I ought to get into this.

President: I wish you would, with Raborn, and see if anything is being done.

[Omitted here is a short discussion on whether Martin had met with Caamaño the previous night.]

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## 65. Editorial Note

At 4:05 p.m. on May 12, 1965, President Johnson telephoned Raborn and recounted the chronology of meetings on the Dominican Republic leading up to the decision to land U.S. Marines. Johnson asked Raborn if he had been informed of the intensifying problem in the Dominican Republic prior to his swearing-in as the new CIA Director and Raborn replied, "yes." The President asked if McCone, Helms, and others were surprised by the Dominican crisis and Raborn responded, "No, sir." The President asked, "They knew this?" Raborn replied, "Yes, sir. They were alerting the entire intelligence community by established means of this." President Johnson said, "Now if this was that explosive, and if they knew it, we have got to set up a better means of notifying me." Raborn said, "I agree." President Johnson said there needed to be "a better means of interpreting to me or preparing me for [them] because quite frankly I don't want to blame anybody, I want to take the blame, I'm big enough and broad enough and man enough to take anything, but I sure do want to know it." Raborn said he agreed and would work to find a solution to this problem. Toward the end of the conversation President Johnson asked Raborn for a complete chronology of intelligence on the Dominican Republic prior to U.S. intervention. Raborn replied that such a document (see footnote 4, Document 64) had just been delivered to Valenti. President Johnson said he would review it. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and William Raborn, Tape F65.23, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)

In a May 12 memorandum to the President received at 6:05 p.m., Bundy recounted that he had met earlier in the day with CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Ray Cline who was informed of the President's

dissatisfaction with the current system of getting information to him. Bundy and Cline agreed to try a new method. The President would receive “all really good” intelligence by a faster ticker which would be delivered to him via his secretary’s office. In addition, twice a day the President would receive a more general assessment, once in his evening checklist and again in a morning summary ready at 7:30 a.m. in the Situation Room. (Ibid., National Security File, McGeorge Bundy Memos to the President, Vol. X)

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## 66. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 12–13, 1965, 11:47 p.m.–1:15 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting in the Executive Mansion at Mid-night, 12–13 May 1965

### PRESENT WERE

The President  
For State: Messrs. Ball, Mann, and Vaughn  
For Defense: Secretary McNamara  
For the White House: Mr. Bundy  
For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. The President opened this meeting, which was held in his private quarters, by reconstructing from hand-written notes a telephone conversation he had had earlier with an emissary whom he identified as Mr. C.J. Davidson<sup>2</sup> and whom he had sent to San Juan for conversation with Juan Bosch.<sup>3</sup>

2. According to the President, the emissary had had a most difficult day with Bosch, achieving a break-through toward the end only when he succeeded in convincing Bosch that Caamano was “unconstitutional” as head of a government in the Dominican Republic. Having

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chron as DDCI and DCI, Folder 13, January 1–December 31, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 13. The meeting was held on the second floor of the Executive Mansion. The time and place of the meeting are from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> A pseudonym Abe Fortas used on a secret mission to Puerto Rico to meet with former Dominican Republic President Juan Bosch. Fortas departed Washington the morning of May 12 and returned the afternoon of May 16.

<sup>3</sup> From Puerto Rico Fortas placed a telephone call to President Johnson at 10:50 p.m., May 12. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.23, Side B, PNO 1)

conceded this, Bosch then nominated two followers whom he would find acceptable to become President of the Dominican Republic:

A) Emilio Almonte Jimenez, Minister of Public Works under Caa-mano and a hydraulic engineer by profession.

B) Silvestre Antonio Guzman, former Minister of Agriculture under Bosch.

3. Further, Bosch proposed that Julio Postigo Arias have a position in the Cabinet and that Colonel Rafael Fernandez be made Chief of Police. Bosch went on to state that he personally would not return to the Dominican Republic and that he would not want either Caa-mano or Imbert connected with the proposed government. He indicated that he would like to see Balaguer in the Cabinet and that he felt Balaguer would support the nominees he had identified. Bosch was agreeable to having United States Marines remain for a period of time, provided that a substantial number were withdrawn from the present complement. (No distinction was made between Marines and United States Army personnel.) Bosch also indicated that the Dominican Republic would need \$100,000,000 during the next seventeen months, at which time an election would be held according to the provisions of the Constitution.

4. Immediately following the President's exposition, the undersigned excused himself for the purpose of starting traces on the individuals whom Bosch had nominated. Therefore, the undersigned was not present for a period of time during which Admiral Raborn can identify the matters discussed.

(Traces and biographical material as requested were available to the White House, Department of State, and the Pentagon in time for the daily 1000 meeting in the White House on 13 May.)<sup>4</sup>

5. After considerable discussion of the problems confronting the United States Government in working with Bosch on his proposal, the President put in a telephone call to Mr. Davidson in San Juan, permitting Messrs. McNamara, Mann, and Bundy to listen in on various extensions.<sup>5</sup> The President asked Mr. Davidson to remain in San Juan and to have further conversation with Bosch on 13 May with respect to a more balanced Cabinet, and particularly to try to work out a more precise statement as to how the proposed government would deal with Communists and Trujilloistas. (On 13 May, the White House received a dictated statement from Mr. Davidson on this last point.)<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>6</sup> See attachment 3 to Document 67.

6. The meeting adjourned with the understanding that further moves would be made on the morning of 13 May when traces on the men proposed by Betancourt would be available.

**Richard Helms<sup>7</sup>**  
*Deputy Director*

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<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

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## **67. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 13, 1965, 5:10–6:40 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Meeting in the Cabinet Room 1700, 13 May 1965 on the Dominican Republic

### **PRESENT WERE**

The President  
For State: Messrs. Ball, Mann, and Kennedy Crockett  
For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance  
For the White House: Messrs. Bundy and Moyers  
For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. The President opened the meeting by reading aloud the three attachments to this memorandum. On attachment number 2, the President thought that the second sentence should be omitted at least until the OAS had declared itself.<sup>2</sup>

2. Traces were requested on Colonel Coromines,<sup>3</sup> the brother of Colonel Enrique Coromines. The undersigned stepped out of the meeting to start this process with both State and the Agency.

3. Admiral Raborn identified the possibility that the Communists in the Dominican Republic might resort to violence when and if an announcement is made that Colonel Caamano has been ousted. He also mentioned the contingency that at some juncture Dominican Communists might cross the border into Haiti in an effort to unseat Duvalier

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chron as DDCI and DCI, January 1–December 31, 1965, Folder 13. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 14. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> Not attached.

<sup>3</sup> A candidate under consideration for Secretary of State for the Armed Forces.

and set up a Communist state there. This in turn led to a colloquy between the President and the Department of State representatives as to what consultations or contingency plans should be made in the event that coups occurred in other Latin American countries, with particular reference to Haiti.

4. The remainder of the meeting was absorbed by two conversations with Mr. C.J. Davidson in San Juan, the first conducted by the President,<sup>4</sup> and the second by Mr. Bundy.<sup>5</sup> From these conversations, it emerged that Bosch was sending a Colonel Hernandez at 6:00 A.M., 14 May, by plane to Santo Domingo for the purpose of having a conversation with Colonel Caamano, hopefully leading to his accepting Bosch's solution to the political problem. The President was clearly doubtful that Colonel Caamano would agree to quit. Nevertheless, if Colonel Caamano does agree, then Bosch would talk with Guzman in an effort to persuade him to assume the presidency, after proper support from the Dominican Congress. This would be followed by an approach to Guzman from Mr. Bundy who would also undertake to insure that the five-man OAS committee would approve this approach. It was also decided to give Ambassador Bennett some small insight into the purpose of Colonel Hernandez' trip.<sup>6</sup> It was left to the Department of Defense to arrange by what aircraft and with what arrangements Colonel Hernandez would proceed to Santo Domingo.

**Richard Helms<sup>7</sup>**  
*Deputy Director*

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<sup>4</sup> President Johnson placed a telephone call to Abe Fortas on May 13 at 5:35 p.m. During this 16-minute conversation Fortas outlined in great detail a plan, which is summarized here for the establishment of a coalition government in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.24, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)

<sup>5</sup> McGeorge Bundy telephoned Abe Fortas on May 13 at 6:30 p.m. to finalize plans for the transportation of the two Dominican military officers from Puerto Rico to Santo Domingo, and discuss arrangements once they arrived. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.24, Side A, PNO 3)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 1018 to Santo Domingo, May 13, Mann, without naming Fortas, informed Bennett and Palmer that an "intermediary" had arranged for two Dominican military officers in Bosch's confidence, Colonels Hernandez and Herrera, to contact Caamaño once they arrived in Santo Domingo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP)

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

**Attachment No. 1<sup>8</sup>**

San Juan, May 13, 1965.

*Dictated by Mr. Davidson 4:15 PM—5/13/65*

It is understood that Juan Bosch will support the following objectives:

1. For President, Silvestre Antonio Guzman
2. Juan Bosch proposes that he talk with Balaguer
  - A. To enlist his support for the plan and the new government, and
  - B. To inquire whether he would serve in the Cabinet or would suggest one of this associates for the Cabinet.
3. Juan Bosch will support for the Cabinet Julio Postigo.<sup>9</sup>
4. J.B. recognizes that the Cabinet might include a person—whether or not a military officer—who would have a special appeal to the San Isidro forces, and he will endeavor to suggest name or names.
5. J.B. is of the opinion that Colonel Coromines—not his brother, Lt. Col. Henrique Coromines—could be a satisfactory Chief of the Army. Bosch thinks that Coromines is now commander of the Mao fortress.
6. Communists. Last night's paper sets forth the understanding.<sup>10</sup> The detailed procedures will have to be worked out with the new President with the object of accomplishing an effective job utilizing the resources available to all concerned.
7. OAS and the President of the US would appear jointly as functioning to bring this about in cooperation with the Dominican people.

**Attachment No. 3<sup>11</sup>**

San Juan, May 13, 1965.

*Dictated by Mr. Davidson*

Concerning active Communists and Trujillistas, it is agreed that they present the problem for democratic government in the Dominican Republic and that effective measures must be taken by the

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<sup>8</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>9</sup> Julio D. Postigo, a close personal friend of Juan Bosch, and a member of the Imbert government.

<sup>10</sup> Not further identified; however, see attachment 3 below.

<sup>11</sup> No classification marking.



constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from their subversive activities. These measures will involve their separation from the Dominican community. They may take the form of their internment in some isolated area under Dominican jurisdiction or their departure from the island, identification of such persons to be effective promptly by mutual consultation, and prompt action will follow as aforesaid.

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## 68. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

OCI No. 1754/65

Washington, May 14, 1965.

### THE SITUATION IN THE INTERIOR OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

#### Summary

The calm which has generally prevailed in the Dominican countryside may be misleading. Under the surface there is a good deal of popular support for the Bosch–Caamano movement and there is little positive support for the Imbert Government of National Reconstruction. At the same time, lack of food or its high cost and the general economic dislocation are stimulating discontent.

This situation is made to order for radical agitations, and it is clear that both pro-Bosch and Communist elements in the rebel movement are attempting to exploit it, particularly through inflammatory broadcasts over Radio Santo Domingo. Disturbances have already occurred in some localities, most significantly in the relatively conservative city of Santiago on 13 May. The chances of growing unrest, confusion, and rebel gains in the interior are almost certain to increase if the political stalemate is prolonged in Santo Domingo.

1. Developments in the provinces of the Dominican Republic have normally been dominated by what is going on in the capital city. Santo Domingo is not only the political, military, and financial center of the country; it is also the hub of the country's commercial, transportation, and communication systems. It is the Dominican industrial center. All major industries, except for chocolate manufacturing and mining, are

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.

based in the capital.<sup>2</sup> Even more important is the fact that Santo Domingo is the location of the country's major wholesale houses, which provide domestic and imported goods to local merchants all over the country. Well over ten percent of the Dominican population lives in the capital.

2. Political and military decisions reached in the capital have historically been accepted in the countryside. Most Dominicans want to be on the winning side. During the crucial days of the insurrection prior to the landing of US military forces, it was apparent that the bulk of the populace in the interior was simply waiting for an outcome in the capital before joining forces with the winner. There is little doubt that if the rebel forces in the capital had won, most of the military commands throughout the provinces, as well as the provincial and local government bodies, would have swung to the rebel side. A few ranking military officers would have recognized that a rebel victory signified the end of their careers, and these officers might have tried to resist, but it is more likely that they would have run away. The conservative business class in the Cibao area would have been opposed to the rebellion, but its reaction probably would have been ineffectual and passive.

3. What actually happened after the landing of US forces was that the wavering and waiting Dominican military commands in the interior suddenly stiffened and became "loyalist." They evidently believed that the coming of US troops had significantly reduced the chances of a rebel victory. It must be assumed, however, that "loyalist" control in the interior at present is only as secure as it is in the capital. If the situation in the capital should shift toward some other group, those now exercising control in the countryside would probably follow suit.

4. There is one element in the present political-psychological situation which could cause some shift from the traditional pattern. This new element is that *potential* rebel strength—in the interior as well as in the capital—is probably much greater than is apparent on the surface. There is little doubt that the Caamano government does represent to many people throughout the country the forces of "constitutionalism" and of general revulsion against the old "establishment." In this sense, there are elements of a genuine popular revolution in the Bosch-Caamano movement.

5. In addition, Caamano personally has shown some of the qualities of a charismatic leader. The Imbert Government of National

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<sup>2</sup> In the city are food processing plants, the country's only cement plant, the largest flour mill, a shipyard, a foundry, a brewery, a distillery, and plants producing nails, vegetable oils, textiles, batteries, fertilizers, asbestos products, shoes, soap, and explosives. [Footnote in the source text.]

Reconstruction, on the other hand, has as yet no base of public support and, where it is respected, it is respected as the source of authority and police control. The Imbert government is, rightly or wrongly, regarded by many Dominicans as the defender of the discredited military establishment and of the conservative economic oligarchy.

6. The issue of Communism in the Caamano government is not well understood by most Dominicans. Reports from a number of interior towns during the course of the insurrection reveal that the young people throughout the countryside were the ones most ready to commit themselves to the rebel cause. Groups of young men left their home towns on the first two days of the insurrection and traveled toward Santo Domingo to fight for the rebels. Many of these youths subsequently drifted back home during the first week of May. They remain an as yet unorganized but potential source of active rebel support in many towns throughout the country. There were 200 such young men in the town of Santiago Rodriguez alone who left for the capital.

7. Given the degree of Communist influence which is believed to exist in the rebel movement, the potential for Communist exploitation of the existing pro-rebel sentiment in the countryside and for Communist organizational efforts must be regarded as considerable.

8. There are reports, from clandestine sources in or close to extremist groups, of Communist preparations to organize guerrilla warfare in the interior. Communists are stockpiling weapons and planning to exploit popular sentiments, using the customary nationalistic and reformist slogans to enlist the militant non-Communist revolutionaries. These reports must be taken seriously.

9. The Communists have a fertile field. It is quite possible, over the coming months, that they may succeed in developing a broadly-supported paramilitary capability at certain points in the interior. Such an effort would threaten to complete the job of stealing the revolution from its former moderate leaders. The result might become effective pressure from the countryside on the city—a reversal of the traditional pattern, but the identical pattern which did, in fact, occur in Cuba in 1958 and 1959.

10. At the same time, discontent has been stimulated by the economic disruption throughout the country caused by the rebel control of most important portions of the capital city. Santo Domingo is now unable to supply the goods needed to maintain the local economies. This condition is exacerbating the already chronic unemployment problem in many towns and cities. Small industries have been forced to close down because they have received no raw materials from Santo Domingo. The commercial banking system, headquartered in the capital is inoperative throughout the country and there is little money to pay the workers who do have jobs. The traditionally passive

campesinos are bringing some locally produced foods into the towns and cities, but it is not enough.

11. Worse yet—because of its serious social and political implications—is the fact that local Dominican merchants—who seem to have even less social awareness than the usual Latin Americans in this class, have raised their prices to levels at which the poor in some areas cannot obtain food even though supplies exist in local stores and warehouses. That this is an explosive problem is demonstrated by the food riots that have taken place this week in almost every location where charitable organizations have set up free food distribution centers. The extremists are being handed a perfect issue with which to rouse public hatred against the middle class.

12. Against this background, the propaganda which the rebel government has been able to broadcast throughout the country over the transmitters of Radio Santo Domingo, at least through 12 May, can only serve to arouse more public discontent and more support for the rebel cause.

13. A possible foretaste of things to come occurred in Santiago on 12 May when Communist and other pro-rebel elements tried to organize a demonstration in a city park. In this case, the local military authorities reacted vigorously in breaking up the small groups which attempted to demonstrate, and one demonstrator was shot when he threw rocks at the police. On the same day members of the medical and law associations in Santiago were canvassing for signatures for a petition against the US military intervention.

14. It is apparent that the longer the political stalemate continues in Santo Domingo, the greater the chances of disturbances and pro-rebel gains in the interior. Also, as the impasse is prolonged, more of the relatively moderate rebels or rebel sympathizers are likely to adopt increasingly extremist attitudes.

15. The one possible development which could significantly undercut extremist potential in the countryside, as well as in the capital city, would be the establishment in Santo Domingo of a government which is more representative of popular aspirations for revolutionary change, less burdened by the ineffective and outmoded traditional Dominican military establishment, not beholden to the old economic oligarchy, and not perverted by Communist influence. The formation of such a government is complicated by the short supply of qualified leaders who can fill the bill.

**69. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1965, 5:51–8:13 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting in the Cabinet Room, 1745, 14 May 1965 on the Dominican Republic

PRESENT WERE

The President

For State: Messrs. Ball, Mann, and Vaughn

For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance

For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti

For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. This meeting consisted of a two and a half hour discussion of a variety of matters affecting United States Government policy toward the Dominican Republic.

2. At the start, Mr. Bundy indicated that he had heard from Mr. Davidson and that the approach to Caamano had gone a hundred percent.<sup>2</sup> In other words, Caamano had accepted the proposition conveyed to him by the two Colonels representing Bosch. Mr. Bundy also noted that the search was on to locate Guzman. At about 1930, another call came from Mr. Davidson to the President in which Mr. Davidson stated that Guzman had agreed to serve as president of a provisional government.<sup>3</sup> It was further indicated that Guzman was proceeding to San Juan for the purpose of meeting with Bosch. At this juncture, there en-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chron as DDCI and DCI, Folder 13, January 1–December 31, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 15. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> Fortas telephoned President Johnson at 2:45 p.m. on May 14 to inform him that "the entire plan has been accepted." They also discussed the next step in the plan, which was to locate Guzman. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)

<sup>3</sup> Fortas telephoned President Johnson at 7:29 p.m. on May 14 to tell him Guzman had agreed to accept the position. Fortas suggested that a "professional," such as McGeorge Bundy be sent to San Juan to meet with Guzman. President Johnson asked what Bundy would do, and furthermore, why was it necessary for him to go to San Juan since Fortas was as "good of a man as I've got" down there. Fortas thought it was essential for someone else to "talk to the future number one man, . . . to do a belly-to-belly understanding of everything." Fortas reasoned, "it would be better to have someone who will have a continuing role establish the relationship" since as an intermediary he would be leaving the scene eventually. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 4, and Side B, PNO 1)

sued considerable discussion of which United States Government official should proceed to San Juan, to meet with Guzman, and to re-enforce on the part of the United States how Guzman was to handle the problem of Communists in the Dominican Republic. The President finally decided, after considering McNamara and Harriman, to have Vance fly to San Isidro first for conversations with Ambassador Bennett and General Palmer, then proceed to San Juan, probably on 15 May, for the desired talk with Guzman. It was further agreed that Kennedy Crockett would go to New York for a private and unofficial conversation with Balaguer in order to insure that Balaguer would play ball if and when he received a telephone call from Bosch. It was emphasized that Balaguer was not to let on that the United States Government had approached him since Bosch has indicated that he is very touchy on the point of having this matter handled by himself only.

3. One part of the meeting dealt with the deteriorating economic situation in the Dominican Republic. There was considerable discussion of this problem, and it was finally decided to send Gaud, Solomon, and a team of twenty-odd economy experts to Santo Domingo in an effort to get the economy of the country moving again.

4. The President was most anxious to have Davidson persuade Bosch that Radio Santo Domingo should stop its inflammatory broadcasts. He indicated that we were prepared to have the Loyalists cease their incendiary statements if Radio Santo Domingo would do the same.

5. Secretary McNamara was asked to organize sabotage teams from the Special Forces to take out the radio transmitters of Radio Santo Domingo if this eventuality appeared necessary.

6. There was a lengthy discussion of actions to be taken if the Davidson mission were to fail. There was acrimonious argument about a Mann proposal to pull United States troops across the bridge to San Isidro and permit the city of Santo Domingo to become a political and economic whole. There was opposition to this suggestion from others present. Bundy advocated having United States troops clean out the northern section of Santo Domingo. There was also reluctance to accept this recommendation. In addition, the role of Balaguer in the present and future of the Dominican Republic was canvassed in depth.

7. The problem in the countryside was much discussed, but it soon became related to what one should do about Santo Domingo since that city is the political and economic heart of the country.

8. During the meeting, the President spoke on the telephone with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. A part of the conversation related to a

request from the President that Mr. Hoover improve coverage on Balaguer.<sup>4</sup>

9. The meeting adjourned at 2015.

**Richard Helms<sup>5</sup>**

*Deputy Director*

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<sup>4</sup> President Johnson telephoned Hoover at 7:05 p.m. on May 14 to ask if he had any information on Balaguer. Hoover replied he did not and President Johnson said he wanted Hoover to “get right after [Balaguer] in New York,” and that he “sure wanted [Hoover’s] operation stepped up wherever it is for the next 48, 72 hrs. unless [he] wanted to have another Castro.” (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 3)

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

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## **70. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1965.

### **SUBJECT**

Contact with Dr. Joaquin Balaguer

During the evening meeting of the Bundy Committee held May 14<sup>2</sup> it was decided that the time has come for a direct meeting with Dr. Balaguer. He should not be caught unawares by the recent turn of events in the current maneuvering aimed at resolving the political impasse in the DR.

I was instructed to carry out this mission observing the following ground rules:

- 1) Dr. Balaguer was not to be told about our negotiations with Juan Bosch;
- 2) Dr. Balaguer was not to be told anything about the nature of the new political grouping which we hope will emerge;
- 3) Dr. Balaguer was to be reassured insofar as our attitude toward him is concerned;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Crockett.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting has been found; but the President’s Daily Diary (Johnson Library) suggests that this meeting probably took place at the conclusion of the 5:51 p.m. meeting in the Cabinet Room on the Dominican Republic, see Document 69.

4) Dr. Balaguer was to be made aware that he is likely to receive a telephone call with relation to the currently evolving situation.

5) He was to be given no indication from whom this call would come nor, for that matter, what the subject might be;

6) I was to obtain Dr. Balaguer's assurance of full cooperation when the time comes for him to bring his own influence and that of his followers into play.

7) The meeting was to be arranged so that it would remain completely secret.

I have not been in direct contact with Dr. Balaguer except on irregular occasions. In order to arrange a secret meeting, it was therefore necessary to work through my intermediary of the last few months, Washington lobbyist Irving Davidson.<sup>3</sup> There was no other way of going about this, particularly in the time frame called for by my action assignment, since I do not have Dr. Balaguer's home address nor know how he can be reached except through Davidson.

On May 14 I called Davidson at home at 8:30 p.m. and told him that I wanted to arrange a secret meeting with Dr. Balaguer for that same evening. Davidson reminded me that Balaguer is always surrounded by people like Enrique Garcia and other hangers-on. If a truly secret meeting was to be carried out, we would have to make some unusual arrangements. After some discussion, Davidson and I agreed on the following plan:

1) Davidson would contact Balaguer in New York by telephone and tell Balaguer that a mutual friend (of Davidson's and Balaguer's) wished to come to New York to see Balaguer that evening;

2) That the nature of the discussion to be undertaken would be such that it would be necessary for Dr. Balaguer to meet with Davidson and the mutual friend at some place other than Balaguer's headquarters;

3) To this end Davidson would suggest to Dr. Balaguer that he wait for Davidson and "the mutual friend" in the lobby of the Regency Hotel at 11:45 p.m. May 14;

4) If Balaguer was willing to go ahead on this basis and would not insist on the "mutual friend" being identified, the deal was on;

5) Davidson and Crockett would take the 10:00 p.m. Eastern Airlines shuttle to New York to arrive at the Regency Hotel no later than 11:30.

Davidson called back very shortly to inform me that he had been able to make arrangements with Balaguer in strict accordance with the terms on which agreement had been reached, as outlined above.

Davidson was not sure, but gathered from a comment Balaguer made during their conversation, that Balaguer probably thought the

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<sup>3</sup> A pseudonym used by Abe Fortas.



“mutual friend” who was coming was General Gleason. In any event, Balaguer did not question the arrangement but readily agreed to it.

I met Davidson just in time to catch the 10:00 p.m. Eastern shuttle to New York and we worked out a scenario for the meeting during the course of the flight. We both agreed that the talk should be informal and leisurely, in keeping with all of the earlier meetings I have had with Balaguer. We also agreed that Balaguer should be suitably impressed by the surroundings in which the meeting would take place. To this end we arranged for a rather elaborate suite of rooms at the Regency.

Davidson and I made it to the Regency before Balaguer turned up and I went immediately to the suite we had reserved (room 1061). Davidson waited in the lobby for Balaguer to make sure that he had, in fact, come to the meeting alone before bringing him up to see me. Balaguer and Davidson joined me at about midnight.

After an exchange of the traditional formalities which the proprieties require in meeting with a Latin American and particularly one who has been a president of a country, I opened the conversation by apologizing to Dr. Balaguer for having asked him to come to me. I told him that I regretted very much the necessity of arranging the meeting in this manner since it would have been much more proper and respectful on my part to come to see him at his own headquarters. I asked that he forgive this impropriety and that he understand that I suggested we meet in this manner only because I felt it would be dangerous for Dr. Balaguer for me to come to his headquarters at this time and in the current circumstances.

To prepare the way for getting into the substantive stage of our conversation, I asked Dr. Balaguer if he would be kind enough to: a) give me his views on the current situation as it has evolved in the DR over recent weeks and b) outline to me any program which he felt might offer promise of contributing to the solution of the current political impasse there. I told him that I and the people with whom I work have a great deal of respect for him as a statesman and that we felt it would be very much to our advantage to have his thoughts on these and any other points he might like to cover. I stressed at this point and on various other occasions during the course of the conversation the importance which I attached to our meeting and the substance of our discussion being held in complete confidence between only the two of us. He not only agreed, but said that he, too, felt this would be in everyone’s interest.

As Dr. Balaguer is an intellectual and a gentleman, productive talks with him must be carried out with dignity and tact. The introductory exercise which I have just described took the better part of 45 minutes.

Dr. Balaguer opened his presentation by recalling his announcement earlier this week to the effect that he and his people would co-operate with the OAS in every way in order to restore tranquility in

the DR. He said that the first indispensable step must be formation of some sort of national coalition which can command respect and qualify for recognition. While Dr. Balaguer and his group would be willing to work with Imbert and/or Caamaño to this end, Dr. Balaguer was afraid that neither Imbert nor Caamaño could organize a government which would command support in the country as a whole.

I told Balaguer that while we wished to avoid making judgments on any political figures or groupings in the DR, except the communists with whom we could not work under any circumstances, I felt his assessment of both the Imbert group and the Caamaño group was quite close to our own. At the same time, I pointed out that Dominican figures of prestige who possess real leadership potential have been extremely reluctant to take any active part in Dominican politics. I asked Dr. Balaguer if he thought there was any realistic prospect for bringing men of stature, good faith, and high motivation together in this hour of great trial for his country.

Dr. Balaguer felt that prospects for achieving this were probably better now than at any time in the past. He pointed out that the DR stands on the edge of a precipice and faces the dire prospect of ceasing to be an independent nation. Unless Dominicans can find some way of working together in governing their own country, they will be governed by someone else, such as the OAS, Muñoz Marín, Betancourt, or perhaps even as a UN trusteeship. He therefore felt that the point has been reached when it would be impossible for Dominicans of stature to refuse a call to serve their country.

I responded that Dr. Balaguer's views were most heartwarming to me. I asked him if he had any particular people in mind who might be willing to come forward in the circumstances he has just described.

Dr. Balaguer said there were many, ticking off a list of perhaps a half-dozen names, none of which were very inspiring as far as I am concerned. I consequently made no comment on the names but sought to turn the discussion in another direction.

I told Dr. Balaguer that I was sure he understood the great price the US had paid in reaching its decision to land US forces on Dominican soil. I "guessed" that it was probably the hardest decision with which this country has ever been faced in its dealings with Latin America. I told him that one of our primary objectives is to help promote, by all means at our disposal, the creation of a stable and prosperous Dominican Republic so that we may withdraw our forces at the very earliest possible date.

Dr. Balaguer interrupted at this point to say that while he, too, was heart-sick over the fact of his country's occupation, he nonetheless recognized that there had been no alternative to the landing of US troops under the circumstances. He felt that it would be a mistake for the US

to withdraw its forces prematurely as the communists would surely gain control of the country if we did. Further, Dr. Balaguer felt that the time has now come for a complete restructuring of the Dominican armed forces. Once this has been accomplished, then the time will have come for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces.

In response to my query, Dr. Balaguer outlined his views on the most desirable form that a restructured Dominican armed force might take. His ideas were so close to those we have developed in the Bundy Committee meetings that I have wondered at one stage whether someone might not have already briefed him about what we have in mind. Consequently, I reacted to his proposal only to the extent of nodding my head affirmatively as he outlined it. At the end of his presentation I told him that it seemed to me this was something for Dominicans themselves to work out but I was sure the DR could count on the full cooperation and support of the US if, in fact, events should evolve in the way he had just outlined.

At this point, I got down to the business of carrying out the remainder of my assignment. I told Dr. Balaguer that:

- 1) We are aware of diplomatic initiatives now underway aimed at breaking the present impasse;
- 2) We hope these will bear fruit because we are in general agreement with Dr. Balaguer's assessment of both the Caamaño and Imbert groupings;
- 3) We anticipate that Dr. Balaguer will be approached very shortly and asked for his collaboration in and cooperation with the diplomatic initiatives to which I had just referred;
- 4) Since this is a highly sensitive negotiation, we entreat Dr. Balaguer to keep completely secret the discussions he and I are conducting;
- 5) We believe that Dr. Balaguer and his group have a large part to play in the interim and long-term political evolution of the DR;
- 6) We are prepared to support Dr. Balaguer and his group in their constructive efforts;
- 7) We fervently hope that if Dr. Balaguer is not able to respond affirmatively to the approach which we feel will shortly be made to him, he will at least not respond negatively until he has again given us the opportunity to consult with him;
- 8) I sincerely regretted finding myself in the position of asking so much of Dr. Balaguer while I was limited by my instructions to tell him so little;
- 9) I reiterated the extreme importance, both from his standpoint and ours, of keeping our meeting entirely secret;
- 10) Without naming any names, I said I was sure he would understand how difficult it was to deal with some of the individuals who must be involved in any meaningful solution. I again underscored the delicacy of this entire operation from that standpoint.

At this point, I asked Dr. Balaguer if he felt we had understood each other, despite the elliptical nature of our conversation. If not, did he have any questions to ask?

Dr. Balaguer said that he felt there was a clear understanding between us and that he had no doubts as to the meaning of my various comments and suggestions nor, for that matter, my failure to react to some of his comments and suggestions. He said that the really serious problem from his standpoint was a basic one for which he saw no solution. He protested that he is a man without ambition and that he is beginning to feel the weight of his years (salt to taste).

I took this up immediately by repeating my earlier statements, emphasizing the Dominican Republic's great need at this time for the help and support of its leading statesmen. I said that for my own part, Dr. Balaguer headed that list. I was confident he would not fail his country in this hour of need despite the heavy price I realized he would have to pay in again taking up an active role in Dominican politics.

I really think Dr. Balaguer swallowed this one hook, line and sinker. At least tears came into his eyes.

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## **71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1965, 1930Z.

1228. "From: The President. For Bundy and Vance."<sup>2</sup>

1. After Bundy's telecon with Moyers this am,<sup>3</sup> it was decided in full review here to approve your recommendation to return, Bundy to come back to Washington Wednesday<sup>4</sup> morning and Vance to remain, pending arrival of OAS Foreign Ministers committee.<sup>5</sup> We hope that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Dominican Republic State & CIA Cables. Secret; Flash; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Bundy, Mann, Vance, and Vaughn, the "Bundy-Vance Mission," departed Washington for Santo Domingo at 7 a.m. on May 15 on President Johnson's instructions to help establish a government of national concord. They arrived in Santo Domingo May 16 after a stop in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> May 19.

<sup>5</sup> OAS Commission members Colombo of Argentina and Carrisoza of Colombia arrived in Santo Domingo on the morning of May 15. The other three members were already in Santo Domingo.

this committee will be constituted at the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting which begins Thursday.<sup>6</sup>

2. It desirable for Bundy, Vance and Mora review situation with Caamano this afternoon outlining what US has successfully done to date and pointing out that we will continue to cooperate with OAS in all undertakings. We hope that OAS will continue the effort to establish a government of moderate, progressively oriented, anti-Communist elements representing a broad spectrum of Dominican opinion and all our info is available to them together with any information they may desire.

3. Desirable Bundy, Vance and Mora have talk with Guzman and Imbert in order also to impress them with the need for restraint pending arrival of OAS representatives.

4. Bundy is to brief Benitez so that Benitez can return to San Juan to advise Bosch as to US efforts and intentions, emphasizing need for restraint during very critical next few days.

5. Press treatment could be as follows: in order coordinate with our briefings here:

(A) At 3:30 pm this afternoon, Washington time, Bundy and Vance will give backgrounder in Santo Domingo.

(B) Rusk will have on-the-record press conference Wednesday morning in Washington.

(C) In describing function of Bundy–Vance mission, you should take following line:

(1) Compliment the 5-man OAS Commission and point out that their presence in Santo Domingo laid the basis for the achievement of a cease-fire which is now being better observed.

(2) The 5-man committee felt that its mandate limited its activities essentially to fact-finding and reporting. It did not feel that without further instructions from the meeting of foreign ministers it had a mandate to search for a liberal non-Communist provisional government of conciliation.

(3) The activities of the Bundy group have been exploratory in nature and designed to assist the efforts of the OAS at a very critical time. At all times the Bundy group has worked closely with and supported

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<sup>6</sup> The Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics was held May 20 at the OAS Headquarters in Washington. The ministers adopted a resolution to entrust the OAS Secretary General, Jose A. Mora "to negotiate a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo," and "to offer his good offices to the parties in conflict, with a view to the establishment of a climate of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic." (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965*, pp. 981–982)

the OAS representative—first the 5-man OAS mission and later Dr. Mora.

(4) Mora has done a good job. There is more observance of the cease-fire agreement reached by the 5-man OAS committee. The Inter-American force is now under the command of a Brazilian officer. Several Ministers of Foreign Affairs plan to attend personally the meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled for May 27 in Washington.

(5) Between the efforts of the Bundy group and the OAS representatives a number of avenues have been explored for establishing a provisional government of reconciliation representing all non-Communist, responsible political groups in the country.

(6) The US however has no special candidate of its own. The Dominican people with the assistance of the OAS must find a way to bring about the creation of a broadly based government committee to reform and to elections. In particular the US does not support extremists either of the left or of the right.

(7) In view of the progress which has been made, the time has come for Bundy to return to Washington in next day or so. He will report fully to the President and the Secretary of State prior to the Foreign Ministers meeting which meets on May 27. Vance will stay on to be of assistance to the Inter-American forces until such time as the decisions of the meeting of Foreign Ministers have been taken. At that time, he too, will return to Washington. Hopefully this will be within the next few days. Stonewall<sup>7</sup> anxious you stress following accomplishments to date:

1. Americans and other foreign nationals have been evacuated without loss of any lives.

2. Under the authority of the OAS an international safety cease-fire has been established and continues to be maintained as a haven for all of those who wish to use it.

3. A small but highly disciplined and armed Communist minority has been prevented from imposing itself on the country.

4. Large scale beachhead has been prevented by first the US force—now the Inter-American force—along the line of communications which separates the two contending forces.

5. Large quantities of food and medicine have been distributed to provide for the hungry and sick as a result of the efforts of many American countries.

6. An Inter-American force has been established for the first time in American history thus making it possible for the US to reduce the

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<sup>7</sup> Presumably a reference to President Johnson.

number of US forces—details concerning the reduction of the US forces will be made available soon.

7. With the efforts that have been made thus far by Mora, the commission and the Bundy–Vance mission, the stage has been set for the OAS to address itself to the question of finding a definitive political solution to the problem and we hope to the consideration of corrective machinery for dealing with these problems in the future. These matters are under OAS consideration. We hope that the OAS will continue to be the principal instrument in this hemisphere for this current, independent and democratic effort in the Western Hemisphere.

*Washington Post* today carried story FBI sending team of agents to Santo Domingo to help identify and locate Communists. Agreed-upon statement by Reedy this morning was ‘the only thing I will say is the FBI and CIA are working jointly as they customarily do on activities that are connected with the welfare of our own country, and any further information will have to come from the FBI.’ You should simply reply back to the White House statement if queried about this.

On Guzman role the agreed-upon statement by State at noon today was ‘We do not have full information about Mr. Guzman’s role at the bank or his activities while director and we suggest you ascertain this from him directly.’ Stonewall anxious avoid direct or indirect endorsement Guzman by USG officials.

One final note from Stonewall: Your effort should provide clear, sharp note of confidence that from the Sunday<sup>8</sup> morning when we first moved ships to horizon until now, we have met with success in our program. Specific objectives (evacuation, averting commie takeover, cease-fire, OAS participation, etc.) achieved. Present step only continuation of that program. Turning now to OAS not admission of defeat but logical consequence previous developments.”

**Rusk**

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<sup>8</sup> April 24.

## 72. Draft Memorandum of Meeting<sup>1</sup>

San Isidro Air Base, Dominican Republic, May 15, 1965.

### PARTICIPANTS

Commodore Francisco Rivera Caminero, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces,  
Government of National Reconstruction (GNR)  
Brig. Gen. Juan de los Santos Cespedes, Chief of Staff,  
Dominican Air Force, GNR  
Brig. Gen. Jacinto Martinez Arana,<sup>2</sup> Chief of Staff, Dominican Army, GNR  
Commodore Ramon Emilio Jimenez, Chief of Staff, Dominican Navy, GNR  
Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann  
Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of State Jack H. Vaughn  
Lt. General Bruce Palmer  
Lt. Colonel Thomas Fishburn  
Lt. Colonel Ralph Heywood (USMC)  
Harry W. Shlaudeman

Under Secretary Mann opened the meeting by thanking the Dominican officers for their courtesy in attending. It was necessary, if inconvenient, to assemble at San Isidro in order to avoid publicity and potentially damaging speculation in the press.

Mr. Mann explained that he had been sent to the Dominican Republic by the President of the United States and was speaking for the President. A solution to the Dominican conflict must be found quickly. It was particularly urgent to get the Dominican economy going again. In this context, the Dominican officers were surely aware that basic Communist tactics aimed at bringing the economy of a target country to a standstill so as to promote general chaos and suffering.

If order could not be restored rapidly, Mr. Mann continued, fighting might break out in the provinces. The United States would then

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/DR Files: Lot 70 D 442, POL 15-1 Head of Government. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The exact time of this meeting has not been determined; however, during a brief telephone conversation between Bromley Smith and President Johnson at 11:25 a.m., May 15, the former told the President that Mann and Vaughn were expected to arrive at the San Isidro Air Base at approximately noon. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Bromley Smith, Tape F65.26, Side B, PNO 2)

<sup>2</sup> General Martinez Arana arrived after the meeting had been underway for approximately thirty minutes. He came from the northern zone of the city where he had been leading troops in the assault on rebel positions along Maximo Gomez Avenue. Martinez reported the going to be tough and progress slow, in part, he asserted, because co-operating units of the National Police were proving [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [Footnote in the source text.]



probably have to use force to a much greater degree and a full-scale occupation could result. Faced with this problem, the United States Government had been giving careful and continuing study to various means of ending the fighting. It was recognized that the use of force to clear the rebels from Santo Domingo might ultimately be necessary. However, the United States Government was not prepared to consider this alternative except as a last resort. The rebel forces included many well-intentioned youngsters who had been tricked by the extremists. The Communists were now in the background while these innocents played an increasingly important role. The shedding of their blood would be a tragedy.

Finally, Mr. Mann said, the United States Government had come to the conclusion that the Dominican people were tired of government by oligarchy, unjustified privileges for the few and general corruption. They wanted equality, reforms and constitutionality. President Johnson, for himself and for all of his government, had made United States support for these aspirations absolutely clear. At the same time, Mr. Mann commented, the Dominican officers should have no misapprehensions regarding the anti-Communist commitment of the United States Government. He personally could speak with full authority and excellent credentials on this point, having been subjected to incessant attack by Castro and all his supporters.

Rivera Caminero spoke at this juncture, first summarizing Mr. Mann's remarks as he understood them and then expressing doubts as to the validity of the argument against using military action to end the rebellion. It was his opinion that such action offered the most rapid and practical way to a solution.

In responding, Mr. Mann pointed out that the creation of martyrs was a basic element of Marxist-Leninist tactics in any conflict situation. He further explained that complicated international problems made it essential to search for a peaceful solution. Obtaining a bare two-thirds vote in the OAS for the concept of an Inter-American force had been a difficult struggle. The intervention had been attacked heavily in the United Nations, and the United States and its allies were hard put there to defend the right of the hemisphere to deal with its own affairs.

Mr. Mann then turned to specifics. In view of these various considerations, the United States Government had decided that the best solution lay with the formation of a government of national unity. Unofficial contacts with Bosch and Balaguer had led to a concrete proposal for such a government to be headed by Antonio Guzman. No firm agreement had yet been reached, but it now appeared close. The patriotic support of the Armed Forces would be needed and the United States Government expected that support to be forthcoming in the best interests of the Dominican Republic and the hemisphere.

There were to be no reprisals or vengeance, Mr. Mann continued. Bosch would have the responsibility of controlling Caamaño and the rebels. The Communists were to be eliminated from the political life of the nation—this being a firm condition for United States support of the proposal. For their part, the Armed Forces would accept and support the new government in return for the recognition of the principle of the integrity of the Armed Forces. The right of the military to exist as an integral institution with a voice in the future of the nation was to be clearly established with the formation of the new government. As added insurance, it had been agreed that a man specifically acceptable to the Armed Forces would be chosen for a Cabinet or sub-Cabinet position.

Mr. Mann emphasized that under this formula the Armed Forces would be in a solid position to defend the security of the nation. The United States would assist in this task, President Johnson already having made clear his determination to prevent the Dominican Republic from falling to communism whatever the cost. The United States would also be prepared to help the Armed Forces to reform and modernize. The Dominican Navy obviously needed patrol boats, not overage destroyers; the Army required mobile units with modern arms, not masses of untrained men; in general, it was time for the Dominican Armed Forces to reorient toward professionalism and the modern age. Perhaps training under Inter-American auspices could be arranged.

Returning to the question of the proposed new government, Mr. Mann described Antonio Guzman as a moderate, honorable and stable man who could give the country responsible leadership. Balaguer had promised to participate, perhaps not personally, but at least through one or more representatives in the Cabinet. This would give the new government balance and help insure its commitment to national unity.

General De los Santos asked if the proposal meant reinstatement of the Constitution of 1963. Commodore Rivera described that Constitution as "atheistic" and said any new government that might be formed should write its own constitution.

In reply, Mr. Mann observed that politics is always the art of the possible. The 1963 Constitution was obviously not ideal but its acceptance seemed to offer the only way to pacify and unite the country. In any case, Mr. Mann continued, it was difficult to believe that this question had very great importance. Various methods would be available to change the Constitution if that proved necessary. The Dominican officers should turn their attention to fundamental issues. The proposal dealt satisfactorily with these: the Armed Forces would be preserved; the country would have a moderate president and a balanced Cabinet; the way would be open to maintain the Inter-American force

until peace could be assured; a beginning would be made on the crucial task of economic development; and the means would be at hand to deal intelligently with the Communist threat.

Mr. Mann also pointed out that what was actually under discussion was a provisional government of approximately 17 months duration. Under the 1963 Constitution, elections would then be held. The OAS would supervise these elections, making certain they were truly free. There were strong indications that Dr. Balaguer could expect to do very well indeed in honest elections.

In addition, Mr. Mann emphasized, the Dominican officers must realize that national unity was essential. He well understood the profound hatreds caused by the conflict, knowledge of his own family's experiences in the American Civil War having prepared him for such understanding. He also understood, however, that the country could only go forward if hatreds were laid aside. As part of the process of creating national unity, the Armed Forces would have to accept the reincorporation of the rebel officers and men. In the end, this would be the least painful course they could adopt. Finally, the reunited Armed Forces would have to change their ways. The goal must be a respected, honorable institution enjoying the support of the people and dedicated to the role of guardians of the nation. When this goal was achieved, the Armed Forces could count on the support of the United States, not before.

Commodore Rivera said he could not accept Caamaño back because Caamaño had sacked his house. Mr. Mann observed that vengeance should be avoided and the law applied in cases of this kind. He also stressed that Caamaño would not be in the new government. In response to a question from De los Santos regarding the political composition of the government, Mr. Mann said that it was not yet known in detail which specific parties and men would participate. The important thing was to have a broad government of national unity. General De los Santos remarked that the Communists always call for governments of national unity. Mr. Mann again explained that the establishment of the government was conditioned on the removal of the Communists from the political arena.

He also reiterated the absolute commitment of the United States to prevent a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican officers should attempt to understand that their best guarantee in this regard was provided by the determination of the United States to protect its own national interests. A Communist victory in the Dominican Republic would have doubled the potential capacity of the Soviets to kill North Americans. It was not a question of ideology but of security against Sino-Soviet aggression.

The discussion then turned to the problem of the leadership of the Armed Forces under the new government. Mr. Mann mentioned that

Bosch had suggested a Colonel Miguel Angel Corominas Martinez as a possible candidate for Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. General De los Santos objected that Corominas was a friend of Rhadames Trujillo. Commodore Rivera added that his wife was a prominent leader of the PRD. The former went on to remark that it was none of Bosch's business who headed the Armed Forces, while the latter expressed the opinion that the Armed Forces should select their own chief. The Dominican officers all agreed with this point of view. Mr. Mann replied that Corominas had only been a suggestion and observed that there could be no objection to the Armed Forces coming up with their own man, always providing he was apolitical, respected, honorable and professional.

Mr. Mann then returned to his thesis that the Dominican officers should concern themselves with fundamentals. The proposal he was advancing offered the Dominican Republic a chance to return to security and peace. The integrity of the Armed Forces would be preserved and the Communist threat would be eliminated. It would be well to think back to the immediate past—to how the country arrived at this crossroads. The revolt created a vacuum; Communists—armed Communists—filled that vacuum. For a time they were the only real organized force. In order to meet this danger, the United States had taken and was continuing to take great risks. It would be a disgrace for the Armed Forces and Dominicans in general if the United States was forced to extend its intervention. The Dominican officers understandably found it difficult to make concessions but under the circumstances they must.

General De los Santos asserted that the 1963 Constitution could not be accepted because its reinstatement would force all decent Dominicans as good Catholics to emigrate. Commodore Rivera added that to accept the 1963 Constitution was to accept the government of Juan Bosch, an impossibility. Mr. Mann suggested that acceptance could be provisional. If persecution of Catholics resulted, Bosch and his supporters would be put on the defensive and corrective action could be taken. He once more pointed out that elections would be coming in 17 months and that there was reason to believe the majority would not vote for Bosch. The latter claimed to be the voice of the people. Why not let him try to prove it? In addition, Bosch and Caamaño had made the 1963 Constitution a symbol. Why not accept this symbol—only a symbol—in order to end the fighting?

At this point, Mr. Mann repeated his explanation of the international difficulties posed by the Dominican crisis. He described in detail the difficult situation in the United Nations where the United States had to counter attempts by the Soviet Union to mix in the Dominican affair. The Dominican officers should bear in mind these important factors, realizing that the fight against communism is not just a narrow, national struggle.

General Martinez Arana responded with the observation that he had nothing personal against Bosch but [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Guzman, in his opinion, was an honorable man and might be acceptable if he were not under the influence of Bosch. Mr. Mann observed that the United States would have considerable influence with the new government and, again, that elections would be coming, with Bosch's chances to win distinctly poor. It was important to separate Bosch from the Communists. The establishment of a new government under Antonio Guzman would accomplish that purpose. General De los Santos objected that the Communists would somehow get into and exploit the elections. Mr. Mann assured him this would not be possible, emphasizing again that the United States had just as much interest in preventing such a development as did the Dominican military.

He further urged De los Santos and the others to think in flexible terms. Why could not they be as clever as the Communists in protecting their long-term interests? Here was an opportunity to take the initiative for once. Nothing would be frozen. On the contrary, acceptance of the proposal would bring a great opportunity to work for truly basic solutions to the country's problems.

Finally, Mr. Mann asked, what were the alternatives? The Dominican Armed Forces did not have the capacity to restore order by themselves. The general situation was increasingly serious. Every hour lost was crucial to the future of the country. Ambassador Bennett at this point added his personal plea. Obviously, given the vilification to which he had been subjected by the rebels, the proposal was difficult for him, just as it was for the Dominican officers. Nevertheless, he recognized as they should that peace must be restored and a beginning made on the task of reunifying the country.

General De los Santos said he still could not understand why it was necessary to accept the 1963 Constitution. To do so would put the Armed Forces in an "undignified position." The Armed Forces had deposed Bosch. Giving in now on the question of the Constitution would leave them "naked" and logically lead to the dismemberment of the Armed Forces. Commodore Rivera added his opinion that to accept the 1963 Constitution would be the equivalent of declaring the cause for which he and his comrades had fought to be unjust—that the rebels had been right. Also, it was well known that Bosch was an enemy of the Armed Forces and that the Communists were behind the PRD. It was the opinion of Commodore Rivera that the best political party was the Union Civica Nacional.

Mr. Mann responded that he still held the view that the constitutional question meant very little. The real cause, the real mission—both of the Armed Forces and the United States—was to preserve the Dominican Republic from communism. What he proposed would serve

that cause. The Dominican officers should look to the future, keep their people together, keep the chance to give the country a decent future. Otherwise, all might end in chaos and hatred—hatred for the military and for the United States. Now was the time to act.

General De los Santos predicted that the proposed new government could only last three months and that by the time it reached its end he and his colleagues would have been eliminated. Mr. Mann conceded that this might happen and that there were, in the very nature of the difficult Dominican situation, possibilities for other unfavorable developments.

Commodore Jimenez then proposed that he and his fellow officers withhold judgment until more specific details of the proposal were available, including the names of those who were to serve in the government. He said the Dominican officers recognized the sacrifices made by the United States and were deeply grateful. He felt it necessary, nevertheless, to point out that the formula proposed by Mr. Mann posed a number of difficult problems. The political parties not involved would resist the formation of a Guzman government, as would many democrats and non-Communists in general.

There was agreement among the Dominican officers that Commodore Jimenez was correct in urging delay in reaching a final decision until more detailed discussions could be held. At this point, Mr. Mann asked to speak privately with the officers, and the meeting was adjourned.

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**73. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, May 16, 1965, 0622Z.

68. May 65. For White House from Mann and Vaughn. For Acting Secretary of State<sup>2</sup> (RUEHC). This afternoon and this evening Vaughn,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Rusk and McNamara. The telegram, sent over Defense communications channels, was received in the Department of State at 3:47 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> On May 15 Rusk was in Vienna to commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. George Ball was Acting Secretary.

Shlaudeman and Mann had three principal conversations. First with the Secretary of State for Armed Forces Rivera Caminero, Chief of Staff of Air Force de Los Santos Cespedes, Chief of Staff of Navy Emilio Jimenez, and Chief of Staff of Army Jacinto Martinez. In two hour discussion we outlined our views of current situation and expressed opinion. This was moment for government of national unity which would hold office for 17 months period preceding next elections. We said we are exploring with Bosch and other political leaders possibility of a coalition but made clear we did not yet have firm agreement. The four expressed opposition to Bosch or to 1963 constitution. Objected to reintegration of or any other accommodation with rebel officers. Specifically rejected Corominas. Said he was former Ramfis Trujillo's chauffeur with fourth grade education. Our feeling is that all four are opposed to proposed coalition but will ultimately go along. Question is whether they will really try to control their officers in the three services and if they do, whether they can succeed in bringing armed forces along.

Personal hatreds obviously run very deep. These officers are, in opinion of Embassy, cream of the crop and the only ones among top officers willing with Imbert to take personal risks to actively oppose rebel movement.

We did not see Wessin, whose staff said he was fighting, but who we are informed by Rivera was hiding from us. We do not believe we should overestimate Wessin's strength as he has lost stature as a result of his vacillating timidity and indecision. Wessin is described as having said he would prefer to be pushed out rather than voluntarily resign and believe it probable that this could be accomplished if necessary.

Imbert made good impression. Shlaudeman says that whatever his faults—and they are considerable—he is man that has never double-crossed us. Imbert strongly expressed his disappointment. He said that he had no political ambition (probably only partially true) and would have stepped down yesterday morning, if he had been told. Said his forces had taken three hundred and forty prisoners; made considerable advance north of Loc yesterday and today and inflicted numerous casualties. Said this cut his ties with all anti-US elements and left him in isolated and exposed position. Said he had spoken to Embassy of possibility of resigning before and would do so at any time. Said occupation by US troops was preferable to Commie take over, that if his loyal forces suffer another serious setback they would cease to exist as effective fighting unit and we would then be faced with necessity of occupying entire country for many months to come. Claimed rebel forces were weary and dispirited and that without excessive bloodshed he will be able to take capitol within four or five days. Denied there was any unrest in countryside. We believe there is substantial unrest in

countryside and while giving Imbert credit for pulling armed forces together and instilling fighting spirit doubt that he has strength to do anything more than achieve stalemate in the city at probable cost of weakening loyalists military strength in interior.

Imbert is obviously very pro US but is typical Latin American reactionary in his approach to political, economic and social problems. We told Imbert we are merely consulting and promised to let him know Washington's views tomorrow. Meeting with OAS committee was depressing. Argentinian and Colombian representatives expressed their displeasure at lack of creature comforts. Committee obviously deeply hurt that UN has intervened in situation.<sup>3</sup> Said they plan to return tomorrow to Washington to discuss with meetings of Foreign Ministers. Questioned whether they had legal authority to do anything other than investigate and report. I made obvious answers and urged that OAS could best reply to UN initiative by doing effective job instead of debating legalistic and theological problems in OAS. I informed them of opportunity which our current efforts to establish coalition government might give them to reestablish OAS prestige by reporting success instead of failure. Promised to get in touch with them again tomorrow and hope to be able to keep them on the job.

It is obvious they shrink from assuming responsibility and almost pathetic in hope that non-violent solution can be found. Doubt they will approve use of force by US or loyalist forces without full and lengthy debate and meeting of Foreign Ministers in Wash and without detailed instructions from their government. Their mood is one of depression and defeat. Have not seen Vance and Bundy yet although understand they made progress with Bosch. Will meet tomorrow at 7:30 Washington time and will report joint appraisals. Meanwhile it is clear we must make our decision very soon or risk falling between stools.

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<sup>3</sup> At 10:30 a.m., May 14, the UN Security Council met and unanimously approved a resolution calling for a cease-fire and inviting Secretary General U Thant to send a representative, Jose Mayobre, to observe and report on the situation. The Secretary General's advance team arrived in Santo Domingo the afternoon of May 15; Mayobre arrived on May 18.



**74. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Vance), and Abe Fortas to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, May 16, 1965, 0745Z.

69. May 65. From Davidson, Vance and Bundy. Nine hours with Bosch, Guzman and Benitez leave us moderately encouraged.

Most important result is specific agreement that suitable persons of our choosing would work with their official to develop plan and come to agreement as to how to handle Communists and our people will continue to participate for such time as necessary. We agreed that while internment or departure of Communists would be among the possibilities for dealing with them, these are not exclusive since other techniques may be preferable in light of practical situation.

Second good result is agreement that Minister of Armed Forces must be agreed between rebels and loyalists. Guzman and Bosch are surprisingly hopeful that such agreement can be reached. Third, proposed cabinet, after two of our challenges were accepted, goes further toward national unity than we anticipated. Names are being sent separately for expert review. Guzman is clearly pro US. He is a decent man with more political sense than political energy. He does not seem to us very strong, but we believe his repeated assertion of convinced anti-communism. His great devotion to Bosch is plain, and we had little chance for separate talk with him. But he repeatedly expressed genuine determination to accept full responsibility himself and we believe he means it, at least for now.

Bosch mystique shows strongly in Guzman's own admiration and in his plausible report of other respected persons of various backgrounds who will serve in cabinet only if Bosch approves. Whole discussion shows solid base of your basic policy: Constitution si, communism no.

Sunday,<sup>2</sup> Vance and Bundy will go to Santo Domingo to see what can be done to improve prospects for this general plan there. They will continue Tom Mann's efforts<sup>3</sup> and also try to get OAS to help clear Radio Santo Domingo for possible Bosch speech or agreement. Bosch will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Rusk and McNamara. The telegram, sent over Defense communications channels, was received in the Department of State at 4:21 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> May 16.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 72.

call Balaguer, also probably Sunday and Davidson will come home arriving about noon.

Probable return for the rest of us will be late Sunday night. We expect our arrival in Santo Domingo will be noted by press one way or another although Mann and Vaughn apparently escaped unseen today.

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## 75. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 16, 1965, 6–8:43 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting in the Cabinet Room at 1800, 16 May 1965

### PRESENT WERE

The President

For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Harriman, Bunker, Solomon, and K. Crockett

For Defense: Secretary McNamara

Special Consultants: Messrs. Acheson and Davidson

For the White House: Messrs. Valenti and B. Smith

For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. At 1815 the President called Messrs. Rusk, McNamara, and Raborn to his office, where they were joined at 1845 by Messrs. Ball and Acheson. It is my understanding that this meeting in the President's office dealt largely with Vietnam.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Raborn) Files, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 17. The concluding time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) Valenti's handwritten notes of this meeting are *ibid.*, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes. During the course of the meeting Bundy telephoned the President from Santo Domingo at 6 p.m. to report on the negotiations there. (*Ibid.*, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.27, Side B, PNO 2 and 3) This conversation was frequently interrupted by technical difficulties and even cut off forcing Bundy to call back at 6:16 p.m. During the second conversation with Fortas and the President on the line, Bundy resumed his account of the efforts being made to assist the OAS and other factions in the formulation of a coalition government that would be acceptable to both sides and still maintain the coordinating role of "constitutionalism si, comunism no." (*Ibid.*, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.28, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)

<sup>2</sup> A record of this segment of the meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. II, Document 304.

2. While the aforementioned meeting was in progress, Mr. Davidson gave a historical run-down on his negotiations with Bosch in San Juan. Also during this period an opportunity was given the undersigned to review the tenor of the activities involving Messrs. Bundy, Vance, Mann, and Vaughn both in San Juan and Santo Domingo.

3. At 1950, the President and others entered the Cabinet Room and the meeting on the Dominican Republic began. The President expressed his concern over the “beating” which we are taking in other countries and noted that we have got to make clear what we have been doing and why. There then ensued a lengthy conversation between the President and Mr. Davidson over the complicated problem of obliging Bosch–Guzman to keep the agreement about picking up the Communists and Trujillistas as soon as a new government is announced. Guzman has been opposing immediate action of this kind.<sup>3</sup> There was also discussion of the very important posts in the Cabinet of Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of the Army.<sup>4</sup> Davidson stated he thought the United States should take a tough line in insisting on men for these two jobs acceptable to us. Davidson described Guzman as a good and decent man but pointed out that he is not a strong character. The President asked if it might not be better to make Bosch the new president. Davidson replied that Bosch has categorically refused to become president again and that it is even doubtful whether he will ever return to the Dominican Republic.

4. There was considerable discussion of the Solomon mission<sup>5</sup> and when it should depart for the Dominican Republic. It was finally decided on balance to have it proceed on Monday, 17 May.

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<sup>3</sup> In another memorandum for the record of this meeting, drafted by Raborn on May 17, the following appears on this point: “Abe Fortas said that Mr. Guzman felt it would create a lot of Communist sympathizers if the known Communists were too abruptly picked up after a semblance of peace was restored to the Island. On the other hand, it was agreed that internment or departure would be strongly imposed on the Communists and this had been agreed on by Bosch and Guzman.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Raborn) Files, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302)

<sup>4</sup> This topic was discussed for 18 minutes during a telephone call placed by Bundy to the President at 7:12 p.m. on May 16. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.28, Side B, PNO 1 and 2) Notes taken by Valenti of this telephone conversation are *ibid.*, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes. Raborn’s May 17 memorandum records this subject as follows: “All the names for the new government were acceptable to Bosch and Guzman but there could be little hope that they would be acceptable to Caamaño—although General Imbert of the junta had generally approved the list with the exception of the latter two positions.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Raborn) Files, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302)

<sup>5</sup> A team of 32 led by Solomon arrived in Santo Domingo May 17 to provide food, clothing, and other necessities to Dominican Republic citizens.

5. Mr. Ball proposed that we make some reduction in our troop strength as soon as other Latin countries have made contributions to the Inter-American Force. Davidson recommended, and the President agreed, that no United States troop reductions should be made until the new government is formed, at which point significant withdrawals should be made even though it was understood that some troops will stay in the Dominican Republic indefinitely. Troop withdrawal is regarded as a significant gesture in the Hemisphere.

6. The President inquired of Bunker whether we should do more propagandizing of Latin American countries about what we are doing and why. Bunker pointed out that those countries which oppose us do so because of domestic problems and that there is nothing much we can say which will lead them to change their public positions. At his request, we agreed to send Bunker our material on Caamano which shows that there is a history of insanity in his family.

7. During the meeting, candidates for various Dominican Cabinet posts were named and the undersigned was on the phone getting the traces started.

8. It is clear that one of the stickiest problems facing us is how we work out with a new Dominican government who is or is not a Communist. The practical application of a joint approach to this problem was discussed inconclusively.

**RH**

*Deputy Director*

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**76. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 17, 1965, 0605Z.

1752. For the President from McGeorge Bundy.

First day in Santo Domingo persuades all of us that even a temporary settlement will be hard to get. With great pain and difficulty Davidson has built a long bridge out from Bosch to this brutalized and fanatically divided island but a day of most intense discussion shows

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 2:48 a.m. and passed to the White House at 3:23 a.m.

that this bridge has no solid pillars on the opposite bank yet. Moreover Imbert and other right-wingers are trying to knock it down before it is built.

First disconcerting experience was violent rebel rejection of yesterday's agreed principle that Minister of Armed Forces should be chosen by joint agreement of contending forces. With Hector Aristy reportedly in the lead rebels appear to have insisted violently to Guzman on Montes Arrache who holds this post under Caamano and is totally unacceptable to loyalists. When I repudiated this wild notion Guzman fell back upon Rafael Hernandez. I pointed out that by agreement we were already asking loyalists for their list of acceptable names and injection of any single rebel name would produce justified and violent charge of bad faith. Guzman then asserted with every show of conviction tinged by relief that in that case there was no further chance of his success and he should give up. No question that rebel military leaders shook him badly. In this situation I suggested possibility of delaying appointment of defense secretary and retention of his powers by president himself. Guzman revived remarkably and went off to try this on the rebels.

He returned shortly with their agreement, but agreement only masked dangerous concession by him to rebel leaders which led to my telephonic reports.<sup>2</sup> He was offering rebel control over nomination of Chief of Army Staff, while masking this proposal with offer of equal privilege to loyalists on Navy and Air Chiefs. When questions revealed his unwillingness or unacceptability to name prospective Army Chief, I took time out. Washington calls and our own deliberations now persuade us that only possible solution is in our own pressure for particular names which on some of the evidence are digestible by both sides. We find no such name for Minister of Armed Forces but we (a) will probe that acceptability of Nelton Gonzales and Sosa Estrada with loyalists tomorrow though latter is known to Embassy as a thief and (b) await reaction of Bosch on two of names given by loyalists and passed to Davidson. Our own belief is that most promising pattern now is temporary vacancy in this Ministry and a slate of de Leon for the Army, Jimenez for the Navy and Nelton Gonzales for the Air Force. We plan strong effort for this ticket tomorrow.

Meanwhile loyalists' generals spent most of Vance's day on extended and passionate arguments over folly of our planned compromise, with focus on their violent objections to 1963 constitution. This seems foolish but Vance and Mann join in first-hand judgement that it is literally a fighting matter to loyalist leaders. We are correspondingly

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 75.

grateful for prompt and imaginative legal help from Davidson and bespeak his help with Bosch again tomorrow. Meanwhile we have heard nothing about planned approach by Bosch to Balaguer. We shall need Balaguer's help both with general public and with rich and respectable who now fear U.S. sellout to Commies' best friend Bosch.

Foregoing deals only with bargaining details. Underlying questions are those reported by telephone: with Guzman we shall have no quick end to Communist threat, but equally no quick Communist takeover. We shall have long contest with Communists not unlike battle in France after 1944 but with no French civilization and no deGaulle. If instead we back loyalists to the limit, we could certainly "win", but I doubt if we could remove U.S. troops for years. This island is cockpit of senseless hate where no strong and responsible leadership has yet emerged and where energy is largely polarized to extreme left and extreme right.

My own firm conclusion is that we should persist in present effort to establish Guzman promptly but without any concessions whatever in basic agreed position, since some entrenched elements in rebel command are sworn enemies to us, and to Guzman himself in the long-run. Right now net of short-run pressure runs against rebels so we have some leverage if only we can keep our honest farmer from going happily home.

Your motto is still right but both "si" and "no" must be somewhat qualified no matter what course we take. The guns are in the streets, and there is no Dominican will or way to get them back soon.

**Bennett**

**77. Telephone Conversation Among the President's Advisers on the Dominican Republic and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

May 18, 1965, 12:01 a.m.

Bundy: Mr. President, we have [met] with both sides tonight and by the use of the very strenuous verbal measures with the loyalists military we have a bargain. We want you to know that we have in effect said that we are taking the responsibility—this is what they said to Cy—that they accept the fact that we have the power to do so, that they themselves will accept it but they cannot vouch for their forces. There is a sadness on their side which is shared by many of us. The fact remains that within the basic terms State worked out over the last three days, we are in a position now to go ahead. While we differ in our enthusiasm, I think it's fair to say that that is our basic recommendation. It's certainly mine. We have a number of specific things which I propose to say to Mr. G[uzman] within the next half hour, not in a way that will engage him in a lot of negotiation with some of the people he has to be careful about, but in a way which I hope will engage him to you. In return for which I will say: while these things are going on, he can expect you to move in the two directions in which Mr. Davidson discussed with you this afternoon with respect to troops and assistance.<sup>2</sup> The most important thing I will get clear with him is just as we have defended the "si," we expect him now to work continuously on the "no." And that we will be with him and that he will be with us and that we will be watching this in all its manifestations in terms of internal political activity, in terms of attempts to worm into the bureaucracy, in terms of party relations, and indeed across the board. We have no doubt of his good faith, but his skill and energy are another matter. We will press very hard for both public attitudes and real performance with respect to an outbreak of vengeance which we expect to appear primarily from what are now the rebels, but also individual cases of revenge from the other side. I don't know how to describe to you the levels of personal hatred we have encountered as we have gone around to the different factions in recent days. We want both

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation among President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, Tom Mann, General Bruce Palmer, Tapley Bennett, and John Martin, Tape F65.30, Side B, PNO 1, Tape F65.31, Side A, PNO 1, and Tape F65.31, Side B, PNO 1 and 2. Secret. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. McGeorge Bundy placed the call from Santo Domingo to President Johnson in Washington; they spoke for approximately 48 minutes.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

his posture to be, and our practice to be, that we are going to protect individuals whose lives in this sense are in vengeful danger.

This may involve us, it will involve us, in asking General Palmer to offer local asylum, which he is already doing, and also in our offering asylum within the United States, possibly by special waivers under the Immigration laws. We will be expecting to press also for the maximum Inter-American Force presence in terms of Inter-American relations—at least in scope and size for as long as needed and we think it will be some time. We expect to press for maximum OAS participation within the Inter-American law which means essentially observation of the referendum. This is something which will help us with the soldiers with which Cy Vance has been talking.

We expect to press for OAS participation in the announcement that we are considering now—at what time to turn around the chicken-livered lazybones that went home this afternoon because they wouldn't believe us.<sup>3</sup> We hope to wake them up at the hour that is most inconvenient for them.

We will plead for magnanimity in public expression towards those who have held temporary roles on both sides. This is something which we need very much for those who feel or will feel more and more as the thing comes out that we have merely used them in a stop-gap role. Finally, or next to last, we will reinforce in him a conviction which he has expressed to me at least six times that the most important practical task in the government is to find ways to bring arms in out of the hands of the civilians and into the hands of authorities, and that we share this view and that our means will be available to him. We are inclined to think that in the first stages people may be much more ready to give their weapons to General Palmer than to any other Dominican, and in later stages there may be a matter of bounty in which we would be willing to take into account.

We will stress to him what I am sure he will understand because it has been the spirit of our discussions for the last 3 days that everything we are asking of him is within the terms of what we have understood and that everything we are able to do for him will necessarily be related to continued performance so that we enter into a continuing partnership in which their dependence upon us becomes continuous to their doing what we hope and believe and urge needs to be done. This conversation I believe will have about 80 percent success in specifics and 90 percent success in attitude and I think it will then lead us off to the practical matter of how we announce it and who says what and that and at what time during the next 24 hours. But before we

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the 5-man OAS Commission; see footnote 2, Document 52.



move to that, I would like to ask you if this basic line of argument and operation is satisfactory to you.

President: Yes, it sounds all right. What he had agreed on for the army, the name we gave?

Bundy: We agreed on the young man whom we were checking this afternoon J[uan] L[ora] F[ernandez].

President: All right. Are you all pretty well satisfied on all these people so far as the second part of our slogan is concerned?

Bundy: As far as the “no,” yes—we are satisfied about all three of them, but I should tell you that there are some other people whom—I didn’t mention one other thing we wish to do which is to arrange to have the most hated men on both sides go on agreeable military assignments outside the country, and a couple of those if we can work it will be bad hats, but I can’t be sure that this will be done in the first day or so. There are people whom we have to be watchful of. This is known by Mr. G[uzman], but there is a problem of timing here on which I cannot give guarantees, but the public names and the official responsibilities which we have agreed to, are without exception, clean as far as we know.

Fortas: What did you do on the top minister?

Bundy: We couldn’t get him, we have none. I have tried very hard to get them to reconsider that because it would help a lot but I don’t exclude that down the road he may want to make an appointment of his own in that area.

Fortas: You mean Mr. G[uzman] will hold that.

Bundy: No. No one will hold it. The Constitution makes him the Commander-in-Chief. He thus avoids being in the position that Reid Cabral was which was very unpopular with everybody. Now, our notion of the announcement, if you’re ready to move on to that.

President: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion on the timing of the OAS announcement and concurrent announcements in Washington.]

President: How does it look to you?

Mann: Well, I recommend it.

President: When you precede it with a “well” it makes me think you’re less than—

Mann: No, I recommend it wholeheartedly. I want to underscore what Mac [Bundy] said that the hatred here is almost ancestral and the most savage that I have ever seen on all sides, and we’re just not going to have peace and harmony, in my opinion suddenly, out of a thirty year tradition of this kind. It’s just a tough situation.

President: Now, we’re not getting into any position where the people can truthfully or effectively say that we sold out and turned it over to the Commies?

Mann: No, no they can't say that truthfully, and we've done a great deal of talking about this and this is something that will have to be done—we'll have to watch it and continue to work on it and have our best people working on it. It can be accomplished gradually.

President: What can we say to the right-wingers, up to the end that we have insured against their running the government?

Mann: Well, we have in this work an undertaking in several parts. One, is to fight them politically all across the board—on labor unions and the places—education—the places where they usually concentrate. Two, not to take any of them into the government into positions of power, including the armed forces and the police, and in general to consider them as political enemies and not political allies. Now we expect to have that kind of an understanding.

President: Are they going to let you bring in J. Edgar Hoover's man<sup>4</sup> to come in as legal adviser to the Embassy to advise Mr. G[uzman] on the bad characters and have him watch them?

Mann: Yes, they have agreed to that.

President: How are you going to get Mr. Imbert to quit making these inflammatory statements?

Mann: We may get some more.

President: I thought Mac said you were going to take care of it.

Mann: I'm going to do my best.

President: You know us right-wingers are supposed to hang together, Tom.

[Laughter]

President: I thought we gave him what we wanted when we said we'd give him a referendum.

[Omitted here is an update by Bundy on news that Imbert would hold a press conference the next day.]

President: What is your [General Palmer's] assessment of the relative strength of the two forces—the loyalists versus the rebels?

General Palmer: I would say in the northern part of the city, there's an even stand-off and in the southern part where the rebel's main strength is, which is the strongest part, I don't think that the loyalist forces are strong enough to take them on.

President: What would you envision if we didn't have an agreement?

General Palmer: If we just let them continue to fight, sir?

President: Yes.

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

General Palmer: I don't think the loyalists could do it.

President: Well, is it better to let them demonstrate that?

General Palmer: How do you mean, to let them continue to fight, sir?

President: Yeah.

General Palmer: This could go on, but, I don't think they can clean up the northern part for several days at least and I feel quite certain that they could not take the rebels in the South.

President: All right, now, would it be better from the reaction in this country and in the world, if we let it come to more or less an impasse. Would it look like now we sold out pretty quick?

General Palmer: No sir, I don't think it would look this way.

President: Do you recommend what they are suggesting?

General Palmer: Yes, I do.

President: Do you think we have insurance against the Communists taking control of the government?

General Palmer: I believe we could block that, sir. I think the danger is what Mr. Bundy pointed out.

President: Is this the way to block it? Is this agreement the best way open to us at this stage to block it?

General Palmer: Yes sir, it is. I think this is the best way to handle it.

President: What is your judgment if these Chiefs say they'll go along as to whether their troops will follow them or not or will we have a lot of sporadic fighting under somebody else's leadership.

General Palmer: We can't really tell. I don't believe that this will cause much trouble unless very strong leaders come forward and, I don't think they will come forward.

President: Are you impressed with the strength of any of the people in the government that we are proposing?

General Palmer: Yes.

President: Do you think they are honest?

General Palmer: Yes.

President: Do you think they are anti-Communist?

General Palmer: Yes. There's always going to be sleepers in there, but this is a chance you run regardless. In this situation, you're going to come to a conclusion like this sooner or later whether you control all the cities or not.

President: Are you going to be in a position if we make the agreement to control the loyalists' equipment?

General Palmer: You mean to block them?

President: Yes.

General Palmer: Yes. We can physically keep the Air Force from taking off, and the Navy.

President: What about the tanks?

General Palmer: I don't think there's enough of them to worry about. We can block them too.

[Omitted here is a brief report by Palmer on the number of Dominican troop casualties and the economic situation in the Dominican Republic.]

President: Is your country team down there pretty generally in agreement that this is the thing to do?

General Palmer: Yes, sir. I would say they would agree that this is the lesser of many evils, sir. There is no approved solution to this, Mr. President.

President: Well, it doesn't look like to me there's much evil in this if we (a) get reasonably honest people, if they're anti-Communist, if we're going to have a popular referendum in two months on the basics of the machinery, the constitution, and if we're not going to let the men go back in office who were thrown out illegally some time ago. Now, I don't know what else you can do. We can pick a dictator and just say, well, to hell with the constitution, or we could pick the constitution and say, to hell with the people. We're not going to let them decide on it one way or another, but doing neither, and it looks like to me that we're being about as democratic as you can be and we're giving them protection and we're giving them food and feeding them and giving them supervised elections, while whatever elements of democracy they have in the country are permitted to function. I don't know what else we could do if we stayed there a million years.

General Palmer: I agree with that assessment. As you say we either go to do it today or 10 years from now, you can't delay the issue today.

President: What does Bennett think about this agreement?

Bennett: Well, I feel frankly that we we're running a risk, keeping a lot of our assets without getting anything very firm, but I think we've gone into it and we have to go ahead.

President: Is there any better, more hopeful alternative to us at this stage?

Bennett: I don't see much quite frankly. I think this is best in our own interests and that is what we have to think of at this stage.

President: Well, if that's true, then it would be better in the country's interest too, wouldn't it?

Bennett: Well, that's our hope, yes sir.

President: What does Ambassador Martin think of the agreement?

Martin: I concur. I think it's probably the best of a bad bunch of alternatives. I think that the side that was militarily winning is now in fact going to be declared the winner. I think that same side has the kind of popular support throughout the country that we can read it and for that reason also I think it's correct. I do feel very likely that Mr. G[uzman] may not prove strong enough to hold this place together and we may have to go under ground later on, but I think that would be true of almost any solution that we found. I think that Mr. I[mbert] will denounce us and say that we double-crossed him, and he's right to a considerable extent. He'll make trouble in statements tomorrow and may try to make other trouble which we can stop. He will make trouble for Mr. G[uzman] in the future. I think trouble of this kind is probably inevitable in this. This is about the way I feel about it.

President: You recommend the agreement, you think it's the best we can do under the circumstances and it gives us something to work for.

Martin: That's right sir.

President: You believe we have the best man that we can get that'll take over?

Martin: I think in the present set of circumstances, that that is the best we can do sir.

President: Do you think there are any Communists in the crowd?

Martin: I do not think this would be a major problem. No, sir.

President: The answer is no?

Martin: That's right.

President: The country team, the AID people, the attachés, and Admiral Raborn's people—do most of them generally share your views?

Martin: Insofar as I know.

President: Is there anyone representing the United States that is violently disagreeing with us?

Martin: No, I think not.

[Omitted here are comments by Johnson praising Martin for his efforts and warning him not to work too hard.]

President: How many people are going to wind up in this Cabinet?

Mann: We do not have a complete Cabinet yet.

President: How many do you think will wind up in it?

Mann: I would guess eight or ten. There's a total possible slate of 15 cabinet slots. We just heard that one of the naval secretaries may not serve as Chief of Staff which is really not Cabinet but it's very important. So, I would say we don't have more than four or five of the top posts with agreed candidates at this point.

President: Are those people who are taking it are they agreeable to doing it?

Mann: As far as I know all of those we have talked about were agreeable except one which might not go along.

President: What's his problem?

Mann: He just doesn't like it. It's the feeling that this is not going to be good for the country and that it is going to bring instability and create a danger from the military point of view of a left-wing take over—an anti-Bosch feeling.

President: I thought he had been agreed upon.

Mann: Well, Mr. President, that is true at one time or another, but that depends on what hour you talk to people. The emotions are running very high. They have in the past agreed on Mr. G[uzman], but they have also said that he is nothing but a puppet. We don't think that is necessarily true, but the political emotions here are just at this particular time absolutely indescribable. I've never seen anything like it. I don't think any of our group has.

President: All right. I guess we've talked long enough. Everybody down there seems to think that it is the best thing to do, so I think that you and Bennett ought to go out and put on your Sunday-go-meeting clothes and take this Imbert and give him the best that you've got.

[Omitted here is a short discussion on the timing of the announcement.]

President: What's your evaluation of this?

Vance: My evaluation is, Mr. President, that this is the best that can be done, and we ought to do it.

President: Do it even if the Chiefs went against us?

Vance: Yes, because I think that this depends on a meeting with Mr. Imbert later on tonight that they will not actively oppose it, but will accept it under protest. Now they say they cannot speak for their troops, but it's my evaluation that they will not actively oppose it. They might in words, but not in deeds.

**78. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 18, 1965, 1900Z.

1776. From: Bundy, Mann, Vance, Palmer, Bennett, Martin.

A. Three basic difficulties we have encountered from outset here in seeking pol solution are that (1) it has not been clear that men we are negotiating with truly represent real power; (2) each side, like Chinese warlord, has true mil force and can and has used that force to disrupt every pol move we have attempted if it thought disruption was to its advantage; (3) we have not had true control because we have not in fact physically interposed our superior mil forces between the contending mil forces.

B. To meet these difficulties and improve atmosphere in which pol negotiations are conducted, we propose that we physically interpose our mil forces between the contending DOM mil forces.<sup>2</sup> We would first consult with both sides and decision to proceed would depend on reactions. This would be done through SYG–OAS Mora, supplemented by approaches through our own channels. We would also ask Amb Bunker to give OAS Comm in Wash an opportunity to concur in proposed action. Bunker would explain to Comm that this action is essential because of continued heavy fighting in north side of city.

C. The advantages to this course are (1) it would show the world we are truly neutral, truly humanitarian, truly desirous of stopping the killing; (2) it would give us more control since we could prevent either side from shooting pol negotiations out from under us and, hopefully, would limit radio capabilities of both sides; (3) it would enable us to pursue pol negotiations with reduced pressure of threats from either side to resume mil action; (4) if taken with OAS Comm endorsement, it will serve to demonstrate that OAS is acting effectively to enforce a cease-fire and this will reduce pressure in UNSC for further UN involvement.

A bonus of significant value would be demonstrable indication to local U.S. and international observers, including press, of neutrality of U.S. forces with respect to both DOM sides. Since loyalist forces are

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 3:23 p.m. and passed to the White House at 3:52 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Bundy introduced this proposal to President Johnson during a telephone conversation at 11:55 a.m., May 18. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.33, Side A, PNO 3)

able to concentrate in NW part of city, while bulk of the rebel forces are confined to southern part of city through presence of U.S. troops, present mil situation definitely favors loyalist side in area north of LOC. Thus, U.S. is credibly open to charge of greatly favoring loyalist side.

**Military Plan:** Operation involves establishing a new corridor starting from intersection of present LOC with Avenida 30 de Marzo and extending to NW along this road to intersection of Avenida San Martin with Avenida Maria Montes, then north along latter to 28th Street, thence west to Avenida Maximo Gomez and finally north along latter to Peynado Bridge. First part of new corridor would include seizure of studios of Radio Santo Domingo which is currently heavily defended and inoperable. As an alternative, Radio Santo Domingo could be bypassed by establishing detour one or two blocks south of Avenida San Martin in area of radio studios.

From intersection of Avenida San Martin with Avenida Maria Montes north to Peynado Bridge, corridor is presently held by loyal DR forces. Thus this operation must be based on at least accepted replacement of those forces by U.S. troops and withdrawal to west of any loyal forces east of Avenida Maria Montes. A brigade of 3 bns from 82nd ABN Div would be used for this operation with 2 bns moving north in column from a line of departure at LOC where it crosses Avenida 30 de Marzo and linking up with 1 bn helicopter lifted into the area south of Peynado Bridge.

The above operation would provide (1) an effective interposition of U.S. forces between loyal and rebel forces which would prevent either side from attacking the other; and (2) an effective sealing off of rebels in city since, in addition to corridor operation, the far bank of Isabela River would be screened from Peynado Bridge to its junction with Ozama River and latter screened south to its mouth flowing into sea; and (3) positive security of major industrial area of city.

Finally, this operation seems to us likely to increase whatever chance there is of agreement on lines we have sought. It would show rebels we can and will ensure cease-fire and it would greatly reduce possibility of armed action by Imbert after agreement is announced.

**Bennett**



**79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 18, 1965, 2055Z.

1778. For the President from Bundy.

1. Though I remain least pessimistic senior officer here, I am deeply shaken by this morning's monkey-wrench.<sup>2</sup> It forces reconsideration of question of basic control of a possible Guzman government. You can judge better than I the role of Bosch, but the stooge's role of Guzman in this episode is clear and unless your evidence to the contrary is conclusive, my own guess is that military command initiated this proposal, whoever concurred in it.

2. Since military command arrangements of yesterday proposed to put a relatively unknown colonel over a group of men whose collective energy and determination is amply demonstrated in recent weeks, and since Guzman obediently telephoned a clearly absurd ultimatum to Embassy, none of us can responsibly recommend that agreement all but completed yesterday is now safe for the United States. Evidence is strong that it would put real control of all Dominican ground forces in hands of those who now have this control downtown. At the very minimum, and on optimistic assumptions about influence of Bosch and impact of office on Guzman, we should have a very hard up-hill road requiring constant energy and skill in daily infighting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 5:23 p.m. and passed to the White House at 5:28 p.m., and to DOD exclusively for McNamara at 6 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> In a telephone conversation with President Johnson at 11:55 a.m., May 18, Bundy reported that Guzman sent him a message explaining the reasons for the sudden impasse. Bundy read Guzman's message to the President: "I have the obligation to suspend conversations and agreements until there has been a total cease-fire. This is because yesterday the Constitutionalist troops permitted the troops of San Isidro to penetrate the city, [at this point Bundy inserted: 'this is a description of the action in the north in their terms'] so the press and the representatives of the United Nations could see for themselves that these advances are protected by the Americans. It is established that the United States is giving arms, ammunition, and all kinds of military help to the anti-constitutional forces. [Bundy inserted: 'That's not so incidentally.'] The troops of San Isidro and Imbert have been permitted pass through the line of communication and in some case they have even been protected with helicopters. This has obliged me to terminate the conversations and the agreement until a cease-fire has been achieved." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.33, Side A, PNO 3)

3. Apparently all of us in Washington and here agree that there are men in rebel command who prefer continued struggle to any agreement they do not control. In the light of the last days's events, I do not think Guzman's government on presently negotiated basis is good enough for us to bet on. Nor do I think time is running out down here.

4. In this situation I believe that when negotiations are reopened we should advance new requirements which combine advantage of testing basis of authority and limiting role of present military command in new government. I think of two such provisions.

5. The first is elimination of three least desirable members of rebel command by appointment abroad. This is parallel to plan already accepted by loyalists and I would nominate Aristy, Tavaras, and Monte Arache.

6. Second, I would reopen question of Minister of Armed Forces and insist on re-establishment of Bosch agreement that a man acceptable to both sides be found.

7. I pressed both of these ideas yesterday but did not insist in face of absolute refusal because we wanted agreement and hoped it would work. Now I believe that strong and sustained pressure for these provisions is essential:

- A. To test the source of power,
- B. To strengthen our confidence in Guzman government, and
- C. To attempt wedge-driving in a dangerous cabal.

8. Unless otherwise instructed I shall take this line in my first talk with Guzman. If eventually we decide to take less for agreement, I can always fall back.

**Bennett**

**80. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1965.

SUBJECT

Contact with Dr. Joaquin Balaguer

REFERENCES

My Memoranda for the Record of May 15<sup>2</sup> and May 17<sup>3</sup>

At about noon on May 17, Mr. Arnold<sup>4</sup> called me by telephone to say an unexpected crisis had arisen in connection with our negotiations. At his request, I met with him in the Situation Room at the White House as soon as I could get there. Mr. Arnold briefed me on recent developments and we reached agreement on the strategy for attempting to prevent a break-down in the negotiations. The text of our agreement as written up at that time is quoted below:

BEGIN TEXT

*Situation*

San Isidro group will accept deal only if new government, at the time it takes office, adopts 1963 constitution but concurrently calls for a plebiscite on the constitution to be held within 30–60 days.

*Problem*

To get Balaguer's support in swinging this with Bosch.

*Tactics*

1. Brief Balaguer on problem, emphasizing its delicacy insofar as dealings with Bosch are concerned.
2. Get Balaguer's assurance that he will keep completely secret the fact we have briefed him.
3. Get Balaguer's commitment to support plebiscite plan if Bosch broaches it to him.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. IV, 5/12–19/65. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Crockett. Copies were sent to Mann, Vance, Helms, Vaughn, and Bromley Smith for Bundy.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 70.

<sup>3</sup> In the May 17 memorandum Crockett describes steps taken that morning to arrange a meeting between Balaguer and Bosch in Puerto Rico later that evening. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. IV, 5/12–19/65)

<sup>4</sup> A pseudonym for Abe Fortas.

4. Develop with Balaguer a “safe” means whereby Balaguer will bring this subject up in his discussion with Bosch (if Bosch does not broach it) in such a manner that Bosch will have no suspicion that Balaguer is serving as our instrument in executing this tactic.

The nature of the plebiscite is not yet finally decided, but it would probably be a yes or no vote with the 1962 constitution coming into effect automatically in the event the vote goes against continuation of the 1963 constitution.

Mr. Arnold and I agreed that it would be necessary to tell Balaguer that tentative agreement had already been reached on Guzman as a single interim president to serve out the remainder of Bosch’s term.

With respect to item 4—Tactics, Balaguer might bring this subject up himself (if Bosch failed to do so) in the following manner:

After he and Bosch had reached general agreement on a plan for establishing a government of national concordance:

a) Balaguer would say that it would be highly desirable to give the people an opportunity to express their satisfaction with the arrangements.

b) It would also be highly desirable to bring the people around to thinking about “constitutional acts” rather than acts of violence.

c) Since no election will be held until 1966 under the arrangement that has been agreed to, a referendum or plebiscite might serve both of the foregoing objectives.

d) Since the establishment of the government would be a fait accompli, a referendum or plebiscite could be held on the question of acceptance or rejection of the 1963 constitution.

e) Given the popular sentiment in favor of the 1963 constitution, the outcome of the referendum or plebiscite would be a foregone conclusion.

f) However, there would be some limited campaigning of a political nature which could serve as a safety valve to relieve tensions which have developed because of the armed conflict.

g) People could make speeches, get a little practice in politics, and once the constitution had been ratified the government would have additional claim to complete legitimacy and constitutionality.

Only one question arose in considering the practicality of this approach: At the time it was being developed, neither Mr. Crockett nor Mr. Arnold knew whether Dr. Balaguer was for or against the 1963 constitution.

END TEXT

It was 1:30 p.m. by the time the foregoing agreement had been reached. If Balaguer was to be contacted to enlist his cooperation prior

to his departure from New York at 5:00 p.m. (en route to Puerto Rico), it was necessary for me to catch the 2:00 p.m. Eastern Airlines shuttle. Even this would allow very little margin in the time frame in which the mission had to be carried out. Accordingly, I called Irving Davidson<sup>5</sup> and asked him to stand by his telephone for the next half hour. I asked him to locate Balaguer in New York and have him stand by his telephone also. Meanwhile, Mr. Arnold sought clearance for the plan through Mr. Moyer.

At 1:45 p.m., Mr. Moyer informed Mr. Arnold that approval had been granted for execution of the plan. I called Mr. Davidson to tell him that I wished to meet with Dr. Balaguer in New York prior to his departure for Puerto Rico. I asked Mr. Davidson to arrange for Dr. Balaguer to meet me in the lobby of the Regency Hotel in New York at 3:45 p.m. Balaguer was to be alone at the time of our meeting. I would undertake to deliver him to Kennedy Airport in time to make his 5:00 p.m. plane to Puerto Rico.

By holding the 2:00 p.m. Eastern Airlines shuttle to New York for a few minutes, I was able to get aboard.

As the Eastern shuttle approached New York, the Captain called me into the pilot's compartment to tell me that a representative of the New York Port Authority would meet me when the plane landed to give me a message. I was to get off the plane before any of the other passengers and go to the Port Authority's offices for this purpose.

The message turned out to be a request that I telephone Mr. Arnold at the White House. When I was able to get through to Mr. Arnold, he informed me that the plebiscite problem had been resolved. It would not be necessary to sell Balaguer on this. I should limit my talk with him to providing him with a background briefing on where things stood as of that time. "Do it lightly and get him to go along if you can. If not, at least get him to agree not to raise objections."

I arrived at the Regency Hotel at 3:40 p.m. Dr. Balaguer was not there. At 3:50 p.m. he had still not appeared on the scene, but Irving Davidson had some how managed to get to New York and joined me in the lobby of the Regency Hotel.

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<sup>5</sup> Another pseudonym for Abe Fortas. In a telephone conversation with Bundy at 11:55 a.m., May 18, President Johnson instructed Bundy to refer to Abe Fortas "hereafter, under all circumstances as . . . Mr. Arnold, nothing else, ever." According to the President "a lot of confusion" had surfaced over the use of Fortas' pseudonyms in the reports he had seen. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.33, Side A, PNO 3) For a detailed account of the confusion over Fortas' pseudonyms, see Bruce Allen Murphy, *Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1988).

Balaguer turned up at about 3:55 p.m. I told him time was short—I had a cab standing by—I would brief him on developments since our last meeting as we drove to Kennedy Airport. Balaguer said we would have to wait until 4:00 p.m. as his suitcase was in the car which had dropped him off at the hotel and it would not be back until 4:00 p.m. He suggested we ride out to Kennedy Airport in “his car”. I objected, pointing out that I did not want to have anyone else listening in on our conversation. He said this would not be a problem as “his car” had been provided by the FBI at his request. I let my cab go.

“Balaguer’s car” turned up at 4:00 p.m. sharp. It was driven by Special FBI Agent Nick F. Estame. The senior Special Agent accompanying him was Heinrich Von Eckardt.<sup>6</sup> After examining each other’s credentials, we all climbed aboard and started for Kennedy Airport. I briefed Balaguer along the lines agreed upon with Mr. Arnold and invited Balaguer’s comments and/or questions.

Balaguer wanted to know how Guzman would be selected or elected, as the case might be. I told him I wasn’t sure, but given Bosch’s strong feelings on the question of constitutionality, it might be necessary to have whatever there was left of Bosch’s Congress “elect” Guzman. This didn’t seem to present a problem for Balaguer. However, he had some very firm ideas about the plebiscite or referendum.

Balaguer said that he saw two serious problems in holding a plebiscite. First, if the plebiscite went in favor of the 1963 constitution, as he supposed it would, then the 1963 constitution would be set in concrete for the future. Balaguer thought some of its provisions should be modified. He agreed that except for a few sections, the 1963 constitution wasn’t really a bad document.

Balaguer felt much more strongly about the holding of a plebiscite of any kind than he did about its possible consequences as far as it might affect prospects for future amendments to the constitution. According to Balaguer, politicking, electioneering and voting should be avoided at all costs until 1966. He felt that far from serving as a means of letting off steam, a vote and the preliminary politicking that would have to precede the plebiscite would increase passions and should be avoided at all costs.

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<sup>6</sup> At 3:02 p.m. on May 17 Hoover telephoned President Johnson to inform him of Crockett’s meeting with Balaguer in New York City. Hoover told President Johnson that an “I. Irving Davidson” arranged this meeting and described Davidson as “a con man in Washington.” Johnson explained to Hoover that “Davidson” was a pseudonym for Abe Fortas who was under his orders to work the “left wing” and Tom Mann to work the “right wing” in the Dominican Republic negotiations. Hoover replied that he did not know this. President Johnson further explained that he wanted the FBI involved to “check the people” referred by former Governor of Puerto Rico Munoz-Marin and other Fortas contacts. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, Tape F65.30, Side A, PNO 2)

I argued that this was a matter of judgment and in any event, the plebiscite was a condition precedent set by the San Isidro group for going along with the whole deal.

Balaguer said he could swing the San Isidro group away from this position without any trouble if this was necessary. As for the question of judgment on the ultimate consequences of politicking and voting under present circumstances, whoever it was that thought this would reduce passions rather than exacerbate the situation just didn't know his (the Dominican) people. I pressed the point, making a strong case against his trying to un-stick something that had already been agreed to in the delicate state of negotiations as they then existed. He agreed that both Imbert and Bosch are not rational men, although they are irrational in different ways. He thought he could bring them both around and outlined his ideas of how to go about this.

If the San Isidro group could not be budged from its position on the holding of a plebiscite, then Balaguer would go along. But he would go along on the basis of an agreement with Bosch that he (Balaguer) would join with Bosch in supporting ratification of the 1963 constitution, provided Bosch would agree to two conditions:

- 1) The plebiscite would confirm the 1963 constitution as the law of the land for the remaining period to be served out by Guzman.
- 2) When a new congress took office in 1967, it would be free to amend the 1963 constitution in whatever manner it might see fit.

Meanwhile, Bosch and Balaguer would reach a private agreement that certain controversial provisions of the 1963 constitution would not be implemented during the interim. By doing it this way, the plebiscite might be carried out without doing too much damage and the country would be protected from those provisions of the 1963 constitution which inhibit private investment and are otherwise unacceptable to the men whose cooperation must be obtained if the national economy is to be resuscitated.

I was unable to bring Balaguer any further along on this particular point and had little time left to cover the remaining ground before we reached Kennedy Airport. I therefore decided to change the subject, but before doing so, I got Balaguer to promise that he would consult with me before breaking off talks should he reach an impasse on the issue of the 1963 constitution and the plebiscite in his discussions with Bosch. I offered to come to Puerto Rico for this purpose if necessary.

Balaguer then raised the problem of how to deal with the communists and the "agitators". I told him what I understood had been more or less agreed to. He immediately spotted the weak point, i.e., the problem is not where you put them, but how you identify them and reach agreement on the definition of a communist and/or an "ag-

itor" (Balaguer's term) who may not be a communist but who is more dangerous from the practical standpoint than a clearly identifiable communist. After much discussion, I had to fall back on the point Mr. Mann made to me when we discussed this by telephone (KY-9), i.e., the key is the man or men who do the job. Balaguer agreed that this might be the answer. He pointed out, however, the men can be appointed or removed very easily once a government has been installed.

I attempted to counter this by pointing out that we would have a great deal of leverage, given the magnitude of the aid program we planned for the Dominican Republic once an acceptable government had been installed. Balaguer picked this up immediately. He said massive aid was really not much of a lever. It would, however, help the Bosch-dominated Guzman government consolidate itself through patronage and otherwise, thus amounting to a US subvention of the forces against which he would have to contend in the 1966 elections. I attempted to reassure him as best I could, taking into account that there were three other people in the car at that time, at least one of whom spoke fluent Spanish. Balaguer understood, but was not perceptibly reassured.

We arrived at the airport at about that point in the conversation and it developed Balaguer had a reservation but no ticket and no money. Irving Davidson bought Balaguer a round-trip ticket.

There was opportunity for me to speak completely alone with Balaguer for about five minutes before he boarded his plane. I stressed two specifics during this brief interlude:

a) Balaguer must respect my (our—the USG) confidence in talking to Bosch. He gave me categorical assurances which I believe were sincere.

b) Balaguer must have confidence in my (our—the USG) conviction that he was the man of the future in the DR and we would do nothing that did not take into account both his short and his long range value for both the USG and the Dominican people—these interests being in every way compatible and consistent in our view.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Fortas informed Bundy that Bosch and Balaguer were to meet in Puerto Rico between 10 and 10:30 p.m. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation among President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, and Abe Fortas, May 17, 2:50 p.m., Tape F65.30, Side A, PNO 1) At 3:36 a.m. on May 18 Munoz-Marin telephoned Fortas to report on the conversation between Bosch and Balaguer. Munoz-Marin said he learned Balaguer would not accept Bosch as a member of the new Dominican Government but would accept a friend of Bosch whom Balaguer did not identify. Under this condition Balaguer would support the new Dominican Government. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between Abe Fortas and Luis Munoz-Marin, Tape F65.32, Side A, PNO 2) President Johnson reiterated this understanding to Bundy during another telephone conversation on May 18 at 3:47 a.m. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.32, Side A, PNO 3)



**81. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 19, 1965, 1620Z.

1805. From Vance, Palmer, Bundy and Bennett. In the event negotiations fail today, we recommend that full modification of plan proposed in ourtel 1776<sup>2</sup> be carried out ASAP, H-hour to be determined by Gen Palmer:

Loyalists have now moved beyond line proposed in 1776 and have taken Radio Santo Domingo. They are somewhat flushed with success. If they are permitted to take all of area north of LOC, Imbert will be increasingly difficult to deal with. Proposed plan would deny to him area east of Avenida Duarte, extending to Isabela and Ozama River. Hard core of rebel forces north of LOC is located in area extending from Radio Santo Domingo to Villa Consuela. Proposed plan would leave hard core between loyalist forces and LOC. Thus, rebels would be faced with choice of fighting in place or leaving their weapons and retiring to area south of LOC. We believe recommended plan would establish better conditions both for true cease-fire and for pol settlement since it interposes U.S. forces between loyalists and rebels, except in Villa Consuela. We also believe this action would give evidence of a credible position of U.S. impartiality. Disadvantages of plan are: (1) risk of further alienating Imbert and loyalist mil leaders; (2) action might be interpreted by Caamano forces as strengthening their position by protecting their weak forces from superior loyalist forces. But this is not all bad, given probable conflict among rebels on pol proposals.

We believe plan could be carried out with minimum difficulty and that casualties, both mil and civilian, would be light. Estimated time to carry out plan in daylight is four hours. If done at night and surprise is effected, it might be accomplished in less time.

We feel OAS should be notified shortly before execution, but not so far in advance as to tip off loyalist and rebel forces. We do not believe UN should be notified in advance.

We should not discuss this plan on open telephone as both sides are monitoring.

**Bennett**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 12:34 p.m. and passed to the White House at 12:45 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Document 78.

**82. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 19, 1965, 0102Z.

1824. From Bundy.

1. The following are uncleared draft texts of two understandings.  
2. These documents are only drafts not yet reviewed in detail with Guzman because of one day without diplomatic relations. They nevertheless reflect faithfully what he and I have orally agreed. I hope to discuss them with him this evening.

3. First document is "public" and second is "private" as explained below. First purpose of "public" paper is for Guzman to get agreement of all on his side to this basis of government, but paper is also drawn with a view to possible publication.

4. "Private" document repeats some of public paper, but it is more precise on:

- A. Management of Communists,
- B. Disarmament of civilians,
- C. Departures of officers in uniform, and
- D. Possible immediate withdrawal of one US battalion.

I have presented it as a private understanding "at the presidential level" to cover Guzman from having to show it to the whole downtown crowd.

5. You may want more about OAS in public paper, and I can probably arrange it. But except for some good work by Mora, OAS presence here has been feeble and ineffective in the extreme.

6. Text of "public" paper follows:

"Statement of the position of Antonio Guzman toward the formation of a constitutional government in the Dominican Republic, May 19, 1965:

1. Sr. Antonio Guzman has expressed his readiness to assume the office of President of the Dominican Republic, if duly chosen, on the following terms and with the following convictions:

2. Sr. Guzman will assume office only when qualified on the basis of the Constitution of 1963. He will at once call for a duly authorized national referendum, to take place within 60 days. This referendum

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 10:55 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD for McNamara, and CIA for Raborn at 11:26 p.m.

will permit the Dominican people to reaffirm—or to oppose—this constitution. Full observation by the Organization of American States will be requested.

3. Sr. Guzman will establish a government of national concord. This government will be broadly based. Members of the cabinet will reflect a broad spectrum of political, economic and social views. In particular, appointment will be offered to one member of the group which has been serving under General Imbert. This government will be equally opposed to extremists of left and right.

4. The military control of the new government will be non-political, and its professional leadership will be entrusted to officers who merit the confidence of the Dominican people and of their fellow professionals.

5. Concerning active Communists and Trujillistas, Sr. Guzman holds the firm position that they present a problem for democratic government in the Dominican Republic and that effective measures must be taken by the constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from their subversive activities. Plans will be developed for the development and execution of such measures within constitutional terms.

6. It is in the interest of the government of national concord that the Inter-American force establish its presence in the Dominican Republic as soon as possible. The United States forces will form a part of the Inter-American force. It is not possible at this time to predict how long the presence of the Inter-American force will be required in the Dominican Republic but withdrawal of components will begin as soon as possible.

7. Sr. Guzman has assurances from the Government of United States that just as soon as government of national concord is established and a full cease-fire is assured, the United States will withdraw a substantial part of the US military forces now in the Dominican Republic. The United States Government has informed him that further withdrawals will be made just as rapidly as the restoration of peace permits.

8. Sr. Guzman has also received assurances that the United States Government will offer strong emergency assistance in the task of restoring active economic life in the Dominican Republic, as well as the assistance already publicly proposed by President Johnson for rapid economic development.

9. On taking office, Sr. Guzman will present a public accounting of all his properties and assets. He will then turn over the management of all these private interests to a trustee, and this trustee will conduct no business with any part of the Dominican government, except for necessary routine dealings with the Agricultural Bank.

10. Sr. Guzman will approach his new duties, if chosen, in the determination that there shall be a spirit of reconciliation among all Dominicans. He will insist on this same attitude among all members of his cabinet and in all branches of the Dominican Government, civil and military alike. In particular he will insist that there be no acts of personal vengeance from any quarter." End of text.

Text of "private" paper follows:

"Memorandum

Communism

1. The constitutional government of national concord will be firmly anti-Communist and President Guzman will state this position in his inaugural address. The government of national concord will oppose communism and will so conduct its activities as to make this opposition entirely clear. It will prevent any confusion in the public mind by distinguishing in all its dealings between the truly democratic political parties and those responding to or influenced by Communist doctrine. It will make certain the public understands that its aims do not coincide with those of the Communists.

2. Persons identified as Communists or Communist sympathizers will be placed under close observation by the government of national concord and, when detected breaking the law, will immediately be detained. Such other measures as may be necessary to contain the threat of Communist subversion will be taken after appropriate consultation with the Government of the United States.

3. The government of national concord will not permit Communists or Communist sympathizers to occupy positions in the Dominican Government, the armed forces or the national police.

4. The Government of the United States will make available professional personnel with full competence in the Spanish language to assist the government of national concord in identifying Communists and Communist sympathizers, and in controlling their activities. The greatest care will be taken to insure that the information in this field provided by the competent Dominican authorities is precise and detailed, and that innocent persons are not victimized.

5. Measure necessary to contain the Communist threat will be the subject of continuing consultations between our two governments. The Government of the United States reserves the right to re-examine the terms of the agreement reflected in this memorandum if the measures taken under it prove to be inadequate.

Pacification

1. President Guzman and his government will firmly oppose the spirit of hatred and vengeance wherever it may be found. President Guzman, by example and word, will demonstrate to the entire nation

his desire that all Dominicans be treated with absolute impartiality and fairness.

2. The task of disarming the civilian population will be the responsibility of the competent Dominican authorities. United States forces will not take an active role in this process but officers of these forces will be available for professional consultation if their Dominican counterparts should find it desirable. Persons who might wish to deliver their arms to the United States forces will be permitted to do so under appropriate safeguards.

#### Organization of American States

1. The process of establishing the constitutional government of national concord will, to the maximum extent possible, take place with the participation and approval of the Organization of American States. President Guzman, with the cooperation of the United States Government, will attempt to insure that his government and its efforts to restore national harmony receive the full endorsement of the OAS through the special commission appointed by the tenth meeting of Foreign Ministers.

2. The government of national concord will request the sending of OAS observers to witness the referendum on the 1963 Constitution that is scheduled to be held within 60 days after the inauguration of President Guzman.

#### Withdrawal of US Forces

President Johnson wishes to begin the withdrawal of US forces at the earliest possible date. It will be recommended to him that the time for the withdrawal of the first units be determined immediately so that President Guzman may make an appropriate announcement in his inaugural address.

#### Departure of Military Officers

Any officer of the Dominican Armed Forces who has been involved on either side in the present conflict and who wishes to leave the country will be permitted to do so. Those leading officers of either side who wish to depart in uniform will be given appropriate official assignments abroad." End of text.

**Bennett**

**83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 20, 1965, 0630Z.

1830. From Bundy.

1. This has been a day of much movement, but conclusions are hard to find.

2. Most important event is capture of Radio Santo Domingo by Imbert. This evening he agreed again with Bennett that station should be run by OAS. Moreover he agrees with us that OAS umbrella should shelter firm U.S. management. He has promised to announce this decision at ten Thursday<sup>2</sup> morning. Effective use of RSD may be decisive in the coming week. We all believe that now is the time for Don Wilson<sup>3</sup> to come. He should be here Thursday without fail and he should be ready to stay awhile. He is not needed tonight because station is still on the blink.

3. Next most important event is rapid Imbert advance in area north of LOC. This advance has no final strategic value to Imbert, because it does not touch real rebel stronghold. But it lifts morale far beyond its real meaning, and there is no Guzman solution in sight tonight that would not be rejected out of hand by Imbert and Loyalist military. This does not mean that Guzman solution is impossible. I continue to believe it makes more sense than any other. But I do not think it can be concluded at an acceptable cost until Imbert and company find out that their small victories north of LOC have no lasting value. They must learn again that rebels will probably remain in control of heart of city which is heart of country. Imbert forces cannot dislodge them and our forces will not—if it can be avoided.

4. Further block to early settlement—but not to a later solution—is reported death of Rafael Fernandez Dominguez<sup>4</sup> in attack on Imbert-held palace. This will shock Bosch deeply, though Guzman has taken it calmly. Utterly cynical rebel assertion that U.S. shot him in the back is seen for what it is by Guzman, but Caamano is on the air making as

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 3:20 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD for McNamara, and CIA for Raborn at 3:57 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> May 21.

<sup>3</sup> Deputy Director, United States Information Agency.

<sup>4</sup> Lieutenant Colonel in the Dominican Army with strong allegiances to Juan Bosch; a leader of the younger officers.

much emotional noise as possible. Unless Commies killed him in Spanish war style, Fernandez died soldier's death he partly sought, and three U.S. Marines were wounded resisting rebel action about the same time. For a hot fire fight front and back are silly words. But rebels will be stirred, and Guzman will be rightly reenforced in his growing conviction that the men downtown are in no mood for reason.

5. Meanwhile Solomon and company are at work, and the country is not coming apart.

6. In this situation I think we probably need a carefully staged pause. No solution appears possible now, but we should soon have on the side of peace the following: (a) time (b) the end of the northern battle, and (c) Radio Santo Domingo. Both Imbert and rebels should learn in coming days that neither of them is going to win a war. RSD should be preaching peace; Solomon should be practicing good works; by continued firmness Palmer should be able to prove that the U.S. is the one real power on the scene.

7. This pause can be signaled by our return or by our ostentatious settling in. On either basis we strongly believe we should be authorized to begin judicious briefing of press and equally judicious contacts with other personages here. We can spread message of peace and reconciliation to all, if we are authorized to do so. It is time.

8. Meanwhile this evening we gave Guzman draft documents sent forward in our 1824,<sup>5</sup> and we also discussed present shape of cabinet. He kept documents for study and he apparently wants to send Bosch both of them. We will stall on this pending your advice because private document is pretty hot. On cabinet Guzman showed usual tendency to backslide a little toward familiar PRD friends, and usual tendency to do better when pressed. Details follow in separate telegram.<sup>6</sup> I floated notion of brief delay in reaching final solution, on ground that both sides were in a bad mood for compromise. He did not quarrel but he did ask that any return of Washington team be accompanied by noises which would leave him in business. I reassured him that Guzman solution remained our choice.

9. It remains to report Guzman–Amiama contact. First meeting was correct and there will be another Thursday morning at ten. We think the two men respect each other. We think they also have a long way to go before their minds really meet. We continue to think that

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<sup>5</sup> Document 82.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 1866 from Santo Domingo, May 21, lists Guzman's proposed cabinet members, Dr. Ramon Ledesma Perez for President, Hector Garcia Godoy for Foreign Affairs, and Tomas Pastoriza for Agriculture, among others. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65)

their conversations can only do good, and we will press them to keep on. But we will not use our biggest guns to seek immediate paper agreement between them unless you tell us to—if only because Amiama will not agree to serve under Guzman at this stage. This agreement is still my strong hope, but all concerned must be softened by a little time before it will be possible. Specifically, Amiama will accept only if his comrades in arms agree, and tonight they see no need for what they call a “surrender to Bosch.” Moreover Amiama will certainly have a view of his own on critical question of Army Chief of Staff and we strongly doubt that he could accept Lora Fernandez. Vance thinks de Leon or Valdes may still be key here.

10. So let us make haste slowly and let us explain why.

11. Vance generally concurs.

**Bennett**

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#### **84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 22, 1965, 0140Z.

1881. Bundy, Bennett and Mora met with Imbert at 11:45 a.m., May 21. Purpose was to get him to agree to indefinite extension of truce and to nail down prompt turn-over of Radio Santo Domingo to OAS. He treated us to quite a display of verbal histrionics designed to impress on us his determination stand fast on GNR and not accept Guzman formula.

Mora led off by asking him to extend truce beyond 24-hour period. Imbert reaction was strongly negative. He said rebels have this time agreed to cease-fire because they know they are licked. Arguments by Mora and Bennett that it is to his interest to project image of man of peace made no perceptible change in his adamant stand. Imbert said that only solution to Dominican situation is for rebels to surrender under full personal guarantees. Bundy said it was USG view that continuation of truce would be great contribution and refusal to go along

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State on May 21 at 10:28 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD for McNamara, and CIA for Raborn at 11:30 p.m.



would be a big mistake. Imbert's rejoinder was that he could clean out downtown in 2 days if US did not have his hands tied. He said that he had been tricked into truce. His colleagues had warned him, he added, that if he agreed to a 24-hour truce, he would find himself trapped into a longer one. Request now being made of him was "proof" they were right.

Bundy switched subjects by asking Imbert when we might expect him to turn RSD over to OAS as he had promised Bennett. Imbert replied he and people repairing station and that he wanted to make speech over RSD to Dominican people before allowing OAS to assume "control." Bundy and Bennett said this not our understanding of agreement. Further discussion led Imbert to say he personally in favor of turning station over to OAS and so announcing in his speech but would have to get clearance from his "associates," including military.

Turning conversation to US efforts to bring about a political solution, Imbert declared flatly "I will not accept an agreement with them. I will not enter into agreements with Communists . . . A return to the 1963 Constitution would be a fatal precedent." He brought up how he had been urged by USG to leave private life to form GNR. He described struggle in DR as one between democracy and communism. He said he failed to see why USG, having urged him assume GNR role, was now trying to force him to deal with Communists. He claimed country was with him and rebels represented only 20 city blocks. Given this and Communist nature of rebels, he saw no reason why he should be asked to accept political formulas which ran counter to his personal convictions and to what Dominican people expect of him. He became so exercised at one point that he said if USG wants to pressure and betray him, he will denounce US before world opinion. "I will not accept political deals (*compendas politicas*) imposed by foreign government," he concluded.

Bundy pointed out that Imbert knew full well that our policy is not to support communism, and we take lessons from no one on danger which communism represents. Bundy said our appreciation of military and political situation is frankly quite different from his. We do not think that either side can win by further killing. Our reading of what Dominican people want is continuation of truce and peaceful formula for political solution and not more bloodshed as implied in Imbert request that we allow his troops cross LOC to mop up rebel stronghold.

Recognizing that in Imbert's present state of mind it was not profitable to continue discussion, Bundy proposed that those present take time to reflect on views expressed. He told Imbert that he wanted him to know that: (1) we think it is very important that truce continue; (2) we desire to have RSD turned over promptly to OAS; and (3) we

plan to continue working toward peaceful solution. Of these, Bundy noted, RSD problem was one needing immediate attention. On this it was agreed that: (1) Imbert would seek consent other GNR members and inform Bennett or Mora of response during course of afternoon; (2) we would promptly send technicians to repair facilities; (3) once in operation, Imbert would make a broadcast announcing he was turning radio over to OAS; (4) Mora would thereupon assume control over programming. Imbert said that he wants his troops to guard RSD even after OAS takes over.

**Bennett**

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## **85. Editorial Note**

On May 22, 1965, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics adopted a resolution calling for provisions to guide the conduct of the Inter-American Force in the Dominican Republic. One provision empowered OAS Secretary General Jose A. Mora to assume the powers necessary to form an Inter-American force with broad representation; another requested that Brazil designate a Commander for the Inter-American force, and the United States designate a Deputy Commander. The last provision established a committee to study the functioning and maintenance of the Inter-American Force. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 14-4 (Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru), with 2 abstentions (Argentina, Venezuela).

Subsequent to this meeting, General of the Army Hugo Panasco Alvim of Brazil was designated Commander of the Force and Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., of the United States, Deputy Commander.

**86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 22, 1965.

1894. For the President from Bundy.

1. In two hours with Benitez and one-and-a-half with me, Guzman today flatly refused to propose departure of three leading rebels or even to allow Benitez to propose it. He is honestly convinced that any such move would cost him the confidence of the people and, after battering him at length, Benitez and I are convinced he would quit before he would accept it.

2. I told Guzman this attitude raised in my mind serious questions since it showed his unwillingness to take any action now to control rebel general staff. I added that this was doubly difficult for us because we do not know who really runs that group. Guzman's bright young factotum, Salvador Jorge Blanco, denied this by asserting Caa-mano's clear control. I expressed doubts which Guzman did not contest. I asked him for full list of rebel military leaders and remarked that in our judgment there were Communists among them—real Communists and not simply leftist idealists. When they asked for details I agreed to provide them. (We are reviewing composition of this group and will report available facts and impressions in a separate telegram tomorrow.)<sup>2</sup>

He agreed completely when I described his position as that of a man who did not think he would have the public and political strength to attempt any split of rebel military leadership at the outset.

3. I told Guzman this decision would be very disappointing and that we would have to report it to Washington. He understood but held his ground.

4. On all the evidence I do not believe Communists now control the general staff or that general staff will control the government. But if we substitute "influence" for "control" I think both propositions will be true. I think degree of influence can be acceptably low in both cases, especially if we can strengthen cabinet. But it will be present, and it will be observed. On the other hand Benitez visited rebel headquarters

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Nodis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received in the Department of State at 6:53 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1902 from Santo Domingo, transmitted a list of the proposed Guzman cabinet. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65)

this afternoon and said afterward that Communist issue was laughable. He reports they are really adolescents with guns. I think he may be right.

5. This series of talks reinforces a growing conviction that Guzman is both good and weak. He really understands Communist problem and he has stood firm against a cabinet job for the doubtful Hector Aristy. But he is not going to go against those who are seen as heroes of the revolution.

6. If we are to go ahead nonetheless—and this is my own firm recommendation—we must plan to give maximum attention to building continuing intensive U.S. relations with Guzman and with his non-Communist military.

7. This of course is only an important special example of general proposition that Guzman government will at best be caretaker affair, terribly dependent on U.S. handholding.

8. We intend to make up on cabinet swings what we have lost on the departure roundabouts. It will be hard work to broaden Guzman's base, but we plan to seek Mora's help. We are aiming for number of outstanding independents, and we also aim to plan with Guzman for best joint approach to possible members. We have already softened up de Leon and Postigo by private feelers and believe both will serve.

9. We discussed possible cabinet grouping with Guzman tonight made up as follows:

Presidency—Ramon Ledesma Perez (PRD)  
 Armed Forces—Colonel Jose Antonio de Leon Grullon  
 Interior and Police—Eduardo Read Barreras (IND)  
 Foreign Relations—Hector Garcia Godoy (PR)  
 Education—Julio Franco y Franco (PR)  
 Without Portfolio—Julio Postigo (IND)  
 Attorney General—Miguel Angel Brito Meta (IND)  
 Labor—Virgilio Mainardi (PRD)  
 Public Properties—Jose A. Brea Pena (PRD)  
 Agriculture—Tomas Pastoriza (IND)  
 Health—Dr. Tabare Alvarez (PLE)  
 Public Works—Emilio Almonte Jimenez (PRD)  
 Finance—Milton Messina (IND)  
 Industry and Commerce—Eduardo Leon (IND)

Guzman was generally receptive, although obviously had some difficulties with Read for Interior and Police and Franco y Franco for Education. Leon, whose presence on cabinet would be welcome in number of sectors including military, was Guzman's own proposal in place of our suggestion of Andres Freites. This cabinet would provide strong representation by political independents, would offer

undoubted competence in some key fields (particularly Messina in Finance) and would lay reasonably solid base for credible claim that Guzman formula does represent call to national unity. Remains to be seen if Guzman will be as agreeable after consulting with Caamano group and if most attractive candidates (Garcia, Pastoriza, Messina and Leon) could be persuaded to join.

10. All this leads me to conclusion we are reaching moment of truth on Guzman solution. I believe it is still best available. I think I can get Mora to back it strongly. It will have to be pushed down the throats of Imbert and military, but Mora, Vance and I can do that too if we are told to do so. We can even get UN help if we swallow a little hemispheric pride.

11. Apart from all the ups and downs of fun and fatigue and fantastic reporting, the dominant political facts of life here are four:

(1) Guzman solution is nearest to desire of people that we can find.

(2) The responsibility of decisive choice is ours.

(3) Delay now favors Imbert who represents most primitive form of cunning feudal strongman.

(4) Because of our massive presence, we have any number of continuing weapons to use against danger of communism.

12. The other possibilities that remain are two. One is Imbert. We could probably help him to general temporary victory today and with less cost in life than I thought before northern victory. We can probably also get from Imbert much wider and stronger cabinet than he now has. Imbert will be hard and genuine anti-Communist and also pro-American. He will also become hated—though he is not now—because he is a superior man of force and fraud, and knows it, and shows it. I am against him.

13. Second remaining possibility is person unknown, somewhere between Guzman and Imbert. This middle man is not in sight. I think we cannot afford to wait for such an unknown. There is sense in which both Guzman and Imbert are temporary and relatively moderate choices. Imbert is the choice of fear, and Guzman is the choice of hope.

14. As you know, I am a hopeful type. Vance generally concurs. Bennett submitting comments.

**Bennett**

**87. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 22, 1965, 1705Z.

1896. For the President and the Secretary.

Following are some pros and cons relevant to your decision:

1. Pro: Solution meets real desires of people.

Con: In Guzman we may be buying a sizeable pig in a poke. While it is the kind of liberal-looking solution we would all like to see, some would not give it much survival value.

2. Con: We all accept that Guzman is a good man, but weak. And he has very little political experience. He himself admits he cannot now control the military group at headquarters and even PRD civilians with firebrand credentials such as Pena Gomez and his group confess they have lost power to influence situation. This headquarters group is very shadowy; we do not really know focus of its control. There is rather general agreement that it is not Caamano.

To put a good but weak man up against a group of strong and determined men of dubious motivations and objectives is to provide a set-up for take-over. An honorable man might well choose to get out, but the damage would have been done.

Pro: Headquarters group will not be real center of power after Guzman is in, and while we do not know as much about them as we would like, there is no reason to credit them with superhuman skills for day-to-day action after battle ends. Takeover by real Communists is impossible while we are here and we need not leave until we are satisfied it is safe.

3. Con: What happens to the Dominican military, a group for whom we have no great admiration but which does represent an organized authority which has had its uses in holding country together this past month against strong undertow and active efforts from Ciudad Nueva. Our forcing them to take Guzman and co. is going to be very messy, public affair, and it may well leave armed forces shattered and fragmented. Destruction of up-country military detachments in reflection of divisions in capital could have most serious consequences nationally and could precipitate breakdowns in towns around country which have thus far been avoided. There is nothing extreme left would like better than to see armed forces rent asunder (and filled with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 1:58 p.m.

resentment against us) while arms are loose in the streets in such great quantities as at present. We have seen painful results of this elsewhere.

Pro: We have means to prevent this result. Morally we have great authority with Guzman and we can have it also with new military chiefs. No one says any of these proposed new authorities is pro-Communist, and we are the ones with logistics, transport and communications.

4. Con: Some of us cannot accept Benitez' assumption that the men at rebel headquarters are "adolescents with guns." There are indeed too many kids with weapons wandering about terrorizing the public and shooting things up for the hell of it—the classic revolutionary tactic of passing out weapons indiscriminately to the "people" was one of the most serious things done here last month. But we have seen too much here these past four weeks to consider the problem merely as a simple one of exuberant youth.

5. Con: It is regrettable we cannot now look forward to departure of any rebel military. If we are to take at face value the notion that the heroes of the revolution are butchers of the Caamano, Montes de Arache and Pena Tavares variety (the first two have been killers since Trujillo's day and have been so employed—Montes for instance was sent to Venezuela to do in Betancourt, while Pena is perhaps a Communist if reports are to be believed), not to mention worthies such as Aristy and Cury, then the moral base of the revolution and of Guzman's government is sadly compromised. On this view, with all their faults, reasonable competent and professional officers such as Rivera Caminero, Jimenez and De Los Santos are preferable. Incidentally, we all agree Wessin must go—and soon.

Pro: The key to this is not in who leaves for a few months. The key is in gradual reassertion of legitimate authority, including that of Guzman above all and then of De Leon and service chiefs. Some of us are now convinced that we can do this job better by not forcing departures even if we could—which is very doubtful indeed.

6. Con: The alternatives of leadership are bleak, and in the situation which has developed in past week here they lead back to Imbert. We all distrust Imbert. He is tricky (although within limits) and he is no move forward. However, to some of us he seems less a step backward than Balaguer, whom so many regard as the electoral answer next time. Imbert has a certain national consciousness, a quality rare among Dominicans; and he has guts, even more rare here. He is not without some appeal in the north and east of country and he has been picking up support as he has been winning. While the people of the country have very burning frustrations and we must move massively to meet their legitimate social and economic aspirations (whatever the governing group), political support for the PRD can be exaggerated. (And not all of it necessarily transferable to Guzman, who is not a widely

known public figure.) After all, both Trujillistas and the military voted in bloc for Bosch in 1962 out of fear of reprisals in event of UCN victory. They would not do so again. Recent polls showed Balaguer running well ahead of Bosch, and an admittedly inconclusive polling of "constitutionalist" prisoners taken here by our forces has shown a preference for Balaguer by just over 50 percent of those interrogated.

Pro: There can be no real doubt—as Postigo told us yesterday—that strong majority of people will prefer Guzman to Imbert.

7. Con: It should not be too difficult to broaden and strengthen Imbert's cabinet to give it more appeal and competence. (He already has one Bosch man.) Judicious handholding, help and pressure by us could influence him in right directions. He is pro-US but can go off reservation and get ugly if he feels himself pushed into corner.

Pro: There is truth in this, but the passion for power in Imbert is strong, and such men usually manage to take us into camp because they cheat and we do not. Imbert will be as hard to manage as Aristy would be.

8. Con: Washington may consider Imbert too difficult a proposition to sell to US press and to some good neighbors. We recognize his very real handicaps in this regard. In an ideal world no one would choose Imbert; however, our situation here and our prospects are about as un-ideal as possible. Imbert is at least a going concern and, despite admitted marks against him, is picking up strength. Guzman has appeal but he has not left the post. And getting him onto the track is going to be difficult.

Pro: The apparent strength of Imbert and the apparent weakness of Guzman can be turned around dramatically when decision is made and some authority delegated. And selling Imbert as final result of US intervention is job some of us think US could never succeed in doing.

9. Whatever your decision it will have unanimous and unreserved support of Bennett, Bundy, Vance and Palmer.

**Bennett**



**88. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 22, 1965, 2:04–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting at White House, Cabinet Room on the Dominican Republic, 22 May 1965, 2:30 p.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

The President, SecState, Ambassador Martin, SecDef and DCI<sup>2</sup>

SecState stated he feels that OAS or another Latin American person with our backing may be the best way to handle.

Ambassador Martin feels that U.S. speaking through an OAS (person)<sup>3</sup> would be “face-saving.” SecState agreed.

President asked about number of troops under Imbert and Caa-mano. DCI replied that they were about equal, but DCI agreed with SecDef and SecState that Imbert would not be able to dislodge Caa-mano from his positions inside the “new city.”

This would result in great loss of life and completely unacceptable to U.S. and the world to let such go on with all of our troops there and in position to prevent. DCI concurred.

A cable will be sent to Vance and McGeorge Bundy to continue discussions with Imbert, Guzman and the three Chiefs (Army, Navy, and Air Force) to accept a coalition government.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Fortas stated that before any progress can be made with Imbert we must have a rather firm arrangement with Guzman and then say to Imbert that this has U.S. approval!

Cable from Ambassador Bennett, #221705Z (Flash 1896) Amb. to SecState.<sup>5</sup>

SecDef feels we should continue talks with military leaders—it should be clear that we are as interested as they to constitute a constitutional (non-commie) government. It is too early for “ultimatum”

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted by Raborn on May 24. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> According to Valenti’s notes of this meeting, the following also attended: Ball, Crockett, Fortas, Mann, Moyers, Bromley Smith, and Dick Goodwin. (Ibid., Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes)

<sup>3</sup> On May 20 the OAS elected Jose A. Mora as the new mediator in the Dominican Republic crisis.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 91.

<sup>5</sup> Document 87.

stage. We have to know “who is in the back room” behind Guzman before we form a government. Otherwise we may find an “Aristy” telling Guzman to order U.S. out of the country.

The President said:

1. We thought at San Juan we had an agreement<sup>6</sup>—to protect Bosch, Dominican people and U.S.

2. The three tough ones (Rebels) must be put on “an island” to prevent them from influencing Guzman’s government.

3. Tell Imbert he must go along for good of the Dominican Republic.

4. Vance to move on Imbert and Chiefs to get this accepted.

5. We won’t get all we want from Guzman, Imbert and three Loyalist Chiefs.

6. If this won’t work, then we will have to work solely through OAS.

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<sup>6</sup> See the attachments to Document 67.

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## **89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 22, 1965.

1199. Cite CAP65192. References: Embtels 1893<sup>2</sup> and 1896.<sup>3</sup> For: Bundy, Vance and Bennett. From: The President. Bundy should make strong efforts with Guzman along the following lines:

1. You should not accept Guzman’s refusal to consider departure of three leading rebels without making further effort. There are serious dangers in creating a government under admittedly weak leadership while ring leaders of present rebel headquarters group remain in country with possible capability of exercising substantial influence.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Bundy’s Mission on the Dominican Republic (2/2). Secret; Flash; Exdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received in Santo Domingo at 4:55 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> This reference should be to telegram 1894, Document 86.

<sup>3</sup> Document 87.

2. You should insist on agreement that specially trained discreet U.S. security team will assist in constant control of Communists. Measures to be taken on findings of team to include, among others, surveillance, detainment and deportation if necessary. In other words, you should return to firm stance of May 14 San Juan agreement with Arnold, insisting that security team must remain in Dominican Republic until, in U.S. judgment, situation no longer requires their presence.

Vance should simultaneously pursue following line with Imbert and separately with military chiefs:

A. Imbert and chiefs should be told categorically that neither Caamano nor Imbert can be President or occupy any ministerial post in the government.

B. The U.S. will insist upon an anti-Communist government in Dominican Republic and will take all necessary measures to secure this objective. In elaborating this, you should explain that we are insisting on anti-Communist safeguards agreed at San Juan and that we are insisting on elimination of worst rebel elements.

C. You should emphasize that the Guzman formula is the best achievable and therefore Imbert and the chiefs should accept it. But for the present, at least, you should not repeat not issue any threats of force or ultimata.

D. We hope that by continuing talks with military leadership—not just with Imbert—Vance can obtain their agreement or acquiescence on the basis that the proposed coalition government could be clearly anti-Communist and provisional pending elections. It should be made clear to senior military officers that we are just as concerned as they that Communist influence be removed from public institutions of Dominican Republic and that the professional military establishment be maintained which supports a constitutional government.

E. Imbert will, as a minimum, insist on arrangements to guarantee his personal safety. If he knows that he cannot be president or a cabinet minister, what ideas can he then suggest to assure his own protection?

**Rusk**

**90. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 23, 1965, 0730Z.

1925. Ref: Deptel 1199.<sup>2</sup>

1. We can and will make additional effort insure Guzman's ability provide us with evidence that his position vis-à-vis rebel camp strong enough give reasonable assurance that he can control his own government. We do not believe, however, that formula of three major rebel leaders for three San Isidro types reaches heart of problem. "Control" in our terms really means ability to deliver on the Communist question. To meet our need for more convincing indication that threat of Communists can be met, we propose insisting on one of two following alternatives.

2. Spanish Communist and PSP member Manuel Gonzalez y Gonzalez is, according to reliable testimony, much in evidence around rebel headquarters. It is widely believed here that he has been functioning as leading rebel military tactician. As pointed out Embtel 1904,<sup>3</sup> available evidence points to Pena Tavares and Garcia German as possibly representing additional significant Communist penetration of rebel high command. We can insist on immediate expulsion of these three as demonstration of Guzman's good faith on Communist issue. Substitution on this list of Gonzalez and Garcia for Montes and Aristy would have double advantage of avoiding very difficult demand for departure of two major popular "heroes" of the revolution while focusing on real threat of suspected Communist subversives. Our present view of Aristy is that he is a tricky nuisance but probably not a Communist.

3. As perhaps even stronger, and in some way more palatable alternative from Guzman's point of view we could ask for firm agreement now on deportation of specific Castro-Communists whose credentials are not in doubt. List could include 20 agreed names of members of three red parties who have spent time in Soviet Bloc, Cuba and/or Communist China and who we know are presently in D.R. involvement or lack of it in rebel movement would not be main issue.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 4:59 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA at 5:25 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Document 89.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1904 from Bundy in Santo Domingo, May 22, described Pena Tavares as a "leading Communist in the rebel military command," and Garcia German as an even "more sinister figure" than Pena. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65-5/31/65)

We would simply make up list of leftist subversives and seek Guzman's firm commitment to the immediate expulsion of agreed 20 as soon as located. Names of our leading candidates follow in separate cable.<sup>4</sup>

4. In our judgment we should at this time seek Guzman's consent to one or other of two foregoing proposals. This would not mean, however, that other could not be carried out at later date under terms of private agreement on Communist issue.

5. In order obtain final concession on one of these alternatives we request definite authority to approach Guzman on basis that his acceptance will be sufficient for final agreement. We cannot get him to do either of these things on any other basis. There will be other things to ask for but they are all covered by our public and private memoranda and by our continuing power position.

6. For this reason, unless otherwise instructed, we will handle language of understanding on Communists on one or other of two following bases:

(A) First and preferably, by existing public and private memoranda

(B) Second, by following language which meets your suggestions in your 1199 while accepting as we have before the notion that not all Communists need be thrown out at once.

"Memorandum of Understanding—shorter form.

With respect to Communists and Trujillistas:

It is understood that effective measures must be taken by the constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from the subversive activities of Communists and Trujillistas. The initial understanding on this point continues as follows:

'These measures will involve their separation from the Dominican community. This may take the form of their internment in some isolated area under Dominican jurisdiction or their departure from the island. Identification of such persons to be effected promptly by mutual consultation and prompt action will follow as aforesaid.'

It was later agreed that 'the detailed procedures would have to be worked out with the new President with the object of accomplishing an effective job utilizing the resources available to all concerned.'

Still later it was agreed that while internment and departure of Communists and Trujillistas is permissible, it may have practical disadvantages. It was agreed that the best practicable course will be for persons of U.S. choosing to work closely with the new Minister of Police and come to agreement as to how best to achieve the basic objective. The cooperation of U.S. personnel will be sought and retained

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

for such time as may be necessary. Such U.S. personnel should be of Spanish-speaking background."

7. Vance and I believe he can handle military much better by waiting until we have solid platform with Guzman. If you give us clear green light on above basis tomorrow, we will proceed fastest.

8. Tonight Mora told us firmly that Imbert solution is no good. He is prepared to say so to Imbert too when time comes. He will also back a clearly anti-Communist and broadly based Guzman government. So give us the tools and we will finish the job.

**Bennett**

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#### **91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 23, 1965, 5:01 p.m.

1208. Embtel 1925.<sup>2</sup> For Bundy and Vance.

1. If Guzman does not have either the power or will to arrange for departure of three rebel leaders in headquarters group and is unwilling even to try to achieve this it is obvious that he would not deal adequately with those leaders and other dangerous elements once his government was formed.<sup>3</sup> This would cast in doubt the efficacy of any safeguards we might write into an understanding with him.

2. Under these circumstances we believe you should continue to insist on the original plan for paid overseas vacations for the three rebel

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Document 90.

<sup>3</sup> On May 23 at 2:02 p.m. Ball read a draft of this telegram over the telephone to President Johnson for his approval. At this point in the text, the President commented: "I'd make it [the first sentence] stronger than that; I'd say that if he doesn't have the will or the power, or the desire to even agree to do it, it is obvious that we'd have a pig in a poke and that he wouldn't do it later. Therefore, we couldn't survive at home. I'd let Bundy know that he's coming back to a bunch of—that he's coming in to the lion's den. He's down there enjoying himself but he better realize that he's going to be facing Dick Russell and Bill Fulbright and all of them will want to know why we put the Communists in charge. If Guzman doesn't have the will or the desire, or won't even agree to get rid of them after he takes power then obviously he wouldn't get rid of others that need to go. And in this situation we could not survive. . . . I want to shake him [Bundy] up a little bit." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and George Ball, Tape F65.39, Side A, PNO 1)

leaders. Anything less would be impossible to explain and justify to Congress and American people. We would not regard expulsion of Gonzales, Pena Tavares, and Garcia German as a substitute. If agreed safeguards work they would be thrown out or interned anyway.

3. In addition we believe we must insist on the following safeguards:

a. Identified communists<sup>4</sup> will be promptly taken into custody and deported or interned.

b. Measures will be taken for the identification of other communists, whether in civilian or military life. When identified those communists will be immediately placed under surveillance and if at any time evidence develops of a plot or threat to security of government they will be immediately deported or interned.

4. We would prefer that you or Mora or other appropriate emissary maintain contact with Imbert and proceed with exploratory talks with him without awaiting conclusion of final agreement with Guzman. However, if you feel strongly that approach to Imbert is not advisable before a final conference with Guzman you may delay such approach until tomorrow.

5. Although it is obviously desirable that Imbert accept agreed cabinet list we are prepared to consider one or more alternative suggestions (excluding Imbert himself) if he finds any names on list totally objectionable. This means we are prepared to consider addition of up to two or three pro-Imbert people who are not Trujillistas.

6. We recognize that these instructions may increase difficulty of reaching a final understanding but we are not prepared to accept a deal that does not fully satisfy our requirements. If your efforts to reach an understanding should in fact meet a dead end we would propose that Mora bring to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers the details of what each side is prepared to accept. Brazilian, Argentinian, Ecuadorian and hopefully other ministers plan to arrive in Washington on May 27.<sup>5</sup> We would expect Mora to make clear to Ministers that United States has carried the ball as far as possible pending the development of OAS arrangements to assume responsibility for establishing government. With the creation of the Inter-American Force and the meeting of the Foreign Ministers the OAS should now carry on from there.

**Rusk**

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<sup>4</sup> During the same telephone conversation Ball read to the President a phrase that included a specific reference to the identification of "Communists totaling in the order of 20" who would be promptly deported. President Johnson objected to this. He said, "I'd just cut out the 20. Why do you want to deport 20 and leave 40" I don't care about 3 or 20. I'm interested in Communists per se." Ball said "okay," he would change the text.

<sup>5</sup> Brazilian Foreign Minister Juracy M. Magalhaes proposed that Foreign Ministers attend the already ongoing Tenth Meeting on May 27 to take stock of the situation in the Dominican Republic and to decide what further steps were necessary.

## 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 23, 1965, 5:39 p.m.

1209. For Vance. Highest authority<sup>2</sup> suggests that in dealing with Imbert you should make clear that in any new government we are prepared to give representation to his adherents and to assure that his anti-communist philosophy will be upheld.

Specifically you should give assurances along following line:

1. We will insist that there be no communists in any new government and that we will not support any government that includes communists. Our objective is a government of national union composed of individuals liberal in their politics but anti-communist.

2. We shall insist that such a government adopt a policy of reconciliation and renounce revenge either toward the United States or toward Imbert and his following.

3. FYI. If Imbert insists we would be prepared to include two or three of his own people in cabinet posts in a new government provided they are reasonably liberal and not extremists. We would also be prepared to include two or three of Balaguer people leaving possibly five places for Bosch's people. End FYI.

4. We will undertake to assure Imbert's personal security. This might be best achieved if he were to come to Washington either as Ambassador or head of a Reconstruction Mission. Under those circumstances security arrangements could be readily provided. We can also arrange financial security.<sup>3</sup>

5. All of this represents a generous arrangement to meet the requirements of Imbert and his followers.

**Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball.

<sup>2</sup> In a telephone conversation with George Ball on May 23 at 2:02 p.m. (see footnote 3, Document 91) the President indicated that another telegram, subsequently telegram 1209, was necessary and outlined its contents.

<sup>3</sup> During the conversation cited in footnote 2 above President Johnson also told Ball: "We'll give [Imbert] plenty to live on, and we'll guarantee to [him] that the power of the 50 states—the fleet, the airplanes, the bombs—will aid and not let any Communists get in the government and not let any Communists rise to power, and reconstruct for [his] people. Now if [Imbert] demands anything else then he's a selfish bastard looking out after himself 'cause we're looking after [his] philosophy and we're looking after [his] people; and that's the way Cy Vance ought to put it to Imbert."



**93. Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 24, 1965, 11:50 a.m.–noon.

[Omitted here is approximately 4 minutes of conversation on Mann's illness; magazine articles critical of U.S. action in the Dominican Republic and specifically of Mann, Bennett, and Vaughn; a proposal for U.S. troop withdrawals from the Dominican Republic; and the possibility of a high-level OAS team, headed by the Brazilian Foreign Minister, to take over negotiations in the Dominican Republic.]

President: You don't think anything will come out of the negotiations with either side do you?

Mann: No, I don't. I think you summed up our feelings early in the game when you said you didn't think these negotiations had a 30 percent chance. I feel now just about how I felt then. I don't think they're ready; it's going to take time. [Mann references a "piece of information" he sent to the President earlier that morning. President Johnson said he read it.]

President: I have grave doubts about Guzman and I don't know what we're finally going to do if he should accept all of our terms. I keep making them a little harder on him without getting rid of all the Communists.

Mann: I have a strong feeling that this is right Mr. President. Your instinct is right on that, and we ought to be thinking about—this is kind of a maneuver which is all right if we think of it that way and maybe trying to build something around somebody else when the time comes and under the OAS tent.

President: Okay, find anybody you might submit as a name?

Mann: There are people around there probably who are not either Balaguer or Bosch that you could build around. I think you'll have to look pretty hard; I can't suggest anybody now. But somebody on the ground could find them. I don't think we ought to become married to this guy Guzman because I just don't trust Bosch to fight the Commies. And, what I'm afraid of is that Bosch is trying to get us to put him in power and to destroy the armies so that there will be nobody to bother him and then once he takes control I think we might be in deep trou-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, Tape F65.41, Side B, PNO 2. No classification marking. President Johnson placed the telephone call to Mann. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

ble. That's my own feeling about it and that came out strongly when I was down there on the ground and everything I've read since I got back tends to confirm this in my mind.

President: I'm also afraid that he'll change the cabinet, if it weren't pro-Commie it would be after he's in there a month.

Mann: That's why I was arguing hard the other day for maintaining the armed forces under their present leadership. I don't mind if you move one or two men but not too many so we have something to fall back on once we get out. The only people we can rely on there now, Mr. President, on the Communist side are the officer corps of the Armed Forces. There just isn't anybody else that I was able to find down there that will give us any base at all to work against the commies in the future. Now we've got to do that on the one hand and on the other hand try to get them, I think we can, to quit throwing out governments that are not Communist. We've got to get them to move toward democracy instead of destroying them.

President: Was there any justification for throwing out Reid [Cabrall]?

Mann: No, not at all. Reid took over at an impossible time from a political point of view because Bosch had raised the cost—that's a sugar economy—of producing sugar to somewhere around 9 cents. Some people say as high as 11. When the world price went down to 2.5 cents, he was in trouble just because he had to fire a lot of people, he had to impose austerity programs, he made the Generals mad by stopping their grafting, he made the rich mad by collecting taxes, and the poor people who don't understand much about this stuff only knew that times were hard. Now that's what really got Reid. He's a pretty decent guy. Most people that I talked to thought he had the cleanest, honest, best government they've had in a long time. But, he's gone, and you couldn't bring him back. You've got to start with a new face. I don't rule out the possibility of Balaguer although I think that would cause great trouble with Imbert. Imbert is afraid of Balaguer.

President: Why?

Mann: Everybody hates everybody down there; that's the main trouble.

President: Why is Imbert afraid of Balaguer?

Mann: Because Imbert killed Trujillo and Balaguer was the Vice President under Trujillo and he thinks he [Balaguer] would let the Trujillistas get to him and kill him and his family.

President: How are we ever going to get Imbert out of power?

Mann: Once we get the OAS down to the [Dominican Republic] and we get the right political climate, I don't think it's going to be so hard Mr. President. If we don't rush it too fast, if we don't insult him

so he thinks his honor is involved, if we play it slowly and firmly, we'll find a way.

President: So you think the best thing to do is to just ride it out and just say that we're waiting on the OAS.

Mann: That's my judgment.

President: And say that we have achieved all of our objectives up to this point; we've stopped the shooting.

Mann: We've done as much as we can to pave the way for the OAS. They are coming down; we're delighted; we're sort of turning over to them. This is going to work out better than most people think, I believe.

[Omitted here are closing remarks.]

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#### **94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 24, 1965, 1830Z.

1963. For the President from Bundy.

1. In 2 hrs this morn presented basic position in ur 1208.<sup>2</sup> Guzman believes he will be quite unable to accept our position or even to negotiate at length about it. But he has undertaken to speak with Mora and Mayobre before giving a more considered answer this afternoon.

2. I opened by reminding him that there had always been 3 basic issues in front of us—and that there had been no really final agreement on any of the 3. They were the need for high leaders on each side to step out and leave the country, the problem of effective dealing with Commies, and a constitutional govt with a sufficiently wide base to command general Dom confidence. I knew he had always recognized the importance of 2nd and 3rd, and equally I knew that he had never given his own approval to 1st.

I said that we had had growing concern in recent days on the role of rebel leaders and especially on the role of Commies. There had been repeated incidents suggesting the influence of forces which do not wish

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 3 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> Document 91.

a settlement. There had been reports from Doms of good will the influence of the Commies continued to be strong. We had growing evidence of our own that Commies were strong in the constitutionalist forces.

3. I reminded Guzman of our original formula that leaders should leave and that known Commies should be separated from the Dom community by detention or departure. I said that we had reported his own objections to these proposals. I said that our fundamental view now was that we did not think a constitutional govt with necessary Dom and U.S. support was possible without a public and decisive position on Commies. The only action which we could see that would show this decision plainly was the separation of those known to be tough, trained, and committed Commies, with a public announcement of this decision.

4. I said all liberal non-Commie movements must eventually confront and defeat Commie threat. I knew that we both agreed on this point. In our judgment the time for this clear breach in the Dom Rep was now, and the slower and more gradual way would not meet the necessities. I said this was the only safe way to a democratic future, in the clear view of my govt, and I reported my impression that there was sympathy for this position on the part of both Mora and Mayobre. (This is what they have told us privately, but it remains to be seen whether they will be so firm with Guzman.)

5. I said that I knew this position would present a grave question for Guzman in the light of his arguments of last week and that I hoped he would take time to reflect before giving a definite reply. I said that our objective was still to lay a firm basis for real agreement, and we should take all the necessary time.

I emphasized strongly our continuing conviction that constitutionalist solution was best and Guzman best man to execute it. Said we were making clear again to Imbert that we saw no lasting solution in him or in his group—and that this opinion too was shared by Mora and Mayobre. We should therefore take our time and find a way to match the basic necessities of constitutional govt with basic requirements I had stated. I was sure this could be done.

6. Guzman said he was deeply disillusioned but not greatly surprised. He knew that I was responsible to final authority of the President. He assumed, however, that the President would know of our discussions and conversations of last week. He recognized that there were many worries in Wash; that many people there and here believed things that were unreal. He himself recognized that there had been Commie infiltration in the constitutionalist forces. He remained persuaded that the Caamano govt had very good control over its various elements. He said it was understandable that in a mood of siege there would be

occasional outbursts that could not be controlled, but that the basic situation was one of effective authority under Caamano. He reminded me that he himself had never supported the departure of revolutionary leaders. He recognized that Bosch had agreed to detention or departure of Commies, but he had always opposed it.

He expressed at some length his conviction that this method was inefficient and indeed not really workable.

He then underlined his rejection of the sacrifice of leaders. He would not do it if Benitez, or Bosch, or the leaders themselves should ask it of him. The departure of these leaders would mean a govt without popular support. If this was required, he would expect to have to withdraw. He would still be glad to assist as a mediator and as an advisor both to us and to his fellow countrymen, but he would not expect to serve in any resulting government.

At this point, I gave him a dose of honest praise, pointing out that his integrity and independence of mind were rare qualities which he had no right to withhold from the service of his people at a time like this if a reasonable solution could be found. I thought he should be sure to talk with Mora and Mayobre before reaching a decision and that I thought it would be very wrong for him to give a final answer now.

7. He said he was willing to defer a final answer but that we should understand these were his firm principles. He believed that repression by force would simply make more Commies. He thought this was the product of earlier crude policies of the Council of State and of the triumvirate govts. He was just as concerned about Commies as we, and he was determined to have them carefully watched and controlled. But he was strongly opposed to creation of conditions that would manufacture Commies. Killing and deportation would have this effect.

8. I replied that I understood and respected his own belief that one set of measures was better than another. But present circumstances had necessarily created special concerns. We both believed that what counts is results. We took no satisfaction in acts of force for their own safety. But today there was a grave question of confidence both in his country and certainly in my own. It was therefore a necessity for visible action against real Commie danger. We could find no other way that to separate hard core Commies. I drew clear distinction between student dabblers and solidly committed, trained, and disciplines revolutionaries. We thought action against the latter absolutely essential.

9. We then discussed a number of other matters such as maintenance of cease-fire, fate of Radio Santo Domingo, and possibilities for econ rehabilitation while seeking pol solution. I also complained

about Cabinet leak to Szulc<sup>3</sup> which we believe came from Caamano himself.

10. Guzman wound up by emphasizing great difficulty of his personal position and his view that both general situation and this personal problem made a quick decision essential. Believing this decision would be negative, I reassured him that no matter when or how discussions ended he could count on us to bear witness to his patriotism, honor and integrity. I re-emphasized that we had common objectives and urged him to make every possible effort to reconcile his purposes with the basic requirements on which we found it essential to insist.

11. He then undertook to talk to Mora and Mayobre and to give us a reply this afternoon. I said that I would take this reply not as a final answer but as a message to the President, so that both sides could be sure of full understanding of each other's position. This may give us another 24 hours—but not much more.

**Bennett**

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a story filed by Tad Szulc, a Washington correspondent of *The New York Times* who was in Santo Domingo. On May 17 at 4:45 p.m. President Johnson telephoned Bromley Smith seeking information on this story. Smith summarized Szulc's article as stating Guzman was the U.S. Government's candidate to lead the Dominican Republic and the Bundy mission's purpose was to convince Imbert to leave to make way for a U.S. Government "slate" under Guzman. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Bromley Smith, Tape F65.30, Side A, PNO 3)

95. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 25, 1965, 10:06–11:32 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House, 25 May, 10:00 a.m., on The Dominican Republic;  
Mr. [name not declassified] accompanied the Director<sup>2</sup>

1. McGeorge Bundy will return tomorrow (26 May).
2. They will get an agreed upon position between SecState, McNamara and Bill Moyers as to what should be said and SecState will hold press statements.
3. Mora and IAF will handle business with strong U.S. representative.
4. Withdraw U.S. troops man-for-man replacement from Latin America.<sup>3</sup>
5. Studies will be made by U.S. military for Mora to see what further reductions in U.S. troops can be made.
6. State will have to have contingency plans with people who will be satisfactory to U.S., for the Dominican Republic Cabinet.
7. Ambassador Bunker will keep OAS informed.
8. President feels that our Latin American ambassadors have not told our Dominican Republic story promptly or good!
9. Have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] supported our Ambassadors in providing them with story or is this State?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Raborn on May 26. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> According to a May 26 CIA memorandum of this meeting, Raborn and his associate [name not declassified] were in attendance as were President Johnson, Bunker, Rusk, McNamara, Mann, Fortas, Ball, Vaughn, Moyers, Valenti, and Bromley Smith. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302) Valenti's handwritten notes of this meeting state that George Reedy was also present. (Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes)

<sup>3</sup> The memorandum cited in footnote 2 above, includes the following: "The President said that he wanted some of our troops to start moving out since there were already some 500 Latin American troops in place. Secretary McNamara said this would be started and that the first group of about 400 would be evacuated by the evening of 27 May. He added that the remainder—to reach about 1700—would be evacuated soon after the Brazilian contingent arrives. Our goal is to be down to about 10,000 troops under the Inter-American Force." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302)

10. President would like State and Defense to initiate an OAS elite force (2000 men with planes, tanks, etc.) to take care of future Dominican Republic situations. We should participate in this planning (CIA). Get in touch with State and Defense and stay close to this effort—we should have a place in such effort.

11. What is status of our analysis of Bosch?

12. Vance will stay for a while yet to fill “gap” until OAS commission arrives.

13. President concerned about instable conditions in Latin America. He feels that our plans are weak to handle contingencies.

14. We have invited suggestions through our ambassadors on how to handle Dominican Republic conditions—but so far no helpful suggestions have been received from them!

15. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] must have placed in their hands a *full* story on the Dominican Republic to acquaint their contacts in Latin America. Get from State.

**96. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 26, 1965, 1050Z.

2003. From Bundy.

1. Vance, Mora and I met May 24 with Caamano, Aristy and Jotin Cury for four hours during late afternoon and early evening. Guzman and Jorge Blanco also present, as was Benitez who lent his valuable assistance in assuring that we all understood one another. Meeting held in deserted Conservatory of Music just across line in rebel territory on George Washington Blvd.

2. Our lengthy discussion was quite useful in my judgment. Caamano and company should now have clear idea of what we want and of what problems must be solved before final solution can be achieved. They can now have no illusions about the firmness of our purpose nor false optimism about a quick and easy solution. At same time, way was left open for further talks which could ultimately produce good results.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 7:47 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.



As a starter Vance and Mora will meet with Caamano tomorrow to discuss problem of removing dangerous source of incidents by bringing National Palace within our security lines.

3. I opened conversation by reviewing status of our negotiations with Guzman. Emphasized my respect and admiration for Guzman both as person and as negotiator for Constitutionalists. Said we had been close to agreement on several occasions during past week but serious issues arose each time and we were not in position of having to step back and give careful consideration to problem as a whole. Told them I was going to Washington tomorrow<sup>2</sup> but Dr. Mora and Vance would be here to carry on. Emphasized our deep interest in having everyone concerned make maximum use of OAS presence and Dr. Mora's good offices in working toward final settlement of Dominican problem.

4. Listed following specific issues to be resolved: (A) constitution—we can understand deep desire on part of Caamano forces for return of 1963 constitution. However, must point out that by no means all Dominicans share this desire. (B) Caamano of Armed Forces—in-sistence that member of Caamano group hold command of army remains one of principle obstacles. (C) Communism—we are satisfied that present leadership of Constitutionalist movement is against communism but there are serious differences between us on how problem should be handled. (D) Civil Base of Government—we have come a long way toward understanding on necessity for broadest possible representation in government so as to attract wide support. However, we might have to go farther. (E) Imbert and the Other Side—power of GNR and its forces has grown considerably during last ten days. Result has been hardening attitude on questions such as who will command army. No one now can seriously believe that a complete victory is possible for either side.

5. Guzman expressed himself as shocked and disappointed at my presentation. (This appeared to be largely for benefit of Caamano and company. Guzman had not filled them in on Monday's conversation—Embtel 1963.)<sup>3</sup> Said he thought we had reached final agreement on constitutional formula, names of officers who would hold top military commands, including Minister Armed Forces and Army and Air Force

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<sup>2</sup> Bundy departed the Dominican Republic to return to Washington the morning of May 26. According to a telephone conversation that morning with Bill Moyers at 9:25 a.m. Bundy, who was still in Santo Domingo, reported that publicly he was returning to Washington for consultations with the President, but the private underlying reason was to try to diminish growing criticism in the press that Americans were attempting to install their own government in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Bill Moyers, Tape F65.42, Side A, PNO 1)

<sup>3</sup> Document 94.

commanders, (Navy unsettled but not a particular problem) and on composition of Cabinet. This would leave as only basic problem matter of how to deal with communism. (Guzman did not mention problem of departure of rebel leaders.)

6. I made it entirely clear that in this, as in all diplomatic negotiations, agreement must be reached on all points in order regard any one as having been finally settled. Conceded that we had reached understanding in principle on various points at various times but obviously failure settle all issues left each side free re-examine its position as a whole.

7. Caamano gave Aristy the floor first. He said Constitutionalist "government" had put negotiations in hands of Guzman and was fully prepared accept peaceful solution as long as it included restoration of 1963 Constitution. On that issue they would not give an inch. As for growing strength of Imbert side this was clearly result of US intervention. Imbert could only exist with US support. If US forces would leave the country the Constitutionlists could finish the job they began April 24. Re army command, Aristy said Caamano group had conceded on other three military posts but would continue insist that Army C/S come from their ranks.

8. Caamano picked up the argument in even more forceful terms: There are only two real "bands" in DR, Constitutionlists and the US. Imbert able clear northern part of city only because LOC had divided Constitutionalist forces and because US military had provided active assistance. Caamano had thought that, as matter of course, there would be cease-fire while conversations went forward. Instead on day after talks began US permitted Imbert to attack. His forces used US arms and were assisted by US helicopters, as well as by US troops firing from LOC. Constitutionlists had nevertheless continued make concessions in in effort find peaceful solution. Now they were virtually being asked to surrender with demand that they give up claim to Army C/S post. He (Caamano) would offer his head if necessary for a real solution but would keep it tightly screwed on under present circumstances. Army C/S post must be filled by Constitutionalist officer.

9. In reply I made following points: (A) Caamano's assessment of our role here and of our relationship to Imbert was quite simply wrong. I knew what orders had been given and I had confidence in the discipline of our troops. No such military cooperation with Imbert had taken place. (B) Re armed forces posts, we were not talking about either side ceding or surrendering anything. Had been agreed from first with Bosch that Minister of Armed Forces and Army C/S would be officers acceptable both sides. (C) Assertion that only two sides exist also incorrect. Imbert's side is a fact, like it or not, and it controls good part of the country.

10. Mora intervened at this juncture to suggest that continuing discussion of specific issues was unprofitable and inappropriate. We should be talking about basic positions and general attitudes. Mora also did valuable work in strengthening Guzman with Caamano by paying tribute to his integrity, sincerity and honest representation of Constitutionalist side. I used Mora's intervention to emphasize that my review of status of negotiations was not meant to indicate we were closing the door. Far from it. We merely saying time had come to take stock and see where we might go from here.

11. Aristy and Cury were not yet prepared let reason flow. They said only two alternatives existed: peaceful solution or total and glorious sacrifice of Constitutionalist forces in fight to the finish. Delays in negotiations suggested—at least to uniformed—that deliberate stalling tactics were being employed in hope of weakening Constitutionalist movement. Time now at hand when people should know the truth. Might even be necessary, Aristy said, to tell all—who had been negotiating and what had been said.

12. I replied that this was up to them. We had nothing to fear. Our purpose was to seek solution in interests of all. Could only point out that type of publicity Aristy suggesting would scarcely brighten prospects for further talks. As for threat to seek solution with arms, my government was committed to sustain cease-fire in accordance OAS resolution. Our forces would, of course, have to reply in kind if attacked. However, no one wanted more violence, least of all Dominican people. Courage and sense of honor of Constitutionlists might be admirable but notion of seeking glory and world sympathy by provoking fight to the end was futile because such a course would solve nothing.

13. From this point on discussion became increasingly more reasonable. I said it my understanding that basic Constitutionalist position was one of opposition to dictatorship of right or left, of determination that country should have honest government responsive to people's will. I pointed out real Communist danger as we see it and emphasized that US national interests would not permit another Cuba. Also observed that reality of Dominican situation required close and understanding relations between our two countries which, in turn, required appreciation on their part of US responsibilities and attitudes with regard to communism. If my understanding of Constitutionalist position correct our fundamental difference was on issue of how to handle Communist problem.

14. Aristy and Caamano each made rather lengthy statements to effect that: Constitutionlists firmly opposed to communism and knew Communist dictatorship would be even worse than rule by the right. Constitutionlists fully recognized absolute necessity of good relations

with US and of economic assistance from US. Constitutionalist would never permit imposition of communism here and were prepared to meet the danger. As soon as constitutional government established, Communists or anyone else who might break law or conspire would suffer full consequences. Caamano said we knew his history from our intelligence sources, knew him to be anti-Communist. He and his movement were out to give people free, honest government and to clean up corrupt armed forces, nothing more.

15. Caamano and friends conceded there were probably a few Communists around. Every popular movement could expect some infiltration. However, there were no Communists anywhere near Caamano, his government or military command—of that we could be sure. He, Caamano, had met only three Communists in his life—gentlemen who happened to be brought under arrest to the National Police while he was on duty there. He had heard other names mentioned but had no direct knowledge of these people. Finally, as Cury said and others agreed, best way fight communism was to give people social justice and work.

16. I said our assessment of situation was quite different. Constitutionalist claimed they could handle problem and we prepared accept that this what they genuinely believe. However, we informed Communists not few and insignificant but rather numerous and active in Constitutionalist movement. These are people who have been identified to our satisfaction. They are brothers-in-arms of Caamano's officers. Their presence and what is to become of them are matters of real concern to us. We must be satisfied that this problem will be dealt with effectively and must have clear understanding on that point in order go ahead toward solution.

17. Cury and Aristy asked if we could provide names and numbers of Communists. Caamano said he prepared accept US technical assistance on the problem. I replied present large meeting no place go into specifics on such delicate subject but perhaps Caamano would wish designate officer (one clearly identified as anti-Communist) who could hold discussions with one of our people. Caamano accepted suggestion. Said he would pick officer and let us know.

18. Talk then turned to basic attitude of Constitutionalist toward concept of national concord and kind of government that might achieve it. Caamano said his side already committed to policy of no revenge and he reluctantly prepared allow "guilty" San Isidro officers leave country without answering for their crimes. Entire Caamano group next took turns presenting case for their contention that fight to restore 1963 Constitution has full support of Dominican people. In essence argument was that installation of government in accordance that document's provisions would end all problems and be greeted with

universal joy. I again noted differences in our assessment of Dominican reality, pointing out that majority of Dominican people have not really been heard from; that opposition to Constitutionalist solution does exist in important sectors; and that Caamano's group must think in terms of broader solution than merely going back to Constitution 1963—of practical steps to create a genuine government of national concord.

19. In reply, and after more argument on the case, Aristy and Cury made following points to which Caamano agreed: (a) leaders of Constitutionalist movement do not seek places in new government and are prepared step aside for other men; (b) they wish government to be constituted of men acceptable to broadest possible range of Dominicans; (c) leaders agree to national referendum on 1963 Constitution; (d) they desire that new government establish close and cordial relations with US, based in part on common opposition to communism. Mora and I both expressed view that this was constructive reply which I could take back with me to Washington.

20. Remainder of meeting—which punctuated at one point by sound of heavy firing from Sans Souci area—taken up with discussion of comparative merits 1962 and 1963 Constitutions and of possible specific measures to strengthen cease-fire. At end we agreed Mora and Vance would be available for further talks. Aristy and I also agreed that any public reference emanating from Caamano camp would be along lines that constructive general conversation had been held and that possibility for further talks existed.

**Bennett**

97. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 26, 1965, 5:35–6:45 p.m.

## SUBJECT

White House Meeting on the Dominican Republic, 26 May 1965—5:30 p.m. (DCI was accompanied by Mr. FitzGerald)

Bundy's remarks:

1. Forms of assurance of Commies.

Forms of assurance on Military commander and police. These are critical and will be essential.

2. Imbert actively promoting his cause.

3. Reason to believe an Imbert solution would be distasteful to OAS and charges that U.S. installed him.

4. We may be forced to accept an "Imbert" solution vis-a-vis Constitutional one.

5. The rebels, however, will probably violently oppose.

6. There is every reason to improve OAS's image. Mora has increased posture.

7. Mora feels that U.S. must be right by his side when negotiating.

8. Cables of past 2–3 days<sup>2</sup> are important—people are most eager to get "normalcy" back earliest. (Banks), etc.

9. If "normalcy" could be brought back—we could have a tripartite state.

10. Mayobre seems to be eager to pull off a "rebel" solution and frustrate U.S.

11. President wanted to know the number of arms passed out plus those now available. Can we get number from Cabral Reid?

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Raborn on May 28. The time is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) The following were present: President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Vaughn, Bunker, Raborn, Fortas, Bundy, Moyers, Desmond FitzGerald, Dick Goodwin, Horace Busby, George Reedy, and Bromley Smith. (Johnson Library) Valenti's handwritten notes of this meeting are *ibid.*, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

12. Troop withdrawal proposed by SecDef

21,000 (-) 1600—19,400	} held in abeyance at this time
1500 more—Saturday <sup>3</sup>	
4500—Saturday, Tuesday <sup>4</sup>	
2000—more by June 9	

This not yet approved in toto.

13.<sup>5</sup> a. Positioning ships.

b. Visit of ambassador<sup>6</sup>

c. Breakdown of law and order

d. Ambassador under desk calling for his secretary to take cover, being shot at, called for assistance as military running up and down hotel shooting with tommyguns among Americans huddled there in grave danger.

e. 600 troops landed to protect Embassy and American life at hotel—at the same time notifying OAS and asking for their help.

f. Further breakdown of law and order due to complete collapse of police.

g. Evening of 28th of April two hard core Commies seen by most reliable source participating with rebels, exhorting crowds and passing out weapons.

h. Morning of 29th of April, 8 more Commies were surfaced.

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<sup>3</sup> May 29.

<sup>4</sup> June 1.

<sup>5</sup> Paragraph 13 is a chronological account of the events leading up to and immediately after the landing of American troops in the Dominican Republic.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Ambassador Bennett's arrival in Washington April 26 for consultations with officials on the problems in the Dominican Republic.

98. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

OCI No. 1809/65

Washington, May 26, 1965.

THE COMMUNIST CONNECTIONS OF JUAN BOSCH:  
A FRESH INTERPRETATION

1. Bosch apparently is not a Communist Party member; he is, however, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* frequently *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* influenced and manipulated by those of his close associates who are Communists. *[8½ lines of source text not declassified]*

2. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* Bosch has always deferred to the Communists around him. Specifically mentioned in this connection is Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart, a prominent Dominican Communist who is an economics professor. Bosch is said to be quite close to Mejia Ricart, who exerts great influence over Bosch's economic line of thought. This individual's influence is probably indirectly increased by the fact that Mejia Ricart also is the ideological mentor of other persons whom Bosch respects. In the latter category are Guatemalans Doctor Raul Osegueda and Mario Monteforte Toledo, who are violently anti-US intellectuals of a far leftist stripe. Both men served as officials of the Arevalo regime (1945–51).

3. Other Dominican Communists who are described as particularly influential over Bosch are Juan and Felix Ducoudray Mansfield. These men, who are brothers, have been identified as top rebel leaders in the current revolt. Both have spent much time in the USSR and Communist Cuba and have had long years of experience as top-level leaders of the Dominican Communist Party (PSPD).

4. Most Central American and Dominican Communists who have known Bosch over the years have regarded him as a *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* political lightweight at home and unworthy of serious attention. Jose Manuel Fortuny, a Guatemalan Communist leader who played a key role in the Arbenz government (1951–54), knew Bosch during this period and considered him *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* not anti-Communist and a person who could be won over. *[1 line of source text not declassified]*, during his many years of exile in Central America and the Caribbean, sought on several occasions to pass himself off as solidly pro-Communist in hopes of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic—Communist Participation in Current Dominican Rebellion—5/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.



winning Communist support for an anti-Trujillo move of some kind. Most of the Communists whom he tried to impress with this pose saw through it, however. This was because they knew that Arevalo and other non-Communists had even more influence over Bosch than the Communists did.

5. [2 lines of source text not declassified] He has tried consistently to be all things to all men. He would like to be another Arevalo insofar as his style of governing is concerned, but he fell short of this goal because he is “too sentimental and too ultrademocratic.” He is also the type of person who thinks that if the people ask for Communism, then Communism is what they should get. But from the US point of view, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that perhaps the most dangerous thing about Bosch is the anti-American, ultranationalist nature of some of his friends.

6. One of Bosch’s Guatemalan friends—Monteforte Toledo—is said to have learned that the Communist element within the Dominican rebel movement plans to take advantage of the “clumsy Yankee intervention” in the Dominican Republic to build strength for a later takeover. According to this plan, the Communists are holding onto their weapons and will bide their time until the crisis has ended. Then they intend to launch an attack against whatever government exists and quickly seize power before there is time for international reaction to mobilize itself against it. These tactics are described [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as typical of the Communists—namely the development of a campaign of terror and internal conflict throughout the country in order to accomplish what cannot be done directly through an open military revolt.

**99. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1965.

SUBJECT

Build-up of U.S. Forces in the Dominican Republic

*History and Background*

The Rebel insurrection in Santo Domingo against the government of Donald Reid Cabral began on Saturday, April 24, 1965. The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) seized control and appointed Rafael Molina Urena as President.

During the next days, the situation became increasingly chaotic. On April 26, Loyalist forces bombed the Rebel-held areas in Santo Domingo. The Rebel government head, Molina, took refuge in the Colombian Embassy. Although the bombing lasted only one day, the situation continued to deteriorate rapidly. Other early leaders of the Rebels began to seek refuge in foreign embassies. Extremist groups moved quickly to the ranks of the Rebels. Leaders of the communist and pro-communist parties became involved with the Rebels and assisted in collecting arms, organizing forces, and setting up strong points in Santo Domingo. As the Rebels gained control of more arms and ammunition, thousands of irresponsible civilians were given weapons.

The U.S. build-up paralleled these events. On April 24, the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron, with its 1,830 Marines, was directed to move to and stand off the Dominican coast. On April 26, two Army battalions of the 82d Airborne Division were alerted. On April 27, the amphibious squadron was ordered to begin the evacuation. On that day 1,176 Americans and other foreign nationals were evacuated out of the port of Haina. On April 28, the situation was so chaotic that Ambassador Bennett requested the landing of Marines to protect the evacuation operations and reinforce the Embassy guard.<sup>2</sup> In response, 400 Marines were sent ashore. On April 29, the Ambassador requested that the remainder of the Marine units and the two Army battalions be moved to the Dominican Republic to protect American lives.<sup>3</sup> On April 30, 1,500 Marines landed and established

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 1266, Dominican Republic 381. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates Vance saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 32.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 41.

positions around the Ambassador Hotel (the assembly point for evacuees) and secured the road to the port of Haina. On the same day, 1,800 Army troops landed at the San Isidro airfield.

Despite the signing of a cease-fire agreement at 5:30 p.m. on April 30, sporadic but frequent sniping continued from the Rebel side; and in less than 36 hours, 3 soldiers and Marines had been killed and 15 had been wounded. As a Rebel shortwave transmitter broadcast instructions to the civilian mobs to shoot Americans on sight and Radio Havana exhorted the Rebels to “fight on,” the remaining seven battalions of the 82d Airborne Division were placed in an increased readiness status. The danger to American lives continued; and with the Rebels in control of Radio Santo Domingo—the only effective communication with the rest of the island—the danger of chaos and anarchy throughout the island increased, with its accompanying danger to American and other lives and property.

Accordingly, 400 Army troops landed late on May 1 at San Isidro, about 10 miles east of Santo Domingo. 1,600 more Army troops arrived early on May 2. They secured the San Isidro airfield, the Duarte Bridge at the east entrance of Santo Domingo, and part of the east bank of the Ozama River on the eastern side of Santo Domingo. On May 1, an International Safety Zone was established within Santo Domingo with U.S. troops to protect it. By the end of May 2, about 1,700 more Army troops and 1,000 Marines were landed at San Isidro and Haina to secure the Duarte Bridge and the road to the airport, and to reinforce and hold the International Safety Zone. By this time, over 3,000 persons had been evacuated from Santo Domingo. The build-up continued on May 3, 4, and 5, with supporting elements arriving until May 14. By May 14, there were approximately 21,000 U.S. Armed Forces personnel on the island; 5,945 Marines, 14,200 Army, and 958 Air Force.

#### *The Need for 21,000 Men*

To appreciate the need for 21,000 men ashore, three major factors must be considered: the missions of the U.S. forces, the geographical location and population density of the areas in which they were required to perform those missions, and the explosive political situation.

The initial mission of the U.S. forces on April 28 was to evacuate U.S. nationals whose lives were in danger. By April 29, the mission was expanded to include the evacuation of other foreign nationals and the reinforcement of the U.S. Embassy guard which was under attack by Rebel snipers. Marines were required to insure the safety of the evacuees from the assembly point at the Ambassador Hotel on the western edge of Santo Domingo to the port of Haina 7 miles away. On April 29, additional troops were needed—and requested by the American Ambassador—to protect American lives in Santo Domingo and the surrounding area. On May 1, an International Safety Zone was established

in densely populated, downtown Santo Domingo to provide a secure area for OAS and other peacekeeping authorities, to protect various foreign embassies (some of which had been violated by Rebel forces), and to protect Dominicans and Americans and other foreign nationals. Establishment and maintenance of this zone (identified on the attached map),<sup>4</sup> together with the need to assure the safe movement of people and supplies over the 7 miles of road from Santo Domingo to the landing, supply, and evacuation point at the port of Haina, required approximately 6,000 Marines, with an additional force of 2,000 Marines off the shore of the International Safety Zone to meet unexpected contingencies.

The missions of the Army airborne troops have been to protect American lives throughout the island, to assist (with the Marines) in the restoration of law and order, to separate opposing Rebel and Loyalist forces, and to protect the lifeline of medicine, food, and other essential supplies from San Isidro to Santo Domingo.

The airborne units landed at San Isidro airfield, which is 10 miles east of Santo Domingo. The initial increments of these forces first secured the airfield for future landings of troops, supplies, food, and medicine, then moved to secure the vital Duarte Bridge and the east bank of the Ozama River on the eastern side of Santo Domingo. Subsequent increments of Army forces were needed to protect and keep open the 10-mile road from the San Isidro airfield to Santo Domingo so that men and essential supplies could move swiftly and safely.

Three airborne battalions, totaling 4,416 men, have been required to secure the eastern bank of the Ozama River, including the Duarte Bridge, and the 10-mile road from San Isidro airfield to Santo Domingo on a 24-hour basis. Three other airborne battalions, another 4,416 men, have been required to secure the airfield at Santo Domingo, to be available to protect American lives and property, and to assist in restoring law and order on behalf of the OAS throughout the remainder of the country in the event the rebellion should spread. An additional 1,809 Army and Air Force personnel have been required to support the intensive air operations at San Isidro airfield and to provide the other services needed to maintain our forces in the Dominican Republic.

Originally, it was hoped that Loyalist Dominican forces would be able to maintain order in a corridor between the U.S. Marines on the eastern boundary of the International Safety Zone and the U.S. Army forces 2 miles away on the east bank of the Ozama River. It became apparent, however, that the Loyalist forces would not be able to do so. Accordingly, additional Army troops were required to establish and

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<sup>4</sup> Not attached.

hold a corridor approximately 4 blocks wide and almost 2 miles long in a densely populated section of the city of Santo Domingo. Initially, this corridor was established by house-to-house fighting through Rebel-held portions of Santo Domingo. Eventually the corridor became (as it now is) the line separating the opposing Rebel and Loyalist forces, and the key to the maintenance of the cease-fire.

U.S. Army troops in the corridor not only perform the mission of separating the opposing Dominican forces, but also search all traffic crossing the corridor to prevent the passage of arms and ammunition from one side to the other. The corridor serves as a route for the transport of food, supplies, and medicine to the International Safety Zone and the rest of Santo Domingo. Three airborne battalions, totaling 4,416 men, have been required to accomplish these missions in the corridor on a 24-hour basis.

During the entire period U.S. forces, in conjunction with interested U.S. agencies, have furnished increasing levels of humanitarian support to the suffering Dominican people and their ravaged economy. Military vehicles, helicopters, and personnel have been used unsparingly in the distribution of more than 8 million pounds of food. Military technicians have directly contributed to the initiation of public works projects which, in the process of revitalizing the Republic's economy, have provided employment for over 4,000 Dominican nationals. Another 15,000 Dominicans have been treated in U.S. military medical facilities.

Throughout the performance of their missions, our forces have been, and still are, subjected to sporadic but frequent sniper fire. From April 30, the date of the cease-fire, to May 25, 18 U.S. military personnel have been killed and 100 have been wounded.

In summary, the missions our troops have been required to perform have been complex and have increased from the first landing of Marines on April 28 to the present. The initial mission of evacuating American citizens was expanded within a day to include the evacuation of other foreign nationals. Subsequently, our forces established an International Safety Zone in the heart of Santo Domingo and provided food and medicine for thousands of Dominicans, and Americans and other foreign nationals, as well as themselves. These missions have been performed over an area stretching from Haina, 7 miles west of Santo Domingo, through the heart of the densely populated city, to the San Isidro airfield, 10 miles east of Santo Domingo. Humanitarian missions such as the supply of food, medical care, and other essentials, have been performed throughout the Republic. Finally, and perhaps most important, these functions have been performed in an unusually explosive political situation involving continuous sniping, bitter Dominican factions, and communists and other extremists—a situation

in which our men may be called on at any time for peace-keeping activities and the protection of life and property throughout the entire country.

Robert S. McNamara<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**100. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 29, 1965, 1850Z.

2083. For the Secretary.

1. Concern and at least beginning of initiative now visible on part civic leaders Santo Domingo, Santiago, and other towns may offer a way out of this squalid mess. People now beginning to mobilize themselves, while largely middle road to conservative in their personal viewpoints, represent broad base of opinion which is essentially apolitical and emphatically rejects extremes of both left and right. Several names suggested by Santiago Group<sup>2</sup> for cabinet were on our compromise solution list, i.e. Postigo, Pastoriza, Garcia Godoy, Messina, etc. They willing to work with PRD supporters to find broad consensus on apolitical regime. Some of Social Christians who are concerned over Communist influence in Ciudad Nueva could possibly be brought along.

2. If I may speak bluntly, and with some oversimplification, I view two contending sides at present as follows:

With Caamano group we are dealing with a bunch of hoodlums infiltrated and fortified by Communists whose presence they unwilling admit. One hears names of legitimate PRD people who have swung

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Passed to the White House. The handwritten notation "President has seen" appears on the White House copy of the telegram that was sent to the President at his Texas ranch. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, White House Cables, 4/65-7/65)

<sup>2</sup> A group of business, banking, agriculture and civic leaders from Santiago who sought a new political alternative, a "third force" or "third viewpoint," to those already established.

back to them now, but people who visit headquarters such as Papal Nuncio and others do not see them about. (Pena Gomez spoke at Caamano rally yesterday; all other speakers were from extreme left (*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* special report 268<sup>3</sup>).) Nuncio, who worked as hard and as generously as anyone with rebels, in earlier days, told me this morning he considered “worst elements” have gained ascendancy in Caamano movement. Guzman generally discounted.

3. As regards Imbert, the gangster side of his nature has surged rapidly to fore as he has felt himself more pressed. He is getting advice from, among others, old Trujillo types whom I find as unacceptable to US interests as extreme left elements downtown. While rising hysteria over communism has brought some worthy people to his group, his popular support seems largely artificially pumped up. Recent events have drawn armed forces behind him, but they are not naturally his allies and residue of distrust remains. Certainly Postigo, and probably Grisolia and Benoit, could be pulled away from him for better alternative (Embtel 2080).<sup>4</sup>

4. It seems to me we have made a good record of trying to work honorably with both contending forces and we have tenaciously sought compromise solution. While some minor concessions have been achieved, neither side has shown itself willing to seek honorable compromise. Situation is declining again with danger of polarization, and perhaps time has come to soft pedal them both and seek middle way.

5. A good bit depends on how much influence we now wish give Juan Bosch. Washington will have to weigh wider considerations, but from purely local point of view he no longer needs be given great weight. Our numerous surveys of opinion in recent days in lower middle class and poor areas, both in town and country, seldom if ever turned up name of Bosch, nor Caamano, nor Imbert. Venezuelan Ambassador, who cannot be described as unfriendly to democratic left, this week called Bosch “political cadaver,” and Papal Nuncio, who came back here at urging of Bosch to seek settlement, agrees. Balaguer would seem have more general strength.

6. Obviously, many, no doubt majority of country, want change—they want better life—and we should be attentive to that deeply held

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2080 from Santo Domingo, May 29, transmitted the views of moderate GNR junta members Julio D. Postigo and Carlos Grisolia who met with Embassy officials on the night of May 28. Both junta members expressed their disillusionment with the GNR, and Postigo expressed hope of leaving the GNR while Grisolia disagreed with the concessions granted to the rebels in the name of neutrality. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VI)

social tenet. Any group which emerges here from current civic initiative must be liberal in tone and dedicated to appropriate constitutional formula and elections to meet legitimate aspirations Dominican people.

7. If a middle way can be found, we would still have problems of Imbert and Caamano hard cores. Imbert may be somewhat difficult dislodge at this stage, but believe it could be worked out. While there is no doubt some serious hard core with Caamano, believe that if cultivation of vine were stopped, movement would wither. Nuncio states he agrees emphatically and offers his estimate peace could be achieved in week's time without violence. We might both be wrong.

8. This is obviously a black and white telegram and cuts across many complexities of situation. However, I hope it will be useful in your discussions there. Civic groups anxiously awaiting indications our interest.

9. A further point: in conversations with Bowdler over past 36 hours, Mora has indicated that he does not think it is possible to bring the two contending sides together on a formula on which both can agree. Mora states that from his talks with business and professional people and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, it is becoming increasingly evident to him that responsible elements desire a solution quite apart from the Imbert and Caamano factions. (Papal Nuncio told me this morning middle way solution could count on strong church support behind scenes; it is responsive to recent letter of bishops). Mora is groping for what the formula might be. His current very tentative thinking is that perhaps he should make a recommendation to the MFM setting forth principles which would serve as a guide in developing a third formula solution. He would like to get MFM approval of the guidelines and with that in hand proceed to put the formula into effect, giving both Imbert and Caamano the opportunity to accept it or face the alternative of OAS action against them.

**Bennett**



## 101. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 2, 1965, 5:29–7 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting in the Cabinet Room at 1700 on 2 June 1965

### PRESENT WERE

The President

For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Mann, Bunker, and Vaughn

For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance

For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Moyers, and Bromley Smith

For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. The first action taken by the President when he joined the meeting at 1730 was to approve the Department of State telegram to Santo Domingo containing Ambassador Bunker's instructions. A copy of this cable is attached.<sup>2</sup>

2. Mr. Rusk introduced a discussion on the problem of an interim provisional government in the Dominican Republic with particular reference to when the United States would lose control of the situation and when, therefore, general election should be held. It was debated inconclusively as to whether sixty or ninety days would be too soon and whether some provisional arrangement should be established which would hold off elections for six months or so. There was concern expressed that an election coming too soon might give skilled Communist agitators the edge in a campaign. It was conceded that no one had any very clear idea on who the candidate would be or what their election prospects were.

3. The President spoke in some detail regarding his change of view with respect to a Bosch-Guzman solution to the Dominican politician problem. From having been in favor of Bosch, he indicated that he had become thoroughly disenchanted with him as to character, decency, behavior, and integrity. He said that he was now convinced that the establishment of a Guzman government would have been a disaster. He repeated that he had the gravest misgivings about Bosch and his followers.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302. Secret. Prepared by Helms on June 3. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> Not attached. Ellsworth Bunker arrived in Santo Domingo on June 2 to take part in the negotiations to resolve the Dominican crisis.

4. There was some informed discussion regarding the respective merits of the 1962–1963 Constitutions in the Dominican Republic. It was pointed out that the 1963 version had certain clauses which might be rather difficult to defend before an American congressional committee.

5. We were asked again to check on the number of weapons available to the rebels in the down-town area and also on the status of Radio Santo Domingo. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

6. There was inconclusive discussion of how to handle the Dominican armed forces. It was recognized that they are the only stabilizing factor in the country. It was left to Ambassador Bunker to take a reading on this problem after he had been in the Dominican Republic for a few days.

7. At Ambassador Bunker's request, it was agreed that the Agency would provide him with daily intelligence from all sources. (DDI and DDP are together on this as of a.m. 3 June and will provide [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], for passage to Mr. Bunker, a full report, including FBI, COMINT, and other material.)

8. It was reported that CBS was broadcasting that Ambassador Bennett was to be replaced. The President authorized an oral statement to CBS to the effect that Ambassador Bennett would remain at his post.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion of operation Rolling Thunder XVII in Vietnam.]

**Richard Helms<sup>4</sup>**  
*Deputy Director*

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified. Ambassador Bennett remained at post until April 13, 1966.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

**102. Record of Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (Crockett) and Former President of the Dominican Republic Balaguer<sup>1</sup>**

June 4, 1965.

SUBJECT

Dr. Joaquin Balaguer's Views as of June 4, 1965

I met with Dr. Balaguer for several hours this evening. I gave him our line. I heard and discussed his views. The bare bones of the conversation can be summarized as follows:

*Balaguer believes:*

1. Bosch is no longer capable of being a constructive force—it is now clear his aims and ends can only be destructive.
2. Despite the risks involved, an electoral solution offers the only apparent way out at this time.
3. An apolitical interim government capable of winning general national support must be formed and installed as quickly as possible—preferably within the next few days.
4. Such a government will not be supported by Bosch or the Caamaño crowd in Ciudad Nueva.
5. It will not be possible to talk Caamaño and his crowd out of Ciudad Nueva—it would be a mistake to shoot them out.
6. During the interim period, they should be left alone, but contained in Ciudad Nueva. Time, attrition and the people will dissolve them in a matter of weeks once an interim government of national consensus is installed and has gained recognition.
7. At best, any interim government will be weak and capable of holding office for only a limited period—a year at the outside, but perhaps no longer than six months.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VII, Cables, 6/1–6/14/65. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Vaughn, Bunker, and Ward P. Allen (ARA/RPA). Another June 4 memorandum by Crockett covers the transcript of a half-hour telephone conversation between Crockett and Balaguer, who was in New York City, on May 26. This memorandum explains that Vaughn, returning from a May 26 meeting at the White House (see Document 97), instructed Crockett to contact Balaguer to: “(1) bring him up to date; (2) sound him out; (3) ask him for additional names acceptable to him; (4) see if he has any new strategy to suggest and (5) keep our line to him open and active.” Also attached to this memorandum is a May 27 FBI report of Balaguer's summary of the conversation sent from Hoover to the President. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL DOM REP-US)

8. Elections should be delayed until the climate is more propitious—at the same time, elections must be held as soon as possible. The trick is to delay the holding of elections for a period which can be gauged as the probable effective life expectancy of the interim government.

