Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editor is convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This volume documents U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union from October 1970 to October 1971, ending with the announcement of the May

III
1972 Moscow summit between President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XIII*

This volume continues the practice established in the previous *Foreign Relations* volume on U.S.-Soviet relations and focuses on the relationship in the global context, highlighting the conflicts and collaboration between the two superpowers on foreign policy issues from October 1970 to October 1971. Beginning with the confrontation over the construction of a Soviet military base in Cuba, the volume documents the development of the Nixon administration’s policy of détente and the crucial role of the private channel between Henry Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The backchannel was key to making progress on the most problematic issues in U.S.-Soviet relations: Berlin, the war in Indochina, strategic arms limitation talks, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, and trade. It also allowed the two nations to avoid conflict and to cooperate on managing crises around the world, such as the Middle East dispute and the Indo-Pakistani conflict.

The Nixon administration’s opening to China, beginning with Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and the subsequent announcement of Nixon’s visit to China, was a policy decision that required careful handling in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations. This volume documents the discussions within the administration of the impact on the relationship of the initiative, as well as Kissinger’s management of that impact in his discussions with Dobrynin.

As Kissinger’s prestige and importance to the superpower relationship grew, the Department of State was increasingly sidelined in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in significant foreign affairs issues. The discussions between Nixon and Kissinger, many captured in Presidential tape recordings, on how to handle Secretary of State William Rogers’s attempts to reassert the Department’s authority are among the documents in the volume.

The volume also includes documentation on the internal and bilateral negotiations for the timing of a visit by Nixon to the Soviet Union and ends with the public announcement in October 1971 of the May 1972 summit between Nixon and Brezhnev, the first U.S.-Soviet summit since 1967. The era of détente and cooperation between the superpowers had begun.

*Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the
time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editor for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Nixon White House Tapes

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President’s Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry
Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document.

The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts included in this volume. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous Foreign Relations volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers' inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information, as amended, and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2006 and was completed in 2011, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full and to make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 7 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented in this volume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of the U.S.-Soviet relations from October 1970 to October 1971.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland, who
made possible the research that forms the heart of this volume. In addition, he is grateful to the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Research in the Kissinger Papers, including transcripts of telephone conversations, could not have occurred without the kind permission of Henry A. Kissinger. John Haynes and Ernest Emrich of the Library of Congress expedited access to the Kissinger Papers and carried out extensive copying on the editor’s behalf. Thanks are also due to the History Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, which helped to arrange full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency.

David C. Geyer collected the documents, made the selections, and annotated them under the direction of Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the series, and Luke Smith, Chief of the Europe and General Division. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Carl Ashley and Aaron W. Marrs did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber compiled the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Ambassador Edward Brynn

September 2011

Acting Historian
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Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department’s decentralized office files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. The papers are a key source for the Nixon–Ford subseries of Foreign Relations.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still
classified documents. In the time since the research for this volume was completed, the Nixon Presidential Materials have been transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California. The Nixon Presidential Library staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XIII

The editors made considerable use of materials already researched for other volumes in the Foreign Relations series, especially those on South Asia, China, and Germany and Berlin; they also collected material subsequently published in volumes on Vietnam, SALT, and the Middle East. Readers interested in these subjects should consult the relevant volumes for further information on the specific sources used in research.

The Presidential papers and other White House records at the Nixon Presidential Library proved to be the most valuable source of documentation on the Nixon administration’s conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. Many of the most important records for this volume were found in the National Security Council Files, in particular, the Country Files, Soviet Union. A collection of sensitive documents on the Soviet Union is also in the Kissinger Office Files, including records of his secret trip to Moscow in April 1972 and of his periodic meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

The President’s Trip File was the source of another important collection for this volume; the records relating to the “confidential channel” between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The so-called “D” File includes memoranda of their conversations and correspondence exchanged and documents dialogue at a high level between the United States and Soviet Union on a wide range of global and bilateral issues.

The National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) were an essential source for recording formal decision-making processes on foreign policy and crisis management. The records of the Washington Special Actions Group and the papers underlying National Security Decision Memoranda and National Security Study Memoranda, for instance, are in this file.

Under President Nixon, decision-making on issues related to the Soviet Union was largely formulated and implemented outside the normal bureaucratic channels of either the National Security Council or the Department of State. Rather than rely on formal decision papers, Nixon and Kissinger made many decisions in person through a series of meetings and telephone conversations. Two crucial sources, therefore, were the Nixon White House Tape Recordings and the Kissinger
Telephone Conversation Transcripts. The latter includes a key collection of telephone conversations with Dobrynin. The Haig Telephone Conversations (Haig Chronological File) and the Haldeman Diaries—including the book, the CD-ROM, and handwritten notes (Staff Member and Office Files)—were also useful.

Nixon occasionally revealed his thoughts in writing, either in memoranda or in marginalia, for key members of his staff and Cabinet. Many of these documents were found in the President’s Personal Files, in particular, the President’s Speech File, which contains a wide range of materials used in preparation for important public statements.

During the Nixon administration, the White House generally excluded the Department of State from important decision-making on the Soviet Union. This exclusion is well reflected in the records of the Department. Several Department of State sources, however, proved useful in the compilation of this volume. The Department’s Central Files contain day-to-day communications, including telegrams, memoranda, and correspondence, on relations between the United States and Soviet Union. The lot files of Winston Lord, Kissinger’s Special Assistant at the time and later Director of Planning and Coordination Staff at the Department of State, helped to clarify some of the President’s preparations for the summit.

The editors also had access to the Nixon Intelligence Files at the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. The files of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly the NIC Registry of NIE and SNIE files, were essential for intelligence reports and assessments on which the Nixon administration based its policy decisions.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 65
XIV  Sources

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Files 1970–73
DEF 6 EUR, armed forces, Europe
DEF 15 IND-US, bases and installations, Indian Ocean
DEF 18–3, arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences
DEF 18–3 AUS(VI), arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences, Vienna, Austria
DEF 18–3 FIN(HE), arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences, Helsinki, Finland
EDX 4 US–USSR, U.S.-Soviet educational and cultural exchanges
LEG 7 MUSKIE, Congressional delegations and individual visits
POL US–USSR, general U.S.-Soviet relations
POL 1 US–USSR, general policy and background on U.S.-Soviet relations
POL 17 USSR–GER B, Soviet diplomatic and consular representation in Berlin
POL 21 INDIA–USSR, political affaivity and relations, India–Soviet Union
POL 23–8 US, demonstrations, riots, and protests in the United States
POL 23–8 USSR, demonstrations, riots, and protests in the Soviet Union
POL 23–10 USSR, travel and emigration, Soviet Union
POL 27–14 VIET S, truce talks, South Vietnam
POL 28 GER B, government of Berlin
POL 28 USSR, government of the Soviet Union
POL 29 USSR, political prisoners, Soviet Union
POL 38–6, quadripartite organizations on access to Berlin
SOC 14 USSR, human rights, Soviet Union
UN 6 CHICOM, Chinese representation question in the United Nations

Lot Files

Rogers’ Office Files, Entry 5439 (Lot 73 D 443)
Office Files of William Rogers, 1969–1973

Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958–1976 (Lot 72 D 317)

Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1966–1972

Records of the Office of News

S/S Files, Entry 5049 (Lot 74 D 164)
President’s Evening Reading Reports, 1964–1974

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)

Haldeman Diaries
Handwritten Journals and Diaries of H. R. Haldeman
Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts

Transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations during his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969–1974) and Secretary of State (1973–1974)

National Security Council (NSC) Files
Agency Files
Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files
Backchannel Files
Country Files
For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations
For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam
Kissinger Office Files
Country Files
Name Files
NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)
NSC Unfiled Material
Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974
Presidential/HAK Memcons
Presidential Press Conferences
President’s Trip Files
Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files
SALT
Saunders Files
Soviet Defector Case
Subject Files

President’s Personal Files
Foreign Affairs File
President’s Speech File

White House Central Files
President’s Daily Diary

White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files
H.R. Haldeman
Leonard Garment
Peter G. Peterson
President’s Office Files
Ziegler

White House Tapes

Central Intelligence Agency

NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A

Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

National Security Adviser
Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files
XVI Sources

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Papers of Henry Kissinger
   Geopolitical Files, 1964–77
   Memoranda of Conversation, 1968–77
   Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule
   Subject Files

National Security Council

Intelligence Files

Personal Papers of William P. Rogers

Appointment Books

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Secretary of Defense
   OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–115
      Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
      Affairs, 1971
   OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067
      Secret and Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
      Under Secretary of Defense, and their assistants, 1970
   OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197
      Secret and Top Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
      Under Secretary of Defense, and their assistants, 1971

Published Sources


Abbreviations and Terms

ABC, American Broadcasting Company
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AH, Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Amb, Ambassador
AP, Associated Press
ARE, Arab Republic of Egypt
ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASW, anti-submarine warfare

B–52, all-weather, intercontinental, strategic heavy bomber
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BDA, bombing damage assessment
BH, Bob Haldeman
BW, biological weapons

C–130, high-wing, four-turboprop engine aircraft used for rapid transportation of troops
and/or equipment
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CBW, Convention on Biological Weapons
CC, Central Committee
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CDU, Christian Democratic Union
CDU/CSU, Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CEQ, Council on Environmental Quality
CES, Conference on European Security
ChiCom(s), Chinese Communist(s)
ChiRep, Chinese representation (at the United Nations)
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
COB, close of business
COCOM, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
Codel, Congressional delegation
CPD, series indicator for communications sent by President Nixon while at Camp David
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CW, chemical weapons

D, Democrat
D, Anatoly F. Dobrynin
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
Dept, Department
Deptel, Department of State telegram
Deptoff, Department officer
Dissem, dissemination
XX  Abbreviations and Terms

DMZ, demilitarized zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State
DRV or DRVN, Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

EC, European Community
EC–121, unarmed, four-engine propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time
Emb, Embassy
Emboff, Embassy officer
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EOB, Executive Office Building
ESC, European Security Conference
EST, Eastern Standard Time
ETA, estimated time of arrival
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/GER, Office of Germany Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SES, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, exclusive distribution
EXIM or Ex-Im, Export-Import Bank of Washington

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBS, forward based system
FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FM, Foreign Minister
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FRC, Federal Records Center
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FYI, for your information

GDR, German Democratic Republic
GM, General Motors Corporation
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

HAK, Henry Alfred Kissinger
Hakto, series indicator for messages sent from Henry A. Kissinger while away from Washington
HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
IG, interdepartmental group
IG/EUR, Interdepartmental Group for Europe
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DRR/RSE, Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Abbreviations and Terms XXI

INR/DRR/RSE/FP, Soviet Foreign Affairs Division, Officer of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDL, Jewish Defense League

JFK, John Fitzgerald Kennedy

JRC, Joint Reconnaissance Center

K, Kissinger

KGB, Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (State Security Committee)

LBJ, Lyndon Baines Johnson

LDX, long distance xerography

Limdis, limited distribution

LP, liquefied petroleum

MARC, Modern ABM Radar Complex

MBFR, mutual and balanced force reductions

ME, Middle East

Memcon, memorandum of conversation

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MFN, Most Favored Nation

MIRV, multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle

MSR, Missile Site Radar

NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC, National Broadcasting Company

NCA, National Capital Area

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Niact, night action, telegram indicator requiring immediate action

NIC, National Intelligence Council

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

NLF, National Liberation Front

Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)

Noforn, no foreign distribution

Notal, not received by all addressees

NPT, (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSA, National Security Agency

NSC, National Security Council

NSC-IG, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group

NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum

NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

NVA, North Vietnamese Army

NVN, North Vietnam

OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

OBE, overtaken by events

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OST, Office of Science and Technology
XXII  Abbreviations and Terms

P, President
PBS, Public Broadcasting Service
PDT, Pacific Daylight Time
PermRep, Permanent Representative
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PNE, peaceful nuclear explosion
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POW, prisoner of war
PR, public relations
PRC, People’s Republic of China
PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government (South Vietnam)
PST, Pacific Standard Time

R, Republican
ref, reference
reftel, reference telegram
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RG, record group
RL, Radio Liberty
RN, Richard Nixon

S, Office of the Secretary of State
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SED, Socialist Unity Party (East Germany)
Septel, separate telegram
Sitto, series indicator for messages sent to Henry A. Kissinger while away from Washington, especially during his secret trip to Moscow in April 1972, when communications were routed through the Situation Room in the White House
SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile
Sov, Soviet
SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SPD, Social Democratic Party (West Germany)
SRG, Senior Review Group
SS, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SU, Soviet Union
SVN, South Vietnam

TAC, Tactical Air Command
TASS, Telegraphnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union)
Telcon, telephone conversation
Tohak, series indicator for messages sent to Henry A. Kissinger while away from Washington
Tosit, series indicator for messages sent to the White House Situation Room

U-8, U.S. military utility aircraft
UAR, United Arab Republic
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
US, United States
Abbreviations and Terms  XXIII

USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USCP, United States Communist Party
USDel, United States Delegate/Delegation
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USNATO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; also series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the Department of State
USS, United States Ship
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations in New York

V, Vietnam
VIP, very important person
VN, Vietnam
VOA, Voice of America

WH, White House
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Abrams, Creighton W., Major General, USA, Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Abrassimov, Pyotr A., Soviet Ambassador to East Germany until October 1971

Acheson, Dean G., Secretary of State from 1949 until 1953

Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States

Alsop, Joseph, syndicated columnist for the Washington Post

Arbatov, Georgi A., Director, Institute of the United States of America, Russian Academy of Sciences; also Senior Foreign Policy Adviser, Foreign Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., “Roy,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Bahr, Egon, State Secretary (Foreign, Defense, and German Policy) in the West German Federal Chancellery and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin

Baker, John A., Jr., Country Director for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State from 1961 until 1966

Beam, Jacob D., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Bergus, Donald C., Principal Officer of the U.S. Interests Section at the Spanish Embassy in Egypt

Binh, Madam. See Nguyen Thi Binh.

Bogdan, Corneliu, Romanian Ambassador to the United States


Brandon, Henry, chief Washington correspondent of The Sunday Times

Brandt, Willy, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Bray, Charles W., III, Director, Office of Press Relations, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, from February 1971

Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Bruce, David K.E., Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam until July 1971

Buckley, William F., editor-in-chief of National Review

Bundy, McGeorge, President of the Ford Foundation; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1961 until 1966

Bunker, Ellsworth, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam

Burns, Arthur, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board

Bush, George H.W., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from February 16, 1971

Butterfield, Alexander P., Deputy Assistant to the President

Casey, William J., member, General Advisory Committee on Arms Control; Chairman, Security and Exchange Commission from April 14, 1971

Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba

Ceausescu, Nicolai, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Chancellor, John, anchor on NBC Nightly News

XXV
XXVI  Persons

Chapin, Dwight L., Special Assistant to the President until 1971; thereafter Deputy Assistant to the President (President's Appointments Secretary)
Chapin, Frank M., member, National Security Council staff
Chou En-lai. See Zhou Enlai.
Clay, General Lucius D., Deputy Military Governor and Military Governor of Germany from 1945 until 1949
Colson, Charles W., Special Counsel to the President
Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury from February 8, 1971
Cushman, Lieutenant Robert E., Jr., General, USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

David, Edward E., Jr., Science Adviser to the President and Director, Office of Science and Technology
Davies, Richard T., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Davis, Jeanne W., National Security Council Staff Secretary (Director, National Security Council Secretariat)
Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Minister of Defense
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France from 1959 until 1969
Dean, John W., III, Counsel to the President
Dean, Jonathan, "Jock," Political Counselor (Chief of the Political Section) at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn
Dewey, Thomas E., Governor of New York from 1943 until 1955
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States; candidate member and, from April 1971, full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Downey, Arthur T., member, National Security Council Operations Staff (Europe)
Dubček, Alexander, former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1968)
Dubs, Adolph, "Spike," Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until June 1971
Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State from 1953 until 1959

Ehrlichman, John, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States from 1953 until 1961
Elliot, Theodore L., Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State
Ellsworth, Robert, Permanent Representative to the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until June 30, 1971
Evans, Rowland, Jr., co-author of syndicated newspaper column with Robert Novak

Falin, Valentin M., head of the Third European Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs until April 1971; Soviet Ambassador to West Germany from May 3, 1971
Farland, Joseph S., U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
Fisher, Max M., Detroit businessman and Jewish philanthropist
Ford, Gerald R., Republican Representative from Michigan; House Minority Leader
Frankel, Max, chief Washington correspondent of the New York Times
Freeman, Mason B., Rear Admiral, USN, Deputy Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Freeman, John, British Ambassador to the United States until 1971
Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Gandhi, Indira, Indian Prime Minister
Garment, Leonard, Special Consultant to the President
Garthoff, Raymond L., Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Executive Officer and Senior Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Gierek, Edward, member, Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party; First Secretary of the Central Committee from December 20, 1970

Gomulka, Władysław, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party until December 20, 1970

Graham, Billy, Chairman of the Board, Billy Graham Evangelistic Association

Green, Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; candidate member and, from April 1971, full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Grunwald, Henry A., managing editor of *Time* magazine

Haig, Brigadier Alexander M., Jr., General, USA, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Haldeman, H.R., “Bob,” Assistant to the President (White House Chief of Staff)

Harriman, W. Averell, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1943 until 1946 and Governor of New York from 1954 until 1958

Harris, Louis, proprietor of Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. (marketing and public opinion firm)

Heath, Edward, British Prime Minister

Heims, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence

Hilaly, Agha, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States until September 1971

Hillenbrand, Martin J., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Hinton, Deane R., Assistant Director, Council on International Economic Policy from March 1971

Holdridge, John H., member, National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia and the Pacific)

Honecker, Erich, member, Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of (East) Germany; First Secretary of the Central Committee from May 3, 1971

Hoskinson, Samuel M., member, National Security Council Operations Staff (Near East and South Asia)

Houdek, Robert G., member, Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until July 1971

Howe, Jonathan T., Commander, USN, staff member (Military Assistant) in the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Huang Chen, Chinese Ambassador to France

Hughes, James D., Brigadier General, USAF, Military Assistant to the President

Humphrey, Hubert H., Democratic Senator from Minnesota from January 1971

Huntsman, Jon M., Special Assistant to the President (Staff Secretary), Office of the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman) from February 1971

Huston, Tom C., Associate Counsel (Staff Assistant), Office of the Counsel (John W. Dean III)

Hyland, William G., member, National Security Council Operations Staff (Europe)

Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State

Israelyan, Victor L., Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Ivanov, Igor, AMTORG (Soviet trading company) chauffeur; convicted of espionage in 1964


Jarring, Gunnar, United Nations Special Representative for the Middle East

Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States from 1963 until 1969

Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
XXVIII  Persons

Johnston, Ernest B., Jr., member, National Security Council Operations Staff (International Economic Policy) until September 1971

Kahane, Meir D., Chairman, Jewish Defense League
Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
Kennedy, Edward M., Democratic Senator from Massachusetts
Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from 1961 until 1963
Kennedy, Richard T., Colonel, USA, Director, Planning Group, National Security Council staff
Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General from 1961 until 1964
Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers from 1953 until 1964
Killham, Edward L., Chief, Soviet Foreign Affairs Division (Bilateral Political Relations Officer), Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until July 1971
Kishilov, Nikolai S., First Secretary, International Organizations Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; also General Secretary and Senior Adviser, Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Klosson, Boris H., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow
Kohl, Michael, State Secretary for the Ministerial Council of the German Democratic Republic
Komarov, Nikolai D., Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade
Kornienko, Georgi M., Chief, United States of America Department and member of the Collegium in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman (Premier) of the Soviet Council of Ministers; also member, Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Kraft, Joseph, columnist with the Field Newspapers Syndicate
Kraslow, David, Washington bureau chief, Los Angeles Times
Krimer, William D., interpreter and Language Officer, Office of Language Services, Department of State
Kuznetsov, Vasily V., First Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kvitsinsky, Yuli A., Deputy Chief, Third European Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense
Le Duan, First Secretary, North Vietnamese Workers’ (Communist) Party
Le Duc Tho, Special Adviser to the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks
Lord, Winston, member, National Security Council staff (Kissinger’s Special Assistant)

Mainland, Edward A., International Relations Officer, Bilateral Political Relations Section, Soviet Foreign Affairs Division, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Malik, Yakov A., Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mansfield, Michael J., Democratic Senator from Montana; Senate Majority Leader
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), Chairman, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
Marder, Murrey, columnist and diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post
Matlock, Jack E., Jr., Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs (Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs), Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from June 1971
McCloskey, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Department of State Spokesman)
McCloy, John J., U.S. Military Governor and High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 until 1952
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from 1961 until 1968
Meir, Golda, Israeli Prime Minister
Mitchell, John N., Attorney General
Moorer, Thomas H., Admiral, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Muskie, Edmund S., Democratic Senator from Maine

Nachmanoff, Arnold, member, National Security Council Operations Staff (Latin America)
Nguyen Cao Ky, Vice President of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
Nguyen Thi Binh (Madame Binh), Chief Delegate of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam
Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States
Novak, Robert D.S., co-author of syndicated newspaper column with Rowland Evans, Jr.

Oberdorfer, Donald, Jr., reporter for the Washington Post
Okun, Herbert S., International Relations Officer, Office of the Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Parker, David, Special Assistant to the President (Office of Dwight L. Chapin) from January 1971
Pauls, Rolf, West German Ambassador to the United States
Pedersen, Richard E., Counselor of the Department of State
Perry, Jack R., International Relations Officer, Multilateral Political Relations Section, Soviet Foreign Affairs Division, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy
Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam
Podgorny, Nikolai V., Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; also member, Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Polansky, Sol, Political Officer (Deputy Chief of the Political Section), U.S. Embassy in Moscow
Pompidou, Georges, President of France
Price, Raymond K., Jr, Special Assistant to the President (Speechwriter’s Office)
Pursley, Robert E., Colonel, USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Rabin, Yitzhak, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
Reston, James B., “Scotty,” Vice President of the New York Times
Riad, Mahmoud, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Roberts, Chalmers M., chief diplomatic correspondent of the Washington Post
Robinson, Rembrandt, Rear Admiral, USN, Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison at the National Security Council
Rockefeller, David, Chairman of the Board, Chase Manhattan Bank; also Chairman of the Board, Council on Foreign Relations
Rockefeller, Nelson A., Governor of New York
Rodman, Peter W., member, National Security Council staff
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State
Rumsfeld, Donald, Assistant to the President and Director, Office of Economic Opportunity until December 1970; thereafter Counselor to the President
XXX Persons

Rush, Kenneth, U.S. Ambassador to West Germany
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from 1961 until 1969

al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, President of Egypt
Safire, William L., Special Assistant to the President (Speechwriter’s Office)
Sakharov, Andrei D., Soviet physicist, dissident, and human rights activist; researcher at the Lebedev Institute of Physics, Soviet Academy of Sciences; founder and member of the Moscow Human Rights Committee
Saunders, Harold H., “Hal,” member, National Security Council Operations Staff (Near East and South Asia)
Scali, John A., chief diplomatic correspondent for ABC News until April 1971; thereafter Special Consultant to the President
Schacter, Hershel, Chairman, American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry
Schecter, Jerrold, Moscow bureau chief for Time magazine
Scheel, Walter, West German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Scott, Hugh D., Republican Senator from Pennsylvania; Senate Minority Leader
Semenov, Vladimir S., Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; Representative (Ambassador) and Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Semler, Peter, International Relations Officer, Bilateral Political Relations Section, Soviet Foreign Affairs Division, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr., Director, United States Information Agency
Shaw, John P., Director, Office of Disarmament and Communist Politico-Military Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Adviser, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Shultz, George P., Director, Office of Management and Budget
Sidey, Hugh, Washington bureau chief for Time magazine
Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Smith, Gerard C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Representative (Ambassador) and Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Smith, Howard K., co-anchor of ABC Evening News
Smith, Wayne S., Foreign Affairs Policy Analyst, Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State until June 1971; thereafter International Relations Officer, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, “Hal,” member, National Security Council Operations Staff (Europe)
Springsteen, George S., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Stalin, Josef I., General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1922 until 1953
Stans, Maurice H., Secretary of Commerce
Sukhodrev, Viktor M., interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Suslov, Mikhail A., Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; member, Politburo of the Central Committee
Symington, Stuart W., Democratic Senator from Missouri

Thant, U, General Secretary of the United Nations
Thieu. See Nguyen Van Thieu.
Timerbaev, Roland M., Deputy Chief, International Organizations Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from March 1971

Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia

Ulbricht, Walter, First Secretary, Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of (East) Germany until May 3, 1971

Volpe, John A., Secretary of Transportation

Vorontsov, Yuli M., Soviet Minister Counselor to the United States

Walters, Vernon A., Major General, USA, Military Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Paris

Warner, John, Under Secretary of the Navy

Welles, Benjamin, foreign correspondent in the Washington bureau of the *New York Times*

Wexler, William A., President of B’nai B’rith International and Chairman of Presidents of Major Jewish American Organizations

Woods, Rosemary, President Nixon’s personal secretary

Xuan Thuy, Chief of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad, General, President of Pakistan

Yost, Charles, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations until February 25, 1971

Young, David R., member, National Security Council Staff

Zamyatin, Leonid M., Director General, Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS)

Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), Premier, People’s Republic of China

Ziegler, Ronald L., White House Press Secretary

Zimyanin, Mikhail V., editor-in-chief of *Pravda*; full member, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Ambassador to France
Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971

“A Moment of Unusual Uncertainty”: Meeting Between Nixon and Gromyko, October 12–December 31, 1970

1. Background Press Briefing by President Nixon

Hartford, Connecticut, October 12, 1970, 1:30–2:08 p.m.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I know that you have already had a briefing by Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Sisco on some of our current problems and also some of our long-range goals.

I thought that in closing this session before I had the opportunity to meet all of you personally—as a matter of fact, not to meet you for the first time. As I looked over the list, I think I met two-thirds of the people in the room on other occasions—but that I might try to put the foreign policy of this Administration in perspective and to talk not simply about our immediate problems, the problems in Vietnam, the problems in the Middle East, the problems of east-west relations in Europe, but how it looks in the long haul, perhaps looking ahead 25 years.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, the Middle East, and the United Nations.]

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 426, Subject File, Background Briefings. No classification marking. The briefing—the last of four such regional briefings before the mid-term elections—was held in the Hartford Hilton Hotel for selected “Northeastern editors and broadcasters.” In a memorandum to the President on October 8, Herbert Klein, White House Director of Communications, explained: “Emphasis in the selection of editors and broadcasters has been placed on the states in which there are key Senate races although other states are included that the list not look overly political.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The President’s remarks, delivered on “deep background, not attributable in any way,” and “strictly embargoed” until 6 p.m. on October 13, were apparently transcribed by the Office of the White House Press Secretary.

2 According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he and Sisco briefed the editors at 10 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) The text of their briefing is ibid., Box CL 426, Subject File, Background Briefings.
At this time, the future of peace in the world as far as a major conflict is concerned depends upon whether the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to resolve their difficulties in a peaceful way. Let me give you my philosophy quite directly and quite candidly.3

I know I have the reputation for being a very strong anti-Communist. I am. I don’t like the Communist system. I prefer ours. When I visit Communist countries and see the grayness that that imposes upon the people of those countries, I prefer free societies of whatever degree.

On the other hand, let us look at their side of it. They do not like our system. As far as their view of the world is concerned, what we both have to realize is that the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are so deep and so profound that they are not going to be resolved by the two top leaders of the countries sitting down and getting to know each other better, not by smiles, not by handshakes, not by summit conferences.

I do not mean that summit conferences may not serve useful purposes under certain circumstances. But the idea that getting down to it, the real divisions between us have been exaggerated and that it is a question of our not understanding them or their not understanding us, that is not true.

They understand us. Perhaps we have not understood them as well as we might. But perhaps we do now. And if we start with that fundamental proposition where we do understand that we are different, that we are competitors, that we are going to continue to be competitors as long as this generation lives, then we can have a sound basis for a meaningful settlement of major differences.

Let us look at a few areas in that respect. The Soviet Union differs with us with regard to settlement in Vietnam. They differ because they would prefer to see the Communists prevail there in South Vietnam. That does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union and the United States, because we differ as to how it should be settled, will allow that difference to drag us into a major power confrontation.

3 Nixon also prepared a set of handwritten notes for the briefing. According to these notes, he planned to state that, in spite of differences in the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe, the United States and Soviet Union shared a “vital” interest in communication to “avoid war,” to “reduce armaments,” and to “have trade.” The President was neither “naïve” nor “sentimental.” The United States and the Soviet Union, allies in the Second World War, had become competitors in the Cold War. This competition would continue, even if the two countries agreed to hold a summit meeting. Rather than seek “quick victories,” “sensational speeches,” and “spectacular formulas,” Nixon was determined to take the “long view” as he sought to build a “structure of peace.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 61, President’s Speech File, October 12, 1970, Connecticut [Media Briefing and Dedication of Italian Community Center])
The Soviet Union, getting to a more important area of difference, the Mideast—a vitally important difference—very strongly differs with the United States about the Mideast. They want the opening to Africa, they want to turn the Southern hinge of NATO, they want the opening to the Mediterranean and they have made tremendous gains over the past ten years in all of these areas; we want peace in the area, we want to deny to any expansionist power domination of that critical area of the world.

So here are our differences, in conflict. That does not mean that as the Jordan crisis indicated that when the chips are really down the Soviet Union or the United States will allow themselves to be dragged, even in this important area, into a major confrontation leading to war.

Now we come to the blue chip. We have a very great difference of opinion about Europe. NATO was set up for a number of reasons: because Europe was too weak to defend itself, because of the threat of the danger from the East, but it was set up, a third reason, because of the need to find a home for the Germans.

Germany is still the heart of the problem of Europe. The German settlement, future of NATO, is all wrapped up in there. The Soviet Union’s ideas about the future of Germany, the future of NATO, the future of Europe are diametrically opposed to ours.

But there again the question is do we allow those differences to reach the point where we are drawn into a major confrontation?

I have talked up to this point, I suppose, like a Cold-War rhetoric man. I do so only because I am trying to point out what all of you know, as sophisticated observers. Let us see what the facts really are and not obscure them, not say the differences in South Vietnam are only a matter of semantics and getting to know each other, or in the Mideast that we can work all of those things out because in the end people will sit down and live together.

That is not true. So be it with Europe as well. The sooner we recognize that the Soviet Union and the United States have a very different view about their role in the world and particularly in certain areas in the world—I haven’t mentioned the Soviet Union’s different attitude toward places like Cuba and Chile or Africa or the rest of Asia—as soon as we recognize that, then we can build a sound basis for an enduring settlement.

What are the great elements that I believe, and I think all of us in our official family believe, are working against a confrontation in any of these areas, no matter how vitally important they are, a confrontation that would lead to a nuclear explosion. They are perhaps in this order, three:

First, neither major power, knowing as it does that whoever pushes the button may kill 70 million approximately, and the other side will
also kill 70 million approximately of his own. The figures can be rounded off, maybe it is 40, maybe it is 50 or 60. But that is enough of a magnitude, 40 to 70 million. Neither major power is likely going to make that kind of a decision.

In other words, the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in avoiding a nuclear confrontation. That is a powerful, powerful interest working against all of these things which pull us apart.

The United States and the Soviet Union also have a common interest in stopping the rise in defense expenditures. We know how hard it is for us. We think that a $70 billion defense budget is pretty tough with our huge GNP. The Soviet Union’s defense budget—look at what burden it puts on the Soviet economy; at least twice, maybe two and a half to three times as great as ours because their economy is not as strong to begin with and their budget is probably larger.

Finally, there is another factor I would put at several magnitudes lower, but still very important, on the plus side: It could serve the interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union to have increased contact, including trade, because we are the two major industrial powers of the world, and at the present time the trade between us is virtually minuscule. They want things from us. There may be some things we can get from them in the trade area.

So there they are: avoid war, reduce defense expenditures—at least don’t see them go up—and third, the whole area of trade.

It seems to me that in that particular area we then come to the point where the United States and the Soviet Union have good, strong, compelling reasons to sit down and talk and to work out the differences in these selected areas of the world.

I have not mentioned the fact that we have other problems at home. They too have other problems: They have the problem of China, where they have more divisions lined up against the Chinese border than they do against Western Europe. They have the problems of Eastern Europe and problems in their economy. We have problems that I have mentioned.

But with all of these factors working together, we can see where looking at the long haul, not instantly but looking ahead, that the United States and the Soviet Union could work together in certain areas on a live-and-let-live basis. That is putting it quite bluntly, but it is the only sound basis for the two powers, who have so many areas in which we are diametrically different in our national goals, in our national and international aspirations, and with areas where we can be together.

Now I come finally to what role the United States plays in this respect. It would be less than forthright not to admit before this group
that there are many Americans—I do not believe a majority, but a very
substantial number of Americans—who are very tired of America’s
playing an international role. They want to get out of Vietnam; they
want to bring the divisions home from Europe; they don’t want to be
involved any place in the world. It isn’t just a case of avoiding war.
But it is a case of looking at the enormous problems at home—the prob-
lems of the cities, the problems of the country, the problems of the en-
vironment, the problems of the educational system, the problems of
taxes, the problems of prices—and a number of American people say,
“Look at all we have done since World War II. Let’s concentrate on our
problems at home, build a strong America, not worry about the rest of
the world.”

None of you would, of course, advocate such positions, but that
is a strong underlying current. There is a new isolationism growing in
this country. The old internationalists, many of them, have turned iso-
lationalist because of the same motivation that made them internation-
alisists in the first place: A feeling of compassion for people who were
downtrodden around the world now makes them nationalists, turning
inward at this time, looking at the problems at home and saying, “Away
with the problems in the world. We haven’t been able to do much about
them. Let’s turn homeward.”

So we now come to what decision we make. I said we would look
ahead maybe 25 years. Who would have predicted at the end of World
War II when the United Nations was founded that within a space of
25 years Germany and Japan, the two defeated nations, crushed eco-
nomically and militarily, would be number three and number four in
the world industrially, partly and perhaps substantially because of our
help?

The United States first, the Soviet Union second, Japan third, and
Germany fourth. All of this has happened. Who can predict what will
happen in the next 25 years? Certainly China will become a major
power.

Today Japan out-produces China. The 100 million in Japan pro-
duce more than the 700 million in China. That will change, because the
Chinese are Chinese, not because they have a Communist system. So
China looms as a great power, militarily, economically, 10, 15, 20 years
ahead.

Japan, a major power, whether it will be a military power remains
to be seen. Japan, China, Western Europe, unity in Western Europe is
inevitable certainly from the economic standpoint, the Soviet Union,
the United States. Those are the great five power centers.

What role does the United States play in this period?

It would be, and frankly is, quite tempting to say that what the
United States should do is to turn into basically a national posture,
away from all of this international responsibility. But what we must realize; of course, is very simply this: That is if we are going to the sidelines that there are going to be only two major contestants left on the field. The one will be the Soviet Union and the other will be Communist China moving up. We must recognize that there is no other nation in the free world that can play a role, play a role not to defeat the Soviet Union, or Communist China, but to at least be a counter balance against the expansionist efforts of Communist China and the Soviet Union in the years ahead.

Basically, we can be very proud of the fact that the United States with all of its faults in this century, in World War I, World War II, Korea and again in Vietnam, has had as its goal not expansion, but simply the defense of freedom and independence around the world.

Sometimes we have done it clumsily. Sometimes we have not gotten credit for it. But that is what we believe as Americans.

So as you travel around the world, the reason that you find that small nations and even those nations that used to be strong in Western Europe,—much as they have kicked the Yankees around at times in public forums—the reason they are petrified at the thought of the United States turning away from its world responsibilities, is they know that the United States in a world role will respect their independence.

No nation in the world among the smaller nations fears that the United States will compromise its independence or dominate it. That is a matter of fact. I say no nation. I am not referring now to publicists and intellectuals, so-called, in the institutions abroad and the rest. I am referring to national leaders, not Tito, none of those that we have talked to.

This cannot be said of the two other major powers in the world, the Soviet Union and Communist China. That is why the United States' playing a role is important to the world.

I think in the long run, of course, this is important to the United States, because if we retreat to the sidelines—as we could with justification do after all that we have done and the sacrifices that we have made—it would mean that we would leave the field to those who do have a great thrust of power, and who would move onward to expand their role wherever they possibly could.

This finally comes down to whether we can do it or not. That is really a question of leadership at the national level. But it is also a question of leadership in the nation's universities, in its intellectual community, in the nation's press, in the nation's television.

I do not and would not want, and none of us would want unanimity of opinion on foreign policy, domestic policy, or any other area. But it is important that the United States continue in the next 25 years, when—not because we asked for it but because of the acts of history—
leadership in the free world is still ours. Only we can do this. Only we have the power, only we have the wealth to play this role.

The question whether we can do it and will do it depends upon whether our people develop the stamina, the patience, the wisdom, the character, to see it through. That will not be easy.

We Americans like instant solutions. We like dramatic conferences. We like some kind of formula which will bring peace and then everybody will live happily ever after.

The world has never been like that. It isn’t now, it isn’t going to be. But the United States can play in my opinion, and must play in these years ahead, a responsible strong role, strengthening the structure of peace around the world, looking at the world as it is, not as we would want it to be, combining our idealism with the realism which is essential to make it work.

It is the kind of policy that the United States needs. And it is this kind of character that the American people are going to have to have in these years ahead if we are going to meet that responsibility.

Incidentally, you know that this concludes our area briefings. We are going to do this on at least an annual basis, maybe more often in the event that there is a major issue to be discussed.

One of the reasons for this is that we believe that the foreign policy role of the United States in this particular period of our history is so important that it must be understood. Only when it is understood will the American people give the support that they must to bringing a very difficult war to a conclusion which is a just peace, peace for a generation rather than just peace for the next election or peace so that we end a war.

I remind all of you, we have ended three wars in this century. We have ended World War I, we have ended World War II, we have ended Korea. We have never had a generation of peace. What we are trying to do is to end this war and to avoid other wars in a way that we can have a goal that all Americans want, a generation of peace for the balance of the century.
2. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 12, 1970, 6:10 p.m.

P: Did Bob reach you on the plane?² I just thought this wasn’t exactly the right way to do this. I like the idea of putting it in the NSC context. Let’s do it in the whole Council. Remember we presented the problem before the Council; let’s present this to the Council in the same general context. Then we have a good record. I think your idea of having Haig go around and present pictures is good because then the Churches³ and other people can see there is nothing there.

K: I will go to Laird and Rogers.

P: Yes. Remember we shouldn’t go about talking to Rogers; that wouldn’t be fair to Laird.

K: Laird is dying to leak this. His intelligence picked them up on the high seas.

P: Tell him to hold it.

K: I have already told him to hold it.

P: That will really hurt us with the Russians because they played fair with us on this and whenever they play fair with us we must play fair with them. I think they have some sense of propriety.

K: We must not make it public that we faced them down.

P: Therefore we must not puff in public, but the fact is that they are gone now. Tell Laird, mum’s the word unless you think we should meet tomorrow.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² After the briefing on foreign policy in Hartford, Kissinger returned that afternoon to his office in Washington. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) The President and White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, meanwhile, visited an Italian Community Center in Stamford before returning to Washington that evening aboard Air Force One. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Although no evidence has been found that Haldeman called Kissinger on the return flight, he reported in his journal entry for the day: “P decided to have a mtg tonite on return re Cuba—felt he had a prob because Rogers knew from Russians they were pulling out & K didn’t know this & was going to tell him. So P decided he’d tell everyone at once. Then—on K’s rec—he decided not to—we’ll wait & discuss it at NSC on Weds,” October 14. (Ibid., Haldeman Diaries, Handwritten Journals and Diaries of H. R. Haldeman, Box 1, Journal, Vol. VI) See also Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition.

³ Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs.
K: I don’t think that is necessary. I can work with Alex Johnson tomorrow to pass some guidance for the press.4

P: Let’s get the guidance now and everybody sits with it. We will make Laird swear on the Bible on it. I like doing it in an orderly way. Much better than off in left field because Laird has to know what is going on.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop.]

P: How did your talks go?
K: I think they were very well.

P: You disarmed them completely. Everyone when they came through the line was ecstatic—and this is New England.

K: They had Crocker Snow who used to be a student of mine and who is with the Boston Globe.5 He used to write how we had divided the country. He said today the academics are ready to come back into the fold, are you going to listen to them? He has a son who is on the editorial page of the (New York Times?).

P: Good, we will have to use him.

K: If we compare today’s questions with July 1,6 all the questions were enormously respectful and people asking set-up questions, like “you couldn’t have done it in Jordan unless you did what you did in Cambodia.”

P: Did they ask that? Good.

K: Howard7 came up to Sisco afterwards and said, if you bring domestic policy up to the level of foreign policy we have to quit.

P: Did Sisco do well?
K: He did a good solid job.

P: After I come in cold to those I don’t know what you said.
K: Well, you did just what was right. You paralleled me on a few things that had already been said, but I think that is good to show this is your philosophy and not just somebody’s construction of it.

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4 Kissinger called Johnson at 8:45 a.m. on October 13 to arrange a meeting that morning of the working group on Cuba. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File) Kissinger then called Laird to confirm the meeting. “We thought we would give them not only Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean,” Laird reported, “but the Mediterranean also at the same time.” (Ibid.)

5 Crocker Snow, Jr., Assistant Managing Editor of the Boston Globe.

6 On July 1, Nixon hosted a televised “conversation” on foreign policy, during which he fielded a series of questions from a panel of television reporters. For the text of the conversation, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 546–549.

7 Not further identified; possibly Howard K. Smith of CBS News.
P: The US—what it will be like for the next 25 years depends on whether we have the guts, the stamina, the wisdom to exert leadership, will determine whether the future of the country . . . that is really what the facts are. People may want to put their heads in the sand; they may want to clean up the ghettos. All right, we will get out of the world. Who is left? The two activists, Russia and Communist China.

K: If you will look at countries like Austria. When they had great political power they also did great things domestically. Now they are just shrunk into weak petty countries.

P: All these people are concerned about peace in the world. We go to the sidelines and there are a couple of big boys out there ready to play—China and Russia. All we are doing is fighting for the right of countries to be free.

K: Their conflicts are going to be infinitely more bitter than anything we participate in.

P: Crawford8 has a good article in Newsweek. You might take a look at it. Did you hear about the poll? The percentage of approval was 67 and disapproval 25.

K: Approval of the speech?

P: No, approval of the Presidency. It won’t be that high by early November, probably around 60–62. When we were up in Connecticut we had a hell of a reception. These people were all for us. Something has caught on.

K: The fact that you have held your course. I found that one point that went over very well today was that the President had many easy opportunities to yield to popular pressure but he felt that it was important we end the war in Vietnam as a governmental decision and not to yield to the voices in the street. They applauded that. I think it is the fact that you have held your course against the most domestic pressures any President has had to face since the Civil War.

P: I had an easy option to blame it all on Johnson and get the hell out. Just get out and let the country go to hell. Peace in our time, or peace for the next election.

[Omitted here is discussion of media reaction to the President’s policies.]

[P:] We have public support we didn’t have before. This is much broader than November 3.9

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8 Kenneth G. Crawford.
9 Reference is to Nixon’s “Silent Majority” speech on Vietnam, which he delivered to the nation on television and radio on November 3, 1969. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909.
K: On November 3 you stood against the tide.
P: Now we have a lot of intellectuals with us.
K: This speech gave them a good excuse to come over.\(^\text{10}\) What made them waver is that Cambodia was obviously working. The success on the Middle East—they don’t know how you did it, but you pulled it together. If they knew about Cuba, with a much better situation Kennedy came to the brink of war. And we did it with a much more glaring case and it hardly raised a ripple.
P: That’s very important.
K: At the right moment someone might want to get that out.
P: At the right moment, yes.
K: I wonder if we shouldn’t tell a few of those Senators who we gave a briefing. The bare essence of the thing. The people will ascribe it to Soviet benevolence.
P: The thing I think has to be emphasized over and over in our relations with the Soviet is to make the point that the US and the Soviet have diametrically opposing views about the world. They want one thing and we want another in the Mideast and Europe. But we have some things in common. So you work it out.
K: But do it on a realistic basis that you described.
P: The liberals really believe that it will be better if we just know each other.
K: The trouble is not that we don’t understand each other, but that we understand each other too well. What they also don’t understand is that the Communists prefer to deal with someone who is unemotional—precise. You can make that point, but I cannot.
P: How did you do it?
K: I said we can’t deal with them on the basis of psychology. We have to be very precise.
P: That fitted in well with what I said, didn’t it?
K: What was astonishing today is how you picked up some of the themes I had started and developed them.
P: Did these guys get the point?
K: Day, from the *Baltimore Sun*.
P: Price Day—I like him. What did he say?

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\(^{10}\) During a televised speech to the nation on October 7, the President announced a five-point plan for peace in Vietnam. The plan called for negotiations on a cease-fire in place; an Indochina peace conference; a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops; a political settlement based on the “existing relationship” of political forces in South Vietnam; and the immediate release of prisoners of war. For the text of the speech, see ibid., *1970*, pp. 825–828.
K: He said, I liked the way all these things hung together and you gave a philosophical [omission in transcript].

P: Tomorrow, let Haig do the backgrounder thing, and on Wednesday¹¹ have a little meeting and you and Alex work up a scenario. The main thing is don’t embarrass the Russians. We have bigger fish to fry. Let me tell you an interesting thing to tell you why we want this summit thing. I put a question in the poll taken over the weekend. It would be very good for world peace if the President of the US and Mr. Kosygin had a summit meeting, and some disagree. Do you favor, or not favor? 76% favor a summit meeting, 18% are against it. Now we are not going to tell anybody that. The point is with that kind of numbers it shows you how this kind of announcement made a week before can have a great effect.¹² If we can get Gromyko when he comes down—that is the way to do it, with Rogers sitting there, you sitting there and Dobrynin—say fine we will have it next week. I think that is the way to do it and if that goes that will have a better effect than having the damn meeting—don’t you think so?

K: Of course, it will be the expectation and there couldn’t be anything going wrong yet. And also we will have a club over their heads.

P: You did a great job today. Ziegler said when Kissinger gets before them it makes all the others look like freshmen.

¹¹ October 14.

¹² Reference is apparently to the effect a summit announcement might have on the mid-term elections (November 3).
3. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Cienfuegos: Thoughts on Being Eye-Ball-to-Eye-Ball, The Other Guy Blinking—And Then Making Massive Increases In His Military Forces

Today’s TASS statement, together with the Izvestiya article of October 9 (morning edition of October 10) plus what has trickled through the intelligence grapevine about Soviet ship movements in and near Cuba, indicate that whatever the Soviets were doing at Cienfuegos has evaporated or is in process of doing so. I assume the TASS statement, with its codeword of top-level authorization, reflects more than merely a public signal.

This apparent turn of events prompts some reflections on Soviet conduct during and after the 1962 missile crisis and its relevance to US-Soviet relations in the period ahead.

Some weeks ago I sent you a memo propounding the obviously unprovable but nevertheless tenable hypothesis that the actions and statements of the Kennedy Administration in the summer of 1962, as late as mid-September, could have given the Soviets the impression that we knew what they were doing, that we did not consider it strategically significant and that as long as they were not going to flaunt it

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba (2). Secret; Nodis; Sensitive; Strictly Eyes Only.

2 The TASS statement included the following passage: “TASS has been authorized to announce that the Soviet Union has always strictly observed the agreement reached in 1962, and will continue to observe it, and assumes that the American side will likewise carry out this agreement strictly. Any assertions of a ‘possible violation’ by the Soviet Union of the agreement because of construction in Cuba of a naval base are fabrications, since the Soviet Union has not [built] and is not building a military base in Cuba and is undertaking nothing that would contradict the agreement reached between the U.S.S.R. and U.S. governments.” For the full English text of the statement, published in both Pravda and Izvestia on October 14, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No. 41 (November 10, 1970), p. 15.

3 The Izvestia article, written by a “political observer,” included the following passage: “The Soviet government has observed and is now observing the agreement reached in 1962 between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and intends to observe it fully, if the government of the U.S.A. will also carry out just as strictly its commitment on not permitting an invasion of Cuba.” For the condensed English text, see ibid., pp. 14–15.

in our faces during that election year we would keep quiet. I suggested further that our angry reaction and use of DEFCONs etc. was greatly surprising to the Soviets and might well have jarred them to such an extent that their behavior could have become irrational—and disastrous for all concerned.

In that earlier memo, I speculated that a somewhat analogous situation may have obtained with respect to the Suez cease fire/standstill where the Soviets might have got the notion that we were more interested in the cease fire in \textit{this} election season than in the standstill, and that they might therefore again have been quite baffled by our angry reaction and our highest-level intimations that we considered the Soviets untrustworthy and hence had second thoughts about the whole US-Soviet relationship.

I stressed, of course, that I was in no sense exculpating the Soviets who, after all, were the perpetrators, active or passive, of the events involved. I was simply trying to underline the extreme importance of making sure that we kept our signals under control, lest misunderstandings with possibly the gravest consequences ensue. (When I wrote that memo I was not in fact aware of the Cienfuegos situation, but I did very much have in mind the general situation in Cuba where, as you know, I had become increasingly concerned about our lack of reaction to the Bear flights and other signs of Soviet activity.)

I would now like to suggest a perhaps rather more fanciful, equally unprovable but nevertheless tenable theory of what happened in 1962 and again this year.

It is that whoever sold or supported Khrushchev on the missile venture in 1962 did so in full expectation that we would discover it, stage a confrontation and, by virtue of geographic advantage and strategic predominance force the Soviets to back down. Their idea was that the resulting psychological atmosphere would make demands for massive resource allocations for the Soviet military—hitherto deflected by Khrushchev—irresistible. (Kuznetsov to McCloy: “This will never

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\textsuperscript{5} Reference is to the cease-fire in the so-called “War of Attrition.” Rogers had submitted a proposal calling for a cease-fire of at least three months and a renewal of the Jarring mission to Dobrynin on June 20. Rogers then announced the plan during his press conference on June 25. For the text of the conference, see Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, July 13, 1970, pp. 25–33; see also \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 170. Gunnar Jarring was the U.N. Special Representative for the Middle East. The United States arranged—without Soviet involvement—for Israel and Egypt to agree to these terms on August 7. During the brief pause in hostilities, Egypt moved Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles to the east bank of the Suez Canal.
Whether as part of a political bargain or as a deliberate decision, it was not at all inconsistent that a massive strategic building program (the fruits of which we are now witnessing) should have been accompanied by a major détente policy on Khrushchev’s part resulting, cumulatively during his reign and during that of his successors, in the test ban treaty, the hot-line, the Johnson-Khrushchev agreement (abortive) on curtailing fissionable material production, the NPT, and major initiatives toward Western Europe, especially the FRG. What better insurance was there against possible US temptations to follow through on the Cuban victory with additional pressures; what better way to persuade McNamara and company that US strategic programs were on the right track and required no increase; and what better way to fix things in such a way that the West might even be induced to help finance the Soviet buildup by increased economic relations as part of the overall détente.

Of course many things supervened to affect events in ways that could not have been foreseen: Vietnam chiefly; the Nixon election victory; Czechoslovakia; the six-day war, etc., etc.

Applied to the latest episode, this line of speculation might lead one to the theory that once again a group of people or interests (the rough equivalent of the Soviet Military-Industrial complex) moved into action in Moscow with a scheme that they had reason to believe would draw a strong reaction from us and lead to a Soviet backdown. (This would not exclude the possibility that others in Moscow, who were a party to the Cienfuegos caper, supported or acquiesced in it because (1) they thought our passivity in the face of the Bears and other Soviet actions betokened a readiness for US connivance with construction of a base at Cienfuegos in this pre-election period, or (2) they wanted to test whether rumors they had widely heard and read about US tiredness and readiness to accept across-the-board parity, were in fact true.) On this theory, the Soviet schemers were eager to demonstrate to the political leadership at this moment of pre-CPSU Congress maneuvering and infighting for resource allocations in the yet-to-be-approved new five-year plan that massive new outlays for strategic and military forces were more than ever needed. In addition to our reaction to Cienfuegos, they could place in evidence also our actions in regard to Jordan and our subsequent vocal claims that these actions

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6 Charles Bohlen recounted that the “galling decision to withdraw [from Cuba] accelerated Soviet construction of missiles. Vasily V. Kuznetsov, a long-time Soviet official, said to John J. McCloy, one of the United States representatives to the United Nations, as the missiles were being withdrawn, ‘You Americans will never be able to do this to us again.’” (Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 495–496)
had turned the tide. It was of course crucial to the persuasiveness of this argument that we should have reacted as we did on Cuba.

Whether or not there is validity to this hypothetical reconstruction of Kremlin calculations and maneuverings, the point I really want to make is that, the denouement apparently having occurred as it now has, we should now prepare ourselves for

—(1) large new Soviet military expenditures, accompanied by
—(2) an invigorated détente policy, including summitry.

Such a policy would quite easily include acceptance of something like our SALT proposal. For while an agreement on that basis would have enormous psychological impact and would indeed place a limit on SS–9s, overall numbers of launchers and numbers of ABM launchers, it would also, especially because of the ABM freeze, allow for and make potentially extremely rewarding a broad Soviet program of (1) accuracy improvement, (2) MIRV development, and (3) other qualitative improvements contributing to the development of counter-force forces in the late 70s.

Moreover, if the détente component of the policy has any success (conceivably by at least some greater flexibility on Berlin) it could, as it failed to do in 1962, produce precisely the kind of economic subsidization, especially from Western Europe, which would make the increased military programs palatable to Soviet political leaders who are concerned with the needs of the USSR’s domestic economy and with how all the burgeoning commitments of the Soviet Union abroad, and the forces needed to sustain them, are to be paid for. (Incidentally, TASS makes clear that, short of bases, Soviet military activities in the Western Hemisphere will continue.)

I do not of course wish to detract one iota from the impressive success of our actions with respect to either the Syrian-Jordan crisis or the Cuban affair. I simply wish to flag, on the basis of a not dissimilar success in 1962, what the Soviet reaction might be. I am concerned because Mr. Laird has been leaving the impression that “tough” US defense decisions will be required only if there is no SALT agreement. I am suggesting that, having just again demonstrated our ability to use power in specific situations, we will face “tough” decisions even, or especially, if there is a SALT agreement. We should remember that we scored impressive tactical victories in 1949–50 (Berlin, Korea) only to find that by 1962 our room for maneuver had been considerably narrowed by Soviet military growth. We again managed to score impressively in 1962 (Berlin, Cuba) only to find that our room for maneuver had further narrowed when we again succeeded in scoring in 1970 (Jordan, Cuba). By 1976, if current trends continue and the above line of speculation has any merit, we may find ourselves with no room left at all between concession and cataclysm.
4. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 13, 1970, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Thomas Karamessines, CIA
Col. Robert E. Pursley, USAF, Military Assistant to Secretary Laird
Adm. Freeman, Deputy Director, JCS
Col. Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Restricted SRG/WSAG on Cienfuegos

[Dr. Kissinger invited the Principals to meet after the NSC meeting.]2

Kissinger: If they [the Soviets] are silent, the President feels we should play it in as low-key a way as possible. There should be no stance that we forced them to back down. He wants to avoid any stories that there was nothing there. If stories leak out again, he would leak out the whole sequence. We would let out at the lowest possible level in the Pentagon the facts that they left. We are not going to announce anything from the White House. The information on the exchanges with Dobrynin are absolutely to be kept in this group.

Johnson: I have hearings this morning with Fascell,3 and with Church tomorrow.

The barges and tanker are still there.

I suggest a statement today noting the TASS statement.4

Laird: I would rather brief on Soviet ship movements in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. We would note the TASS statement but no comment.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970 [1 of 6]. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Situation Room at the White House. The time of the meeting is handwritten on the first page of the memorandum. See, however, footnote 2 below.

2 There was no meeting of the National Security Council on October 13. Before this meeting, Kissinger did meet with Nixon in the Oval Office from 9:32 to 10:10 am. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule; and National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of Kissinger’s meeting with Nixon has been found.

3 Representative Dante B. Fascell (D–Florida), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.

4 See footnote 2, Document 3.
Kissinger: I will check this with the President.

Laird: We should go ahead with it.

Kissinger: I don’t want to let out the Soviet background but we don’t want the TASS statement to prompt new charges that it was a false scare. We could start the Defense briefing with a note about the tender having left. I don’t think Defense should comment on the TASS statement.

Johnson: State could say that we have seen the TASS statement. The question will arise as to whether we consider the episode finished.

Kissinger: You could say we noted the statement and consider this a positive statement and we are continuing to watch the situation.

[All agree.]

Laird: Defense will put its briefing in the context of the previous briefing by Friedheim.  

[At 10:35, Dr. Kissinger left to see the President.]

Johnson: I believe that it is a major gain that the Soviets now accept that missile submarines are covered by the 1962 agreement. This had not been nailed down before.

[At 10:50, Dr. Kissinger returned to advise that the President approved the line and asked to see Mr. Laird, Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Johnson.]

5 Jerry W. Friedheim, a Department of Defense spokesman.


7 According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger, Laird, Johnson, and Karamessines from 10:59 to 11:05 am. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of this meeting has been found. Later that afternoon, Daniel Z. Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, announced that the Soviet submarine tender had left Cienfuegos on October 10 and that, based on this evidence, the Soviet Union was probably not building a submarine base at Cienfuegos. (Benjamin Welles, “U.S. Now Dubious on Cuba Sub Base,” New York Times, October 10, 1970, p. 1) During the daily news conference on October 13, Department of State spokesman Robert McCloskey announced: “We have noted the Tass statement and consider it to be positive, but we will, of course, continue to watch the situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of News, Transcripts of Daily News Conferences of the Department of State, Vol. 55)
5. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, October 14, 1970.