9. There can be no assurance who will win when elections are held, but it seems highly unlikely Bosch will run. Barring a sudden and extreme surge of nationalism, the eventual winner will probably be someone capable of heading a government not unacceptable to the US.

10. Although illiterate and unsophisticated in politics, the Dominicans can learn and have learned a good bit from their unhappy experiences since Trujillo's death. This is reassuring.

11. The military establishment must be greatly reduced in size and completely restructured. This should be accomplished, to the extent possible, during the tenure of the interim government and while the IAF is still in the Dominican Republic.

*Balaguer will take the following actions:*

1. Support any movement which offers promise of gaining national acceptance and which is not unacceptable to the U.S.

2. Urge his contacts and followers to establish liaison with like-minded groups and come to the OAS committee with concrete proposals, including a slate of names from which a single interim Chief of State might be selected.

3. Impress upon all of those with whom he is in contact that they should make their views and proposals known to the OAS committee, regardless of whether they are able to agree on a common plan of action.

4. When and if a national consensus is judged by the OAS committee to have emerged, Balaguer will fall into line if it is at all possible for him to do so, regardless of whether his supporters have at the point in time thrown their lot in with the group heard by the OAS committee.

*Balaguer estimates:*

1. Viriato Fiallo<sup>2</sup> is no longer the power he once was, in the Cibao or elsewhere. He might capitalize on a wave of nationalism.

2. Bonnelly<sup>3</sup> is an elder statesman—heard but no longer heeded.

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<sup>2</sup> Dr. Viriato Fiallo, leader of the Union Civica Nacional (UCN) party; hero of the struggle against Balaguer and Ramfis Trujillo.

<sup>3</sup> Rafael F. Bonnelly, President of the Dominican Republic and the Consejo de Estado (Council of State) that governed the Republic during 1962 and in 1963 until February 27.

3. "Youth" in the Dominican Republic is restive and looking for a change. They want work and stability just as much. Both ends cannot be achieved fully and simultaneously—but the problem must be recognized. One way of partially dealing with it would be to include young, progressive but non-communist elements in both the interim and elected governments to the extent reasonably competent individuals can be identified and recruited.

Augusto Lora, who heads Dr. Balaguer's party in the Dominican Republic, is now in the U.S. He will carry Dr. Balaguer's message to the Partido Reformista faithful and other sympathetic groups in the D.R.

KMC

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### 103. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, June 10, 1965, 1630Z.

2323. For Secretary from Bunker.

1. USUN telegram 4931<sup>2</sup> to Dept, rpt info Santo Domingo 73, raises fundamental considerations affecting outcome of my efforts here on which I want you to have my personal views.

2. I am convinced after intensive investigation on the scene during past week that political formula which would meet our requirements, be acceptable to Caamano/Bosch group, and at same time attract support of other key elements of Dominican body politic (e.g. church, armed forces, civic and professional organizations, business groups, and, I suspect, a not inconsiderable number of common peo-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4931 from USUN, June 9, Stevenson warned that the United States should not "cherish illusion that danger of further SC intervention is past or that those publicly or privately favoring greater UN role, including SYG himself, have been persuaded to contrary or permanently silenced." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VII) The United States believed that Caamaño's group had resisted compromise efforts with the OAS Ad Hoc Committee because of encouragement it had received from Mayobre who had sought an expansion of his mandate to intervene in the Dominican crisis. (Telegram 2232 from Santo Domingo, June 4; *ibid.*, and telegram 1373 to Santo Domingo, June 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)

ple, particularly in rural areas, who long for peace and stability) is virtually impossible to achieve.

3. I have reached conclusion that about only way to break present political impasse here and restore a measure of harmony is to let people decide for themselves through free and open elections supervised by OAS and the formation in the meantime of a provisional government of technicians who, governing under an institutional act with strong OAS support, could take country to elections. This formula should attract broad popular support in DomRep and international acceptance. I am working in this direction in ad hoc committee<sup>3</sup> and I am hopeful that my Brazilian and Salvadorean colleagues will accept this formula.

4. Our prognosis is that electoral formula as I conceive it will not be acceptable to either Caamano or Imbert and that opposition of former will probably be stronger than that of latter, making it necessary for us to proceed without Caamano/Bosch consent and very possibly against their determined, active opposition.

5. Returning to USUN's cable, foregoing prospect raises in my opinion need to begin planning now how we can best deal with pressure for additional UN involvement anticipated in USUN's message. I recognize that given attitudes in UNSC this not easy assignment. Task of putting through electoral-provisional government-institutional act formula is going to be difficult enough without increased UN involvement here. This particularly true when involvement is in hands of a representative like Mayobre who is so clearly inclined toward camp which is likely to oppose our peacekeeping efforts most vigorously, with possible renewal of the hostilities and/or widespread demonstrations and protests which USUN says will immediately trigger pressure for greater UN intervention.

6. I trust that every effort will be made with sympathetic governments on UNSC, as well as with UN-SYG, to keep UN involvement from going beyond already uncomfortable level.

**Bennett**

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<sup>3</sup> On June 2 a resolution establishing an Ad Hoc Committee, composed of Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, Ambassador Ramon de Clairmont Duenas of El Salvador, and Ambassador Bunker of the United States, was adopted at the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Washington. This committee was to continue the efforts of the OAS Special Committee to help find a solution to the Dominican crisis, to guide the Inter-American Peace Force, and to report to the Tenth Meeting as events arose in the Republic.

## 104. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 10, 1965.

### SUBJECT

Dominican Task Force Meeting—June 10, 1965

### PARTICIPANTS

Tom Mann, Kennedy Crockett, Robert Sayre, Richard Phillips,<sup>2</sup> Anthony Solomon, William Rogers,<sup>3</sup> Cyrus Vance, Joseph Califano, Adam Yarmolinsky,<sup>4</sup> Richard Helms, Desmond FitzGerald, Donald Wilson, McGeorge Bundy, Gordon Chase

1. *Economic Situation*—Mr. Yarmolinsky, who had just returned from Santo Domingo, reported to the group in writing (see Tab 1)<sup>5</sup> and orally regarding the economic situation in the Dominican Republic.

(a) *The Welfare Sector*—Mr. Yarmolinsky said that we are in pretty good shape and that there are no real problems.

(b) *The Private Sector*—Mr. Yarmolinsky said that we are not out of the woods but that, generally speaking, the Dominican Republic is probably no worse off now than it was before the revolution. For example, credit is generally tighter than it was, but probably not much tighter than it ought to be. The port of entry problem is difficult but not insoluble. Major export activity is still going on.

Mr. Yarmolinsky said that, from an economic point of view, it is possible to operate the country for many months without the use of the rebel-held area. While Mr. Solomon agreed that the country could probably limp along for some time, there would be an unusually large number of people unemployed and there would be a heavy burden on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic—Planning Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Chase. Another record of this meeting is in a June 11 memorandum from Alexander M. Haig, Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to John T. McNaughton. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 3717, Dominican Republic 092, January–June 1965)

<sup>2</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Deputy U.S. Coordinator for Alliance for Progress.

<sup>4</sup> Adam Yarmolinsky, Chief, U.S. Emergency Relief Mission to the Dominican Republic.

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed. “Interim Report Emergency Relief Group,” is a 3-page summary of the economic problems caused by the crisis in the Dominican Republic. The Emergency Relief Group arrived in the Dominican Republic on May 17 and proceeded to distribute food and medical supplies, establish emergency banking facilities in the International Security Zone, and pay the salaries of all public employees for April and May. These tasks were transferred to the USAID mission on June 9 when Yarmolinsky and others returned to the United States.

us. He added that the major offices downtown contain the books and records, and when a business does not have books and records, it is going to do less business. For example, banks will only make loans they are sure of; they will be very careful if they don't know what people owe them.

Mr. Solomon noted that the Embassy had recommended that the U.S. consider supplying Dominican business concerns with working capital. Both he and Mr. Yarmolinsky disagreed with this recommendation and felt that, instead, we should broaden guarantees to banks and push them harder to make loans. The U.S. should not start lending working capital. This would be a Pandora's Box; among other things, it would permit people to stay in business and send their own money out of the country. In this regard, there is a significant flow of money out of the country as well as a disturbing flow of people out of the country (400 per day).

(c) *The Public Sector*—There was considerable discussion about the problem of paying government servants on June 15. During the discussion, the following dimensions to the problem were noted: *First*, the total payroll is about 12 million pesos a month to 100,000 people (after the meeting, Mr. Solomon said the figure is probably closer to 90,000). *Second*, Imbert is now collecting between 5 and 7 million pesos of revenue per month. *Third*, normal revenue is between 12 and 15 million pesos per month. *Fourth*, last month we were paying full salaries; the average full salary is something below 200 pesos a month (after the meeting, Mr. Solomon said the figure is probably around 150 pesos a month).

The group discussed at length the question of what to pay government workers on June 15—nothing, one-half salary, a flat 50 pesos, full salary; the group finally decided, after much pulling and hauling, to pay the workers nothing on June 15 and to take another look at the problem in a few days' time. There were a multitude of considerations raised, such as the following: *First*, nothing terrible will happen if there is a delay; the workers are accustomed to irregular payment. *Second*, we should wait to see what Imbert is going to do on pay day. *Third*, a delay with a partial payment at a later date (or, for that matter, no payment at all) might increase the pressures for the government workers to get behind an OAS political solution. *Fourth*, the people are not working and, in general, it is bad practice to pay people for nothing.

Mr. Yarmolinsky favored an attempt to take Imbert's revenue away from him; it would weaken Imbert politically. The group did not agree. Mr. Solomon noted that one would need a huge administrative machine to do this. Mr. Mann did not favor rocking the boat this hard at a time when Bunker was approaching the time for decision. Mr. Bundy said that this step is not crucial to controlling Imbert at this time; we



have other and stronger forms of leverage in getting Imbert to go along with an OAS political solution.

2. The group discussed Bunker's recent cable recommending an interim government of technicians to be followed by elections.<sup>6</sup> Some points:

(a) The group agreed that there ought to be a reinstatement of the 1963 Constitution—with the controversial parts of it suspended until the people have had a chance to make a judgment on them. As a general rule, we should try to use as much of the downtown program as possible; while this will not be enough to win over the more extreme rebels, it will tend to bring some of the moderates along with an OAS solution.

(b) Mr. Mann thought that there should be a constituent assembly in 12 months and elections 6 months afterwards. Most of the group disagreed with this timing. Generally speaking, the group doubted that a provisional government could hang together that long, even with an OAS presence. In this regard, the group agreed that, whatever the length of time of a provisional government, there should be an OAS presence which would be sufficient to keep the military in the barracks.

(c) With regard to the cabinet, Mr. Bundy said that it should probably not be limited to technicians. There is considerable advantage in adding names which are respected by all groups even though they do have some political affiliation—e.g., Messina,<sup>7</sup> Pastoriza.<sup>8</sup>

(d) The group agreed to send some guidance to Bunker. An un-cleared cable, drafted by Mr. Mann and Mr. Sayre after the meeting, is attached at Tab 2.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Document 103.

<sup>7</sup> Milton Messina, Dominican Ambassador to the United States.

<sup>8</sup> Tomas A. ("Jimmy") Pastoriza, a young progressive Santiago businessman with ties to the oligarchy.

<sup>9</sup> Not attached; see Document 105.

**105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 11, 1965, 9:54 p.m.

1427. For Bunker. We are in substantial agreement with ideas in your 2323.<sup>2</sup>

(1) We conclude it would be extremely difficult to hold general elections within time available this year, but we await your best judgment on best target date both for possible elections for constituent assembly and elections of constitutional government.

(2) Establishment of interim government at the earliest possible date is of highest priority. Economic problems of DR compounding at accelerating rate. Meaningful progress towards solution of economic problems impossible until political solution has been achieved. Positions of both USG and OAS (within DR and in world opinion) can be expected to become increasingly difficult as time passes and no political solution evolves. Danger of rapid emergence anti-US nationalistic sentiment in DR increases as time passes and no generally acceptable political solution is found. Same is true to lesser extent with respect OAS.

(3) Our preference at this time, like yours, would be for an apolitical government of technicians if this could be achieved. Most important slot would of course be candidates for single or plural executive. Names which occur to us offhand as well known to Embassy are Alejandro Gruillon, Rafael Herrera, Nicolas Pichardo, Bishop Polanco and Tomas Pastoriza. You will undoubtedly have other individuals in mind as well. In reference to cabinet, there may be some advantage in moving toward a consensus in selecting names which are respected by all groups even though they do have some political affiliation. At time

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Mann, Sayre and Crockett; cleared by Bundy and Vaughn; and approved by Mann. This information was sent under cover of a June 11 memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson. In this memorandum Bundy wrote: "Abe Fortas thinks less than nothing of the 'Bunker-Mann' plan. He just does not think that a government of 'technicians' can do the job, and his belief is that this phrase covers an intent to have a hard-nosed middle-of-the-road here, and that we have to be for progress, or against it, right from the start. That is why he strongly urges that we go back to the task of constructing a political government which would have the support of 'constitutionalists' and which would not be violently opposed by the others." Bundy closed the memorandum by asking if the President wanted the text sent in its current form. It was sent unaltered. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. II, 1965)

<sup>2</sup> Document 103.

Guzman formula was considered, following names appeared to fit this category: Milton Messina, Tomas Pastoriza, Hector Garcia Godoy. Here again you may have other individuals in mind.

(4) Composition of either type government at cabinet level and below will present obvious difficulties given human resources on which Dominican nation may call. Many of these officials will probably require technical support, regardless of type of government which eventually emerges. Question: Should USG offer and/or attempt to provide this technical support or should other OAS member governments be called upon? We tend towards latter course because: (a) if USG technicians are provided, USG will bear ultimate blame for inability to “solve” long list of insoluble problems DR faces; and (b) a truly OAS “solution” to current crisis should have as much OAS flavor as possible.

(5) The 1962 Constitution was reinstated at the time of the 1963 coup and is now in effect. However, one of the major conditions Bosch has established for political solution is reinstatement 1963 Constitution. This condition is unacceptable various Dominican groups including GNR. On the other hand there are obvious advantages from several points of view in using as much of 1963 Constitution as is feasible.

(6) We do not see how 1963 Constitution could be accepted in toto for simple reason it would not work in present situation without considerable improvisation and twisting of some articles.

(7) Possible alternative solutions would be (a) reinstate 1963 Constitution and then suspend all articles which are not applicable in present situation or which would present effective action against Communists, or (b) prepare basic law under which provisional government would operate until constituent assembly or group of experts could prepare new constitution which would become effective when promulgated, when approved by newly elected Congress, or approved by people in plebiscite. Require your comments on these alternatives. In meantime we will draft possible basic law using 1963 Constitution as point of departure.

(8) Since Dominican military and police will have responsibility for law and order in country, adequate safeguards will be required to insure that Dominican military police establishment will be apolitical and under control of and responsive to will of interim government and elected government which succeeds it. Individual officers will require special treatment such as assignment or leave outside country. Query: Should efforts towards restructuring of Dominican military establishment be held in abeyance pending inauguration of elected government, or will it be feasible to begin this task earlier?

(9) OAS presence would presumably continue in DR in some form until elected government is inaugurated. OAS supervision of elections taken for granted.

(10) We continue to believe Imbert must step down. Once Dominican military establishment has acceptable alternative which it can rally, Imbert should be much easier to deal with. FYI We continue ready to offer and help provide safeguards for Imbert and his family, provided he goes along with us when time comes. END FYI

(11) We agree that it is highly unlikely that Bosch and rebel group will accept solution mentioned above. Hopefully, once provisional government is established, non-Communist elements in the rebel group will find solution sufficiently attractive to cease organized resistance. We should be thinking now of proposals that can be made to non-Communist rebels to encourage them to accept provisional government including guarantees against reprisals if they remain in country, and safe departure for those who wish to leave. Best argument with rebels will be that they will have their chance to participate in free and fair elections. It will also be helpful to be able to show clear path to constitutional government and respect for as much as possible of 1963 constitution. We also believe there should be room in provisional government for non-Communists who have been sympathetic to rebels if they wish to serve.

(12) Provisional government should be committed to deal effectively with Communist problem. The most important single safeguard for dealing with Communists is solid agreement on cooperation between provisional government and OAS experts with whom in turn our experts could cooperate. This close cooperation in identification and surveillance of Communists is an indispensable requirement for us. Within this cooperation, two steps are involved: (a) agreement should be reached on the definition of "a Communist"; and (b) agreement should be reached on method of dealing with individuals so identified. On question of definition, we tend towards identifying Communists as members or known collaborators with MPD, PSPD, and extreme left wing of 14th of June movement. Provisional government should consult with OAS and USG on this. On question of disposition, our position is that Communists should be allowed to depart country voluntarily. We also believe those unwilling to go voluntarily should be rounded up and deported to a country of their choice provided arrangements can be made for their entry into country of choice. Otherwise, they should be sent wherever they will be accepted. But we repeat that this particular preferred solution is less important than basic pattern of cooperation on this problem.

(13) Once interim government installed and recognized, USG stands ready and eager to seek agreement with it on program aimed

at relieving short-term economic problems and promoting rapid long-term development. We expect OAS–CIAP to play leading role.

(14) Finally, we are anxious for your current estimate of prospects for formation of interim government and time frame within which you believe it will be possible to get agreements necessary for its installation.

**Rusk**

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#### 106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, June 14, 1965, 0430Z.

2405. Ref: Deptel 1427.<sup>2</sup> From Bunker. I appreciate helpful reftel and wish offer further clarification of my current thinking.

1. As I see it: A) Neither side will negotiate with nor make any meaningful concessions to the other. B) Solution through mediation therefore not now possible. C) Resumption of fighting and solution through force of arms is unacceptable. D) OAS must therefore act independently to develop formula that will meet basic aspirations of Dom people, while satisfying responsible international opinion. E) An equitable solution proposed and strongly supported by the OAS should attract popular support and international acceptance to extent that ultimately only hardcore extremists would refuse to go along.

2. A solution firmly based on free and honest elections open to all would seem to have best chance of success. Lack of identifiable national consensus makes it difficult for OAS to sponsor formula based on delivering power for any significant period of time to any particular individuals or groups, no matter how apparently apolitical they might be. On the other hand, OAS is in strong position to propose an electoral solution. It can draw on precedent of 1962 elections in making claim to possessing capability and prestige necessary to organize and guarantee genuinely free elections. It can insist with absolute im-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> Document 105.

partiality that only equitable solution lies in exercise of people's fundamental right to choose their own government.

3. I believe initial emphasis in committee's proposals should therefore be on elections. Agree that satisfactory interim govt is high priority but believe groundwork can best be laid by obtaining widest possible understanding and agreement that basic solution will be reached through elections. Fear attempt push ahead and create yet another provisional govt without first establishing this principle would embroil committee in same disputes over personalities and politics that have plagued previous efforts in that direction.

4. In my judgment OAS proposal for elections must be highly specific to be credible. Plan should emphasize major role of OAS and IAPF in setting up machinery and creating proper climate for holding genuinely free elections. Preparations, such as establishment of new OAS electoral commission, should get under way soonest. Above all, proposal must envisage completion of electoral process within time span sufficiently short to convince Dom political groups and people as a whole that this is not just another scheme to postpone the day of reckoning indefinitely. In my judgment this means an electoral date set between six and nine months from now. Anything further off would, I fear, fail inspire confidence among Doms who are inclined to suspect that any provisional government will want to become entrenched.

5. In putting forward this proposal for elections, committee would at same time stress importance immediate establishment provisional government for interim period. To provide interim govt with necessary legal authority, and in order hold constitutional issue in abeyance, committee has been thinking of an "institutional act" spelling out governmental administrative prerogatives and functions. Drafting of such a document would not be overly difficult given substantial areas of agreement in this field between 1962 and 1963 constitutions. We would anticipate committee asking group of prominent Dom lawyers to sit down with OAS legal experts in order work out details. Dept's promised draft of "basic law" should be most helpful that regard.

6. Given foregoing assumptions, OAS can well take position that interim govt should logically be apolitical in character, with emphasis on technical capacity. As matter of procedure, committee could first ask broadly representative group of Doms to meet with them and work out composition of caretaker regime. My colleagues and I have been collecting suitable names and should be prepared issue invitations just as soon as OAS electoral plan is on the table.

7. In terms of timing, I would hope to have agreement of my colleagues on essential elements of plan by next Wednesday<sup>3</sup> or

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<sup>3</sup> June 23.

Thursday; to lay it before Imbert, Caamano, and public in general the next day; to finish up necessary missionary work among various Dom groups soon as possible thereafter; and to commence promptly negotiations on interim govt. If all goes well we might be on the road to elections with an acceptable interim govt in office by end of month.

8. My prognosis is that resistance to plan will be strong from both sides. We can expect Caamano and company to reject it out of hand. However, emphasis on elections as only fair and practical way out of impasse should result in gradual erosion of domestic and internal support for their position. Goal would be to reduce group in large measures to hard-core extremists. I see no alternative but to go ahead on assumption moderates in rebel camp will come around sooner or later.

9. Imbert and his hard-line following can also be expected to make considerable trouble. Zeller's speech yesterday (Embtel 2378)<sup>4</sup> makes it clear they mean to insist that GNR must stay in office until an elected government is installed. Extremely strong pressure will be required to break this position and I am not completely confident at this point that Amb's Penna Marinho and Clairmont Duenas are prepared to go along with the rough tactics we will probably need to employ, since they seem to have become increasingly impressed by Imbert and his approach to free elections. I plan explore this problem further with them.

10. In conclusion I would like to stress one point which appears to me fundamental. We cannot expect to manage the outcome of this affair as we might like. Attitudes and prejudices of my OAS colleagues, to say nothing of numerous other factors outside our control, will play too large a part. Best we can do—and we mean to do it—is assure that solution meets basic requirements of the national interest.

Next following cable<sup>5</sup> contains comments on specific points raised in reftel.

**Bennett**

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2378 from Santo Domingo, June 12, Bennett reported that in Zeller Cocco's speech he indicated "renewed indications of GNR frustration," principally that of GNR's "forced inability attack rebel stronghold" "which is shielded by foreign 'Cordon Sanitaire.'" (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP)

<sup>5</sup> Document 107.

**107. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, June 14, 1965, 0515Z.

2406. From Bunker. Ref Embtel 2405.<sup>2</sup> Following are additional comments on points raised Deptel 1427.<sup>3</sup> Numbers correspond to paragraphs in that tel.

1. Question of target date for elections covered in our reftel. We have not reached firm conclusion on best method of handling constitutional issue within electoral framework. Separate elections for Constituent Assembly prior to general elections do not, however, appear desirable under existing circumstances. Interim government is likely to be weak and assembly might well provide focus for agitation against it. Confusion as to where ultimate authority lay would also arise. If vote for Assembly did not indicate clear national consensus, country could again become caught up in bitter constitutional controversy without any better prospect of a final decision than we now have.

Other possibilities are: a. the 1962 formula of convoking Congress as a National Assembly after elections but prior to presidential inauguration; b. holding separate Assembly elections under the "institutional act" after inauguration of an elected govt; c. allowing the elected Congress to resolve the problem as it saw fit. As in 1962 (a) appears simplest and cleanest but (b) or (c) might represent wiser approach now.

2. Fully agree that political solution urgently needed to prevent further economic deterioration and to avert emergence here of strong nationalistic sentiments hostile to US and OAS. As Dept will readily appreciate, however, establishment of new interim govt will not of itself solve these problems. They will persist as long as rebels keep city of Santo Domingo divided and country as a whole on edge of political turmoil. Caamano and company have made it abundantly clear that they are no more prepared to accept "middle way" or "third-force" regime of type proposed by various civic groups than they were to accept Imbert. Time and internal dissensions may well be eroding their support but I believe it essential to assist this process by offering "constitutionalists" and their sympathizers the real alternative of elections

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VII. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 2:28 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> Document 106.

<sup>3</sup> Document 105.



to continuing the struggle. As explained reftel, firm commitment to elections represents best hope in this regard.

3. Names you suggest are on our lists, along with numerous others. Believe generally acceptable people will prove available once it apparent OAS and US have decided back specific solution based on elections.

4. Believe technical and economic support for interim government should be provided by and through OAS to maximum extent possible. Both PAU technical assistance program and CIAP facilities should prove useful this connection.

5. In essence constitutional issue is largely symbolic and not fundamentally concerned with specific provisions of 1963 Constitution or any other. (Guzman privately told Shlaudeman yesterday: "You could pick any constitution, call it the Constitution of 1963 and it would be acceptable.") It has been converted by rebel propaganda into a "mystique" which in minds Caamano followers really means economic and social justice. I do not believe it advantageous, as Dept suggests, to accept that 1962 constitution is still in effect. I believe preferable to adopt attitude that constitutional issue remains to be resolved by the people in a free vote.

6. Agree that 1963 Constitution would not at this point be acceptable. Reinstatement, even with subsequent suspension of articles not applying present situation, would meet most bitter resistance from Imbert and armed forces.

7. As indicated reftel, my view is that best way out of constitutional morass would be promulgation of "institutional act" on basis of which interim government could administer country. Would appreciate Dept's suggestions as to procedures that might give such action highest possible color of legality.

8. I doubt that efforts restructure military establishment would meet with much success under present circumstances. Use of kind of pressure necessary to force significant changes would only drive military back into Imbert's arms and present US with solid front in support of GNR as presently constituted. In any case, ranking military may now be dug in so far as to make real changes impossible until this crisis has passed. We should move on Wessin at first opportunity and this may be possible soon.

9. Concur.

10. Concur.

11. Agree that guarantee of free elections with way clearly open to restoration of constitutional, democratic government represents best possible appeal to rebels. I am not, however, overly sanguine about quick collapse of rebel movement under any circumstances except application of force. Believe substantial defections will occur as fact that

reasonable alternative is available sinks in. However, hard core of movement is made up of extremists, armed youngsters, and bitter men of one kind or another who seem convinced they little or nothing to lose by going on to the end. Prevalence also of romantic vision of revolution and willingness to go on even in a "lost cause" is psychological factor to take into account. Concept is obviously irrational but we believe it must be recognized as obstacle to peaceful solution.

12. Provisional govt can only deal effectively with Communist problem when rebels have laid down their arms. Should not be difficult obtain the cooperation on this problem Dept desires from type of provisional govt we envisage. Deportation has been standard practice here and will probably turn out again to be most practical method of dealing with known Communists.

13. Agree that we should move rapidly to get economic program underway soonest once interim govt in power. Also hope OAS-CIAP will play prominent role.

14. Our current estimate of time frame in which implemented contained in ref Embtel.

**Bennett**

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## **108. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 14, 1965, 11:35 a.m.-12:25 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Meeting With the President at 11:30 A.M., June 14, 1965

### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President, Thomas Mann, Robert Sayre, McGeorge Bundy, Gordon Chase

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the attached two cables from Ambassador Bunker regarding a political solution in the Dominican Republic.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings with President Johnson on the Dominican Republic: Fallout. Secret. Drafted by Chase on June 15. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Documents 106 and 107.

1. *General*—The group agreed that the best we can do is to give Bunker some general guidance; we should not try to outsmart him.

2. *Elections*—Mr. Bundy explained the various positions on the timing of elections. Bunker was in favor of a period from 6 to 9 months; Mr. Mann would ideally prefer a longer period but did not feel strongly about it. Mr. Bundy went on to say that he agreed with Bunker's proposal to use the elections as the initial and basic element of a political solution. The President said that we should tell Bunker that the elections should be held no sooner than six months and not later than a year. He added that we are in trouble if the Dominicans elect a Communist.

3. *Communists*—With regard to guidance for Bunker on this subject, Mr. Bundy said that we can stand on the guidance we gave to Bunker in our recent cable (Deptel 1427—attached).<sup>3</sup>

4. *Military*—Mr. Bundy and Mr. Mann said that we should let the regular military establishment produce a slate of names to fill the top command jobs; these should be professionals who are untainted by the present conflict and who will not be an easy propaganda mark for the rebels.

While we should treat the military with dignity, we should press to get something in exchange for permitting them to fill their top command posts. For example, they should support the provisional government and assist in bringing Imbert around to a conciliatory position.

Mr. Mann and Mr. Bundy said that we should try to drive a wedge between the military and Imbert. Mr. Mann added that, in general, we should try to drive a wedge between the moderates and extremists on both sides.

5. *Constitution*—Mr. Bundy said that the more we can show that the basic law is in response to the notion of constitutionalism, the better will be our chances of reducing the resistance downtown. Mr. Bundy went on to say that he and Mr. Mann differed slightly on the constitutional question. While Bundy would press the military not to fuss too much over a piece of paper, Mann would probably press less on the grounds that the issue is terribly emotional with the military. Mr. Mann interjected that his position was not really very far from Mr. Bundy's and that he would not mind seeing the basic act called something like the "1963 Constitution, as amended."

6. *OAS Procedures*—Mr. Bundy said that there is the question of whether or not we submit the Ad Hoc Committee's solution to the OAS so that it can take a vote on it. In this regard, the group generally pre-

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<sup>3</sup> Document 105.

ferred that the OAS be fully informed on the solution but that it not be given the opportunity to vote on it.

7. *Rebel Resistance*—The group discussed briefly the problem of rebel resistance after a political solution is found. In this regard, the group noted the recent reports of dissension and dissatisfaction in the rebel ranks.

8. *Assistance to the Dominican Republic*—The President said that we ought to put the remainder of the unobligated Alliance for Progress funds (\$23–\$30 million) into the Dominican Republic. He added that the remainder of AID's unobligated funds might also be used for the Dominican Republic. He said that, before we are through with the Dominican Republic, it is liable to cost us about \$250 million.

9. *Communists and the Public Case*—Mr. Mann said that he had recently spoken to 7 or 8 Congressmen about the Communist problem in the Dominican Republic; they were skeptical and feel we are hiding the facts. It would be helpful to give certain Congressmen a full run-down on the problem, including the whole spectrum of classified documents, FBI reports, CIA reports, etc. The President expressed reluctance on this plan. In general, we should be careful of investigations; investigators have a vested interest in finding fault. Congressmen should not get information acquired from wire taps; they will make wire taps the issue. Congressmen won't keep quiet on sensitive matters; they are liable to get sources killed. In sum, the President said that Congress should not get access to raw data and should get only summaries. Mr. Bundy added that, whatever we give to the Congress, it should be very hard information. If it isn't, it will get picked to pieces and we will get clobbered.

[Omitted here is paragraph 10, a discussion of four separate points: activities in Panama, an assistance package to Vietnam, a Fulbright speech, and a request by President Johnson that none of his advisers travel abroad while the Dominican Republic and Vietnam areas were "hot."]

**109. Editorial Note**

On June 18, 1965, the OAS Ad Hoc Committee met in Washington at the Pan American Union and proposed a solution to the crisis in the Dominican Republic. The Committee recommended general elections for the President and Vice President of the Republic, members of the National Congress, and for municipal authorities to be held no earlier than 6 months and no later than 9 months from the present date; an OAS technical advisory election commission to observe the entire electoral process; a general amnesty to all who participated in the civil strife provided that all arms be surrendered to the OAS; the establishment of a Provisional Government to assume all responsibilities for law and order; OAS technical and economic assistance once the Provisional Government was established; the creation of an institutional act drawn from provisions of the 1963 Constitution, and a constitutional assembly convoked within 6 months following assumption of office by the elected government. For text of the proposal, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965*, pages 993–995.

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**110. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1965, 5:50–8 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Dominican Republic

**PARTICIPANTS:**

The President, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball, Mr. Mann, Mr. Vaughn, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Vance, Director Raborn, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Busby, Mr. Cater, Mr. Chase

Discussion on the Dominican Republic began after a long meeting on Vietnam.<sup>2</sup> The Dominican discussion began at about 7:30 PM and lasted only a few minutes.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic—Planning Group. Secret. Drafted by Chase on June 24. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The place and time of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library).

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. III, Documents 15 and 16.

1. Mr. Mann described various reactions to the OAS Ad Hoc Committee's proposal.<sup>3</sup> *First*, in addition to a consensus in favor of a single executive, there is a general consensus in favor of delaying elections. The best plan seems to be the establishment of a Provisional Government, followed by a "cooling-off" period for 6 months; a constituent assembly would then follow in 3 more months which, in turn, would be followed by a campaign for elections. *Second*, there are indications that most Dominicans don't want the IAF to remain in the Dominican Republic for too long. Mr. Mann suggested that the IAF pull out 3 to 6 months after the Provisional Government is formed. *Third*, there are indications that the non-Communists in the Dominican Republic don't understand the Communist-front system; it is going to be very important to get a good non-Communist as President. Also, the rebels want the 14th of June people to participate in the elections and will probably reject any efforts to deport Communists from the country. *Fourth*, the rebels want to reinstate military people who have been cashiered since 1963. This would probably include Communists, as well as some of the old, corrupt generals. This is clearly unacceptable. *Fifth*, Caa-mano has not said anything about the control of the armed forces. Mr. Mann suggested that we ask the military to clean its own house.

2. The President interrupted to say that he was already late for an earlier appointment, and asked if there was any action he had to take. The group agreed that there was none. After all the significant reactions to the Ad Hoc Committee's proposal were in, Mr. Bundy and Mr. Mann would work out some guidance for Bunker.

3. After the President left the room, Secretary McNamara said that he would direct General Palmer to try to get General Alvim's agreement to a reduction of 1400 troops in the Dominican Republic. The Secretary did not feel that this step required Presidential clearance in view of the fact that the action was completely in line with previously-expressed Presidential thinking.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 109.

**111. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, June 24, 1965, 0045Z.

2570. 1. Following presentation this morning by Caamano group of their reply to committee plan,<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Bunker and I went for private talk with Imbert. Our purpose was to advise him that reply had been received from other side and to talk with him regarding personal contribution he now in position to make to help in achieving settlement of Dominican crisis.

2. Imbert indicated he had had advance word of Caamano's reply and in brief comment asserted seemingly forthcoming attitude by "constitutionalists" was only a tactic to gain time. He said GNR reply would be ready for presentation to Ad Hoc Committee at meeting scheduled for 4 pm today.<sup>3</sup> He did not attempt to anticipate discussion in GNR document and mentioned only one point, arguing that a constitution should be drawn up before elections are held. He expressed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State on June 23 at 9:51 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> On June 23 at 10 a.m. the Ad Hoc Committee and the Secretary General of the OAS received the "Constitutionalist Government's" 7-page written reply to the Committee's June 18 proposal (see Document 109) for a solution to the Dominican crisis. Colonel Caamaño, Anibal Campagna, Arevalo Cedenio, Alfredo Conde, Salvador Blanco, Hector Aristy, and Jottin Cury signed the reply on behalf of the "Constitutionalist Government." The demands were: a reassertion that the U.S. military intervention was an illegal act; a condemnation of the OAS for ratifying the U.S. action; a call for the evacuation of the Inter-American Peace Force within 1 month of the installation of the Provisional Government; an insistence that the weapons controlled by its irregular forces be turned into the Provisional Government rather than to the OAS; an insistence that all regular military personnel on its side, as well as those who were dismissed after the September 1963 coup against Juan Bosch, be reinstated in their previous ranks, and a proposal that the "Institutional Act" be ratified by the "constitutionalist" congress. For text, see *The OAS Chronicle*, Vol. 1–2, 1965–1967 (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, August 1965), pp. 32–38.

<sup>3</sup> The afternoon of June 23 the Ad Hoc Committee and the Secretary General of the OAS met with the "Government of National Reconstruction" and received a 4-page written reply of that government to the Committee's June 18 proposal. The GNR's key points included the following: a call for elections to be held in 9 months, subject to postponement by the OAS; the departure of the Inter-American Peace Force as soon as a plan is adopted; the exclusion of amnesty for common crimes unrelated to acts of war; the stipulation that only the military who did not violate the military code of justice be allowed to return to their barracks; arms surrendered to the OAS be transferred to the Dominican Armed Forces within 15 days of collection; the desirability of all Communists to leave the country; the approval of the concept of the "Institutional Act"; the installation of the constitution before the elected government takes office; the urgency of returning Santo Domingo to normalcy and allowing the government to exercise police functions, and the reservation of the right to modify its position. (*Ibid.*, pp. 38–41)

opinion that Constituent Assembly provides an opportunity to measure popular and party feelings before elections and avoids danger, as with Bosch, of winning party then writing its own constitution.

3. We then got on to subject of visit. Ambassador Bunker spoke first, stressing US respect for Imbert as Dominican patriot who twice has stepped forward in moments of crisis to save his country, first against Trujillo and now against Communist threat. He would always deserve gratitude of his people for these acts and he would always enjoy high reputation in US for them. Now he was being called on to make a further sacrifice, i.e., voluntarily to renounce his position as chief of GNR and give way to broader-based provisional government which could repair deep cleavages in Dominican society and take country to elections. Such a gesture on his part at this time would be act of highest patriotism and would enshrine his name in Dominican history.

4. Imbert was obviously caught by surprise at this approach but recovered quickly and began to stress his own patriotic motives. He had assumed power for two reasons, and two only; one, his love of country, and two, because the United States, the country for which he has had life-long admiration above all others, had asked him to step forward, he "hates" politicians who have brought nothing but misery to country and looks forward to nine months of administration before elections as opportunity to clean house and to make a real fight on corruption which is such an enervating influence in this country. His own desire, he asserted with emphasis, is for real democratic government.

5. I then spoke in support of Bunker approach, putting remarks in personal framework. I reviewed events of critical days of late April and recalled very real contribution Imbert had made in keeping country from falling apart. I remembered his assistance in sending men from his own troops to guard foreign embassies which were in great danger of mob violence after police protection had dissolved. There was no doubt he had held the pass at critical moment and he would always be remembered and honored by my country for it. We had gone through two very hard months here and now we had arrived at new situation; an outstanding committee representing the entire hemisphere's concern in the Dominican situation was here finding a solution. Danger of Communist take-over, concern over which had brought him to fore, was not averted, and we could depend on committee to find reasonable solution with guarantees against Communists. Having saved his country for second time, progress of events now permitted his return to private life. This would not only be act of high patriotism and self-abnegation but in my convinced opinion it would serve his own personal interests best. He knew Dominican history better than I, and its tragic course in that even good men in power had never known how or when to step down. Even a leader so recent as Donald Reid



had lost his footing largely because of public suspicions over his desire to continue. He, Imbert, had opportunity to serve his own interests as well as nation's by bowing out with appropriate statement and resuming his honored position as Dominican patriot anxious only for welfare of country as a whole. He could now with confidence leave the details to the OAS; his mission was accomplished. Shades of Duarte, San Martin and Cincinnatus as well were invoked during this part of our conversation.

6. While Imbert was noticeably moved by these two approaches, neither really convinced him. He came back to associate himself with national destiny and to stress his own high moral worth (all this said with the sincerity of a man who believes strongly in his own star) as compared with nearly all other Dominicans. To retire at this critical junction would be to "run away" before the problem is solved. Among other evidence, recently intercepted correspondence of Pablo Mella "proved" the link of Bosch with Communists and Caamano and his group were Bosch's stooges. Imbert said he could not leave now but we knew he wanted to work with US in every way. Just tell him which people to put in the government and it would be done. His only purpose of staying was to get the government going and give the country honest administration until election time. He would not leave except under force since that was the only kind of departure which would make it possible for him to live with his children in good conscience. He went on to say that all Dominicans knew that he is firmly committed to the United States and they know why he is in power today. He asserted parenthetically that at the time his government was being formed, he had been promised US recognition a few days later. If he should leave now, it would do US reputation in this country no good. Everyone would say US had used him and then dumped him. This would not redound to credit of the US. Our approach was really making him the main problem in the current situation. We were saying he had to go in order to have a solution. This was not the way to treat a friend. All Dominicans had rejoiced when the US troops came; the latter had saved the situation but then they had stopped short of finishing the job and the politics had begun.

7. Ambassador Bunker resumed the effort. He stressed the deep cleavages in the country and the need for a political truce to allow time for wounds to heal. The committee's talks with people from all sectors of population had convinced them the great majority who were not involved in the conflict above all wanted peace and a chance to work; but pacification was not peace. The need now was for an apolitical group to begin the work of restructuring the country and attacking the critical economic and military problems. Imbert had contributed greatly to saving the country; it was only natural that in taking vigor-

ous action one stirred animosities. A contribution in the greatest tradition of patriotism could be made by him.

8. Imbert replied once again in the negative; his job was not yet finished. His time estimate was different from ours and he knew his people best. It was necessary that he continue and lead the country to honest elections.

9. The conversation ended on that note. It was friendly, intimate and in low key throughout. Ambassador Bunker asked him to give further thought to our conversation and suggested that we meet again.

**Bennett**

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## **112. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, June 27, 1965, 1216Z.

2628. From Bunker. Committee has now completed its round of talks with civic and political leaders. Responses to our proposal from both sides are on record and we have had opportunity test reactions among wide range of other groups and individuals. Believe we can gauge current situation and future prospects in following terms.

1. Committee's proposal in its essential elements still appears best available solution. Number of objections have been raised to single election and brief pre-electoral period but no consensus has emerged on alternatives. Furthermore, firm commitment to early elections is feature which obviously has greatest appeal to rebels, their supporters and, we believe, to country at large. Belief that elections will be held also promises be major factor in persuading at least a significant number of rebels to go along with peaceful solution. As result our talks I propose add following refinements: (a) election date will be set full nine months from date provisional government takes office; and (b) campaign period will be restricted to last three months, with six months of complete political truce preceding.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, White House Cables, 4/65-7/65. Secret; Exdis.

2. I believe we must have solution here soonest. Country cannot support current situation much longer. I propose exert every effort push our proposed solution through next week.

3. Major difficulty we face at moment is attitude of Imbert and his supporters in GNR. He feels his pride is at stake and fears becoming object of ridicule if he were to step down now after, as everyone knows, we asked him to take the job in the first place. Appeals to reason and patriotism have so far failed and, while we should make preparations recommended Embtel 2617,<sup>2</sup> it seems likely considerable pressure will have to be used to get him out. Imbert is reinforced by hard-liners (including a few members of U.S. press corps) who insist that only “military solution” is adequate to meet Communist threat, and by various opportunists who see personal advantages in his remaining in office.

4. Attitude of military represents key factor in Imbert problem. I am encouraged by Penna Marinho’s talk with De Los Santos and Wessin and by reports from Embassy Attachés that armed forces’ leaders may be prepared accept a new provisional government. I am hopeful that this will prove case and that, once presented with firm proposal for interim government including names, they will exert pressure on Imbert to step down. I feel, however, that we have to be cautious in assessing this prospect. Military chiefs are as anxious as Imbert for a solution by force. They may also fear that his removal could open way for their own. These factors, along with increasing sense of frustration engendered by developments such as yesterday’s incident in San Francisco,<sup>3</sup> might in end make them strongly resistant to any compromise solution.

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2617 from Santo Domingo, June 26, Bennett stated that he and Bunker believed the United States should encourage Imbert to “retire gracefully” in order to make way for a “moderate, middle-road provisional government.” If Imbert stepped down, they recommended that the United States make several “gestures” that would boost Imbert’s ego and demonstrate U.S. appreciation for his “service to non-Communist cause” during the past months of intense negotiations. Recommended were: a statement by President Johnson calling attention to Imbert’s patriotic role; award Imbert the Legion of Merit or other decoration; and an invitation to visit with President Johnson in Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)

<sup>3</sup> According to telegrams 2613 and 2619 from Santo Domingo, both dated June 26, at approximately 4 a.m. an armed band of civilians with Communist involvement attacked the police headquarters, the army post, and a small police post in the city of San Francisco de Macoris. No clear reason for this uprising was cited other than it possibly being an effort to mount further violence in another part of island. The Constitutionals suffered 8 dead and 30 wounded (1 GNR soldier wounded) before the Armed Forces brought the incident under control. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VIII)

In this regard, Ambassador Bennett and I are aware of and fully share Dept.'s view that restructuring of military establishment here is absolutely essential. However, I do not see much hope for radical changes in armed forces' leadership in near future if we are to have early solution. We need support of top military if solution is to be achieved and they, in turn, will require reassurances from US. Ambassador Bennett and I do anticipate that Wessin's early removal will prove possible. Other changes will probably have to come more gradually. I am confident we will be able to use our influence and work closely with provisional government to accomplish this objective.

5. Major leverage with Imbert and military lies in GNR's virtually complete dependence on our financial assistance. I hesitate to use it and will not unless absolutely necessary. However, if by next Tuesday night<sup>4</sup> Imbert and company are not prepared step aside, I would propose inform him and military that no further aid for payment wages and salaries will be forthcoming. As I understand it, money for next round will not be available until Monday. We could easily hold off for two days, except perhaps for direct payments to municipalities which might be advantageous. I repeat hope use of this club will not be necessary. Explanation of facts of life to the military may be enough turn trick if Imbert continues adamant.

6. On Constitutionalist side there are also number of problems. Caamano and company still resisting on Communist issue, asking no-deportation guarantee, right of 14th of June to legal recognition and full range of public liberties without adequate provision to deal with subversion. Problem of constitutionalist military is also troublesome, as is proposal that Congress should pass on institutional act. However, I believe these can be effectively dealt with once satisfactory provisional government is at hand. We have impression large number in rebel camp are extremely anxious for solution and not prepared accompany Communists in self-immolation. Their major fear is that giving up fight would expose them to reprisals and repression. Provisional government headed by man in whom they have confidence plus firm assurance of elections should persuade these more moderate elements that time has come to end the struggle. Under these circumstances I would look forward to disintegration of movement at early date, even if rebel leaders for some reason should refuse to go along with our proposal at last minute.

7. Prospects for pushing through solution obviously depend on our ability come up with satisfactory provisional government. There is

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<sup>4</sup> June 29.

surprisingly broad consensus here that new regime should be presidential, not collegiate in form. My colleagues and I agree. We have also about come to conclusion that Hector Garcia Godoy is best man available to head provisional government. He has broad support (Santiago group, Balagueristas and numerous independents); he is at least more acceptable than most to rebels; he is a good friend of ours; he is willing to serve and appears quite capable to us. As previously reported, we have asked Garcia to take appropriate soundings and come back Monday for specific discussions.

8. If Garcia returns with satisfactory answers I would propose push ahead in effort establish his provisional government during course of next week. Before doing so I would, of course, obtain firm commitments from him on handling of Communist problem. I anticipate no difficulties that regard.

Will appreciate your comments and instructions.

Ambassador Bennett concurs.

**Bennett**

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### 113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 28, 1965, 9:56 p.m.

1542. For Bunker and Bennett. Except as modified in this message we are in agreement with Embtel 2628.<sup>2</sup>

1. *Elections.* We are prepared to accept your judgment that most generally acceptable course would be six months moratorium on political activity to be followed by three months of campaigning and general elections nine months after Provisional Government inaugurated. However, our preference would be to delay elections for as long a period as would be generally acceptable, hopefully at least 12 months.

2. *Urgency of solution.* We agree time is of the essence and that every effort should be made to constitute a provisional government this week.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Mann on June 28, cleared by Bundy and Vance (both in draft) and Vaughn, and approved by Mann.

<sup>2</sup> Document 112.

3. *Military.* Agree that support of Dominican officer corps essential to having a viable provisional government. Believe direct conversations between OAS and military should be continued as appropriate. Restructuring of military establishment and changes in armed forces leadership desirable but agree that it is not practicable to achieve this now. We would hope provisional government could make a start but this is a problem for resolution later. Recent violence in the interior and OAS dependence on Dominican military for maintenance of order is additional reason for not introducing at this particular point in time conditions which would weaken and divide the military. We agree in this connection that reincorporation into armed forces of officers removed some time ago and some of those who went over recently to rebel side is impracticable. We are encouraged by Rivera's statement (Embtel 2635)<sup>3</sup> that enlisted men and lower ranking officers in rebel camp can be reincorporated into armed forces.

4. *Caamano Group.* We agree that OAS should stand firm against demands for no-deportation guarantee, legal recognition of 14 June Movement and laws which would impede dealing with problem of communist subversion.

5. *Question of Communism.* The objective of preventing communist takeover in DR remains essential US objective. In view of weakness and division in non-communist ranks it is most important that person emerging as single President of provisional government clearly understand communist problem and that he be determined to deport or otherwise immobilize leading communist personalities in all three parties and prevent three communist parties from participating in electoral process. We therefore consider selection of provisional President as most important.

6. *President of Provisional Government.* Hector Garcia Godoy would be acceptable to us if OAS committee decides to propose his name. OAS Committee should however get clear and detailed commitment from him or any other alternative provisional presidential candidate on question of communist subversion. Principal members of provisional cabinet should likewise be selected with need for clear-cut anti-communist posture in mind. USG can and should help in identifying communists.

7. *Inter-American Force.* Agree that decision on when to withdraw Force should be left for negotiation with Provisional Government.

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2635 from Santo Domingo, June 28, reported a private meeting held on June 27 between Bunker and Rivera Caminero, GNR Secretary of State for Armed Forces. Caminero assured Bunker that the Armed Forces were interested only in the welfare and future of the Dominican Republic and were prepared to stay out of politics. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VIII)

Timing would obviously depend on circumstances not yet clearly foreseeable.

8. *Imbert*. We share your estimate of value of Imbert's services at a critical moment in crisis and agree with approach Bunker is taking in trying to get Imbert to understand he can now step aside with honor and dignity for himself and his family. Better than USG making statements, giving decorations and issuing invitations, from Imbert's point of view, would be for OAS to obtain commitment from Provisional Government to issue as its first official act statement about Imbert's services similar to approach already made by Bunker in his conversations with Imbert. Provisional Government's statement could also make reference to any equally helpful effort by rebel side.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

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#### **114. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, July 9, 1965, 2150Z.

96. From Bunker. State of our negotiations as of afternoon July 9 may be summarized as follows:

1. Rebels have apparently accepted Garcia Godoy–Read Barreras ticket to head provisional government and will presumably so indicate in written reply to UR letter (Embtel 88),<sup>2</sup> which we understand they plan deliver at meeting later today. At moment we do not know how reply will be couched. Guzman told Shlaudeman that Cury has been pressing for inclusion impossible conditions as part of final effort block Garcia–Godoy candidacy. Committee could not, of course, proceed on basis of acceptance bound up in conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 88 from Santo Domingo, July 9, transmitted the translated text of a July 8 letter from the Ad Hoc Committee to Caamaño. The principal point of the letter was that the Committee believed a provisional government must be set up as soon as possible in order for elections to be successful. The Committee considered the best candidates to lead the provisional government to be Hector Garcia Godoy as President and Eduardo Read Barreras as Vice President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. IX)

2. If response is reasonably forthcoming we can move ahead, first requesting Caamano group to avoid publicity until next steps can be worked out with Garcia Godoy and GNR—military side. We would first inform latter and ask their acceptance of provisional government to be headed by Garcia and Read Barreras. I anticipate resistance from Imbert and friends. In meeting with committee this morning they indicated opposition to Garcia and gave us list of 21 other candidates for top spot in provisional government. However, if military backing for Garcia remains firm it should be possible overcome this obstacle in reasonably short order.

3. As Dept. is aware, Imbert and civilian members of GNR yesterday were threatening withdraw and turn govt. over to military. In today's meeting they said this possibility still under consideration. It is our hope that Imbert and company will in fact resign before public announcement is made that provisional government under Garcia is to be formed. This would be face-saving gesture for Imbert and would facilitate negotiations by eliminating one side to this complicated situation. (However it is done, I am afraid we can expect some rather unpleasant publicity when Imbert finally does step down.) Unfortunately, there can be no assurance that this script will be followed. Too many factors over which we have no control are involved.

4. Acceptance in principle by Caamano and military of Garcia-headed provisional government will still leave difficult problems to be resolved before new govt. can be installed. Caamano and company are apparently going to insist on negotiating out problems of institutional act, armed forces leadership, future of constitutionalist military and general amnesty provisions before going through congressional process they regard as necessary to give new government "legality". They want President-designate Garcia to participate in these negotiations as means of committing him to agreements reached. Number of difficult issues are involved here and we do not look forward to an easy time in thrashing them out.

5. There are also problems on other side. Military are still opposed to naming a vice-president and continue favor electoral formula providing for prior Constituent Assembly elections. Rivera Caminero and his chiefs presently have no intention step aside as rebels insist they must. Re problem of constitutionalist military, we understand they now believe solution is to deport Caamano officers, and keep them out of country for five years. Needless to say, rebels are scarcely thinking in these terms.

6. As Dept. will appreciate from foregoing, I am not presently in position offer any realistic projection of time frame in which final solution might be reached. Committee hopes there will soon be agree-



ment on provisional govt. and that this will serve to move things ahead rapidly. However, range of problems still to be resolved suggests caution in that regard. I will continue keep Dept. informed of our progress and will endeavor provide as much advance warning as possible as to when key developments can be expected.

**Bennett**

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**115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1965, 1:11 p.m.

164. For Bunker and Bennett. We have been closely following negotiations and development of political situation in Dominican Republic. We have also been continually assessing attitude of public and government officials and other American Republics as well as public opinion in the United States. It is becoming more apparent than ever that we must move quickly to a definitive solution in the Dominican Republic before the situation deteriorates beyond repair.

Our assessment overall situation (Dominican Republic, hemisphere, world) is that it is reaching boiling point much the same as you encountered in Dominican Republic in middle of June when OAS Committee felt compelled make its proposal on June 18 before you had opportunity fully review it in Washington.

When you departed Washington after reporting MFM<sup>2</sup> you thought solution could be obtained in approximately two weeks. Request your current assessment.<sup>3</sup>

**Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Sayre on July 31.

<sup>2</sup> Bunker departed the Dominican Republic for Washington the morning of July 16 for consultations at the White House and to report to the OAS. No record of Bunker's meeting at the White House has been found. Bunker returned to the Dominican Republic on Monday, July 19.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 117.

**116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1965, 4:20 p.m.

165. For Bunker, Bennett and Palmer. Assuming provisional government is installed with agreement of Caamaño what is your estimate of action that would have to be taken, if any, to restore order in rebel zone? If action is required could this be done entirely by administrative measures of provisional government, that is stopping food deliveries, cutting off utilities, permitting egress but no ingress and waiting out those who resist? Or would there be only pockets of resistance which would rule out general measures such as cutting off utilities?

If some pacification is required should this be done by (1) IAPF, (2) regular Dominican military or (3) a combined operation?

Assuming provisional government is restored without Caamaño's approval what is your estimate?

What is your estimate if provisional government installed without Imbert approval?

Request your combined judgment on military strength of both sides. Both Imbert and Caamaño suggested in United Nations that IAPF be withdrawn. What would be the effect of such action? In your estimate we desire particular attention be given to report received here in Washington that 14th of June and other extremist elements have had considerable success in penetrating enlisted and junior officer ranks in regular armed forces. Also desire your comments on what we understand to be Brazilian view that forces in Caamaño area have shown greater strength and discipline over last few weeks and that their position continues to improve.

Request foregoing by 9:00 AM August 2.<sup>2</sup>

**Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Sayre and cleared by Colonel Greenleaf (DOD).

<sup>2</sup> See Document 117.

**117. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 1, 1965, 2321Z.

310. From Bunker and Bennett. Deptel 164;<sup>2</sup> Embtel 306.<sup>3</sup>

We fully share Department's impatience for definitive solution and concern over attitudes of government officials and public in OAS, as well as over trend of public opinion in U.S. Unfortunately, it is difficult to convey to those not intimately involved here just what a slippery and complex situation this is and what a cross-hatching and interrelation of competing pressures there are. As Department is aware from previous attempts to settle the Dominican problem, there are key elements on both sides who do not want a solution. They are looking for victory and/or satisfaction of personal pride at any cost, up to and including complete ruin of the country. Bringing people like Imbert and Aristy to accept any compromise, let alone bargain in good faith, is no easy job.

Problem is particularly complicated by the fact we are limited in means with which to achieve settlement. As we see it, our options are as follows: (1) We can use force or allow Imbert to use force against Caamano and company. (2) We can bring about Constitutionalist collapse by making life unbearable in Caamano zone—turning off water, closing checkpoints, etc. (3) We can cut GNR off from virtually all funds, using IAPF to close Banco de Reservas and lock up Central Bank. (4) We can continue as we are doing, forcing pace of negotiations in order to reduce issues to essentials and then come forward with proposed final solution. (Our strategy and timing are covered in ref Embtel.)

In our judgment use of first two alternatives would create worse problems than we now face. OAS and world opinion in general would presumably react strongly against such measures. In addition, we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to DOD, CINCLANT, CIA, CINCSO, and the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Document 115.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 306 from Santo Domingo, August 1, described the current status and future course of the negotiations that Bunker believed had been reduced to dealing with the "hard essentials," i.e., the composition of the Armed Forces' high command, future of constitutionalist military personnel, and amnesty/disarmament procedures. Bunker felt the situation was further complicated by Imbert's continuing "resistance to formation of a provisional government," but that he nonetheless intended to move ahead quickly on obtaining as many concessions as possible from both sides. Bunker concluded that a "combination of pressures accompanied by a reasonable proposal for a final solution would turn the trick and allow [the United States] to install a provisional government by the middle of [August] at the latest." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII)

would be left with Imbert. Neither Garcia Godoy nor anyone else we have found acceptable to liberal opinion here or abroad would be likely to take job under circumstances, even if Imbert could be forced out.

Suddenly cutting off all funds for government salaries (which we could have done early in game) might be just as bad from point of view our own vital interests. Unless GNR collapsed rapidly, allowing quick installation provisional government, we could have situation in which military would go without pay for some time. If this were to happen there is impression armed forces would not hold together for long. It is our understanding that maintenance of armed forces in being and continue integrity of officer corps are prime objectives, particularly in view arms distribution by rebels to all and sundry and extremist exploitation of that distribution. At least we clearly do now want to leave that field to Caamano and friends.

We realize that fourth alternative—one ad hoc committee is now pursuing—takes time and offers no hard guarantee of final success. Nevertheless, there seems no other feasible way to proceed. As explained in ref tel, negotiating process should be completed by end of this week. Committee will then come forward with final proposal, at same time exerting maximum pressure by all means available and with full support of Embassy. In order force acceptance it may finally be necessary to threaten or even use measures comprehended with our first three alternatives. Before doing so, however, it is important to be certain that our proposal is before Dominican and world opinion and that both sides have a chance to accept it.

During recent visit to Washington, Bunker estimates solution could be reached in two to three weeks. Committee has been delayed by arrival of Latin American colleagues here a week late, by withdrawal of Read Barreras and by hardening attitude on part of Imbert and company. Despite these and other difficulties we are still hopeful we can finish up soon. As explained in ref Embtel, we hope see provisional government installed by middle of month at latest.

We would, of course, welcome any suggestions Department might have as to how we can move process along faster.

**Bennett**

**118. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 2, 1965, 0321Z.

311. From Bunker, Bennett and Palmer. Ref Deptel 165.<sup>2</sup> Dept please pass CINCLANT from Palmer.

I. Following are answers to questions posed Deptel 165 under three stated hypotheses:

*A. PG Installed with Agreement Caamano*

1. This is of course assumption which OAS committee has been going on all along; it is extremely difficult to envisage how PG could be established, except by imposition, unless this assumption is fulfilled. Certainly it could not be under proposed leadership of Garcia Godoy who has made his acceptance office contingent on Caamano's agreement.

2. Once Caamano agrees to installation PG, many rebels who are opposed to OAS formula will nonetheless decline to fight to prevent it from being carried out. Probably, however, there will remain some sporadic resistance by hard core extremists. It is doubtful that such resistance will be grouped in major geographical concentrations.

3. We doubt that administrative measures, if unaccompanied by use of military force, would provide appropriate means for reducing any resistance remaining. Since such resistance is likely to be scattered rather than concentrated, administrative measures would be difficult to apply. Moreover, even if it proved possible to discriminate, such measures would be slow and insufficient, given considerable stocks of food and other supplies still available in rebel zone. If area or areas holding out contained important economic assets, such as commercial banks, delay would inhibit country's return to normalcy.

4. Military action would probably be required to overcome sporadic resistance of hard core of rebels who refuse to accept any agreement which fails to include their demands. In any event, these actions must be accomplished: positive turn-in of arms; positive check of critical facilities for mines, booby traps, etc. provision of normal police protection—traffic control; prevention of crime; protection of citizens and their property; security of public buildings and utilities. Restoration of utilities. Fire prevention and protection. Clean-up garbage and trash.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to DOD, CIA, and the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Document 116.

5. If significant pockets of rebel resistance should remain, these could be subjected to psyops and selective denial measures, including, if feasible, administrative ones. But these efforts would be supplementary and designed not to substitute for military force but to minimize need for its use.

6. It is possible that, if some rebels continued to resist after Caamano had agreed to PG, Caamano himself might take action against them. Indeed he himself has said as much. In such case, we believe it would be desirable for IAPF to remain outside rebel zone for reasonable time to allow him to establish control over his forces. In event he unable to do so, or is held up for unreasonable time, then IAPF should move in to ensure that job is done.

7. Any pacification which may be required beyond what Caamano himself undertakes should be done only by IAPF. Use of regular Dom-Rep forces and/or national police would only exacerbate hatreds and harden resistance. Combined operation would have same disadvantages. OAS committee contemplates that upon installation of PG present ISZ would be extended to include rebel zone. Thus it appropriate that order should be established and initially maintained there by IAPF. Later, after IAPF forces had been in area for some time, joint IAPF-national police patrols could be used, with eventually national police taking over entirely.

#### *B. PG Installed Without Caamano's Approval*

1. As stated above, this hypothesis is difficult to envisage under present circumstances. In event it should become reality, force would have to be applied by IAPF to degree necessary to restore order and unite capital under PG. Appropriate psyops, designed to weaken popular support of rebel forces, should be conducted in connection with denial measures which, under this hypothesis, would be feasible. Military operations should then be initiated, exact nature and scope depending in part on results of first psychological and denial phase. For example, if only light resistance were expected and encountered, operations should be conducted rapidly to clear rebel zone in its entirety. On other hand, if as events developed heavy resistance were expected and met, operations could be conducted by phases with appropriate psyops and denial measures conducted in between phases.

#### *C. PG Installed Without Imbert Approval*

1. We believe provisional government could be installed without Imbert, although this would probably require that present Minister of Defense, military chiefs of staff and Chief of national police be retained (in view probability their cooperation would be necessary in removing Imbert). Without support of armed forces and police, no provisional government could govern, unless US and/or OAS are prepared introduce military forces on massive scale.

2. Lack of Imbert's approval would not basically affect actions required in rebel zone as described in section A this message. As practical matter GNR could not continue to exist if Imbert deprived of support of chiefs of staff.

[Omitted here is a detailed estimate of the military strength of both sides: the Embassy estimated that Caamano's forces totaled 1,000 and Imbert's totaled 11,500.]

**Bennett**

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**119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 3, 1965, 0120Z.

324. From Bennett and Bunker. We plan handle Communist problem through private agreement with Garcia Godoy. As basis for this agreement we have prepared following draft memorandum of understanding.

*Begin Text* (unnecessary words omitted):

1. Provisional government will be anti-Communist and will associate itself with OAS and the USG in opposing communism on basis of that doctrine's incompatibility with representative democracy. Provisional government will exercise all powers and resources at its disposal to check growth and eliminate influence of communism and Castro-communism in DR.

2. No Communists, Castroites or Castro-Communist sympathizers will hold critical positions in provisional government. If there is doubt with regard a particular individual being considered for an important post, information will be supplied confidentially on basis of which provisional president can make his own determination.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–7 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to DOD, CIA, and the White House. This telegram and Document 120 were sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of an August 3 memorandum from Bowdler who wrote: "Telegram 324 explains how they [Bunker and Bennett] propose to deal with the communist problem. I think it is the best way to go about it. It represents a tall order and I hope Garcia Godoy will buy it." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65)

3. National Department of Investigations will be given responsibility for organizing and coordinating all anti-subversive intelligence and operational activities. Best available man will be chosen to head department after appropriate consultations with representatives of OAS and USG. Appointments to department will be made on sole basis of merit; use of these appointments as political favors will not be permitted.

4. Appropriate agencies of USG will provide assistance to department in training of personnel. Assistance will also be given in establishing an adequate police communications system, as well as in such other technical fields as may be necessary.

5. Important information on subversive activities will be furnished directly to provisional president by Ambassador of US or by representative designated by him. Provisional president will instruct Director of National Department of Investigations to make himself and members of his staff available to representatives of USG agencies for purpose of exchanging information. These agencies will supply information on identities, whereabouts and activities of Communists and other subversives. Provisional president will endeavor to assure that necessary action is taken when information supplied indicates a danger to his government, the Dominican nation or to other friendly governments.

6. National Department of Investigations will assure that Communists, Castroites and Castro-Communist sympathizers are kept under close observation. Those found breaking law will immediately be arrested and held for trial.

7. Provisional president will be furnished list of Dominican Communists and Castroites who have entered country illegally after receiving training in Communist countries. Immediately on taking office provisional president will order the arrest of these individuals in accordance with existing law prohibiting use of false identification documents.

8. On taking office provisional president will also issue decree-law (or propose one to cabinet, depending on vesting of WA [Washington ?] legislative power in institutional act) providing heavy penalties for illegal possession of weapons. Assistance in drafting law will be furnished by OAS if so desired. First priority in enforcing law will be given to apprehending Communists and other subversives who may possess unregistered weapons.

9. Within thirty days of taking office provisional president will issue a decree-law implementing Article 27<sup>2</sup> of Institutional Act which

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<sup>2</sup> The final version of Article 27 of the Institutional Act reads: "The right of all citizens is recognized to join political parties, which may be freely established, the only requirement being that they be organized for peaceful purposes consistent with the principle of representative democracy." (*The OAS Chronicle*, October 1965, p. 28)



prohibits organization of political parties whose aims are not compatible with principle of representative democracy.

10. On taking office provisional president will issue a decree-law creating special presidential committee on freedom of speech and press. Prominent representatives of press and radio industry will be included in committee's membership. Committee will be charged with formulating a code of conduct for press and radio during political truce to be established in accordance with Article 49<sup>3</sup> of Institutional Act. Committee will be responsible for reviewing content of newspapers, periodicals and other printed matter, as well as of radio broadcasts, in order to assure compliance with code. Violations of code not corrected through voluntary compliance will be publicized by committee and reported to provisional president with recommendations as to possible corrective action. Committee will also consult with provisional government on drafting of legislation under Articles 30<sup>4</sup> and 31<sup>5</sup> of Institutional Act designed to prevent use of radio and press for slander and incitement to subversion.

11. Provisional president and Ambassador of United States will periodically review terms of this memorandum. Changes, modifications or additions will be in accordance with these consultations.

*End Text.*

We would plan present memorandum to Garcia Godoy for discussion as soon as authorized by Dept. Once agreed upon single copy of memo could be initialed for retention in Embassy files.

Request Dept's views ASAP.

**Bennett**

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<sup>3</sup> The final version of Article 49 reads: "The provisional government pledges to hold elections within a period of no less than six and no more than nine months from the entry into force of this Institutional Act, to elect a President and Vice President of the Republic and members of the national congress for a period of four years and mayors and councilmen of municipalities for a period of two years. In order that a climate of peace and tranquility may be established, the provisional president will urge political groups and parties and the citizenry in general to refrain from all political activity until three months before elections are held." (Ibid., p. 30)

<sup>4</sup> The final version of Article 30 reads: "All persons may, without any prior censorship, freely express their thoughts by the spoken word, in writing, or by any other graphic or oral means of expression, provided that the thoughts so expressed are not contrary to morality, the public order, or good customs, in which cases the penalties provided by law shall be imposed. All anonymous propaganda, war propaganda, or any other aimed at inciting disobedience of the laws is prohibited, although this latter does not restrict the right to analyze or criticize legal precepts." (Ibid., p. 28)

<sup>5</sup> The final version of Article 31 reads: "The press may not be subject to any kind of coercion or censorship. The only limitation on freedom of the press is that imposed by respect for private life, morality, the public peace, and good customs." (Ibid., p. 28)

## 120. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, August 3, 1965, 0301Z.

325. From Bunker. Ref: Embtel 306.<sup>2</sup> Following is informal translation of text of draft "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" now under consideration by ad hoc committee:

*Begin Text* (unnecessary words omitted).

Convinced of absolute necessity restore peace and unity to Dom family, to promote economic recovery of nation and reestablish its democratic institutions;

Conscious of their patriotic duty to foreswear all personal ambitions and interests for benefit of the nation;

Determined to achieve their high purpose of assuring a climate of peace and conciliation in which all Dominicans can live under system of freedom and social justice;

Parties signing below who declare that they represent respectively, in capacities indicated, "Constitutional Government", "Government of National Reconstruction" and Provisional Government of D.R. hereby make it known that they have reached following agreement as result of negotiations carried out by ad hoc committee of the tenth meeting MFM whose members also sign present act as further testimony that parties have agreed to comply with its terms:

1. "Government of National Reconstruction" and "Constitutional Government" accept the Provisional Government presided over by Hector Garcia Godoy as sole and sovereign Government of Dominican Republic. Members of "Government of National Reconstruction" and "Constitutional Government" will offer their fullest cooperation to Provisional Government in re-establishment and consolidation of political peace, as well as in rehabilitation of national economy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65-9/65. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT, and the White House for McGeorge Bundy. This telegram and Document 119 were sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of an August 3 memorandum from Bowdler who wrote: "Telegram 325 contains the text of the draft 'Act of Dominican Reconciliation.' This also looks okay to me. I do not know how realistic it is to think that Caamano and Imbert will sign the same piece of paper, but I think it is absolutely essential to have a clear understanding in writing as to what the ground rules of the settlement are." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65-9/65)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 117.

2. Parties accept institutional act resulting from this agreement as the constitutional instrument under which Provisional Government will exercise its functions. No previous constitution will have effect during existence of Institutional Act whose text is annexed to this agreement.

3. Provisional Government will, on day it takes office, proclaim general amnesty provided for in Article 11 of institutional act and will take necessary measures to release all political prisoners.

4. Immediately following inauguration of Provisional Government, constitutionalist forces will withdraw all defenses and check points in and around zone presently under their control. This zone will, at same time, become part of security zone established by "Act of Santo Domingo".<sup>3</sup> Security zone will be maintained for period of 30 days, at end of which period it will disappear unless provisional president should consider it necessary to postpone this step.

5. Provisional Government will have responsibility for assuring that public order is maintained within security zone. In discharging this responsibility, it may call on Inter-American Peace Force for assistance.

6. Provisional Government will, as soon as it has taken office, establish special centers for collection of arms in possession of civilian population. These centers will be located in security zone and under direction of persons designated by Provisional Government after previous consultation with Colonel Francisco A. Caamano Deno. These arms will be delivered to Inter-American Peace Force for safekeeping until Provisional Government shall decide that they should be returned to arsenals of the nation.

7. Persons who presently form "Constitutional Government" and its military command will take all necessary measures so that all arms now in possession of civilians under their jurisdiction are delivered within 48 hours after installation of Provisional Government to centers established in accordance with foregoing article. At conclusion this period, Provisional Government will take such measures as may be necessary to recover all arms that have not been surrendered voluntarily.

8. As soon as Provisional Government has been installed, armed forces will return to their barracks and place themselves under orders of their commander in chief, the provisional president. All members of armed forces who have participated in present conflict on "Constitutionalist" side will rejoin their units without discriminations or reprisals at rank they held on April 23, 1965. All such military personnel will be

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<sup>3</sup> "The Act of Santo Domingo," signed May 5, 1965, by members of the "Constitutional Government," "Government of National Reconstruction" and by members of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ratified the April 30 cease-fire agreement that had not been observed. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965*, pp. 973–974.

subject to orders of their respective superior officers in accordance with organic law of armed forces.

9. In accordance with declaration of general amnesty, no officer or enlisted man of armed forces will be submitted to court martial or subject to punishment of any kind for acts, except common crimes, committed since April 23, 1965. Any officer or enlisted man who wishes to retire will be permitted to do so in accordance with prescribed procedures and corresponding retirement benefits set forth in organic law of armed forces. Any officer or enlisted man who desires to leave the country may do so under appropriate guarantees and with assistance provided by Provisional Government.

10. During thirty-day period in which security zone will remain in being, Provisional Government and unified command of Inter-American Peace Force will work out plans for relocation of the force. At same time, Provisional Government will initiate negotiations with tenth meeting of MFM re gradual evacuation of force.

In witness whereof etc.

*End Text*

Department's comments will be appreciated.

**Bennett**

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**121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 4, 1965, 4:38 p.m.

181. For Bennett and Bunker. We all appreciate fine job you are doing under unusually difficult circumstances. This telegram is limited to aspects of communist problem covered in Embtel 324:<sup>2</sup>

1. We assume that any "private agreement" along the lines described in reftel would eventually leak. This would place United States in interventionist light and might destroy usefulness Garcia Godoy. Suggest consideration (a) memo be shown and discussed with Garcia

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 DOM REP. Secret; Exdis; Priority. Drafted by Mann on August 3; cleared by Bundy, Leonard Meeker (L), Vaughn, Read, and Ball; and approved by Rusk and Mann.

<sup>2</sup> Document 119.

Godoy by both of you making it clear to him this is course we would like to see him follow; (b) verbal understanding covering high points problem between OAS Committee and Garcia Godoy; and (c) agreement on text of a letter from Garcia Godoy as Provisional President to his Minister of Interior and to Director of Investigations.

2. Key offices on communist problem will presumably be the Minister of Interior and Director of Investigations. Suggest there be an oral understanding between OAS Committee and Garcia Godoy on who will be appointed to these two key positions. They should be anti-communists by conviction.

3. We believe that no communist should hold any position whatever in provisional government. (Communists defined as members of one or more of the three communist parties or those who are subject to control of one or more of these parties.) Furthermore, we doubt any positions in provisional government should be given communist "sympathizers", however recognize this may not be feasible.

4. Agree that National Department of Investigations should be given responsibility for organizing and coordinating anti-subversive activities. How soon do you estimate recruiting could be accomplished and Department made a going, efficient operation once provisional government is established? We agree USG should provide assistance to this department but doubt this should be put in any written form until provisional government is set up. Same comment re paragraph five of refel.

5. We agree that Department Investigations should keep communists and their sympathizers under close observation but we doubt that as practical matter this can be done if communists are at large.

6. We agree that Dominican communists who entered country illegally after receiving training in communist countries should be arrested for violation of existing law prohibiting use of false identification documents. Is it clear that proposed amnesty to rebels will not be construed as preventing this? We also agree that Provisional President should promptly issue decree-law making it possible to arrest and convict for illegal possession of weapons. We also agree that Provisional President should issue decree-law prohibiting organization of political parties whose aims are incompatible with principles of representative democracy. Is this intended to supplement existing laws making the three existing communist parties illegal? Can we assume these existing laws will be in effect during provisional government period? We also agree that Provisional President should issue decree-law designed to prevent use of radio and press for slander and incitement to subversion. However we doubt wisdom of attempting to formulate code of conduct for press and radio or anything smacking of censorship. Would not strict enforcement of carefully drafted decree-law relating

to slander, incitement to subversion and promotion of unrest accomplish desired objective?

7. While we assume from reftel those possessing false identification documents or unregistered weapons would be subject to arrest and conviction, it is not clear to us whether existing decrees and other laws which we assume would remain in force after provisional government established are adequate in sense of enabling authorities promptly and effectively to arrest and convict those who are engaged in various forms of subversion. We are reviewing information available to us here re existing laws on this subject and request report with detailed information re specific laws and comments re their adequacy. Dominican courts have a reputation for having been very ineffective in the past. Is there any reason to believe they will be more effective in the future even assuming the legal provisions are adequate for dealing with communist problem? Perhaps even more important is question of whether Institutional Act, particularly Article 2,<sup>3</sup> will vest in provisional government broad powers to issue such additional decrees as may be necessary to deal adequately and effectively with communist activities. We are reviewing draft of Institutional Act here with this question in mind and would also appreciate your views on this.

8. We are backing away from suggestion that decree-laws should be approved by majority of Cabinet for fear that this may introduce same kind of indecision, lack of leadership and paralysis as exists in collegiate Uruguayan government today. We now believe Garcia Godoy should have authority to issue decrees as President of provisional government. If safeguards are deemed desirable or would facilitate your negotiations suggest provision to effect President will "consult" with Cabinet before issuing decree but making it plain that majority support in Cabinet is not necessary. Additional possible safeguard could be that a two-thirds majority of Cabinet could veto any decree issued by Provisional President.

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<sup>3</sup> The final version of Article 2 reads: "The provisional president shall legislate on any matter not contrary to the provisions of this Institutional Act but approval by two thirds of the members of the cabinet shall be required when laws on the following questions are concerned: a. changes in the legal money and banking system; b. election of judges of the supreme court of justice; c. changes in the political boundaries of the national territory; d. approval or denunciation of international treaties; e. declaration of war against other states; f. sending Dominican troops abroad; g. establishment or abolition of courts of any nature; h. declaration of a state of siege in the event of disturbance of the public peace and, as a result thereof, suspension of the exercise of human rights set forth in Articles 16, 20-23, 30, 33 and 34 of this Institutional Act; and i. declaration of a state of national emergency, suspending the exercise of human rights with the exception of the inviolability of life." (*The OAS Chronicle*, October 1965, p. 25)

9. We continue to be concerned about Article 26<sup>4</sup> of Institutional Act and Garcia Godoy's statements that no Dominican will be deported by Provisional Government. In addition to doing everything we can to make sure that laws are adequate and courts will enforce them, we think there should be understanding with Garcia Godoy about internment of communists if this should prove to be necessary. Internment could be on some Dominican island as Bosch suggested or at some place on Dominican mainland. This would be safeguard against possibility that communists will be clever enough to avoid possession of illegal weapons or false documentation and, since they will presumably have amnesty except for common crimes, it will be difficult to prove that they have violated some specific Dominican law.

10. Obviously ability of Provisional Government to deal with communists will depend to large extent on will of Garcia Godoy. Are we satisfied that he has made no commitments which would impede his ability effectively to deal with whatever communist problem arises and that he has the will to act? Would appreciate resume of your conversations to date with Garcia Godoy on handling communist problem.

11. Question of command of armed forces is also intimately related to this problem. We should take every precaution to insure that not only Minister of Defense but Commanders of Army, Navy, Air Force and Training Center are anti-communist by conviction.

**Rusk**

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<sup>4</sup> The final version of Article 26 reads: "No Dominican may be expelled from the country. The deportation or expulsion from Dominican territory of any alien shall take place only by virtue of a sentence rendered by a competent court, after compliance with due legal formalities and procedures." (Ibid., p. 28)

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## **122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 11, 1965, 11:25 a.m.

216. For Bunker. Your reports on Dominican reactions OAS proposals reviewed by highest authority. Recognizing that you are in fast-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Sayre, cleared by Bowdler, and approved by Vaughn. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro.

moving situation where man on the spot in best position determine most effective tactics, believe from our vantage point that it would be best proceed with signature Act of Dominican Reconciliation<sup>2</sup> (ADR) on basis your original schedule of signature today, if Garcia Godoy and Imbert willing do so, with installation of Provisional Government by August 14. This will provide government which we can recognize, carry on relations and work out programs for rehabilitation Dominican economy. We believe any delay will lead only to deterioration of situation, indicate lack of firmness and will, without any particular assurance Caamano would sign in any event.

We agree with your general disposition make no changes in substance of solution OAS Ad Hoc Committee has proposed. We also agree that change in form of agreement acceptable if it will in fact result in signature of ADR by Caamano. We read your messages as indication Caamano does not intend sign any document and we also gather this is policy line of Bosch.

Act could be left open for signature by Caamano any time before installation Provisional President say on Saturday, August 14. After that date PG would deal with Caamano and could for example set deadline after which amnesty would not apply. Such a solution might not be unmixing blessing but could provide firm legal basis for dealing with Communist holdouts.

After specified date rebel area could be sealed off with people permitted leave area but no one permitted to enter. If IAPF used it could lead to sticky situation in MFM. If Dominican Forces used decision could be made by PG.

Request your views on foregoing course of actions and your plans for carrying out OAS Committee proposals. You should have in mind that we are trying mount major effort give renewed vitality to Alliance for Progress starting with speech by President on August 17<sup>3</sup> fourth anniversary Charter of Punta del Este.

**Rusk**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 120.

<sup>3</sup> President Johnson spoke on August 17 at 10:25 a.m. in the East Room at the White House. For text of his remarks, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book II, pp. 884–889.



**123. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 12, 1965, 0440Z.

416. From Bunker. Committee's meeting with Caamano group this afternoon brought negotiations down to what has always been gut issue here: makeup of armed forces high command. We came away with impression that other problems could be handled. Objections to Article 4<sup>2</sup> might well be worked out through memorandum of understanding or protocol re procedures for dismantling and disarming constitutionalist zone. Also, in our opinion, Article 8<sup>3</sup> difficulties (i.e. future of various types of constitutionalist military) are susceptible to treatment through some kind of compromise formula, perhaps involving a special board to review individual cases of officers involved. Article 10<sup>4</sup> was not even mentioned.

On other hand, it is difficult see where immediate solution to problem of armed forces' leadership might lie. Caamano's group made the point very clearly. (Up to now they have been avoiding issue but our proposal and public declaration has forced it into open.) Aristy and Jorge Blanco insisted that Provisional Government could not be installed with Rivers, de los Santos, Martinez Arana and Wessin still at their posts. I pointed out that constitutionalists had previously agreed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> The final version of Article 4 reads: "The provisional vice president of the Republic, who shall have under his direction one of the ministries, shall take the place of the provisional president in case of his temporary or permanent absence. The vice president shall be chosen from among the members of the cabinet, upon nomination of the president, through the affirmative vote of the two thirds of the cabinet. In case of the permanent absence of the provisional president, and in case the provisional vice president is also temporarily or permanently absent, the duties of provisional president of the Republic shall be discharged by the following persons in this order: The presiding judge of the supreme court of justice; the deputy presiding judge of the supreme court of justice, and then the other judges of that court in descending order of age." (*The OAS Chronicle*, October, 1965, p. 26)

<sup>3</sup> The final version of Article 8 reads: "The national district and the municipalities of the Republic shall be governed by the provisions of Title X of the 1963 Constitution, which is based on the corresponding provisions of the 1962 Constitution, except that the council chairmen, mayors, and councillors of the municipal governments shall be appointed and may be removed from office by the provisional president of the Republic. Likewise, the provisional government shall be governed by the provisions of Title XI of the said Constitution." (*Ibid.*, p. 26)

<sup>4</sup> The final version of Article 10 reads: "The provisional government shall in no way jeopardize the sovereignty of the Republic nor in any way alienate the property of the state." (*Ibid.*, p. 26)

leave all such matters to Provisional President and said that Garcia Godoy, who is fully aware of problem, could be trusted to work out satisfactory solution. They, however, firmly maintained their position.

Tonight we again discussed situation with Garcia Godoy. He is most reluctant go ahead without at least minimal agreement on part of rebels. Does not believe that provisional government could function (or even be formed, given timidity of his potential colleagues) without rebel acceptance. He also shares our impression that Imbert is only prepared to sign "act of reconciliation" if other side also signs and if four points put forward by armed forces (Embtel 405)<sup>5</sup> are explicitly understood to be binding. Nevertheless, Garcia Godoy did say that he would be prepared go ahead and take office without final agreement if rebels (and presumably armed forces) would agree to installation under such condition. He urged, however, that we first make determined effort persuade Caamano and company accept our proposal as it stands.

We intend make this effort. First step will be private approach to Guzman tomorrow morning in effort use him to enlist Bosch's aid. Emphasis will be on fact that this may well be last chance for solution favorable to PRD electoral ambitions and that party will ultimately lose if Aristy and extremists are allowed continue insist on impossible conditions. Garcia Godoy plans talk to Jorge Blanco in same vein. After these soundings have been made we will decide on strategy for next meeting with Caamano group, probably to take place tomorrow afternoon. Will keep Department informed as we go along.

Re suggestions in Deptel 216,<sup>6</sup> I agree that we must continue efforts persuade Garcia Godoy take over without firm agreements on all outstanding issues. It is clear, however, that he will not assume office solely on basis GNR acceptance of "act of reconciliation". It also clear, in my opinion, that he would not be prepared—at least at outset—to acquiesce in use of coercive measures such as sealing off rebel zone. I think best we can hope for is that he would take over on basis simple agreement of both sides that he do so, with negotiations for final settlement to continue thereafter.

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 405 from Bunker in Santo Domingo, August 10, lists the Armed Forces' four points: "1. All military who are abroad and who deserted shall remain outside of armed forces; 2. All officials who rebelled and who meet retirement age and conditions will be retired with pensions; 3. All rebel officers who in judgment chiefs of staff may constitute danger or may be in personal danger will be designated to post abroad; and, 4. Decisions of retirement board in accordance with organic law of Armed Forces, will be maintained as well as decisions of competent tribunals." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65-9/65)

<sup>6</sup> Document 122.

Time frame is still difficult predict but it seems likely at least a few more days will be necessary to complete our efforts. We are very conscious of risk that delay will give Imbert an opportunity back away from his commitment. We are also aware that with self-serving politicians now rising to the attack, Garcia Godoy's candidacy is in jeopardy. Nevertheless, I believe we must continue along line we have set.

Foregoing may be repeated to AmEmbassy Rio at Department's discretion.

**Bennett**

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#### 124. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

OCI No. 2305/65

Washington, August 13, 1965.

##### THE OUTLOOK FOR INSURGENCY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

##### Summary

The pro-Chinese Communist Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) will probably initiate a program of terrorist activity in the Santo Domingo area and an elementary form of guerrilla warfare at one or more points in the interior. The pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) is divided on whether or not to launch a major guerrilla effort in the interior, but it is better prepared and enjoys greater capabilities than the MPD for this type of insurgency. Because Communist-affiliated groups lack popular support in the Dominican Republic, the Dominican military and police could probably severely limit such insurgent activity to a degree where it would not pose a serious threat. If however, harsh repressive measures are carried out indiscriminately and the economic situation does not improve, the leftist extremists might then gain enough support from non-Communist groups to threaten the provisional government.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA.

## 125. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, August 18, 1965, 2200Z.

461. Refs: Deptels 181<sup>2</sup> and 209;<sup>3</sup> Embtels 373,<sup>4</sup> 385.<sup>5</sup>

1. Ambassador Bunker and I met with Garcia Godoy 15 August for further discussion on provisional government's handling of Communist problem. Embassy had prepared rough draft of memorandum (Deptel 181, para 1) and we discussed it point by point, agreeing that it should be put in final form for approval and verbal agreement. Garcia Godoy was in general agreement with our proposals, with one or two indefinite points as noted below.

2. Garcia Godoy emphasized his determination that PG would be anti-Communist and aligned with United States in opposing communism in all facets. He indicated his intention take every opportunity to eradicate movement's growth and check its influence in DomRep and said he will issue instructions to this effect to his Minister of Interior and Security Chief. We will discuss those at subsequent meeting. Garcia Godoy reiterated intention to take police out of Armed Forces Ministry and put them back under Interior.

3. Garcia Godoy was unequivocal in stating he would invoke emergency powers and, if necessary, order internment of dangerous Communists under authority of institutional act should his government, Dominican nation or friendly governments need such protection against Communist subversion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 DOM REP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. On August 19 McGeorge Bundy sent President Johnson a 1-page memorandum summarizing this telegram. It ended: "Garcia Godoy's response is moderately encouraging. This type of arrangement is about the best we can get under the circumstances. For it to work, we will have to keep after Garcia Godoy with material and moral support. We are in a position to do this with CIA, FBI and AID people down there." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII)

<sup>2</sup> Document 121.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 209 to Santo Domingo, August 9, commented on certain draft articles of the Institutional Act. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 DOM REP)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 373 from Santo Domingo, August 8, responded to the Department's comments on the Institutional Act. (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 385 from Santo Domingo, August 9, reported on a working lunch Bunker and Bennett had with Garcia Godoy on August 8 on the problem of Dominican Communists. (Ibid.)

4. Garcia Godoy agreed that no Communists, Castroites or Castro/Communist sympathizers should hold critical positions in PG. He stressed his interest in receiving confidential information on candidates for position. He agreed that members of PCD (recently the PSPD) and MPD should automatically be kept out of government. He was somewhat less firm on tricky question of APCJ. He readily admitted that members of “hard line” of 14 of June Party should be unacceptable for any position in PG. He stated, however, he had contemplated using some “soft line” APCJ members in PG—not in critical positions, but in non-critical areas, apparently referring to such activities as forestry and public health. His thinking here is to draw away non-Communist members APCJ and cut its appeal by offering non-Communist elements opportunity to participate in legitimate activities. Garcia Godoy also raised question of possible APCJ participation in elections, is stressed [*sic*] our view that, while there may still be some non-Communists in party membership, APCJ now clearly controlled by Castro/Communist elements and should not be allowed to participate in elections or any other important phase of political life in DomRep. Our view continues to be that policy and thrust of APCJ now so clearly apparent that no individual currently active in movement should be given government position. Former or recent membership need not necessarily be a bar, and there is some persuasiveness in Garcia Godoy reasoning of providing alternatives to non-Communist but frustrated youth who have been attracted to APCJ. We plan continue discussion with Garcia Godoy along above lines.

5. Garcia Godoy said he proposed to use moderate number of PRSC such as Guido d’Alessandro in his government. He expressed distrust of hard line PRSC leaders.

6. In discussing function of DNI and secret police in organizing and coordinating anti-subversive intelligence and operational activities, Garcia Godoy was frank in stating he would depend on USG for support and advice. He seems desirous complete cooperation in this field and said he would not only wish consult with US on choice of top personnel, but would welcome suggestions in selection of personnel. We discussed present state of disintegration of DNI and ways to get it organized and operating. Garcia Godoy welcomed our assurance that appropriate assistance would be provided DNI and secret police in their operations against Castro/Communist subversion. He agreed that such assistance would be subject of continuing consultations between us.

7. We found ready agreement on his part that Marxist subversives and their sympathizers would be kept under close observation and that those breaking law should be apprehended and held for trial. He expressed full awareness of difficulties in nature of public disorder and

strikes that will be mounted against control efforts but said he was quite resigned to being called a dictator and other names.

8. Garcia Godoy showed less enthusiasm over suggestion for arrest of Dominican Communists and Castroites who have entered country illegally. He emphasized again his objection to deportation as a control method and was not disposed consider those returning from deportation as illegal entrants. I made point that these individuals were subject to detention and trail on purely legalistic, non-political grounds, but he did not commit himself definitely on this point.

9. Garcia Godoy is in favor of and plans issue decree-law similar to Sullivan act,<sup>6</sup> to provide for penalties for persons found to be possessing weapons illegally. He agreed that the arrest of Communists and other subversives would have first priority in this respect.

10. Third point on which Garcia Godoy displayed some hesitancy was proposal for decree-law implementing Article 17 of Institutional Act for the purpose of regulating political parties incompatible with principle of representative democracy (Deptel 209 para 1). Godoy appeared have some trouble grasping the intent or objective of this proposal, and it is admittedly rather sophisticated legislation for this primitive political Communist. He wishes to discuss this further and has asked for copies of pertinent U.S. laws in order to study them.

11. Garcia Godoy spoke of interest to create "council of information" to deal with abuses of freedom of speech and press. He has already approached Herrera of Listin and Ornes of Caribe, with latter predictably turning him down. He remarked on this score that he was ready to be called a dictator if necessary. But reiterated desire to put main responsibility on media owners for self-regulation. His sincerity on this point is unquestioned; we all agreed it will be difficult.

12. In closing it was apparent Garcia Godoy shares our desire to cooperate closely on Communist question, and wants regular consultation in this field. He said he would welcome written memorandum specifically outlining our understanding and we have that under preparation.

**Bennett**

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to a New York state handgun licensing law concerning the possession of a concealed weapon.

**126. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 25, 1965, 2130Z.

525. From Bunker. Re Deptel 278.<sup>2</sup>

1. I am fully in agreement on necessity apply maximum pressure to induce Imbert fulfill his commitment sign “act of reconciliation.” Excuse that GNR only accepted “act” on basis that not one word would be changed is patently phony and we have no intention allow him use that line.

2. Revisions in “act” were worked out by committee, not by CG, and we believe they have improved and strengthened act as a whole without altering its basic substance or objectives. New language of Article 4<sup>3</sup> is stronger and more precise from point of view Imbert’s own frequently reiterated concern as to future of “Communist focus” in CG. Perimeter around zone will now be maintained until Communists and others have given up their arms. The other changes in “act” should also be welcomed by Imbert and armed forces chiefs as strengthening PG’s authority to deal with problems of constitutionalists and their zone free of hampering prior commitments. Article 8<sup>4</sup> in particular is now more favorable from that standpoint.

3. Revised text has been accepted by CG and committee is now using all avenues of persuasion and pressure open to it in effort obtain agreement from other side. Principle external pressure is economic, represented in committee’s decision withhold financial assistance and retain OAS control of Central Bank. Other pressures, means of persuasion—individual and group—are being employed to fullest extent possible.

4. I believe problem of Imbert is complicated by fact he continues receive bad advice from friends, hangers-on, self-serving politicians and professional anti-Communists—all of whom put personal interest

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 278 to Santo Domingo, August 23, informed Bunker: “With Caamano forces on board highest authority feels now is time apply maximum persuasion get Imbert carry out his commitment sign Reconciliation Act.” It “seems to us GNR simply stalling for reasons which are not clear and we believe ad hoc committee should now use all available bargaining levers force acceptance. We think public opinion throughout hemisphere would support such pressure.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 123.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 123.

ahead of country. (Imbert is a rather unsophisticated man and his attitude often seems to be influenced by what the last person he saw had to say.) In addition, it must be recognized that he himself has never fully accepted necessity for establishment of provisional government.

I am hopeful, however, that appeals to Imbert's patriotism and pride, combined with pressures on both him and the military chiefs will obtain desired results.

5. Problem of armed forces' chiefs is more difficult and more important. They apparently entertain some suspicions about Garcia Godoy's intentions and are reluctant put too much of their future or that of their institution in his hands. They also seem to suspect—completely without reason as far as we know—that he has made secret commitments to Caamano and company. With valuable assistance of Embassy attachés, we are making intense effort reassure chiefs of our own and Garcia Godoy's firm intention to preserve integrity of armed forces. (Embtel 520)<sup>5</sup>

6. In event GNR/armed forces acceptance of "act" not forthcoming within few days, Committee contemplates issuing another declaration to Dominican people reporting on status of negotiations. Because virtually all communications media are in hands of CG and GNR, this step may be necessary in order further mobilize public opinion. Fortunately, there obviously now is mounting public pressure for a settlement which should have its effect.

7. I am aware of feeling exasperation and frustration on part of USG at delays caused by constant maneuvering for advantage by both CG and GNR and by childish refusal of each side to deal with or even recognize existence of the other. This is a feeling fully shared by myself and my colleagues. However, given mandate under which we are operating, I see no alternative to continuing along course we have set, combining patience with pressure and persuasion to achieve our objectives.

**Bennett**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 520 from Santo Domingo, August 25, recounted Bunker's efforts during a 1½ hour meeting with Rivera Caminero and three service chiefs of the GNR to convince them that Garcia Godoy intended to carry out the three objectives supported by the Ad Hoc Committee and the United States: 1. "To deal effectively with the Communist problem; 2. to maintain the integrity of the Armed Forces; and, 3. to establish a stable government that could lead the country to free elections and the re-establishment of democratic institutions." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65-9/65)



**127. Memorandum From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 30, 1965, 10:30 p.m.

1. I talked to Ambassador Bunker at about 10:00 PM tonight. Bunker passed on the following information.

(a) General Imbert has resigned in favor of the Provisional Government, but says he will not sign the agreement. This should not hold up a settlement, however. *First*, we don't need his signature. *Second*, Rivera Caminero says he will sign if necessary for the GNR. The Armed Forces are definitely in favor of the settlement.

(b) The signings will probably take place on Tuesday<sup>2</sup> with the installation of the Provisional Government on Wednesday or Thursday.

(c) The situation is still somewhat touchy and we should definitely *not* make any public statements at this time.

(d) The security situation is quiet at the moment.

2. There is nothing to do before morning.

3. It looks as if we are just about home.

GC  
McGeorge Bundy<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65. Secret. The handwritten notation "L[yndon]" appears on the memorandum indicating President Johnson saw it.

<sup>2</sup> August 31.

<sup>3</sup> Although Bundy's typewritten signature appears on the memorandum, he did not initial it.

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**128. Editorial Note**

On August 31, 1965, the "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" was signed by Francisco Caamaño Deno, Jottin Cury, Hector Aristy, Salvador Jorge Blanco, S. Antonio Guzman, and Anibal Campagna for the "Constitutionalist Government," Hector Garcia Godoy for the Provisional Government, and the three members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Ilmar Marinho (Brazil), Ramon de Clairmont (El Salvador), and Elsworth Bunker (United States), and accepted by Antonio Imbert Bar-

rera for the "Government of National Reconstruction." By signing this Act, the parties agreed to "accept the Constitutionalist Government led by Hector Garcia Godoy as the sole and sovereign government of the Dominican Republic." The parties also agreed to accept: the Institutional Act resulting from this agreement as the constitutional instrument under which the Provisional Government would exercise its functions; a general amnesty provided for in Article 11 of the Institutional Act; an immediate withdrawal of contending forces from their zones of defense; the Provisional Government's responsibility for maintenance of public order; the establishment of special centers to collect arms held by civilians; the return of the Armed Forces under the Provisional President's control without reprisal or discrimination for past actions in the Dominican conflict; and a negotiation with the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to decide the withdrawal date and form of the Inter-American Peace Force. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965*, pages 999–1001.

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## 129. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 1, 1965, 4 p.m.

WITH

Director Raborn, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Broe, Mr. Vance, Mr. Mann, Mr. Sayre, Administrator Bell, Mr. Engel,<sup>2</sup> Director Hoover, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Chase

SUBJECT

Communists in the Dominican Republic—Meeting at 4:00 p.m. on September 1, 1965

### 1. *General Situation in the Dominican Republic*

(a) Director Raborn described the situation in the Dominican Republic as a mess. There are caches of arms up country, there is training of Communist groups, and there are numerous other signs of Communist activity. We are going to need plenty of help to cope with this problem.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by Chase. William V. Broe of the CIA drafted another account of this same meeting on September 4. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 303)

<sup>2</sup> Byron Engle, Director, Office of Public Safety, AID.

(b) Mr. Hoover confirmed Director Raborn's analysis. He said that four or five emotional candidates running around the country stirring up the candidates will provide excellent fodder for the Communists. He added that, conservatively speaking, there are probably 200–300 hard-core, skilled, trained Communists in the Dominican Republic who will try to recruit malcontents. The Provisional Government must identify these Communists and take them out of circulation right away; they have no guts if you pick them up and lock them up.

(c) Mr. Mann noted that the election will present a special problem in that we can probably expect the candidates to court the Communists for political support.

## *2. Police Needs*

(a) The group agreed that the job of dealing with the Communists is a police job and not a military job. In this regard, Director Hoover commented that, generally speaking, the military in Latin America are too heavy-handed and ill-trained for this type of work; a strong national police is the answer.

*[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]*

## *3. Relations With the Provisional Government*

(a) Mr. Bundy said that it is crucial that we treat our relations with the Provisional Government very carefully. The Provisional Government, by instinct, will not be brave on the Communist issue and we want to be in a position of doing more than simply telling them that they should be brave. We want to be able to show the Provisional Government specifically how they can do what needs to be done.

(b) Mr. Mann said that we should make it plain to the Dominican military that we are building a police force that will be anti-Communist and not anti-military; the group agreed that this should be done. In this regard, it was noted that there have been indications from certain members of the military already that they are not instinctively opposed to a vigorous police force in the area of handling Communists.

## *4. Coordination in the U.S. Government*

*[3 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]*

## *5. Summary of Decisions Taken*

(a) A special informal committee, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*, should be set up in Washington to handle the Communist problem. In the Dominican Republic, a similar committee should be set up *[1 line of source text not declassified]* and which would be under the general direction of the Ambassador.

(b) There should be one voice to Garcia Godoy from the U.S. Government on the Communist problem. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*

*declassified*], under the general direction of the Ambassador. Mr. Mann agreed to send a cable to Ambassador Bennett advising him of this decision.<sup>3</sup>

(c) [*name not declassified*] will coordinate with AID on a plan for the development of the Dominican police. In this regard, Mr. Bell agreed to send immediately to the Dominican Republic an AID man, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], to do some work on planning.

(d) FBI agreed to provide training and other facilities as needed for use in the Dominican effort.

(e) The group agreed that, at an appropriate time, an effort should be made to talk Garcia Godoy out of the establishment of the DNI.

(f) The group agreed that, at an appropriate time, the Dominican military should be reassured that the build-up of the police forces does not constitute a move against the military.

(g) Mr. Bundy agreed to clear with the President the Government's organization plan for dealing with the Communist problem in the Dominican Republic.

GC

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

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### 130. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, September 3, 1965, 2027Z.

616. Ref: Embtel 541.<sup>2</sup> Following is copy of memorandum of understanding on handling Communist problem as agreed on with Garcia Godoy this morning:

*Begin Text*

1. The Provisional Government will be anti-Communist and will associate itself with the OAS and the US Government in opposing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65-9/65. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 541 from Santo Domingo, August 27, Bunker informed the Department that he and Garcia Godoy met on the evening of August 26 to "further discuss the handling of the Communist problem" and to review a draft of the memorandum of understanding which Godoy subsequently agreed to. (Ibid.)

communism on the basis of that doctrine's incompatibility with representative democracy. The provisional government will exercise all powers and resources at its disposal to check the growth and eliminate the influence of communism and Castro-communism in the Dominican Republic. On taking office, the Provisional President will provide instructions to the Minister of the Interior and the Director of the National Department of Investigations regarding the general policy to be followed in dealing with the Communist problem.

These instructions will follow consultation with the Ambassador of the US.

2. The Provisional President will take all appropriate action to protect his government, the Dominican nation, and friendly foreign governments from Communist and Castro-Communist subversion. In the event of a real and present danger from Communist subversive activities which cannot be coped with by existing law, he will invoke emergency powers under the Institutional Act. (Articles 2 and 48.) If necessary, he will order the internment of dangerous Communists and Castroites.

3. No Communists, Castroites or Castro-Communist sympathizers will hold critical positions in the Provisional Government. If there is doubt with regard to a particular individual being considered for an important post, information will be supplied confidentially on the basis of which the Provisional President can make his determination. Individuals who are known to be present members of the PCD of the MPD will not be accepted into government service in any capacity during the term of office of the Provisional Government. Some flexibility is indicated with respect to the APCJ in view of the fact that certain non-Communist followers (as opposed to the leadership) are anxious to break their ties to the movement, and should be encouraged in this regard. Information regarding members of those parties presently in government will be made available to the Provisional President. He will take whatever action may be possible to remove them from the government service.

4. The National Department of Investigations will be given the responsibility for organizing and coordinating all anti-subversive intelligence and operational activities. The best available man will be chosen to head the department after appropriate consultations with representatives of the US Government, as will other key officials of the organization. Appointments to the department will be made on the sole basis of merit. In order to deal effectively with the Communist problem, the department will require the close cooperation of the Minister of Interior and Police. It is agreed that the man to head that Ministry must be anti-Communist by conviction.

5. The US Government will provide appropriate assistance to the Provisional Government in dealing with Castro-Communist subversion. The form and extent of this assistance will be the subject of con-

sultations between the Provisional President and the Ambassador of the United States or his designated representative.

6. The National Department of Investigations will ensure that Communists, Castroites and Castro-Communist sympathizers of Dominican nationality are kept under close observation. Those found breaking the law will immediately be arrested and [brought to] trial. The Provisional Government will take necessary steps to send out of the country all Communists, Castroites and Castro-Communist sympathizers of foreign nationality.

7. The Provisional President will be furnished a list of Dominican Communists and Castroites who have entered the country illegally after receiving training in Communist countries. The Provisional President will take appropriate action to submit these individuals to legal process and trial in accordance with Articles 153, 154, and 155 of the penal code which apply to the use of false or altered identification documents, or Article 439 of the code dealing with the destruction of official documents, including passports.

8. On taking office, the Provisional President will issue a decree-law providing heavy penalties for the illegal possession of weapons. Assistance in drafting the law will be furnished if so desired. First priority in enforcing the law will be given to apprehending Communists and other subversives who may possess unregistered weapons.

9. Within thirty days of taking office, the Provisional President will issue a decree-law implementing Article 27 or the Institutional Act with the purpose of setting up procedures for identifying political parties which are not eligible to participate in the elections because they are organized on the basis of doctrines or goals not in accordance with the principles of representative democracy, and with the purpose also of regulating and controlling the activities of parties so identified. The Provisional President and the Ambassador of the United States will consult on the scope and form of this law. Suggested language will be provided if so desired.

10. On taking office, the Provisional President will issue a decree-law creating a "Council of Information" to deal with abuses of freedom of speech and the press. The council will be charged with formulating a code of conduct for the press and radio consistent with Articles 30 and 31 of the Institutional Act. The council will also report to the Provisional Government on the advisability of promulgating laws designed to prevent use of the radio and the press for slander and incitement to subversion.

11. The Provisional President and the Ambassador of the United States will periodically review the terms of this memorandum. Changes, modifications or additions will be in accordance with these consultations. *End Text.*

With respect para. 1 of memorandum, Garcia Godoy prefers provide oral directives to Minister of Interior and Director NDI, due his experience that anything in writing in this country has a way of becoming public in short order. He states he has full confidence that Castillo is anti-Communist by conviction and will serve reliably and effectively as Minister of Interior. NDI Director not yet chosen, with selection subject of consultation [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Re para 3: Department will note some flexibility is provided for in case APCJ. This is in line Garcia Godoy's interest in enlarging political center and providing alternatives for all non-Communist followers APCJ (Embtel 461).<sup>3</sup> He agrees Castro-Communist leadership of APCJ now complete. He, however, cites cases of individuals who have been active in APCJ, but who are anxious to break away and have asked his help by way of jobs abroad or some other means. He would like to assist such individuals to make the break and we believe this in both Dominican and our interest.

Re para 7: Garcia Godoy continues have reservations about reaching back to arrest former deportees who returned to DomRep illegally. He argues number involved is small and he would be accused of political persecution, a charge which would affect unfavorably his broader effort against Communists. He agrees to necessity of keeping these and other Communists under close observation and to intern them in event of clear and present danger (para 2). We have recalled to him Bosch's consideration of Beata Island as secure internment site. He says he is prepared detain Communists and Castroites who enter country illegally from now on.

Re para 9: Garcia Godoy indicated his understanding that law in effect prior to April 24 outlawing three Communist parties will still be in effect. However, he is prepared issue decree law in line that discussed para 10 Embtel 461. He would be glad to have suggestions on this.

Re para 10: Garcia Godoy now believes Council of Information should be primarily keyed to radio industry. He said editors of three principal newspapers had agreed to self-regulation (he hopes they will honor promise), but are opposed to joint press radio council. He believes now it would be better to handle the two media separately.

Throughout these conversations and consideration of memorandum, Garcia Godoy has shown sound, realistic attitude on control of communism. He has indicated full awareness of problem and readiness to act on it, at same time coupling controls with efforts to save those frustrated youth who are salvageable. We are convinced he will exert his best efforts in this vital field of security.

**Bennett**

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<sup>3</sup> Document 125.

**131. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 7, 1965, 6:45 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Report on Dominican Republic

Garcia Godoy weathered a flurry of problems over the weekend and in general continued the painfully slow process of consolidating his position. Progress was more in evidence on the international front than at home. Fifteen countries have recognized the Provisional Government. This includes eleven OAS members including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela (we have unconfirmed press reports that Chile has recognized) and four non-OAS states, including France.

On the domestic front, implementation of the Act of Reconciliation is moving very slowly. The rebels have dismantled some of their defenses, but the collection of arms has not started in earnest. The regular military continue to regard Garcia Godoy with doubt and uncertainty. Among the problems bothering the military are: (1) the premature issuance of a decree, without prior consultation, subordinating Wessin's force to the Army, (2) the failure to confirm the chiefs in their positions and to appoint a Minister of the Armed Forces, (3) the appointment of persons sympathetic to the rebel cause, particularly the manager of Radio Santo Domingo (RSD).

Over the weekend Garcia Godoy moved to allay the fears of the military. He removed the RSD manager (although he transferred him to his own press office). He met with 100 top officers to explain his policies, including his anti-communist posture, and received the endorsement of the chiefs. He went to see Wessin with Bunker to appeal to him on patriotic terms to leave the country, but not to threaten him. When the Dominican radio stations engaged in inflammatory broadcasts threatening to provoke public disorder, he ordered that they suspend operations and obtained prompt compliance.

The most immediate problem is how to get Wessin to leave the country. Wessin was not swayed by Garcia Godoy's appeal to his patriotism. Bunker's suggestions did not seem to move him. Bunker has counselled Garcia Godoy to wait a few days until he confirms the chiefs and Armed Forces Minister Rivera Caminero in their positions before taking up the issue again with Rivera Caminero.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65-9/65. Secret. The memorandum indicates the President saw it.



I believe you are aware of the Jules Dubois story published yesterday that the Embassy tried to bribe Wessin to leave the country. Contacts made by Embassy personnel with Wessin during the past two weeks were of such a nature as to make it inadvisable to issue a flat denial of the story. The State–White House press line is one of *no comment* if questions are asked.

McG. B.

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**132. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence  
Raborn to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1965.

The United States Government has undertaken responsibility for vetting personnel appointed by Hector Garcia Godoy, Provisional President of the Dominican Republic, in order to assist Garcia Godoy in preventing the appointment of Communists and extreme leftists to responsible positions in the Provisional Government. This United States function is spelled out in a secret “Memorandum of Understanding of Handling the Communist Problem” which was agreed to by Garcia Godoy during a meeting with Ambassador Bennett on 3 September 1965. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum reads as follows:

[Omitted here is paragraph 3 of Document 130.]

On the instruction of Ambassadors Bennett and Bunker, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has been in contact with Garcia Godoy for the past two months to make arrangements for this screening process. Garcia Godoy has made a total of 31 appointments to date; of these 18 were not submitted to us in advance. Of the 13 candidates whose names were submitted by Garcia Godoy and screened [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], five had been appointed in spite of the fact that derogatory information on them had been given to Garcia Godoy and Ambassador Bennett [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. One case of particular importance is that of Manuel Ramona Morel Corda, who was appointed to the critical post of Attorney General. Basic biographic data on the five appointees on whom there is derogatory information are included in the attachment to this memo-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 303. Secret. Prepared on September 7. Copies were sent to McNamara, Bundy, and Mann.

random together with the names of the other eight appointees who were vetted.<sup>2</sup>

It should be noted that Garcia Godoy has had to act quickly in making these appointments. He has been under tremendous pressure to accommodate both sides, particularly the Rebels, and this is undoubtedly one of the reasons why he has appointed several undesirables from the Rebel side. In addition, there may be some genuine misunderstanding as to the definition of an "important post." However, a continuation of this practice could bring into the upper and middle echelons of the Provisional Government a number of persons inimical to the best interests of the United States.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will continue to screen Garcia Godoy's appointees and to make information and recommendations available to Garcia Godoy and to Ambassador Bennett. Should there be a difference of opinion between Garcia Godoy and the U. S. Government regarding the acceptance of these recommendations, it is recommended that they be received and enforced by diplomatic representations in accordance with the criteria set forth in the secret Memorandum quoted in paragraph 1 above.

W. F. Raborn<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Raborn signed the original.

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### 133. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1965, 10 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting Called by McGeorge Bundy on 16 September 1965 at 10:00 A.M. to Discuss the Dominican Republic Situation

#### PRESENT

*White House*

Chaired by McGeorge Bundy

Mr. William Bowdler

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80-R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 303. Secret. Drafted by Broe on September 17.

*State*

Ambassador Bunker

Mr. Robert Sayre

*FBI*

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover

*AID*

Messrs. Bell, Engle and Lauren Goin<sup>2</sup>

*CIA*

Messrs. FitzGerald and Broe

1. Mr. Bundy opened the meeting stating that the two subjects for discussion were (1) the vetting of proposed members of the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic and (2) a report of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] AID team which recently traveled to the Dominican Republic.

2. Mr. [*name not declassified*] was requested to report on the team's findings. He began reviewing the United States program to assist the Dominicans to combat and control subversion and insurgency that had been agreed upon at the last meeting,<sup>3</sup> [*9 lines of source text not declassified*].

3. In regard to the DNI it was explained that it was not possible to persuade Garcia Godoy from reconstituting the DNI as he strongly desired to have such an organization and, in addition, the agreement reached between Garcia Godoy and Ambassador Bunker was for the most part based on having this specific organization. The Country Team had approved the planned development of the DNI. [*1 line of source text not declassified*] no complete action could be taken until a Chief of the DNI was appointed. Garcia Godoy had advised [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that his choice was Enrique Rafael Valdez Vidaurre, Chief of Staff of the Navy. [*3 lines of source text not declassified*]

4. [*4 lines of source text not declassified*] It was pointed out that although the Country Team had approved the overall AID [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] approach to the National Police it had taken exception to the establishment of a mobile group. The objection to the mobile group was twofold: (a) United States military were basically against placing a unit they firmly believed performed a military function in the police and (b) the general consensus was that due to the current sensitivity of the Dominican military aggravated by the Wessin y Wessin affair it would be impolitic to request Garcia Godoy to place in the police a function that the Dominican military considered a military function. This would appear to them as additional den-

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<sup>2</sup> Lauren J. Goin, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Public Safety.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 129. The [*text not declassified*] AID team departed for Santo Domingo on September 8.

igration. It was explained that a compromise plan had been proposed to use the personnel of a 300-man Air Force paratroop unit which had been trained by the United States Special Forces building into it a channel for [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] National Police intelligence input by the participation of some police with the unit. The Country Team has been discussing this proposal and a report was expected momentarily.

5. [*6 lines of source text not declassified*]

6. While the meeting was in progress two Country Team reports arrived. One giving final approval to the whole program except the mobile force and the second discussing the Country Team's approach to counterinsurgency, i.e., the first line of defense lies with the police and military garrisons and when they cannot cope and a military situation arises the "Mella" Battalion would be used. The second message was discussed and not found satisfactory. It was decided efforts should go forward to insure a fast reacting force in the pre-military phase of the counterinsurgency situation in the Dominican Republic.<sup>4</sup>

7. Mr. Bundy then introduced the subject of vetting. Ambassador Bunker described his discussions with Garcia Godoy re vetting and pointed out the variety of difficulties surrounding this subject. Mr. Bundy raised the question as to the soundness of the information furnished Garcia Godoy pointing out that the Dominican Republic was a small community and character assassination prominent. He requested Mr. FitzGerald's views concerning the information that can be furnished. Mr. FitzGerald reviewed the criteria the Agency had prepared (copy attached) and stated in category A (active membership) information would be hard but in the other gradations of involvement of leftist activity it would be more difficult to have hard information. Mr. FitzGerald discussed the Agency's concern as to the trend of the Garcia Godoy appointments pointing out that the pattern in the Judiciary is extremely worrisome.

8. The subject of criteria was discussed at length. Mr. Bundy agreed there should be a set of criteria, not for Garcia Godoy, but as a guide for the United States team in the Dominican Republic to assist them in their efforts with Garcia Godoy. Mr. Bundy asked that a set of criteria be established by CIA in conjunction with State and FBI. Mr. Broe was asked to have such a list drawn up and coordinated with State and FBI.

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<sup>4</sup> Neither one of these reports was attached; however, a "Summary Report of the AID [*text not declassified*] Study Team," September 15, 1965, lists the team's recommendations including an overall expansion of the public safety program, improved police service prior to the Presidential elections, and the establishment of a quick reacting counterinsurgency group within the police force. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65-9/65)

9. Mr. Hoover expressed his concern regarding the leftist elements being accepted by Garcia Godoy especially the appointment of three cabinet members with questionable background. He also stated that he had had his people contact Wessin y Wessin in Florida. He read a report concerning this contact.<sup>5</sup> (The only information not already surfaced concerning Wessin y Wessin was fact that he was planning to move to Puerto Rico and establish himself in San Juan.) He also stated he had another report of Juan Bosch returning to the Dominican Republic, this time on September 25.

10. Ambassador Bunker queried whether it would not be wise to prevent Wessin y Wessin from settling in San Juan. Mr. Sayre suggested that steps be taken to keep all such type individuals out of San Juan. Mr. Bundy was of the opinion this was not feasible.

11. Mr. Bundy spoke to Ambassador Bunker stressing the fact that it was most important that the Communists do not gain a prominent position in the government. He stated he would be looking forward to the Ambassador's return from the Dominican Republic (he leaving that P.M.) next week for his views concerning what is being done to keep communists out of the government and suggestions as to other steps that might be taken.

12. Mr. Bundy commented on (a) the importance of not allowing the three major communist elements to coalesce and join forces and (b) his concern regarding the situation in the University in Santo Domingo.

**William V. Broe<sup>6</sup>**

*Chief*

*Western Hemisphere Division*

### **Attachment<sup>7</sup>**

#### **CRITERIA**

##### *Degree*

A. Membership in either the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD), the Partido Comunista Dominicano (PCD), or the Agrupacion Politica Catorce del Julio (APCJ) [current membership in latter]<sup>8</sup> will serve as a bar to governmental employment in all levels of the government.

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<sup>5</sup> Not attached and not further identified.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Broe signed the original.

<sup>7</sup> Secret.

<sup>8</sup> Brackets in the source text.

B. A significant range of Communist affiliation and association (including family ties) but no known membership will serve as a bar at all levels of sensitive ministries, i.e., Defense, Interior, Justice, Propaganda, Education, and the Judiciary, but may be permitted in limited quantity in non-sensitive ministries.

C. Where there are some reports of limited reliability of Communist associations and/or attachments balanced on whole or in part by favorable reporting, individuals would be barred only from the top echelon of sensitive ministries.

It should be clearly understood that as we get government employees beyond the second level in ministries, there will be less likelihood that our files will contain traces.

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#### 134. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, September 26, 1965, 0219Z.

826. Joint State–Defense message. We have had several conversations with Garcia Godoy today on military problem. He invited Allen<sup>2</sup> and me separately this morning and we went together to his house this afternoon accompanied by Connett. There have been other exchanges by telephone.

Garcia Godoy told us again this morning he considered resolution of arms collection and reintegration downtown area as his fundamental problem—until that resolved nothing else can go forward. Arrival of Bosch has given matter even more urgency than before,<sup>3</sup> since he wants to stay ahead of Bosch's maneuvering which he is convinced will go on unceasingly and to deny Bosch "refuge" of downtown section from which to operate. He considers Bosch's presence can easily contribute to the perpetuation of separate zone downtown. When I pointed out that we had feeling not much had been done to prevent

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XI, 9/65–10/65. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, and CINCLANT on September 27.

<sup>2</sup> C. Allen Stewart, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Juan Bosch, in exile in Puerto Rico, arrived in Santo Domingo on September 25. The Embassy's account of his arrival is in telegram 820 from Santo Domingo, September 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 DOM REP)

Bosch's return at this time despite Bunker's and my urgings, he admitted Bosch's return inopportune but said he had no real way of stopping him, particularly in view provisions institutional act and his public position which is very much his personal philosophy that no Dominican should be barred from return to his country except in few extreme cases.

He expressed conviction that there will shortly be set in motion nationwide demand for action to be taken re military. He said he would prefer to stay ahead of this anticipated wave of public feeling rather than be forced by it. From practical point of view he made it clear he is convinced that arms collection and reintegration of rebel military will not be achieved as long as Rivera Caminero is Armed Forces Minister due unacceptability of latter to rebel leadership.

He therefore had in mind "package deal" to be announced in TV address this evening which would involve announcement of replacement of Rivera Caminero by Colonel Juan Esteban Perez Guillen, orders to Caamano to reintegrate rebel military officers tomorrow in accordance with formula to cover several categories involved; arms would also be turned in immediately and way would thus be opened for reestablishment normal police authority over downtown area.

I told him we all shared his view that reestablishment of control over downtown was essential. We also agreed on desirability of military changes. However I told him emphatically that timing gave us great concern. We had backed him and assisted in removal of Wessin, not without some embarrassment to USG. Wessin's removal while agreed on as a necessary step, had further unsettled military whose morale already low. Following conversation with him, word had been passed to military by Bunker of his understanding that President planned no further changes in leadership just now. Only this morning Rivera Caminero had met with other chiefs and large group of officers at San Isidro to quiet military concern by stressing leaders' full support for PG and intention to make every effort to see it through to elections. On both above accounts, abrupt change of Rivera now would be regarded throughout military as sell-out.

I question timing on additional ground involving Juan Bosch's return yesterday. Bosch had made a violent speech demanding removal of 8 to 10 top officers of armed forces. If Bosch's demagogic demand were followed on very next day by removal of Minister of Armed Forces, this would be regarded in US as simple cave-in to Bosch's demand and would in my opinion merely stimulate further demands from Caamano side.

Further, and perhaps most important as regards effective settlement, this seemed to us an arrangement without any enforcement provisions as regards Caamano's side of bargain. Caamano had made

many promises and was already in substantial default on carrying out provisions of Act of Reconciliation. To make public sacrifice Minister Armed Forces in loose agreement which could not be enforced seemed to me to be a step which had considerable danger (in terms of effect on local and international opinion and on possible reaction armed forces) without any real assurance of obtaining objectives sought.

I went on to stress that my government, while sympathetic to his very difficult problems, was nonetheless concerned over some of trends developing. I mentioned again Washington concern over changes in the sugar industry for example. There had been little balancing action to numerous appointments made as result of pressures from constitutionalist side in both military and civilian posts. He acknowledged that he was unhappy about number of appointments but insisted the situation could be rectified once he had turned corner by dismantling rebel zone and establishing his authority therein. He continued express view that removal of Rivera Caminero was necessary to this end.

In afternoon meeting we argued that if he were determined to remove Rivera Caminero we must urge strongly that it be preceded by some fulfillment of obligations on constitutionalist side. We recommended specifically that Rivera Caminero's removal be made contingent upon completion of arms collection process, reintegration of constitutionalist military into armed forces, and establishment of provisional government's authority over rebel zone. A phased operation was discussed, with idea of achieving it in two or three days time. Caamano could be given assurance in advance that change would be made when operation completed and Rivera Caminero's cooperation to program might even be obtained. President prepared to assign Rivera to post in Washington in line latter's desire.

Garcia Godoy seemed to give considerable weight to our argument although still obsessed with his downtown problem.

On learning later in afternoon of Bunker's planned return, Allen and I telephoned him separately to urge that no action be taken to put plan in action until there were chance for discussion with Bunker. He said he had already talked with Perez Guillen and Caamano but had made no definitive agreements. We have learned later [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that Perez Guillen told Army Chief of Staff that he had been called to President who had discussed with him ways to dispose of rebel military problem. Perez told Martinez Arana he had not been offered any post. Rumors have circulated downtown this afternoon, presumably through Caamano, of Rivera Caminero's ouster. However, we believe we have pulled Garcia Godoy back for moment and there will be opportunity for further discussion.

**Bennett**



**135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 29, 1965, 5:39 p.m.

431. For Bunker. We share your view<sup>2</sup>—also repeatedly expressed by Garcia Godoy—that most pressing problem confronting PG is re-opening of downtown and that the longer this is delayed, the greater the erosion in public support for and authority of PG.

What we do not see clearly is how he plans to achieve this objective. He moved resolutely against Wessin but he has not acted with same determination in arms collection and reintegration of rebel zone. In our judgment further concessions to the rebels at expense of military will not do the trick without upsetting delicate balance of forces essential to his maintaining moderate, middle-of-the-road position. If he looks upon prior reintegration of rebel military into regular units as key to dismantling of downtown area, we think he is following mistaken course. Probably most of rebel enlisted men, non-coms and junior officers could be put back into their units without major difficulties. But trying to reintegrate 20–25 key officers into their regular units is a most difficult, if not impossible, enterprise given deep-seated animosity which exists between two camps at this level. We wonder whether with respect to key officer groups some quick solution might not be found which will permit prompt reopening of downtown area. It would be preferable, of course, to give these officers foreign duty or training assignments, both for their own security and to get them out of country until passions cool. If they want training maybe we could help. If they are unwilling to accept such assignments, would it be possible to place them in some appropriate installation outside rebel zone or disperse them individually in garrisons around country, with personal security guaranteed, until Garcia Godoy can work out with each officer and military services appropriate assignment? Request that you explore this matter thoroughly with Garcia Godoy in effort break impasse on dismantling rebel zone.

Another matter which is of deep concern to us is failure of Garcia Godoy to strike more of balance between right and left. Image which he is projecting is one of greater and greater concessions to rebels at expense of moderate and conservative elements. If he is to maintain his authority throughout country, it seems to us that he must move

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by C. Allen Stewart, cleared by Bundy, and approved by Sayre.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 134.

with equal energy against both extremes when they get out of line. In failing to act decisively (as he did in Wessin case) against strong-arm methods of extremists at government offices, business enterprises and university, he is running serious risk of undermining public confidence in his impartiality and ability to steer middle course against pressures from both extremes. Request that you discuss this matter again with Garcia Godoy and stress importance of his redressing balance both from domestic and international standpoint.

We understand his desire to bring about basic changes in military establishment as rapidly as possible. We think it would be serious mistake, however, to take any further action along this line until situation downtown resolved. Once this is accomplished, we believe political and economic picture will be substantially improved and his hand strengthened to take further steps in dealing with military problem. Request you also convey foregoing to him, pointing out that he can count on our support in his subsequent efforts to reorganize military establishment.

We will be interested in what you bring back on these points when you return Friday.<sup>3</sup>

**Ball**

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<sup>3</sup> October 1. Bunker was scheduled to meet with President Johnson at the White House on Wednesday, September 29. (Memorandum from Bowdler to Bundy, September 28; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XI, 9/65–10/65) Bunker, however, remained in Santo Domingo to monitor the situation.

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### 136. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

OCI No. 2328/65

Washington, September 29, 1965.

#### THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY—A BALANCE SHEET

A. Garcia Godoy's actions as Provisional President have roused the expectations of the left in the Dominican Republic and created bitter resentments among the military and moderate political elements. During his first weeks in office he has continually made concessions

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XI, 9/65–10/65. Secret; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA.

to the rebel camp—concessions that have been seen by the military chiefs as threatening to their position and by the moderates as insuring institutional advantages which would bring about an election victory for the left.

B. Garcia Godoy has made no progress on re-integration of the rebel zone and little on arms collection. He apparently feels he must go “softly” with the rebels on these issues so as to be able to solve them without resort to force. As time passes, however, the rebels have felt encouraged to depict themselves as the victors in the civil war and to make increasing demands on Garcia Godoy at the expense of their opponents.

C. In these circumstances the outlook for political stability will change rapidly when IAPF leaves the country. Departure of the IAPF is already becoming a heady political issue. Garcia Godoy is suspicious and distrustful of the military and unwilling to become dependent on them for fear of seriously compromising his political future. This leaves him no alternative but to solicit voluntary cooperation from the left, an almost hopeless task, and the formulation of policies calculated to develop popular support.

D. Unless the provisional regime makes an effective effort to resolve the bitter enmity existing between the contending factions, longer term political stability is unlikely. Neither side is presently reconciled to accept the results of elections if the other wins and both are bent on insuring that the “suspended revolution” reaches a conclusion.

[Omitted here are sections entitled: “Introduction,” “Garcia Godoy as President,” “Garcia Godoy’s Motives and Tactics,” “Concessions to the Rebels,” “Appointments,” “Opposition,” and “Insurgency.”]

### *Outlook*

16. The outlook for political stability will change drastically when the IAPF leaves the Dominican Republic. This provisional government will be under increasing domestic pressure to effect the IAPF’s departure in the next few months. In the meantime, the extreme left can be counted on to create incidents to embarrass the provisional government over the IAPF presence. Even moderate politicians will use the presence of the IAPF as a campaign issue. The demonstrations of 27 September over IAPF occupation of school buildings were the first of such incidents. Bosch has already indicated that the IAPF presence will be a major campaign issue and has called for strikes to bring about its withdrawal. Even relatively conservative Joaquin Balaguer has said the continued IAPF presence offends national “sovereignty.”

17. If the provisional government were to ask for the IAPF’s removal it would be difficult for Latin American nations in the OAS, many of them still sensitive over the US intervention, to fail to comply. Garcia Godoy might exploit such a request in order to win popu-

lar backing. He has already displayed a sensitivity over the OAS resolution calling for joint OAS-provisional government determination of the date of IAPF withdrawals. He has said that domestic politics demand a statement that the provisional government would prefer to make the decision on withdrawal. In a recent interview with a Mexican magazine, Garcia Godoy reportedly said that he hopes the IAPF will leave "soon" and that the election campaign should be conducted without the presence of foreign troops.

18. Until some decision is reached on the IAPF, the paramount problem relating to security and stability will be the conduct of the provisional government. The present trend is toward further concessions to the rebels. Garcia Godoy clearly is reluctant to resort to any action that might entail use of force. He is suspicious and distrustful of the military and unwilling to become dependent on them for fear of seriously compromising his political future. This leaves him no alternative but to solicit voluntary cooperation from the left, an almost hopeless task, and the formulation of policies calculated to develop popular support.

19. Unless the provisional regime makes an effective effort to resolve the bitter enmity existing between the contending factions, longer term political stability is unlikely. Neither side is presently reconciled to accept the results of elections if the other wins and both are bent on insuring that the "suspended revolution" reaches a conclusion.

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**137. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 6, 1965, 9:50 a.m.

RE

Dominican Republic Peace Corps Programs

I know you have been cautious on this, but I believe myself it is now time to act. The Peace Corps is popular in Santo Domingo, and if it behaves with proper discipline, it can be a very useful balance to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XI, 9/65-10/65. No classification marking. Bundy sent this memorandum under cover of an October 6 memorandum to Moyers with the following comments: "The attached memorandum and the President's comment give you one more job. I have told Mankiewicz to go ahead and to keep in touch with you on all aspects of what he does, especially any public announcement. Having been through this once before, he is fully alert to the need for discretion among P[eace] C[orps] V[olunteer]s in the DR."

more hardheaded activities which clearly will be necessary as we go ahead. Bunker is for it, and so are Mann and Vaughn.

I have talked to Mankiewicz,<sup>2</sup> who is the Peace Corps expert here in Washington, and I find him smart and good on the political problems involved. I have his assurance that he will make a special effort himself to insure that volunteers understand the sensitive nature of their work. After all, it is quite simple: if they start criticizing U.S. policy down there, they will simply shut down the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic and give the whole operation a bad black eye.

The programs involved would include about 210 people divided in 4 categories—

rural elementary school teachers—50

Public health volunteers—50

Community development organizers and technicians—80

town administration technicians—30

Can we go ahead?

Yes<sup>3</sup>

No

Speak to me

McG. B.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Frank F. Mankiewicz, Peace Corps Regional Director for Latin America.

<sup>3</sup> The President checked this option and wrote: "Subject to Bill M[oye]'s supervision."

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### 138. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, October 14, 1965.

#### PARTICIPANTS

President Hector Garcia Godoy

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker

Harry W. Shlaudeman, ARA/CAR

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman. The meeting was held in the National Palace.

Ambassador Bunker called on President Garcia Godoy to pay his respects before leaving and to discuss the following matters of interest:

(1) Ambassador Bunker suggested that the time has now come for the Provisional Government "to redress the balance." The impression is widespread both in the Dominican Republic and abroad that the Constitutionals and their extremist allies have had all the best of it since the installation of the new government. Concessions to the rebels were obviously necessary as long as their zone remained intact but, with that problem now resolved, it should be possible for Garcia Godoy to make it clear that his administration will be impartial and free of extremist influence. Ambassador Bunker pointed out that the Provisional Government's unfavorable image resulted in large part from a few specific situations: i.e., the appointment of Morel Cerda as Attorney General, the presence of Franklyn Dominguez in a key position in the National Palace, the strong MPD influence in the immigration service at the airport, and the extremist, pro-rebel line being followed by the government-owned *Radio Santo Domingo* and *La Nacion*.

(2) President Garcia Godoy said he was fully aware of the doubts raised by certain of his appointments and by other concessions he had made to the Constitutionals. However, he strongly believed that his conciliatory strategy and the moves resulting from it had been absolutely correct. For example, the appointment of Domingo de la Mota as Director of Sports was open to justifiable criticism on political grounds but de la Mota took 300 men with him out of the rebel zone and kept them out. Similarly, the new governor of Puerto Plata—a Constitutionalist—persuaded two commandos of men from his region to leave and return home. Garcia Godoy said he gave people in this category jobs only to help restore peace and that some of those involved were aware of his purpose and expected to be replaced in time.

(3) Regarding the specific situations mentioned by Ambassador Bunker, Garcia Godoy said he intended to handle the airport immigration situation by undertaking a complete reorganization of services at the airport. *Radio Santo Domingo* presently infested by several hundred undesirable and/or useless employees would also be reorganized. The government would shut down *La Nacion*, putting its presses to work printing low-priced school textbooks. Garcia Godoy also stated that he planned to move Dominguez out of his present sensitive position in the Palace.

(4) Ambassador Bunker suggested as a further step in the effort to improve the government's image that Garcia Godoy take advantage of the reunification of Santo Domingo to issue a strong public statement calling for maintenance of law and order throughout the country. Garcia Godoy said he was planning to make a speech within the

next few days in which he would stress this aspect of the situation. Ambassador Bunker also suggested that it would be desirable for the government to reassure the country regarding its intention to hold elections on schedule. Garcia Godoy agreed and said he intended in the near future to call in all the political leaders for consultations on the composition of the Central Electoral Board and other questions relating to the elections.

(5) Ambassador Bunker expressed the opinion that Garcia Godoy should pay careful attention to the problem of his relations with the military high command. Maintaining good communications with Rivera Caminero and the chiefs should be a matter of principal concern to the President. Ambassador Bunker thought relations had improved in that quarter recently and urged Garcia Godoy to make every effort to keep them good.

(6) Garcia Godoy, returning to the problem of his government's image, said he hoped the doubts raised by his handling of the Constitutionals would not prevent the United States from providing the generous assistance his government so badly needs. It was his impression that the amount of aid required had been seriously underestimated. Imbert's regime issues \$19–20 million of checks covering payroll and other expenses in July and August for which funds were not available. The Provisional Government was forced to come up with this money. Now, additional assistance over and above the \$20 million grant would be needed.

(7) Ambassador Bunker replied that he had not been aware of the large shortfall left by the Imbert regime. He said we realized more assistance would be needed and were prepared to treat the Provisional Government's requests sympathetically. Ambassador Bunker reminded Garcia Godoy of the Provisional Government's commitment to provide \$10 million to the recovery program from its own resources. He emphasized the importance of meeting this obligation. He also asked that Foreign Minister-designate Rodriguez be informed of the facts regarding United States assistance. Rodriguez recently approached officers of our United Nations Mission with the complaint that the United States had given "nothing."

Mr. Shlaudeman expressed the hope that the Provisional Government would make every effort to furnish balance of payment, budgetary and other financial data requested by the Embassy, AID and the OAS. Comprehensive information would help speed consideration of requests for additional assistance.

**139. Central Intelligence Agency Special Memorandum<sup>1</sup>**

No. 24-65

Washington, October 27, 1965.

**SUBJECT**

Some Perspectives on the Dominican Problem

**SUMMARY**

The Dominican Republic is in a state of suspended revolution, and the provisional government headed by Garcia Godoy has the task, in effect, of reconciling irreconcilables. If he seems to be favoring the rebel cause, he risks intervention by the armed forces; if he leans to the other side, he risks new outbursts of rebel violence. The underlying political trend in the D.R. is to the left, which enhances the prospects of a left-of-center candidate, if elections are held as planned. If such a candidate won, his government would probably be anti-US and Communist-influenced. The military would likely seize power to keep out this kind of regime, but a military take-over would cause sizeable elements of the left to turn to systematic terrorism and guerrilla activity.

[Omitted here are sections entitled "Background," "Political Tendencies," and "Tribulations of the Provisional Government."]

*What Might Come Out of Elections*

12. It is, of course, too early to make any very specific election predictions. Indeed, the elections may not be held on schedule at all. If they are held, it is not yet clear who the candidates would be or what party combinations may be worked out. Although there may be a candidate or two of the extreme right (for instance, the exiled General Wessin y Wessin has been talking about throwing his hat in the ring), most rightist backing will probably be for Balaguer, running on the ticket of his Reformist Party as a center-conservative candidate. Similarly, although one of the Communist parties may produce a nominee of its own, most leftist backing will probably go to the candidate of Bosch's PRD party. It might be Bosch himself, Caamaño, leader of the revolution, or perhaps a party figure not so well known.

13. Some observers believe that Balaguer would win such a contest over any man the PRD could put up. They argue that much of Bosch's old magic is gone—particularly because of his failure to return to the D.R. while the fighting was going on. They dismiss Caamaño as not politically shrewd enough. They note that Balaguer still has

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XII, 10/65-11/65. Secret.



much prestige and is widely respected, and predict that many Dominicans will vote for him as the man who might bring back order and tranquillity.

14. These are all points of some merit. But there are some broader considerations certain to have impact. We think, for example, that the expansion in size of the electorate—those who have politically awakened during the past few years and the large additional number of young people now qualified to vote—will strongly favor the left. We believe that many will vote for the “candidate of the revolution” because they see this movement as their only hope for rapid improvement in their depressed living conditions. The insistence by the PRD party and the leaders of the revolution of their determination to reinstate the Bosch constitution of 1963, with its provisions for agricultural reform and various other measures to improve the lot of the masses, provides a powerful initial issue for the campaign. Nationalistic resentment against the US intervention is also likely to favor the parties of the left. On balance, we think the candidate of the left will be in the stronger vote-getting position.

15. If such a candidate won the election, his government would probably be anti-US and Communist-influenced. The Dominican military leaders would be likely to seize power to prevent the installation of such a government. Indeed, if the election of a leftist candidate seemed likely, the military would probably intervene before voting took place.

16. In the event of a military takeover, or even if Balaguer or someone like him won the presidency, sizeable elements of the left (and not only the Communists) would probably turn to systematic terrorism and guerrilla activity. Although the military might be able to cope with this development initially, their repressive actions would tend to antagonize the people and to lead eventually to another round of revolution.

For the Board of National Estimates:  
**Sherman Kent**  
*Chairman*

## 140. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 3, 1965, 9:30 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting Called by McGeorge Bundy on 3 November 1965 at 9:30 A.M. to Discuss the Dominican Republic Situation

### PRESENT

#### *White House*

Chaired by: McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. William Bowdler

#### *State*

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker  
Under Secretary Thomas C. Mann  
Assistant Secretary Jack H. Vaughn  
C. Allan Stewart, Director, Caribbean Affairs  
Mr. David Bronheim, Counsel to the U.S. Coordinator  
Assistant Secretary Anthony M. Solomon

#### *Defense*

Deputy Assistant Cyrus R. Vance

#### *AID*

Mr. William S. Gaud

#### *CIA*

Director of Central Intelligence  
Chief, WH Division

1. Ambassador Bunker reviewed the situation in Santo Domingo during the period from the night of 22 October to the present. His review covered the activities of Garcia-Godoy, the OAS Committee and the military which had been reported in detail by Embassy and Agency reporting. Items of interest that had not come out clearly in the previous reporting were as follows:

a. Ambassador Bunker is of the opinion that the military (CEFA, the Air Force and specifically the Chief of Staff, General Jacinto Martinez Arana) had a connection with the clandestine radio that attacked Garcia-Godoy on the night of 22 October.

b. Garcia-Godoy had requested the use of the IAPF to support him against the military chiefs and Ambassador Bunker had refused.

c. Commodore Emilio Jimenez exhibits the most sense of all military chiefs and was mainly responsible for keeping the military chiefs within bounds.

d. Garcia-Godoy especially distrusts the Chief of Staff, Arana as he claims Arana has lied to him on more than one occasion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 78-3805, Box 1, Folder 29, Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted by Broe on November 8.

2. Ambassador Bunker believes that Garcia-Godoy will carry through with the “package deal”<sup>2</sup> i.e., removal of the military chiefs, the moving out of Colonel Caamano, Manuel Montes Arache, Hector Lachapelle, Hector Aristy and Franklin Dominguez, removal of the Attorney General Morel Cerda and Judge Abelardo Vicioso and the closing of Radio Santo Domingo. The Ambassador stated the timing is the significant problem. It cannot be done by November 3rd, the date planned, but he expects it will be done in “about a week to ten days.” According to the Ambassador, he further expects that Garcia-Godoy will agree to the use of the IAPF in conjunction with the National Police to attempt to pick up the arms, as it is obvious that current arms sweeps are in no way successful. The thorniest problem is still the reintegration of the rebel military into the Armed Forces. No accepted solution has been reached as yet. The Ambassador stated it was most important that the camp housing the rebel military be closed out as it is a source of potential trouble.

3. Ambassador Bunker stated the securing of the rebel zone was well done. In this connection, he described General Alvim as a continuing serious problem saying that, “everyone is a Communist to him.” The tanks have been removed, the two daily newspapers have opened as well as the banks and other business establishments. Balaguer and Bosch have now come in with statements endorsing the Provisional Government’s actions.

4. Ambassador Bunker described the Dominican Ambassador to Washington, Messina, as a problem. He changes the text of statements to the OAS after Garcia-Godoy and Ambassador Bunker have agreed on them. The Foreign Minister, who serves in New York with the UN, may come to Washington to take his place.

5. Secretary Mann raised the point that Agency and FBI reporting from Santo Domingo indicated that the Leftists could win an election. He advised it was his opinion that, if there was a strong possibility the known Leftists could come into the government through an election, we should take steps to postpone the election especially as we are behind schedule anyway. He asked Ambassador Bunker for his opinion. The Ambassador agreed that we are behind schedule. He stated Garcia-Godoy is “too good” to be President, really has no supporting cabinet as all the worthwhile people refuse to take jobs and Garcia-Godoy is “killing himself.” The Ambassador stated that he is of the opinion we should make no decision now in regard to postponing the election. We should wait until the “package deal” is completed, at

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<sup>2</sup> The components of this “package deal” were transmitted in telegram 531 to Bunker in Santo Domingo, October 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP)

which time he expects things will approach normalcy and then we can make up our minds regarding the election.

6. The DCI presented and discussed a list prepared by the Agency of persons with varying degrees of Leftist connections who should be removed from the government.<sup>3</sup> He advised he would furnish the list by memorandum to the interested agencies. Secretary Mann asked Ambassador Bunker if he thought Garcia-Godoy would really take action against the Leftists, such as action on the subject of the University. Ambassador Bunker stated he hoped so but he really didn't know. McGeorge Bundy asked whether the appearance of so many suspect individuals in the Judiciary was a part of a definite plan to take control of the Judiciary. Ambassador Bunker stated, in his opinion, it was not a definite plan. The Director pointed out that many of the persons on the list that he had previously mentioned were employees of the Judiciary.

7. Secretary Mann stated that he was generally concerned that the military will be neutralized. He wondered if Jimenez, if he replaced Admiral Rivera Caminero, could find capable military leaders. McGeorge Bundy stated the hardest single job is "getting the military set up." He asked if there was any way we could force worthwhile people to work for Garcia-Godoy. The DCI stated Garcia-Godoy had been steadily making concessions in favor of the Left. It is time he redressed the balance and put pressure on the Left to reach the desired and necessary agreements.

8. Ambassador Bunker pointed out the Papal Nuncio is a problem as is the UN Representative, Mayobre. The Ambassador stated the most important issue is the completion of the "package deal" as soon as possible and he was of the opinion he should return to Santo Domingo as soon as possible to do everything he can do to aid in its completion.

9. The remainder of the meeting was taken up with a discussion of the immediate economic steps that should be taken to put the Dominican economy on its feet.

**William V. Broe<sup>4</sup>**

*Chief*

*Western Hemisphere Division*

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 141.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Broe signed the original.

**141. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 5, 1965.

I submit herewith a memorandum which I believe will be of positive interest to you. It concerns twenty-six appointments to important government positions made by Garcia-Godoy since the formation of the Provisional Government.

[1 line of source text not declassified] While these appointments represent a relatively small percentage of President Garcia-Godoy's total appointments to date they are highly significant because of the power to influence and shape policy accorded these positions. Also, these positions are important because those occupying these high offices control to a large degree the employment of others within their respective organizations. [5 lines of source text not declassified] Reliable information on these men and/or their immediate families cited in the attached list<sup>2</sup> throws grave doubt on the likelihood of their conducting their affairs with political impartiality.

**W.F. Raborn**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

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**142. Letter From the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic (Bennett) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, November 6, 1965.

Dear Tom:

While I would not want to go too far out on a limb, I do feel a certain qualified optimism at the end of this week.

The move of the IAPF into the city has without question provided the personal security for the population at large which has made other

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XII, 10/65–11/65. Secret; Official–Informal.

forward steps possible. The opening of the banks and the two regular newspapers this week are the longest strides towards normality yet taken.

The failure of the general strike which the communists were trying to organize was a heartening thing. It lends credence to my own conviction that the rank and file of Dominicans want nothing more desperately than peace and a chance to work, notwithstanding the noise made by the extreme left which is all too often pumped up out of proportion by some of our enterprising and not very judicious press reporters. It was also helpful that Bosch spoke out against the strike, and the Secretary General of his party, who lunched with me today, told me that instructions have been sent out to all the PRD branches to fight the communists on the labor front. This is a new and welcome sense of reality on Bosch's part. I think Garcia Godoy made a mistake in leaving the play, and thus the credit, on dampening down the strike to Bosch. He could have gained some kudos by going on the radio himself, but he chose not to do so. At any rate, any time something bad does not happen means one step forward. Further in the labor field, our own labor movement and the international units to which it is affiliated now have a whole raft of people here. They are moving about actively and have shown some of their muscle both in meetings with the President and in the Labor Ministry. This should be all to the good, although the labor picture here is involved and the fight will not be an easy one.

As for Garcia Godoy, he really seems at last about to move on some of the bad appointments. He has asked agreement of the Uruguayans to receive Attorney General Morel Cerda as Ambassador in Montevideo. We hope to press on to get that accomplished in short order. He seems on the point of moving also on the radio and information sector. There have been other deplorable appointments, but these are the two fields in which the most danger has been done.

Reintegration of the military still remains a major problem and Ellsworth will be pressing on that, with our help there useful. At least Garcia Godoy now accepts the need for people like Caamano to leave the country, (he had already agreed on Montes Arache) and he has talked with them. That will make possible some balancing off with the pressure on the other side in the regular military leadership. My own view is that Caamano should leave first, *before* any more of the regular military. This will be a delicate operation but it ought to be possible to bring it off. At least the fever is out of the situation for the moment.

On the economic side the Dominicans, despite general disorganization, are pulling together better and we are getting a few things going.

The far right is plotting, as is the extreme left. There could of course be further killings at any time. There was one today, this time perpetrated by the rebel Chief of Intelligence, in a restaurant patronized by our own people. Taking out people like Morel Cerda will go a long way to disarming rightist excitement and we can move forward from there. For the first time I believe we may have turned the corner.

There is hard work ahead, and no solution in this country is likely to be wholly satisfactory, but at least we are perhaps on the way.

With warm regards as always,

Yours very sincerely,

**W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.<sup>2</sup>**

P.S. I have also had a private meeting recently with Balaguer. He and his party continue to urge early elections.

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**143. Memorandum From Administrator of the Agency for International Development Bell to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 10, 1965.

I request your authorization to begin negotiations immediately with the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic for the provision of \$30 million of assistance to reduce political and economic pressures so that we can move toward the installation of an elected government and our withdrawal. We presently estimate that \$50 million is the minimum needed for the balance of FY 1966. An additional amount of \$25 million ought to be set aside now in case our estimates of financial and political needs and Dominican capabilities are proven wrong.

To meet these financial requirements \$25 million can be made available from previously appropriated funds. This will exhaust the Contingency Fund. The balance would be dependent upon obtaining a supplementary appropriation. The \$25 million currently available will meet our needs through December 31.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VIII, 11/65–1/66. Confidential. Drafted by William P. Stedman (ARA/ECP), and cleared by C. Allan Stewart and Shlaudeman.

Since it will take until December 1 to establish procedures tying dollar disbursements to U.S. exports, assistance provided for November will have adverse effects on our balance of payments. Not more than \$12.5 million will be disbursed in November. All assistance over this amount will be tied to procurement of goods and services in the U.S. The Treasury Department has stated that it will not object to this arrangement.

Since the overthrow of the Dominican government in April the U.S. has made large amounts of supporting assistance available to reduce potential economic complications and elements of political instability by helping meet government payrolls and provide for employment. The Provisional Government has proven to be weaker than feared. President Garcia-Godoy's financial advisers, who appear to be intelligent and conservative men, have reported serious budgetary problems now and into next year.

In an effort to ascertain the full extent of the Dominican financial problem, Assistant Secretary Anthony N. Solomon recently visited Santo Domingo to discuss the financial situation with U.S. and Dominican officials.<sup>2</sup> The estimates of external assistance needed are the result of his findings which are concurred in by the Country Team. Mr. Solomon, Ambassador Bunker, and the Country Team further believe that the weakness of the Provisional Government prevents our insisting on a commitment to devaluation of the exchange rate when shown necessary as we have when we negotiated program loans with Colombia, Chile, and Brazil. Therefore, the negotiating strategy will be to tell the Dominicans that our maximum assistance through FY 1966 will be \$50 million and that requirements beyond that will have to be met by their own resources. This is intended to limit our financial help and force the Dominicans to reduce their expenditures, increase their revenues, or utilize domestic means of covering deficits.

Our assistance will continue to be focused on playing down possible political problems by helping the government pay government employees their salaries and providing emergency employment on important public works projects. The government needs at least an estimated \$20 million for wages and salaries before the end of 1965 and cannot be expected to obtain this amount from other sources. Although we estimate that it can eliminate the deficit in ordinary budget operations in 1966, it will need an estimated \$15 million for wages and salaries in 1966 before this occurs.

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<sup>2</sup> Assistant Secretary Solomon visited the Dominican Republic October 29–November 2 to examine food distribution problems and assess economic assistance needs for FY 1966.



The additional \$15 million in this \$50 million package includes \$5 million for the balance of 1965 and \$10 million for early 1966 to finance port reconstruction, irrigation, road maintenance and other high priority employment giving activities. These serve more importantly to siphon off potential dissidents from political activity.

Our best judgment is that \$50 million will be required for the achievement of a political climate within which to pursue our aims but that an additional \$25 million should be available since accurate projections of the Dominican situation are not possible to make. We will attempt to negotiate for the maximum self-help possible, subject to existing political circumstances. The negotiation of this package is a desirable alternative to the present situation where we receive piecemeal requests from time to time. Furthermore, we believe the Dominicans are prepared in connection with the U.S. assistance to impose increased taxes on imports and restrict internal credit.

David E. Bell<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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#### **144. Memorandum From the Representative to the Organization of American States (Bunker) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 15, 1965.

##### **SUBJECT**

Current Situation in the Dominican Republic

During the last two weeks encouraging progress has been made toward restoring normal conditions in the city of Santo Domingo and establishing a better political climate in the Dominican Republic as a whole.

The commercial banks located in the former Constitutionalist Zone have been open and in full operation since November 2. As of the same date, the country's major newspapers, *El Caribe* and *Listin Diario*, resumed publication. Shops and stores in the former Zone are now conducting business in a normal manner. The port of Santo Domingo is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIII, 11/65–1/66. Confidential.

open and servicing ships—seven were discharging cargo on November 12—and preparation for the rehabilitation of the port's facilities, extensively damaged during the revolt, will begin this week under the supervision of a representative of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Since the securing of the former Constitutionalist Zone by the IAPF on October 25, the situation of public order in Santo Domingo has improved markedly. The National Police has gradually increased its strength and effectiveness in the former Constitutionalist Zone and now maintains 24-hour foot and motor patrols in the area. The Inter-American Peace Force has been able to reduce its presence in the former Zone to one U.S. Battalion and three Latin American companies.

Despite the generally quieter atmosphere, isolated incidents of shooting and other forms of violence continue to occur frequently in Santo Domingo. Significant improvement in police morale and effectiveness is needed, as are more vigorous measures to disarm the civilian population. The house-to-house search for arms conducted by civilian-military-police teams has produced very little. As a further effort toward disarmament, President Garcia Godoy on November 14 issued a decree offering monetary rewards for arms turned in voluntarily during the last half of this month. A graduated schedule of payments according to type and condition of weapons was established.

An improvement in the political climate was reflected by the last-minute decision of Communist elements—particularly the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD)—to cancel their call for a general strike scheduled to take place November 4. Ex-Presidents Bosch and Balaguer had come out against the strike, both issuing constructive statements urging support for the Provisional Government. Garcia Godoy followed up this small success by initiating a series of conferences with leaders of the non-Communist political parties in order to lay the groundwork for next year's elections and as a means of reaching agreement on the pre-campaign political truce stipulated in the Institutional Act. During the consultations, and in recent statements to the press, Garcia Godoy reiterated his firm intention to hold elections within the nine-month period set by the Institutional Act. A further helpful political development occurred on November 13 when a group of prominent leaders, including Bosch and Balaguer, publicly subscribed to the terms of a "moral commitment" repudiating all acts of violence and calling for the suspension of demonstrations that might affect public tranquillity during the period of the political truce.

Unfortunately, several of the more important rightist political leaders refused to join in this commitment. Rightist plotting against the Provisional Government continues and we have reports of various schemes promoted by this sector to overthrow Garcia Godoy. However, success would depend on the cooperation of the Armed Forces

and there are presently no indications that such cooperation would be forthcoming. Relations between the President and the military chiefs have improved substantially of late. Garcia Godoy has assured the chiefs that he will make no changes in the high command without consulting them, while they, for their part, have pledged support for the Provisional Government and respect for civilian authority. A further strengthening of these relations may be expected when Garcia Godoy makes the changes he has planned in his administration. He intends shortly to replace his Attorney General and Chief Information Officer, both of whom are rebel sympathizers of pronounced leftist tendencies. He has promised additional moves, including reorganization of the government-owned radio and television station, designed to bring the Provisional Government back toward the center of the political road.

The most critical problem at the moment results from the failure so far to make significant progress toward the reintegration of the Constitutionalist military into the regular Armed Forces. The concentration of rebel officers and men at the 27th of February Camp is a factor of continuing uncertainty and a threat to the process of stabilization. Reintegration has been stalled by the question of what to do with those ex-military men in Caamaño's forces who were not on active service as of April 24. We are pressing Garcia Godoy to make the necessary decisions and get on with reintegration.

**Ellsworth Bunker<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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#### **145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 16, 1965, 9:07 p.m.

586. For Bunker. Joint State/AID message. You are authorized begin negotiations immediately with GODR for the provision of \$50 million of assistance during FY 1966 to reduce political and economic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XII, 10/65–11/65. Confidential. Drafted by Richard E. Lippincott (ARA/CAR); cleared by C. Allan Stewart, Reuben Sternfeld (AA/LA), Charles N. Goldman (GC/LA), Sayre, Donald K. Palmer (ARA), Harrison M. Holland (S/S-O), and Bowdler; and approved by Gaud. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro for Vaughn and David Bronheim (AA/LA).

pressures so that we can move toward the installation of an elected government and our withdrawal.<sup>2</sup> In conducting these negotiations you should be guided by following:

1. Requirements and negotiating strategy set forth in November 10 Memorandum for the President from AID Administrator and Country Team/Solomon memorandum entitled "Supporting Assistance Needs—and negotiating guidelines for Dominican Republic—FY 66"<sup>3</sup> is approved as modified below.

2. You should attempt secure GODR agreement accept maximum proportion of additional assistance on a loan basis with terms and conditions of loan (subject to NAC clearance) similar to last supporting assistance loan to DR. An AID lawyer will accompany "Hassman-Kosters" team (see 3 below) assist preparing loan documents.

3. You should attempt secure GODR agreement accept maximum proportion of additional assistance on "tied" basis, through Special Letter of Credit or similar procedure. In no event should amount assistance made available on cash transfer basis exceed \$12.5 million. Hassman, Kosters and Cameron of AID/W will arrive Santo Domingo promptly to assist with procedural matters connection establishment SLC or other tying procedure. You should appreciate that Dominican Republic has extremely bad record compliance with U.S. 50/50 shipping requirements and U.S. shipping interests are pressing strongly for strictest possible enforcement this requirement.

4. You should attempt secure GODR agreement delay receipt AID dollars as long as possible with particular emphasis on minimizing number dollars either loaned or granted during balance 1965.

5. \$25,400,000 from Contingency Fund. Of this sum, \$.6 million is for grants in aid CARE, CARITAS, and community development program proposed by Papal Nuncio. This \$.6 million should be subject separate negotiations by USAID with local reps charitable groups. Balance \$24.8 million consists \$19.8 million estimated in basic memorandum to be "hardcore" budgetary support requirement needed for last two months 1965 and \$5 million for work projects. Additional \$25 million

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<sup>2</sup> On November 13, while spending the weekend with the President at his ranch in Texas, Marvin Watson received telegram CAP 65703 from McGeorge Bundy. In it Bundy wrote: "Secretary Fowler has approved the balance of payments aspects of the Bell-to-the-President memorandum on assistance to the Dominican Republic [see Document 143] which I left with you on Thursday [November 11]. Ambassador Bunker is in Washington and will be returning to Santo Domingo on Tuesday [November 16] morning. I would appreciate your trying to obtain a Presidential decision on the Dominican paper by the close of business on Monday if at all possible." This telegram indicates the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIII, 11/65-1/66)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 143.

estimated in basic memorandum to be required during first six months 1966 will have to be obtained from Congress by special appropriation to be requested early in 1966. Subject to caveat that \$25 million of \$49.8 million must be “subject to future appropriation by the U.S. Congress” you may commit full \$49.8 million if negotiations so require.

6. Assume cash transfer would be made available via OAS.

**Ball**

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**146. Letter From the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic (Bennett) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

En route Santo Domingo–Atlanta, November 20, 1965.

Dear Tom,

I had planned to write you a proper letter this morning, but word came at dawn of my mother’s death last night, and I am accordingly en route to Georgia—hence this paper will have to do.

You will recall that we have been in the midst of taking another poll as to local reactions and opinions, similar to the one done last winter. The interviewing was to be finished today, with tabulations, collations, etc. to take about six weeks—final results scheduled for early January, a little earlier if possible. The director of the field work came in to see me late yesterday, stressing that his impressions and conclusions were *preliminary*, but based on experience elsewhere which, as you know, has been amazingly accurate in measurements of public opinion in several Latin American countries.

First of all, the poll-takers find that Dominicans favor U.S. intervention at a rate of 6 to 1. This, by coincidence, is extremely close to the Harris poll finding American opinion 84% in favor. Garcia Godoy put it the other way ‘round two days ago when he remarked to Congressmen Roybal and Fraser<sup>2</sup> that 85% of the Dominican people do not want the IAPF to leave—notwithstanding the noise made by the agitators and so played up by the press. The poll director found that the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIII, 11/65–1/66. Personal. An “L” on the letter indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Edward R. Roybal (Democrat–California) and Donald M. Fraser (Democrat–Minnesota).

overwhelming majority want the force here through elections, and he anticipates that when that time comes, they will not want them to leave then either. Most expect the "big fight" to come later, to put this year's events in the shade.

If I remember correctly, last winter's poll<sup>3</sup> showed Balaguer 46%, Bosch 28%. The Director said it is his opinion on the basis of the unprocessed data that Balaguer will be shown now to be somewhat, perhaps considerably, stronger than he was before. People in general think of Balaguer as one of them, honest, stable and steady, and the man who put price controls on basic commodities. Bosch is regarded as erratic and unstable, a man who says one thing one day and something quite different the next day, a leader who "let the people down." The director commented wryly that Trujillo would run a good race if he were back.

The polling was done first in the rest of the country, Santo Domingo city the last and just now being finished up. There was the warning that the city polling might cause some change in the above, but not to any great extent. Balaguer himself is hopeful of carrying as much as 50% of the city.

Although youth finds stimulation in the idea of revolution—not surprisingly—the revolution itself seems hardly to have penetrated beyond the city, except for some evidence of support in San Pedro de Macoris (depressed sugar town in the east). The American image as the source of all that is good, true and wise (as well as responsible for everything that happens—good or bad) seems not to have been dented at all. We are still regarded as honest, generous and well-intentioned—a generally beneficent image—but at the same time as bumbling and not very careful of the money we offer too open handedly—not sharp enough, or not caring enough in view of our "unlimited" resources, to keep the rascally Dominican politicians from making off with the money we so generously make available and preventing it from reaching the people. We are still thought of everywhere as those people who can make all things possible and who can cause the milk and honey to flow.

Food—and presumably work—is the principal concern and problem around the country. The food program is much criticized, but not the United States. Here again, the U.S. is thought of as the generous provider (although we often send food to which they are unaccustomed, don't want and don't know how to prepare), with the local officials and priests considered the villains who play favorites or steal the food and sell it. I suspect that just enough of this does go on to

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

provide the basis for the widespread and exaggerated charges. Poor quality foodstuffs are not blamed on the United States, which is considered to have such high standards of quality that it would not stoop to send inferior materials—obviously it is the local handlers who have kept the best for themselves and pawned off shoddy seconds on the people.

The above tends to show the great dependence—the over-dependence—which characterizes Dominican attitudes towards the United States. The trust in us is what I have seen everywhere—including this week's trip with the Congressmen—and it is heartwarming and at the same time rather pathetic. The obverse of this coin is that when anything goes wrong, it is our fault because we are so all-powerful that we could have kept it from going wrong had we only wanted to. A front-page article last week in one of the newspapers sustained that "the Dominican Republic could have peace and stability if only the United States wanted it that way"! Even the far left expects us to pay for their programs, once they achieve power.

Both the political findings and the psychological attitudes largely confirm my own views. At several points in the conversation I remarked to the poll director that he was taking the briefing right out of my mouth. After all, I am now in my fifth year in this country, which means, I believe, that I have spent more of my adult life in this Republic than has Juan Bosch! I await the confirmed results of the poll with great interest.

Yours very sincerely,

Tap<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Bennett signed the letter.

**147. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director (Hughes)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

ARA-Agency Meeting December 8, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

ARA-Mr. Sayre, Ambassador Stewart, Mr. [Charles H.] Thomas

CIA-Mr. Broe, Mr. Phillips, [*name not declassified*]

INR/DDC-Mr. Gardner

*Dominican Republic*

Phillips [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and who is back in Washington for three days' consultation, gave a run-down of the situation in the Republic. With Garcia Godoy, he said, we have come full circle. We originally had supported him to lead the Provisional Government, then had become gravely concerned over the nature of his appointments, and now had become convinced once more that out of the entire field he was the only man who possibly could have done the job. The key here lay in Garcia Godoy's having rid the government of Attorney General Cerda.<sup>2</sup> This man had to be the first to go and now that he in fact was gone the future looked considerably brighter.

Phillips said there now were solid grounds for confidence that the Provisional Government would last and that there would be elections as scheduled. The broad underlying question now is: will both parties, i.e., Bosch and Balaguer, run—or will the PRD boycott the elections? Bosch has already hinted that he will not stand for election if the IAPF is still present, and that there is no use in his running anyway because the Pentagon would never let him take office. If Bosch did refuse to run it would make things very bad for us.

In reply to Sayre's question, Phillips said that he did not believe that the Dominican military would let Bosch hold office for more than a week. In response to Gardner's question, Sayre said that it would be bad if Bosch refused to run, but it would be worse if he did, won, and then got tossed out.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Committee Files, Subject File, Dominican Republic 1965. Secret. Drafted on December 9 by James R. Gardner. The memorandum was also addressed to the Deputy Director for Research Allan Evans.

<sup>2</sup> Godoy removed Manuel Morel Cerda as the Attorney General on November 17.



Later in the meeting there were murmurings about the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] poll in the Dominican Republic. I gathered the results thus far indicate that Bosch stands no chance at all. According to these same murmurings, 64% of the Dominican Republic thinks it a good idea that the US troops came in. This percentage seems unreal; it is possible that it refers only to rural vote. Gardner did not press for clarification [*3 lines of source text not declassified*].

The discussion then turned to the quality of the Dominican security forces. Phillips said that police morale had not been good but that Cerda's removal had brought on almost immediate transformation. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] interest in the police lay in having them a) become an effective intelligence-gathering outfit and b) evolve an effective rural program with good and rapid lateral and vertical communications. The officers of the new rural police force have all been chosen and are undergoing training, as have 85% of the enlisted personnel. The training is emphasizing civic action and public relations, and an excellent augury for the future is the enthusiasm which the police command itself is showing for the program.

As far as urban riot control capability is concerned, there is some distance yet to travel. The former riot control organization had been of first-class quality, but most of its personnel had been liquidated during the troubles. Training was going ahead, but essential equipment was slow in arriving from the United States. The fault here, both Phillips and Broe indicated, lay with AID Washington.<sup>3</sup>

The DNI (National Intelligence Service) was starting from scratch, but there were grounds for confidence. It had a good leader, and furthermore Garcia Godoy was its firm supporter because of the very good and accurate information it had given him on the recent rightist uprising in Santiago.

In sum, it looked as if the Dominican security forces would be able to keep control of the situation when the IAPF pulled out. It was almost sure that there will be some re-action from the Communist Party if Balaguer wins the election, but it presumably can be contained.

Arms collection: Phillips said that the potentials of the buying-up phase had been about exhausted; [*3 lines of source text not declassified*]

[Omitted here are sections on Mexico, Costa Rica, and Venezuela.]

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<sup>3</sup> At this point the words "with AID" are underlined and "To be expected of CIA!" was handwritten in the margin.

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**148. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>**

OCI No. 2954/65

Washington, December 11, 1965.

**THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: AN ASSESSMENT**

1. The provisional government in the Dominican Republic has achieved a fragile stability after a turbulent break-in period. Many moderates and conservatives both in civilian and military life have developed a degree of confidence in the regime—confidence that was badly lacking in mid-October. The continuing series of concessions made to the left appear to have helped achieve Hector Garcia Godoy's purpose—the bloodless elimination of the rebel-held zone. The government now controls the country and most politically minded Dominicans feel it will survive until the elections slated for 1 June. Under these circumstances, Garcia Godoy will probably pursue more balanced policies designed to reconcile the two still hostile factions that contested the civil war.

2. Nevertheless, the provisional government remains a government without popular support, bolstered largely by the Inter-American Peace Force. The regime's mode has proven to be compromise but extremist forces of both the left and right remain willing and probably able to mount widespread terrorism if they feel threatened. The Communists have made inroads—most notably in the labor field and among students—from which they may prove difficult to dislodge. The same animosities which tore the country apart in April 1965 remain—magnified by the revolt itself, but now muted at least temporarily. It remains to be seen whether the present government can provide the conditions necessary for holding elections in June of 1966 and whether if such elections are held the results will be accepted by the Dominican people without a fresh outburst of violence.

3. In mid-October the regime was on shaky ground. The appointment of a number of leftists to leading positions in the government and Garcia Godoy's responsiveness to rebel demands alienated

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIII, 11/65-1/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only; Limited Distribution. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA. Sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a December 14 memorandum from CIA Director Raborn, who wrote: "A review of recent developments in the Dominican Republic indicates that the provisional government there has achieved a fragile stability, and most politically minded Dominicans feel the government will survive until the elections slated for 1 June. We are by no means yet out of the woods there, but Garcia Godoy appears to be dealing with the worst problems on the left and also to have composed, at least temporarily, his principal differences with the military."

moderates, the military and other conservative elements whose dismay was fanned by the slow pace of collecting arms and reducing the rebel zone in Santo Domingo. Rumors that the military chiefs were to be replaced, coming after the ouster of General Wessin, brought the military to the point of rebellion. Both the extreme left and right attempted to exacerbate civil-military tension.

4. Since then, the short-term outlook has improved—a development not all directly attributable to the provisional government. During the last 60 days the “unity of the left” has come undone. The Communists have failed to mount effectively large demonstrations and strikes, in part because non-Communist left-wing politicians have judged that for the time being, at least, support of the provisional regime is in their best interest. The failure of a disorganized rightist attempt to set up in Santiago an alternative to the provisional government has reduced the appetites of conservatives for conspiracy. The firm action of the Inter-American Peace Force in opening up the rebel zone capped Garcia Godoy’s tortuously slow approach to the enforcement of the peace terms. This and the quick end of the Santiago conspiracy contributed to the public consensus that the provisional government will remain in power until elections.

5. Garcia Godoy is now demonstrating that his regime is capable of governing and at the same time is increasingly confident of his own abilities. He also appears to be exercising a closer degree of control over many of his appointees and is injecting himself into policy making in such areas as labor relations. Garcia Godoy’s actions in setting elections for 1 June 1966 and filling vacancies of the three man electoral board with two moderates have contributed to a psychological atmosphere in which many politicians look to the future.

6. In the field of government staffing, Garcia Godoy has taken the step of removing the most influential and objectionable appointee, former Attorney General Manuel Morel Cerda. Morel’s successor, Gustavo Gomez Ceara, has begun to moderate the influence of leftists in the legal area. In addition, Garcia Godoy has given assurances that Gomez will remove many of Morel’s undesirable appointees. Garcia Godoy has promised other staffing changes that will prove beneficial—such as the removal by the Supreme Court of several extremists it appointed to judgeships and the transfer of Franklin Dominguez, a militant rebel who is now the President’s Press Secretary. It should be recognized, however, that continued confidence in the regime by conservative civilians and the military will be to some degree dependent on Garcia Godoy’s fulfilling these promises and closely supervising those undesirable appointees who remain in office.

7. A heartening development has been Garcia Godoy’s interest in developing effective security services designed to control and combat

internal subversion. He has appointed two competent officers to head the Department of National Investigations (DNI), the organization charged with internal security and the Department of Special Operations in the National Police responsible for counterinsurgency. The heads of the two organizations were chosen by Garcia Godoy on the recommendation of US officials and he has adopted US ideas for their organization and mission. The DNI has already begun checking on the loyalty of some 1,500 government employees and will hopefully serve as a channel to alert Garcia Godoy to the extent of extremist penetration of his government.

8. The Dominican military appears to be united behind the present armed forces' chiefs. Relations between President Garcia Godoy and the military leaders have improved but remain tenuous. However, both right and leftwing political groups have and will probably continue their attempts to exacerbate tension between the president and the military. The military's opinion of the president has steadily improved since late October as Garcia Godoy has demonstrated his ability to govern and shown himself not subservient to leftist forces. Garcia Godoy has also apparently realized that he has little to gain by precipitously replacing the present service chiefs and secretary of the armed forces who have proved relatively effective and loyal under the circumstances. In any event the presence of the Inter-American Peace Force, now numbering about 7,000, supporting the provisional government, severely limits the Dominican armed forces' freedom of action.

9. The country's two leading political parties, the Reformist Party (PR) and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) are warming up for the national elections. Although campaigning is supposedly limited to the period three months prior to elections, according to the governing Institutional Act, most Dominican politicians have now turned their efforts toward the election. Former President Joaquin Balaguer, who heads the PR, announced his candidacy in July and has begun making public appearances and speeches throughout the country. Juan Bosch's PRD has still to announce its candidate but it is probable that if the party takes part in the elections, Bosch will be its candidate. The PRD is presently undergoing internal strife as former party leader Angel Miolan and Bosch feud over party leadership. The third ranking National Civic Union (UCN) appears moribund and the numerous micro-parties are jockeying for alliances. The outlawed Communist parties will probably not be allowed to participate in the elections.

10. Living conditions, never satisfactory for the greater majority of Dominicans, have already returned to normal. Santo Domingo's shops, restaurants, and commercial institutions most of which are located in the former rebel zone, are now open, but prices are high.

Business concerns which adopted pro-revolutionary titles during the revolt have now reverted to their original names. The populace in Santo Domingo, however, appears restless and without direction. Unemployment and underemployment are high. Ship traffic to Santo Domingo, the country's principal port, has resumed but a shortage of storage space is causing some problems. The demand for consumer goods, pent up during the revolt, can be expected to return the country's trade balance to a deficit despite the government's efforts and lead to a shortage of foreign exchange. Living conditions in the interior of the country were largely unaffected by the revolt except for temporary shortages of food and imported goods. Unemployment, estimated at one third of the labor forces before the revolt, increased as some business concerns suspended operations and the United Fruit Company terminated its banana operations.

11. Many of the basic social economic problems which beset the provisional government would have existed even if there had not been a revolt. They were exacerbated by the recent strife. It is unlikely that in the time remaining to him, Garcia Godoy will be able to do more than make a modest start toward solving some of them. Nor will the holding of free elections provide a panacea.

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149. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

OCI No. 3100/65

Washington, December 22, 1965.

## PROSPECTS FOR THE DOMINICAN SITUATION

1. The dismal events of last Sunday<sup>2</sup> in Santiago have gravely sharpened existing animosities in the Dominican Republic. President Garcia Godoy's efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to national elections in the spring have received a severe jolt. Indeed, the restoration in Santo Domingo and maintenance of tranquility will continue to depend almost entirely on the presence of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). No change in this grim prospect is likely for months to come.

2. It is still not clear who set off the bloody battle in Santiago—that is, to say who fired first. Both the ex-rebel lieutenants and the local military units were clearly spoiling for a fight after almost a week of tensions and country-wide labor disturbances. The President has appointed a commission of respected and moderate members of his cabinet to determine the facts in the matter. The commission is to report to him on 23 December. What the commission can usefully recommend in the current circumstances is open to question; so, too, is Garcia Godoy's ability to act on the facts (if they are indeed ever ascertained) rather than on the basis of the political imperatives of the moment as he sees them.

3. Rooting out the guilty party or parties at this point is in any event probably irrelevant. Both the rebels and the military are convinced of each other's culpability and more suspicious than ever that the other side is capable of the most sinister machinations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66–4/66. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA. On the title page Bundy wrote: "Bill Bowdler: the Agency is damned close to policy making here. But it may be pretty good policy. What do you think? McG." Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a December 23 memorandum from Richard Helms, Acting Director of Central Intelligence. Helms wrote: "The events in Santiago last week-end have considerably lessened the chances for keeping the situation in the Dominican Republic under control. For this reason I want to invite your attention to the attached memorandum, which contains our latest assessment." A note attached to this cover memorandum indicates that the memorandum was also sent to Vaughn, Mann, Rusk, McNamara, and Vance. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 303)

<sup>2</sup> On the morning of December 19 fighting broke out between Dominican Republic Air Force troops and Constitutionalist troops in the city of Santiago, about 80 miles northwest of Santo Domingo; a number of troops on both sides were killed, but no civilians were hurt. In a December 20 memorandum to the President Bundy deplored the "senseless shooting" for threatening to "endanger the fragile—yet growing—confidence which was developing between Garcia Godoy and his military chiefs." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIII, 11/65–1/66)

4. The rebels will be less willing than ever to divest themselves of their weapons, to break up their still-sizable military stronghold at the 27th February camp, or to place themselves at the mercy of former comrades in arms by accepting reintegration. They will appeal, and probably with some success, to other elements of the left to join them in demands for changes in the military high command, and in other actions which will exacerbate, rather than relieve, tensions.

5. The military commanders have recently come to a working understanding with Garcia Godoy. But after the events in Santiago they will regard any effort to effect command changes as a vindication of earlier fears that the provisional President is a prisoner of the left. And they are now likely to feel that the demonstrated untrustworthiness of the rebels has justified their prolonged resistance to Garcia Godoy's efforts toward reintegration.

6. In this atmosphere of renewed tensions, Garcia Godoy's effort to resolve problems by persuasion and ingenuity rather than by force and bluntness is seriously endangered. He may try to make concessions all around to resolve the furor—say, by trying to relieve some of the military commanders and perhaps by finding foreign assignments for some of the top rebels. The consistently optimistic President would then probably return to the painstaking task of integrating the rebels into the military establishment. In current circumstances, however, such moves by Garcia Godoy are not likely to solve the basic problems; even the mere decision to make them could provoke resistance.

7. We do not foresee any change in this grim prospect for months to come. There may be a pause in violence until the presidential investigatory commission has reported its findings and the President attempts to make concessions. But given the existing underlying bitterness, strikes and violence are likely in any of the larger cities—Santo Domingo in particular. The extreme left, along with the young toughs, will attempt to exacerbate these incidents through pillage, vandalism, and terror. To control these outbreaks Garcia Godoy will be obliged to rely increasingly on the Inter-American Peace Force to back up his own military and police. This will pose the danger that Garcia Godoy will become more identified in the popular mind with both the "foreign invaders" and the "reactionary" military. No other responsible, democratically oriented Dominican is likely to be willing to take up Garcia Godoy's burden for him if for any reason he should depart the scene.

8. An election is possible only because of the presence of the IAPF, but will resolve nothing so long as the armed rival groups still exist. Like most Dominicans, both the rebels and the military believe that there are only victors and vanquished. They will continue to subordinate Garcia Godoy's larger purpose of preparing the country for meaningful elections to settlement of what they regard as the principal is-

sue: "who won that April rebellion." If Bosch or some other PRD candidate is the victor the military is not likely to let him take office. If the victor is Balaguer the chances for a return to stability would be slightly better. Some elements of the left would probably reconcile themselves to his rule, but the more extreme groups would not accept his election and would be likely to turn to insurgency.

9. The foregoing analysis suggests three possible conclusions: a) The Dominican civil war is not over, merely contained, and not very well contained at that. b) In a context of barely suppressed violence, Communist exploitation of bitter national animosities is the only constant; its effort clearly is to polarize the political situation by turning as many non-Communists of the left against the military and police as possible. c) The policy pursued so far of attempting to unify antagonistic peoples needs the essential ingredient of time.

10. After elections and for some time thereafter conditions probably will not be such as to permit the withdrawal of the IAPF. A prolonged IAPF presence would have to be requested by the new president. In its present composition the IAPF would inevitably become the target of local resentments. However, if the new president were to find himself in a position where he felt obliged to call on other Latin American countries for sufficient contingents to change the preponderant US complexion of the force, these resentments would be allayed to some extent.

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## 150. Editorial Note

During the Johnson Presidency, the U.S. foreign affairs leadership reviewed and approved a covert program to help the candidate favored by the United States Government win the 1966 Dominican Republic presidential election. Having intervened militarily in April 1965 officially to "protect American lives" and unofficially to prevent a "second Cuba" in the hemisphere, the Johnson administration approved a program in 1966 to provide covert financial support and electoral information to Joaquin Balaguer of the Partido Reformista, a moderate, pro-American party. The objective was to ensure a political climate conducive to democratic principles and simultaneously to discourage a potential Communist take-over. The 303 Committee provided inter-agency coordination for the covert action. Substantial financial support was passed to Balaguer without him knowing the true source of the funds. Fearful of possible widespread criticism that its pro-Balaguer bias might be rigging the election, the Johnson administration encouraged Juan Bosch, Balaguer's principal opponent to run and even



considered giving Bosch covert financial support although on a much smaller scale than what was authorized for Balaguer. For the United States, the operation was hugely successful—Balaguer won by a decisive margin and most observers attested that the election was conducted fairly, with the voting process unmarred by violence and fraud.

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**151. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Fitzgerald)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 29, 1965.

SUBJECT

Presidential Election in the Dominican Republic

1. Mr. Spera<sup>2</sup> called this office yesterday in an effort to locate some written document describing the President's wishes with respect to our activities in the upcoming Dominican presidential election. To be frank, I thought I had written on this subject to you back in early June, but I am unable to find any record of such a memorandum among my papers. Therefore, I want to reiterate, for the record, that the President told the Director and me on more than one occasion between May and mid-July, he expected the Agency to devote the necessary personnel and material resources in the Dominican Republic required to win the presidential election for the candidate favored by the United States Government. The President's statements were unequivocal. He wants to win the election, and he expects the Agency to arrange for this to happen.

2. If you are finding road blocks in the way of getting on with this operation, I would appreciate being advised, so that the difficulties can be identified to the President with the aim of securing his influence on the side of financial allocations in support of the appropriate candidate.

**RH**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 78–3805, Box 1, Folder 29, Dominican Republic. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (CIA).

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

**152. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 30, 1965.

**SUBJECT**

Presidential Election in the Dominican Republic

**1. Summary**

On several occasions between May and July 1965 higher authority informed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that the presidential election in the Dominican Republic simply must be won by the candidate favored by the U.S. Government [*2 lines of source text not declassified*]. Subsequently, the question of covert election support has been under continuing discussion [*1 line of source text not declassified*] to ascertain which candidate the U.S. Government wanted supported and [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. As of this writing, policy guidance is not yet available on whether or not there should be an election operation nor in whose favor such an operation should be conducted.

This memorandum solicits 303 Committee action to determine, first, the identity of the candidate favored by the U.S. Government and second, whether a covert operation should be undertaken on his behalf. Since barely five months remain before the election which is set for 1 June 1966 and since any covert operation would require considerable lead time, a 303 Committee decision is needed [*4½ lines of source text not declassified*].

**2. Problem**

To determine whether the U.S. Government should engage in a covert operation designed to support the presidential candidate most likely to be able to establish and maintain a stable government in the Dominican Republic which is friendly to the U.S. and which is capable of carrying out essential domestic reforms.

**3. Factors Bearing on the Problem****a. Origin of the Requirement**

On several occasions between May and mid-July 1965 higher authority unequivocally told senior representatives [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that the Dominican presidential election must be won by the candidate favored by the U.S. Government [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records, Dominican Republic, 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Helms under cover of a January 4, 1966, memorandum on the "Presidential Elections in the Dominican Republic" from Broe.

[1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

Since barely five months remain before the elections, which are scheduled for 1 June 1966, and since any covert operation would require considerable lead time, it is important that a decision be reached now. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

*b. Political Background*

The issues which divided the Dominican Republic at the outset of the rebellion have not been resolved, but the Provisional Government of Hector Garcia Godoy has made some progress in its task of reconciliation. It has reopened the divided city of Santo Domingo, eliminated the rebel zone, and established machinery for the peaceful reintegration of the rebel military and for the collection of arms. On 1 December the Provisional Government announced Law No. 69, which sets 1 June 1966 as the date for general elections for president, vice-president, both houses of congress, mayors and members of city councils, and establishes a central electoral board with appropriate dependencies to direct the electoral process. The Provisional Government has also asked the OAS to appoint a commission to supervise the elections and this commission has now been formed. It now appears probable that the Provisional Government will complete its nine-month term and that elections will be held on schedule. Pre-election activities are already under way, although formal political campaigning cannot legally begin prior to 1 March.

Although the holding of peaceful elections is of great importance to the United States as well as the Dominican Republic, real security can come only from fundamental changes in the Dominican society and economy. In looking forward it is clear that two ingredients are essential: stability, to heal the scars of a violent and lingering revolution; and reform, to correct social inequities and rigidities and to develop national resources.

In November a nation-wide survey of Dominican public opinion was conducted<sup>2</sup> [2 lines of source text not declassified] indicated that 64% of all Dominicans believe that the arrival of American troops helped rather than hurt them, and also provided an assessment of the relative popularity of political parties and potential presidential candidates. The poll shows that only two political parties have sufficient popular support to compete for the presidency: the Partido Reformista (PR), headed by Joaquin Balaguer, which was preferred by 42% of the population, and the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), headed by Juan Bosch, which was selected as "best party" by 28% of the people. The ratings of the two leading individual candidates showed Balaguer

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 146.

preferred by 51% of the country and Bosch by 22%. (A similar poll taken in February 1965 showed Balaguer preferred by 42% and Bosch by 25%.)

*c. Presidential Candidates*

Bosch remains silent on whether he will be a candidate. He fears assassination, and prefers to remain under the protection of his armed bodyguards rather than to tour the countryside. Bosch also believes that the Dominican military would try to prevent him from taking office if he were elected. He must therefore make up his mind whether to run himself, to select another candidate to carry the party banner, or to order the PRD to boycott the elections. Since an electoral boycott would be unpopular and could weaken the PRD considerably, and since no PRD leader loyal to Bosch has emerged who appears capable of rallying the party behind him, internal party pressures may force Bosch to campaign. If he does, he will be a formidable candidate, whose charisma and forensic ability may enable him to regain much of the popularity he lost when he failed to return to lead the rebellion launched in his name.

An assessment of Balaguer's character, motivation, past performance and campaign platform indicates that he is, by local standards, a good executive and administrator, politically astute, in favor of democratic processes, opposed to violence, and moderate in his comments on and attitudes toward the U.S. His recent speeches, including the 28 November address which launched the PR's first major political rally in Santiago de los Caballeros, have stressed the need to extinguish the fires of hatred lit by the revolution so that the country can embark on much needed social reforms. The PR's campaign slogan and party motto is "Neither injustices nor privileges." Although Balaguer's campaign stresses the responsibility of government to fight unemployment, hunger and other social ills, he is believed to feel that any lasting social reforms must be based on renewed popular respect for civil authority and that his first and most difficult task, if elected, will be to restore law and order.

*4. Coordination*

On 29 December [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] submitted a formal memorandum to the Department of State requesting policy guidance on the problem stated in para 2 above<sup>3</sup> and asking that this matter be discussed during the regular weekly CIA/State meeting on 30 December. On 30 December Department representatives advised CIA that they had not yet reached a decision but that they were prepared to consider a 303 Committee paper and to take the matter under immediate advisement.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Not found; but see Document 150.

<sup>4</sup> No other record of this meeting has been found.