SUBJECT
Black Sea and Baltic Sea Operations

REFERENCE
Secretary of Defense Memorandum of October 10 re above subject

In light of recent changes in the factors favoring such action, the President has approved your recommendation that the United States Government not go ahead with a Baltic Sea operation. For the same reason, the President has also decided that you should not modify regularly scheduled and normally configured Black Sea operations.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject Files, USSR US Ships in the Black Sea (Silver Fox). Top Secret. According to an attached copy, Kissinger and Haig drafted the memorandum; a “blind copy” was sent to Eliot.
Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)²


SUBJECT

Black Sea and Baltic Sea Operations

In response to your request,³ plans for an expanded presence in the Black Sea and a show of naval force in the Baltic follow:

Black Sea Operations

I propose that we expand our Black Sea operations moderately by sending two destroyers into the area on 23 October for a period of six days and attempt to arrange a port visit to Constanta, Rumania, during this cruise. Our previous operations have been of three or four days duration (in 1964 a 9-day cruise was made with port visit to a Turkish Black Sea port), and since 1968 have been limited to areas south of Latitude 43–30N at the request of the State Department. State now has agreed to raising this to Latitude 44N for the next scheduled operation. As Constanta is at Latitude 44–15N, the port visit in conjunction with the increased cruise duration would comprise a step-up in our naval operations in the Black Sea. In the event that the Constanta visit cannot be arranged, I propose that the destroyers operate up to Latitude 44N. I would further propose that during subsequent operations in the Black Sea we consider expanding the area of operations further to the north and increasing the number of destroyers to three or four. I believe it may be useful to reserve the increase in number of ships as an

² Kissinger initialed the memorandum and wrote: “OK.”
³ No record of the request from Kissinger to Laird, either in writing or by telephone, has been found. The two men, however, discussed the proposal by telephone at 4:15 p.m. on October 13. Laird reported that he had just sent Kissinger a memorandum on the proposed Black Sea and Baltic Sea operations. Although he had not yet seen the memorandum, Kissinger agreed to postpone the latter and modify the former. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “K: I wouldn’t increase the force in the Black Sea now. L: No, some time we may want to do that for a good reason and we don’t have one now. Should we even go ahead with the two destroyers? K: Yes, that’s regular. L: And just go ahead on a regular basis. K: Good. L: I was worried about the memo. K: No, I agree with you. But I wouldn’t weasel on what happened in Cuba. I’d take the position that it was damned serious. L: Oh I have.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)
option for further expansion of our activities should we find that desir-able. This approach would also place less strain on Sixth Fleet re-source which, as you know, are already stretched tight.

The only coordination specifically required for this operation would be compliance with the provisions of the Montreux Convention requiring notification of the Turkish Government at least eight days prior to transit of the Turkish Straits. Although the Montreux Convention states that a prior notification time for non-Black Sea powers of fifteen days is desirable, and this has been our past practice, I would propose that for this occasion we consider reducing the notification time to the Turkish Government to eight days to exercise and keep available our legal right to do so.

The remaining provisions of the Montreux Convention concerning maximum number of ships, tonnages, and gun calibers would not be exceeded by this operation. Notification to the Turkish Government of the expanded nature of the operations would be desirable to fore-stall possible adverse reaction.

Baltic Sea Operations

The JCS proposal provides that a cruiser from the Atlantic Fleet be joined by a missile escort ship from the Sixth Fleet to conduct a cruise in the Baltic Sea during the period 26–31 October, remaining in international waters at all times except during port visits. Port visits could be made to any one or a combination of the following: Helsinki, Kiel, Copenhagen, and Oslo, in the priority listed. No coordination would be required other than arranging for port visits. Advance notification to our European allies would be advisable.

Pros and Cons of these concepts are as follows:

Pro:

—Will demonstrate U.S. willingness and determination to counter expanding Soviet naval presence in the ocean areas of the world.

—Would be essentially consistent with the existing pattern of recurring U.S. operations in the Black Sea.

—The Rumanian port visit would make a strong signal to the Soviets and other European Governments, yet would not depart markedly from the pattern of U.S. actions in the recent past.

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4 The Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits signed at Montreux, Switzerland, on July 20, 1936, by the so-called Black Sea powers, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Greece, Germany, and Yugoslavia, as well as several other nations, provided for free passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in peacetime, but allowed Turkey to close the Straits in time of war. For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.
—Would, against the background of the Presidential trips, indicate our will to maintain a strong posture on NATO’s Southern Flank.

—Will demonstrate U.S. capability to conduct expanded naval operations on short notice in widely dispersed sea areas in spite of continuing heavy commitments in the Western Pacific and expanded commitments in the eastern Mediterranean.

—Would satisfy a request by the U.S. Ambassador to Finland for further U.S. Navy ship visits to Finland. Visits in 1969–70 were highly successful.

—Would demonstrate to U.S. European Allies and the Soviets alike U.S. capability to conduct operations on short notice in the NATO northern flank area.

Con:

—As this concept represents some increase in the scope of U.S. Black Sea naval operations, it could trigger Soviet harassing actions against U.S. ships conducting the operation.

—It may precipitate a Soviet diplomatic reaction accusing the U.S. of further provocative actions exacerbating Middle East tensions.

—Concern over Soviet reaction may engender an adverse reaction on the part of the Turkish Government.

—Request for a visit to Constanta could put the Rumanian Government in a difficult position, particularly in light of the Prime Minister’s forthcoming trip to the U.S.

—Montreux Convention requirements for 8 days advance notification (15 days desirable in the case of non-Black Sea powers) as well as the need to arrange the Constanta visit with the Rumanian Government create pressing time constraints for meeting the proposed October schedule.

—Visits to Baltic ports could trigger adverse Soviet reaction and pressure on countries visited.

—The operation in the Baltic and proposed visit to Helsinki, just before the scheduled resumption of the SALT talks, could influence Soviet actions and impinge on the talks.

—This action would constitute an additional drawdown of major units available for Caribbean contingency operations.

—These U.S. operations could trigger increased Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean. This could lend substance to Congressional criticism of our concern over Soviet activities at Cienfuegos as being a response to U.S. provocations.

—These actions could weaken our case for protesting Soviet activities in the Caribbean.

In conclusion, I understand the fundamental purpose of this operation to be to demonstrate to the Soviets, our allies, and neutrals that
the U.S. will not remain passive in the face of Soviet attempts to change the strategic situation in various areas of the world. In particular, such initiatives on our part will alert the Soviets that lack of restraint on their part in the Caribbean and elsewhere may have counterproductive consequences. There are, of course, some risks involved, as delineated above. On balance, however, I think that such operations as these are a considered step which will accomplish desired objectives at an acceptable risk.

I recommend proceeding with the plan for the Black Sea operation as indicated in this memorandum.

I recommend not going ahead with the Baltic Sea operation at this time. Sudden and unscheduled deployments of this nature cause personnel difficulties and hardships to dependents, and are expensive with respect to immediate costs and to the downstream effect on overhauls and maintenance requirements. I believe that the potential benefits to be gained do not justify the major disadvantages entailed in this case.

Melvin R. Laird

6. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 14, 1970.

SUBJECT
My Recent Conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin

My four recent meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, twice on September 25 and October 6 and October 9, were clearly very significant in the short term and potentially very important for our overall
relations with the Soviet Union. I thought it would be useful if I reviewed the highlights of these sessions. The full records are attached in chronological order at Tabs A through D along with our note to them on the Cuban base issue and their note to us on the Middle East.

I plan to send you shortly a separate memorandum setting forth some of the implications I see flowing from these conversations.

In brief these meetings produced the following results:

—We appear to have resolved, without a public confrontation, the potentially explosive issue of a Soviet base in Cuba;
—There was a clear demonstration of Soviet interest in pursuing a Middle East settlement as well as a denial of any Soviet bad faith with regard to the standstill ceasefire;
—We agreed in principle to a Summit meeting in Moscow in June or September 1971; and
—There was a recognition on both sides that we are at a crossroads with respect to US-Soviet relations.

Soviet Base in Cuba

Our concern over this issue was the principal theme in my presentations during these sessions and its apparently satisfactory resolution was, of course, the most concrete outcome. In our first session on September 25 this subject did not come up but was behind my firm tone with regard to our overall relations while I singled out Soviet actions in the Middle East.

Later in the day the details about the Soviet Cuban base were released by the Defense Department and I then elaborated upon the issue at my press backgrounder on your trip, along the lines of interdepartmental contingency guidance. Thus, while the ostensible purpose of our meeting on the afternoon of September 25 was to discuss a Summit meeting, Dobrynin was obviously preoccupied with the Cuban base question, and I moved to make our position clear on the subject. I explained that we had deliberately inferred in our public statements that we did not know whether there was an actual submarine base in Cuba in order to give the Soviets a chance to withdraw without a public confrontation. We had no illusions and knew that there...
was already a submarine base there and I told Dobrynin that we would view it with the utmost gravity if the construction continued and the base remained. We did not want a public clash and were giving them an opportunity to pull out, but we would not shrink from necessary measures if we were forced to do them. I added that we considered the following up of Vorontsov’s August 4 démarche with construction in Cienfuegos as an act of bad faith, but if the ships, especially the tender, left we would treat the whole matter as a training exercise.

Dobrynin asked if we believed that the 1962 understanding had been violated. I responded that this was a legalistic question, that I did believe it was a violation, but that in any event in 1962 we had taken the most drastic action even though there was no understanding. Dobrynin said he would report this to his Government and give us an answer soon. In response to his question I said that we did not plan a big press campaign, but we were determined that there would be no Soviet base in Cuba. Whatever the phraseology of the understanding, its intent was clearly not to replace land-based missiles with sea-based ones in Cuba.

Dobrynin informed me on October 9 that Moscow had come back with a quick reply which he stated he was unable to give me until we returned from your trip. The Soviet note on Cuba said that they had received “with attention” your communication indicating uncertainty in your mind concerning the 1962 understanding. They welcomed your reaffirmation that we would stick with our side of the understanding, and stated that the Soviet Government in turn proceeded from this understanding. They said that they had not and were not doing in Cuba anything that would contradict that understanding. They would continue to adhere to it if we would. They added that they considered groundless our assertion that we had the right to send atomic submarines into the Black Sea, claiming this is prohibited by the 1936 Convention. Dobrynin said that his government could not promise that the Soviet subs would never call at Cuban ports, but he said that they would not call there in an operational capacity.

I told him I considered this a forthright statement and said that we would have some clarifying questions on this issue because of the ambiguity of the term “base” and possible major disagreements concerning it. I said that we considered the presence of ships at Cienfuegos, especially the tender and barges, clearly inconsistent with the 1962 understanding.

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7 See footnote 6, Document 4.
8 Reference is to the Montreux Convention; see footnote 4, Document 5.
At the October 9 meeting, called at my initiative, I handed Dobrynin our note on the installations in Cuba (Tab E) to tie down our understanding. Dobrynin said that the only point which seemed bothersome was on communications facilities, that he would await further instructions from Moscow, and that Tass would soon publish a statement which would repeat in effect their October 6 note, denying any Soviet intent to establish a base in Cuba. I said that we would judge their actions by the criteria of our oral note. Later in the conversation Dobrynin started to say that the Cuba situation was not clear, to which I replied that we should not kid ourselves and that both he and I knew what was there.

Middle East

Throughout our conversations Dobrynin was eager to discuss the Middle East, as well as other issues, but I continually postponed any such discussions until the Cuba matter was resolved.

At the first meeting Dobrynin asked why we had never replied to Moscow’s note concerning the Syrian invasion and wondered whether we were interested in consultations. I replied that we were interested, but over a period of weeks every Soviet démarche had been followed by a contrary action and we simply wanted to wait to see what would happen. Dobrynin claimed that the Soviets had not known beforehand of the Syrian invasion and then added contradictorily that Soviet advisors had dropped off Syrian tanks before they reached the front. I emphasized that we were always ready to consult at times of crises but that the ceasefire violations, Soviet responsibility, and the Jordanian situation did not provide an atmosphere for a frank exchange of views. I stated that we had no intention of launching military operations in Jordan if other outside forces stayed out.

In the afternoon meeting of September 25 Dobrynin again tried to raise the Middle East and other matters, but I cut him off, saying that I was only authorized to discuss Cuba and the Summit with him.

In the October 6 meeting Dobrynin gave us the Soviet communication on Jordan (as well as Cuba) which by then was somewhat dated. The note said that the Soviets had received with satisfaction your communication that the US contemplated no military action in Jordan.

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9 See footnote 2, Document 3.
11 Nixon underlined the phrase “Soviet advisors had dropped off Syrian tanks before they reached the front.”
The Soviets were restraining interference by other states both in and outside the area, and this had produced results. However, the note continued, the situation was still complex and “all states should exercise necessary prudence in their actions” so as not to aggravate the situation but to help end the Jordan conflict. A speedy peaceful settlement in the Middle East was needed to prevent events like Jordan. In response to his later attempts to engage in discussions on the Middle East, I remarked that Middle East negotiations would probably mark time for the moment.

On October 9 Dobrynin handed me a note on the Middle East (Tab F). He complained about our press campaign, declaring that the Soviets were never part of the ceasefire agreement and that they were only informed of our understanding of the ceasefire. He pointed out that Rogers and Sisco had said that the ceasefire and the negotiations need not be linked although this was desirable. The Ambassador said that his Government was seriously considering starting a press campaign along similar lines and that we should not conclude from the Middle East crisis that they could be intimidated by a show of US force.

At the close of our October 9 talk, Dobrynin reiterated the importance of discussing the Middle East and related issues. I responded that this was not the time, but that if they ever took up our offer for serious bilateral talks between him and me, we would make every effort to proceed.

Dobrynin added that the Soviet memorandum on the Middle East was only for you and would receive no publicity and be referred to nowhere else. He particularly underlined the note’s point that there were no Soviet personnel with the missiles in Egypt.

Summit Meeting

Our first September 25 meeting took place after some fencing during which Dobrynin finally agreed to see me after initially insisting that he had a personal message to you only from the leadership. You will recall that we played it this way because of the developing Cuban problem. He said that his country was ready to proceed in principle on a Summit and had agreed to the agenda outlined in our previous communication (i.e. SALT, Middle East, European security, provocative attacks, principles of coexistence, trade and other topics). The Soviets also agreed that Dobrynin and I should proceed with exploratory conversations. In response to his query about preferred time and place I said that I would let him know later.

In our meeting that afternoon I gave him your response, namely that in principle you were willing to consider a Summit meeting, either in June or September 1971, and were willing to consider Moscow as the site.
US-Soviet Relations

In our September 25 afternoon meeting, I said that we and the Soviets were at a turning point in our relations and it was up to them to decide whether we should go the route of conciliation or that of confrontation. The US was prepared for either.

On October 9 Dobrynin said that it was hard to exaggerate the concern of the leadership in Moscow. The feeling was that the US had already decided on a hard line and was whipping up a propaganda campaign to get a larger Defense budget and perhaps affect the elections. For example, our Middle East campaign was out of all proportion to the provocation. After telling us not to draw the wrong conclusions from the Middle East Crisis, Dobrynin stated that if its national interests were involved, the Soviet Union would act with great force and it would be hard to dissuade.13

I replied that we looked at the situation with great care and knew that when the Soviets used their forces they did so massively. However, the main point was that we were asking the same questions about the Soviet leaders as they were asking of us. They had not replied formally to our offers on two occasions on a Summit and their response was the missile activity in Egypt and the base activity in Cuba.14 Dobrynin came back strongly, saying that they knew how to deal with Americans and could wait six years until President Nixon is out of office if necessary. He said that all senior officials in the Soviet Union thought that relations with the US were at the worst since the Cuban Missile crisis.15

I repeated that we were at a turning point. Neither side could gain in an arms race, but if present trends continued they would force us into enlarging our military budget. I concluded that rather than arguing about each side’s endurance, we must work to turn the present impasse into a more fruitful direction.

In our September 25 morning session Dobrynin informed us that Kosygin would not be coming to the UN, and on October 9 we tentatively scheduled a meeting between you and Gromyko for the afternoon of October 23 after your UN speech. I cautioned Dobrynin against anyone’s raising the subject of a summit before we were able to put this into formal channels.

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13 Nixon underlined this sentence.
14 Nixon underlined this sentence.
15 Nixon underlined this sentence.
On October 14, 1970, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger sent President Richard Nixon a briefing memorandum for a meeting of the National Security Council that morning on the Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. In the memorandum, Kissinger addressed the implications of Brandt’s Eastern policy not only for German politics but also for Soviet diplomacy. “The West Germans assume that the Soviet Union will accommodate to Bonn’s policies,” he explained, “because of the problems with China and because of the intense Soviet desire to gain greater access to Western technologies.” Kissinger, however, questioned this assumption:

“Brandt’s willingness to recognize the status quo as the starting point for changing it and expanding German influence in Eastern Europe and over East Germany runs directly contrary to the imperatives of Soviet policy, which surely must be to freeze the status quo, to contain German ambitions and consolidate Soviet hegemony in East Germany, while Germany remains divided; the result could be stalemate and frustration inside Germany.”

The situation was further complicated by the linkage Brandt had established between ratification of the Moscow Treaty and a “satisfactory” settlement in the quadripartite talks on Berlin. “The consequences of this turn of events,” Kissinger argued, “are that we gain some greater bargaining leverage, but, at the same time, there will be even greater pressures on the Germans to see to it that a speedy solution is reached.” Kissinger was skeptical that such leverage would impress the Soviets: “On Berlin, I feel that our present tactical position is sound enough but that we should be quite wary of German desire to speed up the talks or draw us into uncertain and unexplored territory. It seems highly doubtful that we will obtain an agreement, especially on access, that will be invulnerable to Soviet pressure.” The full text of the memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 125.

President Nixon chaired the meeting of the National Security Council at 9:35 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. Kissinger first briefed the attendees on the general issues involved:

“The West German policy is not new. What has changed is that in the previous government the Eastern policy envisaged and sought a closer relationship with the East European satellite countries leaving the USSR aside. This failed. Brandt therefore concluded that the best approach was to concentrate on improving relations with the USSR. The focus of German policy is now on the USSR and to rely on the existing territorial arrangements; this amounts to their de facto
recognition. The objective is a lessening of tensions weakening the ties between the East and the USSR.”

Kissinger turned to Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to present the “latest details” on the Berlin negotiations. Hillenbrand reported that the results had been “indeterminate”: “After the German-Soviet agreement the FRG thought that the linkage with Berlin would soften the Soviet position on the Berlin negotiations. The opposite was the result. The talks are not at an impasse necessarily. Why the Soviets are now holding a tough line is not clear. Some people think it is a general toughening of the line across the board.”

Hillenbrand observed that the United States was “in a good tactical position; we have given away nothing.” “If Gromyko shows any give in his talks with the Secretary of State this week and with the British later,” he added, “we may have an inkling of where to go.” Kenneth Rush, Ambassador to West Germany, was more pessimistic, especially on the subject of Soviet intentions. “[T]he Soviet effort is to drastically change the status of West Berlin,” he argued. “They are determined to destroy the viability of West Berlin and to destroy its links with the FRG and the West.” Rush also issued a warning: “We must avoid having the onus of a breakdown of negotiations or of Ostpolitik rub off on us—we must shift it to the Soviets.” The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 126.

8. Editorial Note

After the National Security Council meeting on October 14, 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers approached H.R. Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff, to complain about the secret meetings between Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. As Haldeman noted in his diary, Rogers was upset that “K[issinger] was meeting with Dobrynin about Cuba without telling him. He [Rogers] talked to Dobrynin and looked foolish because he didn’t know. Asked me to tell P[resident], because Rogers felt K was doing this under P’s orders and wants to know why.” (Diary entry, October 14; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) The Chief of Staff immediately raised the issue with the President. According to Haldeman’s handwritten notes, Nixon issued the following instructions:

“K shld talk to R—before he talks to Gromyko so he’ll know about summit. Doesn’t have to give all details but there has been some ref—
& it is left to be discussed when Gromyko meets P & that's how K
shld handle w R. K tell R this is how to handle—don't worry about
R setting it up w G—do say nothing shld be done—just refer it to mtg
w P. K must inform R before he sees G—can't assume it won't come
up—& R shld not be caught unawares.” (National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and
Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 42, H Notes, Oct. 1, 1970–Nov. 9,
1970, Part I)

According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Rogers from
11:32 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. on October 15. (Library of Congress, Manu-
script Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No
record of the meeting has been found.

Rogers was not the only Department of State official to raise the
issue of contacts with Dobrynin. On October 2, Ambassador to the So-
viet Union Jacob Beam in Moscow wrote a letter to Under Secretary of
State John Irwin in which he expressed concern about his access to the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“I note that Dobrynin has proposed periodic luncheons with you,
which is all to the good. I wish I could obtain the same commitment
in Moscow, but the situation is somewhat more difficult. I have been
here almost eighteen months but have not had the privilege of enter-
taining the Foreign Minister, despite two invitations. It is true that your
counterpart, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has been absent
in China for a long time, but he has also been a hard man to see so-
cially, although he will receive me in the Foreign Office officially on
stated business.

“As regards Dobrynin, he failed to make the customary call on me
during the long period he was in and around Moscow. I have always
observed this courtesy when I have been in Washington.”

Beam suggested that Irwin could improve matters by providing
guidance on issues of “major importance” arising from his informal
contacts with Dobrynin. “Reference need not be made to your talks
with Dobrynin,” Beam explained, “but the points you may wish to put
across with him in Washington could be usefully reiterated here by
way of emphasis, because it is by no means certain that Dobrynin fully
reports our side of the discussion.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central
Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)

In a memorandum to Irwin on October 13, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand included a draft reply
to Beam’s letter. Hillenbrand also provided the following background
information:

“Ambassador Beam’s difficulty in gaining informal access to So-
viet leaders is a long-standing problem which has disturbed his pre-
decessors as well. Raised to political power within the covert channels
of the Communist Party, Soviet leaders have traditionally been reluctant to associate with foreigners. Communication with present Politburo leaders has been especially difficult because their accession to power coincided with our increased involvement in Vietnam. In the interest of promoting better relations with other communist countries, they have been wary lest close association with U.S. representatives add fuel to Chinese charges of Soviet-American collusion.” (Ibid.)

In his reply to Beam on October 15, Irwin promised to “take an early opportunity to raise with Dobrynin the difficulties you have had in making contacts in Moscow and express to him concern over the double standard that seems to prevail.” The Under Secretary also approved the Ambassador’s suggestion for guidance in the future. “To minimize the possibility that Dobrynin might not report back to Moscow fully and accurately what he has been told here,” Irwin assured Beam, “we shall keep you informed and, when appropriate, suggest that you make parallel representations directly to the Soviets. I also agree that it would be wise to have you follow up in Moscow on any matters of substance which arise in our luncheon meetings.” (Ibid.)

9. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Soviet Private Note on Middle East Violations

I am sending you separately a memorandum summarizing and enclosing my four recent, significant conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin. In our fourth session, October 9, he gave me an oral note on the Middle East (attached at Tab A) which I particularly wanted to

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2 Document 6.

highlight for you. Dobrynin says this note is for you alone and they do not plan to refer to it elsewhere. In this note the Soviet leadership:

—complains about the “hostile” campaign we are supposedly inspiring against them concerning, in particular, their violations of the Middle East ceasefire and, more generally, the theme of a “credibility gap” with regard to the Soviet Union;

—maintains that our charges of violations are groundless because the Soviet Union was only “informed” of the ceasefire and was not a party to it;

—insists “that there have not been and there are not now rocket launchers manned by Soviet personnel in the Suez Canal zone”;

—claims we almost completely ignore Israeli violations and blames the affair on our support of Israel in its efforts “to deliberately complicate the question of ceasefire in order to torpedo the negotiations”;

—maintains that our proposals and subsequent statements did not organically link the Jarring talks to the ceasefire;

—points to the “uproar” created by your recent trip, our delivery of Phantoms to Israel, and our U-2 flights in violation of UAR “territory” as examples of our own steps of aggravation in addition to supporting Israel’s obstructionism;

—reaffirms that the USSR remains a supporter of a speedy political settlement, an opportunity for which is created by the Arab agreement to negotiate through Jarring and by the “actually existing state of ceasefire”;

—states Soviet readiness to continue bilateral and four power talks;

—asks where the US is going in the Middle East and wonders if we will support with deeds what we say to the Soviet government or if we are in effect out to deceive them.

Comment

I am struck by the almost plaintive defensive tone of this note—especially considered in the context of the resolution of the Cuban base issue and a previous conciliatory note on Jordan. The defensive nature is all the more evident when compared with the much harsher Soviet
Foreign Ministry note of October 6, three days before this note, and Brezhnev’s public blustering over Jordan in his speech of October 2.

My view is that the Soviets found themselves overextended, and have been engaged in a retreat to a more tenable position while covering their tracks with a tough public position.

They are, however, almost surely aiming to consolidate the gains they have already made through the ceasefire/standstill violations. Thus their phrase—"the actually existing ceasefire"—can be read to mean for us to forget the past and start fresh from a new status quo. It is this line that we can expect to meet with increasing frequency in coming days and weeks.

I believe that we were sloppy in our launching of the Middle East peace initiative, including our failures to button down understandings on the ceasefire/standstill, to clearly relate it to the Jarring talks, to be prepared to monitor it from the start, and to involve the Soviets more fully. We compounded these defects with our hesitant response to UAR and Soviet violations while we understandably made certain that Israeli charges were well founded before taking action.

None of this, of course, excuses the Soviet actions which have been flagrant and provocative violations of the spirit of the initiative, if not in every case the letter. They certainly calculated their moves carefully and they clearly looked for legal loopholes for these moves. What is crucial is not the legalistic gymnastics but the basic Soviet intentions.

As for their claim that no Soviet personnel are manning (a careful choice of words) the air defense missiles, our intelligence holds that the Egyptians are not yet capable of handling the more advanced SA–3 missiles.

Whatever may have been their original calculation, they have been stung by the widespread publicity of their duplicity. While they may be perfectly willing to cheat, they are chagrined when confronted with...
the fact in public. Clearly, we are in for a delicate period of both private and public diplomacy with the Soviets. 14

14 In his daily news summary on October 17, the President underlined the following sentence from a television report on the Middle East: “The Soviet seem less concerned with peace than with maximum support for the new Egyptian leaders.” Nixon wrote in the margin: “Seems likely.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Office Files, Box 32, Annotated News Summaries, October 1970) John R. Brown III forwarded this comment to Kissinger on October 17. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IX)

10. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 15, 1970, 6 p.m.

P: How do you like that [about the Russian plane being hijacked?] 2
K: Terrific.

P: I was told it was a Jewish couple. From Russia. Did you hear that?
K: I had seen a report a couple of weeks ago that the Soviet airliners were the most vulnerable. They take special precautions.

P: Killed the stewardess. What do you think the Russians are going to do?
K: In my opinion they will be tough. Because they do not want to set an example that this can be done to them.

P: Tough on the Turks. I . . .
K: Criminal charges probably [will be brought against them.]

P: That is fair enough. [omission in transcript] hijackings [omission in transcript]

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking. All brackets, other than those indicating omission of unrelated material or omissions in the transcript, are in the original.

2 On October 15, while en route between two cities on the Black Sea, a Lithuanian truck driver and his son hijacked an Aeroflot flight to Trebizond, Turkey, seriously wounding the pilot and co-pilot and killing a flight attendant in the process. The Turkish Government refused Soviet demands to extradite the hijackers.
K: Question of political [omission in transcript]
P: There is a lot of antisemitism in Russia now.
K: Russians are very tough. I do not think [they will let this go.]
P: This is one we will stay out of. I do not want the Turks to get into any trouble.
K: I am sure they will send the plane back. I am not sure they will send the people back.
P: It’s just like we have a hell of a time.
K: Plane and passengers will be returned. It is an amazing phenomenon.
P: It is good that it happened.
K: Shows that it is a universal problem.
P: Maybe we could have a line or two in the UN speech.
K: Put in the speech that you asked for this last year.
P: Did you get the other thoughts that I had.
K: Yes. We are working them in now. If things broke right in the Soviet Union we could . . .
P: Compete in other fields. People need a little hope. We have been tough on them and now we must give them a little hope.
[Omitted here is discussion of Chile.]

11. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 16, 1970, 1:15 p.m.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on an unidentified individual.]
K: That Soviet submarine tender went on a little maneuver and then stopped at a port on the northern shore of Cuba—the normal port of entry and return. We have no reason to suppose that they will not

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking. All brackets, other than those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. According to several typewritten notes, the transcript was “paraphrased” and the transcriber “entered the conversation late.”
return. Despite instructions not to say anything the Defense Department put it out that it has returned to a Cuban port.2

P: Who the hell over there is doing it? We ordered them not to say a damn thing.

K: Not a damn thing. They released it 1/2 hour after the incoming message had been received.

P: How did they put it out? Did it come from the Secretary’s office, or Navy’s?


P: Well be sure that Bill knows this before his briefing tonight. Call him and tell him we want him to know that we did not know anything about it. I am raising [holy] hell about it.

K: They released it after I had put out another directive reminding them not to say a word about it.

P: We must be sure that Bill just knows. I talked to him about announcing the meeting between Gromyko and myself.3 Told him that any mention of the Summit would be later. That we did not want anything to crack on it.

K: I think he is relaxed mood about this.

P: On this Summit thing. I would have no objection if Gromyko came at him about it but there would be a lot of people in the room, wouldn’t there? [Would be better not to have anything said about it.]

K: As long as Bill knows what we know about it then there shouldn’t be any problem.

P: This question of who goes first. They would go . . . I would go. I don’t know. If it could come up in a way . . .

K: I am seeing Dobrynin tomorrow and I will get it straightened out.

P: Tell him this is no protocol problem or anything here. We both know what we want. Perhaps he could note interest and the communications in discussions. They note what we want. Then he will come in and say why not here and I will come in and say that is fine.

K: OK Mr. President.

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2 Daniel Henkin, the Department of Defense spokesman, announced on October 16 that the Soviet submarine tender had arrived the previous day in the Cuban port of Mariel. “Whether they’re there for crew rest or refueling or any other purpose,” Henkin added, “I do not know.” (“Two Soviet Vessels at a 2nd Cuban Port,” New York Times, October 17, 1970, p. 2) Haldeman wrote in his diary on October 16 that Kissinger was “distracted because Defense had announced the Soviet sub tender was back in a Cuban port.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

3 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon called Rogers in New York at 10:41 a.m. on October 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the conversation has been found.
October 16, 1970, 6:30 p.m.

(Secretary Rogers talked to General Haig for a few minutes, in Dr. Kissinger’s absence.)

R: I have been tied up all day and haven’t heard any news. I heard a report that the Pentagon made further comments about the Cuba base.2

Haig: What happened is the Navy reported that the tender and the tug had pulled into the Mariel base up north, that all Soviet ships come into. They just announced that quietly today which infuriated . . .

(Dr. Kissinger entered conversation at this point.)

K: I was going to call you to let you know this Defense announcement on Cuba was totally unauthorized. The President went through the ceiling.3 It was really outrageous. This is the port where they always stop and refuel. This now puts them into the position where they seem to have backed down.

R: It is going to be tough for me to handle tonight with Gromyko.

K: They didn’t even give us the intelligence. We learned of it 3 minutes before they put it on the news. I had Al call up and say nothing would be said. They called and said it was already done.

R: What did they actually say?

K: Submarine that left Cienfuegos Harbor has reappeared and now is in another harbor. Gave name of it. Made it sound like not much of a menace. Asked, does that mean they are establishing a submarine base? Answered, we are watching the situation.

R: The Russians are going to wonder whether we are shaking them particularly on the meeting, or my meeting with Gromyko.

K: You are going to announce whenever you think proper the meeting with the President—right?

R: The President suggested I do it Monday,4 and I think it much better Monday.
K: That was the President’s view to make it look as if it came out of your meeting with Gromyko.
R: Gromyko knows about it, does he?
K: Yes. But I didn’t tell him [Dobrynin] the details.
R: Why not tell him we think it is tentative at present but I will have final announcement Monday.
K: I think he may think it goes this week, but you may tell him the details on Monday. And we will announce it Monday. The meeting will be Thursday at 11, the President and you on our side and Gromyko and Dobrynin on theirs.
R: Why not play it that way because I think it much better to do it on Monday.

13. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

October 16, 1970, late p.m.

S: Sorry to call so late, but we just finished up.²
K: That’s okay; I appreciate your calling.
S: Not at all. First, Henry, what was discussed was topics that are familiar—the Middle East, Indo-China, SALT, Berlin and the Seabeds was just touched upon very, very briefly.
K: Right.
S: On the Middle East, Gromyko dwelled primarily on the non-responsibility theme—that they weren’t responsible; they didn’t agree to any of all this.
K: That is, they never agreed to the ceasefire, so it isn’t their fault.
S: So none of it is their fault. I think you can summarize . . . All we got into . . . It got into the question of we made clear the notion of going into the General Assembly is no damn good. The Secretary said

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. Kissinger was in Washington; Sisco was in New York.
² Reference is to the meeting between Rogers and Gromyko in New York. See also Document 16.
that rectification was required, and each stuck to his own line, in other words. Nobody changed anybody's mind at this point, although we agreed that in the next meeting on Monday, we would pursue the discussion further.

On Berlin, the Secretary made clear that this last proposal of theirs at this last meeting we didn't like the position they took, and again the talk was quite inconclusive, largely the Secretary reiterating the position in terms of how we see it. They, in turn, did the same. But nothing very concrete—no movement one way or the other.

On SALT, just a very, very minimal reference—merely looking towards the beginning of the renewal of the talks and a mutual expression that they would make progress.

On Vietnam, the Secretary started out by saying we had had good worldwide reaction to our proposals; very good unity at home; and took note of the rejection thus far.3 He didn't ask the Russians to do anything specific, but the conversation turned—Gromyko turned the conversation into pressing the Secretary on whether we agreed to a coalition government or not. That if we agreed to a coalition government, why maybe the Russians would be willing to be helpful, in effect. The Secretary handled that, I thought, very well. He said, “Who knows what is meant by a coalition government? What do you mean by a coalition government? The other side, in effect, defines a coalition government to mean ‘kick out the present crowd in South Vietnam’,,” and he concluded by saying that the President had made it clear that whatever propositions that the two parties really agreed to—you know, if they get together, why we could accept whatever they got together on.

So the whole summary of the evening is that there were no changes on either side.

K: What was the general mood?

S: The mood, I would say, not unfriendly; businesslike; frank, straightforward. Every now and then, Gromyko showed some sensitivity over the fact that we had accused them of cheating; said it had caused difficulties in their government. The Secretary responded that this had caused difficulties in our government—their cheating. We don't understand it. On Vietnam, he pressed the Secretary, I thought, very hard on the usual Communist strategy. He said, “Do you include a coalition government?” The Secretary said, “We have said we don’t like the word coalition government; we don’t know what it means; the other side’s defined it in this way; but what we have said is we will go along with any proposal the two really can get along with.” “Then

you do bar a coalition government”—you know that kind of Communist strategy of boring in. [End of tape]

[Beginning of new tape]

S: . . . after the meeting.

K: Did you discuss that with them?

S: You mean on the announcement?

K: Yeah.

S: Not in my presence that I recall but, in any event, what . . .

K: Were they alone part of the time?

S: They got off to a corner part of the time, but, Henry, the President’s plans are precisely what—I mean the Secretary’s plans are precisely those that were indicated by you and the President; namely, that the Secretary would announce that after Monday night’s meeting and not before.

K: Right, as long as the other . . .

S: There’s no misunderstanding on this.

K: No, no; I know you understand it. But do you think the Russians understand it?

S: I’m sure that if they don’t understand it at the moment, they will because the Secretary’s very clear about it.

K: Well, they wouldn’t announce it anyway.

S: No, they wouldn’t. That’ll work out all right.

K: Okay. Now, how about your doing a little personal memo for me after the second meeting, laying out what you think the President should say, at least in your area.

S: Well, I think we ought to do, if it’s agreeable, I think . . . and also I’ll get together with Martin. Frankly, we need to give you . . . What I’ll do . . . I will cough up and see that the Department as such sends forward a series of talking points on all the key subjects: Vietnam, the Middle East, and on Berlin, and on SALT—just those four.

K: And as much of a summary of what actually was said . . .

S: Although we’ll send you a cable on this and we’ll send you a cable on the Monday night meeting. That’ll be plenty of time to digest the two cables before Friday night’s meeting.

K: Terrific.

S: All right, Henry.

K: Good, many thanks, Joe. You’ve been a good friend.

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4 October 19.

5 Hillenbrand.

6 October 23.
1. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 17, 1970, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

The meeting came about because Dobrynin called me from New York to say that Gromyko wanted to discuss with me the arrangements for the meeting between the President and Gromyko. This had been based on a suggestion by me that, when the President met the most senior Soviet leader he had up to now encountered, there should be no surprises and both sides should know what to expect.

After Dobrynin made some jokes about my attendance at a football game in the afternoon, I asked him how the meeting between Secretary Rogers and Gromyko had gone the day before. Dobrynin told me the main topics of conversation which paralleled what Sisco had already told me.

He said on the Middle East there wasn’t much new. Both sides restated their familiar positions and it was at a deadlock.
On Berlin, he had the impression that the Secretary didn’t really understand the subject very well. Gromyko had stated the Soviet position which was that they did not object to economic ties but did object to political ties to West Germany. He said Rogers had let the matter simply pass and there had then been a desultory exchange between Rush and Abrasimov.

There had been very little on the European Security Conference.

On Vietnam, Gromyko had probed to find out whether we had any interest in a coalition but he had found out from the Secretary that there was no real progress to be made in that direction. Dobrynin said the reason for this probe was not because the Soviet Union wanted to interject itself into the negotiations but because they would undoubtedly be asked by the North Vietnamese what our position was and they wanted to make absolutely sure. They had been told by the North Vietnamese that the only thing that they were interested in was a coalition government.

I said we shouldn’t play games with each other. They weren’t asking for a coalition government; they were asking for a thinly-veiled takeover. They wanted to determine the membership of the PRG contingent in a coalition government and have a veto over the two components—from the Saigon administration and from the other element. They would accomplish this by saying that they had to stand for freedom, peace, independence, and neutrality. But only they knew what peace, independence, and neutrality meant. They also gave themselves another out by saying “genuinely” standing for peace, independence and neutrality. Dobrynin said I might not believe this but the Soviet Union genuinely had no interest in exacerbating the relationship but they also knew that they had no real influence with the North Vietnamese. Therefore, they were functioning primarily as a communication contact. I said I felt they had some influence but I wasn’t going to press the subject.

We then turned to the meeting between the President and the Foreign Minister. I asked Dobrynin with what mood Gromyko was going to come to the meeting. Was it going to be a list of recriminations or were we going to be in a constructive mood? Dobrynin said that Gromyko’s basic thrust was going to be to try to find out where we might go from here rather than looking into the past. I said this was our attitude, too, and I wanted them to know that our speech at the United Nations would be very conciliatory. Dobrynin said theirs probably would not be since the decisions had been made three weeks ago and since the Soviet Union felt it had to reply to the charges that had been made against it. I said they were the best judges of their own speeches but it would not create the best possible framework. Dobrynin said he would transmit this to Gromyko.
Dobrynin then launched into a long explanation, repeating the argument he had previously made, that the Soviet Union had not been a party to the ceasefire and therefore could not be charged with violating an agreement. I said that this was a good legalistic argument but meaningless practically. Dobrynin knew very well that we had assumed that the Soviet Union would honor the ceasefire. If Dobrynin had come to the Secretary at the end of July and had said that there would be a Soviet attitude such as developed, we would certainly not have pursued the course we did. I didn’t care what the Soviet Union said for the record, but when he talked to me, he couldn’t use such legalistic arguments. They were bound to undermine our confidence. I said if one added to it the situation in Cuba one had to understand our mistrust. Dobrynin said we might not believe it but this whole issue was not on the front burner in Moscow. Moscow was absolutely shocked when it was accused of bad faith. At first their leaders didn’t believe that we were serious but now they have cranked up a retaliatory campaign which will gain momentum in the next few weeks. I said this would not augur well for US-Soviet relationships.

We then discussed the Gromyko visit with the President. Dobrynin said that in the past Gromyko had opened the conversation by asking the President how he wished to proceed and the President had then indicated the topics that were to be covered. I said this would be agreeable with us, that Gromyko would probably cover the major themes in this oral note that had been handed to us, specifically inquiring whether we had made a determination to move into a hard line with the Soviet Union. I told him that while I could not answer for the President I could say that our reply would almost certainly be that we had not made the decision but that Soviet actions were giving us some pause. If we were not to move into a direction that would lead to increasing difficulties, this was the moment to reverse course. But this required a specific work program and precise ideas. Dobrynin then said the other topics which would be discussed were the Middle East, SALT, Europe and if we wished, Southeast Asia. Gromyko would not raise it with us.

On the Middle East Dobrynin said Gromyko would raise the three points that he had mentioned to Rogers. That is to say he would recommend a resumption of the Jarring talks, a continuation of the ceasefire and restarting the four-power talks. Dobrynin said he wanted it clearly understood that he was not confining the Soviet position to three points, that four or five would be acceptable, also. That above all, the Soviet Union was eager to get the political talks started again. I asked what four
or five points they might have in mind. Dobrynin said this was just a figure of speech to enable us to put forward other propositions.

Dobrynin said that on Berlin the Soviet Union would maintain the position that it favored economic but not political ties between West Germany and West Berlin. I said this came very close to the old free city idea. Dobrynin said this had always been their position.

On SALT Dobrynin said that not much needed to be said since the negotiators were reassembling.

On Vietnam it was up to us to make a proposition.

After we had counseled the catalogue I asked Dobrynin how he proposed to handle the Summit. Dobrynin said that Gromyko was willing to mention that the Soviet leaders looked at a Summit positively and that they were suggesting Moscow as a site. I answered that we would then accept in principle depending on what had happened previously in the talk. Dobrynin said then the only thing left to do was to set an agenda, etc. I said it was important to handle the agenda in the following way. He and I would work out the general principles and the details would then be shifted into the Department, but the basic principles and subjects would be handled in this channel with me. Dobrynin said it might be useful for the President to repeat this to Gromyko privately. I said that I would raise with the President the possibility of seeing Gromyko for a few minutes after the meeting ended. This could be done by suggesting to him that he would show him the little office he had adjoining the main office.

Dobrynin asked whether the President would give an answer to the Mideast proposals of Gromyko. I said it was unlikely that the President would want to get into the details of the negotiation which would be handled by the Secretary of State but he might indicate a general procedure which we might follow. I told Dobrynin that I thought it very fortunate if there were an attempt to simply debate seeking to push Israel into negotiations at this particular moment. He said that the Soviet Union felt the same way but the Arabs were adamant and they didn’t know whether they would be able to restrain them. I said that in that case I just wanted him to know that this would make it very difficult for us since we would have to back the Israeli view on the standstill violations and that it would simply degenerate into a name calling session.

Dobrynin said that he wanted us to understand that the Soviet system worked differently from the American system. Decisions were made over a longer period of time because the process was more complicated and adhered to more rigidly and for a longer period. He said that he had been very much impressed by the existence of an office such as mine in which all the major activities were pulled together and he had been urging Moscow to install the same thing in the Kremlin.
However, it wasn’t clear under which leader to put it or what way to operate it, and no major steps had been taken in that direction.

The meeting then broke up.

15. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 18, 1970.

K: Bill, how are you?
R: Hi Henry, fine thank you. Met your brother last night . . .
K: Yes, he told me. He was very pleased.
R: I just want to check because I am going back to NY tonight about the plans for Thursday. Dobrynin said he talked to you last night about the planning but he didn’t have a chance . . .
K: Right, I was going to call you today. The only thing he called about was the length of time and I told him it was between an hour and an hour and a half on the President’s schedule. And then who was going to come. And I told him that you were going to make—the announcement was going to be made by you and that all the details, if there were any, other than the ones that he already knew but as I understand it, he is going to cover . . . he said that they may raise again what they had raised with you on the Middle East. And I said fine . . . you know I said that’s what I expected. I would suggest, Bill, that the thing to do is for you or Sisco to get the President a paper on what you think the President should respond. That’s the only thing.
R: Did he say anything more about the possible Summit?
K: Yes, he said that Gromyko might respond when they talk about general policy. He said what Gromyko would want to do probably . . . he said what they have done in the past is have a general discussion and then all the specific items that had already been discussed with

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original.
2 Walter Kissinger.
3 October 22, the date of the upcoming meeting between Nixon and Gromyko at the White House.
the Secretary. Had always in the past followed as this time the Secretary’s meetings. He said it is conceivable that Gromyko at the end of that might indicate their willingness to have it and . . .

R: Would he put it in terms of willingness to have it or sort of liking to have it?

K: I think—My impression—I didn’t want to seem, as if we were eager to get it.

R: He raised the subject.

K: He will raise the subject. And my impression is—Oh yes, there is one other thing the President may want to do, is that he may want to talk for 5 minutes alone at the end of the meeting with Gromyko. But this I haven’t told Dobrynin yet. This is just something the President mentioned to me yesterday.

R: What’s it about, do you know?

K: Well, I think what it will be about if he does it is that if the Summit meeting comes—suggestion—comes in a forthcoming way he may want to raise with him whether there should be an announcement or not. And he may want to do it in a way so that if there is a turn down there won’t be too many interpreters around. It also would be an opportunity and that we want to talk to you about, if those ships haven’t left Cuba yet for him to say something about that.

R: In other words we are not sure whether they are going to leave or not yet? They are still there.

K: I don’t think we get another readout before Tuesday. If they—they would normally stop there on their way out.

R: Ya, I know. The only difficulty with it I see with a private meeting is that it will—if it is known and it probably will be known—is that it will raise a lot of questions as to what it was about.

K: We don’t have to do it. It hasn’t been mentioned to them yet.

R: Well, why don’t we just leave it open. If the President—I think as a matter of fact what he could do rather than having a private meeting would be to take him over to the side of the room and we could have coffee or something. In other words have a few minutes with him by himself, on that subject.

K: He could take him into his little private office for a few minutes.

R: Something like that or pretend he wants to show him something and then talk to him on the side. I have the feeling that the idea of a private meeting would be misconstrued. It will be known obviously.

K: I think that is a good idea. And this is not anything that they are now expecting so there is no problem about it. We can play that

4 October 20.
entirely by ear. But that’s the only—Dobrynin told me that in the past what had happened was that Gromyko would turn to the President and say how—what is your preference and then that the President will say we will discuss general topics first, and so forth. And that then Gromyko is prepared to open and . . .

R: That’s what he did with me the other night too. What should be talked about. What order? And I said that I would think these things but what are your views and he said that that coincides with my views except maybe we ought to talk about this. What about a European security conference? I said fine. We sort of agreed on how we would approach it. And you probably do the same thing. Did he say anything about what we would say after the meeting?

K: No. No and that’s something you might discuss with him tomorrow night.

R: The way I have been playing it at New York. What I have tried to do is start out—the New York Times headline was written before the meeting.5 I think—but I think that generally the tone that I wanted to create was sort of cool and a little bit stiff and then a little bit better, Monday. You know a little improvement. And when the President meets with him you know back to reasonably friendly relations and . . .

K: I think that is exactly right.

R: In other words, have some improvement. If we had pretended or tried to make it appear that there was a lot of progress made the first meeting at first—phoney and it would be the wrong way to do it.

K: And also you know they have done a number of things this summer that were pretty rough.

R: Interestingly enough, I don’t know whether the telegram6 shows this or not because I had a private meeting with him—about an hour. But on the—he got a little tough and I responded in kind and then he calmed down and I calmed down and he talked about the air corridor.7

K: That didn’t come across.

R: He said now what did we do, what did we do? And I said you know damn well what you did. You said that the corridors were

5 On October 17, the New York Times published a front-page article by Hedrick Smith entitled “Gromyko Rebuffs Rogers on the Mideast and Berlin.”

6 The discussion between Rogers and Gromyko on Berlin was reported in telegram 172337 to Bonn, October 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B.

7 On September 30, Soviet authorities in East Germany closed the airspace over the town of Rathenow to civilian traffic for two hours—effectively closing two of the three air corridors to West Berlin. The Western Allies responded not only by delivering a protest note to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin but also by probing the affected area with military aircraft.
going to be closed and you don’t have any right to close the corridors and we are not about to let you. Then he again sort of said what do we do and I said I just told you what you did. And he said well we didn’t intend it that way. I said put yourself in our position. How would you have construed it? I said we were about to have four-power talks. You have done this in the past and then he said I can tell you that we didn’t intend it that way. And I said are you saying that it was a subordinate’s decision, that it was accidental? And he said that is what I am telling you. And he said will you take my word for it? I said that if you say it in that way I’ll take your word for it. I said if you tell me that it was an accident and it was not intended, that’s all right with me, but you can well understand why we thought it had some significance because normally you don’t do things that carelessly.

K: Of course.

R: I said but I will take your word for it. Let’s go on to something else—so that’s the way that that damn thing ended. And I think that’s probably a pretty good way to put it.

K: I think that’s right. It gives them a face saving way out of it. What do you think we should do about . . . what do you think the President could say about the Middle East? I don’t think he ought to get into the details.

R: I don’t either. I’ll talk to you about that later. After the meeting Monday night.8 What they argue is that they were not a party to the agreement. And my answer to that was come on, you know, if you are talking about an agreement that the way you would make it with some shoe merchant and we didn’t have everything crossed and dotted. You knew damn well what the agreement was. The agreement was that we would have a standstill and that both sides agreed that neither would improve its military position.

K: They know that if Dobrynin had come in to you at the end of July and said now I hope you understand we are not bound by that agreement that we would have acted differently.

R: I said you go ahead and take that position, that you weren’t party to it. I don’t care. We know you were. We dealt with you. We obviously communicated directly with Egyptians too for obvious reasons but hell, you have 10,000 and more people in that zone. We know it and you can take that position if you want to. It doesn’t change our position.

K: Exactly.

R: I said I don’t see any reason to argue about it in public. If you want to argue about it in public, we’ll argue about it in public but what good does it do us?

8 The meeting between Rogers and Gromyko in New York on October 19.
K: I don’t think the President should go beyond whatever you say on Monday night.

R: No, I had pretty harsh words with him and then he changed his tune and the dinner was quite friendly. And he was quite friendly afterwards. I don’t think the President should get in that at all.

K: As I told you Dobrynin said they were going to raise the three points that he raised with you. From the cable I didn’t know what they were. I assume they were the Jarring talks, the ceasefire and four-power talks. But I don’t think the President should go beyond whatever you have said. Do you?

R: No, I don’t. And I don’t think it would be helpful for the President to get involved in the controversy. But I will have a better idea after tomorrow night. On the Cuban thing. I think that is all right. I don’t think we should say anything more about that at the moment.

K: I think we shouldn’t be so nervous that every time a ship shows up we call them on it. If it doesn’t leave in a week or so I think we can see . . .

R: What I said to him was this. I want you to know that our government was pleased that you responded about the Cuban situation, that you gave us your assurance privately and publicly that the ’62 agreement was still in effect and that you would not violate it. We would as you know consider any activity in connection with a submarine base in Cuba as a very serious matter and we are pleased that you told us that that was not your intention. And he just didn’t respond.

K: Right.

R: I just let it go at that. I didn’t say anything more about it.

K: Well, we have put them on enough notice now without it.

R: I think that the two serious problems, of course the Middle East and the four-power talks, in some ways the four-power talks is tougher than the Middle East. They want to get out of that Middle East situation. They don’t want to have the ceasefire violated. And we are trying to figure out some device and we’ll talk about that a little tomorrow night. But they don’t want it any more than we do.

K: One thing that struck me. We had a review group meeting9 just in general about that which you probably heard about from your people. That I thought about afterwards that it mightn’t be a good idea to have a de facto ceasefire for a month or so before starting the talks.

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9 The Senior Review Group met at 3:30 p.m. on October 15 to discuss the situation in the Middle East. A record of the meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.
again because then one would have decoupled the standstill and ceasefire problem and made it harder to reraise it again.

R: I think that's right. The difficulty is the Arabs may feel that they cannot accept a de facto ceasefire. That's really. Of course if we could do that that would be ideal. What we are trying to figure out is some device of having a de facto ceasefire but not admitting it.

K: Well maybe the simplest thing would be just a very mild resolution—just reaffirming the '67 one and calling for a ceasefire might do it. Well, that's up to you, the details.

R: But in any event—I don't know if you have seen the intelligence on it—we got the jump on them and they are really on the defensive because they—everybody in the world thinks that they cheated. And they don't know how to get out of that box.

K: Right. And they are very conscious of it.

R: Really, very defensive. That was the only part of the conversation where he was unhappiest and quite defensive and quite belligerent. And I just said what are you talking about? Your Ambassador told me that the standstill would stay in effect and that was part of the agreement and we wouldn't have entered into it if you hadn't given us that assurance. I don't care what you tell me, your reports show. I don't care. I was there and Mr. Sisco was there and Dobrynin told us this. Dobrynin wasn't there, I didn't want to embarrass him.

K: As soon as I learn something Bill I will inform you. You know if the President should decide to keep him for 5 minutes afterwards. But I . . .

R: I think he can do the same thing without having a private meeting. He can take him into the other room and . . .

K: I will strongly urge him that he should say why don't you look at my little office where I use to . . .

R: Not appear that he is having a separate meeting but just take him aside and talk to him and keep us in there and we will all come out together so it doesn't appear that there was a . . .

K: I think that is absolutely right.

R: . . . special meeting.

K: And you might raise with Gromyko what should be said afterwards. We haven't—that hasn't been discussed at all.

R: On what I say. I think I will say that Gromyko asked for the meeting sometime back and that the President considered it and had

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a heavy schedule because of Heads of State and other things but that he did work it out so we would have the meeting on Thursday morning. And I will suggest without saying so that it indicates that our relations really are not cool. I don’t want it to appear that it’s—we’ve been having unsuccessful meetings and this is an attempt to make them successful so I will make it clear that the request for the meeting was made sometime back.

K: Right. We also shouldn’t give the feeling that it is all—that we have kissed and made up. I . . .

R: Oh no. And also, did Gromyko ask for a meeting last year that we didn’t arrange?

K: Well, no. What he did last year was he wanted the President to ask for one and the President refused. It never really got to the point—they—he said if Gromyko asked for a meeting he would give it, but Gromyko never asked for one but it’s also clear he would have come if we had said please ask for a meeting.

R: Well I can say on that that last year it wasn’t possible to arrange a meeting and there was some preliminary discussion at a lower level about a meeting but it didn’t work out. And that therefore they thought it advisable . . . And there was no doubt about it that Gromyko asked for the meeting this year was there?

K: Exactly. No doubt about it.

R: OK.11

K: When are you coming back to Washington? On Thursday morning?

R: I’ll probably come back Wednesday night or Thursday morning. Probably Wednesday night.

K: Right. I’ll be on the West Coast on Tuesday. I’m giving a talk for some of the President’s friends out there.

R: Jack Mulcahy?12

K: Oh Jesus no, but almost. Taft Schreiber.13 They pretend that it isn’t fundraising but I am not . . . but I have no illusions what they are

11 After his meeting with Gromyko on October 19, Rogers announced that the President and Soviet Foreign Minister would meet three days later at the White House. According to Rogers, Gromyko had requested the meeting. (Chalmers Roberts, “Nixon To See Gromyko at White House,” Washington Post, October 20, 1970, p. 1) On October 20, the Soviet Mission in New York denied that Gromyko had taken the initiative, claiming instead that Nixon had clearly wanted to extend the invitation. (“Russians Dispute Genesis of Meeting,” Washington Post, October 22, 1970, p. A27)

12 John A. Mulcahy, a businessman, was a personal friend and financial supporter of President Nixon.

13 Taft Schreiber, an executive at Music Corporation of America in Los Angeles.
It’s to brief them. I told them there could be no fundrais-
ing while I was there but I am sure that’s what they have in the back
of their minds.

R: I don’t envy you. Those are miserable.

K: They are. Finch\(^1\) and the President arranged it and I told them
I wouldn’t do it again.

R: My talks with the Arabs have been very interesting and I think
quite successful. God, they are nice people and they are so helpless.

K: Ya. Do you think that Riad\(^2\) is doing a lot of this for public
consumption?

R: Oh, sure. Either that or he is made to do it by the Russians. I
do not think he is a free agent at all. In fact, in discussing it with him
he said [tape ends]

[begin new tape] Secretary Rogers talking.

R: You uncomfortable. You know what the facts are. You know you
cheated. We saw it happening. Their defense was that they shouldn’t
have made the agreement in the first place. He wasn’t there, if he had
been he wouldn’t have made the agreement. Secondly, they didn’t vi-
olate the agreement at all. And third, if they did violate the agreement
they were entitled to because it was unfair to begin with. And fourth,
even if they shouldn’t have made the agreement and even if it was un-
fair they were very minor violations.

K: Some agreement; that each side claims it ruined its position,

isn’t it?

R: Ya. OK Henry.

K: Right Bill, all the best, bye.

\(^1\) Robert H. Finch, formerly Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, was Coun-

selor to the President.

\(^2\) Mahmoud Riad, Egyptian Foreign Minister.
16. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 18, 1970.

SUBJECT
Secretary of State’s Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

I discussed with Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Sisco the contents of Secretary Rogers’ discussion with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, on Friday, October 16. Essentially the discussion revolved around the Middle East, Indochina, SALT, Berlin, and Seabeds was touched upon very briefly.

**Middle East**

—Gromyko dwelt primarily on the lack of Soviet responsibility for alleged violations of the ceasefire, insisting that the Soviet Union was not responsible, in that they had never agreed to the ceasefire.

—Secretary Rogers held firm to the thesis that the Soviet Union had in fact been completely aware of the provisions of the ceasefire and were thus responsible along with the UAR for the violations which occurred. The Secretary insisted that some rectifications of the ceasefire violations were essential, but the Secretary reports that no one changed their minds on this point, although it was agreed that the issue would be pursued further during discussions to be held on Monday, October 19.

—Gromyko proposed that the U.S. overlook past difficulties and proceed on the following basis: Extension of the ceasefire for a limited period; resumption of talks under Jarring’s auspices; resumption of U.S.–USSR bilateral and continuation of Four Power talks.

—Both Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko appeared to be in agreement that public debate at the United Nations Plenary Session on the Middle East issue would probably be counterproductive.

**Berlin**

—The discussion on Berlin was largely inconclusive, with Secretary Rogers taking exception to the hard line adopted by the Soviets on this issue.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. According to an attached copy, Kissinger and Haig drafted the memorandum. A note on the memorandum indicates that “The President has seen.”

2 See Documents 13 and 15.
SALT

—Although the discussion was minimal, both sides commented favorably on the renewal of the talks and expressed hope that progress would be achieved.3

Vietnam

—Secretary Rogers pointed out that worldwide reaction to your peace proposals had been unanimously favorable; that U.S. domestic opinion was united and favorable, and he expressed disappointment at the rejection of your proposals by the other side.

—Foreign Minister Gromyko responded by pressing the Secretary on the issue of whether or not the U.S. would agree to a coalition government in South Vietnam, suggesting that if the U.S. were to agree to a coalition then the Russians would be more helpful.

—Secretary Rogers rejected Hanoi’s interpretation of a coalition government as a requirement that Hanoi oust the present leaders of South Vietnam and, in effect, define the composition of the government. At the same time he reiterated your position that we would abide by an agreed settlement arrived at by both sides, whatever its outcome.

The discussions were described as not unfriendly, and were businesslike, frank and straightforward. However, Gromyko showed some sensitivity over the fact that we had accused them of cheating on the Middle East ceasefire.

Secretary Rogers plans to announce your meeting with Gromyko from New York, on Monday night.

3 Rogers and Gromyko also discussed SALT during their meeting on October 19. In a memorandum for the file on October 21, Gerard Smith reported the following exchange: “The Secretary said that we were serious about SALT, that we had tabled a specific proposal, that there was no linkage between SALT and other political issues. Gromyko said they, too, were serious about SALT. He said if SALT was not linked to other political problems, that meant that other political problems were not linked to it (which seemed a rather obvious statement). The Secretary confirmed this.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR) Printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 108.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, October 22, 1970

Gromyko will be the highest-ranking Soviet official with whom you will have met since assuming office, although you saw his deputy, Kuznetsov, at the Eisenhower funeral last year, a man who is actually Gromyko’s senior in Party terms. You failed to see Gromyko when he was here for the UN last year, because the Soviets, while probing for an appointment, failed technically to ask for it. They later claimed to have been snubbed.

This memorandum discusses

— the setting of your meeting, which is perhaps the most important US-Soviet encounter since you entered office;
— Gromyko’s probable purposes and line; and
— your purposes and general exposition.

Tabs with more detailed status reports and talking points on the subjects that are most likely to come up are attached in the order in which they would probably arise. There is also a sketch of Gromyko’s career and personality.

The Setting

The meeting occurs at a moment of unusual uncertainty in both capitals concerning the intentions and purposes of the other side.

On our side we have been asking ourselves whether there is in process some turn to the hard side in Moscow’s relations with us, based on Soviet performances in the Middle East, their military foray into the (to us) sensitive area of Cuba, their probe of our resolve in the Berlin air lanes, their continuing strategic military build-up, the generally hos-
tile tone of their propaganda, their apparent effort to divide us from the Europeans, their continued failure to play a constructive role in Vietnam, etc.

Contrasting this, we have continued to see an interest on their part in certain aspects of SALT, including a rather striking if obscure overture for a deal involving joint actions against “provocative” third countries; continued willingness to move ahead on a treaty dealing with the seabed, and on at least certain limited forms of cooperation in the areas of science and space. Whatever their precise motives, there is no doubt that the Soviets are interested in a summit meeting.

As usual our analysis of Soviet policy and its purposes has been complicated by ambiguity or lack of good evidence concerning the attitudes of Soviet leaders, the jockeying that must be going on among them in this pre-Party Congress period and, generally, the distribution of power and influence within the Soviet oligarchy.

Recent events may be part of a deliberate pattern of testing our resolve—and your personal mettle—and of determining to what degree the Nixon Doctrine, our domestic problems, and the emergence of strategic parity may be affecting our foreign policies.

In part at least, the Soviets may have thought from our handling of the Middle East cease-fire and from our failure to react to increased military activity on their part in and around Cuba that they had acquired some increased freedom of maneuver.

By the same token, however, many recent Soviet actions may have their principal explanation and motivation in the particular situation involved and their more or less simultaneous timing may be fortuitous. (Of course, even if the latter hypothesis were the more valid, Soviet conduct could quickly develop into a pattern if it were sensed in Moscow that US resolve and power were in process of retracting and for this reason our actions regarding Cambodia, Jordan, Cuba and Berlin, as well as your trip may have a sobering effect.) In any event, we must examine our future policies toward the USSR in the coming period with more than routine attention.

In Moscow, at the same time, there appears to be uncertainty concerning our policies and our evolution. It is of interest that apart from Gromyko, there are currently in the US two other high-ranking Soviet officials: one, Zimyanin, the chief editor of Pravda, outranks Gromyko in the leadership (where Gromyko still remains essentially a technician.

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on the fringes of power); the other, Zamyatin, a former diplomat and subordinate of Gromyko’s, is now the head of TASS, which, apart from being something like a Western news agency, is also the most far-flung Soviet intelligence gathering machine and the regime’s transmission belt for information, guidance and indoctrination to the Soviet population and Communists abroad. Each of these three officials (and they were preceded in the last several months by a score of well-connected scientists, scholars and America experts), is undoubtedly part of a major Soviet reconnaissance, the results of which could have considerable bearing on the important pending Soviet decisions for the Party Congress, especially those relating to the next five-year plan. In short, this may be a moment of fundamental decision-making in Moscow, too.

For the Soviets, the question of what our policies in major areas like the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe and in the military competition are likely to be, are crucial questions because, given the Chinese challenge and its costs, the obvious problems of the maturing but lagging Soviet economy and the continuing instability in Eastern Europe requiring periodic use of actual Soviet power and maintenance of potential power must all somehow be brought into rational framework in the next five-year plan. In addition to the normal jostling for position among Soviet leaders (possibly more serious right now since all the top men are in their late sixties and must sooner or later give way to younger men), the substantive issues involved are bound to involve differences of opinion and assessment and may, indeed, be highly controversial.

Experience has shown that on the whole we do best
— if we consult our own interests and not attempt to influence the domestic trends in the Kremlin;
— that we recognize that for outsiders Kremlin infighting is a highly opaque matter which we can do little, at least by deliberate action, to influence anyway (even if the outcome is undoubtedly a matter of great concern to us); and
— that we will serve our interests most successfully by getting our purposes and policies across to the Soviets as clearly as possible.

Gromyko’s Purposes and Line

Gromyko will have a dual purpose when he sees you:
— to gauge you personally and your attitudes; and
— to attempt to influence US policies in ways desired by his masters in Moscow.

His reports (and those which may be separately sent back to Moscow by the other Soviets present), as well as the reports of the other high-level Soviets currently here will be read by all members of the Politburo and hence by all factions, if factions there be, in the Krem-
lin. They could thus be of great importance at this particular point in Moscow’s decision-making and political maneuvering.

I understand from Dobrynin that Gromyko’s general attitude will be to put the past behind us and to see where we go from here. He will stress that to the Soviet leaders the events of the summer look like a deliberate turning towards a tougher line by us. He will inquire whether this is a settled policy and indicate a willingness to improve relations while at the same time being prepared to stick out a hard line.

It will almost certainly be part of Gromyko’s tactic to put you on the defensive by reciting an indictment of your policies. He will do this (1) to get a debating advantage, (2) to test your reaction, (3) to draw from you denials or modifications in our policies, and (4) to influence your decisions after his departure.

But while using this tactic, incidentally almost certainly in a fairly conciliatory manner, he may also try to test your interest in certain agreements and deals. This effort is partly related to Moscow’s own interest, right now, in attempting to decide on whether certain beneficial arrangements can be made with the US and partly to its effort to determine whether you are looking for agreements as a means of cutting back on overseas involvements.

His major points are likely to be the following:

— the Soviets were favorably impressed by your initial statements about entering an era of negotiation and by several aspects of your letter to Kosygin of April 1969 detailing the elements of your approach;\(^5\)

— but they soon began to feel that your deeds failed to match your words (he may go so far as to suggest that this was due to the influence of “forces,” like the “military-industrial complex,” interested in keeping the cold war alive and in making profits from armaments.

Uppermost in the indictment that Gromyko may attempt to put forth will be

—the allegation that we mounted a deliberate campaign this summer to discredit Soviet credibility and trustworthiness by our charges that they violated the Suez standstill agreement and, more recently, were attempting to violate the 1962 Cuban understandings.

\(^5\) In his inaugural address on January 20, 1969, the President announced: “After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.” For the full text of the address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 1–4. The letter to Kosygin, dated March 26, 1969, was delivered on April 22. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 28.
Other points that may come up in his critical remarks about us might include

— the charge that we are holding Germans back in their Eastern policy;
— the claim that we are sabotaging the Soviet proposal for a European security conference which, Moscow claims, almost all Europeans want;
— our one-sided support of Israel;
— our “saber-rattling” in the Mediterranean;
— our decisions to proceed with Safeguard Phase II and our MIRV program.

(Note: The Soviet press and other high, medium and low-ranking officials have also complained of the following which Gromyko, however, probably would not raise:
— our China policy, which allegedly encourages Chinese hostility toward the USSR;
— your trip to Romania\textsuperscript{6} which allegedly gave heart to unsavory “nationalist” elements in Romania and elsewhere in Eastern Europe;
— our discriminatory trade policies toward the USSR;
— our Vietnamization policy, which the Soviets claim prolongs the war while saving us casualties;
— our alleged role in the overthrow of Sihanouk\textsuperscript{7} and subsequent “invasion” of Cambodia, which the Soviets claim played into Chinese hands.)

The point about this catalogue, which in one form or another has appeared in the Soviet press or has been rehearsed in private is that it is a mixture of actual Soviet perceptions and of typical Soviet hypocrisy. Indeed, in some respects it reflects the fact that some of your signals may have been unclear while others have in fact gotten through to the Kremlin leaders, unpalatable though they may have been to them.

As noted, Gromyko will probably also display interest in certain kinds of collaboration with us. The areas involved (and discussed in greater detail in the Tabs) may be the Middle East, Berlin, certain aspects of SALT and summitry.

In sum, while trying to put you on the defensive and testing your reactions that way, he will want to get a more precise measure of your commitments and your view towards negotiations.

\textsuperscript{6} During a worldwide trip in the summer of 1969, Nixon made an official visit to Romania on August 2 and 3.

\textsuperscript{7} Prince Norodom Sihanouk—who was in Moscow at the time—was ousted as Cambodian head of state on March 18 by Prime Minister Lon Nol.
(Note: The Soviets not only see the US as subject to numerous contradictory cross currents but they are uncertain whether to regard you personally as favorable or unfavorable—"unrealistic" or "realistic" in their terms—to a modus vivendi, by which they mean not only certain mutually beneficial agreements but our acceptance of them as a world power and of their hegemonial position in Eastern Europe.)

**Your Purposes and Basic Message**

Your overriding purpose in this conversation is—to put across the points—

— that you make the fundamental decisions concerning foreign policy,
— that your purposes are clear,
— that you are precise, careful and thoughtful,
— that you are prepared for serious progress in US-Soviet relations but only on the basis of strict reciprocity.

**Beyond that, you should make the following points:**

— that you meant what you said about entering an era of negotiation and that at this stage in your Presidency you may have the greatest flexibility to negotiate.

— You are in a better position to make basic settlements than your immediate predecessors because you don’t have to worry about attacks from the right.\(^8\)

— This is early enough in your tenure so that a course set now can have effect in either direction of conciliation or, if you are driven to it, resistance to encroachment.

— that there does, however, remain a strong latent anti-Communism in our population which could be aroused if the impression grew that the Soviets were “testing” you and attempting to take unilateral advantage of our effort to reorder some of our priorities in line with the needs of the seventies;

— that we did not mount any organized campaign to cast doubt on Soviet trustworthiness and credibility but that whatever the legal technicalities may have been, you, your Administration, and our people did get the clear impression that at Suez the Soviets had deliberately abetted and participated in the violation of a clear understanding that there be a military standstill;

— that, in addition, we cannot help but view with concern the continued growth of Soviet strategic power, not because we think we have

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\(^8\) Nixon crossed out this point and highlighted the next two in the margin.
a God-given right to superiority but because the Soviet programs are
taking a form (SS–9s especially) that are hard to consider with defensive intent;

—that you firmly believe that negotiations will be successful and
yield viable results only if conducted with a sense of security and that
you are quite prepared to see the Soviets approach this matter in the
same way; but that an effort on their part to gain unilateral advantage
or military preeminence will inevitably produce countermeasures and
set back the prospect for negotiation;

—that you believe firmly that an orderly structure of world peace
must rest on mutual respect of the interests of all concerned and that
the disregard of the legitimate interests of one side by the other will
merely postpone the advent of an era of genuine negotiation;

—that while our two countries obviously carry special responsi-
bilities by virtue of our power, size and influence, you consider notions
of condominium unacceptable and incongruous.

[Omitted here is a list of Tabs A–J.]

Tab A

MIDDLE EAST

Where the Situation Now Stands

1. The U.S. persuaded the UAR to accept its peace initiative9 by
implying that if there were a ceasefire/standstill we would show re-
straint in military assistance to Israel and in a negotiation would press
Israel to withdraw in a settlement.

2. The U.S. persuaded the Israelis to accept by assuring them that
talks would begin from the then existing military balance. For this pur-
pose, a standstill was linked to the ceasefire.

3. The Soviets presumably shared the UAR interest in engaging
the U.S. The Soviets must also have understood the basis of our ap-
proach to Israel:

—They certainly understood that a standstill was part of the cease-
fire. On July 23, Secretary Rogers told Dobrynin we assume that a
standstill as part of the ceasefire is also acceptable to the USSR. Do-
brynin said, “Yes, of course.”10

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9 See footnote 5, Document 3.
—The USSR is legalistically correct in saying that it was not party to the negotiation of the actual terms of the ceasefire/standstill agreement on August 7. However, they were informed of the terms and, on August 12, of the U.S. understanding of the agreement regarding new construction and movement of missiles.

—The Soviets also now claim that Secretary Rogers said the ceasefire/standstill was not an integral part of the U.S. peace initiative. However, in addition to knowing the U.S. reason for insisting on the standstill, the language in the formula which both Israel and the UAR accepted stated that they had accepted the ceasefire/standstill "to facilitate Ambassador Jarring's mission."

—They knew your statement of July 31\(^\text{11}\) and never contradicted it.

4. The Soviets continue to participate in continuing development of the UAR missile complex. They have never formally acknowledged that Soviet personnel are involved, and there is some evidence that UAR crews are beginning to take over some SA–3s.

5. It may be that the USSR urged Syria to withdraw rather than reinforce their units after their defeat by the Jordanians and after Israeli and U.S. moves, but we have no evidence.\(^\text{12}\)

6. The situation now is that:

—Both Israel and the UAR have indicated a willingness to see the ceasefire extended when it expires November 5.

—Israel would be content to see the ceasefire continue without negotiations. It has said it will not begin talks until the UAR standstill zone is restored to what it was on August 7.

—The UAR wants negotiations with the U.S. heavily pressing Israel to withdraw. The UAR is willing to continue the ceasefire as long as there is hope of talks. If that hope wanes, the UAR will feel compelled to renew the war of attrition to regenerate pressure for talks. The UAR is not willing to remove "one missile" from the standstill zone to get talks started.

—Riad told Secretary Rogers that the UAR must seek a resolution in the UN General Assembly to use with the UAR army to get the ceasefire extended. It is not clear what kind of resolution he will seek. One possibility is a simple reaffirmation of the 1967 UN resolution and a

\(^{11}\) In remarks to reporters after meeting with Rogers in San Clemente on July 31, Nixon underscored the achievement of the cease-fire agreement and urged all sides to refrain from any violations. For the text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 635–636.

\(^{12}\) Reference is to the Jordanian civil war, which began on September 17, and the subsequent Syrian military intervention; the hostilities ended with a cease-fire agreement on September 27.
call for continuation of the ceasefire. The other is a more radical call for Israeli withdrawal.

What Gromyko Will Say

1. Gromyko will probably repeat these general points:
   —the U.S. is slandering them with allegations of violations; the USSR was not party to the standstill agreement;
   —the U.S. is undermining negotiations and abetting continued Israeli occupation;
   —Israel violated the standstill;
   —the U.S. never made negotiations contingent on the standstill.

2. He may repeat the specific suggestion he made to Secretary Rogers—that the U.S. give thought to washing out the past difficulties and to proceeding on the following basis:
   —that the ceasefire be extended for a limited period;
   —that talks be resumed under Jarring’s auspices;
   —that the US–USSR talks be resumed; and
   —that the Four Power talks continue.

Gromyko added that proceeding on the above basis would obviate the need for General Assembly debate.

3. What this adds up to is Gromyko asking the U.S. to forget the standstill violations and press Israel again to begin talks on the basis of the new military balance as if nothing had happened.

The U.S. Position

The U.S. problems with Gromyko’s specific proposal are that:
—Israel would not accept without U.S. pressure.
—Pressing Israel on the basis of Soviet failure to observe an understanding would be exceptionally difficult.
—It would set a bad precedent for other U.S.-Soviet agreements such as SALT.

The U.S. must see some evidence of Soviet performance before it can press Israel into talks. The choice is between:
—Continuing to press for some rollback of missiles and
—Acknowledging the violations as a fait accompli but insisting on some other demonstration of Soviet readiness to participate seriously in the negotiating process.

The U.S. has already moved to redress the balance on its side by:
—Removing the self-imposed restraint on assistance to Israel;

13 Nixon underlined this clause.
—Providing Israel with a set ($55–90 million) of the best U.S. electronic equipment to cope with the missile complex;

—Assuring Israel of $500 million in financial assistance (as contrasted to $189 million promised last March).

The U.S. may now have an interest in a tacit extension of the cease-fire which would unhook it from the U.S. peace initiative. Only in that way, perhaps, can Israel move away from the position that it will not talk until the missiles are rolled back. But some evidence of constructive Soviet performance will still be necessary.\(^\text{14}\)

The tactical question is whether to volunteer suggestions now that could form the basis of a new understanding or to await a Soviet move. In view of our interest in creating a new situation and in view of the fact that the UAR still cannot get its territory back militarily, it would seem preferable to wait Moscow out.

**What You Might Say**

1. You are not going to discuss details. The facts are known.
2. Whether the USSR was a legal party to the standstill negotiation or not, the U.S. position and intent were well known in Moscow. The agreement was violated. This not only undercuts prospects for negotiation but raises the most serious questions in our minds.
3. The only U.S. interests in the Middle East are a stable peace and the freedom of the nations in that area to pursue their interests free from external domination.
4. It is a fact that Israel will not leave the occupied territories unless it is either pushed out (with incalculable consequences) or there are negotiations in good faith. We support the latter.
5. To get negotiations started, there will have to be assurance that the USSR and UAR will help establish a sound base for them. The U.S. in July and August negotiated such a base. It has been undercut. Now we would welcome Soviet suggestions as to what new base might be established.
6. The quid pro quo for Israel’s vacating the occupied territories is promises of living in peace or securing arrangements by which confidence in these assurances can be restored.
7. A debate in the General Assembly is now in prospect at Egyptian instigation. That will either improve the atmosphere for continuation of the cease-fire and for talks or make them more difficult.
8. The U.S. has made clear that it would like to see the ceasefire extended. But this will be up to those on the ground.

\(^\text{14}\) Nixon underlined portions of the first and last sentences in this paragraph.
9. As regards arms shipments (if Gromyko raises the subject), the U.S. remains ready to discuss an agreement curtailing them for both sides.15

Tab B

BERLIN, GERMAN EASTERN POLICY

Where the Situation Now Stands

We originally took the initiative following your first European trip to suggest that if there is to be an era of negotiation, Berlin should be removed or at least reduced as a source of recurrent crises.16 Consequently, we and our Western allies, including the FRG, worked out a series of measures which we felt would enhance the viability of West Berlin, make crises less likely but leave the basic four-power responsibility for the city as a whole untouched.17 We did not have in mind any new arrangements concerning the military garrisons since these are already covered by agreements and understandings.

We always recognized that any agreement about Berlin would be vulnerable to sudden Soviet and/or East German violation because geography simply could not be altered. Consequently, we were always reluctant to consider concessions in the present status but aimed at its improvement. We did not know whether the Soviets might have a similar interest but thought it worth testing them.

Then Brandt came into office and activated his Ostpolitik. As it turned out, its center-piece, as distinct from past German efforts to reach agreements with the East, was an agreement with Moscow on renunciation of force and recognition of borders. The Germans hoped by this to allay Soviet fears that they were trying to disaffect the Soviet satellites by dealing only with them but not with the USSR.18

15 Nixon underlined portions of the second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth points in this section.
16 During his European trip in February and March 1969, Nixon visited Belgium, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, France, and Vatican City. Brandt himself, then Foreign Minister, first proposed a “transitional arrangement” for Berlin on April 2 during the biannual meeting of NATO Ministers in Washington. On April 11, the Ministers approved a final communiqué, which supported “concrete measures aimed at improving the situation in Berlin.” See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 20.
17 Nixon underlined the phrase “leave the basic four-power responsibility for the city as a whole untouched.”
18 Nixon underlined most of this paragraph.
Under pressure from the opposition CDU, and coming from Berlin himself, Brandt recognized that he could never claim success in his Eastern policy if it did not include an improved arrangement for Berlin. As a result, the Berlin negotiations became intimately entangled in the Ostpolitik to the point that the Germans said they would not ratify their treaty with the Soviets (in which the FRG made all the concessions, which the Soviets gladly pocketed) unless there were first a new agreement on Berlin.

In agreement with the FRG, the allies worked out a proposal that would (1) regularize civilian access to the city, (2) confirm and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between West Berlin and the FRG, and (3) maintain an FRG political presence in West Berlin. In return, the FRG was willing to curtail certain activities the Soviets found especially obnoxious, like meetings of FRG constitutional organs.

The Germans argued that the Soviets were so interested in getting the Moscow treaty ratified (because of their concern with China and their desire to get German economic assistance—which the Soviets were already getting anyway), that skillful negotiating tactics by the Western allies would induce the Soviets to accept the Western list even though most of the concessions would be Soviet.

There has never been any evidence to support this. In several Ambassadorial meetings, the Soviets proceeded to put forward a series of proposals which, in effect, would make of West Berlin a third German state (somewhat like their old “free city” proposal minus any demands for our military pullout). They would agree to various economic and cultural ties between the city and the outside world, including the FRG; to safeguards for civilian access; but not to any political ties between the city and the FRG. In addition, the Soviets demanded termination of a whole series of “subversive” activities, like radio broadcasts and rejected any discussion of East Berlin, although they do not reject the continuation of four-power (US, UK, French, Soviet) responsibilities for the city as a whole, mainly because they do not want to be excluded from a role in the Western sectors. In fact, the Soviet proposals have aggravated the Berlin position, not eased it.

Gromyko’s Probable Line

In discussing this subject, which is now deadlocked over the issues described above, Gromyko may

—reiterate Soviet readiness to safeguard the economic life of West Berlin and civilian access to it;

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19 Nixon underlined all three points in this paragraph.
20 Nixon underlined several phrases in this paragraph, including “safeguards for civilian access; but not to any political ties between the city and the FRG” and “Soviet proposals have aggravated the Berlin position.”
—reaffirm the continued validity of four-power responsibility for the city as a whole;
— but reject any political ties between the FRG and West Berlin;
— in effect enunciate the idea of West Berlin as a third German state with membership in the UN but without any change in the Western military/civilian presence;
— reject the idea that there can be any discussion of East Berlin which the Soviets regard as the capital of the GDR and a closed subject.

(Note: There have recently been some indications that the Soviets might consider some low-key FRG political representation in West Berlin. This has aroused interest in Brandt’s entourage (Bahr) who has frequent surreptitious contacts with Soviet officials. We may at some point be faced with German schemes for reducing or transforming the FRG’s political presence in West Berlin in an effort to get an agreement which would then permit Brandt to claim success and submit his Moscow treaty for ratification. But as a quid pro quo for such an arrangement the situation may evolve in which the Germans pay twice, on Ostpolitik and on Berlin.)

In Response to Gromyko, You Should
— avoid details;
— avoid leaving the impression that you are willing to scale down the Western position since the Soviets will immediately carry this back to the Germans (and the French, who, if anything, have been the most reluctant to negotiate about Berlin at all because they want to keep their position in Berlin unimpaired as leverage vis-à-vis the Germans);
— reiterate your basic view that there can be little hope of peace and quiet in Europe if Berlin boils up into crisis periodically;
— state your conviction that there ought to be improvements in the life of the West Berliners, if only on humanitarian grounds;
— note the basic reality that the FRG feels intimate ties with the city and that there can be no thought of making it a third German state;
— express the hope that the Ambassadors will continue their work and reach a mutually acceptable agreement which would be bound to have beneficial effects beyond Berlin itself.21

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21 Nixon highlighted in the margin the third, fourth, and fifth points in this section and underlined portions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth points.
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Current Situation

The Soviets have long proposed a conference designed to ratify the status quo in Europe, including the permanent division of Germany and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Until recently, however, their proposed agenda has avoided all concrete issues and dealt with such matters as economic cooperation and renunciation of force.

We and the NATO allies have taken the view that a conference at some point may have a role but that it is pointless and dangerous if it is held and results in failure. NATO in Brussels with our participation has been attempting to identify concrete issues that might be dealt with. The problem is that the real issues between East and West in Europe relate to Germany and these are being negotiated separately. Lately, the idea has gained ground that the question of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) might be a subject to be discussed and the Soviets in their latest proposals suggested that a conference might set up a commission which could negotiate the reduction or withdrawal of foreign forces from Europe (an old Soviet staple). Our own studies are still in process and it is proving extremely complex to come up with options or packages that would be (1) realistic given Soviet geographic proximity and our remoteness, (2) negotiable, and (3) leave NATO with forces with which to conduct a rational strategy.22

(Note: The idea of a conference has also been advocated by Romania which believes that the mere existence of an ongoing negotiating forum would afford it additional protection against Soviet pressure or attack; the Romanians also have the idea that somehow the conference could be used to vitiate the Brezhnev Doctrine.23 Tito, as you recall, was rather cool to the idea [though Yugoslav diplomats have also advocated it strongly] unless there was careful preparation and a very concrete agenda.)24

22 Nixon underlined portions of the last three sentences in this paragraph, including the last three points.

23 During a speech in Warsaw on November 12, 1968, Brezhnev justified the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the previous August—and, by implication, any such military intervention in the future—as a necessary step to prevent capitalist interference in the socialist camp.

24 Nixon met Tito during his State visit to Yugoslavia from September 30 to October 2. For a record of their meeting on October 1, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 221. Brackets are in the original.
Gromyko may
—start by accusing us of dragging our feet;
—note that the Soviets of course would have no objection if we and Canada participated;
—claim that the very holding of a conference would improve the atmosphere;
—note that the Soviets have no objection to eventual talks about mutual reductions in foreign forces.²⁵

You may wish to say that
—you have no objection in principle to a conference and we have not made special efforts to prevent it;
—you do believe that conferences of this kind should not be held for their own sake but deal with concrete issues and have some promise of success;
—simply to talk about more trade and exchanges seems unnecessary because other forums already exist for that;
—each of us should take a careful look at the question of mutual force reductions and then determine whether some negotiating effort is worthwhile.²⁶

(You may wish to refer to Tito’s comments to you.)

Tab D

SALT

It is doubtful that Gromyko will have a detailed response to our last Helsinki proposals (overall limit on ICBM and SLBM launchers, limit on bombers, ABMs confined to capital city protection or eliminated, no MIRV ban).²⁷

He may, however, seek to test your reaction to an ABM-only agreement.²⁸ Despite the difficulties you have had in the Congress with Safeguard the Soviets seem concerned about the ultimate expansion of Safeguard in a way that would erode their deterrent.

²⁵ Nixon underlined all except the last of these four points.
²⁶ Nixon underlined all four points.
²⁸ Nixon underlined the words “to an ABM only agreement.”
Gromyko may allude to the rather vague but potentially quite far-reaching Soviet proposal for a US-Soviet agreement to act jointly against “provocative” attacks or threats from third countries. (They seem mainly to have China in mind.)

Gromyko may also raise again the question of our forward-based aircraft and short-range missiles and assert a Soviet right to have “compensation” for these weapons in any agreement since they can reach Soviet territory.

The Soviets in Vienna appeared to display less interest in a MIRV ban than we had assumed. They rejected our proposal for a flight-test ban (on the ground that it would leave them at a technological disadvantage) and for a deployment ban (on the ground that it would involve on-site inspection). Their own proposal for an uninspected deployment and production ban was unacceptable to us because of its unenforceability. 29

Gromyko may make some critical comments about our Safeguard and MIRV programs and may also charge that our “campaign” to impugn Soviet credibility was complicating the SALT talks.

The principal Soviet interest in testing our position on SALT is that they probably are attempting to settle on their military outlays in the next five-year plan and want to determine whether and what kind of deal might be negotiable.

In your own comments you may wish to make these points:

—despite the disappointments of the summer, and especially the problem over the Suez standstill violations, you intend to pursue the SALT talks when they resume in Helsinki on November 2;

—an ABM-only agreement is of no interest to us, even assuming the technical issues involved (protection against secret SAM upgrading and a definition of what radars will and will not be permitted) can be settled;

—any agreement must provide us with assurance that the Soviet program that threatens our deterrent (whatever Soviet intentions may be) is contained; this means limits on the SS–9; (Note: The Soviets have displayed great sensitivity to statements that they are planning a first-strike.)

—we think our proposals, while not perhaps perfect and not as far-reaching as you would have liked, should be a good basis for negotiation and we await with interest the considered Soviet response;

—on the question of joint measures against countries launching, planning or threatening a “provocative” attack we can consider

29 Nixon underlined most of the previous three paragraphs.
—technical measures such as improved communications and means of identification so as to avoid any misunderstandings that might then embroil the two of us against our will;
—but we do not believe SALT is the proper context for negotiating the type of political understanding at which the Soviets have been hinting; this should in any case be the product of the general evolution of our relations.  

Tab E

VIETNAM

Background and Purpose

—We have often spoken to the Soviets about Vietnam, but generally have not found them ready to do anything for us. We do not want them to become a negotiating intermediary.
—But we can count on them to report what we have said to Hanoi, and they will probably report accurately.
—Therefore, we want to be very tough in this meeting. We do not want Gromyko (or the North Vietnamese) to get the idea that we are softening our position.

His Position

—I doubt that he will raise Vietnam. If he does, it will probably be to tell us that the North Vietnamese will continue to fight unless we meet their demands. He may say that we must agree to a coalition, which he pushed with Secretary Rogers.
—He may also say that we should negotiate on Mrs. Binh’s eight points.  

Your Position

I think it would be appropriate for you to raise Vietnam. You may wish to make the following points:
—We think the military and political situation in Indochina has now reached the point where a stable settlement can and should be reached. 

30 Nixon underlined portions of the second, third, fourth, and sixth points, while highlighting the final point in the margin.
31 Reference is to the proposal that Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, chief delegate of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam, tabled at the formal Paris peace talks on September 17. For an unofficial translation of the text, which was immediately leaked to the press, see the New York Times, September 18, 1970, p. 2.
32 Nixon underlined most of this sentence.
—Your speech was intended to reflect that appraisal. The principles you proposed for a cease-fire, and the points you proposed for settlement, were designed to allow serious negotiations.

—Our strategy is to try for such negotiations. We will recognize the legitimate interests of all parties.

—If we cannot conclude a settlement, we will continue with our present policies, which we believe are working.

—Hanoi’s situation is not getting better, and they will not find it easier to make a bargain later. The South Vietnamese are getting stronger.

—Hanoi’s political proposals are unacceptable. They are a victor’s peace, not a realistic position.

—They ask us to dismantle the organized non-Communist forces, which they have been unable to do in a generation of fighting.

—They are not even asking for a coalition—no matter what they call it—since they want to dictate whom they will accept in each of the elements. This is just a disguised takeover.

—We will not accept their preconditions.

—They must deal with the South Vietnamese Government on political issues. That Government is an existing reality.

—We are getting some intelligence reports which suggest that Hanoi will step up the pace of its military activity soon.

—This could have the most drastic consequences. Nothing could be a bigger mistake.

—We have no intention of making a precipitate withdrawal or a disguised defeat. Moscow should realize that our efforts to preserve stability in that area are in its interests as well as our own.

Tab F

CHINA (Contingency)

The Soviets believe we are trying to put them under pressure by flirting with China. They charge we timed our overtures to coincide with the acute Sino-Soviet tensions last year and thereby encouraged

33 See footnote 10, Document 2.
34 Nixon underlined these two sentences.
35 Nixon underlined these two sentences, as well as portions of the next two.
36 Nixon underlined most of these two sentences, while also highlighting the second one in the margin.
37 Nixon underlined most of this sentence.
the Chinese. They used to get read-outs from the Warsaw talks\(^{38}\) but do not now and may think that things are happening that they do not know about.

You may wish to say that

—our China policy is directed against no one, including the USSR;
—China is a great power and we intend gradually to establish communications with it;
—we take no sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute and have no interest in seeing any conflict between the two;
—no one should any longer take for granted that US-Chinese hostility\(^{39}\) will be permanent;
—we do not anticipate rapid movement.

Tab G

TRADE CONTACTS (Contingency)

The Soviets want credits and are interested in joint ventures for trucks and other heavy equipment. They are bitter that we are not forthcoming both because they consider this “discriminatory” and because they really need Western technology.

You may wish to say that

—you favor increased contacts among our scientists;
—you have no objection to trade deals within existing legislation;
—but a major change will occur only when problems like Vietnam and the Middle East are resolved;
—contrary to some, you believe that extensive economic relations should be the result of better political relations; experience has shown that if it is the other way round, economic relations quickly suffer when crises occur.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) Reference is to the periodic talks—held since September 1958 in Warsaw—between Chinese and American representatives.

\(^{39}\) Nixon underlined portions of the previous three points.

\(^{40}\) Nixon underlined portions of all four points in this section.
Tab H

CUBA. LATIN AMERICA (Contingency)

It is almost certain that Gromyko will not raise the Cuba issue. If he does he may reaffirm the 1962 understandings and accuse us of fomenting a crisis.

(Note: The Soviets almost certainly were probing our reactions in Cuba, though we do not know what the Moscow politics behind the move may have been. There had been a gradual increase in Soviet military activities in the Caribbean this year, culminating in the project at Cienfuegos. Having been brought up short, the Soviets are undoubtedly sensitive about publicity but at the same time want to establish their right to show the flag periodically. Their interest in this may be heightened by the turn of events in Chile and Bolivia.)

You may wish to say that
—Cuba is a neuralgic point for us;
—we adhere to the understandings of 1962 provided both Moscow and Castro do (no export of revolution or subversion);
—we will watch the situation but curtail publicity.
—we will be governed by the understandings regarding the definition of a submarine base of the oral note of October 9.41

Tab I

SUMMIT (Contingency)

Gromyko may broach this, noting that it would be the turn of the US President to visit the USSR.

(Note: Summitry involving you may figure in Soviet leadership politics. Podgorney and Kosygin (Brezhnev seems safe for the time being) might like to button down a summit next year as at least some reassurance against demotion at the Party Congress next year.)

You may wish to say that
—you favor direct communications with other leaders;
—summits between the US and the USSR are different from others because they tend to raise both great hopes and great fears or dis-

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41 Nixon underlined the first, third, and fourth points in this section. See Document 6.
appointments, hence they have to be handled with care and there has to be some assurance of concrete results;
— you would like to visit the USSR again;
— assuming no great crises and progress on some of the great issues of our day you hope to visit the USSR and meet with its leaders before the end of your term.\(^\text{42}\)

\(^{42}\) Nixon underlined portions of all four points in this section.

18. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Soviet Union Foreign Minister Gromyko, 11:00 a.m., Thursday, October 22, 1970

Purpose
I have provided you by separate memorandum\(^2\) an analysis, together with suggested talking points, for your meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko on Thursday. The meeting will include Foreign Minister Gromyko, Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Dobrynin, U.S. and Soviet interpreters, and myself.

This separate memorandum is designed to provide you with an overview of the conduct of the formal meeting and to suggest that you ask Foreign Minister Gromyko to remain with you briefly at the conclusion of the formal meeting so that the two of you can discuss briefly topics not suitable for airing within the larger framework. A private discussion between you and Foreign Minister Gromyko is a useful

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which Kissinger forwarded to the President on October 21 with the following note: “Attached are your talking points for the meeting with Gromyko. They are necessarily detailed because of the complexity of the subject matter and the importance of your talks. There were some suggestions in New York that Gromyko anticipates in depth discussion on the subjects contained in the talker.”

\(^2\) Document 17.
adjunct to the general session because this is your first formal meeting as President with Gromyko and because a brief private discussion will serve to underline your controlling role in the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs as well as permit a personal exchange on summitry and Cuba. This can be accomplished by telling Gromyko you want to show him your small private office.

In order to prepare yourself for this private session, I recommend that you review with some care my memorandum of October 14\(^3\) which forwarded an analysis of my recent discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin during the Cuban crisis and which contains the detailed Memorandums, including the texts of the notes verbale exchanged at the time between our two governments.

**Conduct of the Meeting**

—At the outset of the general meeting, I suggest that you welcome Foreign Minister Gromyko. Gromyko will then ask you what agenda you wish to cover. Ambassador Dobrynin and I have discussed the agenda, and I anticipate that Gromyko will promptly agree to your proposal to include the following topics in the order listed:

1. A general discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations
2. Middle East
3. Berlin and Europe
4. SALT
5. Vietnam

—You should then invite Gromyko to open the discussion on the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Gromyko will mention the summit in Moscow at the end of Topic 1.

—At the conclusion of the session you should suggest that Foreign Minister Gromyko join you for a few minutes in your small office.

**Talking Points for Private Discussion with Gromyko**

You should raise the following issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko:

—Suggest to Foreign Minister Gromyko that as a result of your meeting with him, both sides agree to an announcement that both parties have agreed in principle to a Summit meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, to be held sometime next year in Moscow. If Gromyko agrees, you should suggest that the modalities of the announcement be worked out between Ambassador Dobrynin and me. The date of the announcement should be October 29.

\(^3\) Document 6.
—Assuming agreement in principle for the Summit, you should also suggest that a pre-Summit work program be worked out between Ambassador Dobrynin and me. When Dobrynin and I have arrived at agreement in principle on an agenda item and work schedule, detailed preparatory work should then be referred to regular channels. (Dobrynin indicated that it would be helpful if you reaffirmed our channel to Gromyko.)

—Concerning Cuba, you should underline the sensitivity of and the importance you attach to the nature and scope of Soviet activity in Cuba. A submarine base would lead to grave consequences. Our definition of a base will be governed by the principles in the oral note handed to Dobrynin by Dr. Kissinger on October 9. Within this framework we consider the Soviet announcement regarding Cuba "positive."

Following this brief private discussion, you and Foreign Minister Gromyko should rejoin the main party which will remain in your office.

19. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers' Conversations with Gromyko in New York

The two conversations between Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko concentrated mostly on the Middle East; Berlin, Vietnam and Cuba were also discussed. No substantive change in the Soviet position emerged from these conversations. Gromyko was inflexible on the Middle East, made a small procedural concession on the Berlin talks, and reaffirmed the Cuban understanding of 1962. The atmosphere was not acrimonious; Gromyko seemed subdued, perhaps reflecting concern over our reactions to recent events. (The reports available to us are attached in full as Tabs to this summary.)
The Middle East (Tabs A and B)

The Secretary made it clear that we held the Soviets responsible for the complicity in cease-fire violations, that we were interested in resuming the talks under Jarring’s auspices, but that this could not occur without some rectification of the situation created by the violations. In both conversations Gromyko took the same position: the USSR was not a party to the agreements, was therefore not responsible, and that no rectifications were possible. He proposed to extend the cease-fire for a “limited period,” to resume the Jarring talks, as well as the bilateral and four power talks. On this basis he suggested a debate in the General Assembly could be avoided.

Secretary Rogers concludes that no compromise is presently possible between us and the USSR on the Middle East and that the next stage is a General Assembly debate.

Berlin (Tabs C and D)

Gromyko complained over the lack of progress in the four power talks. He said we would have to clarify our position. Most of his presentation was an attack on the political activities of the West German government in West Berlin. Any understanding, Gromyko asserted, would have to include prohibition on such activities.

The Secretary responded that the recent Soviet proposals were full of difficulties, but that we also sought to reduce tensions provided there was no unilateral interference with our rights. Ambassador Rush emphasized the importance of West Berlin’s economic ties to West Germany. Gromyko replied that the Soviets accepted economic links between West Berlin and West Germany, but not political ties.

In the second conversation, the Secretary said that the Soviets were hampering progress in the talks by their rigid position and Gromyko then agreed that our proposals for practical improvements could be discussed simultaneously with the matters of Soviet concern. Previously they had wanted their concerns met before discussing practical improvements. The Secretary suggested a review of the situation after two more Ambassadorial meetings.

Vietnam (Tab E)

The Secretary stressed the seriousness of your new proposals and our belief that a cease-fire was now feasible. Gromyko said he could add nothing to the North Vietnamese and PRG reaction. In reply to the Secretary’s explanation of our willingness to abide by free elections, Gromyko said elections under the present “clique” would be biased.

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2 Attached but not printed are telegrams Secto 15 from USUN, October 16, and Secto 33 from USUN, October 19.

3 Attached but not printed are telegrams 172337 to Bonn, October 16, and 172472 to Bonn, October 19.

4 Attached but not printed is telegram Secto 24 from USUN, October 19.
Gromyko spent some time probing our attitude on a coalition government. He wanted to know if we held the principle of coalition government “in reserve.” If we wanted the USSR’s aid, he would have to have room to be helpful. The Secretary said we did not rule out any solution acceptable to South Vietnam and the PRG. Gromyko concluded, however, that we did not accept a coalition government. The Secretary replied he did not propose to say anything on that one way or another.

At the end of the talk Gromyko said he had thought we might agree that he could inform the PRG we were agreeable to a coalition government. The Secretary concluded that he could inform the PRG we would accept any solution they could work out with the South Vietnamese government.

Cuba (No detailed report available.)

Gromyko expressed surprise over our comments on Cienfuegos, and gave assurances that the Soviet Union had no intention of violating the 1962 understandings.

Under Secretary Irwin has sent you a briefing memorandum for your meeting with Gromyko which essentially parallels the memorandum I sent to you on October 19.

The Under Secretary makes the additional points that you
—reiterate your long-standing interest in the USSR’s permitting emigration to the US for the purpose of reuniting families; and
—note that the Soviets have joined the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) effective November 14 and that you hope we can now cooperate more effectively on civil aviation matters including the hijacking problem.

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5 In a memorandum to Kissinger on October 21, Eliot reported the “highlights” of Rogers’s meetings with Gromyko on October 16 and 19, including the following summary on Cuba: “The Secretary told Gromyko we had noted their public response and subsequent events with satisfaction. Gromyko said the Soviet Union did not understand why this had become such an issue. They had never had any intention of building a submarine base in Cuba. He thought the issue became so large because of American domestic reasons. The Secretary responded that we knew what had happened. We thought what they had subsequently said and subsequent events were encouraging.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IX)


7 Document 17.
20. Editorial Note

On October 21, 1970, as President Richard Nixon prepared for his upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, an incident took place on the Soviet-Turkish border that threatened to complicate the course of Soviet-American relations. That afternoon, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig received the following memorandum from David McManis in the White House Situation Room:

"Two U.S. Army generals aboard a U–8 Utility aircraft in Northeastern Turkey may be lost and may have strayed into Soviet territory. The generals are Major General [Edward] Scherrer, Chief, JUSMAT [Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey]; and Brigadier General [Claude] McQuarrie, Chief of the Army Section. We will inform you of any developments as they occur." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. IX)

Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (USN), Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, subsequently informed Haig that the pilot, Major James P. Russell, had "encountered cross-winds and dense clouds" en route from Erzurum to Kars before landing the airplane in Leninakan in Soviet Armenia. After examining the available evidence, Murphy concluded that the "apparent accidental and voluntary landing of the U–8 in the Soviet Union resulted from the pilot’s disorientation after climbing above the clouds and his reported reliance on an as yet unidentified beacon signal." (Memorandum from Murphy to Haig, November 2; ibid.)

Ronald Ziegler, White House Press Secretary, reported during his press briefing on October 22 that Nixon and Gromyko had discussed the incident. "[T]hey did not have the details to discuss it in any depth," Ziegler noted. "But it was brought to their attention." (Ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ziegler, Numerical Subject File, Foreign Affairs and Defense, Box 28, 03.3—Europe, Sov. Union) No evidence has been found, however, that the issue was raised during the meeting. Secretary of State William Rogers in New York called Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger at 11:30 a.m. on October 23 to review the situation:

"R: I called to see if there was anything more to this flight of the Generals that I should know.

"K: I just asked that—and independently. To the best of my knowledge, it was a routine inspection flight. They may have been lured over by electronic means—they have done that once.

"R: I will see Gromyko later tonight and wanted to be sure there was nothing I should know. I don’t think I will say anything."
“K: Except to say we would be eager to have them released.

“R: That’s what I wanted to know.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)

Later that evening, U.N. Secretary General U Thant hosted a dinner for the Foreign Ministers involved in the four-power talks on the Middle East. (Telegram Secto 66, October 24; ibid., RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1966–1972, Box 520, CF 471, 1970 UNGA Memcons, Vol. III of VI) No evidence has been found, however, that Rogers and Gromyko discussed the detention of the American officers.

When the Soviets failed to resolve the matter, Acting Secretary of State John Irwin summoned Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to the Department of State on October 29 to deliver a formal protest. The American statement charged that Soviet treatment of the detainees—including failure to grant consular access for five days—constituted a “clear violation” of the Soviet-American Consular Convention. (Department of State Bulletin, November 23, 1970, pages 653–654) The next morning, Winston Lord of the National Security Council staff called Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State. According to Eliot, Lord reported that Kissinger “had no problems with the substance of the note” but was “unhappy that we had not cleared the note with him.” Eliot reminded Lord that it was the Department’s “practice not to bother the White House with matters on which policy is established.” (Memorandum for the Record; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958–1976, Box 112, Lot 72 D 317, S/S Memos, Oct.–Nov. 1970)

Rogers, meanwhile, sought to formulate a new policy on such accidental incursions. In a letter to Laird on October 28, Rogers addressed the implications of recent events in Soviet Armenia: “I am struck by the fact that incidents of our aircraft straying across East-West lines seem to be all too frequent but never seem to happen to Soviet or other Communist aircraft (at least we never catch them at it). I need not tell you that no matter how innocent the intent of our personnel, the Communists make sure that we pay the maximum political price in each case.” Although he promised to “do our best” to resolve the current crisis, Rogers wondered whether anything could be done to “enable us to do better” in the future. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Box 47, 360) When the Secretary of Defense replied in a November 7 letter, the American officers were still in Soviet custody. Laird assured Rogers that the Pentagon shared his concerns. “We certainly need to assure ourselves that we are taking every reasonable precaution against repetitions of this sort of incident,” Laird stated, “and I am looking into this.” (Ibid.) Laird subsequently reported to the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instituted a review of current procedures in “an ongoing effort to avoid unfortunate incidents.” (Memorandum from Laird to Nixon, December 10; ibid.)

SUBJECT
Secretary Rogers’ Exchange With Gromyko on Vietnam

The following summary of the exchange between Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko on Vietnam underlines the need for you to take a direct and tough line with Gromyko in your meeting.

Gromyko’s Statements:

—Gromyko did not seem anxious to talk about Vietnam. When the Secretary first raised the subject, Gromyko said he had nothing to add to the DRV/PRG position. He urged us to present new proposals in Paris, where we were in direct contact. Halfway through the conversation he stated that he had exhausted what he was going to say.

—Once he warmed to his subject, however, Gromyko was very forceful. He pushed particularly hard on coalition government. He first asked if we were holding coalition government in reserve, and he explained that if we wanted Soviet help he had to have room to be helpful. He then asked if we ruled out coalition government. When the Secretary said we did not like this formulation, Gromyko said he would tell the PRG we “ruled out” a coalition government. Then, when the Secretary said that we did not rule out anything approved by the South Vietnamese and the PRG, Gromyko said he would tell the PRG that the U.S. was agreeable to a coalition.

—It seems clear that Gromyko did not want to get involved in a Vietnam discussion, since he already had enough serious topics to discuss with us. But he backed the Hanoi line quite hard once he got into the topic, trying to drive the Secretary into ambivalence or compromise.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 2. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. In a note forwarding the memorandum to Nixon at 9:30 a.m. on October 22, Butterfield reported that this memorandum supplemented Kissinger’s October 20 memorandum, Document 19. Butterfield further stated: “You will want to read it before this morning’s meetings. One additional item: Henry Kissinger believes it essential that he meet with you alone for some 20 minutes prior to your 10:30 meeting with both him and Secretary Rogers.” According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger alone in the Oval Office for over 20 minutes prior to Rogers’s arrival at 10:29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Kissinger then called Dobrynin at 10:35 to review the agenda, including the President’s instructions on the summit. (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)
The Secretary’s Points:

—The Secretary emphasized our readiness to negotiate and our readiness to accept any political arrangement worked out among the South Vietnamese.

—The Secretary began by citing your five points\(^2\) and saying that Vietnamization would continue if Hanoi did not negotiate. He said Hanoi could get a settlement proportionate to Viet Cong strength.

—The Secretary said we supported selection of the South Vietnamese government by the South Vietnamese people, and that the only way we were familiar with was elections. If there is some other way, it is up to the South Vietnamese.

—When Gromyko asked if we ruled out coalition government, the Secretary asked him what he meant by this. Did they mean something like the German coalition? He said Hanoi just wanted us to get rid of the present government. He also said that we would not use the words “coalition government,” but that a solution worked out by the PRG and Saigon would be acceptable. He stressed that we did not accept the term itself, but would accept a solution worked out among the South Vietnamese.

—When Gromyko then said he would tell the PRG that we might agree to a coalition, the Secretary said that he could inform the PRG that the U.S. would accept any solution they could work out with the South Vietnamese government.

Comment

I think that Secretary Rogers did well in leaving open the two ways to a political solution, by direct negotiations between Saigon and the PRG or alternatively, by elections. There is, however, the danger that the Secretary’s purposely vague explanations might be misunderstood as opening the way for ultimately accepting Hanoi’s views.

I therefore think that it is absolutely imperative that you lay out, in the clearest possible terms, our position on a coalition government and making no further concessions. Gromyko can probably be counted on to report your views accurately. For us to leave any doubt on these issues would only serve to prolong the war.

\(^2\) See footnote 10, Document 2.
22. Notes Prepared by President Nixon

Washington, undated.

Gromyko: (preparatory notes)

Mideast—

1. Some rectification—[unclear] before talks.
2. Soviet knew there had to be standstill.
   • Soviet not a party—not responsible—
     —[unclear] should we talk, some rectification.

Berlin:

1. Does not question 4 power rights.
2. Question is FRG’s political use of Berlin.
3. Recognize Economic ties to FRG.
4. What will they do on humanitarian grounds?
   • The Peace treaty depends on progress—
   • It provides non aggression—
     & virtual recognition of E Germany.

Practical improvements versus political activities.

• We have a greater stake—not to allow Berlin crisis destroy our relations.

V Nam:

1. Time limit for withdrawal—
2. Coalition—means getting rid of current government—
   • If it means result of agreement between Government of V Nam and P.R.G.

Politically-economically stable relations is essential despite Cuba—

V Nam—Berlin—

1. We do not heat up atmosphere. (RN speeches for 20 months)
2. We both need arms limitation

Trade—
Flash point control—

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 61, President’s Speech File, October 22, 1970, Meeting with Gromyko. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the text from the President’s handwritten notes. An attached note reads: “For RMW from the President’s Out Basket.” Nixon apparently intended that Rose Mary Woods, his personal secretary, would prepare a typed version. No such version, however, has been found.
23. Memoranum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 22, 1970, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US:
The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State

USSR:
A.A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The President welcomed Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington and said that he appreciated the opportunity to have a talk with him. He had been informed that Mr. Rogers and Mr. Gromyko had held useful conversations in New York. It would be helpful if today they could discuss the questions of the general relationship between their two countries. The President said he was prepared to take up any items

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to another copy, Krimer completed the draft memorandum of conversation on October 23. (Ibid.) In an undated memorandum forwarding the draft to Kissinger, Haig noted that “Win[ston Lord] and I have reviewed and clipped where questions exist.” (Ibid.) A copy of the draft memorandum with Kissinger’s handwritten insertions and corrections is ibid. Substantive revisions are noted below: On October 26, Haig returned the final version to Kissinger with a note stating that it was “revised per your instructions.” (Ibid.) Kissinger also approved Haig’s suggestion to provide a copy of the final version to the Department of State for Eliot and Rogers on an “Exclusively Eyes Only” basis.
that the Minister wanted to bring up. Specific problem areas, in his view, which could be usefully discussed concern the Middle East, the Berlin negotiations between the Four Powers, SALT, a most important issue, Western Hemisphere problems, specifically Cuba, and problems in Asia, specifically Vietnam.

Mr. Gromyko suggested that each problem be discussed in turn and as one was finished the next problem be taken up. This procedure was agreeable to the President.

Mr. Gromyko appreciated the opportunity to hold this exchange of views and to express the point of view of the Soviet leadership on a number of problems. These problems included the bilateral relations between the two countries as well as a number of international problems. The first thing that the Government of the Soviet Union was interested in was to find out what direction the foreign policy of the United States would take with respect to the Soviet Union. What policy did the United States and the President as head of state, personally intend to pursue? Naturally, he and his government were interested in the President’s appraisal of the present state of relations between our two countries, but to an even greater extent they were interested in the future prospects for the development of relations between us. In what direction did the U.S. Government intend to lead its foreign policy? Was it in the direction of developing and expanding relations with the Soviet Union, or was its policy directed toward increasing tensions? He and his Government were well acquainted with the President’s formula which he had put forward some time ago, that is, his announced intention to proceed from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. The President must be aware of the fact that that formula had met with a positive response in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately he had to say that the way relations between the two countries had developed and the concrete foreign policy steps taken by the U.S. Government appeared to him to be in conflict with the formula the President had announced. This applied both to the bilateral relations between the two countries and to the outstanding international issues. He came to this conclusion by noting certain recent events and facts.

Speaking quite frankly and directly, the Soviet Government was puzzled by a number of campaigns which flared up in the United States from time to time. In some cases these campaigns were more than unfriendly, they were even hostile to the Soviet Union. He would not be speaking frankly if he did not tell the President that the question was being asked in Moscow: What was the reason for these campaigns and what purpose were they pursuing? The sad thing was that the impetus for these campaigns appeared to be provided by statements of high officials and by encouragement on the part of the official circles of the United States. He repeated that this question was puzzling to the Soviet leadership. He thought that it would have long since become quite
clear that any attempts to influence the Soviet position by such methods could not possibly be successful. If there were some internal political motives which gave rise to these campaigns, he could only say categorically that it was the Soviet view that the relations between our two countries should never be affected by any temporary internal considerations and should not be burdened by them. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were major world powers and it was the Soviet view that the interests of both countries required peace and an approach to foreign policy that would not escalate tensions, but, on the contrary, lead to international détente. This should certainly be clear to all. Temporary considerations of an internal nature, transitory situations, should not be permitted to affect our relations; these should rather be based upon the vital fundamental interests of the peoples of our two countries, in whose interests it was to strengthen peace rather than increase tensions. Should the President ask him what the basic position of the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership was in regard to relations with the United States, he could state officially on behalf of the Soviet leadership that they would like to see an improvement and expansion of the relations between our countries and a lessening of tensions between us. It seemed to him that if both sides were to take a realistic view, such a state of affairs was clearly in the interests of not only the Soviet Union but also of the United States. Of course, all problems could not be solved at one go. Some of them were far too complex to be susceptible of easy solutions.

The President replied that with respect to the bilateral relations between our two countries, Mr. Gromyko had indeed described his policy correctly, the policy of moving from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation. The President also agreed with Mr. Gromyko’s comments to the effect that the internal situation of a country should not be allowed to influence its foreign relations. However, since both countries were great powers, he was enough of a realist to know that when great powers are involved there were inevitably bound to be some differences and misunderstandings. He thought Mr. Gromyko would agree that the President had been extremely careful to try and limit differences between our countries to private discussions rather than discussions in public. Mr. Gromyko, being a realist, would know that in our country whenever elections approached, political leaders were tempted to take a belligerent anti-Communist line. As for the President personally, he did not consider such an approach to be in the interests of world peace or of Soviet-American relations. For this reason, he had personally tried to avoid any statement that might make the situation worse.

The President continued that he felt very strongly that both sides, allies during World War II, who were instrumental in bringing into being the United Nations, must realize on this 25th anniversary of the
UN that the relations and the interests of the two great powers could hardly be submitted to the United Nations where their differences would be publicly aired.² Mr. Gromyko had spoken before the General Assembly yesterday,³ and the President intended to do so tomorrow.⁴ However, in the next 25 years, world peace in general and, more precisely, even the avoidance of smaller wars would depend to a much greater extent on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union than on anything else. For this reason, he felt unhappy that the relations between our countries were now described as the coolest since the Cold War began.⁵ He had been very careful not to contribute to the difficult situation by rhetoric. He thought it was of greatest importance now to give a signal to the world that the United States and the Soviet Union were not looking for areas in which to confront each other. To be honest, we had to realize that our interests in many parts of the world differed and that on some questions it would be most difficult to reach agreed positions. However, it was clearly in the common interests of both great powers to limit the burden of armaments, to increase trade and communications between them. It was in this spirit that he was resolved to view our bilateral relations.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he found the President’s appraisal of the situation to be a reasonable one. He asked the President’s permission to summarize what had been said to the effect that the policy of the United States would be directed at reducing the tensions which were bound to arise from time to time and that the President’s formula of negotiation rather than confrontation remained in effect; also that the President personally intended to work for an improvement and deepening of the relations between the two countries and the international situation in general.

The President agreed that this was correct and added the further point that in the past we had been reasonably successful and it was his hope that we would be even more successful in the future whenever

² Kissinger substituted the word “aired” for “resolved” in the original draft. Lord had written “(poorly [worded])” in the margin.
³ During his speech before the General Assembly on October 21, Gromyko charged that the United States had deliberately misrepresented Soviet conduct in the Middle East and in Cuba, but he reiterated his willingness to negotiate on such issues as Berlin and SALT. For excerpts from the speech, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No. 41 (November 3, 1970), pp. 4-7. Kissinger called Dobrynin at 8:35 a.m. on October 22 and remarked: “You kept your promise on the speech.” Dobrynin replied: “It was much better than it was before.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)
⁴ See Document 28.
⁵ Kissinger inserted the words “described as.” In reference to the statement that Soviet-American relations “were now the coolest since the Cold War began,” Lord had written “(really?)” in the margin.
difficulties arose to keep them in private channels rather than expose them in public. In the past we may have been at fault to some extent, and so was the Soviet Union, in publicizing our differences. This was in the past, however, and it would be important to avoid that in the future.