5. *Recommendation*

It is requested that:

(a) the 303 Committee identify the presidential candidate favored by the U.S. Government;

(b) a decision be taken as to whether a covert election operation is necessary and thus should be undertaken on this candidate's behalf.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified]

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**153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 5, 1966, 3:55 p.m.

711. For Bunker, Bennett, and Palmer. Your reports and those of CIA indicate deteriorating political and military situation. We would appreciate urgently your recommendations on arresting deterioration and views on following questions and ideas:

Would it help if Garcia Godoy were told he would have full cooperation and assistance of IAPF in carrying out his plan as was done in case of Wessin? Would persons whom Garcia Godoy plans to send abroad depart peacefully if they knew Garcia Godoy had full support IAPF?

Would it assist in departure of de los Santos if we could arrange VIP visit to United States? De los Santos could join the group going to Israel after visit to U.S. as Chief of Dominican Air Force. Would it help if we could arrange VIP visit for any of the other military chiefs understanding that they would return to the Dominican Republic at end of short visit to United States? Likewise, would Caamano's departure and possibly that of Montes Arache be facilitated if they were to receive appropriate invitation for short orientation visit to U.S.? We think that political risks of having Caamano come here would probably outweigh advantages of invitation for short orientation visit but do you think such invitation would make it easier for him to leave Dominican Republic?

**Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Sayre; cleared by Vaughn, Vance, and Bowdler; and approved by Mann.

**154. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, January 6, 1966, 0420Z.

1581. From Bunker.

1. President called me to palace late this afternoon and, in grim mood, informed me that he had decided take drastic action to break impasse over departure of military from both sides. He said that after considerable reflection he had reached conclusion it absolutely essential to remove three armed forces' chiefs as well as constitutionalist military leaders. He therefore planned issue decrees tomorrow assigning Rivera Caminero, De Los Santos and Martinez Arana to posts abroad. Simultaneous decrees would also order Caamano, Montes Arache et al. to foreign assignments. Jimenez would be named MOD, Colonel Enrique Perez y Perez Army C/S, Captain Amiama Castillo Navy C/S and Colonel Beauchamps Javier (reportedly now in Lima) Air Force C/S.

2. Garcia Godoy insisted that only way for PG effectively to govern and take country to elections is through thorough shake-up of top level armed forces. President asserted that, in fact, he is unable to govern outside of limited economic areas. Chiefs ignore his wishes, operate armed forces as "independent power" and obstruct other officials of government in their duties. Attorney General Gomez Ceara finding that he is powerless act in any matter that touches military or involves persons protected by the military, has offered his resignation. Mendez Nunez, "best man in cabinet," also will resign if armed forces not brought under control. Others, it was indicated, could probably be expected take this position. If he does not move, President claimed, PG will collapse.

3. Garcia Godoy then listed a number of grievances against chiefs—duplicity by Rivera Caminero in responding to orders for transfer of troublesome local commanders, apparent stealing by Martinez Arana, inflicting of indignities by military on visitors to President's office and house, and generally arrogant attitude all around. Principal complaint, as before, was that chiefs seemed to be protecting terrorists in and out of military ranks.

4. Larger political issues also involved. According to President, responsible moderates and conservatives have been urging him make

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 12:09 a.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, and DOD.

clean sweep of leading military on both sides. (In addition to Cabinet members of this category, he mentioned in this connection Salvador Ortiz and Virgilio Perez Bernal, a prominent local builder.) President said he convinced Balaguer shares this view and may even so state publicly. (We have conflicting reports on this question.) Finally, in Garcia Godoy's opinion, country looks to him to open way to elections. Under present circumstances elections would be impossible, as Central Electoral Board President Liz has allegedly stated in private. President concluded, therefore, that only by solving country's major problem—that of the contending military factions—could he create climate for elections.

5. Garcia Godoy conceded that it might appear he was acting in response to pressure from Bosch and extreme left. Nevertheless, he thought removal from scene of constitutionalist military would ultimately weaken Bosch's hand. As matters now stand, he said, PRD can be expected to reap maximum advantage from anti-military sentiment in country. This would obviously no longer be case if issue of military leaders resolved. (I pointed out that these are highly debatable points; that, in particular, we have evidence Bosch himself has put forward idea of trading Caamano and company for chiefs.)

6. In conclusion, President said he fully realized possibly grave consequences of his decision. Chiefs might simply ignore or refuse obey his orders when decrees published. He would then have no choice but to resign, offering turn government over to armed forces in event Vice President Castillo and other cabinet officers followed his lead. Outcome, President thought, would depend to large degree on attitude of IAPF and ad hoc committee. It was his opinion that with these behind him chiefs would not challenge orders.

7. I responded to this presentation with observation that President's scheme obviously held certain attractions in theory but question had to be answered as to how it would work out in practice. His objective—and ours—is to hold free elections. Great progress had been made in preparing way until unfortunate events in Santiago. Did this setback, I asked, mean that President should abandon gradualist approach that had achieved so much before December 19? Would it not be better part of wisdom to take action re military on both sides in at least two stages as we had previously suggested? President's reply, in effect was that his decision now made and could not be changed.

8. I did prevail on Garcia Godoy to hold off until my colleagues could be brought down from Washington, promising him that we would do utmost have them here by noon tomorrow. I have not so far been able to reach either Penna Marinho or Duenas but hope schedule can be met. Few minutes ago, when I reassured Garcia Godoy by telephone on this point, he informed me that Cabinet meeting now in session and it appeared "decision final".

9. Ambassador Bennett and I are meeting with President early tomorrow to resume discussion. We plan explore possibility of less drastic approach to problem, drawing on excellent suggestions in Deptel 711.<sup>2</sup> We will have additional comments and recommendations following tomorrow's session with Garcia Godoy.<sup>3</sup>

**Bennett**

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<sup>2</sup> Document 153.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 156.

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**155. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 6, 1966.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting January 6, 1966

The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee held on January 6, 1966 contain the following items:

*"Dominican Republic—Presidential Election*

"a. On the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] paper requesting a decision on whether the U.S. will covertly back any presidential candidate<sup>2</sup> (with an ensuing plea to get cracking since the target date was 1 June), Mr. Broe said that past experience indicated covert political action in any country should have a minimum of six months advance work to ensure a sound operation. It was noted at the meeting that a series of urgent messages currently arriving indicated the possibility that the situation in the Dominican Republic was deteriorating so rapidly that the paper under study might be rendered academic.

"b. It was also apparent that the only visible candidate to support is Balaguer, [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. Ambassador Johnson

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic, 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on January 7.

<sup>2</sup> Document 152.



made the point that Balaguer was coming up in popularity through his own momentum. Mr. Broe indicated that there were a number of built-in obstacles in Balaguer's way. It was decided [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to outline a plan immediately with those aspects needing the longest lead time so that they could be approved at the next meeting. Ambassador Johnson was anxious to see the plan so that he could discuss the matter with Ellsworth Bunker.

"c. [*5½ lines of source text not declassified*]"

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Dominican Republic.]

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**156. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, January 7, 1966, 0049Z.

1587. From Bunker.

1. Full ad hoc committee met with Garcia Godoy for more than two hours this afternoon. President had just concluded session with Rivera Caminero at which he made "one last appeal" for cooperation in making changes in military high command. According Garcia Godoy, Rivera's answer was flat no. MOD explained that even if he might personally wish to cooperate, other officers would not permit him do so. Rivera warned that if President changed so much as one chief, armed forces would act throughout country and not "a single Communist would remain alive". This reaction would be contrary to desires of chiefs but allegedly they would not be able control armed forces. Rivera added that chiefs had no choice but stay in office until after elections.

2. Garcia Godoy said he could see no way out of impasse. Rivera had refused his offer turn government over to armed forces. MOD also insisted there would be no military golpe. Chiefs would simply ignore president's orders. Meanwhile, best cabinet ministers, governors and other government officials prepared resign at any moment. President said he could find himself without a government tomorrow morning. He would not act as mere "figurehead for military" and could, therefore, only resign. Garcia Godoy suggested that committee might wish discuss with Vice President Castillo possibility of forming new ad-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIII, 11/65–1/66. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received on January 6 at 8:30 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD.

ministration. He indicated, however, that he doubted Castillo would take over with chiefs still in place.

3. Garcia Godoy dwelt at length on alarming possibilities of anarchy and violence if satisfactory solution not found. (Only solution he will so far admit to be satisfactory is removal of chiefs.) He recognized that resignation of PG would bring grave risks in that regard but thought this step would be better than permitting PG to become identified with military repression of civil populace. President repeatedly emphasized his conviction that rising wave of anti-military sentiment (Embassy [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] lack reports of such tidal wave in general populace) makes it impossible to continue status quo.

4. We explored various possibilities with Garcia Godoy, including proposal that committee sit down with Bosch and Balaguer (with President perhaps present) to attempt hammer out agreement of two major parties to back PG and help devise formula to resolve crisis. President seemed lukewarm to that idea. In his view, committee could best help by trying to persuade Jimenez, Perez y Perez and Beauchamps to accept respective posts in replacement of Rivera, Martinez Arana and De Los Santos. Jimenez, according to Garcia Godoy, had first let it be known that he would accept but later sent word that his "brotherly" relations with chiefs made it impossible. We indicated our intention talk to military leaders but made no other commitments.

5. There followed prolonged discussion with President covering same ground as in most recent conversations with Ambassador Bennett and me. We continued urge President hold back but apparently made no headway. Garcia Godoy said decrees had been sent to Radio Santo Domingo and broadcast of their contents could be expected this evening. (Decrees are presently—6:30pm local time—being read on radio.) If designated replacements refuse to take posts, President said he might buy time by delivering speech explaining situation and urging calm. As we left palace, Garcia Godoy was going back into session with cabinet.

**Bennett**

## 157. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 11, 1966.

### SUBJECT

Contingency Plan for the Dominican Elections

### REFERENCES

A. Memorandum to the 303 Committee dated 30 December 1965 and entitled "Presidential Election in the Dominican Republic"<sup>2</sup>

B. Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee held on 6 January 1966<sup>3</sup>

### 1. Background

On 6 January a paper entitled "Presidential Election in the Dominican Republic" was presented to the 303 Committee. This paper requested that the 303 Committee identify the presidential candidate favored by the U.S. Government and that a decision be taken as to whether a covert election operation should be undertaken on this candidate's behalf. The minutes of the 303 Committee meeting indicate agreement that the only visible candidate to support is Joaquin Balaguer, president of the Partido Reformista (PR). The 303 Committee decided to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to prepare a contingency plan for an election operation in support of Balaguer, stressing those aspects needing the longest lead time, for presentation at the next 303 Committee meeting. The following contingency plan is submitted in response to this request.

### 2. Concept of the Operation

The purpose of the projected operation is to provide essential support to Balaguer's campaign; its implementation must be guided by certain basic considerations.

First, it is essential that the operation be carried out in such a way that United States sponsorship cannot be proven in any way. Two factors enter here: (a) the U.S. is already believed to favor Balaguer and will be accused of supporting him regardless of its real actions; (b) the exposure of actual facts of U.S. support would be nonetheless damaging both to the U.S. and to Balaguer. Normal operating conditions in the goldfish bowl environment of Santo Domingo present difficult se-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Meeting File, Dominican Republic. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on this memorandum reads: "Approved by the 303 Committee on 20 Jan 1966."

<sup>2</sup> Document 152.

<sup>3</sup> Document 155.

curity problems. Such problems will be further complicated by the international attention and interest which will be focused to an unprecedented degree on the Dominican elections.

Second, while Balaguer will need financial help as well as assistance in other forms in order to overcome certain handicaps, the amount of assistance given him must be controlled to avoid overweight. His campaign should be lean and hungry and his party organization should exert itself to the utmost in order to achieve the necessary degree of efficiency and at the same time hold to a minimum the inevitable accusations that he is getting help from non-Dominican sources.

In addition to money, Balaguer will need help in the form of advice and information. [7 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (11½ lines of source text) not declassified]

In sum, three kinds of support to Balaguer are envisioned: (1) funds to be provided [2 lines of source text not declassified]; (2) information, expertise and political guidance relayed through reliable intermediaries whom Balaguer trusts; (3) development of media and other assets having a natural bias toward Balaguer or toward his platform. In the application of this support the guiding principle will be to tightly control the amount of aid and the manner in which it is given in order to prevent the aid from becoming apparent and to keep Balaguer's campaign organization lean and aggressive.

### 3. Implementation

#### A. Existing PR Campaign Machinery

[6 lines of source text not declassified] No direct contact with Balaguer has been authorized or established.

Through the second-rank PR leaders [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Balaguer has indicated need for U.S. financial support in his election campaign. He has expressed growing concern over the number of adherents of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), the opposition party led by Juan Bosch, who occupy government positions at all levels. Balaguer has pointed out that these positions enable the PRD to influence the thinking of the campesinos, who traditionally do as they are told by the government, as well as to buy votes with jobs and to use government money, transportation and equipment for partisan political purposes. He said that the PR has limited financial resources and is finding itself unable to compete with the PRD under these conditions. Balaguer has also told his party leaders that the PR may not be able to compete effectively in the elections unless additional funds can be acquired.

Balaguer began to lay the groundwork for his campaign as early as 2 October 1965 when teams of party leaders began travelling to

population centers throughout the interior. Although formal campaigning cannot begin prior to 1 March, Balaguer is already touring the countryside and has held one major political rally in Santiago de los Caballeros on 28 November 1965. He intends to devote the early stages of his campaign to the interior, ending with a strong finish in the capital during the final 45 days prior to the election. His party has had considerable success in its efforts to increase its membership through inscription drives and to lay the organizational groundwork for the coming campaign, but is having difficulty in raising new funds and even in collecting financial pledges on which it had relied. Propaganda and public relations mechanisms as well as other campaign necessities such as transportation are still lacking, are expensive to acquire, and obviously need time to develop and coordinate if they are to contribute effectively to the party campaign.

*B. Proposed Measures*

*[6 paragraphs (2½ pages of double-spaced source text) not declassified]*

*4. Security Considerations*

Since the United States is already believed to favor Balaguer and will probably be accused of supporting him regardless of its actions, it is more than ever essential that any support provided to Balaguer be sophisticated, and entirely covert. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*

*[5 paragraphs (9 lines of source text) not declassified]*

*5. Lead Time Requirements*

*[5 paragraphs (1 page of double-spaced source text) not declassified]*

*6. Conclusion*

A. This paper outlines *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*, if so instructed by the 303 Committee, support the candidacy of Balaguer, and highlights the reason why sufficient lead time is important.

B. A sum of *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* would be needed; this amount should cover Balaguer's minimum financial needs while keeping the PR essentially lean and aggressive. *[1 line of source text not declassified]*

C. The security aspects are calculated risks which appear acceptable under the circumstances.

D. Implementation of this plan will await a 303 Committee decision.

**158. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (Broe) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn)**

Washington, February 2, 1966.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic, 1966. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**159. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 11, 1966.

SUBJECT

Report from Bunker on Dominican Situation

Ellsworth Bunker called from Santo Domingo to report that during the course of the night the negotiations took a very good turn and Defense Minister Rivera Caminero agreed to step down. A new man—Colonel Enrique Perez Y Perez—who is quite acceptable to the military leaders, was sworn in this morning as the new Minister of Defense. Bunker expects Rivera Caminero to leave for his assignment in Washington as Naval Attaché either today or tomorrow. After six weeks of very hard bargaining, this is a major, and most welcome, achievement.

Bunker said that Garcia Godoy is planning to make a nationwide TV speech tomorrow night to explain to the Dominican people the understandings which made possible the departure of Rivera Caminero. At this time, he will state that the Army and Air Force Chiefs will remain in their positions provided they obey orders and refrain from political action. Garcia Godoy is hoping, of course, that this decision will be accepted and not lead to further disturbances.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66–4/66. Confidential. An "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Bunker indicated that assuming the change in Defense Ministers leads to a prompt calling-off of the general strike,<sup>2</sup> and Garcia Godoy's decision to maintain the chiefs does not produce a sharp reaction, he plans to return to Washington early next week to report to you. He mentioned specifically his interest in discussing with you the need for withdrawing Tap Bennett as rapidly as possible.

**WGB**

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<sup>2</sup> On January 8 rebel elements headed by Caamaño and Aristy called for a general strike beginning January 10 to force the ouster of armed forces leaders and to prevent the departure of "Constitutionalists."

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**160. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 19, 1966, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Dominican Situation

Ellsworth Bunker says that the situation in the DR continues to improve. The strike is for all purposes over.

Garcia Godoy's success in breaking the strike seems to have given him new courage. In rapid succession he:

1. Warned extremists of the left and right that they face deportation if they continue their disruptive activities.
2. Issued decrees removing 91 provincial and municipal officials who are Bosch partisans. Twenty more changes are due today. Balaguer had complained that there was a serious political imbalance in governmental appointments which put him at a disadvantage in the electoral campaign. The changes are designed to redress the balance and improve the electoral climate.
3. Prepared a decree to be issued today prohibiting private security forces. This hits at some "constitutionalist" leaders, like Hector Aristy, who maintain a small army of personal body-guards. Ex-presidents are exempted to take care of Bosch, but their guards are to be regular policemen.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66–4/66. Confidential. The President wrote "good" with his initial at the bottom of the memorandum.

Ellsworth attributes the sudden change in Garcia Godoy's willingness to act like a President to the stern two and a half hour lecture he gave him last Wednesday<sup>2</sup> morning. Ellsworth thinks the three measures listed above are designed to soften up the military. By reassuring them that the left will be curbed, Garcia Godoy hopes to ease the task of persuading the Air Force and Army Chiefs to leave voluntarily. Only time will tell whether it works.

McG. B.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a meeting between Bunker and Garcia Godoy held the morning of February 16. In a February 16 memorandum Bowdler informed Bundy of this meeting which dealt with Godoy's February 15 decision to resign and Bunker's efforts to convince him not to do "anything precipitous." (Ibid.)

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**161. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 24, 1966, noon.

SUBJECT

DR Situation

Ellsworth Bunker reports that Garcia Godoy is making slow but continuing progress in persuading the Army and Air Force Chiefs to step down. In talks yesterday, Army Chief Martinez Arana indicated his willingness to retire rather than to accept a post on the Armed Forces General Staff, as Garcia Godoy had offered. Air Chief de los Santos is still holding out, but his confidence may have been shaken. Behind Garcia Godoy's progress has been his success in winning the support of an important group of ranking officers who are far-sighted enough to see that the interest of the Armed Forces are better served by meeting Garcia Godoy's wishes rather than by risking a clash.

Talks with the two Chiefs are continuing this morning. Ellsworth, as of noon, did not have a reading on how they had gone. Garcia Godoy cancelled his radio-TV speech last night in the hopes that he can go on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66-4/66. Secret.



the air tonight and announce that the problem of the Chiefs has been resolved. Ellsworth is not at all sure that he will be able to do this.

Garcia Godoy told Ellsworth last night that he will shortly be taking additional measures to improve the electoral climate. He mentioned:

1. A request to the Supreme Court to replace extremist judges.
2. Removal of some governmental legal functionaries, including prosecuting attorneys.
3. A request to the OAS Electoral Commission to return to the DR and remain during the electoral period (March 1–June 1).

As we approach the start of electoral period, our [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] FBI sources in Santo Domingo are picking up an increasing number of reports that Bosch would like to see the elections postponed for several months because of what he describes as the existing state of political insecurity. We have also received several reports that Garcia Godoy would be interested in a plebiscite to extend the life of the Provisional Government for a couple of years, believing that neither Bosch nor Balaguer could provide stability. It is very likely that Bosch would like to have more time in which to recoup some of his losses. We have nothing directly from Garcia Godoy, but as he sees his term drawing to a close, he may be thinking that the taste of power is not so bad after all.

McG. B.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

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**162. Memorandum From the Representative to the Organization of American States (Bunker) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 9, 1966.

SUBJECT

Current Situation in the Dominican Republic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66–4/66. Confidential. An “L” on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Bunker departed the Dominican Republic and arrived in Washington for consultations on March 4.

In my judgment there are now grounds for cautious optimism with respect to the chances of holding satisfactory elections in the Dominican Republic on June 1 as scheduled.

Garcia Godoy has made it clear that he considers the politico-military crisis which began December 19 with the Hotel Matum incident to have ended February 26 on the swearing-in of new Army and Air Force Chiefs.<sup>2</sup> In his view, these and the previous changes in the high commands of the Armed Forces and the Police will make it possible to ensure an attitude of impartiality and obedience to civil authority during the campaign period on the part of the military establishment. I see no reason why this should not be true, particularly given the qualities of leadership and political moderation already displayed by the new Minister of the Armed Forces and the new Chief of the National Police.

Another encouraging development is the fact that political leaders and the people as a whole have obviously become increasingly convinced that the elections will be held. Right-wing parties (including notably the National Civic Union) which previously specialized in conspiracies to overthrow the Provisional Government have now announced plans to participate in the elections. Balaguer's Reformist Party is already engaged in full-scale campaigning and the rightist group behind the candidacy of ex-President Bonnelly has begun canvassing in the northern part of the country. We are presently completing arrangements to assure that the OAS Electoral Advisory Commission is on the ground during the entire campaign period. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission will also maintain a presence and is considering a plan to bring all its members to the Dominican Republic for the month of May.

The two principal problems remaining are the threat of Juan Bosch to boycott the elections and the continuing danger that violence and terrorism will disrupt the campaign. These two problems are closely related. Bosch asserts almost daily that a systematic campaign of violence is being carried out against his followers. Although there is a strong element of exaggeration in his charges, it is true that members of his party and other "Constitutionalists" have been harassed, beaten and even killed for their political beliefs. In addition, there appears to be little doubt that members of the Armed Forces and National Police have been involved in these outrages.

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1994 from Santo Domingo, February 25, Bunker reported that Garcia Godoy and high-level military officers had agreed to a formula to solve the military composition problem. The formula called for De Los Santos and Martinez to be "promoted" to Vice Ministers of Armed Forces and for Osiris Perdomo to be the new Army Chief, and Juan Folch Perez to be the new Air Force Chief. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 6 DOM REP)

We believe it most important that Bosch's party, the PRD, participate in the elections in order to make them meaningful and acceptable to the largest possible number of Dominicans. (In our view it would be satisfactory and perhaps even desirable if someone other than Bosch were to be the presidential candidate, although there seems to be little chance of his giving way. It might also be possible to live with elections in which there was no PRD presidential candidate but in which the party did participate on the local and congressional levels.) Garcia Godoy is also anxious to have the PRD go to elections and, while recognizing that Bosch may continue threatening abstention as a political tactic, wants to do what can be done to eliminate legitimate causes for alleging that a proper electoral climate does not exist.

Shootings and other acts of violence will, of course, continue. With so many weapons in the hands of civilians and such a large residue of hate from the civil war, nothing else can be expected. Nevertheless, I believe Garcia Godoy can establish, with our cooperation and that of his military leaders, minimal conditions necessary for free campaigning. We are presently working with him on arrangements to ensure adequate Armed Forces' backing for the National Police in the event the extreme left is again able to provoke serious disturbances in downtown Santo Domingo. (It is our hope that the Inter-American Peace Force can ultimately be relegated to the role of a backup only to be called upon in extreme emergencies.) We will also continue to press him on the need to take decisive action to end right-wing terrorism.

If all goes well and we get to election on schedule, I estimate Balaguer's chances to be good. Although Bonnelly will obviously take votes away from him on the right, the former's entry into the campaign gives Balaguer the opportunity to come out as the candidate of the center where most of the votes are probably to be found. In any event, I believe we must continue our intensive efforts to bring off the elections on schedule. There is no other acceptable way to resolve our short-term problems in the Dominican Republic. I also believe that our interests will best be served by the earliest possible withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force following the installation of an elected government.

**Ellsworth Bunker<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**163. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 12, 1966, 11 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

At 1100, 12 March, Meeting was held in The Office of Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson to Discuss the Election Situation in the Dominican Republic

**PRESENT**

Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson  
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker  
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon  
Ambassador Henry Koren  
Mr. Robert Sayre  
Mr. Robert Adams  
Mr. William Bowdler  
Mr. William V. Broe

1. Mr. Sayre opened the meeting with a presentation describing the political parties and entities that are or could be involved in the June election.

2. A lengthy discussion was then held regarding U.S. Government support to Balaguer [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. Ambassador Gordon raised the point that Ambassador Stewart was not in favor of any U.S. participation in the election, but that he, Gordon, had read all the papers and was of the opinion we should support Balaguer. The writer reviewed the past discussions regarding U.S. Government participation including the President's statements to the DCI and the DDCI. The writer emphasized the risk involved due to the sensitive political milieu of the Dominican Republic. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*]

3. The writer raised the point that the most important basic aspects of the election were to be sure that Garcia-Godoy carried out the election in line with the Institutional Act and; secondly, the need to get out the vote, especially in the rural areas. The writer discussed the voting situation in great detail including the election carnet problem; need for use of indelible ink; lack of support to the OAS Election Commission; the personality of Angel Liz;<sup>2</sup> need for a Dominican civic group to support the government's efforts in the election, etc. The need to put continual pressure on Garcia-Godoy was emphasized as it was quite

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 78-5505, Box 4/4, Folder 79. Secret. Drafted by Broe on March 14 and a copy was sent to the CIA Deputy Director for Plans.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary of State for Justice under the Council of State that governed the Dominican Republic from 1962 until February 27, 1963.

evident Ambassador Bunker believes the election procedures are on track and Garcia-Godoy has the situation in hand. Ambassador Bunker advised that there would be fifty observers to supervise the actual elections.

4. There was a detailed discussion concerning the necessity for Bosch and the PRD to participate in the election. It was agreed the most important issue was to have PRD participation in any event. It was agreed that probably Bosch could not get the PRD out of the race but a boycott by him or a partial boycott by the PRD would be highly undesirable. The writer stressed all of the unfortunate aspects of a Bosch victory to the U.S. and to the future stability of the Dominican Republic. It is interesting to note that, not in rebuttal to the above, but later in the conversation, Ambassador Bunker opined that if Bosch was elected the new military could work out a *modus vivendi* with him. The Ambassador also stated he believed Bosch had “learned from a previous experience” and would comport accordingly, if elected.

5. There was a general discussion as to methods to be used to keep Bosch in the presidential race. Approaches to Venezuela, Oduber, Figueres, the Mexican Government and possibly Frei to ask them to urge Bosch to stay in the race were discussed. The writer pointed out that this was dangerous business, especially to the Venezuelans as they could get the impression we favored Bosch and pour in substantial support. Up to now, the Venezuelans had kept hands off as they have been disgusted with the Bosch/Miolan bickering. ARA will consider such approaches. Ambassador Bunker suggested that we pay Bosch to stay in the race. He felt that a sum in the neighborhood of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would suffice. Mr. Sayre and the writer opposed this. Ambassador Bunker stated that he would like to explore the feasibility of this [*1 line of source text not declassified*].<sup>3</sup>

6. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson reviewed the situation and stated that, in his opinion, there were four main elements concerning the Dominican Republic election:

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<sup>3</sup> In an April 7 memorandum to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Helms clarified this issue: “I agree with you that the minutes of the 303 meeting of 28 March 1966 are somewhat unclear on the question of support to Bosch. ‘On the problem of Bosch, it was agreed that ARA would sound out the possibility of soliciting the support of other countries to keep him from pulling out.’ This reference overtook the previous suggestion that Ambassador Bunker would explore the possibility of getting some money to Bosch. In sum, there is no question of the United States Government clandestinely funding Bosch’s campaign.” Helms continued, “I am aware of the dangers a Bosch victory would entail, but every effort is being made to see this does not happen. There is general agreement that the best course is to have Bosch run initially, and if he withdraws with a cry of fraud, there is nothing that can be done about it.” No record of the March 28 303 Committee meeting has been found. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302)

- a. Get out the vote, especially the rural vote;
- b. Participation of Bosch and the PRD in the election;<sup>4</sup>
- c. Keeping Garcia-Godoy from backsliding on holding the election in accordance with the Institutional Act; and
- d. Support to Balaguer.

He stated that he felt from the conversations that there are definite lines of endeavor either in being or proposed to push forward on the four elements and that he agreed with the current efforts and those contemplated.

**William V. Broe<sup>5</sup>**

*Chief*

*Western Hemisphere Division*

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<sup>4</sup> At this point the following handwritten notation appears on the right margin: "Not too important in my view."

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Broe signed the original.

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## **164. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, March 17, 1966.

### **SUBJECT**

Visit to Bosch of Ambassadors Bunker and Bennett

### **PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Bunker

C. Allan Stewart, Director of Country Affairs, CAR

Ambassador Bunker telephoned on the morning of March 17 to report on a conversation with Juan Bosch last night at the latter's home outside Santo Domingo.<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador said that the meeting he and Ambassador Bennett had with Bosch late yesterday afternoon was cordial, with Dr. Bosch conducting himself with dignity.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stewart.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2126 from Santo Domingo, March 16, Bunker summarized for the President his meeting with Bosch earlier that day. (Ibid., POL 14 DOM REP)

Ambassador Bunker went into considerable detail about the forthcoming elections. He explained that the United States Government and the OAS were doing their utmost to assist Provisional President Garcia Godoy in creating a climate which would permit all candidates to campaign freely. He said that the President, the vice-president, the chiefs of the armed forces and police are eager to see that the proper conditions can be established and are working to this end, especially in impressing upon the armed forces the necessity of being impartial and aloof from political activity. Ambassador Bunker said this could not be done overnight, but that great progress had been made. Dr. Bosch agreed that conditions had improved.

Ambassador Bunker informed Dr. Bosch that the OAS electoral commission will return to the Dominican Republic on Monday<sup>3</sup> and that full membership of the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Committee would be arriving in May with considerable additional personnel.

It is the policy of the United States Government, Ambassador Bunker said, that it will recognize and support a freely elected government, and he was certain that he spoke for all OAS members in declaring this too was their policy. He said the United States had no favorite among the presidential candidates and fully expected that the voters could make their choice on June 1 without fear or hindrance. It is our hope, the Ambassador added, that a democratic, constitutional government will be installed on July 1.

Dr. Bosch, while admitting progress, did not think there was time enough to achieve the necessary climate for elections by June 1. For instance, he was not certain that his PRD could safely hold a convention of 500 people in Santo Domingo to choose their candidates. Asked why the convention could not be held elsewhere, Dr. Bosch said other cities did not have adequate convention facilities. Ambassador Bunker expressed the belief that if it were made a matter of pride in carrying out their responsibilities, the Provisional President and Secretary of the Armed Forces would provide the necessary security, even if it involved use of the IAPF. Dr. Bosch said the holding of the convention was a great responsibility for him and he feared the communists might resort to violence with the large quantity of weapons they have in their possession. Ambassador Bunker reminded Dr. Bosch that part of the responsibility for the large number of loose weapons rested with Col. Caamano, who had deceived the Provisional President when the latter tried to collect them.

Bosch did not commit himself the one way or the other about the chances of PRD participating in the campaign.

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<sup>3</sup> March 21.

(Ambassador Bunker reported, however, that the PRD is campaigning all over the country at present. He also reported that President Garcia Godoy had issued a decree last night cancelling the commissions of a number of civilians "assimilated" into the military. Among the persons affected is Maximo Fiallo. He also stated that the government had begun to replace with police private guards who have been protecting Manolo Bordas, PRD, and Hector Aristy, promoter of the 24th of April movement. This is the first step in replacing private armed personnel with police for other prominent Dominicans.)

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**165. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1966, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Preliminary Readout of Dominican Poll

The preliminary results of the February–March poll in the Dominican Republic show few differences with the November poll, and the differences which do occur do not affect the standing of the main candidates.

—Balaguer still leads Bosch by better than 2 to 1 (50.4% to 21%). This represents a drop of .6% for Balaguer from the November poll and 1.0% for Bosch.

—In party strength, Balaguer's PR party leads Bosch's PRD party by 41.6% to 21.6%. This represents a drop of 0.6% for the PR from the November poll and 7.4% for the PRD.

—On the issue of our military intervention, 63.2% of the Dominicans continue to think that it helped. In November the figure was 65%.

—On the IAPF departing, 46.1% of the people now think that the Force should stay beyond elections, an increase of 7.5% over the November poll.

Two important factors must be borne in mind in assessing the figures on the candidates and their parties:

—The poll does *not* cover a period when Bosch was actively campaigning—and he is a formidable campaigner.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 21. Secret; Eyes Only. An "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. A copy was sent to Bill Moyers.



—The poll's percentages are based on the assumption that the population of *actual* voters does not differ significantly from the population of *eligible* voters.<sup>2</sup>

A large voter turnout—particularly in rural areas where Balaguer's strength is concentrated—is essential to Balaguer's chances. CIA, State, Bunker and the Embassy are keenly aware of this and know that a substantial portion of their homework lies in this direction. I am satisfied that they are hard at it, and Garcia Godoy is cooperating fully. But a reminder by you to Ellsworth when you next see him would not be amiss.

A copy of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] report is attached.<sup>3</sup>

WGB

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<sup>2</sup> Komer commented on this paragraph and wrote the following note at the bottom of the page: "I'm asking Bowdler to look at pros and cons of surfacing this."

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

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## 166. Memorandum From the Representative to the Organization of American States (Bunker) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 26, 1966.

### SUBJECT

Current Situation in the Dominican Republic

A number of factors have contributed to a gradual but steady improvement in the situation since the date of my last report, March 7.<sup>2</sup> I believe that the grounds for cautious optimism with respect to the chances of holding elections on June 1 which I then expressed have been further strengthened.

Acts of terrorism and violence have markedly declined. The new Minister of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the National Police have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66–4/66. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Bunker originally dated his memorandum March 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Country Files: Lot 70 D 209, Dominican Republic) An identical copy that went to the President was dated March 9; see Document 162.

made it clear, through their public pronouncements and their actions, that they are determined that their respective Services shall maintain an attitude of strict impartiality and discipline throughout the electoral period, that they shall remain aloof from political activities of any kind, and shall be responsive to civil authority. Changes in local commands have been made where there has been evidence of lack of adequate co-operation. The National Police have initiated and continue a search for weapons in the hands of civilians and almost daily report recoveries of weapons and ammunition. I believe that, barring some now unforeseen acts of violence by the extremes of either Left or Right, the atmosphere of tranquility which now prevails can be maintained.

There is growing evidence that the people as a whole not only want to see elections take place on June 1 but have become increasingly convinced the elections will be held. Despite doubts expressed by Bosch a short time ago that the climate in the city of Santo Domingo was sufficiently tranquil to enable his Party (PRD) to hold its convention,<sup>3</sup> he announced on March 18 that the Party convention would be held in Santo Domingo on April 9-10 and would then determine whether or not to participate in the elections. It is my opinion that pressure building up within the PRD will lead to a decision to participate in the elections with or without Bosch as a presidential candidate. I believe that it is important that it should do so in order to make the elections meaningful and acceptable to the largest possible number of Dominicans. Another Party, the PRSC (Social Christian Revolutionary Party) has also announced that it intends to participate in the elections and will hold its convention on April 3 to decide on its candidates.

A further development which has contributed to stability and tranquility is the departure of a substantial number of ex-constitutionalist military either to posts or training abroad. By the end of this week all of the high-ranking ex-constitutionalist officers with the exception of the Camp Commander will have left the 27th of February Camp for posts abroad. Garcia Godoy hopes to be able to close out the Camp, the personnel of which now consists almost entirely of enlisted men and non-commissioned officers, by offering the remaining personnel pay with leave of absence until the elected government takes office, and seems confident that the offer will be accepted.

Within a generally more optimistic frame for the country as a whole, the University remains a matter for concern, the new Rector and Administration having confirmed a substantial number of extreme leftist professors. Because of the University autonomy, established both by law and generally by tradition in Latin America, the problem of cor-

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 164.

recting the situation will be a difficult one for the incoming Administration. It is possible, however, that since a new Constitution must be written after the elected government takes over, the problem can be coped with at that time.

If the present climate prevails and we get to elections on schedule, I continue to estimate that Balaguer's chances are good. He remains, I believe, more than ever the candidate of the center where most of the votes are probably to be found. While Bonnelly will take votes away from him on the right, the PRSC, if it runs an independent ticket as now seems probable, should detract from the votes of Bosch's party (PRD). The 14th of June Movement, declared illegal in December, 1963, has petitioned the Central Electoral Board for recognition as a political party. The Board has declared a decision outside its competence and has referred the matter to the President.

In view of the favorable electoral climate created by the situation described above, I believe that we must continue our intensive efforts to bring off the elections on schedule. Toward this objective, members of the OAS Electoral Commission are already in the Dominican Republic, OAS observers who will witness the voting process are being recruited and, at the invitation of Garcia Godoy, we are cooperating in the preparation and dissemination of publicity directed toward getting out the largest possible vote.

As mentioned in my previous memorandum, I believe that our interests will best be served by the earliest possible withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force. Depending on the outcome of the elections, it may be possible to withdraw the IAPF before the elected government is installed. If this is not possible, we should look toward its withdrawal as soon as possible following the installation of the elected government.

**Ellsworth Bunker**

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**167. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to President Johnson**

Washington, March 31, 1966.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302. Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

**168. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Deputy Director (Denney)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1966.

SUBJECT

Regular CIA-ARA Meeting, 6 April 1966

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Ambassador Gordon and Messrs. Fitzgibbons and Kubisch;<sup>2</sup> CIA—Messrs. Broe, Esterline and Phillips; INR/DDC—Mr. Gardner

Most of the meeting was spent on the Dominican Republic. The remainder was taken up with a discussion of the situation produced by Brazil's arrest of 4 Americans on smuggling charges. Mr. Kubisch, Director of the Office of Brazilian Affairs in ARA, was present during this part of the discussion only.

*Dominican Republic*

The exchanges on the Dominican Republic were materially enriched by the presence of Phillips, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The following emerged:

1) Gordon noted ARA's concurrence with Phillips' point that the return from London of Caamano would be dangerous principally because of the disturbances it would provoke, and not because of the possibility that Caamano might decide to enter the election contest in some capacity. There was some talk about how Caamano might be prevented from returning, but no really helpful thought was advanced.<sup>3</sup>

2) Another pre-election poll has been run. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] Gardner gathered during the discussion the poll still puts Balaguer ahead by almost the same measure as before, and that the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1966. Secret. Drafted by James R. Gardner on April 8. Also addressed to Allan Evans, INR Deputy Director for Research.

<sup>2</sup> Jack B. Kubisch, Director, Office of Brazil Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> In an April 4 memorandum Rostow informed the President of Caamaño's interest in returning to the Dominican Republic and Bosch's statement to a U.S. source that he intended to propose to the PRD that it nominate Caamaño to run for President in his place. Rostow discounted Bosch's statement and thought the danger of Caamaño's running would be the "disruptive influence that it would have on the presently good and improving electoral climate." In terms of the elections themselves, he would adversely affect Balaguer's chances only if he were to become Bosch's running mate. President Johnson wrote: "I'd stop [Caamaño]. Don't let him back. L." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66-4/66)

conservative movement for National Integration (MIN) candidate, Raphael Bonnelly, had moved up from 1% to 3½%. Bonnelly is probably stronger than these figures indicate, because a substantial part of the poll in rural areas was taken before Bonnelly's candidacy had been announced.

3) There was concern voiced by both sides about getting out the vote. Garcia Godoy is cooperating in the effort to arouse people to vote, and there is some prospect that the cumbersome election process will be simplified, thus enhancing the prospects of substantial rural voting.

4) Phillips spoke with admiration of Bunker, saying that Bunker was for a time the only man on the island who thought the Provisional Government would make it. Bunker was in fact largely responsible for the Government's survival. Garcia Godoy is in consequence grateful to Bunker and amenable to his advice and guidance.

5) Phillips said that there had been an almost overnight cessation of terrorism and that the pause had lasted now for 5 or 6 weeks. The principal reason for the break in the series of terroristic attacks was the new chief of police, who had clamped down firmly on the rightists. Phillips pointed out that the rightists had consistently directed their attacks against the PRD; there was not one instance of an attempt against a Communist.

6) Phillips noted that during the past week there had been a marked upsurge in vocalized sentiment that Bosch was a sure winner. Gordon noted with some distaste that this might well create an important band wagon psychology for Bosch, and urged that something be done to promote countervailing assertions that Balaguer was a certain winner.

7) There was agreement that we were working with a delicate problem—giving substantial support to a candidate (Balaguer) who did not know that he was getting it.

8) Phillips said that he had no doubt that the vote would be large enough to be meaningful, and that the PRD would field a candidate. The uncertain point was whether Bosch would run himself. It was impossible to forecast who or which party would win—the polls might be accurate enough as of now, but the Dominican Republic was a never-never land and anything might happen.

9) Broe suggested, and Gordon concurred, that there should be a united effort by the members of the massive country team that we have in the Dominican Republic to keep a timely temperature chart on what was happening in the Dominican Republic, especially in regard to the elections.

10) In response to Gordon's question, Phillips said that if Bosch were to win it would produce a very sticky situation for us, but not one as sticky as many people feared. We could live with him.

[Omitted here is brief discussion of Brazil.]

**169. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 11, 1966, 3 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Recent Dominican Developments

In the past four days these favorable developments have taken place in the DR which should help in maintaining a stable electoral climate and in encouraging a heavy voter turnout:

1. The Electoral Tribunal formally eliminated the troublesome special electoral card as a voting requirement. The identity card, which all Dominicans are required to have, will be used instead.

2. The Provisional Government waived usual fees for first-time applicants for identity cards and for replacement in certain cases. It will also permit voters to vote at their actual precinct of residence, even though the required changes of residence has not yet been entered on their identity card.

3. The PRD convention nominated Juan Bosch and Antonio Guzman to head the ticket. Both accepted. (Bosch was not successful in persuading Caamano to be his running-mate. Caamano has not returned to the DR.)

4. Garcia Godoy issued a public appeal for a peaceful celebration of the anniversary of the revolution on April 24. He warned extremists that the Government knows who is behind planned "acts of agitation." (Bunker has been urging him not to allow the "Constitutionalists" to pre-empt the anniversary celebrations and to make it clear to agitators of both extremes that he will not tolerate disturbances.)

**Walt**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66-4/66. Confidential. Notations on the memorandum indicate it was received at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on April 12 at 4:30 p.m. and that the President saw it. President Johnson flew to his ranch April 7 and stayed there until he departed April 14 for a visit to Mexico City where he dedicated a statue of Abraham Lincoln. President Johnson returned to Washington April 15 at 7:40 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

**170. Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1966.

1. Assistant Secretary Gordon should orally inform his staff not to make any statements which would be helpful to Bosch. The best thing for State Department officers to do between now and the June 1 elections is to clam up. If it is necessary for the Department to comment, we should say in essence that we support the efforts of the OAS to bring about free elections and do not wish to speculate on the results. We are also being asked whether this means that we would support whoever is elected. Our response should be that our assistance to Latin American countries is based on the Charter of Punta del Este, especially the self-help provisions of that Charter. Any assistance to the Dominican Republic would be governed by the same criteria.

2. *[11 lines of source text not declassified]*

3. The flow of funds to Balaguer should be kept under close review by Mr. Gordon and Mr. FitzGerald and such additional sums supplied as may be necessary.

4. *[2½ lines of source text not declassified]*

5. Election procedures in the Dominican Republic should be constantly and carefully reviewed to make certain that rural voters will have a chance to get to the polls and vote and that there are adequate safeguards at the polls to avoid manipulations adverse to Balaguer's interests.

6. *[8 lines of source text not declassified]*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Dominican Republic Elections—1966. Top Secret. An attached covering note from Bromley Smith indicates this paper was from Mann and that Smith put it in the President's file.

## 171. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 86.2-66

Washington, April 28, 1966.

### PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

#### The Problem

To estimate the situation in the Dominican Republic and the prospects for stability during the next year or two.

#### Conclusions

A. Prospects in the Dominican Republic are discouraging. Long-standing social, economic, and political problems have been exacerbated by the events of 1965, and no easy solutions or sure roads to progress are in sight.

B. Even so, conditions have stabilized enough so that chances of holding the scheduled elections on 1 June 1966 are good. If Bosch and Balaguer remain in the race to the end, as now seems likely, the voters will have a representative choice. The contest between the two men appears close at present, and we cannot predict the outcome with any confidence.<sup>2</sup>

C. The winner will probably face major elements on the other side who remain unreconciled to the outcome even if the elections are relatively fair and free. Balaguer's prospects for being inaugurated and for surviving in office under these circumstances would probably be better than those of Bosch. But in either case, we believe the political prospects are for further tension, instability and disorder.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Dominican Republic. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on April 28. In an April 28 memorandum to Raborn, Helms wrote: "I seriously question whether the Estimate on 'Prospects for Stability in the Dominican Republic' should go before the Board today. a) The election is only a little more than a month away, i.e. 1 June. b) NIE's have not been used traditionally to predict elections, and this one certainly does not. c) The basic instability, economic, political, etc., will still be present in the country after the election." Helms continued, "I suggest, therefore, that this paper be held until some time in June." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Chron Files, Job 80-B01285A, January 1-June 30, 1966, Box 11)

<sup>2</sup> Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., for The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the net balance of advantages and weaknesses of the candidates as described in paragraphs 18-30 of this paper gives the edge to Bosch. [Footnote in the source text.]



D. The continued presence of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) would serve to stabilize the situation; on the other hand it would tend to promote exaggerated nationalism and anti-US feeling, and over time might become a factor for instability. After the elections and inauguration of the new president, we believe that pressures for removal of the IAPF will increase on the part of elements within the D.R., the Latin American governments whose troops are involved, and public opinion in the hemisphere.

E. Balaguer would probably provide the country a steadier and abler group of administrators than Bosch would. But whatever government comes to power will be faced with social, political, and economic problems so intractable that any significant progress over the next year or two will be extremely difficult—and without foreign aid, impossible. Even with continuing infusions of US aid and other external credit assistance, the Dominican economy in 1966 and 1967 is unlikely to do much more than regain pre-1965 levels. The government will almost certainly take some tentative steps toward agricultural development, improved education, and more efficient operations in the large state-owned sector of the economy; however, reform measures of the type required for sustained economic growth can hardly be implemented without a prolonged period of political stability.

### Discussion

#### *I. Background*

1. The Dominican Republic is a benighted nation—politically primitive, economically and socially backward, and full of fear and hate. Inevitably the burdens from its past weigh heavily on the prospects for its future.

2. Since the end of Spanish colonial rule in 1821, the Dominican people have passed nearly a quarter of their history under occupations by foreign military forces (Haitian, Spanish, US). When the country has been independent, it has known only turmoil and civil war or military dictatorship. Repressive and brutal rule have been the norm, and life has been held cheap. The currents of social change and cultural enlightenment which have swept across many Latin American countries have scarcely touched the Dominican Republic.

3. The last dictatorial rule—the 30 years of Trujillo which ended only with his assassination in 1961—left a particularly deep imprint. The Trujillo reign not only prevented the development of political leaders and normal political life; it bred fresh hatreds and held back progress in nearly every sphere, except the economic, where there was modest growth. Much of the economic progress was designed for show, however, or was for the benefit of the Trujillo family or close associates, and did little to improve the welfare of the average Dominican.

Partly as a result of the Trujillo era, the political fabric is permeated with mutual distrust, and there is a wide gulf between the small upper-class minority and the great bulk of the population, which is ignorant and poverty-stricken. Dissatisfaction has increased as the Dominican peasants and workers have become more aware of their underprivileged condition.

4. Some two-thirds of the people live in the countryside, most of them scraping a mere subsistence from small plots of land. Less than half the Dominicans are literate, only about 10 percent have managed to complete elementary school, few have acquired any technical training, and there is a marked shortage of skilled workmen. Moreover, there is an acute shortage of managerial and executive talent, and generally a lack of energetic, persistent application to problems, particularly those of a routine and undramatic nature. Although almost all Dominicans have some mixture of Negro and Spanish blood, there is nevertheless a strong tendency for those of lighter skin to look down on the darker ones. The poor of the city streets are often called *negritos*, and political movements seeking mass appeal sometimes refer to upper-class political groups as "the whites."

5. The Dominicans have had one of the highest sustained rates of population growth in the world.<sup>3</sup> This, of course, greatly complicates any efforts to promote economic or educational progress. It also may have political effects, especially over the longer term. More than half the population is now less than 18 years old; the young people, many of them not reconciled like their parents to docile acceptance of minimal living standards, are likely to be a major force for political change.

6. The Dominican military establishment, though it has recently been undergoing change, is still essentially a conservative force, which in the post-Trujillo period has tended to align itself with elements of the civilian elite.<sup>4</sup> Under Trujillo the armed forces had become a praetorian guard ensuring the dictator's absolute control over almost every aspect of life. In return they received certain perquisites, including a share in Trujillo's institutionalized system of graft. Over the past several years a number of the most reactionary and corrupt senior officers have been displaced, and some of the younger, US-trained officers seem to be developing a sense of professionalism and responsibility. Even

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<sup>3</sup> Their reproductive rates have been close to the limits of human fertility. The 1960 census recorded a total population of 3,013,525, an increase of 42 percent over 1950. The current population is estimated at 3.7 million. The growth rate is 3.5 percent a year; given some improvement in present low standards of health and sanitation, this may go still higher. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>4</sup> Personnel strength of the Dominican military is approximately as follows: army 11,600, navy 3,750, air force 3,750. The national police have about 7,830 men. [Footnote in the source text.]

so, the military—or major groups within it—will probably continue to regard themselves as the arbiters of Dominican politics and remain ready to intervene if they think the occasion requires it.

## *II. The Economic Predicament*

7. The Dominican Republic is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, depending chiefly on agriculture, which accounts for 40 percent of GNP and employs two-thirds of the labor force. Its assets include some of the most fertile land in the Caribbean, a climate suitable to the cultivation of a wide range of crops, a primary road system linking all major agricultural regions, and an extensive, though poorly maintained, irrigation system in the arid western part of the country. Bauxite deposits are being mined, and there are small deposits of iron ore and nickel. The stock of other physical resources, however, is small. There are no exploitable deposits of petroleum or coal, and the hydroelectric power potential is limited. Moreover, arable land is limited in extent, and the ratio of population to arable land is one of the highest in the hemisphere. Output of the economy has been kept low by a small stock of capital (including a general lack of transportation facilities in rural areas, a lack of storage facilities at market centers, and little manufacturing capacity), by the application of only rudimentary forms of technology throughout much of industry and most of agriculture, and by a general lack of technical and managerial skills.

8. Dominican foreign exchange earnings and general economic activity are heavily dependent on agricultural exports, principally sugar. About two-thirds of the sugar industry is government-owned. Production costs in these state-owned sugar enterprises are so high that exports would be profitable for them only when world prices are extraordinarily high. Prices have been low since the end of 1964 and seem likely to remain so. The country's vulnerability to fluctuations in export prices is increased by its heavy dependence on imports, including many important staple foods such as rice and beans, and almost all capital goods, fuels, industrial raw materials, and consumer durables.

9. In terms of standard of living, the Dominicans are better off than the Haitians. With that exception they rank with the poorest among the inadequately fed, housed, doctored, and educated Latin American populations.<sup>5</sup> There has been a modest improvement in consumption standards over the past several years, but the D.R. has been plagued by a consistently high level of unemployment and underemployment.

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<sup>5</sup> In 1964 per capita gross national product (GNP) in the Dominican Republic was some \$245 or about \$100 below the average for Latin American countries. While a considerable number of Dominicans are well-off as compared with this low standard, there are no longer many families who are very rich. [Footnote in the source text.]

10. The Dominican economy, which had shown generally rapid growth in the period after World War II, has done badly since 1958. Initially, this was caused by Trujillo's use of an austerity program to gain foreign exchange to build up the Trujillo family fortune outside the country. The policy actions of post-Trujillo governments, which included governmental efforts to reduce unemployment by means of increased budgetary expenditures and hiring by state-owned enterprises<sup>6</sup> and which permitted a rapid rise in real wages, generated demand for goods far beyond the economy's capacity to produce or buy abroad. Political instability caused private investors to be reluctant to increase capacity in response to this demand. Moreover, the use of state enterprises as a "national patrimony" to provide increased employment led to sharp reductions in public sector savings and investment. A sustained period of rapid price rises and increasingly severe balance of payments difficulties ensued.

11. The rebellion in April 1965 made these problems more acute at the same time that it lessened the ability of the government to deal with them. The GNP dipped some 15 percent in 1965; the drop in per capita GNP was 18 percent, though the decline in individual welfare was not that severe. This was partly because of the US emergency feeding program which for several months reached 18 percent of the Dominicans. Even so, unemployment increased from perhaps 20 percent of the labor force to about 30 percent. The deficit in the government's budget rose somewhat over its level in 1963 or 1964.

12. A particular difficulty in 1965 which augurs ill for the future was a sharp decrease in earnings from Dominican exports—down \$58 million from the \$180 million total of 1964. About half the drop was caused by a decline in sugar production as a result both of the rebellion and of the low world market price. Sugar output fell from 910,000 short tons of raw sugar in 1964 to only 620,000 in 1965. However, the combination of US aid<sup>7</sup> and a reduction in the level of Dominican imports prevented further deterioration in the balance of payments.

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<sup>6</sup> State enterprises in the D.R.—most of them former holdings of the Trujillo family—account for about half the country's industrial capital and perhaps a fourth of the most productive agricultural land. Cuba is the only country in the hemisphere which has a higher concentration of means of production in the hands of the state. In the D.R. this has meant that government policy is the decisive factor in most economic matters and that politics and economics are more thoroughly intertwined than generally is the case. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>7</sup> About \$96 million in US aid to the D.R. was disbursed in 1965. This was slightly more than twice the level of 1964. Small amounts of assistance from other sources brought the total for the D.R. in 1965 to \$105 million. [Footnote in the source text.]

*III. The Political Arena*

13. The D.R. has had no experience in achieving political compromise through representative institutions. Its political attitudes and organizations have not progressed far; the parties are generally young and highly personalistic. A large proportion of the people, especially of the rural peasantry, is not politically conscious. In the D.R.'s first free elections in December 1962, Juan Bosch polled some 58 percent of the vote; yet when the Dominican military leaders ousted Bosch in September 1963, there were no significant public demonstrations of protest. In fact some Dominicans continue to yearn for the old days of stability under Trujillo, "the Benefactor."

14. The rebellion accelerated the process of political awakening in the D.R. and widened the gulf between the various conservative groupings on the one hand and the various parties of the left on the other. The senior military leaders did not oppose the overthrow of the Reid Cabral government at the outset of the revolt on 24–25 April. But when they realized that the coup was leading toward a restoration of President Bosch and the constitution of 1963, their reaction swiftly transformed the situation into a civil war, pitting the most militant elements of the left and right against each other. There is no doubt that the extreme leftists played a key role on the side of the "constitutionalists" when the fighting was at its height and that subsequently they have engaged in terrorist activities. Nor is there any doubt that elements of the extreme right have conducted terrorist operations in recent months, which have been particularly directed against members of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and against former "constitutionalist" military figures.

15. Garcia Godoy, President of the Provisional Government which came to power in September 1965, has given top priority to efforts to reconcile the adversaries of the conflict. An experienced diplomat and a man of decent, liberal instincts, though not particularly forceful, Garcia Godoy quickly came under fire from political conservatives and military chiefs for his responsiveness to the demands of the "constitutionalists" and his appointment of a number of men of various leftist hues to important government posts. Indeed the strong support of OAS officials and of the Inter-American Peace Force<sup>8</sup> was required to prevent a military coup against the provisional president within his first two months of office. The IAPF likewise played a key role in opening up the zone of the city previously controlled by "constitutionalist" forces and in supporting other measures aimed at restoring order.

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<sup>8</sup> IAPF troop strength at its peak was about 23,000. It is now about 7,500 of whom 5,750 are US personnel and most of the remainder Brazilian. The Force Commander is Brazilian General Alvaro Alves da Silva Braga. [Footnote in the source text.]

16. In a sense, the primary contribution of the provisional government has been to provide a "cooling-off" period. That it could undertake few policy initiatives and that it could not manage a complete restoration of civil order was of less immediate importance than its ability simply to survive one crisis after another. Even to send a number of "constitutionalist" military leaders and some top-ranking officers of the regular military establishment to assignments outside the country involved a protracted struggle. Garcia Godoy was unable to work this out according to his original plan. He did, however, succeed in sending abroad the key "constitutionalist" officers and in making enough change in the command of the regular military to permit the installation of a new Minister of Defense, General Perez y Perez, in whom he has some confidence, and new chiefs of the army, the air force, and the police.

17. By no means all the improvement in the situation has been attributable to the provisional government. Certain of the military have shown an increasingly responsible attitude. Both Balaguer and Bosch have on occasion provided needed endorsement for Garcia Godoy or at least have refused to participate in irresponsible or destructive acts of opposition. Perhaps as important as anything else has been the breaking apart of the "unity of the left" which had been responsible for much of the strength of the "constitutionalists" in the wake of the rebellion. Not only did the PRD and the parties of the extreme left pull away from each other, but the latter resumed quarreling among themselves about whether to use political tactics or terror and violence. The net effect of all these things has been to permit restoration of a fragile equilibrium.

#### *IV. The June Elections*

18. The provisional government has made good progress in setting up the machinery for the 1 June elections, in which the voters are to choose a new four-year administration.<sup>9</sup> Specialists from the Organization of American States have been serving as advisors to the Dominican Central Elections Board since early January, and there are plans to bring in some additional OAS technicians and observers for election day. The electoral law specifies that except as directed by the Elections

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<sup>9</sup> The president and vice presidential candidates of each party run on the same ticket for a four-year term. Election of the president, vice president and of senators is by simple plurality. Twenty-seven senators and 74 members of the Chamber of Deputies are to be elected for four-year terms; 77 mayors and 417 municipal councilmen, for two-year terms. No member of the provisional government can be a candidate for any of the elective offices. Members of the armed forces and police are forbidden to vote; other citizens (Dominicans over 18 years old or of any age if they are or have been married) are required to vote and may be fined if they do not. [Footnote in the source text.]

Board the security forces will remain in their barracks. Thus the framework will be in place for relatively free and fair elections, if the political climate does not seriously worsen.

19. Such a change of climate could come about in any of a number of ways. Because of the depth of political animosities, small incidents involving the security forces and students or workers could turn into major confrontations. The return to the D.R. of such controversial figures as Francisco Caamano or Wessin y Wessin could provoke new trouble. Assassination of one of the leading political figures on either side is a continuing possibility—and one which terrifies Bosch. There has, however, been a marked decrease in the number and seriousness of violent incidents since early this year.

20. Elements of both extremes find the two major candidates, Joaquin Balaguer and Juan Bosch, unacceptable alternatives. As elections approach, extremists of the right or left may attempt to disrupt them by undertaking terrorist acts or, in the case of the far left, trying to provoke incidents involving the police, military or IAPF. In recent weeks the pro-Castro 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4) and the orthodox Dominican Communist Party (PCD) have indicated that they accept elections as one possible solution to the present crisis, and they are likely to devote their energies to seeking support for Juan Bosch. However, the militant Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) has expressed opposition to the elections. It may try to stir up trouble in Santo Domingo, but its limited capacity for independent action will be countered by improved police and military capabilities and the presence of the IAPF. Although we anticipate some increase in trouble and violence, we think the situation will probably remain orderly enough so that elections can take place as scheduled.

21. Balaguer served Trujillo for years and was president when the dictator was assassinated in 1961. He retained this position for about eight months, undertaking a number of measures designed to appeal to the lower income groups. Today he heads the large and personalistic Reformist Party (PR), composed of moderates, conservatives, and some Trujillista elements. His program is populist, reformist and designed to appeal to the peasantry and other low income groups. Francisco Augusto Lora, the PR vice presidential nominee, is a leading PR organization man but has little popular support.

22. Juan Bosch, who for years was a leader of the anti-Trujillo exiles, was elected President in 1962 by an overwhelming majority, but he was then running against a much weaker opponent than Balaguer. Barely seven months after taking office, he was swept from power by a military coup. Bosch is the undisputed leader of the well organized Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) which is united behind his candidacy. He is clearly the candidate of the "constitutionalists." He is sup-

ported by the radical Revolutionary Social Christians (PRSC), by the pro-Castro MR-1J4, and by the Moscow-oriented Communists (PCD). However, Bosch has sought to disassociate himself from the Communist parties, and has publicly rejected the support of the MR-1J4. The PRSC and the parties of the extreme left command few votes in comparison with the PR and PRD but still might make up the margin of difference in a close election. The PRD ticket has some added strength from the vice presidential candidacy of Antonio Guzman, who for a time was considered as a possibility for provisional president. Guzman brings no large personal following, but he will supply a certain aura of respectability.

23. A third presidential candidate, who appeals mainly to Dominican conservatives and rightists is Rafael Bonnelly, President of the Council of State that ruled the country in 1962, after Balaguer's ouster. He is seeking to coordinate several right-of-center parties into a coalition called the National Integration Movement (MIN). In a contest between Balaguer and Bosch, Bonnelly can be expected to pull votes away from Balaguer. If Bosch appears to be in the lead, pressures will grow on the part of MIN and PR supporters to unify against him. However, the ambitions of individuals in both groups, as well as the longstanding animosities between elements of the two parties make such an alliance difficult. Some MIN sponsors probably hope to use the organization as a political front behind which the military could exercise power in the event of a successful coup.

24. It is likely that the candidates of the two major parties will stay in the contest to the end. Balaguer is almost certain to continue in the race, but Bosch has at times voiced a conviction that elections are impossible owing to police and military intimidation of his party. More recently he has said that the Dominican situation is hopeless and if he should be elected the military would not let him govern. However, despite his fears, driven by his overwhelming ambition and the demands of the PRD, which wants to ride his coat tails, Bosch accepted the party's nomination. In the future he may threaten to withdraw his party for political effect, but barring a major interruption of the electoral process he will probably see the campaign out. If Bosch should withdraw before the end of the campaign, we believe the PRD will probably continue in the congressional and local elections. We are doubtful that they would try to put up a new candidate in the presidential contest.

25. Bosch and Balaguer will be making their appeal to the same sector of the populace—the urban and rural poor. Running on reformist platforms, each has his strong points. Balaguer is identified with the peace and order of the Trujillo period, at a time when many Dominicans long for an end to upheaval and anarchy. He is probably remembered favorably among the urban lower classes for his largesse during 1961. Many Dominicans are anxious, above all, to avoid a return to the



violence and chaos of the 1965 rebellion; Balaguer appeals to them with his pledges of conciliation and unity of action. His PR lieutenants have done some organizational work, and he himself has made a series of trips into the countryside to rally the voting groups likely to give him greatest backing. However the PR campaign so far has not matched the vigor of the campaign of the PRD.

26. Bosch's major advantage is his ability to appeal to the Dominican masses in terms they find understandable and attractive. As a campaigner he has unusual abilities. His general reputation for opposing the unpopular Dominican military establishment will also attract voters. The PRD has a powerful voice in the ministries and agencies of the Provisional Government and this influence will probably give the party considerable leverage at the polls. Should the impression that Bosch is going to win continue to grow, he would also profit from a tendency to get on the bandwagon.

27. Both candidates have recognizable weaknesses. A Bonnelly candidacy will undoubtedly eat into Balaguer's vote. On the other hand, if Balaguer and Bonnelly were able to come to some sort of agreement, Bosch would probably respond by trying to paint Balaguer as a candidate of the Dominican elite. Bosch's identification with the violence of the recent past, and his failure in 1963 to fulfill his campaign promises, have undoubtedly disillusioned some of his potential supporters. He will probably restrict his campaigning in the interior, out of a fear of assassination, and this may hurt his chances. While it did not have this effect during the campaign of 1962, it could now give substance to a widespread belief that he is a physical coward. Another major vulnerability will probably be the susceptibility of the rural peasantry to charges that Bosch is a Communist or Communist supporter. These charges will probably be a major weapon of the Balaguer camp, and Bosch is clearly worried that they will have an effect on the electorate, which though it understands little of communism, is strongly opposed to it.

28. It would be unrealistic to consider either the elections or longer term prospects in the Dominican Republic without reference to the impact of the US. As a result of its intervention in April 1965 and its continuing efforts on the scene to assist the Dominicans in finding peaceful solutions, the US is considered responsible for much of what happens in the country both by the Dominicans themselves and by interested observers throughout Latin America.

29. The US is almost certainly viewed as anti-Bosch and committed to the Balaguer candidacy. This will give Bosch the benefit of anti-Yankee prejudice at the polls. At the same time, many Dominicans will recognize that, without US economic aid and its steadying influence exercised through the OAS and the IAPF, no solutions to the country's

grave political and economic problems are possible. Many such people will vote for Balaguer despite a possible distaste for the Yankee presence.

30. All things considered, we believe the election will be close. Balaguer got off to an earlier start; Bosch now seems to be gaining momentum. We cannot predict the outcome with any confidence.<sup>10</sup>

#### *V. The Role of the Military*

31. The new Minister of Defense Perez y Perez has stated that the Dominican military establishment will abide by the election results, whatever they are. This implies more of a change in military attitudes than we think has yet taken place. If Bosch were elected, some key figures in the military would want to prevent him from taking or holding office. The continuing presence of the IAPF would probably inhibit them from acting quickly; indeed their expectation as to when the IAPF might withdraw would probably be a factor in determining their timing. The dissatisfied military officers might also wish to delay action for some time so as to take advantage of some specific action of the new government which might render it unpopular or otherwise vulnerable.

32. If, on the other hand, Balaguer were elected, he would begin with the acceptance of the military establishment. Moreover, he would probably manage to persuade leaders of the armed forces to go along with modest moves toward social and economic reform, even if these drew protests from rightist politicians. Initially, sharp opposition from the extreme left would improve, rather than detract from, his standing with the security forces. He might, however, lose this rapport if he used the police and army less vigorously than they thought was required to put down leftist-instigated demonstrations and violence.

33. One of the most arduous tasks facing any new government is to continue the gradual and delicate process of reshaping the military so that eventually it will become the servant of the government. If the president moves clumsily in this, he may provoke the very military intervention he is trying to rule out. If he acts to reduce the strength of the armed forces rapidly, he may risk loss of capability to cope with civil disorder, terrorism, or insurgency.

34. Whatever the nature of government action, there are likely to be growing differences of attitude and political opinion within the military, and particularly within the army. Increasing numbers of younger

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<sup>10</sup> Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the net balance of advantages and weaknesses of the candidates as described in paragraphs 18–30 of this paper gives the edge to Bosch. [Footnote in the source text.]

army officers, NCOs, and enlisted men will probably become antagonistic toward the country's elite groups. The PRD has been making efforts to build influence within the military; the more extreme parties are likely to try too. Although this will tend to decrease the danger of intervention by the military establishment as a whole, it will add to the danger of a new split within the military and the alignment of military units with opposing political factions.

*VI. Post Election Political Prospects*

35. Given this uncertain allegiance of the Dominican military, the IAPF will continue, for a while at least, to be the primary stabilizing factor in the D.R. Its presence reduces the chances of a coup from the right and of insurgency from the left. Thus the chances of any Dominican government for survival will be substantially greater as long as the IAPF stays on. Its continued presence would, however, tend to promote exaggerated nationalism and anti-US feeling, and over time might become a factor for instability. After the elections and the inauguration of the president on 1 July pressures for removal of the Force will probably increase, on the part of elements within the D.R., the Latin American governments whose troops are involved, and public opinion in the hemisphere.

36. We think that the staying power of Balaguer as president would be considerably greater than that of Bosch; we are not confident, however, that Balaguer could remain in office for a four-year term—or even for the period of this estimate. Because of his quieter style and more conciliatory approach, we believe Balaguer would be less inflammatory in domestic policies than Bosch; he almost certainly would be less difficult in relations with the US.

37. This is not to say that Bosch would set a policy line antithetical to US interests, but simply that he bears a bitterness which cannot readily be erased and would not be likely to cooperate more enthusiastically than he thought necessary. For example, a government headed by Bosch would probably be difficult in dealings with the US on OAS matters, but would probably go along with the US position on most global issues considered by the UN. In general, we believe that he would be likely to follow foreign policy lines acceptable to the US, mainly because of concern that badly-needed US economic aid would not otherwise be continued.

38. As was indicated during his seven months as president in 1963, Bosch does not have much flair for executive action or administration, nor for finding aides who have such abilities. He is much better at proclaiming a program than implementing it. His tolerance of a variety of views, including those of the extreme left, has caused him trouble before and might again. Moreover, he has continued to show mercurial changes of mood, as well as an obsessive fear for his own safety. His

future actions are not entirely predictable; it is conceivable, for example, that he might win the presidency but later decide to resign if the frustrations of office should become extreme.

39. The revolution and its aftermath have produced sharp new animosities, difficult if not impossible to overcome. We think the broad tendency within the D.R. will be toward continuing growth of the political left. How much of this will benefit the parties of the extreme left and how much the moderate left will, of course, depend on the performance of the new government as well as on the leadership and competitive skill of the parties involved.

40. All three parties of the extreme left—the militant MPD (pro-Peking), the orthodox PCD (pro-Moscow), and the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (pro-Castro)—have gained some ground during the past year. Their members have taken the leading role at the university, and obtained a number of positions in the government bureaucracy; they continue to have influence, although they are by no means the strongest force, in the labor union movement. They have, moreover, substantially increased their capability, in terms of weapons, training, experience, and cadres, to carry out urban terrorism or guerrilla warfare in parts of the countryside—although in general the rural population remains unsympathetic.

41. There is a danger that if the moderate left is politically frustrated, some elements may make common cause with the extreme left. In the event that Bosch were elected and later displaced by the military, this combination on the left would become almost a certainty. In combination, the various leftist parties could bring heavy pressure on any government by means of political strikes, student agitation, and general violence. This might in turn provoke strongly repressive action by the military and finally lead to a new outbreak of civil war, with possible divisions among the military.

42. In any case, the government which comes to power on 1 July will probably have nearly as much opposition as backing. It will be confronted with social, economic and political problems so intractable that any significant accomplishment over the next year or two will be extremely difficult. If it fails to move forward at all in these fields, the support it begins with will shrink away and its vulnerability will increase. Thus the outlook for political stability is discouraging.

#### *VII. Post Election Economic Prospects*

43. During the remainder of this year the Dominican economy will probably continue to recover from the low point reached in 1965. This recovery is unlikely, however, to bring GNP back as far as the 1964 level. Spending for consumption will almost certainly dominate, and no large-scale private investment from either domestic or foreign sources is likely, pending a viable political solution.

44. The new government's economic focus in 1966 and 1967 will be largely limited to short-run measures to provide immediate benefits to the populace. There will be strong pressure to cut down unemployment and central government spending can be expected to increase considerably. The budget deficit in 1966 is likely to run about \$50 million. Increased demand for goods will probably lead to appreciable price rises. If for political reasons the government should undertake greater expansionist spending policies, price increases would be sharper and pressures on the country's balance-of-payments stronger. There probably will be significant deterioration in the Dominican balance of payments position in 1966 and without improved production and prices for sugar the outlook for 1967 remains dim. A rise in imports and the probable stagnation of exports could cause a 1966 deficit for goods and services in the range of \$75 to \$100 million.

45. US program loans and food supplies, combined with loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and other developmental credit assistance, can meet much of the expected shortfall in Dominican finances and materially help with pressing supply problems. The Dominican government may, nevertheless, have to give serious consideration to devaluation as a means of restoring the balance in international payments. But unless this were done as a part of a carefully worked out stabilization program, there is a good chance that a round of price and wage increases would soon vitiate its benefits.

46. In short, Dominican economic policies in 1966 and 1967 will be almost entirely aimed at achieving short-term and largely political results. The government will almost certainly take some tentative steps toward agricultural development, improved education, and more efficient operations of the large state-owned sector of the economy. US and other lending agencies are already supporting projects in these lines. Nevertheless, the economy will remain vulnerable to export price fluctuations and it will face for a long time such problems as an inadequate marketing system, a shortage of capital, backward technology in agriculture, a general lack of technical and managerial skills and a grave problem of government management and resource allocation. Reform measures of the type required for sustained economic development will be extremely difficult without a prolonged period of political stability. Political stability, in turn, will be difficult to attain without a better military relationship to the government and a determined effort by civilian leadership to undertake basic social and economic reform.

[Omitted here is a map of the Dominican Republic.]

**172. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1966.

## SUBJECT

Dominican Election Operation

## REFERENCES

A. Memorandum to The 303 Committee, dated 20 Dec 65, Subject: "Presidential Election in the Dominican Republic"<sup>2</sup>B. Memorandum to The 303 Committee, dated 11 Jan 66, Subject: "Contingency Plan for the Dominican Elections"<sup>3</sup>*1. Summary*

Neither Balaguer nor any of his party leaders knows very much about political organization or the conduct of presidential campaigns. This lack of experience combined with Balaguer's relative lack of success in raising campaign funds from local sources have thus far impeded full exploitation of latent but widespread pro-Balaguer sentiment. There has been a noticeable improvement in the organization and management of Balaguer's campaign [2 lines of source text not declassified]. An evaluation of the progress to date, however, indicates that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should be prepared to inject additional funds into the campaign to ensure that Balaguer does not lose momentum at a critical point in the race because of shortage of cash. [5½ lines of source text not declassified] The purposes of this memorandum are (a) to report on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operations undertaken to date on Balaguer's behalf, and (b) to obtain 303 Committee authorization for an additional [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which could be made available to Balaguer through non-attributable channels if he is unsuccessful in raising necessary funds from other sources as will probably be the case or if he obviously needs additional support for specific campaign purposes.

*2. Problem*

To provide Balaguer with such increased financial assistance as may be needed to enable him to campaign effectively.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records, 1966. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> The date is incorrect; the correct date is December 30, 1965; see Document 152.

<sup>3</sup> Document 157.

3. *Factors Bearing on the Problem*

a. *Origin of the Requirement*

During a 25 April meeting among Admiral Raborn, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and Under-Secretary Mann and Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Sayre of the Department of State, the belief was voiced that Balaguer should be given whatever financial assistance is needed to enable him to campaign effectively, and that the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] previously authorized by the 303 Committee might have to be augmented.<sup>4</sup>

b. *Relative Strength of Candidates*

[*1 paragraph (18 lines of source text) not declassified*]

c. *Operations Designed to Promote a Favorable Election Climate and to Get Out the Vote*

[*5½ pages of double-spaced source text not declassified*]

5. *Recommendation*

It is requested that the 303 Committee authorize an additional [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] which could be made available to Balaguer through [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] channels not attributable to the U.S. Government if Balaguer obviously needs additional support to enable him to campaign effectively.

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<sup>4</sup> [*text not declassified*]

**173. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (McAfee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Gordon)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 9, 1966.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting May 5, 1966<sup>2</sup>

The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee held on May 9, 1966 contain the following items:

[Omitted here is a 1-sentence paragraph on Cuba.]

*"Dominican Republic*

"a. The request for additional monies for the election of Balaguer was approved after it became clear that of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] requested only [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was to be furnished currently; the remainder was to be held on reserve. Use of this reserve would be cleared with the committee.

"b. Ambassador Johnson had several questions dealing with the funding channels and the sources of private money [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on May 9.

<sup>2</sup> The minutes of this 303 Committee meeting have not been found. In an undated proposed agenda for the May 5 meeting McAfee summarized the proposal cited in Document 172 and its status thus far. McAfee also referred to a May 4 memorandum from Gordon to Ambassador Johnson in which Gordon stated ARA's approval of the proposal in Document 172 and recommended U. Alexis Johnson's support of it. McAfee stated: "INR agrees with the ARA position. We have considered the merits of authorizing only a part of the requested [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] at this time, but do not believe them solid enough to justify modification of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] proposal. We have little doubt the whole [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would ultimately have to be authorized in any event, and we see no real point in depriving [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] of flexibility in this operation." In an undated memorandum for the record prepared by McAfee on May 5, he recounts Denney briefing U. Alexis Johnson on the May 5 303 Committee meeting: "Mr. Denney noted that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] had already been spent and that continued expenditures increased the likelihood of a leak which would reveal U.S. intervention." McAfee continued, "Mr. Denney noted that we had queried CIA about previous support for Bosch which had apparently been provided at some previous time. Thus Bosch might be aware that we could be similarly engaged with Balaguer. Mr. Denney noted that Bosch's campaign seemed to be gaining momentum and that one such leak might contribute significantly to putting his campaign over." (All in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1966)



“c. Mr. Moyers wondered if the input of funds was sufficiently diverse and not too conspicuous. In regard to the printing of propaganda, he hoped more than one plant was being utilized.

“d. Mr. Vance felt that whatever funds are necessary to insure the election should be provided.

“e. Mr. Rostow noted the weak structure on which the Balaguer political scaffolding was based and hoped that Balaguer could be persuaded to shift his philosophy somewhat closer to modern times.

“f. It was pointed out that regardless of proof, accusations would be made that the U.S. Government was behind Balaguer.

“g. There was some discussion of having a contingency statement available to ward off accusations. Mr. Moyers concluded that saying nothing was the best defense. It was pointed out that accusations before the election had the damage potential rather than post-election bleats.”

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**174. Memorandum From Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Yarmolinsky) to Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance)<sup>1</sup>**

I-23, 124/66

Washington, May 9, 1966.

**SUBJECT**

IAPF Withdrawal

Without consulting Ambassador Bunker or other representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee, Garcia Godoy dispatched a personal emissary to the various Latin American capitals and Washington (arriving on June 14) to urge a “unanimous meeting of the minds” that the IAPF be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic before the installation of a constitutional government. This move was probably taken by Godoy with an eye towards the 1970 election (when he could campaign as the man who got the IAPF out of the Dominican Republic). It would confront the newly-elected President, however, with the choice of requesting the continued presence of the IAPF or automatically foregoing the security it affords and the new government may badly need.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 330 70 A 4443, Dominican Republic, #385. Secret.

To take the initiative away from Godoy, the State Department has circulated for comment a proposed OAS resolution dealing with the withdrawal of the IAPF. The State proposal (Tab A), together with the reaction of the Embassy at Santo Domingo, CINCLANT and the Joint Chiefs, is described below.

*State* proposes an OAS Resolution that would call for the withdrawal of the IAPF unless the newly-elected government decides by June 15th that the IAPF should stay on. The State proposal assumes that the Dominican military and police will be capable of keeping peace and order. It also assumes that the Dominican military will accept Bosch (unless he begins to govern ineptly or tries to eliminate the military). It notes the possibility, however, that Bosch might try to keep the IAPF for an extended period as an umbrella to protect him while he revamps the Dominican military to his liking and to place him in a better position in dealing with the US on economic assistance.

The *Embassy* argues against the State proposal on the grounds that no Dominican politician could afford the risk of requesting, after the election, that the IAPF stay on. The Embassy believes that both Balaguer and Bosch would want the IAPF to remain for the first few months, and it urges that it is in the US interest to assist the new government, no matter who is elected, to get off to a proper start. The Embassy endorses a formula under which a decision on whether the IAPF stays or goes would be taken by the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers, after the election and following consultation among the Ad Hoc Committee, Garcia Godoy and the successful candidate. This formula, the Embassy believes, would give the OAS and the newly-elected President the flexibility they both need.

*CINCLANT* disagrees with State and Santo Domingo. He proposes a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the IAPF immediately following the elections. *CINCLANT* would not give the elected President an option to retain the IAPF. He argues that the mission of the IAPF will have been fulfilled with the holding of elections and fears that Bosch, if elected, would retain the IAPF so that he could revamp the Dominican military along leftist lines. Without the IAPF, *CINCLANT* believes that Bosch would be forced to seek an accommodation with the military. *CINCLANT* challenges State's assumption re the abilities of the Dominican security forces. *CINCLANT* considers that the Dominican forces would be adequate up to a point where military-type action might become involved. If the latter should occur, he feels that at least 20% of the Dominican security forces would defect and that we would be confronted with another April 1965. In *CINCLANT*'s judgment, the Dominican security forces cannot be fully trained or equipped before January 1967.

The *Joint Chiefs* favor a variation of the State formula. They propose an early OAS Resolution calling for the withdrawal of the IAPF

*to begin* at the earliest practicable date following the election. The speed of withdrawal under this proposal would depend upon the degree of stability shown by the new government. The Joint Chiefs share CINCLANT's assessment of the ability (or inability) of the Dominican security forces to maintain peace and order. The Chief's position is at Tab B.<sup>2</sup>

We agree with the Chief's proposal, but believe it would be improved by adding a statement to the Resolution that the rate of withdrawal would be determined by the OAS (through the Ad Hoc Committee) after discussion with the newly-elected government. This addition would avoid the criticism that the IAPF might be withdrawn precipitately immediately following the elections.

I recommend that you approve the State Department proposal as modified by the JCS and ISA changes noted above.<sup>3</sup> Both changes are shown in Tab A.

**Adam Yarmolinsky**

**Tab A**

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>4</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic

*Recommendation:*

"That the United States seek an OAS resolution at the earliest possible date to commence withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) from the Dominican Republic at the earliest practicable date following the election of 1 June and that the phasing of the withdrawal will be determined by the OAS (through the Ad Hoc Committee) in consultation with the President-elect."

*Discussion:*

*Communist Risk*

From the point of view of the security of the United States the IAPF should remain in the Dominican Republic after a newly elected government is inaugurated only if the Dominican police and military

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<sup>2</sup> Not attached.

<sup>3</sup> Approved by Vance on May 11.

<sup>4</sup> Drafted by Sayre on May 4.

are unable to maintain internal security and prevent a Communist takeover of the government. As a result of the training and equipment we have provided to the Dominican police and military over the last several months, it is the view of the Departments of State and Defense that these forces are now capable of maintaining internal security in the Dominican Republic. We should, however, continue our stepped-up training program and provide such other equipment as may be considered necessary to keep these forces in an adequate state of readiness.

The continued presence of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic provides a lightning rod for extremists and in a sense strengthens their position. It is a continued political liability to the United States.

It is recognized that the extreme left in the Dominican Republic has substantial arms in its possession. It is unlikely that these arms will be collected in the near future, certainly not within the time limit which the Hemisphere in general would consider acceptable for the continuance of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic. We must be prepared to accept the risk that the Communists, at one time or another, will make a further play for power in the Dominican Republic. The best method for dealing with this risk is adequate training and equipping of the Dominican police and military establishment. We could not hope to continue an IAPF in the Dominican Republic indefinitely for the purpose of dealing with this risk.

*Balaguer as President*

The election of Balaguer as President of the Dominican Republic would provide reasonable assurance of a satisfactory working relationship between the civilian government and the Dominican armed forces. It can also be expected that Balaguer will take appropriate action to avoid infiltration of his government by Communists and Communist sympathizers. The Communists and extreme left can be expected to agitate against a government headed by Balaguer, but such agitation can be handled so long as Balaguer and the armed forces work harmoniously together and the United States provides a reasonable level of assistance to the government. It is expected that Balaguer would request the withdrawal of the IAPF very soon after his election.

*Bosch as President*

A government headed by Juan Bosch will have difficulty maintaining good relations with the Dominican armed forces and police. But the armed forces leaders have made clear that they will accept the election results. Difficulties between Bosch and the armed forces would arise if he governed as ineptly as he did in 1963, or if he took action which the armed forces interpret as an effort to eliminate them. Bosch has indicated in some of his remarks and through third parties that he

might like to keep the IAPF in the Dominican Republic after his election as a counterpoise to the Dominican military and police.

The possibility exists that we will be asked to remove the IAPF by the newly elected president at a time of his choosing. In the case of Juan Bosch, there may be an equivocal situation in which he would seek to keep the IAPF as a trump card to be used by him against the Dominican armed forces. This contingency could involve the United States and the IAPF continuously in Dominican politics. Moreover, the recent speeches of Bosch on economic matters suggest that there may be considerable difficulty in working out a satisfactory self-help program under Alliance criteria. With our continued commitment in the Dominican Republic through the IAPF, however, we might be forced to provide continuing economic assistance on a basis which we regard as unsatisfactory.

The OAS commitment, and therefore ours, is to help restore a normal situation in the Dominican Republic and to carry the country to elections. By extension, it might also be said that this includes inauguration of the elected president. Thus, if the IAPF remains in the Dominican Republic long enough to assure the installation of a president, we would have fulfilled the objectives we set out to achieve in April 1965.

The decision on withdrawal of the IAPF should be made before the election. If Juan Bosch should win and the decision is delayed until after the election, we will be under pressure from certain elements in the United States to keep the IAPF in the Dominican Republic to assure that Juan Bosch stays in office. If we nevertheless decide at that stage to withdraw the force, we may be charged with leaving Juan Bosch to the mercy of the Dominican military forces.

**Dean Rusk<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

175. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 10, 1966, 7:45 p.m.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has supplied us with the first partial results of the Dominican Republic poll. It covers a sample of 600 out of the 1,000 planned.<sup>2</sup>

The sample includes the whole of the DR except the towns of Santiago and Santo Domingo; that is, it covers 60% of the potential voting population.

The comparison with the March poll follows:

	<u>March 1966</u>	<u>May 1966</u>
Balaguer	54.8	46.1
Bosch	19.2	34.8
Bonnelly	3.0	5.2
Other	1.4	—
Undecided	21.6	13.9

To the question: Whom do you expect to win?, the answer was:

Bosch—36.4  
Balaguer—31.7  
Bonnelly—1.5  
Don't know—30.4

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] comments as follows:

a. Balaguer should do well in Santiago; but he is weak in Santo Domingo.

b. In general, it looks like a horse race.

c. He is mildly encouraged by the fact that the differences between voter preferences and voter estimate of who will win does not indicate a landslide mentality.

I underlined again that nothing should be spared which will not be counterproductive to get out the rural vote.

**Walt**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Dominican Republic Elections—1966. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive. An "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> In a May 11 memorandum to the President, Rostow summarized the "unweighted full" Dominican Republic poll results as follows: "Balaguer 43%, Bosch 37%, Bonnelly 4%, and Undecided 16%." (Ibid.)

**176. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to all American Republic Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 11, 1966, 3:13 p.m.

2206. For Ambassador.

1. (FYI) Department notes tendency some officials and press in Latin America to assume that Bosch victory in June 1 elections is foregone conclusion. Our reading of Dominican election indicators show that it is very much of horse race. We are concerned over trend to regard Bosch election as assured because if Balaguer wins, there will be many who will mistakenly suspect that elections were rigged and we were somehow involved. There is no basis for suspicion election may be rigged. Dominican Electoral Commission seems impartial and we have detected no reason for serious complaint against it. Election will be conducted under OAS observation as was case in free election of 1962. We also expect substantial number newsmen will be present. U.S. and OAS Ad Hoc Committee have encouraged all these efforts assure Dominicans have chance free election and that results will be respected. (End FYI.)

2. Factors making us believe election very much a horse race are:

a. We expect an honest election under more extensive observation by OAS than was case in free election of 1962.

b. Balaguer and Bosch have been campaigning without restrictions and both have conducted high level campaign.

c. Balaguer touring country with car caravans, as well as using radio and TV, in contrast with Bosch who has chosen to stay at home and rely on radio and TV.

d. Balaguer is drawing large responsive crowds in his travels.

e. Balaguer generally conceded have strong following in country-side and Santiago area where 70% voters reside as opposed to Bosch's lead in capital city area with 30% of electorate. Most of press reporting seems based on testing of political climate in capital city.

f. Despite his Trujillo connections, Balaguer has reputation for honesty, good administration and reform.

g. Balaguer's name is associated with peace, stability and work and he is plugging these themes at time when many Dominicans are tired of turbulence and are aware of Bosch's role in April revolt.

3. (FYI) We think it important for growth democracy in hemisphere that governments and press keep open mind on elections and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Sayre and Bowdler, cleared by Bunker and Stewart, and approved by Sayre. Sent to all ARA posts except Santo Domingo for action and repeated to Santo Domingo.

avoid influencing outcome by uninformed comments and speculation. It is difficult for USG play role in process democratic education in Latin America, especially during election, because it runs risk being accused intervening. Nevertheless we believe you should make effort. We recognize this tricky to accomplish. Best tactic would be not to take initiative in raising subject Dominican election but be ready when others bring up subject to point out in low-key fashion mistake in prejudging outcome because of factors listed paragraph 2.

4. Request Ambassador select members his staff who, by virtue of contacts on local scene and skill in handling delicate job this nature, should be informed content this message and authorized to carry out quiet missionary work using tactic described paragraph 3. (End FYI.)

5. Report promptly all contacts and their reaction.

**Rusk**

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**177. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, May 25, 1966, 1759Z.

2537. Subj: Election Estimate. Ref: Deptel 1109.<sup>2</sup>

1. Since Embassy's previous analysis (Embtel 2416),<sup>3</sup> three trends have altered complexion election campaign, boosting Balaguer's chances but leaving outcome still not clearly predictable: renewed vigor

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Santiago de Los Caballeros and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, and CINCLANT for POLAD. The telegram was re-typed and sent to President Johnson under cover of a May 26 memorandum from Walt Rostow who wrote: "The latest Bunker-Crimmins estimate of the election outlook is attached. They believe that Balaguer's chances have improved during the past three weeks, but they are not confident enough about the gains to predict his victory." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XV)

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2416 from Santo Domingo, May 8, analyzes the Dominican Republic electoral campaign. The Embassy concluded that there is no information to backup predictions and that the "political, economic, and social ingredients of campaign are intricate web from which one is well-advised to derive patterns cautiously." The Embassy reported that the race "should be considered too close to toss-up, with Bosch probably being right now man to beat." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 DOM REP)



and confidence PR campaign; all but formal collapse Bonnelly's MIN everywhere except possibly Cibao, with fragments gravitating to Balaguer without conditions; and failure Bosch neutralize communism issue or cleanse from PRD taint of involvement in swelling campaign violence.

2. In late April PR acquired second wind in campaign. Since then, with renewed confidence and reported infusion new funds, Balaguer has waged adept and aggressive campaign, striking Bosch and PRD most successfully on issues of communism and violence. In improving public relations effort, Balaguer has broadcast at different times on two national networks. Since early May has received near maximum exposure through series at least thrice-weekly radio talks, has stepped up campaign tours and is usually received by impressive crowds turned out by local PR organizations. Small parties allied with PR also making intensive use of radio, country's key political medium. Great number PR vehicles working countryside, expensively printed posters and literature, and airborne Balaguer streamers all attest to PR's generous financial sources. Balaguer's personal appearances throughout Republic (in "saturation" style of US candidates) psychologically uplifting to backers and impressive to uncommitted voters. By contrast, Bosch's avoidance of personal contact with public has cost his campaign some zest.

3. In past four weeks, Balaguer has fixed and held public attention on alleged PRD control sugar corporation (CAD) and government offices, gaining widespread acceptance of charge that CAD employees subject to political pressures and campaign levies and that at least some Cedula and Civil Registry personnel illegally equipping ineligible with voting documents. Though PG has not taken any extensive corrective action, effect has been to put PRD on defensive and even to cause some important PRD friends (such as list in diario) to insist that PG take steps to dispel all suspicions of political misuse CAD resources.

4. As campaign reaches peak, PR has now pushed communism to forefront of its issues. Attacks of this sort increasingly leveled by battery of Balaguer supporters, including Lora, who has come to forefront as PR's hatchet man, thus freeing Balaguer from some of onus for mudslinging. Communism issue appears still of more concern to most of electorate than Trujillismo, though PRD leaders now hitting frequently and forcefully on Balaguer's Trujillo connections (and Bosch has subtly introduced it in several speeches). Bishops' pastoral letter, intended to proclaim church's election neutrality, provided ammunition for some (including priests according to Bosch) to spread notion that even church considers Bosch unsafe. Subsequent clarification by church leaders has not fully erased misinterpretation.

5. PRD campaign since last analysis has continued mount in intensity, and appears well-directed and adequately financed. PRD op-

eratives in interior have stepped up efforts to turn out maximum of Bosch-inclined city voters and counter Balaguer head start in rural areas (while some PR organizers, sensing victory, show signs of complacency). At top of PRD, however, in past three weeks campaign has been less than spectacular. Difficult to judge effect on voter confidence of Bosch's refusal to campaign in person or his statements that he does not want presidency, but it could hardly be encouraging to hard-pressed local leaders. Much of his radio time since last analysis spent on PRD program. Though discussion of roads, dams and irrigation projects is needed, subjects inherently lack drama and newsworthiness and allowed public attention to swing to more sensational comments of Balaguer and allies. Moreover, while Balaguer in person making specific promises which are appealing to local audiences and to key sectors (though not necessarily sound economically), Bosch's economic speeches hold out depressing prospect of austerity, sacrifice and hard work on long road to recovery.

6. At particularly crucial time, Bosch has lost campaign initiative, particularly on issues of communism, violence and CAD. He may have planned stake recovery of initiative on major gambit of threatened withdrawal, but his move at this point seems to have had low and possibly even adverse political yield. Withdrawal threat has lost edge with excessive use. Growing public suspicion that PRD and sympathizers responsible for much of current campaign violence has undercut credibility of Bosch's protests, weakened PRD stance as meek and persecuted party, and sowed doubt that all of isolated police-military actions against PRD unprovoked. At same time, many Dominicans have latent anti-military stain and Bosch accusations may have touched this nerve at important juncture.

7. PR has emerged from it all with strengthened claim to be party of peace and order—but with image as heirs of Trujillo also more firmly fixed in back in heir's minds; adjunct to communism issue, Balaguer has pressed claims that PR stands for order and popular confidence in contrast to climate of chaos and fear that accompanies PRD. PRD members' sacking of MIN offices in Bani and 14th of June attack on PR caravan in La Romana have opportunely underscored Balaguer's claims and sorely embarrassed Bosch at moment he sought to re-establish PRD image as victim of police-military-reformista oppression.

8. Bonnelly's faltering campaign now largely restricted to Cibao, but even there it is not vigorous. MIN denials of rumors of deal have retained nominal support of cluster of small parties that launched Bonnelly, though cracks in alliance apparent. PLE has all but announced shift to Balaguer and other MIN leaders striving to get into Balaguer's camp—with conditions if possible, without them if necessary—before what remains of organization moves en masse without them. Discouraged by long wait, some MIN committees have broken up and

others moribund. Though public has tended overrate MIN strength, drift of MIN backers to Balaguer brings his campaign psychological lift and sudden last-minute swing of group of parties behind PR if handled adroitly could help reinforce trend to Balaguer by creating impression among politically imperceptive of massive pro-Balaguer mobilization at critical moment in campaign.

9. Last analysis remains valid in concluding that large bloc of silent swing voters may well decide winner. Many of these of course will cast vote not on merits of candidates or issues but in hope of joining winner. Difficult gauge effect recent weeks' campaign interplay on uncommitted bloc who may vote issues. Must be supposed, however, that prospect order and stability remains highly persuasive consideration and Bosch's failure to acquit himself on issues of communism and violence have weakened him, notwithstanding his repudiation of 14th June support. For this reason, we believe Balaguer has gained influence, perhaps transitory, in uncommitted bloc.

10. Election machinery has no deficiencies likely to affect results significantly. There is evidence that lagging Cedula issuance could operate against Balaguer—who again asked this week that Cedula requirement be dropped—by reducing rural and female turnout. On other hand, multiplicity of ballots and similarity of colors could result in some voting against PRD and PRSC by mistake.

11. Overall impression from this vantage point is that in past three weeks Balaguer has gained momentum that, if retained, could put him over. PRD still campaigning with strength and confidence, but loss of initiative at top level has slowed what showed signs of becoming accelerating bandwagon. With little more than one week remaining, Bosch used what he may have considered a bit trump card without successfully regaining campaign initiative or developing new issue. Result is discernible, even though faint, trend toward Balaguer among visible electorate. PRD is responding with increased expression of confidence and displaying no defeatism that might hasten migration to Balaguer, in fact, Bosch failure to follow hard-hitting line consistently (e.g., his return, after dramatic withdrawal bit, to important but unexciting issues of economic and social reform) is one of current major puzzles of campaign. We are unable decide whether Bosch, on basis his own judgments (which must be afforded healthy respect) has concluded he has little to fear, or whether he is doing little more than going through minimum motions to acquit his responsibilities to party. At same time, it possible he lying Doggo in preparation for final-week burst of activity. In this regard, some Reformista Party leaders uneasily wondering what dramatic last-minute surprise Bosch may have up his sleeve. Leaving aside such speculation, major questions remain whether recent trend toward Balaguer is more apparent than real and whether—assuming importance of appearances—Balaguer will be able

transform it into victory in brief time remaining, where mistake or accidental bad break can heavily damage either side.

12. Our earlier generalizations about areas and sectors of Bosch and Balaguer support remain basically valid, but with conditions. Balaguer retains popularity among rural voters, but EmbOffs touring interior find sturdy pockets Bosch rural strength in some provinces. Where PRD organization diligent and effective, indications are Balaguer's earlier rural lead has in places been overcome. Similarly, some probes have revealed areas of Balaguer strength in and around cities, including some poorer neighborhoods of Santo Domingo. Sugar areas still lean toward Bosch, but not monolithically. Among salaried mill workers Bosch has heavy lead; but among cane cutters and colonos Balaguer has significant strength.

13. Rundown by area shows Balaguer with perceptible lead in southwestern and extreme eastern provinces. Bosch retains lead in national district and sugar provinces of La Romana and San Pedro de Macoris, though lead could be reduced by strong Balaguer trend in back country. However, in remaining two thirds of country, including populous Cibao, trends at this point hard to establish and prediction would be little more than guess. During recent visits to northwest, Cibao and northeastern provinces, EmbOffs had impression of slight Bosch edge, but Balaguer has drawn extremely well in appearances in those areas and very important silent Campesino vote there defies evaluation. In this last regard, caution advisable in assuming silent vote is usually pro-Balaguer. In areas in which military, police and patron are dominant influence, Bosch backers are inclined to keep their peace.

14. Taking into account all above factors and admittedly unscientific soundings by Embassy, at this point in campaign we now conclude very hesitantly that Balaguer has become the man to beat, principally because he has apparently gained the initiative, a matter of great importance with respect to influencing the large and decisive uncommitted bloc of voters. Events between now and June 1 may well change picture. As we have seen breaks of the race and invigorated Reformista campaign have closed gap. But as tight, hard fought race heads toward finish, inherent organizational superiority of PRD and Bosch's undeniable color and charisma are still advantages that Balaguer has yet to prove he has fully overcome.

15. Emb requests most strongly and earnestly that contents this telegram be closely held and above all be kept from press.

16. Ambassador Bunker concurs.

**Crimmins**

**178. Editorial Note**

The results of the June 1, 1966, presidential elections in the Dominican Republic were reported to President Johnson in a June 3 memorandum from Rostow who wrote that an “impressive” number of voters, approximately 1.4 million from an estimated 1.7 million, went to the polls. Rostow summarized that Balaguer had captured 57.09 percent of the vote; Bosch 39.17 percent and Bonnelly 3.4 percent. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVI)

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**179. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 17, 1966.

SUBJECT

Dominican Republic

You asked me for my personal evaluation of:

- (1) past and recent events in the Dominican Republic as compared to our national interest objectives and
- (2) where we go from here.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVI. Confidential. This memorandum responds to a June 14 memorandum to Bell and Gordon in which Rostow wrote “The President wants a concise and lucid description of: 1. Where we stand in our economic talks with Balaguer. 2. What we are proposing to him by way of an economic recovery program, including self help and external assistance. 3. The resources that we have earmarked for assistance to the new government in the coming fiscal year.” The President wants to ensure adequate assistance allocations for the Dominican Republic and a “strong self-help line with Balaguer, but does not want to see the political and economic consolidation of the Balaguer government stall for lack of necessary U.S. support.” Rostow asked that a response be prepared in time for Bunker’s meeting with the President on June 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 68 D 93, Dominican Republic) On June 16 Bowdler, Rostow, Bunker, and President Johnson met at the White House from 5:50 to 6:32 p.m. to discuss the electoral outcome in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.

## I.

*What We Have Done*

Since April 1965 we have pursued four central objectives in United States policy toward the Dominican Republic.

*First Objective.* With the outbreak and spread of violence in Santo Domingo in April, 1965, the United States acted to protect the lives of U.S. citizens and to evacuate those wishing to depart. The U.S. also gave protection to and evacuated the nationals of other countries.

*Evaluation.* Some 6,500 men, women and children from 46 different countries were evacuated without loss of life.

*Second Objective.* With the complete breakdown of all governmental authority, including the rebel Molina Urena regime, and the filling of the power vacuum by extremists dominated by trained Communists, the U.S. acted to prevent the takeover of the Dominican Republic by these extremist groups. In accomplishing this objective it was the policy of the U.S. first, to preserve the opportunity for the OAS to function and, second, to work within the framework of the OAS to permit the Dominican people to exercise self-determination.

*Evaluation.* The OAS, through collective action approved by the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, established the first Inter-American Peace Force (approved May 6 and organized May 23) and established, on June 2, the "Ad Hoc Committee for the Restoration of Democratic Order in the Dominican Republic".

The U.S. forces, and subsequently the IAPF forces, stopped the increasing chaos and bloodshed, primarily by separating contending forces with the "Line of Communication". This action and the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in helping the Dominicans to establish a provisional government frustrated the efforts of the Communists to seize control of the Dominican Republic by force. (At the same time this objective was being accomplished, the U.S. and the OAS did not permit control of the Dominican Republic to fall into the hands of the military or rightist groups.)

*Third Objective.* With the re-establishment of relative stability under Provisional Government, the U.S., within the OAS framework, worked to help bring about free and fair elections through which the will of the Dominican people could be expressed.

*Evaluation.* On June 1 elections were held and judged by competent OAS and private observers to be free and fair. Results now available show Joaquin Balaguer receiving 57.07% and Juan Bosch 39.17% of the vote. (Bonnely received 3.41%.)

U.S. intelligence indicated in March 1965 and in the months prior to the June 1966 election that Joaquin Balaguer was overwhelmingly the choice of the Dominican people for President. This intelligence plus the decisive results of the election are conclusive evidence that the

timely action of the United States permitted rather than frustrated democratic expression of the will of the Dominican people.

*Fourth Objective.* Beginning in the second week of the revolt, the U.S. had as a corollary objective keeping the Dominican economy afloat and preventing widespread hunger and hardship.

*Evaluation.* The small sector of Santo Domingo under rebel control represented the financial and commercial heart of the Dominican Republic and included the banks, major governmental offices, and important private commercial institutions. While the revolt caused an economic suspension in the Dominican Republic, the U.S., by helping to organize and finance basic civic services and by enabling the banks to open branches outside the rebel area, prevented the suspension from drifting into economic collapse. Outside of the capital city, there was a minimum disruption of economic patterns.

Hunger and extreme hardship were avoided by a large scale feeding and relief program organized by the U.S. within days after the revolt. By utilizing U.S. forces on the Line of Communication as one of the means to distribute food, the U.S. not only increased the rapidity of distribution but also dissipated much of the hostility toward the presence of U.S. troops.

During the 13-month period between the revolt and the elections the U.S. distributed directly and through voluntary agencies over \$16 million in food (final figures are not available). In other assistance, the U.S. obligated over \$118 million (excluding U.S. military expenditures) mostly used to keep the economy and the government sector afloat. About \$57 million of this was nominally administered through the OAS.

## II

### *Where We Go From Here*

You already have memoranda from Lincoln Gordon<sup>2</sup> and Ellsworth Bunker<sup>3</sup> which deal with the probable size of the aid program

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<sup>2</sup> In this June 16 memorandum Gordon and Gaud summarized the economic discussions begun on June 7 among Bunker, Crimmins, and President Balaguer in Santo Domingo. They informed Balaguer that a total assistance package of \$70 million for FY 1966 and 1967 had been authorized, and an additional \$10 to \$25 million in supporting assistance may be required from the Contingency Fund in FY-1967. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 68 D 93, Dominican Republic)

<sup>3</sup> In this June 16 memorandum entitled "Need for Continuing Supporting Assistance in the Dominican Republic," Bunker seconded the recommendation of Gordon and Gaud in their June 16 memorandum for more supporting assistance (see footnote 2 above). Bunker also supported a devaluation of the Dominican peso, but warned that such a measure would take coaxing on the part of the Dominicans because they are "generally afraid of devaluation." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 68 D 93, Dominican Republic)

needed for next year and with the difficult question of the timing of a devaluation of the Dominican peso. Not having the operational responsibilities of Link and Ellsworth, I should like to offer some views from a different perspective without giving detailed action recommendations.

*Internal Security.* Central to the question of political stability in the Dominican Republic is the capability of the Dominican police and military to maintain security once the Inter-American Peace Force is withdrawn (presumably within 90 days of the July 1 inauguration). While the decisive election of Balaguer has taken some of the steam out of the extreme left, the Communists, after their baptism of fire, are better organized for violence (as opposed to political action) than ever before. They and the "tigres" still have large quantities of arms obtained during the revolt.

It is therefore a first order of business to assure that the Dominican security forces are properly equipped, trained and led. As our military forces are being withdrawn, consideration might be given to quietly leaving behind certain equipment, especially soft goods and riot control matériel, which we might find politically difficult to supply to the Dominicans at a later date.<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, the Dominican Military must be modernized, professionalized and taken out of politics. The integrity of the military must not be undermined but at the same time, and important to its capability to maintain security, the military must improve its image in the eyes of the Dominican people who aspire to a reduction in both its size and role. It should be dissuaded from seeking vengeance against Bosch's PRD and other antagonists and it should be oriented away from politics and "golpista" tendencies. Over a period of time, the armed forces should be substantially reduced in number, consequently reducing the tremendous drain it represents in the Government budget.<sup>5</sup>

*"Sense of Progress."* It is important to the maintenance of stability for the Dominican people to have a "sense of progress". They must feel that there is a year to year improvement in their economic life and believe that their children's lives will be better than their own. Given the best of circumstances, only relatively meager gains in the Dominican living standard can be achieved in the next few years. Therefore, this psychological "sense of progress" can only be achieved in ways that are in addition to important but long-run economic development objectives. (The long-run objectives which can be realistically achieved in the Dominican Republic are mainly self-sufficiency in food; export

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<sup>4</sup> The President wrote: "Pursue good" next to this paragraph.

<sup>5</sup> The President wrote "I agree" next to this paragraph.



competitiveness in cash crops such as sugar, fresh vegetables and produce; food processing for consumption and export; and tourism.)

Even Balaguer's economic orthodoxy probably will not overcome the apprehensions of Dominican and foreign investors to the point where private sector investment will provide the immediate economic push needed. Therefore a sense of progress will depend largely on government attitudes and projects.

As a first step, Balaguer should organize his government to reflect the urgency of the economic job to be done. He should name an economic "czar", responsible only to him and with ample powers to overcome political and bureaucratic obstacles. Julian Perez, the head of Balaguer's Economic Commission, may be the right man.

As in Mexico, rapid land distribution could be a major element in creating a sense of progress. Large properties held over from the Trujillo days are available and their distribution, with clear titles, should be begun. Some of the past Mexican mistakes should be avoided such as communal ownership, distribution of non-viable parcels and failure to provide for the other elements such as credit, roads, etc., which make agrarian reform meaningful.<sup>6</sup>

The AID Mission should not be over expanded with "technical assistance" employees. We should operate to a larger extent through contracts with action-oriented organizations on highly visible regional projects. For immediate action we have the Yuma Valley project and in the longer run, there are the World Bank's regional projects for the Yaqui Valley.

Special emphasis should be given to the use of our resources in technical and vocational education so that Dominicans now filling menial jobs can feel that their children will be able to move a notch higher in the economic and social scale.

Finally, in creating a sense of progress it is essential to avoid creating unreasonable expectations, which if frustrated, could contribute to another round of violence.

**Tony**

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<sup>6</sup> Next to this paragraph the President wrote: "Take up with Bunker and Crimmins. L."

**180. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 11, 1966.

**SUBJECT**

Balaguer's First Appointments

Director Hoover has furnished security reports on 35 of Balaguer's first appointments.<sup>2</sup> These cover the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet, the Supreme Court and some of the key independent agencies such as State Properties, Industrial Development, Immigration, Communications and Airport Administration.

Security-wise the Cabinet looks good. The report on Minister of Interior and Police Ramon Castillo contains references to past pro-Castro sympathies. He is a rather erratic fellow who is now well right of center and working closely with our Embassy in Santo Domingo.

Balaguer made a clean sweep of the Supreme Court. You will recall that under Garcia Godoy some highly undesirable elements got into the judiciary. The FBI has no derogatory information on the new group. The Attorney General is also given a clean bill. We can expect the new Supreme Court to clean house further down the ranks of the judiciary.

The heads of independent agencies, with one exception, present no problems. The Director General of State Properties is said by one source to have been a member of the Communist Party. The charge does not seem to be supported by other sources. Both Garcia Godoy and Balaguer regard him as honest, trustworthy and a capable administrator.

From a security standpoint, the appointments represent quite an improvement from Garcia Godoy's choices ten months ago which had us so worried.

**Walt<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVI. Secret. Copies were sent to Marvin Watson and Bill Moyers.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup> Below Rostow's signature the President wrote: "Good—Thank & compliment Hoover and Bunker."

**181. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 24, 1966.

**SUBJECT**

Dominican Republic: Can Balaguer Bell the Cat?

Balaguer is facing a particularly difficult dilemma. He feels the need to bring his military more under control; he would like to do this before the departure of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), now scheduled for late September; but to do it so quickly risks a violent reaction by the military. One possible way out would be to ask the IAPF to stay longer, though this too would have some political cost.

1. In our last estimate on the Dominican Republic,<sup>2</sup> we noted the likelihood of further tension and disorder, and pointed out that the IAPF had become the primary stabilizing factor in the country. We also discussed the necessity, and at the same time the delicacy, of reshaping the Dominican military establishment, and we warned that if the new president moved clumsily in this, he might provoke the very military intervention he was trying to rule out.

2. The Balaguer administration, after a brief honeymoon period, is now faced with increasing suspicion, opposition and intrigue. Some elements on the extreme left have resumed acts of violence; some on the extreme right are plotting once again. One aspect of Balaguer's response has been the preparation of a draft law to curtail political party activity; this is antagonizing part of the moderate opposition as well. His own Reformist Party is not so well-organized or united that it provides him with a really solid base, and a number of its members are disenchanted because Balaguer has given them less patronage and more austerity than they expected.

3. But it is Balaguer's relationship to the military<sup>3</sup> that poses the most serious short-run problem. He has appointed as his own military

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVI. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> NIE 86.2–66, "Prospects for Stability in the Dominican Republic," published on 28 April 1966. [Footnote in the source text. Printed as Document 171.]

<sup>3</sup> This is a big establishment in a small country. Total number of military personnel is nearly 19,000. In addition, there is the National Police with about 8,500. Though not the throw-back, guerrilla outfit it was in Trujillo's time, the Dominican military is still essentially a conservative force and tends to align itself with the civilian elite. [Footnote in the source text.]

aide an ambitious officer who is generally considered a Trujilloist and is regarded with suspicion by the defense minister and the service chiefs, who have made their views known to Balaguer. Balaguer has replaced the chief of police with a trusted associate—but a man who seems heavier handed and lighter headed than his predecessor. He has ordered—though not yet implemented—the transfer of two key military units to what seem to be more reliable commands.

4. Balaguer has told the US Ambassador that he is determined to proceed with a reduction and thorough reorganization of the Dominican military. Although he realizes that this involves some risk, he may be underestimating how much. He has emphasized his belief that certain specific changes must be accomplished and that the broad outline of the whole plan must be established while he still has the backing of the IAPF. (IAPF strength is now down to about 5,000, and the last units are scheduled to leave in the latter part of September.) He has been giving some thought to the pros and cons of requesting an extension of the IAPF presence.

5. Many Dominican military figures are probably willing to cooperate with Balaguer in his reorganization efforts. Others in the military are bound to become restive as they see plans developed to cut back not only their numbers, but also their privileges and prerogatives. Officers already involved in conspiring with civilian rightists are likely to do more of it. Any upsurge in terrorism on the part of the extreme left or any improvement in the political fortunes of the moderate left, would probably cause more of the military to involve themselves in coup plotting.

6. Since its inception, the IAPF has been an effective deterrent to insurgency from the left and to a coup from the right. The likelihood of these contingencies will in any case become greater when the last elements of the IAPF depart. And if, before the presently scheduled departure date in late September, Balaguer presses ahead to accomplish several of his military reform measures—and to advertise the rest—the chances of a military coup would be sharply increased.

For the Board of National Estimates:

**Abbot Smith**

**182. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>**

No. 1597/66

Washington, August 29, 1966.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AFTER THE  
DEPARTURE OF THE IAPF

Summary

The withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in late September will remove the primary element that has ensured Dominican stability during the past 16 months. Although there is presently no evidence that the IAPF's departure in itself will serve as the immediate trigger for a coup or insurgency, the chances for a confrontation between Balaguer and dissatisfied elements are likely to increase appreciably over the ensuing months.

Balaguer has not developed a political base strong enough to withstand severe reactions to his reforms, particularly those affecting right-wing military elements. He will have to balance carefully the opposing political forces if he is to implement his program without the backing of something like the IAPF. If the President succeeds in implementing those reforms through which he seeks to curb the power of right-wing military elements prior to the IAPF's departure—and then can make them stick—his chances for retaining power will be improved. It is by no means certain, however, that he can successfully negotiate this Dominican tightrope.

[Omitted here is the discussion section of the memorandum.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

**183. Memorandum From the Representative to the Organization of American States (Bunker) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1966.

**SUBJECT**

Present Situation in the Dominican Republic

1. During the period September 6–8, I had an opportunity to review the situation in the Dominican Republic with President Balaguer, ex-President Garcia Godoy and Professor Bosch as well as with Ambassador Crimmins, the United States MAAG and AID officials, Generals Braga and Linvill of the IAPF, and Dominican civilians.

2. I have come away with the impression that despite a situation which presented many difficulties of a political, economic and social nature, the new administration of President Balaguer has made commendable progress. Political compromises, not always desirable, had to be made in an effort to overcome and heal old hatreds and bring into the Government as wide a spectrum as possible. Strenuous efforts had to be made to set in motion a stagnant economy. While austerity measures had to be applied to the economic situation, at the same time account had to be taken of the dangerous and explosive situation arising from widespread unemployment, and measures to increase job opportunities had to be planned and implemented. The loyalty and cooperation of the Armed Forces, historically a question mark in the Dominican political situation, had to be secured.

3. I believe the new Administration has made considerable progress in working toward the solution of these difficult and complex problems. Despite a few initial missteps and an early tendency on the part of the Reformista congressional majority to ride roughshod over the opposition, President Balaguer has made serious efforts to obtain the cooperation of Professor Bosch and the PRD. Professor Bosch for his part has expressed his personal friendliness for President Balaguer and has endeavored to carry out his role and that of his party as a constructive opposition. I mentioned to both President Balaguer and Professor Bosch that it seemed to me essential, if the country were to pull through the difficult situation it faced, that both the leaders and their

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVI. Confidential. Transmitted under a September 9 covering memorandum from Rostow who informed the President that Bunker returned to Washington from Santo Domingo the evening of September 8, and that he planned to meet with Fulbright the following week to discuss his trip. President Johnson wrote a note at the bottom of Rostow's memorandum requesting that Rostow report to him after Bunker's meeting with Fulbright.

parties should endeavor to cooperate and work together. Both expressed themselves as being in full agreement.

4. On the economic side President Balaguer is holding weekly meetings with Ambassador Crimmins, top members of our AID staff and Dominican officials concerned with economic problems. Both President Balaguer and Ambassador Crimmins stated that they felt very satisfactory progress was being made in implementing the AID programs. The Government is also beginning to grapple with the difficult problem of reorganization of the Sugar Corporation. Dr. Balaguer wished me to express to you his very deep appreciation for the allocation to the Dominican Republic of additional sugar quota and for the support and assistance he had received. While other problems have been encountered, as, for example, the present depressed tobacco market and some additional unemployment brought about by austerity measures, on the part of the business community there appears to be increasing confidence in the ability of the Government to survive the present difficulties.

5. In response to my question about the attitude of the Armed Forces, President Balaguer replied that he considered that his relations with the Minister of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of Staff and other leaders were excellent, that he held weekly luncheon meetings with them, that they accepted the fact that the military establishment was in need of reorganization, including a reduction in numbers. He has already taken steps to reduce its size by attrition and begun to dismantle the power base of a troublesome group at the San Isidro air base near Santo Domingo. He said that in some elements, particularly in the Air Force, changes would have to be made but that in general he was well satisfied that a proper relationship existed between the Government and the Armed Forces. He also expressed himself as pleased by the plans for reorganization submitted by the MAAG and proposed to go ahead with them although they would have to be put into effect gradually.

6. I reminded the President that as of September 1 there were 2700 troops of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic and that according to the present schedule the last contingent would leave on September 20. The President replied that this schedule was entirely satisfactory to him but then inquired whether it would be possible to retain, for psychological purposes, a small group until the end of September or perhaps even for a week or two in October without any formal request from him. I replied that while this might be possible any substantial extension would require a new resolution by the OAS following a formal request from him. Dr. Balaguer stated categorically that he did not wish to make such a request and my own view is that little is to be gained by an extension of the kind he has suggested; and that on the other hand perhaps a good deal of criticism of the OAS, the IAPF, and es-

pecially the U.S. might result. Both General Braga and General Linvill feel that an extension such as suggested by Dr. Balaguer would be unwise.

7. Dr. Garcia Godoy expressed considerable optimism over the results of the Government's efforts during the first two months in office. In spite of some initial errors he felt that Dr. Balaguer was gaining experience and confidence and that there was a widespread feeling in the country that this administration must be kept in power for its full four year term. Dr. Garcia Godoy, who expects to arrive in Washington September 18 as the Dominican Ambassador, has been performing a very useful role in an advisory capacity to both President Balaguer and Professor Bosch and as intermediary with them.

8. The one exception to the generally favorable view which I received was that of Professor Bosch. While he reiterated his determination to work with President Balaguer, for whom he expressed personal friendship, he said that plotting was continuing and that the only way to put an end to it was to "dismantle the terrorist apparatus" led mainly by extreme right-wing civilians. He added that General Imbert was always the center of these plots but that if the eight or ten leaders were given overseas diplomatic assignments the backbone of the plotting would be broken and Imbert would quiet down. Professor Bosch said that he felt his own presence in the Dominican Republic was vital since he was in a position to exercise restraint on the masses. He expressed great concern over the economic and social problems that beset the country and felt that President Balaguer should exercise care in applying his austerity program not to aggravate further the unemployment problem. He estimated that there were between 80 or 90 thousand unemployed in Santo Domingo alone.

9. With the exception of Professor Bosch, I could find no one who felt that there were signs of any widespread plotting or any likelihood that efforts would be made to overthrow the government. While some irreconcilable elements of the extreme Left and Right stand ready to oppose President Balaguer, these have no significant popular following. While they still possess a significant quantity of arms, considerable progress has been made in collecting heavy weapons and President Balaguer is of the opinion that considerably more progress will be made in this respect. I believe that the Dominican military is loyal to Balaguer and is capable of putting down any uprising that might be foreseeable in present circumstances. The major opposition parties, Bosch's PRD and the Social Christian PRSC, in assuming the role of constructive opposition give the government their support. I came away, therefore, with a feeling that very considerable progress had been made, that the country was calmer than I had ever seen it and that President Balaguer was acting with determination and a good deal of courage in tackling the many difficult problems with which he is faced.



10. In Senator Fulbright's absence this week from Washington I talked with his Executive Assistant, Mr. Williams, before leaving for Santo Domingo about reports the Senator had received regarding a plot to overthrow President Balaguer. I informed Mr. Williams that while rumors were always circulating in the Dominican Republic, I knew of no serious or significant plotting against the Government; that I expected to investigate these reports when I was in Santo Domingo; and that I should be glad to inform Senator Fulbright of my views when he returned next week to Washington. Mr. Williams expressed his appreciation and undertook to inform Senator Fulbright.

**Ellsworth Bunker**

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#### **184. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

SNIE 86.2–2–66

Washington, September 19, 1966.

##### **PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

###### **The Problem**

To estimate prospects for stability over the next six months or so with particular attention to the effect of the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).

###### **The Estimate**

1. The Dominican Republic lacks many of the basic ingredients for stability. It has had scarcely any experience in achieving political compromise through representative institutions. The military—or major groups within it—have long acted as the arbiters of Dominican politics and have not hesitated to intervene when they thought necessary. The 1965 revolution and its aftermath produced sharp new animosities among politically active elements of the population—animosities which cannot be readily overcome. The scope of economic and social problems is such that, at best, progress can come only slowly.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVI. Secret. Prepared in the CIA and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board.

<sup>2</sup> These basic considerations are treated in some detail in NIE 86.2–66, "Prospects for Stability in the Dominican Republic," dated 28 April 1966. [Footnote in the source text. Printed as Document 171.]

2. The Balaguer Administration, in office for less than three months, is only beginning to come to grips with the most serious of its problems. The mandate he received in the June elections—some 57 per cent of the vote—helped create a honeymoon period for his Administration, and he moved quickly to establish a strong degree of control over the bureaucracy and to dominate the Congress. However, a large proportion of his Reformist party's adherents are in the rural areas and are politically inactive most of the time; partly for this reason he has been unable to establish a solid, well-organized political base, especially in Santo Domingo. A number of members of his party have become disenchanted because he has not provided patronage on the scale they expected.

3. Though Balaguer has appointed some members of other parties to cabinet and other administrative posts, this has not attracted much additional political support or otherwise added to the strength of his position. Even by Dominican standards, the calibre of cabinet personnel seems mediocre; Balaguer himself has little confidence in the competence of certain of the ministers and delegates little authority to them. In some cases he has chosen men for key posts chiefly because he felt sure of their loyalty. This appears to be the case for his chief of police and his military aide. The former's heavy-handedness in dealing with demonstrations or agitation carries the risk of estranging Balaguer from the moderate left. His military aide is *persona non grata* with the military chiefs who have long distrusted him and fear he is undercutting them.

4. The Administration has undertaken a few positive economic actions, some popular, some not. It has slightly reduced prices of some foods, it has reduced salaries of higher paid government officials (including military officers), and it has laid off a few government employees. On the other hand, it has not put through any major new tax measures and, though there is a sizable amount of aid money available, has made only limited progress in its emergency investment program. Such projects as are underway have had only marginal impact on the severe unemployment problem, and the government plans in the near future to fire a fairly large number of sugar workers so as to help reduce the exorbitant costs of the government-run sugar establishment.

5. Among Balaguer's strengths are his centrist political position, his staunch anticommunism, and his reputation for integrity. Another major asset is the general recognition that he has strong US support—as indicated by the \$40 million US aid program for emergency investment and the recent increase in the US quota for sugar from the Dominican Republic. And perhaps the chief factor in his favor is that there is at present no viable alternative.

6. The various political opponents of the Balaguer government have so far acted with relative restraint. Elements of the extreme left and extreme right have perpetrated occasional incidents of terrorism and violence, but this has not been on a major scale. Juan Bosch and his left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary party have not gone so far as to cooperate with Balaguer but have shown a measure of responsibility in their opposition.

7. The most important factor affecting the government's stability will be Balaguer's relationship with the military. Balaguer has calculated that his own hold on power cannot become firm unless and until he can establish his government's authority over the military. To this end, he has made plans for ambitious military reforms aimed at consolidating his control and curbing the power of certain rightwing officers. No Dominican leader since Trujillo has been able to impose his will on the military; those who have taken even tentative steps to do so, as did Reid in early 1965, soon find themselves on delicate ground.

8. Balaguer realizes that this is a risky business—as shown by his desire to have key reforms accomplished before the departure of the IAPF. Resentment of the activities of Balaguer's military aide and suspicion that the President may eventually replace a number of top officers have contributed to some discontent in the military. A few officers of the far right and civilians of similar view are taking soundings concerning Balaguer's military support, but they do not now seem to have the strength for a successful coup.

9. Balaguer's orders issued in late August, which would break up the fourth brigade formerly commanded by General Wessin y Wessin and which would shift air force ground combat troops to the army, have been only partially implemented. One danger point in the near future may come in connection with dispersing the armored battalion of the fourth brigade to different commands; the military are well aware that this would be the most potent single organization for, or against, a coup effort.

10. Many of the Dominican military, perhaps a majority, are sympathetic to Balaguer's reform plans. But a growing number of officers are likely to become restive as they see the government moving to cut back not only their numbers and prerogatives, but also their power. In making new appointments of military officers he trusts, Balaguer will inevitably earn the enmity of those he replaces; this will be particularly so if he turns to certain Trujilloist officers with whom he has associated in the past but who are now regarded with disfavor by most of the younger military men.

11. The departure of the IAPF will remove what has served as a primary deterrent to a coup in which the military would be the decisive element. However, the coup danger may not be immediate; it will

depend on how dangerous to the country or to their own interests the military consider Balaguer's actions to be, and to some extent on their ability to find civilian allies. During the period of this estimate, we think that the chief risk of a coup would occur if the military came to feel that Balaguer was pushing military changes too far or too fast. There will probably be some increase in terrorist activities by rightist elements, but in themselves these are unlikely to threaten the stability of the regime.

12. The withdrawal of the IAPF will probably also be followed by an increase, though perhaps not a major one, in the terrorist activities of the extreme left. The 14th of June Movement is likely to play the lead role, and some members of the orthodox Communist party will almost certainly be involved. The pro-Chinese Dominican Popular Movement, militant on a number of past occasions, is so badly split that its effectiveness will be limited for some time. The combined assets of these three extreme leftist organizations are not large; the Dominican military will be able to contain and probably eliminate any guerrilla actions they may attempt in the countryside, because the peasants will not give the leftists much support. These groups do have the capability, however, to undertake violent and disruptive operations in Santo Domingo; unless they obtain support from the non-Communist left, they do not pose a serious threat to the government. There is a danger that the police or military, by over-reacting to agitation or demonstrations which they presume to be Communist directed, may create martyrs and drive some erstwhile moderate leftists into common cause with the extremists.

13. Faced with these manifold problems, Balaguer will not achieve a strong or stable position during the period of this estimate. Moreover, it is unlikely that he can accomplish enough in the way of economic improvement to make any net gain in his political support. On the contrary, some of the economic measures he finds it necessary to take for budgetary or balance of payments purposes are likely to contribute to a gradual erosion of his support. We think, however, the chances are somewhat better than even that he will survive in office for the six month period of this estimate.

**185. Memorandum From the Representative to the Organization of American States (Bunker) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 28, 1966.

SUBJECT

Present Situation in the Dominican Republic

1. Together with my colleagues of the Ad Hoc Committee I called on President Balaguer October 25. The Committee wished to ascertain President Balaguer's views regarding the continuation in being of the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers. I pointed out to the President that, if the 10th MFM were to continue in being, the Ad Hoc Committee could also continue in existence and should any situation arise requiring action by the OAS, the Committee would be able to respond immediately without the time consuming steps involved in convoking another Meeting and establishing new machinery. Dr. Balaguer replied that his preference very definitely was to have the 10th MFM and the Ad Hoc Committee continue in being. He expressed confidence that continuation of the Meeting would raise no public opinion problem within the country. I concur in Dr. Balaguer's views regarding the desirability of continuing the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

2. I referred to Professor Bosch's recent allegations of continued terrorism and his complaint that political activity was not possible, that the government was not paying attention to public opinion, and that PRD sponsored bills had not been approved by the Legislature. I added that his present more critical attitude, his decision to retire as head of the Party and his announced departure in early November for Spain contrasted with his avowed intention when I saw him in September<sup>2</sup> to cooperate with the government.

3. Regarding allegations of terrorism, Dr. Balaguer replied that Bosch had spoken only in generalities and he had asked him publicly to what specific actions he had reference. He remarked that Bosch

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Confidential. Transmitted under a November 9 covering memorandum from Rostow who wrote: "Ellsworth Bunker went to the Dominican Republic the week before last with his two OAS colleagues (Brazilian Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho and El Salvador Ambassador Ramon de Clairmont Duenas) to talk to Balaguer. On Bunker's return he did the attached report for you, describing his findings. He thinks that on balance the favorable new developments of the Balaguer administration outweigh the unfavorable ones and the prospects for stability are still good. Other recent reports have been less sanguine; but Ellsworth's judgment has been pretty good over the months."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 183.

seems to be tired and dispirited, apparently unhappy and irritated by the situation within the PRD, with the Party divided and various factions fighting each other. The President added that, although there are responsible men in the PRD, there does not appear to be any one person likely to replace Bosch able to weld the groups together and maintain Party unity.

4. President Balaguer referred to the desirability of completing arrangements as soon as possible for the training of the frogmen in the U.S., a commitment which we had made as early as last January. I informed him that I expected plans to be completed by the end of the present week and that arrangements could be made for their departure promptly. The President expressed the view that departure of the frogmen would remove the remaining source of possible serious friction. He expects no further problem in completing the reintegration of the remaining Constitutionalist forces.

5. The President expressed the view that although the state of the economy represents the biggest problem facing the government the situation has improved. Current expenses are being met out of income and salaries of all employees of the government and government owned enterprises are being paid on time. Special U.S. budget support assistance has not been needed since July. Referring to the Sugar Corporation, he mentioned that the \$12 million loan under negotiation with private banks would cover the \$6 million current deficit and provide funds for the coming crop. The main problems are to reduce production costs and provide employment for the nearly 5,000 employees whom it was necessary to lay off. He assured me that plans for the use of the \$40 million U.S. assistance loan are proceeding well with nearly \$9 million committed and \$17 million more about to be committed.

6. The situation in the Dominican Republic presents some favorable developments, others less so. Among the less favorable developments are:

a) Some psychological letdown from the general feeling of enthusiasm and optimism which prevailed at the inauguration of the new government.

b) The apprehension that I had earlier expressed that Dr. Balaguer might try to go too far too fast in his austerity program I think may have been borne out. Labor opposition is beginning to develop, and there seems to be a growing feeling of pessimism among the part of the business community most affected by the austerity program, particularly importers. There is a situation for potential trouble between the contending stevedore unions, a problem which had presumably been settled by the Provisional Government. It remains to be seen whether the President's handling of the situation will be successful.

c) At least a partial breakdown of cooperation between the two major Parties and their leaders Balaguer and Bosch.

d) The lack of any real Party organization in either of the two major Parties. The PRD is split between the more conservative older elements, numerically the greater, and some of the more radical younger groups. It remains to be seen what effect Bosch's resignation, if he carries through, and the holding of the PRD convention this weekend will have on the Party fortunes and organization. There has also been a deterioration in the organization of the Reformista Party of Dr. Balaguer due in part to his refusal to sanction funds for the adequate functioning of the Party organization.

e) The fact that Balaguer is by character and nature an old-fashioned man with an innate distrust of technicians and experts. The result is that he is not making use of some of the competent personnel who were assembled by his predecessor Dr. Garcia Godoy. Given the thinness of competent talent in the Dominican Republic, this can have adverse effects on its economic, political and social progress.

Favorable factors are:

a) Contrary to rumors which sometimes circulate in the Dominican Republic and rather more frequently here, there is no real evidence of any plotting.

b) Balaguer's relations with the Armed Forces continue to be excellent. The changes which he has made, i.e., the dispersal of the CEFA artillery brigade formerly commanded by General Wessin y Wessin and the replacement of General Folch Perez as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, have gone off smoothly and without incident. The President remarked that General Wessin y Wessin will not return and has now few followers. He added that while General Imbert is never calm he is now isolated and is not permitted to visit military installations.

c) Evidence points strongly to the fact that the great majority of the Dominican people are determined to see the Administration through its full four years.

d) While the Reformista Party has a preponderant control of the Legislature, it is not true that the democratic process is not functioning. The opposition has been able to secure amendments to certain laws and Balaguer has wisely deferred action on the proposed law to suspend certain political activities. The law is now under study by a mixed commission of five members each from the two major Parties.

7. I believe that on balance the constructive factors making for stability of the Balaguer Administration outweigh the negative ones. It was to be expected that there would be some psychological letdown from the atmosphere of anticipation and enthusiasm engendered by the installation of the newly elected Constitutional government. In view of the serious deterioration of the economy aggravated by the

revolution and the continuous series of crises faced by the Provisional Government, the remedial measures undertaken by the new Administration were bound to cause some dissatisfaction. Certain other problems are those being encountered by all of the underdeveloped nations. While one has to take these into account, I am cautiously optimistic about the situation in the Dominican Republic.

8. The Embassy is functioning well and under the able guidance of Ambassador Crimmins is keeping constantly alert to the situation there.

**Ellsworth Bunker**

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**186. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 18, 1966.

SUBJECT

Dominican Situation

Ambassador Crimmins has sent his assessment of the recent PRD decision to abandon the "constructive opposition" role proclaimed shortly after Balaguer took office. A copy of his cable is attached.<sup>2</sup>

The analysis elaborates what was already evident: that a trend toward political polarization has started which, if left unchecked, could produce a dangerous situation in the next 6–9 months. The threatened polarization would probably take this path:

—the radical elements now in control of the PRD would move the party toward the extreme left and make common cause with the Communists.

—Balaguer, failing to build up his PR party and broaden his popular base, would increasingly depend on the military for support.

Crimmins lists the gross options open to us this way:<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret; Sensitive. The President wrote at the top of the memorandum: "Walt, stay on top of this. This needs attention."

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to telegram 1515 from Santo Domingo, November 14, retyped for the President, attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Crimmins lists these options in telegram 1542 from Santo Domingo, November 16, retyped for the President, attached but not printed.



—Let matters take their course and hope for the best. (This is out of the question.)

—Encourage the decay of the PRD to the point that it becomes an extreme left splinter associated with or allied to the Communists, and thereby discredited. (It is too risky to let the Communists capture the PRD label.)

—Try to keep the PRD from moving to the far left and at the same time persuade Balaguer to build up his Party. (This is the sensible course we *must* follow.)<sup>4</sup>

We must develop a strategy for dealing with the new situation. CIA and State are working on the political component:

—A Balaguer decision to build the PR Party organization, plus funds and organizers to do it.

—Public relations assistance to Balaguer to improve his image.

—Political advice to Balaguer on how to deal with the PRD opposition. (Garcia Godoy should be especially helpful here.)

—Assistance to moderate elements of the PRD to keep active in the Party.

The economic component will receive a thorough review when Ambassador Crimmins and his top AID advisers come to Washington to map out what we do in 1967. We know that our \$40 million investment program is going reasonably well. What we don't have is an overall view of how the economy is doing, the trends and Balaguer's development plans for next year.

Crimmins was slated to arrive here the second week in December. Linc Gordon has asked that he come right after Thanksgiving.

Walt

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1542 Crimmins stated that this option offered "more promise" than the first "in helping arrest down-hill movement and providing greater flexibility."

**187. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 29, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Our Meeting on the Dominican Republic<sup>2</sup>

At Tab A is the memo which you sent to the President summarizing John Crimmins' cables and containing the President's reaction.<sup>3</sup>

*Purpose of the Meeting*

To review the Dominican situation in the light of recent trends toward political polarization and to determine what steps we should take *now* to arrest and reverse this trend.

*Agenda for Meeting*

What we want to accomplish at the meeting is to:

- elicit up-to-date information on the political and economic situation;
- examine the options for reversing polarization, recognizing that the only practical alternative is to try to keep the PRD from moving leftward and to build up Balaguer's Party;
- discuss specific steps which State and CIA might take to translate our "attitudinal" posture into action;
- assign responsibility for preparation of an action paper and a report to the President.

I suggest you follow the agenda at Tab B.<sup>4</sup>

*Some Comments*

According to Crimmins the polarization crisis is less acute than appears in his cables. I agree—but the problem is present, and it is easier to deal with now than later.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of this meeting, which was attended by Rostow, Bowdler, Gordon, Sayre, Bunker, Crimmins, Broe, Esterline, Townsend W. Hoopes, and William E. Lang, the latter two Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs, see Document 190. Another brief account is in a March 22, 1967, memorandum from Sayre to Kohler. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1967)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 186.

<sup>4</sup> Not attached.

State and CIA have worked up a so-so paper on short term courses of action (Tab C) to arrest the polarization trend. On the *attitude* side it is fine. In terms of what *concrete steps* we can take, it is not too good. CIA tells me that they have some ideas that have not been put on paper. We should get these on the table.

The *economic reporting* from the Embassy has not been full and sharp. Washington doesn't have a clear picture of the present situation and trends. Crimmins is up here for this purpose. We need to pump him.

WGBowdler<sup>5</sup>

### Tab C

#### **Paper Prepared by the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, November 29, 1966.

#### POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION—SHORT-TERM

1. We do not believe there is an imminent threat to DR stability but we recognize that recent events, particularly within the PRD, if they continue on course, *may* result in polarization (Balaguer, the civilian right wing, and the military on the one side, the rest of the country on the other), a development to be resisted at all costs.

2. We do not know enough about Peña Gomez to know how extreme he is or may turn out to be. We do know, however, that he is combative, intensely nationalist, and anti-U.S. but is not irrecoverable. He has stated he will leave the secretary-generalship in the spring. There are no clear indications of any possible successor.

3. Bosch's role is still nebulous. It appears, however, that his influence has been substantially reduced and now that he has left the DR will be reduced even further.

4. We agree with Ambassador Crimmins that the splinterization of the PRD should be avoided and that moderate elements of the PRD should be encouraged to keep the party from moving too far left, with the further point of trying to keep the party as representative and broadly-based as possible.

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>6</sup> Tab C was not attached. The copy printed here is from the Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1967. A handwritten notation indicates the paper was adopted by a White House-State-DOD-CIA meeting on November 29.

With the above in mind we recommend consideration of the following course of action:

1. Implement Ambassador Crimmins' plan of action vis-à-vis Balaguer.

2. Impress on Balaguer the importance of a loyal political organization to the success of his government. Identify active and potential leaders of Reformista Party at national, regional and local levels. Assist (preferably in technical terms) PR in creating a going, grass-roots political organization to support Balaguer's policies.

3. Improve our information on PRD leaders, identifying moderates, radicals and any Communist infiltrators.

4. Assist moderate PRD members to increase their influence on party affairs and encourage them to remain in or rejoin the PRD to counter radical influences.

5. Seek to diminish influence on PRD affairs of the more extreme radicals and any Communist infiltrators.

6. Conduct systematic program to encourage moderates and diminish radicalism in PRD youth and labor sectors.

7. Encourage PRSC moderates to diminish influence of hardliners and any Communist infiltrators in the PRSC.

8. Indirectly assist Peña Gomez to obtain a foreign scholarship if he wants one and a follow-on fellowship in the U.S. if desired. Maintain direct and/or indirect contact with him during his foreign training. Intensify exchanges program to develop moderate leadership in the PR, the PRD and the PRSC.

9. *[3 lines of source text not declassified]*

10. Review labor program to see how it can be strengthened in order to prevent identification of significant labor elements with the Communist left.

11. Make efforts to improve the quality of key figures in regime. With this objective in mind provide Balaguer systematically with reliable, unbiased information from all available sources *[3 lines of source text not declassified]*.

12. Encourage the creation of a mechanism to receive and evaluate complaints against the government including complaints against improper actions by the security forces. Encourage Balaguer to come to grips with this problem and to take corrective action when complaints are justified.

13. Try to impress on Dominican security forces the need to distinguish between the Communist and non-Communist left and between legitimate and illegitimate political activity. Help them to identify moderate, constructive members of the PRD and PRSC.

**188. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1967, 11:53 a.m.–12:24 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Ambassador Garcia Godoy—Dominican Republic  
Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon  
Mr. William G. Bowdler

Ambassador Garcia Godoy opened the conversation by expressing deep appreciation for the President's taking the time from his busy schedule to receive him. The President replied that both had shared some difficult moments almost two years ago, and that he was pleased to have this opportunity to speak with the Ambassador.

Garcia Godoy said that he had returned over the weekend from the Dominican Republic. On this trip he had found a noticeable improvement in the political and economic climate in his country. There was, he said, a new sense of confidence and forward movement, particularly noticeable in the business community. Garcia Godoy went on to say that the main purpose of his wishing to see the President was to request special consideration in the allocation of sugar deficits. He noted that the Dominican Republic faced three principal economic problems:

1. Rationalization of the sugar industry which is underway;
2. Serious unemployment, which must be reduced if the Dominican Republic is to achieve social and political stability; and
3. The need to count on an assured higher sugar quota over a period of years on which the government could base its economic planning.

The President stated that we were pleased by the progress which President Balaguer had made during the first six months and wished to be of continued help to the extent that we could. The President recalled that he had authorized giving the Dominican Republic the Panamanian and Philippine shortfalls last year. We are not sure what the deficit situation, if any, would be this year. The Ambassador should keep in touch with Mr. Gordon, whose recommendations he would consider carefully.

**William G. Bowdler<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary.

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**189. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 11, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Hector Garcia Godoy—Dominican Republic  
Mr. William G. Bowdler—NSC Staff

The Ambassador called at his initiative. He said that he had tried to make an appointment with Assistant Secretary Gordon yesterday, but given Mr. Gordon's imminent departure for Buenos Aires, this was not possible.

The Ambassador said that the purpose of his visit was to reiterate what he had said to the President in their interview of January 23,<sup>2</sup> 1967 concerning his government's desire to have an assured quota of 600,000 tons of sugar for the next two or three years while the government-owned sugar corporation was completely modernized. He was making this request again because he had recently heard from his government's sugar brokers in New York that the Philippines would not be able to meet their share of the Puerto Rican deficit.

On the modernization of the sugar industry, the Ambassador reported that his government on February 6 invited bids for a management survey of the industry. The bidding would close on March 6, at which time the government would select a consultant firm to do the survey.

I told him that we were also aware of the information in the hands of the sugar trade. I pointed out I was in no position to give him an answer on his request for additional sugar up to 600,000 tons. He said he recognized this. I said that assuming the Philippines would not be able to meet its share of the Puerto Rican deficit, we would not be dealing with the quota redistribution until late spring and probably not until July. I stressed the importance of moving forward with all speed on the modernization of the industry.

I told Ambassador Garcia Godoy that when I saw Assistant Secretary Gordon in Buenos Aires next week, I would convey his views to him.

**William G. Bowdler<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Confidential. The meeting was held in Bowdler's office. Copies were sent to Sayre and Rostow.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 188.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## 190. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 17, 1967.

### SUBJECT

Support for a Moderate Social Christian Student Group in the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD)

#### 1. Summary<sup>2</sup>

During a 29 November 1966 White House meeting chaired by Mr. Walt Rostow, a program of short-term courses of action for the Dominican Republic was agreed upon.<sup>3</sup> One of the objectives in this program is the encouragement of moderates within the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) and weakening the influence of hard-liners and Communist infiltrators within the PRSC. This proposal is designed to contribute to the implementation of this objective by enabling the Revolutionary Christian University Bloc (BRUC), a Social Christian affiliated student group which reflects the moderate faction of the PRSC to make the strongest possible showing in the elections scheduled to be held in May at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD). A BRUC victory in the University would also benefit and strengthen the moderate wing of the PRSC. The cost of the proposed operation will be [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. If this effort is carried out as proposed, the mechanism used could subsequently provide the access and means of influencing the moderate leadership of the PRSC.

#### 2. Problem

To enable BRUC to make the strongest possible showing in the student government elections to be held in May 1967 at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. A BRUC victory or its strong showing would not only be a counter-force to extremist influences in the university, but would also benefit and strengthen the moderate wing of the PRSC.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Dominican Republic 1967. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> At the end of this section is a handwritten notation that reads: "303 Committee rejected the proposal at its meeting of 7 April 1967 [see Document 191]. Decision reversed on 5 May 67 (see minutes dated 8 May 67) [see footnote 2, Document 200]."

<sup>3</sup> See Document 187 for a briefing memorandum for the meeting.

### 3. *Factors Bearing on the Problem*

#### *a. Origin of the Requirement:*

This proposal is submitted at the recommendation of Ambassador John H. Crimmins, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

#### *b. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations:*

The proposal is based on policy stated in a paper entitled "Short-Term Courses of Action for the Dominican Republic" which was approved on 29 November 1966 by representatives from the White House, Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. To encourage PRSC moderates and to diminish influence of hardliners and any Communist infiltration of the PRSC is one of the objectives cited in the paper. In this context a strong, more moderate Social Christian Student group in the UASD would also tend to strengthen the PRSC faction which represents a more responsible leadership.

In the University elections of 1966 BRUC lost to the Communist student association which now controls the university by a vote of 1182 to 1587 out of a total of 3000 votes cast. BRUC will again present candidates for election during the student government elections scheduled for May 1967. It is the only significant non-communist student association at the University with a fair chance of winning the election. Thus, should BRUC win the coming student elections, or at least make a strong showing under a continuing relationship with moderate PRSC leader Caonabo Javier Castillo, Communist control of the student government as a vehicle for Communist propaganda would be circumscribed and the turbulent political climate at the University would be ameliorated.

The University elections, however, will also play an important part in off-campus politics on a national scale, where student groups enjoy disproportionate importance as pressure groups. Therefore, inasmuch as the BRUC candidates being put forward for election are closely identified with the leadership of the moderate wing of the PRSC, a strong BRUC position in the student government of the UASD could substantially strengthen the moderates within the PRSC, and thus become a moderating influence on the Dominican political scene.

The PRSC is a left of center political party in opposition to the Balaguer Administration. Although the PRSC has generally followed a radical line since the April 1965 Revolution, often tactically allied with the PRD (Revolutionary Dominican Party) and a coalition of extreme leftist parties, in recent weeks the Javier leadership of the party has declared itself in "constructive opposition" to the Government. This posture of "constructive opposition" was formulated by Caonabo Javier



Castillo, the Secretary General of the PRSC, who is also influential among Dominican youth. Because of his prestige among youth and students, Javier's call for "constructive opposition" has been taken up by BRUC, a Social Christian Student Association, which reflects the line of the Javier faction of the Party. Thus, by helping BRUC, it is hoped that a first step will have been taken towards bringing about a more constructive climate in the university which would at the same time strengthen the more moderate wing of the Party. In this connection, it is well to recall that the PRSC is the only significant left-of-center party which has made its policy of peaceful opposition a matter of public record.

Although Javier now represents the moderate wing of the party, it must be noted that he is also young (age 31), mercurial, and has become in the past identified as a strong critic of so-called U.S. Imperialism in Latin America. It is possible, that Javier's recent conversion to a more conciliatory position vis-à-vis the Balaguer Government may be only of a tactical and temporary nature. It should also be noted that even if Javier maintains a party line of loyal opposition to the Balaguer Government, he may in the international field continue to attack the U.S. and so-called "U.S. Imperialism" in Latin America. However, even were Javier to retrogress to a hard anti-U.S. position, a strong BRUC position in the University would be preferable to Communist domination of the student federation at the university. Under any circumstances, development of access to the moderate leadership of the PRSC could constitute an essential instrument in moderating the PRSC line whichever way Javier might veer in the future.

In short, channeling support to a moderate leader of BRUC directly or through a leader of the moderate Javier faction of the PRSC, would be a secure and inexpensive means of implementing the recommendations of the above-cited 29 November 1966 paper on Short-Term Courses of Action for the Dominican Republic.

*c. Operational Objectives:*

The operational objective is to insure the election of a moderate PRSC affiliated student group as the majority element in the Government of the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, thereby encouraging and strengthening the progressive moderate faction within the PRSC, and its stand for "constructive opposition".

[3 headings and 3 paragraphs (18 lines of source text) not declassified]

*4. Coordination*

Action was recommended in Santo Domingo by Ambassador John H. Crimmins, and approved at the Department of State by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Robert M. Sayre.

## 5. *Recommendations*

It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve this proposal to support BRUC, a moderate Social Christian Student Association in the University as a counter force to extremist domination of the student elections and as an encouragement nationally to the moderate faction of the PRSC.

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## 191. **Memorandum for the Record**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 7, 1967.

### SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 7 April 1967

### PRESENT

Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Kohler, Mr. Vance, and Admiral Taylor

General Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 1

Mr. William Broe was present for Item 2

[Omitted here is discussion of a DOD proposal.]

## 2. *Dominican Republic*

a. The committee reviewed the proposal to support the student elections at the Autonomous University in Santo Domingo in some detail.<sup>2</sup> The paper had been put off until such time as the committee could hear Mr. Vance's objections. He emphasized that he still felt that there was too high a risk for too little gain. He said that the maximum achievement would be remote in impact; that in his experience, most covert activity in the Dominican Republic eventually surfaced; that Balaguer, unwitting, would be exercised if he learned of the subsidy; and the USA would have another black eye if the project were ever blown.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes of 303 Committee, April 7, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on April 10. Copies were sent to Kohler, Vance, and Helms.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 190.

<sup>3</sup> In a March 29 memorandum to Gordon and Sayre, INR Deputy Director for Coordination James Gardner summarized Vance's objections to the proposal presented in Document 190 and added that Vance also objected because the "U.S. had gone to considerable effort and expense to build up Balaguer" and it would now be inconsistent to build up potential opposition to him. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1967)

b. Ambassador Kohler noted that he had not been an enthusiast but had been persuaded in talks with Messrs. Gordon and Sayre that there was considerable merit in the proposal. They felt this was one way of starting to build an asset which could be an alternative to Bosch.

c. Mr. Broe pointed out that previous guidance had urged the building of a constructive opposition, and this proposal was one concrete step within the realm of the possible.

d. Mr. Rostow felt that the central problem, of course, was building a party system, and in that way polarization might be averted. A responsible opposition could head off the communists. He felt that what was lacking was a total U.S. plan of which this proposal might be only one step. He urged that Ambassador Crimmins come to Washington for discussions with Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon and others concerning an overall approach.

e. Mr. Broe indicated this was only a start. If this small election was secured, the first step would have been undertaken.

f. In summary, the committee rejected the proposal<sup>4</sup> as a separate effort, recommended a more broadly based program in which this project might be a part, and endorsed the suggestion that Ambassador Crimmins visit Washington in the near future to explore a comprehensive political action program.

[Omitted here is discussion on Cuba, Guyana, and Vietnam.]

**Peter Jessup**

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<sup>4</sup> The 303 Committee subsequently reversed its objection to the proposal; see Document 200.

192. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

No. 0801/67

Washington, April 7, 1967.

THE DOMINICAN POLITICAL SITUATION  
ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

## Summary

Political tensions are on the rise in Santo Domingo and the situation is sufficiently fragile in the Dominican Republic that the regime's stability could be threatened with little warning. There are no signs at present, however, that anti-Balaguer elements plan to move during the President's attendance at the hemisphere summit conference in Uruguay next week.<sup>2</sup> There are, however, deep tensions in the country that are certain to cause Balaguer serious trouble in the near future.

1. Balaguer's scheduled journey to the summit conference next week in Punta del Este comes at a time when Dominican political tensions are on the rise. The attempted assassination of Antonio Imbert on 21 March and its aftermath have added new dimensions to the divisive issue of "trujilloism" that could disrupt the regime's fragile political stability.

*The Aftermath of the Imbert Affair*

2. The attack on Imbert, one of Trujillo's assassins, followed a series of charges—some of them well founded—that Balaguer was employing "trujillista" personnel and tactics in his government. The Communist and non-Communist left have made such accusations the focal point of their criticism since last fall. Recently, elements of the anti-Trujillo right—the political aggregation that governed the country during the 1962 Council of State and during the Reid administration that preceded the 1965 revolt—have picked up the theme. Thus, the attack on Imbert produced expressions of distress, consternation, and outrage from these elements; moreover suspicions immediately developed that the assailants were in or sheltered by the government.

3. Balaguer moved quickly to forestall immediate serious antigovernment repercussions from the incident. He announced that a special, high-level commission would investigate the assault, established a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of National Estimates, and the clandestine services.

<sup>2</sup> President Johnson was 1 of 20 Chiefs of State who attended the American Chiefs of State Conference at Punta Del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14.

\$25,000 reward for information on the would-be assassins, and voiced his personal repudiation of the attack. His most dramatic step, however, was the appointment of the other surviving assassin of Trujillo, Luis Amiama Tio, to the sensitive post of minister of interior and police. Amiama, who saw in the attack a danger to his own personal security, agreed to take the post on condition that he be given a free hand to conduct the investigation.

4. Although the appointment at least temporarily silenced criticism of Balaguer from most quarters, it planted the seeds of discord within the government. Amiama, who is not identified with the more extreme and intractable right, had become increasingly disenchanted with Balaguer over the last few months. He has privately voiced concern over the President's methods and tactics, which he finds reminiscent of those of the late dictator, and has demonstrated a deep sensitivity over the presence in the government of some unsavory leftovers from the Trujillo era. In particular, he has singled out Balaguer's coterie of palace aides for criticism. At the top of Amiama's "bad guy" list is controversial presidential aide Colonel Nivar, but close behind are "special intelligence adviser" Perez-Sosa and legal adviser Polibio Diaz. The background of Balaguer's personal bodyguard and adviser, Melido Marte, suggests why Amiama and others are upset. In 1961 Marte was described as "a poorly educated strong-arm thug who is trusted by the Trujillo family." Although Balaguer occasionally has voiced dissatisfaction over the often independent conduct of such aides as these, he apparently regards such long-time supporters as completely loyal to him and is reluctant to sever ties with them.

5. In accepting the cabinet post, Amiama said he would work for the elimination or downgrading of "trujillista" officials. He quickly came into conflict with one enemy, police chief Tejeda, whom he accused of "unjustifiable errors" in the investigation of the Imbert shooting and in effect pressed Balaguer to dismiss him. The replacement, General Soto, however, was once police chief under Trujillo, is considered incompetent and dishonest, and has had close ties with those officials Amiama finds so objectionable. It may well be that Balaguer named Soto to balance Amiama's influence. In any event, Amiama's handling of the investigation and the direct control he would like to exercise over the police seems likely to bring him into conflict with Soto, who has already said he is unaware of any police deficiencies in the Imbert case.

6. The new minister of interior and police has already come into conflict with Balaguer over the disposition of outgoing police chief Tejeda. Amiama has threatened to resign unless Balaguer, who had named Tejeda to his palace staff, removes the ex-police chief from active duty. If Amiama resigns, this might be followed by the resignation of his brother—Foreign Affairs Minister Fernando Amiama Tio (who

is slated to be a member of the Dominican summit delegation)—and be accompanied by a great glare of publicity and bitter recriminations. Some weeks before the attack on Imbert, Amiama threatened that if Balaguer forced an open break with him he would have no alternative but to make common cause with other anti-“trujillista” elements of both the left and right—including the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the Communists. In fact, Amiama already has held a series of meetings with the PRD secretary general over the past two months.

7. Imbert himself may pose additional political problems as he recovers from his wounds. Even more rightist and opportunistic than Amiama, he had been sounding out various political elements with regard to an anti-Balaguer coalition when the assassination attempt boosted his popular image. Imbert’s heroics after the attack—such as the driving of his own car to the hospital while wounded in both shoulders—probably elicited admiration in certain circles, including the military. Amiama’s concern over Imbert’s ambitions may have been behind his suggestion to the US Embassy that Imbert be invited to the US for medical treatment. Such a move would remove one irritant from the scene, at least for a while.

#### *Attitudes Among the Military*

8. The attack and resulting investigation has introduced an element of strain into Balaguer’s relations with the military. Minister of Defense Perez has said that the intense investigation Amiama has conducted within the armed services has produced some resentment among military officers who remain jealous of their prerogatives and privileges. This could provide an opening for disgruntled military officers, such as those whose political cliques have been disrupted by Balaguer or who had been removed from choice assignments, to coalesce under the guise of protecting the military establishment. Another factor for instability would develop if military elements came to believe that Balaguer’s performance in a period of political turmoil showed irresolution and vacillation.

#### *Other Political Factors*

9. These various charges and maneuvers on the issue of trujilloism are taking place against a mixed pattern of other developments, some favorable and some adverse for the Balaguer government. On the one hand, the left-of-center political parties—particularly those on the extreme left—are in serious disagreement and disarray. On the other hand, they have been keeping up a drumfire of criticism of Balaguer for the failure of his government to control and prevent violence. Particularly active in this role are the radical leaders of the PRD who succeeded Juan Bosch when he went into voluntary exile in Europe.

Government officials continue to provide the left with new ammunition for their charges; most recently the government's director of telecommunications was accused of armed assault for entering a PRD-oriented radio station on 29 March and destroying transmitting equipment.

10. Balaguer has had considerable success in reducing the influence of the PRD and of the extreme leftist parties in the labor movement. There is strong labor resentment, however, over the government's wage freezes. The Dominican President has managed to wean some moderates away from the PRD, and so far the small Revolutionary Social Christian Party has adhered to a policy of "constructive opposition." On the other hand, the Social Christians have recently suggested they would abandon that policy unless Balaguer allows their party a more influential role, and the PRD has said it will not support the government in the event of a coup.

#### *The Economic Scene*

11. Economic developments have not helped to offset Balaguer's political problems. In fact, available signs indicate that the pace of economic activity has been disappointing thus far this year. This sluggishness has taken place against a background of high and chronic unemployment, and potentially explosive social conditions, particularly in Santo Domingo. Further, the persistent balance of payments deficit has recently shown signs of getting worse and the inflation potential may be growing because of the current trend toward increased government deficits. These economic problems will require politically difficult policy choices involving further import restrictions, higher taxes, and devaluation. Uncertainties over the economy's short-term future compound the problem of choosing among these alternatives.

#### *The Outlook*

12. All things considered, the difficulties facing Balaguer seem serious but not yet critical. There are no indications that antigovernment elements are planning to take advantage of Balaguer's expected absence during the summit meeting, but there are deep currents of tension and emotion within the government that could suddenly surface without warning. In addition, Vice President Lora is neither widely respected nor considered to possess great political acumen, and someone could try to test his control of the situation.

13. Balaguer probably believes that he can reap domestic political dividends from the summit trip in the form of favorable publicity; he may hope to establish an image as a recognized hemisphere statesman. He is likely to seek assurances of continued US economic and political backing—a factor that carries considerable weight with many potential Dominican dissidents.

**193. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

US/MC/2

Punta del Este, April 11, 1967, 4:30 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRD PERIOD  
OF SESSIONS OF THE ELEVENTH MEETING OF  
CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Secretary and President Balaguer

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Rusk

Mr. Van Reigersberg (interpreter)

*Dominican Republic*

President Balaguer

Dr. Balaguer replied to a question from the Secretary saying that his country was gradually recovering from its civil war and was strengthening its democratic institutions; the people have learned their lesson from history. Unfortunately, however, they now insist more on their rights than on their obligations. He expressed some concern about the effect of continuous Haitian migration to his country, which adversely affects the Dominican economy and brings in some people with extreme leftist ideas.

The Secretary asked Dr. Balaguer to define the number one problem in the Dominican Republic. Dr. Balaguer replied that it was unemployment. Even though the present Emergency Plan of forty million dollars and government-generated public works projects were helping relieve the unemployment situation, it was still serious. A possible solution, of course, would be an agrarian reform on a broad scale, since 70 percent of Dominicans are farmers. He stated that a plan is being worked out to re-settle some 20,000 families per year over a five-year period. This program will cost some ten million dollars.

The Secretary asked whether there were land holdings that could be divided up. Dr. Balaguer replied that many of the old Trujillo latifundia are in fact being sub-divided and permanent title is being given to the new owners.

On the sugar question, the Secretary pointed out the statutory difficulties involved in changing U.S. quotas, as well as the possible disadvantage of setting a fixed quota and then experiencing a shortage

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Van Reigersberg and approved in S on April 12. A note on the memorandum indicates it was revised on June 1.



requiring even larger amounts of imported sugar. The Secretary also mentioned the repercussions of a new Cuban sugar quota if peace is ever reached with that country. He indicated that certain countries such as Morocco had barter arrangements with sugar-producing countries and that it might be possible for the Dominican Republic to enter into such an arrangement.

Dr. Balaguer stated that he was aware of these factors. Japan has recently offered to enter into such a barter arrangement but this offer was not fully satisfactory in that Japan was willing to compute the value of Dominican sugar only at current world prices, which the Dominican Republic thinks are unrealistic.

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#### 194. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

US/MC-12

Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11, 1967, 5 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

United States Support for Democratic Government and United States Actions  
During the 1965 Crisis

##### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

President Lyndon Johnson

Secretary Dean Rusk

Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant  
to the President

Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon

F. Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

*Dominican Republic*

President Joaquin Balaguer

President Johnson congratulated President Balaguer on his ability to lead the Dominican Republic along the road of political and eco-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 150, Dominican Republic 1967. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Van Reigersberg and approved in the White House on April 28. The memorandum is part I of IV; part II is Document 195. In part III Presidents Johnson and Balaguer discussed a request by the Dominican Republic for assistance to construct the Valdesia dam that according to Balaguer would increase agricultural production and ease the Dominican Republic balance of payment problem. Balaguer also requested an increase in investment guaranties for housing construction. In part IV Balaguer stated his hope that the Dominican Republic be given preferential treatment at the ongoing Kennedy Round trade talks for 20 to 25 agricultural items in order to improve the balance-of-payments situation in his country. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 150, Dominican Republic 1967)

conomic recovery and expressed warm support for the continued growth of constitutional, representative democracy. He stated that the Dominican Republic is a good example of what the United States wishes to see in other parts of the world: namely, that people have the right to self-determination, to freely elect their leaders and to choose the type of government they desire. President Balaguer, with the assistance of Ambassador Bunker (who is now trying to achieve the same objective in Vietnam), worked together successfully toward that aim.

President Balaguer thanked the President for his support and indicated that he was constantly working to strengthen his country's economy and its democratic institutions.

The President asked him what groups cause him the greatest difficulties. Dr. Balaguer replied that the extreme right and the extreme left were the most troublesome groups, although their numbers were very limited. The majority of the Dominican people want peace and stability and support their present Government.

The President stated that because of the prominence of the Dominican people in the eyes of the Hemisphere and of the world he hoped that Dr. Balaguer would have a chance to tell his Latin American colleagues of the efforts by the United States to keep Castroite extremists and others from taking over the Dominican Republic and how the Dominican Republic and the United States had worked together to insure free and honest elections there. It would be good to tell some of the more skeptical Presidents how the Dominican people decided not to be swallowed up by communism and it would be helpful for them to hear from an especially authoritative source that the United States is not interested in satellites or in territorial gains—as proved when the United States left the Dominican Republic right after last year's Presidential elections. The President said that some of our best young men had given their lives in the Dominican Republic and that hundreds of millions of dollars had been spent there for the sole purpose of guaranteeing the people the right to free choice. If the United States Government had not acted, there might now be a second Castro in the Hemisphere.

President Balaguer agreed and thanked the President for prompt United States intervention. He added that he and his people, as well as the whole Hemisphere, were aware of how the United States had saved the Dominican Republic from the threat of communism. It is true that many Dominicans, and also some other Hemispheric leaders, don't always state this clearly because they prefer to use demagoguery for their own political reasons. The great majority of the Dominican people are fully aware of the reasons for United States intervention. He also said that he would be happy to discuss the matter with his colleagues here as well as with the press.

**195. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

US/MC-12

Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11, 1967, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Dominican Sugar Quota

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

President Lyndon Johnson

Secretary Dean Rusk

Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant  
to the President

Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon

F. Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

*Dominican Republic*

President Joaquin Balaguer

The President invited Dr. Balaguer to discuss some of the main problems facing his country at the present time. President Balaguer stated that his country is eagerly awaiting favorable news regarding a larger sugar quota and that he would like to have a five year permanent quota of 600,000 tons, primarily from the Puerto Rican and Philippine short-falls. The President said that he did not know what our sugar requirements would be but that sympathetic consideration would be given to the case of the Dominican Republic when the overall sugar picture became known.

President Balaguer said that upon his return to his country he would be asked what new support had been offered to him by the President of the United States. He indicated that he would like to be able to reply that the prospects in the field of sugar were good, that the President of the United States was interested in assisting in the development of the country's water resources, and that he had promised him United States cooperation in this and other matters.

The President said that while he certainly desired to be helpful, his ability to carry this out was a different story. He said he did not know what the sugar short-fall for this year would be, that the Foreign Assistance Bill had not yet been considered by Congress and might encounter serious difficulties, but that as soon as the framework of decisions became known the Dominican Republic would be given very sympathetic consideration.

President Balaguer thanked the President for his assistance and continued support.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 150, Dominican Republic 1967. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Van Reigersberg and approved in the White House on April 28. The memorandum is part II of IV; see footnote 1, Document 194, regarding parts I, III, and IV.

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**196. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, April 15, 1967.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

*Part I—Statement of Rationale and Basic Strategy*

The future course of the Dominican Republic is of great importance to the United States for three inter-related reasons: (a) its strategic location in the Caribbean chain of islands which puts it on our geographic doorstep and very close to Communist Cuba; (b) the primitiveness and fragility of its political, economic, social and military institutions, which make for chronic instability and consequent vulnerability to extremism; and (c) the serious damage to our interests which would be caused by the assumption of power in another Caribbean country by forces inimical to us.

Four hundred years of political, economic and social underdevelopment, thirty years of corrosive dictatorship, and the last six years of political turbulence and instability have produced a nation and a people uncertain of themselves and their future, erratically searching for a national identity and character while yearning for democracy and the economic and social advances and the peace they associate with it. Political factors, demographic developments, economic and social inequities and proximity to Cuba have contributed to a chronic ferment on the national scene with youth perhaps the most volatile element.

The United States has a vital interest in denying this Caribbean nation to communism, including the Cuban variant. Related directly to this interest is the necessity to prevent a regression into authoritarianism of the right, with its almost certain consequence, in the Dominican environment, of enhancing communist prospects. Any long-term success in this regard must necessarily entail far-reaching economic, social and military reforms and the concomitant creation and strengthening of indigenous institutions which today lack wholly or in part the capability to assure stability and progress or to strengthen the nation against domestic or foreign subversion. From the standpoint of the inter-American system, it is equally important that the Dominican

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 DOM REP-US. Secret. The paper is Part 1 of a 51-page "Country Analysis and Strategy Paper" transmitted as Enclosure 1 of airgram A-532.

Republic be strengthened to the point where it may function as an independent, fully sovereign and responsible member of the international community.

Circumstances of geography and history—but only secondarily economics—have deeply involved the United States in developments in the Dominican Republic. Many factors favor our exercising a significant influence. The first is our very proximity, which predisposes many Dominicans to accept as inevitable a very important U.S. role. A second is the crucial need of the Dominican Republic for our economic and technical assistance. A third is a combination of the first two: the unusually developed tendency of many Dominicans in all walks of life to view the United States as the arbiter of their nation's destinies, for good or for evil. It is easy and dangerous, however, to overestimate the extent to which even a powerful nation can at this moment in history work its will on a weak neighbor. The recent history of U.S. involvement in this country has emphasized certain inherent limitations on the exercise of our influence. First, there are the restraints placed on U.S. policies and actions by a decent regard for domestic and international opinion and by the ultimate ability of the Dominicans to have recourse to international organizations against real or alleged abuses of our influence. Second, the degree to which our prestige has become committed here is in itself an element which Dominicans, in and out of power, can use to resist our influence in matters in which their and our interests diverge because they realize the very restricted alternatives we have under present circumstances. Underlying these other limitations on our influence is the basic, persistent fact of the essential primitivism of Dominican society, politics and institutions which often vitiates, distorts or frustrates our inputs, be they political, economic, social or military. Our very special importance in the Dominican Republic gives us an uncommon ability and opportunity to counsel, persuade and guide; it does not give us the power to command.

Following the revolution of April 1965, our immediate objective had to be the restoration of order in the Dominican Republic and a return to legally elected constitutional government and, once this was accomplished, the maintenance of sufficient political stability and economic progress to enable the Government to carry out its mandate. Over the long run, we seek to promote the existence in the Dominican Republic of democratic governments, operating from a sound economic, social and military base, friendly to the United States and disposed to cooperate with us on vital issues in international forums. In moving toward that basic objective, we seek a citizenry better informed about, and prepared to construct and support, democratic institutions and a way of life based upon the rule of law and respect for the rights of others. As an indispensable concomitant, we seek the strengthening and rationalization of the Dominican economy and a balance-of-

payments equilibrium so that domestic and foreign resources can be most effectively utilized in a comprehensive and effective program of economic and social development and reform, which will assure meaningful and tangible progress toward the correction of economic and social inequities. Finally, we seek a small, professional, apolitical security establishment which acts as a positive, rather than, as in the past, a negative force in the political, economic and social development of the country.

Our over-all strategy to accomplish these objectives inevitably engages us in most aspects of Dominican national life. We are utilizing very substantial financial and technical assistance and encouraging appropriate domestic and foreign investment in order first to stabilize and then develop the Dominican economy along modern lines and to stimulate and accelerate social reforms. As part of this effort we are trying to raise the low average effectiveness of human resources and of the country's economic and social institutions. We support and emphasize publicly and privately the concept of legal, constitutional government and the democratic process. Through material and technical assistance, training and indoctrination we work toward a security force that is effective, compatible with the country's needs, responsive to civil authority, apolitical, and ready to perform a positive supporting role in the country's progress. Finally, we employ these multiple U.S. inputs so as to persuade the Dominican Government and people to commit themselves and their own resources in a manner permitting long-run, self-sustaining economic, social and political development while avoiding resort to violence and disorder.

The broad policies which flow from this strategy are producing undramatic but measurable progress toward our principal goals, and they require no major adjustments.

## 197. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 86.2–67

Washington, April 20, 1967.

### PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO

#### Conclusions

A. The tensions and turmoils which are endemic in Dominican politics have recently been exacerbated by developments following the attempt to assassinate General Antonio Imbert Barrera in March. Chances are, however, that President Balaguer will continue to maneuver adroitly enough to retain power during the period of this estimate.

B. The military leadership will probably hold together behind Balaguer. We do not think that these men have given up the idea that the military establishment is the final political arbiter, but they accept Balaguer's policies and they see no viable alternative to him.

C. Balaguer's political opposition on the extreme left is in disagreement and disarray and likely to remain so for some time. One or more of the Communist splinters may again undertake sporadic urban terrorism; any attempts they might make at insurgency in the countryside will probably be unsuccessful.

D. We see more reason for concern in the possibility that Balaguer might become increasingly vulnerable to charges of neo-Trujillismo. This is an issue on which he is already under attack from important civilian elements of left and right. These opponents of Balaguer will almost certainly seek adherents among the military; however, we think it unlikely that they will enlist enough military support during the period of this estimate for a successful coup.

E. Even so, the combination of political and economic pressures on Balaguer could impel him to adopt a more authoritarian mode of government.

F. The performance of the Dominican economy will continue to be spotty—better than the bad year 1966, but with a high level of unemployment and a large trade deficit. Balaguer will almost certainly come under increasing pressure to raise taxes and perhaps to devalue—either of which would intensify his political problems.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Dominican Republic. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on April 20.

G. Any economic progress will depend on a continuing substantial flow of US economic aid. A severe cut would not only have major economic repercussions but would undermine Balaguer's political power position as well.

### Discussion

1. In a speech in late February, President Joaquin Balaguer likened Dominican politics to "a nest of tarantulas." We would not fault his judgment on the matter. Intrigue, venality, corruption, arbitrariness have long been the rule, not the exception, among Dominican officials. Plotting against the government has been a favorite national pastime, and since 1961, when the assassination of Trujillo ended 30 years of absolute and brutal dictatorship, there have been seven changes of government.

2. Much the most serious outbreak was the revolution in April 1965 which came near to full civil war; order was restored only after the landing of US troops and the stationing in the Dominican Republic of an Inter-American Peace Force, numbering at one stage some 26,000. In June 1966, Balaguer was chosen President in an orderly election and since then political affairs have moved in a smoother fashion. But the fears and enmities of the past are still operative and much of the government's time and energy must go to efforts simply to keep the lid on. In March 1967, the attempt to assassinate General Antonio Imbert Barrera brought a revival of tension.

#### *I. The Balaguer Administration*

3. Despite his past close association with the Trujillo dictatorship, Balaguer is personally honest and is regarded by most Dominicans as an intellectual. He is eager to advance the general welfare and believes that the Dominican Republic needs strong leadership. Lacking a strong political base, he conceives of governing primarily in terms of political maneuver and manipulation of the individuals and interest groups with the most political weight. He tends to be highly suspicious of any he sees as potential rivals; he does not typically appoint strong figures to Cabinet posts; he delegates little responsibility and then usually only to his inner circle of influential advisors, who probably even more than the President, distrust the opposition and lean toward authoritarian methods. Oftentimes his motivation in making a new appointment or in undertaking some more complicated maneuver appears obscure, perhaps because he seems to act in response to pressures from the inner circle. He is intensely concerned about all actions and tactics of opposition parties, and he has come to regard a number of the leaders of Juan Bosch's left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) as little better than Communists.

4. Balaguer has had fair success in his various maneuvers to keep organized opposition groups divided and off balance. He has neutralized



a few of their leaders by means of Cabinet jobs or other patronage, and he has quietly done what he could to encourage their natural tendencies to fragment or simply become less active. However, his political style and policies have encouraged the “outs” to collaborate in opposition to the “ins.”

5. The Balaguer administration’s program has not attracted wide political support. Balaguer’s lack of political appeal comes partly from his austerity measures, such as tighter controls on imports, reduction of government budgetary expenditures, a trimming of some salaries, a cutback in the number of unnecessary employees in the big government sugar enterprise, a harder try at collecting taxes. To convince the vested interests of the necessity for such unpalatable measures is never easy and Balaguer’s style of governing has not made it easier. Efforts at economic development are gaining momentum, but such efforts are concentrated in the countryside with little being either undertaken or accomplished in Santo Domingo. Also, because of the continued political violence, important political segments have been alienated. Perhaps the strongest thing going for him in the broad relationship of his government with the politically influential elements is their reluctance to take the risk of another civil war.

6. In concentrating on various political manipulations, the Dominican President has foregone any systematic effort to turn his Reformist Party (PR) into an active, enduring political base, and he lacks the personality to enhance his mass appeal. The fact that Balaguer carried some 57 percent of the vote in the elections of June 1966 does not mean that he has anything close to that degree of effective political support at present, because the great majority of Dominicans tend to be politically apathetic between elections.<sup>2</sup> Political interest is, of course, sustained to a much greater extent in Santo Domingo than generally in the countryside, where Balaguer’s strength has been greater.

7. A major weak point for Balaguer is his vulnerability to charges of neo-Trujillismo. Although most Dominicans (including Bosch) absolve him from the excesses of the Trujillo era, a number have a real and passionate fear of a possible return to the brutal Trujillo methods, and a number of others find convenient political ammunition in the issue. Moreover, certain of the government’s actions have lent themselves to ominous interpretations by opponents both on the left and the right. Sometimes they picture him as the leader, sometimes as the captive of a neo-Trujillista clique. As evidence, they point to his former chief mil-

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<sup>2</sup> The population is predominantly rural and less than 65 percent literate. In the Dominican elections in December 1962, Juan Bosch won with a higher percentage of the total than did Balaguer in 1966. Yet when the Dominican military leaders ousted Bosch in September 1963, there was no significant public protest. [Footnote in the source text.]

itary aide, Colonel Neit Nivar Seijas, and several other Presidential advisors, who are trusted Balaguer colleagues from Trujillo days. They also cite police excesses—specifically the roundup in late January of 500–800 “leftists” suspected of plotting. And they express alarm at a series of political murders which the administration is seemingly unable to prevent. Some of Balaguer’s opponents have gone a step farther and charged that his government’s resumption and conduct of relations with the Duvalier government of Haiti is also a sign of Trujilloist tendencies.

8. *Neo-Trujillismo* has become the most important issue as a result of the assassination attempt in March against the perennial rightwing plotter General Imbert. In an effort to squelch widespread rumors that the assassins were backed by some of his own advisors, Balaguer has taken several actions to show his determination to solve the crime and deal resolutely with the perpetrators. His administration has offered a \$25,000 reward. He has appointed as new Minister of Interior and Police, Luis Amiama Tio, Imbert’s longtime associate and fellow survivor of the group that killed Trujillo. And he has said that Amiama would have a free hand to carry out the investigation.

9. However effective in quieting immediate criticism over the Imbert affair, the appointment of Amiama to Balaguer’s Cabinet has admitted a highly disruptive influence into the government. A man with political aspirations of his own, Amiama represents elements of the anti-Trujillo oligarchy whose prerogatives have been limited by Balaguer and who have long been at swords point with him and his intimates because of their past roles in the Trujillo government. Amiama has already managed to force out of office one of his old enemies, the chief of the national police. And he is causing the investigation to be pursued in the military establishment so intensively as to produce considerable resentment. Apart from official maneuverings, Amiama has also been meeting with PRD Secretary General Jose Francisco Pena Gomez whom he may hope to use to further his own ambitions.

#### *The Continuing US Role*

10. The Balaguer government realizes great advantages and some problems from the strong US role on the Dominican scene. It finds the US Embassy’s counsel helpful. Its economy depends upon a continuing flow of US economic aid. It has a powerful prop in the realization throughout the Dominican Republic—and particularly within the military establishment—that the US remains firmly behind Balaguer.

11. On the other hand, Balaguer has the problem of reconciling strong dependence on the US with a posture of national independence. He is keenly aware of the increase in anti-US sentiment among a number of elements in the population since the April 1965 revolution.

Although he publicly concedes US influence, he finds ways to avoid the appearance of being entirely the US puppet. He is by no means timid in negotiating many aspects of aid agreements. He speaks of the independent-minded Frei of Chile as the Latin American leader he most admires. And he tries to play up any political differences with the US; for example, after the conference in Buenos Aires of the Organization of American States, he announced that the Dominican delegation had opposed the US by voting against formation of a permanent Inter-American Peace Force.

## *II. The Military Establishment*

12. Balaguer has been able to make certain changes which have improved his position vis-à-vis the military; he has dismembered and dispersed within the army the powerful Fourth Brigade (Wessin y Wessin's old outfit); he has sent abroad, retired, or reintegrated the residuum of Constitutionalist military; he has replaced the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Army; he has reduced the influence of certain of the former military cliques by retiring some officers and sending others into "golden exile." Finally, many officers have come to feel that they can best protect their own positions and that of the military establishment by a reasonable degree of cooperation with Balaguer.<sup>3</sup>

13. It is quite clear, nonetheless, that Balaguer does not completely trust his top military commanders, nor they him. This is reflected in the President's connections with the Trujillista Colonel Nivar, formerly his chief military aide and at present commanding officer of the First Brigade in Santo Domingo; Nivar is widely suspected and despised within the armed forces. Many of the military leaders who support Balaguer do so because it is advantageous to them at present, because they approve of many of his policies and because they see no better alternative. At the same time the armed forces have continued to function as a powerful interest group, and we believe they have not given up the idea that the military establishment is the final political arbiter in the Dominican Republic.

14. A key position in the military is that of Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, who acts as Minister of Defense and has also assumed certain prerogatives of the Service Chiefs. As a buffer between the President and the Chiefs of the Services, he has the task of reconciling what hitherto have been irreconcilables—a civilian chief executive and the Dominican military establishment. At present, the position is held by General Enrique Perez y Perez, who was appointed

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<sup>3</sup> The Dominican military establishment consists at present of some 19,000: an army of about 11,700; a navy of 3,700; and an air force of 3,600. [Footnote in the source text.]

under the Provisional Government but who seems fairly responsive to Balaguer and has so far managed to retain the support of the Service Chiefs. Perez y Perez has been subject to growing criticism from below, however, particularly for his cooperation with Amiana in pressing the investigation among the military of the Imbert shooting. The present Service Chiefs of the army and navy appear to be loyal to the government and to have reasonable control over their officers. The air force is traditionally less disciplined and its officers are more susceptible to rightist coup overtures.

### *III. The Political Opposition*

15. The leading opposition party, Bosch's PRD, has lost considerable ground. It is still suffering from the shock of defeat and the defection into Balaguer's Cabinet of some of its conservative and moderate leadership. The PRD's attempt to take a position of "creative opposition" was rejected by the administration. PRD leaders were harassed by the police, party stalwarts have been fired from government jobs, and its minority representation in the legislature has been all but ignored. The PRD was especially bitter over what it regarded as government persecution in condoning if not actually initiating police attacks on former Constitutionals. Except in Santo Domingo, the party has lost much influence in its former bailiwicks. It no longer has a stronghold in labor or in the State Sugar Council, and its hold on the Santo Domingo city government is under attack from the government as well as from party dissidents.

16. The feeling of persecution, combined with the defection of key PRD moderates, has enabled a more militant group to take over the leadership. The elder statesman of the party, Juan Bosch, now in voluntary exile in Europe, has more or less abdicated, and his young protégé, Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, has taken the helm. The new PRD leaders have responded to Balaguer's offer of a "dialogue" with them by saying that there could be no dialogue until Balaguer took steps to end persecutions and eliminate corruption. The PRD's former partner on the democratic left, the smaller Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) cautiously agreed to a dialogue, but remains basically critical of the government. Although the PRD has threatened that it would organize a "resistance movement regardless of ideologies" if the present situation continues, it has also said that it would not work to overthrow Balaguer unless all other forms of protest were silenced. The meetings with Amiana suggest that the PRD expects that a move against Balaguer may come from the right.

17. The extreme left, always divided, has further fragmented. The three major extremist parties still exist: the Revolutionary Movement of 14 June (MR1J4), the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) and the Dominican Communist Party (PCD). The MR1J4, largest of the three,

and the only one permitted to participate in the June 1966 elections, has suffered the greatest setback. Its percentage of the vote was far below the minimum required to keep it a legal party. Since then some of its leaders have defected to the MPD and have urged that the organization now be regarded as the true party of the proletariat. MPD strength has suffered, however, from the expulsion of a group for trying to act as a "Red Guard"; this splinter proceeded to institutionalize itself into the Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD). The founder of the MPD had been ousted earlier; he has formed still another group, the Orthodox Communist Party (PCO). Despite their differences and small numbers, the extremists have some strength or influence among students and in labor. Leadership of one labor confederation, FOUPSA–CESITRADO, is divided between representatives of the MPD and the MR1J4.<sup>4</sup>

18. The most distinct threat to Balaguer in the short run comes from his opponents among the economic and social elite. Many of them were former members of the defunct National Civic Union and controlled economic and political life during the tenure of the Council of State and under the Reid government. They more than other groups chafed under Trujillo and after his death took a far more anti-Trujillo stand than did the PRD. Aligned with this grouping are Amiana and Imbert, the two surviving members of the conspiracy to assassinate Trujillo. The potential of these elements to embarrass Balaguer is high, but their potential to overthrow him depends, more than anything else, on the amount of support they can obtain among the Dominican military.

#### *IV. The Dominican Economy*

19. Blessed with some of the most fertile land in the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic has been cursed by the inability of generations of Dominicans to use it effectively. The ratio of people to land is already fairly high, and the rate of population growth (estimated at 3.5 percent annually) is probably one of the highest in the world. Agriculture absorbs half the labor force and produces some 35 percent of the GNP. Per capita GNP is considerably below the average for Latin America. The problems of underemployment in agriculture and unemployment in the urban areas are chronic.

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<sup>4</sup> The actual number of adherents to these various extremist parties is hard to determine accurately, since their memberships are in such a state of flux. Our best estimate are: PCD—100; MPD—250; PCRD—50; PCO—25; MR1J4—600. These five parties vary widely in the extent to which their ideology and aims can be identified with those of foreign Communists, whether Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban. One or another has solicited support from each of these external sources, but without significant success. [Footnote in the source text.]

20. The economy was seriously disrupted by the revolution of April 1965; GNP fell nearly 15 percent, unemployment rose to perhaps 30 percent of the urban labor force, sugar production decreased, and there was a sharp drop in export earnings. Recovery has been painfully slow: it remains a major aim of the Balaguer government merely to restore the economy to the level of 1964. In 1966, the GNP increased modestly but probably less than the growth in population. There was no significant reduction in the level of unemployment. The administration of economic affairs suffered from ineptitude in the bureaucracy and from Balaguer's insistence on personal supervision over most financial transactions. The government was not able to realize its goal for public investment, and private investors held back to "wait and see." In spite of an unusual increase in the Dominican sugar quota for sale to the US, the total value of Dominican exports remained below that for 1964, and the trade deficit was the largest in Dominican history. In short, even with an infusion of about \$70 million in US economic aid, the overall Dominican economic performance was poor.

21. On the positive side, the government has provided some encouragement to private investors and has started a number of its own development projects, primarily in the basic agricultural sector. Efforts are being made to improve the technical level of Dominican agriculture, improve the farm credit system, rehabilitate the irrigation system, extend and improve market roads, bring new land into cultivation, diversify production, and to improve the general level of education in the countryside. It is too early for these projects to show much accomplishment but some results are evident, and a foundation is being set for future progress.

22. The government also has established basic policies designed to prevent inflation. Budget deficits have been held within limits that could be financed without internal borrowing and a substantial number of surplus workers have been discharged from the public payrolls and from the government-owned portion of the sugar industry. Most wages have been held in line, although Balaguer found it prudent to rescind earlier cuts in salaries of the military and high government officials. The fiscal and wage restraints undoubtedly slowed the pace of economic recovery, but were probably necessary in view of the unusual danger of inflation in the Dominican economy.

#### *V. The Outlook*

23. The major issue intensifying divisions between pro and anti-government groups will be neo-Trujillismo. As the contest between these groupings continues, the likelihood increases that military officers will be drawn in on one side or the other. Certainly one of Balaguer's main preoccupations during the next year or so will be to prevent the emergence of a rightist civilian-military combination against him.

Although he will attempt to maneuver around and through rightist civilian groups, he may eventually be forced to make a hard choice among them. The combination of the political situation and his austerity program could impel him to a more authoritarian mode of government.

24. While we foresee no expansion of Balaguer's limited base of mass support, we see no substantial growth in the strength of the left-of-center political opposition either. Relations between the government and the PRSC are likely to continue cool but not hostile. Relations between the government and the PRD will almost certainly deteriorate further. We think it unlikely, however, that the PRD, as a party, will choose during the period of this estimate to go into violent opposition to the government and make common cause with the extreme left. A small number of radical PRD members may, of course, do precisely that. A more likely course for the PRD leadership would be *de facto* collaboration with Amiana and some elements of the anti-Trujillista right.