Mr. Gromyko said this was correct. Articles in the Soviet press in the past, reporting what was being said in the United States in regard to the Soviet Union, had been but a small fraction of unfavorable American statements about the Soviet Union. After all, when hostile statements appeared in the U.S., what was there left for the Soviet Union to do but to react accordingly? The Soviet side would not remain indebted when it came to hostile statements. This was not the right path, however. He noted that the President had mentioned the development of trade relations between the two countries. In this respect, we were faced by almost a vacuum. Was this indeed the policy of the United States Government? He simply would like to know the President’s attitude to this question.

The President said that there were possibilities in this field. He thought one would have to be realistic and say that some of the other problems come into play when it comes to considering the possibility of increasing trade between the two countries. For example, the Vietnam war, which involved our primary and basic interests, was bound to have an inhibiting influence upon trade. It was a fact that under our legislative arrangements some items which could be used to aid North Vietnam could not be exported to the Soviet Union. We were indeed prepared to explore ways in which trade between our two countries could be increased. He did not like to use the word “linkage,” but it was true nevertheless that a settlement of these other matters would lead to increasing economic exchanges between us. He therefore felt that if our political relations improved, increased trade would follow naturally. This was in our interest as well as in the interest of the Soviet Union.

Middle East

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he had had a good exchange of views with Secretary Rogers in New York on the subject of the Middle East. To restate the Soviet position briefly, the Soviets were for peace in the Middle East. They would not like to see a new military clash in this area. The independent existence of all states needed to be assured and secured, and saying this, he included the existence of Israel as a sovereign independent state. If someone ever told the President that the Soviet Union had some other objective in the Middle East, or if it was alleged that it had some idea of subverting the independent existence of Israel, the President should not believe any such allegations. What was required today was a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
Arab territories they were occupying and a formal, detailed agreement insuring a stable peace in this area. To accomplish these purposes, the role of the two great powers was far from being the least important. It was the Soviet position that peace in this area should be secured by a most solemn act, if necessary involving the participation of the UN Security Council, an act stating that troops are to be withdrawn, that peace is established, and that no one needs to be apprehensive for the security of any of the independent states of the Middle East.

It would be good if some work could be performed in the direction of a solution now. It was important that these efforts not be discontinued at the present time. As to the Soviet view of what needed to be done now, he had already told Secretary Rogers that the first thing required was a resumption of the Jarring mission. Let there be exchanges of views between the Israelis and the Arab states. Such exchanges could certainly not be harmful to any of the parties involved. Secondly, agreement must be reached on extending the ceasefire. The present situation must be formalized in the form of an appropriate agreement to the effect that firing between the sides will not be resumed and this was to be without any preconditions. Attempts to impose conditions on the extension of the ceasefire could only complicate the situation. After all, a ceasefire was a ceasefire, meaning that the two opposing sides had agreed not to shoot at each other.

Third, the bilateral contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States on this question should perhaps be renewed. They had been suspended for some time now and should be reactivated. It would be good to resume these contacts, and not only from the point of view of attempting to facilitate a solution for the Middle East. So far, the American side had not yet responded to the Soviet proposal on the substance of the matter even though that proposal had been submitted in response to the expressed wishes of the American side. Fourth, Four Power consultations should be continued. This would be a step creating more favorable conditions for consideration of various possibilities to solve the problem.

As for Israel, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union was prepared to give the most solemn guarantees of its existence.

Secretary Rogers said that he and Mr. Gromyko had discussed this question at some length in New York and seemed to agree on many aspects of the problem, but differed on how to get started. He asked

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7 Kissinger inserted this sentence.
Mr. Gromyko, if, assuming that agreement would be reached, the Soviet Union would be willing to undertake peacekeeping activities together with the United States, specifically whether the Soviet Union was prepared to send troops for that purpose.8

Mr. Gromyko inquired what the Secretary meant by peacekeeping activities. In the Soviet proposal they also mentioned the use of United Nations guarantees and personnel. He had thought this discussion was procedural; peacekeeping should be kept for substantive meetings.9 When would negotiations on substance begin, however? In his view the matter was pressing and this should be the first order of business. The four points he had just made were intended as steps to be taken at the present time.

Secretary Rogers said that the reason he had asked the question was that it affected the security of the parties involved.

President Nixon remarked that Israel no longer had any confidence in the ability of the United Nations to keep the peace.

Mr. Gromyko replied that what he was proposing was procedural in nature. These were the first steps to be taken and he realized that they were procedural rather than substantive. However, Secretary Rogers’ idea was not excluded.10

Secretary Rogers inquired what steps the UAR intended to undertake in regard to a UN resolution on the Middle East.

Mr. Gromyko replied that they had this idea because there had been no forward movement toward a solution of the problem. Should the situation change, should the Jarring mission be resumed and the ceasefire continued, he thought the Arab position might change as well. Since he had not received an answer from the United States, he had not as yet contacted the Arabs in this regard. Secretary Rogers remarked that Mr. Gromyko should certainly be able to influence the Arabs.

President Nixon said that the Secretary had reported to him the conversations he had held with Mr. Gromyko about the Middle East. He was aware of the concern Mr. Gromyko had expressed regarding what he believed were misunderstandings which occurred at the time the ceasefire first went into effect. He was aware of Mr. Gromyko’s position that (1) the Soviet Union had not been a party to the ceasefire agreement, and (2) it was unfair to say the Soviet Union had collaborated in violations of that agreement. He did not want to go into this question in detail, but as practical men we had to recognize that a problem did indeed

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8 Kissinger inserted the phrase "specifically whether the Soviet Union was prepared to send troops for that purpose."
9 Kissinger inserted this sentence.
10 Kissinger inserted this sentence.
exist. In fact, this was our problem with the Israelis and affected our ability to influence them.

Mr. Kissinger recapitulated the procedural steps mentioned by Mr. Gromyko, namely, (1) resumption of the Jarring mission, (2) resumption of bilateral contacts, and (3) resumption of Four Power contacts. He asked whether they could be separated or whether Mr. Gromyko was proposing a package.\textsuperscript{11}

Secretary Rogers remarked that it would be a mistake to go into bilateral and Four Power meetings prior to reactivating the Jarring mission. Mr. Gromyko agreed, but added that purely bilateral contacts could take place at any time.\textsuperscript{12}

The President remarked that in the Middle East our respective interests differed considerably and that it was logical for great powers to compete with each other in this area. It was in the paramount interest of both sides, however, to secure the peace in this area since we would be very foolish to allow conflicts between minor powers to lead to a collision between us.

Mr. Gromyko agreed that the President was right and said we should stress what unites us rather than what divides us.

\textit{Berlin}

Mr. Gromyko said he was convinced that it was in the interests of both countries to achieve a reduction of tensions in Berlin and to create a situation there which would work for stability, détente, and general peace in Europe. The American side had many times referred to the status of West Berlin. He wanted to assure the President that the Soviet Union had no intention to weaken the status of the allied powers in West Berlin. In fact, at times he had the impression that the Soviet Union did more than anyone else to respect the special status of West Berlin. The principal question there was the political presence of the Federal Republic of Germany in the city. This presence affected the interests of the Soviet Union and undermined the special status that the American side had so frequently talked about. The Soviet Union advocated the inviolability of the inter-allied agreements concerning Berlin, which were in effect. The Soviets were against anything that would violate these agreements. In his view it was possible that the American side misunderstood the Soviet position to some extent. He sometimes felt that representatives of the United States, at least at the ambassadorial level, regularly meeting to discuss the Berlin question,

\textsuperscript{11} Kissinger inserted this sentence.

\textsuperscript{12} Kissinger revised this sentence, which had read: “Mr. Gromyko thought that since our contacts were purely bilateral they could take place at any time.”
misunderstood the Soviet position. The Soviet Union as well as the German Democratic Republic, were ready to find a favorable solution for the two principal problems affecting West Berlin, those of transit from West Berlin to West Germany and vice versa, and access to East Berlin. These solutions would certainly serve the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as those of the people of West Berlin. The major stumbling block at the moment appeared to be the question of political ties (and he stressed the word “political”) between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. He strongly felt that there was a real possibility of reaching agreement here and this would help ease the situation in the area.

Mr. Kissinger asked for clarification. He had heard Mr. Gromyko use the phrase\(^\text{13}\) that West German political activity in West Berlin must be “curtailed,” rather than “eliminated.” Was this a correct interpretation?

Mr. Gromyko [using the Russian word “svyortyvaniye”]\(^\text{14}\) said that in his view there was no need to continue the political activities of the Federal Republic, since they constantly created new disputes. It would be comparatively easy to list what activities of the Federal Republic in Berlin could be continued and which political functions it should not be permitted to exercise in West Berlin. Above all, this referred to such matters as meetings in Berlin of the West German Bundestag, meetings of various Bundestag committees, and activities of the West German Chancellor in West Berlin. It was entirely possible that some of the activities in West Berlin had not come to the attention of the Allied Powers; they might require close examination under a microscope, as it were. First and foremost, the West Berlin problem, from the Soviet point of view, consisted in the political presence of the Federal Republic as a state in that city.

Secretary Rogers also inquired whether the Russian word meant eliminate or curtail. He said that elimination was certainly out of the question and that the Government of the FRG would be unable to enlist the support of its people for complete elimination of all political ties with West Berlin.

The President said that the umbilical cord between the city and the FRG could not be cut. Looking back over the years at the numerous Berlin crises during the Eisenhower Administration, he saw the city as a central problem in Europe. It was precisely for this reason that we must have a clear understanding on West Berlin in order to reduce

\(^{13}\) Kissinger substituted the words “Mr. Gromyko use the phrase” for “that the Soviet position was” in the original draft.

\(^{14}\) Brackets are in the original. The figurative usage of the Russian word “svyortyvaniye” may be translated into English as either “reduction” or “cutting down.”
the frequency of these crises. Mr. Gromyko must be well aware of the fact that ratification of the Non-aggression Treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG depended upon substantial progress on the West Berlin problem. On this point he, too, said that all political ties cannot be cut, this simply cannot happen. West Berlin cannot be allowed to become a third German state. But if he understood Mr. Gromyko correctly, a low profile of the federal authorities in West Berlin, as opposed to the high profile represented by meetings of the Bundestag, might be acceptable to the Soviet side. We could not agree to eliminating all political ties for the simple reason that we could not sell this to the FRG any more than the FRG could sell this to its own people.

Secretary Rogers remarked that it should be a matter for negotiation what lines and limits should be drawn for the FRG in West Berlin. If we were to continue negotiations on this issue some progress must be made.

Mr. Gromyko again said that it was a matter of bodies and sub-bodies of the Federal Republic in West Berlin. As for a method for achieving concrete progress on this question, we should list specific activities to be eliminated. Mr. Gromyko expressed his appreciation to the President for the fact that the United States had taken a positive view of the treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union. He considered this treaty to be an important step in the direction of creating a détente in Europe. As for the list of activities in West Berlin, these could be considered in detail in the course of negotiations.

The President said that our reaction to the Soviet-German treaty was based upon the fact that we respected the independence of the FRG and that when it signed a treaty in its own interests, we approved of this action, of course. The treaty had been their idea, not ours. It was the Federal Republic that had taken the initiative to negotiate on the questions of borders and non-aggression. It should be realized, however, that this was only a first step. To complete it and obtain ratification of the treaty, it would be absolutely necessary that progress in the Berlin question be achieved. If we could cool down the Berlin problem, even apart from our bilateral relations over Germany, the whole situation in Europe would be affected positively.

Secretary Rogers said it was a simple fact of life that the Federal Republic could not ratify the treaty unless a satisfactory solution was found for West Berlin. He thought we might hold two more Ambassadors’ meetings to see if we can make some progress, and also that all of these various matters, political presence, transit and access, should be negotiated at one and the same time.

Mr. Gromyko agreed and expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would work with the Soviet Union to find appropriate solutions.
Secretary Rogers added that in his view an agreement on West Berlin should also provide for negotiation of any possible disputes there that might arise in the future.

European Security Conference

Mr. Gromyko inquired about the attitude of the United States Government toward the idea of convening a European Security Conference. He did not know whether the President had had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Soviet proposal to call such a conference. The substance of that proposal was to call a conference of all European states, as well as Canada and the United States, in order to see if there was a chance of improving the relations between various states in Europe in the interests of a political détente. The United States had said that it favored such a détente, and so had the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he had the impression that the U.S. was somewhat apprehensive in regard to the ESC. It should be clear that any decisions adopted at such a conference would be joint decisions, taken in the interests of all the states concerned. There was no question of trying to impose a one-sided solution on any state during this conference. For this reason, he believed the U.S. apprehensiveness was quite unfounded. According to information he had received, the United States seemed to be bringing its influence to bear on some other countries, to discourage them from taking a positive attitude toward the ESC. He wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union had no intention of trying to claim the major credit for calling such a conference, that it was the position of the Soviet Government that a détente in Europe, which could result from the ESC, would benefit all interested parties and the world as a whole.

The President wanted to tell Mr. Gromyko quite directly that in our view the success of such a conference would depend primarily on the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko’s impression that we were trying to discourage the convening of the conference was incorrect. We took the position that for the successful conduct of a conference it would be necessary to sit down and explore an appropriate agenda. By saying that the success would depend on our two countries primarily, he did not mean to speak of a condominium of the two powers in Europe.

Secretary Rogers remarked that there was no point in having a conference unless we could foresee what results would likely be achieved. In this respect, our Berlin negotiations could serve as a good indicator. If we could make progress on the question of Berlin, the prospects for a European conference would improve. But, if no progress was achieved on Berlin, what would be the purpose of holding another conference?
Secondly, we were not too sure that the Communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Powers\(^{15}\) had indicated a willingness to discuss reduction of military forces in Europe. Was the Soviet Union suggesting that this question be included on the agenda of a European Conference? With respect to reduction of forces, what did the Soviet Union mean by foreign troops?\(^{16}\) Did this include Russian troops in Eastern Europe? Mr. Gromyko replied that in the Soviet view, it would be better not to consider military questions at the European Conference. We could agree, however, that if some kind of a body—perhaps even permanent\(^ {17}\)—were created at the European Conference, this body could discuss the question of troops. The Soviet Union would be agreeable to such a procedure. As for the term “foreign troops,” it had been meant to include Soviet troops as well.

President Nixon remarked that a Soviet-American understanding on primary issues, such as SALT and Berlin, would have a beneficial influence upon any possible conference of European states.

Secretary Rogers said that if complex questions were to be excluded from discussion at a European Conference, it was difficult to see what could be accomplished. In brief, if we could foresee the achievement of positive results, we would be interested. If not, we would have doubts about the usefulness of such a conference.

Mr. Gromyko said we could not ignore the fact that for 25 years the Soviet Union had discussed disarmament questions in the United Nations with the United States, and with other countries, without being able to find any solutions. For this reason, the question of disarmament and force reduction was not perhaps quite suitable for discussion at an ESC. Should a body be created by that conference, however, he would have no objection to force reduction being discussed in that body. The President said that in principle we were not opposed to the conference. We would be in favor of it if preliminary discussions showed that it would be helpful.

SALT

The President said that it was his impression our two sides were dealing seriously with substantive matters on Strategic Arms Limita-

\(^{15}\) Reference is presumably to the so-called “Budapest Appeal” for a European security conference, which was issued on March 17, 1969, at a meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Budapest. For the text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 106–109.

\(^{16}\) Kissinger deleted a previous sentence in the draft (“The Communiqué had also mentioned reduction of foreign troops in Europe.”) and revised this one, which had read: “What was meant by foreign troops?”

\(^{17}\) Kissinger inserted this phrase.
tion. We did think that it was a constructive phenomenon for the two sides to be discussing this major issue. On November 2, the conference would resume in Helsinki. We were prepared to enter these discussions in the same spirit as we had entered them last year. He was going to instruct the U.S. Delegation to SALT to explore all possibilities of agreement. He recognized that this would require some time because the vital interests of the two countries were involved here. He felt that hard bargaining on both sides would be involved, but that some agreement could result from this bargaining process.

Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Union approached these negotiations in all seriousness, fully aware that the questions under discussion were extremely difficult. His side would do all in its power to reach agreement. While in their view, a broad agreement would be the most desirable, if for some reason such broad agreement could not be reached at the present time, more limited agreements could be negotiated. In the future, such limited agreements could also serve as a basis for a broader understanding. His delegation would conduct the negotiations in Helsinki in this spirit.

The President said that the trouble with limited agreements was that they favored one side or the other. If the agreement dealt only with ABM we could not accept it. If it dealt only with offensive missiles, the Soviet Union would not accept it. Dr. Kissinger made much the same point. Secretary Rogers interjected that he, Mr. Gromyko and Gerard Smith had defined “limited” as the subject matter covered by our latest proposal rather than the earlier options. Mr. Gromyko was non-committal.

Vietnam

The President said that he would raise the subject of Vietnam only in passing, in view of the fact that Mr. Gromyko and Secretary Rogers had already discussed it in New York, and that it had been reported to him that Mr. Gromyko saw no prospects of North Vietnam or the Provisional Revolutionary Government engaging in a discussion of our proposal. Our position in this matter was as follows: we have made a proposal and this is as far as we would go. It had been suggested, for example, that unilateral withdrawals be made without discussion with the other side. This was completely out of the question. The President said he had carefully considered the recent proposal advanced by the United States and if North Vietnam and the PRG declined to discuss our proposal in Paris, we would simply have to proceed down the other

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18 Kissinger substituted the words “dealing seriously with substantive matters” for “rather far apart on substantive agreement” in the original draft.

19 Kissinger inserted this paragraph.
road, our program of Vietnamization. That program also would end
the war, although the road would be longer. We would much prefer to
shorten the war by meaningful discussions with the other side. The prob-
lem of Vietnam, of course, involved the United States to a far greater de-
gree than the Soviet Union, for the simple reason that so many U.S. sol-
diers had been killed there. If, in the future, we should have to undertake
forceful moves to protect the interests of our men, we would do so res-
olutely, but would also inform the Soviet side as we had done at the time
of Cambodia. The President hoped that Mr. Gromyko would understand
our position, by putting himself in our place. Since we were in this area
we must protect our interests. We had made our proposal and hoped
that it would be a basis for negotiation. If this failed to stimulate an in-
terested reaction on the other side, we would proceed down the other
track as forcefully as we considered necessary.

Mr. Gromyko said that in his view there was no prospect of the
other side engaging in discussions unless the United States was will-
ing to work out the timing for withdrawal of its troops, and agreed to
the establishment of a coalition government for South Vietnam. His
statement was based upon his knowledge of the position of North Viet-
nam. The President had spoken of the possibilities open to the United
States and had said that the recent proposals were as far as we could
go. Of course, we would be able to judge the situation better than he,
but it was his impression that if we were serious about wanting to put
an end to the war, we would have to go along with the two conditions
he had mentioned. He would be less than frank if he did not tell the
President the same thing he had said to Secretary Rogers.

The President appreciated Mr. Gromyko’s candor and said he
knew that we disagreed on this subject. Regarding a date for with-
drawal of U.S. troops, we were willing to negotiate a mutual with-
drawal of forces. We were not going to indicate any date in advance
on unilateral withdrawal,20 however, since to do so would mean to de-
stroy our negotiating position. In regard to the coalition government,
the opposition spoke of a coalition government as one that would be
set up after removing all elected people in the present government.
This was totally unacceptable to us. As he had said earlier, and as Sec-
retary Rogers had told Mr. Gromyko in New York, whatever the lead-
ers of North Vietnam and the PRG could arrange with South Vietnam
would be acceptable to us.

If North Vietnam tried to step up military operations we would
take strong actions. In that case, we would inform the Soviet leaders

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20 On Lord’s suggestion, Kissinger inserted the words “on unilateral withdrawal.”
in advance. We had our interests in the area and we had our plan which was succeeding. We were confident that our plan would succeed. Time was now on our side, even though we regretted that it would take longer than the negotiating route. The President emphasized that we would do our best not to permit the Vietnam situation to interfere with our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The President said he believed that he had covered most of the subjects that required discussion. Referring to earlier discussions, he said that as realists we knew, and Mr. Gromyko knew, that the question of the future of Europe, as well as the question of arms control, would depend upon whether the United States and the Soviet Union could work out solutions aimed at strengthening peace. We recognized that there were also a number of other factors threatening peace, but if the great powers worked together, the peace could be kept. As practical men, we knew that US-Soviet understanding was essential for the future of the world. He wanted to be sure that Mr. Gromyko would not leave with the impression that the internal political situation in the United States would lead the President to take a course opposite to the one he had followed until now. He noted that he would make a temperate speech before the United Nations tomorrow. Both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dobrynin were well acquainted with U.S. politics. Both had been in this room before with President Johnson and President Kennedy. The President said that he was in an unusual position. When he was elected to office, it had been said that President Nixon would not be able to work with the Soviet leaders because of his past background of anti-Communism. He did not believe this to be so. More than any other President since World War II, he felt that he could be flexible for precisely this reason. He was prepared to be flexible in all negotiations with the Soviet Union and wanted Mr. Gromyko to realize that his approach would not be doctrinaire on any subject, but, rather, pragmatic in all cases.

Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for his views and said that the President had correctly emphasized the role of the Soviet Union and the United States as the two great powers responsible for keeping peace in the world. The Soviet leadership was in full agreement with the premise that the future of the world depended to an enormous extent upon the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. If the U.S. Government worked in the direction of peace, if it respected

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21 Kissinger inserted the previous two sentences.

22 Kissinger deleted the following words from the draft: “Mr. Gromyko had made a temperate speech before the UN yesterday, and said that,” in response to Lord’s question in the margin (“Gromyko speech temperate?”).
the interests of the Soviet Union, it would find a vigorous, energetic and determined partner in its search for ways to improve relations. This policy of the Soviet Union was not new. It had been inviolable since the very inception of the Soviet State. It was important, however, to stress the concept of reciprocity. Mr. Gromyko repeated this statement for emphasis. As for what the President had said about the internal political situation influencing American foreign policy, it was not for him to offer any evaluation of this influence. He repeated however that his Government sometimes had the impression that the U.S. Government paid some tribute to the internal political situation in the U.S. in the conduct of its foreign affairs. If this was indeed so, it could only be harmful to the relations between our two countries. Mr. Gromyko said that he was gratified to learn that President Nixon’s speech before the UN would be temperate. One should be able to rise above transitory phenomena and guide our two countries to work for the interests of peace.23

23 Rogers called Kissinger at 2:11 p.m. to discuss the meeting, including his exchange with Gromyko on the Berlin negotiations. The following are excerpts from a transcript of the conversation: “R: I think the meeting was good. I didn’t mean to interrupt him on progress—. K: What you said was essential. They can give us internal access in Berlin which means nothing.” “[R:] The holdup was the condition [that] [w]e had to eliminate FRG in Berlin. They backed away from that. They did in NY and again today. He made it clear. I am going to work on the other thing. Let’s not say anything. K: That’s in your hands. We will not do anything.” “R: I think Russian things have gone well. We have taken the chill out of it but it’s not hearts and flowers. K: I think it’s well.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) The “other thing” is an apparent reference to the Middle East.
24. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 22, 1970, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US:
The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State

USSR:
A.A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

Summit Meeting

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that, of course, he was acquainted with the President’s views in regard to a possible meeting at the summit level. He was convinced that certain important questions, including that of the bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States, required consideration at that level. He was authorized by his Government to say that the idea of having a meeting of the top leaders of the two countries is acceptable to the Soviet Union. He was aware of the preliminary considerations expressed by the American side regarding the time for such a meeting. As for the Soviet views on this question: in March of 1971 the Party Congress will be in session in Moscow. Consequently, April also will be a very busy month and would not be quite suitable as a possible date for a summit meeting. It would have to be a date sometime after April which could be agreed upon subsequently. In general, the President’s considerations on this question are not in conflict with the Soviet views and there should be no difficulty in reaching an understanding.

Taking the President’s considerations into account, as for a place for a summit meeting, the Soviets thought that it would be correct that such a meeting be held in the Soviet Union. That was the Soviet pro-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Presumably prepared by Krimer (see footnote 1, Document 23). Haig sent the memorandum to Kissinger and noted it “appears to be okay.” (Undated memorandum; ibid.) Kissinger approved a suggestion from Haig to restrict access to the White House “until after the [summit] announcement is made.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, October 26; ibid.)
posal. As for problems to be discussed at the summit, he did not think that it would be difficult to reach agreement on an agenda in the future. Of course, in connection with the problems to be discussed and with the very idea of holding a meeting at the summit, it would be important for both sides to conduct their bilateral relations in such a way as to insure that the summit meeting would be productive of positive results to a maximum extent. Mr. Gromyko felt there was no need to discuss in detail the impact that a Soviet-American summit meeting would have on the international situation. He thought that a positive outcome would have a tremendous effect upon the relations between his country and the United States and also would have a most important positive influence on the state of international affairs generally. He asked for the President’s views on this question.

President Nixon replied that it was true he had said that a summit meeting would have a very dramatic effect. However, Mr. Gromyko, who had been at Camp David, must certainly also be aware that summit meetings could produce a very dramatic hangover in terms of the great expectations that people placed upon such meetings when not much agreement is produced in the result. He agreed that it would be good to hold this kind of a meeting. He had never met Mr. Kosygin or Mr. Brezhnev in person and thought it was most important that they meet personally. He also thought it was important that we have enough time to prepare for this meeting in order to achieve concrete progress on basic important matters, such as SALT, for example, as well as on some collateral issues, such as the Middle East, if these issues were still active by the time of a summit meeting. He had discussed the idea of a summit meeting with Secretary Rogers and they both agreed that Moscow would be a suitable place. Mr. Khrushchev had come here about ten years ago. Mr. Kosygin and President Johnson had met in Glassboro and therefore it would be quite correct now for an American President to visit the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rogers remarked that it would be important to give thought to the subjects to be discussed at the summit.

President Nixon said it seemed to him that we had basic agreement on setting the time for the meeting sometime next year in order

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2 Reference is to the series of meetings between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev at Camp David, Maryland, September 25–27, 1959.

3 Kissinger added Brezhnev to the list of Soviet leaders Nixon had “never met.” Vice President Nixon, however, had met Brezhnev during his trip to the Soviet Union in July 1959. In his published account of the famous “Kitchen Debate” with Khrushchev, Nixon recalled that “[s]tanding next to Khrushchev . . . was one of his chief aides, a young party official named Leonid Brezhnev.” (Nixon, RN: Memoirs, p. 209)

to minimize any problems he might have with Congress, and he re-
marked that undoubtedly the Soviet side had similar problems with
its own Parliament. It would be desirable to make a formal announce-
ment of the intention of holding a summit meeting rather than risking
the possibility that the information might leak out.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he would welcome the President’s sug-
gestion as for when an announcement of the intention to hold a sum-
mit meeting should be made. Of course, he did not think that this
should be done today or tomorrow. He would be returning to his coun-
try on the 29th of October and would then be reporting to his Gov-
ernment. Perhaps then, or about a week later, the timing of the an-
nouncement could be coordinated between both sides.

The President repeated that it would be useful to announce it be-
fore there was any chance of a leak so that there would then be no need
to deny the information and then confirm it at a later time. It would
be better to do it formally.

Secretary Rogers remarked that it should also be announced that
the summit level idea had come about by mutual agreement rather
than detailing who had invited whom.

The President agreed that it would avoid embarrassment for ei-
ther side if we were simply to announce that during the conversation
between him and Mr. Gromyko both sides had agreed that it would be
useful for the top leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to
meet personally.\(^5\)

\(^5\) As previously arranged by Kissinger and Dobrynin (see Document 18), Nixon
gave Gromyko a tour of the West Wing and his private office from 1:15 to 1:27 p.m. (Na-
tional Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s
Daily Diary) No record of this private meeting has been found. According to Haldeman,
who recorded the day’s events in his journal, Nixon “took [Gromyko] to EOB for pri-
ivate talk at the end. Got agreement on Summit, but not on announcement next week.
Will have to push Dobrynin on this. P. obviously enjoyed the confrontation. Says talk-
ing w[ith] Communists is easier than others because they are hard, tough, blunt, direct—
no diplomatic flummery. Coming out of EOB they started down opposite sides of the
center hand rail—Gromyko moved over & said ‘we should have no rail between us’.”
(Ibid., Haldeman Diaries, Handwritten Journals and Diaries of H. R. Haldeman, Box 1,
Vol. VI) Kissinger later recalled the President also “explained to Gromyko that all prepa-
rations for the summit should take place between Dobrynin and me.” (Kissinger, White
House Years, p. 794)
25. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, October 22, 1970, 4:15 p.m.

K: Are you going to drive?\(^2\)

D: Yes. We intend to leave around 5:00. We have just finished lunch with the Minister. We had lunch quietly.

K: If you feed him the way you feed me, he won’t be in any condition to do anything but sleep. There were two points the President wanted me to make. First, when we talk about SALT what we mean by “Limited” is something that covers the items on the last proposal. We considered the first “comprehensive” and the last two limited. He didn’t mean ABM alone would be acceptable for example. Second point, which he made to the Foreign Minister and wanted to make sure I made to you, relying on the excellence of your communications. He would like to aim for an announcement of the major topic\(^3\) toward the end of next week, the 29th or 30th.

D: All right. I will mention that.

K: If you could do that. My understanding is that in the private talks he did mention the points you thought he should about our channel.

D: He did not tell me everything. There wasn’t a chance. He just began.

K: These were the two items the President wanted me to mention to you.

D: You will be there tomorrow?

K: Yes, and I am staying overnight in New York; I’m not going back with the President.

D: But it’s always difficult to find you there.

K: Not if you go to the right places.

D: I guess it’s just differences of taste.

K: The White House operators always know where to find me.

D: That’s dangerous for you?

K: No, not at all. I am always available. I am glad you are keeping up with all my activities in your usual efficient manner.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.

\(^2\) To New York to attend the session on October 23 of the United Nations General Assembly.

\(^3\) Summit meeting.
D: I have to know where to find you in case. I have heard that tomorrow’s speech will be a major one on our relations. Is that true?

K: It will contain some significant references, but I told you the spirit in which they will be made. It will be somewhat less polemical than previous speeches.

26. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) ¹

Washington, October 22, 1970, 4:45 p.m.

D: I have checked about what you mentioned.² About the 29th or the 30th and about SALT. He was not quite positive; now I want to check, about the three points the Foreign Minister mentioned, you remember. He would like to check his impression. Is it possible that we could get a reply while he is still here?

K: My personal opinion . . . or would you rather that I check first?

D: I think I would like you to check.

K: I think you cannot get a formal reply while he’s here.

D: It’s not a question of a formal reply but one on which we could rely.

K: What would you like to have?

D: Some kind of private [omission in transcript—understanding?] between you and me and him that there will be a beginning, something approximate.³

K: I understand. My personal opinion, I could try and I would check this . . . to get you a private understanding. In that case, we have to be realistic. If we are serious about what you said, we have to do it in a way so that there wouldn’t be screaming like there was in July. You have to rely on us to do it in the best way possible.

D: Will we be able to talk tomorrow?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² See Document 25.

³ Reference is to the Soviet proposal to begin substantive talks on the Middle East.
K: Yes, we could talk in New York. What sort of an understanding do you want? Try to get the Jarring mission started again?

D: The two of us work together and with the understanding that it would happen in a certain time. Clear understanding within the lines he mentioned. Understanding that you really think it will happen and we can rely on that. In this sense can you tell me something tomorrow?

K: I will try. We can talk tomorrow and I may be able to tell you something more definitive Sunday afternoon. I can probably give you some indication of the President’s attitude tomorrow and by Sunday tell you what the chances are of getting it done. But we have to keep this in our channels.

D: He would like to have a more positive and definitive answer if possible. If not possible we will have to send it to him. I think it would be useful. To whatever extent you can do it tomorrow and Sunday would be useful.

K: I can get word to you tomorrow. I will be in the President’s entourage. Where can I find you?

D: The Indonesian lobby.

K: The President is going afterward to the U.S. mission; he will be there for 45 minutes.

D: I will wait in the Indonesian lobby within 45 minutes after he leaves the UN building.  

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4 October 25.

5 Kissinger called Dobrynin at 11 a.m. on October 23 to discuss a change of venue. After considering various options, the two men agreed to meet at the Soviet Mission in New York at 4:45 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)
Washington, October 22, 1970, 5:27 p.m.

K: I call you because I admire your editorial policy so much.

R: I don’t write editorials. I hear sweet mood music over there after the President’s meeting with Gromyko. I want to be sure I hear the right tune. After hearing Gromyko’s remarks yesterday and what Ziegler put out, it seemed to accent the positive and not the negative in Soviet relations. Ziegler says the President will say something on this tomorrow. I got the impression that the crunch is over. You said in one backgrounder you didn’t know if they were going to a hard line and the impression I get that since Cuba is taken care of we are back at the status quo ante.

K: How could we take care of something that didn’t exist?

R: You will never find—I didn’t say it didn’t exist. I quoted people at State who said that.

K: That’s right. The crunch is over is premature but we are trying to move in a positive direction. The major differences remain. We can say that we are trying to move differences from confrontation to ne-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 See footnote 3, Document 23.

3 During his news conference at the White House that afternoon, Ziegler announced: “For our part, I can say that the discussions were helpful. The meeting was conducted in a friendly atmosphere. It is felt that the meeting was helpful, as I said earlier, for laying the basis for improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We also believe that the meeting was useful from the standpoint that it allowed the President to give the Soviet Foreign Minister his personal and direct expressions on the subjects discussed.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ziegler, Numerical Subject File, Foreign Affairs and Defense, Box 28, 03.3—Europe, Sov. Union)

4 In a “news analysis” of the controversy over Cuba, October 1, Roberts cited the following statement from an unnamed White House official: “the Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness.” Roberts also noted that “the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs still claims it knows nothing about Cienfuegos since that is the responsibility of officials handling Soviet affairs.” (Chalmers Roberts, “Remarks on Cuba Base Reflect Worry About Soviets,” Washington Post, October 1, 1970, p. A15)
gotiation. The last two months have shown that pressure tactics don’t work and we are ready to pursue the other course.\(^5\)

R: When are you going to tell us what really happened on Cuba?
K: In due course.
R: Did you read my article on Sunday?\(^6\)
K: You are factually wrong but psychologically on the track. Not factually wrong but facts not quite right but you were psychologically on the right track. It’s essential—
R: I was cautious on facts since I don’t have much.
K: It was a reasonable statement. I can’t confirm facts. You were on the right track.
R: I have not seen what the Pentagon said on the last day or so. Has everything moved out of Cienfuegos?
K: Yes but one ship still in another port but it can’t do what it could in Cienfuegos. Also, in the past—we have an on the record commitment about submarine bases.
R: And reference to Cuba ‘62.
K: A public acknowledgment of Cuba ‘62 and its extension to a submarine base. It puts things again on a different footing.
R: On recollection of Cuba ‘62 issues, Castro wouldn’t play and Kennedy said he would live with the deal that was consummated.
K: Because we didn’t [omission in transcript]. It gave us an extra choice.

\(^5\) On October 23, Roberts reported that the White House and Soviet Embassy had both adopted a similar “public position,” hoping that the meeting between Nixon and Gromyko would lead to an improvement in relations. “But the private American view,” Roberts added, “was that the Nixon–Gromyko meeting and the two earlier sessions in New York between Gromyko and Secretary of State William P. Rogers had convinced Moscow that pressure tactics used against the United States do not work. It that was felt that while it would be premature to say that the recent Soviet-American crunch is over, it would be correct to say that the U.S. is trying to move in a positive direction, that is, to turn from confrontation to negotiations on major differences between the two countries.” (Chalmers Roberts, “Nixon, Gromyko Confer,” Washington Post, October 23, 1970, p. A1)

\(^6\) October 18. In an article on the meeting between Rogers and Gromyko two days earlier, Roberts reported that American officials would neither confirm nor deny the existence of a Soviet-American “understanding” on Cienfuegos. “But they spoke in a manner,” Roberts concluded, “that left no doubt Moscow’s statement of Oct. 13 that the Soviets were not building a ‘military base’ and the quick American characterization the same day of that statement as ‘positive’ were pre-arranged.” (Chalmers Roberts, “Rogers, Gromyko Are Silent on Cuba; Secret Pact Seen,” Washington Post, October 18, 1970, p. 1)
R: You take Gromyko yesterday as being nothing more than pro forma?
K: That speech was written before he left.
R: If the crunch is not quite over, what remains?
K: The rectification problem and how to handle the Suez problem. Are they trying to put the squeeze on? Then the other we can handle as a negotiating problem.
R: That’s what you said about a tactical advantage. When are we going to sit down?
K: You and I? Let’s aim for next week.
R: Why was SALT brought up again?
K: We wanted to make sure we are heading in the same direction. The meeting was scheduled for one hour but lasted 2 and a half, and it was a small segment.
R: You had interpreters.
K: One way. He will only speak in Russian. SALT was only mentioned.
R: How about Berlin?
K: More specific on that.
R: The M.E.?
K: Let’s wait a bit. Call David Young early next week.7

7At 6:10 p.m., Kissinger also called Marvin Kalb of NBC News, who noted a change in Soviet-American relations. Kissinger replied: “If you read what I and the President have been saying, we never went quite so far as talking about a period of testing. We wanted to be sure the positive side would win out. Pressure on us wasn’t way to get anywhere. During the summer, Cuba, ceasefire, Berlin air corridors have been worrisome symptoms. But if you read my backgrounders when I spoke about Cuba you have to be careful to avoid getting tactical advantage out of every situation and get [omission in transcript] of peace. We have had Jordan and other near confrontations and we are trying to convey that if they are prepared to have a fundamental appraisal, we are. They want to get into Cuba but they have given us assurances on Cuba ’62 and submarine bases. For your own guidance, if you look at Gromyko’s performance yesterday you can see his tone today is more directed towards the future. That doesn’t mean we have come close to an agreement. This is the WH perception.” Kissinger further suggested that Kalb would “have our general philosophy” by reading the briefings in Hartford on October 12; see Document 1. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)
28. Editorial Note

On October 23, 1970, President Richard Nixon addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations on its 25th anniversary. During the week before the speech, the President prepared the text with three of his assistants: Henry Kissinger, Raymond Price, and William Safire. Nixon called Kissinger late on the afternoon of October 16 to review his plans to send a signal to the Soviets. After discussing the technical details, the two men turned to the substance of the speech:

"K: [T]here’s a section which speaks of need for restraint in international relations and Soviet/U.S. relations and winds up with theme—

"P: Of what pulls us together—

"K: And first 25 years we were enemies and became adversaries and now let’s become competitors. Now we should do something jointly. Prisoners of war, peacekeeping, narcotics. Then a very idealistic section working towards peace.

"P: What you could do is get in the theme that 25 years ago the U.S. [and USSR] had basically worked together to bring UN into being and hopes of the world were there for the two great powers working together and the great secret (?) in the next 25 years is to work together again. It downgrades the other nations but they know it’s the truth.

"K: It doesn’t have to. It’s good.

"P: Say with our allies and friends [we] reached a point to meet in San Francisco and we worked together despite differences in ideology and did not impair our working together readily and now we need a victory for peace. We worked together for a military victory, now we need a victory over poverty and that stuff. Give Ray and Safire a crack. I want a final version at 10:00 a.m. Sunday morning. That gives the boys more time.

"K: You will have a good product.

"P: We may catch the mood in view of the fact that Gromyko meeting was the day before. We may catch the right note and get some credit for the speech. We didn’t last year.

"K: There was a concerted campaign last year.

"P: Even though it was a good speech but in comparison to Kennedy speech—I was reading the Kennedy speech after the Russians recognized East Germany and he talked about Stalingrad. What rhetoric! And in terms of inflammatory—talks about [the Berlin] wall being built thereafter. I would have built it too!" (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
In spite of the efforts of his speech writing team, the President complained in an undated memorandum to Price that the text still lacked his “style, rhythm and structure.” Rather than dwell on the failures of global security, Nixon wanted to focus on geopolitical realities:

“You must recognize that one of the reasons the world had such great hopes for the United Nations at its inception was that the two most powerful nations, the United States and the Soviet Union had been allies and friends as they fought together for victory in World War II; that they had cooperated together in bringing the United Nations into being and the assumption was made that this cooperation would continue.

“It has not continued. This is not the time to point the finger of blame but simply to look at the facts of international life as they are rather than as we would like them to be.

“(Then comes in the section—which I very much want it—which is—good hard realistic talk—to the effect that we must recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union have very profound differences. Those differences aren’t going to be changed by better personal relations between the heads of their governments or by better understandings. We must expect that the two powers will be competitive in the world for the foreseeable future. The question is to channel that competition into creative rather than destructive activities. To move our relations from confrontation to negotiation and eventually to peaceful competition.

“I see no harm in going back to the peaceful competition theme. It is usually considered that Khrushchev thought it up—actually it was almost coincidental that at the time he made his peaceful competition proposal in the late fifties my speech at Guildhall in 1958 ran to the same theme and I think it has great pull and great appeal even today.”

Nixon asserted that the two superpowers had three fundamental interests in common: to avoid nuclear war; to limit or reduce the costs of armaments; and to increase the benefits of economic and cultural exchange. He also raised a fourth interest—the Third World—suggesting that “one-half of the savings” from arms control could be applied to “international development.” He continued:

“I have been thinking about it and it may be that this is too obvious a gimmick and it might not be acceptable in the US let alone being irritating to the Soviets. Maybe it just isn’t worth throwing out in this speech even though it would be about the only hard, new lead that we would have in the whole miserable exercise. In any event, let’s put it in only in parentheses at this and after seeing what Gromyko says I will determine whether we will leave it in.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 62, President’s Speech File, October 23, 1970, United Nations Speech [1 of 2])
Price incorporated much of Nixon’s memorandum into the final text of the speech. The President, however, gave Price another memorandum on October 19, suggesting an insertion after the section on “the three great forces that draw the US and the Soviet Union together.” “[I]t might be well and newsworthy in discussing [the desire to avoid nuclear conflict] to have a brief paragraph pointing out that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have avoided direct conflicts since World War II despite their differences; that both now desire to avoid that conflict, that history, particularly the tragic experience of World War I indicates that great powers can be dragged into conflict by wars that are allowed to get out of hand between small powers.” After citing “the case of the Balkans in World War I,” Nixon provided a contemporary example:

“[T]he Middle East is such a place today where the major interest of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are involved, where the problem is deep, difficult insofar as the local enmities and rivalries are concerned, but that the real question of whether there is peace or war in the area depends on whether the two major powers play a role which strengthens the forces of peace or the forces of war. For that reason we must work together not only to avoid war in the area but to develop a more compatible live and let live détente—this should be done not only because of our very sincere interest in seeing that the people of this area do have peace so that they can turn their energies to the enormous problems they have internally and not be diverting so much to the enormous burdens of war but from the self-interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union it is absolutely essential because we otherwise will find that without our wanting to have it happen, without our intention, we could be dragged into confrontation that could lead to conflict.

“Therefore, the United States not only urges the continuation of the cease-fire and welcomes the statements of the Soviet Union on this score but we will continue to work in all forums for a settlement that will reduce the dangers of war, not only in this area but with conflict that might involve the major powers.” (Ibid.)

Price revised the text of the speech in accordance with the President’s instructions. Kissinger, however, criticized the draft, especially after Gromyko’s speech at the United Nations on October 21 (see footnote 3, Document 23). During a telephone conversation with Price that evening, Kissinger raised a number of concerns:

“K: I have just started reading your draft and this is just—there is one major problem which was highlighted by the Gromyko speech. What we have about the Soviet Union right now is the sort of canned . . . assistant professors of peace groups. I know you got 90% of it from the President. If we say before the UN all the reasons why we must work together without even a slight slap at what they have done, we will make ourselves look totally ridiculous. I find it hard to see what
Gene McCarthy would have had different than what we have here. I think we should go back to what we had. What you say on page 2 should be made in reference to the Soviet Union, instead of a general attack on all countries. What we have on the Middle East is dangerous in the extreme. What does he mean we are working—does he want an explosion from the Jewish community ten days before the elections and for what? Are we announcing that we are going into discussions again? What is he trying to say?

"P: That is verbatim from a tape he dictated.
"K: Let's take out the phrase, 'in all available forums.' We have to tone down paragraph on page 7. We must not work together—that's exactly what has been happening. Somebody who has just kicked us in the teeth and then has just repeated it in a speech to the UN—it just doesn't sound right. We must 'work'—leave out 'together.'
"P: What he is saying is not that we have been—but that we should.
"K: I guarantee you this paragraph is going to—no one listened to me in June.
"P: It didn't come across to me as soft. It came across to me as a warning to the Soviets.
"K: I am not going to argue because this is not the way to write a speech. But I tell you that anything under these conditions which gives us a condominium impression is going to be serious. I don't mind saying we must strive, we must work, but together just has to go. I don't like the whole paragraph because it doesn't say anything. It is canned—it doesn't mean anything. What does he have in mind? The Soviets kicked us in the teeth by violating the agreement and they have refused to rectify it. Are we going to say let bygones be bygones? What do you suppose it means?
"P: That they have not worked together in the past and they have to now.
"K: I am telling you the Soviets will tell us they accept the paragraph and let's get going working together. We have two choices—either work together or work on alternative paragraphs.
"P: I think there ought to be a paragraph from you that he could work at.
"K: I would prefer to have him have one instead of driving him up the wall. I consider this paragraph lousy—it's just not related to the issues on the table. This can get us in the dilemma that got us in the mess to begin with. I don't believe Sisco will approve this. Will you try to redraft this to take my concerns in mind? Can we get it within the next hour so we can send it to the Department? I would like a paragraph that takes note of the Gromyko speech that says he [Nixon] will however not engage in recounting our list of grievances, to say one of
the paramount problems of this period is that we have to transcend the approaches in which each country was to achieve for itself the greatest possible gain. Do you see what I mean? Say because such an approach could lead to confrontation. This is all the more important because there are bigger things with regards to the Soviet Union. I think we are letting them off in a way—this speech now reads as if nothing happened this summer.

“P: It doesn’t to me.

“K: Look, I have been a party to all discussions with the Soviets. What could we not have said on page 6 or 7 in June? Everything we said in June is the universal truth. The Soviets have a big decision whether they are to confront or cooperate. What the New York Times said today is what I agree with—of course, they got it from my backgrounder in Hartford.

“(laughter)

“P: I will try to work out something.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

On October 22, both before and after his meeting with Gromyko, Nixon continued to revise the text of his address. According to H.R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff, the President “[s]pent all afternoon in EOB on speech, except for time with me, and K.” (Entry for October 22; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

Secretary of State William Rogers called Kissinger that day at 2:11 p.m. to suggest some last minute changes. “As the [North Vietnamese] would say,” Kissinger replied, “we will approach them with good will and serious intent.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File) In an undated handwritten note to Nixon, Rogers also offered his congratulations: “During one week the media says ‘U.S.-Soviet relations at a low ebb.’ Next week ‘the U.S. & the Soviet Union have joined forces.’ I think your speech has the right tone.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 62, President’s Speech File, October 23, 1970, United Nations Speech [1 of 2])

The next day, the President delivered his half-hour speech to the General Assembly at 3:30 p.m. According to one press report, the “scattered applause” was “noticeably shorter and less enthusiastic than it had been for the preceding speaker, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.” (Henry Tanner, “Nixon, at the U.N., Bids Moscow Keep Rivalry Peaceful,” New York Times, October 24, 1970, pages 1, 10) Haldeman recorded the reaction from both the audience and from Nixon himself in his diary as follows: “United Nations. Usual lousy

29. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, October 23, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The conversation came about because the President wanted me to take up the issue of how to deal with getting substantive talks started between Israel and the Arab countries, and also to explore the possibility of the Summit.²

Middle East

I began the conversation by telling Dobrynin that the President had decided after the conversation with Gromyko that he would use his influence to move the negotiations forward. However, the Soviet Union had an important decision to make. Did it want to handle the problem purely tactically in order to get the maximum benefit with the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Kissinger forwarded and summarized the “full records” of his meetings with Dobrynin on October 23 and 27 in a memorandum to the President on November 3. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to Rogers on October 28, Kissinger also forwarded “a record of my Cuba and Summit discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin” on those dates, which was comprised of selected excerpts from his memoranda of conversation. One substantive deletion from this record is noted below. According to Haig’s handwritten notation, Rogers saw it aboard Air Force One on October 28. (Ibid.)

² As Kissinger commented in his memoirs: “One did not have to be too well versed in American politics to understand this rather transparent maneuver so close to our Congressional elections.” (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 795)
Arabs, or would it cooperate with us in a way that would let negotiations proceed towards a reasonable conclusion? Specifically, it was essential if negotiations were to start that there not be too much of a strain between us and Israel. This meant that we should not be pushed into a position either of disassociating ourselves from Israel in the UN debate or of being pushed with it into a position of relative isolation. We, therefore, would suggest either that there be no debate on the issue or that the Soviet Union use its influence in the direction of a moderate resolution.

I said that I would be talking to Golda Meir on Sunday\(^3\) and I would be able to give him a better assessment then of how quickly we could move matters to a negotiation. However, we would attempt to do it in a way that met the legitimate concerns of all sides. We wanted the Soviet Union to take the same attitude, however.

Dobrynin replied that it was one thing for us to have this understanding between our two countries. It was another, though, to get the Arabs to call off a debate on the basis of such a vague assurance. He therefore wondered whether it might not be better to let the debate proceed with the understanding that the Soviet Union would use its influence in the direction of moderation. In any event, the Soviet Union would not exacerbate the situation. It was not possible though for the Soviet Union to go to the Arabs and say they had a vague understanding—all the more so if they would not be able to describe the nature of that understanding or the channel.

I said that another aspect of the proposition was that the ceasefire would have to last six months this time if the talks proceeded. Dobrynin said that this was being seriously studied in Moscow. Finally, I said that if we found it necessary to give military equipment to Israel in order to move it towards negotiations the Soviet Union should not use this in order to inflame Arab feelings.

Dobrynin asked whether I was saying we were giving military equipment beyond what had already been agreed to by the Johnson Administration. I replied that, since the Soviet Union did not give us a schedule of its deliveries, no point was served by my being more specific. He knew very well what I meant.

Dobrynin asked me whether it might not be best to have the debate proceed and to try to concert our actions with respect to the Resolution. I told him this might be a possibility.

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3 October 25.
Summit

We then turned to the Summit announcement. Dobrynin asked me which of the two dates the President had mentioned for the announcement—October 29 or October 30—we were thinking of. I told Dobrynin that the President was now thinking of a Summit announcement for October 30, in California, and I added that it seemed to me unnecessary to wait for final word until Gromyko returned to Moscow since I had every confidence that their communications system was adequate to getting a response.

Dobrynin replied that the communications had indeed been used and that a full report had been sent to Moscow. He hoped to have a reply by the first half of next week. He asked the reason for the hurry. I said that it was to prevent leakage and, in any event, if these things were done, they were just as well done quickly. 4

I then requested Dobrynin to see to it that the two Generals that had been captured because their plane was forced down at the Turkish border be released as quickly as possible. Dobrynin asked whether I could assure him that they were not on an intelligence mission. I replied that, to the best of my information, they were not on an intelligence mission, certainly not one of which the White House had any cognizance. If investigations should turn up that they were, it was a local affair. However, I did not believe that they had been on such a mission. Dobrynin said, “If they have been on an intelligence mission, will you reprimand them?” I said I would have to look into the matter, but I wanted to tell him that it would make a good impression if they were released as quickly as possible. Dobrynin said he would transmit this to Moscow.

Dobrynin then said that the Soviet Union had a concern that they had raised with a number of people. The Ivanov 5 case had been hanging fire for a long time. It had been raised with Secretary Rogers and previously with Secretary Rusk. It was a matter of great concern to the Soviet leadership. Ivanov was not, himself, an important person, but it would be taken as a sign of good will if he were released. I told Dobrynin I did not know anything about the case, but I would look into it. If I had anything to say about it, I would communicate with him.

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4 Kissinger deleted the last two sentences from the record he gave Rogers.

5 Ivanov is a spy we have been holding and do not wish to release because we are using his case to get a constitutional determination on wire tapping. If we let him go now, we lose the opportunity to get a ruling. Once we have a determination in hand there should be little problem in releasing him. This should take about another year. [Footnote is in the original. For background on the case, see Document 33.]
Cuba

Dobrynin then raised the issue of Cuba. He said Gromyko, the previous day, had been amazed that the President had listed Cuba among the topics to be discussed, but had never returned to it. He wondered whether that had any significance. Were we planning anything with respect to Cuba?

Dobrynin said that if the issue had been raised, Gromyko had been instructed to say the following: “We do not have a submarine base in Cuba, nor are we building a military naval facility. We do not intend to have a military naval facility, and we will abide strictly by our understandings of 1962. We are also making the exchanges from August onward part of the understanding of 1962.” Dobrynin added an oral comment that the list of excluded provisions in my oral note could not be accepted in that form because it was not based on reciprocity. The Soviet Union had not given us a list of what sort of exile activities we could not support and we could not give a list of legal standing to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union understood from that list what we considered a naval base, and it would take it into serious consideration in interpreting what constituted a base. The one thing that concerned the Soviet Union was the implication that occasional visits by ships or submarines were excluded, particularly if they were courtesy and ceremonial visits.

I replied the distinction was perfectly obvious. We could not object to an occasional ceremonial visit. We would object, however, to a visit of a nature which extended the operating radius or the length of time that the ship could stay at sea, using Cuban facilities or Soviet facilities based in Cuba. Dobrynin said this was covered by the phrase “Soviet military naval base.” I responded that I wanted to make sure, for example, that he understood that we could not consider the presence of the Soviet submarine tender a courtesy visit when it had been in Cuban waters for over a month and it continued to stay. It would raise serious questions again. Dobrynin said, “Well, in due time, it will probably leave, but we understand the proposition you are making.

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6 On October 25, the *New York Times* reported that Kissinger met Gromyko, as well as Dobrynin, during his visit to the Soviet Mission two days earlier. According to this report, Soviet and American sources had “reluctantly confirmed” that the meeting had taken place but refused to disclose the subject of conversation, “which might have dealt with American concern about possible construction of a Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba.” (Hedrick Smith, “Gromyko Meets Kissinger Quietly,” *New York Times*, October 25, 1970, p. 20) No evidence has been found, however, that Kissinger also met Gromyko on October 23.

7 Dated October 9. See Document 6 and footnote 3 thereto.
We simply cannot accept the proposition that we do not have a right to make occasional visits.”

I said, “I want you to know that we will consider this list as an indicator of what constitutes a base, and we note as a positive contribution your statement about a military naval and submarine base.” Dobrynin replied that he wanted to call particular attention to the phrase “we will strictly observe these agreements” and that the exchange of views from August onward would be incorporated into the understandings of 1962.

Closing

There then was some desultory conversation about the organization of government. It was Dobrynin’s view that the method of having one central focus into which flowed information from the State Department, the Defense Department, and intelligence was something that the Kremlin was lacking, and that they should implement.

Dobrynin then made some small talk about various personalities and the meeting ended. The atmosphere was extremely cordial throughout. Dobrynin served brandy and tea, and was his most affable self.

30. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Zimyanin and Zamyatin

Mikhail Zimyanin has been editor-in-chief of Pravda since September 1965. He is an old line party functionary who rose to prominence in Belorussia under Stalin, advancing to the Central Committee at

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Stalin’s last Congress in 1952. He and others with him fell from grace by the anti-Stalin 20th Party Congress in 1956, and went into diplomatic assignments. He served in Hanoi as Ambassador from 1956–58, and in Prague from 1960–65. He returned as editor-in-chief of Pravda after Khrushchev fell, and returned to the Central Committee in 1966. He is generally considered on the conservative side of Kremlin politics, but also described as intelligent and articulate.

His chief geographical interest is the Far East. He was briefly head of the Far East Department in the Ministry after returning from Hanoi. He speaks virtually no English.

Leonid Zamyatin was promoted to Director of TASS this spring, after serving as Foreign Ministry press spokesman since 1962. He served at the UN from 1946–1957, and afterward specialized in American affairs in the Ministry when Dobrynin was in charge of the American Section. He was promoted to TASS director as part of a general political shakeup this spring, presumably reflecting Brezhnev’s desires. In his present job he would normally go on the Central Committee next spring at the Congress.

Gerry Schechter from Time, who has been doing some of the rounds with them, seems to think that Zamyatin is the better conversationalist and may be closer to the center of power. (The record suggests that Zimyanin as editor-in-chief of Pravda would be more attuned to the top leadership.)

Schechter also says that they seem to have no particular message. I suspect, however, that they are on a high reconnaissance mission, using the UN Press Panel 25th Anniversary as a convenient way to take the temperature here while Gromyko was here, and in light of the tensions in our relations over the last few months. If they have a message it would probably not be particularly different from the public line—we are artificially creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere, our words are not matched by deeds, etc.

Since both are certainly going to report fairly accurately what you say, you can pick the subject that you wish to reinforce. In a sense it will be a follow-up to the Gromyko talks, except of course, that Time–Life reporters will be there. In view of Zimyanin’s service in Hanoi and his interest in the Far East, this might be an area to start with, though not to dwell on. (See below)

We understand that Hugh Sidey, Gerry Schechter and maybe one other Time–Life man will be there, the two Russians, and maybe an interpreter from the Soviet Embassy.

They are both having lunch today with Ron Ziegler and Bob McCloskey.
If you have a chance for serious talk in the group, I would suggest you make the following points (bearing in mind that what you say will also be played back through the Time–Life machine):

1. The President is in charge of foreign policy; whatever the influences that bear in on him, he makes the decisions.

2. The fundamental outlook of the country, despite the press and the intellectuals, is conservative and there remains a reservoir of suspicion toward communism and the USSR that it would not be difficult for a President to play on.

3. But the President has set out on a policy of negotiation based on the realities of power and reciprocity and on a mutual respect of interests.

4. This President has more leeway to conduct such a policy than his Democratic predecessors or any Democratic successor because he need not worry about criticism from the right.