25. We think the divisions and dissensions among the far leftists will persist and will sharply limit their capabilities to make trouble. The evident disarray of the several Communist parties could even serve to discourage further such an enthusiastic, would-be backer as Fidel Castro. The Communists may resume sporadic urban terrorism, particularly in Santo Domingo, but any attempts they may make at insurgency at the countryside will probably prove unsuccessful.

26. The marriage of convenience between Balaguer and the military leadership will probably remain essentially intact for the next year or so. There will be frictions, and a few in the military are likely to engage in plotting with anti-Balaguer politicians. The military may come to exercise a somewhat greater degree of influence on the President than it does now; in any case, he is likely to move cautiously, if at all, on policy changes which would directly affect the military, e.g., the military budget, the salaries and allowances, accepted devices for graft, plans to restructure the military establishment. On most other matters, however, Balaguer will probably continue to reach decisions without military counsel although he will, of course, keep military attitudes in mind; we do not think he will become a "prisoner" of the military.

27. The economy will do better in some ways in 1967 than it did in 1966, but the improvements will not generally be of the kind that bring political dividends. The recovery in GNP will probably be at a higher rate than in 1966, though the level of GNP is unlikely to exceed that of 1964. The amount of investment, particularly in the public sector, will probably increase. At the same time, the value of exports will remain relatively low, and the trade deficit could run more than \$80 million, its level in 1966. Import controls will have to be maintained, and the inflationary pressure, contained thus far, will probably grow.

Balaguer will almost certainly come under increasing pressure to raise taxes and perhaps to devalue—either of which would pose major political problems, particularly with respect to Balaguer's rightwing opponents.

28. In any case, US backing will continue to be an essential pillar of support for Balaguer. This backing cannot insure that he will retain power, but loss of it would hurt him badly. If, for instance, the Dominican military came to feel that the US was withdrawing its backing or becoming lukewarm about it, the chances of a coup would rise precipitously. A severe cut in US economic aid would thus not only have major economic repercussions, but would undermine Balaguer's political power position as well. In a way, the US aid relationship to the Dominican Republic has become similar to the Soviet aid relationship to Cuba—though on a much less expensive scale.

29. Assuming continuation of US support, chances are that Balaguer will maneuver adroitly enough in the primitive arena of Dominican politics to retain power during the next year or so. Nevertheless, charges of neo-Trujillismo could weaken his tenure by producing a new and stronger alignment of forces against him. Furthermore, assassination is still a standard political tactic in the Dominican Republic, and Balaguer has his full quota of political enemies.

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**198. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 21, 1967.

SUBJECT

Political Situation in the DR

John Crimmins reports that the attempted assassination of Tony Imbert on March 21 has produced a new, and perhaps the most fluid, politico-military situation since Balaguer took office.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to telegram 3115 from Santo Domingo, April 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 DOM REP)



Balaguer has handled the situation well so far, and it does not threaten his hold on the armed forces or the government. But it has touched off efforts at political realignment by anti-Balaguer forces which need close watching.

The new situation has these elements:

1. The attack against Imbert came at a time of growing public apprehension over increased “Trujillista” influence in the Balaguer government.

2. Deeply concerned over the assassination attempt and the Trujillista charges which the attack reinforced, Balaguer made Amiama Tio—the only other survivor of the Trujillo assassination team—Interior Minister to carry out an investigation of the Imbert attack.

3. Amiama is pushing the investigation hard but he is also using his position to press Balaguer to rid himself of elements which he regards as Trujillista. It is not clear how far Amiama intends to pursue the second course.

4. Amiama has used PRD support in this jockeying. The PRD, in turn, is trying to use him to establish a broad political front against Balaguer under an “anti-Trujillista” banner.

5. A series of factors—(1) the investigation which points to the Trujillista military stronghold at the San Isidro Air Base as the focus of the anti-Imbert plot, (2) Defense Minister Perez’s cooperation with Amiama in pressing the investigation against military elements, and (3) Amiama’s success in forcing Balaguer to make some important changes in the Police and his Military Household—have made the military a little edgy for the first time since the inauguration.

6. The key to the situation is Amiama’s intentions and objectives. If he sticks to solving the Imbert attack, so much the better. If he continues to press Balaguer for a house-cleaning of what he regards as Trujillista elements and, in the process, uses forces antagonistic to Balaguer as pressure, there could be problems.

**WGB**

**199. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1967.

Mr. President:

The attached memoranda from Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze recommend that you approve a \$5 million Supporting Assistance loan to finance an emergency urban development program in Santo Domingo. Linc Gordon and Ambassador Crimmins are the originators of the request.<sup>2</sup>

The loan is designed to buy some insurance against social unrest and political tensions in Santo Domingo by generating employment for some 3,000 people through city improvement projects.

I do not agree with Charlie Schultze's comment that Balaguer is not as concerned about potential unrest in Santo Domingo as we are and is unwilling to spend his own money. He shares our concern over the danger of the disgruntled urban unemployed. John Crimmins is convinced that if Balaguer had the funds to spend on this program, he would do so. But he does not and would welcome our assistance. Where we differ with Balaguer is that he looks upon the urban program essentially as a means of reducing his security problem, while we think that by demonstrating the interest of the central government in the urban poor, he can build up political support which he very much needs.

The funds for the loan are available. While I would like to see us get away from Supporting Assistance in the Dominican Republic, I think it is in our interest to make this small investment to head off a potential source of trouble.

I recommend you approve the loan.

**Walt**

Approve loan<sup>3</sup>

Disapprove loan

See me

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Confidential. An "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Following this sentence Rostow wrote: "Sect. Fowler concurred."

<sup>3</sup> This option is checked. Handwritten notes on the memorandum indicate that the Bureau of the Budget was notified and sent a copy of the memorandum on May 16.

**Attachment**

**Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget  
(Schultze) to President Johnson**

Washington, April 24, 1967.

SUBJECT

Proposed \$5 million Supporting Assistance Loan for the Dominican Republic

*Bill Gaud has asked you to approve a \$5 million Supporting Assistance loan to finance an emergency urban development program in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. This will be in addition to the \$40 million Supporting Assistance loan authorized last June to finance investment expenditures in the Dominican budget. The final part of that loan was released last month and is fully committed to high priority programs in the rural sector.*

AID Supporting Assistance funds for FY 1967 have been fully programmed, but the \$5 million requested for this emergency loan is available from the Contingency Fund.

*The justification for this loan is purely political. Ambassador Crimmins reports that growing unemployment in Santo Domingo and increasing radical activity by the leftist opposition have created political tensions which threaten the stability of the Balaguer regime. The purpose of the loan is to reduce the possibility of a political explosion in Santo Domingo.*

In January 1967 the city's budget situation forced the firing of 2,700 people. The emergency program to be financed by the loan will generate employment for 3,000 people on street and sewage projects, initiate an urban community development program, and expand loans to small businesses.

Unfortunately, *President Balaguer does not regard the problem in Santo Domingo as seriously as does Ambassador Crimmins.* Balaguer's position is as follows:

1. He views the problem as basically one of *security*.
2. He is not willing to spend his own funds for this program.
3. He is not convinced that this kind of program will improve his position in Santo Domingo, where opposition elements dominate the city.

In view of Balaguer's position, and the lack of self-help provisions, I would normally be reluctant to recommend this loan for your approval. But I do not feel in a position, in the case of a small \$5 million loan, to go against the judgment of Linc Gordon, Bill Gaud, and the

CIA, all of whom agree with Ambassador Crimmins' assessment of the situation. The loan will be made from the *Supporting Assistance* appropriation which authorizes funds to promote *political* stability with no specific requirement for self-help as is required for development loans.

Bill Gaud, Linc Gordon, and Ambassador Crimmins agree that *any future assistance to the Dominican Republic for urban programs should require greater self-help and be provided as a development loan.*

*Balance of Payments*

The dollars made available under this loan will be tied to U.S. procurement. We, Treasury, and AID believe that the existing arrangements for the use of aid funds in the Dominican Republic could be improved to further protect our balance of payments. While there are political problems in doing so, AID is attempting to work out improved procedures with the Dominicans. Secretary Fowler concurs in authorizing this loan at this time.

*Recommendation*

We recommend that you authorize this loan with the understanding that every effort will be made to assure appropriate self-help efforts by the Balaguer regime in connection with any future assistance for urban programs.

Charles L. Schultze

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**200. Memorandum of Meeting of the Dominican Republic Review Group<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1967, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

State  
Deputy Under Secretary Foy Kohler  
Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Sayre  
Ambassador John Crimmins  
Mr. Ted Long

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A copy was sent to Walt Rostow.

Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance  
CIA  
Mr. William Broe  
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald  
Mr. [*name not declassified*]  
WH  
Mr. W. W. Rostow  
Mr. William Bowdler

Ambassador Crimmins reviewed the Dominican situation along the lines of the attached paper. He described the events which took place yesterday in the Dominican Republic—the clash with a small band of guerrillas in the north and fire-bomb attack against PRD Senator Casimiro Castro in Santo Domingo. He thought that the second attack could have as much, or more, of an unsettling effect on the fragile political situation as the March 21 assassination attempt against Imbert.

The BRUC project was considered in detail. Ambassador Crimmins described the immediate objective of the project—to help BRUC wrest control of the leadership of student organization at the University of Santo Domingo from the communists—and the longer term goals—reinforcing the hand of PRSC leader Jaonabo Javier, strengthening the PRCS as a political party and contributing toward general institution building in the DR. He stated that the risk of disclosure was low because the BRUC had been asking Dominican businessmen for money and this was public knowledge.

Secretary Vance withdrew his earlier objection to the BRUC proposal and those present representing the 303 Committee gave their approval.<sup>2</sup>

On the courses of action contained in the attached paper, the principals expressed their general concurrence with them but left to the ARA/IRG to review and approve them during the course of the Dominican CASP paper<sup>3</sup> on Monday, May 8.

William G. Bowdler<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A May 8 memorandum for the record of the 303 Committee May 5 meeting, immediately following the review group meeting reported that “Although Mr. Vance reiterated certain reservations about the proposal, he cast his vote with the majority view. Since three of the four 303 principals were present and CIA was represented by Mr. FitzGerald, the proposal was considered approved.” (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Dominican Republic 1967)

<sup>3</sup> Document 196.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**Attachment**

Washington, May 5, 1967.

**COURSES OF ACTION (SHORT-TERM)—  
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC***I. Background*

The attempted assassination of Imbert on March 21 has been the single most important political event since the last (December) review of short-term courses of action,<sup>5</sup> and indeed since Balaguer's assumption of office ten months ago.

Prior to March 21, the Balaguer Government, in spite of several important weaknesses, had made progress in consolidating itself. While not eliminated, the polarizing trends giving rise to concern in the last review had not intensified and in fact had probably weakened. The PRD was continuing its total opposition to the Government and expressing it in efforts to construct a broad "anti-Trujillista" movement without regard to ideology. On balance, however, this attitude was reducing somewhat the support for the leadership within the Party and in the country as a whole. The erosion of the Party's position was also attributable in part to various pressures exerted against it by the Government, which harbored deep distrust and suspicion of the intentions of the PRD leadership. Moreover, the posture of strong but "constructive" opposition of the Social Christians (PRSC), with constitutionalist credentials as valid as those of the PRD, tended at once to underline the radical stance of the PRD and to strengthen Balaguer's position. The Communists, engaged in bitter internecine struggles, were weak. The "Cívico" (anti-Trujillista) right was in touch with the PRD but ineffective. The great bulk of the military accepted or supported Balaguer, with only isolated centers manifesting low-key discontent. Labor was unhappy but essentially passive. The general economic atmosphere, although reflecting little progress toward correction of basic disequilibrium, and affected adversely by the deflationary tendencies induced by austerity and by administrative and technical ineptness on the part of the Government, was improving as business confidence and optimism about a continuation of stability became almost palpable. This general picture of uneven, flawed but perceptible progress was marred by continuing incidents of excesses by the police against the citizenry, perhaps especially PRD adherents. These incidents were being considerably exaggerated by the opposition to the Government, but

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<sup>5</sup> See the attachment to Document 187.

there was sufficient validity in the opposition charges to create uneasiness about Balaguer's willingness or ability to control the police, and, by extension, to give limited currency to opposition charges of "neo-Trujillista" tendencies in the Government.

The incident of March 21 and its aftermath introduced considerable fluidity into the political environment and weakened the Government. In the process, the essential and persistent fragility of the political structure has been clearly demonstrated. The attack on Imbert has stimulated and gained adherents for the "anti-Trujillista" forces and placed the Government at least temporarily on the defensive. The PRD has exploited the situation, but it has been the "Cívico" right which has taken principal advantage of the new circumstances in an effort to resuscitate itself. Rumors of plotting have burgeoned, and some "Cívicos" are talking of an "Onganía solution," with Wessin y Wessin cast in the lead. (This aggressiveness on the part of the perennially golpe-minded right may give pause to its potential sympathizer—and former blood enemy—the PRD.) The PRSC clings to its line of "constructive" opposition, but within the Party there are pressures, enhanced by the Imbert attempt and its aftermath, to abandon that position in favor of flat-out opposition to the Government. In the military, especially the Air Force, the persistent opponents of Balaguer are becoming somewhat more vocal, but we have no evidence yet of firm plotting. In the economic sector, the effects of the political uneasiness have been direct and swift. The mood of clear optimism in early March which appeared to override the effects of austerity has been replaced by one of, at best, caution and uncertainty.

Despite the clearly negative consequences for Balaguer of the Imbert incident and the period of political maneuvering it produced, the situation is not critical but, rather, uneasy. The President almost certainly has the support of the majority of Dominicans, who still believe in him personally and who see no alternative to him, even though that support is not readily organizable or mobilizable because, in part, of the weakness of the Reformista Party. He still has basic military support. He has the support of the United States. And he appears confident of his authority. Against these strengths are set:

(a) his vulnerability, in the absence of more vigorous and rapid corrective action by him, to the charge that he is either indifferent to, or incapable of controlling, arbitrary actions by the security forces, a charge given substance by the presence of Trujillista throwbacks in the Palace;

(b) his lack of sensitivity to the need for and profit in a more forthcoming attitude toward the PRD and the PRSC;

(c) the serious administrative and technical shortcomings of the Government, including the concentration of even minor decision-making powers in the President;

(d) the stringent economic situation characterized by a serious balance of payments problem, a difficult fiscal picture and a failure thus far of our assistance to compensate for the deflationary consequences of austerity; and

(e) the underlying primitivism of political life in the country.

It is the opinion of the Santo Domingo Country Team that the chances are still somewhat better than even that the Balaguer Government can maintain itself in power, without resort to repression, until the mid-1968 municipal elections, the next major political landmark. The results of those elections will probably be decisive in determining the odds on his staying his full constitutional course.

Against this background, the following short-term courses of action—some of which are repeats or modifications from the December review—are proposed:

1. Continue to impress upon Balaguer and key leaders of the Government the necessity of an effective, loyal political organization as a base of support for the Government now and in the 1968 elections.

- Assist the PR (preferably in technical terms) in constructing a going, grass-roots political organization.

2. Continue to press Balaguer to enter into reasonable relations with the non-Communist opposition, especially that on the left, recognizing that for political and personal reasons Balaguer will probably want to move cautiously.

- Continue to urge Balaguer to assure that basic political liberties of non-Communist parties and individuals are respected by security forces and to take and to publicize disciplinary actions against violators of this policy.

- Continue to urge Balaguer to establish an effective and highly visible mechanism to receive and evaluate complaints against improper actions by the security forces.

- Continue to urge Balaguer to respond effectively to valid opposition criticisms.

- Continue to urge Balaguer to respond more positively and definitively to the PRSC in its “constructive” opposition.

- Continue to urge Balaguer to explore honestly the possibilities of a reasonable *modus vivendi* with the PRD.

3. Continue to encourage the PRSC in its position of constructive opposition.

- Encourage the BRUC in its efforts to gain control of the currently Communist-led Student Federation at the University.

- Encourage the PRSC to stand independently in the 1968 elections on a platform of constructive opposition.



—Increase our and AIFLD contacts with CASC (Social Christian Labor Confederation).

—Intensify exchange programs involving PRSC elements.

4. Continue to try to moderate the position of the PRD.

—Continue to assist moderate PRD leaders to increase their influence on Party affairs and to counter radical influences.

—Continue to seek to diminish influence on PRD affairs of radicals and Communist infiltrators.

—Continue, through expanded personal contacts, exchange programs, etc., to try to diminish radicalism in PRD youth sector.

—Continue our efforts to influence PRD labor sector and expand AIFLD contacts with that sector.

5. Continue to try to impress upon security forces the need to distinguish between the Communist and non-Communist left and between legitimate and illegitimate political activity, recognizing that we are essentially limited to instruction, example and moral suasion and that we have no operational controls.

6. Assure that *all* sectors (left, right, and military) understand clearly that our basic position is firm support of constitutional government of Balaguer and of firm opposition to attempts to replace it by unconstitutional means.

—Use appropriate occasions and means (especially economic) to manifest our support of Balaguer.

7. Continue to impress upon Balaguer the desirability of getting rid of negative Trujillista elements in the Government who are liabilities domestically and internationally.

8. Continue to press upon Balaguer the urgent necessity to improve substantially the administrative and technical competence of the Government, particularly in the economic sector, using to the extent possible responsible PRD and PRSC technicians.

9. Continue to provide Balaguer systematically with reliable, unbiased information from all available sources on domestic intrigues and plots affecting his Government and internal stability.

10. Try to keep the Government from pursuing a labor policy which, while designed to reduce Communist influence by increasing Government influence in unions, will alienate non-Communist labor elements and force them into association with extreme left leadership.

201. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 11, 1967.

SUBJECT

Special Sugar Quota for the Dominican Republic

In the attached memorandum (Tab A) Secretary Rusk asks you:

1. to authorize a special deficit allocation of sugar to the DR of about 105,000 tons, *provided* Balaguer agrees to set aside at least 1½ cents per pound for mutually-agreed programs to improve the efficiency of the Dominican sugar industry.
2. to sign the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B, to be implemented if Balaguer accepts the condition.

*The considerations in favor are:*

—Balaguer badly needs the added dollars to help his balance of payments position.

—The added income from sugar should reduce the need for supporting assistance from us.

—The special allocation translates itself into US political support which is a stabilizing influence in the DR.

—Balaguer has made a good start in improving the efficiency of the state-owned sugar industry by reducing production costs by two cents a pound, and the special fund will advance this effort.

—The legislative history of the Sugar Act mentions the possibility of a substantial increase in the Dominican quota through the reallocation of deficits.

—It permits you to be forthcoming on Balaguer's principal request at Punta del Este.

*The considerations against Secretary Rusk's proposal are:*

—It discriminates against other Latin American sugar producers, who want the full deficit pro-rated, and they may protest.

—Conditioning the entry of additional Dominican sugar on setting up the special fund is technically inconsistent with our GATT commitments.

*Mitigating against the adverse aspects are these considerations:*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Confidential.

—Even with the special allocation for the DR, the other Latin American sugar producers will receive slightly larger quotas than they did last year.

—There was no hue and cry last year when you gave the DR a special allocation, and none is expected this year.

—Secretary Rusk does not think that the inconsistency with GATT will lead to any objections.

I have consulted Secretary Freeman on this proposal and it is fine with him.

I favor your:

1. Approving Secretary Rusk's recommendation

Approve<sup>2</sup>

Disapprove

See Me

2. Signing the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B.<sup>3</sup>

Walt

#### Tab A

#### Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson

Washington, May 8, 1967.

#### SUBJECT

Recommendation for a Special Sugar Quota Allocation to the Dominican Republic

#### *Recommendations:*

- 1) That you authorize me to instruct our Embassy at Santo Domingo to obtain assurances from the Government of the Dominican

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<sup>2</sup> This option is checked and a handwritten note reads: "State Secretariat advised of approval on 5/12."

<sup>3</sup> Johnson signed the directive to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman on May 11, which determined that "in view of the unique and heavy burden of rehabilitation expenditure on the Government of the Dominican Republic in 1967 it would be in the national interest to give the Dominican Republic a special allocation of about 105,000 short tons of sugar from the unused Philippine share of the Puerto Rican and Virgin Island deficits and its pro rata share of the balance of those deficits and of any other deficits that might be declared in 1967."

Republic that, if the United States makes a special deficit allocation to the Dominican Republic of about 105,000 short tons, that Government will set aside a minimum of 1½ cents per pound from the proceeds of the sale of this sugar to be spent on mutually agreed programs to improve the efficiency of the Dominican sugar industry or to assist in diverting excess sugar lands into the production of food or other crops.<sup>4</sup>

2) That you sign the attached directive to Secretary Freeman, to be implemented as soon as our Embassy at Santo Domingo reports Dominican agreement to the conditions we are establishing for assignment of the special allocation.

*Background:*

During your conversations with President Balaguer at Punta del Este last month he asked you to assign the Dominican Republic a special deficit allocation in order to raise the Dominican sugar quota in the United States market to at least 600,000 tons this year. President Balaguer was reflecting a request previously made by the Dominican Government for an annual quota of 600,000 tons for the next five years. Last year the Dominican Republic received a special allocation of 123,000 tons from the Philippine and Panamanian share of the Puerto Rican deficit. Its total quota for 1966 was 603,000 tons.

We believe it would be in the national interest to assign the Dominican Republic a substantial special allocation again this year, but not to meet its request in full. We recommend a special allocation of about 105,000 tons, which will raise the Dominican quota to 590,000 tons. This figure will be well above the quota of any other Latin American supplier, evidencing our continuing support for the Balaguer Government and our satisfaction with the progress it has made in the past year toward solution of the sugar industry's problems. At the same time it will establish our intent gradually to phase out preferential treatment for the Dominican Republic in assigning sugar quotas. This will serve the dual purpose of (1) reassuring other Latin American suppliers that we are not neglectful of their interest in an expanded market in the United States and (2) place additional pressure on the Dominican sugar industry to reduce costs and become competitive in world markets.

The Dominican Government has been making vigorous and politically courageous efforts to improve the efficiency of the state-owned sector of the sugar industry and to diversify out of sugar production. In this first year of President Balaguer's administration, production costs in the state sugar industry have been cut by somewhat more than

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<sup>4</sup> The approve option is checked.

two cents a pound. To continue this program, the State Sugar Council is contracting for the services of American consultant firms to draw up a detailed program of rationalization and diversification that will be eligible for international financing.

We do not believe that a special allocation should be granted unconditionally. Rather, we should take the opportunity to further developmental activities—while at the same time decreasing somewhat the potential requirement for AID assistance—through promoting rationalization of the sugar industry and diverting excess sugar lands to the production of food and other crops.

To this end we propose that a part of the proceeds of the sale of this sugar be set aside in a special fund for mutually agreed programs. We will try to reach agreement with the Dominican Government to set aside 2 cents a pound, which would provide a fund of about \$4.2 million. At a minimum we would require a set-aside of 1½ cents a pound, for a prospective fund of about \$3.2 million. While small in terms of total financing required for the projects to be developed, the proposed fund would assure that, when approved, the projects could be started promptly.

Several other Latin American countries have asked for preferential treatment this year in reallocation of the Puerto Rican deficit. These countries will be disappointed if the Dominican Republic alone receives a special allocation. Furthermore, all countries in the Western Hemisphere will receive smaller allocations than they had anticipated if preferential treatment is accorded the Dominican Republic. We may expect protests from some. However, we would be able to cite the recommendation by the CIAP subcommittee on the Dominican Republic that special treatment be given that country in sugar deficit allocations this year. Moreover, since the Philippines have turned back their share of the deficits, other Western Hemisphere countries will receive slightly larger quotas in the United States market than they did in 1966, even if the Dominican Republic receives a special allocation of about 105,000 tons.

While the language of the proposed directive provides for a special allocation of about 105,000 tons, the practical effect of such an allocation would be to give the Dominican Republic about 85,000 tons more than it would have received in the absence of such an allocation. The use of the higher figure in the proposed directive results from the complicated formula which the Department of Agriculture is required to use in administering the Sugar Act.<sup>5</sup>

No other country in the Hemisphere is as dependent as the Dominican Republic on finding a satisfactory market for its sugar. Fur-

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Section 204(a) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965. (79 Stat. 1275)

thermore, there is mention in the legislative history of the Sugar Act of the possibility of a substantial increase in the Dominican quota through reallocation of deficits. It should be noted that imposing conditions on the entry of Dominican sugar that are not imposed on other countries could be considered technically inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Nevertheless, we do not anticipate any objections on GATT grounds.

I believe, therefore, that the granting of a special allocation of about 105,000 tons would be in the national interest and would be consistent with the legislative history of the Sugar Act.

Dean Rusk

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**202. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 19, 1967.

SUBJECT

Dominican Situation

This is in response to your concern over how things are going in the Dominican Republic.

*The Background*

Up until March 21—when unknown assailants tried to kill Imbert—Balaguer was making slow but steady progress in consolidating his political position. Months of relative stability had given the business community a new confidence and the economy was starting to gather some momentum.

Since March, the political and economic climate has changed and Balaguer's position weakened. Failure to solve the Imbert case—followed by a series of other murders and attempted murders—has made the public apprehensive. The economic sector is uneasy and cautious. And anti-Balaguer elements on the right and left have launched a campaign to pin the "Trujillista" label on him. As might be expected the PRD is in the forefront of this effort.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret. An "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

*Balaguer's Strength and Weaknesses*

Balaguer's situation is not critical, but his hold has been shaken. He still has going for him:

- the support of most Dominicans who long for tranquillity.
- basic military support.
- our strong backing.
- confidence in himself.

Working against him are:

- his vulnerability to the "Trujillista" charge because of certain elements around him.
- his lack of political sophistication in dealing with the non-communist opposition.
- the violence which continues to plague the country.
- his inability to delegate authority and the poor management capacity of his administration.
- a difficult balance of payments and fiscal situation.

*What we can do*

I met with the Dominican Review Group (Gordon, Vance, Fitzgerald, Kohler and Ambassador Crimmins) two weeks ago to review the situation. We agreed on a set of short-term courses of action (copy attached)<sup>2</sup> which Crimmins is carrying out.

The most important of these is to persuade Balaguer to curb terrorism and restore public confidence. He has taken two steps in this direction:

- a strong public statement that he will not tolerate terrorism and will take energetic measures to stamp it out, and
- appointment of a high level committee to make a thorough investigation of the National Police Force, which is suspected of being involved in some of the terrorism. (Unfortunately, Balaguer did *not* include distinguished people from outside the government—another example of his lack of political judgment.)

Ambassador Garcia Godoy called on Bill Bowdler Wednesday<sup>3</sup> evening prior to going to Santo Domingo. He too was concerned about trends. He will talk to Balaguer about political strategy in dealing with terrorism. He will also try to persuade the PRD to moderate its opposition. Bill encouraged him to do this. Garcia Godoy said he would give us his impressions as soon as he got back. He expressed deep appreciation for your action on a special sugar quota for the DR. He noted that this strong US support for Balaguer would be a stabilizing factor.

**Walt**

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<sup>2</sup> Entitled "Short Term Courses of Action in the Dominican Republic," May 5, it is a duplicate of the attachment to Document 200 minus the "Background" section.

<sup>3</sup> May 17; no record of this conversation has been found.

**203. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1967.

## SUBJECT

Dominican Republic Student Election

## REFERENCE

303 Committee Paper Dated 17 March 1967 Entitled Support for a Moderate Social Christian Student Group in the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD)<sup>2</sup> and Approved on 5 May 1967<sup>3</sup>

1. The activities which had been contemplated in the referenced 303 Committee Paper approved on 5 May 1967 were not carried out for the following reasons.

Following the approval of the operation, the political atmosphere at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD) deteriorated to such an extent that it was believed that a confrontation between FRAGUA (the Communist-supported student group) and BRUC would lead to bloodshed. Rather than risk this confrontation, BRUC decided to boycott the elections. In calling for a boycott of the student elections, BRUC hoped to limit student participation to such a degree that it could later have the elections cancelled. Another factor which BRUC considered in making its decision to boycott the elections was the fact that the Student Council, controlled by FRAGUA, had set the elections for 23 May 1967, thereby not allowing BRUC sufficient time for campaigning prior to the elections. Given the above situation and BRUC's assessment that without an extensive campaign it could not hope to win the elections, the need for an operation to support BRUC in the elections no longer existed.

2. Prior to BRUC's withdrawal from the student elections, Ambassador Crimmins [*1 line of source text not declassified*] determined that supporting BRUC in the existing politically charged atmosphere in the university would only lead to an upsurge of violence on the university campus. In addition, with the elections scheduled for 23 May there was not sufficient time for organizing and carrying out an effective campaign to ensure BRUC's victory at the polls.

3. On 19 May 1967, Ambassador Crimmins, after taking all of the above factors into consideration, cancelled the operation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Dominican Republic 1967. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Document 190.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 200.



4. Student elections were held on 23 May 1967 as scheduled. The elections were held amid a flurry of Communist propaganda including the use of Soviet flags which were flown higher than the Dominican flag on the campus. FRAGUA won easily since it was not opposed by the only other major student organization, BRUC. Only 20 per cent (1,421) of the student body participated in the elections. Of those, 1,118 voted for FRAGUA, 230 for FUSD (the PRD student group), and 73 for the Communist Youth group. Even with the abstention of BRUC, the elections were wrought with violence which erupted between the Communist Youth and FRAGUA. These events appeared to confirm BRUC's estimate that had it participated in the elections the UASD would have seen one of its bloodiest student elections.

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**204. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 11, 1967.

Mr. President:

Herewith are memoranda from Gaud, Freeman<sup>2</sup> and Schultze on a \$12 million PL-480 loan to the Dominican Republic.

There is agreement on the size and nature of the PL-480 loan but not on the timing of negotiations. Gaud and Freeman prefer to proceed immediately. Schultze recommends delay until the PL-480 agreement can be combined with our AID Supporting Assistance negotiating package. The delay would be for 4–5 weeks.

Charlie argues that our leverage in negotiating self-help conditions will be increased by making PL-480 and AID one package. He also notes that the Dominicans are obtaining the commodities they need under reimbursable purchase authorizations and the amounts involved are so small that they would have no effect on US prices.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Confidential. Handwritten notations on the memorandum indicate that Bowdler was notified on November 13, and a copy was sent the same day to the Bureau of the Budget.

<sup>2</sup> Attached was a 2-page memorandum from Gaud and Freeman, dated October 30, in which they recommended that the President authorize them "to negotiate a P.L. 480 sales agreement with the Dominican Republic to provide approximately 15,000 tons of soybean oil, 30,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of tallow, 5,600 bales of cotton, 933 tons of tobacco, and other items for export totalling a market value of \$12.3 million." The Departments of State and the Treasury concurred in this recommendation.

There do not seem to be any compelling reasons why the PL-480 agreement should be negotiated right away. Consequently, Charlie's recommendations of deferral until the PL-480 and AID are combined into one package seems reasonable.

Walt

Approve negotiation of PL-480 agreement now

Defer and resubmit as part of combined AID and PL-480 package<sup>3</sup>

See me

### Attachment

#### Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to President Johnson

Washington, November 9, 1967.

#### SUBJECT

Proposed P.L. 480 Program for the Dominican Republic

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authorization to negotiate a \$12.3 million P.L. 480 agreement with the Dominican Republic.

#### Summary

I have no objection to their basic proposal. But *I recommend that we defer* the P.L. 480 negotiation until it can be *combined with negotiations on an AID Supporting Assistance loan*—which will be ready for review in the next few weeks. By combining the two forms of assistance we *maximize our leverage* for self-help conditions. We are trying to combine P.L. 480 and AID loan negotiations wherever possible.

#### Background

The commodities to be supplied are wheat (30,000 tons), soybean oil (15,000 tons), tallow, cotton, tobacco, oats, and cotton yarn. This will be *the first P.L. 480 agreement ever to include cotton textiles*. (The textile interests got the law changed in 1966 to permit the full financing of cotton yarn and cloth.) The agreement would provide a *twenty-year dollar credit*, with shipments made during this fiscal year.

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<sup>3</sup> This option is checked.

Usual marketing requirements would be waived since most imports of these commodities have been financed by AID loans.

This assistance will ease the Dominicans' *balance of payments problem* and help finance public investment in agriculture. It is also intended to supplement domestic production damaged by drought.

Commitments will be sought from the government of the Dominican Republic to take several self-help actions in the agricultural sector, which will be financed mostly by the local currency proceeds of this loan.

A \$20 million *Supporting Assistance AID loan*, also to provide balance of payments and budgetary support in FY 1968, has been requested by Ambassador Crimmins. It will probably be ready for your review within the next few weeks. The key purpose of that negotiation is to influence the allocation of the Dominican budget for 1968. *The self-help measures to be negotiated with the AID loan will improve the effectiveness of our aid.* They will include commitments to

- increase tax revenues and reduce military expenditures,
- limit inflationary government borrowing,
- establish procedures to promote greater export additionality for our aid.

A good portion of the \$12.3 million P.L. 480 agreement is a *budgetary cost to us*. In view of the anticipated reduction in the Supporting Assistance appropriation, it is very important to utilize the P.L. 480 loan to the fullest extent possible to obtain the important overall self-help reforms we seek. \$12.3 million represents a substantial resource for the Dominican budget. *Joint negotiation of the P.L. 480 and Supporting Assistance loans would strengthen our bargaining power* and be consistent with your desire to *treat P.L. 480 and dollar aid as equivalent resources*.

Using P.L. 480 this year to negotiate budget and monetary policy will *lay the groundwork for similar joint dollar aid and P.L. 480 negotiations next year*, when we will need all the economic leverage we can muster. We *face a critical negotiation* with the Dominican Republic sometime after the municipal elections in May, *on the issue of devaluation*. Without devaluation, continued high aid levels will bring little, if any, basic improvement in the Dominican economy or in the high level of unemployment.

Although Gaud and Freeman would prefer not to delay the P.L. 480 agreement for joint negotiations, their reasons are not compelling. At worst, delay might cause some political embarrassment. However, holding the P.L. 480 presents no real problem for us or the Dominicans because *the commodities are now being shipped under reimbursable purchase authorizations*. The amounts of wheat and soybean oil involved in this agreement are so small that they would have *no effect on U.S. prices*.

*I recommend that you defer negotiation of the proposed P.L. 480 agreement at this time, with the understanding that you wish to have it resubmitted as part of a total balance of payments and budget support package.*

**Charles L. Schultze**

Approve negotiation now

Defer and resubmit as part of combined AID and P.L. 480 package<sup>4</sup>

Disapprove

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<sup>4</sup> This option is checked.

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## **205. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, November 19, 1967, 1336Z.

1108. Subj: Political Situation Uneasy.

1. Two weeks—and especially this last, very active week—of intensive rumor-mongering and speculation concerning possible intentions of Wessin movement and alleged USG shifting of its focus and support from Balaguer to Wessin have produced local political situation best described as uneasy. Our vigorous public and private efforts dispel any impression of changing USG attitude appear to have achieved little significant or at least measurable success. By way of illustration, Vice Pres Lora considered it necessary raise what is being said concerning US posture during dinner with Emboffs Nov 16. Lora, who was strongly and categorically assured of straight-line US support for Balaguer, professed not believe rumors himself but said he wanted us know effect they seemed be having in key areas including palace.

2. A. Present campaign has probably contributed to process of erosion in some areas of Balaguer's civilian (and possibly military) support, which process seems have been developing for some weeks and particularly since Wessinista PQD presented request for recognition as political party to central electoral board late last month. PQD's assertion

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 DOM REP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros.

that it presented 125,000–150,000 signatures in support its claim to legal status seems have impressed many and, as reflected by wide variety Emb contacts, may be widely accepted at face value. To a man, however, some 25–30 non-Wessinista Emb contacts (including Lora, Col Nivar Seijas, PRD dissidents and moderates, and PRD leadership's official channel to Emb) profess to view alleged PQD strength decidedly in Golpista terms and only very secondarily in electoral terms. They seem impressed at least as much by rumors concerning PQD's intentions as by their individual estimates its actual or potential strength. And in these rumors highly imaginative allegations concerning US posture weigh heavily.

B. As Dept. is well aware, Doms in and out of office, of high or low estate, have in recent years demonstrated inordinate sensitivity to every nuance, real or imagined, of USG policy. This unhealthy attitude, which is the price we pay for our heavy influence and involvement, is exploited constantly by political elements, sometimes positively but more often negatively. This chronic sensitivity has become acute in the past few weeks, basically because of Wessinista upsurge but also because of unsatisfactory economic conditions and, to a probably minor degree, apprehension over the Congressional cuts in aid funds. The result has been that rumors of a less than positive US attitude toward Balaguer have received wider currency and created more apprehension—even in relatively sophisticated circles—than at any other time since Balaguer took office.

3. We are continuing efforts counter these allegations, many of which concern charges made or echoed by relatively responsible elements that US slowing down or diminishing aid to Balaguer in preparation for changeover to Wessin. Past week or two have seen public charges that there is serious friction between Emb and Balaguer on aid matters, aid is inadequate, aid will be cut, technicians withdrawn, or even entire USAID Mission to DomRep terminated. Amb plans deal as forthrightly as possible with issue in his long-scheduled address to American Chamber of Commerce Nov. 22. We can reasonably expect that this address will have dampening effect on current speculation, but are not sanguine that, in view limitations created by appropriations situation and current policy guidelines provided Emb (on, e.g., PL-480 negotiations), its effect will be long-lasting.

4. Spiraling issue of Wessin's return, with alleged US acquiescence therein, may be approaching a climax. We have indications from US and GODR sources that Wessin and his supporters planning major move for his return Dec 1. Balaguer's position unclear. He stated last July he would permit Wessin's return if sufficient popular clamor for it developed, and has recently acknowledged Wessin's eligibility participate in forthcoming elections, Wessin's name, however, is still on

GODR's prohibited list, and Pres is reported to have privately indicated indecision to Emb contacts. He told Garcia Godoy, according to latter's statement to Amb, he is uncertain about how to deal with situation and reportedly told Col. Tejeda Alvarez that Wessin's return at this time would create divisions in armed forces, a point also mentioned by Garcia Godoy. Garcia Godoy told WRB<sup>2</sup> he had replied to Pres that he as yet had no recommendation to make as to best way handle situation.

5. In conversation with Amb subsequent to his talk with Garcia Godoy, Pres stated he not unduly concerned about Wessinista threat. At same meeting, however, Pres betrayed unusual sensitivity about fact that some military and civilian elements had interpreted routine political contacts by our Consulate in Santiago as US support for PQD. Pres insisted, in response Amb's statements, he fully understood our position of support for him, but incident, in our judgment, betrays a certain amount of jitteriness and lowered morale on part Pres. With respect his morale, should be remembered we have hit him with very gloomy analysis 68 B/P and fiscal prospects without indicating, for reasons well known to Dept., what, if anything, we are prepared to do to help. We have also discussed with him in direct terms GODR delinquencies on certain aid-financed activities (ODC and AG Bank), although Pres stated he would meet all commitments, he may well feel that he is being squeezed at a time when his political problems are mounting. (In pertinent illustration of continually spiraling talk on aid issue, *El Caribe* Nov. 18 prominently front-paged Balaguer comment to press on ODC problem under negative headline "Pres Points Out Case of Discrepancy (with US) on Aid.")

6. Balaguerista elements contacted in past two weeks, including Lora and Nivar, hold that Wessin's return should be authorized before pressures build to point that Pres would patently be surrendering to them, and they profess belief there is still time undercut this pressure. They also profess conviction that Wessin, once here, would "demartyrize" self in relatively short period (2-3 months) and that situation would thus regain its previous if precariously balanced level.

7. Net effect Wessin's return or even his remaining abroad extremely difficult to assess. Even if we discount his own ability carry out his messianic political aspirations, Wessin appears fast becoming rallying point or symbol for disaffected political and business elements covering a broad spectrum who for variety of perhaps contradictory motivations and doctrines see in him potential instrument for upsetting present unsatisfactory (to them) status quo. And there is reason

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to WGB, William G. Bowdler.

believe Wessin still able command some loyalty in armed forces, particularly at lower levels. Whether his disruptive capability varies in direct or inverse proportion to his proximity is question as yet unanswerable, and we are impressed that neither Balaguer nor Garcia Godoy, who in combination probably represent some of best political thinking available here, as yet feel confident of ability make proper decision.

8. Without being alarmist, Emb considers it appropriate alert depart to developing situation and to feeling of concern held and expressed locally. It is interesting and perhaps significant that PRD is newly receptive to contacts with Emb, and one PRD spokesman tells us Pena Gomez wishes Emb know he is "very preoccupied" about situation. In apparent (if true) reversal of long-standing position, Pena Gomez allegedly told PRD legislators recently that party would defend GODR against coup attempt. Since then however, he has spoken publicly of PQD for first time over party radio program Nov. 17, stating PQD ranks being swelled by those seeking escape "terror" of GODR, and he restated official PRD position adopted last March that party would support neither coup effort nor govt and that it would fight only if attacked.

9. Present situation appears both uneasy and fluid. Political antennae are clearly out to determine where USG sentiments really lie and who looks like a winner. Our interest will clearly be served by whatever action transmits msg which will be unmistakably interpreted here as vote of continuing confidence in and support for present constitutional govt. Although we are aware that, under present circumstances, we are obliged keep to general, unspecific and unquantified statements on assistance, Amb in his speech and Emb officers in their contacts will continue endeavor transmit such msg.

**Crimmins**

**206. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 26, 1967.

SUBJECT

Unease in the Dominican Republic

I am not losing my "cool" over recent developments in the Dominican Republic but events of the past ten days have contributed to an uneasy atmosphere in that fragile country. The PRD has been more virulent publicly than it has been in recent months, the new political movement built around General Wessin y Wessin is playing an uncertain but potentially destructive role, the "disappearance" of Colonel Caamano from his post in London<sup>2</sup> has had an unsettling effect, and all in all some unhealthy tensions seem to be building up.

On the plus side, however, President Balaguer seems to be firmly in the saddle, the military leadership, despite some in-fighting, appears to be behind him, the PRD is not nearly the cohesive and broadly militant party that it used to be, and the people in general continue to seek stability and to avoid trouble.

The Embassy is of course keeping a close watch on developments and has been requested to give us a current assessment as well as an indication of what, if anything, the US ought to do in the circumstances. I am not sounding the general alarm but did want to let you know that some danger signals are popping up.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Secret. Drafted by Long.

<sup>2</sup> Details about Caamaño's alleged disappearance from London were transmitted in telegram 1292 from Santo Domingo, December 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 DOM REP)

<sup>3</sup> Rostow was also informed of the troubling developments in the Dominican Republic in a December 26 memorandum from Bowdler who wrote: "For the past several weeks Bosch's PRD Party has conducted a war of nerves against Balaguer." Bowdler continued: "the disquieting feature is PRD use of the signals employed to launch the April 1965 affair. It may be nothing more than an extension of their psychological warfare. We have no intelligence indicating plotting or defections within the armed forces or gearing up of Constitutionalist elements for a return to violent tactics. I am puzzled and uneasy, nevertheless. The Embassy is following developments most carefully." Bowdler concluded: "One way of giving moral support to Balaguer—and warning his adversaries—is for the President to send him warm New Year Greetings." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII)



Harry Shlaudeman has seen some special messages which bear on the general situation.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified. Telegram 1378 from Santo Domingo, December 25, describes in detail possible signals of trouble from the PRD party, such as a broadcast of the Constitutionalist anthem and the Marseillaise over its radio program. According to the telegram the PRD first played the Marseillaise on April 23, 1965, and at that time PRD Secretary General Pena Gomez explained its historical significance and stated that the next time it was heard on the radio program it would announce the advent of a people's liberation movement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP 23)

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## 207. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 29, 1967.

### SUBJECT

P.L. 480 and Supporting Assistance Program for the Dominican Republic

*Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$30 million assistance package with the Dominican Republic, consisting of a \$16.1 million supporting assistance loan and a \$13.9 million P.L. 480 agreement. In November you approved deferral of the P.L. 480 negotiation requested by Gaud and Schnittker so that it could be combined with the dollar loan to assure maximum leverage for self-help. (Previous memoranda to you on the P.L. 480 agreement are attached.)*<sup>2</sup>

The basic purpose of this assistance package is *to assure continued stability of the constitutional Balaguer government through the Dominican municipal elections in May 1968*. The \$30 million aid package will prevent a significant deterioration in the Dominican balance of payments during the first half of 1968. Coupled with increasing tax receipts, it will permit the government to maintain its investment budget at about the same level as in 1967. This \$30 million, covering the last quarter of 1967 and the first half of 1968, is essentially *the same rate of assistance* as we provided with our \$40 million commitment of June 1966. Without devaluation, there is no prospect for reducing this level of aid.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached; but see the attachment to Document 204.

Covey Oliver and Bill Gaud accept Ambassador Crimmins' judgment that Balaguer is not strong enough now to take necessary economic reforms, particularly devaluation. Balaguer will be informed during the negotiations that *further balance of payments assistance for the rest of the year will be related to essential self-help actions*, which we hope he will be in a position to take after the May elections.

Gaud and Oliver will use the \$30 million assistance package to negotiate for limited but important *self-help measures* which will improve the effectiveness of our aid. Commitments will be sought from the Dominicans to

- prevent further deterioration of the balance of payments position, mainly by *restraining monetary expansion*,
- improve tax administration and collection,
- better allocate budget resources* to increase education, health and agriculture activities and gradually reduce the military and police budgets,
- increase agricultural development by a variety of measures listed in the Gaud/Schnittker memorandum.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to maximizing our negotiating leverage, *by programming food aid and dollar aid as equivalent resources, the supporting assistance loan was reduced \$3.9 million below the originally contemplated \$20 million level*. P.L. 480 commodities were substituted for scarce AID dollars. Cotton textiles in an amount slightly less than \$1 million are included in the proposed agreement.

#### *Balance of Payments*

Secretary Fowler agrees that successful negotiation of the proposed procedures to increase the U.S. share of Dominican imports and to avoid substitution for U.S. commercial exports under the AID loan would minimize the impact on the U.S. balance of payments.

*I recommend approval* of Gaud's request to negotiate the \$30 million package with the Dominican government.<sup>4</sup>

**Charles L. Schultze**

<sup>3</sup> John A. Schnittker, Under Secretary of Agriculture. The memorandum has not been found.

<sup>4</sup> The approve option is checked.

**208. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, January 9, 1968, 1943Z.

1461. Subj: Political Situation—Assessment and Short Term Prognosis. Ref: State 88306.<sup>2</sup>

**Summary**

Relative political stability achieved by Balaguer administration during first 18 months in office now coming under stepped-up pressure as result convergence political, economic and other factors. Further radicalization of public and private posture of PRD as leading opposition party appears clearly underway. Emergence of Wessin and PQD as new anti-Communist alternative to Balaguer complicates political scene in negative sense and at least calls into question firmness and continuity of support in some sectors heretofore solidly committed to Balaguer. Increased militancy (perhaps born of frustration) of extreme left seems to pose threat of renewed violence if and when “target of opportunity” situation occurs, or can be developed. Political timetable during first half 1968 offers enough prospective such situations to warrant concern. In face of all this, Balaguer appears confident he can weather anticipated storms by using essentially same methods and tactics as have characterized his administration to date. While we are less sanguine now than heretofore that he is fully on top of situation and all its diverse aspects, we continue give him better than even chance of survival through May 1968 election. Our strong continued support, always publicly demonstrated, is essential to this outcome. End summary.

1. A. Three weeks hence Balaguer administration will have been in office longer than any Dominican regime since Trujillo assassination. Despite its numerous faults and chaotic situation it inherited, present GODR has provided country with greater measure stability and at least better prospect economic progress (although as of yet negligible social and political progress) than any of its post Trujillo predecessors. It has rekindled hopes of many Dominicans (and others) that there may be, after all, a constitutional solution to Dominican problem.

B. Stability, however—always relative here—is achieved and maintained only through constant attention to delicate equilibrium of forces and through keeping opposition (real and potential) as divided

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros.

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 22, 1967. (Ibid.)

and off-balance as possible. Although he seems be finding it increasingly difficult to do so, Balaguer has so far been able perform both feats successfully and has concurrently been able instill in nation as whole a sense of accomplishment, meager though it may be, beyond expectations of most a short 18 months ago.

C. Two major elements of political scene have displayed constant and ever-increasing inability to reconcile themselves either to Balaguer or to being out of power. These opposition elements are, of course: former Constitutionalists, with emphasis on Communists and PRD radicals but including many IRD moderates and numerous Social Christians; and intransigent right wingers, opportunists and others now lumped into or sympathetic to Wessinista PQD. Unfortunately, their frustration has been heightened, rather than lessened, by Balaguer's operation and staffing of his govt and his apparent public insensitivity to very real social problems affecting nation. At this time hard-core Constitutionalists and hard-core "Wessinistas" are seeking seriously undermine if not eventually overthrow Balaguer. Their chances of success in latter endeavor would depend, inter alia, on degree of cohesiveness they possess or can develop within themselves, degree of unity of purpose they can achieve, both internally and with each other, and amount of outside support, i.e., military, Havana (and to a significantly lesser degree Cuban exiles operating with forces of the right) they can draw upon, all available evidence indicates that, at this time, they lack, singly or in any combination, those essential ingredients of success.

2. DR however appears to be entering what may well be its most turbulent period since Balaguer's inauguration. PRD has started 1968 off on ominous note. PQD continues operate its rumor mill and appears preparing for major push in some direction. University situation is definitely heating up (SD 1448)<sup>3</sup> Caamano lurks in background, possibly with newly forged Cuban ties. Communists, while still split and squabbling, are nonetheless trying to increase their trouble-making potential and their initially most effective force, i.e. 14th June, may have strengthened its ties with Havana. All of these elements are, at least to minor degree, already inter-related. Some PRD members and Communists have on instructions infiltrated PQD. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has had indications in recent months of stepped-up infiltration by Communists of PRD, particularly at neighborhood levels in Santo Domingo, where there has been evidence of some infusion of 14th June elements. Some Golpista-inclined elements of PQD have been discussing coup possibilities with PRD and other elements, and there has been evidence of other contact between PQD and PRD elements in an unknown context. Caamano may now be shared by PRD

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

and 14th June, or may even be on way to becoming titular leader new "constitutionalist" movement of which PRD and 14th may be nucleus in at least informal alliance reminiscent of formal PRD-PRSC combination in 1965, which itself may have had 14th June undertones. Opposition's growing, though still limited, potential will, of course, feed on unrest but will make relatively little headway towards ultimate goal of at least some of its sectors, i.e., Balaguer's overthrow, so long as bulk of businessmen, Partido Reformista and, most importantly, armed forces, remain united and behind President. Some erosion these major sectors President's support has already occurred, particularly toward PQD, though not to significant degree. Next few months, with their potential for unrest heightened by three-month municipal election campaign scheduled begin February 16, could well produce significant growth of opposition's potential and increased erosion President's support.

3. A. Particularly in view PQD's probable participation therein, election campaign will bring into open latent hostilities of revolution which remain just barely below surface and provide occasion for possibly serious disturbances. Even should PRD not participate in elections, which not presently certain, it could be fully counted upon to wage vigorous "non-campaign" in pursuit its own interests. Communists are likely to try to join in with harassment of campaigners as they did in 66 elections. Such activities could invite "repression" of left both by authorities and by PQD (and possibly PR) affiliated "vigilantes" and could create atmosphere propitious for inflating ranks of left-wing radicals and extremists and for simulating greater cohesion between these elements of left.

B. To right, including many Reformistas, businessmen, and military elements, such eventualities would in turn translate into visible growth of "Communist threat" and result in heavier pressures on Balaguer to deal with it summarily. Should he not respond satisfactorily, he would run increased risk of losing significant elements of business community and military to PQD, whose attraction for them lies in part in fact it offers Wessin as an acceptable alternative to Balaguer should Pres prove conclusively (to them) that he "soft on communism."

C. All this, of course, is without reference to any specific plans Communists may have in mind for guerilla actions and/or urban terrorism, to possible PRD plans for "popular uprising", or to PQD plans for coup attempt. While we have yet to develop hard evidence that any such effort is likely to occur in near future, it is clear that at least some elements of each of three above sectors are actively considering action along lines indicated. In addition, there are two external factors that could trip delicate balance against Balaguer and force him to assume increasingly defensive and authoritarian positions, and make him prey to more and more wolves. For our purposes these factors, both un-

known, are (a) those of the conceivable developments in Haiti which would impact adversely here, and (b) just how DR (or entire island) fits into Cuban plans.

4. A. Notwithstanding real possibility of major trouble and some erosion of his support between now and scheduled May 16 elections, we continue estimate of his survivability would necessarily have to be reviewed and reassessed however if, in treading delicate tight rope between now and then, he should make any serious missteps such as miscalculation under pressure of some key issue or of balance of forces and should take action net effect of which would be to alienate significant support or sharply intensify opposition, or if he were to be dealt with unfairly by elements beyond his control, e.g. his own incapacitation, successful exploitation by his opponents of any Communist effort in Haiti, or a major Castro-backed effort against him.

B. Against this backdrop, a brief look at major elements of present political evaluation follows:

5. The PRD

A. We hypothesized last Feb (A-436)<sup>4</sup> that "PRD would seem have chosen to seek power through revolutionary means." Sum of party's public, private and clandestine statements, maneuverings and actions since then, particularly in past few months, have tended to reinforce this hypothesis. We also hypothesized that "any movement against the govt in which PRD engaged in foreseeable future would, because of its present isolation from moderate sectors, have to be undertaken in concert with long-discredited elements of military and right, or with extreme left, or with a combination of the two." Intelligence developed since then, and particularly since last Sep, indicates a disquieting but as yet not precisely measurable degree of cross-fertilization between PRD, PQD, and Communists.

B. We hold to our working hypothesis as the most plausible explanation of PRD actions and statements and estimate that PRD is once again attempting maneuver events so as to create situation favorable to eventual realization of its ambitions. In this it is unfortunately being provided an opening by Balaguer and elements of his administration, most notoriously some elements of the police, whose continued

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<sup>4</sup> Airgram A-436, February 26, 1967, reads: "The PRD has become increasingly intransigent since the beginning of the year and has given the strong impression that it is bound on some unknown but dangerous course. . . . The PRD's harsh line, its apparent actions, and its deliberately uncompromising public and private attitude, now resemble its posture during its build-up to the revolution of 1965. . . . We estimate, then, that the PRD may now be seriously engaged in preparing for another contingency: the chaotic situation that would follow the assassination of the President." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 2 DOM REP)

“repression” of opposition elements, however justified its action may be in some instances, is providing ammunition to opposition. PRD’s first attempt manipulate events to its hypothesized ultimate ends took place last May when political temperature had almost reached boiling point after terrorism that capped six weeks of rising political tension following assassination attempt against Imbert. Since failure that effort, economic situation has deteriorated and hopes then existing for early economic upturn have eroded; dissatisfaction with Balaguer on economic and other grounds have increased [garble] right has organized—albeit loosely—around man (Wessin) it considers palatable alternative to Balaguer and political right’s former tolerance of Ires [?] has eroded; and Bosch’s “popular dictatorship” thesis has polarized political opinion to extent (1) it has forced this opinion to support or oppose thesis, and (2) it has confirmed PRD opponents’ suspicion that Bosch and party radicals are intent upon destroying Dom institutions as they presently constituted.

C. PRD’s public posture and its clandestine activities since Pena Gomez’s return from Europe in Aug have clearly suggested party radicals have been reading selves and preparing public for events whose ultimate result radicals obviously hope would be installation of dictatorship with popular support. Which in many respects is an echo of Bosch’s “return to constitutionality without elections” of 1964–65. In fact, later slogan in which “constitutionality” refers to 63 Constitution, is being given renewed currency today by party’s continuing denial of constitutional character to Balaguer administration, its executive committee’s posture on electoral abstention, the growing threat of its legislative bloc’s permanent withdrawal, and its first official invocation of 63 Constitution as basis for party position (as evidenced in its Jan 3 letter to Emb and in Jan 5 broadcast by Pena Gomez, who stated US intervened in 65 primarily to prevent return to constitutionality of 63, and that since PRD still holds to that constitution “it natural” that party would face intervention again should there develop another chance to apply that constitution’s tenets).

D. Party’s radio broadcasts and its private comments to Emb and as reported [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] particularly in past month, have pointed increasingly to its belief in inevitability of eventual new revolution. Its unusual musical offerings on Christmas Eve (Constitutionalist hymn and Marseillaise) and New Year’s Eve (marching song of Dom youths who trained in Cuba prior to Jun 14, 59 invasion effort against Trujillo), all three of which repeated in Jan 6 broadcast, its almost constant public reference to coming “redemption” and “liberation,” its absolute silence on Caamano, its now constant and uniformly contemptuous (and often vicious) personal attacks on Balaguer, its efforts persuade its audience that present situation on “total repression” of people’s hopes and aspirations mirrors or surpasses that

of early 65, and its constant reiteration of friendship for military and particularly AF. AF in part war of nerves aimed at extracting concession from govt and in part effort to hold and to increase its radical following. Beyond this they may well be literally intended to signal coming events. Our major present uncertainties as to PRD's ability mount major revolutionary effort concern extent of its latent support in military (believed negligible) and possible roles assigned to Caamano, Communists and Cuba in its plans (unknown). We estimate, however, that barring assassination of Balaguer, party and its possible allies lack strength with which to succeed in revolutionary overthrow of GODR unless presently unlikely coup attempt (successful or not) or other action affecting armed forces should split military or otherwise diminish its capability for effective response and thus create power vacuum that PRD and its possible allies could fill to their advantage.

#### 6. The Communists

A. While PRD has been taking on increasingly revolutionary posture, DR's three major Communist parties—MPD, 14th June, and PCD—have also adopted more radical posture in recent months. Moscow-oriented PCD has, for the first time known to Embassy, resorted to training guerilla warfare cadres; three such groups of 12–16 personnel each have been identified recently; two were located in Haitian border regions and one in country's northern tier. At least this would seem to indicate that since most recent tricontinental conference PCD has moved toward Havana outlook on revolutionary activity, or, at most, that Dominican Republic may be considered a unique situation by Havana–Moscow axis in which some measure of agreement has been reached by them on its guerilla potential. In either event, these indications signal more extreme posture on the part of the PCD and distinct departure from “pragmatic” approach to which it has adhered in past. 14th June and MPD are being rent by internal dissensions, with MPD in a more advance stage than 14th. Both have encountered ample frustrations in attempting to organize over past months for insurgency effort predicated on more classic approach of Campesino support. They have found that Campesinos do not easily abandon their traditional conservatism; that internal security forces operating throughout interior represent formidable obstacle to clandestine activity of this nature; and that, all aspects considered, this is form of long range endeavor which they are unable to sustain under pressure of their own internal divisions and of government. As their frustrations in these respects have become more pronounced, there has been resultant tendency to look to irrational, quick solutions through process of escalating competition among not only factions in each party but between parties themselves in order prove themselves as most dedicated Marxist-Leninist.



B. Ex-Constitutionalists in form of 24th of April revolutionary movement (M24A) with a net of relationships reaching into 14th of June and PRD have been provided separate political identity recently. According to *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* reports, Cubans invited 14th June to send group of ex-Constitutionalist leaders to Cuba for training in late September and, month and a half later, provided financial support for formation of new ex-Constitutionalist organization for purpose of participating in “armed struggle.” It is suggestive or even perhaps significant that M24A was resurrected shortly thereafter with public announcement made by two ex-Constitutionalists with 14th June backgrounds. Its efforts have to this point been devoted to organizing affiliates in interior and, if it has any particular political cast, based on presently-known personnel affiliations it is 14th June.

C. Communist Parties are at present in no position embark on insurgency course with hopes of eventual success unless there is reasonable prospect for outside support and assistance in form of either parallel or cooperative endeavors from other political quarters. Critical factor here is PRD’s attitude toward this form of collaboration and, to lesser extent, that of PQD. If PRD is prone to overthrow Balaguer at earliest opportunity, PCD’s recent activities and frustrated and irrational mood of MPD and MR1J4 would make them all likely participants if not spearhead of such an effort. There is insufficient evidence upon which to base any estimate of what role might be destined for Caamano. It might only be noted that he would be a catalytic and unifying element for those more radical opposition forces should he reappear, alone or otherwise, in DR in coming months—regardless of sponsorship.

#### 7. Wessin and PQD

Wessin’s PQD is essentially loose agglomeration of those outside of left who traditionally opposed to or more recently dissatisfied with Balaguer. In addition to many of those who followed Bonnelly (who obtained 45,000 votes) in 1966 election campaign, PQDers include numerous UCNers who voted for Balaguer, many disenchanting Reformistas (according to Vice President Lora and other high PR officials), and unknown number PRD and 14th June members. Bulk of latter elements, however, some of whom have joined PQD on instructions their respective parties, are presumably there for protective, tactical or some other non-Wessinista reason. PQD’s surprisingly fast growth derived from fact that in Wessin it provided anti-Communist and otherwise acceptable alternative to Balaguer to those who previously had no non-leftist alternative to him. Recent *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* information has provided evidence of a split between Golpista and electoral-minded elements in PQD. Wessin’s significance lies hardly as much in his electoral potential however as in fairly substantial sympathies he retains in military and in his potential for increased attrac-

tiveness to military and business community, some of whose elements are believed be contributing financially to PQD. Another consideration is possibility that anti-Castro Cuban exiles may be providing funds and doctrinal stimulus to Wessin for their own purposes.

In event situation should deteriorate to point military should consider Balaguer incapable of dealing with it, Wessin's trouble-making potential would indeed be serious.

#### 8. President and Reformistas

A. Balaguer has so far effectively managed to stave off all elements his opposition by stimulating divisions within them, setting them against each other, buying them off, threatening them, cajoling them, playing up to them, and authorizing or permitting certain types of harassment. While playing this risky game of survival (which he has so far had to play less than any predecessor except Bosch, who did not play at all), he has (as did Bosch) deliberately ignored his own party, has not built base of support within government, and has not deemed it necessary to bridge gap between military, business community (i.e., power sectors) and unorganized "sane popular majorities" which together he constantly gives public and private impression are his sole pillars of support. While this has not actually destroyed his party, it has weakened it considerably, though probably not to point it would calmly stand by and watch him overthrown as PRD did with Bosch in 1963. While to many Reformistas Wessin would offer palatable alternative, strong possibility of civil strife and possible PRD victory therein would most likely stir them to Balaguer's defense in crunch.

B. President's almost total lack of real "political" attention to causes and complaints espoused by PRD and Social Christians (latter feel Balaguer has withdrawn from them in recent months) mirrors his inattention to Reformista complaints and desires and stems from integral part his psychological makeup; he appears sincerely to believe that anything a political party or for that matter a labor organization clamors for is designed solely to satisfy one or another narrow partisan or financial interest and has little to do with wishes of people as whole, as such, he will take only that action that will, he hopes, ensure that clamoring remains within limits of the tolerable. With PRD he often deliberately forgets to do that.

C. Pres sincerely believes the people, not the PR, elected him (as they did). He therefore feels he owes nothing to PR, much to the people. He considers he owes even less to PRD and PRSC, who lost election, but he does owe as much to those who voted for PRD and PRSC and who later joined "sane majorities" as he does to those who voted for him. It is not "sane majorities" who are causing problems, but rather self-serving political (and labor) organizations which, in name of "defending people's interests are seeking increase prestige and power of relatively few at top of these organizations. He alone was chosen

defend people's interests, Pres believes, and he doing just that and not about to satisfy narrow ambitions of others by distributing credit. But he does have to keep these ambitions in check, and for this he uses bag of so far successful tricks.

D. All this is difficult for more politically sophisticated mind to accept. But it essential to understanding Balaguer's *modus operandi*. Unfortunately, there seems to be no way (and we and others have tried many times ways) to convince him that political organizations do in fact represent large segments of same people whose interest he believes he so zealously safeguarding. And he is safeguarding them, he believes with highly ingrained paternalistic bias, by protecting them from malevolent designs of "agitators" and "Communists" (with security forces) and improving overall economic situation (via business community) from which all people will eventually benefit. In seeking paternalistically provide peace and progress for people's future, however, he does not seem by instinct or temperament inclined adequately or consistently to recognize basic political necessity of satisfying their psychological needs of present, a failure that opposition more than avidly exploits.

E. Manner and style which Pres runs his administration, never plusses for him, have increasingly become negative factors. It is an "old" govt in terms both of age of most of its leading figures (many of them hacks and throwbacks to earlier era) and of its general approach toward conduct of public business. Concentration of all authority over even minute detail in Pres personally, corresponding relegation Cabinet members (most of whom have not slightest idea what modern govt is about) to mere figureheads unwilling and incapable making routine decisions because they fear Pres's wrath or have not merest idea his thinking, practically total lack of elementary staff work, consequent readiness by Pres to make ad hoc decisions in vacuum or on basis information or opinion always incomplete and often biased or self-serving, Pres innate distrust "technicians"—his tolerance of notorious crooks in his circle—all of these add greatly to burdens of our own operations here, particularly in aid field, but more importantly they have meant that govt as a whole has over the months failed generate any real degree popular enthusiasm and has fallen prey to secular cynicism of average Dom toward any govt. Up to now, Pres himself has been generally excepted from this popular cynicism. Usual formulation, outside more rabid sectors of opposition on left and right, has been that Balaguer is good, honest, sincere, hard-working man trying to do his best but victimized by a bunch of fools, scoundrels and thieves. This judgment, in both respects, is close to the mark. One of most frustrating—and dangerous—aspects this unhappy administrative situation is that Pres gives every sign to us of realizing incompetence and dishonesty some of his closest associates, yet for many reasons which, at least to us, do not seem persuasive, does almost nothing about it, [garble—thereby incurring?] risk increasingly of losing

his present general immunity from direct attack and worsening his already difficult situation.

F. Another factor greatly colors Pres's view of PRD. Pres firmly believes Bosch and his more rabid followers are sworn enemies of both DR as Balaguer working for it to be, (and of USG with which Pres strongly identifies). He has therefore long since set himself out to destroy Bosch before Bosch can destroy him. His fear of Communist threat is directly related to this struggle, as he believes Bosch, Pena Gomez et al either Communist or next thing to it. To fight Communists, protect "sane majorities" and provide business with investment climate, Pres looks ultimately (and increasingly, as threats to him increase) to military. He is not prisoner of military, but his growing dependence upon it could eventually entail some such relationship unless he can neutralize threat he relying on military to overcome.

G. Threat, however, keeps growing and is fed by his acts of omission and commission and words and those of many of his subordinates and adherents. To PRD and Communists (and to PRSC) Pres has in past two weeks, for instance, offered grave challenge and variety legitimately exploitable issues. He has catered primarily to military (promotions and decorations) to business, military and right in general (industrial exposition speech); and to "sane majorities" (above and Christmas and New Years' msgs). During same time he has given opposition nothing but issues (cut in Christmas bonus, maintenance of cut in university budget, extra-ordinary military promotion ceremony, series mostly deplorable or unpalatably political govt-mental personnel shifts and appointments and, most importantly, apparently gratuitous statement of Dom dependence on US with special emphasis on alleged US determination prevent another Communist takeover in Caribbean or, in effect, another revolution like that of 65).

H. Pres's recent actions seem to us unnecessarily provocative to considerable range of opponents. Although we can only speculate, these actions could reflect: (1) diminished presidential sense of proportion and perspective; (2) a presidential assessment considerably different from our own as to power balance of moment and action requirements deriving therefrom; or (3) presidential intent to provoke a direct confrontation and showdown with opposition on timing and issues of his choosing.

9. We unfortunately cannot rely Pres to level completely with us as to what he is up to, if he is in fact operating along final line suggested above. Aside from his normal taciturnity on matters involving such important internal questions, we convinced he would not explain himself to us candidly for fear we would raise serious objections, as we quite probably would. In any event Pres's success in this possible endeavor or in meeting situation stimulated otherwise depends in great measure on military, as he himself fully recognizes.

## 10. The Military

A. Three high military officers have acknowledged to EmbOff in last six weeks that fair amount Wessinista sentiment exists throughout ranks of military and particularly among former CEFA personnel and in air force. Deputy Army C/S, however, stated this sentiment is held on individual rather than sectoral basis and that, with possible exceptions of smaller air force units, there cannot be considered to be Wessinista “segments” in armed forces. Same officers also acknowledged “Constitutionalist” sentiment in military, but they consider this negligible. On other hand, another of these officers, Col Nivar Seijas, has said that among his precautions against some eventuality he has “ringed” officers of some units, whose loyalty to Balaguer he suspects, with trusted sergeants so as to prevent implementation of anti-Balaguer orders these suspect officers may issue or, if necessary, to arrest or kill them. It is possible that Wessinista and/or Constitutionalist-oriented military elements may have made similar arrangements. Above officers, as well as [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] DAO sources and contacts, generally agree, however, that military as whole remains responsive to its high command and to Balaguer.

B. President has recently taken two significant steps to reinforce this responsiveness and to diminish or at least prevent further growth of Wessinista sentiment. These were his Dec 24 promotion ceremony for 765 essentials lower and middle grade military men, about two-thirds of whom enlisted personnel and over half of whom air force, and his decoration on Jan 5 of 217 navy and 475 army officers, also mostly lower and middle grade. List, however, included Navy C/S Jimenez, Captain Revera Caminero, Armed Forces Secretary Perez y Perez, Nivar Seijas, Military Aides Chief Col Perdomo, and appeared reflect all major currents in both services.

C. In light leftist maneuverings detailed above, unusual drama of President’s promotion ceremony and his large promotion and decoration lists, which sandwiched ringing anti-Communist “incentive” speech to business community (and military), convey impression that by appeasing power sectors he is attempting erode Wessinista real and potential strength and at same time consolidate his strength in order to meet what he would appear now to consider more immediate threat of major leftist actions, to deal with this contingency with maximum dispatch and with minimum violence, he knows he must have united and effective military support.

D. We estimate that, with possible exception some air force and other essentially isolated elements, Balaguer continues enjoy very strong military support, particularly in face potential left wing threat, and notwithstanding long-smoldering controversy between Perez y Perez and Nivar Seijas factions. Should eventual resolution this controversy prove decidedly unpalatable to one side or other, it possible that some erosion could

take place, although it unlikely it would be of significant proportions as long as leftist threat persists. Should Balaguer not take steps considered adequate by military to meet this threat, however, it is likely that elements therein would turn more and more to Wessin as alternative. But this does not seem be matter for concern in immediate future.

E. Given these assumptions, which accurately reflect situation as we best able to determine it as present, we consider Balaguer capable of dealing with any revolutionary or other armed left wing activity unless this should include assassination of President himself or other pre-emptive action effectively neutralizing capability of military for forceful response (e.g. through assassination of key officers).

#### 11. Summary Prognosis

A. We estimate present uneasy situation will over next 4–5 months become increasingly delicate. In our own thinking we are dividing period to elections in three segments: (1) between now and PRD-scheduled Feb 7 convention (and/or opening of 3-month campaign for May 16 election immediately thereafter); (2) between then and April 24–28; and (3) between then and elections. We suspect that PRD planning some activity, or preparing take advantage activity being planned or that might accidentally be triggered by others, in order extricate self from dilemma of deciding formally on electoral participation question one month hence. We cannot foretell the occasion or the form of this suspected activity, but are impressed that one situation already at hand and offering quite inflammatory potential exists at the UASD. (*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*) reports indicate 1J4 intent to spark disturbances focussing on university question and PRD's student arm—FUSD—seems heavily involved.) Further, before PRD convention, it would not be unlikely for something to happen on Wessin issue (dormant for many weeks now) and/or concerning Caamano.

B. Should no major activity occur within next month, we would still expect potential for trouble to remain high through May 16 election, with a possible peak toward third anniversary of outbreak of revolution on April 24.

12. As stated above, taking all positive and negative factors into account, we estimate President with our continued economic and political support, publicly demonstrated, has better than even chance of survival through May 1968 election.

13. In response State 89983<sup>5</sup> separate telegram will suggest actions by Dept which in our judgment would have useful impact on Dominican situation.<sup>6</sup>

**Crimmins**

<sup>5</sup> Dated December 27, 1967. (Ibid.)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 209.

**209. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, January 13, 1968, 1539Z.

1508. Subj: Recommended Actions at Washington Level. Ref: State 89983;<sup>2</sup> Santo Domingo 1461.<sup>3</sup>

1. In response Department's request following is Embassy's initial listing of suggestions for actions at Washington level which would have useful impact in existing circumstances:

A. Aid/Economic

1. Readiness to deal quickly and flexibly with negotiating problems as they may arise during Embassy–GODR conversations on new assistance package.

2. Promptest possible processing sixteen million SA loan and subsequent dollar disbursements.

3. Accelerated conclusion of bid and AID/W studies of Tavera Dam project, with object of earliest possible announcement of bid and AID decision to finance (assuming establishment of feasibility). (Ambassador would like briefing on current Washington status and prognosis of studies during his consultations.)

4. Early consideration of special treatment for DR in allocation of sugar shortfalls, bearing in mind electoral stability factors as well as economic balance of payment factors. (We realize normal timing of allocations may not permit pre-electoral impact and certainly cannot be finely adjusted to meet tactical stability needs. At same time, we would want Washington to consider desirability making early statement USG intention take sympathetic attitude toward DR, a statement which would have considerable impact.)

5. Prompt and flexible treatment DL applications.

6. Largest possible FY–68 and 69 DG allocations.

B. Political Military

1. Consideration, on contingency basis, of possible invitation to Balaguer for state visit.

2. High-level, stability-bolstering statements in support of constitutional government in DR, to be made on appropriate occasions to be identified by Embassy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros.

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 27, 1967. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Document 208.

3. Favorable consideration of request by Dominican Armed Forces for grant assistance on military soft goods.

4. Continued and, if necessary, increased surveillance of potential Golpista elements now in US (e.g., Wessin, Pancho Aguirre).

5. Contingency preparations for departure controls on Wessin, should Balaguer so request.

6. Holding line on issuance visas to notorious Trujillistas, whose presence in US would be prejudicial to US interests in DR, and continued and, if necessary, increased surveillance of those already in US.

**Crimmins**

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**210. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 16, 1968.

SUBJECT

Dominican Situation

The IRG for Latin America met with Ambassador Crimmins yesterday to review the Dominican situation and decide what additional steps should be taken to bolster Balaguer.

Ambassador Crimmins expressed some surprise that his recent report had been viewed as sounding a note of alarm over political trends.<sup>2</sup> The message he wished to convey was one of continuing concern over the efforts of the opposition to undermine Balaguer, brought into sharper focus by the proximity of the May municipal election. There is no immediate threat to Balaguer's position, but we must remain alert to dangers and the need to bolster him wherever possible.

Crimmins reported that last Friday<sup>3</sup> before leaving the DR, he asked President Balaguer for his assessment. Balaguer said he was not concerned about the situation and thought it was essentially normal for the Dominican Republic as it approached an important election. Crimmins thought this estimate a little too sanguine.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Secret. A "PS" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 208.

<sup>3</sup> January 12.



When asked about prospects for Balaguer's winning the election, Crimmins observed that the outcome of the municipal elections was not much in doubt. Balaguer's Reformist Party (PR) has the best political organization and with a little bit of effort he can win.<sup>4</sup>

The IRG agreed to explore these courses of action to bolster Balaguer:

*Economic*

1. Speed negotiation of the \$30 million SA-PL 480 package for CY 1968 and advance our paperwork on disbursement so that money can flow promptly after signing of the new agreement.
2. Press for rapid IDB and AID processing of the politically important Taveras Dam loan so that it could be signed by February 27, the Dominican Independence Day. (IDB President Felipe Herrera has expressed an interest in going to the DR for the signing ceremony.)
3. Recommend that you again make a special allocation to the DR of the Puerto Rico and domestic sugar shortfalls and announce this in advance of the May 16 elections.
4. Amend the USDA letters of reimbursement to allow wheat to flow uninterrupted to the DR while PL 480 negotiations are underway.
5. Check to see how we might help the Canadian Falcon Bridge Co. secure the financing for its \$150 million investment in Dominican nickel so that the announcement can be made prior to the elections.
6. Encourage Balaguer to decide on the bids already presented by Esso and Shell for building a refinery in the DR to pave the way for the announcement of another major investment.

*Political-Military*

1. Arrange a series of visits to the DR over the next four months to demonstrate confidence in and support for Balaguer, e.g.:
  - IDB President Herrera for the Taveras Dam loan signing;
  - New OAS Secretary General, after he is elected;
  - President Leoni, either on his way to or from the US, should he accept the invitation you made at Punta del Este;

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<sup>4</sup> During a January 16 ARA–CIA meeting support for Dominican moderate forces in the May municipal elections was discussed. It was noted that Balaguer was not interested in building and maintaining the organization of his Reformist Party and until he responded to U.S. efforts to “vitalize him” there was not much the United States could do. “Sayre expressed his concern that in March or April, when it would be too late, Balaguer would suddenly awaken to the fact that his own prestige was involved in the municipal elections and would turn to us with demands that we do something.” (Memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes and Denney, January 18; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1968)

—Ships of countries participating in the Caribbean naval exercise “Springboard” (Canada, Ecuador, Colombia and possibly Venezuela, but not US or Brazil because of IAPF connotations).

2. Crimmins to review programmed levels of military and police equipment to determine whether the items are best designed to help satisfy the more urgent needs of the security forces and yet be consistent with our plans for modernization and reduction of force levels.

3. Continue and, if necessary, increase surveillance of potential coup elements (e.g., Wessin) and be prepared to place departure controls on them if Balaguer requests.

4. Hold the line on issuance of visas to notorious Trujillistas whose presence here would be prejudicial to our interests in the DR.

*In addition to the foregoing actions [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will:*

1. Subject to 303 Committee approval, make [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] available to the Social Christian Party to keep them in the municipal elections as a validating force for the elections. (It is doubtful that Bosch’s PRD Party will participate.)

2. Press Balaguer’s PR Party to be more aggressive in the election campaign which starts February 16.

3. Make renewed efforts to determine the whereabouts of Caamano who disappeared from his London post on October 24, 1967.

4. Try to learn more about Cuban intentions regarding the DR, since Caamano may be in Cuba and Castro may be looking to the DR as the place to recoup his Bolivian losses.

With alertness to the situation, the foregoing medicine and a little luck, Balaguer should be able to weather this rise in the fever chart unless he precipitates complications with decisions beyond our control.

**Walt**

## 211. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 29, 1968.

### SUBJECT

Covert Financial Contribution to the Revolutionary Social Christian Party for the May 1968 Municipal Elections in the Dominican Republic

#### 1. Summary

The possibility exists that the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) may not participate in the 16 May 1968 municipal elections, thereby depriving Balaguer of the important psychological factor of a major, left of center opposition. It is, therefore, important that the other left of center opposition party, the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), participate effectively in the municipal elections and provide an outlet for left of center sentiment.

This memorandum asks the 303 Committee to approve a proposal for a modest covert contribution [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to the PRSC for its municipal election activities.

#### 2. Factors Bearing on the Problem

##### a. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations

This proposal is consistent with the U.S. Government's general and specific objectives cited in the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP)<sup>2</sup> for the Dominican Republic which was approved on 8 May 1967. The applicable general U.S. objective is the "creation of the infrastructure to support a viable, democratic political system in the Dominican Republic". The Specific U.S. Objectives cited in the CASP and applicable to this proposal are to "maintain and strengthen the Social Christians in a position of constructive opposition", and to "prevent an alliance of the right or the extreme right and the left or the extreme left against the government".

##### b. Background

(1) In accordance with the Dominican Constitution, the biannual municipal elections are scheduled to be held on 16 May 1968. Seventy-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records, 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Bohlen, through Trueheart under a February 13 covering memorandum from Oliver who summarized it and recommended approval of the recommendation.

<sup>2</sup> Document 196.

seven mayoralty positions and 417 council seats are to be contested. It currently appears that President Joaquin Balaguer will face mounting opposition efforts to create political unrest during the period leading up to and through the elections. It is believed important that the municipal elections give the populace confidence in the electoral process even in the face of the existing political problems; they should provide the electorate a legitimate choice and demonstrate that a responsible opposition party can campaign in the Dominican Republic. This would have a favorable and reassuring psychological impact.

(2) On 15 December 1967 the Executive Committee of the PRD meeting in extraordinary session decided that because of the repression to which the PRD alleges it has been subjected and because of the campaign of terrorism in the National District, it would not participate in the municipal elections. The National Executive Committee will submit this decision to the next PRD convention (to be held on 10 February 1968) which has the authority to accept or reject the PRD Executive Committee decision. Should the PRD convention choose to abstain, Balaguer would not have a major, left of center opposition participating in the municipal elections.

(3) The PRSC has announced its intention to participate in the municipal elections. Although the PRSC is a minor party, its participation would tend to put it in harsh contention with the more radical elements of the left, and to entrench the PRSC more deeply in the role of constructive opposition. Should the PRD convention reverse the decision of the PRD Executive Committee and take the PRD to the municipal elections, an effective role played by the PRSC during the elections would still make a significant contribution to the evolution of democratic processes in the Dominican Republic. The PRSC, however, lacks the funds necessary for an active and effective campaign.

#### *c. Operational Objectives*

The principal objective of this proposal is to insure that the left of center is a meaningful constructive factor in the May 1968 municipal elections. A secondary objective is to entrench the PRSC in a constructive opposition role for the left of center and in that role to provide the left of center an alternative to the more radical leftist parties during and following the municipal elections. The objective is not to make the PRSC a major party but to insure its active participation in the municipal elections.

*d. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*

*[1 paragraph (16 lines of source text) not declassified]*

#### *e. Risks Involved*

Although there is an ever present risk in operations of this type, the risks in this proposal are within acceptable limits because: (1) there

will be no attempt to establish control over the PRSC expenditure of the contribution or to require accounting for the funds; (2) no direct contact between the donor and the principal party leaders will be necessary; and (3) [1½ lines of source text not declassified] able to explain contributing the relatively small amount proposed in this operation. Although there is some risk that the Balaguer government would be annoyed should it learn that the U.S. contributed to a rival party without its knowledge, it is believed that this would only cause a temporary strain since the government itself has been encouraging the PRSC to continue in a constructive opposition role.

*f. Timing of the Operation*

The municipal elections are scheduled to be held on 16 May 1968; however, the campaign period opens on 16 February 1968. The funding channel should be activated as soon as possible in order to give the PRSC sufficient time to integrate this contribution into its campaign budget prior to the elections.

*3. Origin of the Requirement*

This proposal evolved from discussions between the CIA [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Ambassador Crimmins. They felt that, since it is probable that the PRD will not participate in the 16 May 1968 municipal elections, a modest covert contribution to the PRSC could improve that party's capability for a more vigorous campaign for the municipal elections thereby insuring a necessary democratic image of loyal opposition to the Balaguer government.

*4. Relationship to Previous 303 Committee Actions*

The approval for action requested in this memorandum has not been the subject of prior 303 Committee action although recommendations have been submitted previously to the 303 Committee regarding presidential elections and activities concerning student elections at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic.<sup>3</sup>

*5. Coordination*

The proposed operation has been coordinated with and concurred in by Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert M. Sayre of the Department of State. The U.S. Ambassador in Santo Domingo, John H. Crimmins, also concurs.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 203.

## 6. Recommendations

It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the expenditure [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for the purpose of providing covert assistance to the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) to enable that party to participate meaningfully in the May 1968 municipal elections.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For a summary of the results of this covert operation, see Document 215.

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## 212. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, undated.

### THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

#### *Part I—Statement of Rationale and Basic Strategy*

The future course of the Dominican Republic continues to be of great importance to the United States for three inter-related reasons: (a) its strategic location on our geographic doorstep and very close to Communist Cuba; (b) the primitiveness and fragility of its political, economic, social and military institutions, which make for chronic instability and consequent vulnerability to extremism; and (c) the serious damage to our interests in case of the assumption of power in another Caribbean country by forces inimical to us.

Four centuries of political, economic and social underdevelopment, thirty years of corrosive dictatorship, and six years of political turbulence and instability had by the start of the present administration produced a nation and a people uncertain of themselves and their future, erratically searching for a national identity and character while yearning for an equitable society with representative, responsive political institutions, and the economic, political, social advances and peace they associate with them. Political factors, demographic developments, economic and social inequities and proximity to Cuba have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files POL 1 DOM REP-US. Secret. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A-563, April 21, which was repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros. A covering note indicates that this paper superseded the April 15, 1967, "Country Analysis and Strategy Paper," Document 196.

contributed to a chronic ferment on the national scene with youth perhaps the most volatile element. By mid 1968, halfway through the term in office of the Balaguer Administration, it is clear that despite modest progress, the problems of political stability, social justice, and economic development are still far from solved.

The United States has a vital interest in denying this Caribbean nation to communism including the Cuban variant. Related thereto is the necessity to prevent a regression into authoritarianism of the right, with its almost certain consequence, in the Dominican environment, of enhancing communist prospects. Any long-term success in this regard must necessarily entail far-reaching economic, social and military reforms and the creation and strengthening of indigenous institutions which today lack the capability to assure stability and progress or to strengthen the nation against domestic or foreign subversion. From the standpoint of the inter-American system, it is important that the Dominican Republic be strengthened to function as an independent, fully sovereign and responsible member of the international community.

Circumstances of geography and history—but only secondarily economics—have deeply involved the United States in developments in the Dominican Republic. Many factors favor our exercising a significant influence. The first is our very proximity, which predisposes many Dominicans to accept as inevitable a very important U.S. role. A second is the critical need for our economic and technical assistance. A third is a combination of the first two: the unusually developed tendency of many Dominicans in all walks of life to view the United States as the arbiter of their nation's destinies, for good or for evil. It is easy and dangerous, however, to overestimate the extent to which even a powerful nation can today work its will on a weak neighbor. The recent history of U.S. involvement in this country has emphasized certain inherent limitations on the exercise of our influence. First, there are the restraints placed on U.S. policies and actions by a decent regard for domestic and international opinion and by the ultimate ability of the Dominicans to have recourse to international organizations against real or alleged abuses of our influence. Second, the degree to which our prestige has become committed here is in itself an element which Dominicans, in and out of power, can use to resist our influence in matters in which our interests diverge because they realize the restricted alternatives we have under present circumstances. Underlying these other limitations on our influence is the basic, persistent fact of the essential primitivism of Dominican society, politics and institutions which often vitiates, distorts or frustrates our inputs, be they political, economic, social or military. Our very special importance in the Dominican Republic gives us an uncommon ability and opportunity to counsel, persuade and guide; it does not give us the power to command.

Following the revolution of April 1965, our immediate objective had to be the restoration of order in the Dominican Republic and a return to legally elected constitutional government and, with this accomplished, the maintenance of sufficient political stability and economic and social progress to enable the Government to carry out its mandate. Over the long run, we seek to promote the existence in the Dominican Republic of representative, responsive and reform-minded governments, operating from a sound economic, social and military base, friendly and disposed to cooperate with us on vital issues in international forums. In moving toward that objective, we seek a citizenry better informed about, and prepared to construct and support, democratic institutions and an equitable society based upon the rule of law and concern as well as respect for the rights of others. As an indispensable concomitant, we seek the growth, strengthening and rationalization of the Dominican economy, as well as a balance-of-payments equilibrium so that domestic and foreign resources can be most effectively utilized in a comprehensive and effective program of economic and social development and reform, which will assure meaningful and tangible progress toward the correction of prevailing inequities. Finally, we seek a small, professional, apolitical security establishment which acts as a positive, rather than, as in the past, a negative force in the political, economic and social development of the country.

Our over-all strategy to accomplish these objectives inevitably engages us in most aspects of Dominican national life. We are utilizing very substantial financial and technical assistance and encouraging appropriate domestic and foreign investment in order first to stabilize and then develop the Dominican economy along modern lines and to stimulate and accelerate social reforms. As part of this effort we are trying to raise the low average effectiveness of human resources and of the country's institutions. We support and emphasize publicly and privately the concept of legal, constitutional government, the indispensability of basic economic and social changes, and the democratic process. Through material and technical assistance, training and indoctrination we work toward a security force effective, compatible with the country's needs, responsive to civil authority, apolitical, and ready to perform a positive supporting role in the country's progress. Finally, we employ these multiple U.S. inputs so as to persuade the Dominican Government and people to commit themselves and their own resources in a manner permitting long-run, self-sustaining economic, social and political development while avoiding resort to violence and disorder.

The broad policies which flow from this strategy are producing some progress toward our principal goals. While this progress, when measured against the situation two years ago, is encouraging, our policies



cannot be said yet to have resolved any of the country's basic problems. As of mid-1968, a considerable degree of political stability exists, but it is not firmly established and its continuation is far from certain. Our economic assistance has contributed to that stability, but it has had as yet little impact upon the problem of massive unemployment, and, notwithstanding some hopeful investment and production trends, it has been able to bring about only minimal economic growth and financial equilibrium. Nor has it yet produced more than modest social advances. The failure to achieve any significant per capita growth in 1967 is of serious concern, and continuation of this stagnation is unacceptable. The time has come to begin to move the DR toward the minimum target growth rate of 2.5% per capita set for the Alliance for Progress and to make it less dependent on the United States. In the FY 1970 Program Memorandum the Country Team will submit recommendations for an assistance program designed to achieve these goals. Pending consideration of these recommendations the present policy of providing only the minimum assistance needed to avoid serious balance of payments and political crisis should be continued.

[Omitted here is "Part II—Assessment of Current Situation and Near-Term Prospects" and "Part III—General and Specific Objectives."]

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### **213. Editorial Note**

On May 15, 1968, municipal elections were held in the Dominican Republic. Over 1 million people turned out to vote for candidates in 77 municipalities, 200,000 more than the Embassy had estimated. With the abstention of the left of center Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) and other important right of center parties, it was expected that President Balaguer's Party, the Partido Reformista (PR), would win a majority of the votes. Of the 77 municipalities, Partido Reformista won 66 including Santo Domingo. The left of center Partido Revolucionario Social Christiano (PRSC) won 2 municipalities and the approximately 45 local independent political movements won 9.

**214. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1968, 7:35 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Special Sugar Allocation for the Dominican Republic

Secretary Rusk in the memorandum at Tab A<sup>2</sup> recommends that you:

1. make a special allocation to the Dominican Republic of 75,000 short tons of sugar from the Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands deficits, *provided* Balaguer agrees to set aside at least 1½ cents per pound for mutually agreed programs to improve the efficiency of Dominican agricultural production;
2. sign the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B<sup>3</sup> to be implemented when Balaguer accepts the condition.

You authorized special sugar allocations to the DR in 1966 (123,020 tons) and 1967 (105,000 tons). Balaguer still needs additional support and has asked for it again this year. In recommending a special allocation, Secretary Rusk proposes to continue the weaning process by cutting the level back 30,000 tons over last year. But this reduction will not materially affect the DR overall quota as compared with what it received in 1967. Higher US consumption and a larger deficit in the Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands quotas will bring increases in the amount received by the DR under the regular pro rata system.

Balaguer continues to make good use of the additional help. Other sugar producers have not complained about the special treatment and are not likely to do so since we are progressively decreasing the special allocation. You have authority in the Sugar Act to make special allocations, and the legislative history singles out the DR as needing help.

Secretary Freeman is in full agreement with the special allocation. BOB has no problem with it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> In this May 20 memorandum to the President, Rusk wrote that "it would be in the national interest to assign to the Dominican Republic a substantial special allocation again this year as evidence of continued support of the Balaguer Government and its efforts to re-establish its economy," although "it would not be in the national interest of either the United States or the Dominican Republic to perpetuate dependence on this special treatment. The Dominican Republic must be encouraged to diversify away from exaggerated dependence on sugar exports." The memorandum was attached but is not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached and not found.

I recommend you:

1. Approve Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

Approve<sup>4</sup>

Disapprove

Call me

2. Sign the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B.

Walt

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<sup>4</sup> This option is checked.

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## 215. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 28, 1968.

### SUBJECT

Results of Covert Financial Contributions to the Revolutionary Social Christian Party for the May 1968 Municipal Elections in the Dominican Republic

1. On 16 February 1968, the 303 Committee approved covert financial support to the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) to encourage that party to participate effectively in the May 1968 municipal elections and thus provide a responsible opposition to President Balaguer's Reformist Party (PR).<sup>2</sup> The basis for this decision was that, with the abstention of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and other opposition parties from the elections, the Balaguer government was in danger of being deprived of the psychological impact which a contested election would have in the Dominican Republic.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records, 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. The date of this memorandum is stamped at the bottom of the first page. A copy was sent under a July 2 covering memorandum from Oliver through Trueheart to Bohlen. In this memorandum, Oliver wrote: "ARA agrees that our aid to the PRSC contributed to the results [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] named, and I therefore recommend that in the 303 Committee you note your approval of the attached [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] memorandum." No record of such approval has been found.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 211.

2. The covert passage of funds to the PRSC had its desired effect. The party withstood heavy pressure from the PRD and other abstentionists—including some of its own young militants—and participated in the May elections. While the psychological impact on Dominican voters of the PRSC decision to participate in the elections would be difficult to evaluate with precision, it undoubtedly made a significant contribution, along with other factors, in inducing a highly encouraging voter turn-out of 1,028,410 on election day—a figure which compares very favorably with the 1,354,404 persons who voted in the more hotly contested and more significant presidential elections of 1966. By its participation in the electoral contest, the PRSC also enhanced its image as the “loyal opposition,” garnering more than 124,000 votes—a fourfold increase over its showing in the 1966 elections. The participation of a responsible opposition also served to make the victory of the PR more generally acceptable and had the net effect of strengthening both President Balaguer’s image and the democratic process in the Dominican Republic.

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## 216. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

No. 0606/68

Washington, July 15, 1968.

### DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BALAGUER AT MID-TERM

#### *Summary*

Since his inauguration in July 1966, President Balaguer has presided over the longest period of political stability since Trujillo’s 31-year dictatorship ended in 1961. In doing so, Balaguer has maintained a broad range of political freedoms, only occasionally resorting to arbitrary methods. His survival in office has perhaps been Balaguer’s major accomplishment and has given many Dominicans hope that a relatively democratic government can provide stability, order, and a measure of economic progress.

This accomplishment is impressive by Dominican standards, but Balaguer nonetheless has so far been unable to create the political conditions that will ensure long-term stability. He has failed to promote the development of political institutions such as Congress, the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.

judiciary, labor unions, and political parties that could provide a force for constitutional stability. The Trujillo period and its turbulent aftermath created hatreds and animosities that are still major political burdens. Intransigent opponents, unable to reconcile themselves to being out of power, continue looking for an opening to topple the government. Although the country's economic prospect is somewhat improved, Balaguer has not given high priority to politically difficult but essential economic, social, and military reforms. US aid is still vital to financial stability and even a moderate rate of economic growth.

During the last half of Balaguer's term, political activity will increasingly focus on presidential elections to be held in mid-1970. Pre-electoral maneuvering seems likely to bring latent political conflicts to the surface, and it is not at all certain that Balaguer's successor—assuming the President does not run again—will be able to move into the presidency in a stable political environment. Balaguer's major challenge during the next two years, therefore, will be to establish the conditions needed to demonstrate that his administration is more than an interregnum between periods of chaos and instability.

*Balaguer's Strengths . . .*

1. Balaguer has been able to maintain the backing—or at least the tacit acceptance—of most of the political sectors that supported his candidacy in the 1966 elections. His generally conservative and cautious policies have avoided alienating the military and the politically influential upper and upper-middle class. In addition, US support, made manifest through conspicuous political actions and a major infusion of economic aid, has served to bolster the President and discourage his opponents.

2. Balaguer continues to profit from the reaction of the majority of the Dominican political community to the violence and instability of the 1965 “constitutionalist” uprising. Most Dominicans have accepted Balaguer's overwhelming electoral victory in 1966 over Juan Bosch as a popular mandate for peace and order. Although Balaguer has failed to generate strong popular enthusiasm, his performance has generally been accepted and no major challenges to his rule have developed. He has retained and expanded his support among moderates, the church, and business elements, and the victory of his Reformist Party in the municipal elections last May was on the whole an endorsement of the President.

3. Balaguer has generally proved to be an astute political tactician with a sound understanding of Dominican political psychology. He has employed a variety of political stratagems to maintain and broaden his support while keeping his opponents off balance. Balaguer has been conscious that most Dominicans respect dominant—at times even authoritarian—leadership. Operating on this assumption, he has issued

veiled warnings to political adventurers and has used government power in a forceful and at times unrestrained manner to harass and intimidate dissidents. He has kept the left and right from uniting against him and has sought to stimulate divisions in each sector. Balaguer has attempted to give his government an image of "national unity" by appointing to government positions a broad spectrum of politicians ranging from right-wing to center left. In so doing, he has bought off some opponents and has exiled potential troublemakers to overseas diplomatic posts.

*... And His Weaknesses*

4. Balaguer's performance as President has not been without serious negative aspects that have been exploited by his opposition. Balaguer's style of governing bears many of the hallmarks of Trujillo, in whose government he served for many years. In addition, Balaguer is so strongly influenced by the traditionalism and primitive nature of the Dominican political environment that he tends to be insensitive to the need for change and modernization.

5. Many of his supporters display political thinking shaped under Trujillo and are considerably more authoritarian and conservative in outlook—as well as much less honest—than Balaguer. Out of loyalty and an inability to place his faith in others, however, Balaguer has put many of these partisans into influential advisory posts and important positions in the security services. The presence of these "trujillistas"—as they are labeled by their enemies—and their occasional arbitrary behavior have served as a constant goad to those who opposed Trujillo and also have provided a ready source of political ammunition for the left and right. Of additional concern has been the increased interest the Trujillo clan has shown from exile in Europe over the last year in Dominican politics and in maintaining ties with some Dominican politicians.

6. Many leaders of the Reformist Party (PR), including Vice President Lora, have been seriously disenchanted by the President's failure to build up the party through government patronage and funds. They are also critical of some of his policies and resentful of their lack of influence in shaping them. The combination of the PR, which appears to have strengthened its grass-roots organization despite the President's indifference, and "trujillista" government officials provides a potential danger to Balaguer and may prove difficult for a moderate successor to dislodge.

7. Balaguer's administrative style and government appointments have not been a source of strength to his administration. By and large he has appointed aides on the basis of politics and old friendships. Balaguer's undistinguished appointments and his tendency to centralize authority in his office have weakened the already inadequately staffed

government ministries, forcing the President to take on the almost impossible task of overseeing even minor policy decisions to ensure their execution. His subordinates, in turn, buck even trivial matters up to the President for a decision. Balaguer's failure to give adequate guidelines to the actions of the police and the palace intelligence staff has been especially damaging politically and has been effectively exploited by the opposition. Balaguer's governing style consequently has produced a more conservative image of his government than is warranted by the President's own political values.

8. Balaguer has proved to be relatively insensitive to public opinion, has displayed a distrust of the press, and has often dismissed even well-intentioned criticism as malicious and politically inspired. Reflecting the Dominican predilection for the politics of annihilation rather than compromise and conciliation, Balaguer has frequently reacted to opposition attacks by stimulating unnecessary antagonism. One of Balaguer's most damaging blind spots has been his slow realization that the appearance of government "repression" and "terrorism" upset many moderates and gave credibility to opposition charges of "neo-trujilloism."

#### *The Intransigent Opposition*

9. Balaguer has had to expend considerable effort to stay one step ahead of the elements on the left and right who have been unable to reconcile themselves to his assumption of power and who have been antagonized by his manner of rule. The left and the right have issued a continuing stream of hostile and frequently inflammatory propaganda that has kept political tensions high. Balaguer's opponents, however, have been unable to form a common front. The divisions between them have remained deeper than their hostility to Balaguer.

#### *Dominican Revolutionary Party*

10. During most of Balaguer's term the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), dominated by its more radical elements, has maintained a militant position of "revolutionary and nationalistic" opposition to the President. It has accused him of "neo-Trujillo" practices and "systematic repression" of his opponents, and has stridently criticized US support of his government. The PRD has issued frequent warnings that unless Balaguer adopts a more acceptable course, it will be in the vanguard of the "inevitable revolution." Early this month, one PRD leader seemed to go even further toward radicalization, saying that the party's goal is "a struggle of national liberation in order to achieve revolutionary power by any means."

11. Despite its posturing, the PRD has not—as many Balaguer supporters believe—engaged in serious conspiracy or made efforts to organize a popular uprising. The party has, however, kept in contact with

Communist and right-wing opponents of Balaguer to discern their strength and intentions. Prior to the election in May 1968, the PRD seemed on the verge of cooperating with the extremist Dominican Popular Movement in a campaign of violence to press voters into complying with the PRD strategy of electoral abstention. At the last minute, however, the PRD leadership—under pressure of more moderate party elements—pulled back and only minor violence occurred.

12. The PRD has based its policies in part on the conviction that Balaguer would eventually succumb to a right-wing military takeover. In addition, the party's efforts to discredit Balaguer and to maintain an atmosphere of political tension seem at times to have been aimed at encouraging others to conspire. The activities of party elder statesman Juan Bosch—who remains in self-imposed exile in Europe—have also pushed the party into a more radical and more anti-US position.

13. Balaguer's efforts to isolate and discredit the PRD and undermine its support among organized labor and the government bureaucracy have also encouraged radicalism. Despite a few half-hearted efforts he has made to reach some sort of accommodation with the PRD, Balaguer has said that its leaders "are little more than Communists."

14. The PRD probably realizes that present conditions differ considerably from those existing in 1965, when it had the support of some military elements in toppling a very unpopular and narrowly based government. The gradual erosion of the party's popular support and the deterioration of its organization have limited its capability for antigovernment action. In addition, a significant current of relatively moderate PRD opinion resents the influence of Bosch, is unwilling to renounce democratic methods for Bosch's authoritarian and radical notions of "popular dictatorship," and dislikes the idea of breaking all links to the US. The "moderates" have served as a brake on the radical leadership and have frequently forced Party Secretary General Jose Francisco Pena Gomez to pull back from extreme positions.

15. Over the next few months the PRD will have to begin to define its position in regard to the 1970 elections. If the PRD is to remain a significant Dominican political force and avoid further radicalization, it must moderate its line, develop constructive alternatives to Balaguer's policies, and find a popular candidate. At present the party seems uncertain of its course and has adopted a wait-and-see attitude, at least until the US political picture becomes clearer. Despite his angry denunciations of "US interventionism," PRD leader Pena has said that future US policies toward the PRD will determine whether the Dominican Republic enjoys a "peaceful transition" in 1970 or whether "we will have a violent revolution." The PRD evidently hopes that a new US administration will be less committed to Balaguer.



*The Extreme Left*

16. Dominican Communists have steadily lost ground under the Balaguer administration as a result of an intensification of ideological and tactical factionalism and intensive government harassment. The total membership of the country's three "major" and three minor extreme leftist groupings appears to have declined from about 1,000 in late 1966 to an estimated 800. Communist activity has been limited to anti-Balaguer propagandizing and sporadic, relatively ineffective violence and terrorism. Although the Dominican Popular Movement and the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement, both influenced by Cuban and Chinese doctrine, have stressed their intention to lay the groundwork for protracted guerrilla warfare, their efforts at promoting rural insurgency have been systematically and effectively disrupted by the security forces.

17. The extreme left remains influential among urban students, particularly in lower and middle-class neighborhoods in Santo Domingo, and at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD). Although Balaguer has expressed deep concern over Communist influence on youth, he has been unable to develop an effective alternative appeal. Balaguer's show of force at the USAD in February 1968, however, demonstrated that he would not tolerate extremist-inspired violence among students.

18. The continued absence of "constitutionalist" leader Francisco Caamano, who mysteriously disappeared from his London military attaché assignment in October 1967 and apparently went to Cuba, has remained an unsettling influence. The PRD has disassociated itself in advance from any rash adventure by Caamano, and differences have developed among the Communists over supporting a possible Caamano-led and Cuban-backed attempt at insurgency. The widespread belief that Caamano has linked up with Castro has discredited him among many Dominicans including dedicated "constitutionalists," while Balaguer's cancellation of Caamano's military commission last May appears to have satisfied military pressure for action against their one-time colleague. Although the return of Caamano could serve to unify some of the Dominican extremist factions, it seems very unlikely that he could pose a major threat to the government.

*The Right*

19. Although Balaguer has devoted considerable effort to undermining the left, he has always believed that the major potential danger to his rule was posed by the right-wing and conservative elements who dominated the governing Council of State in 1962 and who pushed for the military's ouster of Bosch in 1963. Balaguer's suspicion of these elements have undoubtedly been heightened by their successful efforts to maneuver him out of power following the assassination of Trujillo

and by their sponsorship of the candidacy of Rafael Bonnelly in the 1966 presidential elections.

20. Many of these rightists have been frustrated by their inability to influence Balaguer's policies and have sensed a threat to their own positions in the emergence of "trujillistas" in important government positions. They became particularly alarmed following the assassination attempt in March 1967 on Antonio Imbert—one of the two surviving members of the plot to assassinate Trujillo—which they blamed on elements in the government. The rightists, however, have remained unorganized and unable to reestablish their influence with the military. Indeed, some have even accepted government sinecures or remained benevolently neutral toward Balaguer. In mid-May 1968, however, Balaguer stirred up his opponents on the right with his threat to audit all government expenditures since Trujillo's assassination. This has intensified dislike of Balaguer among rightists who profited handsomely from their government "service."

21. The right gained a new ally in late 1967 with the formation of the Democratic Quisqueyan Party (PQD). The immediate goal of the nationalistic and vehemently anti-Communist PQD has been to mobilize public support to urge Balaguer to permit the return from exile of General Wessin, the military leader who opposed the "constitutionalists" and who is now in Miami. Although PQD leaders have asserted their fealty to constitutional government, many Dominicans fear the party will become a vehicle for anti-Balaguer plotting.

22. Balaguer has said he will permit Wessin to return when political conditions are sufficiently stable and will allow him to be a candidate in the 1970 presidential elections. In the meantime, Wessin, frustrated over the ban on his entry, has become increasingly personal in his attacks on Balaguer. Wessin has made some direct public appeals to the military for support for his cause but so far does not appear to have been very successful. The President reacted to these appeals in March 1968 when he placed restrictions on military contacts with politicians and his intelligence operatives have been successful in creating dissension within the PQD.

#### *Balaguer and the Military*

23. Balaguer's ability to keep his opponents at bay has depended on his relationship with the armed forces—the key Dominican political interest group. Balaguer entered office with the strong backing of the military, who deeply distrusted his leftist opponent, Juan Bosch. Balaguer keeps a wary eye on military sentiments in making policy decisions and appears to have satisfied most officers that he will adhere to the national interest as they see it. Balaguer has been aided by a slowly growing apolitical spirit which is being nurtured in the military by the defense minister, Major General Perez.

24. Balaguer has retired or assigned overseas a number of officers whose past loyalties have been to Wessin or to civilian right-wingers, and he reorganized the military in September 1966 to break up the power of the armored unit Wessin once commanded. Balaguer, with the complete support of the military establishment, has systematically retired officers who joined the “constitutionalists” in 1965. Officers whom he trusts, such as the ambitious and opportunistic Colonel Nivar who commands troops in the capital area, have been moved into key posts. At the same time, Balaguer has maintained a delicate balance between antagonistic military factions, although Minister of Defense Perez and Nivar have frequently been at odds.

25. Military discontent appears to be of relatively minor significance and has not been focused on Balaguer. Some officers have grumbled that Balaguer’s tight purse strings restrict armed forces operating expenditures. Others have been irritated by Balaguer’s efforts to contain blatant military corruption. Some officers have complained that Balaguer is too lenient with the left—including the PRD and the Social Christians.

26. Balaguer has been reluctant to press a thorough going program of military reform for fear of possible political consequences. He has reduced military manpower by about seven percent and military expenditures by about 14 percent, but the 18,500-man military establishment remains larger than seems needed to maintain external and internal security. The military itself has resisted US efforts at streamlining, and foot dragging has hindered the effectiveness of the MAAG program.

27. There has been a gradual but steady improvement in the capabilities of the police, particularly after Balaguer appointed the relatively competent General Alvarez police chief in September 1967, and of the Department of National Investigations (DNI), the government’s formal intelligence service. The security forces still show a tendency to overreact, fail to sift rumors from fact, frequently fail to distinguish between the Communist and non-Communist left, and have an overzealous attitude toward the government’s real and imagined opponents. Despite these shortcomings, they appear capable of overcoming any likely security threat as long as they remain politically united.

#### *Economic and Social Problems*

28. President Balaguer’s preoccupation with political stability, his emphasis on achieving financial stability, and his traditionalistic outlook have created drags on economic and social development efforts. Despite more than \$100 million in US aid during Balaguer’s first two years, at the end of 1967 the economy had not yet regained the peak level of 1964. With population growing at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, per capita income has probably shown a small decline

under Balaguer. Both unemployment and underemployment remain high.

29. Although Balaguer recognizes the need for more rapid economic growth, his primary economic objective since taking office has been the restoration of domestic and international financial stability. His austerity program has trimmed noninvestment government expenditures and held total spending to a level that can be financed by domestic revenue and foreign aid. This conservative spending program has helped keep prices essentially stable, but has hampered economic recovery. Important steps have been taken to rationalize the operations of the state-owned industries—particularly the important state sugar corporation—and their financial position has considerably improved.

30. Government efforts have somewhat eased the country's balance-of-payments problem. Exports have been diversified and expanded, and the increase in imports has been held down. Despite these promising developments, the country's international payments position remains dependent on US assistance.

31. Balaguer has refrained from major economic policy changes that would involve substantial political risk. Although devaluation would help to hold down imports, Balaguer has avoided such action because of the probable outcry from importers and the Dominican conviction that the peso's parity with the dollar is "sacred." There has been some increase in tax collections, but the President has moved slowly in punishing tax evaders. Although the sale of government-owned industries would probably lead to better management, Balaguer had demonstrated a sensitivity to the political criticism that would attend such a move.

32. Balaguer's style of administration has hampered economic development. The President's centralization of authority in his office over even minor budget allocations, his failure to appoint competent officials, and his distrust of technicians and economic planning have imposed serious limitations on the government's ability to modernize and have had a detrimental effect on implementation of the the US aid program. Many of Balaguer's personally selected investment projects have been designed more for political showmanship than for economic impact.

33. Despite these flaws, there are positive factors that offer some ground for optimism. Investment by private Dominicans and foreign businesses—which had been badly disrupted by the political chaos that preceded Balaguer—has shown increasing vigor, and gross private and government investment is up considerably. US-aided efforts at agricultural diversification, while not producing results quickly as originally hoped, are gradually strengthening this key sector. The apparent end of a serious year-long drought should also spur agricultural production for export and domestic consumption.

34. Although there has been some increase in criticism of Balaguer's economic policies—particularly the austerity program—there is no indication that discontent has reached a point where it would jeopardize political stability. Nevertheless, unrest among labor, the unemployed, and businessmen, particularly those hurt by government import restrictions, must be continually monitored by Balaguer. Perhaps the most significant political impact of Balaguer's economic policies will be felt by his successor, who will probably inherit many of the same deepseated economic problems that have proven politically burdensome since Trujillo's demise.

35. Balaguer campaigned on the slogan "neither injustices nor privileges" and has subsequently committed himself to some important social reforms, but on the whole his government has had a paternalistic and conservative orientation. In education, for example, Balaguer has not assigned sufficient priority to financing needed changes. Although he seems to have remained a symbol of hope for the country's large rural population, he has come under criticism from campesino groups and progressive churchmen for moving too slowly in agrarian reform and rural improvement. One promising development has been Balaguer's commitment to a program of family planning which may eventually lead to a reduction of the 3.5 percent annual population growth.

36. Balaguer's conservative labor policies have produced a potentially dangerous vacuum within organized labor. Balaguer has taken the view that labor should remain aloof from politics—despite the fact the government dominates the economy—and he has done nothing to encourage the growth of effective unions. Although his policy has reduced organized Communist labor strength significantly, it also has stunted the growth of democratic unions. The austerity program—which includes a freeze on wages designed to compensate for the rapid increase in labor costs that occurred in the immediate post-Trujillo period—and the government's lack of sympathy for legitimate labor grievances have produced growing labor discontent. In response to mounting pressure for a relaxation of the wage freeze, Balaguer announced last month that he would examine the austerity program with an eye to making modifications later this year.

37. A major vulnerability of the Balaguer government is its lack of appeal to left-of-center urban students and youth, organized labor, the urban unemployed, and left-wing middle-class intellectuals and professionals. Balaguer's pragmatic and austere style, his generally conservative policies, and his association with the Trujillo regime have contributed to his alienation from these sectors. Although discontent has led to minor strikes and demonstrations in the Santo Domingo area, the problem has not become critical. Nevertheless, tension between the government and sectors influenced by the PRD and the extreme left

could lead to spontaneous unrest and become a major problem in a period of political crisis.

*The Prospect of the 1970 Elections*

38. Balaguer's attention will be drawn increasingly to the 1970 elections despite his continued concern over short-term political stability. Although Balaguer's intentions with regard to his own candidacy are not completely clear, he has publicly said that he "does not aspire to re-election." If Balaguer did choose to run, he probably would have the edge over any potential challenger. He would have to contend, however, with the strong aversion of many politically influential Dominicans to the concept of a second term, as well as left- and right-wing allegations that his intention is to perpetuate "Trujillo-style" one-man rule.

39. In advancing either his own or another's candidacy, Balaguer will have to choose between his present right-of-center political base in the Reformist Party (PR) and a more moderate political coalition that would be better attuned to the need for a broad array of political, economic, and social changes. There has been considerable speculation among Dominican politicians that Balaguer will support liberal former provisional president Hector Garcia Godoy, who is now ambassador to the US. Balaguer may attempt to establish a political coalition behind Garcia Godoy that would include liberal PR elements, moderates in the PRD and the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC).

40. If a middle-of-the-road coalition is to develop, it seems likely that the PRSC will be in a position to play a key role. The PRSC was greatly encouraged by its showing in the recent municipal elections when it quadrupled its vote and for the first time won elective offices. During the Balaguer administration, the PRSC had moderated its previously radical line, engaged in spirited but on the whole constructive criticism of Balaguer, attempted to broaden its support at the expense of the PRD, and made cordial overtures to the US Embassy. Balaguer has expressed admiration for the Social Christians, even remarking that the PRSC is the only hope for the evolution of a two-party democratic political system.

41. As presidential elections approach, political tensions almost certainly will increase. Both the right and left are sure to believe they are deeply threatened by either Balaguer's continuation in office or the emergence of Garcia Godoy as a moderate alternative. The military remembers with deep distaste Garcia Godoy's term as provisional president when he exiled key officers who had fought against the "constitutionalists." Vice President Lora, whose political outlook is markedly authoritarian and conservative, seems likely to use the Reformist Party to mount his own presidential drive. Elements of the anti-Balaguer right, in turn, may push the candidacy of exile General Wessin. In short,

the 1970 elections may well unearth the latent Dominican political antagonisms that have been hidden under the relative tranquility of the Balaguer administration.

*The Future*

42. Balaguer will probably be able to continue to hold a firm grip on power without having to resort to extreme authoritarian measures. He has so far shown himself able to avoid the serious errors or major miscalculations that could jeopardize stability. His acceptance by the military seems relatively firm, and he will probably be able to count on the continued support of a broad sector of other influential political groupings. Nevertheless, the continued existence of deep political antagonisms, which are at time intensified by the President's actions, and the unyielding opposition of the right and radical left make for continuing political tension that could result in a serious challenge to his government. Should the 61-year-old Balaguer suddenly disappear from the scene—either through assassination or for reasons of health—prospects for stability would be considerably dimmed under his constitutional successor, Vice President Lora.

43. Balaguer's position will remain dependent on continued US economic and political support. Should the opposition consider a new United States administration less committed to Balaguer, it would probably step up its efforts to exploit the President's political vulnerabilities.

44. Balaguer's dependence on the military and other established social groupings will continue to limit his willingness and ability to press for politically difficult social and economic reforms. He may be able, however, to fulfill some of the commitments for reform he has made and may benefit from a moderate upswing in the economy.

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**217. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Santo Domingo, August 16, 1968, 0115Z.

3410. Subject: Current Political Problems Facing Balaguer Government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros, Port au Prince, and USCINCSO.

### 1. Summary

Review current political mood and government's handling of problem areas since municipal elections opportune as August 16 approaches, day on which municipal governments throughout country are renewed or change over. Array of problems facing Balaguer government is formidable but in many instances represents chronic problems or variations of chronic problems. Principal ones include: (a) charges of lack "democratic" atmosphere within which opposition can function, prompted in particular by closing PRD radio program; (b) hunger strike self-styled political prisoners; (c) acts terrorism and alleged police repression and excesses; (d) recent attempts largely by Haitians seek political asylum Venezuelan and Chilean embassies; (e) reports of new rumblings in armed forces; (f) reports of planning for violence in connection change-over national district government. Balaguer in past has been able through combination factors handle or control similar problems and has projected image of man in charge. Now, however, and especially since May elections, President has become more passive and defensive in face opposition actions. Consequence is accumulation of problems and lack of tone in government. Our judgement, however, is that no acute crisis looming; but we are concerned that gradual downhill slide will continue if Balaguer does not reassume direction firmly. It would be in this context that government would become increasingly vulnerable to initiatives on part opposition or unforeseen events.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram detailing the points raised in the summary.]



**218. Minutes of Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1968.

MINUTES OF THE IRG/ARA MEETING ON SITUATION  
IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Ambassador Crimmins began with a review of the Dominican Republic situation, considered in two broad aspects. The first was an analysis of the present situation, and the second was a look at future prospects.

He summed up his current analysis as follows: although the Government has been stronger as a result of the May municipal elections, it has also failed to exploit its improved position. The general movement seems to be that of a gradual downward decline, which is slow enough, however, that the Government's stability is not likely to be threatened before the 1970 elections. He estimated the odds as considerably better than even that the Government will survive through the 1970 elections. Such a survival he saw as representing tremendous psychological value to the country and the population.

Among the various elements, the military is strongly pro-Balaguer. The personal ambitions of certain officers are the source of some conflicts; and General Wessin supporters still exist but their numbers are not increasing. President Balaguer considers Wessin's support as static. The opposition to the Government continues to be flat-out and thorough, but also uncoordinated and ineffective. The PRD has been expanding its contacts with communist-led and Wessin forces. Although the PRD under its present radical leadership will continue to seek issues on which to unify the opposition to Balaguer, no such issues exist as yet. Overall opposition is disunited and weak.

The Social Christians, who were strong in the recent elections, are under pressure from their younger elements to begin organizing for 1970 and to undertake across the board opposition to the government.

The Communist Party continues in the disarray shown over the last two and one half years. Although the communists have a limited terrorist capacity, they do not themselves constitute an effective political force.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 122, IRG/ARA Minutes Aug. 17–Oct. 16, 1968. Secret. The time, location, and a full list of participants have not been determined; however, IRG meetings were routinely attended by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and other representatives from ARA, AID, DOD, and the White House.

On the right, Wessin has no chance in electoral terms. Balaguer may permit him to return soon in order to speed the process of deflating his electoral campaign which enjoys little support. Other right wing elements are implacably anti-Balaguer.

The economic situation is neither good nor bad. The effects of this year's drought are being overcome and agricultural production should rise about 6%. The overall economic growth rate in '69 should be between 5 and 6%, and in 1972 should also attain 6%. The latter estimate is largely based on a \$150 million ferro-nickel investment by Falconbridge of Canada which should come on stream in 1972 and provide significant foreign exchange relief to the economy. The years 1970-71 are the difficult ones, with a particularly heavy debt service burden also emerging in 1969.

The general investment climate is unstable largely due to the force of the protectionist spirit of those influencing the President. Should the Dominican Republic pursue enlightened policies in 1970-71, there is a fair chance of a 5-6% growth rate. No one should underestimate, said Ambassador Crimmins, the economic incompetence of the Government. It is oriented to the past and has no concept of the development process. It has to be pushed and hauled to make intelligent decisions.

However, even though Balaguer is not too enlightened, both we and the Dominican Republic owe him much. Taking into account the difference in the outlook today and that of September 1966, much of the improvement must be credited to Balaguer. His government's conduct has been essentially democratic.

With regard to the future, the Ambassador felt that Balaguer is moving toward a decision to run again for the usual reasons that incumbents find compelling. Although his decision is not yet final, he is moving in this direction.

A second Balaguer term, according to the Ambassador, would jeopardize our hopes for real economic development because of his lack of instinct for and knowledge of the measures required for development. Balaguer will not announce any decision before early 1970. We can expect however, if his decision is made earlier, it will be reflected in exacerbation of our running battles with him in development areas. In Balaguer's absence Augusto Larra would be the likely Reformista candidate. Wessin has no chance of winning. On the left, it is still not clear whether the PRD would fill the candidacy or who it might be. Although predictions on this are risky, Bosch is not likely to run. Garcia Godoy is trying to form a coalition but this is a hard thing to pull off. He would have problems with the military and with the right. The 1970 elections are still too close to 1965 for us to witness the normal play of political forces in the Dominican Republic. The '65 tensions will probably not be dissolved before the 1974 elections.

The problems we will face in 1969 will derive partly from the impending elections and partly from what he described as the “incredible belief” of the Dominicans that the USG has a voice in every political act in the country. Even if our stance in the elections were totally neutral, this fact would not be believed by the Dominicans. This in itself constitutes a problem.

Ambassador Crimmins then answered several questions. He identified the Mayor of Santo Domingo as a possible new face in politics and Antonio Guzman of the PRD as a better prospect than most as a candidate. He noted that a Balaguer decision to run might be the issue over which the right and left could unite. It would certainly produce an immediate increase of conspiratorial action from both the left and right. Balaguer’s chances of surviving such conspiracy, he said, were slightly better than even. His second term, however, would be plagued by continued efforts to overthrow him and his administration.

There is growing awareness within the Catholic Church of the need for structural change, but the conservative majority still holds back the young liberals. It is still a strong influence in the Campo, where it is partly Social Christian oriented and partly conservative.

Regarding the military, he thought it would intervene if Bosch were elected but probably would not, at least initially, should Garcia Godoy be elected.

He noted the unique Dominican sensitivity to U.S. domestic politics, particularly within the PRD. A Nixon election might give the PRD a feeling that there is no hope to overcome the conservative forces in the Dominican Republic, allied with those of the U.S., and therefore move it to take some drastic action. At this point, however, it is incapable of sufficient violence to overthrow the Government.

For the 1970–74 period, he felt there are some leaders in the center and center left factors who could provide adequate leadership despite the serious lack of human resources.

The National University is in terrible shape, with a low level of competence and continuing political turmoil. The best prospect at this time for U.S. help to the universities lies with the Catholic University of Santiago.

## 219. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Santo Domingo, October 19, 1968, 1840Z.

4014. Depart pass to White House. Subj: Political Situation—Deflation of Coup Rumors in DomRep. Ref: SD-4001.<sup>2</sup>

1. As reported reftel, Pres Balaguer's radio-TV address to nation last night came against backdrop of some political uneasiness and mounting wave rumors of possible military coups, etc. (FYI. During afternoon Amb spoke personally with Pres<sup>3</sup> so as to dispel any doubts he might harbor as to continued USG sympathy and support for GODR. He found Pres seemingly calm, confident and whimsically relaxed about "rumor factory" which he said was currently enjoying "abundant output.")

2. Toward end of radio-TV address which was largely devoted economic subjects, Pres turned to what he termed "alarmist rumors and sensational stories" of last few days. He advised listeners to close ears to these rumors which were only designed generate uneasiness and unrest. With considerable fervor Pres stated political situation "is of absolute stability" and said were any real problem to appear GODR would be first to denounce same before national public opinion. Pres said sarcastically that if stability of nation were to depend upon such false and baseless rumors then would be better once and for all convert country into cattle pasture.

3. Country team perceives no solid basis for affording credence to rumors of impending military coup here. SecState for Armed Forces has privately deplored action of military in Peru and Panama. Army C/S Brig Gen Perez Guillen has publicly ridiculed idea of DomRep Armed Forces move against govt as reported SD-4001 para 3-A. Air Force C/S Brig Gen Lluberes Montas was quoted publicly as denying any pertinence here of Peru and Panama coups and privately in long conversation on night Oct 18 he assured DCM with considerable fervor that no atmosphere exists for military coup and that he would be first to defend Balaguer govt against any such move by Wessin y Wessin or others. Also pertinent, we believe, that recent [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] contact with some long-established and reliable

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 2 DOM REP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT for POLAD.

<sup>2</sup> Dated October 18. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

observers local scene reveal latter to be unimpressed by current crop coup rumors.

4. On balance, and taking into account report we have received from Consulate Santiago of calm situation there, recommend depart recognize some sensational press treatment this subject unavoidable but that as of now objective basis for accepting or becoming alarmed by current rumors is difficult to perceive.

**Crimmins**

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## **220. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

A-868

Santo Domingo, December 8, 1968.

### **SUBJECT**

Current Political Assessment of the Dominican Republic With Short-Term and Middle-Term Outlook

### **REF**

SD-3410, 3658, 4001<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

### **SUMMARY**

The Embassy estimates that unless President Balaguer is assassinated or unless there is a combination of other major negative contingencies, such as a Cuban-supported return of Caamaño or a Communist takeover in Haiti, the Constitutional Government will not face a direct and immediate threat to its survival in the short run, i.e., before the change of Administrations in the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP. Secret. Drafted by Crimmins and officers of the Political and Economic sections of the Embassy. Copies were sent to Madrid, Port-Au-Prince, Santiago de los Caballeros, USCINCSO for POLAD, USCINCLANT for POLAD, COMCARIBSEAFRON, and COMSECONDFLT.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3410 is Document 217; telegrams 3658, September 12, and 4001, October 18, are not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP)

For the longer run, i.e., through June 1969, the Embassy—again assuming the absence of major negative contingencies—concludes that Balaguer will be capable of sustaining his position but with some progressive loss of authority and capacity to govern effectively. We judge it probable that Balaguer, under the pressure of many factors which are identified and analyzed in the body of this assessment, will find it necessary to announce his decision on reelection before the end of the period. We further estimate that, were he to make a decision for reelection, the fragility of the situation would increase but that, with the expected support from the military to whom he would probably be obliged to resort increasingly, he would still be able to maintain himself in power.

[Omitted here are an Introduction and sections entitled “Trends and Developments Since Last Assessment” and “Current Pressures and Present Position of Political Forces.”]

## 9. Outlook

A. A number of the chronic problems cited in the “Trends and Developments” section of this report will continue to plague the government during both the short and middle-term periods covered by the assessment. While a number of the “tactical” problems existing in mid-August have been handled and their potentially disturbing effects dissipated, a number of new issues have arisen or are beginning to emerge which pose longer-term implications adverse to the political health of the country. Pre-eminent among these is the election/reelection issue and the manner in which it is beginning to relate to many of the old and new sensitive political questions.

B. In the short-term period, i.e. to January 20, 1969, the usual year-end factors will play their part in adding grist to the rumor mill, creating uneasiness and disaffection in certain sectors and adding to the vague reports that circulate from a variety of sources that there is abroad a kind of anti-government psychosis of such an ill-defined character that it is impossible to pinpoint its causes or evaluate their impact or importance. Among these year-end factors are the uncertainty always caused by the possibility—and rumors of the possibility—of changes in the Cabinet and in the upper ranks of the military at the beginning of the new year, and the opportunity for agitation represented by the still unsettled issue of the Christmas bonus for government workers. These standard, even seasonal, negative political factors tending to exert short-run pressures on the government are not any greater than in previous Decembers except in the sense that this is the third year that they have operated. Moreover, their effect is balanced to some degree by the current disarray of the PRD—whose participation would be critical to any serious exploitation of the negative seasonal factors—and that party’s probable need for time to digest

whatever decisions come out of the meeting with Bosch at Benidorm. In the short-run, therefore, and on the basis of the analysis appearing in the previous sections of this assessment, the Embassy continues to be of the opinion that there is no direct and immediate threat to the survival of the constitutional government. This short-term assessment would have to be modified should one or more of the following events occur:

(1) The return of Caamaño as the leader of a Cuban-supported attempt against the Dominican government accompanied by the simultaneous outbreak of terrorism and/or urban and rural guerrilla activity by the extreme left. The Embassy anticipates that in this event, the evidence for which is thin, the reaction of the government and the military would be prompt and at least reasonably effective and that such a development would not in and of itself topple the government.

(2) The illegal return of Wessin. In this event, and the odds are against its occurring, we estimate, the Embassy believes that the effects of such entry would be containable in the short term.

(3) The adoption by the PRD as a result of the meeting in Benidorm of an aggressively radical line calling for direct and violent action against the government through street demonstrations, strikes etc., with the cooperation of Communist elements. The Embassy believes that such a development, although manageable, would be harder to deal with than would Caamaño, but it doubts that the PRD will adopt this course and, even if it did, that it would have time to elaborate and put such a plan into operation within the six-week period of time being considered.

(4) A wave of concentrated, continuous terrorist attacks by the extreme left (perhaps abetted independently by the extreme right, for its own purposes), directed especially at the security forces. Because of the probability of strong, uncontrollable, relatively indiscriminating reactions by the security forces, a very tense situation could develop. Thus far we have no evidence of such a program, nor do we believe that the extreme left has the will or the cohesion to carry it out. If, contrary to our expectations, it were to happen, we believe that there is a better than even chance that the government would survive it in the short run.

(5) A Communist-oriented takeover in Haiti. This would create apprehension and confusion here, and, if it were accompanied by Communist terrorism or guerrilla attack on this side of the island, the consequences would be serious but still, in our estimate, manageable. (Other developments in Haiti, such as chaos following the disappearance of Duvalier, would have unsettling but less grave repercussions in the Dominican Republic.)

(6) The assassination of Balaguer. Should this occur (and the usual rumors continue) all bets would be off and an entirely new and dangerous political situation would be created.

C. It will be noted that, except in the case of the last, we estimate that any single one of the possible major "special" contingencies can be handled, although with varying degrees of difficulty, by the government. If they were to occur in combination, the survivability of the government would come into considerably more serious question.

D. Having looked at the period up to January 20, 1969 and having concluded that no direct and immediate danger of the government's overthrow exists (barring the unforeseen developments outlined immediately above), the question arises whether that same assessment is valid for the middle term, i.e. up to June 30, 1969. It is probable that some of the factors now in play or emerging will have assumed greater importance by the time that period is over. Among these are the impact of a repatriated Wessin on the political scene; a probable increase in activity on the part of certain groups of the extreme left; the increased activity of the PRD and the other opposition parties, including Garcia Godoy; the growing fatigue, literal and figurative, of the government and its chief and the consequent rise in irritation and resentment caused by inept decisions, particularly in the economic sector; and, looming over all, the election/re-election issue with its broad impact. Against these factors must be balanced the demonstrated ability of Balaguer to postpone any direct and meaningful confrontation through the utilization of a broad range of political and security measures, continuing support of the Constitutional Government by the USG, with its important economic and political/psychological effects, and the probable moderate improvement in the economy, unless external resources are denied or seriously reduced, in which case the consequences would extend well beyond the economic sector.

E. Again barring major negative contingencies of the type listed for the short-term period, the Embassy estimates that Balaguer will be capable, through June 1969, of sustaining his position but with some progressive loss of authority and capacity to govern effectively. The pressures on Balaguer to make up his mind on re-election will increase significantly, and the Embassy believes it probable that Balaguer will find it necessary to make and announce a definitive decision before June 30, 1969, not only because of the mounting clamor from the opposition but also for the sake of his own party. The effects of such a decision, the Embassy believes, would be less unsettling if Balaguer were to opt for non-re-election. Should he decide to run again, the situation would become considerably more fragile but, with the expected support of the military to whom he would probably be obliged to resort increasingly, Balaguer, we judge, would still be able to survive.

JHC



**221. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 18, 1968.

SUBJECT

Dominican Government Believed Facing No Serious Threat

A recent upsurge of rumors has resulted in some heightening of political tensions in the Dominican Republic. A meeting in Spain between former President Bosch and a commission from his opposition PRD, President Balaguer's announcement that ex-General Wessin may return early in 1969, and the continued uncertainty regarding the whereabouts of Constitutionalist leader Caamano, have contributed to the more uncertain atmosphere. However, we believe that President Balaguer has maintained his relatively strong position and that his constitutional government will not face a direct and immediate threat to its survival in the short term.

We also conclude that Balaguer will be capable of sustaining his position through June 1969, but probably with some creeping loss of authority and capacity to govern effectively. The President may find it necessary to announce his decision on reelection before the end of this period. (National elections are scheduled for May 1970.) Should he decide to seek reelection, the fragility of the political situation would increase. However, we estimate that, with anticipated continuing military support, he would still be able to maintain himself in power.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by John J. Youle on December 17 and cleared by Long.

**222. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 31, 1968, 10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

PL 480 Program for the Dominican Republic

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud are requesting your authorization to negotiate a \$9.6 million PL 480 agreement with the Dominican Republic—for wheat, soybean oil, tallow, and tobacco. (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> Covey Oliver urges your approval, citing important political arguments for prompt action to support President Balaguer. (Tab C)<sup>3</sup> Charlie Zwick recommends deferral until the new Administration takes office. (Tab A)<sup>4</sup>

Zwick's memorandum stresses:

—less than satisfactory self-help performance under last year's Assistance package (\$16 million supporting assistance plus \$14 million PL 480);<sup>5</sup>

—current negotiations aimed at improving performance before the final \$8 million of the Supporting Assistance Loan is released;

—desirability of "leaving something tangible for the new Administration to demonstrate continued U.S. support for the Balaguer Government."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Attached, but not printed is Tab B, a December 13 memorandum to President Johnson from Gaud and Freeman who wrote that P.L. 480 assistance was needed "(1) to ease the Dominican Republic's balance of payment deficit; (2) to generate local currency to finance increased investments in the agricultural sector; and (3) to supplement local production which has not fully regained its normal level due to damage caused by the severe 1967-68 drought." They also stated that the Departments of State and the Treasury concurred in their recommendation to negotiate the P.L. 480 agreement.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached and not found.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is Tab A, a December 27 memorandum to President Johnson from Bureau of the Budget Director Zwick.

<sup>5</sup> The memorandum cited as examples of "unsatisfactory performance" on the part of the Dominican Republic in 1967: erratic budget allocations for agricultural development agencies, price support programs not expanded and no action taken to divest the Agricultural Bank of its non-banking functions, and the unwillingness of the Dominican Republic Government to increase funding for education and health.

Zwick agrees the \$9 million is needed for balance of payments support—but fears that authorization now will take the pressure off for better performance on the Supporting Assistance Loan.<sup>6</sup>

Ambassador Crimmins and Covey Oliver argue that:

—Balaguer has been counting since September on this PL 480 package in explaining publicly his tight balance of payments program for 1969.

—Further delay would be interpreted by both Balaguer and his opposition as a deliberate U.S. decision to draw back from full support for his government.

—Political storm clouds have been gathering in the Dominican Republic as we approach the Presidential election—plotting against Balaguer has been growing. The political climate will be especially volatile during the period of transition in the U.S.

—Steady U.S. support for Balaguer has been one of his few solid bases; his chances of completing the constitutional term are relatively favorable so long as our support is unquestioned;

—Balaguer is *more* likely to be able to improve performance under the Supporting Assistance loan if he is reassured that PL 480 support will be forthcoming.

Charlie Zwick says that *if* you wish to take more fully into account the political judgment of Oliver and Crimmins, he would then recommend authorization *with subsequent releases of food contingent on better self-help performance*.

He would release the food in three equal installments contingent on the meeting of special commitments which parallel those involved in the Supporting Assistance loan.

I believe that a more flexible version of this option would meet the minimum political requirement—that we demonstrate prompt, continued support for Balaguer's program. Ambassador Crimmins should have enough negotiating leeway to insure that this objective is met. Specifying now the number or size of the installments, or tying the self-help criteria rigidly to other loans, would not be wise. These are issues better left to the negotiation.

I recommend that you approve negotiation of this PL 480 agreement as recommended in the Freeman/Gaud memorandum, with the

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<sup>6</sup> Zwick's memorandum explained that \$8 million in supporting assistance was withheld because of the Dominican Republic Government's less than satisfactory performance under the previous year's assistance package, and that it therefore made little economic sense to go forward with the P.L. 480 agreement since the two forms of assistance were equivalent resources. In concluding Zwick wrote: "I cannot judge whether or not a delay in authorizing this P.L. 480 agreement would seriously influence the decisions or capability of anyone planning to overthrow Balaguer. But in the absence of explicit evidence I recommend deferral of this agreement. This course would enable the new Administration to demonstrate continuity of policy, and it would put some teeth into our self-help requirements."

additional stipulation that commodities be released in installments after special reviews of Dominican performance.

**Walt**

Approve, make releases in installments contingent on special performance reviews<sup>7</sup>

Approve, without special installment review procedure

Defer to New Administration

Disapprove

Call me

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<sup>7</sup> This option is checked.

# Cuba

## 223. Editorial Note

On January 6, 1964, spokesmen for Leyland Motors Ltd. in the United Kingdom and the Cuban Government in Havana announced the conclusion of a contract for the sale of 400 passenger buses and spare parts, for approximately \$11 million, to be delivered to Cuba over the course of the year on 5-year credit terms, with an option for Cuba to buy 1,000 more.

During a telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy on January 7, President Johnson asked about British trade with Cuba and whether President Kennedy had objected to it in his meetings with the British Prime Minister. Bundy replied, "Well, I think you better say we raised it with them because they would be in position to say no formal objection was made, and the reason, as I say, was that they would have come back, O.K. you sell wheat [the United States had sold wheat to the Soviet Union in 1963], what the hell you talking about?" After a long pause, Johnson asked, "Well, what is the difference?" Bundy replied: "We maintain that Cuba should be isolated because it's exporting subversion. They would maintain that Cuba is no worse than the Soviet Union and that we greatly exaggerate this, and in their public, they'd be right. I mean that's their politics. The British man on the street thinks we've got a neurosis on Cuba. He's not like the German who's willing to play it our way." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, January 7, 1964, 12:16 p.m., Tape F64.03, Side B, PNO 6)

In a meeting the following day, Director of Central Intelligence McCone briefed the President on the status of Cuban economic developments, among a number of other subjects. He reviewed with the President Current Intelligence Memorandum SC No. 03151/64, dated January 8, which included the following report: "Cuban sugar and tobacco exports for more than a year have been building up a favorable hard currency surplus for Cuban trade with Western European countries and Japan. The current balance is probably near \$100 million, the highest level since 1960."

McCone also reviewed with the President reports of increasing Spanish exports, British and Dutch tire and bus parts sales, and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. (Current Intelligence Memorandum No. 03151/64, January 8; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, Folder 7, DCI Mtgs with the Pres., Jan-Apr 1964)

**224. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 9, 1964.

SUBJECT

Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

- (1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;
- (2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and
- (3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced, but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Covert Program, 1/64-6/65. Secret; Eyes Only.

position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

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## 225. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 18, 1964.

### SUBJECT

Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964 at the White House

[Omitted here is discussion of a proposed Geneva Conference statement.]

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the Geneva Conference statement and Panama.]

c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the U.S. to be doing. He thought they were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he understood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these considerations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this program and had the same doubts

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Acting Director of CIA. The meeting was scheduled to begin at 3:15 p.m. The President joined the meeting in progress and left at 4:15 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A handwritten notation at the top of the first page reads: "Noted by DCI on 1 Feb 1964. WELder." Elder was Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence.

the President did. McNamara said that he too had never been in favor of this program and questioned our participation. I stated that while this program was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented and that the program was designed in part for the specific purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activities in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no control. I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with Castro. I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor and this point was not developed further. General Taylor noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of this type since to completely desist would eventually lead Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The President then directed that he wanted a complete review of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba. He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions they might have.

[Omitted here is discussion of South Vietnam and various political and policy matters.]



**226. Paper Prepared in the U.S. Government<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

**REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF  
COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA****I. The Current Situation in Cuba**

During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt the downward curve. Hurricane Flora intensified Cuba's economic problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control. Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a dupe of Soviet policy.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to stop acts of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans disillusioned with his regime.

During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provide a much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Castro-type armed uprisings

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Covert Program, 1/64–6/65. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the paper, but an April 6 memorandum from Joseph W. Scott to U. Alexis Johnson indicates it was prepared by Desmond FitzGerald, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency; John H. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State; and Joseph Califano, Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for Cuban Affairs, in response to a request by McGeorge Bundy. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records) According to Scott's memorandum the paper was drafted on January 24.

throughout Latin America failed to disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to Venezuela. These internal and international trends and developments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.

Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have given the Castro regime an important political-psychological lift. They are:

1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currency reserves from about \$20 million to almost \$100 million during the year.

2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed on January 11, and the Khrushchev assurances of January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to maintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sugar prices.<sup>2</sup> The protocol calls for Cuban-Soviet trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.

3. The distinct possibility that the United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing pressures from Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The British bus deal, with payment spread over a five-year period, is an important political and psychological triumph for Castro. Its erosive effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already clear.

4. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castroite activities. In addition, Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.

5. The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's arm and the potency of his doctrine.

These recent developments have provided the upward political and psychological thrust Castro's regime badly needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major United States effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy. Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime is much improved over that of three or four months ago.

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<sup>2</sup> Castro paid an unofficial visit to the Soviet Union January 13-22, at the end of which Khrushchev announced that the two nations had concluded a trade agreement that would guarantee Cuban income against fluctuations in world sugar prices.

## II. Current U.S. Policy and Programs

The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the present government in Cuba by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting maximum pressure through all means short of the use of military force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the base for subversion in the Hemisphere; and (c) assist in convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse.

In order to create the optimum situation just described, we have been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These comprise:

### *A. The economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from the free world*

1. *Denial of free-world markets and sources of supply to Cuba:* We have undertaken a variety of overt and covert activities designed to reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to its economy. Proposals for expanding and intensifying these activities are now being presented. The execution of these additional measures depends basically on a decision to incur the considerable political costs and risks that are entailed.

2. *The reduction of free-world shipping in the Cuba trade:* We have maintained diplomatic pressure on free-world nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in the Cuba trade (NSAM 220, as amended).<sup>3</sup> To the same general end, we have employed existing legislation, and the threat of additional legislation, restricting economic and military assistance to countries with ships in the Cuba trade.

3. *The reduction of free world, and the containment of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba:* We have maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legislation denying assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on free-world countries to deny their facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such airlines.

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<sup>3</sup> National Security Action Memorandum No. 220 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Document 277.

4. *The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations with Cuba:* As opportunity has offered, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to prevent the establishment of such relations with Cuba.

5. *Efforts to undermine the Castro image abroad and to frustrate Cuban attempts to enhance that image:* By means of diplomatic, propaganda and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro regime.

#### *B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion*

1. *Within Cuba:* As indicated above, all our efforts to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended to weaken the Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.

##### *2. Outside Cuba:*

a. *Multilateral:* We have sought, through the OAS, to obtain general Latin American recognition of the seriousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the transfer of funds and propaganda. At the present time, we intend to expand and intensify this effort through actions to be taken by the OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS, we have made special efforts with the Central American countries and Panama to have them tighten controls on the activities and movement of subversives, to develop inland and inshore surveillance capabilities, to create effective intelligence organizations and to establish a system of intelligence exchange.

b. *Bilateral:* Through training, material assistance and exchange of intelligence, we have worked to improve the internal security capabilities of individual countries.

c. *Unilateral:* In addition to multilateral and bilateral measures, we have continued to maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity of Cuba, to improve our own communications systems and to develop our own intelligence capabilities against subversive activities.

#### *C. The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba*

We have maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to continue troop withdrawals and we have warned the Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprising.

#### *D. The collection of intelligence*

We have maintained and improved our overt and covert collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirements but also operational requirements connected with our covert activities within

Cuba. We have maintained periodic high-level overflights supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against interference with these flights.

*E. Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro Regime*

A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our program appears in Section III.

As stated above, all these courses of action interact and are interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our overt measures of economic pressure. Both types of activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection not only in the popular mass but particularly in the power centers of the regime. This disaffection enhances our ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in the military and other power centers and to develop intelligence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities. By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the others and thus compromises the entire program.

Through 1963, these courses of action were having a measurable positive impact. We are now confronted, however, by a series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert operations particularly timely and important.

### III. Concept of the Covert Action Program

The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove the Castro/Communists from the regime and to eliminate the entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S. is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's regime at home and to prevent him from achieving his ambitions in Latin America, we set the time frame for this program at about eighteen months from June 1963.

As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily on a sustained and intensive effort in other sec-

tors, particularly the overt economic denial and political isolation programs, by all elements of the United States Government. Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there is to be any hope of accomplishing the overall mission.

CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the following interdependent courses of action:

1. *Covert collection of intelligence* to meet U.S. national security requirements and to support current and planned covert operations. It should be noted that clandestine maritime operations are an integral part of intelligence collection.

2. *Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage* and other forms of active and passive resistance against the regime.

3. *Economic denial actions* in support of government-wide overt official U.S. economic isolation measures.

4. *Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban armed forces and other power centers of the regime* to encourage these elements to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist factions. CIA is identifying, contacting and attempting to establish channels of communication with these individuals.

5. *General sabotage and harassment* as an economic weapon and as a stimulus to internal resistance. As an economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and support the overall economic denial program by damaging economically important installations and to add to Castro's economic problems by forcing him to divert money, manpower and resources from economic to internal security activities. As a stimulus to resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence and capability of organized resistance against the regime. To the extent that these operations are successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of the regime to militant action. It is recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe that the cumulative psychological and political impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our mission.

6. *Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban exile groups.* These operations are intended to provide a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and expanding our covert capability and a means of taking advantage of untapped political and resistance resources of the exile community. The program now includes two autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is strengthened by the facts that:

They are led by men whose prominence and status in the Cuban exile community makes plausible their access to funds, equipment and manpower quite independent of the U.S.;

Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of U.S. territory;  
Both have natural, willing allies in power in several Latin American countries;

Both are Cuban and employ Cuba nationals exclusively;

Every item of financial and logistic support has been handled in a manner as to provide maximum protection against proof of CIA or U.S. participation;

The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen the will to resist by increasing the tempo of subversion and sabotage largely maintained until now by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight from the coastline to the interior of Cuba;

The disadvantage of our autonomous operations is that it is necessary to accept a lower order of efficiency and control than would be considered acceptable in CIA-run operations.

Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items (1) and (2) are in train and no policy problems regarding them are expected. Item (3) is the subject of another paper which is being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4) is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action. Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the inception of the program and is the primary subject of this paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5). These latter two items are discussed in more detail in Section V below:

#### IV. The Sabotage Program in Retrospect

We know of at least 80 acts of internal sabotage and 60 armed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors, and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the commencement of our raiding activity), we believe that clearer light is shed on the effects of our harassment program by the statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself.

Since 1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been attempted.<sup>4</sup> All were successful. There was substantial damage to the target; all par-

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<sup>4</sup> Annex I contains a brief review of these operations. [Footnote in the source text. Annex I is attached but not printed.]

ticipants were safely recovered and the plausible deniability of the operations was not compromised.

The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

[Here follows a detailed discussion of the results of the covert program.]

#### V. Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations

Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all interested parties to and observers of U.S./Cuban relations. The cessation of these raids, however disclaimable by the U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be interpreted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of "coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Communist Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in motion which could well lead the countries of Latin America to draw their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in Latin America already threatened by Castroites in their own countries are likely to be subjected to even stronger domestic pressures.

As this belief spreads, Western European and other free world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the economic and political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economic effect would be the release into normal economic activity of manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.

Finally, and most important, this development in time is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and particularly its militant and



articulate elements would be acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we can expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political connections within the U.S.

In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct successful sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations, either in quantity or quality.

If sabotage and harassment operations were to be terminated for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage. Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean where the autonomous groups have been most active.

#### VI. The Residual Program

In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially overt courses of action which are already operating but which can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate cooperation from our allies.

##### *A. Action against free-world economic ties with Cuba*

Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty that, under present circumstances, our economic pressures will be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself bring down the Castro government, at least as long as the So-

viets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop. The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can never have assurance that a foreign government cooperating in the economic program will not pull out and virtually collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program would be to deliver the fate of our policy into the uncertain hands of governments which do not share our convictions and sense of priority with respect to Cuba.

#### *B. OAS Action*

As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a series of measures which we would seek in the OAS. It should be noted that the atmosphere for OAS adoption of strong measures has deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.

The measures which we have been studying include:

##### *1. A break in diplomatic relations*

The principal effects of this measure, which would mean action by five countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatic evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban regime subversive facilities offered by its remaining missions in Latin America. The measure would meet heavy resistance from Mexico, Chile and particularly Brazil.

##### *2. A break in economic relations*

Although this would have little practical effect economically, it would have some utility as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba.

##### *3. A break in air and surface communications*

Over time this would lead to a reduction in the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. It would be useful as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On the negative side it would mean the temporary loss of intelligence facilities and would have an adverse effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an existing escape route for persons inside Cuba.

##### *4. Approval for cooperative surveillance measures against movement of arms and men*

The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be an authorization for the use of force in connection with the movement of arms and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority

for such use was estimated to be less than even before the events in Panama and the prospects have diminished since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and internationally. At the present time, it appears that the surveillance system which might be authorized by the OAS would involve the use of force only in the territorial waters of the countries for which the offending shipments are destined. Thus the question of OAS authorization for the use of force on the high seas will not arise.

5. *Condemnation of the Castro regime*

This would be a *pro forma* action, with only limited psychological force.

6. *Reaffirmation of previous OAS measures on controlling Cuban-based and supported subversion*

This would be of value as a means of reinforcing a general effort in this sector (see C below). It is, however, a purely defensive measure.

In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress. The actions, however, are primarily psychological and defensive.

C. *Increased efforts against subversion*

We can probably increase and expand our multilateral, bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely defensive and external to Cuba. No certain results can be guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to be strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting against increasing odds.

D. *Increased psychological and propaganda efforts*

We can intensify our measures in this sector, including major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such efforts is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive only if there were credible evidence that our words were being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

## VII. Conclusion

The residual program set out above is substantially weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/Communist regime, which have been by no means certain even under the present program, would be very measurably diminished under the residual program. The elimination of the core of the present covert program, especially if accompa-

nied by a rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of economic pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the need to examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or accommodation.

#### VIII. Recommendation

That the covert program be continued in at least its present form and scope.

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### 227. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 6, 1964.

#### SUBJECT

Free-World Economic Ties with Cuba

In response to NSAM 274 of December 20, 1963 (attached) which was issued as a result of the meeting on Cuba which you conducted on December 19,<sup>2</sup> the Department of State, with the collaboration of the Department of Commerce and the Central Intelligence Agency, has prepared the attached study on free-world economic ties with Cuba.

#### *Discussion*

##### 1. *Organization of Study.*

The study is presented in two parts. Part One contains a summary view of current free-world economic relations with Cuba, a brief statement of our efforts to date to restrict and reduce those relations and the results of those efforts, a discussion of the prospects of success of additional efforts, and recommendations for further measures. Part Two contains individual papers setting out, in essentially the same format as Part One, the details of the economic relations between Cuba and the twelve free-world countries having the most important trade and transportation ties with the island.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Free World Economic Ties with Cuba. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> NSAM No. 274 was attached but is not printed. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Document 389. For an account of the December 19 meeting, see *ibid.*, Document 388.

## 2. *Principal Findings*

(a) *Current level of economic ties*: Fragmentary data for 1963 indicate that free-world trade with Cuba increased perhaps as much as \$50–75 million over 1962, to a total of \$250–\$320 million. The increase reflects larger free-world purchases of sugar at higher prices because of the world sugar shortage. There appears to have been little or no increase in free-world exports to Cuba. Calls by free-world vessels in Cuba fell 60 percent in 1963, with British and Lebanese ships now predominating. Aviation ties with Cuba were sharply reduced in 1963, with Spanish activity running counter to the general trend.

(b) *Mixed results of efforts to prevent Cuban acquisition of US-origin and critical commodities*: Very small amounts of US-origin goods have slipped through. Some significant critical commodities of non-US origin have been denied, but substantial amounts of such items have in spite of our efforts been supplied.

(c) *Prospects in aviation and shipping*: There is a reasonable chance for a modest decrease in free-world shipping in 1964. Aviation ties will probably be cut back, but the conclusion of a US–USSR aviation agreement will reduce our leverage.

(d) *Basic consideration affecting trade*: On the Cuban *earnings* aspect of the problem, the world-wide shortage of sugar and increased sugar prices make it impracticable at the present time to do much in the way of shutting off Cuban sales of sugar to free-world buyers.

With these increased earnings, Cuba is now embarked on a major effort to acquire free-world goods, not only to meet present shortages but to provide the means for an upturn in its economy.

Our problem is thus not just reducing the present level but preventing such an upturn. However, this is going to be increasingly difficult as, with the increased foreign exchange reserves at its disposal, Cuba will be an increasingly attractive customer and, even where blocked from direct purchases from the free world, may be able indirectly to procure some goods through the Soviet Union. Also, of course, the Soviet Union can itself make up additional shortages in the Cuban economy, albeit at some additional cost to itself and with delays in delivery.

Thus, even if our efforts are fully successful the cutting off of free world sources of supply cannot be expected to have a decisive effect on the Cuban economy. As a whole, however, well-executed denial programs can seriously impair specific segments of the economy and should be able to prevent Cuba utilizing its increased sugar earnings to bring about any significant upturn. It is clear that, unless we make a major effort in this field, Cuba will increasingly be able to “normalize” its economic relations with other free-world countries and probably bring about an upturn in its economy.

(e) *Key importance of British:* The problems we have with the United Kingdom are representative of those we have with other free-world countries in that it is dependent on trade; needs Cuban sugar; does not share our assessment of the Cuban threat; and justifies its position by citing our own economic relations with the USSR. Because of their attitude, economic importance and special relationship with us, we need the cooperation of the British. The recent sale of buses has had and will have grave consequences for our denial program by undercutting our efforts with other countries.

(f) *The basic issue of political costs:* The effectiveness of our efforts to get the cooperation of any country depends on (1) the relative importance to the national interest of the objective of cutting off Cuban access to critical commodities and other objectives in the country; (2) the balance of negotiating advantage between the country and us; and (3) the degree of risk to other objectives we are prepared to accept in obtaining cooperation on Cuban trade. In short, how much political capital are we willing to expend?

(g) *Cooperation of American firms:* American firms have been cooperative and effective in putting pressure on associated foreign firms. While this technique might be expanded, it would involve problems of "extraterritoriality" with our Allies.

(h) *Improved intelligence reporting and investigation:* We have severe problems in obtaining timely intelligence in depth and in pursuing investigations because of the very nature of the trade in critical commodities and US-origin goods. Improvement in these sectors requires additional personnel, particularly if our present controls on American know-how are extended to all commodities produced with such know-how and destined for Cuba.

(i) *The fundamental question:* Our prospects for success in the economic conflict with Cuba ultimately depend on the priority to be assigned this effort—the results of which are at best uncertain—in the entire range of our relations with the free world.

*Recommendation:*

The recommendations on pages 20–22 of the study are feasible but will create frictions in our international relations. Failure to move on them will also pose problems.

Since carrying them out will involve several NSC agencies, I suggest that, before you move on them, you may wish to convene an NSC session to explore all the issues with the participating agencies, and particularly the political costs indicated in subparagraph (h) above.

**George W. Ball**

**Attachment<sup>3</sup>**

## FREE WORLD ECONOMIC TIES WITH CUBA

## V. Recommendations

(*Note:* Specific recommendations affecting individual countries are contained in the country tabs of Part Two of this study.)

1. That the President make known to all agencies of government that the restriction and reduction of free-world economic ties with Cuba is a basic national policy objective, and that conflicts between that objective and other policy objectives are to be decided in favor of the former whenever the national interest is not demonstrably jeopardized thereby, due regard being given to the need for judicious application of this principle.

2. That the President or the Secretary of State take an early opportunity to make a public declaration on Cuban policy, with special attention to the rationale of our policy on free-world economic ties with Cuba.

3. That the President and the Secretaries of the interested Departments make known privately to the leadership of the American business community our interest in their cooperation with their foreign associates in discouraging and preventing trade with Cuba, particularly in critical commodities, and that all levels of government make full use of this means of pressure on foreign firms.<sup>4</sup>

4. That diplomatic pressure at all levels be intensified on free-world countries maintaining economic ties with Cuba, with resort to Presidential intervention in the case of governments which present major problems.

5. That this pressure be based on a careful country-by-country evaluation of our bargaining position and be directed particularly against (a) trade in commodities we consider critical to the Cuban economy, and (b) long-term commitments for the purchase of Cuban sugar.

6. That a vigorous attempt, centered in Washington, be made to promote a multilateral agreement among countries trading with Cuba on restrictions acceptable to us on the sale of critical commodities to Cuba.

7. That the rationale of our economic policy toward Cuba be made known clearly in NATO forums and to Japan.

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<sup>3</sup> According to a January 14 memorandum from Mann to Ball, the study was prepared by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in collaboration with INR and the Bureau of Economic Affairs. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Cuba File) Printed here are pages 20–22 of the study.

<sup>4</sup> A handwritten note in the margin next to this paragraph reads: "EUR objects."

8. That the resolutions restricting or breaking Latin American economic ties which may result from OAS action on the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba include an appeal suggesting similar action by other free-world governments.

9. That Latin American governments which are well disposed and which represent major markets for free-world countries trading with Cuba be used to discourage such trade.

10. That, in administering existing legislation affecting free-world economic ties with Cuba, we make clear to countries concerned that they must take the action required by the law and that Presidential waivers cannot be relied upon to exempt them from the requirement.

11. That the desirability and feasibility of additional legislation or Executive regulations aimed at countries and firms trading with Cuba be kept under continuous review, the spirit of Recommendation 1 being borne in mind.

12. That existing controls on United States know-how be extended to cover all commodities produced with such know-how and destined for Cuba.

13. That the question of the extension of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to subsidiaries of American firms be carefully reviewed, within the spirit of Recommendation 1.

14. That covert activities directed against critical commodities destined for Cuba be intensified, with resort, if necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclusive buying.

15. That it be made known discreetly through the press that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records constitute a potential "blacklist."

16. That a group of responsible and qualified Cuban exile businessmen be formed to maintain pressure on firms trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

17. That the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, as chairman of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba, establish a working group to recommend measures that might be taken to reduce Cuban foreign exchange earnings from sugar when the current world shortage eases.

18. That steps be taken immediately to intensify intelligence collection, Foreign Service reporting, and Commerce investigative and enforcement actions with respect to free-world trade with Cuba.

19. That exceptions to existing personnel limitations be granted in connection with Recommendations 12 and 18.



**228. Editorial Note**

Shortly after noon on February 2, 1964, the U.S. Coast Guard observed four Cuban fishing vessels off East Key in the Dry Tortugas. When the vessels were ordered to anchor and stand by for boarding, they were found to be 1.5–1.9 miles offshore of East Key and thus within the territorial seas of the United States. Following consultation with Department of State officials, the Coast Guard seized the four Cuban fishing vessels, and the crews were detained in Key West. (Telegram 452 to Bern, February 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–4 CUBA–US) On February 3 Florida officials asked that the Cubans be turned over to them for possible prosecution under Florida law. According to telephone notes of a conversation of that same date between Assistant Secretary Mann and the President, Mann introduced the incident as a “little item” of interest, and the President’s only comment was: “Well, it doesn’t amount to much one way or the other, does it?” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, February 3, 1964, 7:10 p.m. Tape F64.10, Side A, PNO 5)

On February 4 the United States and Cuba traded protests over this incident, with Czech Embassy Counselor Zantovsky delivering a protest on behalf of Cuba to John H. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, and the Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, Emil Anton Stadelhofer, delivering a U.S. protest in Havana. The Cuban Government claimed that the vessels were operating in international and traditional fishing waters and demanded that the fishermen be released. The U.S. Government asserted that two of the captains of the fishing vessels admitted that they were fully aware of their presence in U.S. territorial waters and that Cuban vessels had not fished in the area of the Dry Tortugas during the preceding 5 years. Crimmins told Zantovsky that “the apparent deliberate nature of the violation” “disturbed and puzzled us.” (Memorandum of conversation, February 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–4 CUBA–US)

On February 6 Cuba cut off the water supply to the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo Bay. That night President Johnson alerted his top national security officials to the problem and scheduled a working group meeting for the next morning (see Document 229). Shortly before the meeting was to begin, Johnson asked Secretary of Defense McNamara what he knew about the water cutoff. McNamara replied: “Well, the only thing I know is I don’t think we can do nothing here, Mr. President. I just don’t believe we can allow them to turn off the water, and make no response other than handling these [fishing] crews

through the courts and sending them back to Cuba. We have a whole series of options open to us, it seems to me that ought to be the function of this working group, within an hour, to lay it out for you so you can make your choice."

Johnson asked, "Is there much we can do? I thought we'd done nearly everything on Cuba?" McNamara replied that "there are many things we can do." He also advised the President how the Cuban water could be replaced by wells, evaporators, and by water from a set of tanks and from water tanker ships. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, February 7, 1964, 9 a.m., Tape F64.11, Side A, PNO 6) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

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## 229. Notes on Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 7, 1964, 9 a.m.

Secretary Rusk Presided

Those present—Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, George Ball, Attorney General Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, Ralph Dungan, Ambassador Thompson, Jack Valenti, Bill Moyers, Bill Bundy, John McCone.

John McCone—Currently interrogating the seven juveniles on the boat. Have freed the juveniles but are still in custody of immigration authority.

Rusk—We ought to send the children back to Cuba now.

McCone—We are flying in a U-2 cover each day. No change in the photographs of two days ago.

Rusk—We have a stake in what we do with these fishing boats. We may set a precedence for our own boats in other waters. Suggests a stiff fine for the Captain plus seizure of the boat.

McNamara—In talking with Katzenbach, he favors leaving jurisdiction to Florida rather than the Federal courts.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Office of the President File, Panama. No classification marking. Drafted by Valenti. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. A note on the first page indicates that the President saw the notes.

McCone—Castro's broadcasts are mild not nearly so hysterical as was anticipated.

McGeorge Bundy—We ought to have a set of recommendations of what Florida can do. If we release all but the Captains, we will be in a stronger position.

Kennedy—Maybe it is better to release the Captains and keep the boats. This is the first time in five years Cuban boats have been in these waters.

Bundy—Do we want Castro to have his hand on our water? Should we ship in our own water?

McNamara—Yes, but it ought to be a voluntary thing and not something we do under pressure. It will cost us about \$2½ million a year to supply our own water. This will pose no problem for us.

McCone—I suggest that we go in now and cut the water pipes and say that we don't want Castro's water. We will supply our own water.

Rusk—That's an attractive idea. We need to reply on our own supply before Castro turns the water back on.

Bundy—That's good because if there is a desire on the part of Castro to escalate we cauterize that desire now.

Ball—Why not say that since the water company has failed to perform, we no longer have an obligation to hold to our contract. Therefore, we will supply our own water.

Rusk—Should we not take out some of our dependents quietly. Also, we ought to review the role of Cubans working on the base. We need to thin down the number of Cubans working on this base. If there is the slightest sign of sabotage, we must move very quickly to get rid of the Cubans.

McNamara—We can move dependents out quickly at any time. No need to do this now unless it is a military requirement or we want to put political pressure on Castro.

Bundy—If we begin to use our own water we ought to move deliberately in Florida.

Rusk—We don't accept the relationship between the boat arrest and turning off the water.

Kennedy—We don't know the motivation behind this.

Bundy—We know from interrogating the defectors that the Cubans were told to go to these waters to see if fish were running down there.

Unidentified Man—We are told that American boats were shrimp-ing in these waters while the Cubans were fishing for red snapper.

McNamara—Should we have someone in charge of getting all the facts in this expedition and assessing it? We need to know the full de-

scription of what they are doing, what they had in their boats, and everything about them.

Ball—I assume that someone has made a study of all the harassments that Castro can make against us in Guantanamo Bay.

Mann—We should move now to deny them the \$5 million in foreign exchange. These Cuban employees would not be able to take this money back to Cuba.

Bundy—But if we use our own water and then deny them the foreign exchange, this is another move upward that we are making.

Mann—I disagree. I think it is important to show them that we are not going to stand meekly by. The American people are tired of being pushed around.

McNamara—I think we should try to enforce arms embargo in Venezuela to keep Castro from shipping arms there.

Mann—This takes time and our prestige in Latin America is too important to wait and to come back simply with a “we don’t need the water” is weak. We don’t have to turn off any employment unless of sabotage. We can let them buy food and clothing on the base.

McNamara—It seems to me that the breaking of the water contract is the first step. After that, we have a whole series of alternatives.

Rusk—We have very little left that we can do in the way of legal actions against Cuba. The Venezuela arms cache is one thing we can do. If they provoke this boat incident in order to escalate, we want to keep the monkey on their back. So let us make it clear that we are going to stay in Guantanamo Bay.

Mann—I firmly believe we want to take the foreign exchange step.

Rusk—Perhaps we should start cutting back on employment though not in the third generation employees.

McNamara—But we must keep in mind if they couldn’t use their foreign exchange, Castro will keep them out of the post himself.

Bundy—Our basic problem is that we have used up all of our possible legal moves.

McNamara—I still think that we need to move swiftly on the Venezuela arms embargo.

Rusk—It would be very helpful on that if we could first clear up the Panama situation. We couldn’t do much on the Venezuela problem until Panama quiets down. This is the worst possible time for bilateral action.

Mann—I think it is not wise to merely respond by using our own water. We want to do much more than that. The water shipped in is not good water anyway. We need to say to the world that Castro got the worst of the bargain.

Rusk—I think that we can take the nettle out of Castro's hands by cutting the pipes. We could say "unless water is turned on in 24 hours we consider the contract broken and we will not be obligated."

Ball—There is some virtue in keeping this a civil breach of contract.

Taylor—The Joint Chiefs are of the opinion that this is the first step in a series of moves. Therefore, we want to now make moves of our own to strengthen our military.

Kennedy—(In response to a request from Rusk for his opinion) People merely don't understand the boat situation now. . . It is very confusing.

1. We need a clear statement of facts on the boats.
2. We need a clear statement on what are the legal facts.
3. We should release the men and handle this like a normal case—the way a regular case is handled.
4. Then when Castro turns on the water, we tell Castro we don't want the water.

Rusk—Let us put together a general scenario of the full picture of this situation. The boat, the law, and the precedence. (There was general agreement to give Castro 24 hours to turn on the water, and if he didn't, we would consider the contract breached and we would use our own water.)

Rusk—1. We should handle the boat, the Captains, and the seamen in accordance with legal procedures.

2. Unless we have assurance water will be turned on, we will consider the contract broken.

3. Difficulty is we have used up all of our unilateral initiatives. Request steps to take up the OAS in Venezuela arms situation.

4. There are other steps:

- a) Fire all Cuban employees
- b) Refuse to let the employees take dollars into Cuba. We would set up bloc accounts.

5. We merely need to know if the Cubans and the Russians have escalation in mind.

Taylor—There are three facts involved in military moves here:

1. Shipping
2. Armor from Fort Hood
3. Marines from Camp Pendleton

This kind of movement would alert the public and the world.

The President thinks that merely saying that we would use our own water is not at all a decisive and strong move. He wants this group

to go back and explore every possible move that we can make that is firm and decisive.<sup>2</sup>

Merely saying to the Cubans that we are going to use our own water is a mild slap on the wrist. He wants the Russian Ambassador informed so he can inform Khrushchev that Castro is an irrational man and we cannot long tolerate his actions. He also wants our allies informed.

The Attorney General left the meeting before it was over, and the President wants to get from him his recommendations.

The President wants every man in the room to spend the rest of this day in hard study in every possible action that is available to us, short of war.

He instructed this group to meet again at 4:00 p.m.

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<sup>2</sup> The President joined the meeting at about 10:05 a.m., according to the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

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## **230. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1964, 11:17 a.m.

President: Dick?

Russell: Yes sir.

President: These folks, I met with them this morning, after they'd had the night to think it over, and they haven't got any ideas, or any plans, or any program or anything, except Bobby Kennedy says turn the seamen loose and hold the boats. They want to put out a little statement that we'd give them 24 hours to turn the water on, and if we didn't, we'd supply our own water. I told them to hell with that, that was too innocuous to say that we would. I wanted to give them a list of alternatives, and for them to work on them during the day, and talk to the Joint Chiefs, which they had had a meeting, but they were fuzzy, they didn't know what to do. They thought we ought to move some

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell, Tape F64.11, Side B, PNO 2. No classification marking. President Johnson placed the call. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Marines from the west coast, and I told them to get back in that meeting. Then I told McNamara to call you this afternoon before our next meeting which will be at 4:30, about 3:00 to call you and go over with you the alternatives because I valued your judgment, and then your feel of the public pulse too, and the sentiment of the Congress and all of it wrapped up in one. And to exchange viewpoints with you, give you his viewpoint and get yours before he comes to the meeting. So he's got a little guts, he's the only one in the meeting that does, he and Tom Mann have a little.

Russell: I ain't as bent on bloodshed and warfare right now down there as some of the people probably are, Mr. President. Of course, I don't think we can afford just to take a cringing position.

President: No, what, we, best thing that I could suggest to them after they had met from 9 to 10 before I joined them. I suggested to them that they conceive every act that we could take and that we come back this afternoon and we say we had a contract with this company which has been nationalized by Castro that Castro has violated and in effect, cancelled, and therefore, we're going to make our base independent of Cuba. We're not, we can't rely on him for water, and we can't rely on him for anything else. We know that he's got 3,000 employees there and we're going to staff the thing ourselves, we're going to furnish our own water ourselves. And we're going to make this a base that's independent, and we not only intend to operate independently, but we intend to operate it period. And maybe anything else that they can think of that we could do. We go to searching ships, why that's an act of war, although we're trying to get Venezuela to ask us to come into their waters and inspect some of these shipments. We're trying to get the OAS to ask us to go in and do it, but that takes time and we can't do it today. And they're going to expect their government to react today. And my guess is the best reaction we can have today is to say that we're going to operate this base independent of him, we're going to furnish our own water. We're going to furnish our own people. We're going to cut him off about 7 or 8 million dollars a year in cash, that we're financing him. I told them to get ahold of Khrushchev and tell him that this man's playing a mighty dangerous game with his marbles. I told him to tell the British and tell the French that this is a serious matter with us and that they just want to keep siccing them on and egging them on, they're going to get our people in such shape that we're going to have a pretty difficult time operating with them. I told them let's not say in one hand we're going to cut down on our shipments to Castro and then ship him \$7 million a year ourselves in cash for his people, even though some of these people are good people. Let's just let them go on back to Cuba and find jobs over there. Let him feed them out of Russian money. Let's don't feed them ourselves and let them be taking this cash back every night. And I think those two steps—

Russell: The most important one of all is the manner in which that message will be relayed to Khrushchev. It should be made perfectly clear to him that this man is irrational and that there will be limits to our patience, and if he keeps on that we'll have no alternative but to take some very affirmative steps there. And that it would be very tragic if he were to support a man who would be doing things to us that he would not tolerate himself. Under the same conditions. So I hope they make that perfectly clear to him. Remind him of Hungary a little bit while they're talking to him.

President: Can you think of anything else that can be done? Does that appear to be enough to show them that we are firm and decisive, that we are going to supply our own water, that we are going to supply our own people, and we're getting rid of them?

Russell: I suppose so. There'll be some criticism of course.

President: Oh hell, *The New York Times*—

Russell: Oh, *The New York Times* will support you on that.

President: No, *The New York Times* don't want us to take a dime away from them. They think we ought to be feeding Cuba. So will *The Washington Post*.

Russell: No, I don't think they'll go that far.

President: Damn near it. They'll say you're being punitive, and you're penalizing these poor people. Now I don't think we ought to do it for that reason. I think the public reason ought to be that we've got to have our people and we got to be secure, and we got to be independent. And their people are not dependable if their water's not dependable.

Russell: There are about 2 or 3,000 of those people that live on our base there.

President: 500. And there're 3,000 that work.

Russell: Well, I'd make it perfectly clear, that those 500 if they wanted to sever their Cuban nationality, and not go back, that I'd keep them there, and they'd spend their money on the base.

President: Now can you think of anything else?

Russell: Not right now, no sir.

President: Does that appear to you to be enough?

Russell: Well—

President: We've got to be firm.

Russell: Not much more we can do. It's more in the way you say it and word it than anything else. It could be worded one way where it wouldn't sound like it'd be enough. It could be worded in another way and sound like it's a very firm statement. And I'm sure that your boys down there can do that.



President: What do you think we ought to tell them while we're waiting for these other things?

Russell: Tell them we're analyzing any steps that might be taken to fully protect American rights in the Guantanamo base.

President: Now you know they got them in that little 10 foot square cell down there and no bunks and all that kind of stuff. I told them I thought they ought to try to treat them decently and humanitarially, because I don't think that does us any good to have them locked up in a ten foot cell and giving them no food or no place to sleep. Stuff like that.

Russell: You mean with the ones that don't go back?

President: No, these 28 fishermen that Florida's got. I think it's a damn fool thing to pick them up. What they ought to have done, Coast Guard ought to tell them to get the hell out of here, and let them out instead of turning them over to Florida. They been fishing there up till the last few years, constantly, nobody bothered them.

Russell: It's too late now. You can't afford to turn them loose right now, look like you're surrendering to Castro's demands.

President: Yes, I think that's right. The only thing we got is we seize the ship and fine them \$500. I don't think it's good to try to starve them to death.

Russell: Oh no. No, I wouldn't do that. I'd treat them just like they treat their own prisoners.

President: Well, I guess they treat their own prisoners in Florida, I guess that way. They got no bunk in this county jail down there in this place in Florida, Key West. They've got no bunks in the cell.

Russell: Is that right?

President: Yeah. Hell, yes. They treat them like we treated drunks in Texas.

Russell: [laughter] Well I expect to hear from McNamara then this afternoon, Mr. President.

President: All right. Bye. Thank you.

**231. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1964, 11:30 a.m.

President: These people in State and Defense met during the evening on this Guantanamo thing, we're going to meet again after lunch. They're trying to find out exactly what has happened. I wanted to get any reactions you might have to it before I went back to meet with them again.

Mansfield: Well, evidently it appears that they violated no international law, but a state law. It is my understanding that water is being rationed on a 3-hour-a-day basis there and that Castro has allowed the water to flow from the river for an hour each day, so we ought to have plenty. But here is a statement that I made this morning, if you have a minute or so.

"Mr. President, no matter how the Cuban Government may act, the Cuban fishermen are entitled to and will receive the same justice, the same impartial protection of domestic and international law as any other alien persons in similar circumstances. The fact that they are Cubans or that Cuba retaliates for their arrest is irrelevant insofar as the judicial processes of this nation are concerned. However the Cuban Government may regard the matter, there will not be any mixing of justice and water on our part. Insofar as the water supply is concerned, if the pretext of the arrest of the Cuban fishermen had not sufficed, the Havana government would have had no difficulty in creating another. It is obvious that Castro wants us out of Guantanamo, and it is obvious that he is not going to make it easier for us to stay. It is equally obvious that we have no intention of being pressured out. At this time the need is for cool water at the Guantanamo base, hot words on the floors of the Congress will not supply it. We have the technical means to supply the water for as long as it takes, and in whatever quantities it takes. I have every confidence that the President will see to it that we are not parched out of Guantanamo." And then Tommy Kuchel came in and supported it in effect.

President: That's good. That's a good statement.

Mansfield: This will save you \$14,000 a month, I understand, which you won't pay to Mr. Castro's government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Mike Mansfield, Tape F64.11, Side B, PNO 3. No classification marking. The President placed the call. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

President: What, he's got a good many people working there too, and we probably ought to make, if he's not going to allow us to have water, we probably ought to try to make the whole base independent of him, and secure. We're going to think about that today, and probably issue a pretty strong statement later in the day that, namely that we're going to—he's breached a contract, that's his choice, that's a bad way to do, but he's done it, and therefore we're going to supply our own water, and supply our own personnel and operate our own base.

Mansfield: You mean all the Cubans, all of them would be off?

President: Well, except those that live on the base. So we could do that. We haven't decided to do it, that's a possibility, just declare the complete independence of it. So, we could do that now. I don't know what else we can do. You got any other thoughts?

Mansfield: Well, I would think that one thing which might be worth considering, this would call for very delicate handling, would be for the Florida courts just to release these people with an admonishment and send them home. We could afford to be big-hearted, but that's a state matter, and that could get you into trouble because of the feeling down there.

President: And it may look like we're being awfully soft. I think it ought to follow its normal course, whatever they do to them, and I think most of the time they fine a captain. It looks like from the information we have this is deliberate and—

Mansfield: If I get any ideas on the base of what you said, or any other, I'll pass them on.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In a February 7 memorandum to the President, Mansfield recommended that "we ought not be governed in this matter by any passions aroused by water shut off," that the United States should "avoid the appearance of a great nation bullying the weak by an over-display of power," and that "it should be stressed that if the dismissal of Cuban personnel at the base (apart from the water shut-off incident) is really necessary for security of the base, then the best way to do it would be in as restrained and as unthreatening way as possible." In conclusion, Mansfield advised the avoidance of "inadvertently strengthening Castro with his own people on what may be the mistaken assumption that displays of our anger and power will hasten his downfall." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Guantanamo, Water Crisis/Cuban Fishing Boats, 2/64)

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**232. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1964, 12:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Cuba

**PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador David Ormsby Gore, British Embassy  
The Under Secretary

I spoke this morning with Ambassador Ormsby Gore regarding the seizure of the Cuban shipping boats and the cutting off of the water supply at Guantanamo. I explained that the circumstances under which the boats invaded our territorial waters raised questions as to Cuban purposes. I pointed out that we might be at the outset of a deliberate Cuban policy of trying to drive us either into a dialogue or out of Guantanamo. I pointed out the possible relevance of Castro's trip to Russia and the pending problems in Panama.

I told the Ambassador that American public opinion was aroused and that Americans would be more than ever sensitive to actions by our friends that appeared to be assisting the Cubans—such as the British bus deal. I pointed out that Britain was being held responsible for breaking the line and that the French truck deal announced today appeared to the American public as a predictable result of the British action.

I explained that the imposition of economic sanctions against Cuba was the only weapon short of an act of war that could make the support of Castro's Cuba more costly to the Soviet Union, while at the same time creating conditions of economic stringency that might ultimately bring about the elimination of the Communist regime. It was very difficult for the American people to accept a situation in which their friends appeared to be frustrating such a possibility.

The Ambassador indicated that he was quite aware of our feelings on this matter. He said that, if the issue over Guantanamo should become tense, it might be possible—and he was speaking only for himself—that his Government could do something to stop the delivery of the buses. He would certainly take it up with his Government promptly.

He said that he had already warned the Prime Minister to be prepared for a full discussion of the matter next week, and he hoped that clarification might come out of that discussion.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CUBA-US. Secret. Drafted by Ball on February 7 and approved in U the same day.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 241.

**233. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1964.

SUBJECT

Cuban Fishing Vessels Affair

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large Department of State

I began the conversation by referring to articles which have appeared in the Soviet press accusing the United States of an act of piracy in connection with the seizure of some Cuban fishing boats. I pointed out that these articles stated that the boats were seized in international waters. I said that we were fully convinced and had good evidence that this was not the case. I said that when the boats were boarded, two of the Captains had said that they knew they were in United States waters and that one of the Captains had informed Havana by radio that he was in our national waters.

The Ambassador asked when this message was sent, and I said I understood that it was at the time the vessels were apprehended. I said that moreover it appeared that this was a deliberate provocation as members of the crew had stated that they had been given a special briefing in which they were told that they were going on an historic mission. The Ambassador asked if these statements were made by the defectors, and I said I thought they were. He said that sometimes defectors had a tendency to say things which they thought would make them more welcome and valuable. I said that the action we were taking was in accordance with regular procedure followed by all countries and that Castro's action in cutting off the water supply at Guantanamo was completely unjustified. The Ambassador inquired why we had not simply ordered the boats to leave our waters. He said that he understood that this was in fact our first action and that we had then turned them over to the State of Florida. He quoted from the *New York Times* editorial to the effect that Florida was making foreign policy for the United States. He said he understood that the boats had not violated any Federal law.

I replied that this was not the case, that they had violated Federal as well as International Law, but that at the moment no Federal penalty

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–4 CUBA–US. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 7. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.

was provided for, although a bill was pending in Congress to do this. I said that another disturbing factor which made the Cuban action look like provocation was that the boats were fishing in an area where American boats were fishing and that their action had been observed by these vessels. I said that this also made it difficult for the Florida authorities not to carry out the provisions of Florida's laws.

I went on to say that as he doubtless knew, we considered that Castro was irresponsible and capable of dangerous actions. I said that this recent development took place against the background of a number of actions of interference by Castro in other countries of the Western Hemisphere and I mentioned specifically the arms cache which had been found in Venezuela and the fact that some of the mobs in Panama had been led by Panamanians trained in Cuba.

The Ambassador said that the Czech Consul had informed the Soviet Consul that the Cubans had not been engaged in fishing in our waters. He said that some of the Captains had admitted that they were in United States waters but had come there to find quiet water in which to rest. I said our information was that they were fishing, or at least some of them were, but that we were checking this information.

The Ambassador asked what we were going to do with the crews and the vessels. I said that I could not say for sure as we were still discussing the matter, but it was clear that the Captains would be tried in the Florida court. I said that I thought we would release the minor members of the crew at once and that it was possible that the other members of the crew would be released.

I concluded by pointing out that the Cuban situation was a delicate one and one which, if care were not exercised, could easily and quickly lead into a dangerous situation.

The Ambassador expressed appreciation for my visit and said he hoped we, on our side, would handle matters in a way which would not make the situation any worse.

**234. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

President: Hello.

Russell: Yes sir.

President: Dick, we're going to meet again at 4:30.

Russell: That's right now.

President: Yeah. I wanted to talk to you before I went into the meeting. They're meeting downstairs. Now here's the—nobody wants to do much. They think that the first place these fishermen ought not even have been picked up, that it was a mistake. That they over the limits, but we ought to have told them to get on back home and not make a big incident out of it, because not anything to be gained from it, and we ought to let him show his hand, whether this is in concert with Khrushchev, and what all it means, before we act irrational. There's an opposing viewpoint, that's pretty well the viewpoint of Rusk and McCone, and I would say, Bobby Kennedy. He wants to turn everybody loose and let them go on home. McNamara feels like the sentiment in this country is such that we've got to do more than that, and that even though we would stand acquitted in the eyes of the world and maybe some of the liberal papers in this country, that we probably ought to do two things—declare the independence of that base by saying we're going to furnish our own water . . . and we don't want your damn water, and to hell with you. And number two, tell the people that are on there that they can pledge allegiance to us and live there, the 600. And the other 2500 to go on back and we're going to quit financing, we're going to operate the base independently so our country can be secure and so we operate it independently, and it's going to hurt you more by this action than hurts us, and we just don't need you people. Now that's his feeling, he's about the only one that feels that way. That's my feeling, I think we ought to wrap 'em up.

Russell: That's mine.

President: I think they'll say we're cruel, and these people been loyal to us for two or three generations, been working there, we just firing them outright without anything on their part, because Castro did

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Richard Russell, Tape F64.11, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. Johnson placed the call. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

this. USIA thinks it will get a good deal of sympathy from the rest of the nations, and—

Russell: Well, that's their professional attitude. These nations ain't as silly as we attribute them to be, as we seem to think they are. And while they're envious as hell of us, when they get down to where their self interest is involved and when we get hurt, their self interest is injured, they're not nearly as bad as everybody makes out like they are. This Panama thing will demonstrate that beyond any doubt, if our people will just sit tight, give them the facts, say here it is now, you've got a stake in this. Same thing is true here in Cuba, they don't want Castro to prosper, none of the leaders do, they're thousands of the little people who are Communist do, but they're not going to raise any hell about it. Khrushchev will blow up like hell. Comrade Mao Tse-tung will come in with a philippic of some kind, but the world as a whole will say well that's very logical position to take. You got to know that you can protect this, and Khrushchev pulled them out all at once, which he could do, if he'd stopped them all one morning, and you'd hadn't even had an hour's notice, you would need them, but now you're giving yourself the hour's notice. And you're preparing against the probability that he would do another asinine thing by simply declaring that no Cuban national can enter on the base. You've got to be ready for that. But I know—

President: What do you think? I don't like to see them so split, so divided State, Defense, CIA. What do you think the attitude of the country is, the Senate? Are they indignant about cutting this water off. I don't guess as many of them feel as strong as Goldwater does, but I guess a good many of them feel—

Russell: No, they don't. But there's a great many of them, they don't know exactly what they want done, Mr. President, because they don't know what can be done, but they want something done.

President: That's right, ain't much you can do, but this—That's right.

Russell: They don't know just exactly what to do. They're not in favor of any war, I don't think. I don't believe 10% of them would vote for that right now, under these circumstances. But they're just tired of Castro urinating on us and getting away with it. They don't like the smell of it any longer and they just want to sort of show that we are taking such steps as are within our power without involving the shedding of a lot of blood, that's my analysis of the sentiment in the Congress. And I think in the country, course it would be mighty easy to whip them up to where they'd be ready to go to war over it if you cut loose, and banded it up, instead of playing it in low key like is being done, but I approve of the low key play, but I think there's a latent feeling there, that it may not explode right now, but one of these days,



they are going to say, well we've just been a bunch of asses in this country, continually just back down and give away and say excuse me every time we come in collision with one of these little countries because they're small and particularly Communist countries. And when that valve blows, now somebody is going to get hurt. And nobody will know just when the boiler is ready to give on it, but there's a slowly increasing feeling in this country that we're not being as positive and as firm in our foreign relations as we should be, and that we just lean over backwards, that we're worried more about our image than we are about our substance, and that we're backing down. Now that feeling is in the country, just how far it's gotten, I don't know. A demagogue with any strength could blow it up. I don't know of anyone who's got enough strength to do it, people don't trust Goldwater's judgment, lot of them like his independence, and his—

President: You think a lot of people going to think you're hot-headed when you just fire a bunch of innocent humans.

Russell: I don't think so, I don't believe that even the *Times* and the *Post* could stir up 5% of the people about this. I would make it perfectly clear that this is regrettable, that our association with these people has been pleasant and mutually profitable over a period of years . . . but they were within the power of Castro and not in our power, and that we have to make this base independent, and we hope that in happier days, our pleasant relations with them could be renewed. I'd sure throw that in there, you'll get every one of them where he'd be a potential assassin to Castro. Yes, I'd certainly put it in there that way, that our relations with these people have been mutually pleasant and profitable, that Castro, he had control of them. He could stop them any morning, and not a one of them could come and we couldn't afford to be placed in that uncertain position. We had to rely on our resources.

President: If he's going to cut off our water, tomorrow he can cut off our people.

Russell: Pardon?

President: If today he can cut off our water, tomorrow he can cut off our people.

Russell: Sure, sure. He can stop them everyone at the gate, where not one could come in without a moment's notice. We just we can't operate that important establishment in the unpleasant atmosphere, and as regrettable as it is we'll have to make other arrangements for the time being, and hope that in better days when the Cuban people and the American people are permitted to fraternize as they have in the past, and as we are anxious to do today, that we hope to be able to renew this.

President: I'd planned. I think I'm going to make some kind of a statement on it, at least authorize the press to, after we have our meet-

ing this afternoon,<sup>2</sup> because I think they'll want to hear something after working all day.

Russell: I think you're going to have to say something.

President: Then I think I'm going home for the weekend. Do you see any reason why I shouldn't?

Russell: No, I do not.

President: I think there's every reason to kind of ignore him, go on and make your statement and then go on, not hang around to—

Russell: I agree, don't think there's any reason why you should.

President: Okay, goodbye.

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<sup>2</sup> At a 6:35 news conference that evening, Press Secretary Pierre Salinger read a White House statement indicating that the President had instructed the Department of Defense to make the Guantanamo base self-sufficient. The statement cited that "the reckless and irresponsible conduct of the Cuban Government," remained a threat to peace and warned against "further provocations." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964*, Book I, p. 273) See Document 235 for discussion regarding the statement.

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## 235. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 7, 1964, 5 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House 7 February 1964

1. At 5 p.m. the same group<sup>2</sup> plus Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Donald Wilson, USIA, and Mr. Theodore Sorensen met with the President. Mr. McCone commenced with a briefing of the facts which had been established as follows: First, Cuban public statements, press releases and broadcasts have in the last ten days featured the Guantanamo issue. Second, the Cuban ships were fishing in our territorial waters on February 2nd and there were fish aboard of the type caught in these waters. Third, there was no absolute evidence that the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Folder 7, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan–Apr 1964. Secret. Drafted by FitzGerald on February 8.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of the informal meeting that immediately preceded the 5 p.m. meeting at the White House has been found.

ships were dispatched or directed to national waters as against having been directed into traditional United States fishing grounds. Fourth, Cuban authorities *were* advised that the ships were in U.S. national waters at the time they were seized. Fifth, it should be noted that Castro's actions regarding the Guantanamo water supply took place four days after the ships were apprehended which raises some question as to whether Guantanamo was a part of the original plan.

2. Mac Bundy stated that the easiest part of the decision to be reached concerned the Florida legal problem. After hearing Meeker's briefing, the President agreed that the matter should be handled by the Florida courts as being in the nature of a first offense; that the crews would be released under temporary custody of Immigration and not fined; that the captains should be fined and that there should be no forfeiture of the vessels.

3. On the question of Guantanamo and measures to be taken in response to Castro's act, Mr. Bundy said that the choices had narrowed down to alternatives one and two as set forth in the proposed releases.<sup>3</sup> The argument centered around the question of the Base employees and the lines were quite clearly drawn. The Secretary of Defense strongly favored the dismissal of employees on the ground that only by this act could the Base be made "secure." General Taylor on balance supported the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Nitze on close balance favored not dismissing the employees but did not re-state his position in the later stage of the argument. Secretary Rusk suggested a compromise which would put special emphasis on the dollar contribution to Castro made by the Base wages.

4. The Attorney General repeated his very strong objection to the dismissal of the Base employees on the grounds that (a) it was an over-reaction to Castro's move and (b) it hurt the wrong Cubans who by and large had been loyal Base employees, some for more than a generation. Mr. McCone also opposed the dismissal on these grounds plus the fact that other countries in which we have bases might fear a sim-

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<sup>3</sup> At 6:30 p.m. Johnson called Senator Russell to discuss the wording of the statement to be issued that evening and the differences between the President's advisers over two different alternatives and proposed releases. The President read virtually the entire statement to Russell and noted that Bundy, McCone, and Kennedy had disagreed with him and suggested an alternative statement which proposed that the President instruct the Department of Defense to make the Base "wholly sufficient in fresh water" and to prepare other measures to make it secure. Johnson said, "but to do nothing about it [the employees], you see, just to prepare." Russell said "I much prefer the first one, I think that the people will too." The President then said that Mann thought that the rest of the Hemisphere was watching "and if we get soft with them, we'll be soft with Panama and that everybody else will start kicking us in the pants cause they'll think they can." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of conversation between President Johnson and Richard Russell, Tape F64.12, Side A, PNO 1)

ilar action in the event of a disagreement with them. He also pointed out that our annual rental for Guantanamo is \$3,000. Without the economic benefits of the Base salaries, this rental figure will stand out and weaken our Guantanamo position. Mac Bundy stated that from the point of view of domestic reaction (which he said would be bad) there was little to choose between the two alternatives and that he favored alternative two.

5. The President clearly showed that he leaned toward alternative one, mainly on the ground of Base security. The argument went around again with Wilson voting for alternative two and the Secretary of State for alternative one with certain word changes. Mac Bundy at this point made a heated defense of alternative two.

6. Mr. Sorensen said that the course of the argument had indicated to him that neither alternative was adequate under the circumstances.

(7. Mr. McCone pointed out that a recent report had indicated that Cuban training in SAM operations has now entered a new phase wherein Cuban trainees are regularly passing target tracking information. It was agreed that, in view of the fact that this might presage early Cuban control of the SAM installations, there should be an early review of plans for military retaliation.)

8. The President chose alternative one.

**Desmond FitzGerald**  
*Chief, Special Affairs Staff*

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**236. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1964, 7:05 p.m.

President: What I'm worried about, there's one thing that worries me about the whole thing. I think they'll demonstrate and raise hell, and all that I'm prepared for, but the one thing that I thought was the word reduce, that doesn't mean anything to me. I would say discontinue, and I don't think it means a damn thing to say reduce,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F64.12, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

and I hope somebody doesn't pick that up and go picking at us. But if they do, I think that we've got to say that our intention is to get rid of the people who are under his control, who don't want to live on the base, and who are going to take their money and finance Castro.

Bundy: What we mean in other words is to make this program effective, but not to state it in a provocative way.

President: That's right, what we mean is to discontinue.

Bundy: Yep.

President: Get rid of these people, and because if Goldwater gets ahold of it, he'll say, why hell, he said he was going to reduce, he doesn't have to take but a half dozen of them, and that's a reduction.

Bundy: Yeah, I think that action will make a nonsense out of that. I don't think that's the way Bob's going to run it.

President: No, okay. You take care of it for me the best you can.

Bundy: I'll do the best I can, Sir.

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### 237. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 7, 1964, 7:18 p.m.

McNamara: Hello.

President: Bob.

McNamara: Yes, Mr. President.

President: I never did hear from General Taylor, did the Chiefs think that was all right?

McNamara: Well, he tried to call, he didn't get them all, but frankly they were for the hardest possible line. LeMay wanted to go in and bomb the place and Max told me on the way over, driving over this afternoon, that he felt the Chiefs would prefer alternative one, they hadn't actually seen it in that form, but that's what he thought they would prefer. When you asked him to call, he tried to call, he got one

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, Tape F64.12, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. President Johnson placed the call. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

or two, he didn't get them all. But I think we can safely say they would prefer one or two. I didn't tell you at the meeting, because I didn't want to interject it in the conversation but I called Russell as you asked me to and he would prefer alternative one.

President: Yeah. I knew that. There was one thing that worries me. I think one is all right except for that word reduce.

McNamara: Well, I agree with you. I would have much preferred discontinue.

President: We probably just ought to put discontinue in regardless what they said. I just didn't want—Rusk had gone along with us and I didn't want to have a fight with him, but in doing it now—you reduce them or put them on that base, I mean discontinue them or put them on the base.

McNamara: Yeah. I'm sending people down there tonight. They'll get plans and bring it back here, then we'll get it moving on it.

President: Now do you think we're going to have some static with the press on this thing, you think some of our own crowd will be building it up.

McNamara: I don't think so. I don't think we will. I hope we don't have any.

President: Why don't you meet with some of the press tomorrow.

McNamara: I can do that.

President: I'd background them and have Taylor in there with you and tell them, give them a little the dangerous side if they continue, if this guy can cut you off, your water, he can cut you off your people, and you've got to have security at these bases, so that, so that they think we've done enough. Now my real concern, Bob, is that they're going to think we haven't done anything.

McNamara: Well, that was my concern, that's why I wanted to get away from two onto one. I agree with you. I think that's the real danger in this country.

President: But I couldn't understand McCone. He's pretty hard nosed, and I just couldn't find out where he was.

McNamara: I couldn't either. I just told somebody here that when I find myself being accused by McCone as over-reacting, I really begin to wonder.

President: Maybe we better go back to Ford. Will you take me with you.

President and McNamara: [laughter]

President: Goodbye, thank you. I'm going to leave now. I've lost a real good friend. I've got to go to a funeral. But I want you to take care of things while I'm gone.

McNamara: Dean<sup>2</sup> and I will both be here.

President: All right, okay.

McNamara: Thank you.

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<sup>2</sup> The President called Rusk after talking with McNamara and urged Rusk to meet with the press and “your columnist folk” tomorrow to “go over this thing pretty carefully” so that they would think that “we had a stronger line than some of them” and yet were not “too provocative.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, February 7, 1964, 7:26 p.m., Tape F64.12, Side A, PNO 4)

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### 238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 8, 1964, 5:05 p.m.

2149. REPCU. Verbatim Text.

Request Stadelhofer present following note immediately to Foreign Office:

The United States Government has been informed through the Swiss Government of the note which was given the Swiss Ambassador in Havana at 11:15 AM on February 6 and which stated that as of 12:00 Noon of that same day the furnishing of water to the Naval Base at Guantanamo would be suspended and that the suspension would be maintained until the Cuban fishermen at present under detention in the United States were put at liberty.

As indicated in the note which the United States Government sent to the Government of Cuba through the Swiss Government on February 4, 1964,<sup>2</sup> the four Cuban fishing boats were apprehended within the territorial sea of the United States off East Key in the Dry Tortugas. Further confirmation of this fact is to be found in the testimony of two of the masters of the Cuban fishing boats—Jose Manuel Ventura of the *Cardenas* No. 14 and Manuel Gomez Barrios of the *Lambda* No.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CUBA-US. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler, approved by U. Alexis Johnson, and cleared by Crimmins, Mann, and Leonard Meeker, the Legal Advisor. Repeated to USUN New York and the Cuban Coordinators Miami Office.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 228.

8—who have admitted to United States Coast Guard officials that they were knowingly fishing in United States waters. Furthermore a monitored conversation between the *Lambda* No. 33 and the control station in Havana which took place at 2:25 p.m. on February 2 read as follows:

Havana: Where are you anchored?

*Lambda* 33: Well, we are east of Tortugas. Go ahead

Havana: International waters?

*Lambda* 33: Well no, this is national water, national water

Havana: I understand

From the foregoing it is clear that, first, the Cuban fishing vessels knew they were fishing inside the territorial sea of the United States and, second, that the Cuban authorities in Havana were also aware of this fact.

In the light of the clear violation of international law and of the laws of the United States represented by the illegal fishing of the Cuban vessels in US territorial waters, the Government of Cuba has no justification whatsoever for the arbitrary and irresponsible act of suspending water service to the Guantanamo Naval Base in direct violation of the existing contract between the water company and the Base which runs until 1969.

The Government of the United States protests in vigorous terms this totally unwarranted action and wishes to point out to the Government of Cuba that there can be no relationship whatsoever between measures taken by the Government of the United States against persons who have violated its laws and the unjustified suspension of water service to the Naval Base by the Cuban Government. Any effort to do so is entirely inadmissible to the Government of the United States. Thus the case of the Cuban nationals apprehended illegally fishing in United States territorial waters will proceed under the full guarantees for a fair trial by the State of Florida.

**Rusk**



**239. Paper Prepared by Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 10, 1964.

FREE WORLD TRADE WITH CUBA—SOME  
PRELIMINARY RUMINATIONS

1. Our objective is twofold. First, for obvious reasons, we want to cut down Free World export of critical commodities to Cuba. Second, we want to hold down or cut down the *level* of Free World trade with Cuba. This reduction of Free World/Cuban commercial contacts is consistent with our overall isolation policy. Also, it is probably important for other reasons that the level of Free World/Cuban trade (even in non-critical commodities) does not rise precipitously during 1964.

2. Probably the most effective way of achieving this dual objective is to bring about a situation whereby the American business community would not trade with anyone trading with Cuba. Cuba has only 6 million people and, as a result, a businessman, contemplating trade with Cuba, will think long and hard before he cuts himself off from the huge American market for the sake of the small Cuban market. If a couple Latin American countries joined the U.S. effort, the action would be even more effective. It is conceivable that such action, which is based on the self-interest motive of Free World traders, would make superfluous other steps in this field.

3. There appear to be three ways in which we can bring about the situation whereby the American business community would not trade with anyone in the Cuban trade. First, we could invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act to legally prohibit Americans from doing business with anyone who trades with Cuba. Second, we could make our desires known to the American business community and urge them to voluntarily cut off commercial dealings with persons trading with Cuba. Third, we could use a combination of the above two methods (e.g. We tell business leaders—"The Government is willing to take step X. Will you be willing to take step Y in order to close the circle?").

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Free World Trade, Vol. III, 12/63–5/65. Secret. Chase forwarded the paper to Bundy under cover of a February 10 memorandum, in which Chase wrote that Crimmins and other Cuban experts "intended to seriously explore the possibilities and problems involved in closing off the American market to Free World traders who deal with Cuba" using most likely the Trading with the Enemy Act. Chase informed Bundy that his "ruminations" were of a "preliminary nature" and he needed more facts.

4. Probably the most effective program would depend largely on the Trading with the Enemy Act, under which we could announce that we intend to blacklist any foreign firm which trades with Cuba after a certain date. If we take this route, we may have to or want to provide loopholes (which, reportedly, is possible). For example: (a) We would undoubtedly make an exception for those firms which export food and drugs to Cuba since our own traders are allowed to do this. (b) Until the world sugar situation loosens, we may want to make an exception for those firms which import Cuban sugar (however, they would pay for it in foreign exchange). (c) We may find that a relatively few Free World firms make up a large part of the Free World's trade with Cuba and that it is not worthwhile or effective to blacklist Free World firms which trade in small quantities of noncritical items.

5. Probably the biggest obstacles to the blacklisting action would be the reaction of Free World (particularly Western European) governments.

(a) Free World governments would certainly point to the violation of free trading principles (e.g. GATT and all that) and might conceivably retaliate against U.S. exporters. They would undoubtedly point out that they are forced into two-way Cuban trade involuntarily—because of the world-wide shortage of sugar.

(b) Our response to Free World governments could include such points as the following: *First*, while we also believe in the principles of free trade, there are overriding national security considerations in this case. Cuban actions in autumn, 1962 and Cuba's recent participation in fomenting subversion in Venezuela, Panama, and Zanzibar make it eminently clear that we are dealing with a particularly nasty, hostile power; the U.S. intends to treat Cuba as one. (It is true that there are other hostile powers which we do not attempt to isolate. Our actions are designed to fit the case and, inter alia, Cuba's unique geographic position makes an isolation policy an effective and appropriate response. As evidence of its impact, note how hard the Cubans and the Soviets are working to break it.) *Second*, we are certainly not taking our action precipitously. We have tried strenuously over the past few years to gain Free World cooperation through persuasion rather than sanction. *Third*, the sacrifice we are asking for, in real terms, is not great. For example, the *total* of Free World exports to Cuba, divided up between many countries and firms, only amounted to a little more than \$100 million in each of the last two years. Generally speaking, no one, except Cuba, is going to hurt very much, even if Cuban sugar is paid for in foreign exchange.

(c) There may be a variety of factors which may mitigate (at least privately) a vociferous response by affected Free World governments. *First*, by now, they are pretty accustomed to our "extreme" behavior

when it comes to Cuba. *Second*, we have been hounding Free World governments about the subject for a long time now; they will probably be only half-surprised when we finally do something decisive about it. *Third*, in real terms, no Free World country will suffer if it cuts itself off from Cuban trade. *Fourth*, Free World governments who sympathize with our objectives but who are unable to control their traders effectively, may secretly welcome action which takes the ball out of their hands.

6. Generally speaking, American business firms are unlikely to resist the proposed action. They would appear to lose little in concrete terms.

7. There are some arguments in favor of taking action quickly if we are going to take it. *First*, we might want to take advantage of the atmosphere generated by Venezuela, Panama, Zanzibar, and Guantánamo. *Second*, we might want to act before the OAS discusses Rio Treaty action against Cuba because of the arms cache discovery. We would then be in a good position to ask all or some of the OAR's to take similar measures (e.g. Venezuela). *Third*, there are indications that Free World/Cuban trade has hit bottom and is beginning to rise. The longer we wait, the more resistance we are likely to meet as vested interests increase along with the trade.

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#### 240. Verbal Message From Cuban Prime Minister Castro to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Havana, February 12, 1964.

1. Please tell President Johnson that I earnestly desire his election to the Presidency in November . . . though that appears assured. But if there is anything I can do to add to his majority (aside from retiring from politics), I shall be happy to cooperate. Seriously, I observe how the Republicans use Cuba as a weapon against the Democrats. So tell President Johnson to let me know what I can do, if anything. Naturally, I know that my offer of assistance would be of immense value to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contacts with Cuban Leaders, 5/63–4/65. The message was given to Lisa Howard of ABC News on February 12 in Havana.

the Republicans—so this would remain our secret. But if the President wishes to pass word to me he can do so through you [Lisa Howard].<sup>2</sup> He must know that he can trust you; and I know that I can trust you to relay a message accurately.

2. If the President feels it necessary during the campaign to make bellicose statements about Cuba or even to take some hostile action—if he will inform me, unofficially, that a specific action is required because of domestic political considerations, I shall understand and not take any serious retaliatory action.

3. Tell the President that I understand quite well how much political courage it took for President Kennedy to instruct you [Lisa Howard] and Ambassador Attwood to phone my aide in Havana for the purpose of commencing a dialogue toward a settlement of our differences. Ambassador Attwood suggested that I prepare an agenda for such talks<sup>3</sup> and send the agenda to my U.N. Ambassador. That was on November 18th. The agenda was being prepared when word arrived that President Kennedy was assassinated. I hope that we can soon continue where Ambassador Attwood's phone conversation to Havana left off . . . though I'm aware that pre-electoral political considerations may delay this approach until after November.

4. Tell the President (and I cannot stress this too strongly) that I seriously hope that Cuba and the United States can eventually sit down in an atmosphere of good will and of mutual respect and negotiate our differences. I believe that there are *no* areas of contention between us that cannot be discussed and settled within a climate of mutual understanding. But first, of course, it is necessary to *discuss* our differences. I now believe that this hostility between Cuba and the United States is both unnatural and unnecessary—and it can be eliminated.

5. Tell the President he should not interpret my conciliatory attitude, my desire for discussions as a sign of weakness. Such an interpretation would be a serious miscalculation. We are not weak . . . the Revolution is strong . . . very strong. Nothing, absolutely nothing that the United States can do will destroy the Revolution. Yes, we are strong. And it is from this position of strength that we wish to resolve our differences with the United States and to live in peace with all the nations of the world.

6. Tell the President I realize fully the need for absolute secrecy, if he should decide to continue the Kennedy approach. I revealed nothing at that time . . . I have revealed nothing since . . . I would reveal nothing now.

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<sup>2</sup> All brackets are in the source text.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, Documents 378, 382, and 387.

## 241. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Cuba

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *British Side*

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
R. A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, The Foreign Office  
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador  
Sir Timothy Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet

#### *U.S. Side*

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain  
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON  
Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA

The President asked the Secretary to speak about sanctions on Cuba. He said that he had gone into the matter thoroughly with the Prime Minister in the morning,<sup>2</sup> and that the Prime Minister was willing to help, but had problems of his own. The President emphasized that we understand the British position, and have our own problems in the situation.

The Secretary opened by saying that trade within the Western Hemisphere with Cuba is now down to a rather low level, and includes no industrial trade, primarily because the hemisphere is concerned over Castro subversion efforts. We want measures to make the industrial situation in Cuba grind to a halt. There has been a 60% reduction in free-world shipping to Cuba, but it is still very substantial. We are also concerned over means of transportation, electrical equipment, spare

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, February, 1964. Secret. The memorandum is part I of VI. Drafted by Armstrong on February 12 and approved in the White House on February 24 and in S on February 27. Douglas-Home made an official visit to Washington February 12–13 and met with the President both days.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Rusk met with Douglas-Home at the White House at 11 a.m. that morning. (Ibid.)

parts and mining equipment. There was a little discussion of the number of British ships in the trade, with general agreement that about one-third of free-world ships in the trade are British.<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary said that the matter of trade with Cuba had been discussed with the Japanese, who are buying some 300,000 tons of sugar from Cuba, but who are in return sending drugs and textiles, and as little electrical or industrial equipment as possible.

The Secretary went on to say this was not simply a trade matter but one of security of the hemisphere. He said the overflights are continuing, the SAMs are increasingly under Cuban control, arms are being shipped to Venezuela, and the US people can hit the government on a very touchy nerve. This can erode the strength of support in the US for the NATO relationship. Cuba and Peiping are both of such a nature that they can have this effect on American opinion. We believe that our NATO allies need to see this matter as a security problem. In general, our cooperation has been good. Trade control must be economic or it does not work. We have taken every step possible short of war, and we have applied pressure of all kinds. If additional steps are required, the only ones possible are likely to be acts of violence. We do not wish to think about this until we have explored all non-violent means.

The Prime Minister said he fully understood the political problems Cuba presented for the US. The British have tried to use economic sanctions in the past, and feel that they do not work. The British are not giving credit outside ordinary commercial coverage. The UK lives by trade and if the UK refused such transactions as the bus deal, the French would immediately take the business. If the government went to the House of Commons with a proposal to support the kind of measures the US is using, there would be severe criticism of the US and of the government for giving in to US opinion. If British firms trading with Cuba are in danger in terms of their US contacts, this is another matter, but government policy must be clear. Some ships are British by flag, but the owners live somewhere else, and are mostly Greek. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would get at the ship owners again, but as a government it could not cut off trade. Mr. Butler added that the government would take another look at the credit matter.

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<sup>3</sup> According to a January 24 memorandum of conversation among Rusk, Ball, and the British Ambassador, Ball said that "he felt it was necessary for the British to know that rightly or wrongly their sale of buses to Cuba was regarded in the United States as interference with a well-advertised U.S. policy." Rusk added that "It should be remembered that Bristol was also discussing a \$37 million contract with the United States. Companies were not going to trade both with the United States and Cuba." (Ibid., January, 1964)

The Secretary suggested the British might wish to look at their own attitude toward Venezuela, Mexico and other free countries in the vicinity of Cuba which are seriously concerned over Castro subversion. Perhaps the British could tell the Cubans that they could give government guarantees on exports only as long as Cuba is not injuring its neighbors who have good relations with the UK.

The Prime Minister said of course he realized the Cubans were up to various kinds of monkey business in Latin America but the Russians were up to monkey business throughout the world. He wondered if the US really thought that it was going to bring down Castro by economic pressure. Wouldn't he be more likely to tighten his belt and bear up heroically as a national leader. The Secretary responded by saying that if the Cuban economy was a shambles, Castro would not spend as much on ventures outside of Cuba. If Castro is not going to go away, and is to remain as a real threat, policies have to be devised to deal with this eventuality.

Mr. Bundy said that we did not engage in economic warfare with the Soviet Union. We sell wheat to the Soviet Union, which is of marginal importance to that large economy. The Cuban economy however is in bad shape, and will not last forever in terms of the internal stresses. We can't very well say that we know it won't work, even though making it work is difficult.

Mr. Butler said that British trade is very small, having fallen from an annual average of about £12 million to about £1.9 million. Mr. Bundy wondered if we could talk about things which are in specific short supply in Cuba.

The Secretary said that the people on the UK side should know that it is not Castro's beard, or his organization of Cuba, that we object to. What we do object to, and what are not negotiable, are (a) the military connection with Moscow and (b) the interference in the hemisphere. If Castro realizes this, and accepts it, he can perfectly well negotiate his way back into the hemisphere. The Prime Minister wondered if there was any possibility of Castro approaching the US to talk about it. The Secretary said there were once three schools of thought in Cuba, one favoring Moscow, one favoring Peiping and one Titoist. He said he had seen no significant evidence of an effort to rejoin the hemisphere. Ambassador Ormsby Gore wondered if the Titoist policy would be consistent with membership in the hemisphere. The Secretary said that a Titoist policy, meaning Tito at his best, would open up a different situation, but this might take some time.

The Prime Minister said the whole thing was extremely difficult. He said that his government might talk to firms, might indicate that they could lose US business. He promised further to watch the situation on credits, and he noted that export guarantees are a type of in-

surance. Mr. Bundy said they were about the same as we give on Soviet wheat sales. The Secretary wondered if British firms would trade without credit, and the Prime Minister said they would if Cuba paid cash. The President inquired concerning the trend of British trade with Cuba. Mr. Butler said that it had fallen to £1.9 million in 1963, but he conceded that it was now going up. He observed that US trade in 1963 was about £12 million. He wondered what accounted for this size. The Secretary said the biggest item was food and drugs connected with the prisoner exchange. Trade also included payment for water, and the wages of Cubans working at Guantanamo, and both of these were not being reduced. The Prime Minister returned to the problem of Castro's status in Cuba, wondering if Castro could be repudiated by the people. Mr. Bundy said the regime was not responsible to the people, but the ruling group might split, and control by other elements might be possible.

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## 242. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### MEMORANDUM ON SOME BASIC ISSUES IN THE CUBAN PROBLEM REQUIRING POLICY DECISIONS

[Omitted here is section I on "OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache."]

#### *Counter-Measures Against Free-World Economic Ties with Cuba*

During the past two months there have been major compromises of our efforts to reduce trade between the free world and Cuba. These breaches have made it clear that our present tactics of relying essentially on diplomatic persuasion are not adequate.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 CUBA-US. Secret. Drafted by Crimmins, Bowdler, and Charles R. Carlisle (ARA/CCA), and approved by Mann and Crimmins. The paper was attached to a February 19 memorandum from Johnson to Bundy in which Bundy stated that the paper was prepared "solely to serve as a basis of discussion" for a meeting of national security officials later that day at the White House including McCone, Kennedy, Johnson, Mann, Bundy, Ambassador Bunker, and General Maxwell Taylor. The meeting was held at 5 p.m., and was almost entirely devoted to a discussion of projected OAS action against Cuba; see *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, Document 3.



We confront a major policy decision. Should we:

1. quietly abandon our efforts against Cuba's trade with the free world and accept the probability of a significant increase in this trade with all its consequences?
2. adopt new tactics designed to bring our pressures more directly against the commercial interests of trading firms?
3. continue our present tactics, even though they are not adequate, because they may be an acceptable response to both domestic pressures to "do something" about Cuba and foreign pressures not to do too much?

If we decide to adopt new tactics, we have two major approaches open to us. We can employ either:

1. A proclaimed list barring U.S. citizens from any business or financial transactions with foreign firms trading with Cuba<sup>2</sup> and freezing the U.S. assets of such firms; or
2. A variety of partial measures, either singly or together, such as a denial of government contracts to traders with Cuba and private boycotts.

Although a significant amount of trade between Cuba and the free world would occur despite the establishment of a proclaimed list, the action would almost certainly be much more effective than any other measure or combination of measures we might employ. The fundamental question regarding a proclaimed list is whether we are prepared to endure the very real political costs that would result from its establishment and whether we would also be prepared to incur the risk of retaliation that might be directed against either United States commercial interests or the government itself.

Our problem is made more difficult by the probable necessity of a waiver for Spain under Section 620(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> According to the memorandum for the record of this February 19 meeting at 5 p.m., drafted on February 22, several of the participants felt that one stumbling block to the proclaimed list appeared to be an impossible hurdle, i.e., how could Free World firms be blacklisted while Soviet Bloc ones were not? On the one hand, the U.S. Government was pursuing measures designed to lessen tensions with the Soviet Bloc and to draw these countries closer to the West. On the other, if the blacklist procedures were not employed against the Bloc and Yugoslavia, then the United States would be open to the charge that it was punishing its friends but not the Communists. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution (Arms Cache), Vol. II, Memos, 11/63–9/64)

<sup>3</sup> Section 620(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of September 4, 1961 (PL 87–195), as amended by Public Law 87–872 on October 23, 1962, prohibited economic and military assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft transported merchandise to Cuba. The amended act authorized the President to waive the provisions penalizing such countries if he found it in the national interest to do so. President Johnson chose not to waive the act's provisions in the cases of Britain, France, and Yugoslavia, and in mid-February the Department of State announced that all assistance to them was terminated. The administration also suspended new aid commitments to Spain and Morocco, in the hope that they could be weaned from trade with Cuba.

because of the great importance of our bases there. The concession of the waiver will encourage Spanish-Cuban trade, but beyond that other free-world countries will exploit the waiver to justify their own economic activities toward Cuba. Furthermore, the waiver will be incongruent with and harmful to our attempts to obtain forward action from the OAS in the economic and anti-subversion sectors.

The prospect of the signing of a US-USSR civil aviation agreement poses another serious issue for our Cuban policies and illustrates, as in the case of the Spanish waiver, the sharp conflict between apparently irreconcilable major objectives. The policy choice we face is between:

1. The important broad interest to be served in our relations with the Soviet Union by the signature of the agreement; and
2. The serious damage to our attempts to maintain and strengthen the isolation of Cuba with respect not only to trade but also to the anti-subversion effort.

The choice is complicated by the negative effects of the conclusion of the agreement on our ability to obtain OAS action to sever air and sea transportation between the OAS countries and Cuba.

## *II. Counter-Measures Against Free-World Economic Ties with Cuba*

### *A. Necessity to Consider New Measures Against Trade*

It has become clear that the United States Government must either change its methods of restricting free-world trade with Cuba or accept the probability of a significant increase in this trade, with all its consequences. Our present tactics of relying essentially on diplomatic persuasion, reinforced by pressures on free-world firms trading with Cuba by their American associates and occasional small-scale preclusive purchases, have not prevented major breaches in our efforts to isolate Cuba. Key free-world governments have flatly refused to cooperate with our policy, even when approached at the highest level, and we are suffering successive losses. If we are to continue to try to arrest and turn back the trend in Cuban-free-world trade, we must turn our pressures more directly against the commercial interests of the trading firms, essentially making them choose between trade with Cuba or trade with the United States.

### *B. Possible Dimensions of Expanded Cuban Trade*

In 1963 Cuban exports to the free world may have amounted to about \$190 million, while imports were probably about \$115 million, a total of around \$300 million. During the year Cuba also increased its foreign exchange holdings from about \$20 million to approximately \$75–100 million.

Assuming that, in 1964, we are unable to reduce Cuban trade and that:

1. Cuba maintains sugar exports to the free world at about 1.4 million metric tons;
2. Sugar prices average about 8 cents a pound;
3. Cuba exports about \$10 million worth of other commodities to the free world;
4. Cuba maintains foreign exchange holdings at about present levels;
5. Cuba finances imports from the free world out of current export earnings;
6. Credits extended by free world suppliers to Cuba cover only Cuba's net deficit on invisibles,

then:

Cuba's exports to and imports from the free world would each amount to about \$260 million, for a total of about \$520 million, an increase of nearly 75 percent over 1963.

Obviously, a decrease in sugar prices or Cuban inability to export as much as 1.4 million tons of sugar to the free world could lower the export earnings and perhaps the total trade figure. On the other hand, if free-world suppliers were willing to extend large-scale credits to Cuba, then Cuba's imports from and total trade with the free world could use above the \$260 million and \$520 million estimates.

With respect to the impact that any increase in free world-Cuban trade would have on the Cuban economy, much depends, of course, on how Cuba allocates its foreign exchange holdings and how wisely it employs the goods it does import. A conservative assessment, however, would have to assume increasing Cuban competence in such matters. Significantly increased imports of commodities critical to the Cuban economy could provide the crucial margin between a wallowing economy and one showing satisfactory growth.

[Omitted here is section C, a detailed discussion of U.S. alternatives concerning free world trade with Cuba, and section III, "Measures to Counter Castro-Communist Subversion."]

243. Paper Prepared by Gordon Chase of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 26, 1964.

ECONOMIC ISOLATION POLICY—SUMMARY

*A. Free World Shipping to Cuba*

1. In 1962, Free World ships made a total of 932 trips to Cuba.
2. In 1963, Free World ships made 371 trips to Cuba. This represents roughly a 60% reduction from the 1962 level of Free World shipping to Cuba.
3. The prospects for further reduction in 1964 are fairly bright. In 1963, the Greeks, Lebanese, and British were the primary shippers. For all practical purposes, the Greeks have now left the trade. A Lebanese law is expected to become effective in mid-March which should eliminate many Lebanese ships during 1964. We have made very little headway with HMG, but a U.S. deal with the biggest shipper in the British trade (Mavroleon) is expected to result in a substantial reduction in the British ships by the end of 1964. Thus, the shipping figures in 1964 should be even lower than in 1963; this of course assumes that we can prevent other Free World ships from picking up the slack which we expect the Greeks, Lebanese, and Mavroleon to leave.

*B. Free World Aviation to Cuba*

1. In October 1962, Free World scheduled services to and from Cuba consisted of 20 flights per week, operated by four carriers. Also, there was a Cubana flight which operated between Mexico City and Havana, and a Canadian cargo service which operated once a week between Montreal and Havana. In addition, there were a number of Free World non-scheduled operations to Havana.
2. At present there is only one Free World scheduled service to Havana—Air Iberia operates between Madrid and Havana once a week. Cubana still operates its flights to Mexico and is now also operating, twice a month, to Madrid. The non-scheduled Canadian cargo run is still in operation. Other non-scheduled operations to Havana have been substantially reduced.
3. The prospects for 1964 appear fairly bright. At the least, we think we can hold the line. Hopefully, OAS action, because of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Free World Economic Ties with Cuba, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Chase and forwarded to Bundy attached to an "as you requested" covering memorandum of February 26.

Venezuelan arms cache discovery, will result in the cutting-off of the Havana/Mexico City air link. This will put another crimp in Castro's efforts to bring Latin Americans to Cuba for subversive training. (Other steps have already had a marked effect—in 1963, as compared to 1962, there was a 50% reduction in the number of Latin Americans who traveled to Cuba.)

*C. Free World Trade with Cuba*

1. In 1958, Cuba's total trade with the Free World amounted to \$1.5 billion. Of this, about \$1 billion was trade with the U.S., while about \$500 million was trade with other Free World countries.

2. In 1962, U.S. trade with Cuba was negligible while Free World trade with Cuba fell about 50% from 1958 levels to about \$200–\$250 million; exports to Cuba were roughly \$115 million while imports from Cuba were roughly \$120 million. Estimates indicate that when all the statistics are in, Free World trade with Cuba in 1963 will amount to roughly \$250–\$320 million; exports to Cuba are expected to remain the same at roughly \$115 million while imports are expected to jump to \$190 million. A table is attached which shows the primary Free World traders in 1962 and 1963.

3. The prospects for 1964 are not at all good. Assuming we generally continue on our present course, and take no further concrete steps to restrict trade (e.g. the drastic proclaimed list action), it is estimated that total Free World trade with Cuba could amount to roughly \$520 million, an increase of nearly 75% over 1963. This, of course, could vary. For example, if sugar prices drop below the estimated 8¢ per pound, then the value of Free World/Cuba trade in 1964 could be less than \$520 million. On the other hand, the value of Free World/Cuba trade in 1964 could be more than \$520 million if Free World countries extend large-scale credits to Cuba, or if the Bloc, anxious to break our isolation policy, decides to give foreign exchange to Cuba for purchases in the Free World.

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**244. Editorial Note**

President Johnson commented briefly on Cuban relations during a long telephone call that he placed to Senator Russell on February 26, 1964. He said, in part: "Tom Mann thinks we're stronger in the Hemisphere today than we were 90 days ago, because of what we've done in Panama and what we've done in Cuba. He thinks we're in worse shape than we've been in 20 years and that the Hemisphere is in a very dangerous position. But he thinks that these two little insignificant moves have let them know that 'don't tread on me.' And he thought they needed to know that pretty much."

Later in the conversation Johnson mentioned that Castro had talked during one of his interviews about wanting to turn the water back on at Guantanamo. Johnson summarized Castro's position as being "that he's not going to cause any real trouble and he wants Guantanamo, but he wants it peacefully." The President tied this to "when we fired 500 the first damned day, every one of them went to belly-aching to him that they lost their jobs."

In concluding about Cuba, Johnson said that Guantanamo had had "over 300 known subversives" and that he had "told the Admiral down there" that he would "try to do something about it." The President then said: "But I give up. Whenever I hit the Department of Defense or the Department of State, it's like a man trying to punch his way through a big thick mattress. You just can't do it. You hit it and the damned thing gives when you hit—the bed bounces back out." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Richard Russell, February 26, 1964, 12:10 p.m., Tape F64.14, Side B, PNO 1) The portions of the conversation printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

**245. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 26, 1964.

SUBJECT

Discussion with the President at 1:00 o'clock, February 26th; No one was present

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, Corona satellite coverage of the Soviet Union, and the surfacing of Oxcart aerial surveillance.]

5. I then referred to the Item [*1 line of source text not declassified*].<sup>2</sup> This item refers to the withdrawal of the Soviets from Cuba and the turning over of the SAM sites to them. I said there was a high probability that the SAM sites would be placed in the hands of the Cubans who would have absolute control over them. I said that other evidence convinced us there would be a continuing withdrawal of Soviets from Cuba, but not a total withdrawal; however we could not gauge the exact numbers. I said that this, in my opinion, represented probably the next important crisis that we would face because Castro in his rather amicable but long press conference had raised the question of our penetrating illegally Cuban air space. I therefore recommended that this subject be discussed with Secretaries of State and Defense; that they be ordered to prepare contingency plans for such a situation, otherwise we would be confronted with an emergency, all the lights in town would be on, and our course of action would have to evolve under an atmosphere of emergency. I pressed this point hard. The President asked if I had discussed it with McNamara and Rusk and I told him I had, on two occasions, but they seemed wholly preoccupied with the problem at hand and had never come to grips with this particular hypothetical but possible situation. The President gave me no satisfactory answer as to any action he would take. In fact, he seemed more preoccupied with the withdrawal of Soviets and the “numbers remaining” than he did with the issue I was confronting him with.

[Omitted here is discussion of Ghana and Nkrumah.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January–30 April 1964, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on February 27.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Briefings, 1/64–12/64)

**246. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 2, 1964.

SUBJECT

Guantanamo—Reduction of Cuban Employees

1. A new batch of commuters were given notice last week. The picture now is roughly as follows:

- (a) 300 "undesirables" are gone.
- (b) 180 domestics have left the Base; 35 others have exiled themselves or have other jobs on the Base.
- (c) 265 "goodies" are gone; 225 "goodies" have exiled themselves.
- (d) In total, therefore, roughly 1000 commuters have either left the Base or have exiled themselves.
- (e) 1220 commuters remain to be handled. If and when we give notice to this group, we estimate that roughly 40% will exile themselves.

2. As you may recall, about ten days ago I told DOD that we wanted the commuter reduction gently pushed through to zero.

3. A DOD contact confidentially tells me that he is skeptical that DOD will continue the reduction without a high-level push from the White House—while the Navy prepared a reduction plan at our request, Secretary McNamara appears to be holding it up. He went on to say that the Secretary has taken personal charge of the matter and may not want to carry the reduction beyond 1000 commuters—a figure which the President and he apparently agreed upon originally, at the time of the water crisis. The Secretary may be under some pressure from the Navy which argues (a) that a further reduction of commuters high-lights the erosion of our position in Guantanamo; (b) that the release of faithful employees is a tough moral, humanitarian problem, and gives Castro propaganda ammunition; and (c) that there is a practical difficulty in replacing them.

4. If the President and Secretary McNamara are on different wavelengths, you may want to bring up the issue at lunch on Tuesday.<sup>2</sup> To avoid speculation as to how the White House knows what it knows, you might bring the subject up (a) by noting the Guantanamo cable traffic which indicates that about 1000 commuters have been handled so far,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Guantanamo General, Vol. I, 2/64–2/65. Confidential; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> March 3. This paragraph is double lined in the left-hand margin and a notation in Chase's handwriting on page 1 reads "See p. 2," referring to paragraph 4. No other record of this Tuesday luncheon has been found.



and (b) by inquiring what the plans are with respect to the remaining 1200.<sup>3</sup>

5. While this is an evenly balanced case, I must say that I still favor the reduction to zero. As long as Castro can turn off or turn on the workers at will, the chances are better than even that, for one reason or another, he will tweak our nose in this respect before the year is out. And we will be faced with the same kind of head-line situation that we faced when he turned off the water.

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<sup>3</sup> In an April 6 memorandum to Bundy, Chase stated that the "grapevine confidentially tells me that the President apparently gave Secretary McNamara the word on this one—i.e. that he wanted the Secretary to continue the reduction." A notation in Bundy's handwriting connected by an arrow to the word "McNamara" reads "correct." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Guantanamo General, Vol. I, 2/64-2/65)

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#### **247. Memorandum for Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1964, 6:15–7:25 p.m.

The following are additional notes on the discussion at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting with the President on March 4, 1964 on Cuba, Vietnam and various related subjects.

In the briefing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the operational plans on Cuba and pointed out the various time factors involved—72 hours—7 days—18 days—and the sizes of the forces available in each of these time elements.

The Chiefs emphasized that one of the factors is shipping and that the longest time element involves getting troops from Fort Hood to the East Coast and the Marines from the West Coast through the Canal and to the East Coast for reembarkation.

In this discussion, the Chiefs reviewed the actions of October 1962. Much questioning by the President concerned the strategy involved and the various possibilities.

As an end result of this, the President directed the Joint Chiefs to give him a list, made up by themselves, of everything they think

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of C.V. Clifton, Meetings with the President, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Very Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

we can do that we are not now doing to put further pressure on Cuba.

In the discussion of Cuba there was mention of a joint resolution by Congress which would give the President a quasi-legal position for expanding the efforts. As he understood it, this joint resolution was to be based on an acknowledgment that the activities of Castro had taken on a new and different kind of threat to this hemisphere—not a security threat against the U.S. directly, but because of Castro's training of Cuban and Communist agitators and exporting them to other countries, he is posing a long-range threat to the stability and security of Latin America. On these grounds, he was posing a new threat which people around the world could recognize. Discussion of this resolution was not terminated precisely, but the Presidential reaction appeared to be included in his discussion and reaction to the proposal of a joint resolution by Congress concerning the war in South Vietnam.

The Cuban discussion also led to a discussion of a blockade and the difference between a quarantine which we held in October 1962 and a real blockade, including the halting of Russian shipping, and especially the stoppage of petroleum ships. It was indicated that the Joint Chiefs should discuss this possibility in conjunction with everything we can do that we are not doing.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam. For a memorandum of conversation prepared by Maxwell Taylor, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume I, Document 70.]

My concluding impression of this long discussion on Cuba and South Vietnam was that the President requested urgently that the Joint Chiefs give him their very best military advice in the form of two lists of action that could be taken—one for Cuba and one for the Southeast Asia area, and from what he had heard in the discussion, he was willing to accept their judgments, and, in a sense, was now setting out upon this course of activity which they had outlined verbally.

In turn, the President expected their 100% support of the actions agreed upon and a cessation (on the part of everyone) of forecasting and discussing in public what we intend to do. He emphasized this point with the comparison to the Normandy operation, pointing out how difficult and impossible it would have been for General Eisenhower to succeed if everything we were planning had been discussed by government officials, including State Department and military officials, before they even staged the landings.

**C. V. Clifton<sup>2</sup>**

*Major General, USA  
Military Aide to the President*

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**248. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 6, 1964.

We have one extremely (attached) interesting and disturbing intelligence report<sup>2</sup> to the effect that when Castro heard about the fishing boat incident, one of the things he thought of doing was to shoot down one of our U-2 planes in retaliation. This report underlines the fact that the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba are coming increasingly under Cuban and not Russian control, and that there is therefore a need to take measures to warn Castro and his Russian friends once more on the dangers of interference with our regular high-level surveillance. I therefore suggest that you may wish to sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State<sup>3</sup> asking for a diplomatic scenario aimed at strengthening our position on this matter.<sup>4</sup>

McG. B.

**Attachment**

**Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, March 6, 1964.

Recent intelligence reports indicate that Castro may have an itchy finger on the trigger of the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba. It seems to me very important that we take every possible step to warn both the Cubans and their Soviet friends of the risk involved in any interference with our high-level surveillance. I would be glad if the Department would promptly prepare a plan for appropriate, strong, high-level warnings on this point.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. I, 1/64–1/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached. On March 4 McCone sent an intelligence report to Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara that reported that Castro, in his rage over the fishing vessels incident, considered firing a missile at a U-2 plane as it overflew Cuba, but instead cut off the water supply to Guantanamo. (Ibid., Intelligence, Vol. I, 11/63–11/64)

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached; the attachment printed here is the memorandum the President signed on March 6. (Ibid., Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67)

<sup>4</sup> Johnson signed the memorandum indicating his approval.

**249. Letter From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 6, 1964.

Dear Mac:

Dick Helms and I are most appreciative of the opportunity you gave us this morning for a thorough discussion of the Agency's various operational problems in connection with Cuba. It was very helpful to us and has served to clarify to a great extent our own thinking on the future of our various operational programs. It might perhaps be well to set forth, in this informal fashion, a list of the various topics which we discussed together with the considerations that appear to me to apply.

In the first place, as you know very well, although the Agency appears as the proposer of most covert action programs at the Special Group and elsewhere, we do this only in response to what we understand to be policy requirements and have no interest in either commencing or perpetuating any programs which are not demanded by policy and which are not geared to the accomplishment of a specific objective. The interdependent program of actions which we proposed last spring and which was accepted in June<sup>2</sup> was based on three propositions which were accepted at the time: (a) that it was in the U.S. interest to get rid of Castro; (b) that, in attempting to do so, the U.S. did not wish either to employ overt force or to raise the international "noise level" to an unacceptable degree; and (c) that the ultimate objective of the program was not mass uprisings but to encourage disaffected elements within the military establishment and other power centers of the regime to carry out a coup.

The resulting program represented a maximum covert effort but only a minimum overall national effort which *could* result in overthrowing Castro. The percentage of chance of achieving this purpose was admittedly never too high even had the program proceeded on full blower. In fact the economic part of the program suffered a serious, if not fatal, reverse with the Leyland bus contract and subsequent moves by European suppliers to take advantage of Castro's improved cash position. The sabotage raids, built into the program as a sort of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Covert Program, 1/64-6/65. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the proposed program of action, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. XI, Document 346.

firing pin for internal unrest and to create the conditions for a coup, which was to be the main force leading to Castro's defeat, ran only from August to December and only five were actually conducted. The effectiveness of these five raids is certainly debatable; there are strong proponents on both sides of the argument. Regardless of how that debate might come out, however, five rather low-key raids followed by the present three-month hiatus, the latter clearly noted by pro- and anti-Castroites alike, adds up to a program of a much smaller dimension than originally envisioned which could not be expected to have had the desired detonating effect.

At the present time, as a result of a number of circumstances well known to you, Castro is in a strong upswing and the spirit of resistance within Cuba is at a very low point indeed. In my estimation, a covert program at this time designed to overthrow Castro is not realistic. Acceptance of risks and noise level of a greater magnitude than we had in mind in June would be needed to stand a chance in view of the developments since last June. This then raises the question of what should happen now to the various bits and pieces of the June program. I would like to mention these separately and refer to some of the considerations typical to each.

The sabotage raids are conducted by Cuban exile groups held and trained in Florida and entirely subject to our planning and control. There are three of these groups totaling approximately 50 men. To place them in position and recover them there requires an extensive maritime apparatus in Florida, which likewise serves intelligence agent infiltrations and exfiltrations. To maintain the raiding capability on a stand-by basis is expensive but, more importantly, the raiding groups themselves have a relatively short shelf life; if not employed their morale deteriorates and some of the members, usually the best motivated, drop out. Replacements can be acquired and trained but their caliber and morale is in large part determined by the morale of the exile community as a whole. We probably can retain the present raiding groups at roughly their current capabilities for another month or two, although the well-known Cuban volatility is capable of causing sudden and more rapid deterioration.

In short, we will need to know within a reasonable time whether we should continue to effect repairs to and keep in being our sabotage raiding apparatus. The dismemberment of these raiding teams could be accomplished without too much shock to the exile community. It would be noticed, but, if done carefully, particularly if it coincided with the commencement of "autonomous" operations, it should not cause undue repercussions and polemics against U.S. policy.

As you know, again as part of the June plan, we are supporting two "autonomous" exile groups headed respectively by Manuel Ar-

time and Manolo Ray. In both cases we have gone to maximum lengths to preserve the deniability of U.S. complicity in the operation. Artime, who now possesses the greater mechanical and paramilitary apparatus, has required a good deal of hand-feeding although still within the context of deniability. He will probably not be ready for his operations against Cuba before April or May of this year. He possesses most of his hardware and maritime equipment and has negotiated geographical and political bases in Central America. Manolo Ray has been handled on a much more independent basis. We have furnished him money and a certain amount of general advice. He does not possess the physical accoutrements that Artime has and is probably not as well equipped in terms of professional planning. Ray has a better political image inside Cuba among supporters of the revolution and has recently acquired, according to reports, some of the other leftwing exile activist groups such as Gutierrez Menoyo and his Second Front of the Escambray. He is said to be ready to move into Cuba on a clandestine basis late this spring. His first weapon will be sabotage inside Cuba, apparently not externally-mounted hit-and-run raids.

If U.S. policy should demand that the "autonomous" operations be suspended, we could of course cut off our support immediately. Artime and his group might or might not disintegrate at once. Manolo Ray almost certainly would continue. Both groups are based outside the United States and our only real leverage on them is through our financial support but withdrawal of this support would probably be fatal to their operations in time. A cutoff of this support, even though this support has been untraceable in a technical sense, would have a considerable impact within the exile community. U.S. support is rumored, especially in the case of Artime, and the collapse of the only remaining evidence of exile action against Castro would hit the exile community hard which is what it in turn would do to its favorite target, U.S. policy. The exile of today, however, appears to have lost much of his fervor and, in any case, does not seem to have the capacity for causing domestic trouble which he had a year or two ago. The Central American countries in which the exile bases exist would be greatly confused, although we have carefully never indicated to the governments of these countries any more than U.S. sympathy for the "autonomous" groups.

We have a capacity, which is increasing, to sabotage Cuban merchant ships calling at foreign ports. We are emphasizing in this program the more subtle forms of sabotage as against large explosions obviously stemming from agent-placed bombs and limpets. The Cuban merchant fleet, among the most badly run in the world, can be helped along to a measurable degree by this program.

On the economic warfare front, as you know, we have for many months conducted a covert denial program based on limited

capabilities directed at very narrow targets. The effectiveness of this program is dependent on the careful selection of items to be denied in terms of their critical value to a key element of the Cuban economy. Despite the virtual collapse of the U.S. overall economic denial program against Cuba, we still retain the capacity, using unofficial and covert methods, to hurt but obviously not to destroy certain bits of the Cuban economy. This effort can be complemented by carefully concealed contamination of lubricants and similar actions.

Our program to get in touch with and subvert members of the military establishment and other elite groups in Cuba continues. Its chance of success naturally rises and falls with the state of morale inside Cuba as influenced by the success or inactivity of our other programs and the U.S. posture in general.

Our intelligence program continues at full force. It will be affected by anti-Castro morale but we believe that we can offset the effects of further deterioration in this morale by increasingly tightened and efficient operations.

We are seeking your advice to know which of the above lines of actions we should continue, which we should try to retain as a shelf capability and which to abandon. (Of course, intelligence collection would continue.) As parts of an integrated national program designed to have at least a fighting chance to get rid of Castro, they seemed to us to make sense; as separate pieces they can serve to exert some braking effect on Castro's progress, but that is about all.

Sincerely,

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**250. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 12, 1964.

SUBJECT

Cuba—Miscellaneous

*1. Warnings to Cubans and Russians about SAM's*

I refer to the President's memo to the Secretary (attached)<sup>2</sup> requesting that warnings be given to the Russians and Cubans to deter SAM firings at our U-2's over Cuba.

John Crimmins tells me that, a couple days ago, State completed a package for the President's approval.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary signed off and intended to bring the matter up at the luncheon meeting with the President on Tuesday;<sup>4</sup> reportedly, he did not do so because other people were present. The State paper recommends that we send a warning note to the Cubans only; we would send it through the Czech Embassy so that the Russians would be sure to see it. Tommy Thompson feels that we should not send a warning note directly to the Russians.

It is hard to comment without seeing the State package but my own preliminary view is that the general guiding principle in this case must be that we should do whatever is most likely to restrain the Cubans from shooting down a U-2. Castro scares me because I think he is a man who can regard a threat as credible but still disregard the consequences if his honor and emotion are involved; the upcoming OAS action may be just the sort of thing which will rile him next. On the other hand, when the Russians regard a threat as credible, they appear likely to act accordingly. In short, I believe that we are most likely to prevent a shoot-down if our note to Castro is buttressed by a good strong pitch from Khrushchev to Castro; Khrushchev, after all, has real leverage over Castro.

If Tommy Thompson's indirect approach to the Russians is most likely to result in a strong Khrushchev pitch to Castro, then I am for it. If, however, we are more likely to get the most effective Khrushchev

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64-7/67. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See the attachment to Document 248. A notation in the upper left hand corner in Bundy's handwriting reads "GC. Ask them where this is?"

<sup>3</sup> Document 251.

<sup>4</sup> March 10; no other record of this meeting has been found.



pitch by sending a stiff note directly to the Russians, then other arguments, against sending a note to the Russians, should be very powerful to be over-riding. (Another consideration might be that we would want our position on a shoot-down to be clearly on the record vis-à-vis the USSR; especially, if one occurs.)

[Omitted here is a brief item on Morocco.]

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**251. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1964.

SUBJECT

Warning to Cubans and Soviets Against Interference with our Aerial Surveillance of Cuba

1. I recommend that the warning to the Cubans and Soviets against interfering with our overflights of Cuba, which you requested in your memorandum of March 6, 1964,<sup>2</sup> be done in the form of a note to the Cuban Government to be delivered through the Czech Ambassador in Washington. By using this method and channel we can be sure that the Soviets will also get the message without our incurring the disadvantage of making a special, direct approach to them on the subject. There is enclosed for your consideration and approval the text of a proposed note.<sup>3</sup>

2. I also recommend that as a further deterrent we get word to Castro through “black” channels that: (a) we have taken very careful note of his recent public statements on overflights, (b) we interpret these statements as a threat to shoot down our surveillance flights, and (c) we would like nothing better, and we are prepared to react immediately to such an eventuality.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See the attachment to Document 248.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> There is no indication on the memorandum that the President approved items 1 or 2.

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*Discussion:*

The late President Kennedy and I on various occasions following the missile crisis made public statements indicating that in the absence of inspection on the ground we would maintain our surveillance flights over Cuba and that any interference with those flights would invite a dangerous situation. A compilation of these statements is enclosed.<sup>5</sup>

Last June the Cubans sent us a note protesting U.S. overflights<sup>6</sup> and warning that: (1) Cuban gunners had orders to fire at any foreign war plane that makes low-altitude flights over Cuban territory, and (2) the Cuban Government was stepping up its preparations to shoot down any war plane that violated Cuban air space at any altitude. In our reply, sent to the Cubans through the Czechs, we reminded the Cuban Government of our publicly expressed position on the dangers of any interference with air surveillance and pointed out that our position remained unchanged. We considered sending the note through the Czechs tantamount to notifying the Soviets of our position. The text of our reply is enclosed.<sup>7</sup>

In recent months Fidel Castro has repeatedly alluded to violation of Cuban air space by U.S. aircraft. The most forthright of his statements was made in a press conference with foreign newsmen on February 6, 1964. Castro said: "The Government of Cuba has repeatedly warned the United States of the consequences which may result from violations of our air space. It must not be forgotten that this is an arbitrary action which may create problems and incidents."

The foregoing statement, made in the context of the fishing boat incident, gives us a good occasion for sending a warning to the Cubans on the overflights. Since in the next few days we plan to send a routine reply to the Cubans, via the Czech Ambassador, on their notes concerning various aspects of the fishing boat incident and Guantanamo, we would use the same occasion to deliver the warning note. By sending the note through the Czech Ambassador we can be sure that it will reach the Soviets. This will avoid our having to make a special, direct approach to the Soviets on this matter, which could be counterproductive in that the Soviets would feel compelled to respond and thus commit themselves more formally in ways they may otherwise desire to avoid.

**Dean Rusk**

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> The text of this note is in the Microfiche Supplement to Volumes X, XI, and XII of *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963.

<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed; see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Document 352.

**252. Memorandum From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 17, 1964.

1. The State memorandum<sup>2</sup> is not fully responsive to the President's request, which was for "a plan for appropriate, strong, high-level warnings" on interference with our high-level surveillance over Cuba.<sup>3</sup> There are several "open" circuits in Washington other than a State Department typewriter.

2. The warning should not be given in a note to the Cubans through the Czechs or even to the Russians.

a. A note calls for a reply from Castro which can only be unsatisfactory.

b. A note is a formal challenge in an area where we have been living under a tacit non-interference agreement. All the draft note does substantively is to remind Castro of this fact.

c. Castro's threats have been in public statements. We should not raise them to the formal level. Last June the Cubans sent us a note to which we replied. Should they do so again, we could make a formal reply.

3. The importance of non-interference of our surveillance is such that it should not be mixed up with the fishing boat and Guantanamo incidents. The State memorandum proposes the warning note be delivered along with routine replies to notes about these incidents.

4. The Russians should continue to be held responsible for Castro's conduct in connection with those aspects of the Cuba missile crisis which are still with us. Our surveillance arises out of Khrushchev's failure to get Castro to accept on-site inspection in Cuba. The fact that the Russians may be turning over "control" of the SAM sites to the Cubans does not relieve the Russians of their responsibility to ensure that these SAMs are not used against the U.S. reconnaissance planes. (It is inconceivable to me that the Russians would not retain ultimate control of these weapons by means of a "permissive link" device.)

5. Established channels used during the missile crisis should be used again to convey a strong, informal, direct warning, i.e., Tommy Thompson to the Russian Ambassador here. Castro's statement could be used as a peg on which to hang a reminder to the Russians that for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Document 251.

<sup>3</sup> See the attachment to Document 248.

us the surveillance of Cuba is an issue involving the USSR—that as the controlling power they are responsible for their satellites' use of the weapon.

6. If the Russians deny their responsibility for controlling Castro's use of the SAM sites, or acknowledge that they have no capability to control these weapons now that they are being operated by Cuba, we are in immediate need of some serious planning about how to get out of what would be an intolerable situation.

7. As to recommendation 2 of the State memorandum, i.e., getting word to Castro through "black" channels, I am at a complete loss to understand what purpose would be served. To tell Castro that we would like nothing better than to have him shoot down one of our surveillance flights so we could retaliate is to issue the kind of a challenge that even a rational Latin has difficulty turning down. The whole proposal should be dropped.

BKS

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**253. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 19, 1964.

Alexis Johnson has discussed with me your views on notification to the Soviets of our attitude toward a possible Cuban shoot-down of a U-2 after the Cubans assume control of the SAM sites.

I feel sure that even an informal approach will prompt a reply from the Soviets and that they would be bound to state that the Cubans have every right to defend their sovereignty over their air space. The important thing, in my view, is that if the Cubans do shoot down a U-2, we will want to treat our retaliatory action as a purely United States/Cuban affair. This would be harder to do if we were on prior notice from the Soviets that they would support the Cubans in their defense of their sovereignty, which is a quite possible Soviet response to any direct approach on our part. I feel confident that before turning over the SAMs to the Cubans, the Soviets will have had some understanding with them

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64-7/67.

about their use. If the Cubans should shoot down a plane without prior agreement with the Soviets, I think it quite possible that the Soviets, while making fierce noises, would not, in fact, give the Cubans real support and would use the violation of their understanding as an excuse for not doing so.

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**254. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

JCSM-253-64

Washington, March 21, 1964.

SUBJECT

Possible Actions Against the Castro Government (C)

1. At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 4, 1964,<sup>2</sup> you directed them to concentrate their attention on possible ways of obtaining greater support from the Organization of American States (OAS) in carrying out a program directed at the eventual overthrow of the Castro government. Also, you asked that they examine additional ways of bringing pressure upon Castro beyond those presently authorized.

2. With regard to possible actions by the OAS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States Government should seek the cooperation of the other OAS members in obtaining the complete isolation of Cuba from other American States. Further, the United States should, if possible, secure broad authority for a wide range of actions under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, including the possible use of armed force against Cuba, should OAS members, individually or collectively, deem such action necessary to prevent further intervention and aggression by Castro. With these possible objectives for OAS action in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the text of the proposed OAS resolution which the United States has suggested that the Venezuelan Government propose for the consideration of the OAS member states. They consider that if such a resolution is adopted essentially in its present form, the United States Government will have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba–U.S. Policy, Vol. II, 12/63–2/65, Box 29. Top Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 247.

sufficient basis for action directed at the further isolation of Cuba and for military action against Castro in case of further aggression on his part. Hence, for the time being, they have nothing additional to suggest in this field.

3. With regard to measures designed to put additional pressure on Castro beyond those presently authorized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend a resumption of the program (which is presently approved but on which no actions are currently being taken)<sup>3</sup> involving the employment of covert assets to conduct interdependent operations, including the covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions, economic denial actions, and externally mounted sabotage operations against Cuba. As this program unfolds, they would favor expanding and intensifying it while maintaining a continuing evaluation of the reactions of Castro, the communists, and the Free World. Concurrently, they favor the development and conduct of a hard-line propaganda campaign, integrated with the foregoing actions, to estrange the Castro regime from the Cuban people and the remainder of the Free World.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate United States objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. However, they have difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which have not been previously considered, and in some cases tried. It is a hard fact that little remains which offers promise of real effectiveness in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military action up to or including invasion. They will keep this problem under continuing review and advise you should any new and promising courses of action be uncovered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Maxwell D. Taylor**

*Chairman*

*Joint Chiefs of Staff*

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<sup>3</sup> This program was detailed in a CIA paper, June 8, 1963; see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Document 346.

**255. Editorial Note**

Under Secretary of State George W. Ball's speech on "United States Policy Toward Cuba" before the North Atlantic Council in Paris on March 23, 1964, was an important statement on U.S. policy toward Cuba during the Johnson Presidency. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 CUBA–US)

Ball said that the loss of Cuba to communism was a loss not just to the United States, with its long and particularly close ties to that country, but to all free nations, because it had created a beachhead of communism in a very vulnerable but important part of the world, Latin America. Ball stated that the United States regarded Cuba as a subversive threat, not a military one. He highlighted the aggressive and subversive nature of Castroism, the non-negotiability to the United States of Castro's political, economic, and military dependence on the Soviet Union and his subversive activities in Latin America, and the objectives of the U.S. and OAS economic denial programs. The latter, he said, were limited to lessening Castro's will and ability to export subversion and violence, convincing the Cuban and Latin American peoples that Castroism could not serve their interests and that communism had no future in the Western Hemisphere, and increasing the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a Communist outpost in Latin America. Ultimately, however, Ball said that Latin America would be rendered "immune to Communist infection only by an amelioration of the conditions—political, economic, and social—in which subversion flourishes. The United States and the free nations of Latin America have, therefore, through the Alliance for Progress, undertaken a major collective effort" to transform the structure and production of the region.

Ball explained how Cuba was "almost uniquely suited to a policy of economic denial," but that the program would "be effective only if generally supported by the Western Alliance." Ball said that the United States and its allies had developed a three-pronged program of common action to exploit Cuba's economic vulnerability by: 1) restricting the availability of Free World shipping to Cuba, 2) limiting the categories of goods available to Cuba, and 3) limiting governmental credit guarantees in connection with sales to Cuba. The importance of the latter action was emphasized by Ball. Noting that "a recent transaction was presumably made possible only by a positive government decision to guarantee the financing," he said:

"The primary question is not, therefore, whether governments should impose negative controls on exports to Cuba—as the United States does, for example. The central issue is whether member governments of the Western Alliance should take positive action to en-

courage such sales by assuming risks that commercial bankers are unwilling to take.

"To the people of the Western Hemisphere—including many of my countrymen—this element gives such transactions the appearance of a political act—and an act that has the effect of defeating the principal instrument short of war available against a regime that seriously menaces free governments in the Western Hemisphere."

In telegram Polto 1138 from Paris, March 23, Ambassador Finletter reported that Ball's presentation "drew so much support that UK decided best not to speak at all. Canada, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Greece and Turkey spoke out strongly in favor US policy." Finletter added that several "permanent representatives expressed view US case as just lucidly presented to NAC should be presented to European public badly informed on Cuba" and he concluded that "UK appears isolated in NAC on Cuba." (Ibid.)

In a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on April 15, reported in telegram Polto 1472 from Paris, April 15, British representative Shuckburgh read a statement under instructions in which he declared that the United Kingdom was "opposed in principle to economic warfare no matter what name is except in case like Berlin contingency planning." He added that the "UK does not agree that its trade policies should be custom tailored and designed to differentiate among Communist countries in accordance with conditions and behaviour of individual countries and with specific objectives towards each. This is fundamental difference." Shuckburgh noted that the "British are a trading people and trade is essence of their survival." In the case of Cuba, he said, British trade policy coincided with its political judgment, in that the "UK does not think that policy of economic denial is right or wise politically or likely to be effective." Among many other arguments, Shuckburgh stated that the UK questioned "whether there is direct relationship between Cuba's economic strength and her capacity for subversion." (Ibid.)



**256. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 24, 1964.

On March 6 we sent the Secretary of State a memorandum asking for a strong plan to warn "the Cubans and their Soviet friends" against any interference with our high-level surveillance in Cuba. The Department has now come back with a plan which is intelligent as far as it goes. In essence it is that we should send a diplomatic warning to the Cubans by way of the Czechs,<sup>2</sup> and follow this up by certain covert statements which will reach Cuban ears and show that we are entirely serious.

The Department thinks we should not go straight to the Russians, and after discussing the matter with Ambassador Thompson,<sup>3</sup> I now find his arguments persuasive.

I do think that one further element is needed—and that is an appropriate public warning from you at some appropriate time—perhaps in answer to a question at an early press conference. If you agree, I will see to it that such a question comes up.<sup>4</sup>

McG. B.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> The warning was issued on March 27 to Czech Ambassador Duda, who was given two diplomatic notes for Cuba, one of which concerned the overflights. Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Adams emphasized to Duda that "we want to make sure that there is no misunderstanding about our continuing position on this matter." (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, PS 8–5, Gitmo Protests and Fishing Boat Incident) A copy of the protest note is *ibid.*, Central Files 1964–66, AV 15 Overflights Problem—Public Relations, 1964.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 253.

<sup>4</sup> The approved option is checked.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

**257. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
(Crimmins) to the 5412 Special Group<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 30, 1964.

SUBJECT

Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile Groups

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the members of the Special Group as to the current state of operational readiness of the autonomous Cuban exile groups which receive U.S. Government support and to indicate what might be expected of these groups in the relatively near future.

2. As part of the covert program authorized in June 1963, CIA is providing financial and some technical support to two autonomous Cuban exile groups headed respectively by Manuel Ray and Manuel Artime. In our judgment, Artime and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Ray, now possess the hardware and maritime equipment as well as the geographical and political bases in Central America needed to launch independent infiltration and sabotage operations against Cuba. Both groups also appear to have reached a state of training and psychological readiness which could impel their leaders to launch operations against Cuba at almost any time and with little or no notice to the U.S. Government.<sup>2</sup>

3. The possibility of imminent unilateral operations on the part of the autonomous groups is brought to the attention of the Special Group at this time since it is related to the question of the future of CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations now under review by higher authority.<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that if a policy decision is made

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> According to U. Alexis Johnson's notes on the April 2 Special Group meeting, FitzGerald said that "if we paid Artime, we could probably control to some degree" but that "We have no control over Ray." (Ibid.) In an April 7 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Califano wrote that although no decision was made on the future of the sabotage program at the April 2 Special Group meeting, "McGeorge Bundy indicated that he would call a meeting with higher authority this week [see Document 259] with the hope that definite policy lines could be determined for future covert activity against Castro." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 1 31, Cuba, Activity Against Castro)

<sup>3</sup> At this point the following was crossed out: "This relationship was described in Part V of the memorandum entitled 'Review of Current Program of Covert Action Against Cuba,' dated 24 January 1964, submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group." The January 24 memorandum is in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records.

to terminate sabotage and harassment operations for the autonomous groups as well as for CIA, it will be necessary to terminate support for the autonomous groups as CIA would not be in a position to insure that they would refrain from raids and sabotage even if so requested.<sup>4</sup> In fact, it now appears likely that neither group will disintegrate at once upon notification of termination of U.S. subsidies. While withdrawal of U.S. financial aid and moral support would probably be fatal to their operations in time, they are likely to make strenuous efforts to find other sources of support. In so doing and in order to prove their viability to potential supporters, they would, in their desperation, probably feel compelled to launch one or more dramatic raids against Cuba.

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<sup>4</sup> Since the Special Group did not address this issue at its April 2 meeting, Crimmins asked that they have another look at the memorandum during the next weekly meeting. (Memorandum from INR Deputy Director for Coordination Joseph W. Scott to Johnson, April 6; *ibid.*)

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## **258. Central Intelligence Agency Briefing Paper<sup>1</sup>**

SC No. 02971/64

Washington, April 7, 1964.

### **CUBA**

I. We have seen no change since the beginning of the year in the size of the Soviet military establishment in Cuba, but the evidence continues to point to an imminent turn-over of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system to the Cubans.

A. We believe there are still about 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, making allowances for as many as 2,000 more or less.

B. The majority—perhaps as much as 80 percent—can and probably will be withdrawn when the Cubans complete their SAM training later this month.

C. An advisory and technical assistance group of perhaps one or two thousand will probably remain for some time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan–Apr 1964, Box 6, Folder 7. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*]. Prepared for McCone to use at a White House meeting; see Document 259. McCone apparently did not use the document.

II. Cubans have been conducting comprehensive air defense drills throughout the island on an almost daily basis since early February. *[3½ lines of source text not declassified]*

A. Cubans have already assumed control over most early warning radar functions.

B. *[3½ lines of source text not declassified]*

C. Some of the more sophisticated radar and communications equipment we would not expect the Soviets to turn over has been removed from the SAM sites.

D. Air defense activity conducted wholly by Soviets has been declining steadily, and *[5½ lines of source text not declassified]*.

III. Cuban naval and ground forces have been improving their combat capabilities with more intensive and more realistic training, organizational improvements, and *[1 line of source text not declassified]*.

A. *[2½ lines of source text not declassified]*

B. Cuba apparently is going to draft about 25,000 men a year for the next three years, but with simultaneous discharges, the Cuban force level of about 100,000 probably will not increase much, at least at the outset.

1. Our photography, incidentally, has recently shown the enlargement of existing barracks, and the establishment and occupation of fairly extensive tent camps with field kitchens. This probably reflects preparations to receive the draftees.

IV. Our evidence is that there may be as many as 1,500 Cubans training in bloc countries at present, suggesting that Cuba may be expecting additional Soviet military equipment soon.

A. Last month Soviet ships carrying otherwise non-military cargos brought in another six of the fast P-4 Soviet motor torpedo boats—making 12 in all—and some extra surface-to-air missiles.

B. There have been three purely military cargos delivered to Cuba this year, and a fourth is on the way, probably carrying vehicles and spare parts. One of the earlier ships brought in 12 crated MIG jet fighters, probably as replacements, which are still sitting in their crates at San Antonio de los Banos.

V. Castro himself has recently been preoccupied with economic matters and with the re-trial of Marcos Rodriguez, an old-line Communist charged with having betrayed student conspirators to the Batista police. Castro steered the second trial to center the blame on Rodriguez personally, rather than the party, thereby heading off a possible purge of the old guard Communists and putting them further in his debt.

A. The immediate economic concern is the sugar harvest now under way. Indications are the 1964 crop will be no bigger than last year's 3.8 million tons—possibly less.

B. [1 line of source text not declassified] the crop is being adversely affected by labor shortages, by a somewhat lower sugar content in the cane, and by damage to the cane by the mechanical cane loaders.

C. In general, however, Cuban officials are cocky about their economic situation at present, and optimistic over prospects for improvement. You have probably read Che Guevara's gloating remarks at the UN Trade and Development Conference in Geneva. The Cubans are convinced they have, as they say, "broken the back" of our economic denial effort.

D. The Cubans had a balance of about \$100 million in convertible currency, largely from sugar sales, at the end of 1963. The sugar agreement Castro negotiated with the Soviet Union on his January visit makes them feel that sugar earnings will continue to increase. This confidence seems to be reflected in the credit ratings the Cubans are getting.

1. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

2. Against this background, Cuba is becoming a much more attractive market for non-bloc countries, so much so that the Cubans feel they may be in the driver's seat.

3. Japan used to be Castro's biggest single trading partner in the Free World, but last year both exports and imports fell off. Now the Cubans are telling Japanese firms that unless they trade with Cuba, Havana will feel compelled to switch the business it does in Japan to Western European firms.

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## 259. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 7, 1964.

### SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House 7 April 1964

Subject—Review of Covert Program directed against Cuba

### PRESENT

The President

State Department: Secretary Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Mann, and The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Mr. Crimmins

Defense Department: Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance

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<sup>1</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Mtgs with the Pres., Jan–Apr 1964, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret.

JCS: General Maxwell Taylor  
CIA: The Director, Messrs. Helms and FitzGerald  
White House Staff: Messrs. Bundy and Dungan

1. Mr. Bundy presented to the meeting a memorandum<sup>2</sup> to guide discussion concerning the Cuban program against Cuba. Seven categories of activities were listed in this memorandum as follows:

- (1) Collection of intelligence.
- (2) Covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance.
- (3) Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial.
- (4) Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba.
- (5) Indirect economic sabotage.
- (6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding.
- (7) Autonomous operations.

2. Mr. Bundy's paper recommended continuation of the first five items listed and recommended discussion of the last two.

3. There was a brief discussion of item (5) during which various methods of economic sabotage were described. There was no disposition on the part of those present to interfere with this program.

4. With respect to sabotage raiding by CIA-controlled assets, Secretary Rusk said that two things presently militate against a resumption of the program: (a) the pending OAS matter with respect to the Venezuelan arms cache which may be strengthened by discovery of arms in Argentina as well as in Brazil, and (b) the prospective turnover of the SAM sites by the Russians to the Cubans in April or May. Secretary Rusk said that we would wish to maintain a clean hands posture while the OAS case is pending and that if the Cubans are to misuse the SAMs we would wish the onus to be fully on their backs. Secretary Rusk said that in addition he does not believe that hit-and-run raids are in any event very productive; that they have a high noise level and, furthermore, that he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possibly wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U.S. involvement in order to increase that involvement. Mr. Bundy said that in the past he had been an advocate of sabotage operations, but in view of the history of the program since June, he had come to the conclusion that it is unlikely that an effective sabotage program will be conducted. In explanation he pointed out that the policymakers, each time for good reasons, had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that a program of the type envisioned in the June paper simply does not, in the nature of things, appear feasible.

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<sup>2</sup> Dated April 7. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Covert Program, 1/64-6/65)

5. Mr. McCone called attention to the paper dated 8 June 1963<sup>3</sup> which is the basis of the Agency's current program against Cuba. He quoted from the 8 June paper as follows:

Paragraph 2: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba."

With respect to the interdependence of the various courses of action comprising the program, he quoted from paragraph 5 of the paper as follows: "Unless all the components of this program are executed in tandem, the individual courses of action are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in terms of achieving relatively limited policy objectives. This is clearly a case where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts."

With respect to the sabotage program, he quoted from paragraph 6.E. as follows: "It must be recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate significant resistance. However, it is our opinion that a well-planned series of sabotage efforts, properly executed, would in time produce the effect we seek."

Mr. McCone pointed out that five relatively low-key sabotage operations since June 1963 do not in effect constitute a test of the program and that the statements quoted from the 8 June paper remain valid. He said that there was a surge of anti-Castro sentiment during the fall of 1963, corresponding with the period during which the sabotage raids were conducted, but that resistance sentiment has now fallen into apathy. He said that the five items for which approval is recommended in Mr. Bundy's paper would not have the effect envisioned by the 8 June paper although they might have the effect of slowing down Castro's consolidation of his regime.

6. The Secretary of State said that part of our problem has to do with the Soviet Union which is now going through a crisis period, particularly with respect to the Sino-Soviet split. He said that he felt sure that were Ambassador Thompson present at the meeting he would indicate the danger of forcing Khrushchev to take a militant defensive attitude with respect to Cuba. Secretary Rusk said that should the Cubans shoot down a U-2, raid peaceful shipping off the coast or should there be a strong OAS resolution, the question of the conduct of sabotage raids could be reconsidered. (I do not think that I am in error in quoting the Secretary as equating a U-2 shootdown with a good OAS resolution as a basis for resuming raiding operations.)

7. Mr. Mann said that his attitude towards CIA-conducted raiding operations would depend upon getting a clear legal basis for action against Cuba out of the OAS. He said that he doubted that all

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<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Document 346.

seven courses of action combined would result in the overthrow of Castro. He said that he leans away from CIA-conducted raids and towards autonomous operations. He said that at the present time, particularly in the light of the Brazilian events, favorable action by the OAS on proposed paragraph two of the resolution looks like a fifty-fifty chance. In reply to Secretary Rusk's query, I said that I believed that CIA-controlled raiding assets could be held together for another two months pending the resolution of the Secretary's two points (OAS and Cuban use of SAMs).

8. I briefed the President on the present status of autonomous operations, including the fact that Artime is planning to launch his operational program on the 12th of April. There was some discussion of these plans but no one appeared disposed to try to stop Artime. I said that Manolo Ray's plans were not as well known to us but that he had made it clear that he intended to move by May.

9. The Secretary of Defense said that it was his opinion that the covert program has no present chance of success in terms of upsetting Fidel Castro. He suggested that it might be useful, for reasons which had not been brought out at this meeting, and pointed out that the principal decision to be made was a broader one—presumably what the overall U.S. attitude should be with respect to Fidel Castro. He said that he felt that the present raiding assets should be held in being pending resolution of Secretary Rusk's two points but that in the meanwhile the fundamental question should be debated. Mr. Vance said that he agrees with the suggestion of continuing these assets in being but that he believes that the program, if permitted to go forward as planned, would at least have the advantage of hindering Castro in the consolidation of his power. He pointed out that the noise level of the raiding operations had not in fact been very high. He would advise resuming raiding operations following the resolution of Secretary Rusk's points. General Taylor said that the Joint Chiefs favor the program in its entirety, that they believe the program has never been given a fair test and that we should move forward with it in the interests of making Castro's life as hard as possible. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA covert program is the only matter to be resolved today, that the matter of our negotiations with the British on the economic program and sugar support would be ready for discussion next week.

10. Secretary Rusk recommended to the President that we keep the raiding assets in being for the next two months and that the question be discussed again following the resolution of OAS events and the Cuban use of the SAM sites.

11. The President accepted this recommendation.

**Desmond FitzGerald**

*Chief*

*Western Hemisphere Division*



### **Attachment**

Washington, April 8, 1964.

*Dictated by Mr. McCone:*

McCone went on to say the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy as outlined in the 8th June paper and also less specifically in the paper circulated in the meeting by Mr. Bundy, or abandon the basic objective of bringing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective. Specifically McCone said that he could envisage such issues as extreme economic distress caused by sharp drop in sugar prices or other external factors arising which might cause Castro great pain and, ultimately, his downfall. In summing up his position McCone stated that the actions favorably looked upon, that is, intelligence gathering, propaganda, economic denial and surreptitious acts against Cuban ships all would have some effect but definitely would not accomplish the stated objectives.

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### **260. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 9, 1964.

A meeting was held at 1015 on 9 April with Mr. Bundy, Desmond FitzGerald and Richard Helms to discuss the problem of independent action by Cuban emigre groups headed by Manuel Artime and Manolo Ray. The following points were made:

Mr. FitzGerald stated that he did not believe any verbal dissuasion had any chance of success with Artime in his determination to mount an operation from Central America.

Those present agreed that it was possible to block the operation by an air-sea search and by the use of U.S. Navy destroyer but that this was a drastic step.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964, 1965. No classification marking. Drafted by Jessup.

Mr. Helms pointed out that this could write finis to use of Cuban emigre groups and would radiate considerable fallout elsewhere.

Mr. Bundy capsuled the problem by saying his worry was whether an Arttime attack would give the U.S. a hypocritical image when out of the other side of its mouth the U.S. was plumping for votes at the OAS to outlaw subversion and armed attack.

He further said that he wanted to be clear as to whether higher authority fully grasped the implications of the autonomous exile group activity as discussed at Tuesday's meeting.<sup>2</sup> *This he was going to check.*

Mr. Bundy felt it would be extremely useful to regularly publicize Castroite guerrilla activity both in Argentina (thus far played only by the *Christian Science Monitor*) and in Central America as a contrasting backdrop to possible Castro slurs against Cuban exile activity.

PJ

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 259.

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## 261. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 22, 1964.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador  
David Henry, Deputy Director, SOV

After a discussion of the other subjects the Secretary raised the matter of Cuba. He said that the United States had hoped the Western Hemisphere could be protected against aggression from Cuba either by the original US-USSR agreement of October 1962 for ground inspection, which the USSR had been unable to persuade Castro to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, April 1964. Confidential. Drafted by the Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs, David Henry on April 22 and approved in S on May 2. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Office. The memorandum is part III of III; parts I and II concerned the site of the new Soviet Embassy building and Laos. (Ibid.)

accept, or by the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America which would offer sufficient protection if it could contain some provision for following up on indications of violation. Unfortunately, neither of these had worked out. The basic point he wished to make to the Ambassador was that the United States has no desire to inflame the situation further. The United States overflights are as discreet as possible, but it is essential for the United States to maintain them so that we can tell our people and those of the other Hemisphere nations that there is no danger from Cuba. The overflights are also related to Castro's activities in the Hemisphere. Gromyko had said that these activities were more talk than action; but the United States has indications of actual Cuban subversive action in, for example, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and most recently in Guatemala. The Secretary emphasized that he was mentioning these matters out of a desire to avoid a major crisis with Cuba. He hoped that the Soviet Government will caution Castro not to inflame the situation into a major crisis. The United States is not attempting to stir up a crisis over Cuba and he hoped Castro is in the same mood. He also hoped that some progress could be made toward a nuclear free zone in Latin America. He had the impression that the USSR would favor such a zone but that Castro opposed it.

The Ambassador in reply said that he would be frank. How could one convince a small country that it should allow the airplanes of a big country to overfly it? What self-respecting country could accept a note stating that overflights would continue? How can the United States have any right to overfly Cuba? The OAS has excluded Cuba, so how can the United States retain any rights from the OAS system and agreements? Cuba could not be a serious threat to the United States or the Western Hemisphere.

The Secretary replied that Castro knew he could live at peace with the other nations of the Hemisphere if he so desired, but on the contrary he had declared war against his neighbors. Therefore we must keep watch to assure against aggression. Cuba had mounted a real threat in Venezuela, and Guatemala, and was also involved in Panama. The basic point was that Castro was not trying to find a way to live at peace with his neighbors, but, the Secretary repeated, the United States is not looking for trouble over this issue.

In response to a question from Dobrynin the Secretary reminded him that the USSR had agreed to ground inspection of the missile sites in Cuba in October 1962. He added that the United States had been interested in a nuclear free zone in Latin America because such a zone would go far to meet the inspection problem. In response to a question the Secretary confirmed that the United States and other Western Hemisphere nations are still interested in the possibility of a nuclear free zone which would include all except the United States.

Dobrynin raised the question as to why Cuba had suddenly received so much attention during the last few days. There followed an exchange on this subject in which the Secretary emphasized the celebration in Cuba of the anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion while Dobrynin implied that the United States had itself generated the recent attention to Cuba.

Dobrynin then repeated that any self-respecting government would react against overflights of its territory and said the USSR could not support with Castro such a position (i.e., to urge him to accept the overflights).

The Secretary concluded the conversation by reiterating that Castro had an opportunity to live at peace with his neighbors but was not interested and that the United States wants no further crisis over "this wretched little man" and he trusted the USSR felt the same way.

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## **262. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 29, 1964, 4:45 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Discussion with President Johnson—Wednesday afternoon—29 Apr. 4:45 in his office

### **PRESENT**

The President and Mr. McCone

[Omitted here is discussion of the National Security Council, DeGaulle, and intelligence matters.]

4. I mentioned to President Johnson that I had discussed with Eisenhower the possibility of a Cuban shooting down a U-2. That Eisenhower first responded by indicating that he thought, under such circumstances, the offending SAM sites should be "taken out." However, after considering the problem and reviewing a map, he expressed the opinion that perhaps it would be best to take out all the SAM sites, although Eisenhower did not go so far as to firmly recommend this action. President Johnson then asked my opinion. I stated I most certainly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan-Apr 1964, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret. Prepared by McCone on April 30.

would take out several SAM sites in the vicinity and possibly all of them. President Johnson retorted he agreed and in fact, he favored taking them all out, indicating that the public opinion, UN discussion, etc. would be just as valid on one as on all and therefore we might as well dispose of the problem in its totality.

I then told President Johnson it was unnecessary to have a U-2 shot down, that we could operate the ECM equipment, but this had been steadfastly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President asked that I discuss this matter with McNamara and General Taylor.

*Note:* Subsequently I reviewed this question with McNamara and Taylor and McNamara was of the opinion that JCS was incorrect for technical reasons and the use of the ECM on the U-2 would not compromise the plan to use the ECM on the B-52.

McNamara stated that the subject was very technical and therefore it was agreed to convene a technical group from Defense (headed by Fubini) and CIA (headed by Wheelon) who could examine all facets of the problem and hence McNamara and I would be in a position to make a firm recommendation to the President and the Executive Committee at a meeting scheduled for 12:00 noon on Saturday, May 2nd.

[Omitted here is discussion of North Vietnam.]

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## 263. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 1, 1964.

The following is the brief summary you requested of actions taken by the U.S. and U.K. to place economic pressure on Cuba. I am inclosing a detailed list to give you a more precise and complete picture of U.S. actions.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330, 69 A 7425, Cuba 381, May–July 1964. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The President's request has not been found, but was evidently issued in order to prepare for a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Butler on May 4. Topol 1696 to Paris, May 4, reported that at this meeting the "question of British trade with Cuba, including credit guarantees, was raised by President and Secretary in vigorous terms" in private meetings with Butler. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 CUBA-US)

*United States*

- a. Prohibited unlicensed exports to Cuba except for non-subsidized foodstuffs and medical supplies. (Licenses are not normally granted.)
- b. Established embargo prohibiting import of goods of Cuban origin.
- c. Prohibited Americans from having financial transactions with Cuba and blocked Cuban assets in the U.S.
- d. Eliminated U.S. air and surface links with Cuba.
- e. Exerts bilateral and unilateral, official and unofficial pressure on foreign countries and firms to reduce trade with Cuba and cut air and surface links. For example, U.S. has terminated aid to countries which failed to take steps to stop ships and planes from participating in Cuban trade.<sup>3</sup>
- f. Reduced dollar flow through Guantanamo Naval Base by Cuban employee reductions and termination of retirement pay to Cuban Civil Service employees.

As a result of these actions, U.S. exports to Cuba fell from \$547 million in 1958 (\$223 million in 1960) to \$37 million in 1963 (of which \$36.4 million was for the Bay of Pigs prisoner exchange). Imports to the U.S. from Cuba fell from \$527 million in 1958 (\$357 million in 1960) to \$1 million or less in 1963.

*United Kingdom*

- a. Made minimal informal representations to shipowners discouraging further participation in Cuban trade.
- b. Discourages Cuban air operation to the U.K. and inspects Cuban aircraft upon landing on U.K. fields.
- c. Denies use of its Caribbean dependencies as air transit points.

U.K. exports to Cuba fell from \$26 million in 1958 (\$21 million in 1960) to \$6 million in 1963. U.K. imports from Cuba amounted to \$50 million in 1958 (\$22 million in 1960) and \$35 million in 1963.

**Robert S. McNamara**

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<sup>3</sup> A detailed 6-page summary of U.S. economic pressures and legislative actions against Cuba, attached but not printed, included the report that, under Section 620(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, enacted December 16, 1963, "United States aid was terminated to countries which failed to take appropriate steps by February 14, 1964, to prevent their ships and aircraft from carrying all goods to or from Cuba. (UK, France, and Yugoslavia were denied aid; Morocco and Spain were considered to have taken 'appropriate steps.')

**264. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

SNIE 85–2–64

Washington, May 2, 1964.

**LIKELIHOOD OF AN ATTEMPTED SHOOT-DOWN OF A U-2****The Problem**

To estimate Cuban and Soviet intentions with regard to US overflights of Cuba.

1. When we last reviewed this general subject in December 1963, we estimated<sup>2</sup> that the Soviets would probably relinquish control of the SAM system in Cuba, perhaps shortly after the Cubans were able to operate the entire system. We further estimated that Castro might endeavor through diplomatic and propaganda means to force a political solution with regard to the overflights, beginning such a campaign even before final transfer of the system.

2. Castro is now engaged in a campaign of this sort; we believe that he still prefers to try to force the cessation of U-2 flights by political pressure at the UN and elsewhere. Because he expects to gain complete control of the SAM system within the next few weeks he hopes that, with Soviet support, his warnings will be taken seriously and the US compelled to abandon U-2 flights over Cuban territory.

3. The Soviets must for obvious reasons give strong political support to Castro, yet they almost certainly wish to avoid the major crisis which would follow a shoot-down. They could escape such a crisis by withholding control of the SAM system, and we do not rule this out despite the high political cost to the USSR. The US, however, can have no assurance that Khrushchev will take this way out. Indeed, we continue to estimate that the odds favor the complete turnover of controls to Cuban personnel. Moreover, the Soviets probably still hope to persuade the US to discontinue or modify the overflight program. Recent Soviet approaches to the US may have been designed to gain time and probe for a possible settlement. Probably also the Soviets will strongly urge Castro to try all possible political actions before shooting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 85, Cuba. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on May 2.

<sup>2</sup> SNIE 85–4–63, dated December 18, 1963, "Soviet Transfer of the Surface to Air Missile System to Cuba." (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, NIEs and SNIIEs)

4. If Castro obtains control of the SAM system and becomes convinced that agitation and pressures are ineffective, we believe that there will be a significant and, over time, growing chance that he will order a shoot-down. Indeed, he may believe that any US military reaction will be a limited one, and could even help his case by incensing world opinion. We think this general estimate is supported by his May Day speech.

5. There is, of course, a possibility of an unauthorized shoot-down attempt; in view of the importance to Castro of this matter we believe the chances of such an occurrence are small.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

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## 265. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1964.

### SUBJECT

Discussion at National Security Council meeting Saturday—2 May 1964

*Note:* the initial part of the meeting the President did not attend

### PRESENT

The President, Rusk, Ball, Johnson, McNamara, Vance, LeMay (representing JCS), Bundy, Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Thompson

*Note:* Several White House Staff members were present

1. McCone opened the meeting by discussing pages 1 through 3 of the attached May 1st memorandum reviewing actions taken by USIB<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May 1964, Box 6, Folder 8. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on May 4. According to the President's Daily Diary the President joined the meeting in progress in the Cabinet Room at 10:40 a.m. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed, this memorandum noted that there were continuing reports of offensive missiles in Cuba and that most of these reports had been disproved through the examination of concurrent photography. It noted that the vulnerable U-2 aircraft could be made less so if electronic countermeasures (ECM) were used, but that the "continued use of ECM would, in the opinion of experts, permit the early development of counter countermeasures and hence the value of the ECM equipment would rapidly deteriorate." Peripheral photographic reconnaissance "will not provide needed intelligence." The USIB stated that drones "would produce useful photography though not as good as the U-2," but that they were "vulnerable, more so than the U-2." The new CIA-developed high-altitude, high-speed Oxcart reconnaissance aircraft, later known as the SR-71 Blackbird, would "not be operational at the design speed of 3.2 Mach and 85,000 to 90,000 feet for another few months." The CORONA satellite system was judged to be "not sufficient to give us useful photography."



on the recommendation of COMOR on the 2nd of April and in the past few days, reaffirming the need for overflights but on a reduced scale and indicating that, except for a most unusual circumstance, two to three flights per week would meet COMOR requirements.

2. Thompson stated that his analysis of recent statements by Khrushchev and Castro indicated that there was a strain between the Soviets and Castro. It appeared to him that Castro is concerned that the relaxed tensions between the U.S. and the USSR exposed Cuba to actions by the U.S. which would not be seriously challenged by Khrushchev.

3. Rusk stated that he felt that the threat was not immediate.

4. McCone contributed the SNIE<sup>3</sup> which was read carefully and all agreed with the conclusions.

5. There was some discussion in which there was complete agreement on the obvious necessity for continued overflights. Rusk stated that we cannot negotiate with Castro—this was out of the question. Castro will attempt to bring the issue to the Security Council or the General Assembly. He will receive considerable sympathy but he will not receive an affirmative vote in the Security Council and he could not get the two-thirds majority necessary to place the subject before the General Assembly.

6. Our tactic will be to throw the issue into the OAS, thus keeping it out of the UN and depending upon the October, 1962 resolution which calls for continuing aerial surveillance in the absence of on-site inspection. Rusk did not expect a blessing from the UN or the world at large, but he does not expect an adverse vote in any form.

7. The question arose as to reopening the UN offer for on-site inspection. McCone stated that much would depend on how this inspection was carried out. UN inspection has not been very satisfactory and that probably (though not assuredly) aerial photography would be necessary to complement on-site inspection.

8. Rusk said that their attorneys felt that if the issue was brought to the World Court, our case would not be good, however they could confuse it by concurrently putting forth a great many counter claims against Cuba such as ceding property, etc., etc.

9. I then turned to a discussion of the alternatives as covered in pages 4 through 7. I added a point made at USIB that a shootdown of a drone would not create an incident exactly paralleling the shootdown of a U-2 and also put forward the idea of drones. Also in the discussion I noted State Department's reservations, but not their dissent at USIB, on the question of the intensity of the overflight program.

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<sup>3</sup> Document 264.

10. My final recommendation was that the U-2 flights should be continued, the use of ECM's should be carefully considered and in the final analysis the compromise of ECM equipment was up to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Alternate means of aerial photography were not satisfactory; alternate intelligence assets would not suffice our needs; we could expect a continuing flow of human resource information concerning "missiles in Cuba", which must be checked out.

11. There was no disagreement with these recommendations.

12. The President then joined the meeting.

13. Rusk reviewed the discussions accurately, except in interpreting the SNIE he indicated to the President the Board was not concerned about the immediacy of an incident. I stated the Board could not be sure about this.

14. After some discussion, and inviting any dissents, the President decided that:

a. We should continue the U-2's overflights on the basis of two to three a week as determined by USIB;

b. He favored use of the ECM; he instructed McNamara and the Chiefs to review the subject on Monday;<sup>4</sup> he felt the JCS' arguments were probably not valid and he wished them studied in the light of the morning discussion.

c. He called a meeting for 12:00 o'clock noon Tuesday to make a final decision on the use of ECM equipment.

15. During the meeting there was considerable discussion of the use of the Oxcart. I stated that it was my opinion (though I had not checked it out with our operators) that it could be used in a matter of weeks at about 2.2 Mach, 75,000 feet and several months later at 3.2 Mach and 85,000 or 90,000 feet, that its presence would be known because it would appear on the radar and the sonic boom would be audible, it would be more disturbing to people in Cuba than U-2's because they could not see the U-2 but they would hear the Oxcart, that because of the absence of the Tall King search radar I felt the SAMs with their Fan Song would not be effective on the U-2 because of their short reaction time. I pointed out the use of the Oxcart would compromise it as a reconnaissance vehicle. No decision was reached.

16. McNamara stated that if ECM equipment was used, he felt there would be a 95% or more possibility that the first U-2 that was attacked would survive and come home. He pointed and, and I confirmed, that this would create a new situation as it would demonstrate Castro's true intentions which were now only a matter of conjecture. McNamara asked that the Contingency Plan be amended to discuss courses of action under such a situation.

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<sup>4</sup> May 4.

17. McNamara then stated that while he does not agree with the Joint Chiefs on the seriousness of the compromise of ECM equipment, he is against using it now, suggests it be kept in readiness, and the question be reviewed from week to week.

18. The actions are as follows:

a. Study the operational capabilities of the Oxcart.

b. Study the vulnerability of the Oxcart.

*Note:* Both of the above to be discussed with JCS Monday afternoon in preparation for Tuesday's meeting.

c. Develop in detail the Agency position on ECM which varies from the SAG-JCS position.

d. Prepare to supply CIA planes equipped with ECM on short notice until the SAC planes are fully modified.

*Note:* In this discussion McNamara stated that ECM equipment similar to Systems 13–15 was aboard the Powers' plane and therefore known to the Soviets.

*Action:* I would like this explored because this question did not arise in the Powers' Hearings.<sup>5</sup> I was very much surprised to hear that Powers had ECM equipment aboard and raised the question in my mind as to why he did not turn it on when he had received the warning. Also I raised the question as to why this matter, if true, was not brought out in the very extensive Hearings with Powers upon his return.

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<sup>5</sup> Francis Gary Powers' U-2 aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. After his release from captivity by the Soviets, he spoke about the U-2 incident at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 6, 1962.

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## 266. Summary Record of the 530th National Security Council Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1964, 10 a.m.

### OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBA

The meeting began without the President. Mr. McCone distributed, and the group read, the attached SNIE 85–2–64, "Likelihood of an Attempted Shoot-down of a U-2."<sup>2</sup> The conclusion was that Castro prefers

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 2, Tab 2, May 2, 1964. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

<sup>2</sup> Document 264.

to try to halt the U-2 flights by pressure at the UN and elsewhere, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a growing chance that he will try a shoot-down.

Secretary Rusk said we need to deal with four questions:

- (1) What is our intelligence requirement for aerial reconnaissance?
- (2) What do we think Castro will do to prevent our overflights?
- (3) What is the best way to meet our intelligence requirements?
- (4) Are there any additional political actions which we could take in the immediate future to reduce the risk that Castro will try to shoot down a U-2?

Director McCone, reading from a paper,<sup>3</sup> made the following points in response to Secretary Rusk's request for the views of the intelligence community:

(1) Aerial photography is the only dependable evidence we have on the status of Soviet military equipment in Cuba. All alternatives to aerial photography have been carefully studied and all have been found wanting.

(2) The intelligence community has concluded that overflights must be continued but the number of missions can be reduced from the number now flown. Three flights per week are considered essential. There have been forty-two refugee reports about missiles in Cuba since January 1, 1964. In order to check on these reports, we must have aerial photography.

(3) Castro will probably take over control of the SAM sites and he probably will try to shoot down a U-2 at some time in the near future.

Secretary Rusk asked whether we had aerial photography which we had not read out. Mr. McCone replied that we did not. However, we have taken pictures of the same objects many times but we continue to have a requirement for current pictures in order to check on incoming refugee reports.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said all agree that overflights are required. The number of flights could be reduced but this made little difference because the risk of a shoot-down remained approximately the same and the political cost of the overflight problem was not materially affected by the number of missions flown.

Secretary Rusk and Mr. McCone expressed the agreement of all those present that there is a requirement for from two to three flights per week—two certainly and an additional one if cloud cover or other operational problems make the third flight necessary.

Ambassador Thompson commented that overflights of Cuba create a strain on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets, in their May Day slogans, had downgraded the Cuban problem. The Soviets believed,

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 265.

however, that because we had sent a note on overflights to the Cubans via the Czechs, we were taking a new initiative and launching a new move against Castro. They felt we had concluded that we had interpreted the climate of improving U.S.-Soviet relations to mean that we had a free hand to do what we wished to Castro as far as the USSR was concerned.

Secretary Rusk said Dobrynin had asked him directly<sup>4</sup> why we had raised the problem of the overflights in a note in writing. He had left the impression that we could have handled this in another way, thereby avoiding making a direct issue of a problem which had not been causing concern for months.

Secretary Rusk recalled that during the missile crisis of October 1962 we had discussed a nuclear free zone in Latin America and on-site inspection in Cuba by the UN. These ideas had been accepted by Khrushchev but flatly rejected by Castro.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that Castro, in his recent speech, had made clear that the overflights issue was not of a nature to lead to the possibility of nuclear war. However, the Ambassador believes the danger of a Cuban shoot-down of a U-2 will increase.

Secretary Rusk said that a shoot-down was not imminent. Assistant Secretary Mann also agreed with this view which is expressed in the SNIE. However, there is a strong possibility that Castro will raise this question in the UN.

Secretary Rusk then asked how we could best meet the agreed intelligence requirement. Mr. McCone said that the U-2 was vulnerable. If we equipped it with electronic countermeasures (ECM), its vulnerability would be greatly decreased, but countermeasures would be developed very rapidly, thereby reducing the effectiveness of existing ECM equipment. In addition, the use of ECM risks compromising the equipment in the event that an ECM-equipped U-2 were shot down. The Russians know about our system but they are not familiar with specific equipment which we have developed.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that if the Russians knew our ECM was on a U-2, they might try very hard to shoot one down.

Mr. Fubini, as the expert, answered a question as to whether the Powers plane had been equipped with ECM. He said the plane did have some ECM equipment which undoubtedly had been obtained by the Russians. Secretary McNamara added that all the Government's ECM experts are agreed that the Soviets have our ECM equipment or equipment similar to it. General LeMay noted that he believed the Soviets may have the idea of our system but they do not have specific knowledge of our equipment.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 261.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that ECM is not on our major strike forces. If an ECM-equipped U-2 is shot at, the plane would be ordered to abort its mission and its chances of survival would be almost 100%. If the plane were shot at, we would then have a new confrontation requiring additional U.S. action. This particular situation is not included in the present contingency plan which is based on a U-2 having been shot down.

General LeMay said that the Cubans had the option of not shooting at the first mission of an ECM-equipped U-2. In a short time they would learn how to deal with the ECM equipment and then would be in a position to attack the U-2.

Secretary McNamara said that even after practice the Cubans would have only an approximate 20% chance of shooting down an ECM-equipped U-2. Deputy Secretary Vance commented that the chances of hitting a U-2 were much greater if it did not have ECM equipment.

Director McCone commented on the following alternative methods of fulfilling our intelligence requirements:

(1) *Peripheral photography.* This is useful for targets on the coast but it does not cover inland targets and will not provide the intelligence we require.

(2) *Drones.* They do not produce as good coverage as the U-2. They are more vulnerable. The shooting down of a drone would call for a different response by the U.S. because no pilot is involved.

(3) *Balloons.* These could operate at 90–100 thousand feet with good cameras and would be relatively invulnerable. However, they cannot be controlled without an elaborate setup which does not exist but which could be constructed. The coverage depends on the control of the balloons. Thus, the coverage is not as good as the U-2 and the American public, learning of this, could complain that we were not adequately covering the island. Secretary Rusk said that a balloon is different only because it is unmanned.

General LeMay, responding to Secretary Rusk's question, said the pilot of a U-2 cannot outmaneuver a SAM missile. To do so keeps the plane in the area a longer time, and, therefore, increases the risk. SAM missile guidance makes them lethal.

(4) *Oxcart.* This plane is not ready to fly at its peak capacity and will not be for several months. It is now able to fly mach 2.2 at 75 thousand feet. It could not be shot down but its presence would be detected. The propaganda difficulty would not be relieved because the plane makes a loud sonic boom which would be heard by many people on the ground. Secretary Rusk commented that we might use the Oxcart with its sonic boom and then ask Castro if he preferred that we go back to the silent U-2. This might be something to talk about.

(5) *Satellites.* Mr. McCone said the camera resolution is not good enough for our purposes. The weather is often difficult and cloud cover is a problem. As to specific targets, it is not possible to synchronize

the satellite so that specific targets would be covered by plan not by coincidence. There is the difficulty of the north and south orbit of present satellites. Only 5% of the island would be covered in a four-day orbit. There is a possibility of an east-west satellite orbit, but it would take at least nine months to establish tracking stations to make such an orbit possible. The expanse of an east-west orbit system would be considerable. In summary, there is no satisfactory alternative to the U-2.

In answer to a question, General LeMay said the B-58 could not do the job even with ECM. The plane is capable of a supersonic burst and the first mission would get through, but following missions would have great difficulty.

Secretary Rusk discussed political actions which might be taken:

(1) Negotiations on the overflight problem with Castro would be fruitless.

(2) The UN Security Council might be asked to vote against the overflights. We could probably prevent an adverse vote by telling Council members that the problem was being dealt with by the OAS. If we could persuade the Council that the OAS was seized of the problem, we could avoid an adverse vote but we could not possibly get a favorable vote.

(3) The General Assembly, which will not meet until Fall, could be kept from a 2/3 adverse vote. We would probably get more "yes" than "no" votes but many countries would abstain.

(4) We might revise the October 1962 proposals for on-site inspection in Cuba. The risk here is that the Cubans might accept and then we would have to give up overflights in return. Would a UN on-site inspection system meet our intelligence requirements? In October 1962 we answered this question in the negative.

Director McCone said he was not prepared to answer the question but he would look at it carefully. He personally doubted the value of a UN on-site inspection in Cuba.

(5) World Court. Secretary Rusk is not too sanguine about what we would do if Castro took us to the World Court in an effort to disprove our right to overfly Cuba. We could show that our authority for the overflights was given us by the OAS but is an OAS ruling binding on Cuba which refused to accept the OAS decision? We say it is, but the International Court of Justice might not say it is. One way to deal with an effort by Castro to use the World Court would be for us to offer to adjudicate all outstanding legal issues with Cuba. We could thus confuse the overflight issue by talking about the legality of the nationalization of American property in Cuba, etc. There is always the possibility that Cuba could formally withdraw from the OAS and denounce the treaty, thereby claiming that it was not bound by any OAS action. One action we could take would be to go again to the OAS to request a reaffirmation of the 1962 resolution.

Secretary Rusk concluded by saying that inevitably we must continue the U-2 flights. We should look again, perhaps at a later date, at the possibility of using Oxcart.

The President entered the meeting at 10:45. Secretary Rusk summarized the earlier discussion and Secretary McNamara summarized the conclusions, pro and con, of the use of ECM.

Mr. Bundy said that everyone agrees that overflights are necessary.

Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the use of ECM on U-2s overflying Cuba because of the risk of reducing the effective implementation of our Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). He said that he personally felt we could use the ECM and would have a 95% survival chance of escaping on the first shot if the U-2 immediately aborted. He did not recommend the use of ECM now because he did not think the Cubans were ready to attempt a shoot-down. He recommended that the use of ECM be reconsidered on the basis of a review each week of the risk of a Cuban effort to shoot down a U-2.

In response to a question, both Mr. McCone and General LeMay said that the ECM equipment could be put on the U-2 a very few hours after a decision to do so is made.

Secretary Rusk raised again the feasibility of using the A-11. Mr. McCone described the sonic boom problem with the A-11 which the U-2 does not have. When the A-11 is flying at maximum altitude and maximum speed, it is dubious whether the SAM missile could hit it. It might not even be seen by Cuban radar.

The President said we had no choice but to continue our overflights. However, we should take every precaution to avoid a U-2 being shot down. He asked that we explore again the use of ECM. He asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review their position and to weigh the use of the ECM against the possibility of a U-2 shoot-down and what would flow from that action. We will meet again Tuesday to discuss the matter further. A careful study of the use of the A-11 as an alternative would be available then. We must provide the required intelligence, but we must make every effort to increase the security of the overflight planes. We should get our information in a most secure way and make the overflights as secure as possible. In the meantime, we should continue our present program.

Secretary Rusk said we might consider a mix of overflight instruments such as U-2s, interspersed with the A-11.

Secretary McNamara, referring to the contingency plan in the event a U-2 is shot down, commented that the plan did not discuss what we would do if an ECM-equipped U-2 were shot at but not shot down.

Mr. Bundy said the contingency plan was available for the President's reading. It provided for military reaction under certain circumstances.

The President expressed an interest in the contingency plan, particularly in view of the fact that he had read in the press all about what



it was supposed to contain. He expressed his irritation that war plans leak to the press. He had gotten almost to a point where he hated to meet with Foreign Ministers because he read in the press the following day everything he had said to the Minister and some things he hadn't said. Only four people were present at a recent meeting, but reports of what went on appeared in the press. (This apparently referred to a conversation with Foreign Minister Butler.) We must tighten up security and put an end to such press leaks.

Bromley Smith<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 267. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 5, 1964.

### SUBJECT

Discussion at NSC Meeting—5 May 1964

### IN ATTENDANCE

Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Thompson, McNamara, Vance, Taylor, Bundy, Dillon, Mann, Attorney General and McCone

1. McNamara reviewed the use of ECM equipment on the U-2's, stating that doing so would not compromise SIOP;<sup>2</sup> would give some protection initially but not over the long range; the Soviets know the principals of our ECM; ECM would not provide great protection to the U-2 but the degree of protection was open to question as it was obvious that ECM would not permit continued use of U-2's to meet intelligence requirements. JCS objects for a variety of reasons and General Taylor discussed this.

2. General Taylor stated that the JCS agree that the use would not compromise SIOP; pointed out 14 countries have SAMs and therefore

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May 1964, Box 6, Folder 8. Secret; Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary President Johnson joined the meeting in progress in the Cabinet Room at 12:25 p.m. and left at 12:55 p.m. (Johnson Library)

<sup>2</sup> Single Integrated Operations Plan; see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. X, Document 112.

compromise might be serious at some future time. Vulnerability was uncertain and was dependent upon the warhead, noting there were 100# and 500# warheads and that DIA had indicated 500# warheads were on the Cuban SAMs. (McCone said we had no intelligence on this.) Therefore JCS recommended against the use of ECM.

3. Rusk raised the question of whether a new pattern of flights crossing the island, rather than flying the axis of the island, would reduce exposure. McNamara said this could be done by increasing the number of flights and therefore the danger.

4. McNamara then advanced the idea of drones, stating they were awkward to use, of questionable reliability, limited in quantity, but raised an alternative intelligence means. ECM would make them less vulnerable but would compromise ECM.

5. I then stated that drones were limited in number, were only six of two types operational and three in the works; altitudes were 54,000' to 59,000' versus 64,000' to 72,000' for the U-2's; photography resolution equivalent to U-2 but area limited to 18-mile swath and 255 miles of linear coverage; that drones were vulnerable to MIG-21's; that they could be identified by contrails and therefore I had reservations concerning their effectiveness. McNamara agreed and after some discussion the drone question was pretty well dismissed. The same is true of balloons as it was felt they represented more serious operational problems than drones. The Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, expressed himself very positively against changing to drones as it would represent an unacceptable retreat.

6. We then turned to a discussion of the Oxcart. I stated that it was coming along well, giving the figures on the number of flights and the speeds but that all of our operational people, without exception, felt that we must not attempt to use it until it is completely debugged and this would take several months. Furthermore I said that at 2.2 Mach the Oxcart would possibly be vulnerable to SAMs though this was uncertain.

7. Secretary Dillon then asked what the ultimate value of the Oxcart was. I stated that when fully operational it probably would be quite invulnerable except under miraculous circumstances.

8. Thompson spoke the political situation, feeling that Khrushchev and Castro would be restrained during this year, recognizing our internal political situation.

9. The President entered and Rusk and McNamara reviewed the conversations. The President commented that we were right back where we started.

10. Rusk raised the question of UN on-site inspection. I agreed that properly planned and executed on-site inspection would be somewhat more dependable than in October 1962 because of our knowledge of the island gained through extensive photography.

11. McNamara then recommended that we operate for a week with U-2's at the rate of 2 to 3 flights a week on the assumption that Castro will not take offensive action. In the meantime we create ECM capability but not use it; finally we expedite our drone capability to give us an option but that we emphatically deny any intent to use them. McNamara noted some leaks about drones out of the Pentagon which disturbed him.

12. The President inquired about expediting the Oxcart. I took the position we would do all we could to push the development and debug the vehicle but said that we were working against unexplored frontiers of aviation; that many felt unexpected problems were arising—some of which we can answer rapidly, but many have to be answered by methods of “cut and try”; and that the problem in hand would not lend itself to a “crash” program.

13. There was no discussion of the Contingency Plan.<sup>3</sup>  
[Omitted here is discussion of Laos.]

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<sup>3</sup> According to a May 1 memorandum from Califano to Bromley Smith, the Contingency Plan was a DOD-State Paper entitled “U-2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans,” which developed a series of actions to be considered by the United States in advance of and after the shoot down or attempted shoot down of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. The Contingency Plan is attached to Califano's memorandum. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May 1964, Box 6, Folder 8)

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## 268. Summary Record of 531st National Security Council Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 5, 1964, noon.

### LAOS AND OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBA

The meeting began without the President. Secretary Rusk asked Secretary McNamara to review the problem of the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) on U-2s overflying Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said that the use of ECM in the U-2 would not, in his opinion, seriously compromise implementation of SIOP.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meeting File, Vol. 2, Tab 3, May 5, 1964. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

Some experts believe the survivability of U.S. bombers over the USSR will be reduced if ECM is used over Cuba. This is very hard to evaluate. However, the use of ECM on U-2s over Cuba will not provide great protection for the planes flying regularly over Cuba. The protection will be limited to the first plane flying over. It would not be sufficient to protect U-2s on a regular flight basis. After the first flight there would be a 90% chance of a successful shootdown if the Cubans made a determined attack on the plane.

General Taylor said that the use of ECM would not have a serious effect on the implementation of SIOP. However, some fourteen countries now have Soviet SAM systems. To use ECM in Cuba would undoubtedly result in the transmittal to these other countries of the methods of dealing with the ECM. In addition, there may come a time when we have a critical need to look at a SAM-defended site. If we use the ECM now, we would throw away the one free ride which we would like to have in reserve in case of critical need. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends against the use of ECM because it will not protect continued overflights, plus the fact that its use will risk compromising the ECM equipment.

Secretary McNamara said that flight plans could be made which expose a U-2 to attack from fewer SAM sites. He did not recommend that this course of action be followed.

The discussion then turned to the use of drones. Secretary McNamara said the use of drones would be an awkward way of meeting our intelligence requirements. We had never operated drones to this extent. There are numerous operational problems limiting the capability of drones. We have enough drones now so that within ninety days we could carry out our full reconnaissance requirements, but for the next ninety days we could obtain only 75% of our requirements. These estimates excluded enemy action against the drones. With existing drones encountering enemy action we could probably carry on for several weeks, operating at the 59,000 to 54,000 foot level.

Director McCone said he had trouble with the suggestion that we rely on drones to meet our aerial reconnaissance requirements. Only two drones are operational now at 50,000 feet. Two more will be operational in the next fifteen days at this height. The U-2 operates at 64,000 to 68,000 feet. This difference in altitude is important because the drones flying at the lower level will have contrails. Thus, they are more detectable and more vulnerable. In addition, there is considerable difference in the width of ground photographed—18 vs. 30 nautical miles. The drones have a 255 linear mile limit, which is considerably less than the U-2s. There is a loss of track accuracy of plus or minus five miles, or approximately an eighteen-mile swath.

Secretary McNamara said he agreed with Mr. McCone's evaluation of the difference between the U-2s and drones, but, even so, we

could carry out our required intelligence mission by using drones. The cost would be about \$80,000 per drone mission or about \$150,000 per U-2 equivalent. It is true that the drones will cost more and are less predictable. If there is enemy action against the drones, they would be able to carry out their mission for a period varying from two to six weeks.

Mr. Bundy asked whether Secretary McNamara was thinking of a course which would run Castro out of weapons. Secretary McNamara said he was. For example, we might use nonphotographic drones which would be less costly to lose.

Mr. McCone said the idea of running Castro out of SAM missiles would depend on whether he used MIG-21s against the drones. Secretary McNamara replied that great pilot skill is required if a MIG actually shoots down a drone.

Secretary McNamara said that the possibility of our using drones was leaking to the press. This disturbed him greatly and he had instructed his press officers to deny flatly that any consideration is being given to the substitution of drones for U-2s.

Under Secretary Ball made the point that if it became known to the Cubans that we were flying drones, Castro would undoubtedly attack them. Mr. Bundy said that he agreed that the Cubans would act much more promptly against a drone than against piloted planes. Secretary McNamara commented that we would have to respond to the shooting down of drones at some point, particularly if it later became possible for us to fly thirty drones per month.

Mr. McCone said the intelligence community's best estimate was that Castro had in Cuba 500 missiles for his SAMs. General Taylor said that the Cubans would not really know whether we were flying drones or piloted U-2s. Secretary McNamara pointed out, however, that if the Cubans knocked out drone after drone, we would have to make some response.

With respect to balloons, Secretary McNamara said these had many of the disadvantages of drones, but operational difficulties with them were much higher.

Secretary Rusk asked whether, if we made the maximum use of peripheral photography, our overflights requirement would be reduced. Mr. McCone said not significantly.

Secretary Rusk asked whether, if the Cubans took their case to the United Nations and said they were prepared to accept UN on-site inspection as soon as we gave up our overflights, would we find this acceptable? Mr. McCone replied that on-site inspection can now be made much more dependable than was the case in October 1962 because we now have many aerial photographs of the island. The information we have received from these photographs will not decay seriously over time.

Alexis Johnson recalled that the 1962 inspection plan had called for overflights by UN planes in addition to on-site inspection. We could re-

new this proposal and insist on the UN-operated reconnaissance system. Mr. Bundy said he believed this put us in a very strong position. He thought that we could sell our European allies on such a proposal. He said that it was important, however, to make clear the difference between the kind of intelligence we wanted about specific targets for use in the event of an invasion and the kind of information which we need to reassure that strategic missiles were not being introduced into Cuba.

Secretary Rusk asked if we could use a combination of means of aerial reconnaissance. He agreed that if the Cubans heard that we were replacing U-2s with drones they would certainly try to shoot down the drones.

Secretary McNamara repeated his view that if word gets around that we are using drones, the Cubans would say that we are weakening our position. The Attorney General agreed that if the word got around that we were no longer flying U-2s, but using drones, the effect on public opinion would indeed be serious. He expressed his view forcefully.

Secretary Rusk asked what was the status of the proposal to use the A-11 plane. Mr. McCone replied that the A-11 was not ready for use. It has been operated successfully but not yet at the maximum speed it is apparently able to reach. It is coming along very well, indeed, but it would be most dangerous to use the A-11 now. The A-11 is vulnerable to flameout and to other operational difficulties. Several additional months are needed for testing to ensure that the plane is fully operational. For example, he said the early versions of the A-11 had to come down to 35,000 feet in order to relight their engines after a flameout. A way around this limitation had been found, but each plane had to be modified to include the new equipment making possible the relighting of the engines without the descent. He said we are on the very far frontier of knowledge and there are many problems remaining. Those who had operated the planes were unanimous in agreeing that it would be reckless to use them over Cuba without further testing. Secretary McNamara said everyone was unanimous in opposing the use of the A-11 for at least several months. Secretary Rusk said that if the Cubans learned an A-11 was flying over they would make every effort to shoot it down.

With respect to the vulnerability of the A-11, Mr. McCone said the plane would be much less vulnerable when it was fully ready. There were many imponderables in trying to decide whether the plane could be shot down. He concluded that it was theoretically possible to shoot down an A-11 if everything used against it worked perfectly, i.e., a perfectly trained crew and a perfect SAM site operation. He reminded the group that although the A-11 cannot be seen, its sonic boom can be heard clearly. Therefore, from Castro's point of view, the use of the A-11 would be more objectionable than the U-2.

Ambassador Thompson commented that it was doubtful that Castro would contemplate early action against an overflying plane. He said the Soviets were very conscious of the timing in relation to the elections in the U.S. The Russians would object to the Cubans taking the case to the UN because our insistence on overflights would reveal that we think the Russians are capable of sending strategic missiles back to Cuba.

Mr. Alexis Johnson pointed out that while Castro might not push his case in the UN, the Secretary General undoubtedly would ask for our informal views on Castro's letter to the Secretary General. Secretary Rusk replied that if this happened we could remind the Secretary General of our 1962 offer and say that we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of Castro accepting on-site inspection and UN aerial reconnaissance. Mr. Alexis Johnson replied that we had some time in which to work this out. He felt we had several months.

The President joined the group and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara summarized the earlier discussion.

As to compromising the ECM, Secretary McNamara said he doubted its use would result in making more difficult the implementation of the SIOP. He said that ECM did not ensure survival of the U-2, but that the first plane flown with ECM had a very high chance of escaping. This percentage dropped sharply after the first flight. He asked General Taylor to summarize the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on ECM. General Taylor repeated his earlier comments.

With respect to drones, Secretary McNamara estimated that even with enemy action, we would be able to carry on a continuous program of drone flights for one to twelve weeks, but if Castro fired on the drones, we would obviously have a major political problem.

With respect to the A-11, Mr. McCone summarized his view that the plane was not now ready for use.

The President said, "This gets you back to where you were." Secretary McNamara replied, "Yes." Secretary Rusk said that was true, with one addition. We could engage in a political holding action with the UN Secretary General. There are ways to keep the ball in play, but we expect nothing to come of these moves.

The President asked how serious Castro was when he made statements about preventing overflights. Secretary Rusk replied that over time he undoubtedly was serious. However, there are things we can do to reduce the risk of a shoot-down but we cannot back away in the face of Castro's threats.

The President asked if one of our planes is shot down, do we take out the SAM sites? Mr. Bundy replied that the contingency called for taking out one or more SAM sites.

Secretary McNamara recommended that we proceed on the assumption that for the next week there will be no attack on our U-2s.

We should continue the flights of the U-2s. The Defense Department will look again at the proposals to use an ECM-equipped U-2 and to use drones. The production of drones will be immediately increased, but a flat denial will be made to any press queries about whether consideration is being given to the use of drones.

The question was asked whether the readiness of the Oxcart could be speeded up. Secretary Dillon asked what could be done in an allout effort to increase the readiness of the Oxcart. Mr. McCone replied that the operators were working as fast as they could on dealing with each problem as it arises. He said he would keep the pressure on but he did not think that a crash program should be undertaken. He cited again the case of modifying the planes in order to make it possible for the pilot to relight the engine at maximum altitude in the event of a flameout.

Secretary Rusk asked whether we should read anything into the timing of the public release by Castro of the discovery of the arms cache off the Cuban coast. Assistant Secretary Mann said we knew of their discovery of this cache on April 20th and they had waited several days before making their discovery public.

[Omitted here is a discussion of Laos.]

**Bromley Smith<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



**269. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1964.

SUBJECT

Special Group—Cuba

1. Continued exile raids<sup>2</sup> are going to make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba between now and November. This is just the sort of thing that evokes a highly emotional response from Castro. As things stand, he seems convinced that we are tied into the raids—as indeed we are.

2. There seem to be two things we can do.

(a) We can make a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says that this can't be done, I wonder if that's true. For example, the cessation of assistance and pressure on countries like Nicaragua to cease providing facilities might do the trick.

This step is a drastic one and could lead to angry charges (in the U.S. and elsewhere) that we are lending positive support to Castro. It is probably a step we would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which we can't control, were propelling us to the brink.

(b) We can cut off all our ties with these exile groups (e.g. money, equipment, intelligence information). The exile grapevine is a sensitive one and the word will get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully, this word will get to Fidel and he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles rather than on us (specifically, a U-2). In sum, at a minimum, we might want to be impregnable to the charge that we are connected in any way with these exile activities.

3. This strikes me as an urgent problem which we should grapple with now. Moreover, there may be a good deal of support in town in favor of doing something. My talks at State indicate that Alexis John-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. I, 11/63–7/65. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> On May 13 one of Artime's commando groups struck the Port of Pilon in southern Oriente province, damaging warehouses and, according to an official Cuban announcement, destroying approximately 70,000 tons of sugar. The CIA was advised that Artime planned another raid on two radar installations in Cuba for early June.

son, Tom Mann, and John Crimmins are also unhappy about the present trend of events.<sup>3</sup>

4. You may want to initiate a discussion of this matter<sup>4</sup> at the Special Group meeting today.<sup>5</sup>

GC

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<sup>3</sup> A notation in Chase's handwriting in the left margin next to this sentence reads: "This may or may not be still true as of 6/4/64."

<sup>4</sup> A notation in Chase's handwriting at the bottom of the memorandum reads: "P.S. Also, we might want to consider making a distinction between types of raids. Externally-mounted noisy ones (e.g. Artime) are bad. Internal quiet ones are more tolerable."

<sup>5</sup> The Special Group postponed decisions about the autonomous exile groups until June; see Document 270.

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**270. Memorandum From Albert E. Carter of the Office for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes) and the Deputy Director (Denney)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 4, 1964.

SUBJECT

ARA—Agency Meeting of June 3, 1964

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Mr. Mann, Mr. Crimmins, Mr. Pryce

CIA—Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Herbert, Mr. Cheever, Mr. Bolton

INR/DDC—Mr. Carter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, June 1964. Secret.

*Cuba*

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the attached CIA-prepared paper entitled “A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations.”<sup>2</sup>

Mann read the paper and commented with regard to “II Current Status” at the top of page 5 that he was not sure it was accurate to say he had “argued and suggested.” He said he had simply “raised the question.”<sup>3</sup> FitzGerald remarked it was a draft paper that would not be used “outside this room.” Mann said it was not an important point.

Crimmins liked the paper. FitzGerald said it was one-sided, but that “the more we worked on it the more one-sided it became.” Mann thought if we cut off aid the Cubans could blackmail us and it could get out.

Crimmins then said that before proceeding with this discussion he would like to fill Mann in on the apprehension of Manolo Ray by the British in the Bahamas. He said Ray and party were picked up on Anguila Key Monday afternoon.<sup>4</sup> They were discovered by the British on a normal patrol. Ray tried to get away, but the British pursued and picked him up. A U.S. Coast Guard plane assisted, said Crimmins, “as is usual in such cases.” Crimmins explained that Ray was not using his own name, but that his identity was evidently now known. He said there were three Americans in the party, including a *Life* photographer and a girl radio operator.

Crimmins thought that being picked up ten days after he was supposed to be in Cuba would make a laughingstock of Ray. He saw it as a “sticky” public relations problem for us also.

In response to a question from Mann, Crimmins explained that we collaborate with the British in matters of this nature “for many reasons”, particularly since August 1963 when Castro’s forces kidnapped a group of Cuban exiles from Anguila Key.

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. This June 3 paper drafted by FitzGerald included a review of the history of the autonomous exile groups program, the consequences of terminating U.S. support for them, and conclusions. The main conclusion was that “The cessation of autonomous commando operations—the only remaining external sabotage activity since unilateral CIA operations of this type were stood down in January 1964—would effectively kill the remaining chances of carrying out the objectives of the Integrated Covert Action Program initiated in June 1963. While the cost would be high, it might well be worth the sacrifice if the U.S. is prepared for armed intervention in Cuba and if the OAS will unequivocally support it.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964–65)

<sup>3</sup> In a June 16 memorandum to Bundy, Chase stated that FitzGerald’s reappraisal “was apparently instigated by Tom Mann’s expressed feeling that if we mean what we say under the warning paragraph of the OAS resolution (subversion is aggression), we should keep our hands clean and cease support of autonomous exile operations.” (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> June 1.

Crimmins said in the present case the British want to take the position they cooperated with us, but that the fact is we were cooperating with them in their waters at their request.

He said there was a precedent for the present case in that another group of Cuban exiles was picked up on Anguila Key by the British a few months ago, tried, fined \$210 each, given suspended sentences of 90 days and deported to the U.S.

Crimmins said when we capture such groups we simply seize their equipment and set them free.

Mann thought we might quietly suggest to the British they do about what we do in cases like this. He thought we might tell them they were heading into a hornet's nest, that they had a hero.

It was explained that the group was due in Nassau at 1:30 June 3 (the day of the meeting) and that they would undoubtedly be tried, as were the others. It was decided that "without really twisting their arm" the British would be asked to low key the matter as much as possible. Mann suggested Crimmins talk with Alex Johnson about how to handle this aspect of the matter.

FitzGerald said a related development was that weapons "from a West Coast carriage factory" made for Ray had been traced by U.S. officials to a basement in Miami which is now under surveillance. Included in these, said FitzGerald, is a special "assassination" weapon.

FitzGerald also reported that Artime will put to sea Friday (June 5) for two operations in Oriente province, one east and the other west of Santiago. FitzGerald seemed to think these operations would be more "cream puff" in nature than the Pilon raid. It was his understanding that they would not involve landings.

At this point Mann's next appointment was announced and there was no time to return to a discussion of the autonomous operations paper. Mann said he would study the memorandum and probably arrange a special meeting to discuss it.

**271. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 11, 1964, 7:05 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of Brazil, Mexico, and other Latin American countries.]

President: What are our danger spots?

Mann: Well, that's the—

President: Chile election?

Mann: That's the biggest one, I would say, with the fact of the Communist element in it.

President: And the Dominican—

Mann: The overflights over Cuba.

President: What in the world can we do to minimize that? We can't go around them. We can't circle the island. We got to go over it. And—

Mann: I think we'll get, I'm hoping we'll get some good resolutions, which would be very helpful on the domestic front, and also of real value to us.

President: Is trade going up much between the British and the Cubans?

Mann: Well, it has in terms of British exports to Cuba, and French exports.

President: They told me when they were here that they'd been 55 million, they'd cut them to five, but they'd be up on account of the buses. Now what, how much are they up to?

Mann: Well, what really happened, I don't have the figures in my head, but I know it's up quite a bit, Mr. President, because they've been buying all this sugar, and they've got these, Cuba's got the convertible currencies to buy anything they want. I think it's about two hundred million dollars a year that Castro made last year, and we expect him to make about the same this year as a result of the increased price of sugar. Now sugar prices are dropping, this is a very temporary phenomenon, sugar prices are dropping and he's just, he's not going to have the money to buy this kind of stuff much longer. So I don't think

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, Tape 64.31, Side B, PNO 5. Secret. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. The full transcript of this conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXI, Document 16.

that the prognosis, the medium and long term prognosis, is bad. It's good.

President: You getting any reports of the things inside Cuba? What's happening?

Mann: Well, not really anything new that—

President: Is there any dissatisfaction?

Mann: Yes, we figure about 25 percent of the people—the job holders, the office holders, especially the young people in the country who are better off than they ever were before—are totally in favor of Castro. We think he can count on about 25 to 30 percent of the people. We think there are about 25 to 30 percent of the people who are opposed to him, and the middle ground there, the 40 to 50 percent, are just sort of apathetic. And that's the way it's been for the last year or so, and there isn't much change in that, because his hard core of support is built around the people who hold jobs.

President: Would you say that our economic isolation policy has been a complete failure?

Mann: No, sir. I think it's been largely successful. I—

President: How? When the French and British are all trading with him?

Mann: Well, he's had these dollars and they've sold him some things, and that's hurt us. But on the, if—The alternative would be to let the bars down and let them extend credits and that sort of thing. And we've been very successful in keeping this limited to a number of isolated transactions. And this is a hell of lot better than taking him into our bosom.

President: How are we going to get rid of him?

Mann: It's going to take some time.

President: Well—

Mann: I think it's going to have to come from—I really don't think that, unless somebody kills Castro, or he dies, or the army is split in the very top command where they turn on him, the army especially, that the people themselves can get rid of him. As long as that army is loyal to him, he's going to be there until he dies. And when he dies, nobody knows what's going to happen, because he's got the same power to mesmerize people that Hitler had, and we doubt that anybody else has got, can project this same kind of image. The only other way to knock him off would be to go in there with force from the outside, and this could happen, either as a result of our reactions to his shooting at our planes that are doing this photographic stuff, or as a result of collective action which we're working on in this Venezuelan thing, whereby he tries again what he did in Venezuela, and if at that time you decide you want authority, the legal basis to go in, and you

want to go in, I think we could get it. The main objective we hope to get out of this meeting is to say that subversion, communist subversion, is an aggression which is not an armed attack within the meaning of article six of the Rio Treaty, get them to accept that, so that if we have another act of subversion, we'll have a good legal basis of going to the OAS and saying now you agreed that this was the law, and here are the facts, and this is what we ought to do. Because the biggest problem, as you know, that we had in the Bay of Pigs, was this doubt on the part of the lawyers and others that we had any right in international law to do anything, and we hope to clear that up considerably.

President: So that for the subversion by importing arms to other countries to be considered aggression, that would justify our moving.

Mann: That's what we—If he does it again. But we would have to go to the OAS and prove the facts. They didn't want to give us a blank check.

President: Well, you've got a statement there,<sup>2</sup> say I ought to say at a press conference that I don't intend to invade Cuba, just as Kennedy didn't.

Mann: Well, sir, if I were you, I wouldn't make a statement like that, because who can tell what's going to happen tomorrow? Suppose he shoots tomorrow and—

President: Well they say Khrushchev is saying that he hadn't seen us repeat Kennedy's pledge and we ought to do it.

Mann: Well, I would send, I wouldn't make a public statement, I'd have the Secretary of State say that if he behaves himself, doesn't commit any aggressive acts against other Republics, and doesn't shoot at any of our planes, or doesn't give us cause to do anything, that everything's going to be all right in terms of war and peace.

President: You tell, in the morning you call Mac Bundy, he's not here, but you call him, and tell him I was talking to you last night, and you'd like to know what he'd propose to say in that statement and then you tell him why you don't think it ought to be done.<sup>3</sup>

Mann: All right.

[Omitted here is discussion of Uruguay, Argentina, and Venezuela.]

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<sup>2</sup> The President was evidently referring to a June 2 memorandum from Bundy to him that advocated that a "no invasion" statement be made at a press conference. Bundy suggested that the Soviets "might find it easier to keep Castro under control if you were to reaffirm our intent not to launch an invasion of Cuba unless the Cubans forced it on us." Bundy included the text of a proposed statement. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5, 1964–1965)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 272.

**272. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 12, 1964.

SUBJECT

Possible Statement by the President on Cuba

I understand from Tom Mann<sup>2</sup> that the President is considering the desirability of volunteering a press statement reiterating our position with respect to a military invasion of Cuba. Tom and I have thoroughly considered the matter, and for the reasons set forth below do not recommend that such a statement be made. However, if nevertheless the President desires to make a statement, we would recommend the following text, which has been carefully drawn from and conforms to the statements President Kennedy made in late 1962 and 1963:<sup>3</sup>

"As President Kennedy pointed out on several occasions, we do not intend to launch a military invasion of Cuba or to begin a war against Cuba. Should, however, Cuba again become a military threat to us or its neighbors, or should it carry out aggressive acts against us or other countries of the Hemisphere, then we would have an entirely different situation. Thus, peace in the Caribbean depends on the actions of the Cuban Government. This was the position of the Kennedy Administration; it is the position of this Administration."

While the foregoing covers the two situations that might lead to armed conflict, introduction of offensive missiles, or an act of aggression against any American republic, the statement is of necessity ambiguous as to whether the phrase "aggressive acts" includes acts of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CUBA. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 271.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. XI, Document 95, for the "assurances against the invasion of Cuba" that Kennedy gave Khrushchev in telegram 1015 to Moscow, October 27, 1962. The White House simultaneously released the text to the press. At his news conference on November 20, 1962, President Kennedy stated that "for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'" Asked to "be a bit more specific on the scope of your no-invasion pledge" to Khrushchev, Kennedy replied that "I think if you re-read the statement you will see the position of the Government on that matter." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy*, 1962, pp. 831 and 832)



kind that recently took place in Venezuela. We will be on much sounder ground with respect to acts of this kind after we obtain agreement on the Venezuela resolution in the OAS.

However, the basic difficulty we see is that now to take the initiative in raising the issue of the “no invasion pledge,” at a time when it is not being pressed either by the Soviets<sup>4</sup> or domestically, inevitably raises problems on one or both sides. To the degree that any statement appears to Khrushchev to be less than the Kennedy statements it requires a response on his part, and to the degree that any statement appears to be more than the domestic understanding of President Kennedy’s statements it raises domestic questions of the degree to which the Administration is prepared to “co-exist” with Castro.<sup>5</sup>

U. Alexis Johnson<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In a June 16 memorandum to Rusk, Mann wrote: “There are rumors already current in Latin America and in the United States that the United States and Russia have reached some kind of accommodation on Cuba.” While Mann said that he thought this was “not an accurate description of our policy,” he argued that a “no invasion” pledge would “give currency” to the “notion of coexistence.” Mann also stated that a “no invasion” pledge “might cloud our legal right to retaliate against Castro” for shooting down a U-2 plane since Russia had already advanced the legal argument “that Castro would not be guilty of an ‘aggressive act’ as he was only defending Cuban air space.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Cuba File)

<sup>5</sup> The President did not make a “no invasion” pledge.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.

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**273. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs,  
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins) to the Deputy  
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 18, 1964.

SUBJECT

Continued Assistance to Manuel Ray’s JURE as “Autonomous Group”

I understand that the Special Group at its meeting today will explore the question of the desirability of continuing the support of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records, June 18, 1964. Secret; Sensitive.

Cuban exile "autonomous groups". I understand further that there will probably be no decision taken at this meeting.<sup>2</sup>

Pending this basic decision, we have an immediate problem with respect to Manuel Ray and his organization, JURE. Ray wants three things from us: (a) an immediate special grant of funds (over and above the funds he received at the beginning of this month) to recoup his losses from the recent fiasco; (b) intercession with law enforcement agencies in Puerto Rico to relax the very strict surveillance they maintain over his principal vessel so that it can leave Puerto Rico for Costa Rica; and (c) intercession with the Dominican Government to give him a base and, possibly, broadcasting facilities in the Dominican Republic.

The question is: Should we meet any of these requests in view of Ray's recent performance?

Ray has been guilty of violations of the rules of "autonomy", of major errors in judgment, and of lack of success. He has mounted his operation from and maintained his bases in US territory; he has informed Tad Szulc of the *New York Times*, apparently in detail, of US support for him; he has used Szulc as a channel for making requests for further support from US officials; he has carried out his projected operations ineptly and carelessly; and he has failed in a humiliating and noisy way.

These are grievous mistakes. Some, perhaps, can be mitigated by a plea of extenuating circumstances, but taken together they could easily justify our washing our hands of Ray and his group. There are, however, cogent reasons, in my opinion, for giving Ray another chance.

The basic argument in favor of continuing support for him is the fact that his strategic concept of political operations provides at least some hope for loosening up the situation within Cuba. As you know, his plans call for infiltration of small groups into Cuba (no hit-and-run attacks from the outside) with the object of beginning small-scale propaganda operations in urban and suburban areas, validated and reinforced by occasional sabotage. The idea is to raise a symbol of organized, coherent and gradually expanding resistance to Castro and to attract disaffected elements of the regime and of the mass by establishing the beginning of an alternative to the regime. Ray's political platform, which is certainly left of center, and an echo of the original

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<sup>2</sup> In a June 18 memorandum updating his May 14 memorandum to Bundy (Document 269) Chase included a few additional points for the Special Group meeting. He added the options of searching harder for an alternative to the U-2 and encouraging the exile groups to make internally-mounted rather than the externally-mounted raids that he had proposed in his May 14 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964-1965)

promises of the revolution, probably has greater potential for appealing to sectors of the power structure than that of any other group available to us. His proclamation of May 20 (copy attached)<sup>3</sup> was, in my view, a very effective piece of political propaganda.

As it is with all exile groups, it is impossible to assess the accuracy of Ray's claims to support in being within Cuba. Probably the most that can be said is that, given his role in the revolution, his reasonably important post in the early days of the Castro regime, and his general political beliefs, his claims have more plausibility than those of others. A prickly personality, Ray should not be viewed as having the leadership qualities of Fidel nor should his movement be expected to sweep the island. Probably the most that we can prudently and realistically expect from a successful effort by Ray is a gradual loosening up of the internal structure. On the other hand, even if he gets inside and begins to work, it is entirely possible that he will lay a massive egg. We simply cannot be sure.

Basically, however, his strategic political concept has merit; it is his execution which has been miserable.

The Agency reports that JURE people say that they have learned bitter lessons from the June 1 fiasco<sup>4</sup> and that they will not repeat them. It is entirely possible that they have been shocked into realizing the necessity for greater care and for abiding by the rules of engagement. Their pleas for our intercession with the Dominican Government stem from their knowledge that we have meant what we said when we stipulated that US territory cannot be used as a base of operations. This has been borne in upon them with special force because they claim that a significant, if not major, part of their operational problems was caused by their inability to employ US-based equipment which was under strict surveillance.

With respect to Ray's revelations to the newspaperman, there is now no way for him to correct that blunder. No amount of references to the general lack of discretion of the Cuban exile or to similar (but lesser) breaches of security by the other "autonomous" leader can justify it. The only small comfort that can be drawn in the area of security is that the Anguila Key fiasco improved the general cover for US support of JURE. Among the press in general, in fact, Arttime, because of his history, is much oftener credited with US support than Ray. Unfortunately, Szulc is more influential and may be more ready to use his information than most. It should be noted that, if we were to intercede with the Dominicans in Ray's behalf, his establishment in the Do-

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding this episode, see Document 270.

minican Republic would tend to confirm to Szulc Ray's account to him and the hollowness of our insistence that we have not supported him.

Taking all these factors into account, I recommend that we meet Ray's first two requests immediately, *provided* that:

1. He agree to cease completely the use of US territory for mounting operations;
2. He agree to keep his mouth shut, to keep away from Szulc, and be prepared to deny totally any statements on US support attributed to him by Szulc; and
3. He be made to understand that if these conditions are violated all assistance will be cut off forthwith, and in the case of a violation of the first condition, all his equipment in the United States will be seized.

Regarding intercession with the Dominican authorities, we should take no action pending the basic decision on policy toward autonomous groups in general.<sup>5</sup> If it is decided to continue support for such groups, I recommend that we do intercede but that we limit ourselves to having the appropriate officer of the Embassy (Ambassador or DCM) repeat to the President of the Triumvirate the standard formula (in effect, Ray is a respectable and dedicated Cuban exile leader) which CAS already has used in reply to an inquiry from Reid Cabral. Ray himself should, of course, make the specific request to the Dominican authorities.

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<sup>5</sup> According to Johnson's Notes on the June 18 303 Committee Meeting, it was decided to tell Ray that we "agreed with him that he should operate from outside the US. He must establish a base outside, and then we will help him as we have undertaken to do. We will help him get his boat out." Johnson also noted that "On Artime, we shall continue as we are now doing." As for rumors of assassination plots against Castro and selected Cuban leaders, McCone and McGeorge Bundy were to inform Attorney General Kennedy to use U.S. law enforcement agencies to prevent such plans. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records, June 18, 1964) McCone sent Bundy an August 19 memorandum reviewing the FBI's investigation of reported exile assassination plans. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Exile Activities, Vol. I, 11/63-7/65)

**274. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 1, 1964, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of President Francisco J. Orlich of Costa Rica with the Secretary  
Part II—Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary Thomas C. Mann

Ambassador Raymond L. Telles

Mr. Oliver L. Sause, Director, Office of Central American Affairs

*Costa Rica*

Francisco J. Orlich, President of Costa Rica

Daniel Oduber, Foreign Minister of Costa Rica

Mario Quiros, Minister of Presidency

Gonzalo Facio, Ambassador of Costa Rica

Eduardo Lizano, Economic Advisor

Fidel Tristan, Dean of the School of Economics

The Secretary said that he wanted to repeat to President Orlich the firm pledge of the Government of the United States to assist in any feasible way if Costa Rica were threatened by Castro Communism. U.S. help might take the form of cooperation in mounting coastal patrols and surveillance of arms shipments, cooperation between military forces or any other means appropriate to the occasion. It was firm U.S. policy to keep Castro in Cuba and to make it clear that any effort by him to subvert or to threaten other countries would encounter a prompt reaction.

President Orlich said he was providing some help to Cuban exile leaders.

The Secretary said the U.S. was trying to ensure that no Cuban exile activities originated on U.S. soil. Hit-and-run raids are not very effective since most of the work to overthrow Castro will have to be done inside Cuba. The introduction of people into Cuba is becoming more difficult. Cuban police work is very professional, thanks to Soviet training.

President Orlich asked about the possible whereabouts of new guerrilla activities. The Secretary said this was difficult to judge. He

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 Costa Rica. Secret. Drafted by Oliver L. Sause, Director of the Office of Central American Affairs and approved in S on July 14. Part I of the memorandum of conversation on “Economic Assistance,” is *ibid.*

was concerned about arms being smuggled from Panama to Colombia and from Bolivia to Argentina. The Secretary said that control of arms traffic required a great deal of careful organization.

The Secretary then discussed on the impact of the defection of Fidel Castro's sister, Juana. He indicated he was very much interested in her remarks regarding the use of Cuban embassies as centers of subversion. Ambassador Facio recalled that when he had visited Cuba in March 1959 in the company of President Orlich and Jose Figueres, Castro's sister apologized for the sharp exchanges which took place at that time between Figueres and Castro and remarked to the Costa Rican group that she greatly feared communist penetration of the July 26 movement.

There was general agreement that the increasing number of Soviet trained students from Central America and other areas represented a threat. It was noted that the Costa Rican Government has tried by publicizing names of those taking such training to cut down the flow. The Secretary asked if the Government of Costa Rica had lists of all those who had been trained by communists, and urged that the Government continue to keep an eye on them after their return.

The Secretary then referred to the forthcoming OAS Foreign Minister's meeting in Washington and said that while it appeared there would be sufficient votes on the present version of the Venezuelan resolution, he would appreciate continued Costa Rican efforts to try to influence the two or three nations still opposed to action. President Orlich and Foreign Minister Oduber said that they would continue their efforts. There was also general agreement that the resolutions should not be further watered down. The Secretary said that the recommendations by nations of the hemisphere to nations outside the hemisphere that they cut off commercial relations with Cuba, if approved, would have a very significant impact on European nations now trading with Cuba. The volume of their trade with Cuba is small. They would probably think twice about continuing Cuban trade if it were in any way to jeopardize their much greater trade with the rest of Latin America.

## 275. Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

No. 1601/64

Washington, July 2, 1964.

### Summary

The appeal of Castro's revolution is wearing thinner, but Castro himself retains firm control over the instruments of power. We believe that there will be further erosion of popular support for his regime over the next year or two. Unless he dies or is otherwise removed from the scene, however, we think the chances of an overthrow of the regime or of a major uprising against it during this period will remain slim.

### STAYING POWER OF THE CASTRO REGIME

1. The regime's economic performance—still dismal after five and a half years of trying—has resulted in a continuing loss of popular backing. Living conditions are depressed; rationing has become a way of life; and the administration and management continue to be both inept and high-handed. In short, the regime has failed to deliver the economic benefits that it promised, and the consequences of this failure are increasingly felt by most of the Cuban population. Moreover, we expect little, if any, increase in overall economic output during the rest of 1964 or in 1965. Indeed shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods are likely to become even more pronounced.<sup>2</sup>

2. We estimate Cuban sugar production in 1964 at about 3.8 million metric tons—the same as the 1963 crop, which was the smallest in 18 years. Cuban export earnings this year, however, while slightly below those of 1960 and 1961, will be substantially better than in 1962 and 1963 because of the abnormally high prices at which most of the 1964 crop was sold on future contracts during 1963.

3. Recent sharp declines in sugar futures make Cuban prospects for foreign exchange earnings much less promising for 1965, and probably for 1966 as well. World spot prices, which had hit a peak of 13 cents a pound a little more than a year ago and were still as high as 12 cents last November, now are not much above five cents; sugar futures for 1965 are running at 4.5 to 4.6 cents. Assuming that sales to non-bloc

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Vol. I, 11/63–11/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting that the Cuban economic plan for 1964 calls for only a 1.3 percent increase over 1963 in the total amount of food available for consumption. Even if this target is achieved—and the Cubans have not often met plan goals in the past—this would mean a small decline in *per capita consumption*, since the population is almost certainly increasing at a substantially greater rate. [Footnote in the source text.]

purchasers are made at about these levels, the Castro regime would not only have to expand sugar production by about 20 percent next year to earn as much in 1965 as this year; it would also have to sell the entire increase to the bloc at the six-cent price specified for Soviet purchases in the long-term Soviet-Cuban sugar agreement. Such an expansion of production would be possible, but unlikely. The regime's program of canefield expansion—carried out at the expense of other crops—may permit a modest expansion in the 1965 sugar crop, but we believe there is no more than a remote chance that the 1965 harvest will be large enough to produce export earnings significantly above those of this year.

4. Meanwhile, Castro is pressing ahead with his program of socialization, relying increasingly on methods of compulsion and repression in carrying it out. The Cuban leaders are applying some measures borrowed from the Soviet bloc without successfully adapting them to Cuban characteristics; they are not putting enough cha-cha-cha in a system [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] likes to refer to as "Marxism cha-cha-cha." The three government actions undertaken during the past year which have produced the strongest adverse reactions among large segments of the population have been the Second Agrarian Reform law (expropriating virtually all farms over 165 acres), the Work Norm and Wage Classification law (aimed at forcing an increase in worker productivity), and the Obligatory Military Service law (creating a disciplinary institution to handle uncooperative youth and to provide cheap forced-labor brigades, as well as to maintain the strength of the military services).

5. Castro has not been able to put an end to internal anti-regime activity. Small guerrilla bands continue to operate in the mountainous areas of Las Villas, Camaguey, and Oriente provinces. Covert and "accidental" sabotage by workers has been a factor in low productivity rates. The regime seems particularly concerned that an expansion of guerrilla activities in conjunction with a successful landing by Cuban exiles could trigger some kind of local revolt. We do not believe that the present capabilities of the exiles justify this fear, but we do think the fear is real. Indeed, it was almost certainly the primary reason for the extensive Cuban military alert and mobilization that took place in May.

6. The very fact that the regime is nervous and has moved during recent weeks to arrest and deal ruthlessly with small numbers of suspected agents and other opponents has probably increased its short-term security. The large and increasing number of potential opponents of the regime within the country has never had much opportunity to organize for any unified action. The elaborate internal security machinery which now exists makes such organizational activity even more difficult and dangerous.



7. Castro's Cuba has taken on the character of a police state. The national intelligence and security organization, the Department of State Security, with an estimated personnel strength of several thousand, maintains units throughout the country and has apparently been effective in infiltrating and exposing counter-revolutionary groups. It works closely with the huge and ubiquitous organization of volunteer informants—the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. These informants appear to be active in almost every block of every Cuban city and claim the Committee has a membership of almost a million and a half. In addition to spying and reporting on their neighbors, they distribute food rationing cards, hand out propaganda, and organize “voluntary work” groups. A parallel informants' role among the youth, particularly among students, is carried out by the Union of Young Communists.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cuban police and security organizations.]

11. We doubt that contingencies like those mentioned above will develop in the next year or two, unless Castro dies or is otherwise removed from office. He has demonstrated a remarkable ability to preserve a workable degree of unity among the disparate groups involved in the regime, and he has been able to make the great bulk of the population accept—however grudgingly or resignedly—the socialization and regimentation measures of the revolution. All this may change, and in these or other ways Castro's power position in Cuba may be undermined, but the process would be likely to take some years.

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**276. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 7, 1964.

Castro's *New York Times* interview<sup>2</sup> was discussed rather fully at the ARA Staff Meeting today. Tom Mann asked John Crimmins to do

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Vol. III, 5/64–10/64. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> In a July 5 interview with correspondent Richard Eder, Castro said that although Cuba reserved the right to shoot down U.S. U-2 overflights, he remained convinced that the matter could be settled peacefully. Castro also intimated that Cuba was disposed to begin negotiating its differences with the United States. (*New York Times*, July 6, 1964)

a paper for the Secretary addressed primarily to the Castro proposal that Cuba would call off its subversion if we would stop our support for Cuban exile raids.<sup>3</sup> He is concerned that it may have appeal to the uninformed and believes we should have clear the rationale for our position. He regards this as especially important for the MFM<sup>4</sup> because he believes that the Castro interview was timed with the MFM in mind. Castro also had other objectives in mind, of course. I would summarize the points in our rationale as follows:

(1) Castro has treaty obligations not to engage in subversive activities—Havana Convention of 1928, OAS and UN Charter, Non-Intervention Convention of 1936, etc. For our part, we are already doing all we can to stop exile raids from U.S. soil because we do not intend to let exiles make our foreign policy.

(2) We cannot accept Castro's promise that he will stop his subversion. In the very same interview he said he would continue moral support to Castro/Communist groups in Latin America. His whole record is one of broken promises and duplicity. We do not believe a Communist will renounce the world revolution. The Soviet Union promised in 1933 to discontinue subversive activities.

(3) Castro has domestic problems. He seems to recognize finally that Cuba cannot grow and prosper while he is fighting with Cuba's traditional friend, the United States. This is further evidence that inter-American policy on Castro has been effective.

(4) We continue to believe as Thomas Jefferson did that people have a right to change their government if it no longer represents them. Castro argued this himself when he was fighting to overthrow Batista. Cuban patriots have a right to overthrow a dictatorship. Even those Latin American countries which oppose collective action by the OAS assert the right of the Cuban people to depose Castro by revolution if he will not permit elections. So far as we are concerned Cuban patriots may exercise their inherent right so long as they do not involve the U.S.

**RMS**

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<sup>3</sup> No such paper has been found. However, telegram 61 to all posts, July 9, included the rationale in points 1-4 of this memorandum and suggested that posts use this response in discussing the U.S. Government attitude toward the Castro interview with host governments and media. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 CUBA)

<sup>4</sup> Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held at the Pan American Union in Washington in July 1964; see Document 279.

**277. National Security Action Memorandum No. 311<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 10, 1964.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Review of the problem of assurance against any missile crisis in Cuba

The President has requested that a careful study be made of all aspects of the problem of maintaining adequate assurance against an attempted reintroduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. He requests that this study be undertaken by representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the State Department representative as chairman.

This inquiry should assess such questions as (1) the probability and prospect of a renewed Soviet attempt to introduce missiles, (2) the different levels of assurance which might be achieved by various means of obtaining information, (3) the possibility that an increase or decrease in tension with Cuba might change the urgency of the problem or the availability of various means of information, (4) the various kinds of risk which various means of assurance involve, and (5) prospective changes in the “state of the art” of different methods of surveillance.

It is expected that this group will work closely with the United States Intelligence Board, with government agencies involved in research and development, and with those responsible for policy planning. It is requested also that the chairman of the group maintain liaison with my office, through Mr. Peter Jessup and with me directly, as he thinks appropriate.

It is not expected that this review group should reach final recommendations, but rather that it should examine all aspects of this question and prepare a report showing as clearly as possible the various courses, with their premises and consequences, which may be available to the U.S. in the future. After a preliminary survey the chairman and I will agree on a completion date for this study.

**McGeorge Bundy**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 69 A 7425, Cuba (Sensitive) 1964, 000.1. Top Secret.

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**278. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 14, 1964.

SUBJECT

Recognition of Cuban Government-in-Exile

We have consistently maintained the position that it is not in the US interest to recognize a Cuban government-in-exile. The most formal public expression of our views was made by Assistant Secretary Martin in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees on May 22, 1963. He gave the following reasons for our stand:

1. Recognition of a government-in-exile would give those in Cuba who are struggling against communism, or who might be disposed to turn against the regime, the idea that they are being disregarded and that they will have no role to play in determining how Cuba will be governed.

A fundamental premise of our policy is that the Cuban people themselves will decide how they will achieve and organize their freedom and that those now within Cuba must have the major share of that responsibility.

2. The problem of finding a government capable of uniting a majority of the exiles is a most difficult, if not impossible task.

3. Our consistent policy has been to recognize governments-in-exile only when they have direct constitutional connection with the last constituted government of the country, usually when they have actually exercised power in the country just prior to being forced out.

4. We still recognize the Castro regime as the Cuban Government (although we have broken diplomatic relations) and as such, responsible for its international obligations, including the protection of US citizens and the recognition of our rights under the Guantanamo Treaty. To recognize a government-in-exile might put those rights in legal jeopardy.

In addition to these publicly stated reasons, the following other considerations are pertinent:

1. There is a better than even chance that a government-in-exile would fall under the control of old-line, discredited Cuban politicians

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Cuba File. Secret. Drafted by Bowdler and cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs Marjorie M. Whiteman.

who constitute a numerous, aggressive and often well-financed element of the Cuban exile community. Such figures have very little, if any, support within Cuba. Our experiences in the 1961–1962 period with the Cuban Revolutionary Council—the nearest thing to a government-in-exile—are a poor augury for relations with an even more formal body.

2. If an acceptable alternative to Castro should arise within Cuba as a result of internal developments and should establish itself physically in some form as a provisional government, our ability to recognize it would be made much more difficult if we were already in relations with a government-in-exile.

3. A government-in-exile would claim Cuba's seat in the OAS. We would have to support its being seated. There are Latin American Governments, such as Mexico and Chile, which would not recognize the exile government and oppose its participation in the OAS. This would place serious strains on the inter-American system. The exile government would probably also try to obtain representation in world bodies. Few, if any, of our Western European allies would recognize the government or support its replacement of Castro representatives in these organizations. This could prove highly embarrassing to us.

4. Recognition of a government-in-exile would put great pressure on the US Government to support its efforts to take military action against the Castro regime.

Other than preventing Castro from bringing suit in the United States and claiming sovereign immunity in connection therewith, about the only advantage to be derived from recognition of a Cuban exile government would be to remove the legal obstacles to giving exile groups financial and material support for their activities against the Castro regime. Given the preponderant strength of Castro's military forces in relation to what the exile government could muster, our decision to support the exiles would only make sense in the context of a broader determination on our part to take direct action against the Castro regime.

In my opinion the foregoing considerations very clearly add up to our maintaining, in the absence of a clear decision to move directly against the present regime, the negative stand on recognition of a Cuban government-in-exile.

**279. Editorial Note**

On July 26, 1964, at the conclusion of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States, held at the Pan American Union in Washington, the Ministers signed a Final Act in response to Venezuela's complaint of December 3, 1963, against Cuba, after the latter was found to have positioned an arms cache in the territory of the former. The Foreign Ministers found that the Government of Cuba had directed and sponsored subversion against Venezuela and that such subversion was an act of intervention and aggression. Among other things, it adopted the following measures:

1. "That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba;
2. That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and
3. That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of humanitarian nature."

The vote in favor of this resolution was 15 to 4 (Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay). Circular airgram CA-1051 to all Latin American posts, July 28, transmitted the full text of the Final Act. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CUBA) An account of the history of the arms cache incident and the OAS resolution is in *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1969, volume XXXI, Documents 1 ff.

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**280. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1964.

**SUBJECT**

Notes on Luncheon Meeting attended by the President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, in the President's private dining room Tuesday—28 July 1964

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May-Oct 1964, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on July 29.

[Omitted here is discussion of Japan air routes and Vietnam.]

3. I reported on the withdrawals from Cuba following the substance of the attached memorandum. I specifically stated that we could not say positively that surface-to-air missiles had been turned over to the Cubans; there was no way to know whether or not the Soviets “kept a finger on the trigger”. I said that I believed that Khrushchev did not want a confrontation with the United States, that he knew such a confrontation would be created by a shootdown of the U-2 and that I would be very surprised if he felt sufficiently confident in Castro’s ability and veracity to turn these weapons over to him unrestricted with all of the consequences if Castro should use them in an emotional fit of anger. I said that intelligence could not reveal the true situation, other than this we felt that all military units have been withdrawn from Cuba, that all equipment was now in Cuban hands, that the communications systems except for one Navy link were operated by the Cubans, and that the 1500 to 2500 remaining Soviets were military advisors.

[Omitted here is discussion of the MLF, the Chinese nuclear danger, and domestic politics.]

## **Attachment**

### **Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1964.

#### **SUBJECT**

Soviet Military Personnel Withdrawals from Cuba

1. Since the missile crisis of 1962, some 20,000 Soviet military personnel have left Cuba in four major withdrawal periods, the peaks of which occurred in November 1962, March 1963, November 1963, and June 1964. About 5,000 personnel were withdrawn during each of these periods, the most recent period extending from early May to the present during which time 14 Soviet passenger ships sailed between Cuba and the USSR.

2. At the end of 1963, as the result of an examination of the probable number of Soviet military personnel believed to have been withdrawn from Cuba since the estimated high of 22,500 troops in October 1962 and of the probable Soviet personnel strength in each of the

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<sup>2</sup> Top Secret; Dinar.

weapon systems remaining on the island, we estimated that as many as seven thousand Soviet servicemen remained.

3. Since that estimate was made, twenty Soviet passenger ships have called at Cuban ports, 14 of them in the last three months. Few military passengers were on the ships calling between January and April, and military personnel departures were probably offset by arrivals. Extra ships were scheduled beginning in May, however, and at least 5,000 Soviet military personnel along with a few dependents, agricultural technicians, and Cuban students departed Cuba for the USSR. No more than 800 passengers are known to have arrived in Cuba on these 14 ships, and almost all of these were Cubans who arrived on the last two ships.

4. We believe that the last major withdrawal of Soviet military personnel has now been completed, and that only about 2,000 Soviet military technicians and advisors remain on the island. All Soviet communications links within Cuba (except for one naval link which will probably terminate operations this week) have been deactivated or turned over to the Cubans, and Cuban forces have apparently assumed full control over the operation of all Soviet weapons remaining on the island. No Soviet operational or combat units are known to be on the island.

[Omitted here is a discussion of specific ship movements and photographic reconnaissance flights.]

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## **281. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

NIE 85-64

Washington, August 5, 1964.

### **SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA**

#### **The Problem**

To assess the Cuban situation and the outlook over the next year or two.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 85, Cuba. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on August 5.



### Conclusions

A. Though the downward trend of the Cuban economy seems to have slowed and perhaps levelled off, we believe the economic situation will be stagnant over the next two years. Inept management and low labor morale will persist. Living levels are likely to become slightly lower, and shortages of foodstuffs, housing and many types of consumer goods will continue. Slight gains in industry are likely, but these will probably be offset by some decline in the agricultural sector. (Paras. 3–7, 9–13, 17–19)

B. Export earnings in 1965 and 1966 are likely to be below 1964 levels, because of lower sugar prices and poor prospects for substantially larger production of sugar and other export commodities. The value of total trade with the Free World can be expected to decline during the period. We believe that the Soviets and other Communist countries will provide sufficient credit assistance to prevent a seriously damaging drop in total imports. In these circumstances, Cuba's heavy economic dependence on the Communist world will continue. (Paras. 8, 14–16)

C. Depressed levels of consumption, the imposition of work norms, and forced labor and security duties will tend to narrow the regime's popular support. However, the huge security apparatus will almost certainly prevent popular dissatisfaction from bringing down the regime. We think it likely that a number of military officers have lost sympathy with certain of its policies, but we doubt that there is military disaffection on a scale sufficient to threaten Castro. Major deterioration in the internal situation or serious difficulties within the government could alter the picture, but would be unlikely to undermine Castro's power position in less than several years. We believe his death would lead, in fairly short order, to a power struggle of unpredictable outcome. (Paras. 20–36)

D. The Cuban armed forces are much the best-equipped in Latin America and, except for Brazil, the largest. Their capabilities have continued to improve, chiefly as a result of the delivery of additional weapons from the USSR and Cuban acquisition of weapon systems formerly under Soviet control. The compulsory military service program, introduced last November, will probably cause an initial drop in the level of training and efficiency, but will permit improved selectivity of recruits for the active forces, and will eventually produce a much larger trained reserve. (Paras. 37–43)

E. There are almost certainly no Russian combat units still in Cuba. Upon completion of current withdrawals, a Soviet MAAG-type presence, mostly technical and maintenance personnel, of about 2,000 will probably remain so long as the Cuban armed forces remain dependent on the USSR for technical and material support to maintain their complex Soviet equipment. (Paras. 44–45)

F. During the period of this estimate, the Soviets are highly unlikely to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba, though they have the technical capability to do so clandestinely. They might use Cuba for support of their submarines, but so long as they calculate that the risk would be high, they would not push such a venture very far. (Paras. 46–47)

G. The Cuba-Soviet relationship remains intact, although frictions have continued. Castro, though willing to lean to the side of the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet dispute, has refused to join in any formal condemnation of Peiping. He is concerned lest a further improvement in US-Soviet relations leave his regime more isolated and exposed. Though the Soviets almost certainly consider Castro to be erratic and undependable, they have little choice but to continue to support him. (Paras. 48–52)

H. The most explosive question in Soviet-Cuban relations, as well as between Castro and the US, is the continuation of U-2 overflights. Castro and Khrushchev have conducted a program of warnings, threats, and compromise suggestions to induce the US to desist. It is almost certain that Cuba now has full control over the SAM system—and consequently the capability to shoot down a U-2. Thus we believe that the Soviets can only give advice, backed up by their political and economic leverage, though we cannot wholly exclude the possibility that they have retained some sort of physical restraint on an actual firing. Nevertheless, we believe that Castro does not intend to force the issue until after the US elections, when he will seek UN action. If this fails, there is considerable danger that he would order a shootdown, calculating that the US would not retaliate in force or that, if it did, the resulting hue and cry would end the overflights. An impulsive reaction by Castro or even an unauthorized shootdown is always possible. (Paras. 44, 53–56)

I. Castro has a serious interest in improving relations with the US, as a means of reducing the pressures on his regime. He probably also considers that his recent gestures are useful to build a record of Cuban reasonableness and flexibility in preparation for Cuba's appeal to the UN on the U-2 issue. He will probably make further overtures from time to time, but there is little chance that he will accede at any early date to the conditions the US has stated. (Paras. 57–58)

J. Castro's efforts to foment revolution in Latin America have suffered setbacks during the past year. He is probably somewhat less sanguine about the chances for quick success. Nevertheless, he will almost certainly continue to provide aid and subversive training to potential revolutionaries. He may press for early aggressive action by some Castroist groups, even though their immediate chances seem poor, hoping that their repression would eventually produce conditions more favorable for exploitation. (Paras. 59–62)

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

**282. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 26, 1964.

SUBJECT

Trouble before November—Free World Trade with Cuba

1. Present statistics indicate that Free World exports to Cuba in 1964 will show an increase of roughly 80% over the 1963 figures. So far the domestic press has not focussed on this issue but there are indicators that our good luck will not hold out much longer. State tells me that there are reporters in town who are beginning to snoop around for current statistics on Free World trade with Cuba, which are unclassified and which are available at Commerce or at the IMF. Eventually, we should probably expect the Republicans to use the figures to point up the Administration's "ineffective isolation policy, etc., etc." (We may also get some heat on specific trade deals that are consummated—e.g. a UK/Cuba deal for \$4.5 million of locomotives is coming down the road which we can't stop.)

2. State continues to work hard on the problem of keeping down trade with Cuba and has several strings left in its bow. *First*, the Secretary, in the near future, will be calling in the Ambassadors of the trading nations<sup>2</sup> to emphasize the results of the recent OAS meeting and to once again request cooperation. *Second*, State is encouraging other OAR's to call in the Ambassadors of the trading nations to make a pitch similar to the Secretary's. *Third*, ARA is pushing ahead with its paper recommending (a) the denial of U.S. Government contracts to firms trading with Cuba, and (b) the enlisting of some OAR cooperation in applying similar measures; this paper will probably hit the Secretary's desk in the next few days.

These measures, if implemented, may or may not be effective in reducing trade with Cuba over the long term. Over the short term (between now and November) they will help only marginally in making the 1964 statistics more tolerable than they now appear to be.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Free World Trade, Vol. III, 12/63–5/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In an August 27 memorandum to Rusk, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Robert W. Adams suggested that the Secretary use the talking papers prepared for each of the countries involved in trading with Cuba in his upcoming talks with the Ambassadors (see Document 285). (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Cuba File)

3. Our public position is important in counteracting a possible Republican charge that "the 1964 trade statistics indicate that the isolation policy is a hoax." Our reply to such a charge, among other things, might contain the following elements.

(a) We should try to keep the statistics in the context of Free World trade with Cuba since 1960. They look better that way.

(b) We should emphasize the positive aspects of our efforts in the isolation dimension (e.g. breaking of diplomatic relations).

(c) We should make it clear that, while we are not 100% effective, our efforts have obviously been successful and have had a considerable impact on Cuba's economy; if we continue our efforts, the prospects for improvement in the Cuban economy are poor. Also, we might background that while our failures are well known (e.g. British bus deal), many of our successes cannot be made public.

(d) We should make it clear that we and the other OAR's have not given up and are continuing to exert pressure on the pertinent trading nations. We might point out that the job is not an easy one since we are, of course, dealing with sovereign nations whose interests are often not the same as ours.

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**283. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 27, 1964.

SUBJECT

Cuban Exile Activities

I have no strong feelings about the immigration status of Cuban exiles taking part in anti-Castro activities outside United States' territories. And I understand the political risks in rocking the boat at this time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note by Thompson on the memorandum reads: "Mr. Jessup informed of gist 8/27/64."

After the first of the year I do believe, however, that we should have another look at whether our interests are served by Cuban exile activities based in other American republics. I have in mind two principal questions:

First, I question whether the activities of the Cuban exiles do any real harm to the Castro regime and specifically whether the assertion that these activities are a morale builder for the anti-Castro Cubans inside Cuba is still valid. Rather I think we may now have reached the point where these activities are on balance helpful to Castro by giving him a pretext for appealing to the patriotism of the Cubans and presenting himself as the defender of Cuban sovereignty against the Colossus of the North.

In the second place, I find that United States policy is astride two horses each veering off in different directions. In the Foreign Ministers' Meeting we took the position that the subversive activities in Venezuela amounted to Cuban aggression. It will become increasingly difficult to maintain this line and at the same time try to downplay the importance of extra legal activities directed against Castro and designed to bring about his overthrow.

I don't have any final opinions about these two questions. I only say we should have a careful look at them in the not-too-distant future.

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## **284. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 4, 1964, 3:30 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Cuba

### **PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary  
Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy  
Mr. Hugh G. Appling

The Secretary said that he wished again to raise the matter of Cuba, since there were two new elements in the situation. The first was the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 2 CUBA. Confidential. Drafted by Appling, and approved in S on September 18. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

meeting of the Ministers of the OAS in July and the second was the decline of Cuba's credit rating. World sugar prices had come down from abnormal levels, Cuban production was down, and the Government of Cuba had to recognize that it had overreached its capabilities. The OAS Ministers, concerned at continuing Cuban interference in their internal affairs, were inclined to go even further than the decisions they did take and our role in the meeting to some extent had been to restrain them from extreme measures. Feelings were very strong in the hemisphere and it was hoped that friends would help with the problem. The resolution which was adopted nearly exhausted peaceful remedies and the hemisphere was determined that Castro must stop his troublemaking. We wanted to see these peaceful means effective. They could not be effective without general participation and we looked to others to help in avoiding opportunities for Cuba to escape from pressure.

The Secretary said he did not wish to suggest that Italy had not been helpful. We noted that Italian trade with Cuba was small and Italian imports were down but exports were up. We also appreciated Italian support in NAC and FIAT's responsiveness to our concern about their Cuban deal. Furthermore, Italian shipping companies had been helpful in assuring that their ships would be out of Cuba trade by the end of the year. The Secretary said that we might at some future time take up the matter again in NATO and wanted the Ambassador to have this background for the information of his Government.

The Secretary said there were two aspects of the problem which were not negotiable. The first was the presence of the Soviet military in Cuba and the second was Cuban interference in the affairs of other countries. There had recently been substantial reduction in the number of Soviet forces there. We believed that something in the neighborhood of two thousand remain. These were largely technicians and advisers and did not appear to be organized into units. Two thousand was still too many. We had no evidence at all that the Cubans were changing their policy to end interference in other countries. They were active and in close contact with the Soviets. Their providing of agents and funds to create unrest continued. With the termination of diplomatic relations, the misuse of their embassies was decreasing. The Ambassador said that he had heard that the United States preferred that some Soviet troops remain in Cuba as a moderating influence. The Secretary said that this was a misinterpretation. We had only expressed our concern that, after Soviet withdrawal, sophisticated arms would remain in Cuban hands and that they might use them irresponsibly. He concluded that the Soviet presence in Cuba cuts across a hundred and fifty years of history and that stability could not be achieved as long as it continued.

The Ambassador said that he would report the Secretary's remarks faithfully. The Ambassador referred to the elections in Chile. He and the Secretary agreed on the importance which Frei's victory could have as a rebuff to Castro who had made an enormous effort in support of Allende.

The Ambassador remarked that some countries lacked legal means of enforcing restrictions on trade with Cuba. He asked whether we envisaged some sort of collective NATO action. The Secretary said we did not have such collective action in mind now and that the means and problems would be different in every country. One tool generally available to governments was the possibility of refusing to guarantee credits for trade with Cuba.

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## **285. Editorial Note**

Secretary Rusk scheduled a series of meetings with Ambassadors from Italy, Canada, Spain, United Kingdom, France, Lebanon, Japan, Portugal, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, and West Germany to discuss the results of the Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers on Cuba, with special reference to the question of trade. The Italian Ambassador was the first one seen (Document 284), followed by the Spanish Ambassador (Document 286) and the Canadian Ambassador on September 9, and the others later in the month. Memoranda of conversation for most of these meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 2 CUBA.

In his meetings with the French Ambassador on September 10, Rusk again mentioned the OAS meeting on Cuba and its trade resolutions. The Ambassador responded that French trade with Cuba was insignificant. The Secretary then mentioned reports that a French deal seemed to be in progress with Benoto for earth moving equipment and "that French trade with Cuba was up significantly this year." (Memorandum of conversation, September 10; *ibid.*, POL 1 CUBA)

In his meeting with the Belgian Ambassador on September 15, Rusk mentioned "the virtual collapse of Cuban credit" as a factor that "might provide a basis" for the trading countries "to reassess the situation." The Ambassador described his last conversation with the Secretary concerning Cuba on February 19 and recalled that at that time Rusk had expressed concern about the sale of Belgian locomotives to Cuba. The Ambassador stated that "On the basis of this conversation the Belgian Government had intervened to block credit for that sale, because of its desire to work closely with" the United States. (Memorandum of conversation, September 15; *ibid.*, POL 2 CUBA)

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**286. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1964, 5 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Cuba

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Marques de Merry del Val, Spanish Ambassador  
Mr. Juan Duran, First Secretary, Spanish Ambassador

The Secretary  
Mr. Hugh G. Appling, Deputy Director, WE  
Mr. John H. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, ARA

The Secretary said he wished to take up with the Ambassador, as he was doing with the Ambassadors of several other countries, the Cuban problem in the light of the deliberations of the Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers (MFM) in July. He said that, although the immediate issue in the July meeting had been Cuba's interference in Venezuela, several Ministers in the course of the meeting had referred to Cuban activities in their countries also. The seriousness with which the Ministers viewed Cuban interference was demonstrated by the fact that the sanctions imposed on Cuba about exhausted the peaceful measures which remained available to the inter-American system. The Ministers hoped that Castro would heed the warning and thus avoid a dangerous situation. The Secretary pointed out that for our part we had made repeatedly clear to Cuba and the USSR that one of the two non-negotiable elements in any discussion of improved U.S.-Cuban relations was the cessation of Cuban interference; the other was the Soviet military presence in Cuba.

The Secretary referred to the paragraph of the basic resolution of the MFM which sought demonstrations of solidarity from non-OAS states. He pointed out that this measure, like the others adopted at the meeting, was not imposed by the U.S. but arose from the serious concern and initiative of the Latin members of the Alliance. The Secretary added that, in fact, the paragraph as finally adopted represented a moderation of a proposal, which at one point was favored by a majority, to interrupt trade by OAS members with countries trading with Cuba.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2 CUBA. Confidential. Drafted by Appling and approved in S on October 5. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.



The Secretary went on to say that there was considerable good evidence that the Cuban Government was facing foreign exchange stringencies as a result of the sharp drop in world sugar prices, low sugar production and possible over-extension of purchasing in the Free World. He commented that the Cuban credit position would be correspondingly impaired.

The Secretary said he wished to call the attention of the Government of Spain to the OAS resolution and its background with the hope that that Government would look at the Cuban problem in this perspective to see if there were ways of indicating its solidarity with the OAS countries. He complimented the Spanish Foreign Minister on his remarkable achievements in recent years in creating a new respect for Spain, particularly among the OAS countries. He made clear that he did not wish to urge any particular steps on the Spanish Government but to suggest their earnest consideration of the new situation.

The Secretary stated that the Spanish Government might wish to review its trade relations with Cuba. He noted that Spain's commerce with Cuba was substantially higher than a year ago. The Ambassador attributed Spain's increased purchases of Cuban sugar to the drop in the Spanish sugar beet crop; he expressed the belief that this year's crop would be better. In response to the Ambassador's question, the Secretary said that Soviet aid to Cuba continued to be substantial, but the Cuban economy continued to decline, with the supply of spare parts, for example, becoming an increasingly important matter.

The Ambassador asked whether there had been concrete results from the OAS Ministerial Meeting yet. The Secretary pointed to the closing of three Cuban Embassies which Castro's sister had described as "nests of subversion" in Latin America. He added that we were not overly concerned that Mexico had not yet broken relations, since some of the OAS states had seen some advantage in keeping at least one Latin American Embassy in Havana for purposes of asylum and observation. We did not know what Mexico's further steps might be but the OAS members were not unduly disquieted by Mexico's position at present. The Ambassador asked whether the President would take this matter up with the President of Mexico when they meet. The Secretary said he thought not since the situation had just been discussed at the OAS meeting and, with a change in government due in December, it seemed improbable that President Johnson would take this up with President Lopez Mateos.

The Ambassador remarked that Spain had been able to rescue many Cubans. For instance, a plane load of 81 refugees had been flown out this week, including some who had been condemned to death. The Secretary recognized that Spain had some special problems in Cuba.

He suggested that because of its special relationship it might be possible for the Government of Spain to speak frankly to the Cubans to tell them that they must stop their interference in other countries.

The Ambassador asked whether we had evidence of further arms shipments from Cuba into other countries. Mr. Crimmins said that Venezuela was the only well-established, large-scale case but that there were some other indications of Cuban arms on a minor scale, for example in northern Argentina.

The Secretary repeated that he hoped the Government of Spain would take a new look at the situation and measures which it might take in the light of the position adopted by the MFM and the further decline in Cuban creditworthiness. The Ambassador said he would report his conversation with the Secretary faithfully to his Government.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In a meeting on October 28 the Spanish Ambassador informed Rusk "that Spanish ships are now being removed from Cuban trade." (Memorandum of conversation, October 28; *ibid.*, Secretary's Memcons, 1961-64: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964)

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## 287. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 6, 1964, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Ambassador Dobrynin came in to see me today pursuant to an appointment which he had made almost a week ago. He said he wished to talk to me entirely on a personal basis about Cuba. His remarks were rather vague but his purpose seemed to be to express concern about raids on Cuba, the training of emigrant groups in Central America and elsewhere, and some rumor that some Central American countries

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 30-2 CUBA. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on October 6. The meeting was held in Thompson's office.

might take some forceful action<sup>2</sup> before the end of the year. In the course of the conversation, he mentioned the Artime group and another exile leader whose name he said he thought was Olivo.

I said that as he knew we had expressed ourselves as being opposed to these hit-and-run raids and pointed out how embarrassing it was to us that a Spanish ship had been sunk.<sup>3</sup> I said I had not heard of the rumor of a Central American-supported action before the end of the year, and did not think it was true. I said we had taken strict measures to prevent the use of our territory by these groups and understood that these measures had been effective.

When he expressed surprise that a Spanish ship could have been sunk in view of the air and sea power we had in the area, I pointed out that we could scarcely get into the position of escorting ships to Cuba in view of our overall policy. He said he could understand this. He indicated that the Soviet Government had remained relatively quiet about the activities directed against Cuba as they did not wish to inject this issue into the American political campaign. I said that in conclusion that while I assumed that all of our policies would be under review after the election, I did not believe there would be any change in our attitude toward hit-and-run raids on Cuba.

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<sup>2</sup> J.C. King of the CIA's Deputy Directorate of Plans met with Nicaragua's dictator, General Anastasio Somoza, on September 17 at Friendship Airport in Miami. King told Somoza that he "could count on a sympathetic understanding in Washington" if he dropped his support for Artime. (Memorandum for the record, September 17; *ibid.*) According to the minutes of a joint ARA-CIA meeting on October 1, FitzGerald said that Somoza told King he had information that Castro would attack the exile camps in Nicaragua and they would expect the United States to respond. FitzGerald saw this as a Somoza entrapment ploy. Mann "made it clear he wanted no such move on Somoza's part and directed that Somoza be so informed." (ARA-CIA Weekly Meeting memorandum, October 1; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files)

<sup>3</sup> The Artime exile group had sunk a Spanish ship, the *Sierra Aranzazu*, in mid-September. According to the Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee of September 25, Secretary Rusk had assured the Spanish Ambassador that the United States would assist in the investigation of the incident. At the same meeting it "was generally agreed that the U.S. should not lend weight to the case against Artime and the findings should remain 'as indeterminate as is plausible.'" (*Ibid.*, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records)

**288. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 29, 1964.

SUBJECT

National Security Action Memorandum No. 311<sup>2</sup>

You have asked for a sit rep on the committee established by NSAM 311. My present judgment is that it has bogged down, not because of personality differences and interagency disagreements, but rather because of unresolved technical problems which prevent the accurate judgment factor from being applied.

These amount to:

a. gaps remaining in the factual information available regarding advanced aircraft capabilities. (Thompson will try to shake an interim report loose from McCone on this problem.)

b. a disagreement as to whether satellites can, by themselves, provide adequate coverage. NRO said no for some time but is revising this opinion. (This will go back to USIB.)

c. It has not been determined whether the JCS will permit the most sensitive ECM techniques to be used in peacetime reconnaissance U-2's over Cuba.

d. Agreement does not exist as to whether a mix of surveillance methods is advisable or not. DOD favors this.

e. Ambassador Thompson advocates a reaffirmation of UN ground inspection in Cuba.

Another factor may be that Ambassador Thompson, a reflective thinker out loud, may lack the two-fisted authoritarian approach required to hammer out the kind of a paper you want from this committee consisting of Tom Hughes, Kitchen, Weiss and Lindjord for State, Ray Cline for CIA, and Brig. Gen. John Vogt and Alvin Friedman of Defense.

When I can catch Ray Cline I will get additional insight.

I would recommend that the work of this committee be further refined now that the election period is over. In other words, the question should be can we live after November 4th with any degree of lessened

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. I, 1/64-1/65. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Document 277.

assurance. The committee should dispense with such matters as what to do after a shootdown, etc. etc. and concentrate on what are the minimal requirements and what are the minimal means to dissatisfy these. Our 303 Committee could generate the answers to the technical problems by direct orders. These are the problems which have the NSAM committee floundering. The time is getting short; the UN may debate the matter before we have your paper.

Peter Jessup<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**289. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 10, 1964.

SUBJECT

Cuba—Miscellaneous

John Crimmins, Des FitzGerald, Joe Califano, and I met to talk about miscellaneous Cuban problems. Here are some of the items which came up.

1. *Aranzazu Incident*—John Crimmins said that we have completed our “investigation” of the *Aranzazu* incident and that the Spanish have now asked us to give them our evaluation of the various reports we have furnished to them. John is now working on a paper of talking points he will use with the Spanish (he wants to keep it oral if possible). The general pitch he will probably want to use will take into account such facts as (a) that we want to give the Spanish the minimum necessary to keep them from thinking that we are trying to deceive them and (b) that the Spanish, themselves, probably evaluate Artime as the prime suspect. Specifically, such points as the following might be made to the Spanish: *First*, while we cannot rule out the possibility that the Cubans sunk the *Aranzazu*, it is probably more likely that the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activity, Vol. III, 1964, 1965. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

exiles did it. *Second*, there are a number of exile groups that have the capability of doing the job. *Third*, the most likely of the exile groups is probably Artime. But the fact that Artime's boat was in Curacao would seem to rule him out; and even if this could be explained, we could still not prove that Artime is the culprit. *Fourth*, (if pressed) by a process of elimination, the attack would seem to have come from the Dominican Republic<sup>2</sup> (the Spanish already strongly suspect this—see attached cable).<sup>3</sup> In any event, we are sure it did not come from the U.S.

John Crimmins plans to clear his talking points with the Special Group before he talks to the Spanish.