5. It would be preposterous to suggest—as the Soviets have—that a President who has made negotiation rather than confrontation his hallmark would artificially manufacture a crisis with the USSR; our problems with Soviet policy were real and specific; fortunately some though not all, seem to have moderated now.

6. We do not expect ideological differences or certain broad differences in outlook to disappear but we think a viable modus vivendi can be evolved between us provided neither great power seeks momentary tactical advantages out of some crisis or attempts to obtain paramount influence in one or another area.

7. We recognize the USSR world power and have no desire to deny it such a role provided it is played under the terms indicated above.

8. We have been restrained in our arms policy. The Soviets may think that this is solely due to economic problems. We do have economic problems and would much rather devote increasing resources to them. But it would not be difficult for this President to persuade the American people that the Soviet build-up (SS–9s, etc.) and other Soviet activities, e.g. Mediterranean, are inimical to our interests and require new efforts on our part. (Next Congress may be more conservative than this one.)

9. So, as the President suggested, this may be an unusual opportunity for both sides to make decisions that will produce what will still be a competitive but potentially a less antagonistic and less wasteful relationship. (The Soviets should take this into consideration as they prepare for their Party Congress and Five Year Plan.)

Note: If the question comes up, you may want to say that
—our dealings with Romania are not based on any anti-Soviet purposes but strictly on the principle that every nation has the right to its sovereign independence; we seek no special position there; we recognize Soviet sensitivity about its western neighbors but not the Brezhnev doctrine;

—we will deal with China in conformity with our own interests as a great power on the same Pacific ocean as we; we take no sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict and see no interest of ours served by any open hostility between those two powers. (You may add your point from backgrounders that we can understand to some extent the Soviet feeling of having vast, relatively empty lands adjacent to 700 million bustling Chinese with nuclear weapons and territorial claims. But on the other hand the Soviets (and Russians) treated the Chinese as a second-rate power for a century and they now reap the fruit of that folly.)

I think your basic approach to these people should be not to get into current diplomatic issues but to deal with US-Soviet relations on a conceptual plane. (Zamyatin, a slick operator and former diplomat may try to get you involved in the Middle East, etc., but your real target is Zimyanin, whose access to the top and whose probable association with the conservative strain in Soviet politics make him the most important Soviet you will have talked to in the period since you have been in the White House.)

31. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 26, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Hugh Sidey, Time–Life
Mr. Simmons Fentress, Time–Life
Mr. Herman Nickel, Time–Life
Mr. William Mader, Time–Life
Mr. Gerald Schecter, Time–Life
Mr. Mikhail Zimyanin, Editor-in-Chief, Pravda
Mr. Leonid Zamyatin, Director of TASS
Soviet Interpreter
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

The meeting took place in the Time–Life offices on 16th Street and ran about from 6:40 p.m. to 7:35 p.m., Monday, October 26, 1970.2

Approximately the first half hour was taken up with questions relating to the press. The Time–Life people noted the troubles their correspondents had had in Moscow, and stressed the desirability for more reciprocity. Zimyanin went into a rather lengthy and defensive dissertation on the nature of the Soviet press, seconded from time to time by Zamyatin. His basic point was that it was wrong to see the Soviet press, and Pravda in particular, as monolithic and “totalitarianism!” There were differences of view and self-criticism as well as spirited debates. Basically, of course, he stressed the Soviet press reflected the socialist system and the commitment of the Soviet people to it.

Sidey asked how the Soviets viewed President Nixon. Zimyanin said they recognized him as the President of the United States, who

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2 Kissinger also briefly attended a luncheon for Zimyanin and Zamyatin at the White House that afternoon, arriving in time to answer a question from Zimyanin on “an alleged anti-Soviet campaign” in the United States. According to a memorandum of conversation, “Dr. Kissinger said that the Administration did not conduct and has no intention of conducting an anti-Soviet campaign either for domestic or propaganda reasons. To set the record straight, Dr. Kissinger noted that the months of June and July were marked by a feeling that progress was being made with the Soviet Union in some areas. However, events surrounding the standstill violations in the Middle East, developments in Cuba—about which he did not believe it necessary to elaborate—as well as other Soviet actions led people to question the motives and intentions of the Soviet Union.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)
had been elected by the American people and was in charge in Washington. Zamyatin interjected that it was no secret that in previous administrations there had been an understanding that there would never be personal attacks on each other's leaders and he implied that in this administration this understanding was being violated by the US. (Time's correspondent was expelled because two Time stories had referred to leadership struggles in the USSR and the role of the military.)

Dr. Kissinger noted that the President had never attacked any Soviet leader nor indeed the Soviet system and that this was our general rule. He noted that we could not control what the American press said; in fact, what it said about President Nixon and the US Administration was a lot rougher than anything it said about the Soviets. Sidey said there was a "friendly adversary relationship" and that any US newspaperman who was uncritical of the President and the Administration might as well turn in his White House press card.

The Time people urged greater reciprocity for US correspondents, noting that the TASS man was always the first one in the White House press office to pick up texts of Dr. Kissinger's backgrounders. Zamyatin said these were read very carefully in Moscow. Both Soviets stressed that all foreigners, except socialist ones, were subject to the same restrictions in the USSR and that no one minded if they performed their duties as journalists. It was only when they performed other activities and wrote slanderously that trouble occurred.

In making the point that the President and his associates had not criticized the Soviet leaders or their system, Dr. Kissinger noted that actually the President's constituency was such that it would be easy and natural for the President to attack the Soviets, but he had deliberately chosen not to do so. Zimyanin said this was understood in Moscow.

Sidey then asked whether US-Soviet relations were better or worse now, nearly two years after the President had enunciated the principle of negotiation rather than confrontation. Zimyanin took over and, looking mostly at the floor, spoke rapidly and intensely. He said Vietnam continued to be the great stumbling block. The US talked of an "honorable settlement" but it was not taking into account what the other side would regard as honorable. In general, we did not show responsiveness in our proposals to those made by the other side, which the USSR supports. Sidey commented that the President was trying to end the war. Zimyanin persisted.

3 Stanley W. Cloud, a correspondent for Time magazine in Moscow, left the Soviet Union on June 13.
Dr. Kissinger said that we had done just about everything that we had always been told would produce constructive negotiations. We had stopped the bombing; we had begun withdrawals; we had withdrawn 100,000 men; we had agreed to accept a fixed timetable for complete withdrawal; we had agreed to talk to the NLF; we had appointed a new senior negotiator in Paris. None of this had produced the results we were assured would ensue. The only thing we had not done was to accept the other side’s demand for a coalition. In fact, the other side was not even proposing a genuine coalition; it was trying to name the people on the Saigon side that fitted its own definition of people committed to “freedom and independence.” Dr. Kissinger concluded that we obviously had an interest in achieving an honorable and lasting settlement because we would be 10,000 miles away while the Vietnamese would be on the ground; if they did not accept the settlement they would obviously wreck it.

Zimyanin expressed appreciation for Dr. Kissinger’s systematic exposition of the US view. He then delved into history, noting his own tenure as Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi from 1956–1958. He argued that the people of VN had elected Ho Chi Minh democratically after World War II; then the French had tried to reconquer the country; then Geneva ensued and there was agreement for free elections by 1956. But the US sabotaged this agreement and instead installed a “democratic” regime in the South which has changed 13 times and now is dominated by Ky, who has openly expressed his admiration for Hitler. Dr. Kissinger observed that there was obviously much more to say and there undoubtedly would be many matters on which we would not reach agreement, including, perhaps, the precise meaning of the concept of an “honorable settlement.” In any case, he noted that despite all our actions in response to the advice we had received no negotiations were taking place and that all we were confronting in Paris was a repeated examination by the other side in our comprehension of the terms and meaning of its five, eight, or whatever the number, of points they happened to be putting forward at a given moment.

Zimyanin repeated that we should remember that the other side wanted an honorable settlement too. He said the Soviet position was simple: there could only be a settlement by political means. Dr. Kissinger said we fully subscribed to this principle.

In parting, Zimyanin said that the Soviets this summer just had to react to the aspersions being cast on them in connection with Jordan, Suez, Cuba etc. He said the Soviets had nothing to do with what Syrian tanks did in Jordan and found it baffling that we should have been beating our breasts about somehow having faced down the Soviets by our military moves. No Soviet military moves had occurred, no rockets were moved. He went on, in rapid-fire fashion to deny that
the Soviets were anti-Israel or anti-semitic or, for that matter pro-semitic. *Pravda*'s whole message had been that Israel may think it was sitting pretty now but in the long run its policy was suicidal because it was surrounded by vast sea of hostile Arabs. The US was backing the wrong horse; it was time to change the Rogers Plan, and for the US to stop backing the Israelis 100%. Dr. Kissinger commented that that was not the version we got from the Israelis as regards to our backing them.

The meeting ended with expressions of appreciation all around that at least a brief talk had been possible.

In parting Dr. Kissinger mentioned to Sidey that at one point in the Jordan crisis when he had talked to Soviet DCM Vorontsov about Soviet involvement in the Syrian tank invasion of Jordan, Vorontsov had commented indignantly that all the Soviet advisors had jumped off the tanks before they entered Jordan.

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32. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 27, 1970, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

I asked Dobrynin for the meeting in order to have an excuse to discuss the possible Summit announcement.

Middle East

I began the conversation by telling Dobrynin that I had talked with Golda Meir and that we were going to try to move things in the direction of substantive talks; however, it would take several weeks to accomplish this. He asked what I thought the timing might be. I said it would be around December 1st before I could get a clear picture, but that I was fairly hopeful of being able to do something in that time frame, give or take a few weeks. I said it was highly important that no effort be made to drive a wedge between us and the Israelis in the interval and that there be restraint shown in the General Assembly. Dobrynin said he understood.

Summit

Dobrynin then said he had a message for me which was as follows. First, the Soviet Government wished strongly to reaffirm its desire for a Summit meeting. Secondly, the Soviet Government agreed with the President that such a meeting had to be carefully prepared. Thirdly, it therefore proposed the initiation of discussions about agenda

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Drafted on October 28. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 5:12 until 5:35 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Kissinger forwarded and summarized the “full records” of his meetings with Dobrynin on October 23 and 27 in a memorandum to Nixon on November 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 2) In a memorandum to Rogers on October 28, Kissinger also forwarded “a record of my Cuba and Summit discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin” on those dates, which was comprised of selected excerpts from his memorandum of conversation. According to Haig’s handwritten notation, Rogers saw it aboard Air Force One on October 28. (Ibid.)

2 No record of a conversation either in person or by telephone has been found.
and substance in the confidential channel of Dobrynin and Kissinger. Fourth, in the course of these discussions, the timing of the visit and the announcement of it could naturally be discussed. Fifth, pending such discussion and agreement, the Soviet Government expected that there be no leak. Considering that only three people knew on our side and only five people on the Soviet side, the Soviet Government was confident that this restriction could be maintained.

I told Dobrynin that this was clear and that I would inform the President accordingly. He reiterated the need for no leaks. I told him that I would undertake personally to do everything the White House could to avoid it and that I thought I would succeed.

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3 In the record he gave Rogers, Kissinger omitted any reference to his “confidential channel” with Dobrynin and redrafted this point as follows: “Third, in the course of these preparations, the timing of the visit and the announcement of it could naturally be discussed.”

4 Kissinger omitted this fourth point and renumbered the fifth point in the record he gave Rogers.

5 In the record he gave Rogers, Kissinger added that the Secretary of State would also be informed accordingly.

6 Haldeman noted in his diary entry for October 27: “Haig called me on plane to report Soviets turned down idea of announcing Summit this week. Say they need more time for preparation. Actually just don’t want to help us in the elections. Warned against any leak, would scuttle whole plan. P not very disturbed, seemed to expect it.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, p. 205)
SUBJECT

Status of the Ivanov Case

Attached is a fact sheet prepared by Art Downey which summarizes the current status of the Ivanov case. I have not made any contacts with Justice on this issue until you have had an opportunity to assess on your own the complexities of this long-standing problem area. I am informed that the Soviets have opened this case with the United States government on at least seven prior occasions and that they never fail to do so whenever the opportunity arises.

The current situation with the summit and détente on the horizon and the two U.S. generals in a hostage configuration again provides a propitious opening for the Soviets. Because of the case’s linkage with wire tapping evidence, the Cassius Clay issue and the horrendous implications of this case to our Constitutional laws, I am confident that John Mitchell will take the hard line as Justice has continually done despite a drumbeat of pressure from State over the years.

My concern is that if we were to try to shake Ivanov loose we would be succumbing to future blackmail of this kind and would provide an incentive for the Soviets to pick up innocent U.S. citizens in return for proven Soviet spies. Therefore if we were to move, it should only be after our two generals have been released. I am also concerned that the Soviet response to the summit initiative does not justify our taking this action which would only confirm obvious Soviet suspicions that we are slobbering for a summit—an attitude generated by events.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, Haig drafted the memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 In a memorandum forwarding the status report to Haig on October 28, Sonnenfeldt argued: "While I do not know what is in play at the moment, I strongly urge that any thought of exchanging Ivanov for the Generals should quickly be abandoned: Ivanov just happens to be a real spy, in contrast to the accidental intrusion of the Generals’ light aircraft; having secured the release of Ivanov by linkage to the Generals, (after years of unsuccessful diplomatic approaches), the Soviets would be given the incentive to hold American tourists, etc., the next time they want us to release another spy; there may be fairly strong (and righteous) resistance within the Justice Department to any such suggestion." (Ibid.)
of the past two weeks which must have the Kremlin hierarchy puzzled if not totally flabbergasted.\(^3\)

**Recommendation**

That we do not stir the waters on this controversial case without a sizeable quid pro quo and that we hold this issue in abeyance until we need something from the Soviets beside the release of generals or sweet music in the wake of the Gromyko visit.\(^4\)

**Attachment**\(^5\)

*The Status of the Ivanov Case*

*Background.* A Soviet national employed as a chauffer by Amtorg (Soviet trading company), Igor Ivanov was arrested in 1963 and convicted one year later for espionage. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, but after serving only a very short while, he has been free on a bail bond pending his appeal. The court has confined his freedom to New York City and the Soviet estate on Long Island.

Ivanov appealed his conviction essentially on the assertion that the wiretapping employed in his case was unconstitutional. His appeal traveled to the US Supreme Court which in 1968 decided to remand the case to the Federal District Court in New Jersey. The issues were divided into two, one constitutional and the other evidentiary. The constitutional issue was whether telephone surveillance conducted without a court order, but ordered by the Attorney General in the interests of national security, was constitutional. The relatively minor factual issue was whether the wiretapping of Amtorg (uncontestably unconstitutional) provided evidence that “tainted” the conviction of Ivanov. The District Court on October 15 decided the constitutional issue in favor of the Government. It will soon set a date for a hearing on the factual question.

*The Department of Justice’s Interest*

The Justice Department has withstood some forty approaches from the Soviets over the years to take action to release Ivanov. State has

\(^3\) In a note to Kissinger on October 29, Haig noted “a little clarification of Soviet views on the Ivanov case.” On the basis of an attached telegram (6440 from Moscow, October 28), Haig reported: “As you can see, what they are pressing for is to have Ivanov released on bail so that the United States will not have to compromise on the constitutional principle. Obviously, he will never return.” Kissinger initialed the note. (Ibid.)

\(^4\) Kissinger indicated neither approval nor disapproval of this recommendation. He instead wrote the following response on the first page of the memorandum: “Issue was not a trade of Ivanoff for 2 generals but a general contribution to détente.”

\(^5\) Secret; Sensitive; Outside System.
pressed Justice almost as hard and with equal lack of success. Justice argues that it is not harboring vindictive motives nor does it fail to understand the international factors involved. Rather, this particular case just happens to present in the most favorable light the very important constitutional issue of wiretapping for national security reasons. A decision against the Government on this issue would severely hamper Justice’s investigatory responsibilities, so Justice argues.

Once the Supreme Court has decided the constitutional issue in the Ivanov case, Justice undoubtedly would not care whether Ivanov was then expelled from the country.

Next Steps. As soon as the New Jersey District Court decides the point of evidence, Ivanov is expected to appeal that Court’s decision on the constitutional point to the Third Circuit Federal Court. From the Third Circuit, the case would move to the Supreme Court at an unhurried pace. However, the constitutional issue is virtually identical to the one in the case of Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali), although Justice feels the Ivanov case is more favorable to its position. The Clay case will probably come before the Supreme Court within a year, and the Court may very well assume jurisdiction over the Ivanov case from the Circuit Court (prior to a decision there) in order to have the two cases decided at the same time.

State has been doing some internal studies on the idea of altering Ivanov’s bail provisions to permit him to return to the USSR (theoretically pending the conclusion of his appeal). State hopes that Justice might be more receptive to this approach, particularly since the Government on October 15 won the initial favorable decision on the constitutional point from the District Court. However, it is equally possible that Justice may argue that now that the case is finally nearing the point of getting to the Supreme Court for final decision (perhaps within a year), it is not the time to consider releasing Ivanov. In short, Justice may say that after six years, one more year won’t hurt anyone and this is the critical year.
34. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
and Secretary of State Rogers

K: I was having lunch with Irwin and I thought I would stop by.
You haven’t had any thoughts? I don’t think we should try it.2 I don’t
see what we can do now.
R: I don’t either.
K: It wasn’t a firm question. It would give an impression of fran-
tic activity.
R: Did you have any discussion with Dobrynin on—
K: They wanted to reaffirm it. They are interested. They are
prepared to discuss it [omission in transcript] terms of agenda. Two
problems—looked like an election ploy and it looked like a sudden
change to them. I am sending you the note. It’s very brief. They specif-
ically reaffirmed the invitation and interest.
R: Just the election ploy is understandable.
K: I told you, from our point of view, I am not sure it’s not a bless-
ing. We would have had a lot of explaining to do.
R: I don’t see why we should announce it so far in advance. Some
in advance but—
K: Jan. or Feb. we might need it. I don’t think it would add to the
situation.
R: Other talks with Dobrynin.
K: There were no other talks.
R: When you saw him in NY3 they didn’t indicate it was all right
and then back away from it?
K: He asked when we wanted to announce it. He thought the 30th
and I said the President thought the 29th. He said I would have an an-
swer by next week. 99% of discussion was Cuba. I have written that
up and will let you have it.4 Other topic was just to clarify between the
29th and 30th.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Tele-
phone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 Reference is to the abortive plan to announce a summit meeting. See Document 32.
3 See Document 29.
4 See footnote 1, Document 29, and footnote 1, Document 32.
R: I saw him at dinner last night but he didn’t raise the subject. We will let it stand.

K: Maybe in late Nov. or Dec. you could start generally talking about an agenda. I don’t want to get in it.

R: On the other subject, tell the President there’s nothing that isn’t contrived.

K: If you try you pay for it later. In fact, now it will look obvious. Many elements of the bureaucracy would say they hadn’t heard of it.

R: The President looks great anyway.

K: Considering difficulties we have overcome—

R: Not an issue in the campaign.

K: No one attacking him.

R: Position on Israel is good.

K: We have pulled out of that.

R: We met with the Arabs last night—Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco and very friendly.

K: Considering we are in morass we are doing well.

R: See you at 4:00 tomorrow.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) No record has been found to indicate that Kissinger and Rogers met on October 29.

SUBJECT

Feeler from Soviet Embassy Official Concerning the Americans Being Held in Armenia

At 7:30 this evening John Price of Mr. Ehrlichman's staff came to me with a bizarre feeler from the Soviets which he asked me to pass to you directly.

Last night at midnight Victor Tchernyshev, a Second Secretary in the Soviet Embassy here and reputedly their KGB man in the Embassy, called Theodore Barreaux, an American who works for OEO. Barreaux, who is a friend of Price, has known Tchernyshev for a long time. Tchernyshev said he had an important message and Barreaux met with him in the Mayflower Hotel at 5:00 p.m. this afternoon.

In their meeting Tchernyshev told Barreaux that it would be very useful if he got the following information to the President. He said it would be advantageous for the United States to consider the following proposal with regard to the three Americans whose plane strayed over the Turkish/Soviet border and are being held by the Soviets. The proposal is a trade of the Americans for the two Soviet citizens who hijacked the Aeroflot plane and are being held by the Turks, and Ivanov, the Soviet spy we have been holding for some time. (You will recall that Dobrynin recently raised the Ivanov case with you.) Tchernyshev added that "I cannot guarantee their health." He closed by saying that this proposal should not go through Rogers to Dobrynin, but that any response should go directly to him, Tchernyshev.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Haig. Kissinger, who had been with Nixon at the Western White House in San Clemente, returned to Washington with the Presidential party on November 4 at 9:34 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

2 Barreaux was vice chairman and senior adviser, Planning and Review Commission, Office of the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President.

3 See Document 29.

4 No evidence has been found to indicate that Kissinger sent a response, either directly or indirectly, to Tchernyshev.
Comment

I have never met Price before and do not know Barreaux. Weird (and outrageous) as this proposal is, I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of the story Price told me.

36. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 5, 1970, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Russian Ambassador
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Dobrynin had requested the appointment while I was in California. In order not to show too much eagerness, I suggested that we meet on November 6. He indicated however that he had already sat on his instructions for several days and would appreciate seeing me the first day back. We therefore arranged to meet in the Military Aide’s office, our usual meeting room the Map Room being preempted by a party given by Mrs. Nixon.

The conversation opened with a general exchange about the significance of the election. Dobrynin said that he had noticed our claim of an ideological shift in the Senate and that, while he did not want to

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Military Aide’s office in the East Wing of the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 3:35 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Lord forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on November 7 with the following note: “I am sure you have told the President about his position on our officers held by the Soviets, and therefore see no reason to forward this Memcon to him.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3) Kissinger, however, forwarded it and a summary of its “highlights” to Nixon on November 16. (Ibid.)

2 The results of the mid-term Congressional elections on November 3 were mixed. The Democratic Party maintained control of both houses, losing 4 seats in the Senate but gaining 12 in the House of Representatives. President Nixon, however, claimed that the outcome would give him a “working majority” in the next Congress. Vice President Agnew added that the elections for the Senate had resulted in a “very definite ideological change irregardless of party.” (Don Oberdorfer and Carroll Kilpatrick, “O’Brien Hails ’72 Outlook: But President Sees ‘Working’ Hill Majority,” Washington Post, November 5, 1970, pp. A1, A15)
contest our assessment, he wanted to try out his own on me. His assessment was that while there had been a slight shift to the right in the Senate, the Democrats would be so encouraged by the results in the House and in the Governors’ races that they would make up in the violence of their attacks for the relative loss in the Senate. He therefore thought that the net result was a stand-off. He also believed that it would not affect US-Soviet relationships and that we should continue along the road that we had charted.

I said I was not a domestic expert and I didn’t want to debate his interpretation, though I was sure that the Senate would be easier to work with. I did agree, however, that it would not affect US-Soviet relations.

Dobrynin then began to make a brief statement to the following effect.

The incursion into the Soviet air space by the two U.S. generals and the Turkish colonel was not simply an accident. Maps shown in the airplane covering part of the Soviet territory indicated that premeditation was involved. In addition, the flights along the Soviet border were intrinsically dangerous for all these reasons. These generals had made themselves subject to Soviet criminal law. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had taken a political decision to release these officers at an early opportunity. Dobrynin said I should pay particular attention to the word “political.” Dobrynin then handed me a note—a little piece of paper—which read as follows: “We count on the U.S. Government to display due appreciation of this act of good will on the part of the Soviet Government and on its part the use of the means at its disposal in order that other corresponding questions may be resolved to mutual satisfaction.” (Note attached)³ Dobrynin said that this referred to the Ivanov case.

I told Dobrynin that he had often accused us of not understanding the Soviet decision-making system properly. In this case, however, I was certain ahead of time what the meeting would be about. I had been prepared to tell him that we would not trade a Soviet spy for two generals who had mistakenly strayed into Soviet territory, and therefore the two cases could not be brought into relation with each other. At the same time, as I had already told him weeks ago, we were looking at the Ivanov case and I would be given some information about it in several weeks or maybe longer. I told him that our principal concern was the constitutional question which we were bringing to trial through Ivanov.

³ Not printed.
Dobrynin then asked when I was prepared to begin the conversations envisaged for the preparation of the Summit. I said that I was going to Key Biscayne with the President and that I would not be ready for another three to four weeks. Dobrynin said this was fine, and the meeting ended.

4 Nixon left for Key Biscayne and the Bahamas on November 6; he returned to Washington on November 10. No evidence has been found that Kissinger accompanied him at any time during the trip. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files; and Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

37. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Non-Attendance at Soviet National Day Parties Because of Continued Detention of US Military Officers by USSR

Despite several approaches through diplomatic channels, a formal note by the Acting Secretary of State and public statements, the Soviets are continuing to detain three US military officers and a Turkish officer whose light aircraft strayed into Soviet airspace inadvertently and landed on a Soviet airfield last month. Although, despite initial Soviet delays, we have now had consular access to our officers and they appear to be well, the continued detention of these men is wholly unwarranted by any standard. (The US officers are Major General Scherrer, Brigadier General McQuarrie and Major Russell.)

It is not wholly clear why the Soviets are detaining these men. It could be due to a combination of some pulling and hauling between

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X. Confidential. Sent for urgent action. Sonnenfeld forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on November 4 with the following recommendation: “I believe that this form of action, if carried out in a disciplined fashion, could have some impact on the Soviets—hard and soft—and might spring the officers. In any case, it would be another salutary signal that the President runs this Government and will not be trifled with.” (Ibid.)

2 Not found.
different parts of the Soviet bureaucracy, an effort to induce the Turks to send back to the USSR recent hijackers of Soviet aircraft, and part of Moscow’s long-standing campaign against our military bases and activities in Turkey and other areas adjacent to the USSR.

In any event, I believe under the circumstances, it would be inappropriate for US officials to attend in the normal fashion the forthcoming October Revolution anniversary parties at Soviet Embassies and missions (November 6).

Recommendation

That you agree that Alex Butterfield notify all heads of Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch as follows:

1. In view of the continued unwarranted detention by Soviet authorities of the crew and passengers of a light aircraft which inadvertently landed on Soviet territory last month, including three officers of the US Armed Forces, it is considered inappropriate this year for any Presidential appointee or any other member of the Executive Branch of equivalent rank to attend parties at Soviet Embassies and Missions observing the Anniversary of the October Revolution.

2. Heads of Departments and Agencies should ensure that attendance at such parties by their subordinates be (a) limited in number and (b) confined to officials of middle-level rank.

3. Heads of Departments and Agencies which do not normally have business with the Soviet Government or its organizations should ensure that no members of the Departments or Agencies attend such parties.

4. While it is not intended to volunteer a public statement explaining the above measures, the following statement may be made in response to questions:

“In view of the unwarranted detention of the crew and passengers of a light American aircraft by Soviet authorities, including three officers of the Armed Services of the United States, it is not deemed appropriate this year for American officials to accept the hospitality of the Soviet Government on the occasion of the November celebration. This was a decision taken at the highest level.”

5. The above actions will not be taken if the Soviets should release the crew and passengers of the US aircraft before the parties in question occur.3

3 Nixon initialed his approval of all five parts of this recommendation. Kissinger, rather than Butterfield, signed and sent the attached memorandum to “all heads of Departments and Agencies” on November 6.
38. Editorial Note

On November 9, 1970, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger met Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the White House from 11:50 a.m. to 12:12 p.m. to discuss the release of the American officers—Major General Edward Scherrer, Brigadier General Claude McQuarrie, and Major James Russell—from detention in Soviet Armenia. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) Although no record of the meeting has been found, Kissinger discussed the situation by telephone with President Nixon in Key Biscayne, Florida at 3:40 p.m. “The Soviets are releasing the two generals about now,” Kissinger reported. “Dobrynin came in and gave me advance warning. As you know, he came in on Thurs. [November 5]” After an exchange on Vietnam, Germany, and Chile, Nixon added: “On the foreign policy world, we are doing well. Casualties down. Soviets playing games on Cuba thing and Jordan cannot be mentioned. We are doing well.” Kissinger replied: “All the newspaper comment on the foreign side is good.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)

Dobrynin, meanwhile, also gave Secretary of State William Rogers the news on the American officers. (Telegram 184290 to Moscow, November 9; ibid., NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X) Rogers then called Kissinger at 1:20 p.m. to compare notes:

“R: Did you get word from Dobrynin on the two Generals being released?

“K: Oh, great.

“R: They will be making a release at 3:00 this afternoon, but have asked us not to say anything beforehand. They will be released on the Turkish border. The Major and plane will be released tomorrow. We will hold this in confidence. I am not telling anybody until 3:00. If it leaked and something happened . . . It’s good news though.

“K: It’s excellent news. I will want to pick up some of the mood of the conversation.

“R: I want to check in the next couple of weeks on Ivanov case. That one doesn’t make any sense at all. We call him a spy and he has been at liberty in our country for six years.

“K: I think this would be an excuse on which we could make points at the appropriate moment.

“R: But we shouldn’t do it too soon, or it will look like an exchange.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)
Kissinger called Dobrynin at 6:52 p.m. to outline how the administration planned to proceed, not only on the American officers but also on the Soviet “spy,” Igor Ivanov:

“K: I have spoken to the President in Key Biscayne and he wanted me to express to you that he thought it was a most constructive step and appreciated the spirit in which it was taken. We are looking at the other matter that concerns you.

“D: Okay, thank you for calling. You will make a statement?
“K: We will make a statement tomorrow morning and so will the State Department.

“D: The other thing, we will discuss it when you come back?
“K: Which other thing?
“D: That other thing you mentioned in the first part.
“K: Oh, yes. There is a technical—I will let you know as soon as we come to a conclusion. It will not be before I come back. I wanted you to know that it is being looked at actively, at the highest level.

“D: Okay.” (Ibid., Box 27, Dobrynin File)

Kissinger called Dobrynin back at 6:57 p.m. to report that the news had already leaked to a member of Congress in spite of his efforts to maintain secrecy. The White House, therefore, planned to release its statement as soon as possible. (Ibid.) Later that evening, Ronald Ziegler, White House Press Secretary, announced in Key Biscayne that the decision to release the American officers was a “constructive step in United States-Soviet relations.” (Terrence Smith, “Freedom Was Promised,” Washington Post, November 10, 1970, page 1)
November 10, 1970.

[Omitted here is discussion of preparations for the funeral of former French President Charles de Gaulle.]


K: Yes, the Generals were released yesterday as Dobrynin told us. And we put out a rather friendly statement last night about it.

P: When are you going to start your chats with him about agenda?

K: I thought next week, or whenever you say.

P: Sure. When do you think they want to have the talks about it?

K: He's already asked me when they are ready.

P: Yes. I noticed from reading the news . . . I mean, from reading your diplomatic things that they are dragging their feet on SALT quite [omission in transcript] now. Do you think maybe that's because they're waiting for us?

K: No. Actually in SALT they are moving not in an extremely [fast] pace, but they're moving. They're revealing their position in a little more detail.

P: The other thing is that when do you think Dobrynin wants to talk about releasing the Summit thing?

K: I think we can schedule that for almost any time. Early next year. I think the way to start it is to begin talking agenda and have it emerge out of that.

P: Well, let me say this. It occurred to me that I don't want them to think—and I want the record to show—that we were panting to have it released just because of an election. So I think that maybe you ought

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. Transcribed in the White House from a tape recording. The date typed on the transcript, November 12 (when both Nixon and Kissinger were in France), was in all likelihood the day the tape was “brought in” for transcription. References in the text, including release of the American generals “yesterday” and preparations for de Gaulle’s funeral, clearly indicate that the conversation took place on November 10. While at his residence in Washington that morning, Kissinger called Nixon in Key Biscayne three times (and received one return call) before he arrived at his office at 10 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule)

2 The third SALT round began in Helsinki on November 2.
to have a meeting with him on the agenda items and say, now look, on this release of the time, and so forth, let's determine now when it's gonna be. As far as we're concerned there's no strain for us. Don't let them think we want to delay the release of the time and use that as a gimmick.

K: Right. Exactly.

P: See my point. I don’t think it makes that much difference. A good bluff, but that’s about all.

K: Well, it will be a substantial.

P: Yeah, it will be a story from there on, but I just⁴

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⁴ According to a typewritten note on the transcript, the tape recording ended at this point.

40. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, November 13, 1970, 12:05 p.m.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Vietnam.]

J: Have you seen the text on Cuba?²

K: Yes, I like that. I think that is good. I talked to the Secretary on the plane yesterday, I don’t know if you have talked to him or not, and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking. A typed note indicates the transcript was “paraphased.”

² During the daily briefing on November 13, McCloskey issued the following official statement: “On this general matter [Cienfuegos], and in light of questions that were raised here a few days ago—with me, and I think with others in the Department—let me say that in view of President Kennedy’s press conference statements on November 20, 1962, and to which this Administration has referred, and the Soviet Government’s statement issued by Tass October 13 this year, we are confident that there is understanding by the two governments of the respective positions on the limits of their actions with regard to Cuba.” Although he refused to qualify this statement, McCloskey confirmed on a background basis that the “understanding” would “preclude the establishment of a naval base for the Soviet Union at Cienfuegos or any other place in Cuba.” (Ibid., RG 59, Records of the Office of News, Transcripts of Daily News Conferences of the Department of State, Vol. 56) For the text of Kennedy’s press conference on November 20, 1962, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830–838.
I just gave him the gist of it. I did not have that exact text but we did talk about it.

J: I worked it out after we discussed it. Frankly, I had a little trouble with working out the wording. In connection with that, Fascell is pressing for hearings and wants an answer by Monday.  

K: What do you think?

J: I think we have to go up. Question of who does it. I think the finger points at me but that is something we can work out.

K: You won’t get any argument from me.

J: Ben Welles was around to see me yesterday. Times is doing a Cienfuegos article. Gist of it was we have been taken in badly and we built up the story and took credit for getting them out and now they are back in—whole thing back. He had the fact that I sent a memorandum to you on the subject.  

K: When in hell did you send a memorandum to me?

J: Quite a while ago. Only I and Ray Garthoff knew about it over here at State and you over there. Only the three of us knew that it existed.

K: Oh yes. You drew it up on a contingency basis and then we did not use it.

J: It actually never came about. He said they had from Defense that a Y-class submarine had put in to Cienfuegos.

K: That’s not true. A Yankee class submarine?

J: That’s what he said. I told him before you go to press on it you better check with DOD and make sure that that tender is still there. I made it sound like there was a question whether it would still be there or not.

K: I just do not believe that they—have you seen the latest Dobrynin memcon? I told Al Haig to send it over. I just cannot believe that they will be wanting a showdown at this point.

J: Unless they wanted to prove the ability to make “courtesy calls.” I just checked. They are still in there this morning. I will be talking to him again. Everyone knows it is there. There will be a blow up about this in the press if it is going to stay. Perhaps it would be wise to call Dobrynin.

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3 November 16.

4 Not found.

5 In a letter to Johnson on November 13, Kissinger forwarded memoranda of four conversations with Dobrynin on Cuba: September 25 (10 a.m.); September 25 (5:30 p.m.); October 6; and October 9. Unbeknownst to Johnson, the memoranda had been sanitized and abridged. See also Document 46.
K: Call up Dobrynin?
J: Yes. Only thought I have.
K: Call him up or ask him in? I will ask him in late today or early tomorrow. I will report to you as soon as I have talked to him.

[Omitted here is discussion of scheduling and personnel at the United Nations.]

41. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 14, 1970, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

I opened the conversation by telling Dobrynin that I was reluctant to raise the subject of Cuba again but their actions had given me no other choice. I wanted him to know that the President took a very dim view of the fact that the submarine tender had returned to Cienfuegos, the port from which it had originated. This made it extremely difficult for us to claim the Cuban issue was resolved. And it seemed to me inconsistent with the whole thrust of our recent conversation.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to an attached copy, Kissinger and Lord drafted the memorandum of conversation on November 20. Kissinger then forwarded this memorandum and another summarizing its “highlights” to Nixon on November 23. (Ibid.) According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting began at 10:30 and lasted until 11:10 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 Nixon and Kissinger discussed the naval situation near Cuba by telephone the previous evening: “K: The press is starting to play around again with the Cienfuegos thing and the fact that the [Soviet vessels] are still there. I am going to meet with Dobrynin in the Map Room again tomorrow. N: I wonder why they did that. K: Just trying to prove [omission in transcript] going out, there’s no sense in it anyway. They are a petty bunch. N: They are pretty small.” “When you see Dobrynin,” Nixon instructed Kissinger, “take a hard line because we can’t fool around with him now. We [They?] are going to know this affects our relations right down to the core.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)

3 See Document 38.
Dobrynin asked whether this was my personal idea or whether the President was really upset. I said I wouldn’t be talking to him unless the President were personally concerned with the matter. Dobrynin then said he would have to report it to Moscow but asked if I really thought a submarine tender was really that significant. I said that if I did not I would not be speaking to him. He said he would report to Moscow and let me know.

Dobrynin then handed me the attached note about the sequence of events starting with his notification to me of the release of the two generals. He said it was time that something good came out of this channel and not only bad things. He said we have proved that we can block things in this channel but we have not yet proved that we can do something. I said this was a matter of reciprocity and that there had been very little put into it from their side.

On this note the meeting adjourned.

Attachment

Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Original of Note Verbale handed to Mr. Kissinger by Ambassador Dobrynin, 14 Nov 1970

For the President

In Moscow attention was drawn to the fact that despite our notification made through the confidential channel way back on November 5,4 about the release soon—as an act of our good will—of the American military officers who had violated in an aircraft the USSR state border, statements and propaganda steps continued to be made in the US clearly with the knowledge of the White House, which in fact were aimed at aggravating American-Soviet relations in connection with that incident, including instructions to US Ambassadors in other countries to avoid presence at the receptions in Soviet Embassies November 6–7 on the occasion of the National holiday of the USSR.5 Moreover, some of US Ambassadors directly referred to the instructions of the White House received by them on this score.

Naturally, the question arises as to how we can rely on the confidential channel which, it would seem, should be most efficient and effective for transmitting important information if the other side does not ensure its functioning so that it would increase understanding and lead

4 See Document 36.
5 See Document 37.
to a betterment of our relations rather than serve some other aims as it happened in that particular case. References to a “discrepancy” that occurred, as well as to the argument that allegedly “it was impossible to stop in time the bureaucratic machine already in motion,” do not seem convincing to us and do not change the crux of the matter.

42. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Max Frankel of the New York Times

Washington, November 14, 1970, 2:05 p.m.

K: I had a painful, semi-blackmailing conversation with Ben Welles who is doing the Cuba story. He wants to say that we have reason to believe that this tender will leave in two or three days. I don’t think this can be said because (a) this isn’t true, and (b) to say it at this point will jeopardize the whole complex back-and-forth on this issue. He says if I don’t tell him what is true, he will have to go with what he thinks is true. Very few people in this government know what is true. This isn’t true. It may come true but if it does, it would be a pure accident. When does he plan to publish this? Tomorrow?

F: Tomorrow.

K: For reasons which you don’t know and cannot control and for which you are not to blame, it would be the worst possible timing and would jeopardize the whole thing. He can, if he wants, speculate about permanent stationing there. The true reasons I cannot give you now, but the article appears at an excruciatingly bad time. We can get this wound up only by keeping the profile low.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 During a telephone conversation with Kissinger five minutes before this one, Welles reported: “We have written a story that US has understanding with the Soviet Union not to base nuclear missiles in the Caribbean waters or nuclear missiles in the Western Hemisphere. We would not be averse if they want to use recreation facilities, service and maintenance or calls at the ports. We have hopes that there will be evidence in the next few (3 or 4) days of the removal of the tender in Cienfuegos.” Kissinger did not think the story was “outrageous,” but warned that any reference to a deadline for Soviet withdrawal would be “really unfortunate.” Although Welles wanted to avoid being “irresponsible,” he insisted that his source of information was “accurate.” “All you have is gossip,” Kissinger replied. “I do not know who gave you this information but this is just not right.” (Ibid.)
F: I think I get the picture.
K: I don’t object to most of the rest of it, but lay off the tender to some extent.
F: Let me see if we can find some way of sloughing away from it.
K: In return, when the tender leaves, I will explain to you why this is so sensitive and give you a chance to do an article. If I have deceived you in this phone call, then you could slam me.
F: I wouldn’t do that. You understand why this is an intriguing topic for us. But I will talk to him.
K: But it would be most unfortunate right now.
F: I understand.3

3 On November 15, the New York Times published a front-page article by Welles on efforts to resolve the controversy over Cienfuegos. Welles reported that American officials expected the Soviet Union to withdraw the submarine tender from Cuban waters “in the coming days,” contradicting the claim of “another highly credible source” that the tender would leave “within the next two or three days.” Such action, he explained, would be in accordance with the unwritten “understanding” between the two sides. According to Welles, Kissinger’s “quiet diplomacy”—including secret meetings with Gromyko and Dobrynin—was behind the “understanding.” Welles also repeated the warning of unnamed officials that “the national interest might be impaired by anything that Moscow might interpret as an ultimatum, even through press reports.” (Benjamin Welles, “Soviet’s Removal of Vessel Is Awaited by U.S.,” New York Times, November 15, 1970, p. 1)

43. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 14, 1970, 2:20 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, including a coup in Syria, and a Congressional amendment to restrict funding for combat troops in Laos and Thailand.]

[K:] I had a talk with Dobrynin this morning and told him about the tender.² He said he would report to Moscow.
P: Did he know it was there?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.
² See Document 41.
K: He said, ‘Do you take it seriously or are you making an issue?’ I said we are taking it seriously. They are trying to kick us a little. It’s not in its former position. They have it way in a corner of the harbor—on the Cuban side of the harbor. It’s not where the installation is. It’s a salami tactic where they always test you.

P: Okay.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Vietnam war, including military operations in Laos and Cambodia and political opposition in the United States.]

P: We won’t worry about it. We’ll get the economy moving. I think it will be a shocker when we come on with the Summit. Suck them along on U.S./Soviet relations, and we’ll then surprise them.

K: On the Soviet/American side, there is something you could do for them. It’s a complicated thing. We have held a spy—we want it for legal precedent. Dobrynin has asked me about it. He said State and the Attorney General haven’t been able to do anything. I have worked out with Mitchell that the case would be kept in the courts and the guy can be released to Dobrynin, and this would get us rolling to the Summit.

P: We can reconsider in view of their action in Cuba and Jordan. We can reconsider that gear thing. Would this be in exchange for the Generals?

K: No, I would hold it until close to the Summit announcement. Put another week or two between release of the spy and the Generals. It would be a sign of good will on your part. We have made our point by holding him for 7 years. Mitchell is willing to go along if you are.

P: Okay, do it.

K: All right, Mr. President.

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3 Igov Ivanov. See Document 33.


5 See Document 38.
44. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 16, 1970, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

It was Dobrynin’s birthday and there were some pleasantries at the beginning of the conversation. I then handed Dobrynin the talking points approved by the President giving our side of the November 5th and 6th incident (copy attached). Dobrynin said, well this means that both sides are maintaining their position.

He said that he had hoped that I had called him over to tell him some good news. I said I also had some good news and I wanted to inform him of the fact that as a sign of our goodwill, Ivanov would be released. The Secretary of State would be in touch with them to work out the details in about three weeks. Dobrynin said that that was good news indeed.

Dobrynin then raised the issue of the two newspaper articles over the weekend—one in the New York Times and the other in the Washington Post (attached). He said the one in the New York Times had not bothered him too much because it was obviously inaccurate in essential parts, but he had to say that the one in the Washington Post was extremely worrisome. It mentioned five private meetings between him and me—something that no one could have known except me and therefore he thought I had leaked it to the press as a means of bringing pressure on them.

I replied I would not engage in such a cheap method of pressure and that in fact if I had wanted to use that for pressure I would not have had to call him in. Dobrynin said that the impact in Moscow

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House (see, however, footnote 4 below). According to another copy, Kissinger drafted the memorandum of conversation on November 23. Kissinger then forwarded the memorandum, and another summarizing its “highlights,” to Nixon on the same day. (Ibid.) According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 3:40 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 See footnote 3, Document 42.

3 The attached Washington Post article (p. 12), November 15, reported “contradictory claims” over the “understanding” on Cuba. The article also repeated a report the previous day in the Los Angeles Times, “that this new U.S.-Soviet understanding on Cuba came after five secret exchanges between Washington and Moscow, controlled in the White House and unknown to lower-ranking officials.”
would be extremely unfortunate because they would think that we were giving them a veiled ultimatum. He thought that perhaps the Soviet submarine tender would have left in a few days, but now they may keep it there for a week just to show that they are not to be intimidated by us.

Dobrynin wondered whether there had been any Congressional pressure on us. I said that pressure existed and it was going to get worse and worse. He said there obviously is some limit to the power of the White House if we cannot even stop press leaks. I said that it was a question of what we chose to do, not of what we were able to do.

I then said, on the instruction of the President, that I would prefer really to talk about constructive things, such as the agenda for the forthcoming summit meeting. Dobrynin said that he would not be ready for three or four weeks just as I had told him when I would be ready. I said I would call him on December 1; we set a luncheon date for December 5th at the White House.4

Attachment

Note From President Nixon to the Soviet Leadership

The President has noted the communication of the Soviet Government handed to Mr. Kissinger on November 14.5 He wishes to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the following facts:

(a) On October 23, Mr. Kissinger told the Soviet Ambassador of the President’s personal interest in this case.6

(b) No reply of any kind was received until November 5. Despite the President’s intervention and seven requests by the U.S. Embassy, Consular access was denied until October 27.

(c) On November 5 at 1530, the Soviet Ambassador on a confidential basis informed Mr. Kissinger that the Soviet Government would release the generals as a political act upon completion of the investigation.7 No date was mentioned.

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4 Nixon called Kissinger at 6:45 p.m. to discuss the meeting with Dobrynin. A transcript of the conversation records the following exchange: “P: How did you meeting come off?—when I called you[,] you were in the Situation Room. K: I said what you had suggested. First I told him about Ivanov. I said why don’t we start talking about the agenda. He said when he said we should talk about it. I said in three or four weeks—now he says he has authority to talk about it after December 1. He said he was going to communicate with Moscow. They are playing it cool. P: We will play it the same way.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File)

5 See attachment to Document 41.

6 See Document 29.

7 See Document 36.
(d) Mr. Kissinger pointed out to the Soviet Ambassador that instructions had been dispatched forbidding attendance of high-ranking U.S. personnel at Soviet Embassy receptions on November 6. Because of the confidentiality of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel, these could not be reversed unless there were some official communication or public statement from Moscow. Mr. Kissinger emphasized the extreme sensitivity through which this channel was maintained and the difficulty of modifying instructions already widely promulgated solely on the basis of exchanges through this delicate channel. He expressed the strong hope that some official communication or public statement would be forthcoming from the Soviet side before the embassy receptions took place. The order would then be cancelled immediately.

(e) The Soviet Ambassador said that he would communicate this to Moscow, pointing out that it was near midnight there. He said nothing else to indicate that an answer might not be forthcoming. No word was received from the Soviet Ambassador on November 6.

(f) Because the Soviet Ambassador was aware of the delicacy of the channel, was told in advance of the difficulty involved and the means to overcome it, the implication that the failure of the U.S. to rescind the order was due to “some other aims” is highly inappropriate.

(g) The President wishes to reaffirm the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel for subjects of the highest sensitivity and for the purpose of bringing about a fundamental improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.

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8 See Document 37.
45. Journal Entry by the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics, including the President’s meeting with newly-elected Senators.]

Haig in today—to reopen the Rogers problem. He feels it is more serious & threatening now than ever before. This time re Cuba sub base. Prob. is Rogers originally denied it was there, then publicly down-played our accomplishment in removing it—mainly because he resented WH dealing w/Russians w/o State. Now he’s calling reporters in & undercutting Admin line—which is the truth—all to protect & build his position. Trouble is this completely destroys P. credibility w/Russians—and Haig fears it will result in a whole new period of Soviets testing us. So many more confrontations—or near ones. Haig can’t stomach idea of cab. officer operating for his own personal glory—contrary to P’s interests—and in many cases, P’s orders. Nothing we can do right now but Al wanted me to be aware of this. He feels K is again on verge of quitting—esp. because he’s not getting RN’s ear—which is true—but no one has—except re politics. Trust that will change this week.

Washington, November 17, 1970, 9:55 a.m.

K: I have two problems, one major and one minor. I will give you the major one first. I had a call yesterday from Dobrynin,2 strictly between us, expressing total outrage at the Washington Post article on Sunday. He didn’t mind the NY Times story on Cuba.3

J: I just saw the NY Times this morning.

K: He said NY Times is inaccurate. He says the Washington Post mentions 5 secret meetings between him and me. He wants to know if there’s an agreement between State and them on what’s a fact. I find that hard to answer. We have tried to work together cooperatively. Two senior respected journalists who said that the WH is over excited on Cuba and said give us the truth. When they said this is going to be written about one way or another, I refused to talk to them.

J: Did they imply it’s coming out of here?

K: Yes.

J: I can’t think who it is.

K: Let me say right here that I don’t think it’s you.

J: I appreciate that. I can’t think of whom.

K: There was 5.

J: I didn’t think of 5.

K: I thought I had him but it is 5. No. 4. I will have to check it. Be that as it may, he believes that the best way to kill the speculation is to say 5. It was 5. You have 5 memcons over there.4 The basic problem now is that whoever is doing this is playing with national interest. Two interpretations—One is that we mean to invade and that’s impossible. So a higher establishment believes the Soviets have a right to do what they are doing. I did talk to Dobrynin on Saturday.5

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 Reference is to the meeting—not a telephone call—between Kissinger and Dobrynin on November 16. See Document 44.
3 Sunday, November 15. For the newspaper reports, see footnote 3, Document 44, and footnote 3, Document 42.
4 See footnote 5, Document 40.
J: You mentioned that.

K: He said, “I communicated to Moscow.” He said, “You talked to me and then there are two stories”—they will read it as an ultimatum. It says State is beaten into line. It’s in the Washington Post and LA Times. State beaten into line and carefully avoided understanding.

J: We did say understanding.

K: I approved it. It couldn’t have started without someone starting it. It has nothing to do with personal positions—it’s in the national interest. You know what the Russians must conclude.

J: I can’t think of where—it’s never gone beyond you and me and the Secretary. Not even my own office. I can’t think of where it could be coming through. We have used understanding instead of an understanding because in previous years we made many letters to the Congress that there was no understanding or agreement.

K: Kennedy didn’t want to appear soft on Cuba and we might invade. But no one today would believe that. So we are leaving open that they have a right to construct nuclear installations. The way the agreement runs that isn’t even precluded (?). It’s an agreement totally to our (or their) advantage.

J: Entirely so. McCloskey statement is clear on that. ⁶

K: One of these newsmen I have shut off that I must check with the President but he will write a major story. He will say there’s total confusion and that State and the WH are at loggerheads.

J: I will find out from McCloskey what he is picking up.

K: He will write it. It’s Chalmers Roberts.

J: I heard this morning that he was working on it at the same time that Ben Welles was working on it. Murrey Marder picked it up and the Post story was done by Marder.

K: That’s right.

J: Chal has an additional story?

K: He has 5 pages of notes.

J: Good God!

K: We can do a number of things. Ziegler could say something but it’s raping State. I think McCloskey should say that he omitted the participle in front of understanding.

J: Put that way—

K: And that would end it and it would come from you and with grace. We wouldn’t be disciplining you.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 40.
J: You think that would kill it?
K: If he said there is an understanding, they will ask what it is.
J: And what the text is. Say it’s contained in the public statement which he pointed out in previous [omission in transcript].
K: The most gentlemanly low-key way. If it came from you it would be much better than one of us over here saying it.
J: I have no problem with that.
K: I have not told the President about this because I think it is important that we work together.
J: I have no problem with that and I can handle that.
K: Then I will tell Roberts there’s nothing to say anymore.
J: Should he say it to Chal or at the conference?
K: At the conference, then it will be on the record.
J: OK, let’s.
K: That would be a great help.7
[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Portugal and Malta.]

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7 During his daily briefing that afternoon, McCloskey provided the first on-the-record account of the Soviet-American “understanding” on Cienfuegos. When asked to define it, McCloskey replied: “Well if the question is, ‘Does this mean that the United States will not invade or intervene in Cuba?’ the answer is we have no plans for invading Cuba. On the other leg of it, ‘Does this mean that the Soviets cannot introduce offensive weapons and construct bases for such weapons?’ the answer is yes.” McCloskey, however, would neither confirm nor deny published reports of “five secret contacts.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of News, Transcripts of Daily News Conferences of the Department of State, Vol. 56) On November 21, Chalmers Roberts reported in the Washington Post (p. A1) that “the Nixon administration is deeply disturbed by Soviet activity at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos.” “The issue has cast a deep pall over the whole range of Soviet-American relationships,” Roberts observed, “including such ongoing negotiations as those on Berlin and on the limitation of strategic arms.”

SUBJECT
Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson

At a luncheon with Ambassador Dobrynin and his wife today, I found him more concerned over U.S.-Soviet relations than at any time in our long acquaintance with the exception of the Cuban crisis. He is an able diplomat and some of his remarks may have been a deliberate ploy designed to influence our policies. My conclusion however is that he is genuinely worried.

Dobrynin based his concern on the premise that the Soviet Politburo had reached the conclusion that the totality of U.S. policy constituted an effort to push them around and to influence their policy by a show of strength. He referred to our exploitation of a number of petty matters such as the Soviet detention of our two Generals, although on this he implied that both sides deserved some blame. More important was the fact that there appeared to be an anti-Soviet campaign here which he thought was deliberately ordered by a high level in our Government.

After I said I was sure that he was mistaken he said that whatever the cause, the Soviet leadership was in a bad frame of mind and he feared a kind of vicious circle developing in our relations. His purpose

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Drafted by Thompson on November 18. Secret; Limdis. The luncheon was held at Ambassador Thompson’s residence. At Kissinger’s request, Thompson forwarded copies of the memorandum—as well as memoranda of conversation with Dobrynin on the Middle East and SALT—to the White House. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X)

2 According to Thompson, Dobrynin expressed similar concern during their discussion of the Middle East. When Thompson “wondered aloud” if the movement of Soviet missiles was “motivated by a desire to bring pressure on the Israelis to reach a settlement,” Dobrynin interjected that “if this had been in their minds they could have given the Egyptians bombers and other offensive weapons. He said more in a manner of concern than of making a threat that such a move was still not excluded as members of the Politburo had become rather angry as a result of a number of what they considered anti-Soviet actions and developments in this country. Among other things he mentioned the numerous press articles and statements to the effect that the Soviets were attempting to establish bases in various places.” (Ibid.)
in raising this matter was to ask if I could suggest any way to avoid such a development.

I replied that while I could only speak personally, I thought the best thing was for us to reach agreement on some important issue. He had indicated that the Strategic Arms talks were going to take considerable time and I therefore wondered if Berlin might not be a good issue on which progress could be made quickly.

Dobrynin seemed to agree. He said that from their side the Soviets wanted to see ended the political arrangements between West Germany and West Berlin which were illegal even from the point of view of the Western Powers. The West wanted greater security of access and a situation which would avoid recurring crises over Berlin. He said the Soviets were ready for a compromise on these issues.

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48. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 17, 1970, 2020Z.

6944. Subject: Alleged US Aerial Intrusion.

1. Chief MFA American section Korniyenko called in DCM at 2130 November 17 to read him following oral statement.

2. Begin text. On November 17 an American reconnaissance aircraft type RS–135, carrying out a flight over the Barents Sea, at approximately 1025 hours Moscow time approached the borders of the airspace of the USSR in the region of the south coast of Novaya Zemlya island.

3. Soviet fighter aircraft, defending the state borders of USSR, with the purpose of not permitting a violation by the American aircraft of the airspace of the USSR gave the crew appropriate signals. However, the American aircraft did not respond to these signals, continued its...
flight and reached (dostig) the airspace of the USSR. Only after one of
the Soviet aircraft had fired warning shots did the American aircraft
turn and move away in a north-west direction.

4. Directing the attention of the Embassy of the USA to this new
fact of a flight of a USA military aircraft along the borders (u granits)
of the Soviet Union, the Ministry recalls the warnings previously given
given the Government of the USA regarding the possibly dangerous conse-
quences of such flights. End text.

The DCM said he would report Ministry’s statement to Wasington.³

³ In telegram 190246 to Moscow, November 20, the Department instructed Klosson
to reject the Soviet allegation, since “the aircraft in question was at all times over inter-
national waters and well outside of Soviet air space.” Klosson was also to protest “the
unwarranted discharge of weapons by Soviet fighter aircraft in the vicinity of the U.S.
plane” and to insist that Soviet authorities “take the necessary measures to prevent a re-
currence of such dangerous activity, which could have tragic consequences.” (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR,
Vol. X) Klosson followed these instructions in a meeting with Korniyenko on November
23. (Telegram 7035 from Moscow, November 23; ibid.)

49. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

US Ships in the Black Sea

It is currently planned for two US destroyers to conduct a regularly scheduled three day mission in the Black Sea on November 27,
1970 following the track shown at Tab A.² Although the ships will ap-
prox within 47 nautical miles of the Soviet Union, the penetration in
an northerly direction is not particularly deep and follows the general
pattern of Black Sea visits in recent years.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Sub-
ject Files, USSR, US Ships in the Black Sea (Silver Fox). Secret; Sensitive. According to
another copy, Kissinger, Haig, and Howe drafted the memorandum. (Ibid.)
² Attached but not printed.
Last month the possibility of extending the track in a more northerly direction and adding an additional ship was considered because of Soviet activity in Cuba. However, this concept was dropped when the Soviet ships left Cienfuegos.\(^3\) Since the Soviet submarine tender has returned to Cienfuegos it would appear that a mission which varies from the normal configuration for Black Sea operations should again be considered. A map showing a revised mission is at Tab B.\(^4\) Although the three destroyers would approach no closer than 39 nautical miles to the Soviet Union the track, length of mission and number of ships would represent a significant change from routine Black Sea visits.

**Recommendation**

That you approve modifying the Black Sea visit scheduled to commence on November 27 along the lines outlined on the map at Tab B.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) See Document 5.

\(^4\) Attached but not printed.

\(^5\) Nixon initialed his approval of this recommendation. As Haig reported in an attached note to Kissinger dated November 19: “The President has approved the expanded Black Sea patrols. This will cause considerable problems in State and especially with the Turkish Desk who will insist that the Turks will oppose this. The only appropriate way to do it is to raise it at this afternoon’s 40 Committee Meeting, point out to the group that the President wants it done and that you will have the proposal circulated tomorrow for a telephone vote and prompt interdepartmental coordination.” In another attached note, Haig instructed Chapin on November 20 to “hold pending tender answer & Moorer reply.”
50. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 19 November 1970

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Admiral Moorer, and General Cushman.
Messrs. John Irwin, Charles A. Meyer, William Broe, Arnold Nachmanoff, and Wymberley Coerr were present for Item 1.
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy and Mr. Thomas Karamessines were present for the entire meeting.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the U.S. Black Sea operation.]

2. Black Sea Freedom of the Seas Patrol

a. Mr. Kissinger said he wished to brief the Committee members on the thinking of higher authority with regard to the proposed periodic Black Sea patrol by two U.S. destroyers contained in the JRC monthly forecast for the month of November. He stated that when the Soviet activity in Cuba first began to look substantially as though the Soviets might be establishing a nuclear submarine support facility there, higher authority considered sending a U.S. naval patrol into the Black Sea as a signal of disapproval to the Soviets. This was not done at the time, but higher authority has now approved in principle expanding the proposed JRC Black Sea destroyer operation in two respects:

(1) adding one more destroyer to the proposed two-destroyer mission, and

(2) extending the northernmost leg of the proposed track to make a closer approach to the USSR than have previous destroyer missions in the Black Sea, although the closest point of approach to Soviet territory would still be 39 miles.

b. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the most recent intelligence showed that the Soviet submarine tender had just left Cienfuegos, Cuba, that morning. He also stated that the Turks might object to the addition of a third destroyer to the scheduled two-destroyer patrol.
c. Admiral Moorer commented that a problem of timing existed under the notification requirements of the Montreux Convention. He pointed out that under this restriction an advance notice of at least eight, and preferably fifteen, days is required prior to entry of a ship into the Black Sea. Since the two-destroyer patrol is scheduled for entry on 27 November, the time available probably did not permit proper notification under the terms of the Montreux Convention. Admiral Moorer stated that changing the mission track itself was no problem, as this can be radioed any time. However, it appeared that addition of another destroyer to the patrol would necessitate some delay in its dispatch.

d. Mr. Kissinger stated that perhaps changing the mission track would be enough considering the departure of the Soviet submarine tender from Cienfuegos. But, he pointed out, the latter happened before—an announcement had been made to the press and the tender had returned to Cienfuegos. Since the tender had not yet traveled far enough to provide an indication of whether or not it is leaving Cuban waters, he asked if it would be possible to say nothing to the press for the time being about its departure.

e. Mr. Packard commented that in the normal course of events, if the question were asked at the next day’s Department of Defense press briefing, the response would be that the tender had departed Cienfuegos. He stated that he would see if he could arrange for such queries to be answered merely by saying that no new information was available.

f. Mr. Kissinger stated that after Admiral Moorer had double-checked on the timing problem under the Montreux Convention he would circulate to the Committee members for concurrence and/or comment the mission composition, timing, and track proposed.

g. On 24 November 1970 a memorandum was circulated and concurred in by each member, reflecting that the Black Sea patrol would proceed with two destroyers as scheduled on 27 November following the above-described expanded track, a copy of which was attached for the examination of each Committee member. Subsequently, the mission proceeded and was completed as scheduled without untoward incident.

3. Soviet Reaction [less than 1 line not declassified]

a. Mr. Packard said he would like to invite to the attention of the members the circumstances surrounding the incident [2 lines not declassified] and subsequently alleged an intrusion of USSR airspace. He pointed out that there was clearly no intrusion of Soviet airspace [6 lines not declassified]

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2 Not found.
3 See Document 48.
b. Mr. Packard conceded that he had not focused on and been aware of the more provocative nature of this new track and that he planned to establish a firmer control over the introduction of such changes in the JRC Monthly Schedule in the future.

c. Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Johnson agreed that they, too, had missed the possible provocative significance of this new track.

d. Mr. Kissinger asked that in future monthly schedules any track changes, and the reasons for such changes, be clearly pointed out and highlighted for the attention of the members.

3. Admiral Moorer undertook to flag for the members all such new proposed mission tracks in future JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Schedules. This procedure was initiated by incorporation of a "New Track" section in the JRC Schedule for December 1970.4

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the U.S. Black Sea operation.]

4 Not found.

51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Soviet Violations of US-Soviet Agreements

In four recent incidents the Soviet government has violated the notification, access, and communication provisions of the US-Soviet Consular Convention.2 Previously accepted interpretation of the Convention and

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X. Confidential. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt submitted a similar memorandum to Haig on November 16. After showing it to Kissinger, Haig returned it two days later with the following instructions: "Hal—Great job—HAK has asked this be turned into memo for Pres." (Ibid.) Sonnenfeldt forwarded the revised memorandum to Kissinger on November 19. (Ibid.) According to an attached note, Nixon saw the memorandum on December 9—possibly in preparation for his press conference the next day.

2 The U.S.-Soviet Consular Convention was signed on June 1, 1964, and entered into force on July 13, 1968. (19 UST 5018; TIAS 6503) For background on its negotiation, signature and ratification, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV, Soviet Union. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 22, 1964, pp. 979–984.
Protocol has also been called into question. On November 12 State handed Ambassador Dobrynin a note expressing US concern over three of the incidents.3 In brief, the four cases are:

1. **Slepuchow**: On May 25, 1970, Mrs. Maria Slepuchow, a US national, was detained in the Soviet Union. The Soviet government informed US consular officials of the detention on June 1 and granted consular access to her on June 6. The Convention (Article 12, paragraph 3) calls for notification to be given specifically within one to three days from the time of arrest or detention. A US consular officer is to be allowed the right to visit and communicate with a detained US national within two to four days (Protocol, paragraph 2). In the case of Mrs. Slepuchow, both notification and access occurred beyond the times prescribed.

2. **Galinovski**: Mrs. Olga Galinovski, a US national, was detained in the Soviet Union on October 17, 1970. US consular officials were informed nine days later; consular access to her was permitted eleven days later. Again, both notification and access occurred beyond the times prescribed. In addition, the Soviet government prevented Mrs. Galinovski from communicating with US consular officials after her detention.

3. **Scherrer**: In the recent airplane incident in which Major General Edward Scherrer, Brigadier General Claude McQuarrie, and Major James Russell were detained on Soviet territory, beginning October 21, the Soviet government did not allow consular access until five days later (despite seven official US requests beginning October 22). Moreover, the Soviets prevented General Scherrer from communicating with US consular officials by telephone. Requests by US consular officials for telephone or telegraph communication were also refused.

4. **Rigerman**: In a less clearcut case, Leonid Rigerman who claimed US citizenship through his father, was twice forcibly prevented by Soviet militiamen from entering Embassy Moscow on November 9 for the purpose of obtaining new copies of some documents and instructions. Rigerman was arrested and sentenced to seven days imprisonment for not following militiamen’s orders. US consular officials have stated to the Soviets their belief that Rigerman, an American citizen unless adjudicated otherwise, was denied right of entry to the Embassy under Article 12 of the Convention. Subsequently, after an initial review, State concluded that Rigerman probably cannot be considered a US citizen on the basis of evidence presently available. But the principle of right of access for a person who claims American citizenship nevertheless was violated.

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3 Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State Curry forwarded a copy of the note to Haig on November 16. Haig wrote on the copy: “HAK—text of our note to Soviets on generals.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X)
In efforts to explain or cover up the arbitrary handling of American citizens in these cases, Soviet officials have repeatedly tried to reinterpret the Consular Convention. They have challenged our understanding on such points as: the definition of “detention,” “access on a continuing basis,” application of the Convention to US citizens who claim dual nationality, and the rights of detained citizens to deal with local officials and to communicate privately. The Soviets seem to want to engage us in a renegotiation of portions of the Convention. We are holding up further discussion of interpretation pending receipt of the Soviet response to our Note. State is pressing for an early response.

Apart from these problems, which have a clearly defined legal basis, there continues to be problems over such matters as

—harassment and expulsion of US journalists;
—Soviet footdragging on our commercial air agreement, e.g., refusal of Soviet travel agencies to ticket Soviet travelers and others requesting tickets in Moscow on the US carrier PanAm.

52. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)


SUBJECT
Dealing with the Soviets—Current Problems

You asked me to put down on paper some thoughts about effective ways of dealing with the USSR in the light of recent developments.

1. Middle East. Our handling of the Jordanian crisis was adroit and purposeful. I believe that the Soviets were impelled to put strong pressure on the Syrians by their perception of our readiness to back Israeli forces in a military move, if that had proved to be necessary. Additionally, the movements of the Sixth Fleet and other measures of readiness we undertook were seen by the Soviets as providing for contingency action by US forces. Thus, these reinforced their concern and led them to place heavy pressure on the Syrians. The outcome was a strikingly successful application of moves implying our readiness to see

force used, and to use it ourselves, if need be. This took place within the confines of the problem, i.e., within the geographic area of the Eastern Mediterranean, under circumstances in which the Soviets were themselves reluctant to commit their own forces since, in view of US strength, they could not count on a successful outcome.

2. Berlin. Our prompt reaction to the Soviet attempt to close the Berlin air corridor is a second recent example of the correct application of countermeasures. It resulted in a speedy back-down by the Soviets. Once again, the counteraction took place in the same geographic area—indeed, in direct defiance of the Soviet ban. When a Soviet bluff is called in this purposeful fashion, the Soviets tend more often than not to react in accordance with Lenin’s famous dictum: “If you are not able to adapt yourself, if you are not ready to crawl in the mud on your belly, you are not a revolutionary, but a chatterbox.”

3. Cienfuegos and the Black Sea Patrol. It is against the background of these carefully calculated—and, hence, successful—counteractions that I raise a question about the idea of signalling our displeasure to the Soviets over their activities in the Caribbean, and particularly at Cienfuegos, by means of naval entries into the Black Sea.

In his memorandum of November 19, Mr. Sisco has enumerated probable Turkish reactions and vulnerabilities—a point to which Ambassador Beam also calls attention in Moscow 7089.

The NEA memorandum of November 19 asserts that an increase in the number of ships involved, an extension of the duration of the exercise, and a more northerly track are the kind of signal the Soviets will understand.

I quite agree that they will understand. But the Soviets enjoy conventional military superiority in the Black Sea. They are likely to consider a noticeable stepping-up of our activities as provocative; surveillance and harassment of our units is likely to be heavy. I believe that, far from convincing them to use restraint in areas of vital interest to us, the effect is likely to be the opposite. The Soviet aspiration to be recognized as a naval power fully equivalent to the US precludes a

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2 This section is largely based on an attached briefing memorandum from Springsteen to U. Alexis Johnson, November 20, entitled “Expanded Scope of Black Sea Operations.”

3 Addressed to U. Alexis Johnson; attached but not printed. Robert L. Pugh of the Office of Turkish Affairs (NEA) prepared an earlier version of the memorandum, which he cleared with Davies and with other officers in the Department. A handwritten note on the draft, however, reads: “11/19/70—This memorandum rejected by JJS[isco] who felt just the opposite.” (Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 65, Def 7 Black Sea Visits)

4 In the attached telegram, November 25, Beam stated: “I can understand utility of demonstrative counter-move to Soviet naval incursion into our Caribbean backyard, but am concerned we may be overlooking a correspondingly serious aspect, namely continuing Soviet effort to neutralize Turkey as Western ally.”
knuckling-under to such pressure. The contrary reaction is likely to be the case, perhaps through the employment of more demonstrative Soviet naval activities around Cuba and in the Caribbean.

If we wish to demonstrate our strength to the Soviets, we should do this in areas of vital interest to us and where we have local military superiority, so that we are not put at a disadvantage and do not create the possibility of a Soviet miscalculation.

I think the use of the Black Sea patrol as a counteraction to Soviet naval activity around Cuba and in the Caribbean is the wrong way to make the Soviets sit up and take notice—and is likely to make them take notice in the wrong way.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) In a memorandum to Kissinger on November 25, Lord also questioned the utility of sending such signals to the Soviets. “Frustrated by the November elections, the economy, and Hanoi’s intransigence in Paris,” he commented, “the search is on for dramatic recoups. Are the Soviets playing in Cienfuegos and with our generals? Never mind, pant after them for a Summit and a splashy trip to the Soviet Union.” Lord concluded: “If we feel that in a broader sense something is needed to counter Soviet unpleasantness, we should not translate this judgment (unconsciously or not) into escalation against North Vietnam but rather into a steady, sound overall approach to the Soviet Union. As a starter, we should stop eagerly pursuing a Summit until relations are greatly improved and real results can be foreseen.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 824, Name Files, Winston Lord [1970–73])

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53. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Status of Soviet Submarine Support Facilities at Cienfuegos, Cuba

The continued presence of a Soviet subtender in Cuban waters, along with the associated facilities remaining at Cienfuegos, gives the Soviets a capability to provide replenishment and limited upkeep for

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters (Cienfuegos), Vol. II. Top Secret; Codeword; Nodis. Sent for information. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Nachmanoff forwarded a draft to Kissinger on November 21. (Ibid.) A stamped note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
nuclear-powered submarines. This could be accomplished in the protected naval basin in the southern part of the harbor where the mooring buoys, submarine net, and new shore recreation facilities remain in place. Alternatively a tender based at Cienfuegos could rendezvous with submarines at sea and furnish them virtually the same support.

All of the anti-aircraft and field artillery pieces emplaced in the harbor area after the arrival of the Soviet ships in September have now been removed. One of the two coastal surveillance radars installed near the entrance to the bay in September was still there on November 12 (the date of last available photography), but the other may have been removed. There has been considerable construction activity in the Cienfuegos area throughout October and early November, but most of it has been associated with a number of major high-priority projects in an industrial complex north of the city. Work on military projects has been more limited in scope:

—Interior finishing work is being completed on the barracks adjoining the recreation facility on Cayo Alcatraz, an island in the naval basin.

—A small shed is being built near the pier on Cayo Ocampo, where two special barges usually associated with nuclear submarine support are still tied up.

—Road improvement and clearing activity near a probable communications site on a promontory north of the naval basin. (There has been no progress on the communications project itself since mid-September, however, indicating that the project has been delayed or cancelled.)

As you know, the subtender and rescue tug which left Cienfuegos in October returned there on November 7 after a two-week visit to the Cuban port of Marielle. The subtender departed Cienfuegos again on Thursday, November 19, entered Casilda, a port southeast of Cienfuegos for a five-day visit, and returned to Cienfuegos on November 24.

The Soviet capability for nuclear submarine support which remains because of the presence of the subtender is limited. The tender can carry out maintenance and minor repair services for submarines, but probably cannot perform major repairs. It also lacks facilities for removing and handling ballistic missiles, and these facilities are not available in Cienfuegos. Because of these limitations, the support capability at Cienfuegos is less than that available to U.S. Polaris submarines at Holy Loch. Its primary value would be in furnishing mid-patrol servicing and recreation facilities to nuclear-powered attack submarines, thus extending the length of time such vessels could remain away from major base facilities in the USSR. If the Soviets want to use the facilities at Cienfuegos to service Y-Class ballistic missile submarines, the “on-station” time of these units could be increased about 25%.
We have no firm evidence as to whether the Soviets intend to proceed with the establishment of a submarine support facility at Cienfuegos, either for themselves or possibly for the Cubans, or whether they will abandon the project. However, until the subender leaves the area, the Soviets do in fact retain a capability to support nuclear-powered submarines at Cienfuegos.

At the present time there are no known Soviet submarines of any kind in or near the Caribbean.

54. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Soviet Note on Protective Reaction Raid

Ambassador Dobrynin called on me Tuesday, November 24 to deliver a Soviet protest note on last weekend’s bombing of North Vietnam (copy attached at Tab A). Highlights of the note are as follows:

—The Soviets wish to state their attitude on the bombing raid in this confidential manner as well as condemning it publicly;

—No justification can change the “aggressive nature” of reconnaissance flights over a sovereign state, and bombing of that state when it lawfully tries to prevent such flights—such actions rather than bringing closely a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, “inevitably complicate the whole situation still further;”

—Aggressive U.S. actions against North Vietnam “entail more far-reaching consequences” in terms of their impact on the international situation generally and on Soviet-American relations; they are

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Lord forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on November 27 and noted: “This will also serve as a memcon of the meeting. In your memo to the President I did not include any comment on this note, which would seem to be routine.” (Ibid.)

2 In the wake of the unsuccessful raid the previous day on Son Tay, the former North Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp, the United States conducted an extensive air strike over North Vietnam on November 21 to protect American reconnaissance planes.

3 According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 12:20 to 12:35 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

4 Attached but not printed.
inconsistent with your words to Gromyko on the necessity “to do everything so that events in Vietnam may not cloud relations between our two countries;”5

—The Soviet leadership hopes you will view these considerations “with utmost seriousness.”

I told Dobrynin that I was sure that he did not expect a response from us to his note, and he confirmed this. Our very brief meeting adjourned without discussion of any other subjects.

5 See Document 23.

55. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

November 29, 1970.

P: Hello, Henry.
K: Mr. President.
P: How was your game at Philadelphia?
[Omitted here is discussion of the Army–Navy football game, Vietnam, and American domestic politics.]
P: What significance do you attach to the German action on Autobahn?2

K: That was—did—you see the German Bundestag is still CDU controlled and they were going to have some committee meetings in Berlin and this is their way of showing . . .

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. Nixon was at Camp David; Kissinger was in Washington. The date on the transcript, December 2, is in all likelihood the day the tape was “brought in” for transcription. References in the text, including the Army–Navy football game and a front-page article in the New York Times, clearly indicate that the conversation took place on Sunday, November 29. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon called Kissinger on November 29 at 12:17 p.m.; the two men talked until 12:29. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 On November 28, East Germany protested an upcoming display of West German presence in West Berlin—a meeting two days later of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group—by initiating a “slow down” on the overland access routes to the city. The Western Allies and Soviets exchanged protest notes during the crisis, which ended when East Germany suspended its harassment of traffic on December 2. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 137.
P: Oh, I see.
K: . . . the pressure. This is a retaliation for—but this proves what they can do anytime, with or without an agreement.
P: Typical of what they’re up to.
K: An agreement won’t stop this sort of bureaucratic harassment because they’re using the pretext of checking the papers very carefully, they are not stopping the traffic, just checking the papers.
P: Yeah, yeah.
K: I mean it shows really how—that these negotiations are missing the essential point that the Germans are pressing for.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Senator Hugh Scott.]
K: Brezhnev made a speech yesterday in which he attacked our bombing.³
P: The bombing?
K: And the raid.⁴
P: On what ground did he attack it?
K: On the ground that we are claiming rights in the sovereign space of another country and that the Soviet Union will give all fraternal assistance.

P: Well, that’s not unusual, is it? Haven’t they been saying that all along? They have to, don’t they?
K: They have to do something like that. What was most interesting in the speech, though, was he praised the Europeans to the sky and said that the détente in Europe was proceeding. So they are clearly trying to drive a wedge between us and the Europeans, and what I had mentioned to you earlier that we may be the ones that pay for the European détente policy, including the Ostpolitik.

P: Yeah. Because basically if they can get Europe without help from us, they don’t have to do anything for us. They can get it by themselves.
K: They can cover their rear in Europe. The nuclear stalemate guarantees that we can’t do anything to them in a nuclear field.
P: They can turn around and handle the Chinese . . .
K: That’s right. I think that’s their basic strategy now.

P: Yeah; they’ve got to be doing a lot of thinking about these things. You’ll find some more of . . . he’ll give you a little more guidance when you talk to Dobrynin on that. Listen to him; see what he has to say. They are now playing a waiting game; we’ll play a waiting game, too. That’s all there is to it.

³ See Document 56.
⁴ See Document 54.
K: Well, there’s another week. That lunch isn’t until the 7th.\(^5\)
P: Okay, Henry, fine.
K: Right, Mr. President.

\(^5\) On December 7, Dobrynin called Kissinger at 12:32 p.m. and, citing “unforeseen circumstances,” asked to postpone their luncheon that afternoon. “This was a mutual talk,” Kissinger replied, “and there is no sense in having it unless we are both ready.” Dobrynin promised to call back in several days to arrange another time for the meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon\(^1\)

Washington, December 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

Brezhnev’s Remarks on Foreign Policy and their Implications

Brezhnev devoted the foreign policy part of his speech of November 29 to Vietnam, the Middle East, and the situation in Europe.\(^2\) No new proposals or commitments emerged, but some of his formulations and discussion of the issues suggest that the Soviets are trying to strike a fairly conciliatory pose on the Middle East and Berlin, while making strong noises on Vietnam.

**Vietnam; Guinea**

Brezhnev took up our air strikes against North Vietnam\(^3\) and denounced them as “unprecedentedly impudent” attempts to usurp the...

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI. Confidential. Sent for information. According to an attached note, the President saw the memorandum on December 10. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum, with FBIS summaries of Brezhnev’s speech attached, to Kissinger on November 30 and noted: “Attached (Tab A) is the analysis you requested for the President of Brezhnev’s recent speech. While the speech is not all that exciting, there are interesting nuances on the Middle East and Berlin. But perhaps the most interesting point is the fact that Brezhnev continued to limit major comment on the US to the context of Vietnam and to a few bromides on imperialism.” (Ibid.)


\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 54.
right to do whatever we please in the “territory and airspace of other states.” He went on to comment generally on the so-called “bloody crimes” of imperialism in connection with not only Vietnam but also the “bandit attack on Democratic Guinea.” He concluded that it was becoming “increasingly clear what an acute danger the present policy of imperialism represents to all peoples . . .”

He avoided all mention of the raid against Son Tay and any detail on what was in fact going on in Guinea. In this latter connection, there are reports of the landing of two Soviet transport aircraft in Conakry, and intercepted Soviet messages that the USSR will replace whatever arms are used by Guinean forces. A Soviet destroyer may also be going there. Thus, the Soviets may be building up more than the usual propaganda on “imperialist” interventions and violations of territory as they themselves begin to inject themselves into situations like that in West Africa on the basis of their now substantial naval and air lift capabilities.

The renewed Soviet commitment of support to the Vietnamese communists was routine. Thus, there is no suggestion that recent events have led to a change in Soviet policy in Southeast Asia (there is no mention of Laos or Cambodia).

Middle East

In contrast to the militant anti-US tone on Vietnam, and, more broadly Guinea, Brezhnev’s comments on the Middle East are more restrained. After dutifully noting that Israel is becoming more isolated and the forces of the National Liberation movement in the Middle East are growing stronger, Brezhnev confessed it was “difficult to predict with precision how events will develop.” He concludes, however, that conditions are favorable for liquidating the Middle East “hotbed,” and that all “peace loving” forces should increase “moral and political pressures on the aggressors.”

What is significant in this commentary is Brezhnev’s careful use of the phrase “moral and political pressures” which seems to say that military pressures, whether from the Arab states or the fedayeen should be avoided for the present. As regards the latter, he seemed to be hopeful of greater Soviet influence.

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4 On November 22, mercenaries from Portuguese Guinea invaded neighboring Guinea by sea. President Sékou Touré immediately appealed to the international community for assistance. The Soviet Government issued a statement the next day, calling the invasion an “open attempt” by Portugal to “strike a blow at the national liberation movement in Africa.” Although Portugal denied responsibility, the United Nations Security Council voted on December 8 to condemn the attack—which by then had been repulsed—and called on “all States to abstain from giving economic and military assistance to the Government of Portugal.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, December 26–31, 1970, pp. 24353–24355)
Europe

Most of Brezhnev's speech is devoted to Western Europe where he asserts there are "fairly good grounds" to say that changes are for the better. In a recent speech in Budapest, Brezhnev had also spoken positively of developments in Western Europe. He cites in the first place the "struggle" within Germany over the German-Soviet treaty, and in describing these contending forces within Germany "and beyond" he is notably favorable to those (i.e. Brandt and the SPD/FDP) who show "true concern for peace."

On the Berlin issue Brezhnev more or less accepts that the situation in Europe depends on a Berlin settlement though in line with the Soviet position he refers only to "West Berlin."

What is noteworthy, however, is his prediction that an "improvement of the situation" is quite "feasible," and that all that is needed is to work out decisions that meet the "wishes of the people of West Berlin" and "take into account the legitimate interest and sovereign rights of the GDR."

This is a rather weak formulation of the Soviet position, in that it acknowledges, although without precision, the "wishes of the West Berliners" and only calls for "taking account" of the GDR's rights. Given the adamant insistence in the four-power talks that the USSR cannot negotiate for the GDR, and that it cannot give the GDR a four power mandate to negotiate on access arrangements, this rather mild turn of phrase might be a signal of some softening. In light of the severe harassments of civilian traffic to Berlin, however, Brezhnev's statement may simply be window dressing. A forthcoming Warsaw Pact meeting later this week and before the next four-power Ambassadorial meeting in Berlin may produce indications whether the USSR will move and whether Ulbricht will acquiesce.

The Two-Tier Policy Toward the West

The rather conciliatory tone of the speech on Europe also extends to Brezhnev's positive mention of relations with Britain, France and Italy, but direct commentary on over-all relations with the US is totally

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6 See footnote 2, Document 55.

7 The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in East Berlin on December 2. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting included the following passage on Berlin: "the hope was expressed that the talks now under way on West Berlin will be concluded by the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement that corresponds to the interests of a détente in the center of Europe, as well as to the requirements of the population of West Berlin and the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the G.D.R." (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No. 49 (January 5, 1971), pp. 1-3)
absent. The implication for Soviet readers, of course, is that Soviet policy is gaining ground in Western Europe and the US is becoming isolated. The one area which Brezhnev might have touched on in US-Soviet relations is SALT, but he ignored it, as have all Soviet leaders in recent speeches.

The speech seems a striking confirmation that Soviet policy in Europe is more and more détente oriented, relying heavily on German Ostpolitik and its effect on others in Europe to “race to Moscow”, and that one of the principal objectives is to divide us from our European Allies. It is worth noting in this respect that in the middle of the harassments over Berlin, the Soviets made a separate private approach to the French, who failed to inform us until they had not only answered the Soviet’s complaint rather mildly, but had registered a protest in Bonn over the West German meetings that began in West Berlin on Monday, November 30.

In Soviet eyes this policy of separating their relations with Europe, on the one hand, from the relations with the US on the other, must seem to be paying dividends.

The Warsaw Pact meeting scheduled this week may reveal the further steps the Soviets will take to increase interest in their proposals for a European Security Conference. In the broader context, movement along the lines of a European rapprochement will, in the Soviet’s view, eventually also increase pressures on the US to move on a Middle East settlement, and perhaps even in SALT as well, lest we become isolated on positions which have no support from our principal allies. (Even the UK, for example, still strongly favors a MIRV ban and ABM limitations, because without these the costs of the UK strategic force, if it is to be kept effective, rise sharply.)

Meanwhile, the Soviets evidently expect economic benefits from their West European policies. While Moscow will have a continuing problem of adjusting to the Common Market and is highly schizophrenic about East European economic cooperation with Western Europe, it appears to anticipate substantial economic assistance for itself from Germany, Italy, France and the UK. Even the most conservative Soviet leaders welcome this because they hope that new infusions of capital will enable the USSR to avoid fundamental reforms which would be both ideologically obnoxious and politically risky since they would involve greater decentralization. In addition the Soviets do not of course object to having the Europeans help them finance their military competition with the US and their expensive military buildup in Central Asia and the Far East. In fact, if it were up to the Soviets, they would not even object to US business playing this role.

There is not in Brezhnev’s speech any hint of the private Soviet approach to us via SALT for joint actions against “provocative” third countries. This theme continues to appear in Helsinki and the Soviets
no doubt still have some hope to make the proposition attractive to us. While at one level it runs counter to Moscow’s current approach of softness toward Western Europe and toughness toward us, at another it is not inconsistent with longer-term, recurrent Soviet efforts to involve us in a condominium deal, and with their hope to accentuate differences in interests between ourselves and the Europeans.

57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
The Lithuanian Defector Case

In accordance with your request, reports have been submitted to you on this incident by Acting Secretary of State Irwin (Tab B) and Secretary of Transportation Volpe (Tab C). Both reports agree generally (but diverge on specifics) that the investigations revealed the following two problems were immediately involved in this case:

— the Coast Guard unit involved was not adequately informed of the standing instructions and procedures for dealing with potential defectors;
— there was inadequate communication between the State Department and the Coast Guard.

In addition, Secretary Volpe notes that when this incident arose the State Department did not inform the Coast Guard of the existence of the general guidelines relating to defectors, but also points out that the Coast Guard failed to retain the defector on board the cutter pending receipt from State of specific guidance, nor did it notify, in a timely way, the State Department of subsequent developments.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 908, Soviet Defector Case, November 70. Confidential. Drafted by Kissinger and Downey on December 2. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2 Simas Kudirkas.
3 On November 30, Kissinger notified Rogers and Secretary of Transportation Volpe that the President wanted an “immediate investigation of the circumstances surrounding the alleged defection of the Soviet seaman to the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant.” Kissinger added that the two agencies should report their findings by the close of business on December 2. (Ibid.)
4 Both memoranda dated December 2; attached but not printed.
Both memorandums report that the following actions have been taken:

—Guidance on defectors has been provided to all Coast Guard commands and units, as well as to all other agencies of the Government which had not heretofore been involved in refugee and defector affairs.

—The Coast Guard has now assumed membership on those interagency bodies dealing with refugee and defector affairs.

—Steps are being taken to establish a direct communications link between the Coast Guard Headquarters and the Operations Center at the State Department.

Secretary Volpe also reports that pending the conclusion of a formal Board of Investigation, the three Coast Guard officers directly concerned with this incident have been suspended from their duties without prejudice. He suggests that any public announcement of the suspensions at this time could conceivably prejudice the legal proceedings of the Board of Investigation and any actions which may follow under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. However, he notes that a factual statement to the effect that an investigation is being conducted to determine whether or not there is a basis for courts-martial would not prejudice any subsequent legal actions.

The memorandums relate generally consistent statements of the factual situation of the events of Monday, November 23. There are, however, significant differences with respect to some of the details. At Tab A is a rough chronology of the actions that day, drawn from both memorandums. It is clear, however, that during the entire day and night of the attempted defection and return, no attempt was made to contact the White House or the Interagency Defector Committee.5

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5 On December 11, Nixon read a summary of a wire report on his failure to meet more often with the press, including the following passage: “The President’s isolation was nowhere more discernible than in the case of the Lithuanian seaman. RN learned of the event six days after it occurred. Not only were his intelligence reports lacking, but news stories available to millions of newspaper readers did not reach him.” Nixon underlined the last sentence and wrote a message for Kissinger in the margin: “K—did we drop one here?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President’s Office Files, Box 32, Annotated News Summaries, December 1970) Haig answered this question on December 21 as follows: “I believe that the White House staff should not be faulted for not providing this information rapidly because there was no official reporting and the sketchy unofficial reports we did receive did not reveal the full circumstances or significance of this tragedy.” (Memorandum from Haig to Staff Secretary; ibid., NSC Files, Box 908, Soviet Defector Case, November 70) For the subsequent Congressional investigation, see U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Attempted Defection by Lithuanian Seaman Simas Kudirka, Hearings and Report (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).
CHRONOLOGY

The following rough chronology of the events of Monday, November 23, has been drawn from both the State and Transportation memorandums. The Coast Guard cutter cabled the Boston District Headquarters at 12:43 p.m. reporting that there was an estimated 80% probability that a crewman from the Soviet ship would attempt a defection. This cable was received at State shortly after 3:00 p.m. Shortly thereafter, State advised the Coast Guard in Washington that the possible defector should not be encouraged, and noted the possibility of an attempted provocation by the Soviets. The State Department asked that it be kept informed of the developments in the case.

At 4:00 p.m. the Coast Guard told State it had no further information and thus assumed an attempt at defection had not been made. At 7:45 p.m. the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned the State Department Operations Center. According to the Coast Guard’s record of the conversation, its Duty Officer reported that the crewman “is being returned” at the request of the Soviet Master. The State Department’s record of the conversation is that the Coast Guard Duty Officer said that the probable defection case “had been resolved by the return of the seaman.” The last action in Washington that evening was when a State Department officer telephoned the Coast Guard Duty Officer at 11:30 p.m. for further information. The Duty Officer reported he had no further information, and assumed that the case had been resolved.

Returning to the events on board the cutter, the defector arrived on board at approximately 4:00 p.m., and by 5:00 p.m. the Soviets had informed the commander of the cutter, Commander Eustis, that one of 

Footnotes:

6 Drafted by Kissinger and Downey on December 2. In a memorandum to Kissinger on November 30, Sonnenfeldt forwarded the “best obtainable chronology,” including the following background information: “The Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant tied up with a Soviet fishing vessel [Sovetskaya Litva] off Martha’s Vineyard (in US territorial waters) to discuss the question of limiting the size of the Soviet catch of yellow-tailed flounder. This was the first US-Soviet meeting on yellow-tail, but there are informal meetings on fishing matters a couple of times a year. The discussions take place generally under the auspices of the North West Atlantic Fisheries Convention. The meeting was set up some weeks ago with State Department approval. Participating in the meeting were Coast Guard, industry representatives, and Marine Fisheries officials from Interior. The meetings switched back and forth between the two vessels. State had also obtained Port Security clearance for the Soviet vessel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 908, Soviet Defector Case, November 70)

7 The documents cited in the chronology are attached to the memoranda at Tabs B and C.
its crewmen was missing. At 5:15 p.m. Commander Eustis phoned Rear Admiral Ellis, the Commander of the Boston Coast Guard District, who was at his home in a sick leave status. Rear Admiral Ellis advised the commander to put the crewman back if the Soviets requested him, and if he jumped into the water to allow the Soviets the first opportunity to pick him up.

Following this there was a series of telephone conversations between Commander Eustis and Captain Brown, the Boston District Chief of Staff. At 6:11 p.m. Commander Eustis advised Captain Brown that the defector was “definitely in fear of his life.” Captain Brown noted that this was a situation which is “going to have to be resolved by the State Department.” During another telephone conversation shortly after 7:00 p.m. Captain Brown instructed Commander Eustis to return the defector if the Soviets formally requested him. Commander Eustis again noted that if the defector returned his life would probably be in jeopardy. At 8:30 p.m. Commander Eustis advised Captain Brown that he had a formal written request from the Soviet Master for the return of his crewman. Captain Brown instructed Commander Eustis to proceed in accordance with previous instructions—to have the defector returned.

Subsequently, when the defector refused to return to his vessel at the request of Commander Eustis, the Commander advised the Soviet Master that he could send Soviet crewmen on board for the purpose of apprehending the defector. After four Soviet crewmen arrived on board, there was a considerable struggle with the defector who was then beaten severely, bound, and returned to the Soviet vessel at 11:55 p.m. in a Coast Guard boat.8

8 According to Kissinger: “It later turned out that Kudirka had a valid claim to US citizenship. He was permitted to emigrate to the United States after President Ford interceded privately on his behalf with Brezhnev.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 795–796)
SUBJECT

Soviet Ship Visit to Boston is Postponed—The Danger of a Deepening US-Soviet Crisis

Early last month a Soviet oceanographic vessel\(^2\) requested permission to call at Boston December 5–9 to take on provisions and to permit Soviet scientists to meet with their American counterparts at Woods Hole. Similar port calls have been made recently: in August a Soviet research vessel called at Honolulu, and in September a Coast Guard ship called at Murmansk. Another research vessel has requested permission to call at Miami in late December. The Port Security Committee formally cleared the Boston visit on the afternoon of December 1.

Fortunately, State was alive to the distinct possibility of an unpleasant incident in Boston if the Soviet vessel were to tie up at Boston Harbor. State has suggested to the Soviet Embassy that we do not feel that we can provide optimum security for the vessel, its crew and scientific team at this time, and that it would be better if the Boston visit were postponed. The Soviet DCM (Vorontsov) said he could not see any connection between this Boston visit and the Lithuanian defector incident, but he nevertheless understood our position.

A reporting memo from State on this is at Tab A.\(^3\) I do not believe any action on your part if required, in this particular instance.

Comment: There is no question that the State Department did the right thing in this case.

In the broader context of the present phase in US-Soviet relations, I would judge that this incident, although minor as these matters go, will in the Soviet perception of our conduct and purposes, be seen as further evidence of a “hardening” in the US position.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Urgent; sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum on December 8.

\(^2\) Akademik Kurchatov, named after Igor Vasilevich Kurchatov, the physicist who, as scientific director of the Soviet nuclear program, oversaw not only its first atomic bomb test in 1949 but also its first hydrogen bomb test in 1953.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed at Tab A is a memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, December 2.
The Soviets (i.e., various people in Moscow with various sets of biases, interests and domestic political ambitions at this highly fluid moment of internal Soviet politics) see American behavior in peculiar ways. There is much evidence that just as we have in recent months perceived a hardening in Soviet policies toward us, and have reacted thereto, they in turn have seen a similar trend in our behavior toward them. (Comments by Dobrynin and high-level Soviet visitors to this effect are of course to some extent normal Soviet debating tactics and psychological warfare but they do, in my view represent a hard core of actual Soviet perception and judgment.) We must allow for the strong possibility that many things that the Soviets are doing are seen by them as reactions to our behavior. (Needless to say the detention of the Soviet vessel in the Panama Canal\(^4\) will be added by the Soviets to the catalogue of our sins, as will, for example, our rejection of an ABM-only agreement at Helsinki.)\(^5\)

We are in consequence in a period of the greatest delicacy in our relations with the USSR in which discipline and coherence in the signals we emit and the actions we take, or do not take, are more crucial than ever; or we may find ourselves in a first-class crisis of unpredictable outcome. I can think of no more serious problem than this for our national security policy at this time.

I am of course at your complete disposal should you want me to be of assistance to you.

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\(^4\) In a memorandum to Kissinger on December 2, Arnold Nachmanoff, the senior NSC staff member in Latin American Affairs, reported: “This morning a US Marshal boarded the Soviet passenger vessel \textit{Shota Rustaveli}, owned by the Black Sea Shipping Co., in Cristobal at the Atlantic end of the Canal and impounded it. The Marshal was acting on orders issued by the US District Court in Cristobal in connection with a suit for damages filed by the American owners of the SS \textit{Aquarius}, a vessel which suffered a collision with another vessel owned by the Black Sea Shipping Co. in the Persian Gulf some time ago.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI)

\(^5\) Semenov proposed talks on an ABM-only agreement during the SALT session in Helsinki on December 1. (Smith, \textit{Doubletalk}, p. 192)

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59. Editorial Note

On December 10, 1970, President Richard Nixon addressed the subject of Soviet-American relations during his first press conference in over four months. For several days beforehand, the President reviewed his position on a number of issues, from negotiations on SALT
and Berlin to confrontations in Vietnam and the Caribbean. To prepare for the occasion, Henry Kissinger, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, assembled a “foreign policy index” of relevant questions and answers. Nixon studied the answers carefully but also planned to reply in his own words. Kissinger, for instance, suggested an acknowledgment that “our own people” had “displayed poor judgment” and “applied faulty procedures” in the recent case of the Soviet defector near Martha’s Vineyard. Nixon drew a sharper distinction, writing in the margin that “it was a disgraceful incident,” “completely contrary to American tradition,” so “outrageous” in fact, that “a court martial was under consideration.” The President also drafted the following handwritten response to a question on prospects for a summit:

“We have no plans for a summit meeting now.

"1. Continue to talk on the Mideast, SALT, Berlin—other channels—

"2. When there is something to be determined at summit—OK

"3. We have differences—but we are talking—

“Mideast—

“Berlin—

“SALT—” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 907, Presidential Press Conferences, December 10, 1970)

Kissinger was particularly concerned about a question on Soviet military presence in Cuba, drafting and re-drafting language on two informal agreements: the “understanding” of October 1962 on Soviet nuclear missiles and the “understanding” of October 1970 on Soviet nuclear submarines. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the issue by telephone at 5:45 pm on December 8:

“P: With regard to this base on Cuba. I was of the opinion that in the TASS thing they referred to the understanding that they hadn’t referred to submarines being a base.

“K: They said they were not constructing submarine bases in Cuba.

“P: Was that new?

“K: They reaffirmed the ’62 which referred to offensive missiles and extended it to submarine bases.

“P: It doesn’t say that. My answer should say it reaffirms the agreement of ’62.

“K: I have it and I will change that.

“P: I don’t think it’s clear. The Soviet news agency issued a statement they are not building a military base on Cuba.

“K: They said military naval base.

“P: ’[omission in transcript] with regard to offensive [omission in transcript] on the island. [omission in transcript]’ See what I’m getting at?
“K: ’62 that they agreed not to put offensive weapons on Cuba and TASS statement extended it to military naval base. That’s new and they added that to the understanding of ’62.

“P: That will do it. No need to re-write it. Fine. Thank you.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

Kissinger provided additional guidance in a note to Nixon the next morning:

“In line with our discussion yesterday evening, I have modified the question and answer covering Soviet military activities in Cuba. As you know in recent days the Soviet submarine tender has been involved in military exercises in the waters northeast of Cuba with as many as 4 Soviet diesel-powered submarines. Thus, we can see their salami tactics beginning.

“For this reason, I believe it is important that you include the second paragraph of the proposed answer dealing with our expectation that they will comply with both the letter and the spirit of our understandings.”

The attached second paragraph, with Nixon’s handwritten revisions incorporated, reads as follows:

“In view of such assurances, we consider that there is an understanding between us and the Soviets as to our respective positions on the limits of actions with regard to Cuba. I expect that the Soviet Union will abide by both the letter and spirit of this understanding. We will continue watching current Soviet military activity in and around Cuba very closely.” (Ibid.)

Kissinger addressed the issue again in a memorandum to the President that afternoon, taking into account reports that the Soviet submarine tender and other naval vessels had returned to Cuba on December 8: “These actions suggest that the Soviets are taxing our resolve by continuing activities in and around Cuba just below the legal limits or our ‘understanding.’ For this reason, it is important that we maintain a firm and cool posture with respect to the existence of an ‘understanding’ and the seriousness with which it is regarded.” Kissinger reviewed and emphasized the “precise language” of the statement issued by TASS on October 13: that “the Soviet Union has not built and is not building its military base on Cuba and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the Governments of the USSR and the United States.” Kissinger reiterated his advice that if asked about the “understanding,” Nixon should “take a strong line to ensure there are no uncertainties in Moscow as to your attitude on this subject.” (Ibid.)

The President spent most of the day on December 10 preparing for his press conference that evening. As White House Chief of Staff
H.R. Haldeman recorded in his diary: “P stayed locked up at the EOB all day, and I didn’t see him for the entire day, something of a record. He didn’t leave the EOB until just time to go over to the Residence and change clothes and go down for the press conference at 7:00.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, page 218) While “locked up” in his private office, Nixon collected his thoughts on a yellow legal pad, covering a variety of issues both foreign and domestic. His handwritten notes include the following passages on Soviet-American relations:

“Defector: Court Martial [Board of Investigation completed—and Commandant of Coast Guard in the next 2 days—]

“1. The relevant information was not reported to State—and for that reason—from State to W.H.
“2. It was a shocking, disgraceful incident—in a nation with a proud tradition of providing a sanctuary for refugees—
“3. It will not happen again.”

“Understanding with Cuba—

“1. In 1962—Understanding that Soviet would not introduce offensive missiles
“2. In October 13 Soviet TASS—reaffirmed this understanding—to include a military naval base
“3. We expect it to be kept & will watch—”

“U.S.S.R.:

“1. We have great differences
“2. We talk at SALT—
“We work on Mideast—
“We work on Berlin—
“3. Summit may will be useful.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 62, President’s Speech File, December 10, 1970, Press Conference—RN Notes) The brackets are in the original.

Nixon began the press conference, which was broadcast live on radio and television, at 7 p.m. in the East Room at the White House. As expected, he received several questions on his Soviet policy. The first such question concerned Soviet naval presence near Cuba. When a reporter asked, however, whether he thought a “submarine base in Cuba” threatened national security, the President gave a brief answer: “No, I do not.” Nixon was more expansive when asked whether the lack of progress on SALT and Berlin reflected “any serious deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations”:

“I have noted the speculation to the effect that U.S.-Soviet relations—sometimes they’re warmer and sometimes they’re cooler. I would only suggest that U.S.-Soviet relations are going to continue to be difficult, but the significant thing is that we are negotiating and not confronting. We are talking at SALT. We are very far apart because our
vital interests are involved, but we are talking, and our vital interests, the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States, require that we have some limitation of arms, both because of the cost and because of the danger of a nuclear confrontation.

“And so it is with Berlin, so it is with the Mideast. I am not suggesting that we are going to find easy agreement, because we are two great powers that are going to continue to be competitive for our lifetime. But I believe that we must continue on the path of negotiation, and in my long talk with Mr. Gromyko, I think there are some other areas where we can negotiate.”

Nixon also answered a question on his “personal view on the defector problem” as follows:

“Well, as I have already indicated, I was, as an American, outraged and shocked that this could happen. I regret that the procedures of the Coast Guard informing the State Department and the State Department informing the White House were not adequate to bring the matter to my attention. I can assure you it will never happen again. The United States of America for 190 years has had a proud tradition of providing opportunities for refugees and guaranteeing their safety, and we are going to meet that tradition.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pages 1101–1111)

The President called Kissinger at 7:45 p.m. to review the press conference. Kissinger assured Nixon that his performance was “spectacular, the best that I have ever heard.” “From a foreign policy point,” Kissinger added, “this was ideal. If I had staffed it, it wouldn’t have been as good.” Although he “really stuck it into Hanoi,” Nixon commented that he did not “get the Middle East in there. The State Department wanted me to kick the Soviets on that.” After a brief exchange on domestic issues, the two men turned to Soviet-American relations:

“P: [W]asn’t it good the fact that with regard to the Soviets, Mr. Gromyko and I had some other things we talked about—of course, the President discussed other things.

“K: You gave a message to the Russians.

“P: What was the message?

“K: We want to talk seriously with the Russians. You talked just enough about the Chinese.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Cuba, Credibility and Dobrynin

Following our brief chat after the Yugoslav film today;\(^2\) I learned that Dobrynin will be one of the guests at Lucet’s this evening (along with Secretary Rogers, etc.).\(^3\) This may not be a propitious occasion for you to get into the Cuban business. But I thought it might be helpful to you if I briefly put down some ideas relating to the President’s press conference statement on Cuba.\(^4\)

The problems with the President’s brief answer are of course manifold and complex. For one thing, those in Washington who thought an artificial crisis was being manufactured by the “White House” for some ulterior purpose will feel themselves confirmed in that view. It just seems very suspicious in an election year to have a grave situation in September and early October, an “understanding” involving a seeming Soviet backdown later in October and then, in December, even though the press has been fed a steady stream of information about continued Soviet activities, no threat to our security at all.

More serious than this, may be the impression left with the Soviets. If I am correct in believing that until August–September the Soviets had reason to believe that their military activities in the Caribbean were tolerable to us, it may be valid to say that they were genuinely surprised when they suddenly found us making a major issue of them. And now, when they are doing at least as much as they did in August–September, they hear that this is no threat to our security. I do not, of course, know for a fact whether the “understanding” is actually being abided by, since I do not know its terms and do not know

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, which is marked “Personal.”

\(^2\) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger attended that afternoon a screening of a Yugoslav film on the President’s recent trip to Yugoslavia. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

\(^3\) Kissinger and Rogers attended a dinner that evening hosted by Charles Lucet, the French Ambassador, in honor of Hervé Alphand, the former Ambassador and then Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Sally Quinn, “Old Party, New Guests,” Washington Post, December 12, 1970, p. C2)

\(^4\) See Document 59.
how well the Russians understood these terms. I take it, however, that Soviet activities today have the same potential for servicing Y-Class submarines as in September, even though this has not occurred, either now or in September. For Moscow, therefore, it would appear that we had reverted to the posture of toleration and that September/October was a temporary aberration. Moscow, too, must ask itself about the reasons for the aberration: was it in fact authorized by the President, if so, why?

For some audiences, the President’s remark may carry the inference that if Soviet military activities in the Western hemisphere carry no threat to our security then similar activities in more distant places could hardly be seen by us to carry such a threat and to justify costly countermeasures. (The doves in Congress may use this very argument.)

For all these and other reasons, I do feel that some gloss on the President’s statement would be desirable.

I think a case could be made that Soviet activities so close to us do in fact carry less danger to our security in military terms than, say, Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean for the simple reason that we enjoy overwhelming military superiority in the Caribbean. I also believe, as I suggested in my memo on the Indian Ocean,5 that we have done too much glamorizing of the Soviet Navy and have thereby given its activities political and psychological bonus effects which we have long since ceased to obtain from our own naval activities. It may also be desirable to still give the Russians the opportunity to pull back gracefully.

With these points in mind, my suggestion for getting the President’s statement into a more coherent relationship with what happened in September and October (and with the fact that some Soviet naval activities have increased in this area since then) would be as follows:

We should let it be known that

—Soviet activities have remained under close scrutiny to determine whether they exceed or violate limits established by the understandings reached in September/October;
— the evidence still remains ambiguous;
— in any case, for the moment, the most worrisome aspects of the Soviet activity remain potential rather than actual;
— the President addressed himself to the situation as of the date that he was being asked the question;
— in any event, the President was answering a question relating to a threat to our security; he did not address the broader question

as to whether we consider our interests adversely affected; nor did he address the question of whether Soviet actions help or hinder the process of finding a modus vivendi based on mutual respect for interests;
—clearly, apart from our judgment as to whether our security is threatened we must judge Soviet behavior by these broader considerations;
—consequently, it remains our position that actions by one superpower designed to gain unilateral or tactical advantages at the expense of the other are incompatible with the era of negotiations and could, if carried beyond acceptable limits, lead to a major crisis.

61. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Vietnam and Soviet-American Relations

Vietnam has always been in the background of our relations with the USSR. Since the negotiations began in Paris, however, the Soviets have been relatively content to remain on the sidelines, becoming active only periodically, and then usually responding to new developments with by-now-standard pledges of support for Hanoi and the Viet Cong. Nevertheless, Vietnam, when added to other issues has an impact on the Soviet assessment of our policies.

When it appears that the situation on the ground may escalate, the Soviets cannot help but be concerned. It raises the question for them of further military aid requests from Hanoi, which, in turn, means a greater dependence on the Chinese supply routes. It forces the Soviet leaders to fall in line with Hanoi and China in issuing recent denunciatory statements by Brezhnev in Yerevan,² at the Warsaw Pact

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI. Secret; Nodis. Urgent; sent for information. Hyland initialed the memorandum for Sonnenfeldt. According to an attached note, Kissinger saw the memorandum, which he also initialed, on December 21.
² See Document 56.
meeting,\textsuperscript{3} and the Soviet government statement of December 16.\textsuperscript{4} And it raises the question for the Soviet leaders of whether they can and should continue to negotiate for agreements with the US, if Vietnam is going to escalate to a major crisis.

This last factor is of some immediate concern in regard to the continuation of the Paris talks. While the Soviets will not acknowledge any responsibility for the “understanding” they know as well as we that they did assume some measure of responsibility for the terms of the bombing halt.\textsuperscript{5} But more important, a continuation of the talks, and some remote prospect of a political settlement, has been the Soviet position throughout the debate with China (and with Hanoi) over how to conduct the war.

At the same time, the Soviets have profited from our involvement in Vietnam, and, no doubt, attribute some of their successful European diplomacy to European fears that Vietnam would cause a gradual withdrawal of the United States from world affairs. Thus, as long as talks continue and the war does not escalate to North Vietnam, the Soviets are relatively content.

Now it seems their concern may be growing. We have, for example, received a report\textsuperscript{6} of the line sent from Moscow to Gus Hall and the American communist party. According to this, (tailored for USCP use) at the CPSU Party Central Committee plenum on December 7, Brezhnev made a “belligerent and combative speech” in which he blamed the President for sharpening the world situation in Indochina, the Middle East and Berlin. He criticized us for blocking the Bonn–Moscow treaty, and following a “reactionary” domestic policy. Interestingly, however, Brezhnev is supposed to have said that the Soviets will try to reach agreement in SALT, and are not against a summit conference. (This last squares with French reports of what Brezhnev said to Pompidou).\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{3} See footnote 7, Document 56.


\textsuperscript{5} Reference is presumably to the bombing halt over North Vietnam of October 1968.

\textsuperscript{6} Not further identified.

\textsuperscript{7} Pompidou visited the Soviet Union for eight days in October 1970. In a memorandum to Nixon on October 23, Kissinger reported that the results of the visit were “rather ambiguous and inconclusive.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files, Europe, France, Vol. VII) Sonnenfeldt, who drafted the memorandum, also observed: “As evidenced by the cordial reception afforded Pompidou, the Soviets were obviously intent on warming up their relations with Paris—undoubtedly in part to help dissuade Paris from moving toward too close a rapprochement with the U.S. Many elements of Gaullist policy of détente and cooperation with the East were clearly renewed by the Pompidou trip.” (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, October 19; ibid.) Kissinger’s memorandum is scheduled for publication in \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
The significant aspect of this seems to be the ambivalence in the Soviet position. On the one hand, Brezhnev wants it known that he is tough and harsh on the US, but he is careful not to foreclose a meeting with the President or even a major agreement. It may be that Vietnam is casting a shadow over these latter possibilities, and could move the Soviets into some more diplomatic action. It is difficult to see how the Soviets can influence the situation much without confronting Hanoi or further worsening their relations with us by some new pressures to dissuade us from a course of action which to Moscow must appear potentially very dangerous.

62. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 17, 1970, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Editors of The Washington Post, December 17, 1970; 1:00 p.m., the office of Kay Graham. Questions answered by Dr. Kissinger.

PRESENT, AMONG OTHERS
Don Oberdorfer, Marylin Berger, Chalmers Roberts, Murrey Marder, Meg Greenfield, and Henry Hubbard

Question: Why are our relations with the Soviets so bad now?
Answer: I really wish I knew. In June I would have thought they were going to be much better by this time. The question is really whose fault has it been. Even granting Soviet paranoia it seems that something happened in July or August which stalemated the Soviet leadership. This seemed to coincide with their decision to delay the Party Congress. The symptoms of the stalemate within the Soviet leadership would seem to be their reactions in the Middle East during the ceasefire where they brought in the missiles in violation of the cease-

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 269, Memoranda of Conversation, 1968–77, Chronological File. Confidential. Graham was publisher of the Washington Post. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 2:55 p.m. (Ibid., Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 On July 13, TASS announced the postponement of the 24th Party Congress until March 1971; Brezhnev had insisted as recently as July 2 that the Congress would be held “this year.” (James F. Clarity, “Soviet Postpones Party’s Congress Until Next March,” New York Times, July 19, 1970, p. 1)
fire, their base in Cienfuegos, Cuba and their condoning of the harassments in Berlin.

The real problem may be on a much deeper level and it may revolve around the Soviet Union’s relationship with the Chinese, both geopolitically and ideologically. If they improve their relationship with us and there is a warming of the atmosphere and détente, then they face criticism from the Chinese for not holding the ideological line. At the same time, if they hardline it so that they avoid criticism from the Chinese they cool the détente atmosphere. They also have a geopolitical factor with the Chinese which makes this a complicated choice for them. What they may be trying to do is maneuver so that they don’t have to make a choice between détente in the West and a positive relationship with China. This they could do if they could split Western Europe away from the US and have a détente with Western Europe but not with the US.

Another element may be that it appears to the Soviets that several of our actions have been part of a deliberate campaign against them; such things as the publicity with regard to the defector and the two generals that strayed across the Turkish border. In the latter case it must be remembered that they took two-and-a-half weeks deciding what to do, never answering our requests to see the generals.

One must realize that each nation tries to bring coherence and rationale to the actions of the other nation, regardless of how diverse or inexplicable such actions are. One should also realize in dealing with the Russians that in the Cold War posture of the 1950’s, there was a substantial difference between the strength of the US and Russia so that relatively minor changes did not really make much of a difference. But today they are so close to parity that minor changes can make major shifts in balance.

**Question:** Would you review each of the areas that you have mentioned specifically, i.e., the Middle East, Cuba and SALT?

**Answer:** On SALT, in the Vienna phase we developed our position more fully and so did they, but they did not put in numbers to explain their position. At Helsinki the positions were developed more in a conceptual framework and it would seem that what we have done, or what the Russians have been attempting to do is get the negotiations to a point at which they could move forward into very serious negotiations when it is politically opportune. In other words, they have gotten to the point where a political decision is now necessary on whether or not, and what type of, an agreement is desired. They expanded the conceptual theory on which their position is based; but

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3 The second round of SALT talks was held in Vienna from April to August 1970.
they did not come up with anything concrete enough so that we would reply or make a counter-proposal. The talks did make progress but they have reserved to themselves the time on when to move. It seems that so far there has been a non-decision in Moscow on whether they want to move ahead seriously and on whether or not they want a comprehensive agreement.

**Question:** Was Laird’s statement which appeared in today’s *Post* a deliberate signal?

**Answer:** No.

**Question:** Is the White House admitting that it can’t control the Department of Defense?

**Answer:** No, but it helps when we know what they are going to say.

**Question:** What are your views, or how do you look at the Middle East in view of what you have just said above?

**Answer:** There are three basic issues when one looks at the Middle East. First, one can look at it solely as an Arab-Israeli problem; secondly, one can focus on the significance of the Soviet presence there; or thirdly, one can also focus on the nature of the Arab states, their autonomy. Our objective has been to try to get each of these issues in phase with each other. Some however think that only the first issue is of any consequence and it is therefore the key. They believe that if it can be solved, the rest will fall in place.

We believe however that each of these issues is related; that there are a number of problems which have to be resolved or at least addressed. A good example is the likelihood of a stalemate once negotiations are started.

In fact, stalemate is really inevitable. It seems to be an obsession in Washington to focus only on the next step. One of the things that surprised me most when I came here was the singlemindedness with which the immediate step was addressed and the lack of attention paid to what was going to happen next. Starting negotiations is of second order priority; breaking the stalemate is really the critical issue. Examples of the questions we should address are: With whom are we going to deal when there is a stalemate? Is it going to be in a four-power forum, two-power forum, the Security Council at the UN? Are we going to move alone? There are numerous other crucial questions which

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4 In his statement released on December 16, Laird reported that there were “some preliminary indications” that the Soviet Union had recently started to curtail construction of its SS–9 ICBMs. (Michael Getler, “Soviets Slow ICBM Buildup,” *Washington Post*, December 17, 1970, p. A1)
have to be answered, but they will not be addressed until the problem is on top of us.