2. *Special Group Items*—Des mentioned that a dissident group [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] inside Cuba have contacted Artime's people; reportedly, they have picked Artime because they feel that anyone with his resources must have the support of the U.S. Government. Des feels that we should let this contact develop and, in this connection, he believes that the Special Group should permit the continuance of our support to Artime for another 60 or 90 days and, if absolutely necessary, allow Artime to make one more attack (more or less controlled by CIA) on Cuba. If we drop Artime precipitously, the dissident group in Cuba will assume that Artime is not worth contacting and their willingness to express dissidence may tend to dry up. In all of this discussion, Des emphasized that he is no great admirer of Artime and that the above is not an Agency device to keep Artime's group alive. This item will probably come before the Special Group on Thursday.<sup>4</sup>

Des also mentioned the possibility of passing on to Dorticos, in an unattributable, deniable fashion, the message that, while the U.S. cannot live with Fidel Castro, it might well be able to live with Dorticos. Des feels that Cuba is in terrible shape, that Dorticos knows it, and that a move like this could conceivably produce a big dividend. At best, it will start Dorticos plotting; at worst, (if Castro finds out) it will help to sow some seeds of dissension and distrust. This item will probably come up at a later Special Group meeting.

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<sup>2</sup> In a November 21 memorandum Crimmins noted that a "large number of FBI reports of interrogations of Cuban exiles in Miami and Puerto Rico" had been passed to the Spanish. Crimmins said that he would tell the Spanish that "We are quite satisfied" that the attack did not come from Jamaica or Haiti and that "we are certain it did not come from Puerto Rico." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 519 from Santo Domingo, November 3; attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> According to Ambassador Thompson's notes on the 303 Committee meeting on November 12, the CIA proposal was approved with Department of State support. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records)

3. *Erosion of Cuban Economy*—Des was very hopeful that Cuba will be in very bad economic shape by the end of 1965. [1 line of source text not declassified]; some of this is going in already, and some is on the way. Emphasizing the extreme sensitivity of the operation, Des said that the effect on large amounts of Cuban machinery could be brutal.

The point was made that there was, these days, a general recognition by the European missions in Cuba that the Cuban economic situation is grim and that, in fact, the isolation policy is not entirely a farce. To some extent, this realization coincided with the timing of the recent Cuban restrictions on credit.

4. *British Channel to Castro*—John Crimmins said that Patrick Gordon-Walker, in his meeting with Secretary Rusk,<sup>5</sup> suggested that the British would be pleased to act as a middle man for a dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba. The Secretary has asked John to look into the desirability of this. The initial feeling of the group was that it was not a good idea. Among other things, if we want to establish a dialogue with Castro, there are better channels than the British.

5. *Basic Review of Cuban Policy*—The group agreed that, with November 3 behind us, we can usefully do some basic review work on Cuba. To this end, John Crimmins agreed to write a paper which would outline the major problems and the possible options, including accommodation. This will be ready in a few days' time and will be distributed for comment. We can then decide where to go from there.

Des FitzGerald said we should consider the re-institution, in the near future, of the "unilateral" CIA-directed covert program which had scored a number of hits last year. The group agreed, however, that a decision on this should probably wait until some of the basic review work on Cuba had been completed.

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<sup>5</sup> Rusk and Gordon-Walker met on October 27 in Rusk's office; see Document 397.

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**290. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 19, 1964, noon.

**SUBJECT**

Meeting at the White House—12 Noon

**IN ATTENDANCE**

The President-Elect, The Vice-President-Elect, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance, McGeorge Bundy, McCone

The above were present for all topics; others came in as indicated.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Congo and South Vietnam.]

3. *Cuba*. In attendance: Amb. Thompson.

Rusk outlined the work done by the Thompson Committee on the question of overflights of Cuba,<sup>2</sup> explaining the position that Castro had taken, forecasting debate in the United Nations, and explaining briefly the alternatives open to us such as satellites, drones, balloons, the Oxcart, or a mixing of all of these.

McNamara advocated satellites, suggesting consideration of a launch pad at Cape Kennedy for an East-West satellite mission.

Rusk then asked for an explanation by me of a plan developed by CIA to fly over the unprotected zones. I explained the plan in considerable detail, using maps indicating that U-2's could fly and photograph 80% of the island and remain out of range of the SAM's. However, this would only cover 30% of the priority targets and would not cover the major military or population concentrations. I indicated that the mounting of a satellite 112-B camera for oblique photography would give us useable photography over all of the defended areas with resolution of about 5'. This would be better than satellites and could be synchronized with weather. I raised the danger of the redeployment of SAM's, indicating that such a move by Castro could be detected by the U-2's if they were equipped with available warning systems. I concluded by stating that I had less confidence in the product from satellites than indicated by Secretary McNamara, that the use of satellites over Cuba would deprive us of some capability over USSR and Communist China, and it would be impossible to refute stories of missiles in Cuba on the basis of satellite photography. I explained in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, Folder 10, DCI Meetings with the President, Oct-Dec 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 277 and 288.



some detail the innumerable times I had gone before Committees of Congress to discuss Cuban missile rumors and had been able to disprove them satisfactorily with U-2 photography. This, I said, could not be done with satellites. The President asked if I was positive that there were no missiles in Cuba. I replied you could not absolutely prove the negative; we were satisfied that all missiles which we had seen had been removed; all missile sites under construction had been destroyed and were non-existent; all secure areas obviously built for nuclear war-head storage had been destroyed and no new ones had appeared. Finally, the redeployment of the SAM's, which left the logical missile-launching areas unprotected, made me think the Cubans and the Soviets did not intend to reintroduce missiles at the present time.

There was no decision except to explore the subject further and to continue U-2 surveillance on the most modest reasonable basis subject to further review before or during the UN debate.

Also re Cuba: See addendum.

[Omitted here is discussion of South Africa.]

### **Addendum**

#### *Cuba*

Rusk made two important observations: First, that he felt that the purpose of reconnaissance over Cuba was to produce intelligence on the presence of, or the introduction of, offensive missiles, offensive aircraft or other weapons or weapons systems of sufficient range to pose a threat to the security of the United States. Requirements for overflights, whether by manned aircraft, satellites, balloons, drones, etc., should be governed by this criteria. Collateral intelligence would be useful, such as information on military encampments, equipment, deployments, economic developments, etc., in studying Cuba, but should not govern as criteria for establishing requirements for reconnaissance.

*Note:* This criteria should be passed to COMOR and should be discussed with General Carroll.

Secondly, Rusk stated that he had had a long meeting with Dobrynin and had been told that Castro had stopped all subversive activities and efforts against Latin America and had insisted to the Soviets that neither he nor his government are engaged in any way in such nefarious operations. I stated that our information contradicted this statement as there were a number of developments which indicated acceleration in these activities by the Castro Cubans.

*Note:* This criteria should be passed to COMOR and should be discussed with General Carroll.

## Attachment

### Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

#### CUBA

We continue to receive reports and rumors of missiles in Cuba and these we disprove by U-2 photography. I would expect a continuation of such rumors and also a continuation of statements by individuals or members of the Congress similar to those we have witnessed in the last two years. I have depended heavily on U-2 photography to dispel these rumors.

While satellite photography will make some input into our intelligence on Cuba, it will not be conclusive because of the resolution of KH-4 and the small area coverage of KH-7. Also we expect disappointments from satellite photography because of uncertain weather conditions encountered in Cuba and the impossibility of synchronizing satellite missions with Cuban weather. It should be noted that every mission targeted against Cuba will involve sacrifices of intelligence gathering capabilities on the Soviet Union and Communist China.

An east-west orbit would be useful but expensive and KH-4 or KH-7 missions in such an orbit, while covering Cuba more satisfactorily than the present north-south orbit, would not produce intelligence of particular interest in other parts of the world.

U-2's can be flown in the safe corridors and a satellite 112-B camera can be mounted in a U-2 on an angle and thus photography of the defended areas of Cuba as well as the undefended areas can be had with photographic resolution of about 5 feet which will be useful in my opinion and better and cheaper than satellite photography with KH-4 because of resolution and KH-7 because of area coverage. This however would continue the political problem.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> A notation written by McCone following this paragraph reads: "Rusk discussed Cuba with Dobrynin—who says Castro has quit [subversion] against LA and will probably not attempt shoot down flights against missiles or main targets. This might be done by mix of means." A memorandum of this conversation on November 18 is in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Document 72.

## 291. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 3, 1964.

### SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 3 December 1964

### PRESENT

Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. McNaughton, and Mr. McCone

[*name not declassified*] was present for Item 4

[*name not declassified*] was present for Item 5

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated subjects.]

### 3. *Cuban Forecast*

The paper "Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations into Cuba during December and 1–7 January 1965"<sup>2</sup> was approved by telephonic vote on 3 December 1964.

### 4. *Manuel Artime*

a. The CIA paper of 23 November 1964 entitled "Synopsis of Meeting with Manuel Artime Advising Change in Policy Regarding U.S. Government Support for His Operation"<sup>3</sup> was noted by the principals.

b. The CIA paper dated 30 November 1964 entitled "Proposed Take Over of the Cuban Merchant Ship *Rio Caonao* by the Artime Group" was discussed by the principals with a marked lack of enthusiasm for the concept.<sup>2</sup> (This paper was not a CIA endorsed proposal, but a relay to the Committee of stated intentions of Artime.)

c. Ambassador Thompson cited five vigorous State Department objections:<sup>4</sup> (1) the inevitable charge of piracy and its complicative fac-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on December 4 by Jessup and distributed to Thompson, Vance, and McCone.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The paper described the CIA's meeting with Manuel Artime on November 13, in which Artime was advised of the recommendations of the 303 Committee meeting of November 10; see Document 289. The CIA told Artime that he was "to concentrate all of his assets on developing the internal operation while still maintaining his paramilitary posture to the degree necessary to preserve his attractiveness to the internal group." Artime made a strong plea to be allowed to proceed with the *Rio Caonao* operation, [*text not declassified*]. Artime was requested to prepare and submit his operational plan. The CIA paper is attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> ARA's objections to Artime's proposal were detailed in a December 1 memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary Adams to Thompson. Thompson reiterated these objections to the 303 Committee. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Files, 303 Committee Records)

tors, (2) a revival of Spanish charges at a time when repercussions of the *Aranzazu* incident have not yet faded, (3) the possibility of intercept by Cuban naval craft, (4) reverberations of such an act in UN debates, and (5) possible retaliations by Castro from his missile sites.

d. Mr. McCone stated he could not view this proposal favorably and he would prefer that Artime's energies be channeled into a commando effort more susceptible to guidance and control.

e. Mr. Bundy felt the proposal had too many Cecil B. de Mille overtones.

f. Mr. McNaughton stated he understood that this paper was to be tabled until Mr. Vance's return but he would record the views of those present. The Committee Secretary determined that if there had been some votes in favor, the matter should be postponed until Mr. Vance was heard, but since the attitude was overwhelmingly negative, this constituted a veto.

g. In response to a question, [*name not declassified*] indicated that when informed of the U.S. attitude on this operation, he felt Artime would abandon the idea, but he could offer no guarantee that this would be the case. [*name not declassified*] also indicated Artime was farther along in his operation with internal dissidents and was shortly to have a meeting with their representatives, probably in Paris.

h. Mr. McCone urged that the pace not slacken in the preparation of a Cuba after Castro study which he understood was under the aegis of Mr. Crimmins, the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. Ambassador Thompson made note of the request.

[Omitted here is discussion on Sudan and the World Youth Festival.]

**Peter Jessup**

**292. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 15, 1964.

SUBJECT

Che Guevara and Lisa Howard

1. I have talked to John Crimmins about the Che Guevara approach. He and Tom Mann are very interested to hear what Guevara wants to say to us if, in fact, he does want to say something to us. (I told State that I thought that this could be a Lisa-generated<sup>2</sup> operation but that the odds are probably 7–5 that Guevara, in fact, would like to talk to us; whether he would say anything to us that we don't already know is another matter.)

2. The mechanics of talking to Guevara is the tough part. He is a real center of attention in New York (e.g. police, crowds) and it would be extremely awkward to try to get together with him privately. In addition, my own very strong view is that we should keep Lisa Howard out of it as a middleman; among many other considerations, Lisa is so subjectively wound up in rapprochement that one would never know what Guevara is saying and what Lisa is interpreting.

3. John and I agreed tentatively on the following outline.

(a) If Lisa Howard calls me back, I will simply tell her that I have nothing to tell her and will let her know if and when I do.

(b) John will explore with selected people in State the possibility and desirability of having a USUN type (maybe Yost) "fall in front of" Tabio, who is the Cuban ambassador to the UN, and say (1) that we understand from a newspaper source that Che wants to say something to us, and (2) is this true? If the answer is affirmative, we can then decide what to do. The main problem is to ascertain the truth—e.g.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contacts with Cuban Leaders, 5/63–4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Lisa Howard of the American Broadcasting Company had a 10-hour interview with Fidel Castro on April 22, 1963, and wrote an article in the September 1963 issue of *War/Peace Report*, entitled "Castro's Overture," stressing Castro's expressed desire for reaching an accommodation with the United States and his willingness to make substantial concessions to this end. She subsequently made numerous calls to Cuban and NSC officials, attempting to facilitate a rapprochement; see Document 240.

whether Che really has something to say to us or whether this is Lisa Howard building bridges. Somewhere along the line, our man would also indicate that, if it is true that the Cubans want to talk to us, we prefer not to talk through unofficial third parties.

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### 293. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 17, 1964.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting with Che Guevara, Cuban Minister of Industry

#### PARTICIPANTS

Under Secretary George W. Ball

Senator Eugene McCarthy

Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

R. E. Woods, Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary

Senator McCarthy outlined the main points of his December 16 conversation with Che Guevara, Cuban Minister of Industry. The meeting was arranged directly with the Senator by Lisa Howard and took place in her New York apartment.

The Senator said he believed the purpose of the meeting was to express Cuban interest in trade with the US and US recognition of the Cuban Regime. Mr. Ball agreed this was plausible, saying that because of the state of the Cuban economy, the Cuban Regime was interested in reviving its trade relations with the US to obtain convertible currency. Further, he felt that Guevara probably recognized that any dealings with the US would add respectability to the regime in the eyes of other Latin American States.

Guevara told Senator McCarthy the Alliance for Progress would fail because it merely underwrites vested interests and the status quo. He said that Venezuela and the Central American States in particular needed revolutions. Chile was one state that was undertaking reforms that might make a revolution unnecessary. He noted that Chile would recognize Cuba if it were not for United States pressure.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CUBA-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Woods on December 18.

Guevara did not attempt to conceal the subversive activities which Cuba was undertaking. He explicitly admitted that they were training revolutionaries and would continue to do so. He felt that this was a necessary mission for the Cuban Government since revolution offered the only hope of progress for Latin America.

Guevara attacked United States' overflights but not in particularly belligerent terms. He said that Cuba had the means to shoot down the planes, but had not taken any action against the United States. He insisted that there was no juridical basis for the overflights and that such a juridical basis was not furnished by OAS approval. Guevara mentioned only one specific "violation of sovereignty", this being when a US helicopter landed "over the line" (presumably at Guantanamo). He said that in this case, after some talk of firing upon the helicopter, it was permitted to leave Cuban territory.

Guevara said he knew the CIA was in Cuba. He stated that most of Cuba's enemies worked for the oil and power companies. He said the regime could identify them and they in turn knew they would be shot if they resorted to sabotage.

Guevara took issue with a statement that Ambassador Stevenson had made that the US was not withholding shipments of drugs to Cuba. Mr. Mann commented that drug shipments may have been cut back and that this was one area in which the Cubans could score on us. Mr. Ball said there was no reason why we should not sell drugs or medicines to Cuba, and Mr. Mann said he would look into the matter.

Guevara told the Senator that while conditions in Cuba were not good, there was no question of the regime collapsing. On the question of refugees, he said Cubans who did not like life on the island were free to leave. Mr. Mann commented that this was not true. Guevara also said the regime did not want any refugees returned to Cuba.

On relations between the Government and the Catholic Church, Guevara said they were good but that Party members could not belong to the Church. He mentioned in passing that they had more problems with Protestants than with Catholics.

On free elections, Guevara said these had not taken place because the revolution had not fully evolved. As to what form of government might eventually develop in Cuba, Guevara said—with pointed reference to Senator McCarthy—there was no interest in a bicameral congress or in anything along the lines of the Supreme Soviet in the USSR. He commented that the latter had no real power.

Mr. Ball asked if any references were made to Cuba's relationship to Moscow. It was mentioned that Lisa Howard had made the point that better relations with the US would give Cuba a more desirable position vis-à-vis Moscow. Mr. Ball said he believed the USSR was becoming fed up with Cuba but felt compelled to continue supporting it

because of its symbolic importance as the first country to go communist without pressure of the Red Army.

Mr. Ball emphasized the danger of meetings such as that which the Senator had had with Guevara. There was suspicion throughout Latin America that the US might make a deal with Cuba behind the backs of the other American States. This could provide a propaganda line useful to the Communists.

Mr. Ball pointed out that Guevara could not move about without a great many people knowing where he was and whom he was seeing. McCarthy agreed, mentioning the large number of police cars that had gathered when he met Guevara. Mr. Ball asked that McCarthy get in touch with him if any further contacts with Guevara were contemplated. Meanwhile it was essential that nothing be publicly said about the McCarthy–Guevara meeting although there was danger that Guevara himself might leak it.

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**294. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 18, 1964.

SUBJECT

Senator McCarthy/Che Guevara

1. John Crimmins gave me a brief read-out (reportedly, more details are to come)<sup>2</sup> on the meeting Senator McCarthy had with George Ball about McCarthy's meeting with Che Guevara. After listening to McCarthy, State feels that the conversation was entirely Lisa-generated and that Che really had nothing to tell us. (My own pre-conversation odds, which I transmitted to State, were 7–5 that Che wanted to talk to us but less than even money that he would say anything new to us.)

2. Che exuded confidence with McCarthy.

(a) Latin America, with the possible exception of Chile, is going to collapse. Everything is ripening in Cuba's direction. The U.S. is on the wrong wicket and is going to lose.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contacts with Cuban Leaders, 5/63–4/65. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 293.



(b) Resumption of trade with the U.S. would be good but Cuba can get along without it.

(c) The U.S. policy on drugs to Cuba is iniquitous.

3. If the McCarthy/Che conversation does become public, it could cause us some problems (e.g. in Latin America) since McCarthy will be viewed by some as an envoy from the Administration. Our line presumably will be to simply stick to the facts—i.e. that we don't control U.S. Senators and newspaperwomen; in this regard, the Senator did not ask for our recommendation before he had his talk with Guevara.

About the only plus from the McCarthy/Che meeting is that it was probably an eye-opener for McCarthy.

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**295. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 7 January 1965

*Cuba*

"a. The recommendations in the CIA paper of 6 January 1965 entitled, 'Activities of Manuel Artime Buesa During December and Early January; Contact with Military Dissidents Inside Cuba,'<sup>2</sup> were discussed at length and approved with the proscriptions elaborated below.

"b. The identification in the paper of the principal dissidents purporting to overthrow Fidel Castro led to a number of questions from the Committee members: What reason is there to believe that these per-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records, January–June 1965. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

sons are bona fide? What sort of a man is Cubela?<sup>3</sup> Does [*name not declassified*]<sup>4</sup> have the loyalty of the men under his command? What are Cubela's present relations with Fidel Castro?

"c. Mr. FitzGerald's estimate was that these individuals were genuine 'disenchantees' positively identified from other sources as being anti-Castro. Predicting success or failure was not possible because of the unknown factors: security, loyalty, resoluteness of officers and men, and judgment and luck in their timing. Ambassador Thompson wondered if open civil war would be a desirable objective, and he suggested a Soviet reaction in other theatres in that event.

"d. Mr. FitzGerald then requested that consideration be given to reiteration by higher authority of a theme, made by the late President Kennedy in a speech about a week before he died, to the effect that there are a lot of people in Cuba with whom the United States is prepared to deal.<sup>5</sup> Mr. FitzGerald said that the impact of this message on the island at that time could not be overestimated and its reissuance now would have a strong psychological impact. The Committee members were receptive to this concept, and Mr. Bundy requested a submission of draft language from Mr. FitzGerald which could be used by higher authority in response to a planted question at a forthcoming press conference.

"e. Mr. McCone wanted the committee to know that dealing with autonomous exiles was, unfortunately, a part of a previously approved total program against Cuba and that Artime, less and less responsive to persuasion, constituted a persistent menace. Mr. Bundy concurred that Artime was a firecracker in our midst.<sup>6</sup>

"f. It was in this context then, that the Committee agreed with the recommendation in the paper (i.e., that the subsidy to Artime be paid through the month of February). Mr. McCone's suggestion that additional payments for 'two or three months' could be offered in exchange for acceptance of restrictive conditions<sup>7</sup> by Artime was also approved.

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<sup>3</sup> Cmdte. Rolando Cubela is identified in the January 6 CIA paper as "a representative of an internal military dissident group, which is plotting to overthrow Castro."

<sup>4</sup> [*text not declassified*] one of the three groups that Cubela said were involved in a coup against Castro.

<sup>5</sup> In an address before the Inter-American Press Association in Miami on November 18, 1963, Kennedy said "once this barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, p. 876)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 296 for an addendum to this paragraph.

<sup>7</sup> concentration of development of the internal operation and curtailment of grandstand operations to augment his image. [Footnote in the source text.]

Ambassador Thompson reserved the right to refer the Committee position to Assistant Secretary of State Mann prior to signing off. (Subsequent to the meeting, the office of the Deputy Director for Coordination/INR indicated that Mr. Mann had been advised of the tenor of the meeting and concurred in the Committee's decision.)"

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## 296. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 13, 1965.

### SUBJECT

Amplification of the Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee,  
7 January 1965

At the request of Mr. McCone, the following amplification of the record of his remarks concerning Manuel Artime is inserted as a change on page 2 of the minutes dated 8 January 1965.<sup>2</sup> In place of paragraph 3.e. of the 8 January minutes the following paragraphs are added:

3.e. Mr. McCone impressed on the Committee the difficulty of dealing with the autonomous exile groups and it was, in his opinion, extremely dangerous and of questionable effectiveness. Incidents beyond the control of CIA or USG might occur which could be very embarrassing.

f. Mr. McCone explained that support of the autonomous exile groups was part of a 6-point program and that when the program was submitted, stipulation was made that the program was a package involving propaganda, psychological efforts, infiltration, directed sabotage operations, economic denial, and autonomous operations.

g. As time passed, some of the "package", most particularly the directed sabotage operations, was discontinued for policy reasons. Hence, the effectiveness of autonomous operations has been greatly reduced and the danger of embarrassment enhanced. Furthermore, Artime is not responsive to persuasion or direction and thus constitutes a persistent menace.

h. The Committee agreed the situation is hazardous and Mr. Bundy called Artime "a firecracker in our midst."

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<sup>1</sup> Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records, January–June 1965. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Document 295.

Paragraph 3.f. of the minutes dated 8 January thus becomes paragraph 3.i.

In the opinion of the Executive Secretary, this amplification is completely in accord with what transpired at the meeting.

**Peter Jessup**

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## **297. Memorandum to the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 23, 1965.

### **SUBJECT**

Withdrawal of Support from Arttime Group

The Department of State strongly recommends that, in light of recent developments in the activities of the Arttime group,<sup>2</sup> the 303 Committee adopt immediately the following course of action with respect to that group:

1. Arttime will be notified without delay that, in conformity with previous statements made to him, US support for his group will be terminated as of February 28, with phasing out of US assistance to be carried out as quickly as possible.

2. Arttime will be notified immediately, with respect to his dealings with Cubela<sup>3</sup> concerning the "internal operation", that (a) it is our firm estimate that under present circumstances such an operation is impractical, unrealistic and almost certain to fail; (b) we cannot be certain that the participation by internal Cuban elements is not a provocation and a trap; and (c) in any case, we want it clearly understood

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964, 1965. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. According to a February 23 covering memorandum from Williams to Jessup, Thompson had approved the memorandum and wanted it circulated to members of the 303 Committee. The memorandum was prepared by Crimmins, following a meeting among Rusk, Thompson, Hughes, and Mann according to the February 25 ARA-CIA Weekly Meeting report. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting Reports)

<sup>2</sup> Arttime's group had recently made an attack on Casilda, Cuba, carried out by the captain of the Arttime vessel, without the approval of either Arttime or his deputy, thus disregarding the expressed wishes of U.S. officials for Arttime's group to desist from all such attacks. (Memorandum from Carter (INR/DDC) to Hughes, February 25; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 295.

that we cannot and will not make any commitments in advance concerning US support for such an operation.

3. Through both diplomatic and Agency channels, the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican and Dominican Governments will be informed discreetly, but clearly, that (a) we are in no way supporting Arttime; (b) he is on his own; (c) any arrangements made with, or facilities provided to, Arttime by the Governments concerned are strictly between them and him; and (d) we would understand and would have no objection if the Governments concerned were to refuse assistance to him or withdraw present assistance from him.

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**298. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Williams) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Adams)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting March 4, 1965

The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee held on March 4, 1965 contain the following items:

*[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (9 lines of source text) not declassified]*

*“Cuba—Proposed Political Action Operation to Acerbate Cuban-Soviet Relations<sup>2</sup>*

“In the proposed deception operation to acerbate Cuban-Soviet relations, Mr. FitzGerald said that the Agency was withdrawing the proposed use of former Senator Kenneth Keating and hoped to build a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> A January 25 memorandum to the 303 Committee proposed that Castro’s suspicions of the Soviets be aroused by having a prominent American announce a trip to Moscow and inform the press that the purpose of the trip was to publish articles, and meet Kosygin or another top Russian official at the Kremlin. The individual would return to the United States, but instead of publishing anything about his Soviet visit, he would visit Florida, the Caribbean area, and Washington, trying to make it appear as if secret negotiations about Cuba had been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union behind Castro’s back. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. I, 11/63–7/65)

similar confusion operation around an actual trip to Moscow planned by lawyer James Britt Donovan. Mr. Donovan would remain unwitting. Ambassador Thompson asked if this would not preclude Mr. Donovan's usefulness in other possible missions in the future. The reply was that there are no plans in sight to make use of Mr. Donovan's services. The proposal was considered as approved."

*"Cuba—Future of CIA's Cuban Paramilitary Program; Proposed UDT Sabotage Operation"*<sup>3</sup>

"a. The Committee vetoed the proposed UDT operation for the present time. A discussion followed in which Mr. FitzGerald stated that keeping paramilitary assets in being is an expensive process and such a 'shelf life' is limited in duration. He emphasized that only the lesser motivated types are willing to remain on ice indefinitely—better caliber people drift away.

"b. While accepting this difficulty, it was the opinion of Ambassador Thompson that this asset could be needed in the future, and Mr. Vance felt it important to preserve the capability despite its tendency to waste away. It was agreed to expend the necessary funds to keep such a paramilitary capability in force."

*"Cuba—Support to Artime"*

"In regard to the two papers on support to Artime, Mr. FitzGerald stated that there was no basic disagreement between State<sup>4</sup> and the Agency;<sup>5</sup> it was a matter of how best to terminate Artime. He felt that there was some obligation now to 'get the boys back home.' After some discussion back and forth, it was decided that an undetermined sum to return the Cubans from Caribbean outposts was in order. Mr. Bundy directed that these arrangements be established and completed by the end of April. Ambassador Thompson asked some questions concerning the internal operation of Cubela and indicated that it was a matter

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<sup>3</sup> A January 18 memorandum to the 303 Committee reported that a substantial number of Cubans had been "selected and intensively trained in all aspects of paramilitary work, including commando tactics and sabotage," but were "becoming discouraged at inaction," and that, therefore, some type of underwater demolition team action against Cuban navy patrol vessels or "other Cuban targets of opportunity" should be taken. The memorandum stated that "If an operation of this type is not considered acceptable," the "CIA be authorized to begin reduction of its commitments in the paramilitary field." (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 297.

<sup>5</sup> According to the ARA-CIA Weekly Meeting Report of February 25, FitzGerald expressed concern that DDC had "circulated" a paper recommending that aid to Artime be cut off as of the end of February. FitzGerald stated that the Agency's view was that aid should be continued for another 2 months to give Artime time to develop his potential for action with Cuba. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting Reports) The CIA paper on this subject has not been found.

of some concern to the Department and that it be made absolutely clear that there was no U.S. commitment to Cubela via Artime. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed this. He felt that Cubela was living on borrowed time."

*"Cuba—Problem of U.S. Support for Cuban Exile Organization RECE*

"This brought the discussion to the RECE proposals.<sup>6</sup> It was the consensus of the group that 'either-you-do-or-you-don't' and that the U.S. should not be involved with another exile organization. The committee agreed to reimburse Major Oliva some \$17,000 and to offer Oliva himself some help in finding a sort of job commensurate with his talents. A suggestion of enrollment in the International Police Academy was made, and Mr. Vance and Mr. FitzGerald agreed to collaborate on finding a solution."

*"Cuba—Emergency Exfiltration Operation*

"The committee approved a one shot emergency exfiltration operation for 5 March 1965. The paper concerning his operation was circulated at the meeting and is hereby attached."<sup>7</sup>

*"Cuba—Question and Answer for Presidential Press Conference*

"a. Paragraph 3.d. of the minutes of 7 January 1965 authorized a proposed draft of a planted question and answer on the subject of Cuba for a forthcoming Presidential press conference. The purpose of this question and answer was to reiterate a theme made by the late President Kennedy<sup>8</sup> a week before he died to the effect that there were Cubans within Cuba with whom the U.S. would be willing to deal.

"b. Mr. Bundy directed that the draft be circulated to members for comment at a future meeting. There was some doubt expressed whether a press conference at this time could appropriately generate a question on Cuba. The draft is appended to these minutes as an attachment."<sup>7</sup>

*"Previous Approvals by Telephone*

"The Cuban infiltration/exfiltration operations for March were approved by voice vote on 17 February."

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<sup>6</sup> In a March 1 study by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, prepared in consultation with operating-level representatives of the 303 Committee agencies, and forwarded to the Committee under a March 1 covering memorandum, Crimmins discussed the background of the RECE (Representation of Cubans in Exile) request for U.S. support, the basic factors affecting a decision, and the principal conclusion that the U.S. Government had "only a limited interest in keeping RECE alive." The covering memorandum concludes with the statement that "the Department is inclined to favor giving no assistance to RECE." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964, 1965)

<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 295.

**299. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Crimmins) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 16, 1965.

SUBJECT

US-UK-Canadian Talks on Cuba

*Purpose*—The talks have two purposes: 1) to try to come to a common assessment of the present situation and outlook in Cuba, and 2) to set out and examine, on the basis of this common assessment, the range of options<sup>2</sup> open to the West. Although lines of policy will inevitably be discussed, it is clearly understood by all concerned that there will be no attempt during the talks to fix a common policy toward Cuba.

*Possible British Position*—We cannot be sure about British motivations in the talks, for which they took the initiative.<sup>3</sup> It is possible that they are approaching the discussions with an open mind, intent only upon an examination of the facts. On the other hand, they may regard the talks as the first step in a process to move us toward a relaxation of current pressures on Cuba.

If the British have the latter intention, they may advocate the line, set forth in various “think-piece” despatches written by their Ambassador in Havana, Adam Watson (whom you met last summer), that whereas our policy toward Cuba has been successful in isolating Cuba, it cannot overthrow the Castro regime or induce any changes in his basic policies. Therefore, the British may argue it is necessary to provide inducements to Castro (in addition to keeping some pressure on him)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CUBA. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> According to a March 2 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, Secretary Rusk told Crimmins that he wanted “no new initiatives on Cuba policy for the time being.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Memos re: Cuba Miscellaneous, 11/63-6/65)

<sup>3</sup> In a January 15 memorandum to Rusk, Mann stated that the British Embassy, “acting on instructions from London” had inquired informally of Crimmins “concerning the Department’s receptivity toward an informal US-UK examination of the Cuba question.” The British added that they would be interested in inviting the Canadians to participate. Mann, Thompson, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Tyler agreed “that a review of the kind suggested by the British could be useful.” Rusk initialed his approval of an informal exchange with the British and the Canadians, but added in a postscript that “In agreeing to informal discussions, it should be made clear that the U.S. has clear and far-reaching agreements with the members of the OAS with respect to Cuba and this factor must be fully taken into account.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CUBA)



in order to reduce or terminate his subversive activities and to lessen his dependence on the Soviet Union. The inducements would be (1) expanded economic and other relations with the non-OAS West (i.e., the US would cease its objections to such ties); and (2) an end to “subversive activities” against Cuba, to be keyed to Castro’s cessation of activities against Latin America.

There are, however, some indications that the British may have somewhat revised the assessments upon which the approach above was based, and are now thinking in more modest terms, having in mind a more limited objective and the consequent employment of narrower inducements. We may find that they will stress the single goal of preventing Castro from, as they put it, being forced irreversibly into complete dependence upon the Soviets. The means by which this would be accomplished would be the expansion of trade and other relations between Cuba and the non-OAS West. There would be no reciprocal arrangement on subversive activities.

*Recommended US Position*—The policy which the US is following arises from two key judgments: 1) the present Cuban Government has as a firm long-range goal the organization of Latin America in a form inimical to Western interests; and 2) the close association of the Soviet Union with the present regime, manifested by its dependence upon the Soviet Union for its security, constitutes an extension of Soviet power and influence into Latin America which is unacceptable to the West as a whole and particularly to the nations of this Hemisphere. Our objectives, therefore, are to prevent the present Cuban Government from attaining its own objectives in Latin America and to bring about the retraction of Soviet power and influence.

*US Views on Possible British Position*—While we agree that an opening to the West might give Castro more independence in his dealings with the USSR, we see little or no reason to believe that this would affect his bed-rock, continuing reliance on the Soviets for basic economic support and military guarantees, which no one in the West, outside the United States, can provide. Moreover—and this is a basic point—there is no evidence whatsoever that Castro has any intention of making an ideological shift, of moving out of the “Socialist” camp, or of being ready to abandon his objectives in Latin America. His strong desire for greater independence relates to his relationships within, not outside, the camp. We believe that an arrangement like the one which the British may propose would be advantageous to Cuba and the USSR and distinctly disadvantageous to us. We consider that such a policy would be less effective than our present low-cost, low-risk policy in keeping Castro from moving toward his objective in the Hemisphere and in inducing a retraction of Soviet power and influence. In fact, the “relaxed” policy could well be destructive of any hopes of further progress toward our (and the OAS) goals.

300. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 19, 1965.

SUBJECT

U.S./U.K./Canadian Talks on Cuba

On Wednesday and Thursday,<sup>2</sup> I attended the U.S./U.K./Canadian talks on Cuba. Jack Vaughn<sup>3</sup> chaired the meeting, which included John Crimmins and Bill Bowdler on the U.S. side (Tommy Thompson attended the last session); Rennie (Head of Latin American Affairs) and Watson (Ambassador to Cuba) on the British side; and Pick (Head of Latin American Affairs) on the Canadian side. The purpose of the two-day talks was (a) to assess the situation inside Cuba and (b) to take a look at the policy options now available to the West. By and large, the talks consisted of a U.S./U.K. dialogue, with the Canadians listening and chipping in only occasionally.

1. The first order of business was to assess the *economic* situation in Cuba; on this, there seemed to be general agreement.

(a) *Sugar*—The crop this year will probably be about 5 million tons; it could be smaller if the cane does not get cut in time. In this regard, external activist pressures on Cuba seem to make some difference on cane-cutting; if there were a relaxation, there would be fewer soldiers and more experts available to cut cane.

Cuba's sugar production will probably reach 6.0 to 7.5 million tons by 1970 (6.8 million in 1961), which is a lot of sugar but which is considerably short of the Cuban target of 10 million tons. Russian combines are now being used and will undoubtedly be used more and more in the future. Sugar expansion in Cuba does seem to have some limiting factors—e.g., the difficulty of putting too many resources into this one industry, in view of other requirements.

(b) *Trade with West*—Cuba sells an average of 1.5 million tons of sugar to the Free World each year; the Cubans have a dilemma here in that they like to earn the convertible currency but definitely do not like the price these days. Imports from the West will drop

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, US/UK/Canadian Talks, 2/65–3/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> March 17 and 18.

<sup>3</sup> Mann resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on March 17, and Jack H. Vaughn assumed this position 5 days later.

considerably in 1965 as opposed to 1964 because of Cuba's foreign exchange problems.

(c) *Trade With and Aid From the Bloc*—It is hard to say just how much subsidy the Soviets pay for Cuban sugar; while the announced price is considerably above the world market price, it should be noted that the sugar is part of a barter deal—and we don't really know the true value of what the Soviets are giving the Cubans in exchange for the sugar. With respect to aid, Russian loans are probably not very hard and they probably don't expect to get repaid. As a general point, it is amazing how little the Russians get, in the form of Cuban good behavior, for the investment they are making.

(d) *Miscellaneous*—A number of interesting miscellaneous points were made. *First*, the management problem is severe in Cuba. There is entirely too much transferring of personnel; also, the penalties for failure are excessive and lead to over-caution. *Second*, Fidel is not always happy about sending trainees to Russia—e.g., learning to farm in a cold climate is not very applicable to farming in Cuba. *Third*, next to sugar, cattle production is the second most important economic activity; arable crops don't seem to count for much. *Fourth*, in terms of growth, Cuba seems to be at the bottom of the pendulum. The economy may swing back and make up the ground it has lost since 1961, but it is probably going to take Cuba a number of years before there is any real economic growth.

2. *Political Currents in Cuban Leadership*—The group generally agreed with the set of conclusions attached at Tab 1. Ambassador Watson did go on to elaborate at some length on the struggle between Castro and the Old Guard communists. He made the point that the removal of the Old Guard from points of power might not only be a reflection of Castro's dissatisfaction with this group; it is also possible that the Old Guard is getting more and more disenchanted with Cuban progress and, in fact, is not unhappy to withdraw from the fray. In this regard, Watson speculated that the Old Guard may do much to feed Moscow's doubts about Russian involvement in Cuba.

3. *Cuban Relations with Latin America*—At the outset, the British expressed strong reservations about the U.S. view regarding the threat of Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere. In the first place, there is not much subversion (e.g., "surely there is more OAS subversion against Cuba than there is Cuban subversion against Latin America"). In the second place, Cuban subversion is negotiable. Castro is beginning to have doubts about it. He is not so sure there will be revolution in Latin America in the near future and, in any event, he is not so sure he will be the leader of it. These beliefs, in addition to the belief that Castro may want to concentrate on his own island, lead the British to believe that he would reduce his subversion if he got something meaningful

in return. In a related regard, the British speculated that any recent increase in subversive activity has to do with the fact that Castro may feel that his efforts at rapprochement with the West have been rebuffed.

The U.S. pointed out that, while it would be nonsense to attribute all Latin American tension to Cuba, it would be inaccurate to say that Cuba had no responsibility for a considerable part of it. Certainly, there was plenty of evidence around to indicate Cuba's subversive interests. *First*, there was the recent meeting in Havana among Latin American communists to revitalize the subversive effort. *Second*, there is in operation today a very energetic National Liberation Section in the Cuban Government's Directorate General of Intelligence. *Third*, the public line has been getting harder. Cuba no longer talks so much about "exporting revolution by example." In a recent speech, for instance, Guevara talked about "bullets instead of ballots." *Fourth*, there are recent hard cases in point, too. In Colombia, for example, the leader of a recent carefully planned subversive incident had spent two months in Cuba just before coming home to lead the insurgency. *Fifth*, the training of guerrillas goes on. Ambassador Vaughn noted that in Panama literally hundreds have received training over the past couple years and that this number of people can make quite an impact on a fragile society. His personal experience with a few of these trainees indicates that they are Chinese-oriented, fanatical, and violent.

By the end of the discussion, the British, while still implying that a deal might be made with Castro on subversion, seemed to have a somewhat better appreciation of the Cuban threat in Latin America.

4. *Soviet Intentions Towards Cuba*—While there was a difference in emphasis between the U.S. and the British, by and large there was close agreement with the summary paragraphs attached at Tab 2.<sup>4</sup> The British emphasized the point that the Russians are not very happy with the present burden and that they would certainly be prepared to accept closer Western/Cuban relations.

There was a good deal of discussion on the question of just how far the Soviets would be willing to disengage from Cuba. They would conceivably go pretty far—e.g., permit downfall of the Old Guard; agree to military neutralization of Cuba (although Cuba would have some contrary views on this). On the other hand, even the British did not think that the Soviets would willingly permit Cuba to leave the Socialist camp, although they did imply that this could conceivably come about over the long pull once the West had its foot firmly in the door.

5. *Options for the West*—By the end of the talks, the British view seemed to boil down to the following elements: *First*, the U.S. policy

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

has been “brilliant” (Watson), and has provided us with a remarkable opportunity to loosen the Cuban/Soviet tie. This is an important opportunity since we do not want to make the Cuban/Soviet tie indissoluble. *Second*, while it is clear that the U.S. and the OAS should probably not ease their pressures, the non-OAS Free World countries should be encouraged to sound out the Cubans on what their terms might be. In this regard, one of the Western carrots might be an offer of increased contact with the non-OAS Free World (e.g., trade and cultural contacts), in exchange for good behavior on Castro’s part—i.e., less subversion.

The case for the present policy and for a harder policy was made by the U.S. and ran roughly as follows: We want to reduce subversion and induce a retraction of the USSR from the Hemisphere; in this regard, we are engaged in a policy designed to strengthen the internal resistance of L.A. governments, weaken Cuba, and demonstrate to the Soviets that they have made a mistake. Thus far, the policy has had moderate but measurable success. *First*, economic prospects in Cuba are not bright; the regime’s failure to demonstrate progress has hurt the regime with its own people and has hurt Cuba as an example in Latin America. *Second*, Cuba has been denied any subversive successes in Latin America. *Third*, this hard policy has increased Cuban/Soviet tensions. *Fourth*, it should be emphasized that this is a policy which has called for very modest risks and costs on the part of the West.

Moreover, one could argue that a modest intensification of the present policy would improve results. (In this regard, for all practical purposes, the non-OAS West has had no political restraints on their relations with Cuba.) Among other things, an intensification might increase Soviet/Cuban tensions and make Castro look like even more of a satellite to Latin Americans. This course, which does not significantly increase the chances of Cuban subversion, allows us to wait comfortably and safely for the breaks and for the chance of hitting the jackpot (eviction of the Soviets). On the other hand, relaxation may reduce the chances that we will ever hit the jackpot, may give Cuba political and economic respectability, and may demonstrate to Latin Americans that the Cuban path is worthwhile after all.

6. A considerable amount of documentation related to the U.S./U.K./Canadian talks has been done and is still in process. *First*, State is drafting up a joint record of conclusions which will be cleared by the British and Canadians<sup>5</sup> and which primarily will spell out the options for the West, with the arguments pro and con. I will show these to you when we get them. *Second*, there are in being a number of British,

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to “Resume of US-UK-Canadian Talks on Cuba,” March 18. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, US/UK/Canadian Talks, 2/65-3/65)

U.S., and Canadian papers on such subjects as the Cuban economic situation, political currents in Cuba, Cuban relations with Latin America, and Soviet intentions towards Cuba.<sup>6</sup> I will not burden you with these unless you indicate that you would like to take a look at some or all of them.

7. So far as the U.S. is concerned, the meetings were quite useful. In addition to providing us with an excuse to march up the Cuban hill again, the meetings gave us an opportunity to educate the British and Canadians to our side of the story and, hopefully, to persuade them that we are really not madmen when it comes to Cuba. The next step is to get together among ourselves and, taking into account the British views, give a good, hard, inter-departmental look at where we are headed and what we want to do about Cuba in the future. This process is in the works now and will be picking up steam over the next few weeks.

GC

### Tab 1

#### *Conclusions*

The principal conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing analysis are:

1. Castro remains the dominant figure on the Cuban scene. Power centers in him. He is the dynamic of the revolution. His popular support remains strong, despite the gradual erosion. He holds the rival elements together and is the arbiter of their differences. He will accept no diminution of his personal leadership. There is no force in Cuba today in a position to challenge his authority.
2. Castro turned to the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1960 more out of necessity than conviction, dictated by the internal and external programs he set for himself. In the process of reorienting Cuba toward the Soviet Bloc he came to accept Marxism-Leninism. His strong emotional commitment to radical change predisposed him in this direction. He is motivated, however, more by personal ambition than by ideological commitment. Having transformed Cuba into a Marxist-Leninist state and associated her with the Bloc, he finds himself more dependent upon Moscow than is compatible with his plans and temperament.
3. While Castro would like greater elbowroom within the "Socialist" camp, there is no evidence to indicate that he desires to break

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<sup>6</sup> These papers are *ibid.* and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CUBA.

away. A Communist world organized along the lines of regional polycentrism in which Cuba would lead an independent Latin American group is more in line with his objectives.

4. Of the various groups which comprise the Cuban political spectrum, the neo-Communists are clearly dominant. This is due to their numerical strength, the positions they hold in the party-state apparatus, and the fact that Castro is himself a neo-Communist. No other group is in a position to challenge the neo-Communists as long as Castro takes their side.

5. The old-guard Communists are passing through a critical period in which Castro appears intent on severely reducing, if not eliminating, their influence. The only support which the old-guard has comes from Moscow. This is sufficient, however, to make Castro move cautiously against them.

6. The fact that the neo-Communists appear to be on the ascendancy represents no advantage for the West because they are more fanatical, more emotionally “anti-imperialist”, and more disposed to push armed struggle as the appropriate means for achieving power in Latin America.

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### 301. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 22, 1965.

#### SUBJECT

Status of Termination of Manuel Artime’s Autonomous Paramilitary Group

1. In accordance with the decision of the Committee on 4 March 1965,<sup>2</sup> CIA has begun phasing-out support to Artime.

2. Artime has agreed to cooperate in the disbanding of his paramilitary group. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

[6 paragraphs (1½ pages of double-spaced source text) not declassified]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records, January–June, 1965. Secret; Eyes Only. Circulated to 303 Committee principals at the March 30 meeting, according to an April 2 memorandum from Williams to Vaughn. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 298.

302. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 11, 1965.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting June 10, 1965

The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee held on June 10, 1965 contain the following items:

*"Cuba—Proposed Reactivation of CIA's Paramilitary Effort*

"a. Admiral Raborn stated that he had requested this subject on the agenda and went on to say he felt strongly that as a result of the Dominican situation and increasing subversion in the Hemisphere, we should make Castro's life as difficult as possible at home as a deterrent to his mounting interference outside his own borders. There were a number of things that could be done with existing capabilities and we should concentrate on hitting the source of the difficulty.

"b. Mr. Bundy observed that the paper<sup>2</sup> was a good statement of that viewpoint but we had spent some months in searching for ways to hurt Castro without hurting ourselves more and had not found them. He remained skeptical as to whether any or even a combination of the various methods would permanently damage Castro without our incurring high collateral political costs. Mr. Vance said he had just discussed the methods enumerated in a. through d.<sup>3</sup> with the Secretary of Defense, and they had emerged negative on all higher noise-level operations at the present time. Ambassador Thompson indicated State was opposed, if for somewhat different reasons. Continual harassment by the U.S. might stimulate Soviet aid, whereas if left alone, the Soviets might tire of the rising costs of Cuban disarray and ineptitude.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a June 2 memorandum to the 303 Committee entitled "Proposed Reactivation of the CIA's Paramilitary Effort Against Cuba." (Washington National Records Center, Foreign Policy Historical Files 1962-1972, 330 77 0131-#3, Cuba)

<sup>3</sup> Items 9a.-9d. were proposals for maritime CIA commando raids against Cuban coastal targets, CIA underwater teams' demolition of ships in Cuban ports, night attacks against the *Playa Giron*, Cuba's only liquid petroleum gas equipped tanker, and/or other Cuban merchant vessels in Cuban territorial waters, and air bombing of selected targets within Cuba, such as the guerrilla warfare training center at Minas Frias, by CIA Cuban exile pilots and non-attributable aircraft. (Ibid.)



“c. Mr. FitzGerald emphasized the problem of internal morale. If the Cubans on the island realized that the U.S. was faint-hearted, they would continue their coalescence into the Castro body politic. Already, agent recruitment was decidedly more difficult. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

“d. The limited activities consisting of infiltration/exfiltration operations, intelligence collection, and economic measures appeared to be all the Committee members were prepared to endorse at this time.

“e. Mr. Bundy said he would summarize the disparate views and present them to higher authority.”

[Omitted here is discussion of Haiti; see Document 345.]

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### **303. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1965.

#### **SUBJECT**

Covert Action Against Cuba

1. I think you should know that Admiral Raborn has recommended reactivation of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. This matter has been considered in the 303 committee (the committee which monitors all covert operations).<sup>2</sup> Tommy Thompson, Cy Vance, and I are against the recommendation, but, along with Raborn, we have agreed to report the matter to you in case you want to pursue it further.

2. The Raborn recommendation calls for the following types of operations:

- (1) Maritime raids by commando teams against coastal targets.
- (2) Use of an underwater demolition team to blow up ships in Cuban ports.
- (3) Night attacks on major Cuban merchant vessels while in Cuban territorial waters.
- (4) Air bombing of selected targets in Cuba by covert aircraft.
- (5) Deception operations designed to give the impression of imminent invasion by U.S. forces.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Covert Program, 1/64–6/65. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 302.

3. The trouble most of us see in such operations is that their international noise level outweighs their anti-Castro value. Especially with the Dominican problem before us, most of us do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba. I believe this is also the opinion of Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara. But if you feel differently, we can have the matter examined again.

McG. B.<sup>3</sup>

Look at it again<sup>4</sup>

Leave it alone for now

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

<sup>4</sup> Neither option is checked, but a July 2 memorandum from Alfred T. Wellborn (INR/DDC) to Vaughn stated that "on 29 June, the disparate views on Cuba were brought to the attention of higher authority, who directed that written argumentation for and against the proposal contained in 'Proposed Reactivation of CIA's Paramilitary Effort Against Cuba', a CIA paper dated 2 June 1965, be prepared for his future study." See footnote 2, Document 302.

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### 304. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 10, 1965.

#### ARA VIEWS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF REACTIVATING CIA PARAMILITARY EFFORT AGAINST CUBA

##### I. Background

In June 1963 President Kennedy approved a covert policy and an integrated program of action toward Cuba. Three basic considerations underlay the program: first, the United States did not contemplate the use of military force against Cuba; second, the United States wished to exert maximum pressure by all means available to it (short of military intervention) to prevent the consolidation of the Communist regime; and third, dissident elements in the military and in other power centers of the regime could be encouraged to bring about the eventual

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings Reports, August 12, 1965. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Crimmins and forwarded to Thompson and Rusk.

replacement of the regime and to eliminate the Soviet presence in Cuba.

The program which was approved consisted of six interdependent, mutually reinforcing courses of action: (1) the covert collection of intelligence to meet both strategic and operational requirements; (2) propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance; (3) exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and other power centers; (4) economic denial actions in support and extension of overt efforts; (5) general sabotage and harassment, designed to achieve economic and psychological impact and to be conducted by either external, CIA-controlled assets or by internal assets in being or to be developed, initial emphasis to be placed on external operations with a shift to internal assets as soon as feasible; and (6) support of "autonomous" anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the foregoing courses of action.

Of these six components, the first four are still in operation. Although there was agreement when the entire program was approved that, if results were to be achieved it would be necessary to continue the program for a considerable period of time (18 months), even in the face of difficulties, the fact is that actions under Course 5 (CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment) were suspended in January 1964 after only five hit-and-run operations had been carried out in the period August-December 1963. In terms of purely Cuban policy, the raids probably had had a net positive effect. The decision to suspend was taken essentially on broader grounds, including concern about disturbing the emerging détente between the US and the Soviets (whose support Castro normally invokes against direct US pressures against him), the desire to avoid measures which might prevent or delay Soviet troop withdrawals from Cuba, the desire to have "clean hands" in moving towards OAS action on the Venezuelan arms cache case, and the belief that other less costly measures, particularly economic, would be effective. A tactical factor was the embarrassment caused us by the Cuban capture of a CIA infiltration team in December 1963 and the subsequent revelations by members of the team. It is important to note that this incident occurred in connection with an infiltration and that this kind of operation continues to be approved.

Operations by "autonomous" groups were permitted to proceed, and the first effort occurred in April 1964. In late 1964-early 1965, however, these too were closed out because they were producing more problems and risks—including complications in US-USSR relations and in the Vietnamese situation—than results. An important special factor during most of the life of the autonomous operations was the concern that they would provoke Cuban action against US surveillance overflights. The immediate motive for abandonment of the autonomous ap-

proach was the highly embarrassing attack on a Spanish merchant vessel in September 1964, which illustrated forcefully the lack of US control over groups not directly responsive to CIA.

Thus, there are no paramilitary efforts being mounted against Cuba at present. The CIA proposal is, in effect, an attempt to seek a reversal of the early 1964 decision with respect to their own operations. There is no intention to resurrect the autonomous approach. The basis of the CIA proposal is the belief that the present state of the Cuban question counsels a resumption of CIA-controlled paramilitary activity.

## II. Current Situation

The Castro regime is almost certainly more firmly entrenched now than at any time since its accession to power. Its control, however, is not absolute. The economy, although still operating at a relatively low level and hampered by disorganization and inefficiency, has been moving forward in the past two years. The prospect is that modest advances will continue through 1965, with the outlook highly uncertain beyond this year. Politically, the regime certainly has problems, but it appears capable of dealing with them, short of the disappearance of Castro. Security measures have become increasingly effective, but there are, from time to time, evidences of uneasiness and over-reaction to internal or external threats, real or imagined, on the part of the regime. The great bulk of the population is apathetic. Although the average Cuban is probably unhappy with his lot and skeptical of significant, early improvement of it, he is almost certainly becoming more and more resigned to the permanence of the regime. Internal active opposition to the government has grown increasingly weaker. Morale among anti-regime elements within and outside Cuba is low, and there is growing reluctance among these groups to take the risks involved in acts of resistance. This prudence is heightened by the absence of visible, effective external pressures.

The pressures, largely economic, which we have placed upon the regime have probably had moderate success in delaying—but not in preventing—the movement toward internal consolidation of the Castro government. If maintained at their present level, they will probably become more and more difficult to maintain and less and less effective.

Moreover, these pressures have not induced the regime to abandon its subversive efforts in Latin America. The great bulk of the evidence shows that Cuba has been trying to make those efforts more effective at a time when our own subversive measures against it have been sharply reduced. There are, moreover, several indications of increased Soviet activity in fostering “national liberation movements” in Latin America. The Soviet endorsement of the harder line set forth by

the November 1964 meeting of Latin American Communist Parties in Havana has been translated, according to reliable reports, into concrete and substantial financial assistance to the Venezuelan FALN. It is not possible to say whether this apparent Soviet decision to become more heavily involved in Latin America arises from the need to meet Chinese Communist pressures, from an assessment that the general situation in the Hemisphere affords more opportunities than heretofore, or even from an intention to place heavier pressure on us in Latin America in response to our policies in Vietnam. No matter what its origin, the evidence of heightened Soviet activity in Latin America is clearly relevant to any consideration of the effects on US-USSR relations of US policies toward Cuba and toward subversion in Latin America.

The situation in Latin America from the US point of view remains fragile, and subversion, whether from Havana, Moscow or Peking acting independently or, in the case of the first two, together, remains a constant serious concern. It is certainly true that, in contrast to 1961, the image of Cuba in Latin America has been dimmed and that, moreover, this may have resulted in part from the comparatively low-key US policy toward Cuba in the past two years. Nevertheless, a Communist Cuba which will be able to show that it is progressing economically and is consolidated politically cannot help but be impressive in Latin America. When such a regime is able, at the same time, to continue to carry out acts of subversion with impunity, in part because it is under the protection of the USSR, the negative effects for the United States are magnified in Latin America. The weakening or even the disappearance of the Communist government in Cuba would certainly not solve US problems in Latin America, but its continuation and its gradual entrenchment seriously prejudice US objectives and programs.

The US actions in the Dominican Republic have probably had mixed effects on Latin American views on US policy toward Cuba. On the one hand, those elements in Latin America which have advocated a "hard" US line on Cuba and Communist subversion were probably encouraged by the US intervention and hoped that it foreshadowed a "tougher" attitude in keeping with their opinion that the problem of subversion should be attacked at the source. They would probably welcome US moves against Cuba. On the other hand, most of the sectors which opposed or were made uneasy by the US action in the Dominican Republic as a retrograde step in US-Latin American relations would probably tend to fear that a more aggressive US stance toward Cuba was part of a general administration policy of "cracking down" in Latin America. Therefore, their response probably would be unsympathetic. Although the Cuban regime has by no means been able to restore its image in Latin America as a result of the Dominican affair, it probably has made some gains in at least the short term in left sectors of the Hemisphere.

Within the United States, interest in the Cuban problem is at a very low ebb. The administration is not under significant domestic pressure to "do something"—beyond what it is now doing. In part, this attitude seems to be founded on the belief that matters are going reasonably well for us in Cuba. If this belief begins to wane, if events elsewhere in Latin America go against our interests and especially if such setbacks could be attributed in any way to Cuban activities, this acceptance of current administration policy could change, especially in 1966. An influential general factor here would be the results of our Vietnamese policy.

### III. Advantages and Disadvantages of Paramilitary Activities As a Means of Pressure

#### *A. Principal Advantages*

1. Paramilitary activities have a considerably better chance of creating within Cuba the political, economic and psychological effects we have sought—and therefore of reducing the Cuban regime's ability to project itself externally—than the principal other means of increasing pressure available to us, i.e., the intensification of overt economic denial measures.

2. They provide an unmistakable signal to all concerned of our continuing opposition to the Cuban regime.

3. They can be justified, if necessary, in appropriate quarters as a response to the harder Cuban-Soviet line in Latin America, particularly in view of the long stand-down which can be presented as an unsuccessful attempt by us to elicit a similar slackening of Cuban subversion.

4. They may exacerbate Cuban-USSR relations, should Soviet response to Cuban requests for support be considered inadequate by Havana.

5. The risk of capture of participants is not appreciably greater than that involving infiltration/exfiltration teams, whose operations remain authorized.

6. It is possible that the resumption of paramilitary activities might inhibit any Cuban plans to become further involved in Vietnam (e.g., the dispatch of volunteers).

7. US involvement in the activities is to some degree deniable because of the personnel and techniques involved.

8. The activities take advantage of an existing capability, which over time is degraded through disuse.

9. Those elements in Latin America which are concerned about Cuba and Communist subversion would probably welcome the

resumption of activity as a sign of our determination to get rid of Castro.

*B. Principal Disadvantages*

1. It is impossible to predict with any assurance whether and to what degree paramilitary activities will in fact bring about the results hoped for within Cuba. The regime may be able to utilize the activities as a means of rallying political support against "imperialist aggression" and as an excuse to the Cuban people, the Soviets, and others (including Latin Americans) for its failures. Moreover, the erosion of the will to resist and the improvement of the security apparatus may have progressed beyond the point of no return.

2. There is no serious possibility of cloaking US involvement, whether or not missions go awry and personnel are captured.

3. If we decide it is necessary to suspend the activities in mid-course, the effects will probably be sharply negative and perhaps irreparable.

4. The resumption of paramilitary activities will probably stimulate uncontrolled exile groups to attempt to launch raids from US territory.

5. Such activities may strengthen rather than weaken Soviet-Cuban ties, particularly in the context of the Soviet-Chinese Communist conflict.

6. Subversive efforts in Latin America may be intensified in retaliation, and our own "dirty hands" may reduce our ability to obtain Latin American and other support for counter-action.

7. Paramilitary activities increase the risk of Cuban action against surveillance overflights.

8. They will probably reinforce the fears in some sectors in Latin America that the administration is embarked on a course of direct action throughout the Hemisphere.

IV. Conclusions

1. Under present levels of external pressure, the Cuban regime probably will become stronger and better entrenched.

2. The regime remains committed to the "export of revolution" and, in concert with the USSR, is attempting to make Communist subversive activities in Latin America more effective.

3. The stronger the regime becomes, the greater are the difficulties and dangers for US policy in Latin America.

4. In spite of the improvement in its position, the regime still confronts economic and political difficulties which constitute vulnerabilities and which indicate that we have not yet run out of time.

5. Increased pressure, either in the form of additional overt economic measures or of a resumption of paramilitary activities, offers some unmeasurable prospect of halting and in time reversing the trend in Cuba.

6. Of the two types of pressure, paramilitary activities provide a better chance of success.

7. In the past paramilitary activities, after a relatively brief trial, have been considered to be too costly politically in relation to their return and to the availability of other means of pressure believed at the time to be promising.

8. In order to maximize the chances of success, and to avoid the perhaps irreparable damage of suspension in mid-course, paramilitary activities have to be carried on steadily and progressively over a considerable period of time.

9. A decision to embark upon paramilitary activities carries with it an acceptance of their objective, a coup from within the power structure, the timing and nature of which we might well not control.

10. Under present circumstances, we have three gross policy options with respect to Cuba:

a. We can continue our present policy in full awareness that, barring some fortuitous development, we will probably lose ground in terms of both our Cuban and our Latin American objectives.

b. We can increase pressure, by either resuming paramilitary activities or taking additional economic measures (which are less costly, less risky and less effective), in the hope—whose realization cannot be assured—that we can arrest and eventually reverse the forward movement of the Cuban regime.

c. On the grounds that our present policy is no longer productive and that a policy of increased pressure is too uncertain, costly and risky, we can move toward accommodation and try to bring about a Titoist evolution of the Cuban regime, accepting in the process the probability of serious damage to our long-term interests, particularly in Latin America.

11. Of these options, a policy of increased pressure on Cuba provides the best protection for our position in Latin America.

12. Because it has a better chance of being successful than other available means of increasing pressure and in spite of the substantial costs and risks it clearly entails, the resumption of paramilitary activities against Cuba meets the needs of our Cuban and Latin American policies.

13. The resumption of these activities will certainly have positive and negative effects on the achievement of national objectives in areas of foreign policy beyond Latin America, and the net result of these effects must obviously be assessed.



## V. Recommendations

ARA recommends that, provided that the benefits to our Cuban and Latin American policies are not clearly outweighed by disadvantages elsewhere,

1. You support the resumption of a sustained program of paramilitary activities, it being clearly understood that each operation will be subject to the authorization of the 303 Committee.

2. If you decide that the broad national interest would not be served by resumption,<sup>2</sup> you authorize in principle the initiation of additional measures of economic denial, it being understood of course that these measures would be subject to your approval.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For Rusk's response, see Document 306.

<sup>3</sup> At the ARA–CIA meeting on August 11, John Hart from the CIA responded that the Senate paper “stated well the things the Agency wanted to get across.” He took exception to the view that paramilitary operations were merely a “pinprick;” he believed that none of these efforts had been really carried through. He also noted that Cubans “over-react” to these operations and therefore the disruptive effect was greater. Hart assured Vaughn renewed operations could be undertaken without “undue publicity” and fully under CIA control. (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, August 12; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting Reports)

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### 305. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 85–65

Washington, August 19, 1965.

#### CUBA

#### The Problem

To estimate the Cuban situation and outlook over the next year or two.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, NIEs and SNIEs. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on August 19.

### Conclusions

A. Castro's hold on power is firm; there is virtually no chance of his overthrow in the foreseeable future.

B. His regime has abandoned its ill conceived program for rapid industrialization and is concentrating on what Cuba can produce most readily—sugar. The economy is making some progress, though not enough to advance living conditions much during the next few years.

C. Recognizing that he has no alternative to further large-scale aid from the Soviet Union, Castro has moved politically closer to the Soviets and has cooled toward the Chinese Communists.

D. He no longer views all Latin America as on the brink of revolution, and will concentrate his clandestine support where revolutionaries are already active—in particular, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru.

E. Both the Soviets and the Cubans will probably exercise caution to avoid any direct confrontation with the US in Latin America; thus Castro is not likely to use his SAMs to shoot down a U-2.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

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### 306. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 30, 1965.

I am informed that you would like to have my views for presentation to the President on the CIA proposal to reactivate its paramilitary efforts against Cuba. While I believe it would be advisable for the CIA to keep open, so far as may be practicable, the option of renewing such activities in the future should circumstances warrant, I am strongly opposed to resumption of such operations at this time. I believe that with the current situation in the Dominican Republic and the status of the conflict in Viet-Nam, not to mention other problems around the world, we should not initiate the actions proposed which could well precipitate another crisis. Moreover, the proposed program

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to Pres., McG Bundy, Vol. 14, Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Thompson on August 30.

could well affect Soviet policies in a manner adverse to our interests. I should be glad to reconsider the matter should changes in circumstances so warrant.

As of possible interest, I attach a study of this question prepared by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department,<sup>2</sup> which constitutes a useful statement of the problem from the point of view of our interests in the Western Hemisphere, but, as will be noted above, on the basis of our world-wide interests, I do not reach the same conclusions.

**Dean Rusk<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 304.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### **307. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1965.

#### **SUBJECT**

Status of Proposed Reactivation of US Paramilitary Activities Against Castro

On June 2, 1965, Admiral Raborn, in the forum of the 303 Committee, requested the reactivation of the paramilitary effort<sup>2</sup> against Cuba on a highly selective basis. The CIA argued as follows:

1. Castro is supporting and encouraging active or potential insurgent groups in 14 Latin American nations as well as several in Africa. Cuba is a privileged sanctuary within the Western hemisphere from which Communist subversive efforts are launched.
2. Castro defiance of the US strengthens ultra-nationalist and pro-Communist movements in the hemisphere.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to Pres., McG Bundy, Vol. 14. Secret. Sent to the President under a covering memorandum, in which Bundy "reluctantly" agreed with Rusk and McNamara, and asked the President whether he wished to "Let it go" or whether they "should take the matter up at an early lunch." The President checked the latter option. A notation in Bundy's handwriting reads: "P.S. President heard negative argument on Sept. 29 and agreed to drop matter for now."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 302.

3. Although time is on Castro's side, he is still vulnerable. Many divisive forces are at work within Cuba.

4. Reactivation of selective paramilitary harassment at this time is our best means to cost him heavily in money and manpower at a highly critical time and reduce his capability to export revolution.

5. CIA has in being a small paramilitary mechanism composed of Cubans which can mount carefully selected operations which can destroy installations and facilities with loss of life held to a minimum while economic damage is maximized.

6. The program envisaged would include:

- a. sabotage of Cuban ships in Cuban ports
- b. maritime raids on coastal targets
- c. deception operations to keep Cuban defenses on costly alert.

The Department of State examined this proposal; the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) supported the CIA reasoning.<sup>3</sup> They felt that of all possible methods, paramilitary activities have the best chance of creating within Cuba the political, economic, and psychological effects we seek. Reactivation of these operations would provide an unmistakable signal to all concerned of our continuing opposition to Castro. The stronger the regime becomes, the greater the difficulties and danger for US policy in Latin America.

ARA concluded that we can 1) continue our present "limited" policy and probably lose ground; 2) we can increase pressure and perhaps arrest and eventually reverse the forward movement of the Cuban regime; 3) we can move forward toward an accommodation. . . . Of these options, the policy of increased pressure provides the best protection of our position in Latin America.

On 30 August, the Secretary of State made known his views in the attached memorandum.<sup>4</sup> He is "strongly opposed to resumption of such operations at this time" for reasons he makes clear in the attached single page memorandum.

On 20 September, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance confirmed that he and Mr. McNamara hold the same opinion as Mr. Rusk.

**Peter Jessup<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 304.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 306.

<sup>5</sup> Bundy initialed under Jessup's signature.

**308. Editorial Note**

On September 28, 1965, Fidel Castro stated that Cubans desiring to go to the United States would be permitted to do so, and he declared that exiles wishing to come and pick up their relatives at the Port of Camarioca would be free to do so after October 10. There followed a chaotic rush of small boats from Florida to Camarioca.

On October 3, at a previously scheduled signing of an immigration bill at Liberty Island, New York, President Johnson declared "to the people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here in America will find it." Noting the dedication of Americans to the tradition of giving asylum to oppressed people, he directed the Departments of State, Justice, and Health, Education, and Welfare "to immediately make all the necessary arrangements to permit those in Cuba who seek freedom to make an orderly entry into the United States." Johnson stated that priority would be given to immediate relatives and requested the assistance of the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross "in processing the movement of the refugees from Cuba to Miami." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book II, page 1039) In an October 6 memorandum to the President, Bundy stated that "Castro seems to have misread, deliberately or otherwise, your Statue of Liberty statement, interpreting it to mean that we wanted to conduct all negotiations through the Red Cross. We have pointed out to him through the Swiss that this is *not* the case. A note to Castro setting forth our position on modalities for the movement of refugees is going to the Swiss Embassy in Havana today." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Daily Regional Staff Reports to President)

The first of the refugees with family members in the United States began arriving in Florida by small boat in October. By October 18 the number had exceeded 700. As Bundy stated in an October 14 memorandum to the President, "we took special measures to persuade Cubans in southern Florida to wait until orderly arrangements could be worked out. We have been largely successful in obtaining their cooperation." Bundy noted that the previous night "the Cubans had replied to our note outlining procedures for handling the flow of refugees. They indicated a willingness to start operations right away. We had expressed a desire to keep the flow to about 3,000 per month, but they said they preferred a 12,000 rate. They said that men of military age (15–26 years) would not be allowed out, but agreed to our priority of immediate family members. They want to make up the lists of persons to depart, but they explicitly recognized our right to veto persons on the lists. They do not want the Red Cross to participate, noting that the Swiss can do what is necessary." Bundy concluded by stat-

ing that the U.S. Government would "concentrate on getting agreement where agreement is possible, while insisting on orderly procedures for movement." (Ibid.)

Negotiations with Castro through the Swiss Embassy in Havana resulted in the United States and Cuba exchanging notes on November 6 formalizing a Memorandum of Understanding covering procedures for the movement of refugees from Cuba to the United States. It called for the departure of between 3,000 and 4,000 Cubans per month in an airlift provided by the U.S. Government, departing from Varadero Airport, 85 miles east of Havana. The understanding contained no time limitation. The Cuban Government wanted two modifications inserted into the Memorandum of Understanding involving the exclusion of men of military age and also technicians and professional persons. The United States refused to incorporate the "two points" into the memorandum, and the Cuban Government finally agreed to refer to its prohibition on the departure of military age men, certain technicians, and political prisoners in supplemental notes to the general Memorandum of Understanding. Details of the U.S.-Cuba negotiations formalizing the Memorandum of Understanding are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Vol. I, 4/64-1/66, including an October 28 memorandum from Bowdler to Bundy, and the text of a note delivered by the Cuban Foreign Ministry to the Swiss Embassy in Havana on October 19.

The United States continued to insist that the Camarioca boat traffic had to be reduced, controlled, and eventually eliminated. On October 28 the Cuban Ministry of Interior announced that as of midnight that day, no more boats would be allowed to dock at Camarioca to pick up relatives. This action slowed the southward flow of boats, but some 300 small boats already anchored at Camarioca continued to move northward. Finally, on November 4, as agreement on the understanding became imminent, the Cuban Government announced that as of noon that day it would permit no further departure of Cuban citizens from Camarioca. (Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, Research Memorandum No. 1230, May 20, 1980)

On November 13 the U.S. Government began a sealift evacuation of the 2,000 stranded refugees at Camarioca by chartered vessels. The sealift was completed on November 24 when the last eligible Camarioca refugees were brought to the United States. The shift from sealift to airlift took place as scheduled on December 1. The airlift operated on the basis of two flights per day, 5 days a week, carrying an average of 4,000 persons each month from Varadero to Miami, Florida. In all, 9,268 refugees arrived from Cuba during 1965. Of these, 3,349 came in December via the airlift arranged by the United States and Cuban Governments. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book II, page 1040) As of December 1, 1968, the airlift

had brought 131,372 Cuban refugees to the United States. (Paper prepared by John F. Fitzgerald, December 10, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Miscellaneous Correspondence, FitzGerald, Oct–Dec 1968) The airlift continued until April 1973, by which time a total of 260,737 refugees had entered the United States. (Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, Research Memorandum No. 1230, May 20, 1980)

The airlift provided a major new transportation link, since after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 all direct commercial air transportation between the United States and Cuba had been suspended, although some people could arrange transportation through Mexico or Spain. “Several hundred thousand Cubans apparently registered their desire to leave Cuba when the airlift began or shortly thereafter.” (Paper prepared by FitzGerald, December 10, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Miscellaneous Correspondence, FitzGerald, Oct–Dec, 1968) The Cuban Government stopped accepting new registration for the airlift in May 1966 (see Document 309). By December 1968, there were still thousands on this list awaiting departure.

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**309. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant  
(Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 25, 1966.

SUBJECT

Incidents at the Guantanamo Naval Base

In the past four days there have been two reported incidents of Cuban penetration of the Guantanamo Base perimeter. They are reminiscent of a rash (7) of such incidents last March.

*Night of May 21–22*

A Marine sentry at about 7:00 p.m. observed an armed Cuban soldier on the Base side of the fence. The sentry reports that he challenged him and fired a warning shot which the intruder ignored. A second

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Vol. 2, 2/66–7/67. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

shot wounded him. It is not clear whether the Cuban was on the Base side of the fence when this shot was fired. The Cuban soldier involved in the incident was probably the one which the Cuban Government alleges was killed by the Marines while at his post on the Cuban side of the fence.

*Night of May 23–24*

At about midnight a Marine patrol sighted six armed Cuban soldiers in the salt flats area inside the Base perimeter. The Cubans reportedly fired four rounds at the Marines and fled over the fence. The Marines fired back with seven rounds. Our men were not hit. We have no report on the Cubans. But there is no evidence that they were hit.

*Relation to Refugee Flights*

At present there is no indication that these incidents are in any way related to the Cuban suspension of refugee flights last Friday. The suspension was deliberate. But the reasons are not yet clear. Administrative delays in shifting from Category “A” refugees (immediate family members) to Category “B” (all others wishing to come) is not a sufficient explanation.

Since the airlift started last December 1, almost 22,000 Cuban refugees in the “A” Category have arrived. The Cuban Government claims that there are no more persons in this particular group who wish to come. We know otherwise—HEW has close to 50,000 Category “A” applications.

We told the Cubans last week that we are prepared to start with Category “B” refugees, so that the record is clear that any delay—or suspension—is not our doing.

There are several as yet inconclusive indicators that the Cubans would like to close down the airlift if they could find a means to shift the onus on us. State is alive to this and will not get mouse-trapped.

**Walt**



### 310. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 18, 1966.

#### SUBJECT

CIA Survey of Its Cuban Operations

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the members of the 303 Committee of the results of a survey of CIA's Cuban operations undertaken in recent months, and to solicit the Committee's ratification of the proposed amendment in the program.

2. In February<sup>2</sup> 1966, the 303 Committee ratified the Agency's program of action<sup>3</sup> against the Castro regime. This program consisted of the following courses of action:

- a. Covert collection of intelligence for strategic requirements.
- b. Covert collection of counterintelligence and the use of this information to counter Cuban efforts to export the revolution.
- c. Intelligence and covert action operations; the former designed to detect, and the latter to exploit discontent, within the military and other key power centers.
- d. Economic warfare operations designed to further weaken the economy.
- e. Covert actions, including propaganda, designed to stimulate discontent, to maintain the spirit of resistance, at least to some degree, and to maintain the isolation of Cuba.

3. It should be noted that, in contrast with earlier CIA programs, the objective of the program described in the February 1966 memorandum was to contain the Castro regime rather than to undermine it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> "22 March" is handwritten above this date in the memorandum.

<sup>3</sup> In a March 23 memorandum to Gordon, Koren noted that "The following item is contained in a Memorandum for the Record, dated 22 March 1966, subject: Telephonic Approvals by 303 Committee Principals: 'The CIA paper "CIA Program of Action against Cuba" dated 21 February 1966 was noted without comment.'" (All *ibid.*) The February 21 CIA paper informed the members of the 303 Committee that the CIA's program of covert actions, including propaganda, covert collection of intelligence, covert collection of counterintelligence, and economic warfare against Cuba continued, despite "apathy and disillusionment" being "particularly noticeable in agent motivation." It noted that two related programs had "met with success during the past year," including "an energetic effort to encourage the defection of key personnel such as diplomats, industrial and commercial experts, and merchant marine officers." It also noted that "Limited financial assistance is provided to several émigré political organizations, with 303 Committee approval, to keep these nuclei of resistance alive."

4. The CIA survey concluded that the courses of action approved by the 303 Committee in February 1966 are still valid, but that a change in emphasis on certain aspects is required. Specifically as a result of the survey, CIA plans to take the following actions:

a. Increase emphasis on the collection of intelligence and counterintelligence through operations in third countries. This is necessary because of the quantitative and qualitative improvement in the Cuban security services which has resulted in increasing difficulty in creating and maintaining in-place assets in Cuba. The decline in the productivity of agents recruited by means of infiltration operations exemplifies this problem.

b. Because of the decreasing effectiveness of intelligence infiltration operations it is planned to limit these to those essential to exfiltrate agents who are in difficulties in Cuba, to provide support to inside assets, and to infiltrate teams for intelligence purposes only on limited occasions in order to gain access to high priority targets.

c. To revise the total output of written and radio propaganda directed at Cuba, retaining those portions of the current program which are currently effective, and eliminating those portions which have become outdated because of the erosion of time and changes in the situation. The revision of the program will involve an overall quantitative reduction, but is not expected to affect the impact within Cuba appreciably. The proposal envisages elimination or reduction of support to certain specialized exile groups, such as jurists, students, and teachers. Also under active consideration is the possibility of substituting use of commercial radio stations located in the U.S. for the present radio broadcast facility maintained [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

d. No changes in other aspects of the program are contemplated.

5. The proposed changes in emphasis will not materially affect CIA's capability to accomplish the limited containment objective cited above. They will result in significant savings in money and manpower, however.<sup>4</sup>

6. The Castro Government and the exile groups, as well as the Latin American republics, may note and incorrectly interpret this change in emphasis as a reduction in U.S. determination to restore Cuba to its rightful position as a member of the Western community of

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<sup>4</sup> In a November 23 memorandum to Thompson, Gordon recommended that the CIA proposal be supported in the 303 Committee. Gordon noted that the CIA intended to cut down its 24-hour-a-day propaganda broadcasts to Cuba to 4-6 hours of comparatively high-quality material. Gordon also noted that the Agency intended to maintain "on an active basis six highly trained and expert infiltration teams (out of a one-time maximum of 25) on which it can rely for intelligence collection purposes." (Ibid.)

nations. It is believed that such an interpretation can be effectively thwarted in part by more sophisticated radio programming and by one or more authoritative restatements of policy by appropriate U.S. officials.

7. It is recommended that the 303 Committee ratify the proposed changes<sup>5</sup> in emphasis in the CIA program.

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<sup>5</sup> According to a November 28 memorandum for the record, the committee approved the paper as presented. [*name not declassified*] of the CIA answered questions about the paper and, according to these minutes, estimated that the finely honed program would result in savings of approximately \$2,000,000. (Ibid.)

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### 311. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 85–67

Washington, March 2, 1967.

#### KEY ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR CASTRO'S CUBA

##### The Problem

To estimate the outlook over the next two years.

##### Conclusions

A. The Castro revolution has survived adversity, but it has not prospered. Increasingly the regime is keying its hopes for major material progress to the more distant future, when it expects the economic and social impact of its large-scale education and long-term economic programs to be felt.

B. The level of the economy in 1966 was only slightly above that reached in 1958, the last prerevolutionary year; per capita private consumption was down nearly 25 percent, though favored groups in the population were better off. Economic gains in 1967 and 1968 will probably be minor, with little or no improvement in living conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 85, Cuba. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on March 2.

C. Fidel will almost certainly persist in providing encouragement and training support to "anti-imperialist" and insurgent movements abroad, and in extending material aid to a few of them. Poor prospects for success in Latin America help to account for his increased support to revolutionary elements in Africa, where there are more opportunities and fewer risks.

D. Differences about Communist revolutionary tactics and the amount of aid required by Cuba will continue to produce frictions in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. But Cuba remains important to the Soviets; they have little practical choice except to keep backing Fidel.

E. Castro has continued the process of institutionalizing his revolution and has talked of sharing more responsibility with his inner circle of colleagues. We believe that he will remain clearly preeminent, however, and his hold on power will remain strong.

F. In the unlikely event of Fidel's death or incapacitation during the next two years, a collegium headed by his brother Raúl and President Dorticós would probably take control. We doubt that this arrangement could long endure; at some point it would probably give way to a power struggle of unpredictable outcome. However, we know of no basis for supposing that a resulting new government would fundamentally change the domestic political and economic system. The effect on Cuba's foreign affairs is beyond useful speculation.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

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### **312. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 7, 1967, 8 p.m.

#### **SUBJECT**

Report of Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

I have checked the charges made by Paul Bethel before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee today that there are Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Strategic Missiles in Cuba. Secret.

Dick Helms has furnished me the following judgment passed by the United States Intelligence Board on March 2, 1967:

"We do not believe that the Soviets will again try to turn Cuba into a strategic base of their own, as in 1962. We think it highly unlikely that the USSR will attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba.<sup>2</sup> We recognize that the Soviets have the technical capability clandestinely to reintroduce the components of a strategic weapon system. But the build-up of strategic forces in the USSR in recent years would make the installation of strategic weapons in Cuba of less significance to the Soviet strategic posture than in 1962. In any event, we believe that the risk of another grave confrontation with the US would be unacceptable to the Soviets."

You should know that Paul Bethel is a propagandist who for the past five years has traded on his brief experience in our Embassy in Havana to make a living out of the Cuban issue. What he told the Subcommittee today is the same tale which he has repeatedly published in his newsletter and tells everybody who is willing to listen to him. The sources for his charges are the same Cuban refugees who passed through our intelligence screening process in Miami. What they tell our interviewers is critically examined by experts. Bethel accepts the stories without critical evaluation.

I am having State do an assessment of other charges made in his testimony. You will see from this how wild and irresponsible Bethel can be.<sup>3</sup>

**Walt**

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<sup>2</sup> In an April 18 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Thomas H. Young, Jr., Acting Chairman of the CIA–DIA Team, reported that "we have received no intelligence which changes our conclusions that there are no strategic weapons or nuclear warheads in Cuba." (OCI No. 1092/67; *ibid.*, Bowdler File, Vol. II, 2/66–7/67)

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten postscript by Rostow on the memorandum reads: "P.S. Nevertheless, I'm going to make one more personal check-out tomorrow." Below this line Johnson wrote: "W—I want more study given this by our best and report back to me."

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**313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1967, 5:38 p.m.

180698. Sugarcane. Eyes Only for the Ambassador from Secretary.

At Punta del Este Valdez<sup>2</sup> spoke to me about Cuba and seemed to think that there are now some differences of view in Havana which might be open to probing. I told him what I had many months ago told Carrillo Flores of Mexico. The attitude of the United States remains that indicated by President Kennedy, namely, that Cuba could find its way back to the Hemisphere if it (a) stopped its interference in the affairs of other American states by agents, arms and propaganda, and (b) severed its military association with the Soviet Union. I said that the internal organization of Cuba is not the crucial obstacle but that these two primary external forces were fundamental. As you will recall, these have been the two key points all along. I added to Valdez that we have seen no real evidence that Castro is prepared to change his attitude on either point. Indeed, he seems to be differing with Moscow on the question of interference in other countries. Nonetheless, I told Valdez I saw no objection to any most secret probes which he might wish to undertake and that if he got anything of interest coming back we would be glad to know about it. I further said that we would set up this special channel between you and me in order to assure maximum secrecy and that he could be entirely frank in passing on to you, and to you alone, anything that develops.<sup>3</sup>

Regards.

**Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHILE-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk.

<sup>2</sup> Gabriel Valdez Subercaseaux, Chilean Foreign Minister.

<sup>3</sup> Dungan reported to Rusk, in telegram 283 from Santiago, July 26, that Valdez had said the previous day that "there had been no developments significant enough to pass on to you." Valdez stated that the Cubans had been interested in knowing whether the Chilean probe was being made with the knowledge of the U.S. Government and that they were told that "this strictly Chilean initiative." Dungan concluded the telegram by stating that it was his impression "that matter is not being pushed aggressively." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CHILE-US)

**314. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1967.

SUBJECT

US Policy Toward Castro's Cuba

A review of our Cuba policy seems very much needed.

Our present policy of economic denial and political isolation through OAS action has contributed to Castro's difficulties, but has not shaken his grip on power. It may indeed be running into considerable difficulty. In any event, after six years it is only prudent to ask whether this policy will be the best means of advancing our national interests under the conditions which may prevail in the future.

A policy review might well conclude that, all things considered, no fundamental change is required. Various alternative strategies could, however, usefully be explored. For example, the manner and consequences of applying considerably increased pressure on the Castro regime, and the opportunities and risks involved in seeking some accommodation could both be studied.

Without a thorough evaluation, however, we do not have the basis for recommending any of these courses of action on Cuba. The NPP (National Policy Papers) would seem to offer the best framework for such a study: they are well established, interagency, comprehensive, and authoritative.

We would, of course, keep strict security on the fact of this review.

*Recommendation:*

That you approve the undertaking of an NPP on Cuba.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Country Files: Lot 72 D 139, Cuba, 1967–1968. Secret. Drafted by Henry D. Owens and cleared by Sayre.

<sup>2</sup> Approved by Rusk on May 15. In a September 8 memorandum to Jessup, Trueheart noted that "the study is just now getting under way." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records)

### 315. Editorial Note

In a May 23, 1967, memorandum for the record Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency J. S. Earman indicated that beginning April 24 he transmitted in installments a 133-page report to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms on plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. A copy of the report is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 233, JFK Assassination Collection, Microfilm File 104-10184-10001, CIA Files, Job 80-T01357A, Box JFK64, Folder R48-ZZ. After reading a March 7, 1967, column by Drew Pearson that alleged the United States attempted to assassinate Castro, President Johnson directed Helms to conduct an investigation. (*Interim Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities*, Report No. 94-465, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," November 20, 1975, page 179) The result was the Inspector General's Report of April 24, 1967, which clearly indicated that the CIA was in contact with and cooperated with Major Rolando Cubela of the Cuban military in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. The operation was known as Project AMLASH. After receiving the report, Helms orally briefed the President about its contents. According to his testimony before the Select Committee, when asked by the Committee if he had told the President "that efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's Presidency, Helms replied, 'I just can't answer that, I just don't know. I can't recall having done so.'" ("Alleged Assassination Plots," page 179) When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or had authorized continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms replied: "The Special Group would have continued to consider these matters, and I would have assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in turn reported to the President, which was the usual practice." (*Ibid.*, page 180)

The records of the Special Group for the Johnson administration do not record any consideration, authorization, or involvement by the United States in any plot to assassinate Castro during the Johnson administration, even though the CIA had a relationship with Cubela. Special Group/303 Committee Records of June–August 1964 indicate only that, in regard to rumors of Cuban émigré assassination plots against Castro and selected Cuban leaders, McCone and McGeorge Bundy were to inform Attorney General Kennedy to use U.S. law enforcement agencies to prevent such plans. (Minutes of Special Group Meetings, June 18, 1964, and July 30, 1964; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records) The June 18, 1964, Minutes of a 303 Committee meeting read: "Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like



to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement." (Ibid., Minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting) Following an FBI investigation that dismissed the reported exile assassination plans, McCone sent Bundy an August 19 memorandum reviewing the investigation and agreeing with the FBI analysis. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. I, 11/63–7/65)

In the minutes of the Special Group/303 Committee meeting on January 7, 1965, a CIA January 6 paper acknowledges Rolando Cubela only as "a representative of an internal military dissident group, which is plotting to overthrow Castro." The minutes indicate the Committee members asked, "What sort of man is Cubela?" See Document 295 and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.

The Select Committee concluded: "the records of the Special Group do not show any consideration of Castro's assassination or of the AMLASH plot during the Johnson administration (or earlier) and there was no other evidence that McCone or anyone above the Agency was informed of or specifically authorized the AMLASH plots." ("Alleged Assassination Plots," page 180)

The CIA Inspector General's Report of April 24, 1967, provides considerable information about Project AMLASH during the Johnson administration. The Report indicates that a CIA officer was passing an assassination weapon, a ballpoint pen rigged with a hypodermic needle for Black Leaf 40 poison, to Rolando Cubela, AMLASH-1, at the very hour that President Kennedy was shot. (Inspector General's Report, pages 93–95)

The Inspector General's report provides background on Rolando Cubela Secades, the second-ranking leader of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) 13 de Marzo, an elite group of leftist students founded in 1956 to organize violence to overthrow the Batista regime. (Ibid., pages 78–79) Although close to Castro, Cubela became disenchanted with him. When the CIA first contacted him in March of 1961 in Mexico City, Cubela was non-committal, but he soon began to insist that the essential first step in overthrowing the Cuban regime was the elimination of Castro himself, which Cubela stated he was prepared to accomplish. (Ibid., pages 79–90)

After the aborted ballpoint poison pen incident, Cubela attempted to obtain a silencer for a Belgian FAL submachine gun, but the CIA was unable to produce one in time to be included in an arms cache drop. (Ibid., page 97) On December 6–7, 1964, in Paris, the CIA informed Cubela that the United States could no longer be involved in

the attempted assassination of Castro and that he would have to get help elsewhere in this respect. ("Alleged Assassination Plots," page 89; Inspector General's Report, page 100) Instead, the CIA put Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime and Cubela together in such a way that neither knew that the contact had been engineered by the Agency. "The thought was that Artime needed a man inside and Cubela wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon for Artime to give to Cubela, and did not do so." (Inspector General's Report, pages 100–101) Artime and Cubela met in Madrid on December 27 and December 30, 1964, where Artime agreed to provide a silencer to Cubela. (Ibid., pages 101–102) In Madrid on February 10–12, 1965, Cubela met Artime and reportedly received a Belgian FAL rifle with silencer and a pistol with silencer. Also during February 1965, Cubela requested financial assistance from several CIA officers for emergency travel expenses, and was given a total of \$8,200. (Ibid., page 106)

According to the Inspector General's Report, "On June 25, 1965, headquarters sent a cable to the stations concerned directing termination of contact with members of the Cubela group. It read in part: 'convincing proof that entire AMLASH group insecure and that future contact with key members of group constitutes menace to CIA operations against Cuba as well as to security of CIA Staff personnel in Western Europe. Under circumstances headquarters desires that contact work with key members of the group be eliminated as rapidly as possible, and that assets who may be in contact with individual members of the group or peripherally involved in AMLASH conspiracy be warned of danger implicit in these associations and directed to eliminate contacts ASAP.'" (Ibid., page 106) The CIA decided to terminate all contacts with the Cubela group, after it became apparent "that the circle of Cubans who knew of Cubela's plans and of CIA's association with them was ever-widening." (Ibid., pages 104–105) In March 1966, Cubela was arrested by Cuban security police, confessed his guilt, and, after Castro's written request to the prosecutor that the death penalty not be imposed, was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. (Ibid., pages 107–111)

**316. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 3, 1967.

SUBJECT

Travel to Cuba

*Background:*

As I am certain you know, one of the continuing concerns of this Bureau has been with the implementation of the Department's controls on the travel of U.S. citizens to Cuba. The Under Secretary spoke to me a short time ago on the general subject of travel controls.<sup>2</sup> He said that although he agreed with the position we had taken in several recent instances, such as the Cheddi Jagan case, he thought that possibly ARA's position on travel to Cuba was unnecessarily severe.

With this in mind, I thought it might be appropriate to outline to you our problems and views on this subject.

*Our Current Practice on Cuban Travel:*

Restrictions exist on the travel of American citizens to North Vietnam, North Korea and Communist China, as well as to Cuba. Under the current implementing rules (Tab A),<sup>3</sup> exceptions to these restrictions relate to such categories as professional journalists, medical and public health specialists, and graduate scholars needing to do research in Cuba connected with their specialties. Other cases—including those involving humanitarian factors—are considered on a discretionary basis.

Journalists and scholars, of course, constitute the bulk of applications for waivers to our travel restrictions. As I understand it, SCA's position is that journalists, for example, constitute a *mandatory* exception, but it is supposed to be necessary for applicants to show (1) that they are established journalists who earn the greater part of their living through this profession and (2) that they are going to Cuba only

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, Fitzgerald, Oct–Dec 1967. Confidential. Drafted by Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA) and Oliver.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed, Tab A, the Department of State's July 11, 1966, Press Release No. 163, restated the Department's guidelines relating to travel ban exceptions, added a new category of applicants, and restated the main criteria that such travel "be in the national interest of the United States."

for reporting purposes. In determining the application of these two factors to each case, SCA normally requests the views of our Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (ARA/CCA). Until recently, if that office interposed strong objections to an application, SCA either accepted these objections or deferred a final decision on the validation of the applicant's passport until CCA had had an opportunity to present its views in detail.

The celebration of Cuba's National Day on July 26 this year and the LASO (Latin American Solidarity Organization) conference which began on July 31 resulted in a flood of applications for journalist travel to Cuba. Our present concern over the handling of those applications arose when it became clear that ARA's role, as outlined above, was being seriously eroded to the point where, in a number of the most doubtful cases, passports were validated despite the fact that CCA had raised strong objections, in some cases without informing CCA of the action taken. I have attached (Tab B)<sup>4</sup> a summary of several case examples.

*ARA's View on Cuban Travel:*

Our concern with the present way in which these applications are being handled does not stem from any innate desire on the part of this Bureau to be simply "hard-nosed". As a general rule, I personally believe that "the truth will out" and that any increase in the flow of information or opinions eventually will work to our advantage. However, I hardly need point out that the way in which we carry out the various aspects of our policy toward Cuba directly affects our relations with other Latin American countries. The application of our own restrictions on travel to Cuba is no exception to this rule.

It is part of our basic policy, and that of the OAS, to isolate Cuba, not only to cut down the movement of subversives, but also for political, economic and psychological reasons. This policy was reiterated strongly by the OAS Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Washington September 22-24, 1967. In connection with the recent LASO conferences, we made strenuous efforts to encourage Latin American governments to inhibit travel to that meeting. As a result, even Mexico, which has never broken relations with Cuba, cooperated with us with surprising effectiveness.

However, because of our leadership in the area of Hemispheric policy toward Cuba, the Latin Americans continually search for, and are quick to point out, any inconsistency, real or imagined, in our words and deeds. We are constantly enjoined by them to "practice what we preach". The presence of so many U.S. enthusiasts for the Castro regime

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

who have been *authorized* by the Department to travel to Cuba inevitably raises questions in the minds of other Latin American governments.

All of this does not, of course, argue for no travel to Cuba. But it does I hope point up the fact that this Bureau has a central responsibility in determining the *scope* of our waiver policy; that our interest stems not simply from the fact that Cuba is within the geographic zone of this Bureau but more importantly, that U.S. actions on the matter of Cuban travel affect ARA's responsibilities elsewhere in Latin America.

I do not intend that we in ARA become simply "no sayers". But at the same time we must put forward our views when the situation warrants and, to do this, we need to be certain that full consideration will be given to them. I regret to say that as the system of considering applications for waivers now operates, we do not believe our views are being given the consideration due them.

I have seen enough of human institutions to know that a policy is sometimes changed without admitting it, by lowering the intensity of its administration. On the whole I think this is a poor way to make foreign policy. If a change in our policy on travel to Cuba is desired, then the Department ought to face up to that possibility, instead of fudging on operations under existing policy.

*Summary:*

Cuba has announced that early next year it will host a conference of "artists, scholars and writers" and that a conference of journalists is scheduled for July 1968. I can assure you now that we intend to cooperate as fully as possible with all interested offices to make certain that within existing USG policies toward Cuba, our travel regulations are applied in such a way as to serve our own best interests. At the same time, I hope that we can look forward to an improvement in the present method of reviewing applications for waivers in order to ensure that ARA's views on each case are taken into account.

317. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 18, 1967.

SUBJECT

Cuba

Last Friday I had a most interesting talk with CIA's new man in Cuba. He is Dave Phillips—one of their more sophisticated operators who performed so well in the DR following the 1965 revolt.

Dave is revamping the Cuban operation. The apparatus mounted following the Bay of Pigs is obsolete. It was aimed at stimulating Castro's overthrow from the outside with propaganda, infiltrators, supplies, etc. For this purpose they had a large and not well-camouflaged establishment in Miami. The Miami operation is being phased out. The sizeable sea-borne infiltration-exfiltration capability is being dismantled and a small, more efficient one established for stand-by use. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is being discontinued.<sup>2</sup>

The new emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. We need to know more about who his main advisers are and what they are thinking. If there is to be a change in Cuba, it is more likely to come from defections in this group. If Castro were to start looking for accommodation, one of them would be the first to know and probably the channel for feelers.

Dave agrees that Castro finds himself increasingly hemmed in. The loss of "Che" and the insurgency effort in Bolivia on the heels of the big LASO splash has been a serious blow. The outlook for the sugar

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Vol. III, 8/67-3/68. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> In a December 6 memorandum to Kohler, Trueheart noted that the CIA was "set to phase out [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the end of the fiscal year and to initiate, in its stead, broadcasts directed to Cuba from various privately owned stations" in the Caribbean area, including Costa Rica and Venezuela. Trueheart added that the "programs would be more temperate than those broadcast from [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]" but that they would "play up matters embarrassing to the Cuban regime to an extent that would be difficult for VOA." Trueheart also noted that he had notified the 303 Committee Secretariat that the Department of State approved the termination of the infiltration/exfiltration operations against Cuba. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records) In a December 12 memorandum to Oliver, Trueheart noted that the minutes of the December 8 303 Committee meeting stated that "the decision to discontinue these operations and maintain a skeleton force was approved." (ibid.)

crop this year is not good: only 5–5.5 million tons. Cuba is committed to deliver 5 million to the USSR alone. Relations with the Soviets are probably the testiest since the missile crisis, as reflected by Cuba's actions during the 50th anniversary ceremonies.

All this makes it most important that we:

- develop our intelligence on what is going on inside the regime.
- be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him.

I am happy to see as politically sensitive an operator as Dave Phillips on the Cuban job at this time.<sup>3</sup>

**WGB**

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<sup>3</sup> A notation in Rostow's handwriting in the top right hand corner of the page reads "WB. Good."

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### **318. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 22, 1967.

#### **SUBJECT**

US-Cuban Relations

Attached is a memorandum given to Secretary Rusk by the Spanish Ambassador on December 21<sup>2</sup> reporting on a conversation between a special Spanish emissary and Fidel Castro on US-Cuban relations.

In a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister last month, Secretary Rusk asked if Spanish diplomats in Havana were in contact with Castro. The Secretary noted that it would perhaps be beneficial if they were to remind Castro that there are only two issues in our relations with Cuba which we regard as non-negotiable: (1) Cuban intervention and guerrilla activities in other Latin American countries and (2) the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Vol. III, 8/67–3/68. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

presence of Soviet arms on Cuban soil. The US, on the other hand, had no interest in interfering in Cuba's internal political situation.

It was not the Secretary's intention that the Spanish send a special emissary to Castro, but in their eagerness to be a bridge, they did. Castro received him promptly and listened intently. Castro was puzzled by the overture ("Why would the Americans think of this now?", he asked) but did not reject it. He said he wanted to analyze carefully the motives and timing of the message before responding. Predictably, Castro used the opportunity to recite all his grievances against the US.

Castro promised to maintain utmost discretion about the approach and to use the same channel for any response he may decide to make.

The Spaniards have taken what Secretary Rusk intended to be a low-key reminder to Castro of our position and, for self-serving reasons, escalated it to a special message delivered by a special envoy. As long as there are no leaks, this may prove to be an interesting and useful exercise. If it gets out that the US has taken the initiative in putting out accommodation feelers to Castro, it may prove embarrassing to us in Latin America and on the domestic political front. We have asked State to handle the matter on a most restrictive basis.

Walt

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**319. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
(Fitzgerald) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for  
Inter-American Affairs (Walden)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1968.

SUBJECT

Current Committee Data

REF

Memorandum of 3/18/68 to you from O/MS<sup>2</sup>

The only committee pertinent to ARA/CCA is the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba, of which I am chairman.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, POL Misc. Working Papers, 1966-1968. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.



This was established pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum No. 213 (Secret) of January 8, 1963, of which a copy is attached.<sup>3</sup> NSAM 213 specified that this committee should be chaired by the Department's Coordinator of Cuban Affairs whose position was also created pursuant to NSAM 213. The other agencies on the Committee are the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, currently represented by Deputy Assistant Secretary William Lang (ISA) and Mr. William Broe. Other agencies may be associated with the Committee's work as necessary in particular cases.

It is recommended that the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba now be eliminated<sup>4</sup> inasmuch as the establishment in the intervening period of the SIG/IRG mechanism provides an instrument for interdepartmental coordination of matters relating to Cuba along with all other areas. Because of the SIG/IRG, the Committee has not met since December 1966. Moreover, many of the factors which impelled the NSC to establish a special coordinating committee on Cuba in January 1963 have changed in focus in the last few years. Accordingly, it is recommended that steps be taken to withdraw that portion of NSAM 213 concerned with the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba.<sup>5</sup>

Such action, however, should not apply to the position, functions or authority of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs who, under NSAM 213 was given day-to-day coordinating responsibility for Cuban policy. NSAM 213 provided that the Coordinator "will be responsible to the Secretary of State for State Department business, and under his guidance to the President and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination". The need for this day-to-day coordination continues to exist.

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> In a May 28 memorandum to Rostow, Read forwarded the Department's recommendation "that the portions of NSAM No. 213 that refer to an 'Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs' be revoked." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, POL Misc. Working Papers, 1966–1968)

<sup>5</sup> In a June 12, 1969, memorandum to Assistant Secretary Crimmins, Fitzgerald noted that this recommendation had had the advance concurrence of Sayre, William Lang (DOD/ISA), and Broe. Fitzgerald then stated that "I later learned that no action was taken on this recommendation at the White House, apparently because Bill Bowdler, while agreeing with the reasoning behind the recommendation, believed that it was still desirable to keep the Committee in being as a useful instrumentality for the Coordinator in case a crisis situation arose." (Ibid., 1969)

**320. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 4, 1968.

SUBJECT

Comments on National Policy Paper for Cuba

1. While I am in agreement with the general conclusions and recommendations of the second draft of the National Policy Paper on Cuba,<sup>2</sup> I wish to emphasize that the carrying out of the recommended actions would require an extremely careful and subtle approach. This is necessary so that (a) we do not give the impression to Cuba and to the world that we have finally accepted the permanence of the Castro regime in an unchanged form, and (b) that we do not over-emphasize the "carrot" aspect in the carrot and stick approach. The draft does, of course, fully discuss the dangers in implementing the program.

2. There is, however, one important new factor. Since the draft was first produced, internal conditions in Cuba have deteriorated strikingly. This trend has intensified even since the last draft was considered. This situation has been covered in other documents, including the first draft of the IRG paper on Cuba<sup>3</sup> which is now being submitted. The point at hand here, however, is that the current deterioration in Cuba gives more hope than we have had for a long time that elements in the Cuban power elite may themselves conceivably be impelled within the near or at least foreseeable future to consider whether some drastic change does not have to be made in Cuba's posture toward the world (and even in the internal aspects) if Cuba is to survive. I therefore think that now and for some months to come we should be even more cautious in anything we do so as not to convey a seeming signal<sup>4</sup> that we have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, Fitzgerald, Apr–Jun 1968. Secret. Drafted by Fitzgerald and Park F. Wollam (ARA/CCA) on June 3.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 322.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed, the IRG Paper on Cuba, May 10, described a progressive decline in Cuba, including a shortage of consumer goods, a very poor sugar crop, a decline in Cuban productivity and foreign exchange earnings, public protest demonstrations, and anti-Castro wall writings. Also see Document 321.

<sup>4</sup> In a February 16 memorandum to Under Secretary Katzenbach, Oliver had proposed an easing of the administrative criteria with respect to licenses for export of pharmaceuticals to Cuba. Katzenbach approved this recommendation on February 23. However, in an April 30 memorandum to Rusk, Oliver recommended that this modification be deferred because "Intelligence and other reports indicate a striking deterioration in economic, psychological and other conditions in Cuba." (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 245, The Secretary, 1968)

finally accepted the permanence of the Castro regime just at a time when others, who have disagreed with our attitude in the past, may be acquiring real doubts as to the viability of the regime. It is a time for alert watchfulness and for sending of signals which encourage power elite elements to do something about Castro or some of his policies in the hope that they could reach accommodation with us, rather than a time to seem conciliatory toward the Castro regime as such.

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### **321. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

SNIE 85–68

Washington, June 27, 1968.

#### **CUBA: CASTRO'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO**

##### **Conclusions**

A. Castro's problems have taken a turn for the worse over the past year. A severe drought has depressed sugar production and agriculture generally. Living conditions have become more stringent because of reduced food supplies and a variety of other factors, including new attempts by Castro to overcome his economic problems by forcing the population to work harder. There has been an increase in popular discontent and in the number of small, local disorders.

B. Nonetheless, we see little prospect that economic adversity will significantly weaken Castro's position over the next couple of years. A return of more favorable weather, already in prospect, would in itself somewhat relieve domestic pressures. Even if economic conditions were to deteriorate further, Castro would still have the advantages of charismatic appeal, political skill, and ultimately, a formidable military-security apparatus.

C. Although there probably will be fluctuations in the level of future Soviet aid to Cuba, we think it unlikely that the USSR will permit the Cuban economy to approach a critical condition. This will be so even if Soviet-Cuban tensions continue to develop.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 85, Cuba. Secret; Controlled Dissem; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on June 27.

D. We doubt that either Castro's economic difficulties or his contentious relationship with the USSR will cause him to turn toward the US. He will, however, seek to expand his trade with other non-Communist countries. There will be an increasing reluctance by such countries to maintain Castro's diplomatic and economic isolation, though his limited financial credit will restrict his trade with them.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

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### 322. Editorial Note

Henry Owen, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, obtained Rusk's approval in May 1967, to review U.S. policy toward Cuba. Rusk agreed that a National Policy Paper (NPP) offered the best framework for such a study (see Document 314). The study did not get started until September 1967. During the spring of 1968, the ideas of the second draft of the NPP were still being debated within the Department of State (see Document 320).

The Policy Planning Council's final draft National Policy Paper on Cuba, dated July 15, 1968, described the present U.S. policy as "passive containment," consisting of three conceptual elements—1) protecting other countries from Cuban subversion; 2) applying "diplomatic isolation and economic denial policies" aimed at both hindering Castro's capacity to export subversion and at maximizing his internal problems and vulnerabilities; and 3) "hoping and waiting for 'breaks'" that might improve the situation. It described the present policy as the easiest one to follow at the time, but stated that the "capacity of the U.S. to isolate Cuba, exert pressure on Castro and exploit vulnerabilities is declining." "The ability of 'passive containment' to meet U.S. objectives may therefore with time have to depend increasingly upon the pure containment aspect, i.e., simply countering Castro's probes at target sites, rather than on measures having direct impact on Cuba itself."

The paper stated that the only apparent hope "that Castro and/or the Cuban power structure" would change their policy rested "on their becoming convinced that it is unproductive." "Present U.S. policy, however, does not promise to be the most effective way to achieve this kind of long-term improvement." It predicted that the effectiveness of economic denials would decline over the next few years and that the political cost of U.S. policy would grow greatly. "Present policy in sum is a negative and reactive one which offers limited promise of effecting desirable change."

The paper advocated replacing “passive containment” with “positive containment,” which it described as “a series of initiatives, parallel steps, concrete actions and understandings concerning limited things, all acted on their own merits at the time, the cumulative effect of which over time would be de facto changes.” It described “positive containment” as a strategy containing the elements of containment (keeping Castro from successfully subverting other countries), pressure (continued application of isolation/denial measures), psychological context (a change in the basic U.S. policy attitude of implacable hostility and threatening intentions), and “a variety of alternative probes to improve the situation.”

It would be important in the psychological context “largely to ignore Castro in public stances and proclamations” and to project “patience and friendliness toward the Cuban people.” In this respect, the paper advocated “encouraging more legitimate and responsible scholarship.”

The paper illustrated how a scenario of incremental “parallel” steps might unfold, without actually recommending the specific quids and pros. As an example, the paper notes that a Castro quid of continued repatriation of American citizens could be matched by a U.S. pro of granting licenses for commercial shipment of pharmaceuticals “on a more lenient basis.”

The paper concluded with a long series of courses of actions and contingencies. It restated basic U.S. Latin American policy ideas such as support for the Alliance for Progress, OAS regional cooperation, and intelligence surveillance, but also advocated steps to create a new atmosphere and new initiatives. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Cuba, 1967–68)

This change in policy, however, was never approved, much less implemented. Instead, the present policy continued. In an August 28 memorandum to ARA/IRG Staff Director William D. Broderick, Director of the Office of Inter-American Political Affairs John W. Ford noted that his office agreed “with CCA that this is not the most propitious moment to embark on such a program, as Cuba’s present economic straits and the signs of growing discontent would indicate that the pinch of isolation is having a real effect and that we should therefore maintain the full pressure of the isolation policy.” He noted, furthermore, “that any U.S. actions or concessions must fit within the OAS criteria to which we are a party and must avoid if possible the impression of unilateral U.S. policy making. (Ibid., ARA/CCA Files: Lot 71 D 201, POL 3.4 OAS) In an October 29 briefing paper Fitzgerald wrote that this draft national policy paper “was never formally processed for approval because it was decided that it should be considered by the new administration.” (Ibid., Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, Fitzgerald, Oct–Dec 1968)

**323. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs  
(Fitzgerald) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for  
Inter-American Affairs (Vaky)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 30, 1968.

BRIEFING

Cuba

REF

Your memorandum of July 25 to all Office Directors<sup>2</sup>

In view of your familiarity with the Cuban situation as a result of chairing the NPP Working Group on Cuba, I assume it is unnecessary for me to give you a political, economic and security assessment.

The following are the major current problems and issues relating to Cuba:

*1. Political*

You are, of course, familiar with policy issues for the reason given above and I will therefore not discuss these here.

*2. Hijacking*

So far we have gotten back with reasonable promptness all of the U.S. planes, crews and passengers hijacked to Cuba (including the Cuban-born pilot, Prellezo, who was detained for a week or two before release), but the problem continues to be one of grave concern<sup>3</sup> in aviation, Governmental, Congressional and press circles, particularly because of the danger that one of these days an accident may cause loss of lives. Measures to prevent hijackers from boarding planes or, once they are aboard, to thwart diversion of a plane to Cuba, are not promising and emphasis is therefore placed on the deterrence which might result from some arrangement for the return of hijackers to the U.S. for prosecution. The problem here is that since Cuba has not been suffering from hijacking of its planes, Castro has no incentive to enter into an arrangement primarily of benefit to us. We have no evidence

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, Fitzgerald, July–Sept. 1968. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed, this memorandum from Vaky requested a political, economic, and security assessment from all ARA Office Directors.

<sup>3</sup> In a February 27, 1969, briefing paper Fitzgerald noted that from 1961 through 1968, 34 U.S. planes were hijacked to Cuba, including 17 in 1968. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, Fitzgerald, Jan–March 1969)

so far that the GOC is back of these hijackings and they may be embarrassed by the whole situation, but we feel that Castro would meet any request for return of hijackers with a demand for return to Cuba of all persons who escaped from the island by small boat or otherwise. At present we are exploring possibilities for solution through the Mexican Government and through international civil aviation organizations like ICAO and IATA. We have also asked the Swiss to ascertain Cuban willingness to use the refugee airlift plane for a return to Cuba of Cuban exiles who wish to go back permanently<sup>4</sup> (although this will reduce the temptation to hijack only marginally since most hijackers have not been Cuban).

### *3. Violence in U.S. by Cuban Exiles*

In recent months anonymous Cuban exiles, usually using the signature "Cuban Power", have been engaging in a wave of bombings and threats involving the Cuban Mission to the UN and tourist or other installations of countries which have been trading with Cuba. This has resulted in protests of the countries involved and in intensive efforts by law enforcement authorities both to protect these installations and to apprehend the perpetrators of these acts. Although the authorities have a pretty good line on a number of individuals believed to be associated with "Cuban Power", so far there have been no arrests primarily because it has been impossible to get direct evidence of guilt or to catch any one in the act. Our Mission to the UN and we have urged the authorities to do everything possible to harass the suspects.

### *4. U.S. Citizens in Cuba*

We still have several hundred U.S. citizens who have not been allowed to leave Cuba freely and, together with their "fireside alien relatives", the repatriation group is estimated to number a few thousands. Starting with February of this year, Castro agreed to allow the Mexicans to carry out one repatriation flight a month on a Mexican charter plane via Mexico. This operation has been carried out routinely since then. There are new registrations every month of U.S. citizens (primarily dual nationals) and the net figure has not been declining very much, but at least we have been getting out many of the hardship cases and those persons who have been waiting longest. The Mexicans hope to step up the frequency of the flights later, but do not feel the time is yet right to approach Castro about this.

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<sup>4</sup> In his February 27 briefing paper, Fitzgerald stated that "No response was received in the ensuing months" to this initiative. Documentation on hijacking is presented in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIV, Documents 296–314.

### 5. *Refugee Airlift*

This has been proceeding in routine fashion ever since it began on December 1, 1965, on the basis of two flights a day, five days a week. We bring out about 3700 refugees a month and the total thus carried out is now about 120,000. This is listed as a problem only in the sense that the influx of refugees represents a burden, financially and in terms sometimes of domestic politics, and as of July 1, 1968, there has gone into effect a quota of 120,000 immigrants a year for the western hemisphere. It has been determined that Cuban refugees must be counted against this with a resulting impact on the number of immigrants from other countries, including Canada and Mexico, who can be admitted. The airlift refugees themselves do not immediately count against this quota inasmuch as they are "paroled" into the U.S., but when they convert into permanent residents they count as immigrants and are subtracted from the quota. INS has estimated that probably 40,000 a year will have to be so counted, and in addition there are the thousands of Cuban immigrants who come via Spain and other countries.

### 6. *Guantanamo Base*

The general issue of retention of the naval base has not been in the forefront of issues for some time, even in the form of Cuban declarations, and in the last few years there have not been any fence-line shootings or other incidents of the type which caused tension in the past, but as long as we have the base there is always the possibility of incidents which could lead to serious consequences. Perhaps the main problem in the last year or two has been the increased use of the base as a means of escape from Cuba. The issue is somewhat sensitive (particularly as far as the Navy is concerned) in view of those provisions of the Guantanamo Base treaty which prohibit use of the base as a means of exit from or entry into Cuba. We have felt that we could not turn escapees back to the GOC and they are quietly evacuated by air to the mainland where they are "paroled" like other refugees. The GOC obviously knows of this but so far has not made a public issue of it. A correlary concern of ours has been over the possibility that Castro might infiltrate agents by this route, although we subject such escapees to close screening after arrival.

### 7. *Economic Denial Program*

You are quite familiar with this. The basic problem is that European and other countries trading with Cuba are less and less inclined to cooperate in our program of economic denial toward Cuba,<sup>5</sup> both

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<sup>5</sup> The U.S. Government began a new element in its economic denial program towards Cuba during the fall of 1968 by working to delay and weaken the International Sugar Agreement approved by the UNCTAD Sugar Conference at Geneva on October 23.



because of commercial considerations and because of their feeling that Cuba is a U.S. problem not particularly of concern to them. The main present obstacle to increased trade by these countries is their growing doubt as to Cuba's credit worthiness in view of deteriorating economic conditions there and uncertainty as to the Soviet Union's willingness to continue underwriting Castro.

#### *8. Travel Controls*

Travel of U.S. citizens and residents to Cuba, along with that to Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam, is officially proscribed except for certain categories such as journalists, scholars, medical men and humanitarian cases. Court decisions, however, have virtually deprived the Department of the ability to enforce these controls except with respect to use of passports. Therefore persons who defy the ban are subject to no criminal penalties and not even to loss of passports unless it can be shown they used them in the banned countries.

A more particular problem for CCA is that even within the above admitted limitations, SCA shows little inclination to use what authority it has. Thus, for example, in examining applications for passport validation to go to Cuba, SCA does not, as in the past, insist on proof that the applicant is a *professional* journalist but often wants to accept as credentials the applicant's own claim, supported by a letter from some publication (often of the "butcher's-wrapping-paper" variety) that if he can get to Cuba the publication will print an article by him. The same is true of "scholars", SCA not requiring, as the original criteria did, that the scholar be an established one whose trip to Cuba is necessary for a particular research project. The result of all this is that we have a constant parade of U.S. radicals to Cuba on false pretenses and genuine scholars rarely go, as they cannot get Cuban visas.

The whole subject is such a farce that I would recommend dropping all travel controls on Cuba were it not for the fact that this would probably result in the resumption of the tourist trade on a significant scale. The result would not only be an economic advantage to Cuba but also a protection problem which, in the absence of diplomatic relations, we could not handle.

#### *9. Criticism of Cuban Policy*

Cuba is a sensitive issue to almost everyone and we are subject to constant criticism from opposite points of view. On the one hand, persons who feel strongly about the Castro regime, including Cuban exiles, attack us for not taking action to end the Castro menace and, on the other hand, the growing U.S. leftist-liberal community criticizes us for being "rigid" in our policies and, openly or otherwise, advocates a policy of accommodation with Castro.

In connection with the first school of criticism, one of the perennial charges is that there are still long-range missiles or other offensive weapons in Cuba. The intelligence community maintains a constant watch on this situation and, on the basis of all the evidence, believes that there are no offensive weapons or Soviet bases in Cuba, but reiteration of this assessment does not quiet anxiety more than temporarily. Excitement over this waxes and wanes but Cuba presents a more continuing issue in domestic politics than other countries in the hemisphere.

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**324. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director (Hughes) and Deputy Director (Denney)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 16, 1968.

SUBJECT

ARA/CIA Meeting, August 15, 1968

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Messrs. Oliver, Vaky and Morris

CIA—Messrs. Broe, Horton and Phillips

INR—Mr. Gardner

[Omitted here is discussion on Bolivia.]

*Cuba*

There was a considerable discussion of what our next moves toward Cuba should be. The Agency referred to a paper that it had submitted to the Department in April<sup>2</sup> and which, according to Mr. Vaky, was still on the Secretary's desk. In this paper, a copy of which is attached, the Agency discussed the possibility of approaching Cuban leaders around Castro to assure them that the U.S. had no wish to abrogate or wipe out the gains of the Cuban revolution and that it was prepared to cooperate with these leaders and indeed support them in any post-Castro regime, if they were prepared to cooperate covertly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting Files. Secret. Drafted by Richard F. Gardner on August 16.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

with CIA to provide information and perhaps to take timely action that would expedite the removal of Castro as a regime leader.

Messrs. Oliver and Vaky indicated that they felt some of the language of this proposal required modification but that it might provide a basis for discussion. It was felt especially that references to a post-Castro regime or the suggestion of Castro's removal were not appropriate.

Phillips, who runs the Cuban branch in DDP/WH, said that matters were reaching the point that CIA really had to know how our policy toward Cuba was going to develop. Right now the issue was both confused and becalmed. Mr. Oliver's speeches were being interpreted by some as opening up the possibility of Cuban-U.S. rapprochement. There was a world-wide impression that secret negotiations were in fact going on between Cuba and the United States.<sup>3</sup> The domestic economic and political situation in Cuba was worse now than it had been any time under Castro (Phillips stated here that he never had been one of those who had depreciated the strength and endurance of the Castro regime) and actually the biggest thing that Castro had going for him at the present time was the wide spread impression among second-echelon Cubans that he was negotiating some sort of political settlement with the United States.

*[1 paragraph (10½ lines of source text) not declassified]*

What, Phillips wanted to know, did the Department wish to be done with this facility? Should we attempt to open up and pursue a dialogue or should we close it down immediately? Oliver said that at the moment a freeze should be put on any further talk and that it merely be indicated to the Cubans that the channel would be kept open for their use if they so desired.

Returning to the question of the wide-spread rumors that the United States and Cuba were in negotiations, Phillips asked what he might say if in fact he were approached by a member of the Cuban DGI and were asked if negotiations in fact were going on. Oliver replied

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<sup>3</sup> In the *Washington Post*, July 18, Drew Pearson reported allegations of U.S. "diplomatic overtures to Castro towards resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba." ARA's suggested guidance prepared that day by Sayre and Fitzgerald for the noon briefing was that "No consideration is being given to resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba." The guidance referred to a March 15 statement by Oliver in Miami, reiterating U.S. policy on Cuba: "We are not aware of any indication by Fidel Castro that he would like to resume diplomatic relations with the United States. On the contrary, as recently as February 1968 Castro is quoted by a foreign journalist as saying: 'this kind of peaceful co-existence is of no interest to us—our quarrel with American imperialism is total and insurmountable. As to us, we have no contacts with the U.S. and have no desire for any.'" (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, Fitzgerald, July–Sept 1968)

that we should deny that negotiations were taking place, but that we should add that the ball was in the Cuban court and that channels for negotiation existed.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Vaky wanted to know if the question put by Phillips meant that the Agency intended to take the initiative in approaching Cuban intelligence, or whether CIA merely meant to remain passively prepared with an appropriate response in case it ever was approached by the Cubans with a query of the sort mentioned. Phillips replied that the Agency intended to await a Cuban initiative. Gardner said that if in fact rumors and reports of negotiations were working as strongly in Cuba's favor as Phillips had indicated, and if in fact we wanted to scotch reports that these negotiations existed, the method of denial just agreed upon seemed excessively demure. Mr. Vaky suggested that perhaps it would be better to instruct station chiefs in Latin America to see it through their own means that denials of the negotiations were effectively made in their own countries. The meeting ended without further concrete suggestions being made. The creation of a small study group with State, Defense and CIA participation to consider the question of what exactly we should do next about Cuba was made but no definite decision was reached.

It was agreed that another meeting should be held to review this subject and what had been said about it in the current meeting. It was recognized that any decisions about changes or developments in our policy toward Cuba would have to be referred to a higher level.

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<sup>4</sup> According to an August 6 memorandum for the files, Arlene Gould of *Life en Español* called on Bowdler that afternoon and asked if he would like to meet with Cuban UN Delegation member Jesús Jiménez, who was in Washington for a Pan American Health Organization meeting. Bowdler responded: "I told her I did not wish to meet with Sr. Jimenez; if the Cubans are interested in making an official contact, other channels are available to them. With respect to the recent newspaper stories about U.S.-Cuban talks, I told her I was not aware of any such talks and that our position on the subject was clear." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1965-68)

# Haiti

## 325. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Port-au-Prince, December 18, 1963, 6 p.m.

494. Following is our analysis background current GOH moves against U.S. personnel, supplementing comments contained Embtels 458, 460<sup>2</sup> and subsequent related messages:

(1) In light Duvalier present position of relative strength inside Haiti, marked by survival challenges and difficulties past nine months, and with new U.S. President, new U.S. Ambassador forthcoming U.S. election year and possible major OAS test upcoming on Castro, Duvalier may feel he in good bargaining position to extract resumption sizeable U.S. aid perhaps even on his terms. Murchison/Davidson interest in Haiti has been source of encouragement to Duvalier. While current GOH conduct represents change in tactics toward U.S. it does not in our view reflect basic switch in objectives such as turning away from U.S. toward Castro or Commie bloc.

(2) Duvalier may be encouraged on present course by similarity present situation and that 1960. Thus in first six months 1960 USAID projects, which had begun make real progress, brought to complete halt by GOH insistence on unilateral control over hiring and firing and other key aspects USAID program. During resulting long impasse GOH requested USG to withdraw top Embassy, USAID and USIS personnel, at same time forcing many key Haitian personnel out of joint projects. May be recalled that Castro also was growing problem at that time and major test OAS opinion on Cuba shaping up. U.S. moreover was in election year and racist Duvalier regime evidently thought, and still believes, U.S. attitude toward negro nations significant factor in U.S. domestic politics.

(3) In late 1960 with arrival new U.S. Ambassador and offer substantial U.S. aid Duvalier professed great satisfaction and relations improved. Haiti later attempted blackmail U.S. at Punta del Este and when annual review USAID program arose in early 1962 Duvalier

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams 458 and 460 from Port-au-Prince, December 12, 1963, reported Haitian Government interest in and inquiries about a newly assigned FSR officer, John Hasey, who previously served in Southeast Asia and the Congo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961-63, PER HASEY, JOHN and POL HAI-US, respectively)

again balked at accepting needed controls, leading eventually to phase-out program. Duvalier, however, undoubtedly recalls that tensions 1960 were followed in 1961 by his best year in terms U.S. assistance, when \$14.1 million received in grants, including \$6.0 million budget support.

(4) No doubt current GOH calculations contain some elements desperation arising from continuing deterioration economic situation. Earlier "intellectual" supporters now largely disillusioned, leaving mainly most venal TTM-types as basis Duvalier power. These still under control but evidently restive as payoffs delayed. Duvalier accordingly under some pressure produce resumption U.S. aid or, if this not immediately possible, some sign from U.S. which can be interpreted as foreshadowing resumption aid.

(5) Should however be noted that for Duvalier himself, intensely preoccupied with retention political power, problems of economic situation beneath him and even perhaps beyond his comprehension. He knows full well value of money in buying favors and protection but broader problems of economy he leaves to technicians. So long as they continue furnish him needed cash, and basic crops coffee, sugar and sisal continue assure some minimum economic activity, serious economic problems unlikely shake Duvalier resolve.

(6) Duvalier has made it clear over past year he intends remain in control of Haiti until he dies, that he will use any means to this objective, and will not tolerate any threat to his political control. Latter, of course, based primarily on fear, terrorism and threats even toward his close followers.

(7) On surface it may seem paradox that Duvalier would deliberately request removal of EmbOffs at same time he trying get aid.<sup>3</sup> Explanation may lie party in distortions and miscalculations in Duvalier's thinking, as follows: new U.S. Amb shows U.S. recognizes Duvalier has successfully beaten down all challenges, is here to stay. U.S. must therefore make best of situation and try get Duvalier on side U.S. particularly since U.S. needs Haiti just now in OAS (Haiti's deliberate absence at COAS vote Dec 3 perhaps significant this respect). At same time, along with hopes for new era inspired by such possible misconceptions re U.S. motives, Duvalier may recently have begun to fear that arrival new Amb might signal new efforts unseat him. Seen in this light, USIS

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 720 to Port-au-Prince, December 19, 1963, reported a conversation between Irving Davidson, a registered agent for Duvalier, and Department officers, during which Davidson produced a letter allegedly from Duvalier asking for the quiet transfer of four Embassy officers for conspiring against the Government of Haiti, and stating that the new U.S. Ambassador, Benson E.L. Timmons III, had made a bad impression and had displayed a "certain stiffness." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. I)

progress in arousing pro-U.S. interest among Haitian students and intellectuals was potentially dangerous (so GOH cracked down on Haitian writers identified with USIS and put in Blanchet as Min Info). At about same time Duvalier focussed on Hasey's presence in Haiti. This interest and Hasey's immediate departure after FonOff request may have suddenly made plot theory plausible to Duvalier, and led to stories now circulating that Amb is "another Lodge" (Embtel 492).<sup>4</sup> This Duvalier attitude ambivalent: hopes for new era vs. fears of plot. By moving against selected Emb officers he hoped remove three key officers who would be highly useful to Emb in case plot theory correct, and could at same time test new era hypothesis at relatively little risk to himself. If U.S. acceded to request for withdrawal this would comfort Duvalier that new era theory right and enable him claim to supporters he in driver's seat vis-à-vis USG, while maintaining GOH public position that no problems now exist in U.S.-Haitian relations.

(8) Appears significant that in current gambit Duvalier really risking relatively little compared to what we would gain if successful. He has probably heard reports U.S. policy not changed, hence believes he has little to lose. He can, moreover, back off from this issue, if he decided to avoid showdown at this time, by saying he willing let affair pass "this time" as gesture good will toward USG and new Ambassador. With his own followers he can avoid loss prestige by saying privately "wait and see, it is only question of time," meanwhile directing low-key or covert harassment and continuing work behind scenes for removal U.S. officials.

(9) On balance we conclude that Duvalier will not initiate PNG action immediate future or retaliate against me by delaying presentation credentials indefinitely. However, risk of either or both certainly exists, since Duvalier now perhaps more than ever capable of faulty judgment and irrational acts.

**Timmons**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 492 from Port-au-Prince, December 18, 1963, reported Haitian Government skepticism and suspicions about Timmons. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961–63, POL HAI-US)

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**326. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Port-au-Prince, February 13, 1964, 6 p.m.

643. Embtels 632; 636; and Deptel 297.<sup>2</sup>

1. I talked with Pres Duvalier for an hour and fifteen minutes this morning, after being kept waiting an hour. FonMin Chalmers and Raymond were with him, and Curtis accompanied me. Highlights of conversation summarized below; full memcon will follow.<sup>3</sup>

2. While waiting in anteroom, Chalmers said he understood Duvalier wished have "private" exchange of views with me and to talk of general "spirit" of relations between Haiti and US; while there would probably be mention of some subjects he (Chalmers) and I had already discussed, Duvalier wished specifics to be pursued between FonMin and myself.

3. Conversation between President and myself took place in a neutral atmosphere, which relaxed somewhat toward end of talk. Chalmers and Raymond said practically nothing, even when invited do so by Duvalier. Duvalier apparently made effort refrain from exhibiting any hostility and, for first time in Curtis's experience, even smiled broadly at several points. Duvalier looked alert and fit, although when he stood up at beginning and end of conversation he moved slowly and I thought with a bit of difficulty. One corner of presidential office filled with machine guns and miscellaneous weaponry, and usual security precautions were visible at all points inside and outside palace.

4. Most noteworthy feature of conversation was fact that Duvalier made no mention of reference, direct or indirect, to "four problems" or to any officer of the Embassy. He also omitted usual strictures against former US Ambassadors.

5. Conversation was opened, after few words of greeting and amenities, by Duvalier's remark that he wants "close collaboration" between myself and Chalmers, Raymond and other ministers. He then embarked upon lengthy historical review, beginning with reference to "two oldest republics of hemisphere" and ending with my presentation of credentials (memcon will report all details). Inter alia he recalled

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-67, POL HAITI-US. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams 632 and 636 from Port-au-Prince, February 10 and 12, transmitted reports of conversations preliminary to the Duvalier-Timmons meeting. (Ibid.) Telegram 297 to Port-au-Prince, February 12, contained guidance for the meeting. (Ibid., AID (IDB) 9 HAITI)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.



his 14 years collaboration with Americans, his studies at University Michigan, his policy of marching "side by side" with USG in foreign policy and practice of voting with US in UN and other international bodies (citing Punta del Este and second Cuban crisis), his close relations with President Eisenhower, latter's \$6 million grant ("not loan") to Haiti, various unfilled Haitian requests to USG (road to Jacmel, jet airport), various recent invasion attempts (Dade County deputy sheriffs in 1958, Cubans in 1959, Cantave last year). Re credentials presentation, he stressed his desire do me utmost honor (ceremony held in audience chamber not used before, presidential guard in tenue de gala, turn-out of all GOH personages, etc.). As clincher he said never before had he addressed formal remarks to a new Ambassador. (I suppressed strong temptation to say that in view nature his unpleasant remarks to me on that occasion, he would be wise revert to former practice.) Duvalier said these were all things he had wanted to tell me, adding that while they were perhaps not couched in language of diplomacy they were words of "a friend of US." (Duvalier evidently at some pains to keep his recital fairly dispassionate.)

6. I then responded, saying I had come to Haiti with instructions to seek to improve relations between two governments if there was full and genuine desire on Haitian side to do so. It was in this spirit that Chalmers, Raymond and I had had two exploratory discussions, and I had thought it useful review main lines of what had been said so far with President Duvalier. I then referred to tourism and private investments as subjects that were of mutual interest and could I thought be usefully discussed. Duvalier countered with long statement of his personal solicitude for American tourists, orders he had given to police to protect and care for tourists, and traditional Haitian hospitality. He also made passing reference to fact that US vessels had been "suppressed" from visiting Haiti. Re private investments, he said he hereby gave "green light" to Chalmers and Raymond to proceed with discussion these and other subjects with me.

7. Duvalier then went off into discussion of importance of "man" in diplomacy. I broke in to say that subject had be seen in its true perspective. I like other Ambassadors of US spoke and acted under close instructions. There would undoubtedly be from time to time differences of view on this or that policy issue between GOH and USG, as there were between all governments. It was however great mistake to attribute these differences of view to "some Ambassador or some Embassy officer." I then made clear statement of need for mutual respect, saying that USG treats Haiti with respect and naturally expects and intends be so treated. Duvalier echoed this and added that cardinal principle for Haiti was "auto-determination." Haiti had no intention trying tell US what to do but converse must equally be true. He then said a few halting words in English, largely to effect how much English he

forgotten since he left Michigan. (I suspect he has really forgotten very little.)

8. Chalmers added that conversations to date had been quite useful and he looked forward to pursuing them. It was left that we would have further talk in next day or so.

9. *Comments:*

(A) As indicated above, conversation chiefly important for what Duvalier did not raise. There was no reference to famous "four problems" by Duvalier, and he took my rather pointed remark on "Ambassadors and Embassy officers" without any reaction. I naturally did not expect him to refer in any way to Davidson, Dec. 19 letter<sup>4</sup> or similar events of recent history, and he did not.

(B) I will wish reflect on meaning Duvalier obviously intended USG to attach to conversation. It is tempting to conclude that, having met unyielding US position on "four problems" and being aware my oft-voiced discontent over delay in credentials presentation, his offensive remarks about my predecessors, and open threat over "four problems," Duvalier has decided some minimum level mutual accommodation is in his own interest and will thus go along with US step-by-step approach. However, having no desire figure in "famous last words" Department, I refrain from drawing such attractive conclusion. It does appear, however, that at least he is prepared have dialogue continue. Thus opening we have been seeking, to explore possibility reaching position where we can conduct with Duvalier at least the minimum business we need to in US own self-interest, is probably at hand. In this connection, USG should restrain its natural altruistic impulses toward Haiti. We can lose before we begin if we show ourselves too eager and come forward with too many goodies. Country Team and I are giving thought to some feasible way of testing and measuring Haitian performance, and I shall be forwarding my thoughts on this.

(C) GOH will remain GOH, that is to say, basically devious and untrustworthy. I by no means exclude possibility that today was show-day, designed lull us while Duvalier pursues his objectives by other means. One defense is to continue handle intermediaries and agents provocateurs as Davidson has been dealt with. Another example of constant dangers in situation here is rumor (emanating we are told last night from Raymond himself) that USG engineered expulsion of Canadian Jesuits (Embtels 637 and 641).<sup>5</sup> I am raising this matter with Dept in separate message.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 325.

<sup>5</sup> Telegrams 637 and 641 from Port-au-Prince, February 12 and 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-67, SOC 12-1 HAI)

(D) I expect see Chalmers Feb 14 or 17 to continue with tourism and investment guaranties.

(E) Country Team concurs this message.

**Timmons**

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**327. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 24, 1964.

SUBJECT

Haitian Request for U.S. Grant Assistance

*Recommended Action*

I recommend you authorize Ambassador Timmons to inform President Duvalier that you have personally approved the decision not to accede to his request for grant budget-supporting assistance.<sup>2</sup>

*Discussion*

Ambassador Timmons has made excellent progress in establishing the productive relations with Haiti that our own self-interests require. President Duvalier has seized upon this favorable evolution to request budget-supporting assistance as “evidence of the genuineness of U.S. goodwill toward his Government.” Although some such aid may have to be given later, we do not believe we should do so now.

*Duvalier is an extreme egocentric and believes that if he could only “get through” to you personally, you would grant all his requests. It is thus important for Ambassador Timmons to be able to say that the U.S. response has your personal approval.*

Since January we have taken a number of actions favorable to Haiti’s interests. We are now encouraging tourism to Haiti, processing investment guarantee applications and supporting IDB loans to Haiti that meet the Bank’s criteria.

Continuation of the productive dialogue already begun may require us to be additionally forthcoming. At the same time, we need

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. II. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Sayre indicated that President Johnson disapproved the action on March 26.

persuasive arguments in pressing the Haitian government to pay off its debts. To serve both purposes, we plan to explore, without commitment, the reinstatement of the 1962 Port-au-Prince airport loan (\$2.8 million) which was cancelled in 1963 as a consequence of Haitian defaults on previous U.S. loans.<sup>3</sup>

DR

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<sup>3</sup> A handwritten note at the end of the memorandum reads: "This is Tom Mann's recommendation."

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**328. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 31, 1964.

SUBJECT

Haiti

I am still looking into the Haiti problem; as a starter, the following may be useful:

1. About a month and a half ago the GOH asked for grant emergency support. They gave no particular figure.

2. State and the Embassy have been wrestling since then with the problem of replying to the GOH. The essence of our position is that we want to say "no" on this particular request, but at the same time, we do not want to close the door completely on future requests. First, we may need Haiti's OAS vote on one thing or another. Second, we may have to kick in at some time in order to stay in Haiti. State (Tom Mann and Kennedy Crockett) feels that we should not lose contact with Duvalier again. Haiti is only fifty miles from Cuba. Also, Duvalier is a sick man, and could drop dead at any moment; and we want to be around if and when it happens.

One element in the equation is that Duvalier feels that if he could cut through the "bureaucratic nonsense" to President Johnson, he would get his money.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. II. Secret.

3. Recently, State sent a memorandum to the White House requesting that the President concur in a negative response to Duvalier's request for aid. The President apparently wanted to remain flexible, and declined to tie himself on.<sup>2</sup>

4. The last action document is Deptel 373 (attached),<sup>3</sup> which tells Timmons to go ahead and talk to Duvalier. (Timmons may not be happy since he thinks Duvalier will balk at a "no" answer from anyone less than the President.)

Kennedy Crockett hopes that Timmons will be able to say "no" to Duvalier in such a way that we will not close off the possibility for future aid.

5. I asked Kennedy Crockett to clear future Haiti traffic at the White House.

GC

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 327.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 373 to Port-au-Prince, March 30, attached but not printed. Another copy of this telegram is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–67, AID (US) 9 HAITI.

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### **329. Policy Paper Prepared in the Embassy in Haiti and the Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 23, 1964.

#### **HAITI**

Proposed Plan of Action for Period Beginning May 1, 1964

[Omitted here are sections 1–10 assessing Haiti's political, military, economic, and foreign relations situations.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. III. Secret. Drafted in the Office of Caribbean Affairs with contributions from the Embassy in Port-au-Prince. The memorandum is attached to a May 5 covering memorandum from Executive Secretary James M. Frey to the Latin American Policy Committee. The Latin American Policy Committee approved the Plan of Action on May 21, according to various records, including Document 338. No copy of the approved plan has been found, and there is no record of the draft paper having been revised. Annex I, "Summary of Developments from December 15, 1963 to March 15, 1964" was attached but not printed.

### 11. *Role of the United States in Haiti—Interests and Objectives*

(a) The United States is now faced with the prospect that the Duvalier regime will continue to rule Haiti for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances it is in the United States interest to seek to bring about at least a minimum level of mutual accommodation, realizing that room for such accommodation may be very limited and of dubious duration. United States interests range from the need to protect American citizens and property interests to ensuring that Haiti votes on the merit of questions of importance to the United States and the free world in international organizations and forums. The United States also has an abiding interest in the social and economic welfare of the Haitian people, although past experience shows that effective cooperation with the Duvalier regime in these fields is beset by very great difficulties. It may be possible to avoid many of the pitfalls of bilateral cooperation by bringing Haiti into a meaningful relationship with the Alliance for Progress including the CIAP and such international financial organizations as the IDB, thus shifting primary responsibility to a multilateral "impersonal" organization. In any event, the well-being of the Haitian people or lack thereof has an important long-term bearing on the key United States interest of denying Haiti to the Communists.

[Omitted here is an account of U.S.-Haitian relations from 1915 to 1963.]

### *Objectives, Conclusions and Recommendations*

[Omitted here are sections on objectives and conclusions.]

#### *C. Recommendations*

*Economic and financial*—The United States Government should:

1. Refrain from granting emergency or budget-supporting assistance to Haiti in the absence of some overriding consideration of political expediency.

2. Make clear to the Haitian Government that its economic development program and other self-help plans, by means of which Haiti would participate in the Alliance for Progress, should be evaluated by the CIAP, and, if Haiti is found eligible for AFP assistance, the Government of Haiti should look primarily to the IDB and other international lending organizations. This would not exclude some United States bilateral assistance should our fundamental interests require this.

3. Support the IMF in its efforts to balance the Haitian budget, maintain the convertibility of the gourde and amortize the Haitian internal and external debt (including payments to private American citizens, Ex-Im, AID, etc.).

4. Encourage selected European countries (such as the German Federal Republic) to grant modest amounts of technical and capital

assistance to Haiti, while opposing aid in such amounts that Duvalier would gain any real liberty of action.

5. Continue the United States financing (approximately \$1.5 per year) of the Malaria Eradication Program (which is administered as a four-way operation—Government of Haiti, United States Government, PAHO and UNICEF).

6. Encourage United States private religious and charitable organizations to continue their programs in Haiti. Continue to make foodstuffs available to such organizations under Title III of PL 480.

7. Continue to encourage tourism in Haiti by responding favorably to requests for advice from American shipping companies, tourist organizations, and individual citizens.

8. Encourage United States private investment in Haiti by approving applications for investment guaranties where such applications meet AID's criteria.

*Political*—The United States Government should:

1. Seek to continue the substantive dialogue already begun, and cultivate meaningful contacts with officials of the Haitian Government, as part of the process of arriving at a minimum level of mutual accommodation.

2. If, as a result of the fact that the United States is not prepared to resume immediately bilateral aid to Haiti, Duvalier reverts to his usual tactics of reprisals against United States representatives in Haiti, or attempts to blackmail the United States in the OAS, it should be made clear that the United States will not be intimidated. (If a firm stand is taken, Duvalier would probably not risk a reversal in the present trend of United States-Haitian relations, which is basically favorable to his own selfish interests.)

3. Attempt to thwart any further efforts of Duvalier to go around the Embassy, or to use unofficial intermediaries.

4. For the time being, discourage visits to Haiti by high-ranking officials of the United States Government, other governments or international organizations which could be exploited by Duvalier.

5. Continue the present USIS information and cultural program.

6. Resume visits to Haiti by United States naval vessels, subject to advance clearance by the Embassy in each case.

7. Maintain continuing close observation of activity in the two small Communist groups in Haiti, and seek, when and as propitious occasions may arise, the elimination of pro-Communist members of the Government (e.g. Paul Blanchet, Minister of Information).

8. Disassociate itself from any exile attempt to invade Haiti, or any plot against Duvalier, except in the circumstances (1) that the prospects for success appear favorable, (2) that public knowledge of United States

Government involvement could be successfully avoided, and (3) that the installation of an acceptable successor group is virtually assured.

9. Continue discreet contacts with Haitians outside the Government (and with those in exile) in order to attempt to build up assets for the future.

10. Defer for the time being any attempt to reconstitute a MAAG in Haiti, and deny any further United States military assistance if such should be requested by the Government of Haiti.

11. Continue to oppose and frustrate Duvalier's attempts to purchase arms in other countries.

12. Discourage Haiti from extending its political or economic relationship with the Soviet Bloc (Poland is the only Bloc country with which Haiti maintains diplomatic relations). Watch carefully for any signs that Haiti has any type of contact with Cuba and move immediately to urge the Haitian Government to cut off any such contacts.

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**330. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1964.

SUBJECT

Developing Crisis with Haiti

In Duvalier's "inauguration" address he made pleasant noises about cooperation with the United States. Having set the stage, Ambassador Timmons believes Duvalier is now ready to present his bill.

Duvalier plans, according to usually reliable palace sources, to call in Timmons and request loans, ask Timmons to go to Washington to see if he can get them, and imply very strongly that he need not come back if he is not successful.

The Haitian Ambassador has presented an export license request for thirty T-28A aircraft which the Department has told the trade sources believed to be involved that it will not approve. It did this in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. III. Confidential. The memorandum was mistakenly dated 1961.



warning aircraft dealers that they should not ship without a license—something the Department had reason to believe they planned to do.

Timmons has asked for permission to take leave beginning June 30, during the course of which he would consult in Washington. All of the reasons why Ambassador Timmons wants urgent consultation are not clear, but the primary one seems to be the need to reassess our position in the light of changed and expected [*unexpected?*] events. State has approved his request for leave and consultation.

RMS

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**331. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 9, 1964.

SUBJECT

Exile Incursion into Haiti

Duvalier finally announced publicly July 8 that Haitian exiles had invaded Haiti. The announcement insisted that the Haitian armed forces were mopping up the invaders.

CIA informs me that 28 Haitian exiles did enter Haiti on the south coast, each armed with an M-1 rifle and about 1000 rounds of ammunition. They went into the mountains. The area in which they are operating is some of the best guerrilla territory in the world—mountainous, lots of caves, foliage, and fruit. Duvalier did send forces into the area but these forces got a bloody nose in their first encounter. They are now patrolling about 10 miles away from the area in which the exiles are located. Government forces are scared to go after the exiles.

Duvalier has considered such schemes as sending 75mm guns (mortar ammunition did not detonate); burning the villages in the area; sending the peasants in the area ahead of the soldiers in hopes the guerrillas would fire at the peasants and identify their positions, etc.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Confidential.

Duvalier has begun a general round-up of all relatives of any exiles from grandmothers to babes in arms. This is a terror tactic. He has told his household staff, if he goes, he will go like Hitler and level Port-au-Prince.

It is too early to tell whether these few exiles will be successful. They apparently have little back-up material outside. Reports that the exiles may have been trained in Puerto Rico, Miami, or Cuba all appear unfounded. Nevertheless, Mr. Mann asked that they all be run down.

RMS

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**332. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 10, 1964.

SUBJECT

Haitian Arms Request

State is under intense pressure from the Haitians to approve an export license for thirty T-28 aircraft owned by a Dallas, Texas firm. Irving Davidson, a registered public relations man for Duvalier, has told State that Fred Orleans (a Texas lawyer and one of the Americans promoting the sale) insists that there is no need to worry about approval because the White House will overrule the State Department.

The Haitians have also presented a long shopping list for military equipment.

The pressure from the Haitians for the T-28's may be an indication of Duvalier's concern about the small band of guerrillas operating in Haiti. The Haitian Army wants to machine-gun their positions since Haitian soldiers are afraid to tangle with them on the ground.

Another reason for the pressure might be that the Haitians involved have already received their payoff and they are worried about their skins if Duvalier does not get his aircraft.

RMS

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Confidential.

**333. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Port-au-Prince, July 27, 1964, 5 p.m.

188. Deptel 61.<sup>2</sup> Personal for Asst Secy Mann from Timmons.

1. Thought it might be helpful to you have following thoughts on GOH-USG relations while FonMin Chalmers still in US and before definitive replies are made to GOH on requests for T-28 aircraft, spare parts for weapons and emergency electric power generators.

2. Since last January, when decision taken that USG self-interest required an attempt to reach minimum level mutual accommodation with Duvalier regime, I believe considerable progress made toward this objective, as shown most recently by GOH vote at MFM. Our hand was never exactly full of cards, but ones we did have (resumption tourism, including naval visits and cruise ships; IDB water supply loan; resumption processing investment guaranties) proved useful. Backdrop against which this dialogue proceeded was of utmost importance. Duvalier, pathologically suspicious that USG playing with Haitian exiles against him, has repeatedly threatened in private get rid of me or entire Emb. On other hand, he restrained by what must be reluctance precipitate another serious incident in his relations with USG, with unknown consequences. Meanwhile Duvalier has directed that three major official requests be made through me to USG for various items of assistance (budget-support aid last Feb; electric generators last March; export licenses for T-28 aircraft last week, reinforcing earlier request to Dept), to which he has recd refusal of first and no reply to last two. In addition there have been number of unofficial approaches through Davidson, Orleans, Sherman, etc.

3. Basic question has been and continues to be whether USG policy objective (maintain position here in attempt influence Haiti on matters important to USG, such as OAS, and deny Haiti to Communists) can be successfully pursued much longer under present conditions, i.e., unless Duvalier gets something more from dialogue than it has yet yielded to him.

4. Problem has two aspects: (a) present items in dialogue, always "low-yield", have dwindled further. Although no official instruction

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-HAITI. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 61 to Port-au-Prince, July 26, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform Haiti that its requests for export licenses for the T-28 aircraft, arms, and parts were under consideration. (Ibid., FT 18-1 HAI-US)

has yet reached us, there are seemingly well-founded indications that USG has again suspended processing investment guaranties (Embtel 94),<sup>3</sup> and intends block any further IDB, IDA or IBRD loans to Haiti. If so, and with naval visits in suspense for several reasons, including recent exile incursion and subsequent suspension GTMO's support flight to PAP, virtually nothing would be left of original items except Grace Line cruise ships. (b) Meanwhile Duvalier injected into dialogue three items of his choice, as indicated para 2 above. In this context he undoubtedly attached very great importance to question of Haiti's participation in July 21 MFM. He must have gone through roughly same analytical process we did, as to what various courses of action would yield him. It presumably became clear to him that Haiti would not have swing vote, and that even if it had such vote, USG was in no mood bargain for Haitian support. In these circumstances seems evident he decided play it sweet and low for time being; hence elaborate little act of calling me in to receive copy of Chalmers' instructions, with request that these instructions be brought Pres Johnson's personal attention, and low-key approach which Chalmers took with you on July 20, all preparatory to casting of Haitian vote with US in MFM. (If however Chalmers sees you again before leaving US, his tone may become more exigent, as has Raymond's with me.) Another factor has of course been exile incursion, and calculation by Duvalier that as long as he was under the gun he could best discourage oppositionists by attempting give concrete evidence that GOH-USG relations improving and he on side USG. MFM on Cuba was handiest subject for this purpose.

5. In short, what Duvalier has gotten in last eight months has been USG "neutrality" toward him (i.e., no official opposition to presidency for life), presence of an American Ambassador in PAP, widespread conclusion here and to some extent abroad that considerable détente achieved in GOH-USG relations (of which he has made useful propaganda capital), and some benefits in tourism, etc. No matter how much he would like strike out at US, he not likely abandon these advantages without close calculation, if past actions any guide. However, denial his outstanding requests (of which T-28s most important) could be enough tip balance toward some move by Duvalier against USG. Again on past form, target would probably be me. I find it difficult estimate odds here; I think that they run in favor of such a move, but could easily be wrong.

6. Present arguments against any extension of existing US assistance to Haiti, either economic or military, seem to me to be generally valid. Hemisphere considerations are important, and I am aware of

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<sup>3</sup> Dated July 15. (Ibid., FN 9-3 HAI)

depth of US public and Congressional distaste for Duvalier. At same time, reasons for maintaining strongest possible US presence are cogent, and I believe are becoming more so. If we continue deny all Duvalier's requests, we are essentially gambling that he will continue place such high value on lack of open USG opposition to him that he will not risk return to dangerous conditions of 1963. We should be able reinforce this by such items as interest you expressed to Chalmers in assisting movement Haitian exile leaders out of DomRep. An early acknowledgment of Duvalier's "message" to President would also work in same direction. To go further would mean approving one of Duvalier's aid requests, such as aircraft or budget-support assistance. This would almost certainly buy considerable time but also give rise to expectations of more to come.

7. Given all factors, including tight limitations on US policy toward Haiti at this time, I assume only feasible course is to continue present stance. There is one aspect that probably introduces a "cushioning" effect. If Duvalier does decide apply pressure on USG by attempt oust me, there likely be quite a bit of advance warning, since Duvalier allergic to PNG action except as last resort. This would enable new look to be taken at situation. Goes without saying that use of term "present stance" implies continuation of US policies embodied in original dialogue, including processing investment guaranties and willingness go along with loans to GOH by IDB and other international lending agencies in cases where Haiti meets criteria. Under Dept's instructions I made quite categorical statements to GOH on these items, and I fear that any change, which could not be concealed for long from GOH, would seriously complicate matters here.

8. We have also given thought to possibility that Duvalier might attempt kick up some public incident in pre-electoral period. Curtis and Warner believe this unlikely; I generally share their view but would place odds somewhat shorter than they do.

**Timmons**

**334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 7, 1964, 6:18 p.m.

104. For Ambassador Bennett from Mann. In view of today's information regarding new invasion by unknown armed band at Madre Dame Marie and conflicting reports which we have concerning possible support by Dominican military of released Haitian internees, growing feeling here is that even if new rebel band has no connection with Castro we cannot afford to be implicated directly or indirectly with another attempt by Haitian internees to enter Haiti again from Dominican Republic. It would seem to us most inconsistent to directly or indirectly support intervention in Haitian internal affairs after having so recently condemned Cuban intervention in Venezuelan internal affairs. If you perceive no objection suggest you make this clear to Reid Cabral so that he can be under no misunderstanding about USG attitude. You may furthermore inform him that it seems quite possible Haiti will decide to bring matter before OAS and that we are anxious that Dominican government have clean hands in event this should happen.

**Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-67, POL 23-9 HAITI. Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Mann. Repeated to Port-au-Prince.

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**335. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 23, 1964.

**SUBJECT**

The Multiple Dilemma in Formulating U.S. Policy on Haiti

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 HAITI. Secret.

### PREMISE

(1) Continuation of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship and maintenance by the U.S. of even minimal relationships with it are disadvantageous to the United States because:

(a) Continuing economic deterioration, moral decay and despair of another alternative work to the advantage of the communists. In addition, only the most clandestine opposition can hope to survive under Duvalier, a situation more suited to communist organization and tactics than to non-communist opposition.

(b) Haitian oppositionists, along with many of our own people and the people of the Hemisphere, are unwilling to concede that the U.S. interest is better served by the maintenance of even a minimal relationship with the Duvalier dictatorship as contrasted to the moral advantage to be gained by a complete U.S. withdrawal from Haiti.

(2) The maintenance of a U.S. presence in Haiti is in the U.S. interest because:

(a) The U.S. must be in the best position possible to protect the lives and property of its citizens in Haiti.

(b) Haiti has a voice in international forums (OAS, UN, etc.) which can be used for or against U.S. interests. Direct access to Duvalier is necessary in order to get maximum advantage for the U.S. from Haiti's vote and voice in international forums.

(c) We must be on the scene if we are to have maximum influence on the course of events in Haiti when Duvalier goes.

### ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

(1) *Actively consort with Duvalier's opposition to overthrow him.*

#### *Advantages*

The better Haitians, who are all in opposition to Duvalier, would be greatly heartened. Their bitterness toward the U.S. for tolerating Duvalier would be blunted. We would garner support for such a policy from many of our own people and the people of the Hemisphere who abhor Duvalier. If the policy resulted in Duvalier's overthrow, it would open the prospect for establishment of a less repugnant successor government.

#### *Disadvantages*

To undertake an interventionist policy such as this would be to assume very grave responsibility for the consequences. In the final analysis we can ensure the establishment and continuation of a less repugnant post-Duvalier government only if we are prepared to install and control it with force of arms if necessary. To undertake an interven-

tionist policy in Haiti without being prepared to go the whole way to ensure its success would be to invite a double curse on our house, i.e., (a) to have intervened, and (b) to have failed.

An interventionist policy in Haiti would represent a major shift of U.S. policy in Latin America. Our enemies would exploit it to the fullest. Many of our friends would see in it a precedent involving much greater dangers to their interests than does Duvalier's continuation. We could expect major and continuing criticism.

Assuming we were prepared to bear the consequences in order to do something meaningful for the Haitian people, the needs are so monumental that even the unrestrained application of our resources could be expected to make only a modest impact for at least a generation. Thus, the initial and continuing foreign policy price would be great. The long-term cost to our economy would be very high. But demonstrable and real benefits would be quite small, at least through the mid-term.

(2) *Work closely and fully with Duvalier despite his shortcomings.*

#### *Advantages*

Substantial input of funds and technical assistance would alleviate the great suffering of Haiti's masses to some extent in the short run and would offer improved prospects for the country's future. A substantial U.S. developmental effort might give us some leverage in softening Duvalier's brutal oppression of the Haitian people.

#### *Disadvantages*

All of the better elements of Haiti (who are in opposition to Duvalier) would decry such a policy as strengthening Duvalier's hand at home and abroad. Many of our own people and the people of the Hemisphere would denounce our support of a brutal dictatorship. Experience has demonstrated that Duvalier prefers to forego U.S. assistance unless he can get it on his terms and exploit it to his maximum advantage. This would minimize benefits accruing to the Haitian people while maximizing benefits to Duvalier and his supporters. Reactivation of an assistance program in Haiti would be taken as a sign of U.S. weakness by Duvalier and would probably provide little if any additional leverage in dealing with him.

(3) *Maintain a U.S. presence in Haiti but make clear by word and deed our distaste for the Duvalier dictatorship.*

#### *Advantages*

The U.S. position would be clear for all to see. We would satisfy most of those who criticize us for consorting with Duvalier. We would continue to enjoy a presence in Haiti.



*Disadvantages*

It is unlikely that Duvalier would long tolerate a U.S. presence in Haiti under these circumstances, but would force a confrontation offering two alternatives: (a) a softening of the policy, or (b) the expulsion of our Ambassador and possibly our entire mission. At the very least, our ability to exploit our presence in Haiti would be greatly circumscribed.

(4) *Maintain a U.S. presence in Haiti on as normal a basis as conditions there permit, but deny Duvalier U.S. endorsement or economic assistance.*

*Advantages*

Maintenance of a U.S. presence in Haiti on as normal a basis as possible permits maximum application of our influence in attaining our policy objectives. We will be on the scene and in a position to take quick and effective counter measures should a communist takeover threaten or occur either before or after Duvalier's demise.

*Disadvantages*

Maintenance of even limited relationships with the Duvalier dictatorship places us in an ambiguous position, especially for those who find it simpler to see all things in black and white. Criticism and bitterness will be engendered, creating problems for the U.S. now and in the future. Elements of the Haitian opposition who offer the best hope for the country's future are estranged by such a policy. It is a difficult policy to implement because it has few tangible benefits for Duvalier. Consequently, he is constantly tempted to force a confrontation which might deny him the limited benefits he now enjoys over the short run but offers prospects of more tangible returns as the price for a future rapprochement. To stay this temptation, Duvalier must be kept in doubt about future U.S. intentions and the value which the U.S. places on maintaining a presence in Haiti.

## CONCLUSION

Despite the disadvantages, Course of Action (4) is clearly the least unattractive of the alternatives open to the U.S.

**336. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

SecDel/MC/48

New York, December 10, 1964, 11 a.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
New York, December 1964

## SUBJECT

Revolutionary Action by Haitian Officials

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The Secretary

Mr. Irwin, ARA

Mr. Glenn, Interpreter

*Foreign*

Rene Chalmers, Foreign Minister of Haiti

The Secretary said that he wished to comment briefly regarding the mounting of military forays against Haiti from United States soil. The Secretary emphasized that such action is illegal in the United States and that the policy of the United States Government is not to permit such action to occur on its territory. The Secretary said that it is not possible to take action against people who only plot with their tongues—that, too, would be contrary to our law. However, the United States would be pleased to be informed through our Embassy of any actual plots the Government of Haiti believes might be afoot. He assured the Foreign Minister that the United States would take measures, as it had in the past, against such action.

The Haitian Foreign Minister replied that there have been several conversations through the two Embassies on this matter. He recognized that the United States Government does not tolerate such action on United States soil. He said that he fully realized that when the Government of Haiti reports such suspicions to the American Embassy that they are transmitted to Washington. The Minister said that he wished to speak frankly, however that in the last invasion, the Haitian Government took two prisoners and a large amount of matériel. He said that a large part of this matériel had come from Syracuse, New York and, although the prisoners may have been attempting to mislead the GOH, they made statements to the effect that they had been trained on United States territory. He said that he had discussed the matter with Ambassador Timmons, saying that he did not believe the United States

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-67, POL HAITI-US. Confidential. Drafted by Irwin and approved in S on December 30. The memorandum is part V of VII.

was responsible. However, at this time, he wished to suggest the possibility of some low-level United States officials being involved, or persons who belong to some “quasi organization.” The Minister concluded that he believed it behooved him to prepare a complete file on this subject for the Secretary.

The Secretary said he would appreciate this, and asked that the Minister have the American Embassy address the report to his personal attention. He repeated his disavowal of any United States participation in rebel activities, and said that all over the world rebel elements falsely claim the support of the United States for their own advantage.

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**337. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 30, 1964.

SUBJECT

Haiti

Both the *New York Times* and the *Herald Tribune* are giving particular attention to the smuggling of arms into Haiti.<sup>2</sup> The arrival of two T-28's in Haiti earlier this year in the face of a ban of export licenses is what whetted their curiosity. Szulc and Collier have apparently been working together. They tried to develop the thesis with the Director of Caribbean Affairs that the United States Government was conspiring with Duvalier to provide arms, despite the fact that we refused an export license. They apparently gave this up as a bad theory, but are now on the tangent that the Department of State and CIA are preventing prosecution because they are unwilling to let a key witness testify. This witness can apparently testify to the fact that the aircraft in Haiti are in fact the ones smuggled out of Florida.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Mann called Valenti on December 28 about the two newspapers' articles and said that he had learned from a journalist friend that the “whole Haiti story was leaked by Justice.” Mann added that “the newspaper people had tried to sell the idea that Duvalier was promised help in return for Haiti's vote at the July OAS meeting so this was why they could get T-28s from us. This was not true at all.” (Ibid., Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 4, 1964–April 30, 1965)

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mann feels that the emphasis which the two papers are giving to the story indicates a new effort on their part to revive the dictator-democracy issues. He regards our present policy as perfectly defensible. We have done everything we can to prevent arms shipments to Haiti, including obtaining an arms embargo by all the Europeans, which is effective. Although Mann regards Duvalier as the worst dictator in the Hemisphere, and would be happy to see him go, no one has suggested any way to do it except by force. Mann regards this an unacceptable course. Even if this were done, no one has a satisfactory alternative in prospect. Haiti has never had a reasonably decent government, even by Latin standards. Some, like Duvalier, are just worse than others.

RMS

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**338. Airgram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

A-332

Port-au-Prince, February 24, 1965.

SUBJECT

Results in 1964 of the Application of United States Policies toward Haiti

1. *Introduction and Summary*—The purpose of this airgram is to analyze briefly the results in the calendar year 1964 of the application of United States Government policies toward Haiti, especially in two key areas—the specific requests that the United States Government made to the Haitian Government in matters of substantial bilateral or multilateral concern, and the requests of the same nature that the Haitian Government made to the United States Government. As will be indicated below, the Haitian Government responded affirmatively to all such requests made by the United States Government (except in one case—the suspension of an expulsion order against an American citizen), while at the same time the United States Government, in accord with the established policy, successfully rejected all Haitian requests

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 HAI-US. Secret. Drafted and approved by Timmons; cleared by Curtis, Political Counselor Warner, Economic Counselor Breaux, Military Attaché Lieutenant Colonel Warren, USIS Attaché Moss, and Consul General Maule.

and maneuvers to obtain the resumption of United States economic and military assistance to Haiti.

2. *Basic United States Policy toward Haiti*—The elements of United States policy toward Haiti for the immediate and short-run future, as set out in the currently applicable Policy Paper entitled “Haiti—Plan of Action for Period Beginning May 1, 1964,”<sup>2</sup> prepared by the Embassy and ARA/CAR and approved by the Latin America Policy Committee on May 21, 1964, may be summarized as follows:

(a) To maintain a substantial United States presence in Haiti (defined as being an Ambassador and an adequate Embassy staff) so as to be able to influence the situation when the inevitable change in regime occurs, either through Duvalier’s death or through his assassination or deposition, and to deny Haiti to the Communists.

(b) Meanwhile, to give no aid or support to Duvalier through resumption of United States economic or military assistance, and to frustrate his efforts to buy arms in the United States or other countries.

(c) To influence the Haitian Government to support United States positions on matters of bilateral or multilateral concern (such as in the OAS, UN and specialized international agencies).

(d) To protect the substantial number of United States citizens resident in Haiti (over 1,000) and the large United States investments here (estimated at more than \$60 million), and to collect the debts owed by Haiti to the United States Government and to United States citizens and firms.

[Omitted here is discussion of major requests for and by the Haitian Government.]

#### 6. *Conclusions*—

In terms of the four major objectives set out in Paragraph 2 above, the following conclusions may be drawn:

(a) During the period under review the desired United States presence in Haiti was maintained, and two attempts by the Haitian Government (in December, 1963 and January, 1964) to bring about the withdrawal of three key Embassy officers (Army Attaché, Chief of Political Section, and Public Affairs Officer) were decisively defeated. I made clear to the Haitian Foreign Minister in January, 1964 (a month after my arrival here) that the Haitian Government was naturally free to declare these officers *persona non grata*, but in that case the United States Government would retaliate against Haitian Government personnel in the United States on a one-for-one basis. The Haitian Government dropped the matter.

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<sup>2</sup> For the draft version, see Document 329.

(b) All Haitian Government efforts to obtain the resumption of United States economic and military assistance were successfully rejected.

(c) The Haitian Government agreed to support United States Government positions on all matters of substantial bilateral and multilateral concern, and this was accomplished without the resumption of United States assistance.

(d) Except in the case of Bishop Voegeli, United States citizens and investments here were successfully protected.

**Benson E. L. Timmons**

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**339. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 19, 1965.

SUBJECT

Proposal to counter Radio Havana Broadcasts to Haiti

ARA endorses the attached proposal<sup>2</sup> to use Haitian exiles to broadcast radio programs in Creole to counter communist propaganda now regularly beamed to Haiti by Radio Havana and recommends that you support it in the 303 Committee.<sup>3</sup>

As pointed out under e. *Risks Involved*, Duvalier's reaction to this operation could be quite sharp. It is possible that our ability to maintain a presence in Haiti will be threatened. In recommending approval of the program, the Department emphasizes the importance of avoiding, to the extent possible, program content which would tend to direct Duvalier's displeasure towards the United States, rather than the Haitian exile community. To this end, particular care will be required in preparing that portion of broadcasts originating in the U.S. which is aimed at disassociating the United States from Duvalier in the Haitian mind.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Haiti. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> An April 23 memorandum for the record notes that the proposal received telephonic approval from 303 Committee principals on April 22. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Haiti)

**340. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1965, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Arms for Haiti

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Rene Chalmers, Foreign Minister of Haiti  
Andre Theard, Ambassador of Haiti  
Miss von Thurn, ARA/CAR  
Mr. Glenn, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Chalmers stated that the Government of Haiti lacks weapons and ammunition with which to defend itself against outside attack; he said that this problem is of particular concern to his government at present in view of the situation in the Dominican Republic.<sup>2</sup> Chalmers stated that Haiti has made numerous efforts to obtain arms during the past year but that none of these efforts has been successful. He added, slowly and emphatically, "this will become a question", repeating the statement several times. (Note: He did not mention specifically his government's several unsuccessful requests for U.S. military assistance nor did he make specific reference to the equally unsuccessful applications for munitions control export licenses. He also avoided mention of Haiti's attempt to smuggle weapons out of the United States.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Confidential. Drafted by von Thurn. The memorandum is part II of V. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

<sup>2</sup> A May 4 briefing memorandum from Vaughn to Secretary Rusk for this meeting recommended that the Secretary receive Chalmers, since "the need for Haiti's vote at the OAS is clear" and "Chalmers is one of the few MFM delegates who has expressed broad general support for our recent actions in the Dominican Republic." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL HAITI-US)

**341. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 13, 1965.

SUBJECT

The Impact in Haiti of the Dominican Crisis

In the two and a half weeks since the fall of the Reid Cabral government, the Dominican crisis has had only a very limited impact on the situation in Haiti. This could change quickly however if the several Haitian exile activists now serving with the Dominican rebel forces should succeed in obtaining rebel logistic support for an invasion of Haiti.

*Immediate Impact*

*Relations with the Dominican Republic*

From the outset of the Dominican crisis, official Haitian reaction has been one of ill-disguised fear that Juan Bosch, or someone answerable to him, might gain control of the government in Santo Domingo. Haitian officials have seized eagerly on the leftist infiltration of the present pro-Bosch forces as a pretext for their fears, and have underscored again and again their willingness to go along with any move to brand Bosch a threat to the security of the hemisphere. As a practical matter, Haiti's fear of Bosch has little to do with the issue of Communism and is based primarily on Bosch's association with leaders of the non-Communist left, principally Figueres, Betancourt, and Munoz Marin, all of whom are openly and loudly critical of the Duvalier dictatorship to the point of having pressed for OAS censure of the regime. Bosch himself, during his brief tenure in office, permitted Haitian exiles to launch two probes against Haiti from Dominican soil.

*Haitian Exile Groups*

Usually reliable sources report that Haitian exiles living in Santo Domingo obtained a sizeable quantity of weapons when the Dominican rebels stormed the Fortaleza Ozama on April 30. Among these exiles were two individuals who participated in Dominican-based guerrilla invasions of Haiti in June and August of 1964. These two, plus their French military advisor, are currently members of Colonel

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records. Secret.



Caamano's inner circle according to recent reports. The acquisition of arms and of influential new Dominican contacts materially changes the power position of these exiles. The Reid Cabral government had disarmed and/or interned most of these exiles under pressure from the OAS. To date there are no indications that the exiles have organized themselves for an invasion but they have reportedly expressed their intention of doing so as soon as the situation permits.

*Relations with the U.S. and the OAS*

The immediate practical effect of Haiti's newly revived fear of Bosch has been to mute the otherwise predictable criticism of the use of U.S. military forces in Santo Domingo and to soften, temporarily, Haiti's perpetual attempts to blackmail the U.S. in OAS meetings. During the current Meeting of Consultation, Haiti's fears have dictated support for the U.S. position, without haggling. At the same time, however, there are indications that Duvalier may soon attempt to trade on his "cooperation" and on the proximity of the Dominican crisis to make a bid for the resumption of large-scale U.S. aid. Even before the start of the Dominican crisis, Foreign Minister Chalmers said he believed it would be useless for the forthcoming Rio OAS conference to discuss "the strengthening of representative democracy" without giving attention to the underlying question of "reinforcing the respective economies".

*Internal Repercussions*

There is no evidence that security measures have been tightened in Haiti nor that the border garrisons have been reinforced. There have been reports that one of the two Haitian Communist parties (the PPLN) and several other small, disorganized opposition groups—all of which are clandestine—have discussed the implications for Haiti of the Dominican crisis but there has been nothing to indicate that any group plans overt action on the face of Duvalier's ruthless repressive tactics. Aggressive broadcasts by Radio Havana, in Creole to Haiti, urging Haitians to back the Dominican rebels, have had no visible effect.

The Haitian economy, chronically shaky and recently in a state of near paralysis, has not been affected by the Dominican situation.

*Possible Impact in the Next Few Months*

One of the most obvious possibilities for the near future is that the Haitian exiles now serving with the Dominican rebels may attempt an invasion of Haiti under cover of the present confusion in Santo Domingo.

If these exiles should find themselves able to move, they could well succeed in bringing Duvalier down with as few as 300 well equipped men. Their failure to do so in 1964 can be ascribed in large

part to the lack of support from the Dominican side of the border, lack of trained manpower (no invasion group numbered more than 30 or 40), and a lack of suitable equipment.

In 1964, despite the exiles' poor logistics and support, Duvalier was unable to effectively control the invasion areas for four months (July through early November). The exiles now in the best position to mount an invasion, i.e., those in Santo Domingo, have had no pronounced ideological orientation but reportedly have drawn closer to leftist groups in recent months for lack of support from other quarters.

Ambassador Timmons' assessment of Duvalier's probable reaction to this and to other factors in the situation is set forth in the attached telegram (Port-au-Prince 1489, May 11, 1965).<sup>2</sup> While it is possible, as stated in the Embassy assessment, that Duvalier might accept or even welcome U.S. military intervention in the event of an invasion, such intervention would almost certainly create serious difficulties for the U.S. in terms of hemisphere opinion and would be likely to backfire within Haiti after a short time, given Haiti's vivid memories of the U.S. Marine occupation of 1915-1934.

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1489 from Port-au-Prince, May 12, reported Timmons' discussions with Chambers and Raymond, and Timmons' analysis that Duvalier favored an authoritarian regime in the Dominican Republic, as far to the right as possible. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 DOM REP)

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### 342. Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

OCI No. 1754/65

Washington, May 13, 1965.

#### INSTABILITY IN HAITI

1. Since Francois Duvalier's accession to power in 1957, he has attempted to destroy every force which could possibly overthrow him.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.; Controlled Dissem. A May 14 memorandum from Murat W. Williams (INR) to Vaughn noted that this memorandum was circulated at the May 13 meeting of the 303 Committee. The Committee agreed that "a small group of determined insurgents could unseat Duvalier." Bundy directed that State and the CIA "coordinate on investigating alternative sources of political power in Haiti," since Duvalier's days might be numbered and the United States "should not be caught short." (Ibid., Country File, Haiti)

The military, which has been the traditional kingmaker in Haiti, lost most of its power in 1958 when the National Security Volunteers (VSN-Militia) and the secret police (Ton-Ton Macoute-bogeymen) were created as counterforces. Since that time there have been repeated purges within the military. Those who have been purged have been replaced by Duvalier favorites who owe their positions to him. A civil service does not exist. All government employees are hired on the basis of their loyalty to Duvalier. Even cabinet officers are changed frequently to prevent their building up any following. Discontent is believed to be widespread, but opposition, both real and imagined, is ruthlessly and immediately suppressed.

2. Over the years there have been numerous incursions by anti-Duvalier Haitian exiles. In August and September 1963 several incursions took place on the northern border area, the last with a force of over 100 men. These expeditions met with failure, however, because Duvalier was alerted and because of the poor leadership of the exile commander, Brig. Gen. Leon Cantave. Cantave has since lost exile support.

3. From June to September 1964 two separate groups invaded Haiti. One group of about 30 came from the Dominican Republic and operated in the southeastern portion of the southern peninsula for several weeks, then crossed back into the neighboring republic where they were temporarily interned by Dominican officials. The other group landed on the southwestern portion and was comprised of 13 men. This group was probably the best trained and equipped that has operated in Haiti. The Haitian military were unable to engage them for several months, but the group was finally worn down until all had been captured and killed. It is significant to note that a force of only 13 men operating in the countryside were capable of running the Haitian Armed forces (FAdH) ragged for several months. The FAdH was demoralized at its inability to engage the enemy. There were complaints that the army lacked good field support and sufficient supplies. Another widespread complaint was that the VSN—Duvalier's favorite—was not up to the task of fighting for the country.

4. The last two incursions were eventually beaten back, but only at great cost to the economy. Haiti has been unable to recover fully and is now in serious economic straits. Government employees are not paid for months on end. The Duvalier government has repeatedly asked for US economic aid. Following its vote in the OAS to back the US in its actions in the Dominican Republic Haiti may seek "its reward."

5. Although Haitian exiles are agreed that Duvalier must be overthrown, they are divided amongst themselves. The exile factions work singly without overall direction and therefore are unable to put large groups in the field. Last year's defeats also have served to dampen exile spirits.

6. During the past several weeks we have had reports that some Haitian exiles are fighting with the rebels in the Dominican Republic. These exiles are probably led by Andre Riviere, a French soldier of fortune. He is reported to have fought in Indochina, and is an expert in guerrilla tactics. In the past several years Riviere has instructed anti-Duvalier exiles—numbering about 70–100—in the Dominican Republic. Those Haitians presently fighting with the rebels may be some of those which he has trained. One of the exiles' perennial complaints was that they lacked arms; however, they may have acquired some from the Dominicans. At present Riviere—who reportedly has had Communist ties in the past—is a translator and military adviser to Manuel Montes Arache—one of the leaders of the Dominican rebel command.

7. [16 lines of source text not declassified] Radio Havana has long been trying to incite the Haitian people to overthrow the dictatorship. Recently these broadcasts, in the Creole language, have included excerpts from "Che" Guevara's guerrilla warfare book. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

8. Should exiles be able to mount an incursion on several fronts simultaneously, with small, well-trained groups who could be re-supplied, the Duvalier regime could be overthrown. Depressed economic conditions in Haiti limit the government's ability to finance protracted military operations.

9. This paper has the concurrence of WH/DDP and O/NE.

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### 343. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 2, 1965.

#### SUBJECT

Haiti—The Threat and Possible Pre-emptive Measures

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Haiti. Secret. Drafted in the Western Hemisphere Division, forwarded with a June 3 covering memorandum through the Deputy Director for Plans and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the signed concurrence of Thomas H. Karamessines, Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency. The covering memorandum stated that this CIA–State coordinated paper was the response to McGeorge Bundy's May 13 request for a plan of pre-emptive action in Haiti; see footnote 1, Document 342. The covering memorandum was attached but not printed.

*I. Alternative Sources of Political Power*

There are no alternative sources of political power in Haiti today. The army, stripped of its best officers, is powerless to act against the regime and its armed rabble, the National Security Volunteers (VSN). There are no political parties other than the two communist parties which operate clandestinely. All power rests with President Duvalier who has relentlessly smashed all overt opposition.

*II. The External Threat*

No presently established group of Haitian exiles in the United States is capable of invading Haiti.

A potential threat to the Duvalier regime exists in the Dominican Republic. There, several Haitians who have long been identified with anti-Duvalier activities are known to be serving with Colonel Francisco Caamano. It is reliably reported that arms have been put at the disposal of these men. One of them has stated that these arms are to be used to liberate Haiti. They are trained guerrilla fighters and four of them are known to have participated in two previous invasions of Haiti.

It is further reported that nearly all of the trained men (30–60) who took part with them in the previous invasions are also with the rebels and have their own Headquarters in Santo Domingo. From the reservoir of 80,000 Haitians in the Dominican Republic they can probably build a new invasion force of as many anti-Duvalierists as they can arm and lead.

Equating these facts with the belief that a well-armed and determined force of from 200 to 300 men, well-trained and well-supplied, could overthrow the Haitian government, the danger should not be minimized. The Communists inside the country, although few in number—approximately 500 hard core—are the best organized and best disciplined of all opposition elements and can be counted on to attempt to seize power in the period immediately following Duvalier's disappearance. They could also be counted on to capitalize on an invasion attempt, especially if it came from leftist-led elements in the Dominican Republic. There is indication of outside direction from international communism through Haitian party members in Mexico City, Paris and Moscow. They have sympathizers in cabinet positions in the present government. The masses, long-suffering and apathetic, and exhorted daily by Radio Havana Creole language broadcasts, could likely be swung behind the leaders. Those in the provincial areas, especially the southern peninsula, are reliably reported to be tense, and ready for a revolt with racial implications at the slightest opportunity.

If the new government of the Dominican Republic assumes a posture unfavorable to the exiles, their capability to mount an effective invasion of Haiti will be diminished. If the new government is of leftist persuasion, action against Duvalier may be expected. In that case Haiti

might fall quickly to the Dominican-based rebels and their Communist-oriented associates.

### *III. The Problem*

An attempt to overthrow the Duvalier government by effective forces of Haitian, or other, leftist elements now in the Dominican Republic, would demand pre-emptive action.

Internal revolt by disgruntled members of Duvalier's entourage, which is an accepted possibility, would likewise call for pre-emptive action to forestall accession by undesirables, unless an understanding had been reached with the Haitian Army leaders to the effect that order would be maintained until acceptable exiles could be returned.

Sudden deterioration of Duvalier's health, which is known to be poor, would precipitate a crisis in which similar immediate action would be necessary.

The above conclusions are drawn in the belief that no individual, or group of individuals, now in Haiti or outside it, with enough power to seize control, is free of Communist influence, or acceptable to the U.S. Government by any standards applicable to its own, or hemispheric, interests.

### *IV. Proposed Alternatives for Pre-emptive Action<sup>2</sup>*

[6 paragraphs (64 lines of source text) not declassified]

### *V. Preparations for New Regime*

By direction CIA has conducted an intensive survey of Haitian individuals of influence, both inside and outside the country, in order to pinpoint those best suited, in terms of U.S. interests, for inclusion in a post-Duvalier provisional government. Factors considered in selection of potential participants have been political ideology, responsiveness to U.S. direction, influence inside Haiti, experience and stability. A suitable group is at hand and could be activated in a matter of hours. Included would be Marcel Fombrun, Louis Roy, Robert Bazile, Francois Latortue, Raymond Joseph, Luc Fouche, Joseph Dejean, Paul Magloire and Jean Elie. They are all known to each other and have shown signs of being capable of working together.

Haitian army officers in exile have been carefully screened and enough have been selected for a rapid reconstruction of the Haitian army along lines consistent with U.S. interests.

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<sup>2</sup> A June 10 memorandum from Vaughn to Thompson expressed Vaughn's concurrence with sections I, II, and III of the CIA paper, but noted his disagreement with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of section IV. [text not declassified] (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records)

*VI. Suggested Action in a Crisis Precipitated by Duvalier's Health Failure*

The political vacuum created by Duvalier's disappearance would almost certainly necessitate quick action. The least exceptionable form of action would be for the U.S. Ambassador to make immediate contact with General Gerard Constant, the Army Chief of Staff, and tell him that if he can keep the army together and maintain order, the U.S. will guarantee his safety, and arrange the arrival in Port-au-Prince of Haitian civilian leaders now in exile in accordance with a listing to be negotiated with him on the spot.

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**344. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Port-au-Prince, June 4, 1965, 1745Z.

1587. Embtel 1586.<sup>2</sup> Summary follows of salient points June 3 ltr from Duvalier to President<sup>3</sup> (based on copy of English translation handed me by Duvalier):

"Dramatic events" in DomRep point up relationship peace and stability to prosperity. For Haiti all three depend on help from "friendly and understanding USG," and international banking institutions. Haitian people have courageously endured natural catastrophes and economic difficulties for years but must be extricated from "economic strangulation." Duvalier has long seen need for changed USG attitude (as leader Hemisphere) to end "steady deterioration" in relations between states, and particularly "to understand me." Despite being "less well understood," GOH has accepted "policy of sacrifice in hope . . . of resurrection of national economy by injection of fresh dollars . . . for works of infrastructure" such as roads, harbor works, communications, hydro projects, sugar mills, irrigation, airports and other "realistic proj-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) HAITI. Confidential; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1586 from Port-au-Prince, June 4, reported that Duvalier gave Timmons an "administrative letter" for the President, as well as a copy for himself, in a meeting that morning. Timmons also reported that Duvalier asked that he transmit a request that Haitian Ambassador Andre Theard be granted a "personal audience" with Johnson, at which time Theard would deliver a "confidential letter" from Duvalier to the President. (Ibid., POL 15–1 HAITI)

<sup>3</sup> The signed copy of the letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Haiti–Presidential Correspondence.

ects for an aid program." "Foundered economy of Haiti cannot through its own efforts . . . be reinvigorated." "Adequate injection of money and capital to put country back on its feet" is necessary. "This can only come from US . . . in form generous aid . . . long term loans . . . , economic and technical assistance . . ." Duvalier is "sure" that President's "personal attention to economic situation of Haiti" will permit quick action "in way Pres Eisenhower did six years ago." Closes with "fervent hopes for . . . fruitful cooperation in all fields between US and Haiti."<sup>4</sup>

**Timmons**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1594 from Port-au-Prince, June 5, reported Timmons' preliminary reactions to Duvalier's letter. He concluded that the request for an appointment for Theard to deliver the "confidential letter" was probably a maneuver to test the "temperature of water in Washington." Timmons observed that Duvalier's aid request was "clearly related" to the crisis in the Dominican Republic and consequent OAS actions, in which Haiti provided the necessary 14th vote on several occasions. He noted that the "administrative letter" was the 7th request for U.S. aid since the "current phase" of relations began in December 1963, but that this was the first time Duvalier had personally made such a request. Timmons asked whether any change in current policy toward Haiti was needed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 HAITI)

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**345. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 11, 1965.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting June 10, 1965

The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee held on June 10, 1965 contain the following items:

[Omitted here is discussion of Cuba; see Document 302.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country File, Haiti. Secret; Eyes Only.



*“Haiti—The Threat and Possible Pre-emptive Measures”<sup>2</sup>*

[2 paragraphs (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

“c. The action suggested in paragraph 6 was also approved to the effect that Ambassador Timmons should get in touch with General Gerard Constant, Chief of Staff, and advise him that, in the event of Duvalier’s death,<sup>3</sup> his (Constant’s) safety would be guaranteed if he could maintain civil order until the arrival of Haitian civilian leaders in exile in accordance with a listing to be negotiated with Constant at the critical time.

“d. Mr. Vance submitted a list of four potentially useful Haitian officers produced by the JCS who, in their estimate, appear to be a cut above the Haitian average. [2 lines of source text not declassified]”

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 343.

<sup>3</sup> A June 16 memorandum from Williams to Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff, reported that the minutes of the 303 Committee meeting were to be corrected to show that Timmons was to take the action indicated in the event of Duvalier’s death, not before. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country File, Haiti)

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### 346. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 15, 1965.

SUBJECT

Haiti—The Danger and Possible Pre-emptive Action

*I. Assessment of the Situation*

The danger inherent in the Haitian situation may require pre-emptive action of an urgent nature if U.S. interests are to be served. It may flare without warning, following any one of three separate developments which the U.S. Government is presently powerless to prevent. They are:

(a) An invasion by leftist-led Haitians known to be serving with the rebel forces in the Dominican Republic, known to have arms at their disposal, and known to have the intent.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only. In a June 23 memorandum to Thompson, attached but not printed, Vaughn recommended that Thompson support the CIA’s proposal in the 303 Committee.

(b) An internal revolt led by members of Duvalier's entourage, with or without Communist backing from the outside, which might well be forthcoming.

(c) The sudden demise of Duvalier, resulting in a power struggle in which none of the contestants would be acceptable, and which might be won by the best-organized opposition forces inside Haiti, the Communists.

## *II. Warning Signals*

There are reliable reports that Haitian Communists outside the country have recently accelerated their organizational activities.

Haitians in Paris and in French universities, numbering in the hundreds, are being wooed by the Communists among them, reportedly to demonstrate to the French Communist Party that the financial support being channelled to them from Moscow is justified.

Haitian students in West Germany, both Communists and non-Communists, are being invited to Prague for quick indoctrination courses.

A group in Caracas is allegedly expecting support from the Communist movement in Venezuela.

Radio Havana continues its inflammatory barrage in the Creole language, exhorting Haitians inside the country to revolt against Duvalier and the U.S., whom they treat as a single oppressor.