Question: Isn’t the issue that we are facing now—that Israel wants an answer as to what we will do?

Answer: Yes, that is true in part, but we say that we won’t propose a settlement and we really can’t say or be any more precise at this time.

Question: Do the Israelis want us to say we will exercise our Security Council veto in their behalf if the occasion arises where it is needed for their support?

Answer: Yes. One must realize the situation which Israel faces. It would prefer to hold on to all conquered territories rather than give them up in exchange for promises and one must admit that there has been little in the last year which inspires confidence in the promises or assurances, whether written or verbal, on the Arab side. It is very tough for an Israeli politician to take the position that he will withdraw from the conquered territories because that is their security. If he does, he has problems not only with his government but the bureaucracy as well. Israel would probably have been much better off if in 1967 they had immediately offered a half or a third of the territory that they had conquered in exchange for the recognition and promises which they want. They would have probably had a better chance of getting the terms they want now. And even though it probably would have been turned down in the abstract by the Arabs, it would have been a better starting point for today. What we have to do now is distinguish between what the Israelis will take and what they say they will take.

Question: Why do we even contemplate interference in this matter in the Middle East?

Answer: It is our strong conviction that any other route than our involvement might become too dangerous. The factors here involve predominance and growing influence of the Soviets in the Middle East and the radicalization of the Arabs.

Question: Is this danger equivalent to the danger of our losing our influence in Western Europe due to the increase in Soviet influence and interest there?

Answer: The change here has primarily been one in starting points and it has not relieved tensions. There are of course risks if you try to intervene, but there are also risks if you do nothing.

Question: Returning to the proposition that stalemate is inevitable. Would it make sense to have a stronger peace force with the Soviets and the US joining as a means of enforcing any settlement?

Answer: It would seem difficult to at the same time both remove the Soviets by one negotiation and insert them by another. An international force would have its maximum effectiveness in relation to a
conventional attack. But as we can see, the threat to Israel is primarily guerrilla operations, not conventional ones. At the same time the Israelis are primarily geared to operate conventionally and their strategy is based on moving preemptively. An international force therefore does not meet the needs of Israeli security. Possibly, in ten or 15 years, this would not be the case, but right now it is.

Question: How then can boundaries of Israel be secured?

Answer: The issue facing Israel is that they must weigh security provided by the intangibles of promises, good will and international legal recognition against the security provided by the reality of territory. There is a need for them to have confidence in the promises and other intangibles before they give up the territory. One of our objectives should be to remove Israel from the forefront of four-power politics.

Question: The Jordanians, Lebanese and Syrians do not seem to pose that much of a threat today? Is not the real threat to Israel’s survival from the Egyptian side?

Answer: You are right in talking about Jordan, Syria and Lebanon as not being threats, but only in the conventional sense, not in the guerrilla sense. On the Egyptian side it is true that an international force could play a useful role because of the distance and the fact that only a conventional attack could be launched there. An international force could therefore contain it, or at least prevent it for a limited time. If such border security could be arranged, Israel might, but it is very unlikely that they would, accept the 67 borders vis-à-vis Egypt. If they did, we would not object. We are not going to say, “Hold on, look what you are giving up.”

Question: What do you think of the Dayan idea for settlement and the likelihood that Sadat would go along with it?

Answer: The Dayan idea has many good points. The opening of the canal would greatly reduce the likelihood of attack, but my impression is that Egypt won’t accept it. [The questioner interjected here that Sadat, as a first step, might accept the border settlement with Egypt even though the other borders are not settled, and that this could lead to serious negotiations on the other borders.]

Question: Have the Israelis been less flexible than you had hoped and have the Egyptians been harder to deal with? We realize you never thought it would be easy, but has it been tougher than you had expected?

Answer: It has been tougher than we had anticipated but for different reasons. The point to be made here is that how one manages a dead-

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5 Reference is presumably to the “interim canal-agreement initiative” proposed by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in November 1970.

6 Brackets are in the original.
lock is essential to the kind of peace that ensues. The series of events that took place in September could not be managed or anticipated, but it is not surprising that some such development would occur. What is surprising and in many respects cannot be explained is the fact that they so brutally broke the ceasefire understanding. In addition, there was the death of Nasser which, of course, no one had anticipated.

Returning to the point made earlier on the nature of the problem facing Israel, where they have to balance promises, good will, and legitimate legal status against the relinquishment of territory—it is obvious that the events of the summer have depreciated the value of the intangibles and at the same time increased the value ascribed to the territory. There is a need for confidence not only in the willingness of the Arabs to carry out their promises, but in their ability to do so. In certain surrounding circumstances during this past summer’s events there was a lack of willingness to carry out their promises. And in the case of Jordan there was a lack of ability to carry out their promises. Furthermore, circumstances surrounding the whole episode, such as the violations of the ceasefire, do not increase one’s confidence in the seriousness with which the Arabs want to make peace. In my view we have therefore gone back since July. And, in addition, the other fears that were voiced then seem to still remain. We are not against a settlement but we must be realistic in our appraisal of what it is going to take to have a settlement.

Question: On the subject of Cuba and the sub-base at Cienfuegos, do the Soviets now constitute a threat there? The President answered this with a short “no” the other night at his press conference, and the State Department has since said that the President’s answer meant that it is now not a threat. Do you agree with this? And would you, if you had to give the backgrounder over again which you gave just before the trip to Europe use the President Kennedy quote again?

Answer: The events which led up to the making of the statement were as follows:

When we became aware of what the Soviets were doing we decided to work out a joint public affairs posture which all the agencies of the government would adhere to. It was decided that the Department of

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7 No statement from the Department of State qualifying the President’s answer on Cuba has been found.

8 Kissinger answered several questions on Cuba during his “backgrounder” for the press on September 25. During the session, Kissinger read the following quotation from President Kennedy’s press conference on November 20, 1962: “As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 2)
Defense would acknowledge and reply to the factual questions on what was there and the State Department would make a follow-up statement if required. This was the statement that I made at the press conference. It was approved by all the departments and in fact was drafted by State.

In this setting, then, there appeared the Sulzberger article in the Friday edition of the *NY Times* addressing the whole situation in Cienfuegos.\(^9\) Next, the Defense Department revealed very extensively the factual basis for our concern 45 minutes before I was to brief the press corps in connection with the President’s European trip. It was then decided that I should read the agreed statement. It just happened that this backgrounder was the first time that an Administration spokesman would be before the press after the Defense revelation and it would not have looked good for the White House to have referred this to State or to have “no commented.”

The only thing which I did which was not in the original game plan was to read the quote rather than simply refer to it. I did this because I felt that the obvious next question would have been, “Well, what did Kennedy say in the statement to which you are referring?” It is therefore utter nonsense to say that I was blowing up the Cienfuegos situation. The way that the statement played was what we wanted. It was only in later articles that the matter became confused, not only to our public, but also to the Soviets.

*Question:* But that question with regard to Cuba was planted. We know that Ziegler handed a piece of paper to one of the press corps coming in which told him, or asked him, to ask that question.

*Answer:* But the question that was asked did not, as far as I know, come from the person who was asked to ask it. It developed independently and on its own. In any event, that is irrelevant to the question of whether or not the situation was blown out of proportion. The outcome of all of this was an unfortunate spate of stories. The one that was put out by Tad Szulc of the *NY Times* saying that it was based on evidence that was ten months old was a straightforward lie.\(^10\) For our part, perhaps we made the mistake of bragging too much. However, from a diplomatic point of view the result is that the understandings are now clearly established. If a sub-base is established there, then there is clearly a violation.

An interesting question to ask is, if they were not doing anything, why was Castro so quiet? His silence is usually evidence that what we are alleging is true.

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The question then is whether or not the present situation is a threat to the security of the United States. The answer is no. But if they apply salami tactics and try to stretch the understanding, then their facilities may become a threat. There are all sorts of variations and ways in which they could try to stretch the understandings. But it is clear that the understandings themselves alone are not going to stop them. If they want to build a base, they will try to build a base whether or not we have an understanding with them. One should remember that Kennedy didn’t have an understanding with them in ’62. The question one must ask himself at this point is why do they do this if they really want to reduce tensions.

**Question:** Are you saying it is not a present threat but it may be a potential threat?

**Answer:** No; what State said that the President meant is true. Perhaps he simply wanted to give a short answer. On the other hand, if they do develop a full-scale sub-base it could increase their coverage by some 35%. If they don’t actually build a base they can horse around all they want. We don’t care. But we are determined to prevent establishment of a base. It is also very clear that there is no misunderstanding. They have said they understand, and they have not violated the understanding yet.

**Question:** What do you think actually happened within the Soviet leadership structure in July?

**Answer:** One can’t really say. It is interesting though that Dobrynin went home and my Deputy, Haig, told me that it must be that they don’t want to be reached. At the time I didn’t quite accept this, but it seems that it may have been true. There could have been a leadership crisis. They could also simply have wanted to tread water while preparing for the Party Conference. It could also be that each of the heads of the various departments was trying to gain a little more muscle for himself; each acting below the threshold but with an accumulative effect that may result in a chain of events which is beyond their control. One should remember that the Politburo does not have any coordination below it, such as we have with our National Security Council. All the members of the Politburo read all the cables and it is very possible that at one time or another different factions of it are predominant, but that none is strong enough to control the whole.

**Question:** If the Soviets are in a suspicious or aggressive mood, do you think it is because the situation in Vietnam or NATO makes them feel squeezed?

**Answer:** It is unlikely that the situation in Vietnam or the recent bombing of North Vietnam has made them feel squeezed. In fact, our experience has been just the opposite. The time when they were most flexible and forthcoming was immediately following the Cambodian
operation. What have we done which would lend support to the proposition that they feel we are trying to squeeze them? I really can’t say. Perhaps our decision to go unilateral on the Middle East—they could think that that was an attempt to squeeze them. But overall I would think that about 75% of the cause is on their side; perhaps 25% on ours. It is also true that they might feel that our actions in NATO are an attempt to squeeze them.

*Question:* Have you gone through all of your backgrounders of the summer and any other public statements which might lend credence to their feeling that we are trying to squeeze them?

*Answer:* No, it seems very unlikely other than what I have said.

*Question:* What are the upper limits on the ABM?

*Answer:* I can’t answer that. Of course this all depends on one’s assessment of the Soviets. One should realize, though, on the ABM that it will not be deployed—nothing will be deployed before ’74 and that if they really want to stop it and have a zero or very limited ABM, we can have an agreement. We are not trying to provoke them.

*Question:* On the ABM, is it likely that there will be a large step vis-à-vis the Senate?

*Answer:* No, I would think this unlikely. The basic question here is whether or not you are more likely to get them to negotiate seriously and reach agreement by conceding your main bargaining chip ahead of time, or by keeping your main bargaining chip and using it as part of the negotiations.

*Question:* What is the general view of the Administration with regard to Cambodia now looking back?

*Answer:* There is no doubt that the Communists will mount a major attack on Cambodia as soon as they can. How well the Cambodians will be able to withstand the attack we do not know. They are not very well trained yet, but they have done much better than we expected. The whole Cambodian operation however was far more successful than we even anticipated. The fact that they were bringing in so many supplies through Sihanoukville—three times our highest estimate—has meant that they now have to reestablish their whole supply system. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese now know that they cannot knock over South Vietnam until they have gotten Cambodia and can get their supplies in through Cambodia. We estimate that they will launch a major effort in Cambodia this dry season. If they can knock over Cambodia this year then they can try for South Vietnam next year. If they do not knock over Cambodia this year then the pace of our disengagement and our withdrawals should continue without much difficulty.

*Question:* Are the Soviets now providing more supplies to North Vietnam?
Answer: This is really not relevant to the question of negotiation. It is likely though that the more we destroy, the more they are in need of supplies and the more they are going to ask the Russians for.

Question: Are we risking the creation of a new credibility gap when we launch new bombing raids such as we did a couple of weeks ago?

Answer: When one does something again which has been done in the past and which has a certain association with it, they will always face the problem of association, but we have been scrupulous in trying to give out as much information as we can and which we consider consistent with the national interest.

Question: Are we forcing Cambodia into the arms of the North Vietnamese by allowing the South Vietnamese to run loose in there?

Answer: The only choice which we had was either to let Cambodia collapse or let the South Vietnamese help them. The fact is that the Cambodians asked the South Vietnamese to help them and, indeed, complained at one point that help was not coming soon enough. There are some abuses, but these are minor and I don’t think that we can say that the South Vietnamese are driving the Cambodians into the arms of the North Vietnamese.

Question: As a general observation, would you say that President Nixon is spending more time on domestic affairs this year than he did last?

Answer: By and large, this is true. His interests, however, have not changed. I believe that he is still very interested in foreign affairs, but he has changed the amount of time that he has been able to spend on domestic affairs vis-à-vis foreign affairs. In each case it takes more time to set the basic direction than it does to try to keep tabs on an operation. In the first year we spent more time trying to set our direction on foreign policy. And now we are trying to follow it and carry it out. More time is now being spent trying to set directions domestically and this by its very nature requires more effort and consumes more time.

On foreign policy, the only issue left with regard to Vietnam is how quickly we will get out, but whether or not it’s a little faster or a little slower than some people want is not an issue of first order magnitude. If one were objective and had access to all the information which we have, I do not believe that they would vary from what we calculate by more than plus or minus four months.

Question: Would you comment on the German Ostpolitik and on where Dean Acheson’s views fit in with those of the Administration?11

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Answer: There was no special significance to the fact that Acheson, Dewey, Clay and McCloy came in recently. The President has made a policy of from time to time meeting with them. And it just happened that their turn came up. McCloy’s views are well known on Europe and one would expect him to have certain views on Ostpolitik and their effect on NATO. The President’s job in this situation is to listen to their points of view and to other points of view. It does not mean necessarily that he agrees, but these are people that he respects and which he likes to hear from.

We are not opposed to Ostpolitik. We don’t want to interject the United States into German internal politics. We did not open the negotiations with the Russians, nor did we establish a linkage between the Ostpolitik and the Berlin negotiations. Quite frankly, we do not know why people are complaining that we are dragging our feet. There has actually been no concrete proposal as yet on which we could act. In general, I believe that the Berlin situation really can’t be improved very much. Historically, access to Berlin has become more difficult as East Germany has grown in sovereignty over the access routes. There are all sorts of administrative procedures which they could use against us. An ingenious bureaucracy can invent innumerable ways in which to harass access to Berlin. There is nothing in the treaty which could prevent this and it could even be legal.

The real improvement is going to depend on the relationship between East and West Germany. If each believes it is in its interest to have better relations and less friction with regard to Berlin, then there can be a meaningful treaty. One must admit that the Soviet attitude on Berlin has been quite puzzling, since they could get the Berlin situation settled by making a few concessions and this would force ratification of the Ostpolitik. No German politician is going to stand up and say he is against a rapprochement with the East Germans. I predict that when the Ostpolitik treaty is ratified it will be unanimous. Why then have the Soviets been so inflexible? One could say that perhaps the East Germans have more of a veto over their actions than we think. It could also be simply that the Soviets think they are going to get their way without giving any concessions, or it might be explained by a difficulty within the factions of the Soviet leadership which we discussed earlier.

Question: Do you think this Solzhenitsyn case recently has had any impact internationally?

Answer: No, I think it is too minor an incident.

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12 On October 8, the Nobel Academy announced that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn would receive its 1970 prize for literature. Although he accepted the honor, Solzhenitsyn announced on November 27 that he would not ask for official permission to travel to Stockholm to receive the award.
63. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, December 17, 1970, 4:17 p.m.

D: I just arrived from New York.
K: Did you have a good time?
D: Not exactly—it was a very short visit.
K: You called me yesterday.
D: Yes because yesterday I was in New York and Vorontsov was with Mr. Davies at State.²
K: Who?
D: Mr. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary dealing with East European affairs. He works for Mr. Hillenbrand.
K: Oh yes, I know who.
D: And he invited Vorontsov yesterday and he mentioned two points. The second, about the gentleman, you know.³
K: Yes, but he doesn’t know anything about it. The Secretary will talk to you about that next week.
D: He put some conditions on it and Moscow will be very angry.
K: There will be no conditions.
D: He already said it.
K: What are they?
D: That we have to give back Mr. [Kudirka] who is a Soviet citizen, an unbelievable demand, and second about the four Americans in East Germany.⁴ I told Vorontsov to hold this until I came back to Washington to discuss it with you.
K: Let me discuss it with the President. Don’t make this an official thing.
D: Should I drop it with you?
K: Let me talk to the President to make sure.
D: I asked him to hold it because I knew he would send a telegram to Moscow. He put it down in writing.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.
² No record of the meeting between Vorontsov and Davies on December 16 has been found.
³ Igor Ivanov.
⁴ Not further identified.
K: What I communicated to you was the expression of the President with no conditions attached. The only thing I want to confirm—which I already know the answer to—is that this was not a change made without my knowing it. Let me call you tomorrow morning.

D: I will hold it till tomorrow morning.

K: Could you?

D: Yes. I was so surprised with these changes of mind.

K: There is no change.

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64. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Attorney General Mitchell

Washington, December 17, 1970, 5:07 p.m.

K: In the unending saga of the Secretary of State, we now have a real problem connected with the Ivanov case. They were driving us batty for years to do it. Now that we have agreed, they don’t want to do it.

M: I understood this to be the case and I was led to believe you concurred. They are concerned about PR in view of the Lithuanian sailor’s problem.

K: They called Dobrynin today and told him there were two conditions: that the four Americans held in East Germany be released, and that someone they consider a Soviet citizen be released. Dobrynin is beside himself. He said, “You are discrediting me and you.” He said he could not send this to Moscow unless he knows the President wants this. If this sticks, I am going to get out of dealing with him in this channel. It is dishonorable, and I knew nothing about it. If the President wants to release this guy, can you do it without State?

M: Yes; they have nothing to do with it.

K: That’s all I wanted to know.

M: I’m sorry about this double-dealing operation.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 See Document 63.
K: I am afraid he figures Rogers had something to do with it. How can I explain it after giving him the word of the President this would [happen?]. You know how they bugged you.

M: This leaves me speechless. They bugged the hell out of me.

K: Maybe the President will order you to do it.

M: We have no problem with State. They can’t do anything one way or the other.

K: Okay, thank you.

65. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) ¹

Washington, December 17, 1970, 6:10 p.m.

K: I just talked to the President ² and he asked that you as a favor please tear up that thing.

D: Drop it?

K: Yes. The commitment to you stands and will be implemented in the nearest future—probably next week. This is based on a bureaucratic confusion and probably over-eagerness by people who figure if you can get something for something why give it away for nothing. We have a commitment which we made voluntarily and it will be implemented in the nearest future. I have to make a few phone calls first which I prefer to have wait till the British Prime Minister ³ has left because I am so busy with him here. If we are going to quarrel, let’s quarrel about more important things.

D: What did he say about the first statement?

K: We are releasing Ivanov without conditions except for the arrangement you and I have made which was already agreed upon.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Nixon from 5:46 to 6 p.m. on December 17. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 436, Miscellany, 1968–76)

³ Prime Minister Edward Heath began an official two-day visit to Washington on December 17.
D: Another thing I would like to ask in connection with this. Ivanov case is in the clear and I am thankful. On the second situation, I asked was it really on behalf of the White House or the State Department? I would like to know whether it was done with the knowledge of the White House—the demand from us to return the Soviet citizen to the United States. It was an unbelievable demand. It was an official demand from the US Government to my government. He is a Soviet citizen but the US Government demanded the return of a Soviet citizen. The reaction in Moscow would be very strong.

K: Obviously there is no connection.

D: It is clear now. But was it cleared by the White House?

K: This is strictly between us—I would be in great trouble if this . . . I was totally unaware of this and so was the President and I don’t know how much of a record you want to make of this.

D: It’s already in Moscow—it was sent yesterday.

K: If you have such a thing as an informal communication, I recommend that this be handled in a low-key manner.

D: But it was on behalf of the US Government to the Soviet government.

K: I don’t know how much we want to prolong a naturally fruitless exchange.

D: This is what I am wondering. It is a fruitless base. It’s completely hopeless and fruitless.

K: Whatever one may think of what happened and the judgment involved, it is now simply an internal American matter.

D: But now it comes to us.

K: What can be done? We don’t want to prolong an exchange on this.

D: It will be dropped if you authorize me to say this was done without authorization.

K: Then what would happen?

D: I could say drop this issue.

K: I would like to check that with the President. Personally we have no interest in elevating this into a formal exchange between two governments.

D: But you already have.

K: The White House has no interest in doing that. Now we have to reduce it to an appropriate level.

D: It would be very worthwhile if you could tell me to drop this as something from government to government.

K: And then we never get a reply?
D: That is exactly the case.
K: Ask them not to send a reply till I talk to you again. I will check
with the President and we will get in touch tomorrow.\(^4\)

\(^4\) No record has been found that Kissinger talked with Dobrynin on December 18.

66. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and Attorney General Mitchell\(^1\)

Washington, December 17, 1970, 7:18 p.m.

K: Hello, John. If you want to know the latest on the Ivanov case,
the State Department has attached two conditions. Dobrynin just called
absolutely blubbering.\(^2\) The four Americans held by the East Germans
and the return of the Lithuanian we turned over to them.

M: You must be kidding, who is this?
K: It was an official demand from the U.S. government.
M: Incredible!
K: On legal grounds, we have nothing to stand on. An American
who no matter how [omission in transcript].
M: Almost insulting to them on the national basis. Incredible, ab-
solutely incredible.
K: I talked to the President and he has ordered now that the guy
be released. I will get the word to the State Department on Monday\(^3\)
and I am seeing Dobrynin on Tuesday. It will be done by then. We can
do it or not do it but not doing this, we make it worse.
M: Will State tell them?
K: Let’s say State will tell you to move on it unless I do.
M: This is incredible. Good God, I can’t even fathom.
K: It is beyond belief.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Tele-
phone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.
\(^2\) See Document 65.
\(^3\) December 21.
M: What did he say?
K: The President?
M: Yeah.
K: He just said that gives him no choice, he’s got to do it.
M: Well Henry, this is one for your memoirs.
K: I won’t be writing memoirs.\(^4\) The State Department, if they don’t get us into a nuclear war, it won’t be because they haven’t tried. After prodding us for a year and a half, then they do this. The guy would be better off to remain in the States.
M: I just find it hard to believe.
K: Give my best to Martha.\(^5\)

\(^4\) Kissinger briefly mentioned the Ivanov case in *White House Years* (p. 795).

\(^5\) Nixon called Kissinger at 7:25 p.m. on December 21 and reported: “I talked with Rogers on this Ivanov case and I have worked it out. He said Dobrynin asked to see him. I said tell him President made a commitment and we will carry it out but it’s technical and we will do it early in January. He said fine and that he could tell him. A decision was made without letting anything happen on the Congressional side. Otherwise, people jump on us. So when you see him tomorrow say that the Secy. has notified you that he will carry it out. Shortly, after Congress leaves. Secy. will carry it out with him.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File) For the December 22 meeting, see Document 74.
67. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, December 18, 1970, 4:14–5:02 p.m.

SUBJECT
Poland

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Under Secretary John Irwin
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand
Mr. John A. Baker, Jr.
Defense
Mr. G. Warren Nutter
Mr. John Morse
CIA
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Mr. Thomas Karamessines

[Omitted here are the Summary of Conclusions and discussion of the current situation and possible developments in Poland.]

Dr. Kissinger: What conclusions can we draw about the reaction in East Germany and the Soviet Union? Can we get an assessment? We don’t have to have it right now.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have a tentative assessment. Even if the disturbances do not rise to a higher level than at present, we believe the cause of economic reform in Poland will be set back. The Polish disorders will also give the Hungarians pause in carrying out their far-reaching economic reform program, to which there is considerable domestic opposition. In the USSR the group that takes a passive attitude toward Ostpolitik may be led to reassess their position. One theory about the Polish price hikes is that they were implemented at this time because the...
Polish Government was feeling more confident as a result of having settled its border with Germany. If the objective of Ostpolitik was greater Soviet permissiveness toward German intercourse with Eastern Europe, then the troubles in Poland may constitute a setback for Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may be the devil's advocate, couldn't the riots be viewed as being not the fault of Ostpolitik but of the conclusions the East Europeans drew from Ostpolitik? That is, it is all right to go full speed ahead on Ostpolitik, but it is not correct to conclude that it is possible to raise prices just because a major international settlement has been arranged.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Possibly, although my judgment is that in the short run we will find the Soviets and the Poles taking a more conservative approach.

Dr. Kissinger: Then you estimate that if the riots subside, the domestic consequence in Poland will be a more conservative economic policy and that internationally the Poles will adopt a more cautious approach toward increased dealings with the West.

Mr. Irwin: These are possibilities, not predictions.

Mr. Baker: There will probably be a greater impact on the Soviet attitude toward Ostpolitik than on the Polish. Poland will still be looking for the benefits that Ostpolitik could bring. As Marty [Hillenbrand] has said, if the Soviets see that the situation is volatile in Poland, they may take another look at Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: The old approach to Ostpolitik, which the Germans tried in 1965, was to deal directly with the East European countries. When that didn't work, they decided that the way was to go through Moscow. Now the Soviets may conclude that even that route is too dangerous. The Germans represent a magnet for the East Europeans. The conclusion the Soviets might draw is that rapport with Bonn is just not the right policy. If one carried this line of speculation one step further, it might be said that the Soviets will decide that it is better to seek détente with the US.

I believe that one of the foreign policy problems the Soviets have had in recent years is choosing between geopolitical and ideological considerations. They want to be sure that they are free to meet the Chinese threat; yet, if they get too close to us, they open the way for the Chinese to contest their leadership in the communist world. Ostpolitik seemed to offer the Soviets a way out by pacifying Europe. Now

3 Polish Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz and West German Chancellor Brandt signed a renunciation of force agreement in Warsaw on December 7. For the text of the treaty, see _Documents on Germany, 1944–1985_, pp. 1125–1127.

4 Brackets are in the original.
they may draw the conclusion that these benefits from Ostpolitik are only superficial. Am I speculating too wildly?

Mr. Karamessines: The Polish disorders could be the greatest thing that ever came down the pike for Ulbricht.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sonnenfeldt) What do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Russians may be more cautious about German access to Eastern Europe, but they will still have a major problem. They want Western economic and technical assistance, and they know they can only get what they need from Germany. It is not going to be available from us, and the French and British can’t offer enough. The only way for the Soviets to avoid economic reforms is to get the margin of support that Germany can provide.

Dr. Kissinger: When Ambassador Pauls was in yesterday crying about Acheson, he said the Germans were not going to give credits to the Soviets. (to Hillenbrand) Do you believe that?

Mr. Hillenbrand: On the basis of recent talks I have had with various German bankers and industrialists, I would say that the Russians have illusions about the quantity of money that might be available from either private or governmental sources in Germany. Pauls’ statement is probably correct. People like Egon Bahr are economic illiterates. The money won’t be produced by the Chancellor’s office but by the industrialists and bankers, who are much more bearish about the possibilities.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They also belong to a different party.

Dr. Kissinger: If neither the government nor the private bankers give the money, then the last incentive for Ostpolitik is removed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets may well draw the conclusion that they cannot derive the dividends from Ostpolitik that they had expected. The Soviets face the problem of deciding what to do to promote economic growth. If credits are unavailable, the pressures for economic reform will possibly be increased. There are three ways they can make the economy move. They can squeeze the people; that constitutes a return to Stalinism. They can try to get subsidies from the West. Or they can make reforms, but this is repugnant to the present leadership.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) What are your views?

Mr. Irwin: I tend to think that anything like what is happening in Poland tends to make the Soviets more cautious. However, if they recognize that the recent events are not the result of Ostpolitik but are due

to the internal situation in Poland, they might conclude that Ostpolitik is still helpful to them.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s look at the next contingency. What if the riots spread and are bloodily suppressed by the Polish forces? Would we expect the consequences to be merely a magnification of what we have already discussed, or would there be additional elements that might come into play?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The quantitative difference would be such as to constitute almost a qualitative difference. The Ulbricht line will carry the day—that is, that it is dangerous to expose yourself to Western contamination.

Dr. Kissinger: I tend to agree with what John [Irwin]\(^6\) said, but if the Soviets did connect the troubles in Poland with German policy, what would happen?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think the linkage is more complex. The Soviets might conclude that if the political systems in the Eastern European countries are so volatile that a price rise threatens their stability, how much more dangerous might it be if these countries are exposed to German influence.

Mr. Irwin: That makes considerable sense.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good thesis. Then we can say that if there is a bloody revolt, the Soviets will clamp down. Will it be a general clampdown, or will they try to achieve friendlier relations with us, since we are not a threat in this situation?

Mr. Hillenbrand: SALT would probably be the least affected. There might be more fallout with regard to Berlin and Germany.\(^7\)

[Omitted here is the remainder of the minutes, including discussion of such contingencies as a military crackdown in Poland, political instability in Eastern Europe, and Soviet intervention.]

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\(^6\) Brackets are in the original.

\(^7\) After the meeting, Kissinger went to the Oval Office to discuss matters with Nixon and Haldeman. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule; and National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Although no record of the conversation has been found, Haldeman described the meeting in his diary as follows: “In the afternoon he had Henry in and just sort of sat and chatted, using up the idle time. He got into a discussion of the Poland uprising and the possibility that this could cause a major problem for the Soviets, especially if it keeps on going. If it stops at the point it’s already reached, it won’t make very much difference.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, p. 222)
68. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, December 19, 1970, 5:30 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I was going to ask you—anything new on Warsaw?

K: It seems to be—the riots seem to have subsided, the reports we get is of great tension; some factories still occupied by workers but no actual riots in the street.

P: I bet it was a lot rougher in the President’s case.

K: Oh, we have conversations of that little bastard, Bahr . . .

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: . . . and he says well if this goes on another day or two, that’s the end of Ostpolitik.\(^2\) So strangely enough they see it the same way that I do. He is a bastard.

P: Thank God, the British see it like we do now.\(^3\) You know the one great thing that we have to remember here, you realize if we had Wilson here, he would be pushing Brandt rather than trying to hold . . .

K: Oh, yeah. Oh, of course and he would be pushing you to go to—for him to go to Moscow.

P: Yeah, he’d be going.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, including the unrest on college campuses.]

P: There’s nothing we can do to stir the Polish thing up?

K: I’m afraid not but still here is another Communist regime that has had to use troops against its own workers.

P: Get that out.

K: Right.

P: Let’s get the real PR effort on that and don’t let State, Defense—The regime, are they putting out defense of the regime, they hope that everything—no violence, I hope not.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking.


\(^3\) During his visit (see footnote 3, Document 65), Heath and Nixon and Kissinger discussed the situation in Poland. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
K: I haven’t seen anything yet. We had a meeting yesterday\textsuperscript{4} and we . . .

P: In one column, I noticed that the United States, Scali was being carried and he’s right but I just want to be damn sure that we don’t appear that we’re stirring them up but on the other hand, we know that we don’t condone this at all.

K: We may be impudent, Mr. President, but what these fellows say depends a lot on what they are told.

P: Yeah.

K: If they are told this is another indication of a workers’ revolution in a Communist regime, some of them will say it and that’s what we ought to get out.

P: Get that out and around through the bureaucracy tomorrow, will you?

K: Absolutely.

P: Fine.

K: In fact, I’ll do it . . .

P: This is the President’s view, will you do that?

K: Yeah, I’ll do it immediately.

P: All right, Henry, good.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule and Vietnam.]

\textsuperscript{4} See Document 67.
69. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

K: I thought you might like to know, Mr. President, that the top four leaders of the Polish Communist Party including Gomulka have resigned.²

P: Humph.

K: And that the man who’s taking over we have generally thought of as a traditionalist . . .

P: Um-huh.

K: He has said that all reforms now have to be carried out by consulting the workers’ interest. Now a number of things to be said, everyone would have thought Dubcek was a traditionalist when he came . . .

P: He became a tough son-of-a-bitch.

K: And he became a very liberal Communist.

P: (laughter) I know.

K: Yeah. But whatever it is—what it may mean is that they will cancel the price rises. Our guess on Friday³ was that if he came in he’d cancel the price rises which would look like a liberal—like a move to placate the workers.

P: Yeah.

K: But which would buy them more trouble later on.

P: Yeah. Well, it of course has an enormous effect in world opinion, don’t you think? If they . . .

K: And I think it has a tremendous effect on the Communists.

P: That’s what I mean.

K: Because here they are, they try to loosen ties a little bit, they are doing it—loosening things a little bit, they are using—they are doing

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. Although the transcript is undated, Kissinger’s comments on the news from Warsaw clearly indicate that the conversation took place on December 20. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Kissinger called Nixon on December 20 at 5:49 p.m.; the two men talked until 5:54. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² Edward Giersz replaced Gomulka as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party and de facto leader of the Polish Government on December 20.

it with the Germans and nevertheless the system can’t stand even that little strain.

P: Um-hum.

K: Which shouldn’t even be a strain.

P: Yeah. Think it’s good news don’t you?

K: Oh, I think it’s good news. I think what it means . . .

P: Even Gomulka.

K: Even Gomulka—what I think it means at a minimum is that they are internal—that they will be much more cautious now in their policies. I think it will mean a slowdown of their playing with the Germans but above all I think . . . I wouldn’t be surprised if it meant that the Soviets decide that the taunt [détenue? ] with the Germans is too dangerous and they had better get a little closer to us. As a tactical maneuver, I don’t think it will change their basic orientation.

P: You mean it will put the Soviets—them to have a little pressure to come closer to us you mean?

K: I think it puts a little pressure on the Soviets to come—it will either mean that they will tighten up all the way across the board and pursue a new transition policy towards everybody but I think if they want to taunt in the West they are more likely to seek it with us now than with the Germans.

P: Yeah.

K: Because we are less of a threat to them in Eastern Europe.

P: Well, that’s good, good, well.

K: But in any event whatever it does to us, I think . . .

P: It will give a little break.

K: They will be more absorbed in their own affairs for a while now.

P: This will shake the Soviet leaders don’t you think?

K: Oh, yes. It shows them that really they don’t have the basis . . .

P: They just know their system doesn’t have any support.

K: That’s right. It will make . . .

P: Be sure that the State Department doesn’t give any condoning of this damn thing, you know what I mean. I just want to be sure that there is no weak shrub that we think, you know what I mean?

K: Oh, yes. I think what we should say is that this shows how fragile these governments are and . . .

P: That’s what they should say. Let State say a few things, make them say that, see what I mean.

K: And that there is no basic solution, until Eastern Europe is re-integrated with the Western Europeans, something like that ought to be said.
P: Right, right. Well, if any of the State guys get out of line on this, I’m really going to raise hell because boy they want to—they’ll just think this is terrible you know because it affects Ostpolitik—it will worry that damn Bahr won’t it?

K: Well, as I told you the other day,4 he said which we got from intelligence sources that if this goes much further, that’s the end of Ostpolitik.

P: Right. Well, okay.

K: Well, at any rate, I thought you might like to know this. I think it’s good news.

P: Very interesting. Okay Henry, thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

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4 See Document 68.

70. Editorial Note

On December 20, 1970, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger instructed William Hyland of the National Security Council staff to provide a “preliminary assessment” for President Richard Nixon on the situation in Poland, including the implications of the crisis for the Soviet Union. Kissinger and Hyland discussed the memorandum by telephone that afternoon:

“K: Okay, now look here’s what I want you to do in this memo for the President. First, explain briefly what it does in internal politics. Secondly, what it means in bloc politics, you know greater voice for the East Germans—

“H: Right, right.

“K: . . . and thirdly, what it does in East-West politics.

“H: Yeah, okay.

“K: Now, do you agree with my assessment, which incidentally I just was playing the devil’s advocate, I agree with you.

“H: Oh. (laughter)

“K: I mean I can’t judge the domestic politics but I agree with you on the other—on the Ostpolitik.

“H: Well, Ulbricht is going to—this is a windfall for Ulbricht—he is going to blame a great deal of it on Ostpolitik and . . .
"K: I agree with this. Now, the next thing I wonder is this, I think the Russians may decide is either to toughen up their line generally slightly towards the whole West or they may decide that they need some détente with the West and it is safer to do it with us than with the Germans.

"H: Yeah, I think the latter is more likely.

"K: Do you agree with that?

"H: Yeah, I think they will have to cool it with the Germans and end it up with us.

"K: You think that’s right.

"H: That would be my guess, yeah.

"K: Okay, will you put that in the memo.

"H: Yeah, yeah, we can put it in.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File)

During a subsequent telephone call, the two men reviewed the text of the draft memorandum, and Kissinger urged Hyland to prepare the final version for delivery to the President before 8 p.m. (Ibid.)

Nixon was in his private study in the Executive Office Building that evening when he received the unsigned memorandum from Kissinger. (President’s Daily Diary; ibid., White House Central Files) After reviewing the “facts” and “domestic implications” of recent events, the memorandum assessed the impact of the crisis on Polish-Soviet relations. “To what extent Moscow was consulted on the leadership change is not clear. It appears the changes were made too rapidly for the Soviets to be directly involved.” The new leadership in Warsaw, however, had already declared that cooperation with Moscow was a “fundamental” requirement for Polish security. The memorandum then addressed how developments in Poland might affect détente in Europe, including relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany:

“The change of leaders may lead to a slow down in the pace [of] normalization between Poland and West Germany. Gomulka had been heavily identified with the rapprochement with Bonn and the recent treaty. If only because of the tense internal situation, the new regime is not likely to make new moves in foreign policy. Gierek in his speech mentioned normalization with Bonn but perfunctorily. Moreover, the East German leadership will probably be able to claim that Gomulka’s foreign policy contributed to instability in Poland. Ulbricht immediately congratulated Gierek, suggesting he is satisfied with Gomulka’s removal.

“As for Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet leaders may also be inclined to believe that Ostpolitik has an unsettling effect on Eastern Europe. For example, they may believe that the treaty with Germany led
Gomulka to conclude he could press unpopular price increases on the population. Thus, Moscow may also want a pause in its relations with Bonn. One casualty of the Polish events could be the Berlin negotiations, where the Soviets may not wish to press the East Germans for concessions—thus compounding instability in Central Europe.

“At the same time, with this détente with Bonn at least temporarily slowed down, the Soviet leaders, if they choose to maintain some prospect of détente, may be inclined to show some improvement in their relations with us.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Poland, 1969–1971)


Kissinger later described the denouement in his memoirs: “After submitting my memorandum, I had several extensive conversations with the President on the situation. I told him that the moment had come to test the channel between Dobrynin and me. I conjectured that the Soviets might be ready to break the deadlock on a number of negotiations; of these SALT and Berlin were especially important, for SALT would influence our defense budget and Berlin would test Allied cohesion.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 798)

71. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Assessment of Soviet Initiative via Mr. Harvey Hament

Last month Harvey Hament, president of the photo processing business with which William Casey is associated, reported that he had again been contacted by Soviet representatives. The Soviets were

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Casey/Hament (Soviet Initiative). Secret; Sensitive. According to an attached copy, Kissinger and Howe drafted the memorandum on December 21. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

2 Attached but not printed is a November 16 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, reporting on his telephone call from Hament that morning.
attempting to pinpoint responsibility for the negative U.S. decision on a Ford truck plant for the Soviet Union and to determine whether there was any hope for renegotiating a contract with Ford. Hament also reported that he was shown remarkable hospitality during his three week trip to the Soviet Union which resulted in some lucrative commercial contracts for his company.

Upon receiving this report I asked Director Helms for an evaluation of Soviet motives for their contacts with Hament. Attached is CIA’s assessment which indicates that:

—The KGB is cultivating Hament as a tool for future exploitation in Soviet political operations.

—The stage is being set for financial commitments sufficient to induce Hament to carry out Soviet bidding in order to protect his investment. The expenses-paid trip to the USSR also was probably designed to place Hament under some sense of obligation.

—Hament appears to be shrewd and cautious in his dealings with the Soviets and gives every indication of wanting to cooperate with the U.S. government. Since he has not yet faced any obstacles it is too early to forecast how he will fare with the Soviets in the future.

—The Ford decision is a political blow to Soviet plans to exploit the West by obtaining capital investments for technological improvements, particularly U.S. management techniques and computer technology.

—The Soviets will use a number of channels to try to reverse the Ford precedent and have already activated a very senior KGB official for the purpose of following-up with Ford.

According to the CIA report the Soviets have attempted for a number of years to use businessmen, scientists, and academicians with the access to the White House as tools for flexible manipulation of disinformation. Information is frequently used to play off one western country against another with the goal of creating misleading impressions that will influence foreign policy makers and reduce government effectiveness.

In attempting to establish channels to the White House the following disinformation themes have been used: (1) one faction of the split Soviet leadership wants to establish direct contact, (2) a younger less rigid liberal Soviet faction wants to deal directly with the White

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3 On April 20, Henry Ford II, Chairman of Ford Motor Company, announced plans to help the Soviet Union build a large truck manufacturing complex in Naberezhnye Chelny on the Kama River. In response to criticism from Laird and others, Ford withdrew from the project within one month.

4 Attached but not printed is a November 19 memorandum from Haig to Helms.

5 Attached but not printed is a December 10 memorandum from Helms to Haig.
House, (3) the President in office is more reasonable than his predecessor, and (4) the President should visit the USSR for highly confidential discussions with the Soviet leadership. The latter theme is designed to deprive the President of an opportunity to consult with Allies while false reporting of discussions and secret agreements is used to sow confusion and disunity among the Allies.

72. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Status of Soviet Submarine Support Facilities at Cienfuegos, Cuba

Since my last report to you on November 27, 1970,2 construction associated with the Soviet submarine support facilities in Cienfuegos has virtually ceased. Construction associated with the industrial complex north of the city continues at a high level. Anti-aircraft and field artillery emplaced in September and later removed has not been redeployed. Truck-mounted ocean surveillance radar continues to be deployed at the harbor’s mouth, probably to provide security for Soviet fleet units in the harbor. Construction activity has included:
—completion of interior finishing work to the barracks adjoining the recreation facility on Cayo Alcatraz;
—repair work to the pier on Cayo Ocampo, part of which apparently collapsed or was damaged in some way;
—construction of a small shed or open-sided warehouse near the pier on Cayo Ocampo;
—road improvement near a possible communications facility north of the naval basin. (There has been no work on the possible communications site itself since September.)

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Codeword; Nodis; Outside System. Sent for information. Although Kissinger initialed the memorandum, no evidence has been found that Nixon saw it. According to an attached handwritten note, the memorandum may have been “overtaken by events.” Haig wrote in the margin: “Hold here in Dob. file re subject.”
2 Document 53.
There has been considerable Soviet naval activity in Caribbean waters since my last report. The submarine tender left Cienfuegos on November 28 and rendezvoused north of Puerto Rico with a Kashin Class guided missile frigate and an oiler which had entered the Caribbean enroute from the Baltic. The group was later joined by an F-Class (conventional) attack submarine. After performing maneuvers, the group visited several Cuban ports and called at Havana from December 15–18. It returned to Cienfuegos on December 21. Maneuvers were also performed with Cuban naval units along the way. Two Soviet Bear long-range reconnaissance planes flew from the Soviet Union via the North Atlantic to Havana on December 3 and returned December 8. They overflew the Soviet fleet units on the way to Cuba but remained on the ground while there and performed no discernible maneuvers with either Soviet or Cuban forces.

At the present time, the submarine tender, guided missile frigate, F-Class submarine, and ocean rescue tug are in Cienfuegos. The oiler is probably also there. The two nuclear support barges have remained in Cienfuegos though they have been moved from Cayo Ocampo to the Cuban naval base at Cayo Loco, apparently to allow repair work on the Ocampo pier. The SS Komarov (space event support ship) and the diving tender remain in Havana. Another F-Class submarine, and possibly a Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine unaccounted for for some time may also be in the Caribbean area.

The continued presence of a Soviet subtender in Cuban waters, along with the associated facilities remaining at Cienfuegos, gives the Soviets a capability to provide replenishment and limited upkeep for nuclear-powered submarines. This could be accomplished in the protected naval basin in the southern part of the harbor where the mooring buoys, submarine net, and new shore recreation facilities remain in place. Alternatively a tender based at Cienfuegos could rendezvous with submarines at Sea and furnish them virtually the same support.

The Soviet capability for nuclear submarine support which remains because of the presence of the subtender is limited. The tender can carry out maintenance and minor repair services for submarines, but probably cannot perform major repairs. It lacks facilities for removing and handling ballistic missiles, and these facilities are not available in Cienfuegos. Likewise, there is no evidence of nuclear storage facilities. Because of these limitations, the support capability at Cienfuegos is less than that available to U.S. Polaris submarines at Holy Loch. Its primary value would be in furnishing mid-patrol servicing and recreation facilities to nuclear-powered attack submarines, thus extending the length of time such vessels could remain away from major base facilities in the USSR. If the Soviets want to use the facilities at Cienfuegos to service Y-Class ballistic missile submarines, the “on-station” time of these units could be increased about 25%.
We have no firm evidence as to whether the Soviets intend to proceed with the establishment of a submarine support facility at Cienfuegos, either for themselves or possibly for the Cubans, or whether they will abandon the project. However, until the sub tender leaves the area, the Soviets do in fact retain a capability to support nuclear-powered submarines at Cienfuegos.

73. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 22, 1970, 1125Z.


1. The spirit of yuletide charity is conspicuously absent in Soviet commentary about all things American this Christmas season. Recent visitors from Milton Eisenhower\(^2\) to Reston of the New York Times have been treated even-handedly to harsh commentaries about administration policy, of a consistency and inflexibility which suggest top level inspiration and command. Reston, in particular, was struck by the harder tone sounded by Soviet officials, in comparison to previous visits, and he echoed the question posed frequently by our NATO colleagues: why the change of tone and what does it mean for US-Soviet relations.\(^3\)

2. The current Soviet attitude toward the administration is not the result of any single event, but the product of a growing disenchantment reflected in commentary since late 1969. A turning point in the period of testing and trial seems to have come as a result of a number of issues, beginning with Cambodia last spring. Soviet leaders were apparently taken aback by the success of the Cambodian inter-

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\(^2\) President Emeritus of Johns Hopkins University.

\(^3\) In a New York Times op-ed piece on December 20, Reston wrote: “The gentlest thing that can be said about U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the year is that they are not exactly bubbling with the Christmas spirit. The official attitude here toward Washington is now hard and critical. It is not hostile or menacing, but clearly there has been a marked change for the worse since the first of the year.” On the basis of his discussions in Moscow, Reston reported that Soviet officials objected to the “Kissinger doctrine of linkage,” Nixon’s “diplomacy of surprise,” and the administration’s “anti-Soviet propaganda campaign” on Cuba and the Middle East.
vention, by our firm support in the Middle East of an intransigent Is-
rael, Sixth Fleet maneuvers during the Jordan crisis, our handling of
the Cuban base issue, and renewed raids on North Vietnam. Viewed
either as spasmodic diplomacy or part of a single grand design, each
was displeasing, probably because of Moscow’s sensitivity to any
suggestion that it was being compelled to back down in the face of
American muscle.

3. In our handling of bilateral issues the Soviets have also appar-
ently found the administration a tougher bargainer than they may have
hoped. Soviet disappointment is evident in connection with a variety
of bilateral issues of articulated interest: notably, opening of a shipping
line to New York; extension of the Civil Air Agreement\(^4\) to include on-
ward flight rights across the US and beyond; agreement on the open-
ing of consulates and the terms of chancery site construction; the
release of Amtorg chauffeur Ivanov, despite repeated high level requests.
Continuing American press criticism of the top Soviet leadership, voc-
al American interest and sympathy for the hard-pressed Soviet intel-
ligentsia, the merger of the general issue of dissent with the escalating
campaign in the US over treatment of the Jews in the USSR—have all
struck raw and sensitive nerves in Moscow and brought renewed
Soviet retaliation against US correspondents.\(^5\) Our alleged “con-
nivance” with “anti-Soviet Zionist provocations” has become a major
irritant in US-Soviet relations. Events in the field of trade policy also
prompt Moscow to see another more basic demonstration of the ad-
ministration’s continuing hostility toward the USSR. It was prob-
ably with the aborted Ford deal\(^6\) in mind that Kosygin told Brandt bitterly
last August, in effect, “they do not like us and we do not need them.”\(^7\)

4. The Middle East crisis deserves special mention since it pro-
duced a bitter exchange of accusations between Washington and
Moscow and dashed the short-lived atmosphere of optimistic expec-
tation last August which surrounded the then upcoming negotiations

\(^4\) The civil air transport agreement was signed at Washington November 4, 1966,
and entered into force the same day. (17 UST 1936; TIAS 6135)

\(^5\) In the most recent round of the “correspondents war,” Soviet authorities an-
nounced on October 22 their decision to expel John Dornberg, bureau chief for Newsweek
magazine in Moscow, on the charge of producing anti-Soviet leaflets. In a memorandum
to Kissinger on November 5, Eliot recommended that the United States retaliate by ex-
pelling Leonid Zhegalov, a member of the TASS bureau in Washington. Kissinger ap-
proved the recommendation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC
Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X)

\(^6\) See footnote 3, Document 71.

\(^7\) Brandt visited the Soviet Union in August 1970 to sign the Moscow Treaty. Dur-
ing his visit, Brandt met Kosygin on August 12 and August 13. For records of their con-
versations, see Akten zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2,
Documents 387 and 390.
on SALT, Germany, and the Middle East. The reasons for Soviet involvement in UAR violations of ME standstill are still matter for speculation. Hinted Soviet justifications for such complicity included: resentment that the June 1970 Rogers initiative was "sprung" on them,\textsuperscript{8} that they were not consulted in its development and implementation, and that the US ignored a Soviet "initiative" of approximately the same date to elaborate guarantees for a ME settlement.\textsuperscript{9} One plausible explanation is that the Soviets hoped to gain credit for strengthening the Arab hand and pressuring Israel during the Jarring peace talks, which they very wrongly assumed would not be jeopardized by sabotage of the Rogers plan.

5. Soviet indignation over the justifiably strong US reaction was ascribed privately to US press charges of bad faith on the part of Gromyko and Dobrynin. In part, the Soviet outburst served essentially propaganda aims: to obfuscate an embarrassing issue, isolate us further from the Arabs as well as to contrast our intransigence with the Soviet spirit of détente in Central Europe. In part, however, the outburst also appeared to reflect a perplexity giving way to anger on the part of the Soviet leadership over the determination of the administration, through the American press, to make a major issue of the violations and pin the label of perfidy on its ideological opponent.

6. In return Soviet propagandists now accuse the Nixon administration of escalating the war in Vietnam, making policy impulsively and heedless of military risk, and resisting efforts by its allies to come to peaceful accommodation with the socialist world. Difficulties in Berlin negotiations and foot-dragging in connection with proposals to convene a CES are traced to the US. Echoing a familiar dialectical argument that imperialism becomes more dangerous as it becomes more degenerate, Moscow has stressed both the internal problems in America and the danger that the US will use its admittedly mighty arsenal in an unpredictable and irresponsible fashion to sabotage peace and prevent détente. Basically there is fear that with the Nixon Doctrine the US may successfully embark on a course similar to that which has permitted the Soviet Union itself to achieve foreign policy objectives without the declared loss of a single soldier since 1945 (except in combat with the population of Soviet allies and with China).

7. Fortunately, the deterioration thus far in our relations has been more sound than substance. Negotiations on Berlin, SALT, and other areas have been tough as the issues themselves would dictate, but essentially businesslike. The most dramatic demonstration of bad relations

\textsuperscript{8} See footnote 5, Document 3.
\textsuperscript{9} See footnote 3, Document 23.
was the cancellation of the Bolshoi Opera tour, but the motives may be different from those alleged. On a wide range of issues in many different forums, the Soviet-American dialogue continues normally and American visitors to Moscow, notably important businessmen, continue to be received courteously—suggesting that Moscow has not given up hope of doing business with the US where its interests dictate.

8. There seems to be a wish to avoid or at least to minimize incidents with the US. Foreign Ministry officials and “Americanists” who seem genuinely to regret the down-turn in our relations, have urged us to pay attention to their government’s actions and not its words, as though they anticipate we are passing through a polemical period. Even in the area of words, Moscow continues to show restraint in its general avoidance of direct personal attacks on the President, at least in print; the Vice President and Secretary Laird serve as proxy targets and symbols respectively of growing McCarthyism and militarism in the US. Privately, Soviet officials have expressed some satisfaction that Gromyko’s meetings with the President and Secretary took some of the sharp edges off our relations—although publicly they seem as strained as before.

9. On the Soviet side, there still seems concern to avoid any radical cutback in our exchanges programs or a correspondents’ war. While Moscow has refused to be hurried in its investigation of Americans in trouble in the USSR (Mrs. Slepuchow, Mrs. Galinovski, General Scherrer party), it has eventually released them rather than prosecuting. Acceptance of the long-standing proposal to discuss incidents at sea after the 24th Party Congress, and the proposal for closer cooperation in funding of UN specialized agencies suggest an interest even in widening the dialogue.

10. At the same time, there are disturbing indications in Soviet politics which may simply be related to preparations for the Party Congress, but which could also reflect a doctrinaire ground-swell whose effects will last beyond the Congress. It is perhaps no coincidence that an increase in anti-American propaganda and charges that the US has returned to the Cold War should parallel an increase in pressure for ideological conformity, stress on the secret police and the need for vigilance, efforts to reduce ties between foreigners and particularly Soviet dissidents, and talk of an increased “class” and “anti-imperialist” struggle abroad. We may have to wait for the Party Congress to end

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10 On December 11, citing “provocations by Zionist thugs,” the Soviet Union announced the cancellation of upcoming trips to the United States by the Bolshoi Theater’s opera and ballet companies.
11 See Document 51.
to determine whether the events of the past six months have played into the hands of those more doctrinaire elements in Soviet society, who have become more vocal if not more influential in recent months and who may argue that Moscow cannot, and need not try to do serious business with the Nixon administration.

11. But even assuming we are in one of Moscow’s periodic doctrinaire phases, I believe that the present ambiguity in US-Soviet relations is likely to persist, combining dialogue and negotiation in many fields with a fundamentally hostile and suspicious view of our policies and intentions. The tone of our relations will be affected by the practical results of upcoming talks on Berlin and ME, as much as by the ideological imperatives of the propagandists. To the extent that Soviet prejudices about the President and administration policy have increased in recent months, negotiations may be stickier and personal relations less warm in the coming year.

12. The Soviets would doubtless like to repay us in kind for their years in the wilderness, and isolate and ignore us if they could. They realize, however, that an understanding with the US remains still the passkey to agreement on many issues of vital concern to themselves, and conversely, confrontation with us can adversely affect their interests in a wide variety of ways—-from threatening their security, to persuading America’s allies to draw back from negotiations with Moscow, to discouraging a firm from selling to the Soviets. Talk of political “linkage” has irritated the Soviets from the beginning (they associate it with a “position of strength,” “diktat” policy) but they are realistic enough to know that linkage and reciprocity will remain a fact of life so long as two super powers confront one another under conditions of hostility and rivalry. I would suggest therefore that there are inherent limits to any anti-American campaign of the sort we presently are seeing.

Beam
74. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger and Ambassador Anatole Dobrynin

The lunch lasted about three and a half hours and took place in an extremely cordial atmosphere. During the course of the luncheon the discussion covered the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations as well as a number of specific topics including the Middle East, Vietnam, SALT and Cuba.

Khrushchev’s Memoirs. I began the conversation by asking Dobrynin on a personal level what he thought of the Khrushchev Memoirs. Were they authentic? He replied, “It depends on what one means by authenticity.” It is clear that Khrushchev never wrote anything in his life. He remembered when Khrushchev was First Party Secretary that he would call in Dobrynin who was then head of the American section and start saying, “Now, please write the following letter to Mr. President. Dear Mr. President:” And then he would start pacing up and down the room and talk as if he were confronting the President personally oblivious to anyone else in the room.

This procedure finally reached the point where Dobrynin always brought a secretary along and put her into a corner to take things down. So it was clear that Khrushchev had not written the Memoirs. On the other hand, it was also probable that they were dictated in some form and were therefore quite authentic. He thought that either Khrushchev had dictated some of it or, alternatively, some Westerners whom Khrushchev had permitted to call on him had brought tape recorders in their pockets and got the Memoirs on that basis.

I asked him about Kennan’s theory that the KGB may have put these out in order to prevent more damaging Memoirs from appear-
ing. Dobrynin said this struck him as absurd. The KGB would not operate independently. It would have to be the Politburo and the Politburo would have no interest in doing a thing like this.

I then asked Dobrynin about an aspect of the section in the Memoirs where Dobrynin, during the Cuban missile crisis, is reported to have quoted Robert Kennedy as saying that there was danger of a military coup in the United States.4 Dobrynin said we had to remember, first, that whenever Khrushchev made these observations was long after the event and that he would not have had the reports in front of him. Secondly, I could be certain that when Dobrynin reported a conversation with a very senior official such as the brother of the President, the report would be an exact quotation.5 What Khrushchev would do with it in reporting to the Politburo was less certain, and what Khrushchev would remember was even less certain. It was a fact Kennedy had said to him that if things continued much longer, the military dominance would become so great that there would be no choice except to invade Cuba. But he obviously never said anything about a coup.

Ivanov. I then turned the conversation to Ivanov, and commented that the procedures to release Ivanov would start early in January and that the Secretary of State would call him in within the next few days to inform him of that fact.

Summit: I then raised the Semenov conversation with Smith in which Semenov allegedly remarked that this would be a hot, political summer, and that SALT would have to mark time while the principals were negotiating.6 I wanted Dobrynin to understand that Smith did not know about our Summit discussions and that I really had to be sure Soviet diplomats would not speak to other Americans about the content of our conversations. Dobrynin replied that he had read Semenov’s reporting cable and it contained no such references. He wondered whether Smith might have made it up. I said it seemed unlikely

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4 See Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 551–552.
5 According to Dobrynin’s reporting telegram, Robert Kennedy told him on October 27, 1962: “We want to avoid that [a “real war”] any way we can. I’m sure that the government of the USSR has the same wish. However, taking time to find a way out [of the situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy mentioned as if in passing that there are many unreasonable heads among the generals, and not only among the generals, who are ‘itching for a fight’). The situation might get out of control, with irreversible consequences.” For the full English text, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 523–526. For Robert Kennedy’s memorandum of the conversation, which does not mention how American generals might react, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 96.
6 Smith reported on this conversation with Semenov in a backchannel message to Kissinger on December 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, SALT, 1971)
since it was too circumstantial. But whether or not it happened exactly as reported by either side, special care should be taken that our channel would not be played back into any American net.