There are unconfirmed reports that small quantities of arms have been smuggled to the Communists in Port-au-Prince.

Plotters are reported to be at work in inner circles of the Haitian government where Communist sympathizers are tolerated.

Reports on Duvalier's health run the gamut from indigestion to his death. He may safely be considered in questionable health.

## *III. The Problem*

To reduce, or eliminate, the possibility of an invasion of Haiti by leftists in the Dominican Republic.<sup>2</sup>

To constitute a contingency force composed entirely of Haitians which could be moved swiftly to Port-au-Prince to preserve order and protect a provisional government of our own choosing following Duvalier's disappearance.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A June 28 memorandum from Williams to Vaughn transmitted the minutes of the 303 Committee meeting of June 25. During the 303 meeting FitzGerald reported the recent deaths of Andre Riviere and a Haitian émigré leftist fighting in the Dominican Republic, and suggested that the threat of a takeover by leftist exiles was no longer as likely. (Ibid., Country File, Haiti)

<sup>3</sup> [text not declassified]

To prevent a take-over by Communists or Communist sympathizers now in positions of power in Duvalier's government, should they, or other unacceptable elements, trigger an internal revolt.

To explore quick means of approach in time of crisis to the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Army in order to gain army backing of the provisional government against the National Security Volunteers (VSN) and the Ton Ton Macoutes (TTM).

#### *IV. Proposal*

*[4 paragraphs (37½ lines of source text) not declassified]*

#### *V. Advantages*

It is believed that the action suggested above would:

(a) materially reduce the possibility of an invasion of Haiti by leftist-led elements in the Dominican Republic by usurping the manpower and isolating the leaders;

(b) allow the constitution of a pre-emptive force of Haitians under competent Haitian officers for quick transfer to Port-au-Prince in case Duvalier dies or is overthrown by internal revolt;

(c) diminish the capability of Communist agitators to foment trouble by appealing to those men of military age among the Haitian population of the Dominican Republic;

(d) improve the morale of the key officers in the Haitian army who know the exile officers who would be involved and feel some solidarity with them. It might do more to assure an army on which reliance could be placed in time of crisis than any move that could be made at present.

#### *VI. Disadvantages*

Disadvantages might be:

(a) *[2 lines of source text not declassified];*

(b) the creation of an organization with a will and capability to act against Duvalier; its purpose may conflict with U.S. policy, and it may be difficult to deter.

#### *VII. Diplomatic Action*

As a separate action to be undertaken immediately at the time of Duvalier's disappearance, it has been agreed that the U.S. ambassador make contact with General Gerard Constant, the Haitian Army Chief-of-Staff and tell him that if he can keep the army together and maintain order, the U.S. will guarantee his safety and arrange the arrival in Port-au-Prince of Haitian civilian leaders now in exile, in accordance with a listing to be negotiated with him on the spot. It is suggested that the ambassador explore with the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* ways and means of making swift, sure contact when the

need arises. It is believed that Constant would be more amenable and have more chance of successfully controlling the army if the suggested action [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is approved, as noted in paragraph IV (4) above.

#### VIII. *Attributability*

It is believed that all the action proposed in this paper can be undertaken without revealing the hand of the United States Government.

### 347. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

SecDel/MC/31

New York, October 8, 1965, 11 a.m.

#### SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1965

##### SUBJECT

Economic and Financial Situation in Haiti

##### PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State Dean Rusk  
Mr. Alton W. Hemba (USDEL)  
Mr. Jose DeSeabra (Interpreter)

Secretary of State for Foreign  
Affairs Rene Chalmers (Haiti)  
Minister-without-Portfolio Clovis  
Desinor (Haiti)  
Ambassador Andre Theard (Haitian  
Ambassador to the U.S.)

The Foreign Minister said he wished to discuss the economic and financial situation in his country. He said conditions are very poor. Contributing factors are two hurricanes in the relatively recent past, lower incomes from coffee, sisal, and sugar, and a lower income from tourism because of the situation in the Dominican Republic. Because of near famine in parts of the country, the government has had to feed 600,000 people for about 6 months. The government of Haiti is unable to remedy the situation alone. The Foreign Minister turned to Minister Desinor and asked him to add to the presentation.

Minister Desinor repeated that the country is unable on its own resources to come out of its dire economic plight. Haiti needs outside

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Confidential. Drafted by Hemba and DeSeabra, and approved in S on October 19. The memorandum is part I of II.

help, and he wondered how the United States could assist. Minister Desinor also suggested that it might be in order for the United Nations Special Fund to supply economic assistance because of the decline in income from coffee.

The Secretary replied that he would explore the possible applicability of the UN Special Fund in the Haitian situation. The Secretary added that the Inter-American Development Bank with our concurrence is already studying the initiation of a number of educational projects for Haiti.

Minister Desinor suggested that the projects under consideration by the Inter-American Development Bank are more social in nature, whereas the most urgent need of the country is for economic development. He dwelt on economic development as a fundamental, pressing need. He then referred to Haiti's requests for U.S. assistance as outlined in two recent letters to President Johnson, one delivered to our Ambassador in Port-au-Prince and the other delivered to our Chief of Protocol. Minister Desinor suggested that social progress that is not accompanied or backed by economic development may become a serious burden on the country.

The Secretary mentioned that in the past we had had some differences, not strictly political, but more in the nature of administrative problems in carrying out our aid activities in Haiti. The Secretary suggested that perhaps we should have a fresh start, a new look, on both sides, through frank and private discussions. The Secretary said that, speaking frankly to good friends, it was a matter of concern to him that Haiti, an important country in the Western hemisphere and situated so near to the world's richest market, had such a low standard of living and had made virtually no economic progress during his tenure as Secretary of State. What is needed is statesmanship of the highest order to identify and remove the obstacles to progress, to assist the Haitian people to move into the modern world. At times matters become too entangled at the highest level, and perhaps a more down-to-earth approach, say, for instance, meeting the problems of a particular village, would help. Somehow there must be found a way to light up the imagination of the Haitian people to do more on their own with what is available, with their own resources. For instance, professional Haitians, such as doctors, who go off to other countries where individual opportunities are greater, might be encouraged to stay home and devote their talents to their own people. Haiti probably would find an affectionate interest in the hemisphere in its efforts to improve conditions.

Minister Desinor said that Haiti appreciated the understanding which the Secretary displayed, and his country would like very much to pursue discussions along this line with the United States. He added that while it was important to work from the people up it was even

more essential to provide the people with much needed jobs, food and health facilities. Minister Desinor again emphasized that the fundamental problems of his country derive from economic stagnation, and he said that an injection of dollars into the economy is needed.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that the two countries would continue discussions on this general subject.

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**348. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 21, 1965.

SUBJECT

Recommended Response to President Duvalier's Letter to the President

*Discussion:*

There is attached (Tab B) a translation of a letter of August 12 to the President from President Duvalier of Haiti, and a recommended response to be signed by you (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

Duvalier's rambling six-page letter appears intended to prompt an offer of renewed US military assistance and to remind the President that we have not acted favorably on an earlier letter, received in June,<sup>3</sup> requesting resumption of large-scale economic aid (except for a verbal acknowledgment by Ambassador Timmons no reply was made to the June letter). Although the letter of August 12 proposes that Duvalier and the President "have a meeting", the context indicates fairly clearly that Duvalier is willing to view the proposed meeting as spiritual and figurative rather than physical.

I believe that the President should not sign a letter to Duvalier. Any communication from the President—however innocuous—might

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL HAITI-US. Secret. Drafted by Maureen Harris (ARA/CAR).

<sup>2</sup> Tabs A and B are attached, but not printed. At Tab B was the "confidential" letter which, according to a handwritten note file with the translation of Duvalier's letter, indicates it was hand delivered by the Haitian Ambassador to Chief of Protocol Lloyd Hand for the President and delivered to the White House on September 16. (Johnson Library, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Haiti—Duvalier Correspondence)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the "administrative" letter; see Document 344.

receive publicity which we would prefer to avoid. While I do not discount the possibility that Duvalier might react strongly to this apparent “brush off” of his overtures to the President, I believe that it is unlikely that his annoyance will take any overt form. As you know, Haiti’s chronic economic problems have reached new proportions and there are indications that Duvalier feels that he cannot afford any action that might affect Haiti’s standing with the USG or the international agencies from which he also hopes to gain assistance. Even though I am now reviewing our position in Haiti to determine whether there are some areas in which we might be able to offer some accommodation to Duvalier, I believe it would be unwise to delay further our reply to his letter.

*Recommendation:*<sup>4</sup>

I suggest that you sign the attached letter to Duvalier (Tab A).

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<sup>4</sup> A handwritten note by Bromley Smith filed with the translation of Duvalier’s letter cited in footnote 2 above indicates that “reply is to come from Secretary not President.”

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### **349. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Port-au-Prince, October 21, 1965, 2242Z.

220. For Asst Secy Vaughn and Amb Stewart, ARA/CAR.

1. Following updating of my views on USG policy toward Haiti may be timely in context both of Dept’s current consideration of what USG reply, if any, should be made to Duvalier’s letters to President of June 3 and Aug 12,<sup>2</sup> and of Secretary’s talk in NY Oct 8 with Ministers Chalmers and Desinor.<sup>3</sup> (June 3 letter contains direct request for resumption USG economic assistance; Aug 12 letter is more generalized request or hope for resumption some form US military assistance.)

2. Comments this tel of necessity highly compressed. Dept already has available Emb’s extensive analysis of Haitian situation and US pol-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 HAI–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Received at 9:26 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> For summaries of these letters, see Documents 344 and 348.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 347.

icy as they have evolved during past two years. I consider that basic US policy goal as laid down in current LAPC paper<sup>4</sup> remains entirely valid, i.e. maintenance effective USG presence (i.e. Amb and essential Emb personnel) in Haiti so as to be in position influence events when Duvalier passes from scene, and to frustrate any Communist attempt to take over before or after. Meanwhile, there other short-run policy objectives of considerable importance to US national interests here, including (a) persuading GOH to support USG positions in OAS, UN and other international orgs, (b) protection US nationals and investments in Haiti, (c) servicing GOH debts to USG and private US citizens (GOH recently resumed service on debts to Ex-Im Bank and AID). Concurrently, USG has in operation two very limited programs of assistance to Haiti (malaria eradication and Title III P.L. 480 assistance through vol agencies) which are designed benefit Haitian people directly and avoid political exploitation by Duvalier.

3. As Dept aware, GOH has acceded to all USG requests for support in last two years (see especially Emb's A-332, Feb 24).<sup>5</sup> Particularly important examples were (a) GOH support of US at 1964 MFM on Cuba, (b) at time of landing US forces in DomRep last April, and (c) subsequently at 10th MFM on DomRep. GOH has also consistently supported USG on UN items, including Chinese representation, disarmament and Article 19, and at USG request made statement in UNGA Oct 1 this year generally supporting US policy in Viet-Nam (Depcirtel 316<sup>6</sup> and Embtel 166<sup>7</sup>). Latest example of GOH support contained Embtel 216.<sup>8</sup> I need not emphasize that such support does not imply any change in character of Duvalier regime, which remains brutal and regressive dictatorship, but is motivated entirely by GOH self-interest (e.g. fear that Caamano/Bosch govt in DomRep would have allowed Haitian exiles mount operations against Haiti) and hope that GOH support of USG would lead to resumption of US economic and military assistance to Haiti. Landing of US troops in DomRep has also undoubtedly had salutary effect on Duvalier (as well as on local Communists), although some desperate act (such as firing PAP) by Duvalier in event of, say, substantial exile invasion, is always possibility (CAS htp 784).

4. I remain reasonably confident that even if USG makes no reply at all to Duvalier's two letters, he will not attempt PNG reprisals against

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 329 and 338.

<sup>5</sup> Document 338.

<sup>6</sup> To all posts, August 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S)

<sup>7</sup> Dated September 17. (Ibid.)

<sup>8</sup> Dated October 20. (Ibid., POL HAI-US)



USG presence here although he remains intensely suspicious US intentions toward him (see especially [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]).<sup>9</sup> However, he might be tempted begin withhold some of full GOH support now being accorded US policy. This connection, I assume it important that GOH continue vote with USG on unfinished DomRep business in 10th MFM. There is also upcoming Rio Conference to consider. These and other factors indicate desirability avoiding any flatly negative response (or fail to respond at all) to Duvalier's June 3 letter and indeed point to need insure maintenance low key "low-cost" dialogue with GOH, so as to keep ball in play in USG's own self-interest. Examples of items recently injected into dialogue from US side are resumption of carefully-spaced US naval visits to PAP for R and R (Deptel Wirom 71)<sup>9</sup> and USG approval in principle of GOH request Oct 8 for increase in modest Title III program (Deptel 104).<sup>10</sup>

5. Focusing these considerations down to Duvalier's June 3 letter, I recommend following approach, dealing first with substance of reply, and then form.

6. (A) Request in June 3 letter covers both bilateral USG econ assistance, and also loans from international financial institutions such as IDB.

(B) Duvalier basically wants a bilateral "injection of dollars" into Haiti by USG, e.g., general budget-supporting assistance. I remain completely opposed for several reasons. On technical side, money would simply go into pockets of regime without benefit to Haitian people, and it would be impossible for USG to control. Of even more weight is fact any such aid would constitute, and would be so interpreted in Haiti and outside, as US political support for regime. This clearly undesirable and unacceptable to USG, and to Congressional and US public opinion.

(C) However, as Dept has had in mind for some time (Deptel 694, June 25),<sup>11</sup> and as was I believe touched on by Secy in talk with Chalmers Oct 8, it seems desirable to explore with GOH whether a carefully delimited social-benefit project, to be financed indirectly with AID funds, could be undertaken, while avoiding political and administrative problems which brought almost all direct US econ assistance to Haiti to an end in 1962–63. Have in mind project whereby a US university or private foundation, with AID financing, would work with GOH on creating effective national health service (NHS). This would

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<sup>9</sup> Not found.

<sup>10</sup> Dated August 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18–9 LA)

<sup>11</sup> Actually dated June 24, not June 25. (Ibid., AID (US) HAI)

be vehicle for attacking many types medical and public health problems in Haiti, and consolidating gains from Malaria Eradication Program, now well advanced. But, most importantly, such an NHS could be vehicle for implementing a population program, if GOH decides embark on one. A response along this line would be very limited but nevertheless positive reply to a portion of June 3 letter, would serve to keep dialogue going, and might even lead to a valuable institution-building project if properly implemented and controlled. Doubt that Duvalier could get any political mileage out of it, especially if aid financing is indirect. Even if nothing came of exploratory discussions, useful time would have been gained.

(D) As regards Duvalier's request as it affects international institutions, both UNTA program and IDB either have in operation or are considering limited TA projects here with institution-building objectives. UN projects should continue, and I recommend that US Executive Director IDB be authorized approve four Haitian TA projects now under consideration. Additionally, however, to further US objectives spelled out above, there is room for some limited and carefully controlled international capital assistance to Haiti, similar to \$2.3 million water supply loan granted GOH by IDB in 1964. Therefore recommend that USG indicate informally to IDB management that US would not oppose IDB working up a sound project for, say, further loan to IDAI (which already has \$3.5 million line of credit from IDB). (Perhaps some financing for Peligre electrification could be worked out within IDAI framework.) Such loan assistance would benefit Haitian economy long after Duvalier goes, and here again I doubt it would have any significantly negative political by-products in US public opinion if way properly prepared. Water supply project seems going well under strict IDB control and not subject political exploitation by Duvalier.

(E) If USG adopts line contained foregoing subparas, we could reply to Duvalier that bilaterally USG is prepared see if worthwhile specific project could be developed. Multilaterally, we could say that USG naturally prepared have IDB consider sound Haitian projects on merits. GOH already fully aware that USG holds absolute veto over IDB loans (Fund for Special Operations) to Haiti; thus if Haiti gets a small loan for IDAI GOH will know that USG was determining factor, and this again would constitute very limited but positive reply to second aspect Duvalier's June 3 letter.

7. As regards form of US reply to two letters, I recommend against substantive written reply, on ground that Duvalier might release it publicly or otherwise exploit. This leaves following alternatives: President, or Secretary on his behalf, could send brief generalized letter, saying President has taken note of views Duvalier expressed, etc. and that there are some matters which Amb Timmons will pursue with FonMin (this picks up note on which Secy/Chalmers Oct 8 talk ended), or I

could give oral reply to Chalmers along same line. On balance I prefer brief noncommittal letter. In either case I would then begin talking to Chalmers as indicated subparas (C), (D) and (E) para 6 above and after working out careful scenario with appropriate political filling.

8. Duvalier's broad hint, in Aug 12 letter, regarding resumption US military assistance, should be ignored, and I recommend USG continue maintain strict policy of not supplying any such assistance to GOH, and of continuing frustrate Duvalier's efforts obtain arms in US or elsewhere.

9. Appreciated Dept's reaction.

10. Country Team concurs.

Timmons

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**350. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 17, 1965.

SUBJECT

Reply to Duvalier

Last June 3 and August 12 Duvalier sent the President letters asking, in effect, for renewal of U.S. economic assistance to Haiti (see attached Read-to-Bundy memo).<sup>2</sup> The August 12 letter contains highly offensive language charging that our Embassy (under Ambassador Thurston) and the MAAG worked with the Haitian armed forces to overthrow him.

After several months of delay on when and how the letters should be acknowledged, State has now suggested that the President send the brief, non-committal acknowledgement included in the attached memo.

The background to State's delay is important. From June to October they deliberately postponed answering the correspondence, first

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Haiti—Duvalier Correspondence. Confidential. A notation in Bundy's handwriting at the top of the memorandum reads: "You tell 'em [illegible] to do it your way. It's absurd to answer an August letter in December. MGB."

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

because they were awaiting the more substantive August 12 letter and after that because of the problem of Duvalier's mood. During this period, Duvalier was making noises about PNGing Ambassador Timmons. State wanted to string him along, making no commitments on assistance and avoiding giving him any pretext to act against the Embassy. In October, they decided that the situation was calm enough to reply. I advised ARA, in order to avoid the President getting involved in correspondence with Duvalier, to take advantage of his hospitalization to have Secretary Rusk reply on his behalf. They readily bought this, drafted a letter and sent it to the Seventh Floor for signature. In the Secretary's absence, the reply went to Ball. He refused to sign it because it did not take issue with the objectionable paragraphs. Then Tom Mann got into the act and he decided that a Presidential reply is necessary to avoid antagonizing Duvalier. I checked back with Tom to see how strongly he felt about this. He is still of a mind that the President should send a non-committal acknowledgement along the lines of the one suggested, avoiding any reference to the objectionable paragraphs.

My view is that we should not put the President in the position of replying to Duvalier. One reason is the long delay in answering the correspondence. Another is that I prefer not to have the President corresponding with this petty tyrant. But much more important are the highly offensive paragraphs. I don't see how the President can send a letter ignoring the charges. And if he replies rejecting them, we run the serious risk of Duvalier reacting against our Embassy, which it is in our interest to prevent.

I think that the nature of Duvalier's charges and the language used are such that State could have declined to accept the August letter on delivery. If it had done so, however, it probably would have produced the Duvalier reaction that we wanted to avoid. But perhaps now the paragraphs offer an escape hatch.

I would recommend no written reply, either from here or from State. I would have Allan Stewart or Jack Vaughn call in the Haitian Ambassador and tell him in very polite language that:

1. the offensive paragraphs make it very difficult for us to reply formally without taking strong issue with the charges, which we, of course, do not accept;
2. because of this, we would prefer not to have to reply as we do not believe it would further relations between our two countries;
3. perhaps the useful conversations between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Chalmers at New York and Rio<sup>3</sup> might be considered

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 347 for Rusk's conversation with Chalmers in New York. A memorandum of their conversation at the Second Special Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro on November 23 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV.

an adequate substitute; or if the GOH prefers, we would be pleased to entertain a new letter without the paragraphs in question.

If you agree on this approach, I recommend that you call Tom Mann and tell him that we would prefer to handle it in this fashion.<sup>4</sup>

**WGB**

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<sup>4</sup> A notation in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence reads: "Yes tell him." A December 20 memorandum from Bowdler to Read informed the Department of Bundy's decision. (Ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence File, Haiti—Duvalier Correspondence) A memorandum of conversation, dated January 12, 1966, reported that Vaughn informed Ambassador Theard that morning that the President had decided not to answer the two letters sent by President Duvalier because of the objectionable references in the second letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL HAI-US)

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### **351. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 5, 1966.

#### **SUBJECT**

Contingency and Policy Planning on Haiti

Our present contingency plans for Haiti are currently valid. The longer Duvalier remains in power, however, the less will be the potential influence of Haitian exiles. In a chaotic situation even several years hence, these exiles could provide some personnel for a provisional government, but forming a permanent stable government from exiles will be most difficult if Duvalier remains in power another year or more. To form the basis of a stable successor government, therefore, we will have to rely largely upon Haitians who remain in Haiti, including those presently in Duvalier's entourage.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 HAI-US. Secret. Drafted by Osborne (ARA/CAR). A note in Mann's handwriting in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "Jack—Hope you will have a talk with the Secy soon about Haiti on a) your plans for CARE, the Israelis, possibly the Mexicans, Venezuelans, and Colombians and b) the possibility of a US base of some kind."

Our review of the Haitian situation suggests a need to shift our tactics in an attempt to build some assets in Haiti. We believe this should be done indirectly through an expansion of U.S. voluntary agency programs, the Inter-American Bank, etc. A revised LAPC paper is being prepared.<sup>2</sup>

If one or more members of Duvalier's regime prove unable to seize and hold power following Duvalier's departure from office, an extended period of anarchy and chaos is likely to result, inviting a Communist bid for power. In order to restore law and order no effective means other than intervention with U.S. military forces would be available to us unless by that time a permanent Inter-American Peace Force had been organized and made ready to function promptly. We doubt that an IAPF will be effective in time for a Haitian crisis and consequently the present contingency plans in this respect remain applicable.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 352.

<sup>3</sup> A January 25 memorandum from Vaughn to Mann reported that a new contingency plan for Haiti was being drafted. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 HAI-US)

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### 352. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs for the Latin American Policy Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 19, 1966.

#### POLICY AND ACTION PAPER FOR HAITI

##### I. Assessment of Current Situation

###### A. Background

###### 1. Political

After declaring himself "president for life" in 1964 Duvalier has consolidated his control of Haiti by eliminating or terrorizing all actual and visible opposition to his rule.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 209, Latin American Policy Committee Folder. Secret. The paper was approved by the Committee on January 19; see Document 353.

Duvalier has not recently committed so many atrocities against Haitians and foreign residents of Haiti as he did earlier in his regime, probably because there is less identifiable opposition to him than in the past and because he wishes to improve his image abroad. Extortion, corruption, and brutality still characterize his government, however, and the general economic situation has reached new lows.

The Haitian Government has cooperated with the United States on issues arising in the OAS, the UN and other international forums, but this is apparently based upon the hope of eliciting foreign economic assistance rather than an identification with U.S. objectives.

In July 1965 a group of Haitian exiles began broadcasting to Haiti in Creole from Station WRUL in New York City. Listener interest has been greater than anticipated and through the station's efforts the Haitian people have performed a few acts demonstrating their opposition to Duvalier and support of the exile group but exposing the demonstrators to a minimum of retaliation. The exiles estimate, probably correctly, that Haitians believe the broadcasts are a prelude to a foreign-based operation to overthrow Duvalier, but if such an operation does not take place within six to nine months listener interest will decline and the latent non-marxist opposition within Haiti will disappear. The exiles also believe that if Duvalier remains in power another year few exiles will maintain an active interest in Haitian affairs and there will be no pro-West exile group capable of assuming power upon Duvalier's departure.

Haitian Communist parties are in complete disarray following Duvalier's arrest of a number of Haitian Communist leaders in July 1965 and the voluntary exile of others. Communist intellectual influence continues to increase, particularly among Haitian youths and intellectuals. There are unconfirmed reports of Communist training schools in the Cayes area, but it is unlikely that any significant amount of organized Communist activity can be conducted in Duvalier's police state.

In view of the weakness of opposition to Duvalier a successor regime will most likely be composed of one or more of Duvalier's lieutenants. If, however, Duvalier's lieutenants fight for power among themselves chaos could result which would invite a Communist bid for power.

Our Embassy at Port-au-Prince has been successful in avoiding clashes with the Duvalier regime and in executing its two-year-old mission of maintaining its presence and preventing the expulsion of its personnel. It has not been appreciably successful in influencing key elements of Haitian society except the press and the business, religious and diplomatic communities. As a result of Duvalier's pressure upon Haitians, United States personnel have limited contact with civilian

and military officials, youth, labor, peasants, students, teachers, intellectuals and other groups most likely to provide the future leadership of Haiti.

[Omitted here are sections on economic, social, cultural, and security.]

## II. Policy Objectives and Lines of Action—International Relations Political

### A. General Objective

Haitian understanding, acceptance and support for United States foreign policy objectives.

#### 1. Specific Short-Term Objective

Continued support by Haiti for United States objectives in the United Nations, the Organization of American States and other international organizations.

#### *Lines of Action*

a. Urge the acceptance of United States objectives through personal contacts with Haitian officials, emphasizing the basis for United States positions as well as urging Haitian support for them.

b. Through public media and in contact with business, youth, religious, university and other leaders of Haitian society, publicize United States positions on key international issues and the bases for them.

#### 2. Specific Short-Term Objective

Encourage the Haitian Government to develop and use generally recognized instruments and methods in the conduct of its foreign relations.

#### *Lines of Action*

a. Encourage Duvalier to use normal diplomatic and other recognized channels in his dealings with the United States and international agencies and discourage his use of unofficial intermediaries.

b. Discourage visits to Haiti by high-ranking officials of the United States unless such visits are clearly in the national interest and specifically coordinated with the activities of our Embassy at Port-au-Prince.

c. If Duvalier should again take reprisals against United States personnel in Haiti or attempt to use Haiti's votes in international gatherings improperly to his advantage, insure that such actions prove clearly unproductive from his point of view.



Economic

*B. General Objective*

A mutually advantageous economic relationship designed to promote the long-term interests of the United States.

*1. Specific Short-Term Objectives*

Increasing mutually satisfactory trade with the United States.

*Lines of Action*

a. Urge Haiti to provide improved facilities for tourists and to avoid incidents which discourage tourist travel to Haiti.

b. Assist Haiti in obtaining fair prices for its exports in international markets.

c. Encourage Haiti to diversify and improve the quality of its exports through meaningful contacts with reliable international traders.

d. Encourage American business to help Haiti in the production and export of winter vegetables, particularly from the Antibonite Valley.

e. Urge Haiti to improve its climate for productive foreign investment.

f. Approve applications for investment guaranties where such applications meet AID criteria.

g. Continue visits to Haiti by United States naval vessels, subject to advance clearance by the Embassy in each case.

*2. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Security of American lives and property in Haiti and respect for legitimate contractual obligations with American interests.

*Lines of Action*

a. Conduct appropriate representations with the Haitian Government to protect American lives and property.

b. Maintain contact with American private interests in Haiti to keep informed of their problems.

c. Maintain consular protection and related services.

d. Impress upon Haitian officials and business leaders the necessity of maintaining the sanctity of contracts and concessions under the norms of international law.

Social-Cultural

*C. General Objective*

Understanding among all segments of the Haitian public of American culture and institutions.

### *1. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Widely disseminated information on American domestic and foreign problems and progress in resolving them.

#### *Lines of Action*

a. Continue present USIS information and cultural programs, targeting them not only towards urban educated groups but to potential leaders among the peasants, labor and students.

b. Increase our facilities for teaching English and other cultural center activities in order to influence the younger generation and the intellectuals towards American ideals and objectives.

c. Encourage Haitian youth to develop a knowledge of the principles and methods of the Alliance for Progress and their relevance to Haiti.

d. Publicize the progress being made by and in behalf of American negroes in the United States.

### Security

#### *D. General Objective*

A Haitian society opposed to Communist influence, maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries and capable of self defense against external aggression and internal subversion directed from abroad.

### *1. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Effective countering of any attempts to subvert the Haitian Government by direct action from abroad.

#### *Lines of Action*

a. Maintain continuing close observation of activity in the two small Communist groups in Haiti, seek the elimination of pro-Communist members of the Haitian Government and counter other forms of Communist influence in Haiti.

b. Disassociate the United States from any exile attempt to invade Haiti or any exile plot against Duvalier except under extreme provocation.

c. Maintain close surveillance over Haitian, Cuban and other exile groups to prevent the illegal use of United States territory to launch an attempt to overthrow Duvalier.

### *2. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Increased Haitian resistance to any extension of influence over its internal or external policies by the USSR, Cuba or other Communist countries.

*Lines of Action*

a. Discourage Haiti from extending its political or economic relationships with the Soviet Bloc (Poland is the only Bloc country with which Haiti maintains diplomatic relations).

b. Watch carefully for any signs that Haiti has any type of contact with Cuba and move immediately to urge the Haitian Government to cut off any such contacts.

c. Continue dissemination of anti-Communist information among literate Haitians through cultural centers and missionary organizations as well as through mass media.

d. Persuade the people of Haiti, especially youth and intellectuals, that communism is a system incompatible with their own legitimate aspirations and that Cuba is the focal point of Communist danger in the Western Hemisphere.

*3. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Encourage normal relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

*Lines of Action*

a. Encourage the Haitian Government to maintain its present neutral attitude toward the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic.

b. Persuade the Haitian Government to move toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic when an elected government has taken office there.

*4. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Prepare and maintain on a current basis plans for possible implementation upon the departure of Duvalier from the Presidency.

*Lines of Action*

a. Keep up to date United States plans for Emergency and Evacuation actions as well as plans designed to restore order in Port-au-Prince and Haiti's other important population centers. These plans might include possible use of our IAPF units in the Dominican Republic to secure the Haiti–Dominican Republic frontier in cooperation with Dominican forces, intense surveillance of the sea and airspace between Haiti and Cuba and between Haiti and other Caribbean islands, and the provision of emergency medical and food relief to the Haitian civilian population.

b. Until the OAS establishes a mechanism for dealing with anarchy and chaos in hemispheric countries, conduct continuing discussions with influential and receptive OAS member countries regarding the current situation in Haiti and plans for dealing with possible con-

tingencies that might arise in Haiti. We would hope to elicit the cooperation and support of these countries, particularly when formal OAS action is desired.

c. Continue to maintain contact with Haitian exiles who might be useful in a severe crisis in Haiti without encouraging them to believe that they are the chosen instruments of the United States.

### III. Policy Objectives and Lines of Action—Internal

#### Political

##### *A. General Objective*

A Haitian political system, non-Communist in orientation, with prospects for development along democratic lines and providing for the regular, orderly transfer of political power.

##### *1. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Influence of the Duvalier government in any move, however slight, toward a more democratic outlook and a lessening of its repression of the people.

##### *Lines of Action*

a. Seek opportunities for a substantive dialogue and meaningful contacts with officials of the Haitian Government, as part of the process of arriving at a level of mutual accommodation which will best promote United States interests and objectives.

b. Continue the present USIS information and cultural program and encourage United States mass media to report frequently and accurately on Haiti.

c. Disseminate through mass media, books, periodicals and personal contact descriptions of democratic societies and free social and economic systems.

d. Continue book presentation program among Haitian opinion leaders.

##### *2. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Build resources for our relations with any future government and our ability to influence it.

##### *Lines of Action*

a. Develop contacts with such potential leaders as may be identifiable among Haitian youth, intellectuals, students, labor, peasants, and military and civilian officials.

b. Promote low-cost book, magazine and pamphlet distribution preferably in French and directed towards Haitian youth and intellectuals.

Economic

*B. General Objective*

A healthy Haitian economy with self-sustained growth providing increasing standards of living for all elements of its population.

*1. Specific Short-Term Objective*

The establishment and maintenance of sound monetary and fiscal policies and practices by the Haitian Government.

*Lines of Action*

a. Support the IMF in its efforts to balance the Haitian budget, maintain the convertibility of the gourde and amortize the Haitian internal and external debt (including payments to private American citizens, Eximbank, AID, etc.).

b. Encourage the Haitian Government to modernize its customs and tax collection services with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund or another appropriate international agency.

c. Continue to urge through CIAP and other economic assistance agencies the incorporation of all the Haitian Government's collections and expenditures into its regular budget system.

d. Refrain from granting emergency or budget-supporting assistance to Haiti in the absence of some overriding consideration of political expediency.

*2. Specific Short-Term Objective*

A meaningful Haitian development program achieving a maximum of self help in its implementation but avoiding support to the Duvalier regime.

*Lines of Action*

a. Make clear to the Haitian Government that its economic development program and other self-help plans, by means of which Haiti would participate in the Alliance for Progress, should be evaluated by the CIAP, and, if Haiti is found eligible for AFP assistance, the Government of Haiti should look primarily to the Inter-American Development Bank and other lending organizations.

b. Insist that the Haitian Government refrain from improper interference in Haitian development agencies such as IDAI (Agricultural and Industrial Development Institute) and CAMEP (Port-au-Prince water supply project), suspending disbursement of loan funds if necessary to achieve this end.

c. Make necessary representations to protect legitimate American investment in Haiti from harassment and intimidation by Haitian officials and their agents.

d. Defer resumption of large-scale, government-to-government assistance until Haiti has made the necessary administrative and fiscal reforms and has demonstrated its readiness to cooperate fully in the development activities of international organizations.

### Social-Cultural

#### *C. General Objective*

A unified Haitian society, free of racial antagonism, with equal opportunity for the members of all classes and undivided by language barriers.

##### *1. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Identification of educated Haitians with the needs and aspirations of the Haitian masses.

##### *Lines of Action*

a. Convince Haitian leaders that Haiti's economic future depends upon the ability of the Haitian peasantry to produce for market, purchase goods and pay taxes.

b. Encourage a university or foundation to study means of teaching large numbers of Haitian peasants the elements of the French language.

c. Stimulate greater acceptance of Fulbright Exchange Professors in Haitian universities, including professors in the social sciences and the humanities.

##### *2. Specific Short-Term Objective*

A healthy, vigorous Haitian population, consistent in size to the country's economic potential.

##### *Lines of Action*

a. Continue United States financing of the Malaria Eradication Program and provide the assistance required to carry on effective malaria controls after the present program is completed.

b. Encourage and assist religious and charitable agencies to conduct programs at the community level in health, sanitation, nutrition, education and family planning, commencing with a pilot program conducted by one or more of the voluntary agencies operating in Haiti.

c. Urge the Haitian Government to conduct similar programs in health, sanitation, nutrition, and planned parenthood, using its own resources and any assistance international organizations are prepared to provide.

d. Encourage international organizations, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Special Fund, to

develop and finance sound projects in health, education, nutrition and agriculture that do not support the Duvalier regime.

*3. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Haitian communities capable of identifying and solving local problems through joint action.

*Lines of Action*

a. Encourage and assist American charitable agencies to conduct community development programs in Haiti utilizing surplus agricultural commodities for self-help projects in housing, small-scale agricultural projects, street and road maintenance and similar community projects.

b. Encourage and if necessary assist third countries such as Israel to establish and operate community development and agricultural activities in Haiti.

c. Encourage and assist American universities, foundations and charities to assign young people to Haiti to assist in community development programs.

d. Stimulate private groups and third countries to undertake humanitarian programs in Haiti, particularly hospitals, clinics, schools, cooperatives, marketing, credit, agriculture and the like.

e. Encourage one or more private foundations to provide supplies, equipment, and technical assistance which are required in community development activities by the charitable agencies concerned but which are beyond their limited resources.

*4. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Improved technical and professional education for Haitian youth, particularly promising rural young people.

*Lines of Action*

a. Encourage the Inter-American Development Bank and other international organizations to develop and finance projects in agronomy, medicine, veterinary medicine, university and professional education.

b. Encourage private agencies or an American foundation to reactivate the 4-S (4-H) movement in Haiti.

c. Urge the Haitian Government to use its own resources to rehabilitate the farm extension program.

Security

*D. General Objective*

Haitian security forces capable of maintaining law and order in accordance with modern police concepts.

*1. Specific Short-Term Objective*

The development of a professional army oriented to control by a democratic constitutional government.

*Lines of Action*

a. Encourage the Haitian military to accept police functions as its primary mission until the economy of the country can support more ambitious missions.

*2. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Amelioration of Duvalier's repressive security apparatus and effective controls over the secret police.

*Lines of Action*

a. Continue to oppose and frustrate Duvalier's attempts to purchase arms in other countries.

b. Defer the reestablishment of a military mission in Haiti, deny any further United States military assistance to the Duvalier regime and avoid identification with the personnel of Duvalier's repressive security apparatus.

c. Urge Duvalier to eliminate the excesses of his security forces as necessary to improve his image abroad, the chief obstacle to increased foreign assistance, private investment and tourism.

*3. Specific Short-Term Objective*

Better understanding of the political forces at work in Haiti and the part played by Haitian exiles.

a. Strengthen our reporting capabilities in Haiti to insure that we will have adequate information available to us in a crisis situation.

b. Continue discreet contacts with Haitians outside the Government and with those in exile in order to attempt to build up assets for the future.



### 353. Draft Contingency Plan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 29, 1966.

#### HAITI CONTINGENCY PLAN

##### *I. Introduction*

1. The LAPC paper, approved January 19, 1966,<sup>2</sup> sets forth the current situation in Haiti and the bases for the assumptions made in this contingency paper. It also sets forth some actions which prepare for contingencies described in this paper, including:

- a. Accelerated efforts to broaden our contacts in Haiti in order to influence potential successors to Duvalier.
- b. An intensified effort to obtain greater information on personalities and power relationships within Duvalier's entourage.
- c. Regular consultations with the representatives of selected members of the OAS to exchange ideas on the current situation and possible actions to be taken in contingencies. Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico will soon be consulted.
- d. Continued contact with non-Communist Haitian exiles.
- e. Encouragement to United States press and other mass media to report frequently and impartially on Haiti in order to influence Duvalier and the members of his entourage to the extent possible.

2. In addition, US agencies will prepare and keep up-to-date lists of persons with experience in Haiti from which to select persons to serve on temporary duty in a crisis situation.

3. In the existing situation, it is not possible to identify clearly the competing groups that may emerge when Duvalier falls. Lists are available of possible Haitian successors from the military, the VSN, civilian politicians and other potential power groups.

##### *II. United States Objectives in Haiti*

1. The United States should insure that a non-Communist government is established in Haiti and preferably a government that will permit the orderly political, economic and social progress of the country.

The U.S. would prefer a successor government that:

- a. Is able to gain and maintain effective control of the country.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263. Secret. Forwarded under an April 29 covering memorandum for consideration at the May 3 meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). The paper indicates it was the third draft; see footnote 3, Document 351.

<sup>2</sup> Document 352.

- b. Governs with the minimum recourse to violence and repression.
- c. Takes effective steps to begin to improve the economic and social life of the country.
- d. Continues to cooperate with the United States and other non-Communist countries on international issues.
- e. Accepts the international obligations of Haiti.
- f. Takes effective measures to eliminate any Communist influences.
- g. Commits itself to restore representative government.

2. On the other hand, the US might have to accept a government that is able to maintain effective control of the country and is non-Communist.

### *III. The Problem*

1. a. When Duvalier leaves the presidency of Haiti, whether by voluntary departure, death, or forceful overthrow, the United States will want to influence the character of a successor government.

b. If Duvalier loses control of the situation in the country, the U.S. might be required to take action to stabilize conditions and obtain an acceptable successor government.

c. If a Cuban-based group entered the country while Duvalier was in power the U.S. would also want to take action to stabilize conditions and obtain an acceptable successor government.

### *IV. Assumptions*

1. There is not at present an effective force in Haiti prepared to overthrow Duvalier. However, disaffection of key followers might result in his loss of control of the country with anarchy a result. Given the lack of an effective internal or external opposition, Duvalier may be succeeded at least initially by one or more persons close to the center of power, including the military, no matter how his departure from office takes place.

2. A struggle for power among two or more groups within the Duvalier regime may also occur. If long continued, this struggle could result in chaos and a power vacuum that would invite Communist exploitation.

3. There is no exile group, Communist or non-Communist, capable of eliminating the Duvalier government without transport and logistical support from third countries.

4. No third country will invade Haiti except under the most extreme provocation. Despite the known strength and determination of United States military power in the Caribbean and the limited value of dominating a country so poor and disorganized as Haiti, a Cuban supported invasion using trained Haitian exiles is a possibility. The Dominican Republic, the only other nearby country capable of mounting

a successful invasion, is likely to be so concerned with its domestic problems that it will not mount nor permit a serious invasion effort during the foreseeable future.

5. Communist countries would like to exercise strong influence over any new government of Haiti and can be expected to promote internal chaos if they are unable to exercise such influence.

6. In a power vacuum or a chaotic situation in Haiti, the lives of American citizens and other foreign nationals would be threatened.

#### *V. Summary of Contingencies*

A.1. Duvalier falls: An acceptable individual or group immediately assumes control of the country.

2. Acceptable members of Duvalier's entourage, being close to the source of power, might easily assume power. They would be likely to want an early accommodation with the United States.

B.1. Duvalier falls: An unacceptable non-Communist individual or group quickly assumes control of the country.

2. Our actions in this case would be designed to promote the establishment of an acceptable government by measures short of military action. If acts of violence against American lives occur, E & E action would be required.

C.1. Duvalier falls: Chaos follows; a struggle for power ensues between non-Communist groups.

D.1. Duvalier falls: Chaos follows; a struggle ensues between two or more groups, one of which is dominated by the Communists or is otherwise unacceptable.

2. In Contingencies B, C and D United States actions will depend in large measure on the nature and extent of the civil disorder. These Contingencies offer a chance for effective OAS actions in a Haitian crisis. For Contingency D, United States action will, of course, depend on the nature and strength of Communist involvement.

E.1. Duvalier falls: An individual or group in Haiti controlled by Communists quickly assumes control of the country.

2. Should this contingency present itself, the U.S. would take decisive action to install an acceptable government in its place.

F.1. Duvalier remains in office: though anarchy and chaos result, no group moves to take power.

G.1. Duvalier remains in office: A Cuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts to invade.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the plan comprising 27 pages of courses of action spread sheets and 16 pages of annexes, covering memoranda, and briefing papers.]

**354. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1966.

SUBJECT

SIG Meeting: Haitian Contingency Paper

The situation in Haiti has "stabilized" itself again after the plotting of three weeks ago. But conditions continue to be sufficiently unstable to make a sudden upheaval a possibility at any time. Ambassador Timmons is coming from Port-au-Prince today to give the SIG the latest estimate.

The contingency paper before the SIG is an incomplete and not very lucid draft.<sup>2</sup> The most important annexes (explained below) are missing. The paper itself was prepared according to a pre-determined standard format dictated by an IBM approach to problems and suffers from all the corresponding rigidities. My efforts to have papers tailored to individual country situations have foundered on bureaucratic requirements levied on ARA by higher authority.

The paper's principal value is that it identifies the various ways which the ball might bounce if Duvalier falls or a serious effort to dislodge him materializes. In trying to anticipate specific Latin American and Communist reactions to various contingencies and prescribe fixed courses of action, the paper is unrealistic, although there is some utility in at least thinking through the possibilities. What we do in a given situation will depend upon the circumstances prevailing at the time which may be quite different from those anticipated in the paper.

In the IRG/ARA review of this paper, I insisted on the preparation of three annexes which should be kept up to date:

- a. list of US personnel with Haitian expertise who could be used in Haiti or Washington in a crisis situation.
- b. list of acceptable Haitians in Haiti or in exile whom we could tap to man a provisional government.
- c. list of immediate economic measures which we could take following the fall of Duvalier to quiet unrest, buttress the provisional government and get the economy moving again.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 6th Mtg., 4/19/66, Vol. I. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 353.

As you and I discussed earlier, these three lists, plus the military contingency plans, are the guts of realistic planning in that they will enable us to act with maximum speed in any situation.

The IRG agreed to include all three lists as annexes. They are in various stages of preparation but none ready to be included in the package which the SIG will consider tomorrow.

I recommend that at the SIG you take this position:

1. The SIG should take note of the paper as a useful planning document.<sup>3</sup>

2. The SIG should ask IRG/ARA to:

a) complete the annexes and keep them up to date as a matter of top priority.

b) revise the paper to make explicit references to the annexes and relate them to the corresponding sections of the paper.

**WGB**

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<sup>3</sup> A Record of Agreements and Decisions of the SIG meeting of May 3 reported that the Group considered the draft contingency plans on Haiti and agreed that, if possible, the United States should avoid placing its forces in Haiti for any purpose other than rapid evacuation of U.S. and certain other citizens, and that the contingency plans should not be discussed with other members of the OAS. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 6th Mtg., 4/19/66, Vol. I)

355. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 19, 1966.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ecuadorean ex-President Galo Plaza<sup>2</sup>

Ellsworth Bunker, Bob Sayre and I met with Galo Plaza last Friday to have his impressions and recommendations on Haiti from where he had just come.<sup>3</sup>

His impressions were:

—Duvalier is strongly entrenched with a highly personalized system of control and the chances of a palace coup or popular uprising are virtually nil.

—He might die from natural causes or assassination, in which case Haiti will be plunged into a blood bath because there is no institutional structure.

—The deterioration of the economy and the poverty and misery of the people is appalling.

—The unwillingness of the U.S. to pump more resources into Haiti is understandable but it really works to Duvalier's advantage since in the Haitian milieu he does better in isolation.

—The hemisphere for humanitarian reasons cannot stand idly by and permit the plight of the Haitian people to worsen because of Duvalier.

—The OAS cannot survive another U.S. unilateral intervention and we should get the Latin Americans thinking in terms of collective action *now*.

Galo Plaza recommended that the OAS furnish and administer through a special mission in Haiti assistance in the educational, agricultural and other fields. All activities would be under the direct

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of Bill Moyers, Haiti. Secret. A copy was sent to Moyers.

<sup>2</sup> President of Ecuador 1948–1952, Ambassador to the United States 1944–1946, and a UN diplomatic troubleshooter in Lebanon, the Congo, and Cyprus during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Galo Plaza visited Haiti to assess appropriate International Development Bank and OAS assistance for that country. In May 1968 he became the fourth Secretary General of the OAS.

<sup>3</sup> Telegrams 261, 262, and 263 from Port-au-Prince, all September 13, reported details of Galo Plaza's September 8–12 trip to Haiti. The first telegram reported on his meetings with Duvalier and Chalmers, and the latter two on his discussions with Timmons about Haiti's perilous political situation and the need for United States and IDB assistance. (All in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 ECUADOR)

supervision of the OAS mission so that Duvalier and his henchmen could not get their hands in the till. He thought that under the guise of property watchmen the OAS could put as many as 200 armed men into the country. The mission would constitute an OAS presence which would facilitate OAS collective action when Duvalier goes and chaos follows. All of this would, of course, be subject to getting Duvalier to invite the OAS in and accept OAS control conditions. He said he thought this possible and he would be willing to work on Duvalier to bring it about.

Bunker Sayre and I reacted favorably to his proposal. I told Galo Plaza that I was not as sanguine as he on the OAS aid presence facilitating *rapid* political decision-making in the OAS for collective action to put forces in Haiti to avert bloodshed. I suggested an add-on to his proposal in the form of a prior understanding among the American governments (worked out informally on a foreign office-to-foreign office basis and *not* through the OAS) that when the lid blows in Haiti, the OAS machinery will be brought into play immediately and the necessary decisions on collective action taken without delay. Galo Plaza thought this might be acceptable and in any event should be tried.

We indicated that his proposal would be carefully examined.

WGBowdler<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears the typed signature.

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### 356. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

SecDel/MC/25

New York, September 24, 1966, 3:30 p.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
New York, September–October 1966

SUBJECT

Bilateral Relations

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL HAI-US. Confidential. Drafted by Cates and approved in S on September 28. The meeting was held in the Waldorf-Astoria Towers.

## PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The Secretary  
John M. Cates, Jr.—USUN

*Foreign*

H.E. Mr. Rene Chalmers,  
Foreign Minister of Haiti

Foreign Minister Chalmers opened the conversation by referring to the recent meetings in Washington on August 22 and 23 between the Haitian Ambassador and representatives of CIAP and the State Department, at which it was announced Haiti was ineligible for Alliance for Progress Aid.<sup>2</sup> He then referred to a recent meeting in Port-au-Prince attended by Ambassador Timmons and Chalmers and his Deputy at which various high officials of Haiti were accused of disturbing the good atmosphere of Haitian-American relationships. Chalmers stated that he had prepared a special Memorandum with relation to these problems with answers to the charges which he wished to present to the Secretary. (Memorandum being pouched separately.)<sup>3</sup> Chalmers then went on to state that Haiti very badly needed help, particularly in connection with the development of infrastructure, such as roads and dams. However, Haiti's request for assistance had been denied, particularly the request with regard to the dam at Peligre (phonetic). The United States had, however, offered technical assistance on certain minor programs such as community development, rural education and birth control (as recorded, although Chalmers could have intended "malaria control"). Haiti was grateful for the aid in these minor areas. However, Haiti feared that the failure to receive help in basic development projects would mean that the already large gap between Haiti and the other Latin American countries would increase with the result that Haiti would eventually become a burden for the whole continent.

Chalmers then referred to the discussions last year with regard to a small loan from the IDB for social needs such as elementary schools. Though this was a minor program, even this had been blocked. Chalmers recalled the generous offer of help made by the Secretary last October 8 in conversation with Chalmers and Minister Dessinor. He recalled the Secretary's statement of amazement that Haiti was still so poor although so close to a major market area, the United States.

Chalmers recounted a conversation he had had with ex-President Galo Plaza of Ecuador<sup>4</sup> who had expressed the view that the great

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<sup>2</sup> Telegrams 33460 and 33747 to Port-au-Prince, August 23, reported these meetings. (Both *ibid.*, AID (AFP) 3 ECOSOC-IA)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Telegrams 261 and 262 from Port-au-Prince, September 13, reported this conversation. (Both National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 ECUADOR)



powers must aid Haiti. The Secretary interjected to say that he recently had a conversation with Mr. Galo Plaza.<sup>5</sup>

Chalmers then stated that President Duvalier had agreed in order to obtain Alliance for Progress Aid to turn over (in French he said literally “abandon control of”) the management of approved projects to appropriate international agencies. Haiti will try this approach when next it comes to the United States for assistance. Haiti was prepared to turn over this delegation of authority to an international organization “for the period of capital amortization” (it is not too clear exactly what period of time Chalmers had in mind unless it was the time necessary to amortize the loan). Chalmers then went on to describe some negotiations the Haitian Government had had two years ago with General Electric Corporation which was about ready to agree to the project if it could itself take over the management of the Berique Dam project. Haiti wished to start again its negotiations with General Electric and carry them through to fruition. Haiti’s intention was that the management of the project would be turned over to General Electric in order to obtain agreement. Chalmers realized this was a private not a government project but he wished to inform the Secretary of Haiti’s intent to renew these discussions.

Chalmers then referred to the population explosion in Haiti which he estimated would result in an increase in population from 4.5 million to 8 or 9 million by 1980. If the Haitian Government did not do something such as complete the Peligre Dam project which would help raise the subsistence level, it would have a terrible problem on its hands.

Chalmers then went into a discussion of the situation of an unnamed Western European country whose policies (presumably political and social) the United States did not like and to which it had accordingly refused aid. When the United States changed its outlook towards this country, and the country received aid, it began to make progress in every area and “even liberalized its government”. Yet this government, he pointed out, had been one of the most backward. (Chalmers never did define which government he meant but the implication of a comparison with Haiti was clear.)

The Secretary then replied by recalling his personal esteem for Foreign Minister Chalmers and asked whether he might speak freely, saying he would leave it to Chalmers how much he would tell his government. When Chalmers expressed the hope that the Secretary would so speak, the Secretary stated he was very much interested in the possibility that Haiti might accept the concept of independent manage-

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<sup>5</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

ment for some AID projects. He said he had discussed the Haitian problem personally with other Latin American Foreign Ministers, all of whom were concerned with the development gap between Haiti and the other countries of the hemisphere. (Chalmers here interjected that "it was not a gap but an abyss".) The Secretary continued, saying that if he might he would like to speak bluntly: "The position of the Haitian people was a scandal and a problem in the hemisphere". He considered that Haiti presented a problem as urgent as any in the hemisphere including Cuba. The concern of both the Secretary and his colleagues was how the United States or the Latin American countries might move to improve the situation. The Secretary said he did not want to embarrass the Foreign Minister but there existed, in fact, a disposition to help the Haitian people if we, and others, could be assured that the people themselves would be the recipients of the aid. There had been some unhappy experiences in the past. Chalmers indicated he would like to discuss this point. The Secretary then reiterated the deep concern in the hemisphere, and he used the term hemisphere to include institutions as well as governments, with the situation of the Haitian people, a preoccupation with raising their standard of living and of education. For example, said the Secretary, the governments of Chile, Mexico and Venezuela were deeply concerned about doing something for the Haitian people. They wished to help in such a way as not to run into political difficulties and not to be hampered in their efforts. There was no intent, however, that in working with the people they would engage in plots or conspiracies. Chalmers acknowledged his certainty that the United States had no such intent. The Secretary again repeated his desire to find some way to be sure all the efforts would go to the Haitian people.

The Secretary then referred back to the Memorandum presented to him by Chalmers, saying that he would study it carefully. He expressed the hope that whatever might be done for the people could be insulated from political considerations to be sure that the people themselves might benefit.

Chalmers replied that he would report all of this to his government "which will not find shocking the proposal that some programs of AID should not be managed by the Haitian Government".

The Secretary continued that Haiti caused him to lose a great deal of sleep pointing out it was not only the difficulties in Haiti but also the difficulties with various organs of the United States Government which were bothered about the Haitian problem.

Chalmers then asked whether he might write personally to the Secretary on some of these matters. The Secretary replied in the affirmative but urged that Chalmers use the "utmost discretion" in the interests of both of them. The Secretary repeated how much he valued

his contacts with Chalmers, contacts which he wished to continue. Therefore, he wished no events to occur which might interrupt this contact. He then expressed his high opinion of Chalmers' competence as a Foreign Minister. To this Chalmers replied that a Foreign Minister "sits on the outside". The Secretary replied that nevertheless some foreign ministers earn their pay.

Chalmers left thanking the Secretary sincerely for his consideration and leaving with him a Note and a Memorandum.

The Foreign Minister's Note transmitted:

"(1) a detailed memorandum concerning the difficulties met by the Republic of Haiti as to the aid which she might expect to receive either on a bilateral basis or under the Alliance for Progress;

"(2) a summary in French of the Memorandum; and

"(3) the English translation of the summary."

The Note and attachments (being sent under separate cover)<sup>6</sup> present a review of Haitian assistance to the United States in the international field and a detailed explanation of various cases, such as that of Dr. Berman, Dr. Shirer, Father Duplessis, Valentine Refining Corporation, etc., brought to the attention of the Haitian Government by the Department.

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<sup>6</sup> Neither the note nor its attachments has been found.

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### **357. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 5, 1966, 6:30 p.m.

#### **SUBJECT**

Current Situation in Haiti

You asked for an assessment of the situation in Haiti and the status of our contingency planning. The attached memorandum covers both matters.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Secret.

I have asked Linc<sup>2</sup> to take a hard look at Galo Plaza's proposal for expanded aid administered through an OAS Mission in Haiti. It would enable us to do more for the Haitian people than we are doing under present guidelines. We and the other hemisphere countries have a humanitarian responsibility to lessen their plight if means can be devised which ensure that the assistance goes to the people and not the Duvalier crowd. The proposal would also establish an OAS presence which might prove handy should collective action become necessary.

**WGB**

### **Attachment**

#### HAITIAN SITUATION

Duvalier continues to maintain an iron grip on Haiti. The surface appearance that he has ameliorated the ruthlessness of his regime is misleading—he has physically eliminated the opposition or driven it from the country and for the time being no one is opposing him.

The general economic and social situation continues to deteriorate. Although Haiti has maintained a reasonably sound financial situation, there has been no significant new investment in the country. Successive hurricane disasters over the last several years have also adversely affected the Haitian economy. Preliminary reports on the damage done by Hurricane Inez indicates that it has not been too serious. We are providing emergency relief.

Our ability to assist Haiti is limited. We terminated our bilateral economic programs in 1963 when it became obvious that Duvalier would not permit AID to operate except under his political control. We have continued minimal indirect assistance (\$3.3 million in FY 66) through multilateral and United States voluntary agencies.

We have followed basically two objectives with regard to Haiti: (1) assisting the Haitian people as much as possible without giving direct assistance to Duvalier and (2) establishing a greater international presence in Haiti and a greater awareness among the American Republics of the situation there in case contingencies should arise which would require action by the OAS or U.S.

We have tried to increase assistance through third agencies to the extent we have considered possible without assuming unacceptable political liabilities. We have urged Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia to give technical assistance. Israel and the Republic of China are considering small technical assistance projects if ways can be found to cover the dollar costs.

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<sup>2</sup> Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

The IDB is considering a \$1.3 million project to improve Haiti's education facilities. The loan has the approval of all of the Latin members of the IDB Board. The project is stalled because Treasury is reluctant to vote for the project in the IDB at the same time AID is unwilling to provide assistance on a bilateral scale. Secretary Rusk has discussed this loan with Secretary Fowler. I have asked State for a memo so we can get this impasse resolved.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Galo Plaza Lasso, ex-President of Ecuador, recently visited Haiti and has proposed an enlarged program of technical assistance and some capital development for Haiti to be conducted by the OAS under strict controls. Duvalier indicated to Galo Plaza, and his Foreign Minister stated to Secretary Rusk, that Haiti would accept international control of the program. The Galo Plaza plan anticipates a large OAS presence in Haiti to be available when a major political crisis occurs. State is staffing out this proposal and will be making recommendations on it in the near future.

State, Defense and CIA have prepared a comprehensive contingency plan for Haiti.<sup>4</sup> It considers all currently anticipated contingencies, including the employment of United States forces to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals from Haiti. It includes up-to-date lists of acceptable Haitians inside and outside Haiti who could be used in forming a new government and of U.S. civilian and military personnel with Haitian experience who could be mobilized to work in Haiti as we had to do during the early days of the Dominican crisis.

We are also consulting on a regular basis with the large American countries about conditions in Haiti, but we have not discussed specific contingencies or possible United States and OAS reactions because such discussions would inevitably become public knowledge.

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<sup>3</sup> Rusk's October 14 memorandum to the President requesting approval of his loan argued that multilateral assistance was a good way of getting aid to the people of Haiti without providing political benefit to Duvalier. The approval line of the memorandum is checked. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 353.

**358. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

NIE 86.1-66

Washington, October 27, 1966.

**SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN HAITI****The Problem**

To estimate the situation and outlook in Haiti over the next year or so, and to consider what might happen in the event of President Duvalier's death or overthrow.

**Conclusions**

A. Duvalier's position still seems fairly strong, despite the sporadic plotting and political tension normal in Haitian affairs. We think the chances are better than even that he will remain in power during the period of this estimate. If he does, there will be continuing political repression and economic stagnation or decline.

B. Duvalier's overthrow would probably have to be largely an inside job, with some key members of the security forces—and especially the Presidential Guard—participating. We doubt that any now in a position to organize such a coup has the will or the courage to attempt it. None of the many small groupings among the divided, bickering Haitian exiles could succeed in overthrowing Duvalier without decisive help from the US or some other foreign government. The Haitian dictator might, of course, die suddenly of natural causes, though he is only 59 and in reasonably good health; assassination is also a possibility, though he takes unusual precautions.

C. Duvalier's departure would probably be attended by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and other towns. Whether this violence was limited and sporadic or became widespread and intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going. The danger of widespread hostilities would probably be greatest in the event Duvalier were assassinated in public. A coup attempt that failed at the last minute could produce equally nasty results.

D. The most likely successor to Duvalier would be a military junta which might or might not choose to exercise power behind a civilian

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Joint Staff. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 27. The estimate was attached to a November 4 memorandum from Bowdler to Rostow that summarized the NIE's conclusions.

front. Initially at least, such a government would probably not be stable, and there would likely be maneuvering for power among its members.

E. The two Communist parties are too small and weak to be able to contend for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier's departure. We doubt that outside Communist support—from Castro, the Soviets, or Haitian Communist exiles—would be forthcoming on a significant scale. We believe that the Haitian Communists themselves would see their best chance of gaining influence as coming through offers of their administrative assistance to new government leadership rather than through any attempt to seize power on their own, and we think they would act accordingly.

F. In a situation where order had completely broken down, the Organization of American States (OAS) would almost certainly acquiesce in action by the US to evacuate foreign nationals. Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and establish an effective government, however, would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. Any contention that such intervention was necessary in order to forestall a Communist takeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless the supporting evidence was incontrovertible. Whatever the purpose for intervening, the US would face considerable criticism internationally.

G. The initial Haitian reaction to the landing of a US force would probably be favorable, but if a military occupation were at all prolonged, opposition would develop. Nevertheless, the problems in Haiti are such that it might prove more difficult to get a force out than to put it in, as was the case in 1915.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

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### 359. Editorial Note

In November 1966 rumors began to circulate in Haiti and in Miami, Florida, that an invasion of Haiti was imminent, with Miami and the Dominican Republic mentioned as staging areas. In a November 11 memorandum from Rostow to the President, also sent as an unnumbered telegram to the LBJ Ranch, Rostow reported that there was no "hard information of any muscle" behind impending coup plans but that officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of Defense and State were meeting that morning to review contingency plans and ensure that "the Caribbean Amphibious Force is in position to react promptly in case of need." (Johnson Library, National

Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV) Rostow reported to the President the following day that Duvalier had dismissed or retired 17 Haitian military officers without first arresting them, indicating that the dictator was "sure of his ground." (Ibid.)

A November 14 memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, sent by telegram to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Directors of Central Intelligence and Defense Intelligence among others, reported that Rolando Masferrer, an exiled former Cuban senator, had organized an invasion force in the Miami area to overthrow Duvalier, and was attempting to charter a boat capable of carrying 300 men. (Ibid.) In a November 17 note to Rostow, Bowdler reported that he had relayed the substance of the FBI memorandum to Sayre, who reassured him that the enforcement agencies had their own people inside the ranks of the expeditionary group and would "move against Masferrer when the time is right." (Ibid.) Telegram 88010 to Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince, November 18, reported that a Department officer had told the Haitian Chargé that "the USG would not permit such activities on its soil" and authorized the Ambassador to so inform Foreign Minister Chalmers. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-7 HAI)

Telegram 1914 from Santo Domingo, December 16, reported Crimmins' discussion with President Balaguer the previous day. Crimmins said that U.S. policy toward Duvalier was essentially passive, stating that "we are neither helping him stay in office nor in any way abetting his overthrow." Balaguer replied that he "in effect could not care less about Duvalier and Haiti." Concerning invasion activity, Balaguer said that Haitians and Cubans were still preparing plans, bases, and supplies in the Dominican Republic, but that the Dominican military had raided their Manzanillo camp, seized their arms cache, and were deporting three Cuban "no-good adventurers." (Ibid., POL 23-9 HAI) Telegrams 111362 and 112102 to Port-au-Prince, January 3 and 4, 1967, reported that U.S. Customs Service agents arrested 75 persons from Masferrer's group during the night of January 2, seized two boats, arms, and ammunition. (Both *ibid.*)



**360. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Chairman of the Contingency Coordinating Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1967.

SUBJECT

Summary of Contingency Plan for Haiti

1. The Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) Study on Haiti anticipates that the United States may be confronted with one of two basic situations: (a) loss of control by President Duvalier, resulting in chaos throughout the country or (b) the demise of Duvalier from natural causes or otherwise. In either case CIA will support the overall U.S. effort and provide coverage of intelligence requirements.

2. To this end, the CIA contingency plan covers the following aspects:

a. *Administrative and Logistics*: In either contingency it is planned to effect an immediate build-up of personnel [1 line of source text not declassified]. Provision of logistics support to satisfy CIA infiltration and exfiltration requirements is currently under active study.

b. *Intelligence*: Coverage of the developing Haitian situation will be reported by internal and external assets. [4 lines of source text not declassified] All available information on known or potential subversives in Haiti and abroad has been collated for ready use by the Intelligence Community.

c. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Additionally we have compiled a list of Haitians, located both inside and outside Haiti, which has been made available to the Departments of State and Defense to assist in the selection of individuals deemed suitable for use in the reconstruction period.

d. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

3. For the duration of the contingency close liaison would be maintained with both the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

[name not declassified]  
CS/CIA Representative

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country File, Haiti. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

### 361. Politico-Military Contingency Plan for Haiti<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 16, 1967.

#### *I. Summary*

This contingency plan for Haiti conceives of two categories of contingencies: (1) Duvalier falls from power and unacceptable Haitians achieve dominance; and (2) Duvalier remains in office but Communists or other unacceptable Haitians mount a potentially successful operation to overthrow him.

An external attack on Haiti involving a few guerrillas could occur without detection or interception by the United States and therefore might be in a position to succeed before we are able to react. Similarly, the overthrow of Duvalier and his replacement by an unacceptable successor could occur without giving us needed reaction time.

Very little military force is needed to take the capital and no other single city or area is necessary to control the existing governmental organizations of Haiti. The introduction of even a small military force in Port-au-Prince would therefore be a major, if not decisive, influence on the crisis situation. The employment of a US military force is contemplated to prevent a Communist government from controlling Haiti and, if necessary, to evacuate American and other foreign nationals whose lives are threatened.

Duvalier's successor will probably seek our military and/or economic assistance to stabilize his regime, but withholding that assistance would not necessarily insure his downfall.

[Omitted here is the contingency plan, proposing U.S. options in response to "unacceptable" successors to Duvalier in Haiti and nine annexes.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V. Secret. Drafted by IRG/ARA on April 29 and June 24, 1966, Revised in the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Contingency Coordinating Committee and approved by both groups on May 16.

**362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1967, 8:13 p.m.

213370. Tosec 21.

1. At White House today on another matter Covey Oliver raised current Haitian situation and participated in meeting on that subject with Walt Rostow, Linowitz, Sayre and others. Rostow suggested possibility you exchange views Haiti with Latin American FonMins present New York.<sup>2</sup> We understand Argentine, Brazilian, and Colombian are or will be there.

2. Substance our current assessment situation contained in State 210686 which being repeated.<sup>3</sup> Reports last several days received from Rio, Buenos Aires, and Bogota in answer to State 210686 indicate those Foreign Ministries concerned re situation but have little constructive to suggest.

3. At meeting today consensus was it would be worthwhile if you had time for you raise Haiti problem again, reemphasize your concern, and discreetly ask for views on political, economic, and diplomatic multilateral actions which might be possible, either within or outside OAS framework.

**Katzenbach**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 HAI. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Long on June 20, cleared by Herbert B. Thompson (S/S), and approved by Sayre. Rusk was in New York June 20–22 for UN General Assembly meetings.

<sup>2</sup> An unattributed paper, entitled “The Haitian Situation,” June 20, reported that approaches to seven Latin American governments in June and November of 1966, hoping to elicit suggestions of multilateral means of assisting Haiti in the period following the fall of Duvalier, brought “disappointing results” and no “constructive suggestions.” It also reported that there seemed to be no disposition on the part of Latin American governments to provide technicians to Haiti. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 210686 to Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, Buenos Aires, and four other Latin American capitals, June 13, also requested suggestions on what could be done about Haiti. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 HAI)

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**363. Intelligence Information Cable<sup>1</sup>**

TDCS-314/09395-67

Washington, June 28, 1967.

## COUNTRY

Haiti

## DOI

26 June 1967

## SUBJECT

Situation Appraisal—President Duvalier's Present Strength and Capabilities

## ACQ

*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*

## SOURCE

Staff officer of this organization. This is a field appraisal of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

1. Although it is true, as it has been for some years, that Duvalier could be overthrown at any moment, the political situation has not become more tense nor has it further deteriorated. There is little evidence that there has been any active plotting or that any group could form to carry off a coup without detection and ruthless annihilation. If anything, Duvalier has strengthened his position by his recent display of life-and-death control over each and every Haitian, innocent or guilty. His closest associates have remained loyal and have carried out his orders blindly, even though they must know their lives are in jeopardy. Intelligent Haitian observers say that this incredible subservience and shortsightedness is to be expected from the men close to Duvalier. He has so thoroughly involved them in his own crimes and, at the same time, so enriched them that they will cling to their prerogatives. They are unwilling to take any preventive action whereby they might lose everything, and hope to be able to save their own lives by seeking asylum at the last fatal minute. They feel they have more to fear from a future unknown regime.

2. If a real coup attempt is made and fails, Haiti may see a terrible bloodbath, but any other event probably will pass by with little loss

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Bowdler forwarded this cable to Rostow under a June 29 note, stating that this "is the latest appraisal on Haiti from a CIA staff officer *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*."

of life. There has been no doubt for some years that Duvalier is not normal. His speech on 22 June 1967 showed definite signs of paranoia. In his fear of his enemies, imagined or real, he believes any denunciation and would take wide-range repressive action if any unsuccessful attempt were made against his life. Despite his fears, he remains in full control of his faculties and the instrument of government. Lacking real targets, he simply has removed all threats to his power: his son-in-law, his close past associates, his bodyguards, and most recently, members of his own cabinet.

3. The economic situation continues to worsen. Drought conditions in the cul-de-sac may lessen the sugar crop. The coffee and sisal markets offer little hope for the Haitian economy. Duvalier's monetary situation is shaky as revenues continue to decline. In the face of these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, it appears that Duvalier's family has urged him to abdicate. However, there is little chance that he will, and he is likely to retain his political power while further injuring the national economy through foolish acts. Most recently, he has threatened the continued existence of the Commercial Bank by depriving its president, Clemard Joseph Charles, of much of his empire. This will be a serious blow to free enterprise and continued business operations, let alone development.

4. Duvalier's control is total. There is no "power balance" in the palace. Duvalier plays off his militia against the army and vice versa, and he has never permitted anyone to become a threat to his own power. All opposition, or imagined opposition, is ruthlessly and bloodily crushed. Least likely to succeed in the near future are the Communists who are too small in numbers to carry through any move. Someday someone may muster up enough courage to kill Duvalier. It would not be difficult; however, then the first scramble for power would come among the top Duvalierist hierarchy which would still hold the symbols and some of the seats of power, as well as the only weapons. The army is the most likely force to seize control if Duvalier should go. A military regime would not last long and successor governments would, without outside help, continue to deteriorate and lose more and more control. In this atmosphere, the Communists will have an opportunity for insurgency; the danger, however, is not immediate.

*[1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]*

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**364. Record of Agreements and Decisions of 18th Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Review Group<sup>1</sup>**

SIG/RA #18

Washington, July 27, 1967.

PRESENT

The Under Secretary of State (Chairman)  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
The Administrator, Agency for International Development  
The Director, United States Information Agency  
The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The Under Secretary of Treasury  
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Staff Director  
  
Mr. Covey Oliver, ARA  
Mr. Robert R. Bowie, S/C

*A) Haiti*

The Senior Interdepartmental Group:

1) Agreed to give political support, and financial support as required up to a million dollars, for the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) for the purpose of providing Latin American technical assistance to Haiti up to 36-man years provided that such a number of qualified French-speaking Latin Americans can be found and recruited.

2) Agreed that Contingency Coordinating Committee plans should include domestic actions to be taken, particularly with respect to Congress and the press, as well as military and political actions outside the country.

3) Directed ARA to compile an appropriate set of plans, prepared on past experience, for economic and technical assistance to Haiti in the event that President Duvalier is succeeded by a Government capable of governing.

4) Noted that in the event it becomes necessary for the US to evacuate American citizens and other foreign nationals by the use of US armed forces, it would probably be necessary for those forces to take over control of the City of Port-au-Prince; that whether or not to relinquish that control after the evacuation, and the costs of doing either

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 18th Mtg, 7/27/67. Secret. Drafted by Schwartz on July 31.

one or the other, are of such importance as to require further study at all levels of the Government.

[Omitted here are decisions related to Bolivia.]

**HHS**  
*Staff Director, SIG*

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**365. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 6, 1968.

SUBJECT

OAS/CIAP Technical Assistance for Haiti

On September 16, 1966, at the request of Joseph E. Johnson, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, you received Galo Plaza who proposed an OAS “plan” for Haiti. Quiet discussions on this topic were held between departmental officers and officials of the OAS/CIAP in the ensuing months and a general program, a substantial refinement of Plaza’s plan, was developed. The SIG, on July 27, 1967, “agreed to give political support, and financial support as required . . . for the purpose of providing Latin American technical assistance to Haiti . . . provided . . . qualified French-speaking Latin Americans can be found and recruited.”<sup>2</sup>

OAS/CIAP sent several exploratory missions to Haiti during 1967, and in January 1968 the Haitian government formally requested an OAS/CIAP technical assistance mission of about thirty people. At its regular meeting on January 22, 1968, the CIAP formally supported the Haitian request and called upon the member countries of the Inter-American system to join in a special multilateral effort in order to carry out this program. Haitian support of the OAS/CIAP program was confirmed during the CIAP sub-committee review of Haiti January 29–February 2, 1968. Recruiting for the team has already commenced and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V. Secret. Drafted by Long on February 5. The date is handwritten on the memorandum. A marginal handwritten note by Bowdler reads: “Walt—Pls. Read.”

<sup>2</sup> Document 364.

OAS/CIAP hopes to have the first experts on board in Haiti within weeks.

While experience in Haiti during recent years has shown how difficult it is to operate meaningfully in that tragic country, we hope that this OAS/CIAP effort will establish an OAS "presence" in Haiti which will be instructive for the individual Latin American governments and useful in case of emergency.

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**366. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1968, 7 p.m.

SUBJECT

Haitian Situation

Bill Bowdler met this afternoon with representatives of State, CIA and DOD to review the bidding on the Haitian situation.

The intelligence community has not been able to come up with a clear picture of what is going on at Cap Haitien. A landing of some nature did take place, but we have not been able to determine the size of the invasion force. The figure of 50-75 men is the one most frequently heard, but the reports of the aircraft used could not have lifted this many. Reports on the fighting vary with the source. The invaders claim progress. Duvalier says they have been contained and will shortly be liquidated. The latest report from Ambassador Ross is that everything appears normal and outwardly calm in Port-au-Prince. He has nothing on the situation in the north.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive. Handwritten notes on the memorandum indicate it was received at 7:23 p.m. and Bowdler was notified the following day.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified. In a later telegram Ross reported on a meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Raymond, who stated that forces under the leadership of Haitians based in the United States had bombed Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien and "landed mercenaries" near the latter area during the morning of the previous day. Raymond asked the U.S. Government to investigate and interdict any illegal acts of Haitians based in the United States. Ross replied that the first news that both the Department and he had received about the invasion had come from Haitian Ambassador Arthur Bonhomme in Washington. (Telegram 813 from Port-au-Prince, May 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 HAI)



The Duvalier Government has sent notes of protest to the OAS and the UN but it does not call for action by either body.

At this afternoon's meeting at State, the following contingency actions were noted, or agreed upon:

1. State, earlier today, asked FAA to put out an advisory that all non-scheduled private aircraft were to stay away from Haiti except those going to Port-au-Prince. PanAmerican notified State that it had cancelled its regular flight to the Haitian capital today.

2. The Caribbean Ready Force left Vieques, Puerto Rico, this morning on a training cruise to Panama. This will take it to the south of Haiti. At this stage, there is not sufficient justification to divert the Force toward Port-au-Prince. DOD is to furnish us tonight with the plotted position of the Task Force over the next 24 hours so that we will know precisely what its steaming time to the Haitian mainland will be.

3. DOD is stationing a patrol ship in the Windward Passage to act as a deterrent to the Cubans should they try to send forces into Haiti.

4. CIA is to determine the whereabouts of responsible civilian and military Haitian exiles in case it becomes necessary on short notice to put together a responsible government and get it into Haiti.

5. State is going through the same exercise with US officials with experience in Haiti in case we need to beef up our mission on a crash basis.

6. Our Embassy in Port-au-Prince has recently reviewed its emergency evacuation plans, but State is to ask the Ambassador to make sure that he is ready for fast implementation should the need arise.<sup>3</sup>

7. State is to prepare a policy paper recommending the action we should take in the event the invaders succeed in gaining control over a respectable piece of real estate and ask for the help of the United States and/or the OAS.

8. State has kept OAS Secretary General Plaza fully briefed on developments in Haiti. We are suggesting to him that he use the delivery of a Haitian Note on the situation to call for an informal meeting of the OAS Council. This would serve to give the OAS a basis for preempting collective action in the event the Haitians try to involve

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 826 from Port-au-Prince, May 22, reported that the Haitian military had retaken the Cap Haitien airport the preceding day, that the small number of invaders had retreated into the countryside, and that, unless reinforcements arrived, "it would seem only matter of time before they liquidated." Ross added that he had not made arrangements for the possible evacuation of American residents from Cap Haitien because it seemed unlikely that the invasion attempt would necessitate such action. (Ibid.)

the UN.<sup>4</sup> Galo Plaza had lunch with U Thant today. We do not know whether they discussed Haiti, and the roles of their respective organizations.

9. State has informed all of our missions in Latin America of the facts as we know them. State has given special briefings to the Venezuelan and Brazilian Embassies here since these are the two countries on which we would most depend for support in the event collective action becomes necessary.

I believe the foregoing actions are commensurate with the nature of the situation as we know it to be. I have your note suggesting a meeting of principals to go over contingency plans. If after reading the foregoing you still wish to have such a meeting, I suggest it be held late tomorrow afternoon. The participants should be Paul Nitze, Dick Helms, Nick Katzenbach, Covey Oliver, Bob Sayre, Bill Bowdler, and myself.

**Walt**

Set up meeting for tomorrow evening

Hold up on meeting for the time being<sup>5</sup>

Call me

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 5286 from USUN, May 22, reported that the Haitian representative had delivered a letter to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Council be convened so that "appropriate measures" could be taken to reduce the "state of tension which threatens peace," but that he had no date in mind for such a session. (Ibid., POL 23-9 HAI/UN) Telegram 169444 to USUN, May 23, responded that the U.S. Mission should discuss the complaint with the Brazilian Security Council representative and seek to have him dissuade the Haitians from pressing for a meeting. (Ibid., POL 23-9 HAI)

<sup>5</sup> This option is checked.

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### **367. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson**

Washington, May 23, 1968.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country File, Haiti. Secret; Nodis. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

**368. Editorial Note**

Following a meeting with Haitian Ambassador Bonhomme on May 24, 1968, Katzenbach sent a memorandum to President Johnson recommending that he receive Bonhomme, at the latter's request. Katzenbach wrote that difficulties in the United Nations could be avoided if the President could convince the Ambassador that there was no basis for the Haitian allegations against the United States, "and that if Haiti persists it will be damaging to U.S.-Haiti relations." A notation in the President's handwriting next to the approved option reads: "10 minutes." (National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967–69, POL HAI-US)

A May 24 memorandum from Rostow to the President concurring with Katzenbach's recommendation that the President receive Bonhomme, stated that "Nick's disclaimer that 'there is no basis for Haitian allegations against the U.S.,' may be overstated" and that news reports suggested "that the B-25 used in the expedition may well have come from the United States [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V)

A May 27 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President reported that the United Nations Security Council was scheduled to meet at 4 p.m. that afternoon in response to Haiti's request that "appropriate measures" be taken to reduce tension that it alleged threatened international peace and security. Katzenbach noted that Haiti had not made clear what action it expected and that Security Council members were generally unenthusiastic about considering this matter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HAI-US)

Telegram 5352 from USUN, May 27, reported Bonhomme's "long presentation" before the Security Council, in which he presented 22 exhibits linking the invasion aircraft to the United States, but did not actually name or accuse the United States as being involved in the invasion. The Brazilian representative then intervened to note that the Haitian charges were vague and were best handled in other ways. The U.S. representative expressed regrets to the Haitian representative that the latter "had not been more forthcoming in bilateral channels." (Ibid., POL 23-9 HAI/UN)

Telegram 195334 to Port-au-Prince, July 2, reported that the Haitian and U.S. Governments were cooperating in connection with the investigation of "invasion facts." (Ibid., POL 17 HAI-US)

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**369. Memorandum of Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 27, 1968, 10:10 a.m.

PRESENT

The President  
Ambassador of Haiti, Arthur Bonhomme  
Assistant Secretary of State, Covey T. Oliver  
William G. Bowdler

Ambassador Bonhomme opened the conversation by saying he had come at the express direction of President Duvalier. He then made an indirect criticism of the State Department for the delay in getting the appointment,<sup>2</sup> noting that he had asked for it one hour after the landings at Cap Haitien but had been referred to Assistant Secretary Oliver.

The Ambassador made protestations of Duvalier's high regard for the President. He referred to the President having "loosened the strangulation" of Haiti. To illustrate the point, he referred to the education loan granted by the IADB.

Ambassador Bonhomme then recited general complaints about exile activities against Duvalier. He said most of the action was in the United States, but it also goes on in Curacao, the Bahamas and Europe. The State Department was aware of all this. He admitted that six months ago, an expedition had been stopped in Miami by U.S. authorities, but the plotting continued. The implication here was that the State Department was not cracking down as hard as it could.

On the Cap Haitien incident, he claimed his Government had facts that U.S. aircraft flown by U.S. pilots and other U.S. military equipment had been used in the invasion. He noted that Haitian exiles, prior to and after the invasion broadcast programs from the U.S. calling for the overthrow of Duvalier. He added his government had tapes. He said there is evidence of Castro Cuban involvement and made a murky

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler. The meeting was held in the President's office.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 170497 to Port-au-Prince, May 24, reported Ambassador Bonhomme's meeting with Katzenbach that day during which Bonhomme said he had instructions to give President Johnson a message from Duvalier. Katzenbach asked for the "facts" of U.S. involvement in the bombing and invasion. When Bonhomme "went on in typical rambling fashion" about the operation being launched from the Bahamas, Katzenbach observed that this meant that the Haitian Government did not think the attack had come from the United States. Bonhomme replied to both issues that the "facts are for the Security Council, not for you." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL HAI-US)

reference to the possibility of another missile crisis over Haiti if exiles, with Cuban support, were to succeed, as Castro had done with his twelve followers.

During this part of the conversation, the President interrupted to say he was not aware of any evidence of U.S. involvement. He asked Mr. Oliver and Mr. Bowdler if they had such information. Mr. Bowdler noted we had asked the Ambassador and his government for such evidence, but so far it has not been forthcoming.

Referring to Haiti's request for UN Security Council action, Ambassador Bonhomme said Duvalier had given him instructions not to attack the United States. He would present evidence on the equipment used by the Haitian exiles and from whence they came. He admitted that the Cap Haitien invasion had been staged from the Bahamas and not from U.S. territory. He was vague on the action he would ask of the Security Council, saying the UN could recommend that states prevent the type of activities which have been directed against Haiti.

The President asked Mr. Oliver and Mr. Bowdler if they had any comments. Mr. Oliver pointed out that Haiti, in going directly to the UN Security Council, had by-passed the OAS—the body to which it should have gone with its evidence and complaint. Mr. Bowdler recalled that when we had hard evidence last year on the Miami-based invasion, we stopped it cold and got convictions. In this complaint, the Haitians say they have evidence, but have not given it to us; and we cannot act except on the basis of facts.

In closing, the President told the Ambassador he could not tell President Duvalier what to do, but it was regrettable that he had not brought his complaints to the body where we handle hemisphere differences. He reminded the Ambassador that we can act only on the basis of solid evidence, and the quicker it is furnished, the quicker we will be able to assess it and act accordingly.

**WGB**

# Guyana

## 370. Editorial Note

During the Johnson administration, the U.S. Government continued the Kennedy administration's policy of working with the British Government to offer encouragement and support to the pro-West leaders and political organizations of British Guiana as that limited self-governing colony moved toward total independence. The Special Group/303 Committee approved approximately \$2.08 million for covert action programs between 1962 and 1968 in that country.

U.S. policy included covert opposition to Cheddi Jagan, the then pro-Marxist leader of British Guiana's East Indian population. A portion of the funds authorized by the Special Group/303 Committee for covert action programs was used between November 1962 and June 1963 to improve the election prospects of the opposition political parties to the government of Jagan's People's Progressive Party. The U.S. Government successfully urged the British to impose a system of proportional representation in British Guiana (which favored the anti-Jagan forces) and to delay independence until the anti-Jagan forces could be strengthened. Through the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States provided Forbes Burnham's and Peter D'Aguiar's political parties, which were in opposition to Jagan, with both money and campaign expertise as they prepared to contest the December 1964 parliamentary elections. The U.S. Government's covert funding and technical expertise were designed to play a decisive role in the registration of voters likely to vote against Jagan. Burnham's and D'Aguiar's supporters were registered in large numbers, helping to elect an anti-Jagan coalition.

Special Group/303 Committee-approved funds again were used between July 1963 and April 1964 in connection with the 1964 general strike in British Guiana. When Jagan's and Burnham's supporters clashed in labor strife in the sugar plantations that year, the United States joined with the British Government in urging Burnham not to retaliate with violence, but rather to commit to a mediated end to the conflict. At the same time, the United States provided training to certain of the anti-Jagan forces to enable them to defend themselves if attacked and to boost their morale.

Following the general strike, 303 Committee-approved funds were used to support the election of a coalition of Burnham's People's National Congress and D'Aguiar's United Force. After Burnham was elected Premier in December 1964, the U.S. Government, again through the CIA, continued to provide substantial funds to both Burnham and D'Aguiar and their parties. In 1967 and 1968, 303 Committee-approved

funds were used to help the Burnham and D'Aguiar coalition contest and win the December 1968 general elections. When the U.S. Government learned that Burnham was going to use fraudulent absentee ballots to continue in power in the 1968 elections, it advised him against such a course of action, but did not try to stop him.

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**371. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 6, 1964.

SUBJECT

Visit of British Prime Minister Home; British Guiana

I recommend you make the following points to Sir Alec Home regarding British Guiana:

1. You are as concerned as President Kennedy over British Guiana.
2. Emergence of another Communist state in this hemisphere cannot be accepted; there is grave risk of Jagan's establishing a Castro-type regime should he attain independence.
3. Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy agreed that British Guiana should not become independent under Jagan<sup>2</sup> and that a change of government must be sought.
4. Jagan must be defeated in the next election.
5. Suspension of the constitution and imposition of direct rule would help defeat Jagan.
6. Direct British control over internal security, strengthening the police, and a broad interpretation of the powers reserved to the UK in foreign affairs to prevent entry of personnel and funds from Cuba would help overcome the atmosphere of intimidation Jagan is trying to create.

Sir Alec will probably (1) confirm the Macmillan/Kennedy understanding; (2) endorse the importance of assuring Jagan's defeat;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Chronological File 1964. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett on February 5 and forwarded to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a February 7 memorandum in which Burnett assumed Bundy would "wish to talk to the President personally" about it.

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on the Kennedy administration's policies toward British Guiana is in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume XII.

(3) question the feasibility of a resumption of direct UK rule unless the grounds can be publicly shown to be fully justified.

Dean Rusk<sup>3</sup>

## Attachment

### Paper Prepared by the Department of State

#### BRITISH GUIANA

##### *Background*

In a letter of July 18, 1963, to President Kennedy from Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>4</sup> the British advised us of their decision "... to impose a system of proportional representation without a referendum and then to hold elections under a new system". This letter also informed us of a British expectation to "renew direct rule for a period of six months to a year while a new constitution is introduced and new elections held under it". The latter assertion was made on a British assumption that Jagan would resign when informed of the new electoral system at a Constitutional Conference held October 22-31. He did not do so, but has repeatedly stated that he does not feel bound to accept the British decisions.

Jagan seems uncertain and a little desperate but he is unlikely to resign voluntarily. No occasion has yet arisen to show whether he will obstruct the carrying out of the decisions but probably he will try to hang on, temporizing and avoiding flagrantly illegal acts. His regime has been organizing a protest march on Georgetown as well as secretly promoting a rash of arson in the countryside. The regime is likely to try to foster an atmosphere of intimidation and potential terror in an effort to attract international attention and more particularly to discourage opponents of the regime.

While the UK agrees as to the importance of getting rid of Jagan, it is reluctant to impose direct rule unless Jagan's actions so clearly call for such a course as to pose no presentational problems for the UK. In addition, the UK tends to put somewhat less weight than we do on the advantages of such a step. The UK believes that Jagan would pose as a martyr and could be more dangerous in opposition than as Premier.

In view of the above circumstances, we think it desirable that the UK increase security and interpret its reserved powers in the foreign affairs field broadly in order to frustrate communist aid to the Jagan regime.

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>4</sup> A copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK/Macmillan.



**372. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

PARTICIPANTS

*British Side*

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

R. A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, The Foreign Office

Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador

Sir Timothy Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet

*U.S. Side*

The President

The Secretary of State

Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON

Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA

[2 lines of source text not declassified] that they were now engaged in registering parties, and he gathered that there had been some problem in the development of splinter parties. Mr. Bundy remarked that people were engaged in party cultivation, but that it was stony ground. The Secretary noted that the East Indians who don't like Jagan are reluctant to come forward. It was understood that party activity was being closely observed. The Secretary went on to say that it was very important not to let Jagan take over in a situation of independence. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] The Prime Minister said that at some point there would have to be an election, and he thought December might be a good time.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 BR GU. Top Secret. Drafted by Armstrong and approved in the White House on February 24 and in S on February 27. The memorandum is part V of VI. The meeting was held at the White House. Prime Minister Douglas-Home made an official visit to Washington February 12–13.

<sup>2</sup> In a February 27 memorandum for the record, Burdett noted that Bundy stated that the President and Prime Minister had discussed British Guiana privately during the latter's visit and that they had reaffirmed the agreements existing between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, and in particular the understandings reached at Birch Grove the previous summer. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana White House Meetings) Kennedy and Macmillan met at Birch Grove, England, on June 30, 1963, where the British proposed, and Kennedy agreed, that independence should be delayed, that a proportional representation electoral system be established, and that the alliance between the leading politicians opposed to Jagan be supported; see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XII, Document 295.

373. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 19, 1964, 10 a.m.

## SUBJECT

British Guiana

## PARTICIPANTS

## US

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for  
European Affairs  
William G. Burdett, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary, EUR  
Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA  
Thomas N. Judd, BNA

## UK

Patrick Gordon Walker, Labor  
"Shadow" Foreign Minister

Mr. Tyler asked Mr. Gordon Walker what he thought about British Guiana. Gordon Walker replied that he knew Mr. Tyler was thinking of an article which appeared in *The Reporter* on February 13 which purported to represent Gordon Walker's views. Since the article had come out, he had been giving considerable thought as to what he had really said to the man who had written the article. To the best of his recollection, he had made the following points which, he emphasized, were his own views which had not been fully checked out with the Labor Party:

1. It makes the Labor Party uncomfortable not to grant independence to any country when the situation is ripe.
2. He recognized the primacy of U.S. interests in British Guiana.
3. Labor believed there would be social revolutions in Latin America. Some of these would be ugly ones which would not fit in with the pattern of the Alliance for Progress. Some Nasser-type governments would undoubtedly emerge.
4. Labor would like to find a way to give independence to British Guiana without affronting or injuring the U.S. Britain of course cannot afford to appear as an agent of the U.S. The way in which the Douglas-Home government was trying to do this was completely unacceptable to the people of British Guiana because it makes the entire country into one constituency. Some other form of proportional representation<sup>2</sup> might well be considered by Labor.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL BR GU. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas M. Judd, Officer-in-Charge of UK Affairs. The meeting was held in Tyler's office. The memorandum is part 2 of 2; part 1 was not found.

<sup>2</sup> At a Constitutional Conference in London in October 1963, the major British Guiana party leaders asked British Colonial Secretary Sandys to devise a constitution, "since they were unable to agree among themselves." Sandys then decreed a new registration and general election under proportional representation for a single house legislature. "Jagan was furious at being outsmarted." (Memorandum from Cobb to Rusk, September 15, 1965, Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana White House Meetings)

There was a discussion of the menace represented by Jagan. Mr. Tyler said we were seriously concerned with the way Jagan conducted himself. We could not live with a Castro-type government on the South American continent. Mr. Gordon Walker thought the U.S. exaggerated the menace of Jagan. There was a limit to what he could do, in view of the racial division in British Guiana; for example, he could hardly have complete control in a situation where the capital of the country was against him.

Mr. Tyler added that we were worried about the Castro aspects—that British Guiana would be used as a base for subversion on the continent. Mr. Gordon Walker replied that a bit of this sort of thing was bound to develop in Latin America. However, if a way could be found for the U.S. to put its troops into British Guiana, the Labor Party would not object. Britain did not want to keep its troops there indefinitely. Britain had no real reason of its own to stay. Furthermore, its troops were spread too thin. One battalion now in British Guiana was not enough.

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**374. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 18, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

1. Reference is made to my memorandum of 7 March 1964 concerning the efforts of the Jagan-controlled Guiana Agricultural Workers' Union (GAWU) to gain control of the sugar workers in British Guiana.<sup>2</sup> During the past week the strike has continued and the situation is still serious. The intimidation by GAWU has forced still more workers to remain away from their jobs, and Ministers of Jagan's government, including Jagan himself, have given their full and open support to the strike. Thus far the management group has remained firm

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only. A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting reads "OK."

<sup>2</sup> In this memorandum to Bundy, Helms reported on GAWU-inspired violence and killings. (Ibid.)

in not recognizing the GAWU, but events may force the companies at least to allow a poll of the sugar workers to determine which union they wish to represent them. This in itself would be a defeat for the anti-Jagan Manpower Citizens' Association (MPCA), which presently represents the sugar workers, and further withdrawals from the MPCA could result in its complete loss of control of the sugar workers.

2. The police force has been vigorous in its efforts to control the intimidations and demonstrations, but the force is not large enough to handle the situation completely. British troops have not yet been used.

[2 paragraphs (22½ lines of source text) not declassified]

5. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Mr. Burdett.

RH

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**375. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 1, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

1. An essential element to winning the next general elections in British Guiana<sup>2</sup> and forming a successful coalition government after the defeat of Premier Cheddi Jagan is the behind-the-scenes co-operation of Linden Forbes Burnham, leader of the People's National Congress (PNC), and Peter S. D'Aguiar, leader of the United Force (UF). Although the two opposition leaders worked closely together at the London Constitutional Conference in October 1963 and agreed to continue joint discussions when they returned to Georgetown, these discussions have not taken place and there has been no co-operation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> In a February 19 memorandum to Bundy, Helms reported that [text not declassified] had informed the CIA that the new general elections in British Guiana would be held during the last 3 months of 1964 and that [text not declassified] had agreed that [text not declassified] could inform the leaders of the two main opposition parties [text not declassified] of this timing. (Ibid.)

2. In April 1964 [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] sent a political adviser for each party to British Guiana to assist with preparations for voter registration and secondly to work out a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] understanding between Burnham and D'Aguiar for co-operation during the election campaign and for the future coalition government. These advisers have arranged for two meetings between Burnham and D'Aguiar, one on 24 April and the second on 28 April. Thus far Burnham and D'Aguiar have agreed to the following:

- a. to share poll watchers in certain areas and to share the costs of challenges in these areas;
- b. to co-operate in a joint publicity campaign before and during the registration period;
- c. to refrain from attacking the other party during the election campaign outside of "honest politicking";
- d. to review their progress at mid-point in the registration period and consult on any corrections that might need to be made;
- e. to decide if specific areas of responsibility are desirable, based on the results of the registration.

3. The two leaders have also discussed cabinet posts for a future coalition government, but have not yet reached agreement on this matter. The advisers report that the meetings have been harmonious.

4. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Mr. William C. Burdett of the Department of State.

RH

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**376. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Acting Secretary of State Ball<sup>1</sup>**

REU-33

Washington, May 12, 1964.

SUBJECT

Outlook for More Violence in British Guiana

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. 1, Memos, 12/63–7/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limited Distribution; Controlled Dissem.

*Abstract*

In an effort to prevent the holding of a UK-imposed proportional representation election, expected to be held late this year, the Jagan regime has been resorting to intimidation and violence. What began some 12 weeks ago as a strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers' union has developed into a campaign of beatings, bombings, and arson in which 19 persons have been killed and more than a million dollars' worth of property and sugar cane have been burned. This violence has exacerbated the racial tensions between the majority East Indians and the minority Negroes to such an extent that some officials fear that the situation may get out of hand.

Contributing to this concern has been the agitation of activists in the Jagan regime, who have attacked not only members of the competing sugar workers' union but also the opposition parties, which are composed mainly of Negroes and other non-Indians. Local police have uncovered arms buried by members of Jagan's youth organization. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

As the proportional representation election which threatens to oust him from office draws nearer—registration began on May 8—Jagan's despair is deepening. In the hope that the election may be postponed, he has invited Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad to try to mediate the differences between him and the leaders of the opposition parties. It seems unlikely, however, that the opposition parties, hopeful of victory in a proportional representation election, will agree to Williams' proposals. As the Jagan regime grows more desperate, its extremist elements may well be tempted to undertake more ambitious acts of terrorism. Such acts could provoke the threatened Negro minority into large-scale retaliation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

**377. Telegram From the Department of State [text not declassified] to the Consulate General in British Guiana<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 13, 1964.

Following is a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] State [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] cable for Carlson [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:

1. We concur with guidance to Burnham not to resort to counter-violence and that he can be assured that if PPP makes effort take over country by force the U.S. Govt will not stand by and see opposition crushed by terror, and Carlson's comments on arms to Burnham (Congentel 377).<sup>2</sup>

2. We are now exploring possibility of giving counterterrorist training to selected members of opposition.<sup>3</sup> While this will not have any immediate positive effect on containing violence, it may give boost to opposition. We will inform you when final decisions and plans are made. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

3. Meanwhile we suggest you discuss [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] steps which could be taken to control violence.<sup>4</sup> It our view that frequent use of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] mechanism should be made not only to work out locally solutions to problems but also to give true picture to Governor so he will in turn influence CoOff. Request cable summary of all [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] meetings [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

4. Please note Deptel 285<sup>5</sup> re our approach to British here.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Messages between Consul General/Ambassador Carlson and Ranking Department Officials [file name not declassified] re: Situation in British Guiana, Vol. 1, March–September, 1964. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 377 from Georgetown, May 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 BR GU)

<sup>3</sup> In an April 30 memorandum to Bundy, Helms wrote that if the situation deteriorated “to the extent that it is decided to furnish the trainees with the necessary material, this would be furnished them [text not declassified] British Guiana.” A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting reads “Approved by phone. May 7.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File)

<sup>4</sup> In a March 23 memorandum to Bundy, Helms reported that “the Colonial Office has taken note of the request by the Department of State that the British Guiana elections not be held prior to the U.S. Presidential elections on 3 November 1964.” (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 285 to Georgetown, May 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23 BR GU)

**378. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 22, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

1. On 21 May 1964 the Consul General in Georgetown [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] reported that [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] it was now evident that the security situation had reached the point where it would be essential for a state of emergency to be declared.<sup>2</sup> The Governor has urged both Cheddi and Janet Jagan to end the strike on the sugar estates and to give him the necessary advice of the Council of Ministers to declare a state of emergency, as reported in my memorandum of 21 May.<sup>3</sup> The Governor has reported that Premier Jagan would be prepared to give him the advice of his Ministers on either 22 or 23 May; he said the legal documents were ready for the emergency order, but there were still a few decisions yet to be made. However, the Jagan emergency order may not contain sufficient powers to control the situation, such as the right to search and detain without a warrant.

2. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] wished that influence could be brought to bear on Richard Ishmael, president of the Manpower Citizens' Association (MPCA), which is the anti-Jagan sugar workers' union, to co-operate with the pro-Jagan arbitration committee which has been set up to mediate the dispute. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] representatives pointed out to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that this would be giving in to Jagan and that Ishmael probably would not follow [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] advice in this matter. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] agreed with this, but said that he would not like [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to urge defiance from Ishmael.

3. In view of the above, a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] State [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] cable has been sent to the Consul General [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> [*text not declassified*] State [*text not declassified*] telegram from Georgetown, unnumbered, May 21. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana 1964 [*file name not declassified*] Progress Report [*file name not declassified*] State Memos)

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum from Helms to Bundy, May 21. (Ibid.)



in Georgetown,<sup>4</sup> giving [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the following guidance:

“a. Our principal objective is to defeat the PPP in the forthcoming elections and to bring into power a coalition government of the People’s National Congress, the United Force, and alternative East Indian party(ies), headed by Linden Forbes Burnham. While retaining tactical flexibility, all our moves must be directed at attainment of this objective.

“b. We believe that in terms of accomplishing our objective things at this time are going well despite the current wave of violence. Registration of voters to date and the increasing nervousness of the PPP support this assessment.

“c. Therefore, we should make every effort to adhere to the present schedule, i.e., elections under proportional representation in early November, and to avoid being deflected from our present course. The PPP is clearly making every effort to upset this schedule.

“d. We believe that resumption of direct British rule at this stage would impede the attainment of our objective. Resumption could delay elections, make it easier for the British Labour Party, if it comes to power, to tamper with Sandys’ decision, and give the PPP additional campaign issues.

“e. We share the view of the Governor that the declaration of a state of emergency probably will be required to cope with the security situation. The British may have to buttress the declaration by dispatching additional troops to British Guiana. We see advantages in the declaration resulting from ‘advice’ of the Ministers. If ‘advice’ from the Ministers is not forthcoming,<sup>5</sup> declaration by a special Order in Council may well be necessary.

“f. Tactically we would prefer to allow HMG on its own initiative, without urgings by the U.S., to arrive at the conclusion that a declaration of emergency and probably the dispatch of additional troops are required.

“g. We agree with your reasons that it would be disadvantageous for the MPCA to consent to co-operate with the committee to investigate the sugar dispute, which is obviously stacked in favor of the PPP. We also agree that Ishmael is not likely to co-operate. In discussions locally you should continue to take the position that Ishmael should be allowed to make his own decision.

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<sup>4</sup> No other copy of this cable has been found.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 298 to Georgetown, May 22, the Department reported that the British Embassy in Washington had informed it that, under pressure from the Governor and the Commissioner of Police, Jagan had notified the Governor that he would “advise” the Governor to declare a state of emergency on May 22 or 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 BR GU)

"h. [1 line of source text not declassified]"

4. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Mr. William C. Burdett of the Department of State. Ambassador Bruce in London has been informed of the above.

RH

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### 379. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Georgetown, May 25, 1964.

#### SUBJECT

Call on Premier Cheddi Jagan

#### PARTICIPANTS

Premier Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana  
Delmar R. Carlson, American Consul General, British Guiana  
William B. Cobb, Jr., British Guiana Desk Officer, Washington

We were received by Premier Jagan in his darkened, air-conditioned office. Jagan explained that because of astigmatism his eyes suffered from the intense glare and therefore he was more comfortable in a dim office.

Jagan said he was most discouraged about the situation in British Guiana. The efforts of the sugar workers to throw off the burden of the company union had led to tension in the community and racial animosities had been aroused. He did not know what would happen now. The struggle against the company union, and the BGTUC is nothing but a company union nowadays, should be resolved and he had appointed a committee to try to resolve it but only the sugar workers were willing to cooperate.

On the political scene he was also discouraged. The British Government had imposed PR although it was admittedly a most unsatisfactory voting method and he wondered what it might lead to. The British had pushed him around since he first organized the PPP and had changed the system on him time and again gerrymandering districts, changing the number of districts, and now even PR. It was most discouraging and Indian voters might well become disenchanted with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 BR GU. No classification marking. Drafted by Cobb. The meeting was held in Jagan's office.

the so-called parliamentary system of democracy and turn elsewhere if the Guiana experience was any example. Perhaps it was a result of the cold war tensions but parliamentarianism and democracy seemed on the way out. In Latin America for example there are many more dictatorships today than ever before since World War II.

“No matter what I try to do,” Jagan said, “I can get no where. I am opposed by everyone, including the CIA which I suppose is the American Government. I laid my cards on the table to President Kennedy, and he gave me to understand that he would help me but he didn’t and I can only conclude that he was a liar or that he was influenced to change his decision. The people in BG know that I am trying to help them. They are not dumb. But they see that I am being frustrated by every turn. When I see newspaper correspondents they distort what I tell them. I am being maligned by a press agency in Miami, presumably run by Cuban refugees, which has distributed an article saying that I advocated wiping out the Negroes in B.G. This is completely untrue—it’s a deliberate distortion.”<sup>2</sup>

In his rambling exposition Jagan mentioned that he listened often to the VOA, and referred specifically to a panel program which discussed the situation in Vietnam. He said that one of the speakers pointed out that the war in Vietnam was being lost because it was not supported by 80% of the population. He inferred that the turmoil in South East Asia was a direct result of American involvement.

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 403 from Georgetown, May 30, reported Carlson’s observations of the meeting with Jagan, including Jagan’s view that the United States turned against him after what he thought had been a successful visit to Washington, presumably because “pressure had been brought on President by right wing groups or by CIA.” Jagan visited the United States and met with President Kennedy on October 25, 1961; for a memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XII, Document 259. Jagan also felt the only answer to the present situation was a grand coalition but that “speaking man to man,” Burnham would not join in because the United States would not let him. Carlson reported that he responded that he could not believe that the Premier, or Burnham, or D’Aguiar were or could be puppets of anybody. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 BR GU)

**380. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 25, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

I talked to Bill Burdett today about the situation in British Guiana. Bill made the following points:

1. The present unrest in British Guiana is still a long way from being serious. Only a few people have been hurt and the British response has been and has needed to be only a moderate one. The unrest, in part, is a sign that we are on the right track; Cheddi Jagan and/or his people are beginning to feel that they are on their way out and are stirring up trouble in the hope that they can reverse the trend. We will see more of this sort of thing over the next few months.

2. We should keep our eye on November. A postponement of elections might give a Labor Government in the UK an opportunity to throw a monkey wrench into our effort to get rid of Jagan.<sup>2</sup>

3. Our policy with respect to BG is the right one and we should stay with it. With a little luck, the events between now and November will be controllable. With a little more luck, events after November, with Jagan in opposition, will also be controllable.

4. There does seem to be an area where some useful work can be done. We probably can usefully do more planning with respect to the moves we will take once Jagan is gone. (I will look into this one—to see what planning has been done and what else needs to be done.)<sup>3</sup>

GC

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. I, Memos, 12/63–7/64. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> In a May 28 memorandum Chase reported to Bundy that he had spoken to Burdett about preparing for a Labor Party victory. Burdett advised against talking to Labor before the election, but also recommended that, if Labor won, "our Ambassador should immediately talk to the new Prime Minister." Chase added that he would talk to Burdett's replacement, J. Harold Shullaw, about the need for further contingency planning with respect to a Labor victory. A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence reads "good." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence reads: "Also contingency planning for a Labor victory in United Kingdom."

**381. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 9, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

1. On 3 June 1964 Linden Forbes Burnham, leader of the People's National Congress (PNC), proposed in the Legislative Assembly that a three-party coalition government be formed to run British Guiana until elections are held under proportional representation (PR) later this year. Burnham's reasoning for suggesting a coalition now with the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the United Force (UF) was that it would lessen tensions and allow for more vigorous police action to control the situation. He further believed that acceptance of an interim coalition would mean that Premier Cheddi Jagan had acknowledged PR as the voting system. Burnham, however, indicated that he would go no further with this idea unless it was accepted by Peter D'Aguiar, leader of the UF.

2. D'Aguiar refused to join the coalition. Meanwhile, Jagan was preparing a counter proposal for a coalition of the PPP and PNC, excluding the UF. Jagan's proposal was contained in a letter sent to Burnham on 6 June. His coalition would last for from two to four years before new elections are held; these elections would be held under a combination of PR and the old voting system of first-past-the-post. Jagan proposed that the ministries be equally divided between the two parties, with Jagan as Prime Minister and Burnham as Deputy Prime Minister. Jagan suggested that the coalition continue after independence when the Ministries of Home Affairs and Defense would be divided between the two parties. Between now and independence Jagan asked that a United Nations presence be introduced in British Guiana and that the UN and Commonwealth nations be asked to aid in the creation of security and defense forces.

3. In reporting the above, Consul General Carlson [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in Georgetown said that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Jagan found this to be the expedient moment to propose such a coalition government: G.W.Y. Hucks, British electoral commissioner, had announced publicly on 4 June that voter registration had been very high in the Corentyne, a Jagan stronghold, and low in Georgetown, where Burnham is strongest. [*less than 1 line of source*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only.

*text not declassified*] Jagan may have been encouraged over his chances in the coming election or simply believes that now is psychologically an opportune time to press ostensibly reasonable terms of a coalition government on Burnham, hoping that he will panic into settling for half now rather than risk losing it all later on.

*[3 paragraphs (14½ lines of source text) not declassified]*

7. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Mr. J. Harold Shullaw of the Department of State.

RH

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**382. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 13, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

1. Attached is Georgetown's 422<sup>2</sup> which reports that the Governor of BG has taken over the emergency powers from the Council of Ministers and has started to pick up some of the people who are suspected of being responsible for the recent violence.<sup>3</sup> This action by the Governor does not detract from the other responsibilities of the Ministers, which remain intact.

2. Harry Shullaw (Bill Burdett's successor) tells me that State (Harry, Alexis Johnson, and Bill Tyler) feels that the Governor is the best judge of the present situation and that his step may give us a breather for a while. Harry feels that there are few negatives involved in the move. Jagan's forces may try to use the development as a new

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. I, Memos, 12/63-7/64. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 422 from Georgetown, June 13, not attached, reported Governor Luyt's new Order-in-Council "which in effect puts him rather than Jagan regime in charge of emergency." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 BR GU)

<sup>3</sup> A June 12 memorandum to Bundy reported that a number of prominent PPP leaders were scheduled for immediate arrest under the secret and about-to-be-invoked Order-in-Council emergency regulations, which permitted the detention of persons suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File)

reason for postponing the elections, but unrestrained violence probably works toward this end even more effectively.

3. The Committee of 24 at the UN has been hearing appeals from the Jagan forces and renewed appeals can probably be expected. The British will probably be able to continue to stall off a UN inquiry on the grounds that BG is an internal British matter and that the British are already working towards a solution (i.e. PR). Neither we nor the British favor a UN inquiry since such an inquiry could conceivably lead to a UN recommendation that PR be substituted by another scheme.

4. In general, I think the situation in BG is still tolerable. It merits close watching, however, and I will continue to keep an eye out.

GC

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**383. Telegram From the Consulate General in British Guiana to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Georgetown, June 27, 1964, 1600Z.

443. Premier Jagan called me to his office late afternoon June 26 and talked over an hour along following lines. For first time he is seriously worried about what is happening in BG and where it is going. Several years ago he thought BG had bright future; there was much waiting to be done in way of economic development and possibility help solve problems outside BG. For example, Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad were all facing pressing economic problems resulting partly from exploding populations. They were trying solve this by some industrialization but would never be able to keep up. In fact, all these places were just barely keeping the lid on. (He apologized at this point for digressing.)

Now in British Guiana there was this deplorable violence, senseless retaliation, and there seemed no end in sight. A few days ago he had to take his daughter out of school in Georgetown because of harassment by classmates. Several times he asked somewhat rhetorically "what can be done?" I asked if he were satisfied that he and the two opposition leaders had done everything that was within their power, individually as well as collectively, to stop the violence. He said he thought so but that everybody could not be controlled. He said he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 BR GU. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London.

wanted this to be a very frank discussion. I asked him if he believed people in Mazaruni had anything to do with violence. He quickly replied that he did not think so but there was this theory of a plan. He said he wished to talk about solutions.

He said as I knew he had been seeking coalition but his efforts had come to nothing. In past few days he had been talking with Governor about such possibility and now he wished to talk with me. As long as U.S. was opposed to having PPP in coalition or in government at all, Burnham would refuse. During coalition negotiations with Burnham when Ghanaian delegation was here, Jagan had made concession after concession, including parity in cabinet, but Burnham always had another demand. This experience and subsequent ones simply illustrate that Burnham will not go against wishes of U.S.

He had thought many times about what caused his relations with U.S. to "go sour." He still did not know specifically how this happened. He used to go annually from 1957 to 1961 to the U.S. and personal relations were very good. In 1961 he had talks with President Kennedy, Chester Bowles, Schlesinger, and other top officials. They had probed him very deeply and he had every reason to believe that he had passed the test. He had been quite frank with them about his socialist views. Generally speaking he was inclined to think there were two reasons for the deterioration: opposition leaders in BG had effectively spread word in U.S. that he was Communist and secondly, there had been U.S. trouble with Cuba. These two elements, in interacting way, had given impression that he was potential menace to U.S. This was myth but was now fact of life in U.S. which he must recognize. In actual fact, he said, U.S. need have no concern on this score.

Recently he had talked with various elements in Georgetown including Pres. Chamber of Commerce, businessmen, Catholic Church, etc. about possible solution to BG problem. Several had told him that he and PPP were Communist, that there was fear of regimentation, exclusion of private enterprise, and, if independent, of invitation by him to Soviets and Cubans to come in. He told them in essence that his record belied any danger to private enterprise. He had publicly pledged to keep his hands off sugar and bauxite industries, and as for regimentation, there could be ironclad guarantees in constitution and he was not fool enough to try tear up constitution with opposition being so strong in BG. As for Soviets and Cubans, he was prepared have treaty of neutrality, e.g., along Austrian lines. If U.S. wanted, it could have right to intervene. This was in fact unnecessary because he realized U.S. would intervene in any event if its security were threatened. Some businessmen had mentioned BG might be another Zanzibar, but he realized BG in same hemisphere as U.S. and events which take place in Africa would not be permitted to take place here.



Jagan said in final analysis only three courses now possible in BG: (1) coalition; (2) civil war; (3) partition. He thought coalition was dependent on U.S. He thought partition was no solution and recalled difficulties and suffering which ensued when India was partitioned. Economically partition would not make sense, but BG already is drifting toward partition. (I agreed that partition would not represent progress.) He could see no end to violence without coalition. Uncontrollable groups were now operating. I asked whether when he said coalition he meant all three parties. He said no, he meant PPP–PNC because their objectives were more similar and in any event there should be an opposition party. I asked whether he had in mind coalition now before election or after or both. He did not see much value in coalition before election since ministers would just be settling into their jobs “when the dog fight of elections would start in October or November,” but he was willing to consider it. He was more interested in agreement for coalition after elections. While he much preferred postponement of election to give time to work out problems, he was willing to consider acceptance of no postponement. He added that PPP had not yet decided whether to contest those elections.

He then asked where U.S. stood and what my views were. I told him that U.S. was assuming that course of events would be determined by elections in implementation of Colonial Secretary’s decision and that after the elections we would presumably know with what government we would be dealing. In meantime, pending basic political decision by electorate, we were in effect simply waiting. I indicated incidental opinion that he placed far too much weight on view that Burnham acted on basis of what he thought U.S. wanted. In my experience, politicians of all kinds were guided primarily, if not entirely, by what they thought would get votes and how they would fare at polls. I suggested that what happens in BG is for parties here to decide and matters of coalition or no coalition were not matters for U.S. to determine but could and undoubtedly would be decided by political leaders here. I mentioned that if he wished I would report his views exactly insofar as possible as presented to me. He was extremely pleased. I cautioned however that there would not necessarily be any response but that channels of communication were open and I would faithfully report his views at any time.

*Comment:* Jagan gave controlled performance. He was purposely calm, reasonable, most courteous, earnest. Only sign of tension was slight shaking of hands at times; otherwise he seemed relaxed. It is obvious that he would give almost anything to obtain U.S. support and will leap at any possibility of favorable response. We can probably expect some more peace feelers.

Carlson

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**384. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1964.

**SUBJECT**

British Guiana Meeting, June 30, 1964

**PARTICIPANTS**Mr. Tyler; Mr. Cobb; Mr. Helms; [2 names not declassified]; Mr. McGeorge Bundy;  
Mr. Chase

The meeting was called at Mr. Tyler's request, primarily to discuss recent messages about the situation in BG.

1. *Jagan's Coalition Proposal*—The group agreed with the Consulate General's assessment that we should steer clear of a coalition government.<sup>2</sup> We are on the right track and should press ahead towards the elections. If necessary, we should stiffen up Governor Luyt who has given some indications that he may be weakening on the coalition issue—i.e. the Governor is very concerned about the security situation, and may feel that a coalition will reduce the terrorism.

2. *Jagan's Emissary to U.S.*—While a dialogue with Jagan might conceivably cool down the BG security problem, it was decided that we should not accept a visit from a Jagan emissary.<sup>3</sup> We would be able to get no meaningful concessions from Jagan and the fact that we talked to a Jagan emissary would probably help Jagan's cause. Moreover, it would be difficult to keep a dialogue going (for purposes of cooling down the security situation) since we would have very little to say to Jagan.

3. *UN Trusteeship*—The group discussed Eric Williams' proposal that BG be made a UN trusteeship for five years. The group did not think this was a good idea since at best it would only delay a bad situation, and at worst might make the Communist menace even tougher to control.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Chase on July 2.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 440 from Georgetown, dated June 27, reported Carlson's concern about an abortive Canadian attempt to promote a PPP-PNC coalition. (Ibid., Country File, British Guiana, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63-7/64)

<sup>3</sup> A telegram to London, July 2, reported that Jagan wished to send Attorney General Ramsahoye to Washington to discuss the British Guiana problem with Department officers. The Department requested that the Colonial Office have the Governor decline to transmit Jagan's request. (Ibid., Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File)

4. The group agreed on the following actions: *First*, State [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would cable Georgetown and tell our people that we agree with their assessment and are against a coalition and emissary.<sup>4</sup> *Second*, State will tell Ambassador Bruce to talk to the British about the BG situation. Bruce will try to get the British to apply whatever force is necessary to control the security situation in BG.<sup>5</sup> *Third*, at a somewhat lower level, the U.S. Government and HMG will get together in the near future to compare notes and insure that we are still on the same wave length.

GC

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<sup>4</sup> An undated telegram to Georgetown advised “we do not believe coalition talk should be encouraged” and “we have no intention of receiving any envoy from British Guiana for we do not wish to give Jagan any encouragement.” It also stated that Jagan should be advised that the U.S. Government was in no position to direct Burnham to accept or reject a coalition and that any question of an envoy should be taken up with the Governor, the official responsible for external affairs. (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> In an undated telegram to London for Ambassador Bruce, Tyler requested that Bruce inform the Colonial Office that “we are anxious that every effort be made to hold elections in November under proportional representation as planned,” that additional UK forces be sent to British Guiana, and that all possible steps be taken to put down further violence there. (Ibid.) A telegram from London to Tyler, July 2, reported that the Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, responded that HMG intended to go forward with the elections as planned, was most reluctant to send more troops to British Guiana, and had reached no conclusion about the possibility of a coalition, but would consult with the United States before doing so. (Ibid.)

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**385. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 17, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

The following message for you was received from William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on 17 July 1964:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only. A marginal note in Bundy's handwriting indicates the memorandum was sent to Gordon Chase for information.

"1. The US/UK talks on British Guiana on 16 July<sup>2</sup> chaired by Sir Hilton Poynton, Permanent Undersecretary of the Colonial Office, produced basic agreement on an assessment of the security situation, electoral prospects, and the need to proceed on course with elections in late November or early December. There was agreement on both sides that, although results might be close, registration figures indicated that Premier Cheddi Jagan, at best, could get no more than 48 per cent and probably would not get more than 46 per cent of the vote. This calculation did not presume that an alternative East Indian party would have any strength, and both sides agreed every effort should be made to keep them from falling by the wayside.

"2. The British maintained that the principal threat to elections comes from the deteriorating security situation. They suggested that even with one division peace and order could not be guaranteed. The situation in Georgetown is particularly critical in that violence there could force the postponement of elections. The British urged that Forbes Burnham, leader of the People's National Congress (PNC), be counselled to exercise all possible restraint on his supporters in Georgetown. They noted that the London papers played up the killing of Indian children, omitting African deaths and arson.

"3. The British said the Governor had suggested he be authorized to try to obtain a PNC/People's Progressive Party coalition as a means of reducing tension in the pre-electoral period. They acknowledged that assurances of success were limited, but thought that failure might be attributed to Jagan and serve to discredit him. We explained the bases of our opposition and found that the British did not take issue with them.

"4. On the assumption a non-Jagan government could be formed, we said we would be prepared to extend the same financial assistance we agreed last October. The British suggested the formation of a US/UK/Canada joint development commission to work out a long term plan. We made it clear that US aid was predicated on Jagan's not being included in the post election government.

"5. When the British inquired what policy might be should Jagan win, we reiterated that such a situation would be politically intolerable in the United States.

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<sup>2</sup> In a July 11 memorandum to Ball, Tyler reported that he and Shullaw intended "to discuss tactics" with the British and that "our objective continues to be the holding of elections later this year under a system of proportional representation which hopefully will result in the formation of a new Government replacing the Jagan regime." Tyler added that the threat to this objective "arises from the deteriorating security situation and from Jagan's efforts to exploit a situation for which he and his followers are primarily responsible, so as to secure a postponement of the elections." (*Ibid.*, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. I, Memos, 12/63-7/64)

"6. On the question of the envoy to the United States the British said they could not oppose if Jagan came in a private capacity and expressed hope he would be received. We said we had made no plans to receive him or any other emissary and hoped the situation would not arise.

"7. The question of possible steps to assist in the security problem were discussed at length and the British agreed to explore with the Governor, who will be recalled for consultation soon:

"a. the possibility of establishing under the emergency regulations communal peace committees, seeking to obtain the public support of Jagan and Burnham for same.

"b. announcing the date of elections at this time as an indication of their firmness of intention to proceed.

"c. the formation of a national government in which all three parties would participate.

"8. Both sides agreed that little leverage existed to force Jagan to cooperate in the elections since he had everything to lose and nothing to gain.

"9. An agreed minute is being prepared."

RH

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### 386. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 27, 1964.

#### SUBJECT

British Guiana Meeting—July 27, 1964

#### PARTICIPANTS

William Tyler; Harold Shullaw; William Cobb; Richard Helms; [*name not declassified*]; McGeorge Bundy; Peter Jessup; Gordon Chase

1. The meeting was called to discuss the attached cable from Georgetown.<sup>2</sup> The cable reported Consul General Carlson's apprehension about telling Cheddi Jagan we are not ready to receive an envoy.

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<sup>1</sup> Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Chase on July 29.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Georgetown IN 35522, July 24, from Carlson to Shullaw; attached but not printed. (*Ibid.*)

2. The group agreed that a visit to the U.S. by a Jagan emissary would be a bad thing. At worst, such a visit would be interpreted to mean that the U.S. supports Cheddi Jagan; at best it would be interpreted as a sign that we can live with him. The visit would hurt the opposition parties in BG and would not help us domestically.

3. The group then discussed whether it would be advisable to send a lower-level official down to BG to talk to Cheddi Jagan as well as to the two opposition leaders. The advantages of this would be that we would appear reasonable ("willing to listen"), and that it might allow us to stall for time and reduce the rate of violence in the months between now and the BG elections. The main disadvantage is that any talks with Jagan will probably be misinterpreted by the uncommitted voters in BG—which number about 10%; such talks might indicate to these voters that "perhaps the U.S. does not think Cheddi is so bad."

4. The group agreed that Jagan's request to send an envoy to the U.S. should be turned down and that we should not offer to send someone down to BG. However, we should use more gentle wording than the flat assertion now under consideration—i.e. "This proposal has been informally discussed with the Americans and they see no useful purpose for it. Therefore, it would be better if the proposal were dropped." Instead, a more flexible position should be adopted which offers a quid pro quo—i.e. when the violence stops, we will reconsider the proposal. The group decided that a cable should be drafted in this sense and sent to London,<sup>3</sup> with an information copy to Georgetown (copy attached).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> An attached undated telegram to London requested the Embassy to ask the Colonial Office to modify its instructions to the Governor to the following: "This proposal has been informally discussed with the Americans who see no useful purpose in it at this time. The Americans are obviously influenced in this point of view by continuing pattern of violence in British Guiana and widespread belief in British Guiana, as elsewhere, that PPP as governing party bears heavy responsibility this state of affairs. Their subsequent attitude toward question of emissary naturally would be influenced by course of events in British Guiana." (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> According to an August 1 telegram from Carlson to Shullaw, the Governor delivered the message to Jagan on July 30, but omitted the part suggesting that the PPP was responsible for the violence. Jagan made no objection, observing that "it means then that if things stay quiet emissary will be received" to which the Governor responded that he could not speculate beyond the wording of the message. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana 1964 [file name not declassified])

**387. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1964.

SUBJECT

Proposed Reply to Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys' Letter on British Guiana

*Problem*

Duncan Sandys has written to you (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> stating that he believes order and security in British Guiana can only be restored through an all party coalition government. He asks for our support in bringing about such a coalition.

*Discussion*

During my talks in London with British officials July 16 and 17 I outlined the reasons why we thought a pre-election coalition of Jagan's party and the two opposition parties was of doubtful value so far as security is concerned and dangerous from the point of view of our political objectives in British Guiana. The British officials with whom we talked were unable to make a convincing case for the coalition. Despite this Sandys has come down on the side of a coalition. I continue to believe this is an unwise and unnecessary move.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the attached message (Tab A)<sup>3</sup> to Sandys which reiterates our doubts about a coalition and asks for further consideration before the Governor is given instructions to try to bring one about.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Special Operations, 1964. Top Secret. Drafted by Shullaw. The memorandum is undated; the date used is the drafting date.

<sup>2</sup> The attached July 30 message from Sandys, stated that the British were not certain they would be able to restrain racial violence sufficiently to hold elections and that they were satisfied that the only method of restoring order and security was to bring about a temporary all-Party coalition to bridge the period to the elections.

<sup>3</sup> Document 388.

<sup>4</sup> Approved by Rusk.

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**388. Message From Secretary of State Rusk to the British Colonial Secretary (Sandys)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 4, 1964.

I fully appreciate your concern at continuing violence in British Guiana and your desire to find some way of preventing a situation developing which could necessitate postponement of the elections you intend holding in the colony later this year. I also sympathize with your capable and courageous Governor in his efforts to carry out his responsibilities under such trying conditions. In the circumstances I am somewhat hesitant to raise again the doubts and misgivings about a pre-election coalition which we expressed to your people at the recent London talks. Since, however, we are in complete agreement on the constructive objectives we are pursuing in British Guiana, I have no hesitation in doing so.

In the first place we seriously doubt that Jagan, who has been using violence for political purposes, would be likely to forego such tactics if a coalition were formed. Apart from that consideration there is, in our opinion, the very real possibility that a pre-election coalition would adversely affect the electoral prospects of the PNC and the UF by confusing the supporters of those two parties. A coalition of the PPP and PNC excluding the UF would endanger the hoped for post election PNC-UF coalition which at the moment is the only possibility of replacing the Jagan Government. In short, we share your view of the importance of holding the elections later this year but are concerned that nothing be done in the pre-election period in the quest for order and security which would jeopardize the currently hopeful electoral results.

Since the London talks on July 16 and 17 there have been several developments in British Guiana which may be relevant. The strike of the sugar workers has been ended in what amounts to a defeat for Jagan. Whether this will result in any immediate improvement in the security situation, of course, remains to be seen. I also understand that Jagan has broken off his "unity" talks with Burnham and D'Aguiar. In the course of those talks he clearly indicated that the coalition he seeks has as its objective postponement of the elections. He showed no interest in a coalition limited to a brief pre-election period but insisted on a five year coalition.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 BR GU. Top Secret. Drafted by Shullaw.



I would be most grateful if you would give further consideration to these very real concerns on our part about the dangers of such a course of action.<sup>2</sup>

Warm regards,

Dean Rusk<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In a personal message to Rusk, attached to an August 17 covering note from the British Embassy, Sandys' deputy, Sir Hilton Poynton, reported that the risk of violence was diminished and the case for a temporary coalition was therefore less strong. Poynton stated that he was sure that Sandys would agree, upon his return from holiday, that the idea should not be pursued under these circumstances. If, however, violence were to set in again at the pitch it reached in June and July, a temporary coalition might be reconsidered. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### 389. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 11, 1964.

#### SUBJECT

British Guiana—Meeting on September 11, 1964

#### PARTICIPANTS

Messrs. William Tyler; Harold Shullaw; Delmar Carlson; William Cobb; [*name not declassified*]; McGeorge Bundy; Gordon Chase

The meeting was called so that Consul General Carlson could brief the group about the current situation in BG.

1. *Election Prospects*—Mr. Carlson said that the election prospects are good. The Justice Party seems to be doing surprisingly well and everyone, including Jagan, seems to think that the anti-PPP forces will win. At the same time, the PPP is likely to get a plurality.

The group agreed that something would have to be done if the PPP did win. The general feeling was that, despite his conciliatory noises, Jagan is the same unrehabilitated bad egg he has always been; he has not really been “educated” by the US/Cuban experience.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, British Guiana, Special File. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Chase on September 14.

2. *Security Situation*—Mr. Carlson said that the security situation is fairly good these days. He added that this is the thing to watch before and after the elections. If the security situation gets very bad before elections, the Governor will be inclined to push for a PPP/PNC coalition. Assuming Burnham wins the election, a deteriorating and uncontrollable security situation could conceivably push Burnham and the Governor towards accepting the formation of a PPP/PNC coalition.

3. *Burnham*—Mr. Carlson made these points relating to Burnham: *First*, while Burnham is now getting on very well with the leaders of other opposition parties, we should not expect this to last forever. The anti-PPP forces are bound to have plenty of problems with one another in the future. *Second*, Mr. Carlson noted that Burnham and the British do not get along. The Governor does not like Burnham, who twists the lion's tail whenever he can. We can expect to see a growing British/Burnham problem. *Third*, Mr. Carlson said that while he is trying to build a relationship with Burnham, it is tough to do so. Burnham, a racist and probably anti-white, remembers slights and repays them; at the same time, he takes advantage of people who treat him softly. A recent frank exchange between Carlson and Burnham, however, proved at least partly satisfactory. Burnham said that if he gets into power he will not recognize the USSR and that he will have nothing to do with Cuba so long as he can find other people to buy British Guiana's rice.

4. *Other*—Mr. Carlson reported that Burnham had said that it would be helpful if, during his campaign, he could promise the voters something concrete (e.g. the East-West road and the airport terminal). The group agreed that we should go along with Burnham on this.

The group discussed briefly the future of Atkinson Field. Mr. Tyler agreed to call DOD's John McNaughton to get a reading on how important the facility is to us.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In a May 12, 1965, memorandum to Howard Meyers, Director of Operations for the Office of Politico-Military Affairs (G/PM), Shullaw reported that the Government of British Guiana wanted to resolve the status of Atkinson Field, and asked again for a reading from the Department of Defense regarding its retention. Shullaw stated that Carlson had reported that if the United States was prepared to agree to release the field unconditionally, the Government of British Guiana in return would probably be willing to agree to unrestricted authorization for the United States to use the field whenever it wished. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [file name not declassified] 1965)

**390. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 14, 1964.

For Ambassador Bruce from Tyler.

In our view, following considerations argue for desirability of expediting preparations for elections and setting election date as early in November as feasible with appropriate announcement earliest: (1) Possible complicity of Burnham in Georgetown violence and conceivably his indictment (which Governor considering), (2) likelihood of attempts by Jaganites and others to use such prospects to delay elections and seek alternative courses of action, (3) uncertainty of opposition groups over date of election, and (4) adverse effect of any late date on present momentum of opposition parties.

Appreciate Embassy conveying this thought to Coloff soonest since Governor Luyt in London this week and will be consulting Sandys.

FYI: Our primary aim with above is to avoid substantial interval when efforts might be made toy with Sandys' decision in some fashion, especially if Burnham under indictment for conspiracy commit murder. End FYI.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Policy Papers, 1964. Secret.

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**391. Telegram From the Consulate General in British Guiana to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Georgetown, October 3, 1964.

IN 86222. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] pass following message from Carlson to Shullaw:

In discussions with Burnham at his initiative early this week I found him relaxed and confident. He apparently believes election largely matter of getting vote out and having organized to do so along

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. II, Memos, 12/63–7/64. Secret.

lines of U.S. party he foresees no particular problem. Every week or so he plans to spend few days in countryside talking to small groups and has already done so in African pockets of Corantyne. He prefers this method rather than mass meetings in order minimize problem of security. He plans no concentrated campaign with mass meetings until last 3–4 weeks before December 7 election. His party manifesto will appear at start that phase of campaign. In meantime he plans issue separate pamphlets unemployment, education, roads, and rice.

Burnham was especially interested in any ammunition we could provide to counter Jagan's exploitation of theme that Cuban rice market depends on his continuation in office. I told him we were aware of this problem and would see what we could develop.

Burnham also much interested in what specifics he could promise in way of projects. I suggested (1) improvement of East Coast road; (2) maintenance of sea wall; (3) airport improvements, including new terminal building; (4) Berbice Bar cut. Re sea wall I pointed out he could claim regime jeopardized lives and property by failure do maintenance work over last few years. He could call attention to break in wall and flooding near Buxton early this year. He picked this up with alacrity. He also apparently liked Berbice Bar cut (which incidentally may improve his relations with New Amsterdam PNC boss Kendall who is not always enthusiastic about Burnham). He was all for East Coast road, but also suggested desirability improving road from New Amsterdam to Skeldon in Corantyne, saying need was especially great because not only is road in miserable condition but also there is no railroad. He also wanted Atkinson–Mackenzie road (estimated total cost U.S. \$8 million) and mentioned desirability developing road to Potaro and eventually on to Brazil. He thought this road would open up agricultural areas. Although he sought my immediate approval to road in Corantyne and Atkinson–Mackenzie road, I made clear I was not in position to go beyond East Coast road without further authorization. He asked me to look particularly into possible authorization of Corantyne road. He has in mind after very brief respite following election to announce full-scale program. He would like during four-year term to complete as many short-range projects as possible and to have made sufficient start on number of long-range projects that public can clearly see what future portends from Burnham administration. Shortly after announcing his program he apparently wishes to make tour abroad, not only for purposes prestige or recognition but also to collect commitments for financial or economic assistance. He did not specify what countries he has in mind but it will undoubtedly include Germany and U.S. He mentioned that Jagan had apparently been given much attention when he visited Washington in 1961. I have little doubt that Burnham will expect be received by the President and that he is already leading up to this suggestion.

*Comment:* It would be politically desirable for Burnham to advocate Corantyne road since it would so clearly benefit Indian community as well as have immediate impact as adjunct of East Coast road. This road passes through rice and sugar areas from New Amsterdam to Skeldon and is 48 miles long. In 1949–53 this road was rebuilt and paved reportedly at a cost of about U.S. \$3 million, but because of faulty engineering and construction it deteriorated almost completely after 4 years. Since then it has been occasionally patched. It is estimated that rehabilitation and paving with asphalt could be done for about U.S. \$1.5 million. It is suggested that Department explore feasibility of permitting me inform Burnham Corantyne road may also be improved.<sup>2</sup> The Department may wish consider whether touch base Colonial Office to obtain their concurrence to substitute Corantyne road for some other project or projects of equivalent value now on U.S.–U.K. agreed list. (Actually this road could be considered part of East Coast road.) Burnham will doubtlessly be raising matter of both Corantyne and possibly Atkinson–Mackenzie road with me shortly in order start preparing pamphlet on roads. Therefore, sooner we can decide whether we bless Corantyne road at least in principle the better.

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<sup>2</sup> In an unnumbered telegram to Carlson dated October 7, Shullaw reported that Burnham could be assured that the United States would assist British Guiana in road improvement projects and that this would include East Coast roads at least as far as Skelton. Regarding the Atkinson–MacKenzie road, Shullaw said that “assurances must be hedged at this time,” due to the question of how best to finance all the road projects. (Ibid.)

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### 392. Backchannel Message From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 14, 1964.

For Ambassador Bruce from Shullaw. There follows a paper on our interest in British Guiana which you may draw on in talking with Harold Wilson, should he become Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup> Wilson will undoubtedly have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana, Policy Papers, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Cobb.

<sup>2</sup> In an October 13 memorandum to Bundy, Chase stated that this cable was redrafted to delete mention of a possible Johnson–Wilson telephone call and instead stressed the need for Bruce to talk personally to Wilson, who was “sensitive to the US–UK Alliance.” A notation in Bundy’s handwriting on the memorandum reads “OK, MB.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. II Memos, 12/63–7/64)

a very tight schedule and countless other problems but we believe it would be best to go straight to him personally on this subject rather than to his Colonial Affairs Minister. So far as we can tell developments in BG are in accordance with our policy objectives and we hope Wilson will agree to continue along the charted course.

TALKING PAPER FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE  
(May be left with Mr. Wilson should he request it)

Since August 1961 the problems of British Guiana as it approaches independence have been discussed at the highest levels of our two governments with a view to seeking ways whereby the colony may obtain independence without posing a threat to the security of its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

As you know, Latin America is an area of the greatest importance to us. The establishment of an independent government in British Guiana under leadership which has been markedly receptive to communist ideas and vulnerable to communist subversion would create an intolerable situation for the United States and other countries in the Hemisphere. Previous British Governments have shown an understanding of this situation [*1 line of source text not declassified*] affording a full opportunity for the United States to express its views. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*] The President hopes you will share with him the conviction that it should continue along present lines.

It is the opinion of the United States Government that the proposed elections in British Guiana under Proportional Representation, despite the difficulties entailed, provide a democratic means through which the aspirations of all the people and races of British Guiana can be faithfully reflected. We believe that if the electorate participates fully in the elections the results can provide a basis for the formation of a representative government in which the possibility of communist infiltration will be significantly reduced. It is our intention to do what we can to assist a non-communist government in British Guiana so that the country at the earliest practicable date may attain independence with economic and social stability and have the prospect of playing a useful role in the hemisphere and in the community of free nations.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Bruce did not get an opportunity to talk to Wilson personally (the British Labor Party won the general parliamentary elections of October 15 and Harold Wilson, as party leader, became Prime Minister) and transmit this message, but did give it to Patrick Gordon Walker, the new Labor Foreign Secretary; see Document 394.

**393. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 17, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

Here are a few miscellaneous items on British Guiana.

1. The election prospects still look good. One of the things we are concentrating on is ensuring that the opposition parties turn out to vote on election day; to this end the CIA, in a deniable and discreet way, is providing financial incentives to party workers who are charged with the responsibility of getting out the vote. Another thing worth concentrating on is the job of ensuring that intimidation, threats, and violence do not hamper the conduct of the BG elections; attached is a cable from Carlson which describes British planning in this area.<sup>2</sup>

2. With respect to the impact on the BG situation of the Labor victory, State feels that the election was sufficiently close so that Labor will be chary of tampering with the present course of events in BG.

While this takes some of the edge off our worry, you may still want to talk about BG with Lord Harlech the next time you see him.<sup>3</sup>

3. We are going ahead with our contingency planning for a likely Burnham victory. In this regard, Harry Yoe, the AID man working on BG, will make a quiet trip to BG between November 4 and November 12 to evaluate projects which we may want to initiate immediately after the BG elections.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. II, Memos, 12/63–7/64. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Dated October 10; attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Two notations in Bundy's handwriting relating to this paragraph appear on the memorandum: one reads "Bruce and Walker talked recently," and the other reads "I did it. He assures me new Govt. will know of our interest."

**394. Backchannel Message From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

London, October 19, 1964.

From Ambassador Bruce to Secretary Rusk.

Have had no opportunity to deliver message,<sup>2</sup> as instructed, to Harold Wilson, if elected, on British Guiana.

I did, however, take subject up with Gordon Walker this morning, who will shortly discuss it with PriMin.

Foreign Secretary said present HMG had never approved policy predecessor on BG. They recognized, however, USG particular interest in safeguarding BG against Communist takeover. He will be prepared give answer during Washington trip.<sup>3</sup>

*[1 paragraph (1½ lines of source text) not declassified]*

*Comment.* 1. I think HMG will permit proposed December elections under proportional representation to take place. *[1 line of source text not declassified]*

2. Appointment of Greenwood as Colonial Secretary bodes no good for us later on in this affair. Nevertheless, I believe PriMin will keep him under strict control.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Policy Papers, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 392.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 396.

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**395. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 20, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. II, Memos, 12/63-7/64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Cobb.



We have just learned that Jagan is flying to London October 21 to urge the British to postpone the elections scheduled for December 7 in British Guiana. We also have a message from Ambassador Bruce<sup>2</sup> who has taken up British Guiana with Patrick Gordon Walker, who says he will discuss it promptly with the Prime Minister. Gordon Walker says he will be prepared to discuss British Guiana in his forthcoming visit and to give us his Government's position at that time. In view of the fact that we got to Gordon Walker first, we think it unlikely that the British will take any decision regarding postponement without consulting with us.<sup>3</sup>

Our real difficulties are likely to arise after the December 7 elections, since at that time Colonial Minister Tony Greenwood will naturally expect to play an important role in British Guiana developments.

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<sup>2</sup> A handwritten notation in the margin next to this sentence reads "attached." Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> In an October 20 memorandum to Bundy, Chase reported that, in his "weekly gabfest on BG" that morning with Richard Sampson and William Cobb, the latter had stated that the Labor government was very unlikely to postpone the elections. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. II, Memos, 12/63–7/64)

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**396. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Shullaw) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 27, 1964.

SUBJECT

Recent Events in British Guiana

Several weeks after the Anglo–US consultations in July 1964 violence in BG came to a virtual halt with the end of the sugar workers strike, and the beginning of the election campaign. In mid-August a new East Indian party was formed—the Justice Party—and Jagan announced that the PPP would participate in the elections "under protest."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Chronological File, 1964. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by Cobb.

The campaign is now in full swing with the deposit of electoral lists October 26, and the three major parties, as well as several new parties are active. As the campaign intensifies the likelihood of violence increases but every effort is being made to maintain security. To this end the US has just supplied 20 radio transmitter receivers and 10 jeeps for the police.

Jagan's actions indicate that he is on the defensive. He is blaming his government's failure to receive assistance on reactionary elements in the U.S. and the U.K., and he maintains that the intense internal dissatisfaction with his administration is attributable solely to outside influences. The most recent estimate from the Colonial office suggests Jagan would get only 40% of the vote if elections were held today. Last July we thought he would get from 45% to 48%.

We are preparing to move ahead with an assistance program for a non-Jagan government in BG. The program would consist of road rehabilitation, maintenance of the seawall, making a cut through the Berbice Bar to open up the New Amsterdam area, and construction of a road from Atkinson field to the interior. An AID representative will go to BG November 4 to investigate the degree to which the BG administrative services can be used in implementing the projects.

We must anticipate that if Jagan loses by a close vote HMG will press us to agree to a Jagan-Burnham coalition government after elections. They may argue that only in a PPP-PNC coalition can the major groups in the population be represented; that a government which does not contain the PPP will be under continuing attack designed to keep it from governing effectively; and that an African dominated Burnham government will seek to intimidate and repress the East Indians.

We believe a PPP-PNC coalition after the elections would only add to BG's problems. It would be politically impossible for the US to assist a government in which Jagan and his colleagues played a role. Intense personal rivalry between Jagan and Burnham would contribute to instability and intensify racial antagonisms. We hope that a coalition government can be formed without the PPP and that it will be genuinely multi-racial.<sup>2</sup> We will use the influence we have in support of such a government.

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 125 from Georgetown, October 26, reported a 2-hour discussion between Carlson and Burnham on October 23, during which the latter spoke of his thoughts about whom he wanted for the various cabinet positions in his coming government, with United Front and Justice Party leaders slotted for minor positions. Carlson reported that Burnham's "current thinking somewhat disturbing because may indicate intention make coalition government unduly PNC dominated with other parties' participation kind of sham," which Carlson said would be "very divisive" and would lead to a Burnham administration of "one term or less." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 BR GU)

**397. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 27, 1964, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
William R. Tyler, Assistant  
Secretary for European Affairs  
J. Harold Shullaw, Director,  
EUR/BN

*UK*

Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary  
The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador  
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under-  
Secretary, Foreign Office

By way of background the Secretary described the great problem in the Western Hemisphere of ensuring that the long overdue social and economic revolution is carried out democratically and without communist exploitation. He noted that the long tradition of the Monroe Doctrine means the strongest possible feeling in the United States against foreign intervention in this Hemisphere. In the case of Cuba, the two non-negotiable points are the Soviet presence and Cuban interference in the affairs of other Hemisphere countries. Castro has shown no willingness to cease this interference although the Cubans have suffered reverses in the case of Venezuela and the recent election in Chile.

The prospect that the United Kingdom might leave behind in an independent British Guiana a second Castro regime would be a major concern to the United States. Jagan has received aid from Castro and has meddled in Surinam. We cannot take a chance on him [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. Proportional Representation offers the possibility of unseating Jagan and obviating the need for direct British administration. We are prepared to give substantial assistance to a non-communist, non-Jagan government. The Secretary described the British Guiana problem as a gut issue on which we need the help of the British Government. He expressed the hope that the elections in British Guiana would be held as scheduled. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

In his reply, the Foreign Secretary remarked that a Labor Government could not do less than the Conservatives with respect to trade

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson–Department Messages, Vol. 2, 10/2/64–12/31/64. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. The memorandum indicates it is an advance copy; no final or approved copy has been found.

possibilities with Cuba. He said, however, that he would look into the suggestion made earlier by the Secretary that Britain as an alternative to trading with Cuba attempt to improve its trade ties with other Latin American countries. The Secretary said he would send the Foreign Secretary a message on what we thought might be done to strengthen UK relations with the Hemisphere.

With respect to British Guiana, the Foreign Secretary gave the assurance that his Government would proceed with the elections as scheduled. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The Foreign Secretary said he had a very unfavorable opinion of Burnham who is a thoroughly unreliable person. Regardless of the outcome, the election will provide no answer to the problem of racial conflict and therefore there is little prospect of early independence emerging from it. The previous Government committed itself to an early post-election conference on independence, which in the view of the Labor Government, was not desirable. He thought the preferable course of development would be along the lines of self-government with a Commonwealth Court consisting perhaps of Indians, Nigerians and Canadians to deal with the racial conflict. The actual date for independence could be fuzzed. The Foreign Secretary expressed the hope that even if British Guiana does not obtain early independence, it will nevertheless be possible for the United States to furnish aid. He added that Eric Williams on a recent visit to London had advised strongly against early independence.

The Secretary replied that we would be quite happy to see an indefinite continuation of British authority in British Guiana. Perhaps the Organization of American States might ask the British Government not to grant independence while racial strife continues.

Mr. Tyler added the comment that a Burnham-Jagan coalition would make it impossible to get Congressional approval of aid for British Guiana. The Foreign Secretary indicated that he recognized a Burnham-Jagan coalition would not work although the British Government could not take a public position to this effect.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) of source text not declassified]

**398. Airgram From the Consulate General in British Guiana to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

A-89

Georgetown, November 5, 1964.

SUBJECT

Foreign Policy of Possible Burnham Administration in British Guiana

This report is intended to make a matter of record certain assurances given to me by L.F.S. Burnham, Leader of the People's National Congress, concerning the foreign policy of a Burnham administration in an independent British Guiana. These assurances (which I conveyed orally during consultation in the Department in September) arose out of a very frank conversation in which I pointed out that while the general trend of Burnham's thinking was known to us, some important foreign policy aspects were unspecified. In the ensuing discussion and in response to my questions, Burnham assured me categorically that:

- 1) He would not recognize the USSR;
- 2) He would not recognize or associate in any way with the Castro regime;
- 3) He would cut off all trade with Cuba if asked to do so, provided that the U.S. arranged an equally good market for British Guiana's rice;
- 4) He would join the OAS.

In a discussion of some adverse impressions among some parts of the local community about Burnham he denied any intention to permit racial considerations to decide policy, to take over the trade union movement, or to establish a dictatorial regime.

*Comment:* When Burnham gave these assurances he was under the impression that I was being suddenly called to Washington for consultation about the British Guiana situation, including his role here.

**Delmar R. Carlson**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 BR GU. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.

### 399. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 7, 1964, 1:10 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Scope of Talks

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *U.S.*

The President  
Secretary Rusk  
Secretary McNamara  
Ambassador David Bruce  
Mr. George Ball  
Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. William R. Tyler

##### *UK*

Prime Minister Wilson  
Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary  
Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defense  
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador  
Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under  
Secretary of State  
Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet  
Mr. D. J. Mitchell, Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister

The President and Prime Minister Wilson joined the group at about 1:10 p.m. The President said that he had had a very enjoyable meeting with the Prime Minister, that both of them had discussed how to get reelected. Mr. Wilson said that he had very much enjoyed their talk which had related to principles, objectives and political background. They had not tried to get into any arguments for or against any particular solutions. The President said that he and the Prime Minister had whole-heartedly agreed that our objectives and hopes stand upon having a proper understanding of each other. It was better to talk across the table than in the columns of newspapers. He had told Wilson that "a burned child dreads fire," and that he didn't intend to pressure Mr. Wilson, and he felt sure that Mr. Wilson did not intend to pressure him. The President went on to say that he thought it would be useful for our two governments to continue to "reason together," as recommended in Isaiah. He felt that this meeting was a continuance of previous meetings which would permit both sides to explore their common problems and discuss them. Nothing would emerge from this meeting that was black on white or of a nature to make other countries feel that a blueprint of action had been developed by our two governments. We were not undertaking to provide answers to our problems at this meeting. The President said that he had to be very careful because of what the press tended to write.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on December 16. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and defense matters not related to British Guiana.]

The Secretary reported to the President very briefly on the discussions at Ministerial level which had been held while the two principals were talking alone that morning.<sup>2</sup> It had been decided that we would discuss defense questions this afternoon, also Southeast Asia, Southwest Africa, and other matters. Mr. Wilson said that he wanted to talk to the President about British Guiana. He had told Jagan that whoever wins in BG, the UK would not grant BG independence as there would be a blood bath if it did so.<sup>3</sup> He thought that if both Burnham and Jagan (the latter of whom he described as a naive Trotskyite) were out of BG it would be so much the better. He didn't think a government could be entrusted to either of them and the UK rather felt that the U.S. placed excessive trust in Burnham who was just as bad in his own way as Jagan was in his. In fact, interjected Gordon Walker, "they are both horrors." Mr. Wilson said that it would be necessary to arrange for a Canadian or an Australian distinguished judicial figure to go down to British Guiana in order to lay the groundwork for the organization of the judiciary, eventually.

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<sup>2</sup> A December 7 memorandum of conversation reported Rusk's discussion with Foreign Secretary Walker that morning concerning British Guiana. Walker said that HMG would not "go toward independence in the foreseeable future. Perhaps some steps toward increasing self-government could be devised." The Foreign Minister added that he thought that the U.S. Government "had an excessively favorable estimate of Burnham." (*Ibid.*, POL 16 BR GU)

<sup>3</sup> In a December 6 memorandum to the President, Ball urged Johnson "to demonstrate your personal interest" in British Guiana to Wilson by emphasizing that the United States attached great importance to a satisfactory outcome, that independence should not be granted prematurely, that the United States could not provide assistance to any government which included Jagan, and that it was hoped that close cooperation and aid would contribute to a racially peaceful, democratic, and non-Communist British Guiana. (*Ibid.*, POL BR GU)

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#### 400. Editorial Note

December 7, 1964, elections in British Guiana resulted in Jagan's Peoples' Progressive Party gaining 45.6 percent of the popular vote and 24 seats in the legislature. Burnham's Peoples' National Congress (PNC) won 40.5 percent of the popular vote and 22 seats in the legislature. However, in accordance with the constitutional tradition in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, the Governor offered the Premiership to Forbes Burnham as the person commanding the most

confidence of the legislature as a whole. Burnham was asked to form a government, and he did so by placing his party in coalition with Peter D'Aguiar's United Force (UF), which had won 12.5 percent of the popular vote and 7 seats in the legislature. It took several weeks for the PNC and the UF to agree on terms for a coalition.

Jagan initially refused to resign as Premier and he did so only after an Order in Council was issued in London authorizing his removal. Jagan later held a press conference in which he promised strong but non-violent opposition to the new government.

In telegram 196 from Georgetown, December 10, Carlson reported that the most striking aspect of the election was the extent of racial voting. He reported that "in one district after another the number of votes for Jagan's PPP was approximately the same as number of registered Indian voters." Carlson said that the cause of "such complete racial voting by Indians apparently stems from fear and distrust of African-led government" and that the PPP's propaganda and pre-election violence played on those fears and "created psychology which made Indians impervious to reason. Thus Indians deserted United Force with its advocacy of multi-racial approach, non-violence, and prosperity. Likewise rejected was Justice Party leader Rai's logical appeal to Indian self-interest to obtain share in non-PPP administration which was certain to come about as result of election." Carlson concluded that the consequence of this racial voting was that the PNC-UF coalition would have to govern without significant Indian representation.

Considering the future, Carlson was pessimistic about the depth of the racial cleavage in British Guiana. He speculated that while the Burnham administration would probably try to "demonstrate responsibility, improved government, and assistance" to all Guianese, it seemed unlikely that such an approach would lead to Burnham's re-election within the next few years, "especially in view of increased number of eligible Indian voters at that time. Therefore it might be expected before another election Burnham administration may seriously toy with more radical solutions, possibly e.g. seeking obtain independence in order to tamper with the electoral system." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 BR GU)



**401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in British Guiana<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1964.

For Carlson from Shullaw.

We believe it would be helpful if you were to talk with Burnham soonest while he is considering composition of the cabinet and make the following points.

1. We were gratified by the election outcome for in our view it provides a basis on which B.G. can move forward toward independence without the danger of communist domination.

2. We were pleased by the report from our Consul General that in his view a PNC/UF coalition appeared certain.<sup>2</sup> We think this is of vital importance as a means of maintaining the broadest possible support for the new government. We do not hold any brief for any specified United Force representation, that is, we hold no brief for including D'Aguiar himself in the cabinet. The important thing is UF representation.

3. We were pleased to hear that Burnham was studying ways to include East Indians in the government. We have heard that he is considering Rai for an important appointive position to head a commission and we think this is a wise move. We also think there would be much merit in having an East Indian Attorney General and perhaps this could be achieved with Ramsahoye by changing the constitution so that the Attorney General would not be a member of the government.

4. We would not be opposed to Burnham trying to bring one or two moderate PPP Indians into his cabinet but in this connection it must be clearly understood that the United States would not be able to provide assistance for a government which involved a PPP/PNC coalition of any kind or which included Jagan or his henchmen. We assume that Burnham will be on guard against approaches by Jagan to get the nose of his camel under the tent.

For your information in our talks in London we will take position that election outcome is advantageous our joint interests. While we are

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Chronological File, 1964. Secret. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 193 from Georgetown, December 10, Carlson reported that Burnham had admitted to him that the United Front commanded much of the managerial talent in the country, "which new administration would need." Burnham's main concern was the "means to overcome what he called 'Jaganism.'" Carlson reported that Burnham "urged desirability of early independence and appealed to me to persuade the USG to use its influence to that end," and that Burnham said that he did not want to be "hampered" by British "fair play" and that "if we do not down this 'ogre Jagan' before too long we will never be able to do so." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 BR GU)

disappointed at showing of JP, GUMP, etc., we do not think idea of alternative EIP<sup>3</sup> should be dropped. We anticipate that UK may seek our support for a PPP/PNC coalition but we will resist this appeal. Our position is that new government without Jagan should be given chance demonstrate capacity and work for racial harmony and this best achieved by not including PPP members who provoked racial strife for their own ends. We plan to counsel Burnham toward moderation and assist him where possible.<sup>4</sup> To include Jagan and PPP in a coalition would probably lead to strife and jeopardize this assistance.

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<sup>3</sup> East Indian party.

<sup>4</sup> In a telegram from Georgetown to London, December 11, to the attention of Ericson for Shullaw, Carlson reported Burnham's basic agreement with the U.S. advice. Carlson stressed to Burnham the importance of reaching a coalition agreement with the UF quickly; otherwise the new administration would be vulnerable to claims that it was only a minority government, "and that it would be wise to ensure that UF accepts responsibility for new government." Carlson also advised that UF participation would encourage the business community and private investors. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson-Department Messages, Vol. 2, 10/2/64-12/31/64) In a telegram from Georgetown to London, December 17, to the attention of Ericson for Shullaw, Carlson reported that he had urged that UF leaders be included in the list of original cabinet appointments, after Burnham had stated that "having UF in cabinet would evolve in month or two." (Ibid.)

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**402. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Shullaw) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 21, 1964.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

There is attached the agreed minute of our official level talks in London, December 17-18.<sup>2</sup>

The talks were from our standpoint most satisfactory. We found that in the British view so long as Jagan continues as the leader of the Indian community racial harmony cannot be re-established without a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Chronological File, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Cobb.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

rapprochement between him and Burnham. You will note that we took issue with this concept pointing out that Jagan's record does not justify any assumption that he can serve as a basis for the establishment of racial harmony. I believe we have in effect bought time which Mr. Burnham can use to try to allay the Indian fears. If Burnham's actions bear out the intentions of his speeches, there may be some basis for hope.<sup>3</sup>

On the question of prompt action to start a vigorous assistance program in British Guiana,<sup>4</sup> we found that HMG was in such a state of indecision regarding the role of its new Ministry of Overseas Development that we could not get authority for Mr. Yoe to proceed to Georgetown on January 1.<sup>5</sup> They indicated a willingness to give this authority at an early date<sup>6</sup> and I hope we will not be delayed. The power play between the Ministry of Overseas Development and the Colonial Office may give us a number of problems before responsibilities are finally divided between the ministers.

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<sup>3</sup> The agreed minutes of the U.K.–U.S. consultations reported that U.S. officials made the case that “the Justice Party could continue to serve a useful purpose” as an alternative for Indian voters and that Indian confidence could be won by including Indians in the government and in other public bodies, especially in the police force. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson–Department Messages, Vol. 2, 10/2/64–12/31/65)

<sup>4</sup> In a telegram to Ericson in London for use at the U.S.–U.K. conference, December 8, Shullaw reported that the AID program proposed for British Guiana for the 1965 calendar year included \$5.8 million in grants for road and sea defense maintenance; \$.825 million in grants for technical assistance; \$5.0 million in a development loan for the Atkinson–McKenzie road; and \$3.5 million in loans for public works, small industry, and housing. (Ibid., British Guiana Chronological File, 1964)

<sup>5</sup> The record of the U.S.–U.K. meeting on economic aid to British Guiana is reported in a memorandum of conversation, dated December 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/NC Files: Lot 69 D 41, Folder Guyana 66)

<sup>6</sup> In a telegram from Georgetown to London, December 17, to the attention of Ericson for Shullaw, Carlson reported that the Governor thought that the “program looked fine.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson–Department Messages, Vol. 2, 10/2/64–12/31/64)

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403. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 4, 1965.

## SUBJECT

Aid Program for British Guiana

## PARTICIPANTS

Michael N. F. Stewart, Minister, British Embassy  
Iain J. M. Sutherland, First Secretary, British Embassy  
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA

In the absence of Lord Harlech, Mr. Stewart was asked to come in to see the Secretary today on the subject of British Guiana. Mr. Tyler explained that the Secretary had been obliged to go to the White House and had instructed him to convey his views to Mr. Stewart.

We believe that Burnham has not done badly since taking office and that he has adopted a moderate and constructive line in his public statements regarding racial conciliation. We are under no illusions about Burnham's weaknesses and shortcomings. He is not ideal, but nevertheless he is the only alternative at present to Jagan and the PPP.

We have told Burnham that we would move ahead rapidly on an aid program immediately after the British Guiana elections. We are ready to do so and wish to send an AID official, Mr. Yoe, to Georgetown to work out details. Any delay, we are convinced, would have extremely adverse consequences. Such delay would destroy Burnham's confidence in us and make his relations with Governor Luyt difficult.

We are asking, therefore, with great urgency that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary authorize our going ahead with the implementation of our aid program.<sup>2</sup> We have had a formal request from Burnham dated December 29 which he states has been submitted with the agreement of the Governor.<sup>3</sup> We have instructed our Embassy in London to give copies of the letter of request to the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Overseas Development. To get the program under way at the earliest date, we are proposing that Mr. Yoe and an engineer proceed to Georgetown on or about January 10.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) BR GU. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw. The meeting was held at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> At a January 8 meeting Stewart told Tyler that "HMG warmly welcomes the U.S. (aid) proposal." (Memorandum of conversation, January 8; *ibid.*, POL 2 BR GU)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

In response to Mr. Stewart's question, Mr. Shullaw said that we had outlined our proposed aid program during our talks with British officials in London on December 17 and 18. We had also at that time said that we would like to send Mr. Yoe to Georgetown at the beginning of January.

Mr. Stewart said that he would report immediately to London on this conversation and our request for clearance for Mr. Yoe's visit.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In a January 23 letter to Crockett, Harry W. Yoe (AID) reported that he had arrived in British Guiana on January 15 and met with Burnham and Finance Minister D'Aguiar, and was impressed that they and other figures in the government and the civil service had a "sincere desire to utilize the assistance given in the most efficient manner," but that work on the roads and sea wall was hampered by a shortage of machinery and trucks. Yoe suggested that equipment could be obtained quickly from "ready stocks of the Navy." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65)

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#### 404. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 8, 1965.

##### SUBJECT

British Guiana and Cuba

1. *[1½ lines of source text not declassified]*<sup>2</sup> there is a note of optimism in BG these days, even among East Indians; *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* the Governor is pleasantly surprised by Burnham's performance thus far, and *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* the two men seem to be getting along quite well with each other; *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* we can expect the PPP to come

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> *[text not declassified]* British Guiana, visited the country January 16–19. He did not meet with Burnham during this trip, but did meet with him on February 3 in New York. Burnham was en route to British Guiana from the United Kingdom, where he met the new Colonial Secretary, Anthony Greenwood, whom Burnham found "not as pro-Jagan as he had originally assumed." (Memorandum to Cobb, February 4; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson—Department *[file name not declassified]*, Vol. 2, 10/2/64–12/31/64)

up with some kind of shennanigans during Greenwood's visit to BG,<sup>3</sup> now scheduled for about February 12–15.

2. [7 lines of source text not declassified]

3. *BG Rice Exports*—There is a glut of rice in BG these days and we are working [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]<sup>4</sup> on ways of moving some of it into the export market. This is important; as you may recall, one of Cheddi's major claims during the campaign was that only the PPP was able to dispose of BG rice (grown primarily by East Indians).

[Omitted here is material unrelated to British Guiana.]

GC

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<sup>3</sup> [text not declassified] reported PPP intentions "to assume a more aggressive attitude" toward the new Burnham government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65)

<sup>4</sup> In a February 26 memorandum to Deputy Director Helms, Assistant Secretary Tyler requested [text not declassified] on a project involving the disbursement of up to \$550,000 to subsidize the clandestine purchase of 5,000 tons of rice from British Guiana. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana White House Meetings)

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#### 405. Memorandum From the Officer-in-Charge of British Guiana Affairs (Cobb) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Shullaw)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 19, 1965.

##### SUBJECT

Events in British Guiana—February 5–19

1. The Greenwood visit was very successful from our point of view. Jagan behaved like a petulant adolescent, while Burnham and D'Aguiar made favorable impressions.<sup>2</sup> The security situation did not

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana White House Meetings. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 290 from Georgetown, February 15, Carlson reported a discussion with Greenwood, who agreed that Burnham had done well but thought that "sooner or later Cheddi would win an election." Greenwood said, "I don't subscribe to the view, you know, that Cheddi is a Communist," he was "in his way brilliant although rather incompetent. He then remarked: 'On the other hand, here is this other man who knows so quickly relationships, where British Guiana fits in the wider scheme of things, procedures, etc., whereas Cheddi just does not grasp those things.'" (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 BR GU)

get out of hand even though there was a marked increase in the number of troublesome incidents. Jagan is reportedly going to Leipzig to get bloc funds but whether his line of credit with the bloc is still good remains to be seen.

2. Reynolds metals signed on February 16 a 25-year contract with the government. It will double production to 600,000 tons annually and Reynolds has paid \$500,000 in advance income taxes. Total taxation bauxite industry will be 50% of profits this year according to D'Aguiar.

3. Rice is still our number one problem. An American rice broker arrives in British Guiana February 22 to try to arrange a sale with Peru but the Rice Market Board may not do business since it seems to insist on a premium price. Puerto Rico's Governor is seeking ways to help out also. An American rice growing specialist will go to British Guiana in March.

4. Burnham told Carlson he had asked Police Commissioner to give us a list of the equipment needed to modernize police force. We sent a message stressing that we could provide no equipment until we conducted a public safety survey and that we would not conduct a survey unless HMG requests it.<sup>3</sup> I doubt we should be in the police business so long as the UK is in BG.<sup>4</sup>

5. In response to a request from D'Aguiar for financial advice we indicated we could send on a short visit an FSR and a FSO who might be helpful.

6. HMG is not amused by public reference to John Carter as next BG Ambassador to the U.S. and asks us to discourage same.

7. To get the AID program going we need to buy road machinery in a hurry. Gordon Chase is checking with Defense to see if they have stocks which we might tap (the Navy Department told us it does not have) and AID has been asked to assemble the machinery and trucks as quickly as possible but it looks as if we will have a 90-day delay which isn't good.

8. 100,000 pounds of dried milk was shipped from Panama in early February and this should keep the glasses filled until the shipment from New Orleans arrives. Carlson has asked for a PL-480 adviser

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 156 to Georgetown, February 12. (Ibid., POL 23-8 BR GU)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 305 from Georgetown, February 24, Carlson agreed but added that the situation was "so different from that elsewhere" that it merited special consideration and suggested supplying the police with vehicles and motorcycles after obtaining U.K. approval. (Ibid., AID (US) BR GU)

since the BG Red Cross wants to get out of the milk business July 1. The specialist who recently worked out a program for Jamaica will be available to go down in late March or early April.

9. At the Canadians' request Harry Yoe is going to Ottawa to co-ordinate assistance planning for BG. I advised the U.K. Embassy.

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#### **406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Georgetown<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 25, 1965.

Foll for Carlson from Shullaw:

Your message<sup>2</sup> re Greenwood visit extremely enlightening. Was apparently more productive than we had anticipated. We agree with Governor that it is important to take advantage of Greenwood's good will and provide him with basis for [garble—convincing?] Labor Party that Burnham is more responsible than many Laborites have believed. You should therefore after briefing Governor on our views, pass them on to Burnham in manner you judge most likely be effective.

1. U.S. has heard very favorable report about Greenwood's visit from HMG,<sup>3</sup> and is aware Burnham's astute statesmanship was major factor in visit's success.

2. U.S. believes that if Burnham agrees now to authorize Greenwood to establish commission to examine question of racial imbalance he will in effect speed up setting date for constitutional conference.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson—Department Messages [file name not declassified], Vol. 3, 1/1/65–7/6/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 405.

<sup>3</sup> A February 18 memorandum to Bundy indicated that Greenwood had been very impressed by Burnham, "commenting that he had no idea that he was a man of such stature," while the performance of Jagan and his party was "lamentable." Greenwood no longer believed a coalition of Jagan's party and Burnham's party would work. Greenwood reportedly felt that if the racial imbalance question in the security forces could be resolved, then a constitutional convention to prepare the way to independence could be held. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65)



3. If Burnham drags his feet on authorizing appointment commission he will retard setting date for conference.<sup>4</sup>

4. While Burnham no doubt disappointed over emergency powers, he has gained far more than he realizes, and rather than be discouraged he should build on his gains. For example, securing Greenwood's agreement to amendment constitution to permit appointment Ramphal as Attorney General is master stroke and real achievement. Tactically Burnham should play this appointment up as major step toward racial harmony and betterment relations between races. Burnham might wish announce further that he will no longer press for lifting emergency powers. Will ask new Attorney General to undertake thorough study conditions and thereafter advise the Governor, Premier and Cabinet when emergency might be lifted. This is suggested as one way getting over this hurdle and avoiding any "horse trade."

5. U.S. hopes Burnham will seize this chance to make progress toward independence by in effect providing Greenwood the tools he needs to do the job, i.e., authorize Greenwood to go ahead with commission to examine racial imbalance, and work with him toward this end. We urge him to send Greenwood a message giving the authorization Greenwood requested.

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<sup>4</sup> In a February 25 telegram from London to Shullaw, Ericson reported that the Foreign Office insisted on cooperation from Burnham on the Commission to study racial imbalance. However much Greenwood's attitude toward Burnham and Jagan had changed, Greenwood was "politically committed here to commission idea and could not sell independence conference or return of emergency powers to his Labor colleagues unless Burnham accepts commission." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson—Department Messages [*file name not declassified*], Vol. 3, 1/1/65–7/6/65)

**407. Telegram From the Consulate General in British Guiana to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Georgetown, April 11, 1965, 4 p.m.

376. Following is course of developments over past 36 hours in Burnham-D'Aguiar budget crisis since our tel 375 London 201<sup>2</sup> which indicated grave threat to continued coalition. This threat now appears to have been brought under control and impasse resolved after intensive pressure by ConGen.

During mayor's reception evening April 9 for newly appointed BG commissioner to UK, Lionel Luckoo, Minister of Works and Hydraulics Kassim (UF) told me that at cabinet meeting scheduled that evening it was anticipated that decision would be made for D'Aguiar to leave cabinet. Kassim did not know whether other UF ministers would remain but thought they would. This meeting apparently went far into night but without real results. D'Aguiar did not attend but other UF ministers did with his permission.

On morning April 10 at briefing on rice problem by Dr. Efferson (Dean of School of Agriculture, Louisiana State University) in Burnham's office which was attended by Kassim, Minister of Trade and Industry Kendall, Minister of Agriculture John, and by myself and other US representatives, message was received about one hour later from Burnham summoning key ministers to special meeting at his residence. On way out I urged Kendall, whose political judgment Burnham respects, to see that if D'Aguiar had to go that it be done smoothly on grounds personal and health reasons, preferably with commendatory letter of appreciation from Burnham, but sought impress on Kendall importance of retrieving situation if at all possible. I also spoke with Kassim, who seemed uncertain and depressed. Gave him same advice along with view that D'Aguiar's departure from government would be damaging but departure of UFs would be disastrous and consequently every effort must be made to retain D'Aguiar's services.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 BR GU. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 375 from Georgetown, April 9, Carlson reported his talk with D'Aguiar earlier that day about the latter's intention to resign. D'Aguiar told Carlson he had "no political future," the PNC intended to merge with or swallow up his party, and that, therefore, he would direct all his efforts towards doing a "good job as finance minister." D'Aguiar thought that since "there is no hope in hell of balancing the budget" due to PNC politically inspired spending increases, that the only hope for the country was "in providing image which will attract private investment" through a good budget, "especially by abolition property tax." (Ibid.)

Toward midnight April 10 I learned [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that UF executive had held meeting at which D'Aguiar claimed matter of principle and substance was involved on which he felt strongly: that party's choices were: (1) for him to resign with other UF ministers remaining; (2) for all UF ministers to resign; and (3) for all UF members to resign from legislative assembly. After lengthy discussions executive voted for all ministers (3) to resign and to defer question of leaving assembly (7 members) until constitutional aspects could be determined. Report also indicated that D'Aguiar scheduled meet with Burnham at 9 a.m. April 11 for final session.

Immediately sought reach Burnham without success. Called D'Aguiar early morning April 11. He was just arising so invited him to breakfast. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Decided try combination of flattery, pleading, and strong language related to horrible consequences of breakdown anti-Jagan forces. Told D'Aguiar how much US entities appreciated his contributions to Burnham administration, what favorable impact his presence in government had on various visitors, e.g., that American businessmen usually say after seeing ministers that they are good but D'Aguiar is really outstanding. (D'Aguiar usually does make better impression than any other minister on businessmen.) Told him one of main reasons for USG support and confidence in BG was coalition and constructive role D'Aguiar was playing; everyone knew he was outstanding member of cabinet and counting on him; that Washington would not be able believe that on issue of abolition of property tax worth about \$1 million he would hand BG to Jagan on a silver platter; that I had just been to Washington and had given optimistic appraisal stability Burnham administration, and USG on basis such reports had gone to extraordinary lengths to expedite aid and to make it substantial; that because of this stability and his presence in cabinet potential foreign investors were being encouraged; that I could not believe that after all effort put into saving BG from communism, including strenuous efforts by D'Aguiar (all those miles and all those speeches), it was going to be thrown away. I stressed it would be bad enough if he felt he must leave government but to permit UF to leave was to sell his country out; that with all trouble spots Secretary and senior officers had to cope with, such as Vietnam, Russians, Castro, Chinese, were we now going to have to add BG to the list? I asked him to think about consequences in BG itself which would doubtless see return to violence, possibly against his own supporters.

Then suggested that there must be compromise and that he must realize Burnham could not give way totally under ultimatum of resignation. Burnham must save face and D'Aguiar must give at least little bit. I asked if he would accept idea of moratorium if I could obtain Burnham's agreement, or some kind of depletion allowance which

would permit government to collect property taxes with one hand and refund it with the other. We discussed matter and arrived at compromise whereby existing industries could deduct cost of any expansion or capital improvements from taxes owed or, if company did not qualify in this way, purchase of government debentures would be regarded same as paying tax. New industries would be exempt from tax. (First \$50,000 is not taxable in any event under existing legislation.) At my insistence he also reluctantly authorized moratorium of two years but only as last resort if Burnham rejected above.

At this point, with D'Aguiar's concurrence, I informed Burnham that 9 a.m. meeting with D'Aguiar postponed if agreeable and I would meet with Burnham first. He agreed. D'Aguiar said he also wished have Burnham's agreement to downward revision of income tax rates and to simplifying tax structure by decimal system. This tax now ranges from 6 percent on first \$1,000 to 70 percent on \$13,200 and above. Total cost of D'Aguiar's plan would be about \$125,000 BWI. He was prepared not to inaugurate it until 1966 but wished make some allusion to possibility in budget message scheduled April 14.

Finally, D'Aguiar confided other matters which have been bothering him in coalition, some of which are petty annoyances which probably loom much larger than otherwise in view his fatigue: there were too many long cabinet meetings at night with important matters decided at late hours; lack of expeditious handling of agenda items, inadequate air conditioning, and belief that no one but he felt free to be critical. I offered to talk to Burnham about reducing number of night sessions or possibly exempting D'Aguiar in some fashion, as well as proposing more personal consultation with D'Aguiar. D'Aguiar thought it would be good idea have committee with each side represented on party basis to express freely to the other any matters of concern. I did not commit myself to support this idea as I am not certain that it would be productive.

D'Aguiar throughout whole first part of discussion, kept reiterating desire to resign, but by end of discussion had specifically agreed to stay indefinitely and to give it another try.

I saw Burnham immediately afterward and informed him of likelihood UF ministers resigning, possibility of UF leaving legislative assembly and recalled series of serious consequences previously drawn to his attention. Told him it seemed essential to keep D'Aguiar in government at least at this stage and to settle this tax issue at any cost. Told him Washington had been given favorable view of stability his administration during my recent visit, that USG would find collapse of coalition over tax involving \$1 million incomprehensible, that if events should take this disastrous turn, I had little doubt USG would have to reevaluate its aid program since there would be little point in improving country for Jagan. I then described compromise which

D'Aguiar was now willing to accept on tax issue and Burnham readily accepted it, even claiming he had proposed most of it to D'Aguiar yesterday. (This may be more face-saving.) Told Burnham that more than just taxes was involved here: D'Aguiar was tired, unsure he was really wanted or appreciated, and Burnham should pat him on the back occasionally. I outlined D'Aguiar's complaints and suggested Burnham find ways to ameliorate them. I suggested he call D'Aguiar in at least once each week and talk over important matters personally, making clear that D'Aguiar was not just another minister. In short, that although Burnham might find it distasteful, he should turn on some of his charm.

In order not to risk agreement coming apart in Burnham–D'Aguiar meeting, I suggested that no meeting be held but that either Burnham or I simply inform D'Aguiar of Burnham's concurrence with tax compromise. Burnham agreed and telephoned D'Aguiar, who said he wished to see Burnham anyway "to thrash out a few things." Burnham then asked me to remain during this session. D'Aguiar made notes on all major tax changes in new budget, asking Burnham in each case to agree. Burnham was considerate, readily agreed, although offering occasional language changes. Burnham exempted D'Aguiar from cabinet meeting evening April 11 or any meeting April 12 to free him to work on budget. He agreed to try operate cabinet meetings more expeditiously, to consider farming out items to subcommittees, to have better air conditioning in cabinet room, and to have more personal consultation. D'Aguiar suggested periodical special committee meeting on party basis in which criticism would be freely offered on any subject without thought of offense. Burnham agreed but suggested it be limited to cabinet officers and parliamentary secretaries. D'Aguiar agreed and read back all of his notes. By this time three hours had passed and Burnham invited us sample his bar.<sup>3</sup>

**Carlson**

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<sup>3</sup> In an April 12 memorandum to Cobb, Shullaw reported that he sent the following message to Carlson: "Heartiest congratulations your efforts." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana Chronological File (Burdett), 1965)

**408. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Davis) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1965.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

The question of holding a constitutional conference and fixing a date for independence is becoming an increasingly serious issue in British Guiana. Premier Burnham is becoming suspicious of both the United States and the United Kingdom and his suspicions have been intensified by press stories in Britain to the effect that the United States Government is opposed to early independence on the grounds that an independent British Guiana might go communist.<sup>2</sup>

The British have informed us that they expect to hold the promised constitutional conference as early as practicable, presumably, if all goes well sometime toward the end of this year, but they have not been willing to be this explicit to Premier Burnham. Instead they have told him that the conference could not be scheduled until there had been time to study a report on racial imbalance in the public services<sup>3</sup> which the British Guiana Government has requested from the International Commission of Jurists.

Our Consul General in Georgetown has been told to try to allay Burnham's suspicions of footdragging on the part of the British and to deny press reports that the United States opposes independence.<sup>4</sup> We have suggested to the British that a more forthcoming reply to Burnham's request for a constitutional conference in September might be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 BR GU. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and Cobb.

<sup>2</sup> In a telegram from Georgetown for Shullaw, May 17, Carlson reported that he assured Burnham that these press stories were completely false. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Telegrams and Reports, 1965)

<sup>3</sup> In a telegram from Georgetown for Shullaw, May 22, Carlson reported that the Governor had confirmed his earlier assurance that the "only stipulation [concerning timing] was that of time to 'study' ICJ report before constitutional conference and that there was no mention of requiring its implementation." (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> In a telegram from Georgetown for Shullaw, June 1, Carlson reported that Burnham was "quite unimpressed" with and unconvinced by U.S. arguments that the United Kingdom was not dragging its feet on independence. Carlson stressed to Burnham that the United States did favor early independence. (Ibid.)

helpful.<sup>5</sup> Specifically we have suggested that since it is their intention to convene this conference this year Premier Burnham might be advised of this fact.

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<sup>5</sup> In a telegram to Georgetown for Carlson, May 21, Shullaw reported that he had called in John Killick of the British Embassy and “suggested that HMG might wish to consider being somewhat more forthcoming,” and that there could be “considerable gain were HMG to tell Burnham that the conference would be held this year.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65)

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**409. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Davis) to Secretary of State Rusk**

Washington, May 25, 1965.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

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**410. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1965.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

1. Attached are some State documents which describe the problem we are now having with Greenwood<sup>2</sup> [3 lines of source text not declassified]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> In a June 22 memorandum to Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy recommended informing Dean “We believe it is absolutely essential we continue as necessary our covert financial support to the anti-Jagan political parties in British Guiana” and that it would be appreciated if the Ambassador would convey to Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Stewart “our deep concern [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].” (Ibid.)

2. Rusk spoke to Ambassador Dean yesterday and made a hard pitch.

3. Harry Shullaw called me this afternoon to say that we have indications that we may be getting a negative answer from the British. To ward this off, your help is needed. He offered the following possibilities:

(a) You could call Ambassador Dean and, without mentioning the fact that we know the British are thinking negatively, refer to the Secretary's conversation with the Ambassador yesterday and indicate that the White House (the President, if you can say it) is also very interested in an early affirmative<sup>3</sup> answer. Also, you want the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to know this.

(b) You could authorize the State Department to make the above point to the British on your behalf.

4. Shullaw feels that a direct call from you to Dean will be most effective and that the sooner you make the call, the better (the British may be replying to us any time now).<sup>4</sup> I agree with Harry on both accounts.

GC

I will call Dean as per Paragraph 3(a).<sup>5</sup>

Tell State to make the pitch on behalf of the White House.

See me.

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<sup>3</sup> The words "early affirmative" were underlined and a marginal note in Chase's handwriting reads: "FYI we need to write some checks for Burnham."

<sup>4</sup> According to a July 9 memorandum of conversation Dean advised Rusk that [*text not declassified*] had approved the U.S. covert support program. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana, White House Meetings)

<sup>5</sup> A marginal note next to this paragraph reads: "done."



**411. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 14, 1965.

SUBJECT

British Guiana—Constitutional Conference in November

In response to your question, here are some reasons why the announcement of a Constitutional Conference<sup>2</sup> seems a good thing.

1. Since we can in no way be assured that the British will stay in BG for 5 or 10 years, it is probably better to get the British out of BG sooner rather than later.

(a) With the British in BG and the East Indian population growing, there is always the chance that the British will change the rules of the game (e.g., coalition, a new election). In this regard, it is probably true that Jagan feels he still has a chance so long as the British are around. With the British gone, Jagan himself may decide to bug out.

(b) With the British gone, it is highly likely that Burnham will do what is necessary to ensure that Jagan does not get back into power on the wings of a growing East Indian population (e.g., import West Indian Africans; establish literacy tests for voters—these would hurt the PPP).

(c) The chances for violence probably won't increase significantly with independence. Generally speaking, the East Indians are timid compared to the Africans and, without the British to protect them, they might be even more timid. Also, it is conceivable that a British military presence could be maintained even after independence.

(d) If Burnham does not get fairly early independence, his credibility as a national leader will be questioned—i.e., not able to deliver on his big promises.

2. Once we assume that relatively early independence is probably not only inevitable but also desirable, it would seem to make sense to announce it. In this regard, it should be noted that Burnham has been pressing the British very hard to live up to their previous commitment

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 182 from London, July 14, the Embassy reported that Greenwood would announce the next day in Parliament that he had proposed November 2 as the date for the British Guiana constitutional conference in London. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 19 BR GU)

on a Constitutional Conference, and British reluctance (until now) to agree to a specific date strained Burnham/British relations; this, in turn, has, on occasion, led Burnham to suspect that we were encouraging the British in their stand. In short, an unpleasant situation, all around, was building up.

GC

PS—Best guess on date of independence is mid-1966.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The postscript was handwritten by Chase.

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#### 412. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 30, 1965.

##### UNITED STATES COMMENTS ON BRITISH BRIEF

The United States Government has studied with interest the brief on British policy in British Guiana which was received July 23, 1965.

The United States welcomes the intention of the British Government to convene the constitutional conference in November which will, among other tasks, fix the date for independence.

The United States shares with the British Government the view that the Indian community should be represented at the conference. It would normally expect that Dr. Jagan and his party would attend the conference even though they might not wish to see independence granted under the present government, just as Mr. Burnham and Mr. d'Aguiar represented their parties at earlier constitutional conferences under somewhat similar circumstances. However Dr. Jagan's behavior since the election in December gives rise to the question whether he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Cobb on July 30. Transmitted as enclosure 2 of airgram CA-1173 to Georgetown, August 2, in which the Department reported receipt of a brief on British policy in British Guiana on July 23 from the British Embassy in Washington in preparation for the first of a series of "periodic discussions on policy toward British Guiana as it approaches independence." The British brief was enclosure 1 to the airgram. The first meeting was held on July 30 between representatives of the British Embassy in Washington and Department of State officers led by Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard H. Davis, during which this paper was given to the British.

appreciates the responsibilities of the role incumbent upon him as leader of the opposition. His failure to resign the office of Premier, his failure to meet jointly with the Colonial Secretary and present Premier to discuss racial imbalances, his announced intention to refuse to co-operate with the Commission of Inquiry of the International Commission of Jurists, and his erratic pattern of attendance at sessions of the House of Assembly may indicate that no matter what steps are taken he will find some pretext to refuse to attend the Conference. We therefore suggest that consideration should now be given to the possibility that other persons in the Indian community in B.G. may have to be invited in order to assure that this important section of the community be represented at the conference.<sup>2</sup>

The United States also shares the British view of the importance of allaying Indian fears for the future, and hopes that the report of the ICJ Commission will contribute toward this objective. We have noted that the British Government is anxious that Dr. Jagan's party cooperate with the Commission in order that the report not be open to criticism that evidence was tendered from one side only. Should Dr. Jagan's party fail to avail itself of the opportunity offered by the ICJ Commission it would seem to bear out the view that the leaders of the party are not genuinely interested in alleviating alleged imbalances and discrimination but have used this charge as a smoke screen for their political objectives.

The United States Government believes that the racial fears in B.G. will be difficult to assuage, based as they are on deep racial cleavages. These are not easily susceptible to rapid transformation and several generations may be required to effect more than marginal progress toward this objective. While efforts of government make a contribution toward this task, it should not be assumed that any government, no matter how well intentioned, will be able to eradicate long standing suspicions. Only years of education, association and understanding can break down the wall of segregation on which racial fears rest. Nevertheless there is a major role for the security forces in B.G. to play in the task of seeking stable conditions. The presence of British troops in British Guiana during the past year provides ample evidence for this conclusion. If British troops can remain after independence until adequate local forces are recruited and trained and equipped to meet the security requirements of the area, this would contribute substantially to allaying Indian fears.

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<sup>2</sup> In a brief on British policy in British Guiana, September 3, the British doubted whether they could invite other persons to represent the Indian community if the PPP refused to attend, since these special invitees could hardly claim to be democratically elected representatives. (Ibid., POL 32-1 BR GU-VEN)

Since the maintenance of internal security and stability will be no small task, the nature, composition and objectives of the B.G. security forces will not, we hope, have to take into account the possibility of a foreign threat. The United States hopes that problems arising from the Venezuelan boundary claim can be resolved amicably between two such good friends as Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Venezuela. It would be unfortunate if a continuation of this claim were to be used as the pretext for establishing an Army in B.G. or for recruiting security forces in excess of the Government's domestic requirements and of a nature not suitable to the countries' needs, thereby imposing a possibly excessive burden on the developing economy.

The United States welcomes this opportunity to exchange views on B.G. and looks forward to receiving additional briefing on British policy in the Colony.

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**413. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 6, 1965.

SUBJECT

Current Situation in British Guiana

1. The coalition government of Forbes Burnham's People's National Congress (PNC) and Peter D'Aguiar's United Force (UF), installed as a result of the December 1964 elections, is having some success in restoring responsible government to British Guiana. The coalition is not an easy one, however, since Burnham and D'Aguiar neither like nor trust each other and hold conflicting political views. They are united by their opposition to Cheddi Jagan. Jagan's opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) is suffering from increased factionalism caused by conflicting personal ambitions and differences of opinion concerning its role as an opposition party. There is no evidence to indicate that Jagan has lost the political support of the vast majority of the Indian population. Some evidence is coming to light of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64-11/65. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Chronological File DDCI & DCI, 1 Jan-31 Dec 65. Secret; Eyes Only.

increased Chinese Communist interest in the PPP, and a number of party leaders recently visited China including two leaders of the militant group within the PPP which reportedly wishes to break away from Jagan and form a Communist Party of British Guiana. Jagan has taken a public position opposing the granting of independence to British Guiana under Burnham, and this also has caused him some difficulties.

2. The International Commission of Jurists is now conducting an inquiry in British Guiana into the question of racial imbalance in the public service, including the security forces. It is expected to produce a report about 1 October 1965. The British Government has informed Burnham of its intention to convene a conference in London to devise a constitution for British Guiana and to set a date for independence. This conference will take place once the International Commission of Jurists' report has been submitted, and a date of 2 November 1965 is tentatively established. If this sequence of events is not interrupted, it is expected that British Guiana will achieve independence in the spring of 1966.

3. The security situation in the country remains disturbed and Jagan is believed to be directing arson and sabotage activities, attempting to increase these to such an extent that the British Government will be forced to delay the independence conference. The leadership of the Guiana Agricultural Workers' Union (GAWU), which is loyal to Jagan, plans a major strike effort on the sugar estates during August and September. This could lead to racial violence, and it may be Jagan's intention to utilize the strike for this purpose. Local security forces continue to be less than adequate, and the presence of 1300 British troops is still required to insure internal security.

4. The United States Government is providing approximately \$12,000,000 in financial aid to the Burnham government, some of these funds being useful for attacking unemployment in the Georgetown area. The economic situation is slightly improved in British Guiana although the government's inability to find a market for its rice crop is causing some unrest, particularly among the Indian population, and provides Jagan a handy criticism of the government.

5. The *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* program in British Guiana has three objectives:

- a. to obtain intelligence on the PPP's capabilities and intentions, particularly Jagan's plans in the immediate future;
- b. to keep Burnham and D'Aguiar working together in the coalition government, and to keep their parties organized in support of the coalition government and prepared for a quick election if one should be necessary; and
- c. to counter Jagan's efforts to gain control of organized labor in British Guiana.

*[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]*

6. The following items are suggested for discussion at the forthcoming meeting:

- a. the current situation in British Guiana;
- b. current United States Government policy with respect to British Guiana;
- c. anticipated problems in the immediate pre-independence and post-independence period. The withdrawal of British troops from British Guiana and the inadequacy of local security forces are of immediate concern.
- d. *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* maintaining covert channels to Burnham and D'Aguiar and how this should be carried out.

RH

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#### 414. Telegram From the Consulate General in British Guiana to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Georgetown, September 16, 1965.

Ref: Message dated 15 September 1965.<sup>2</sup> Following message for Shullaw (info Brubeck) from Carlson:

Had long and useful discussion with Burnham evening September 15 lasting until well after midnight, after which he still planned to do some work at his office. He is not looking as well as he should, probably due to overwork and possibly because of recent crash dieting program which took off about 30 pounds. At moment he also has what seems to be painful sacro-iliac condition.

Opportunity arose early in conversation to seek determine how he views central problem of assuring re-election in 1968. It is clear that he prefers to hope that significant fraction Indians can be won over to his party or to one he can work with. If, however, it appears that such development not occurring he then strongly favors program for importation West Indian Negroes and while conceding there would be practical problems, believes they could be overcome. If such program not possible, I gather he would be willing consider such ideas as unitary statehood with Barbados or, conceivably, disenfranchisement of illiterates.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Telegrams and Reports, 1965. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

He finds such thoughts very distasteful but believe he would do so if convinced there is no other way to survive politically against PPP.

This topic enabled me to raise matter of anxiety in some quarters, such as UF, regarding his ultimate intentions and to talk to him along following lines. Impression is that there is increasing anxiety within UF that Burnham might establish police state. This is undoubtedly having effect on D'Aguiar but apparently that is only one aspect of what is bothering him. Indications are that he is becoming dissatisfied again and while situation has not reached stage of crisis comparable to week-end when coalition was in danger of collapse, time to do something about this reviving potential danger is now. It is essential to seek to improve relations with D'Aguiar and to try to go to London in general accord.

In addition to concern over Burnham's intentions, D'Aguiar apparently feels that he is not being consulted sufficiently, is too often overridden in cabinet on fiscal matters, that expenditures higher than should be and sometimes include unnecessary items, as well as projecting increased expenses next year. His concern is understandable. It is natural for there to be anxiety about intentions in period of great uncertainty when country is emerging as independent. Such apprehension should be recognized and steps taken to cope with it. One must remember that UF regards itself not as junior partner but as key. On fiscal side, D'Aguiar's services are needed. It is not easy task to look after the purse when needs are legion and ministers are in hurry to achieve success, but somebody must do it. He is probably more inflexible than necessary on occasion,<sup>3</sup> but perhaps Burnham is too much the other way. In any event, substantive points should be talked out and cultivating D'Aguiar, in my opinion, would have great effect in facilitation agreement on substantive matters. D'Aguiar is man who needs to be appreciated. Complimenting him is effective. I realize this course of action may be disagreeable but politicians—and diplomats—sometimes have disagreeable tasks. Burnham can do this job. I suggested that he might wish consider some of the following approaches: consult D'Aguiar much more frequently; reassure him at appropriate stage soon about intentions; be frank and genuine on this subject; perhaps have him to dinner or other private meeting weekly until Lon-

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<sup>3</sup> In a September 16 telegram for Shullaw, sent earlier in the day, Carlson reported that D'Aguiar had told him that morning that he was generally concerned by Burnham's tentative 1966 expenditure plans, and that "there would be a balanced budget for 1966 'or else'." (Ibid., Carlson—Department Messages, Vol. 4, 7/7/65–2/14/69)

don conference; seek his opinion and advice on various subjects, even if your mind is already made up; compliment him privately and perhaps publicly in press conference just before leaving for London, in course reviewing accomplishments your administration; consider asking him to visit United States and talk to business groups (I told Burnham that if this useful I will be prepared give D'Aguiar invitation at USG expense); refrain, at least for present, from raising items involving expenditures which D'Aguiar most likely regard as unnecessary.

Burnham agreed with my analysis and prescription and indicated intention begin this operation soonest.

Plan to see D'Aguiar if possible today.

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**415. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 5, 1965.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

Today I had lunch with Del Carlson who is presently in town on consultations. Here are some of the points which came up.

1. *BG Security Forces*—The way matters now stand, (a) independence is likely to come in April 1966 and (b) the British will want to take out their troops a few days before independence. Unfortunately, the local BG security forces will not be in a position to handle the security job effectively before September, 1966. The problem—to delay independence (not likely) or to keep the British troops in place after independence.

Del said that the British have not yet made a firm decision on this matter and that we might be able to convince them to keep troops in BG after independence. I indicated to Del that we will be happy to lend

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65. Secret.



a hand in this effort when he and State give us the word.<sup>2</sup> He assured me that he and State will have our offer clearly in mind.

2. *Burnham's Visit*—Burnham is expected to come to the United States sometime in early December. Del emphasized that the trappings of the visit are as important as the visit itself. He urged that, in addition to the appointment with the President (which is a “must”), we should try to give Burnham some red-carpet treatment. For example, it would be wonderful if we could get Burnham into Blair House.<sup>3</sup>

I told Del that we will be as helpful as we can.

3. *Venezuela/British Guiana Border Dispute*—Del said that the Venezuelan claim against British Guiana (Venezuela is claiming about one-half of BG as its own) irritates the hell out of Burnham and that the Venezuelans seem to be getting more serious as time goes on. Del thought that we should look very hard at this one in the fairly near future to see if we should be doing anything. For example, we could urge both parties to go to the International Court of Justice; [4 lines of source text not declassified]<sup>4</sup>

I told Del that I would look into the matter to see if there is anything that we should be doing at this stage of the game.

4. *East Indians*—Del said that we are so far getting nowhere with respect to building up an alternative East Indian party. He went on to say, however, that the situation is still very fluid and that we should probably wait until after independence before we get to work on this problem in earnest. The big hope is that we can locate an alternative East Indian leader; so far no one of any stature appears to be on the horizon. A lesser hope is that Burnham will, by sensible and progressive policies, be able to win the East Indians over to his side. Burnham, however, is not at all confident that he can ever translate East Indian acceptance of his regime into East Indian votes. Neither is Del.

Del added that even if the East Indians cannot be wooed away from Jagan, Burnham will probably do whatever is necessary to win

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<sup>2</sup> In a September 21 memorandum to Chase, Cobb reported that during the next exchange of views with the British Embassy, the Department of State planned to present the advantages of keeping British forces in British Guiana until September 1966. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> A marginal notation in Bundy's handwriting next to this sentence reads: “This should be easy.”

<sup>4</sup> At a meeting between Secretary Rusk and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Irabarren Borges on October 7 Rusk “expressed the hope that the Venezuelan Government would pursue this matter bilaterally with the U.K. and not seek to involve the U.S. at this point ‘since we have more than enough other problems.’” (Memorandum of conversation, October 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 BR GU–VEN)

the election in 1968. This could take the form of importing Negroes from other Caribbean countries or, in a pinch, establishing literacy tests for Guianese voters. Literacy tests would hurt the East Indian population more than the Negro population.

5. *Carlson's Availability*—Carlson will be in Washington for the next week or so; he will, of course, be delighted to come over and talk to you if you want to get an up-to-date briefing. Are you interested?

GC

Yes. Set it up.

Not this time.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Bundy checked this option.

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#### 416. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 18, 1965, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA

UK

Anthony Greenwood, Secretary of State for the Colonies

Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador

Ian Wallace, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office

C. G. Eastwood, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office

The Colonial Secretary said he believed Jagan and the PPP would attend the Constitutional Conference scheduled to begin in London on November 2 although they would probably walk out at some point in the proceedings. Mr. Greenwood expressed satisfaction with the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 16 BR GU. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Shullaw and approved by S October 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part I of II.

course of developments in British Guiana during the past year under Burnham's leadership. He also expressed an optimistic view of the Conference prospects and satisfaction that Burnham is prepared to accept the recommendations in the report of the International Commission of Jurists. Mr. Greenwood said this was not easy for Burnham to do, but it should be a helpful gesture on the eve of the Constitutional Conference.

The Secretary expressed concern at the security situation in British Guiana following independence and asked if it would be possible for the UK to leave some military forces after independence. Mr. Greenwood replied that in view of our concern<sup>2</sup> he would be prepared to recommend retention of British forces for a limited period of time after independence.<sup>3</sup> He stressed that there was no precedent for doing so. Mr. Greenwood said Burnham was being pressed to get on with the creation of local security forces, but it would be a year from now before such forces would be able to take on the job of security. While Burnham was asking for independence in February, Mr. Greenwood thought June or July would be more realistic. The Colonial Secretary added that Burnham is agreeable to British forces staying on for a period after independence.

In response to the Secretary's question about the Venezuelan claim Mr. Greenwood said the claim was without a sound legal basis and for that reason Venezuela would be uninterested in referring the dispute to the International Court. The Secretary expressed the hope the matter could be resolved before independence since otherwise the existence of the dispute would constitute a bar to membership for Guiana in the OAS. The Secretary asked whether there was any possibility of minor border adjustments. Both Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Wallace replied that any territorial concession to Venezuela would be exploited by Jagan against Burnham.

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<sup>2</sup> In a meeting later that day at the White House with Bundy and Chase, Greenwood said that to shorten the gap between independence and the readiness of local security forces the British would delay independence until June or July and institute a phased withdrawal of British troops. Bundy expressed continuing Presidential interest in British Guiana. Greenwood complimented Bundy on the U.S. Consul General in Georgetown. Bundy responded "we have taken particular pains in our selection of personnel for all agencies operating in British Guiana." (Memorandum of conversation, October 18; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/63–7/64)

<sup>3</sup> At a meeting on November 27 Dean informed Rusk that the British Cabinet, acting upon Greenwood's recommendation, had decided to allow British troops to remain in British Guiana after independence on May 26, 1966, until October 1966 when Guyanese forces would be prepared to assume their responsibilities. (Memorandum of conversation, November 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6 UK)

The Colonial Secretary in the course of the conversation described Burnham as a "good Prime Minister" whose performance has been above expectations. He suggested that Burnham has made some progress in reassuring the small, well-to-do Indian business community and noted that return of Indians to areas which they had left during the racial disturbances. The Colonial Secretary's references to Jagan were unsympathetic. He believes Jagan's position has deteriorated in the past year as his party has suffered from internal differences.

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**417. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1965.

SUBJECT

British Guiana

1. The British Guiana Independence Conference concluded in London on 19 November 1965 by setting the date of 26 May 1966 for the independence of what will be known as the state of Guyana. The conference also produced agreement on a draft constitution for the new state and stipulations in the conference record for consultations between the leaders of the two parties in the coalition government. A number of compromises were worked out between Premier Forbes Burnham and Finance Minister Peter D'Aguiar which, hopefully, will ease some of the strains between them. The conference did not, however, succeed in bringing the two leaders much closer together; they remain basically incompatible on both personal and political grounds and are united only in mutual defense against the threat posed by Cheddi Jagan.

2. [5 lines of source text not declassified] It was generally agreed that the basic division of the country along racial lines would continue, that Jagan and the PPP would continue to enjoy the support of the vast majority of the Indian population and that this would continue to pose a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [file name not declassified] Telegrams and Reports, 1965. Secret; Eyes Only.

serious threat to the government of independent Guyana. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] informally indicated that the British Government was alert to the possibility of racial violence breaking out following independence and would continue to be sensitive to any developments which might bring into question the good judgement of the British Government in granting independence to a government led by a representative of a minority racial grouping in the circumstances now prevailing in British Guiana.

3. Apart from the conference, the British Government and Premier Burnham made some progress in negotiating other agreements, primarily with respect to the internal security of the country. The British have agreed to maintain troops in Guyana until the end of October 1966 and to train and provide a cadre for the newly formed Guyana Defense Force. This force and the augmented Guyana police forces are to be brought to a sufficient level of capability to permit the withdrawal of British troops in October 1966. The adequacy of this solution cannot be judged at this time.

4. In a conversation [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on 20 November,<sup>2</sup> Forbes Burnham stated that his immediate objective is to launch his economic development plan so that he will be able to induce large numbers of West Indians of African descent to settle in Guyana prior to the December 1968 elections. His purpose is radically to alter the racial balance now existing in the electorate in sufficient time to enable him to win a plurality in the 1968 elections. Burnham stated that he will seek aid from both the British and American Governments for this purpose. He said further that he was confident his scheme was feasible and that it was the only possible course of action which would prevent Jagan returning to power with the support of the Indian community.

5. A copy of this memorandum is being made available to Mr. J. Harold Shullaw at the Department of State.

**Richard Helms<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> An unattributed memorandum, dated November 26, reported that [*name not declassified*] met with Burnham on November 20. Burnham said that the British had rationalized the outcome of the Conference "to save their own consciences," fully expecting that the constitutional safeguards would inevitably lead to East Indian control by constitutional methods, which he said was "not going to come about." The report highlighted not only Burnham's plans for West Indian immigration, but also his idea "that under the new constitution absentee voting would be permissible." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

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**418. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

NIE 87.2-66

Washington, April 28, 1966.

**GUYANA (BRITISH GUIANA)****The Problem**

To estimate the prospects for Guyana over the next year or two.

**Conclusions**

A. British Guiana will probably make a relatively smooth transition to independence, but racial suspicions between East Indians and Negroes will continue to dominate Guyanese politics.

B. When (or whether) these tensions break out again into violence will depend in large measure on the conduct of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the Negro party (the PNC), and of Cheddi Jagan, leader of the East Indian party (the PPP). For over a year, Burnham has governed with considerable restraint and Jagan has refrained from violent opposition. But new elections are due by late 1968, and between now and then tensions will rise and may at some point get out of hand.

C. Even after British troops depart in October 1966, Guyanese security forces can probably cope with sporadic violence. If violence got out of control, Burnham would probably call for a return of British troops. If US consent were forthcoming and British troops were available, we believe that London would comply.

D. The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D'Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. Friction between the partners over patronage and fiscal issues will probably be intensified after independence, but chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together.

E. Guyana's economy will need substantial foreign capital, much of it from the US. The need for aid will keep Burnham on tolerable terms with the US, UK, and Canada, though his administration will incline toward a neutralist posture in foreign affairs. If Jagan came

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A, NIEs and SNIEs. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on April 28.

to power, he could, because of his Marxist sympathies and his connections in Communist countries, count on some help from these countries. However, they probably would furnish only token quantities of aid.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

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**419. Telegram From the Ambassador to Guyana (Carlson) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Georgetown, July 15, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

[*telegram number not declassified*] Please pass foll to Mr. Cobb from Ambassador. Proposed action program designed to ensure government victory in the next general election.

1. It is believed that the action proposed in this paper, designed to ensure a victory in the next general election (1968–69) for the parties of the coalition government led by Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, must be tempered and weighed in light of the following basic considerations:

A. Present indications are that the East Indian people, as a whole, dislike the African, distrust him, especially fear him, and believe that they must stay together, particularly as a voting unit, if their rights are to be protected and their aspirations achieved.

B. The East Indians, generally, believe that if they maintain their solidarity, they can, by virtue of their rapidly increasing numbers, win any future election.

C. Most East Indians do not now think, and will not easily be convinced, despite a plethora of anti-Communist and anti-Jagan propaganda, that Cheddi Jagan is anything less than an altruistic leader who, although perhaps capable of error, loves his people and is motivated by a desire to act in their best interests. His charismatic appeal continues basically undiminished, although apparently some of the gloss has gone from his image.

D. Within the PPP, those relatively few East Indians who question Jagan's motives and leadership and might even welcome a replacement are most reluctant to oppose him openly for fear of intimidation—which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Operations Files, Job 89–00998R, Latin American Division. Secret.

the government cannot prevent. The February 1966 murder (undoubtedly inspired by Jagan's People's Progressive Party—(PPP)) of Ackbar Alli, a PPP activist who turned on Jagan, is one of many incidents that have made a strong impression on the East Indian mind. The few PPP leaders who oppose Jagan also realize that the mass of party supporters are likely to favor Jagan over them in any open contest.

2. As sobering as the foregoing observations may be, the seemingly solid East Indian, Jagan-built wall must inevitably develop some cracks. There are a few indications that economic improvement, especially the road program, is making a favorable impression on some East Indians. It is too early to tell how significant this may be. The following proposals are of the type which seem best designed to hasten the development of East Indian disaffection from Jagan, enhance the position of the government and provide a much-needed assist to the economy of the country—which if not improved can only further complicate the political situation:

A. Intensify and expand the road building program, giving special emphasis to the predominately East Indian areas such as the Corentyne. The major artery from New Amsterdam to Crabwood Creek (the last village in the Corentyne) should be paved before the election.

B. By means of a soft loan, assist with the re-organization and modernization of the rice industry. While this effort may not attract any new support for the government, it is needed as a means of stabilizing a major industry of importance to the economy.

C. Give consideration to special assistance to the anti-Jagan Man Power Citizens' Association (MPCA), the largest labor union in the country and the one officially representing some 20,000 sugar workers. Such assistance might include establishment of a credit union to assist the predominantly East Indian MPCA-affiliated worker to satisfy his basic needs. Obviously, it would enhance the position of the MPCA and weaken its arch rival, the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union—Jagan's principal pirate labor arm. Most important, it would give the East Indian tangible evidence that his individual lot was being improved under the government, actively assisted by the U.S.

D. Carefully examine the extent of need and the feasibility of making grants or soft loans to expand the government's credit facilities in the agricultural sector. Again, if the small farmer, who is predominantly East Indian, can perceive tangible benefits under the present administration, in a manner he has not known before, considering his basically pecuniary nature, he might consider severing his ties with Jagan. This might also be an opportunity to promote a diversification program in agriculture by giving priority consideration to the farmer willing to plant some of the basic agricultural commodities which the country is now forced to import. A new rural credit agency, initially endowed by



the U.S. and geared to give rapid small loans to the farmer on a non-racial basis, might have merit.

E. Explore assisting the government in the construction and renovation of small school buildings in the rural areas. This would include assistance in the acquisition of basic educational tools such as books.

F. Assist with the modernization and expansion of medical facilities in the small medical stations in the rural areas. Again, in this effort the East Indian would receive considerable benefit.

G. Consider assisting the government to greatly expand its present youth program, including a CCC-type project involving rehabilitation, training and trail building in the interior.

3. Activities of a less orthodox nature which are recommended or are now being conducted would include the following:

A. Consider giving financial assistance and active encouragement on a selective basis to East Indian individuals or groups which might emerge and show promise of being able to influence politically a significant segment of the East Indian population. (At the present time, the prospects in this area are not particularly encouraging. The anti-Jagan East Indian Justice Party and the Guyana United Muslim Party have been discredited, and consequently offer little, if any, hope of being able to contribute substantially to any future anti-Jagan effort. However, if nothing new appears before 1968, and there is reason to believe that these basically defunct organizations can still play a useful role, consideration should be given at that time to pumping new blood into their emaciated bodies. It is not believed that any action in this regard is justified at present.)

B. Continue to promote the growth and attempt to extend the influence of the small moderate group within the PPP in the hope that its members might succeed in replacing the Jagan leadership or gain sufficient strength to break away and form a new viable East Indian party.

C. Encourage the government to consider the feasibility of exiling Cheddi and Janet Jagan. Without them the PPP, as presently constituted and oriented, would be hard-pressed to continue. The exiling of Janet alone would probably not be sufficiently useful in the light of the problems involved, including that of splitting a family. While she is highly important as the organizer, Cheddi is the vote getter and could probably keep the Indian community largely intact. As a practical matter, the government is not likely to take any such action unless the Jags provide it with some good pretext; and this may never happen.

D. Encourage the government, and assist where necessary, to conduct a survey of its supporters who live abroad for the purpose of ascertaining their exact numbers and qualifications to cast absentee ballots in the next election. Government offices in London, Washington,

New York, and Ottawa should be able to assist by requesting Guyanese in their areas to register.

E. At the Washington level, have election experts conduct a study and make detailed recommendations as to how best (preferably in the simplest and most fool-proof manner) the government might proceed to rig, if necessary, the next election. Particular attention should be given to the absentee ballot which would seem to lend itself to manipulation, as well as to any maneuver in Guyana.

F. Consider the possibility of buying East Indian votes. (Circumstances do not now appear to lend themselves to this practice. For fear of being exposed to the wrath of the PPP, the East Indian would most likely immediately denounce to the PPP any such attempt to influence his vote, or, at best, quietly take the money and then proceed to vote as his blood line dictated.)

G. Continue to assist the coalition parties of the government to maintain their organizational structures; and be prepared in the next election to give all the support necessary to enable these parties to register all their potential supporters, conduct a vigorous campaign and ensure that all their people arrive at the polls on time.

H. Continue to encourage the government to pursue a benign policy toward the East Indian, attempting to convince him of the government's impartiality and genuine desire to improve his standard of living, etc.

4. Prime Minister Burnham is reasonably convinced that West Indian (Negro) immigration might well solve his electoral problem. More objective observers tend to be more skeptical, primarily because there is not enough time before the next election. While there is no doubt that additional human resources will be required to subdue the extensive Guyana wilderness, with local unemployment still high (at least 15 percent of the total work force) it would seem that immigration cannot proceed in the next year or so at an inordinate rate. The East Indians are, understandably, solidly against this migration scheme and many of Burnham's supporters will oppose it unless they first have jobs. As a short term election device, immigration does not seem to be very practical. In fact, Burnham might easily lose more supporters from within than he hopes to gain from without—particularly if he immediately pushes for the fifteen-twenty thousand immigrants he has in mind.

5. Burnham is pressing for some type of Caribbean grouping and envisions himself as a likely leader of whatever might emerge. Also, he has entertained the possibility of putting together some form of unitary state with Barbados or Antigua, or one or several of the smaller islands. (Burnham told the U.S. Ambassador on July 4th that Grenada and St. Lucia had recently expressed an interest in merging with

Guyana.) This plan might prove workable, but again there is no assurance that anything will materialize within the next two to three years. Arrangements of this nature, obviously, cannot be unduly pushed; but they should certainly be discreetly encouraged where possible.

6. Best estimates available indicate that the domestic non-East Indian voting population in 1968–69 will still exceed the East Indian electorate by five to eight thousand. No provision is made in these estimates for new immigrants. Absentee voters probably number between ten and fifteen thousand, with the non-East Indian in the majority. Balanced against this apparent margin in favor of the government, is the fact that the government could easily lose the votes of as many as ten thousand of its nominal supporters. They would be the dissatisfied and the disgruntled who might well refuse to go to the polls or in some cases conceivably even vote for the PPP. Facing a contest such as this, a man as astute as Burnham, will probably want to enter the game with at least a few extra aces. (In 1964 the PPP received 109,000 votes; the coalition parties a total of 126,000; the total vote was 238,530 out of 247,495 registered, the projected registration in 1968–69 is estimated at 284,387.)

7. Burnham is not considering calling an election before 1968, and apparently there is no great advantage in doing so. Prior to that time, he will not be able to demonstrate major accomplishments, such as substantially reducing unemployment, etc. In short, he can probably afford to give Jagan a few more votes conceivably by virtue of the greater numbers of East Indians who will have arrived at the voting age by 1968, in the hope that by waiting, he, Burnham can not only better satisfy his own supporters but hopefully wean away a few of the East Indian voters.

8. Burnham has confided to close colleagues that he intends to remain in power indefinitely—if at all possible by constitutional means. However, if necessary, he is prepared to employ unorthodox methods to achieve his aims. In these circumstances, probably the best that can be hoped for at this time, is that he might respond to guideline and thus take the most effective and least objectionable course to attain his goals.

**420. Letter From the Ambassador to Guyana (Carlson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Gordon)<sup>1</sup>**

Georgetown, August 4, 1966.

Dear Mr. Gordon:

1. I trust you may have seen my telegram (Georgetown 99)<sup>2</sup> reporting how impressed Prime Minister Burnham was with his visit to the United States. He was especially taken with President Johnson and believes that the President strongly supports him. I thought you would be interested in the Prime Minister's brief confidential summary to me of the topics discussed with the President privately.<sup>3</sup>

A. The President expressed appreciation for Burnham's congratulatory telegram on the successful flight of Gemini 10.

B. Burnham raised the subject of Viet Nam, apparently indicating support of the United States and expressing wonder as to how the Communists always seem to get away with their case before much of the world.

C. After the discussion of Viet Nam, which was relatively short, the conversation turned to civil rights. Burnham expressed admiration for all that had been accomplished to promote Negro voting rights and education. His remarks were complimentary of the President's achievements in this field.

It was not clear from Burnham's rather sketchy account whether it was at this point, earlier, or as seems probable later, that the President said something along the following lines: "Remember you have one friend in this corner going for you and his name is Lyndon Johnson."

D. Finally, Burnham related to the President the idea of migration from the over-populated British West Indian islands to Guyana and the needed electoral benefit to the Burnham administration. The President's subsequent inquiry to you as to whether we are "on top" of this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 BR GU. Secret; Official Informal.

<sup>2</sup> Dated August 3. (Ibid., POL 7 GUYANA)

<sup>3</sup> Burnham had a private meeting with President Johnson at 5:11 p.m. on July 22 at the White House. They were joined from 5:32 to 6 p.m. by Guyanese Ambassador Sir John Carter, Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon, and Ambassador Carlson. According to a notation in the President's Daily Diary, Rostow and Bowdler said that there was no substantive reason for this meeting. No other record of this conversation has been found. (Johnson Library)

idea has been interpreted as a very significant indication of the President's sympathetic attitude toward it.

2. While I assume that this private meeting was intended as off-the-record, I thought it might be useful for you to have the highlights as they appear from this end. If no record of any sort is appropriate, please destroy this letter and so advise me. I am not sending a copy to anyone else but you may wish to let John Hill and Bill Cobb see it.

3. Incidentally, I note that the Prime Minister's account corresponds to a considerable extent with my prediction about the points which he would raise, as reported in Bill Cobb's memorandum of July 22 to Bill Bowdler,<sup>4</sup> and that he did not raise any of a variety of specific economic matters more appropriate to lower levels.

Best regards,  
Sincerely,

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Guyana (Brit. G.), Vol. 1, Cables, Memos & Misc., 5/66–11/68)

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## 421. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 17, 1967.

### SUBJECT

Support to Anti-Jagan Political Parties in Guyana

#### 1. Summary

It is established U.S. Government policy that Cheddi Jagan, East Indian Marxist leader of the pro-Communist People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana, will not be permitted to take over the government of an independent Guyana. Jagan has the electoral support of the East Indians, who are approximately 50% of the total population of Guyana. It is believed that Jagan has a good chance of coming to power in the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records, April, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only.

next elections unless steps are taken to prevent this. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the majority People's National Congress (PNC) in the coalition, is aware of the problem, and has stated that he is fully prepared to utilize the electoral machinery at his disposal to ensure his own re-election. Burnham has initiated steps for electoral registration of Guyanese at home and abroad,<sup>2</sup> and has requested financial assistance [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for the PNC campaign. It is recommended that he and his party be provided with covert support in order to assure his victory at the polls. At the same time, it is believed that support to Peter D'Aguiar and his United Force (UF), the minority party in the coalition government, is also essential in order to offset Jagan's solidly entrenched East Indian electoral support. It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the courses of action outlined in this paper at a cost of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].<sup>3</sup>

## 2. Problem

To prevent the election of Cheddi Jagan in the next elections in Guyana.

## 3. Factors Bearing on the Problem

### a. Origin of the Requirement

Under the Guyana Constitution, new elections for the National Assembly must take place prior to 31 March 1969, and can take place at any time should the Prime Minister bring about the dissolution of the Parliament.

Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana is aware that the U.S. Government is opposed to Cheddi Jagan's assumption of power in Guyana. He is also acutely conscious of the racial factors in the country which work to Jagan's advantage, and he realizes that he must immediately initiate a vigorous campaign if he is to defeat Jagan.

Burnham has personally undertaken the task of reorganizing the PNC, which has not functioned in many areas since the last elections.

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<sup>2</sup> In a meeting [*text not declassified*] on September 16, 1966, Burnham requested money for various political purposes and outlined his plans to issue identification cards to all Guyanans above the age of 10, and to identify and register all Guyanans of African ancestry in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in order to get their absentee votes in the next elections. "Conversely, Burnham acknowledged with a smile, East Indians living abroad may have trouble getting registered and, if registered, getting ballots." (Ibid., [*file name not declassified*] Telegrams and Reports, 1965)

<sup>3</sup> According to an April 10 memorandum for the record, the 303 Committee approved this proposal at its April 7 meeting. [*text not declassified*] emphasized during the Committee's discussion the importance of starting early in the implementation of the proposal. (Ibid., Guyana 1969, 1970)

He plans to establish campaign headquarters in Georgetown and other urban areas where the African vote is concentrated, and will also send organizers throughout Guyana to re-enlist PNC supporters who have been inactive in party affairs since the last elections. At the same time, Burnham is sending a trusted political adviser abroad to survey the potential absentee vote which he can expect from Guyanese residing in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the West Indies.

Burnham believes that he would have great difficulty ensuring his own re-election without support from the U.S. Government. He has requested financial support [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for staff and campaign expenses, motor vehicles, small boats, printing equipment, and transistorized public address systems. He also wishes to contract for the services of an American public relations firm to improve his image abroad and counteract Jagan's propaganda in the foreign press.

Since we believe that there is a good likelihood that Jagan can be elected in Guyana unless the entire non-East Indian electorate is mobilized against him, we also believe that campaign support must be provided to Peter d'Aguiar, the head of the United Force (UF) and Burnham's coalition partner.

*b. Background*

The U.S. Government determined in 1962 that Cheddi Jagan would not be acceptable as the head of government in an independent Guyana. When elections were scheduled for December 1964, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was instructed to ensure Jagan's defeat by the provision of guidance and support to Burnham and d'Aguiar, leaders of Guyana's two anti-Jagan political parties. This was accomplished. Burnham and d'Aguiar established a coalition government which is now in power. This is, however, an uneasy arrangement and Burnham desires a PNC majority in the Assembly to result from the forthcoming election. While we are not yet persuaded that Burnham's objective is feasible, we believe it is essential that he wage a vigorous campaign against Jagan from this moment on.

The following tabs provide further background: Tab A, Background to the Jagan Problem; Tab B, Burnham and d'Aguiar; Tab C, Other Courses of Action.<sup>4</sup>

*b. Relationship to Previous 303 Committee Actions*

Action to remove Jagan from power in British Guiana was considered by the Special Group during the period 6 April 1961–23 May

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<sup>4</sup> All attached but not printed.

1963. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] financial support to the British Guiana Trades Union Council during the strikes of 1962 and 1963 was approved. The Special Group did not approve other political action against Jagan during that period because of British Government concern. Since early 1963, political action operations in Guyana have not been the subject of Special Group consideration.

*c. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations*

U.S. policy towards Guyana has since 1962 been to prevent the return to power of a Communist government headed by Cheddi Jagan.

*d. Operational Objectives*

To prevent the installation of a Jagan-led government in Guyana by providing support to the PNC and the UF for the purpose of assuring an electoral victory for the non-Jagan parties.

[Omitted here is subsection e., "Cover Considerations."]

*f. Risks Involved*

Jagan has consistently and publicly accused the U.S. and U.K. Governments of having undermined him and of having aided Burnham. It is expected that he will continue to reiterate these charges and to accuse the U.S. and U.K. of supporting Burnham, regardless of what course of action Burnham may follow. Jagan has cried wolf so often in the past that a reiteration of the same charges is not expected to carry much impact, particularly if the timing of the operation is handled appropriately. In this connection, Burnham is thinking of utilizing voting machines in certain districts in Guyana, knowing that this will attract Jagan's attention and lead to charges of fraud. Since Burnham does not intend to rig the machines, and the tallies will in fact be accurate, he believes this will not only divert Jagan's attention during the election campaign but will add credibility to the results after the fact.

Burnham has been made aware that the U.S. Government will attach the utmost importance to tight security practices in the event that support is provided to him as proposed in this paper. He recognizes that any exposure of this support will reflect on him as well as on the U.S. Government, and he is prepared to deny receipt of any such aid. American and British press coverage of the 1968 elections must be expected to be relatively intensive, and it is likely that some British and American correspondents may be favorably predisposed to Jagan. For this reason, it will be essential that Burnham not only counter Jagan's assertion that Burnham represents a minority of the electorate, but also that the U.S. Government's involvement not be revealed in any way. Recent publicity resulting from the *Ramparts* exposures had led to charges in the press that AFL/CIO assistance to the British Guiana Trades Union Council during the general strike of 1964 was in fact CIA



action and overthrew the Jagan government. There has been no allegation in the aftermath of the *Ramparts* exposures that the U.S. Government was involved in the December 1964 election. Therefore, it is believed that since the AFL/CIO is not involved in this proposed course of action in any way, and since there has been no exposure of U.S. Government involvement in the 1964 elections, necessary risks involved in the proposed course of action can be undertaken with appropriate safeguards.

The present security forces in Guyana are considered adequate to contain limited or sporadic violence. However, should Jagan resort to large-scale violence such as occurred during the 1962–64 period, the present security forces would not be adequate. If this should occur, it is problematical as to whether the U.K. could be persuaded to send in British troops, even if Burnham so requested. In any event, the British would have difficulties in sea-lift and logistical support.

*g. Other Courses of Action*

In recent months various methods for dealing with the Jagan problem have been considered by the Department of State [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], and discussed with representatives of the British Government. The proposed course of action outlined in this paper is believed to represent the most desirable course of action under current circumstances. Should it appear, as the election campaign develops, that this proposed course of action is not sufficient, other actions may become necessary to supplement this proposal. Whichever courses of action are pursued, it is believed necessary that we anticipate that elections will be held in Guyana no later than March 1969 and support to Burnham for the PNC and to d'Aguiar for the UF is essential in any case. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will continue to monitor the Guyana situation to permit identification and evaluation of other courses of action should Jagan depart from his current strategy or should it appear that he is likely to win an election despite our best efforts to prevent this. These other courses of action are outlined in Tab C.

*h. Timing of the Operation*

[*6½ lines of source text not declassified*] For this reason, we recommend the immediate and continuing injection of fiscal support to both the PNC and the UF, and we propose to maintain close contact with Burnham and d'Aguiar and their principal associates in order to influence the course of the election wherever necessary. This should be initiated at the earliest possible date, so that alternate tactics can be considered.

[Omitted here is Section 4., "Coordination."]

### 5. Recommendation

It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve this proposed course of action at a level not to exceed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

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#### 422. Telegram From the Ambassador to Guyana (Carlson) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Georgetown, June 1967.

Following message for ARA/NC Cobb from Ambassador Carlson.

1. In course discussion with Prime Minister Burnham last night I raised subject coming elections and explained election mathematics at my disposal tended show that the PNC majority over the PPP and the U.F. would require at minimum 60,000 votes additional. Even Prime Minister Burnham does not consider that overseas vote can be blown up to that extent; even 50,000 figure used by him very hypothetically and 30,000 accepted as more realistic (Embassy finds in excess of 25,000 not believable). Earlier Prime Minister Burnham said that overseas vote figures could be manipulated pretty much as he wished and he tentatively had in mind say 25,000 for a new coalition government and 5,000 for the PPP. When pressed by these mathematics, Prime Minister Burnham said he "would not break his lance" over the PNC majority, meaning that if the U.S.G. made issue of it he would not pursue it. Clear however he intends to follow number of election tricks to add to the PNC totals and detract from the PPP votes. Accumulated total of these may well produce a surprisingly good showing for the PNC, though falling short of absolute majority. Adds that he well aware of need that these election tricks be done smoothly and without controversy.

2. Prime Minister Burnham appreciated point of view that motive behind his pining for majority lies in great part in difficulties doing business with Finance Minister Peter D'Aguiar. I suggested that solution this problem lay less in engineered majority than it did in arranging for D'Aguiar's honorable withdrawal from politics and government after the election is won and a new coalition government formed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson—Department Messages, Vol. 4, 1965–69. Secret. The date is handwritten on the bottom of page 1 of the telegram.

Observed Burnham would have much less trouble with remaining U.F. officials. Burnham receptive to idea but saw no U.F. official on horizon who could take over. I suggested this would be an U.F. problem which could be arranged provided D'Aguiar withdrawal was affable and in constructive agreement with Prime Minister Burnham.

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**423. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director (Hughes) and Deputy Director (Denney)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 6, 1967.

SUBJECT

Guyana

There follows a review of recent 303 Committee actions on Guyana. It provides operational background that you may find of use in your review of SNIE 87.2–67.<sup>2</sup> 303 Committee action has been predicated on the assumption that Jagan is a Communist or an accurate facsimile of one, and that his becoming Prime Minister of Guyana would be disastrous for Guyana, would prove a dangerous stimulus to Castro, and would introduce an unacceptable degree of instability into the Caribbean area.

The final paragraph of the Estimate, on the significance of a Jagan victory, has therefore attracted a good deal of attention in ARA, and CIA/DDP as it has gone through its several revisions. In its earlier forms the paragraph reflected a judgment inconsistent with that which motivated the policy decisions of the 303 Committee; in its latest form the inconsistency has considerably diminished. For its part, DDC finds the current version acceptable.

On 10 April 1967 the 303 Committee approved a proposal to provide Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of the Guyanan People's National Congress with covert support in the next national elections.<sup>3</sup> The cost of the assistance necessary to assure a Burnham victory over Cheddi Jagan of the People's Progressive Party was estimated at [*less than 1*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 424.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 421.

*line of source text not declassified*]. Some of this was to go to Burnham's coalition partner, the United Force.

Committee approval was grounded in the belief that as Prime Minister Jagan would be an instrument of Communist influence in Latin America. The [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] paper embodying the proposal noted that during Jagan's years (1961–4) as head of the government, some 50 PPP youth trained in Cuba in guerrilla warfare, a "Guyana Liberation Army" was organized and equipped largely with Cuban weapons, and \$3,000,000 of Soviet bloc funds entered Guyana for the support of the PPP.<sup>4</sup> The paper also stated that some 90 PPP youths were currently being trained (?educated?) in Bloc countries and that in Guyana Jagan's Accabre College was training Guyanan youth in Marxist thought.

The paper forecast that the vote would be an extremely close thing even if Burnham had our assistance. The [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] suggestion, adopted by the Committee, was to make 12 equal monthly payments to Burnham to help him in revitalizing his party and in organizing his absentee vote strength. If Burnham's electoral prospects appeared bleak, [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. These measures, it was hoped, would forestall the necessity of exile of Jagan, or his detention, or coup d'état after the elections.

The Committee's approval was attended by a recommendation by the Executive Secretary for a quarterly progress report on the progress of the campaign. On 7 August [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] reported to the 303 Committee that some [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] of the original sum had been committed, that a [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*]. In oral presentation an [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] representative noted that the vote might go as high as 350,000 (instead of the 278,000 previously predicted) and that the increase was expected to be largely Indian and therefore pro-Jagan.<sup>5</sup> The race, he said, would be nip-and-tuck all the way. The [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] disposition at the moment, and that of ARA, is to continue to rely on the electoral process in Guyana (no matter how much that process will need "adjustment"), [*2 lines of source text not declassified*]. If it does, the issue will be submitted to the 303 Committee for review.

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<sup>4</sup> Information on Soviet Bloc assistance to Jagan's government was attached at Tab A; see footnote 4, Document 421.

<sup>5</sup> The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee of August 7 reported [*text not declassified*] the estimated voting figures. The minutes recorded that Rostow and [*text not declassified*]. (Memorandum from Donald S. MacDonald to Sayre; *ibid.*, Guyana, 1969, 1970)

#### 424. Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

SNIE 87.2–67

Washington, December 7, 1967.

##### GUYANA

##### The Problem

To consider the prospects for Guyana, with particular attention to problems and consequences of the coming parliamentary election.

##### Conclusions

A. Voting in the coming election, which according to the Constitution must take place by the end of March 1969, will again be predominantly along racial lines. Cheddi Jagan, the East Indian leader and an enthusiastic Marxist-Leninist, has a basic advantage: The East Indians are now probably a slight majority of the population. The Negroes, almost all of whom support Forbes Burnham, the present Prime Minister, constitute about 44 percent.

B. Burnham, whose coalition with the small, conservative United Force (UF) has always been fragile,<sup>2</sup> is working on various schemes to enlarge the Negro vote. He will try to obtain a substantial number of absentee votes from Negro Guyanese residing abroad. Beyond this, he is exploring means to merge Guyana with one or another Caribbean island (most likely St. Vincent)<sup>3</sup> so as to increase the proportion of Negro voters.

C. If Burnham became convinced that such arrangements would not suffice to keep him in power and Jagan out, he would probably rig the election. In any case, he would have to rely on the small civilian police and Guyana Defense Force (GDF), both of which are predominantly Negro, to maintain order. They probably could do so, except in the unlikely event of a major East Indian uprising.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, NIEs and SNIEs. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on December 7.

<sup>2</sup> D'Aguiar resigned from the Cabinet on September 26 despite Carlson's best efforts to dissuade him. (Telegram 295 from Georgetown, September 25, and memorandum from Bowdler to Rostow, September 25; both Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Guyana (Brit. G.), Vol. I, Cables, Memos, and Misc., 5/66–11/68)

<sup>3</sup> An October 24 memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes reported that the move to associate with St. Vincent would probably not succeed. It stated that "we understand that the Commonwealth Relations Office in London is negatively disposed." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970)

D. Prospects for a second Burnham Administration would depend in major part on how he won. A merger with St. Vincent, for instance, would almost certainly raise fears, among East Indians and UF supporters, of discrimination and possibly even of persecution under a government completely controlled by Negroes. Such fears could produce unrest and some violence. If Burnham returned to power as head of a coalition in an election that appeared reasonably fair, prospects would be good for continuing stability and further gradual economic progress. The need for outside economic aid would nonetheless continue.

E. If Jagan's party won, he would probably not be permitted to exercise power. Burnham could use force to keep him out, or suspend the Constitution and rule by fiat, or even press for a grand coalition which he himself would seek to head. Alternatively he could permit Jagan to take office—only to subvert his government at a later date.

F. In the unlikely event that Jagan did take and hold power, the Communist orientation of his government, more than its actual capabilities, would make it a new disturbing factor in hemispheric affairs, especially in the Caribbean area. Communist countries would make considerable propaganda capital of the fact that such a government had come to power by free elections. The USSR and some other Communist governments would move quickly to establish diplomatic or trade missions in Georgetown. Both the Soviets and Castro would probably provide Jagan with small amounts of economic aid.

G. A Jagan administration would, however, be beset by powerful internal opposition and would not have the resources for an adventuresome program abroad. Thus, Jagan would not try to launch an independent Communist revolutionary effort on the continent or in the Caribbean, though he probably would cooperate in the overt and clandestine activities sponsored by the USSR or Cuba. Such actions would encourage Venezuela to press its territorial claims against Guyana and perhaps even to undertake military action.

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the estimate including sections on Background, the Burnham Government, Preelection Maneuvers, and Security Forces.]

#### *V. Postelection Prospects*

21. If Burnham wins, the postelection prospects will depend in major degree on how he manages to do so. If he were returned to office as head of a coalition, and as a result of a more or less normal and reasonably fair contest, the prospects for his government would be good. He would require continuing economic aid from the US, and if he got it, Guyana would almost certainly make gradual further economic progress. He would more than likely again have trouble within the coalition, and opposition on the part of Jagan and the East Indians

would become increasingly bitter. But there probably would not be disorders and violence of such magnitude that the Guyanese security forces could not control them.

22. If, however, he blatantly rigs the election, or if he wins by means of a merger with St. Vincent or another Caribbean island, the political situation is likely to be more unstable. Should Guyana join with St. Vincent, for example, the additional number of Negro voters in the new nation would produce fears among East Indians and UF members alike that the Burnham government would become solely a Negro-run institution and that they would be excluded from power indefinitely. Jagan would be the first to claim that the merger was engineered by the US and would use it in his anti-US propaganda in Guyana and abroad. At least initially, some unrest and violence would be likely. The Guyanese security forces would probably remain loyal to Burnham and be capable of preventing violence from getting out of hand.

23. If, in spite of Burnham's preelection activities, Cheddi Jagan's PPP gained a majority of seats in the Assembly, Cheddi probably still would not be permitted to form a government. Burnham might call upon the security forces to keep Jagan out, or suspend the Constitution and rule by fiat, or even try persuading Jagan to join in a grand coalition which he, Burnham, would head. Any of these actions, with the possible exception of the last, would raise racial tensions and produce danger of violence—both probably more inflammatory than the merger possibility discussed above.

24. It is possible that for appearances' sake Burnham would let Jagan take office—only to subvert his government at a later date. It is unlikely that Burnham would go into loyal opposition, but if he did, Jagan would still face a highly troubled tenure. The Negroes in opposition would probably be more militant than the East Indians have been, and Jagan could not count on the security forces.

25. However determined Jagan was to take measures to favor the East Indians or to carry out Marxist economic policies, he would be severely inhibited by circumstances. Sooner or later, he would have to make numerous concessions to the Negroes or risk being deposed. He has talked of nationalizing the important foreign enterprises, but he is probably aware that expropriation of the foreign aluminum companies or of the big British-owned sugar properties would be disastrous economically. He would, in any case, encounter certain economic difficulty. There would be a loss of confidence on the part of private investors, and most of the economic assistance from which the Burnham government has benefited would probably not be forthcoming to Jagan.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In 1965–1966, the US committed \$18 million in aid to Guyana of which \$13 million has been drawn down. [Footnote in the source text.]

His friends among the Communist countries would probably provide some help, but less. Cuba would most likely give Jagan a favorable price for Guyana's rice crop and the USSR would probably give limited credits.

26. In the unlikely event that Jagan did take and hold power, the Communist orientation of his government, more than its actual capabilities, would make it a new disturbing factor in hemispheric affairs, especially in the Caribbean area. The USSR and other Communist countries would make considerable propaganda capital of the fact that such a government had come to power by free elections, and the Jagan government would support the Communist nations in international forums on basic issues. The Soviets and some other Communist governments would move quickly to establish diplomatic or trade missions in Georgetown. Yet a Jagan administration would be beset by powerful internal opposition, and its internal weakness would require it to move cautiously in order to retain power while trying to strengthen its political base. It would not have the resources to carry out an adventuresome program abroad. Thus, Jagan would not try to launch an independent Communist revolutionary effort on the continent or in the Caribbean. He probably would cooperate in the overt and clandestine activities sponsored by the USSR or Cuba. All actions of this kind would encourage Venezuela, certain to be suspicious of Jagan regardless of his policies, to press its territorial claims against Guyana and perhaps even to undertake military action.

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**425. Memorandum From James R. Gardner of the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart)**

Washington, December 11, 1967.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]



## 426. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 22, 1968, 11:25 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana  
Sir John Carter, Ambassador to the United States from Guyana  
Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Acting Assistant Secretary of State  
Mr. William G. Bowdler, the White House

Two substantive issues were discussed in Prime Minister Burnham's 20-minute meeting with the President.

On the Guyanese elections the Prime Minister thought he would have to go to elections by November 1968. He said he was "calmly confident" about the outcome. The President stressed the importance of maintaining his coalition strong.<sup>2</sup>

The Prime Minister described his border difficulties with Venezuela during the past year. He referred to Venezuela's having blocked Guyana from eligibility to sign the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty at the UN last session.<sup>3</sup> He asked the President if the United States could use its influence with Venezuela to be less "bellicose" about the boundary problem. Mr. Sayre explained that we had been active with both sides in keeping the dispute quiet. The President asked Mr. Sayre for a memorandum on the subject.<sup>4</sup>

WGB

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GUYANA. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler and approved in the White House. The meeting was held in the President's office. Burnham visited Washington for medical care at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center. A Department of State briefing paper prepared for the meeting recommended the President congratulate Burnham on 3 years of stability and racial peace, assure him of the high priority of the AID program in Guyana and that "we have also selected our best people to send to Georgetown," and be aware that Burnham might request that the United States influence the Government of Venezuela to ease its border dispute pressures on Guyana. (Memorandum for the President from Rusk, January 20; *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> A January 20 memorandum for the President from Rostow noted that Guyana's uneasy coalition partnership had become shaky over appointments and budgetary issues and stressed that "a word from you on the importance of maintaining uneasy political combinations in election years would be useful." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Guyana (Brit. G.), Vol. I, Cables, Memos, and Misc., 5/66–11/68)

<sup>3</sup> The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed at Mexico City on February 14, 1967, and entered into force on April 22, 1968. The United States was not a signatory, but was party to two Additional Protocols dealing with matters concerning non-Latin American nuclear powers. (*Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Texts and Histories of Negotiations*, 1982, pp. 59–81)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 430.

**427. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1968, 10:30 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Call of Prime Minister Burnham  
Electoral Situation in Guyana

**PARTICIPANTS***Foreign*

L. Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana  
H.E. Sir John Carter, Guyanese Ambassador to the United States

*United States*

The Secretary  
Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs  
Mr. John Calvin Hill, Jr., Director, North Coast Affairs

Following his release from a physical check-up at Bethesda Naval Hospital, Prime Minister Burnham paid a 45-minute courtesy call on the Secretary.

After an exchange of pleasantries, the Secretary asked the Prime Minister how he saw the situation in Guyana. Burnham replied that he was "quietly confident" about the outcome of the elections, which could be held at any time before the end of March 1969. Amplifying on this at a later stage in the conversation, he said he thought that the government had picked up support and that, while it would be untruthful to suggest that there was a landslide of defectors from the P.P.P., there were some who had gone over to the government in some areas. He might pick up 3% to 4% of the East Indian vote. He was also counting "heavily" on the overseas absentee ballots, which were concentrated in the U.K. and, secondly, in the U.S. He said that last year's U.S. Supreme Court decision which had the effect of allowing Guyanese citizens who had also become naturalized U.S. citizens to vote without losing their U.S. citizenship would be helpful. The Secretary expressed some uncertainty whether the decision contemplated voting by such citizens while they were resident in the U.S. and whether electioneering in this country would present problems. He said we would look into this. Mr. Burnham indicated that no

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 GUYANA. Confidential. Drafted by Hill and approved in S by Shlaudeman. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part 1 of 5. Part 2, Caribbean Regional Problems, and part 5, World Situation, are *ibid*. Part 3 is Document 428; part 4 is Document 429. Sayre sent Rusk a January 22 briefing memorandum for this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 GUYANA)

objectionable electioneering was contemplated and, in substantiation of his assessment that his electoral prospects were good, pointed out that Cheddi Jagan was already setting the stage among his followers for a defeat by claiming the elections would be rigged, he would not be allowed to assume power, etc.

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#### 428. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 23, 1968, 10:30 a.m.

##### SUBJECT

Call of Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana  
Border Disputes

##### PARTICIPANTS

###### *Foreign*

L. Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana  
H.E. Sir John Carter, Guyanese Ambassador to the United States

###### *United States*

The Secretary  
Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs  
Mr. John Calvin Hill, Jr., Director, North Coast Affairs

The Prime Minister alluded to the border dispute with Surinam which had flared up before his departure and reported that, in the interval, Sir Lionel Luckhoo, the Guyana High Commissioner in London, had taken the matter up in the Hague with the Foreign Minister when he was presenting his credentials as Ambassador to the Netherlands. Sir Lionel was in the process of returning to report in detail, but he had gained the impression that the Netherlands was not backing the Government of Surinam and that the matter could be settled quietly.

The border dispute with Venezuela was more worrisome, especially as it was also an election year in Venezuela with the consequent temptation to agitate the issue. The saving factor grace was the Venezuelans were pledged not to use force and that they seemed to realize the problems which would result from a hostile government on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GUYANA. Confidential. Drafted by Hill and approved in S by Shlaudeman. The memorandum is part 3 of 5; regarding parts 1, 2, 4, and 5, see footnote 1, Document 427. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

their frontiers. The Mixed Commission was now working satisfactorily (except that the Ankoko Island question remained unsolved)<sup>2</sup> and it was setting up a Sub-committee to look into economic cooperation. Guyana appreciated the efforts that the U.S. had been making to keep matters cool on the Venezuelan side and was counting on the U.S. to continue those efforts, as the Opposition in Guyana was only too anxious to cry "sell out" at any sign of failure to maintain the nation's sovereignty. The Secretary commented that border issues were often agitated in political situations but that it was contrary to Venezuela's traditions and objectives in the OAS and UN to settle matters by force. He remarked that, in the 40 or so border disputes around the world, it was our observation that those in possession seemed to win out and that the thing to do was for all to remain cool.

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<sup>2</sup> In 1966 Venezuela moved to occupy the tiny border island of Ankoko, half of which was claimed by Guyana, according to a background paper attached to a January 22 briefing memorandum from Sayre to Rusk (see footnote 1, Document 427). That paper also described how Venezuela had "effectively blocked Guyana from becoming a party to the Organization of American States by the Act of Washington which bars admission to American States that have unresolved border disputes with a member state."

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#### 429. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 23, 1968, 10:30 a.m.

##### SUBJECT

Call of Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana  
U.S. Assistance

##### PARTICIPANTS

###### *Foreign*

L. Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana  
H.E. Sir John Carter, Guyanese Ambassador to the United States

###### *United States*

The Secretary  
Mr. Robert M. Sayre, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs  
Mr. John Calvin Hill, Jr., Director, North Coast Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 GUYANA. Confidential. Drafted by Hill and approved in S on January 23. The memorandum is part 4 of 5; regarding parts 1-3 and 5, see footnote 1, Document 427. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

The Secretary invited the Prime Minister to take five minutes or so to say frankly what he thought the U.S. should be doing in Guyana. The Prime Minister noted with appreciation that the U.S. had been in the forefront of contributors of assistance to his development effort but that, as he had indicated at the Donor's Conference in Georgetown, his principal problem had been to raise sufficient local currency financing to make use of the external financing offered. In fact, part of last year's British assistance had to be foregone because local cost financing could not be raised. He understood the Congressional and U.S. balance of payments considerations which put constraints on U.S. assistance for local costs, but it would be useful to have the utmost flexibility in this regard. Meanwhile, he had been exploring with the U.S. the possibility of a PL 480 program (for instance, Guyana was importing \$15 million or more in U.S. wheat) which would provide counterpart which could be used for local cost purposes. The Secretary indicated sympathy with regard to the local cost financing problem, which emanated from our balance of payments, and with regard to PL 480. He indicated he would want to take up the PL 480 problem with Messrs. Hill and Sayre later. There followed a brief discussion of the recent U.S. balance of payments problems, in which the Secretary emphasized the effort which had been taken to avoid an adverse impact on investments in and trade with the less developed countries.

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**430. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 25, 1968.

SUBJECT

Guyana's Border Dispute with Venezuela

During Prime Minister Burnham's call he asked for our help in persuading Venezuela to be less "bellicose" about the border dispute. You asked for a memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Guyana (Brit. G.), Vol. I, Cables, Memos, and Misc., 5/66–11/68. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 426.

The dispute, involving some 5/8 of Guyana (see attached map),<sup>3</sup> goes back to colonial times. We became involved in the 1890s in an arbitration effort between the British and Venezuelans. The award generally corresponds to Guyana's present boundaries. Venezuela has never accepted it.

Venezuela allowed the case to lie dormant until Guyana approached independence. Thinking that it could get more concessions out of a Britain anxious to get rid of a problem colony than an independent new nation, the Venezuelans began agitating their claim. They blocked Guyana from joining the OAS and becoming part of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone.

In 1966 at Geneva the British and Venezuelan Governments agreed to establish a Mixed Guyana-Venezuela Commission to discuss the dispute. The agreement provides that if the dispute has not been resolved by 1970, the Commission will be dissolved and the problem taken to the United Nations.

The Commission has not made any progress toward resolving the boundary question but it has succeeded in draining off some of the political heat. Last year there was a small flareup when Venezuela occupied the border island of Ankoko, half of which is claimed by Guyana.

We have made it clear to both governments that they should use the Mixed Commission to work out their differences. We follow the controversy closely and counsel restraint when things get unsettled. After the Ankoko incident interrupted the dialogue, we encouraged President Leoni to receive an emissary from Guyana to resume bilateral talks. Venezuela eventually agreed to this, and offered to consider joint economic development projects in Guyana under the aegis of the Mixed Commission. Prime Minister Burnham accepted this suggestion in the understanding that the projects would not be limited just to the disputed territory.

The prospects for reaching a solution to the border controversy in the near future are not bright, unless there is a sharp change in attitude by the Venezuelans. For internal political reasons, they now find it convenient to agitate the issue from time to time. Our strategy is to use our influence to restrain the Venezuelans from further adventurism along the frontier and from too much politicking at home. We have repeatedly reminded the Venezuelans that if they undermine Burnham, they run the risk of getting a communist bridgehead at their back door under Cheddi Jagan.

**Walt**

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not reproduced.

**431. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 13, 1968.

SUBJECT

Electoral Assistance to Guyanan Prime Minister Burnham—Progress Report

Attached is a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] memorandum of 22 January<sup>2</sup> reporting the progress that has been made in putting into effect the 303 Committee's decision of April 1967 to provide anti-Jagan forces in Guyana with covert support for the next national elections, which are scheduled for late 1968 or early 1969. The bulk of the assistance, whose total cost was estimated at [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], was to go to Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of the Peoples National Congress (PNC); a lesser amount was to go to the PNC's junior partner in the government coalition, the United Force (UF).

The Committee's decision was grounded in the belief that as Prime Minister Jagan would be an instrument of Communist influence in Latin America. He is a declared Marxist, and during his years as head of government in 1961–64 demonstrated in a number of ways his close sympathy with both the Soviet Union and Cuba. The [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] memorandum of proposal that formed the basis of the Committee's April decision pointed out that in these years some 50 members of his People's Progressive Party (PPP) were trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba; that some 90 PPP youths were currently being educated in Bloc countries; that the Soviet Union during Jagan's premiership had given over \$3,000,000 in direct support of the PPP; and that Jagan's Accabre College, which he established in Guyana in 1965, is a base for Marxist indoctrination of PPP members.

The attached memorandum notes a number of steps that have been taken to implement the 303 Committee decision. A PNC training program in organizational and campaign techniques is in progress [*4 lines of source text not declassified*] to publicize Guyana's progress and thus attract the maximum number of these voters.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> The attached memorandum reported that the PNC claimed to already have 20,000 overseas Guyanese registered, [*text not declassified*], and that, "according [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]," Cheddi and Janet Jagan and a small hard-core group of Marxists around them had purged the PPP of the majority of its moderate leaders at the party congress in late August 1967.

A nation-wide registration of all Guyanese over 15 has been all but completed; the information it yields will be helpful in indicating likely areas and groups for PNC campaign effort. For its part, the UF has begun working in both urban and rural areas and among its potential supporters in American Indian settlements. Of the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* originally authorized, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* was committed in FY '67. Of the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* programmed for FY 1968 only *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* has been committed thus far, but the report anticipates an early quickening in the pace of outlays.

Despite these endeavors, the election still promises to be a nip-and-tuck affair. The country's vote will once more be cast almost completely along ethnic lines, and there is no solid assurance that Burnham's Negro supporters, even with their strength supplemented by their overseas compatriots, will carry the day against the East Indian supporters of Jagan. The feasibility of Burnham's design to effect a pre-election merger with St. Vincent and thus take advantage of that island's largely Negro vote is still uncertain. Guyana's border problems with Venezuela and Surinam are being vigorously exploited by Jagan, as are charges that the United States, and especially the CIA, is involving itself in Guyana's internal affairs.<sup>3</sup> But although prospects are thus unclear, they are bright enough to justify keeping to our present course.

I recommend that the attached memorandum be noted in the next 303 Committee meeting.

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<sup>3</sup> Jagan charged that the Shoup Registration System International of Pennsylvania was a front for the CIA and would help with the rigging of the coming elections, according to a December 17, 1967, *New York Times* article, a copy of which was attached but not printed.

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## 432. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Rusk met with Guyana Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Finance Dr. Ptolemy Reid on May 24, 1968. Dr. Reid's primary purpose in coming to the United States was to generate electoral support for the People's National Congress (PNC) among Guyanese living in the United States. Reid took over as Minister of Finance from United Force leader, Peter D'Aguiar, in late September 1967, after the latter's resignation. Ambassador Carlson estimated that Reid



would assume the leadership of the anti-Jagan forces in Guyana in the event of Burnham's death or incapacitation. (Memorandum from Oliver to Rusk, May 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GUYANA)

Reid had progressively assumed more responsibility for economic development matters in Guyana and his visit occasioned a review of the U.S. aid program in Guyana. The briefing memoranda prepared for his visit reported that the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) program in Guyana "has been progressing well with inputs of grants, loans, and PL 480 foods of roughly \$10 million per year since the Burnham government took office in December 1964." These memoranda stated that substantial improvements had been made in the main coast road, and that Morrison-Knudson was preparing to begin work on the last remaining unimproved coastal road section, around Corentyne in the eastern part of the country, financed by a \$7.5 million AID loan. (Memorandum from Oliver to Rusk, May 24, Tab B—Briefing Notes; *ibid.*) Another AID project was the building of a 50-mile road from Atkinson Field to the previously isolated mining town of Mackenzie, begun in 1966 and finished the summer of 1968. Major improvements were made through AID funds to the international airport developed at Atkinson Field. An AID loan was also planned for Guyana's rice industry, to construct drying/storage centers at a number of sites along the coastal rice growing areas, to modernize Guyanese rice mills, to establish a rice research station, and to provide technical assistance. The loan was approved in November of 1968; see Document 440.

Further information on Reid and his May 1968 U.S. visit is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GUYANA, POL GUYANA–US, and POL 6 DR. REID.

### 433. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 5, 1968.

#### SUBJECT

Support to Anti-Jagan Political Parties in Guyana: Progress Report

#### 1. Summary

On 7 April 1967 the 303 Committee approved<sup>2</sup> a proposal to support anti-Jagan political parties in Guyana in the national elections scheduled for late 1968 or early 1969. Previous progress reports on this activity were considered by the 303 Committee on 7 August 1967<sup>3</sup> and 16 February 1968.<sup>4</sup>

This progress report describes current and projected activities in the election campaigns of the People's National Congress (PNC) and the United Force (UF), notes a new turn in Prime Minister Forbes Burnham's electoral strategy and describes the current state of Guyana's border disputes with Venezuela and Surinam.

This report also refers to the previous progress report on this activity, considered by the 303 Committee on 16 February 1968, which stated that of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] originally approved by the Committee, approximately [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] were spent in FY 1967 and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] were programmed for FY 1968. This report further points out that these funds have now been spent and it is estimated that an additional [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be needed for the remainder of FY 1968 and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be needed in FY 1969. Approval for the expenditure of this amount is recommended.<sup>5</sup> (The [*less than 1 line of source text*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 421.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 423.

<sup>4</sup> The 303 Committee meetings on August 7, 1967, and February 16, 1968, were review and discussion, rather than decision, meetings. The facts noted in Document 431 and in the January 22 memorandum cited in footnote 2 thereto were among the topics reviewed at the February 16 meeting.

<sup>5</sup> According to the minutes of the July 12 meeting of the 303 Committee, [*name not declassified*] acknowledged "the seemingly high costs for such a 'postage stamp' country election but indicated that known Cuban or Soviet subsidies to Jagan are on almost the same scale." The additional funding was approved by the Committee. (Memorandum from McAfee to Oliver, July 16; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970)

*not declassified*] are available [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] needed for FY 1969, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] are available or programmed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; the remaining [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would have to be provided from the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Reserve for FY 1969.)

## 2. *Current Activities*

Preparations for the elections are proceeding satisfactorily with the following activities now under way:

### A. *Campaign in Guyana*

The campaign organizations of the People's National Congress (PNC) led by Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and the United Force (UF) led by Peter D'Aguiar have been set up in Guyana and both these parties are now engaged in their electoral campaigns. Due to its larger size and the wider and more varied activities demanded of it, the PNC is more advanced in its state of organization than is the UF. PNC offices have been set up at the precinct level throughout the populated areas of the country and party activists have begun to canvass potential voters. The UF began its campaign later than the PNC due to its smaller size and the somewhat more restricted area in which it must organize. However, the UF campaign is now beginning to get underway, party organizers are canvassing urban areas where most UF voters are located and are also making an increasing number of visits to the interior, where Amerindian voters, who made up approximately one third of the UF vote in 1964, are located.<sup>6</sup> The UF and the PNC each has a campaign manager in Guyana [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Both of these are professional political organizers and are doing an excellent job in getting the parties organized for the elections.

### B. *Guyana National Census and Voter Registration*

The Government of Guyana is carrying out a census of all citizens 14 years of age and over who reside in Guyana. The names of Guyanese of voting age will be drawn from the census list to compose the voter registration lists for the elections. All three parties, the PNC, the UF and the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) led by Cheddi Jagan, are now working to make sure that their adherents are properly registered. [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] The Government of Guyana at one time planned to have the census completed in early 1968; however

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<sup>6</sup> According to a July 2 memorandum from Oliver to Bohlen, part of the additional funds was for PNC and UF motor vehicles and boats to reach Amerindian voters and funds to contact overseas voters. (Ibid.)

various delays have occurred and the government recently said privately that the census will not be completed until the end of July, at which time registration will be closed. Due to these delays, the government's contract with the company expired, company representatives who were in Guyana returned to the US, and Guyanese are completing the census without the company's help. Prime Minister Burnham recently said that he believes the registration can be completed in time to permit elections to be held in early December 1968 but that there is a possibility that they may not be held until February 1969. According to the constitution, elections must be held by the end of March 1969.

### *C. Registration of Overseas Voters*

The main thrust of present PNC and UF efforts overseas is to get potential voters registered. This will be strictly a registration of voters as no census is being conducted in overseas areas. This registration effort is going slowly but reasonably satisfactorily in the US and Great Britain but has run into snags in Canada. Steps are being taken to correct this problem. It is difficult to estimate what the total number of overseas registrants will be as there are no figures to be used as a basis for such an estimate. There may be as many as 20,000 potential voters in Great Britain and possibly 15,000 in the US and Canada. As many as 25,000 of these may be supporters of the PNC and the UF.

### *3. New Developments*

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] representatives met with Prime Minister Forbes Burnham in late April to discuss operational matters related to the electoral campaign. At this meeting Burnham stated unequivocally that he plans to conduct the registration and voting in such a manner that the PNC will emerge with an absolute majority in the Guyana National Assembly. Burnham said that he will never again allow the life of his government to depend upon his coalition partner Peter d'Aguiar and that if the voting should turn out in such a manner that he could not form a government without the help of d'Aguiar, he would refuse to form a government. Burnham said that he plans to register 17, 18, 19 and 20 year old PNC adherents (minimum voting age is 21 years) to make up part of the vote he needs and will direct his campaign in such a way as to attract enough additional East Indian voters to put the PNC approximately on a par with the PPP in Guyana. The additional votes he would need to give the PNC an absolute majority would come from the overseas Guyanese. On the other hand Ambassador Carlson [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Georgetown have commented that they believe this is wishful thinking by Burnham. They believe Burnham would encounter insurmountable administrative and organizational difficulties

in attempting to rig the elections to the extent necessary to assure the PNC an absolute majority.

It should be noted that Burnham's plans to get an absolute majority in the elections constitute a basic change in strategy. Planning heretofore had been based upon the PNC and UF running separately but re-forming the coalition after the elections. Burnham will probably still be willing to have a coalition government after the elections but wants an absolute majority so that the coalition will be formed on his terms and so that the life of his government will not depend on the UF and Peter d'Aguar.

[Omitted here are sections 4–8, "Additional Development," "Security," "Coordination," "Future Plans," and "Recommendations."]

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**434. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and Administrator of the Agency for International Development Gaud to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1968.

SUBJECT

Public Law 480 Program with Guyana

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 sales agreement with Guyana to provide approximately 1,500 tons of edible vegetable oil, 2,000 tons of wheat/wheat flour, 100 tons of tobacco and 3,000 tons of potatoes for which the current export market value (including applicable ocean transportation costs) is approximately \$1.0 million. The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 5 percent on delivery and the balance in approximately equal installments over 20 years; interest will be 2 percent per annum during a two-year grace period and 2.5 percent thereafter. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Guyana, Vol. I, Memos. Forwarded as Tab B to the President under a July 11 memorandum from Rostow requesting Johnson's approval. Tab A to Rostow's memorandum was a July 8 memorandum from Director of the Bureau of the Budget Zwick concurring with Gaud and Freeman's recommendation. Johnson checked the approve options on Rostow and Zwick's memoranda. (Ibid., Guyana (Brit. G.), Vol. I, Cables, Memos, and Misc., 5/66–11/68)

*Need for Program*

The Guyana (Burnham) Government has undertaken with help from the United States Agency for International Development and the British and Canadian Governments an ambitious economic development program over the past three years. We have given particular priority to assisting this government in its effort to demonstrate what a democratic government can achieve following the years of difficulties under the rule of communist-oriented Cheddi Jagan. The Burnham government is making a special effort to accelerate its development projects, particularly for agriculture, but local currency costs for development have placed a substantial strain on the Burnham government's budget.

This agreement would assist the Burnham Government to sustain its record of economic achievement and progress, which is important at this time since national elections will be held in Guyana prior to March 31, 1969, with Jagan again opposing Burnham.

*Self-Help Efforts*

In negotiating this agreement, we will seek the following commitments from the Government of Guyana:

The local currency generated from the sale of the commodities in the importing country shall be made available for development of agriculture as follows:

1. For the construction and improvement of roads connecting rural areas with the market cities and also for planning and construction of access roads in the Atkinson/McKenzie land settlement project.

2. For the modernization of agriculture through the expansion of adaptive research and extension and increasing the means for storage, processing and distribution of basic food crops and for land development and water control in farming areas along the coast.

3. For the improvement of facilities and operation of the government maternity and child health centers, especially for projected family planning, and including vaccinations for polio, etc.

4. For strengthening systems of collection, computation and analysis of statistics to better measure the availability of agricultural inputs and progress in expanding production and marketing of agricultural commodities.

5. For other improvements in the agricultural sector to be agreed upon by the USAID Mission and the Government of Guyana.

*Military Expenditures Review*

With respect to Section 620(S) of the Foreign Assistance Act, State/AID has concluded that U.S. developmental assistance is not being diverted to military expenditures and that Guyana's resources are

not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Guyana's development. A summary of State/AID conclusion is attached.<sup>2</sup>

*Recommendation*

That you authorize us to proceed with this PL 480 sales agreement.

**Orville L. Freeman**  
**William S. Gaud**

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

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**435. Telegram From the Ambassador to Guyana (Carlson) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Georgetown, June 28, 1968.

For Hill ARA/NC from Amb Carlson.

1. Had long discussion with Prime Minister Burnham June 27 on variety subjects but my primary purpose was to assess his attitude re dimension of possible electoral results and whether reports referred to in your message to me of June 21st<sup>2</sup> should be viewed as definitive.

2. I first touched on status of possibility SA loan,<sup>3</sup> mentioning that while great progress had been made toward authorization and I was hopeful, it was at the moment still not certain. There was, however, another matter involved in this which was of concern to me. Some of the friends of Guyana in Washington had recently become apprehensive as to whether Prime Minister might plan Tammany Hall tactics on so

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Carlson—Department Messages [*file name not declassified*], Vol. 4, July 7, 1965–February 14, 1969. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In a June 21 telegram Hill had advised Carlson to warn Burnham not to rig the election so extremely as to show an African majority in the population. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Supporting Assistance loan, which could provide over \$2 million for small public works projects, reducing unemployment and resulting in maximum political impact during the pre-election period. In a June 28 telegram [*text not declassified*], on Carlson's behalf, requested [*name not declassified*] immediate intercession, since the loan agreement had to be signed prior to the end of the fiscal year (June 30) and Gaud was reluctant to proceed. Carlson planned a direct appeal to the Secretary of State "if day's events require," but the loan was approved without this proving necessary. (*Ibid.*)

massive a scale as to taint the results, raise questions of legitimacy, and embarrass the U.S. I was sure that he would no more want to have us all in the funny papers than would our friends in Washington. I said I assumed that Sonny Ramphal had already mentioned to him that John Hill has expressed this anxiety to Ramphal in New York. In addition, an ingredient in the discussion in Washington of my request for SA funding had been question as to whether election was to be so fixed as to make such funding unnecessary thereby saving us several million dollars. (Burnham seemed impressed by this point.) Moreover because of our strong support of the Burnham administration in the past, which was well known, and the closeness of GOG-USG relations what he does will inevitably affect our image too.

3. Burnham asked what these people thought was reasonable and I told him the matter was not one of any precise equation but simply one of dimension. We wanted him to win; we had backed him to the hilt; neither of us wanted a scandal. He agreed. I asked him what he really expected electorally. He said he foresaw the PNC in about the same range of votes in Guyana as the PPP; i.e., roughly even, perhaps not quite as much as the PPP, or perhaps slightly more but in general about the same order of magnitude. Burnham told me he expects work hard on Muslims and hopes have some success as well as with various other non-Africans so as to give PNC more multi-racial image. He hoped part of this process could take place before election and mentioned various individuals including Kit Nascimento and Ann Jardim.

4. As far as overseas was concerned, he thought registration of as many as 50,000 was within realm of possibility because of ease with which persons can qualify as Guyanese, i.e., descendant if mother was Guyanese and even foreign wives of Guyanese under the law qualify. He was urging his agents to work vigorously toward this large registration but he thought prospect was not good for high voter participation overseas. He expected not more than about 30,000 to vote if registration went high as 50,000. We agreed that overseas vote should be heavily PNC, i.e., 75-90% (with him more inclined to the latter figure). We agreed that it was entirely logical that it should be heavily PNC.

5. Since all indications from collateral reporting showed that his intentions were much more reasonable than had been feared this was far as I thought it necessary to go. Our conversation generally tended to confirm reports from several other sources few days before [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that Burnham is not planning or expecting massive rig. ([*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]) reports that he is mentally prepared to accept plurality and is hoping for 26 seats with thought that if coalition is not reestablished (presumably due D'Aguiar on scene trying set terms) that he will be able persuade at least two if not three UF legislators to join him in forming majority.



**436. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 17, 1968, 2314Z.

204263. Subject: Guyana–Venezuela Border Dispute.

Following is summary developments Guyana–Venezuela border dispute that can be drawn on as appropriate.

1. Background: Dispute originates in 1899 Arbitral Award of territory west of Essequibo River (about five-eighths of what is now Guyana) to Great Britain. GOV has since 1962 maintained officially that arbitral award was result “fraudulent deal” between British and Russian members tribunal and therefore award is null and void. In period immediately prior to British granting independence to Guyana, Venezuela pressed for reopening question of where boundary should lie in belief that Venezuela could more easily twist tail of British lion than of small newly sovereign neighbor. In February 1966 at Geneva UK, British Guiana and Venezuela Governments signed agreement establishing Mixed Commission to discuss dispute arising out of Venezuelan claim. Since Guyana’s independence May 1966, Mixed Commission has met 9 times and has generally served as useful channel for diversion political heat generated in both countries.

2. Mixed Commission meetings have been frustrating to GOV, however, since it apparently saw purpose Mixed Commission to redraw boundary, whereas Guyana saw it as forum to examine validity Venezuelan allegations concerning Arbitral Award. In effort break impasse GOV offered contribute to joint economic development of disputed territory. GOG expressed willingness discuss Venezuelan economic assistance but broke down when it became clear to GOG that GOV wanted exercise more authority over project than normal for economic assistance donors.

3. Last year Venezuela occupied tiny border island Ankoko, half which claimed by Guyana. As dispute boiled over “Ankoko Affair” early summer 1967 we encouraged President Leoni receive Guyana emissary. Talks resulted in easing of tensions and assuring GOG that Venezuela did not intend to use force in dispute and that matter would be played in low key during pre-electoral period in Guyana.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 GUYANA–VEN. Confidential. Drafted by Luers and George F. Jones, cleared by Hill and Richard A. Frank (L/E), and approved by Sayre. Repeated to London, USUN, USCINCSO, and Montevideo for Assistant Secretary Oliver.

4. In May 1968 Venezuela reiterated a 1965 warning that any commercial concessions GOG might grant to foreign firms in disputed territory would not be recognized by GOV. (GOV has policy not to grant new concessions for mineral exploration in territory it controls.) This brought angry charges from Guyana Government that Venezuela violating Geneva Agreement by publicizing its claim outside Mixed Commission and committing "economic aggression" against Guyana. In late June GOV withdrew from sub-commission for economic development following refusal GOG entertain joint development of disputed territory.

5. On July 9 Venezuelan President issued decree claiming 9 miles of territorial sea beyond 3 miles claimed by Guyana off coast of disputed territory. "Explanatory note" published with decree pointed out Venezuela claims 12 mile territorial sea off its own coast and wished put on record its claim to similar area off disputed territory. However since Guyana does not claim zone from 3 to 12 miles Venezuela feels free claim zone and, "explanatory note" implies, exercise immediate sovereignty over it by some unstated "physical act of possession" or "concrete act of dominion." GOV member Mixed Commission told press foreign merchant ships would have right innocent passage through zone (which includes major shipping lanes) but no fishing rights. Naval vessels could pass with GOV permission. GOV FonMin told US Ambassador privately he "assumed" GOV will institute naval patrols of zone.

6. On July 13, Under Secretary asked explanation decree's meaning from Venezuelan Ambassador in Washington stating that if Venezuela intended exercise rights of sovereignty in 3 to 12 miles zone off Guyana US would take "most serious" view situation. Under Secretary pointed out:

a) In addition to fact USG does not recognize 12 mile territorial seas, US does not accept decree's validity if it implies actual exercise sovereignty and if matter came up in international forum we could not support Venezuela.<sup>2</sup>

b) We viewed decree's explanatory note with allusions such as "physical act of possession" as more disturbing than decree itself and wondered about GOV intentions in view earlier assurances from Venezuelan President that GOV would not resort to force.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 206210 to Georgetown, July 20, reported that Under Secretary Katzenbach met with Prime Minister Burnham earlier in the day and assured him "that U.S. viewed decree as invalid under international law and had so informed GOV firmly." (Ibid., ORG 7 ARA)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 206216 to Georgetown and Caracas, July 20, reported that President Leoni of Venezuela, in the presence of Foreign Minister Iribarren, gave Ambassador Bernbaum assurances that "no incidents would occur and that the right of innocent passage would be honored." The telegram reported that these assurances were conveyed to Burnham following his meeting with Katzenbach. (Ibid., POL 7 GUYANA)

c) We concerned that GOV actions might erode Burnham electoral strength and divert his attention from campaign prior to crucial electoral confrontation with Jagan<sup>4</sup> which will possibly take place in December this year.

7. US has consistently maintained neutral stance on merits of dispute itself and has so informed GOV and GOG. We may, however, be compelled make our position public at future date on legal aspects recent decree and its implications for peace in area. We will attempt to avoid making public our legal position until GOV responds to Under Secretary's inquiry.

8. GOG has undertaken at UN present case to regional groups and particularly seek support from LA countries. Burnham also contemplating bringing matter to UNSC.

9. Press reports implying US favors GOV inaccurate and to date press reports of GOV military or naval movements also appear inaccurate.

10. Foregoing can be used as background in discussion with government officials provided such action would not be interpreted as lobbying for interests of either government.

**Rusk**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 7021 from Caracas, July 20, reported that after Bernbaum's conversation with Leoni and Iribarren (see footnote 3 above) Foreign Office Director of Political Affairs Herrera Marciano met with Carlson who outlined the effect GOV's actions were having on Guyana's domestic political situation stressing how they were helping Jagan and hurting Burnham. Carlson pointed out that Jagan's position had been on ebb, but that Burnham had felt compelled to bring him in to consult on Guyana's position in order to present a united front, thus lending Jagan some new respectability. Carlson also said that "recent Government of Venezuela 'provocations' distracted Burnham" and that they could have a significant effect on Burnham's campaign effort. (Ibid., POL 32-1 GUYANA-VEN)

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437. Memorandum for the Files<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 26, 1968.

## SUBJECT

Meeting of Guyana Prime Minister Burnham with the President, Friday, July 26, 1968—5:30 p.m.<sup>2</sup>

Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, accompanied by Ambassador John Carter, paid a courtesy call on the President. Assistant Secretary Oliver was also present.

After an exchange of greetings the Prime Minister described the Venezuelan decree claiming nine miles of territorial waters beyond the three-mile limit off the disputed territory of Essequibo. Mr. Burnham also mentioned the Venezuelan warning to firms seeking concessions in the disputed territory. He said the warning had already scared off one Canadian investor. In making the presentation, the Prime Minister gave no indication that he was seeking Presidential help.<sup>3</sup>

The President inquired about the outlook for the elections in Guyana. The Prime Minister expressed optimism. While no date has been set for the election, he thought it would be in early December.

The President, mentioning his interest in regional integration, asked the Prime Minister how he saw the Caribbean Development Bank shaping up. The Prime Minister described past difficulties with Jamaica. He noted that recently there seemed to be a change in the Jamaican attitude which gives some reason to hope they would join the Bank and bring the Bahamas and British Honduras with them.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Guyana, (Brit. G.), Vol. I, Cables, Memos, and Misc., 5/66–11/68. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler.

<sup>2</sup> In a July 24 memorandum to the President, Rusk advised that although Burnham's U.S. visit was private and unofficial, he had come to Washington to discuss his government's concerns about Venezuela's recent territorial waters decree with Katzenbach. Rusk recommended that Johnson meet with Burnham for a brief courtesy call because "Burnham needs to demonstrate in Georgetown that he has received highest level consideration of the Guyana position on the recent Venezuelan decree," adding that Cheddi Jagan's newspapers "have taunted Burnham that U.S. silence on the decree constitutes tacit approval of this new Venezuelan claim." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 GUYANA)

<sup>3</sup> In a July 23 memorandum to Johnson, Rostow stated that the appointment "must be handled in such a way that it does not offend our Venezuelan friends. This is manageable and the Prime Minister will certainly play ball." Rostow added that "State is doing all possible to defuse the incident without taking sides on the territorial dispute. So far, these efforts seem to be meeting with success." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Guyana (Brit. G.), Vol. I, Cables, Memos, and Misc., 5/66–11/68)

Mr. Burnham added that on his way back he expected to talk to Prime Minister Shearer about the Bank.

The President said he would like to be as helpful to Guyana as he could. He told the Prime Minister he could give careful consideration to any proposals he wished to make. Mr. Burnham thanked him for his understanding and willingness to support him.

**WGB**

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**438. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (Broe) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms**

Washington, November 7, 1968.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 89–00998R, Box 3, Folder 40, OPI: 57 Latin American Division. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**439. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1968.

**SUBJECT**

Support to Anti-Jagan Political Parties in Guyana: Progress Report

**1. Summary**

On 7 April 1967 the 303 Committee approved a proposal to support anti-Jagan political parties in Guyana in the national elections scheduled for late 1968 or early 1969. Previous progress reports on this activity were considered by the 303 Committee on 7 August 1967, 16 February 1968 and 12 July 1968.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.

This report notes that the elections have been set for 16 December 1968, describes progress in the election campaigns of the People's National Congress (PNC), led by Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and the United Force (UF), led by Peter D'Aguiar, notes the outcome of the national census and voter registration effort in Guyana and describes the problems facing Burnham stemming from his having padded the registration lists in the United Kingdom excessively in an attempt to win an outright majority in the elections. This report also notes the security implications arising from Peter D'Aguiar's having become aware of this padding and his efforts to counter it.

This progress report also states that somewhat under half of the funds approved for this activity for fiscal year 1969 were obligated by mid-November 1968.

[Omitted here are sections 2-6, Current Activities, Date of Elections, New Developments, Additional Pertinent Developments, including Border Problems, the MPCA, the PNC-UF Coalition, and U.S.-U.K. Discussions, Security, and Coordination.]

#### 7. Future Plans

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will continue to provide financial support and electoral guidance to the PNC and the UF for their campaigns in Guyana and overseas. The PNC contracted with a U.S.-based motion picture company to produce newsreel films showing the progress made by the Burnham government; the first two of a projected ten films are now being shown in Georgetown and depict Burnham inspecting self-help projects in small villages and the visit of Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi to Guyana.

The United States government will continue to exert all possible influence to persuade Burnham to pursue a moderate and statesman-like course toward the PPP and the UF with regard to the registration problem and to the objections of these parties to the electoral law. To date, however, Burnham has not responded in the manner desired to U.S. advice to avoid an overly large false registration and to U.S. urging to plan for the formation of another coalition government after the elections. He feels that his own pride, self-respect and competence as a leader are called into question when he is urged to continue his cooperation with Peter D'Aguiar, whom he hates. Racial considerations are most likely a significant ingredient in Burnham's attitude. Thus we have no assurance that he will accept our guidance in this regard. Peter D'Aguiar also is an extremely difficult person to deal with and so far has rejected our attempts to persuade him to take a more moderate and flexible line toward Burnham. D'Aguiar has been in close touch with Cheddi Jagan regarding the lawsuit that each of their parties is instituting and at one point it appeared that the two parties would cooperate closely in the suits. Jagan and D'Aguiar have now agreed to

consult and cooperate in their attacks on Burnham and the government. D'Aguiar continues to maintain a strongly anti-Communist attitude and told Jagan that he dislikes his Communist sympathies and will work with him only to obstruct any government plans for electoral chicanery. However, D'Aguiar despises Burnham passionately and has a paranoid streak in him; this combination may well induce him to take attitudes and to pursue courses of action that a better balanced man would avoid.

Of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] approved for this activity for fiscal year 1969, a total of approximately [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has been obligated through mid-November 1968.

#### 8. Recommendation

It is recommended that the 303 Committee note this progress report.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> In a December 18 memorandum to Bohlen, Trueheart reported that Rostow read the memorandum for the 303 Committee and asked that the other 303 Committee principals see it and note it at the next Committee meeting, but that it not be formally placed on the agenda. Trueheart added that the memorandum reported that [*text not declassified*], with 303 Committee approval, had contributed some [*text not declassified*] to the electoral campaign of the PNC and the UF. (Ibid.)

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#### 440. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 23, 1968, 10:40 a.m.

##### SUBJECT

Loan for Guyana Rice Industry

Bill Gaud is asking urgently for your approval of a \$12.9 million loan to modernize the rice industry in Guyana (Tab B).<sup>2</sup> Charlie Zwick

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Guyana (Brit. G.), Vol. I, Cables, Memos, and Misc., 5/66–11/68. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a November 18 memorandum from Gaud to the President, attached but not printed.

recommends your approval (Tab A).<sup>3</sup> Treasury has no problem on balance of payments grounds.

The critical elections in Guyana will take place December 16. Prime Minister Burnham has done a very good job of preparing the political ground to fend off Cheddi Jagan's challenge at the polls. Although the East Indian population outnumbers Burnham's predominantly black following, some of Jagan's supporters have been won over by Burnham's good government record. The outlook is for a very narrow Burnham victory, barring last-minute surprises.

This rice loan project plays a key part in Burnham's electoral strategy. The government's efforts to modernize Guyana's rice industry, well publicized for over a year, will help split Jagan's almost solid political support among the small rice farmers, all of whom are East Indian. The project has been delayed for technical reasons long past the intended starting date. Nonetheless, announcement of the loan within the next few days will still have important political benefits for Burnham and help to guarantee his election.

This is a good project on its economic merits. The overriding argument, however, is that it provides important political support for Burnham at this crucial point. Ambassador Carlson urges your approval in time for an announcement to be made in Georgetown early next week.

I recommended that you approve authorization of this loan.

**Walt**

Approve<sup>4</sup>

Disapprove

See me

---

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum from Zwick to the President, November 21, attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> This option is checked.



**441. Editorial Note**

The People's National Congress (PNC) of Prime Minister Burnham won 30 of the 53 seats in Parliament in the December 16 elections. Burnham's PNC won 50.7 percent of the domestic vote and a heavy majority of the overseas which raised his total to 55.8 percent of the registered voters. The United Force (UF) party of Portuguese businessman Peter D'Aguiar emerged from the election with only 4 seats in Parliament. Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) won only 19 seats. (Airgram A-349, December 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 14 GUYANA)

Ambassador Carlson reported that Burnham "was somewhat disappointed at not making greater inroads into East Indian community [Jagan got almost all of their votes] in view his four year record of peace, stability and economic progress." (Telegram 2201 from Georgetown, December 20; *ibid.*)

Burnham named members of the PNC Parliamentary delegation on December 24 and named his new cabinet on December 31, including East Indians and other non-Africans in both groups. (Airgram A-349, December 31; *ibid.*)

*[text not declassified]*

More information about U.S. Government reporting of the December 16 Guyana election is *ibid.*, POL 14 GUYANA.

# Index

**Note: All references are to document numbers**

- Acheson, Dean, 75  
Adams, Robert W., 10, 55, 163, 256, 282, 298  
Agency for International Development (AID), 325, 349, 357  
Balance of payments, U.S., 199  
Dominican Republic:  
Agricultural development, 16  
Balance-of-payments problems, 10, 17  
Construction projects, 209  
Development of police, 129, 133  
Implementation of program in, 147, 179, 183  
Reestablishment of mission, 5, 9  
Supporting Assistance loans, 199, 204, 207  
Guyana, 402, 405, 432, 434  
Haiti, 325, 349, 357  
Agricultural Bank, 82  
Agricultural commodities, 204  
Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 210  
Aguirre, Francisco "Pancho," 17, 209  
Air Iberia, 243  
Albert, Carl, 35  
Allende, Salvador, 284  
Alli, Ackbar, 419  
Alliance for Progress, 9, 122, 212, 255, 293, 322, 329, 352, 356  
Almonte Jiménez, Emilio, 66, 86  
Alvarez, 216  
Alvarez, Tabare, 86  
Alvarez Alguin, Col., 55  
Alvim, Gen., 110, 140  
American Chamber of Commerce (Dominican Republic), 205  
American Chiefs of State Conference, Punta del Este, Apr., 1967, 192, 193, 194  
American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL/CIO), 421  
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), 200  
American Red Cross, 57  
Amiama Castillo, Capt., 154  
Amiama Tio, Fernando, 192  
Amiama Tio, Luis, 9, 12, 83, 192, 197, 198  
AMLASH, Project, 315  
Andujar, Col. Librador, 55  
Ankoko Island, 428, 430, 436  
Antigua, 419  
Appling, Hugh G., 284, 286  
Arends, Leslie C., 35  
Arevalo, Juan José, 98  
Argentina, 56, 61, 131, 362  
Arms smuggling, 274, 286  
Inter-American Peace Force, 57, 85  
Subversion charges against Cuba, 259, 260, 261  
Aristy, Héctor, 87, 111, 128, 140, 159  
Overseas posting of, 79, 90  
Private security forces, 160, 164  
U.S. negotiations with, 62, 76, 96  
Armstrong, Willis C., 241, 372, 373  
Arnold, Mr. *See* Fortas, Abe.  
Artime Buesa, Manuel:  
Acts of sabotage by, 259, 260, 270, 287, 289, 291  
Contact with military dissidents inside Cuba, 295, 296, 315  
U.S. support for, 249, 257, 269, 273, 297, 298, 301  
Atkinson Field, 389  
Attwood, William H., 240  
Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD), 190, 191, 200, 203, 216  
Bahamas, 270, 273, 369, 437  
Balaguer, Joaquín (*see also* Balaguer Presidency *under* Dominican Republic):  
Assassination of, possible, 220  
Bosch talks with, 74, 80  
Elections:  
Call for, 12, 14, 15  
Campaigning in, 148, 162, 171, 176  
CIA perspectives on, 139, 140  
Military attitude toward, 149, 219  
Outcome of, 178  
Polling results, 146, 152, 165, 168, 175, 177  
U.S. covert support for, 151, 152, 155, 157, 163, 170, 172  
Formation of interim government in Dominican Republic, 55, 66, 69, 70, 80, 102  
García Godoy's removal of controversial officials, 156

Balaguer, Joaquín—*Continued*

- General strike, 144
- Haiti-Dominican Republic relations, 359
- Imbert's view of, 93
- As interim leader, possible, 51, 55
- Popularity of, 87, 216
- Return to Dominican Republic, possibility of, 3, 4, 16
- Trujillo association with, 14
- U.S.-Dominican relations, 194, 197, 200
- U.S. economic aid to Dominican Republic, 179
- U.S. views of, 5, 11, 61, 197, 202, 217
- Balance of payments, 10, 17, 199, 216, 222
- Ball, George W., 47, 49, 88, 92, 95, 97, 121, 232
- Cuba, 227, 229, 235, 255, 293
  - Overflights of U-2 planes, 265, 267, 268, 290
- Dominican Republic, 61, 64
- Formation of interim government in, 66, 67, 69, 73, 75, 91, 101, 110
- Landing of U.S. Marines in, 31, 33, 35, 41, 42
- Guyana, 376, 385, 399
- Haiti, 350
- Balloons, 266, 267, 268, 290
- Barbados, 383, 414, 419
- Barnes, Donald F., 56
- Batista, Fulgencio, 275
- Bazile, Robert, 343
- Belgium, 255, 285
- Bell, David E., 129, 133, 143, 145, 179, 364
- Benítez, Jaime, 22, 42, 44, 71, 87
- Bennett, William Tapley, Jr., 2, 6, 16, 18, 20, 27, 62, 97, 146
  - Bosch's view of, 49
- Elections, 14, 176
- Establishment of provisional government, 24, 26
- Evacuation of U.S. citizens, 25, 32, 35, 36
- Formation of interim government in Dominican Republic, 67, 70, 72, 77, 78, 84, 88, 112, 115
- Cabinet selection, 86
- Contingency planning for, 116, 117
- Deportation of rebel leaders, 86, 89
- Exclusion of Communists, 119, 121
- García Godoy on communism, 125

Bennett, William Tapley, Jr.—*Continued*

- Formation of interim government in Dominican Republic—*Continued*
- García Godoy presidency, 142, 153, 154
- Interposition of U.S. forces between rebels and loyalists, 78, 81
- Leadership options, 87
- OAS Ad Hoc Committee proposals, 111
- U.S. screening of García Godoy appointees, 132
- Formation of military junta, 28
- Landing of U.S. Marines in Dominican Republic, 40, 64, 99
- Military reform, 19, 112
- Prospects for the Dominican Republic, 5, 9, 10
- Reid as leader, 6, 7, 8, 17
- Replacement of, 101, 159
- Benoit, Col Pedro B., 28, 32, 34, 46, 62, 100
- Berle, Adolph, 20
- Berman, Dr., 356
- Bernbaum, Maurice M., 49, 436
- Betances Pierret, Commodore Fedirico, 1
- Betancourt, Rómulo, 49, 51, 55, 56, 58, 63, 87, 341
- Bethel, Paul, 312
- Blanchet, Paul, 325, 329
- Blanco, Salvador Jorge, 86, 111, 128
- Bligh, Timothy, 241, 372
- Boggs, Hale, 35
- Bohlen, Charles E., 211, 215, 431, 433, 439
- Bolivia, 57, 274, 279, 317
- Bolton, 270
- Bolton, Frances, 35
- Bonhomme, Arthur, 366, 368, 369
- Bonilla, José Antonio Atilés, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 26, 56
- Bonilla Aybar, Rafael, 3
- Bonnely, Rafael F., 3, 9, 102, 162, 166, 168, 171, 175, 177, 178, 216
- Bordas, Manolo, 164
- Bosch, Juan, 38, 93, 105, 156, 174, 221
  - Activities in exile of, 5, 18, 19
  - Administration of (1963), 1, 17, 55
  - Anger at Americans of, 49, 61
  - Balaguer presidency, 183, 187
  - Balaguer's enmity toward, 208
  - Balaguer's talks with, 74, 80
  - Cease-fire arrangements, 44, 46, 47
  - Communist connections of, 41, 98
  - Elections:

- Bosch, Juan—*Continued*  
 Elections—*Continued*  
   Boycott threats, 162, 163  
   Military's attitude toward, 149  
   Outcome of, 178, 216  
   Polling results, 146, 152, 165, 168, 175, 177  
   PRD campaign, 56, 139, 148, 169, 171, 176  
   U.S.-Bosch talks on, 164  
   U.S. covert opposition to, 151, 152, 173  
   U.S. response to possible Bosch victory, 168  
 Exile incursions into Haiti, 349  
 Formation of interim government, 63, 66, 67, 73, 74, 75, 80, 101  
 General strike, 142, 144  
 Haitian fear of, 341  
 Lack of popular support for, 50  
 Political activities of, 11, 18  
 Private security forces, 160  
 Return to Santo Domingo, 134  
 Terrorism by rightists, 185  
 U.S. view of, 22, 61, 100, 101  
 Bowdler, William G., 122, 140, 145, 153, 160, 176, 238, 278, 350, 358, 363, 365, 424  
 Cuba, 242, 300, 308, 317, 319, 324  
 Dominican Republic, 25, 49, 133, 159, 204  
   Balaguer presidency, 187, 188, 189, 198, 202, 206  
   CIA as policy maker in, 149  
   Elections in, 163, 165, 179  
   Formation of interim government in, 100, 119, 120  
   U.S. covert funding of student elections, 200  
 Guyana, 420, 426  
 Haiti, 350, 354, 355, 357, 359, 366, 369  
 Bowie, Robert R., 364  
 Bowles, Chester, 383  
 Braga, Gen., 171, 183  
 Brazil:  
   Arms cache charges against Cuba, 259  
   Arrest of U.S. smugglers, 168  
   Dominican role of, 49, 58, 61, 131  
   Military force levels, 281  
   U.S. economic aid, 143  
   U.S. talks over Haiti with, 353, 362  
 Brea Peña, José A., 86  
 Breaux, Clarence T., 338  
 Breisky, A.E., 17  
 British Guiana. *See* Guyana.  
 British Guiana Trades Union Council (BGTUC), 379, 421  
 British Honduras, 437  
 Brito Meta, Miguel Angel, 86  
 Broderick, William D., 322  
 Broe, William V., 129, 152, 158, 187  
   Cuba, 319, 324  
   Dominican Republic, 133, 140, 147, 155, 163, 168, 191, 200  
   Guyana, 438  
 Bronheim, David, 140, 145  
 Bruce, David K.E., 241, 372, 384, 390, 392, 394, 393, 395, 399  
 Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 199, 214  
 Bundy, McGeorge, 44, 55, 80, 113, 121, 135  
   Cuba, 208, 229, 243, 276, 277, 280, 289, 315  
   Dismissal of Cuban national employees from Guantanamo, 235, 236, 246  
   Free-world economic ties with, 223, 239, 241, 242, 282  
   Overflights of U-2planes, 265, 266, 267, 268, 288, 290  
   Reactivation of covert operations against, 302, 303, 306, 307  
   Shooting down of U-2s, possible, 248, 250, 252, 253, 256  
   U.S. no-invasion statement, 271, 272  
   U.S.-supported sabotage operations against, 224, 249, 257, 260, 269, 270, 273, 291, 295, 296, 298  
   U.S. talks with Guevara, 292, 294  
 Dominican Republic, 13, 25, 58, 65, 83, 149  
 Communist involvement in, 61, 129  
 Dominican Task Force meetings, 49, 51, 64, 104  
 Formation of interim government in, 76, 77, 84, 86, 87, 108, 110, 127  
 Balaguer talks on, 70  
 Bosch talks on, 66, 67, 73, 74  
 Bundy-Vance Mission, 71, 78, 95  
 Deportation of rebel leaders, 86, 89, 90, 91, 94  
 Government of technicians, 105  
 Guzman as provisional president, 69, 79, 82  
 Interposition of U.S. forces between rebels and loyalists, 78, 81

- Bundy, McGeorge—*Continued*  
Dominican Republic—*Continued*  
Formation of interim government—*Continued*  
Meeting with rebels, 96  
Report on return from Dominican Republic, 97  
U.S. position, 88, 101  
García Godoy presidency, 125, 131, 133, 140, 148, 160, 161  
Landing of U.S. Marines in, 31, 35, 40, 42, 48, 49  
U.S. economic aid to, 137, 145  
Guyana, 374, 375, 378, 382, 386, 404, 406, 410, 413, 416  
Coalition government, 381, 384  
Elections, 372, 389, 393, 395  
Independence, 399, 411, 416  
Haiti, 328, 330, 331, 332, 337, 342, 343, 350  
Bundy, William, 229  
Bundy Committee, 49, 51, 64, 104  
Bunker, Ellsworth, 49, 97, 176, 187  
Cuba, 242  
Dominican Republic:  
Balaguer presidency, 183, 184, 185  
Elections, 1965, 155, 162, 163, 164, 166, 177, 179  
Formation of interim government in, 57, 78, 115, 125, 128  
Contingency planning for, 116, 117  
Draft "Act of Dominican Reconciliation," 120, 122, 126  
Elections for, 103, 104, 106, 108  
Exclusion of Communists, 119, 121, 130  
OAS Ad Hoc Committee proposals, 111, 112, 114, 122  
U.S. position, 75, 101, 107  
García Godoy presidency, 131, 138, 140, 144, 160, 168  
Reintegration of armed forces, 135, 142  
Removal of controversial officials, 153, 154, 156, 159, 161  
U.S. screening of appointees, 132, 133  
Landing of U.S. Marines in, 39, 41, 95  
U.S. economic aid to, 137, 143, 145, 179  
Haiti, 355  
Burdett, William G., 371, 373, 374, 380  
Burnham, Linden Forbes (*see also* Burnham government *under* Guyana), 379, 385, 412, 429  
British views of, 399, 416  
Coalition government, 381, 388, 401, 413  
As dictator, 414, 419  
Election as Premier of, 370, 400  
Foreign policy of, 398  
Greenwood visit, 404, 405, 406  
Independence for Guyana, 401, 411, 417  
Indictment of, possible, 390  
Reelection campaign of, 422, 427, 435, 440  
U.S. covert support for, 370, 421  
U.S. talks with, 391, 396, 414  
U.S. views of, 375, 389, 403, 418  
Venezuelan boundary claims, 426, 428, 430, 436, 437  
Visit to London, 1965, 404  
Visit to Washington, 1965, 415, 420  
Visits to Washington, 1968, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 437  
Busby, Horace, 35, 97, 110  
Bushnell, J., 17  
Butler, R. A., 241, 263, 266, 372  
Caamaño, Gen., 55  
Caamaño-Deno, Col. Francisco, 44, 57, 59, 83, 107  
Anger at Americans of, 49  
Balaguer's views on, 70, 102  
Departure of, 67, 69, 140, 142, 153, 154  
Disappearance from London of, 206, 210, 216, 221  
Exile incursions into Haiti, 341, 343, 349  
Formation of interim government in Dominican Republic, 55, 57, 66, 72, 75, 89, 106  
"Act of Dominican Reconciliation," 120, 122, 126, 128  
OAS role in, 96, 111, 112, 114  
U.S. position, 63, 101  
Formation of provisional government, 26, 68, 118  
General strike called by, 159  
GNR actions against, 117  
Guzman's view of, 94  
As possible presidential candidate, 139

- Caamaño-Deno, Col. Francisco—  
*Continued*  
 As prisoner of Communists, 62  
 Return to Dominican Republic of,  
   possible, 168, 169, 171, 220  
 Surrender proposal, 62, 64  
 U.S. views of, 87, 100, 134
- Caccia, Harold A., 241, 372, 397, 399
- Caceres Troncoso, Ramón, 17, 21, 40
- Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 55, 104, 226,  
 257, 267, 289
- Cameron, 145
- Campagna, Anibal, 111, 128
- Campos, Albizu, 23
- Canada (*see also Canadian subheadings  
 under other subjects*), 210, 255, 285,  
 326, 384, 433, 434
- Cantave, Brig. Gen. Leon, 326, 342
- Carbuccia, Ismail, 13
- CARE, 145
- Caribbean Development Bank, 437
- CARITAS, 145
- Carlisle, Charles R., 242
- Carlson, Delmar R., 377, 381, 386, 397,  
 398, 401, 405, 406, 408, 420  
   British views of, 416  
   Budget issues, 407, 414  
   Burnham talks with, 391, 396  
   D'Aguilar resignation, 422, 424  
   Elections, 389, 393, 415, 422, 435  
   Jagan talks with, 379, 383  
   U.S. economic aid to Guyana, 391,  
   419, 435, 440  
   Venezuelan-Guyanese boundary  
   disputes, 436
- Carroll, Lt. Gen. Joseph F., 290
- Carter, Albert E., 20, 29, 36, 270
- Carter, John, 405, 420, 426, 427, 437
- Carter, Lt. Gen. Marshall S., 225
- Casado Saladin, Col. Enrique A., 28, 41
- Castello Branco, Humberto de Alencar, 9
- Castillo, Caonabo Javier, 190, 200
- Castillo, Manuel Joaquín, 156
- Castillo, Ramón, 12, 130, 180
- Castro Ruz, Fidel, 244, 246, 258, 265,  
 307, 323  
   Aid to Dominican leftists, 1, 39, 55,  
   216  
   Assassination plots against, 273, 315  
   Cuba after, 291, 324  
   Emigration approval given by, 308  
   Message to Johnson, 240  
   Overflights of U-2 planes, 261, 264,  
   267
- Castro Ruz, Fidel—*Continued*  
   Popular support for, 271  
   Shooting down of U-2s, possible,  
     248, 250, 251, 252  
   Soviet view of, 281  
   Staying power of, 275, 304, 321  
   U.S.-Cuban relations, 318, 324  
   U.S.-supported sabotage operations  
     against, 224, 226, 249, 302  
   U.S. views of, 41, 233, 300  
   Visit to Soviet Union, 1964, 232  
   Water cut-off to Guantanamo, 229
- Castro, Juana, 274, 286
- Castro Ruz, Raúl, 311
- Cater, S. Douglass, Jr., 110
- Cates, John M., Jr., 356
- Catholic Church, 218, 293
- Catholic University of Santiago, 218
- Cedeno, Arevalo, 111
- Censorship, 6
- Central America, 260, 293
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):  
   Cuba:  
     Aerial surveillance over, 290  
     Capture of CIA infiltration team by,  
       304  
     Shooting down of U-2s by,  
       possible, 264  
     Situation and prospects in, 258,  
       281, 305, 311, 321  
     Soviet troop withdrawals, 280  
     U.S. relations with, 324  
     U.S.-supported covert operations  
       against, 224, 225, 226, 257, 289,  
       291, 310, 315  
       Reactivation of, 302, 303, 304,  
       306, 307
- Dominican Republic, 182, 187, 192, 199  
   Balaguer presidency, assessment of,  
     216  
   Communist connections of Bosch,  
     98  
   Communist role in, 60, 61  
   Elections, prospects for, 139, 140  
   García Godoy presidency, 132, 133,  
     141  
   Intelligence briefings for officials,  
     65, 101  
   Landing of U.S. Marines in, 39, 40,  
     64  
   As policy maker in, 149  
   Political situation, 187, 192  
   Situation and outlook in, 1, 50, 68,  
     124, 148, 182

## Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—

*Continued*Dominican Republic—*Continued*

Stability in, prospects for, 136, 149,  
171, 184, 197

U.S. covert funding for municipal  
elections, 211

Guyana, 375, 377, 378

Prospects for, 418, 424

Purchase of rice from, 404

U.S. covert operations in, 370, 393,  
413, 421, 423, 431

Haiti, 342, 358, 363

Contingency planning for, 353, 357,  
360

Exile incursions into, 331, 359, 366

U.S. plan for pre-emptive action in,  
343, 346

Jagan's view of, 379

Chalmers, Rene, 326, 333, 355

Economic situation in Haiti, 347, 349

Exile incursions into Haiti, 336, 359

Haitian arms purchases, 332, 340

U.S.-Haitian relations, 341, 356

Charles, Clemard Joseph, 363

Charter of Punta del Este, 170

Chase, Gordon, 13, 55

Cuba, 246, 250, 292, 294

Free-world economic ties with, 239,  
243, 282

U.S.-supported sabotage operations  
against, 269, 270, 273

Dominican Republic, 51, 58, 61, 104,  
108, 110, 129

Guyana, 380, 382, 384, 386, 404, 415

Elections, 389, 393, 396

Independence, 411, 416

U.S. economic aid to, 405, 410

Haiti, 328

Cheever, Francis S., 270

## Chile:

Cuba, relations with, 293, 294

Cuban government-in-exile, 278

Elections in, 271, 284

García Godoy government's  
recognition by, 131

Harriman visit, 61

Inter-American Peace Force, 49, 57,  
58, 85

Landing of U.S. Marines in  
Dominican Republic, 39

OAS actions in Dominican Republic,  
45, 59

Probe on Cuban-U.S. relations by, 313

Chile—*Continued*

U.S. economic aid, 143

U.S. talks over Haiti with, 356, 357

Venezuelan OAS complaint against  
Cuba, 279

China, People's Republic of, 241, 259,  
281, 304, 305, 316, 323, 349, 413

China, Republic of, 59, 357

*Christian Science Monitor*, 260

Clarizio, Msgr. Emmanuel, 5, 6, 40, 145  
Cease-fire arrangements, 39, 46, 49,  
57

Communists in the Dominican  
Republic, 62, 100

U.S. view of, 140

Clifton, Maj. Gen. C. V., 247

Cline, Ray S., 60, 61, 65, 288

Cobb, William B., Jr., 145, 379, 384, 386,  
389, 392, 395, 405, 407, 408, 415,  
420, 422

Coin, Lauren J., 133

Colombia, 39, 49, 56, 58

Cuban subversion in, 274, 305

Harriman visit, 61

Naval visits to Dominican Republic  
by, 210

U.S. economic aid to, 143

U.S. talks over Haiti with, 353, 357,  
362

Colombo, Richard M., 52, 71

Communists (*see also* Cuba):

In Dominican Republic, 16, 61, 68, 96,  
108, 119, 174

During the Balaguer presidency,  
208, 216

García Godoy's views, 119, 121,  
124, 125, 129, 130

Rebel leaders, 62, 86, 100

U.S. plans to deport, 58, 86, 89, 121

U.S. position, 60, 76, 113, 129, 212

In Haiti, 67, 220, 329, 346, 352, 369

Conde, Alfredo, 111

Congress, U.S., 35, 145

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 242

PL-480, 204, 207, 210, 222, 349, 429,  
432, 434

Trading with the Enemy Act, 239

Connett, William B., 41, 134

Constant, Gen. Gerard, 343, 346

Corominas, Lt. Col. Henrique, 67

Corominas Martínez, Col. Miguel  
Angel, 67, 72, 73

Corruption, 6, 17, 171

Costa Rica, 39, 49, 58, 273, 274, 297, 317

- Crimmins, John Hugh, 59, 238  
 Cuba, 228, 270, 276, 289, 291  
   Free-world economic ties with, 239, 242, 286, 299, 300  
   U.S. covert activities against, 226, 257, 259, 269, 273, 297, 298, 304  
   U.S. talks with Guevara, 292, 294  
 Dominican Republic:  
   Balaguer presidency, 198, 205, 219, 220  
   Economic situation, 183, 185, 207, 209, 218  
   Political polarization, 186, 187, 208  
   U.S. support for, 186, 202  
 Election analysis, 177  
 U.S. covert funding of elections, 190, 191, 200, 203, 211  
 U.S. economic aid to, 179, 199, 209, 210, 222  
 Haiti, 359  
 Crockett, Kennedy M., 6, 10, 19, 55, 57, 80, 88, 104, 105  
 Dominican Republic, 7, 8, 11, 12, 18, 33, 51  
   Election possibilities, 14, 15, 20  
   Interim government, 55, 67, 70, 75, 102  
 Guyana, 403  
 Haiti, 328, 335  
 Cuba (*see also* Communists; Cuba and Cuban subheadings under other subjects):  
   Airlift of refugees from, 308, 309, 323  
   Assassination plots against Castro, 273, 315  
   British role in U.S. dialogue with, 289  
   Castro government:  
     Staying power of, 275, 304, 321  
     Study on Cuba after ending of, 291  
   Chile, relations with, 293, 294  
   Chilean probe on Cuban-U.S. relations, 313  
   Discovery of arms cache by, 268  
   Dominican leftists' ties with, 39, 44, 208, 210  
   Economic situation:  
     Deterioration in, 275, 281, 289, 320  
     Export and import levels, 242, 281  
     Improvements in, 258  
     Sugar production, 223, 226, 260, 275, 281, 284, 300, 305, 318  
   Emigration from, 308, 309  
   Free-world economic ties with, 227, 323  
   Cuba—*Continued*  
     Free-world economic ties with—*Continued*  
       Aviation, 226, 243  
       British sales, 223, 226, 232, 241, 249, 271  
       British-U.S. talks on, 232, 241, 263  
       Canadian-British-U.S. talks on, 299, 300  
       Drug sales, 293  
       French sales, 232, 271  
       Italian-U.S. talks, 284  
       Shipping, 226, 243  
       Spanish trade, 223, 242, 285, 286  
       Trade levels, 243, 271, 282, 300  
       Travel, 243, 316, 323  
       U.S. countermeasures against, 226, 239, 242, 263  
     Government-in-exile, U.S. recognition of, 278  
   Guantanamo base:  
     Armed incidents, 309  
     Dismissal of Cuban national employees from, 229, 231, 234, 235, 236, 237, 244, 246  
     U.S. retention of, 323  
     Water cut off, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 238, 244  
   Guerrilla activity in, 275  
   Guerrilla training for Guyanese, 423, 431  
   Hijacking of planes to, 323  
   Illegal fishing in U.S. waters by, 228, 233, 234, 238  
   Landing of U.S. Marines in Dominican Republic, 50, 57  
   Latin America, relations with, 300  
   Mexico, relations with, 286, 316  
   Military force levels, 258, 281  
   OAS actions against, 279, 284, 285, 286  
   Offensive missiles, reintroduction of, 277, 312  
   Rice purchases from Guyana, 391, 398, 424  
   Rodriguez trial, 258  
   SAM sites controlled by, 235, 241, 245, 258, 264, 280  
   Security apparatus of, 275, 281  
   Soviet Union, relations with, 223, 226, 298, 300, 305  
   Strains in, 265, 266, 281, 304, 317  
   Withdrawal of troops, 245, 258, 280, 284



Cuba—*Continued*

- Soviet-U.S. talks on, 233, 261, 287
- United States, relations with, 295, 298, 313, 318, 324, 383
- U.S. actions against subversion by, 226
- U.S. citizens in, 322, 323
- U.S. covert operations against:
  - CIA survey of, 310
- Contact with military dissidents inside Cuba, 295, 296
- Reactivation of, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 317
- Sabotage operations:
  - Arrest of Ray, 270
  - Cuban merchant ships, 249
  - Preparedness of exile groups, 257
  - Results of, 249
  - Sinking of Spanish ship, 287, 289, 304
  - Underwater demolition team actions, 298
  - U.S. approval of, 224, 225, 226, 259
  - Withdrawal of U.S. support for, 269, 297, 301
- Seizing of Cuban merchant ship, 291
- Split with Soviets, engineering of, 298
- Support of exile groups, 226, 283, 295, 296
- U.S. intelligence gathering:
  - Capture of CIA infiltration team, 304
  - Need for improvements in, 227
  - On-site inspections of missile sites, 265, 267, 268
  - Reports, 258, 281, 305, 311
  - Shooting down of U-2s, possible, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 256, 259, 262, 264, 265, 267
  - U-2 overflights, 226, 261, 265, 266, 267, 290
- U.S. military action against, possible, 247, 254
- U.S. policy toward, 255, 319
  - Reviews of, 225, 226, 289, 314, 320, 322
- U.S. talks with Guevara, 292, 293, 294
- Venezuelan arms cache charges against, 226, 227, 229, 230, 239, 242, 259, 272, 279

Cuba—*Continued*

- Venezuelan charges of intervention by, 9, 226, 227, 233, 239, 241, 242, 259, 261, 272, 279
- Violence in U.S. by exiles from, 323
- Cuban Revolutionary Council, 278
- Cubana Airlines, 243
- Cubela Secades, Cmdte. Rolando, 295, 297, 298, 315
- Curaçao, 369
- Curtis, 326, 333
- Cury, Jottin, 87, 96, 111, 114, 128
- Czechoslovakia, 346
- D'Aguiar, Peter, 375, 379, 405, 412, 414, 417
  - Budget issues, 407, 414, 418
  - Burnham's views of, 433
  - Coalition government proposals, 381, 388, 401, 413
  - As finance minister, 403, 407
  - Resignation of, 422, 424, 432
  - U.S. covert support for, 370, 421
- D'Allessandro, Guido, 124
- Da Silva Braga, Gen. Alvara Alves, 171, 183
- Davidson, C.J. *See* Fortas, Abe.
- Davidson, I. Irving. *See* Fortas, Abe.
- Davidson, Irving, 325, 326, 332, 333
- Davis, Richard H., 408, 409, 412
- Dean, Patrick, 410, 416
- De Clairmont Duenas, Ramon, 103, 106, 128, 154, 185
- Defense, U.S. Department of:
  - Cuba, 234, 246, 324
  - Haiti, 353, 357, 359, 366
  - Johnson's view of, 244
- Dejean, Joseph, 343
- De la Mota, Col. Felix, 55
- De Leon Grullon, Col. José Antonio, 76, 83
- De Los Santos, Emilio, 1, 24, 27, 32, 112
  - Bombing by, 41
  - Departure of, 153, 154, 156, 161, 162
  - U.S. views of, 87
- De Los Santos Cespedes, Brig. Gen. Juan, 72, 73
- Denney, George C., Jr., 171, 173, 210, 270, 324, 376, 423
- DeSeabra, José, 347
- Desinor, Clovis, 347, 349, 356
- Despradel, Herman, 26, 32, 34, 41
- Díaz, Polibio, 192
- Dillon, C. Douglas, 265, 267

- Dirksen, Everett McK., 35
- Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 233, 261, 266, 287, 290
- Domínguez, Franklin, 138, 140, 148
- Dominican Republic (*see also* Communists; Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF); *Dominican Republic and Dominican subheadings under other subjects*):
- Act of San Domingo, 59
- Balaguer presidency:
- Economic situation, 185, 197, 216
  - Military relations, 181, 183, 184, 192, 197, 205, 208, 216
  - Municipal elections, 210, 211, 213, 215, 218
  - 1970 elections, preparing for, 216, 218
  - Outlook for, 220
  - Political problems facing, 184, 186, 187, 206, 216, 217
  - Punta del Este conference, 192, 193
  - Sugar quotas, 193, 195, 201, 214
  - Terrorism, 202, 208, 211, 217
  - U.S. policy during, 180, 196, 200, 212
  - U.S. position, 171, 174, 183, 184, 216, 220
  - U.S. support for, 20, 186, 202, 206, 222
- Betancourt four-nation rule proposal, 49
- Bosch-loyalist disagreements, 76
- Bunker proposals, 106, 107, 108
- Cease-fire arrangements, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 53, 59, 79
- CIA as policy maker, 149
- Collection of arms from civilians, 120, 124, 131, 134, 135, 144
- Corruption in, 6, 17, 171
- Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), 196, 200, 211
- Cuban anti-Castro forces based in, 273, 297
- Economic situation:
- Austerity program, 17, 185, 216
  - Balance of payments, 10, 17, 216, 222
  - Devaluation of the peso, 179, 197, 207
  - Growth rate, 212
  - IMF standby agreement, 6, 7, 9, 17
  - Kennedy Round, 194
  - Land redistribution, 179, 193
- Dominican Republic—*Continued*
- Economic situation—*Continued*
- Mining, 218
  - Payment of government workers, 104, 117
  - Poverty, 5
  - Slow recovery in, 148, 216
  - Sugar industry, 93, 171, 177
    - Quotas for U.S. imports, 183, 188, 189, 193, 195, 201, 202, 209, 214
    - U.S. position, 104, 105, 171
- Elections, 1966, 12, 119, 157, 169, 171
- CIA perspectives on, 139, 140
- Military attitude toward, 149, 171
- Outcome of, 178
- Polling results, 146, 152, 165, 168, 175, 177
- Security situation and, 166, 168
- Timing of, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112, 113
- U.S. covert funding of, 151, 152, 155, 157, 168, 170, 172, 173
- U.S. position, 14, 20, 103, 106, 147, 163
- Evacuation of U.S. citizens, 23, 25, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 59, 179
- FBI investigation in Santo Domingo, 71
- Formation of interim government, 55, 86, 92, 106, 119, 121
- Acceptance of 1963 Constitution, 72, 76, 80, 82, 104, 105, 107, 108
  - "Act of Dominican Reconciliation," 120, 122, 126, 127, 128
  - Bosch talks on, 66, 67
  - Bundy-Vance mission, 70, 71, 72, 78
  - Contingency planning for, 116, 117
  - Deportation of rebel leaders, 86, 89, 90, 91, 94, 121
  - Exclusion of Communists, 119, 121, 124, 129, 130
  - García Godoy as president, proposal, 105, 112, 113, 114, 118
- Government of National Reconstruction (GRN), establishment of, 61, 62, 63
- Guzman as provisional president, 69, 79, 82
- Inter-American Peace Force, 48, 57, 58, 75, 77
- Leadership options, 87
- OAS Ad Hoc Committee proposals, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122

Dominican Republic—*Continued*Formation of interim government—*Continued*

U.S. interposition of forces between  
rebels and loyalists, 78, 81, 179

U.S. meetings with military  
leaders, 72, 73, 77

U.S.–OAS meeting with rebels, 96

U.S. position, 63, 75, 88, 100, 101,  
107

Wise Men proposal, 56, 58, 63

Freedom of expression in, 11, 13, 17,  
119

## García Godoy presidency:

Actions against the left, 160, 169

Appointments of, 132, 133, 138, 141

Election laws enforced by, 163, 164

Establishment of, 129

General strike, failure of, 142, 144,  
148, 159

GNR acceptance of, 126

IAPF withdrawal request, 174

Memorandum of agreement on  
handling Communists, 130

Military high command,  
relationship with, 131, 134,  
138, 142, 144, 148, 162

Private security forces abolished  
by, 160, 164

Rebel acceptance of, 114, 118

Reintegration of rebel area, 134,  
135, 142, 144, 148

Removal of controversial officials,  
134, 140, 147, 153, 154, 156, 161

Resignation attempt, 160

U.S. position, 105, 112, 113, 131,  
168

U.S. screening of appointees, 132,  
133

U.S. views of, 136, 171

## Government of National

Reconciliation (GNR), 61, 62, 63,  
68, 105, 106, 107, 111, 112, 114,  
117, 126

Government of technicians, 104, 105

Government oppression, 15

Haiti, relations with, 16, 193, 208, 217,  
334, 343, 352, 359

Illegal migration to, 193

## Intelligence reports:

Elections prospects, 139, 140

Political polarization, 187

Political situation pre-Punta del  
Este, 192

Dominican Republic—*Continued*Intelligence reports—*Continued*

Prospects for stability, 136, 149,  
171, 184, 197

Situation and outlook, 1, 50, 68,  
124, 148, 182

Situation in the interior, 68

Withdrawal of IAPF, 182

Landing of U.S. Marines, 33, 35, 48,  
54, 55, 56, 58, 349

CIA intelligence reports, 39, 40, 64

History and background for, 99

Information program, 55, 58

Junta request for, 29, 32

Latin American reactions, 50, 55,  
304

OAS proposals, 45, 49

Planning for, 30, 31, 40, 41, 43, 51,  
64

Reductions and withdrawal of  
forces, 57, 62, 69, 82, 95, 110

U.S. diplomacy over, 37, 49, 75

## Military situation:

Arms quantities in circulation, 97

Communications problems, 27, 39,  
51

Cordoning of rebel area, 122

Coup, Sept., 1963, 1

Coup rumors, 1968, 219

IADF occupation of rebel area, 142

Improvement in security situation,  
166

Loyalist capture of Radio Santo  
Domingo, 83, 84

Military reform, 18, 19, 112, 113

Outlook for insurgency, 124

Police training, 129, 133

Rebel control of Santo Domingo,  
22, 23, 24, 25, 50, 88

Removal of Trujillista officers, 18

Rivera Caminero's removal by  
García, 134

Sabotage of transmitters, proposed,  
69

San Cristobal group coup, possible,  
13, 16

Santiago battle, Dec., 1965, 149

Seizure of Fort Ozama, 44

Strength of armed forces, 1, 171,  
197

Training of security forces, 179

OAS commission, 49, 51, 52, 53, 56,  
58, 63

Police brutality, 15, 217

Dominican Republic—*Continued*

Political parties (*see under* Political parties and organizations)

Political situation:

Amnesty issue, 3, 4, 120, 128

Apathy, 5, 197

Establishment of provisional government in Santo Domingo, 24, 26

Formation of military junta, 28

Imbert assassination attempt, 192, 197, 198, 200, 202, 208, 216

Patronage, 184, 216

Reintegration of rebel area, 134, 135

Trujilloism, 192, 197, 198

U.S. position, 171

Population growth rates, 171

Public attitudes toward the United States, 146, 152

Reid junta:

Dominican Republic as base for foreign exile groups, 273, 334

Elections, 12, 15

Military relations, 3, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 93

Overthrow of Reid, 21, 23

Strengthening of position of, 10, 16, 20

U.S. position, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 17, 20, 23, 93

U.S. talks with, 4

Santiago group, 100

Self-help support, 5

Stability of, 136, 148, 149, 171, 184, 197, 208

U.S. covert funding of elections:

Municipal, 210, 211, 215

Presidential, 151, 152, 155, 157, 163, 168, 170, 172, 173

Student, 190, 191, 200, 203

U.S. draft plan of action for, 2

U.S. economic aid to, 5, 6, 7, 145, 179, 216

Agricultural development, 16

Budget shortfall, 138, 171

Construction projects, 194, 209, 210

Increases in, 108, 143, 145, 188

Peace Corps, 5, 58, 137

PL-480 loans, 204, 207, 210, 222

Relief operations in Santo

Domingo, 51, 57, 58, 59, 179

Supporting Assistance loans, 199, 204, 207, 209, 222

\$25-million-dollar proposal, 9, 10

Dominican Republic—*Continued*

U.S. military aid to, 29, 179, 209

U.S. screening of government appointees, 132, 133, 180

Dominican Republic Review Group, 200

Dominican Task Force, 49, 51, 64, 104

Donovan, James Britt, 298

Dorticós, Osvaldo, 289, 311

Douglas-Home, Alec, 241, 371, 372, 373

Drones, 265, 266, 267, 268, 290

Duarte, Juan Pablo, 61

Dubois, Jules, 131

Ducoudray Mansfield, Felix, 98

Ducoudray Mansfield, Juan, 98

Duda, Karel, 251, 256

Dungan, Ralph A., 2, 16, 59, 229, 313

Duplesis, Fr., 356

Duran, Juan, 286

Duvalier, François:

Alternatives to, 342, 343

Communist attempts to overthrow, 67, 369

On Dominican Government, 341

End of rule of, 220, 345, 346, 353, 354, 358, 361, 362

OAS role in Haiti, 355

Presentation of credentials by U.S.

ambassador, 325, 326

As "president-for-life," 352

Strengths and capabilities of, 363

U.S. economic aid to Haiti, 327, 328, 348, 349, 350

U.S. military aid to Haiti, 330, 332, 333, 337, 348, 349

U.S. policies toward, 352, 359

U.S. support for, 335, 338

Earman, J.S., 315

Eastwood, C.G., 416

Ecuador, 56, 57, 58, 61, 85, 210

Efferson, Dr., 407

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 262, 326, 344

*El Caribe*, 144, 205

Elder, W., 225

Electronic countermeasures (ECM), 262, 265, 266, 267, 268, 288

Elie, Jean, 343

El Salvador, 57

Engle, Byron, 129, 133

Erhard, Ludwig, 225

Ericson, 401, 406

Espallat, Manuel Enrique, 1

Estame, Nick F., 80

- Esterline, Jacob D., 168, 187  
Europe, 369  
Evans, Allen, 147  
Export-Import Bank, 5, 349
- Facio, Gonzalo, 274  
Falconbridge Ltd., 210, 218  
FALN (Venezuela), 304  
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), 366  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),  
71, 273, 359  
Fenoaltea, Sergio, 284  
Fernández Domínguez, Col. Rafael, 66,  
83  
Fernandez Pérez, Maj. Venicio, 55  
Fiallo, Maximo, 164  
Fiallo, Viriato, 102  
FIAT, 284  
5412 Special Group. *See* 303 Committee.  
Figueres-Ferrer, José Pepe, 49, 51, 56,  
163, 273, 341  
Finletter, Thomas K., 255  
Fishburn, Lt. Col. Thomas, 41, 72  
Fisher, Adrian, 225  
FitzGerald, Desmond, 16, 104, 149, 235  
Cuba, 226, 249, 257, 259, 260, 270,  
289, 295, 298  
Dominican Republic, 20, 51, 55, 97,  
120, 133, 170, 200, 202  
Haiti, 346  
Fitzgerald, John F., 308, 316, 319, 320,  
322, 323, 324  
Fitzgibbons, Harold E., 168  
Folch Pérez, Gen. Juan, 162, 185  
Fombrun, Marcel, 343  
Ford, Gerald, 35  
Ford, John W., 322  
Fortas, Abe, 22, 56, 77, 95, 97, 105  
Formation of interim government in  
Dominican Republic, 55, 66, 67,  
69, 70, 75, 80, 88  
Landing of U.S. Marines in  
Dominican Republic, 38, 42, 49,  
58  
Fortuny, José Manuel, 98  
Fouche, Luc, 343  
4-H Movement, 352  
Fowler, Henry H., 145, 199, 207, 357  
FRAGUA, 203  
France, 131, 242, 285  
Franco y Franco, Julio, 86  
Frank, Richard A., 436  
Frankel, Max, 49  
Fraser, Donald M., 146  
Freeman, Orville, 201, 204, 214, 222, 434  
Frei, Eduardo, 59, 197, 284  
Frey, James M., 329  
Friedman, Alvin, 288  
Frietas, Andres, 86  
Fubini, Eugene, 262, 266  
Fulbright, J. William, 35, 91, 108, 183
- García, Enrique, 70  
García Bauer, Carlos, 52  
García German, 90, 91  
García Godoy, Héctor (*see also* García  
Godoy presidency *under*  
Dominican Republic):  
As Ambassador to United States, 183  
Balaguer presidency, 183, 188, 202,  
205  
Collection of arms from civilians, 144  
Elections of 1970, 216, 218  
As Foreign Affairs Minister,  
proposed, 83, 86, 100  
Formation of interim government in  
Dominican Republic:  
"Act of Dominican Reconciliation,"  
120, 128  
Exclusion of Communists, 119, 121,  
124, 129, 130  
U.S. talks with, 3  
Withdrawal of Bennett as U.S.  
Ambassador, 159  
Gardner, James R., 147, 191, 425  
Gardner, Richard F., 324  
Gaud, William S., 55, 140, 145  
Dominican Republic, 51, 58, 61, 179,  
199, 204, 207, 222  
Guyana, 434, 435, 440  
General Agreement on Tariffs and  
Trade (GATT), 201, 239  
General Electric Corp., 356  
George, David Lloyd, 61  
Germany, Federal Republic of, 225, 255,  
285, 329  
Glenn, 336, 340  
Goldman, Charles N., 145  
Goldwater, Barry M., 234, 236  
Gómez Barrios, Manuel, 238  
Gómez Cerda, Gustavo, 148, 154  
González Tamayo, Armando, 55  
González y González, Manuel, 90, 91  
Goodwin, Richard, 42, 49, 88, 97  
Gordon, A. Lincoln, 187  
Cuba, 310  
Dominican Republic, 49, 186, 194, 202  
Elections, 163, 168, 170, 173

- Gordon, A. Lincoln—*Continued*  
 Dominican Republic—*Continued*  
 Sugar quotas, 188, 189, 195  
 U.S. covert funding of student elections, 191, 200  
 U.S. economic aid to, 179, 188, 199  
 Guyana, 420  
 Gordon-Walker, Patrick, 289, 373, 393, 395, 399  
 Goulart, João, 14  
 Gould, Arlene, 324  
 Greece, 42, 243, 255  
 Greenfield, James, 51, 55, 58  
 Greenleaf, Col., 115, 116  
 Greenwood, Anthony, 394, 395, 404, 405, 406, 409, 410, 411, 416  
 Grenada, 419  
 Grisolia Poloney, Carlos, 62, 100  
 Gruillon, Alejandro, 105  
 Guantanamo Base. *See under* Cuba.  
 Guatemala, 56, 57, 261, 305  
 Guevara, Che, 258, 292, 293, 294, 300, 317, 342  
 Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy, 249  
 Gutierrez, Maj. Giovanni, 55  
 Guyana (*see also* Guyana and Guyanese subheadings under other subjects):  
 British assumption of emergency powers in, 382  
 British economic aid to, 434  
 British military forces in, 415, 416  
 British policy on, 412  
 British-U.S. differences on, 373, 380, 387  
 British-U.S. talks on, 371, 372, 373, 385, 392, 394, 397, 399, 402, 403, 425  
 Burnham government:  
 Budget issues, 407, 414, 418  
 Constitutional Convention, 411, 412, 416  
 Formation of, 389, 400, 401, 413, 417  
 Police state fears, 414  
 Reelection campaign planning, 422, 427  
 U.S. views of, 403, 413  
 Caribbean migration to, 414, 415, 420  
 Coalition government proposals, 381, 384, 385, 387, 388, 389, 396  
 Cuban economic aid to, 424  
 Elections, 371, 375, 392, 397, 425  
 Participation of overseas voters, 422, 425, 427, 433, 435  
 Guyana—*Continued*  
 Elections—*Continued*  
 Results, 400  
 Rigging of, 370, 393, 399, 419, 433, 435, 439  
 Scheduling of, 372, 380, 383, 384, 390, 395  
 Foreign policy of, 398  
 Independence discussion, 397, 399, 401, 408, 411, 417  
 Merger with Caribbean islands, possible, 419, 423, 431  
 National Census, 433, 439  
 Partition of, 383  
 Political parties (*see under* Political parties and organizations)  
 Prospects for, 418, 424  
 Racial tensions, 376, 387  
 Red Cross, 405  
 Rice sales, 391, 398, 404, 405, 424  
 Security situation in, 377, 378, 384, 385, 386, 389  
 Soviet bloc economic aid to, 418, 423, 424  
 Soviet Union, relations with, 398  
 Strikes, 370, 374, 388, 396, 421  
 Surinamese boundary claims, 428, 431, 433  
 UN role in, 381, 382, 384  
 U.S. covert operations in, 370, 393, 409, 410, 413, 419, 431, 433, 439  
 U.S. economic aid to, 385, 393, 402, 418, 435  
 British authorization of, 403, 410  
 Infrastructure, 389, 390, 391, 405, 419, 432  
 Local cost financing, 429  
 PL-480, 429, 432, 434  
 Rice industry loans, 432, 440  
 U.S. military aid to, 396, 405  
 U.S. military intervention in, possible, 373  
 U.S. use of airfields, 389  
 U.S. visit by Jagan envoy, proposed, 384, 385, 386  
 Venezuelan boundary claims, 412, 415, 416, 424, 426, 428, 430, 431, 433, 436, 437  
 Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union (GAWU), 374, 376, 413, 419  
 Guzmán-Fernández, Silvestre Antonio, 63, 66, 67, 71, 82  
 Cease-fire request by, 79

- Guzmán-Fernández, Silvestre  
Antonio—*Continued*  
Formation of interim government in  
Dominican Republic, 74, 76, 77,  
86, 107, 114, 128  
Deportation of rebel leaders, 86, 89,  
90, 91  
Selection of provisional Dominican  
president, 69, 72, 75, 80  
U.S. position, 88, 93, 101  
As presidential candidate in 1970, 218  
As provisional president, 69, 79, 82  
U.S. views of, 87  
As vice-presidential candidate, 169,  
171
- Haig, Alexander M., 104
- Haiti (*see also* Haiti and Haitian  
subentries under other subjects):  
Anti-Castro exiles operating from,  
289  
Communists in, 67, 220, 329, 346, 352,  
369  
Creole broadcasts to, 339, 352  
Dominican Republic, relations with,  
16, 193, 208, 217, 334, 343, 352,  
359  
Economic situation, 347, 349, 357, 363  
Exile incursions into, 331, 334, 336,  
341, 352, 359, 361, 366, 368, 369  
Instability in, 342  
Inter-American Peace Force, 57, 351  
Invasion attempts, 326  
Latin American role in, 353, 356, 357,  
362, 365  
Political parties (*see under* Political  
parties and organizations)  
Population increases, 356  
Radio Havana broadcasts to, 339  
Soviet Bloc, relations with, 329, 352  
Tourism in, 326, 329  
United States, relations with, 325,  
333, 344  
U.S. contingency planning for, 329,  
338, 351, 352, 353, 354, 357, 358,  
360, 361  
U.S. economic aid to, 325, 327, 328,  
348, 349, 350, 356, 365  
U.S. military aid to, 329, 330, 332,  
333, 337, 340, 348, 349  
U.S. plan for pre-emptive action in,  
341, 342, 343, 345, 346  
U.S. policy toward, 335, 349, 351,  
352
- Haiti—*Continued*  
Visits by U.S. naval vessels, 349, 352  
Hand, Lloyd N., 56, 348  
Harlech, Lord, 393, 397, 399, 403  
Harriman, W. Averell, 49, 59, 61, 69, 75,  
241, 372  
Hart, John, 304  
Hasey, John, 325  
Hassman, Samuel, 145  
Havana Convention, 1928, 276  
Healey, Denis, 399  
Health, Education, and Welfare, U.S.  
Department of, 308  
Helms, Richard M., 44, 49, 55, 80, 104,  
149, 152, 191  
Cuba, 260, 312, 315  
Dominican Republic, 51, 61, 149, 163,  
171  
Formation of interim government,  
66, 67, 69, 75, 101  
Guyana, 374, 375, 377, 378, 381, 384,  
386, 404, 413, 417, 438  
Haiti, 359, 364, 366  
Intelligence briefings for Johnson, 65  
Hembra, Alton W., 347  
Hendrix, Hal, 6  
Henry, David, 261  
*Herald Tribune*, 337  
Herbert, 270  
Hernandes, Rafael, 76  
Hernández, Col., 67  
Herrera, Col., 67  
Herrera, Filipe, 210  
Herrera, Rafael, 105, 124  
Herrera Marcano, Luis, 436  
Heywood, Lt. Col. Ralph, 72  
Hickenlooper, Bourke, 35  
Hill, John Calvin, Jr., 420, 425, 427, 428,  
429, 435, 436  
Hilliker, Grant G., 46  
Holland, Harrison M., 145  
Honduras, 56, 57  
Hoopes, Townsend W., 187  
Hoover, J. Edgar, 69, 77, 80, 102, 129,  
133, 180, 359  
Horton, 324  
Howard, Lisa, 240, 292, 293, 294  
Hucks, G.W.Y., 381  
Hughes, Thomas L., 147, 210, 270, 288,  
297, 324, 423, 424  
Humphrey, Hubert H., 35, 290  
Hungary, 230  
Hungria Morell, Brig. Gen. Renato, 1  
Hurricanes, 226, 347, 357

- Ide, Carter, 5
- Imbert-Barrera, Antonio, 3, 9, 71, 81, 111, 116  
 Assassination attempt on, 192, 197, 198, 200, 202, 208, 216  
 Balaguer's view of, 70  
 Battle of Santo Domingo, 41, 88  
 Bosch's view of, 183  
 Budget shortfall from administration of, 138  
 Cabinet selection, 86  
 Capture of Radio Santo Domingo by, 83, 84  
 Departure of, proposed, 90, 92, 94, 105, 111, 112, 113  
 Distribution of arms by, 15  
 Formation of interim government in Dominican Republic, 66, 73, 75, 89, 114, 118, 120, 122, 126, 128  
 Inflammatory statements by, 77, 80  
 Interim government of (GNR), 61, 62, 68  
 Isolation of, 185  
 Payment of government workers, 104  
 Rebel view of, 96  
 Resignation of, 127  
 U.S.-OAS talks with, 84  
 U.S. views of, 51, 62, 87, 93, 100, 108
- Integrated Covert Action Program, 270
- Intelligence Memoranda:  
 OCI No. 1496/65, 50  
 OCI No. 1754/65, 68, 342  
 OCI No. 1809/65, 98  
 OCI No. 2305/65, 124  
 OCI No. 2328/65, 136  
 OCI No. 2954/65, 148  
 OCI No. 3100/65, 149  
 No. 1597/66, 182  
 No. 0801/67, 192  
 No. 0606/68, 216
- Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), 105, 107, 201, 329, 352, 356, 364, 365
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 171, 210, 347, 351, 352, 369
- Inter-American Human Rights Commission, 162
- Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), 49, 57, 58, 75, 85, 146, 162  
 For Haiti, 57, 351  
 Occupation of rebel areas by, 142, 144  
 Pacification of rebels by, 118, 149  
 Troop strength of, 171
- Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF)—  
*Continued*  
 U.S. position, 77, 91, 110, 147, 171, 179  
 Withdrawal of, 113, 116, 128, 136, 165, 166, 174, 181, 182, 183, 184
- Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio, 1947), 38
- International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 333
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 323
- International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 412, 413, 416
- International Committee of the Red Cross, 308
- International Court of Justice (ICJ), 265, 266, 415, 416
- International Development Association (IDA), 333
- International Development Bank (IDB), 327, 329, 333, 349, 356, 357
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 6, 7, 9, 17, 352
- International Sugar Agreement, 323
- Iribarren Borges, Ignacio, 415, 436
- Irwin, John, 336
- Ishmael, Richard, 378
- Israel, 357
- Italy, 225, 255, 284
- Jagan, Cheddi, 374, 401, 404, 412, 416, 430, 436  
 British views of, 371, 399, 402, 416  
 British-U.S. differences on, 373, 380  
 Coalition government proposals, 381, 384, 388  
 East Indian support and opposition, 372, 419  
 Elections, 375, 376, 379, 385, 390, 395, 396, 427  
 Envoy to United States from, 384, 385, 386  
 Exile of, possible, 419, 423  
 Future election of, 405, 424  
 Greenwood visit, 404, 405, 406  
 U.S. covert opposition to, 370, 409, 421  
 U.S. talks with, 379, 383  
 U.S. travel controls, 316  
 U.S. views of, 389, 413, 418, 425, 431
- Jagan, Janet, 378, 419, 431
- Jamaica, 289, 383, 437
- Japan, 193, 227, 241, 258, 285



- Jardim, Ann, 435  
Javier, Col. Beauchamps, 154, 156  
Jessup, Peter, 191, 260, 283, 288, 296,  
297, 307, 314, 344, 386  
Jimenes Grullón, Juan Isidro, 12  
Jiménez, Jesus, 324  
Jiménez, Commodore Ramón Emilio,  
72, 73, 140, 154, 156, 208  
John, 407  
Johnson, Joseph E., 365  
Johnson, Lyndon B., 135, 167  
Alliance for Progress, 122  
British-U.S. relations, 399  
Bureaucracy as seen by, 244  
Cuba, 242, 245, 280, 308, 309, 315, 318  
Dismissal of Cuban national  
employees from Guantanamo,  
234, 235, 236, 237, 244, 246  
Free-world economic ties with, 223,  
227, 241, 242, 263, 271  
Guantanamo Bay water cut off,  
228, 229, 230, 231, 244  
Illegal fishing in U.S. waters by,  
228, 234  
Message from Castro, 240  
Offensive missiles, reintroduction  
of, 277, 312  
Overflights of U-2 planes, 265, 266,  
267, 290  
Reactivation of covert operations  
against, 303, 306, 307  
Shooting down of U-2s, possible,  
248, 251, 256, 262  
U.S. military action against,  
possible, 247, 254  
U.S. no-invasion statement, 271,  
272  
U.S.-supported sabotage operations  
against, 224, 225, 259  
Dominican Republic:  
Balaguer presidency, 180, 186, 188,  
195, 201, 202, 206, 214  
Bundy Committee meeting, 64  
Communists in, 61, 129  
Elections in, 162, 165, 166, 169, 175,  
177, 178, 179  
Evacuation of U.S. citizens from,  
23, 31, 35, 37, 38, 40  
Formation of interim government,  
56, 61, 69, 76, 86, 87, 92, 108,  
125, 127  
Bosch talks on, 66, 67  
Deportation of rebel leaders, 91,  
94  
Johnson, Lyndon B.—*Continued*  
Dominican Republic—*Continued*  
Formation of interim  
government—*Continued*  
Government of technicians, 105  
OAS commission for advice to,  
58  
U.S. meetings with military  
leaders, 72, 77  
U.S. position, 75, 88, 93, 100  
García Godoy presidency, 141, 144,  
159, 160, 161  
IAPF withdrawal, 183  
Landing of U.S. Marines in  
Dominican Republic, 35, 38,  
48, 49, 54, 55, 95, 99  
CIA reports on, 39, 64  
OAS actions, 42, 44  
Planning for, 30, 31, 40, 64  
U.S. diplomacy over, 37, 75  
Military situation in, 22, 23, 79, 97,  
149  
Reid resignation, 21  
United States, relations with, 194  
U.S. economic aid to, 82, 137, 143,  
145, 179, 188, 199, 207  
P.L.-480 loans, 204, 207, 210,  
222  
Guyana, 371, 372, 416  
Burnham visits, 420, 426, 430, 437  
U.S. economic aid to, 410, 434, 440  
Venezuelan boundary claims with,  
426, 430, 437  
Haiti, 333, 344, 348, 357, 359, 366, 368,  
369  
Intelligence briefings for, 65  
Punta del Este conference, 192  
Johnson, U. Alexis, 226, 238  
Cuba, 253, 257, 259, 265, 267, 268,  
269, 272, 273  
Dominican Republic, 155, 163, 173  
Guyana, 382  
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS):  
Cuba, 229, 230, 247, 254, 259, 262,  
265, 267, 268, 288  
Dominican Republic, 35, 43, 55, 58,  
174  
Memorandum JCSM-253-64, 254  
Jones, George F., 436  
Jordan, 59  
Joseph, Raymond, 343  
Judd, Thomas N., 373  
JURE, 273  
Justice, U.S. Department of, 308

- Karamessines, Thomas H., 343  
 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 229, 320,  
   364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 436  
 Keating, Kenneth, 298  
 Kendall, 391, 407  
 Kennedy, John F.:  
   Cuba, 223, 229, 230, 240, 251, 271,  
     272, 295, 298, 304, 313  
   Guyana, 372, 379, 383, 437  
 Kennedy, Robert F., 235, 242, 265, 267,  
   268, 273, 315  
 Kennedy Round, 194  
 Kent, Sherman, 139  
 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 226, 229, 230,  
   234, 250, 251, 264, 265, 266, 267,  
   271, 272  
 Killick, John, 408, 409  
 Kilpatrick, James, 49  
 King, J. C., 287  
 King, Spencer M., 3, 4, 6  
 Kitchen, Jeffrey, 288  
 Klebanov, Eugene, 57, 59  
 Kohler, Foy, 187, 191, 200, 202, 316, 317  
 Komer, Robert W., 165  
 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of,  
   316, 323  
 Koren, Henry L. T., 147, 155, 163, 310  
 Kusters, 145  
 Kosygin, Alexei N., 298  
 Kubish, Jack B., 168  
 Kuchel, Thomas, 35, 231
- Labor unions, 142, 144, 148, 200, 216,  
   374, 376, 379, 419, 421  
 Lachapelle, Hector, 140  
*La Nación*, 138  
 Lang, Ted, 200  
 Lang, William E., 187, 319  
 Lara Fernández, Col. Juan, 55  
 Latin America:  
   Communist subversion in, 274  
   Cuba, relations with, 300  
   Haiti, role in, 353, 356, 357, 362, 365  
   Landing of U.S. Marines in  
     Dominican Republic, 50, 55, 304  
   Nuclear-free zone, 261, 266, 426,  
     430  
   Soviet activity in, 304  
 Latin American Solidarity Conference,  
   Cuba, 1967, 316  
 Latortue, François, 343  
 Lebanon, 42, 243, 285  
 Leddy, John M., 410  
 Ledesma Pérez, Ramon, 83, 86
- LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 237, 265, 266  
 Leon, Eduardo, 86  
 Leoni, Raul, 44, 49, 210, 430, 436  
 Leyland Motors Ltd., 223  
*Life en Español*, 324  
 Lindjord, Haakon, 288  
 Linowitz, Sol, 362  
 Linvill, Gen. Robert R., 183  
 Lippincott, Richard E., 145  
 Listin Diario, 144, 177  
 Liz, Angel, 154, 163  
 Lizano, Eduardo, 274  
 Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 56, 58  
 Lluberes Montas, Brig. Gen. Salvador,  
   219  
 Long, Lt. Col. L. F., 17, 221, 365  
 Long, Russell, 35  
 López Mateos, Adolfo, 286  
 Lora, Francisco Augusto, 3, 102, 171,  
   177, 192, 205, 208, 216, 218  
 Lora Fernández, Juan, 77, 83  
 Luckhoo, Lionel, 407, 428  
 Luers, William H., 436  
 Luna Pérez, Brig. Gen. Miguel Atila, 1,  
   18, 41  
 Luyt, Richard, 378, 382, 385, 388, 390,  
   400, 403
- MacDonald, Donald S., 423  
 Macmillan, Harold, 371, 372  
 Magalhaes, Juracy M., 91  
 Magloire, Paul, 343  
 Mainardi, Virgilio, 86  
 Malaria eradication, 329, 349, 352  
 Malaysia, 59  
 Mankiewicz, Frank F., 137  
 Mann, Thomas C., 20, 44, 47, 53, 63, 80,  
   88, 95, 105, 113, 121, 131, 149, 153,  
   238, 242  
   Communist subversion in Latin  
     America, 274  
   Cuba, 228, 242, 268, 276, 278  
     Bahamian arrest of saboteurs, 270  
     Free-world economic ties with, 227,  
       271, 299  
     Guantanamo Bay water cut off,  
       230, 235, 244  
     Overflights of U-2 planes, 266, 267  
     U.S. no-invasion statement, 271,  
       272  
     U.S.-supported sabotage operations  
       against, 259, 269, 270, 283, 295,  
       297  
     U.S. talks with Guevara, 292, 293

Mann, Thomas C.—*Continued*

- Dominican Republic, 2, 27, 51, 61, 137, 140
- Evacuation of U.S. citizens from, 23, 31, 37, 38, 40
- Formation of interim government, 58, 69, 78, 80, 104, 108, 110
  - Bosch discussions on, 66, 67
  - Bundy-Vance Mission, 71, 72, 78
- U.S. meetings with military leaders, 72, 73, 77
- U.S. position, 93, 101
- Landing of U.S. Marines, 33, 37, 38, 42, 45, 48, 55, 64
  - Cease-fire arrangements, 46, 49
  - Planning for, 30, 31, 40, 41
- Military reform by Reid, 18, 19
- Prospects for, 9, 10
- Rebel control of Santo Domingo, 22, 23
- Reid as U.S. problem, 6, 7, 8
- U.S. covert program for elections in, 170, 172
- Haiti, 327, 328, 331, 334, 335, 337, 350
- Resignation of, 300
- Manpower Citizens' Association (MPCA), 374, 419
- Mansfield, Mike, 35, 231
- Mao Tse-tung, 234
- Marte, Melido, 192
- Martin, John B.:
  - Bosch's view of, 49
  - Cuba, 278
  - Dominican Republic, 17, 42, 58, 62, 63, 64, 77, 78, 88
- Martínez Arana, Brig. Gen. Jacinto, 72, 73, 134, 140, 154, 156, 161, 162
- Martínez Francisco, 26
- Masferrer, Rolando, 359
- Masterson, Adm. Kleber S., 47
- Maule, Robert W., 338
- Mavroleon, 243
- Mayobre, José A., 73, 94, 97, 103, 140
- McAfee, Robert, 173, 433
- McCarthy, Eugene, 293, 294
- McCone, John A.:
  - Cuba, 223, 229, 242, 245, 258, 277, 280, 315
  - Dismissal of Cuban national employees from Guantanamo, 235, 237
  - Illegal fishing in U.S. waters by, 234, 235

McCone, John A.—*Continued*

- Cuba—*Continued*
  - Overflights of U-2 planes, 265, 266, 267, 268, 288, 290
  - Shooting down of U-2s, possible, 248, 262
  - U.S.-supported sabotage operations against, 224, 259, 273, 291, 295, 296
- Dominican Republic, 65
- McCormack, John, 35
- McDonald, Adm. David L., 13
- McLean, Malcolm, 17
- McNamara, Robert S., 49, 82, 83, 84, 95, 132, 149
- Cuba, 228, 229, 230, 234, 245, 262, 263, 277, 280
  - Dismissal of Cuban national employees from Guantanamo, 236, 237, 246
  - Overflights of U-2 planes, 265, 266, 267, 268, 290
  - Reactivation of covert operations against, 307
  - U.S.-supported sabotage operations against, 225, 259, 302, 303
- Dominican Republic, 51, 61, 64
  - Formation of interim government, 58, 66, 67, 69, 75, 88, 101, 110
  - Landing of U.S. Marines, 35, 42, 44, 48, 99
  - Planning for, 31, 41, 42, 64
  - U.S. withdrawal, 95, 97
- Guyana, 399
- McNaughton, John, 51, 61, 291, 389
- Meeker, Leonard, 58, 121, 235, 238
- Mejia Ricart, Marcio, 98
- Mella, Pablo, 111
- Méndez Núñez, 154
- Merry del Val, Marques de, 286
- Messina, Milton, 86, 100, 104, 140
- Mexico:
  - Cuba, relations with, 286, 316
  - Cuban government-in-exile, 278
  - Cuban threat to, 241
  - Elections in Dominican Republic, 163
  - García Godoy government's recognition by, 131
  - Inter-American Peace Force, 57, 58, 85
  - Landing of U.S. Marines in Dominican Republic, 39
  - OAS actions in Dominican Republic, 59

- Mexico—*Continued*  
 U.S. talks over Haiti with, 353, 356, 357  
 Venezuelan OAS complaint against Cuba, 279  
 Meyers, Howard, 389  
 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 5, 183, 216, 329, 350  
 Miolan, Angel, 148, 163  
 Mitchell, D. J., 399  
 Mixed Guyana–Venezuela Commission, 430, 436  
 Molina Ureña, Rafael, 24, 26, 46, 60, 179  
 Montas Guerrero, Salvador Augusto, 18, 21, 27, 32, 41, 50  
 Monteforte Toledo, Mario, 98  
 Montes de Arache, Manuel, 76, 79, 87, 90, 140, 142, 153, 154, 342  
 Mora Otero, José A., 46, 52, 62, 71, 78, 82, 85, 86  
   As Dominican crisis mediator, 84, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 100  
 Morel Corda, Manuel Ramon, 131, 138, 140, 142, 147, 148  
 Morgan, Thomas E., 35  
 Morocco, 242  
 Morrice, Frank, Jr., 52  
 Morrison-Knudson, 432  
 Moscoso, Teodoro, 49  
 Moss, Stanley D., 338  
 Moyers, Bill, 44, 49, 55, 88, 95, 97, 165, 180, 225  
   Cuba, 229  
   Dominican Republic, 51, 60, 64, 137, 173  
     Formation of interim government, 67, 69, 80, 101  
     Landing of U.S. Marines, 31, 35, 42, 48, 52  
 Muñoz-Marin, Luis, 23, 42, 56, 58, 63, 80, 341, 405  
 Murchison, 325  
 Nascimento, Kit, 435  
 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs):  
   NIE 85-65, 305  
   NIE 86.1-66, 358  
   NIE 86.2-66, 171  
   NIE 87.2-66, 418  
   NIE 85-67, 311  
   NIE 86.2-67, 197  
 National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM), 277, 288, 319  
 National Security Council (NCS):  
   530th meeting, 265, 266  
   531st meeting, 267, 268  
 National Security Volunteers (VSN) (Haiti), 342, 343, 346  
 Nelton Gonzales, 76  
 Nepple, J., 17  
 Netherlands, 59, 223, 255, 285, 428  
*New York Post*, 64  
*New York Times*, 230, 233, 273, 276, 337, 431  
 Nicaragua, 57, 287, 297  
 Nitze, Paul, 235, 366  
 Nivar Seijas, Col. Neit Rafael, 192, 197, 205, 208, 216  
 Nixon, Richard M., 218  
 Non-Intervention Convention of 1936, 276  
 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 255, 284  
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 227, 241  
 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 261, 266, 426, 430  
 O'Brien, Lawrence, 35  
 Oduber, Daniel, 163, 274  
 Oliva, Maj., 287, 298  
 Oliver, Covey T.:  
   Cuba, 316, 320, 324  
   Dominican Republic, 206, 207, 211, 215, 221, 222  
   Guyana, 431, 433, 436, 437  
   Haiti, 362, 364, 365, 366, 369  
 Organization of American States (OAS) (*see also* Inter-American Peace Force):  
   Actions against Cuba, 279, 284, 285, 286  
   Ad Hoc Committee:  
     Continuation of, 185  
     Elections, 176  
     IAPF withdrawal, 174  
     Provisional government proposals, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 122, 179  
   Cease-fire arrangements for Dominican Republic, 45, 46, 53  
   Charter of, 276  
   Cuban government-in-exile, 278  
   Cuban policies of, 316  
   Cuban support for, 322  
   Dominican role for, 35, 44  
   Dominican visit by commission of, 49, 51, 52, 53, 56, 58, 63

- Organization of American States (OAS)—*Continued*  
Elections in Dominican Republic, 106, 109  
Electoral Advisory Commission, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166  
Foreign Ministers meetings:  
Ninth, July, 1964, 274, 275, 276, 279, 285, 349  
Tenth, May, 1965, 71, 85, 91, 103, 179, 185, 349  
Guyana membership in, 398, 416, 428, 430  
Haitian exile incursions, 334  
Haitian role in, 344, 352  
Haiti censured by, 341  
Haiti role for, 355, 358, 364, 365  
Inter-American Peace Committee, 56, 62  
Meeting, Apr. 29, 1965, 42, 45  
Meeting with Dominican rebels, 96  
Military action against Cuba, possible, 254  
Overflights of Cuba with U-2 planes, 265, 266  
Radio Santo Domingo control by, 83, 84  
Referendum on 1963 Dominican Constitution, 82  
Subversion as aggression, 270  
UN vs. OAS roles in Dominican Republic, 73  
U.S. cooperation with, 88  
U.S. problems over Dominican intervention, 38, 39, 40  
Venezuelan arms cache charges against Cuba, 226, 227, 229, 239, 242, 259, 272, 279  
Orleans, Fred, 332, 333  
Orlich, Francisco J., 49, 274  
Ormsby Gore, David, 232, 241, 372  
Ornes, German E., 124  
Ortiz, Salvador, 154  
Osborne, 351  
Osegueda, Raul, 98  
Owen, Henry D., 314, 322  
Oxcart project, 265, 266, 267, 268, 290  
Palmer, Lt. Gen. Bruce, Jr.:  
Dominican Republic, 43, 52, 61, 62, 64, 110, 153  
Formation of interim government, 58, 67, 70, 72, 77, 78, 81, 87, 116  
Palmer, Lt. Gen. Bruce, Jr.—*Continued*  
As Inter-American Force Deputy Commander, 85  
Palmer, Donald K., 145  
Panama, 57, 108, 188, 201, 244  
Arms smuggling, 274  
Cuban subversion in, 226, 229, 232, 233, 239, 261, 300  
Dry milk shipment to Guyana from, 405  
Harriman visit, 61  
Military coup, 219  
Pan-American Union (PAU), 107, 279  
Panasco Alvim, Gen. Hugo, 85  
Paraguay, 57  
Pastoriza, Tomas A. "Jimmy," 83, 86, 100, 104, 105  
Peace Corps, 5, 58, 137  
Pearson, Drew, 315, 324  
Peguero Guerrero, Brig. Gen. Belisario, 1, 13, 18, 32, 41  
Peña Gómez, José Francisco, 21, 87, 187, 197, 205, 206, 208, 216  
Peña Tavares, Capt. Mario, 26, 87, 90, 91  
Penna Marinho, Ilmar, 52, 103, 106, 112, 128, 154, 185  
People's Republic of China, *see* China, People's Republic of  
Perdomo, Col. Osiris, 162, 208  
Pérez, Julian, 179  
Pérez Bernal, Virgilio, 154  
Pérez Guillen, Col. Juan Esteban, 134, 219  
Pérez-Sosa, 192  
Pérez y Pérez, Maj. Gen. Enrique, 154, 156, 159, 171, 197, 198, 208, 216  
Peru, 49, 57, 58, 59, 61, 85, 219, 305, 405  
Philippines, 188, 189, 195, 201  
Phillips, Dave, 147, 168, 317, 324  
Phillips, Richard I., 104, 372  
Pichardo, Nicholas, 105  
Plaza Lasso, Galo, 355, 356, 357, 365, 366  
Polanco, Bishop, 105  
Poland, 329  
Political parties and organizations:  
Communist Party (France), 346  
Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD), 197  
Democratic Quisqueyan Party (PQD)(Dominican Republic), 205, 208, 216

## Political parties and organizations—

*Continued*

- Dominican Communist Party (PCD),  
1, 21, 98, 105, 124, 133, 171, 197,  
208, 218
- Dominican Popular Movement  
(MPD), 1, 21, 105, 124, 133, 144,  
171, 184, 197, 208, 216
- Dominican Revolutionary Party  
(PRD), 1, 21, 140, 152, 162,  
163, 166, 171, 177, 185, 186,  
187
- Balaguer presidency, 192, 197, 200,  
206, 208, 211, 216, 220
- Bosch–PRD commission meeting,  
Spain, 1968, 221
- Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard,  
1, 4
- 14th of June Political Group (APCJ),  
1, 5, 15, 21, 105, 124, 133, 166,  
171, 177, 184, 197, 208
- Guyana United Muslim Party  
(GUMP), 401, 419
- Haitian Communist parties, 341, 352,  
358
- Justice Party (Guyana), 396, 400, 401,  
402, 419
- Labor (U.K.), 373, 380, 393
- Movement for National Integration  
(MIN) (Dominican Republic),  
168, 171, 177
- MR–1J4, 171
- National Civic Union (UCN)  
(Dominican Republic), 1, 3, 12,  
145, 162, 197, 208
- Orthodox Communist Party (PCO),  
197
- People's National Congress (PNC)  
(Guyana), 370, 381, 383, 388, 413,  
425, 432, 433
- Election results, 400, 441
- U.S. covert aid to, 421, 423, 431,  
433, 439
- People's Progressive Party (PPP)  
(Guyana), 370, 371, 377, 382, 383,  
386, 404, 417
- Coalition government proposals,  
381, 388
- Cuban guerrilla training for  
members of, 423, 431
- Elections, 389, 396, 400, 414, 441
- Opposition to Jagan within, 419
- Purging of moderates from, 431
- Victory of, possible, 424

## Political parties and organizations—

*Continued*

- Reformist (PR) (Dominican Republic),  
148, 152, 162, 171, 177, 181, 185,  
187, 208
- Republican (United States), 282
- Social Christian Revolutionary Party  
(PRSC), 15, 18, 166, 171, 177, 192,  
197, 208
- 1970 elections, preparing for, 217,  
218
- Revolutionary Christian University  
Bloc (BRUC), 190, 191, 200, 203
- U.S. covert funding for, 210, 211,  
215
- 24th of April Revolutionary  
Movement (M24A), 208
- United Force (UF) (Guyana), 370, 371,  
381, 388, 396, 424, 433
- Election results, 400, 441
- Participation in government by,  
400, 401
- U.S. covert aid to, 421, 423, 431,  
433, 439
- Portugal, 285
- Postigo Arias, Julio D., 62, 66, 67, 86, 87,  
100
- Poverty, 5
- Powers, Francis Gary, 265, 266
- Poynton, Hilton, 385, 388
- Prellezo, 323
- Project AMLASH, 315
- Proportional representation, 370, 372,  
373, 379, 381
- Protestants, 293
- Pryce, William T., 270
- Puerto Rico, 195, 201, 214, 273, 289, 405
- Quilty, J. F., 17
- Quiros, Mario, 274
- Raborn, William F., Jr., 44, 49, 82, 83, 84,  
97, 167
- Cuba, 302, 303, 307
- Dominican Republic, 61, 65, 129, 171,  
172, 181
- Formation of interim government,  
66, 67, 69, 75, 88, 101, 110
- García Godoy presidency, 132, 140,  
141, 148
- Landing of U.S. Marines, 35, 39, 40,  
41, 42, 64
- Racism, 325
- Radio Havana, 339, 341, 342, 343, 346

- Radio Santo Domingo, 83, 84, 131, 140, 156
- Rai, Balram Singh, 400, 401
- Ramírez, Col. Hernando, 26, 55
- Ramparts*, 421
- Ramphal, Sonny, 406, 435
- Ramsahoye, Fenton, 384, 401
- Ray, Manolo, 249, 257, 259, 260, 270, 273
- Raymond, Adrien, 333, 341, 366
- Read, Benjamin H., 20, 33, 47, 49, 121, 319, 350
- Read Barreras, Eduardo, 86, 114, 117
- Reedy, George, 35, 71, 95, 97
- Refugees, 308, 309, 323
- Reid, Ptolemy, 432
- Reid Cabral, Donald J., 9, 12, 14, 15, 97
- Asylum request by, 40
- Foreign exile groups based in
- Dominican Republic, 273, 334
- Military relations, 3, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 93
- Political amnesty issue, 3, 4
- As problem for United States, 6, 7, 8
- Reform of military by, 18, 19, 23, 93
- Resignation of, 21, 22, 35, 341
- Strengthening of position of, 10, 16, 20
- U.S. views of, 1, 5, 17, 23, 93
- Reilly, John, 49
- Rennie, John Ogilvie, 300
- Representation of Cubans in Exile (RECE), 298
- Rib Santamaria, Commodore Julio A., 1, 18
- Rio Conference (1965), 349, 350
- Rio Treaty (1947), 38, 254, 271
- Rivera Caminero, Capt., 208
- Rivera Caminero, Commodore
- Francisco, 13, 32, 41, 72, 73
- Departure of, 154, 156, 159
- Formation of interim government in
- Dominican Republic, 126, 127, 131
- García Godoy's view of, 134
- Refusal to resign, 114
- U.S. views of, 87
- Rivera Cuesta, Marcos A., 41, 50
- Riviere, Andre, 342, 346
- Rodriguez, Marcos, 258
- Rogers, William D., 10, 104
- Ross, Claude G., 366
- Rostow, Walt W., 187, 189, 200, 358, 363, 365, 424
- Cuba, 309, 312, 317, 318, 319
- Rostow, Walt W.—*Continued*
- Dominican Republic:
- Balaguer presidency, 180, 185, 186, 194, 198, 202, 206
- Elections, 168, 169, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179
- Sugar quotas, 195, 201, 214
- U.S. covert funding of student elections, 190, 191
- U.S. economic aid to, 199, 204, 210, 222
- Guyana, 420, 423, 426, 430, 434, 436, 439, 440
- Haiti, 354, 355, 359, 364, 366
- Rowan, Carl T., 49, 53
- Roy, Louis, 343
- Roybal, Edward R., 146
- Rusk, Dean, 20, 24, 44, 49, 56, 95, 97, 121, 149, 304, 362
- Communist subversion in Latin America, 274
- Cuba, 245, 276, 277, 278, 280, 289, 313, 318
- Dismissal of Cuban national employees at Guantanamo, 235, 237
- Free-world economic ties with, 241, 263, 282, 284, 285, 286, 299
- Illegal fishing in U.S. waters by, 234, 235
- Overflights of U-2 planes, 248, 251, 261, 266, 267, 290
- U.S. policy reviews, 314, 320, 322
- U.S.-supported covert operations against, 224, 259, 297, 303, 306, 307
- Dominican Republic, 61, 64, 71, 132, 194
- Balaguer presidency, 195, 201, 206, 214
- Formation of interim government, 75, 87, 91, 100, 101, 103, 110
- Landing of U.S. Marines, 31, 35, 41, 42, 48, 55
- Guyana, 371, 387, 388, 397, 399, 408, 409, 416
- Elections, 372, 395, 427
- U.S. economic aid to, 403, 429, 435
- Venezuelan boundary claims, 415, 428
- Haiti, 327, 336, 340, 347, 349, 356, 357, 359, 365
- Punta del Este Conference, 193
- Russell, Richard, 91, 230, 234, 235

- St. Lucia, 419  
 St. Vincent, 423, 431  
 Salinger, Pierre, 234  
 Saltonstall, Leverett, 35  
 Sampson, Richard, 395  
 Sanchez-Villejo, Roberto, 42  
 San Cristobal Group, 13, 16  
 Sandys, Duncan, 373, 384, 387, 388, 390  
 Santana Carrasco, Capt. Manuel Olgo,  
   28  
 Satellites, 266, 290  
 Saunders, William, 58  
 Sause, Oliver L., 274  
 Sayre, Robert M., 20, 24, 57, 105, 122,  
   129, 135, 145, 176, 187, 189, 314,  
   319, 362, 436  
   Cuba, 276, 324  
   Dominican Republic, 16, 104, 133,  
     147, 153, 163  
     Formation of interim government,  
       108, 115, 116  
     Landing of U.S. Marines, 33, 37  
     U.S. covert funding of elections,  
       172, 190, 191, 200, 211  
     Guyana, 423, 426, 427, 428, 429  
     Haiti, 327, 330, 332, 337, 355, 359, 366  
 Schlesinger, Arthur, 383  
 Schnittker, John A., 207  
 Schultze, Charles L., 199, 204, 207  
 Schwartz, Harry H., 364  
 Scott, Joseph W., 226, 257  
 Seaborg, Glenn T., 225  
 Second Front of the Escambray, 249  
 Segni, Antonio, 225  
 Shearer, Hugh L., 437  
 Shirer, Dr., 356  
 Shlaudeman, Harry W., 15, 19, 58, 138,  
   142, 206, 428  
   Formation of interim government in  
     Dominican Republic, 72, 73, 107,  
     114  
   Reid junta, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15  
   Visit to Dominican Republic,  
     Apr.–May 1965, 49  
 Shoup Registration System  
   International, 431  
 Shriver, Sargent, 58  
 Shuckburgh, Evelyn, 255  
 Shullaw, J. Harold, 381, 382, 407, 410,  
   414  
   British-U.S. talks on Guyana, 380,  
     385, 388, 392, 397, 402, 403  
   Constitutional Convention, 408, 416  
   Elections in Guyana, 389, 391, 401  
 Shullaw, J. Harold—*Continued*  
   Greenwood visit to Guyana, 405, 406  
 Single Integrated Options Plan (SIOP),  
   266, 267, 268  
 Smathers, George, 35  
 Smith, Abbot, 181  
 Smith, Bromley K., 49, 80, 88, 95, 97,  
   170, 266, 268  
   Cuba, 252, 267  
   Dominican Republic, 40, 42, 72, 75,  
     94, 101, 127  
   Haiti, 348  
 Social Christian Labor Confederation  
   (CASC), 200  
 Solomon, Anthony M., 10, 51, 75, 104,  
   140  
   U.S. economic aid to Dominican  
     Republic, 57, 75, 83, 143, 145, 179  
 Somoza, Anastasio, 287  
 Sorensen, Theodore, 235  
 Sosa Estrada, 76  
 Soto, Gen., 192  
 Soto, Miguel, 21  
 Soviet Union:  
   Castro's visit, 232  
   Cuba:  
     Overflights by U-2 planes, 250,  
       251, 252, 253, 261, 264  
     U.S.-supported sabotage operations  
       against, 224  
   Cuba, relations with, 223, 226, 298,  
     300, 305  
   Strains in, 265, 266, 281, 304, 317  
   Withdrawal of troops, 245, 258,  
     280, 284  
   Guyana, relations with, 398  
   Landing of U.S. Marines in  
     Dominican Republic, 40, 57, 59  
   PRC, relations with, 259, 281  
   United States, relations with, 267, 268  
   U.S. wheat sales to, 223, 241  
 Spain, 223, 242, 285, 286  
 Special Group. *See* 303 Committee.  
 Special National Intelligence Estimates:  
   SNIE 85.2–64, 264  
   SNIE 86.2–64, 1  
   SNIE 86.2–2–66, 184  
   SNIE 87.2–67, 423, 424  
   SNIE 85–68, 321  
 Springboard naval exercise, 210  
 Stadelhofer, Emil Anton, 228  
 Steakley, Gen. Ralph D., 191  
 Stedman, William P., 143  
 Sternfeld, Reuben, 145



- Stevenson, Adlai E., 35, 103  
Stewart, C. Allen, 176  
    Dominican Republic, 134, 135, 140,  
        143, 145, 147, 163, 164  
    Haiti, 349, 350  
Stewart, Michael, 409, 410  
Stewart, Michael N. F., 403  
Sugar:  
    Cuban production, 223, 226, 260, 275,  
        281, 284, 300, 305, 318  
    Destruction by Cuban exiles, 269  
    Dominican production, 93, 171, 177  
    In Guyana, 378, 383  
    International shortage of, 239  
    U.S. quotas for importation of, 183,  
        188, 189, 193, 195, 201, 202, 209,  
        214  
Sugar Corporation, Dominican, 177,  
    183, 185  
Surinam, 428, 431, 433  
Sutherland, Iain J. M., 403  
Sweden, 285  
Szulc, Tad, 94, 273, 337  
  
Tabio, 292  
Tamayo, Armando, 55  
Tapia Espinal, Ramón, 1, 3, 4  
Tavares Dam, 194, 209, 210  
Tavares Justo, Manuel, 1, 3, 4, 9, 17, 79  
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D.:  
    Cuba, 225, 230, 235, 237, 242, 254,  
        259, 262, 267, 268  
    Vietnam, 247  
Tejada Alvarez, Col. Ney, 192, 205  
Telles, Raymond L., 274  
Terrorism, 168, 171, 184, 185, 202, 208,  
    211, 217, 382  
Thant, U, 72, 103, 268, 366  
Theard, Andre, 340, 344, 347, 348, 350  
Thomas, Charles H., 147  
Thompson, Herbert B., 362  
Thompson, Llewellyn E., 304, 306,  
    343  
    Cuba, 229, 233, 287, 298, 299, 300  
        Overflights of U-2 planes, 250, 252,  
            253, 256, 259, 265, 266, 267,  
            268, 288, 290  
    U.S.-supported covert operations  
        against, 283, 289, 291, 295, 297,  
            302, 303, 310  
    Haiti, 339, 346  
303 Committee:  
    Cuba, 288, 310, 315, 317  
    Sinking of Spanish ship, 287, 289  
303 Committee—*Continued*  
Cuba—*Continued*  
    Soviet split with, engineering of,  
        298  
    Support for anti-Castro forces, 257,  
        273, 291, 295, 296, 301, 302, 304  
Dominican Republic:  
    Covert funding of elections:  
        Municipal, 210, 211  
        Presidential, 151, 152, 155, 157,  
            163, 172, 173  
        Student, 190, 191, 200, 203  
    Guyana, 370, 421, 423, 431, 433, 439  
    Haiti, 339, 342, 343, 345, 346  
Thurston, Raymond L., 350  
Timmons, Benson E. L., III, 336, 354, 355  
    Haitian-U.S. relations, 333, 344, 345,  
        356  
    Presentation of credentials in Port-au-  
        Prince, 325, 326  
    U.S. economic and military aid to  
        Haiti, 327, 328, 330, 347, 348, 349,  
        351  
Tonton Macoutes, 325, 342, 346  
Treasury, U.S. Department of, 143, 222,  
    357, 434  
Trend, Burke, 241, 372, 399  
Trinidad and Tobago, 383  
Tristan, Fidel, 274  
Trueheart, William C., 210, 211, 215,  
    314, 317, 324, 423, 424, 425, 439  
Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas, 1, 14, 51, 171  
Trujillo, Ramfis, 73  
Trujillo, Rhadames, 72  
Turkey, 255  
Tyler, William R.:  
    Cuba, 241, 299  
    Guyana, 373, 382, 386, 397, 399, 404  
    British-U.S. talks on, 402, 403  
    Coalition government proposals,  
        384, 387  
    Elections, 372, 385, 389, 390, 395  
  
United Fruit Company, 148  
United Kingdom (UK) (*see also* British  
    *subentries under other subjects*):  
    Bahamian arrest of anti-Castro  
        saboteurs, 270  
    Cuba, relations with, 223, 227, 255,  
        285  
    Guyanese voters resident in, 433, 439  
    Trading with the Enemy Act applied  
        against, 242  
    United States, relations with, 399

- United Nations (UN) (*see also* UN subentries under other subjects):  
 Committee of 24, 382  
 OAS vs. UN role in Dominican Republic, 73  
 On-site inspections of Cuban missile sites, 265, 266, 267, 268  
 Special Fund, 347, 352  
 U.S. military intervention in Dominican Republic, controversy over, 72  
 United Nations Charter, 276  
 United Nations General Assembly, 266, 336, 347, 349, 356  
 United Nations Security Council (UNSC):  
 Exile incursions into Haiti, 366, 368, 369  
 Landing of U.S. Marines in Dominican Republic, 57, 59, 103  
 Overflights of Cuba by U-2 planes, 266  
 Venezuelan-Guyanese boundary dispute, 436  
 United States Information Agency (USIA), 54, 234  
 United States Information Service (USIS), 17, 325, 329, 352  
 Uruguay, 45, 57, 58, 59, 61, 279
- Vaky, Viron P., 323, 324  
 Valdes, 83  
 Valdes Subercaseaux, Gabriel, 313  
 Valdez Vidaurre, Enrique Rafael, 133  
 Valenti, Jack, 49, 55, 95, 225  
 Cuba, 229  
 Dominican Republic, 35, 42, 61, 69, 75, 110  
 Haiti, 337  
 Valentine Refining Corporation, 356  
 Vance, Cyrus R., 24, 49, 55, 63, 80, 99, 104, 113, 129, 140, 149, 153, 291  
 Cuba:  
 Overflights of U-2 planes, 265, 266, 267, 290  
 U.S.-supported covert operations against, 259, 298, 302, 303, 307  
 Dominican Republic, 51, 174, 202  
 Formation of interim government, 67, 73, 74, 87, 92, 110  
 Bundy-Vance Mission, 70, 71, 72, 78  
 Deportation of rebel leaders, 86, 89, 91
- Vance, Cyrus R.—*Continued*  
 Dominican Republic—*Continued*  
 Formation of interim government—*Continued*  
 Interposition of U.S. forces between rebels and loyalists, 78, 81  
 Meeting with rebels, 96  
 U.S. position, 88, 101  
 Landing of U.S. Marines, 42, 55  
 U.S. covert funding of elections, 173, 191, 200  
 Haiti, 345  
 Van Reigersberg, Fernando A., 193, 194, 195  
 Vaughn, Jack H., 44, 53, 63, 80, 95, 97, 105, 113, 121, 122, 140, 145, 149, 158, 301  
 Cuba, 300, 304  
 Dominican Republic, 20, 61, 137, 155  
 Formation of interim government, 66, 69, 101, 102, 110  
 Bundy-Vance Mission, 71, 72, 78  
 U.S. meetings with military leaders, 72, 73  
 Landing of U.S. Marines in, 33, 37, 41, 58  
 U.S. aid to combatants, proposed, 27, 28  
 Haiti, 339, 342, 349, 351  
 U.S. economic and military aid to, 340, 348, 350  
 U.S. plan for pre-emptive action in, 343, 345, 346  
 Vazquez Carrizosa, Alfredo, 52, 71  
 Venezuela:  
 Arms cache charges against Cuba, 226, 227, 229, 230, 239, 242, 259, 272, 279  
 Communist support of Haitian exiles, 346  
 Cuban intervention charges by, 9, 226, 227, 233, 239, 241, 242, 259, 261, 272, 279  
 Cuban subversion in, 305  
 Elections, 1963, 226  
 Elections in Dominican Republic, 163  
 García Godoy government's recognition by, 131  
 Guevara on need for revolution in, 293  
 Guyana boundary claims, 412, 415, 416, 424, 426, 428, 430, 431, 433, 436, 437

Venezuela—*Continued*

- Inter-American Peace Force, 49, 57, 58, 85
- Landing of U.S. Marines in Dominican Republic, 39
- Naval visits to Dominican Republic, 210
- OAS actions in Dominican Republic, 45
- Radio broadcasts to Cuba from, 317
- U.S. talks over Haiti with, 353, 356, 357
- Ventura, José Manuel, 238
- Vicioso, Abelardo, 140
- Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 225, 316, 323
- Vietnam, Republic of, 108, 247
- Vietnam war, 42, 304, 306, 349, 379, 420
- Vinas Roman, Maj. Gen. Victor, 1
- Virgin Islands, 201, 214
- Vittini, Read, 12
- Voegeli, Bishop, 338
- Vogt, Brig. Gen. John, 288
- Voice of America (VOA), 54, 317, 379
- Von Eckardt, Heinrich, 80
- Von Thurn, 340
- Walden, James T., 319
- Walker, Patrick Gordon, 394, 397
- Wallace, Ian, 416
- Warner, Norman E., 333, 338
- Warren, Lt. Col., 338
- Washington Post*, 71, 230, 234, 324
- Watson, Adam, 299, 300
- Watson, Marvin, 35, 49, 145, 180
- Wellborn, Alfred T., 303
- Wessin y Wessin, Brig. Gen. Elias, 1, 20, 46, 47, 56, 73
  - Coup possibilities, 13, 219
  - Failure to advance into Santo Domingo, 28, 32, 40, 50
- Wessin y Wessin, Brig. Gen. Elias—*Continued*
  - Latin American view of, 50
  - Military communications problems, 27
  - As presidential candidate in 1965, 139
  - As presidential candidate in 1970, 216, 218
  - Rebel control of Santo Domingo, 22, 23, 24, 25
  - Removal of, 62, 107, 112, 131, 133, 134, 135, 148
  - Return to Dominican Republic of, possible, 171, 185, 200, 205, 206, 208, 210, 220, 221
  - U.S. view of, 51, 55, 58, 87
- Wheeler, Gen. Earle G. "Buzz," 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 49, 51, 55
- Wheelon, Albert D., 262
- Whiteman, Marjorie M., 278
- Williams, Eric, 376, 384, 397
- Williams, Murat W., 342, 344
- Williams, William L. S., 59, 295, 297, 298, 301
- Wilson, Donald, 51, 55, 61, 104, 235
- Wilson, Harold, 392, 394, 399, 410, 437
- Wollam, Park F., 320
- World Court, 265, 266, 415, 416
- Yarmolinsky, Adam, 104, 174
- Yoe, Harry W., 393, 402, 403, 405
- Yost, Charles, 292
- Youle, John J., 221
- Young, Thomas H., Jr., 312
- Yugoslavia, 242
- Zantovsky, 228
- Zanzibar, 226, 239, 383
- Zeller Cocco, Alejandro, 62, 106
- Zwick, Charles, 222, 434, 440