*Cuba.* I then mentioned to him that I had just spent 15 minutes with the President and that the thrust of the conversation had been on Cuba.\(^7\) I wanted Dobrynin to understand that to a feeling of general concern which we had already expressed, there was now added a growing personal irritation. I did not want to go through the whole exercise again, but I wanted him to understand our position exactly. If nuclear submarines were being serviced in or from Cuban ports, it would lead to the most grave situation between the United States and the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, nuclear submarines were not to be serviced in or from Cuban ports, then constant needling with the submarine tender and other ships could only complicate our relations without leading to anything very productive.

I further stated that I understood the port visits were going to conclude on December 23rd and that we would watch matters attentively. Dobrynin responded, “Well, we will see . . . Why don’t you wait till the 23rd and then we can talk again.”

I then made a little speech to Dobrynin on worsening U.S.-Soviet relations and where we should go from here along the following lines:

**Worsening U.S.-Soviet Relations**\(^8\)

—We both know that relations between our two countries have worsened in the past couple of months.

—We seemed to be making some progress earlier this year, but since the summer a series of incidents has served to cloud our relationship.

—I can assure you that the President continues to seek better relations and concrete results—negotiation instead of confrontation is no idle phrase. Perhaps in some cases, we have failed to communicate.\(^9\)

\(^7\) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met in the Oval Office from 12:52 to 1:10 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No record of their conversation has been found.

\(^8\) The following sections on “Worsening U.S.-Soviet Relations” and “Where Do We Go From Here” are taken nearly verbatim from the talking points Lord prepared for Kissinger on December 21. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3) One substantive change is noted below.

\(^9\) The first sentence of this paragraph in the talking points, which Kissinger deleted from the memorandum of conversation, reads as follows: “I won’t pretend that an objective observer would state that this deterioration is entirely the fault of the Soviet Union.”
—I am willing to grant that from your perspective you might misread certain moves; e.g.

- The timing of our restriction on attendance at Soviet National Day receptions in relation to your release of our generals.\textsuperscript{10}
- The holding of a Soviet ship in the Panama Canal.\textsuperscript{11}
- The refusal of entry into Boston Harbor of a Soviet oceanographic vessel.\textsuperscript{12}
- Secretary Rogers’ attempt to bargain an exchange in the Ivanov case.\textsuperscript{13}

—We had a good reason for our actions in most of these cases; in a few, faulty coordination may have been the problem. But I recognize that your version of some incidents could lead you to misinterpretations of our motives.

—On the other hand I must state emphatically that your government has pursued some policies that we just cannot reconcile with a building of constructive relations.

—To name only the more serious.

- The continued flaunting of at least the spirit of our understandings on Cienfuegos despite our conversations and the explosiveness of this issue.
- Your moves in the Middle East, in particular the ceasefire violations.
- The harassment of Berlin corridors while negotiations are going on.\textsuperscript{14}
- Your failure to observe the provisions of the U.S.-Soviet Consular Convention,\textsuperscript{15} and in particular your dragging out of the case of the generals.

—I do not cite these today to get into a debate. I only wish to give you examples of actions which from our perspective have unfortunate motives and threaten seriously to damage our relationship.

—You probably believe that these actions are justifiable. Perhaps some are subject to clarification.

—The basic point is that distrust has begun to set in on both sides and a dangerous momentum and interaction seem to be occurring.

\textsuperscript{10} See Document 37.
\textsuperscript{11} See footnote 4, Document 58.
\textsuperscript{12} See Document 58.
\textsuperscript{13} See Document 33.
\textsuperscript{14} See footnote 2, Document 55.
\textsuperscript{15} See Document 51.
Where Do We Go From There

—We are at a crossroads in our bilateral relationship. We have the choice between letting this chain of events continue and making a fundamental attempt to set a new course.

—Unless we make a mutual and sustained effort to reverse recent trends, the pinpricks in our relations could continue and feed on each other. We could slide into a serious deterioration.

—Such a deterioration would mean not only that we would lose the benefit of possible agreements and understandings. It could also mean that suspicion between us could grow to the point that a minor incident could develop into a major one because of a failure in communication.

—The President has asked me to reaffirm to you his desire to improve our relations. His October UN speech\textsuperscript{16} purposely emphasized this subject and spelled out his views—e.g., we have serious differences that atmospherics can’t remove; we also have overriding common interests which require that we forego tactical maneuvering for immediate gains, etc.

—Let us make an effort to begin shaping more constructive bilateral relations.

—Frankly this will require a serious attempt by your leadership to refrain from making moves that appear provocative to us.

—We, in turn, will try to avoid actions that could contribute to misunderstanding.

—I suggest we both agree to use this channel whenever we see problems developing in our relations. We will, of course, continue to have basic policy differences. But frank exchanges between us can help to remove imagined differences based on misunderstanding as well as to make progress on the real issues.

Soviet View of US–USSR Relations

The Middle East. Dobrynin responded with a very lengthy exposition on Soviet-American relations. The gist of his remarks was as follows: Dobrynin said that when the Administration came in there was the profoundest suspicion of the President. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had attempted to establish normal relations. After about six to nine months, the idea had grown that perhaps responsibility in office had made the President more conciliatory and an attempt was made to enter serious negotiations. However, there were a whole host of issues that in the Soviet Union had created the worst possible impression.

Outstanding among those issues was the Middle East. The Soviet Union had engaged in months of negotiations with Sisco which on our

\textsuperscript{16} See Document 28.
side concentrated in effect on legalistic quibbling and never seemed to come to any particular point. Finally, the Soviet Union accepted two major American proposals early in June.\(^{17}\) He could assure me that it was done with the greatest difficulty—that Nasser did not want to go along with it, and that there were many in the Politburo who were of the view that the tactic was entirely wrong. Nevertheless, the two propositions were made.\(^{18}\)

Dobrynin continued that up to this time, the Soviet Union has not received a reply to these two propositions. Sisco and Rogers point out periodically that there will be a reply, but there has never been a formal reply. Indeed, no sooner had these proposals been made than the United States decided to go unilateral. Now, this had to create the impression in Moscow that the United States was trying to push Moscow out of the Middle East, and it stood to reason that Moscow could not look at this favorably. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had looked at the Rogers plan\(^{19}\) as an essentially procedural scheme and therefore had endorsed the ceasefire. He could assure me that Nasser was enormously reluctant but the Soviet Union had insisted on it.

Dobrynin then repeated his well-known argument that the Soviet Union was not part of the ceasefire agreement. It had only been notified of the conditions afterwards. It could hardly be accused of violating an agreement that it did not negotiate and the contents of which were unknown to it when made. Dobrynin said he spent August in a dacha area near Moscow where the major Soviet leaders have houses. When the first claims of violation arrived there, no one believed them, and no one believed that the United States could be serious. He wanted to give me his word, whether I believed it or not, that the violations had not been ordered from Moscow but involved the execution of plans that had been made largely by the military. The Soviet leaders therefore thought that we were deliberately provoking them and starting a deliberate press campaign. Even today, the Soviet Union has not had a reply to its June proposal in the face of a clear hint to the President by Gromyko.

\(^{17}\) See footnote 6, Document 23.

\(^{18}\) These two propositions modified or extended two formulations in a Soviet paper of June 17, 1969. The first point advanced the time when peace would become effective, accepting that a state of peace would begin at the same time as completion of the first stage of withdrawal of Israeli troops. The second formulation conceded Arab responsibility for control of the fedayeen, by accepting that the parties would agree to undertake everything necessary so that any hostile or military acts with the presence or use of force against the other side will not originate from and not be committed from within their respective territories.\(^{*}\) [Footnote is in the original. The Soviet paper is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.]

\(^{19}\) See footnote 4, Document 31.
What Dobrynin wanted to know was whether we were prepared to settle the Middle East and, if we were, was there anything that I could tell him that the people in Moscow could use in their current negotiations with the Egyptians. I had to recognize that this was an extremely difficult matter for them. They were constantly being pressed to supply offensive weapons which they so far had refused. What exactly did we visualize would happen after the Jarring talks started? Would we be prepared to give joint recommendations to Jarring. These and similar questions required an answer. They would affect U.S.-Soviet relations for the future.

SALT. Dobrynin then turned to SALT. He said there, too, the Soviet Union had made an offer on ABM, and the impression had been created not only that it was unacceptable but that direct White House intervention stopped it. For example, when Gerry Smith turned down the offer he said he had just talked to Kissinger and had received personal instructions from Kissinger not to proceed with an ABM limitation alone, leaving the impression that he personally might be quite willing to proceed.

Other Irritants. Dobrynin then mentioned the Soviet irritation at a number of other things; for example, the refusal of American personnel to attend the National Holiday which was a very emotional matter, and then the treatment of the defecting incident of the Soviet sailor. He said he could not understand the American performance. If we had given asylum to the Soviet sailor, he would have had to make a protest, and the matter would have been forgotten within 24 hours. But, first, to return him to the Soviet ship, and then to announce daily how profoundly concerned the President was had filled Moscow with outrage. For all these reasons, there was now profound distrust in the Soviet Union.

After Dobrynin ended his presentation, I told him that without wanting to argue details, it was important for Moscow to understand how certain things appeared in Washington. For example, Dobrynin had told me for months that he wanted the White House to play a more active role in our Middle East negotiations. The fact of the matter was, however, that when we did so, we confronted a very ambiguous situation. If the negotiations which he and I had started in March had borne fruit, we could perhaps have made progress. Dobrynin remembered that he had offered a ceasefire in Egypt in March. I had used our influence with the Israelis to get them to agree to a ceasefire. We had even delayed the delivery of airplanes. It therefore seemed to us that that would have been the right moment for a ceasefire without any of the difficulties that later arose. However, in the precise week that the ceasefire was agreed upon, indeed on the day when I wanted to in-

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20 On Kissinger’s memorandum summarizing the conversation, Nixon underlined the corresponding sentence and wrote in the margin: “note—I agree.”
form him of it, Soviet SA–3 missiles appeared in Egypt, together with Soviet personnel. Therefore, the arrangement failed.

Similarly, during the Middle East crisis in September the Soviet role was ambiguous. No one in Washington thought that the Soviets started it, but at the same time no pressure was put on Syria until it was nearly too late. I wanted Dobrynin to reflect on what would have happened if the Syrians had been more effective and had broken through; whether this would not have brought the world to the edge of war. Equally on Berlin, I did not know a single proposal that we had held up, and the constant accusations that we did so could only produce irritation.

Dobrynin replied that in March the SA–3 deliveries were made by the Defense Ministry and were handled in a completely different channel from the ceasefire proposal. I might not believe that, but he wanted to assure me that this was true. I said that either explanation was worrisome; the explanation that the Soviet Union is not in control of its government, or the explanation that the Soviet leaders are deliberately deceiving us.

Dobrynin then said that with respect to Berlin, he was only repeating what our allies told him. Both the French and the Germans constantly told the Soviet Ambassadors that the United States was holding up progress. He admitted that the British were in a different category, but then the British are almost a sub-organ of the U.S. State Department.

I then commented that we had tried to show great restraint during the Polish affair of last week, and that perhaps this might be an example of the restraint which they should exercise. He called my attention to a very tough speech by Frank Shakespeare and also to the fact that the Voice of America had more than quintupled its broadcasting into Poland. He said he knew there was a quarrel between Shakespeare and Rogers, but it was hard to convince people in Moscow that these decisions were made in such a haphazard way.

21 See Document 67 and footnote 2 thereto.
22 According to press reports, Rogers and Shakespeare disagreed on the proper tone of the administration's policy toward the Soviet Union. Rogers, who favored a more diplomatic approach, reminded Shakespeare in September that by law the Department of State provided the United States Information Agency with formal policy guidance. ("Rogers Warns USIA Chief Not To Set Foreign Policy," Washington Post, October 19, 1970, p. A1; and Tad Szulc, "Tough U.S.I.A. Line Drew a Complaint from Rogers," New York Times, October 25, 1970, p. 3) Shakespeare met Nixon on November 25 to present his side of the story. According to Haldeman: "Following Shakespeare's presentation, the President assured him that the USIA position was very much along the correct lines, and that Shakespeare had the President's full support—that he should not seek or engage in a direct confrontation with State, but should continue to work as skillfully as he has in the past." (Memorandum for the President's File by Haldeman; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President's Office Files, Box 83, Memoranda for the President, Beginning November 22, 1970)
Areas For Further Discussion

The main problem, Dobrynin said, was to get beyond the immediate irritations. He wanted to assure me that there was great eagerness in Moscow to come to an understanding with the United States. Why couldn’t we break out of the various impasses? Why couldn’t we make progress somewhere? For example, why didn’t we start talking on something on the Middle East? Could I not go through the record of negotiations and see whether there was anything at all that he and I could talk about? Why not take an issue which even Israel said it wanted such as guarantees?

The same principles applied to SALT. I had to understand that any agreement would be a major political step and that once the principle had been decided to have a limited agreement, one could go on to more comprehensive issues. This would enable the Politburo to give clear instructions to technical staffs.

The same was true of Berlin. The Soviet Union thought it had made a major concession on December 10th by speaking of preferential, uninterrupted access. On the other hand, the American Ambassador seemed totally unprepared and had to ask for a recess twice. And when Abrasimov wanted to continue the meeting, he said he had personal business. This was unheard of in the Soviet Union. Soviet Ambassadors have the idea that they’re serving their government—not that private business has precedence. I told Dobrynin that there was no sense in continuing an exchange of recriminations—that we should concentrate on the future. Dobrynin said he agreed and he recognized that this might be the last moment where we could have fruitful discussions.

Middle East. I said that, as far as the Middle East was concerned, I could assure him that the President knew that there was no settlement possible except that excluded the Soviet Union. We had always recognized that a settlement in the Middle East had to get the cooperation of the Soviet Union and we would, therefore, be prepared to discuss it with them. However, I would have to find out from the President whether I should participate in any of these discussions, or whether they should be handled at the Sisco level. Dobrynin said it would be best if he and I had some discussions and then shifted the technical points to the Sisco level.

SALT. On SALT, he said if we didn’t like their proposal, maybe I could offer some compromise; but the major concern was to have some progress. Then, the Summit meeting in September would make real sense. I pointed out that it was essential, however, that we keep our channels straight. I had to tell him in all candor that when we proposed a Summit meeting in the summer23 and then never received an

answer for six weeks, that this made an extremely painful impression in Washington. Dobrynin commented that this was based on a misunderstanding and that they had never grasped we had made a concrete proposal. (This remark, of course, was patently absurd because when he came back from the Soviet Union, he gave an answer to the concrete proposal.)

Vietnam. Finally Dobrynin turned to Vietnam. He said he had always criticized me for the linkage theory, but he was beginning to think that there was something to it. He then read me the attached statement on Vietnam, which he said was in response to the President’s Press Conference. The statement which was very conciliatory in tone read as follows:

The events of the last few weeks in the area of Indochina as well as some statements by US leaders can hardly be viewed other than as an evidence that the Nixon Administration is going back on the course it earlier proclaimed, for a settlement of the Vietnam problem by political means. To embark on the path leading to a new expansion of military actions in Indochina means to ignore the entire record of that war as well as to throw far behind the attainment of a settlement in Vietnam.

Negotiations alone, searching for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of respect for lawful rights of the people of that country are, in the profound conviction of the Soviet leaders, the only thing that can put an end to the conflict in Vietnam. We have reasons to believe that similar views are shared also by our Vietnamese friends. But no progress whatsoever in the negotiations may be counted upon when one side is trying to impose on the other participants its will with the help of military ultimatums.

Clear also is the fact that such course of actions by the US, violation by them of the assumed obligations, in this case—with regard to stopping the bombings and other military actions against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—can in no way facilitate trust in international relations. Quite the contrary, in view of the idea repeatedly expressed by US officials about a global linkage of problems, it is hard to avoid asking oneself the following question: if the US are leading the way toward complication in the area of Indochina does it not mean that for some reasons they want an aggravation of the international situation as a whole.

The Soviet Government is of the view that the efforts of our countries should be aimed at peaceful solution of disputes and removal of sources of international tension. Our relations cannot but be affected by whether there is progress in peaceful settlement of existing conflicts or this cause is going backward. The Soviet Union will not remain indifferent to whatever attempts are made to implement the threats against the fraternal Socialist country.

25 See Document 59.
I replied that, first, in the recent communication from Moscow after the bombing of North Vietnam, there seemed to be a misunderstanding about what the President had told Gromyko. The President had not said that he would not let Vietnam interfere with Soviet/American relations. The President had clearly pointed out that if the North Vietnamese continued to press military actions, we would have no choice except to react very strongly, and he hoped that, in that case, the Soviet Union would recognize that the action was not directed against it.

Dobrynin then commented that the Soviet Government hoped we understood the limits of their influence in Hanoi, given the whole combination of circumstances. I said the tragedy was that there was no possibility for military victory anymore by North Vietnam—that if the war went on another two or three years, the outcome would still be essentially the same as it is now. If the Soviet Union wanted to use its influence for negotiations, now was the time. This was the best way to prevent a deterioration of US/Soviet relationships. I would have to tell him, without a threat but in all fairness, that we would simply not sit by while the North Vietnamese were building up for an offensive. On the other hand, the second paragraph of his statement seemed to me perfectly appropriate, and we could agree to it completely as a statement of our principles.

Dobrynin then asked me whether we would agree to a coalition government. I replied that North Vietnam had not asked for a coalition government. It had asked for a government in which they nominated a third, and vetoed the other two-thirds. Dobrynin asked me whether we would accept a coalition government in which we could nominate a third and the other side could nominate a third. I said it seemed to me that the issue was wrongly approached in this manner. We had made clear that we were prepared to accept the solution that reflected the real balance of forces, and we had made some proposals along this line. We would certainly listen to counterproposals, but they had to be realistic and not be a subterfuge for a Communist take-over. If the Soviet Union would be prepared to enter the negotiating process seriously, I could promise them that (1) we would not embarrass them, and (2) that we would make serious replies to serious proposals.

Dobrynin concluded with an eloquent speech on the need to make some progress in our bilateral channel. He said he was ready to meet as frequently as possible. It would be very helpful if I could give him some indication of our general thinking on the Middle East as quickly as...

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26 See Document 54.
27 See Document 23.
as possible. He reiterated that we should review the negotiating positions of both sides, and he invited me to dinner on some evening the week of my return from California, though he said he would be prepared to meet earlier.

We finally settled on January 7th for dinner at the Soviet Embassy and agreed that we would both review our negotiating positions on Berlin, the Middle East and SALT, and see whether there were any points in which we might usefully make progress.

75. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, December 24, 1970, 4:15 p.m.

K: I take it the Ivanov thing is on the track.
D: The man I spoke [to] about [it] does not know the details because about that last assurance given from your side it doesn't matter what kind of decision [is] taken by the court.2
K: What do you mean?
D: You were obligated to take a [omission in transcript] but a final stage.
K: He doesn't know that but I will make it a matter of record. The State Dept. has just to work out the arrangements with you. It will be a record in the WH and the Justice Department. No point in making it—
D: I just understood it was the case—
K: Only to prevent a leak. I have two other things—when we were talking the other day of minor things that cause irritation,3 one that hasn't happened yet but as presidential campaigning begins, many

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 Dobrynin met Rogers on December 24 to discuss the Ivanov case. No record of the conversation has been found.
3 See Document 74.
aspirants will go to various capitals. Things that help certain candidates will take exception when other candidates weren't given them.4

D: One already applied. I wrote to Moscow but haven’t received a response. For the first of January. Don’t know what the answer is. We were told rather asked if it was possible.

K: We cannot say that someone shouldn’t visit Moscow but when the President was a candidate the circle of people he could see was definitive. If it changed for these, it would cause [omission in transcript].

D: No one will ask any candidate to do anything.

K: But taken out of context it could be used that way.

D: How can we keep it quiet?

K: It’s entirely a sovereign decision. It’s just that in my judgment some things that cause problems within the intrinsic [omission in transcript]. I didn’t know there was one planned.

D: It’s been almost two weeks.

K: Being received by top level people and being there are two different things.

D: No, when I talk about going it’s for a meeting with top level people. I can give visas for any Senator to go but when I say it was an application, it was to visit people.

K: So you meant with top level—if they see top level—it’s up to you.

D: I have no answer—maybe today or tomorrow. I don’t know.

K: The point that was made to me when the President was there he was refused to see senior people and he remembers it of course. If they are received, if conversations could be kept so that they cannot be used it would help political discussions we are planning. This is personal advice and not an official request. I thought you may want to see the comments I made on our relations at the background today,5 which you will find constructive.

D: Have you already typed it?

K: I will have a copy sent over. I have not seen it yet. As soon as it’s done. Finally and most importantly (something about the M.E.) but because you felt there was some urgency.

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4 Reference is to the plans of Muskie to visit the Soviet Union in January 1971. Kissinger implied that the Soviets should not treat Muskie, then the leading Democratic candidate for President, any better than they treated Nixon during a similar trip four years earlier.

5 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger gave a background press briefing on December 24 from 10:23 to 11:40 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) A copy of the text is ibid., Box CL 426, Subject Files, Briefings, Background.
D: I will invite you.
K: The President would be prepared to have me discuss with you some of the general proposals and formulations and in the meantime we should avoid matters to aggravate the military situation there. Some ideas you have discussed the other day he is considering in a positive spirit and I will say more to you on the 7th.
D: Off the record, if something could be more completely now—it is important based on Soviet/American relations and would be good to discuss concrete—
K: I am doing something on this. Berlin (I have worked out).
D: Strategic.
K: I will give it to you on the 7th. We have made a preliminary decision.
D: I will wait to have the usual dinner with you.
K: I want you to know on general background. In my backgrounder I said settlement in the M.E. not possible because it was not in the interest of the Soviets. (But that was just as a diversion.)
D: Send it in a personal envelope to me.
K: Merry Christmas and see you on the 7th.
D: I hope you will see your children.
K: They are coming to the W. Coast with me.

76. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 24, 1970, 4:50 p.m.

K: I wanted to tell you I had a long talk on the phone with Dobrynin² and hung out the prospects for SALT and Berlin and the Middle East. I said that if Presidential candidates started receiving treatment not accorded others in Moscow we would look very unsympathetically on it. He said the Senator had already asked and I said

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.
² See Document 75.
he had better not come back with statements he can use in a partisan way because it will jeopardize everything.

P: You think he’s going to go?

K: He thinks not, but I think so. Then I talked that snake Lake\(^3\) to complete the circle.

P: But the way you left it he said that he had asked and he didn’t know whether it had been approved?

K: Right. I said we don’t mind his going to Moscow, but just the people he’s going to see.

P: That’s okay. Then he’ll owe us one.

K: That’s right. And I’ve held out enough goodies. They will probably see him, but they may not tell him much.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Stewart Alsop, columnist for Newsweek magazine.]

P: Okay Henry, take a couple of hours off.

K: Thank you. Merry Christmas.

P: Same to you.

\(^3\) W. Anthony Lake, Kissinger’s former special assistant. Lake had resigned on April 29, the day before the President announced his decision to invade Cambodia; he subsequently accepted a position on Muskie’s staff. Kissinger called Lake at 4:30 p.m. on December 24. According to the transcript, neither man mentioned Muskie’s plan to visit the Soviet Union. “I have high personal regard for Muskie and for you,” Kissinger told Lake. “And the only other thing I have to say is to wish you well, and Merry Christmas.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

77. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

December 26, 1970, noon, PST.

K: Hello Mr. President. I have two matters.

[Omitted here is discussion of prisoners of war in Vietnam.]

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking. Nixon was in Washington; Kissinger was in San Clemente.
We are getting a lot of heat from Jewish groups about these people who were sentenced\(^2\) and we have urged Ron to say nothing.

P: Yes. That is right. I am for capital punishment for hijackers. I am glad to see the Jewish people raising Cain with the Russians. The idea of putting out a big public statement is like blowing into the wind.

K: And also whatever the trial, these are after all their own citizens.

P: That is right. They are not American citizens. They were not part of that Turkish group,\(^3\) were they?

K: No. I wouldn’t be surprised if they were framed but who are we to say that? I think we would irritate the Soviets if we said that now.

P: I think everyone should be tough on hijackers.

K: The report says it was a KGB trap of people who wanted to flee.

P: Tell your Jewish people we are looking into it.

K: We have shifted it to the State Department.

P: Give it to the same guy who handled the Lithuanian matter.\(^4\) I will get hold of Haldeman on the POW matter.

K: Thank you Mr. President.

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\(^2\) In June 1970, two Soviet Jews, Mark Dymshits and Edward Kuznetsov, failed in their attempt to emigrate to Israel by hijacking an Aeroflot flight from Leningrad to Helsinki. The Leningrad trial began on December 15 and ended on December 24 with the conviction of Dymshits and Kuznetsov, who were immediately sentenced to death. The fate of the defendants sparked widespread sympathy, most notably within the American Jewish community.

\(^3\) See Document 10.

\(^4\) The defector from Lithuania, Simas Kudirka. See Document 57.

78. Editorial Note

On December 28, 1970, while Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger was in San Clemente preparing the Second Annual Report on United States Foreign Policy, President Richard Nixon was in Washington raising concerns about Kissinger’s conduct of the “confidential channel” with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. During a telephone conversation with the President that evening, Secretary of State William Rogers reported on his meeting with Dobrynin earlier in the day. Nixon then called H.R. Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff, to discuss the relationship among Kissinger, Rogers, and Dobrynin. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily
Although no record of either conversation has been found, Haldeman wrote in his diary that Nixon was worried “that Rogers is aware of what Henry’s doing with the Russians. While Henry thinks he’s operating secretly, he’s not really.” Haldeman continued:

“The P feels that Henry’s got to open up the fact of his secret channel, so that Rogers knows about it and we have some more candor in this whole thing, because the problem now of playing it two ways poses a very bad situation for the P. For example, on the past trips [to Paris], Tony Lake, who’s now working for Muskie, was with Henry, so he knows all about them, yet Rogers doesn’t know about it. There’s a good chance that this will come out, which would be a very embarrassing thing. Also on the Ivanov problem, it was hard to explain to Rogers that Henry had been making an independent deal with Dobrynin. The P feels Henry’s got to realize he’s not a secret-type person, that the things he does do come out; so, we either have to get along with each other, or we’ll have to change one of the people involved. He summed it up by saying the whole situation now poses a major problem for the P, because Rogers knows that K’s meeting with Dobrynin. Maybe the thing to do is to tell Rogers that both he and Henry have to meet with Dobrynin independently, and both of them should understand this. To do this we have to get K and Rogers together, especially as we approach the possibility of a meeting with the Russians.” (Entry for December 28; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition; see also Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, page 226)

Nixon instructed Haldeman to “have a talk” with Kissinger’s deputy, Alexander Haig, Jr. According to Haldeman’s handwritten notes, Nixon further reported that “Dob[rynin] talked to R[ogers] today re summit.” “K is taken in by Dob re secret channel,” Nixon told Haldeman. “[He] doesn’t really have it.” Nixon, therefore, wanted Haig to “keep things away from K.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 42, H Notes, Nov. 10, 1970–Dec. 30, 1970, Part II)

The President met with Haldeman and Haig in the Oval Office the next afternoon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) As Haldeman reported in his diary: “We had quite a long discussion of the K–Rogers problem as the P reviewed it with me yesterday. His real concern here is that he can’t go on having Henry conduct operations independently of Rogers without Rogers’ knowledge.” “The P told Haig he was going to have to help handle this whole thing,” Haldeman added, “and that he was counting on him for that.” (Entry for December 29; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

Nixon also called Rogers that morning to review the recent conviction and death sentence of two Soviet Jews, Mark Dymshits and Edward Kuznetsov. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,
White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to Haldeman:

“The other item that came up today was the whole flap on the Jewish protest in this country regarding the planned Russian execution of two Jewish hijackers. The activity today consisted mainly of Rogers meeting with some of the complainants and making contact with [Mayor John] Lindsay, [Senator Jacob] Javits, etc., to lay out our line, which is that we’re working behind the scenes to try to save the lives of the people, but we’re not going to make a big political play out of it as those people are doing. Rogers is taking a hard line on this, as he has on several things recently, and this may greatly improve the overall Rogers situation.” (Entry for December 29; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

79. Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers


Dear Bill:

In view of your report on your conversation with Dobrynin in which he told you that I had not requested an appointment with the Soviet leaders, I thought you would be interested in seeing a copy of the letter that Bob Ellsworth wrote to him at the time I was planning my trip in 1967.

Bob had several conversations with Dobrynin prior to writing the letter and wrote the letter to Dobrynin at Dobrynin’s suggestion. A couple of weeks later we received a wire from Thompson saying he had taken up the matter with the Soviets and that their response was negative.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Rogers’ Office Files: Lot 73 D 443, Box 25, WPR—President Nixon. No classification marking. According to Kissinger’s copy, Nixon dictated the letter to Rose Mary Woods. Kissinger initialed the copy; Haig also wrote on the copy: “absolutely no distribution.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3)

2 See Document 78.

3 Dated February 17, 1967; attached but not printed.

4 During his “fact-finding mission” to Europe in March 1967, Nixon visited the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.

5 Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson.
This incident would clearly indicate that Dobrynin was pulling your leg when he tried to act as if he was not aware that I had officially requested to see the Soviet leaders in 1967. Not only was he aware of the situation but he was deeply involved in discussion with Ellsworth over a period of weeks prior to the time that Ellsworth wrote the attached letter to him.

I think it is very important that you let him know that he did not get away with this patently dishonest attempt to deny the record. The mystery of it is that he would not have had the good sense to know that I would have kept records on a matter of this type.

Sincerely,

RN

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On July 1, 1968, Dobrynin told Secretary of State Rusk that Nixon, then the Republican Presidential candidate, hoped to visit the Soviet Union that summer. According to a memorandum of conversation: “He [Dobrynin] added, very much off the record, that Mr. Nixon has approached the Soviet Government on three occasions about a visit to Moscow following the Republican Convention. He said that they had simply not replied to the first two inquiries but now have a third inquiry in front of them which they are thinking about. [Rusk] told him that I was not in a position at this moment to offer any advice on that subject but did point to the habit of many candidates to want to make a ‘grand tour’ of foreign capitals and that this has presented problems for busy leaders of other Governments.” See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Document 278.

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80. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive. 1 page not declassified.]
"A Key Point in Our Relationship": Backchannel Talks on SALT, Berlin, and the Summit, January 1–April 22, 1971

81. Editorial Note

On January 1, 1971, President Richard Nixon went to Camp David to prepare for an upcoming televised "conversation" at the White House. (President's Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) In a meeting there with White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman the next afternoon, Nixon reviewed his "general homework," including plans to explore the political utility of his foreign policy. As Haldeman recorded in his diary that day: "He made one interesting point, which is the need to get to work on our foreign policy PR because this is our strongest point, and especially since the death of de Gaulle, we have a real opportunity to build the P as the world leader. Muskie and all the rest of them will try to move in on this field, but we must continue to dominate." According to Haldeman, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, who remained in San Clemente to prepare the President's annual report on foreign policy, was "very worried" about the "defection" of his former staff member, Anthony Lake, who had recently accepted the position as foreign policy adviser to Senator Edmund Muskie, the leading Democratic candidate for President. "The P had to give Henry a big pitch," Haldeman wrote on January 3, "trying to make the point that these people are just seeking power and that there's no reason to be disturbed about that kind of thing, it's too late to worry about it after it's happened." (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, pages 229–230)

The President, meanwhile, carefully studied an "index" on foreign policy that Kissinger and his staff had prepared for the televised "conversation." Nixon underlined a number of passages on SALT, Cuba, the Middle East, and Germany; he also collected his thoughts on these issues in the margin. On relations with the Soviet Union, Nixon wrote: "We don't like Mideast, Caribbean—they don't like Viet Nam." On the issue of Soviet naval presence near Cuba, he noted: "Servicing Nuclear subs in or from Cuban ports is not consistent with understanding." And on the possibility of a settlement in the Middle East, he wrote: "U.S. & Soviet are key. Both must cooperate." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 377, Subject Files, President's TV Interview, 4 January 1971)

On January 3, the President prepared a set of handwritten notes for his television appearance. Although he supported "reducing tensions" over Berlin and ending the American "combat role" in Vietnam,
Nixon observed that the United States could not “guarantee peace all over world” and that a “U.S.-Soviet guarantee” in the Middle East was “not realistic.” (Ibid., President’s Personal Files, Box 63, President’s Speech File, January 4, 1971, Conversation with the President) Nixon also drafted a separate set of notes, which included the following sections on Soviet-American relations:

“Soviet-U.S.”
- 1. It is a period of negotiation not confrontation.
- • We have differences about S.E. Asia, Mideast, Europe, Arms Control, Caribbean—
- • But we discuss the differences—trying to find agreement—to avoid ultimatums, rhetoric—
- • We are moved by cost of arms—danger of war—possibilities of trade—

“SALT:
- 1. The talks are essential because our vital interests are involved—
- 2. We have offered a comprehensive agreement—
- • The definition of strategic weapons—disagree—
- 3. We now explore a limited agreement—
- 4. It will take time—I’m still optimistic about eventual settlement because alternative of arms race, nuclear destruction is unacceptable to both sides.”

“Mideast:
- 1. Cease fire 5 months—
- 2. Talks begin—
- 3. We will help maintain balance—guarantee the peace, responsible assistance.

The hour-long “Conversation with the President”—which was conducted by a panel that included John Chancellor (NBC), Eric Sevareid (CBS), Nancy H. Dickerson (PBS), and Howard K. Smith (ABC)—began in the Library at the White House at 9 p.m. on January 4. Dickerson asked the President whether, contrary to his hopes for an “era of negotiation,” Soviet-American relations had recently “returned to something of a cold war situation.” After expressing concern about developments in the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Berlin, Nixon emphasized the “plus side” of the ledger:

“Over the past 2 years the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating. We have been negotiating, for example, on arms control. Those negotiations will begin in Helsinki [Vienna] in March. I am
optimistic that we will reach an agreement eventually. I do not suggest
now that we are going to have a comprehensive agreement, because
there is a basic disagreement with regard to what strategic weapons—
what that definition is.

"But we are now willing to move to a noncomprehensive agree-
ment. We are going to be able to discuss that with the Soviets in the
next round at Helsinki [Vienna]. I am not predicting that we are going
to have an agreement next month or 2 months from now or 3 months
from now. But in terms of arms control, we have some overwhelming
forces that are going to bring about an agreement eventually, and it is
simply this: The Soviet Union and the United States have a common
interest in avoiding the escalating burden of arms—you know that they
have even cut down on their SS–9 and big missile deployment lately,
development—and, second, the Soviet Union and the United States
have an overwhelming common interest in avoiding nuclear competi-
tion which could lead to nuclear destruction.

"So, in this field, I think we are going to make some progress. In
the Mideast it is true we are far apart, but we are having discussions.
On Berlin we are far apart, but we are negotiating. And finally, with
regard to the rhetoric—and the rhetoric in international affairs does
make a difference—the rhetoric, while it has been firm, has generally
been non-inflammatory on our part and on theirs.

"So, I am not without the confidence that I had at the beginning.
I always realized that our differences were very great, that it was go-
ing to take time. But the United States and the Soviet Union owe it to
their own people and the people of the world, as super powers, to ne-
gotiate rather than to confront."

When Dickerson wondered whether, given his interest in "per-
sonal diplomacy," it would be a "good time" for a summit, Nixon
replied: "If it appears at some time that a meeting of that type would
be what is needed to bring about the final consummation in one of
these areas, for example the SALT talks or the Mideast or the rest, we
will certainly have such a meeting. But unless there is the chance for
progress, a summit talk is not in their interest and it is not in our in-
terest, and not in the interest of world peace."

Smith raised the question of Soviet "adventurism" in the Middle
East, where local conflict could escalate into global confrontation. The
President maintained that the "key to peace" was held not only in the
region but also elsewhere:

"If the Soviet Union does not play a conciliatory peacemaking
role, there is no chance for peace in the Mideast. Because if the Soviet
Union continues to fuel the war arsenals of Israel’s neighbors, Israel
will have no choice but to come to the United States for us to maintain
the balance to which Mr. Sevareid referred. And we will maintain that
balance.
“That is why it is important at this time that the Soviet Union and the United States as well as Britain and France all join together in a process of not having additional arms and additional activities go into that area, because that will only mean that it produces the possibility of future confrontation.”

Chancellor then asked how the United States would react if the Soviet Union introduced a submarine missile base in Cuba. Nixon took the opportunity to clarify his position:

“I can tell you everything that our intelligence tells us, and we think it is very good in that area, because, as you know, we have surveillance from the air, which in this case is foolproof, we believe.

“First, let us look at what the understanding is. President Kennedy worked out that understanding in 1962 that the Russians would not put any offensive missiles into Cuba. That understanding was expanded on October 11th of this year by the Russians when they said that it would include a military base in Cuba, and a military naval base. They, in effect, said that they would not put a military naval base into Cuba, on October 11th.

“Now, in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding. That has not happened yet. We are watching the situation closely.

“The Soviet Union is aware of the fact that we are watching it closely. We expect them to abide by the understanding. I believe they will.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pages 6–23)

The next morning, Kissinger received the “objective” views of observers outside the White House. Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post called at 9:15 a.m. to discuss the President’s broadcast:

“R: Henry, in his conversation last night the President was talking about SALT and he used the term non-comprehensive agreement. Since he is using it I was wondering if there was some new move here.

“K: No. According to our definition the 1st two were comprehensive but the one now is not.

“R: Those were the ones including the MIRV?

“K: Yes.”

Kissinger further assured Roberts that “non-comprehensive” did not refer to an “ABM-only” agreement. Roberts also raised the Soviet-American “understanding” on Cuba.

“R: What other foreign policy matters were brought to the fore last night by the President?

“K: You tell me.

“R: The Cuban thing. He said it on the record that servicing subs was a violation of the agreement.
“K: He said in and from Cuban ports.
“R: The form was a little more direct.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

As soon as Roberts hung up, Rowland Evans, a syndicated columnist, called Kissinger to discuss Nixon’s televised “conversation,” including his comments on the Middle East:

“E: I thought he moved toward center with the Soviet Union. His tone was not bellicose and . . .
“K: Is that bad?
“E: The emphasis on the positive rather than the negative. We don’t have our problems solved but we are willing to negotiate and talk. It was positive from the way the President worded it.
“K: That was intentional.
“E: He spoke of non-comprehensive agreement.
“K: That was terminological. Our first two proposals were comprehensive . . .
“E: I believe we will be talking to the Russians within 3–4 weeks on the Middle East.
“K: It may take a little longer.” (Ibid.)

Nixon called Kissinger that afternoon to listen to reviews of his performance. The two men agreed that the reaction, public and private, was positive:

“K: Henry Brandon said it was a spectacular performance and that you are better at it than Kennedy, more articulate and more disciplined.
“P: Really? That’s like talking against Christ.
“K: He said why don’t you do it more often? I told him you do it so well because you spend days preparing for it and don’t take these things lightly.
“P: That for him is a tremendous acknowledgement.
“K: And Chalmers Roberts wanted clarification on SALT so he called me, but he was extremely complimentary.
“P: I thought I was quite clear on SALT.
“K: No, it’s the non-comprehensive . . .
“P: That we are ready to move from that to limited?
“K: Yes, but we haven’t said it before: now we have to avoid Gerry Smith running wild with it. But I said it was against accidental war and he was satisfied with that. He thought you were precise with the right combination of conciliatoriness and firmness with the Soviets. Altogether it was a great plus. And Rowland Evans called me and he felt the same way. They may never write this . . .
“P: I don’t care about that.
"K: He wants to know what it means about the Middle East. I said generally the President’s words were self-explanatory.

"P: But you can always elaborate a little."

Nixon thought his televised “conversation” had achieved at least one objective: “for the next two or three months you’re not going to hear people crying about why don’t you have a press conference?” Kissinger, however, urged him to take the initiative, first with his State of the Union address, and then with his second annual foreign policy report:

"K: That will be ready by February 15, so that is going to be a strong month, and then these other things planned for April. And by that time . . . I am seeing Dobrynin soon. We can get a good feeling for what’s obtainable. I’ll see him this weekend.

"P: That’s a good idea; he probably will have seen this.

"K: You can bet your bottom dollar he will have. I noticed Kosygin picked up almost the same language at the year-end backgrounder that I gave.

"P: You noticed how I handled the summit thing too? Dobrynin will appreciate this. He knows we are discussing it, but I said there has been speculation but when we have something to discuss then we will do it; if we don’t we won’t.” (Ibid.)

Washington, January 6, 1971, 0427Z.

1550. Subj: Leningrad Trial: Secretary’s Meeting with Jewish Leaders December 30. Following report of conversation is FYI and Noforn.

1. At 3:00 p.m. December 30, Secretary held one-hour meeting with principal representatives of emergency conference of leaders of major U.S. Jewish organizations, which took place in Washington Dec. 29–30. Attending meeting, which was held at request of Jewish leaders, were: Dr. William Wexler, President of B’nai Brith and Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; Rabbi Hershel Schachter, President of American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry and Wexler’s predecessor as Chairman of Conference on Presidents; Detroit industrialist Max Fisher, and Washington attorney Herman Edelsburg, head of foreign-affairs section of B’nai Brith. Following the meeting, Secretary took Wexler, Schachter, and Fisher to White House for 40-minute meeting with President Nixon, whence they returned to give short press briefing at State Department.

2. Jewish groups originally intended to send 19 representatives to meet with Secretary but finally decided to send only three (Edelsburg’s presence was anonymous self-styled “amicus curiae” and was not announced to press). Secretary stated at outset of meeting that he was prepared to receive others if Jewish leaders preferred, but expressed his personal belief that smaller meeting more useful. Rabbi Schachter agreed that usefulness of meeting was most essential consideration and others, some of whom were at Department, were not invited in.

3. Secretary made several opening comments. First, he expressed certainty that he had no substantive disagreement with Jewish leaders concerning either Leningrad trial or situation of Soviet Jews. He pointed out that both he and President Nixon were very concerned from outset of trial, for they fully realized gravity of situation. He stated that President and he had several long discussions in an attempt to
find most effective way to deal with situation and, in first instance, to save lives of Dymshitz and Kuznetsov. Secretary said we had taken action which we considered most effective, but expressed his hope that we would not be compelled to reveal details of action taken. Secretary described McCloskey statement of Dec. 28\(^2\) as deliberately low-key to avoid giving impression that we were exploiting situation for political purposes. Secretary stated that *NY Times* article of Dec. 29\(^3\) treated matter to his satisfaction. (FYI: *Washington Post* story December 31\(^4\) contains report that US action was in form of Secretary-Gromyko letter;\(^5\) but story has not yet been picked up widely or produced strong pressure on Department to confirm. End FYI)

4. Secretary also informed Jewish leaders that we had attempted to orchestrate our action with other governments. Rabbi Schachter expressed his belief that this helped to bring sympathetic response in friendly countries. Secretary expressed agreement, but asked cooperation of Jewish leaders in not revealing this coordination.

5. Secretary stated that he had no reservations concerning actions of private groups such as American Jewish organizations. He expressed belief that responsible activities on part of religious and civic groups in U.S. and abroad constitute most effective method to try to alleviate both Leningrad verdict and plight of Soviet Jewry.

6. Dr. Wexler asked on what level USG had taken action in effort to mitigate Leningrad verdict. Secretary replied that we are unable to release details, but he expressed certainty that Soviet Government is well aware of our position. Wexler then asked what Secretary foresaw as outcome. Secretary replied that he was uncertain, but expressed his

\(^2\) During the daily news briefing on December 28, McCloskey was asked whether Washington had made “any representations” to Moscow concerning the Leningrad trial. McCloskey replied: “We say only, that in light of the severity of the sentences handed down in that trial, that this matter has received serious consideration in Washington. The Secretary discussed it at length on at least two occasions over the weekend with the President. We have taken steps which we hope will be helpful. Now I’m not prepared to say anything beyond that at this time.” (Ibid., RG 59, Records of the Office of News, Transcripts of Daily News Conferences of the Department of State, Vol. 56)


\(^5\) During a meeting with Dobrynin on December 28, 1970, Rogers gave him a letter to Gromyko, appealing for leniency in the Leningrad trial. (Telegram 21168 to Moscow, December 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 USSR) Kissinger cleared the letter, but not before modifying its tone, including removing a passage stating that the execution of the defendants “could affect the prospects for improving relations between our two countries.” (Draft telegram, December 26; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI)
view that the Spanish Government’s decision to commute the Basque sentences would place additional pressure on Soviet Government. Mr. Fisher stated that present situation is one of most delicate in Jewish history. Secretary replied that he knows this.

7. Secretary revealed our latest information, based on press sources, on appeal proceedings, and expressed his belief that Sakharov’s open role was of possible significance in indicating that death sentences might be commuted. He also referred to report by Victor Louis, who is “believed to have good contacts.” Secretary cautioned, however, that, although most evidence seemed hopeful, the unusual rapidity of the appeal process in this case could also be interpreted as indicating that the Soviets might want to execute Dymshitz and Kuznetsov forthwith in effort to avoid further build-up in pressure of world opinion.

8. Secretary expressed his belief that the draft convention on hijacking does not apply to Leningrad case, as there was no attempt to take over an aircraft in flight. He described case as “a probable attempt to steal a plane,” and stated that we would background the press to this effect. Mr. Edelsburg expressed view that the case was “an entrapment to steal a plane,” as the rapid police roundup of Jews in two cities indicated that Soviet authorities were intent upon incriminating persons who were on record as desiring to emigrate to Israel. (FYI: While awaiting the return from the White House of Secretary and others, Edelsburg stated to Deptoff that a detailed brief had been prepared to persuade the Secretary that this was not legally an attempted hijacking, but “the Secretary disarmed us.” End FYI.)

9. Secretary also stated that USG was considering inviting Soviet observers to attend trial of Angela Davis in effort to pressure Soviets to permit Americans to observe any subsequent Soviet trials of this nature. Rabbi Schachter replied that this was a “brilliant idea.”

10. Rabbi Schachter stated that no single issue has so captured attention of Jews and, to his gratification, many non-Jews as well. He expressed view that trial pointed up need to undergo “an agonizing reappraisal” of U.S. policy toward Soviet Jewry, for, despite our past efforts, situation of Soviet Jews has continually deteriorated. He said that there

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6 Sakharov sent an “open appeal” to Podgorny and Nixon on December 31, 1970, calling for clemency not only for Dymshits and Kuznetsov but also for Angela Davis, the African-American militant charged in California with murder and kidnapping. (Telegram 7812 from Moscow, December 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 USSR)

7 Louis, a correspondent for the London Evening News (and reputed KGB operative), predicted in an article on December 30, 1970, that the death sentences would be commuted. (Telegram 7790 from Moscow, December 30; ibid.)
might be need for more pressure from USG, for perhaps Soviet Government “didn’t get the message” that this issue is of priority concern to “more than just a section” of the American people.

11. The Secretary replied that it is necessary to differentiate two aspects of problem, namely, the trial and the overall situation of Soviet Jewry. He expressed certainty that we took the most effective action possible in our effort to obtain mitigation of sentences. On more general question of Soviet Jewry, Secretary stated that he is perfectly prepared to discuss alternative courses of action. He cautioned, however, that private organizations have a tendency to exaggerate amount of pressure which USG can bring to bear on Soviet Government in regard to what Soviets consider internal matters. Secretary stated that critical commentary in Soviet press on internal U.S. developments sometimes influences Americans in opposite direction, and he expressed view that the same might be true of U.S. statements on the USSR.

12. Mr. Fisher replied that to remove any possible misunderstanding, he wanted to assure Secretary that leaders of Jewish community were grateful for fact that Administration “had moved immediately” in response to Leningrad sentences. Mr. Fisher also expressed his appreciation for the Secretary’s positive comments on the efforts of Jewish organizations to arouse public opinion on this issue. Rabbi Schachter, too, expressed appreciation for USG action, but asked whether “one more step” might not be possible. He suggested that one of most effective steps would be to have President receive a small group of Jewish leaders while emergency conference was underway in Washington. Rabbi stated that Jewish leaders would not expect President to make a major statement, but hoped only that he would state publicly that he was pleased to receive delegation and that he “shared their concern.” Mr. Fisher expressed his conviction that both President and Secretary were “one hundred percent with us,” and he stated that such a meeting would therefore have great effect within the American Jewish community.

13. The Secretary agreed that there were no basic differences of view between the Administration and the delegation, but he expressed his concern that a public statement of concern by President might be misconstrued by Soviets as political exploitation of this delicate situation. The Secretary pointed out that senior U.S. spokesmen at the UN have taken a strong public stand opposing Soviet Union’s discrimination against its Jewish citizens, and he gave his assurances that these efforts will be continued. Secretary cautioned that although he did not doubt fact of discrimination against Jews in the Soviet Union, it was very difficult to present type of evidence which would persuade governments and peoples of other countries. He stated that it is easier to obtain agreement of other nations on principle of free emigration. Sec-
retary expressed view that this principle was at the core of Leningrad case, and he suggested that USG efforts to relieve the situation of Soviet Jews should be based on this principle.

14. The Secretary cautioned again, however, that a public statement by the President could be interpreted by Soviet leadership as a USG effort to pit itself against the Soviet Government in an attempt to exploit this situation politically. He stated that he would be particularly reluctant to request such a statement because the lives of two men were involved. Secretary stated that if the Jewish leaders were willing to hold a private meeting with the President, following which they could return to Department and state in a low-key manner that they had had a satisfactory meeting with him, he would try to arrange this immediately. Dr. Wexler replied that the very fact that they were able to meet with the President and to express their concern to him would be of considerable importance to the Jewish community.

15. The Secretary agreed to try to arrange an immediate meeting on this basis. He pointed out, however, that if American Jewish leaders, after further reflection, believed that a public statement from the President or himself was essential to relieve the great concern within Jewish community, he would reluctantly consider such a statement. Mr. Fisher replied that a U.S.-Soviet “showdown” might have adverse consequences for our efforts to obtain commutation of the death sentences against Dymshitz and Kuznetsov. He stated that the Secretary was in a better position to judge how USG should proceed on this matter. Mr. Fisher expressed belief that it would nonetheless be highly useful for President to receive a small delegation of Jewish leaders, particularly in regard to the American Jewish community’s strong concern over the fate of Soviet Jewry, even if no statement were made. Rabbi Schachter agreed that it would be best for any statement to be made by the Jewish leaders themselves.

16. After a 40-minute meeting with the President, to which they were personally escorted by the Secretary, the Jewish leaders returned to the Department, where they made a short statement to the press. Dr. Wexler told the press that the delegation met for an hour with

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8 Ehrlichman called Kissinger in San Clemente at 10:10 a.m. (PST) on December 31, 1970, to discuss the meeting. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “E: You should have been around for the meeting with the Jewish leaders. Shultz and I were in there doing budget stuff and Bill Rogers pranced in with the Jewish leaders and we got roped into attending the meeting. K: The President called me last night. He thought it went extraordinarily well. I don’t know . . . E: It did. It was a very good meeting.” After Ehrlichman told an anecdote, Kissinger commented: “He [Nixon] was all charged up about it and wanted to make a statement but I told him I didn’t think it was a good idea.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)
Secretary and was “very gratified with his concern.” He said “it was suggested during this meeting that we go to the White House.” Rabbi Schachter stated that the delegation was “heartened by the President’s deep understanding and continuing concern for the problems of Soviet Jewry and of religious minorities throughout the world.” He stated that the discussion with the President focused primarily upon the trial “and the fact that Jews in the USSR are denied elementary cultural and religious rights.” Asked whether delegation had been informed of the action taken by USG, Rabbi Schachter replied negatively but reiterated that they were “heartened” by Administration’s “continuing interest and concern.” Asked if they were satisfied, Rabbi Schachter stated that delegation was departing with “a much happier feeling.” Dr. Wexler stated that they did not wish to discuss in any further detail their meetings with either the President or the Secretary. Press then asked if Jewish leaders had received any response to their request to meet with Soviet officials, and Rabbi Schachter replied, “We can’t comment.”

Rogers

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83. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

San Clemente, California, January 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Soviet Démarche on Berlin Negotiations²

Most of this note is a politely worded but fairly clear charge of bad faith, based on the Soviet interpretation of Gromyko’s conversations with Secretary Rogers and with the President, and what the Soviets expected to flow from those talks.

1. At that time Secretary Rogers made quite an issue over the Soviet negotiators’ unwillingness to discuss the question of Berlin access, without first reaching an understanding on their demand for a reduction in West German presence in West Berlin. Gromyko made a “concession” and agreed to discuss both issues simultaneously. On this basis the Soviets apparently expected the negotiations would go more rapidly.

2. This note suggests they believe we have not lived up to the bargain of simultaneous discussions. They expected to learn more of our position on West German presence, while they would reveal more of their position on access. In fact, Abrasimov did make a new proposal on access, and accompanied it with a reminder that he expected “parallel” progress on all the main issues.

Ambassador Rush, however, replied that the question of West German presence would have to cover activities to be excluded and those permitted. This latter point was new, Abrasimov claimed and in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 691, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Kissinger later incorporated most of Hyland’s analysis in a January 25 memorandum to the President; printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 166. Kissinger and Hyland were both in San Clemente on January 6, drafting the President’s annual foreign policy report. According to Hyland’s memoirs, during this trip Kissinger “indicated he thought that we had reached a turning point with the Soviets. And he plotted a strategy for his talks with Dobrynin. His plan was to bring matters to a conclusion in the German–Berlin negotiations, which he now took into his private channel with the Soviet Ambassador. Second, he said he would try to negotiate a breakthrough in the SALT talks, which had become bogged down. And he intended to undertake this plan while signaling strongly to China that Washington was ready for a significant move.” (Hyland, Mortal Rivals, pp. 34–35)

contradiction of the understanding reached by the Foreign Ministers, including Secretary Rogers and Gromyko.\(^3\)

3. The third complaint is that we have permitted continuing West German meetings and activities in Berlin, which force the Soviets to react. Probably, the Soviets believe we could prevent these incidents if we wanted to, and they expected us to following the Gromyko visit.

On the more positive side:

—The Soviets indicate they are willing to move into more intensive discussions if that is desired (picking up the Brandt proposals).\(^4\)

—The negotiators should be empowered to work out detailed texts and to put agreements in “formal shape.”

—The Soviet “package” already introduced (i.e., a four power agreement, an intra-German agreement, and a subsequent covering document for the entire package) will provide a “definite assurance that the agreement will be observed in all parts.”

If this latter could be translated into similar language in the negotiations one of our principal concerns would be met, since what we want is a Soviet assurance and not merely for the Soviets to pass on, as a kind of honest broker, the unilateral assurances of the GDR.

What do they expect of us?

1. Apparently, the Soviets expect some sort of procedural signal from us, either to hold the sessions more often, or perhaps break them down into working groups to come up with detailed language.

2. On substance, they are looking for us to reveal some of the fallbacks on German presence that their contacts with Bonn and other intelligence probably inform them we have considered.

3. Since the Soviet offer of December 10 did come some distance toward our position, they probably want a sign that we appreciated what they had done.

The note makes a special point that when the conversations start in mid January it will be “very important” what they start with and how they will be “arranged.”

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\(^3\) This exchange between Abrasimov and Rush took place at the quadripartite ambassadorial meeting in Berlin on December 10, 1970. Sonnenfeldt assessed the meeting in a December 11 memorandum to Kissinger; see ibid., Document 144.

\(^4\) On December 15, 1970, Brandt sent identical letters to Nixon, Pompidou, and Heath, urging the Allies to intensify the Berlin negotiations by turning the periodic ambassadorial meetings into a “continuous conference.” The letter to Nixon is printed ibid., Document 145. For the letter to Heath, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. III, pp. 2273–2275.
The Soviets probably are beginning to have some doubts that a Berlin agreement is possible. But they have a major stake in an agreement, because of the treaties with Bonn. After the discussion with the President in late October, it does appear that the Soviets decided they would have to loosen up their own position. In the session of November 4, Abrasimov was generally conciliatory, and accepted our general concept that traffic should be unhindered and preferential.\(^5\) About that time Brezhnev originated new formula, adopted at the Warsaw Pact meeting in early December, that was unusually conciliatory (i.e., an agreement would have to meet the “wishes of the Berlin population”).\(^6\)

The Soviets may believe our response has been to harden our terms and challenge them on the Federal German presence. Since the Polish riots and purge, the Soviets must have come under fire from the East Germans, and perhaps within the Politburo for investing too heavily in Ostpolitik and accepting Western precondition of a Berlin settlement. This note seems to be a sort of appeal at the highest level for a show of responsiveness.

The Soviets may have some considerable concern that they cannot go into a Party Congress in March with their Western policy in a shambles—no Berlin progress, no move to ratify the treaties, no prospect for economic assistance from the West Germans—but that we hold the key.


\(^6\) The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in East Berlin on December 2, 1970. During the meeting, the Communist Party leaders released a statement on strengthening security and promoting “peaceful cooperation” in Europe. For the text of the statement, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXII, No. 49 (January 5, 1971), pp. 2–3.
January 6, 1971, 12:35 p.m., PST.

K: I have just talked about this document with the President and I will be prepared to discuss it with you on Monday but I wanted to be sure I knew what the precise question is to which you want an answer. The question is not clear. You said there is one question in particular to which you want an answer and I was calling to make sure I knew what it was.

D: About the first page, to speed up the whole process. Secondly, from our side and from your side point of view—you remember Gromyko’s discussion with the President.

K: That you are prepared to go forward on that basis.

D: How it was handled there—

K: I understand, I understand. We are looking at this with a very constructive attitude.

D: Constructive position. We are quite prepared to—I have instructions which I did not want to put in writing in that message—if President OKs we could have some talks between you and I. I have instruction to tell the President . . . details of the major issues—we are prepared to go but both of us should talk—

K: For your information I think I will be prepared to talk with you. Perhaps on Monday we will not be able to deal with all of it but get the basis for which our discussions will take place.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking. A typed note indicates that the transcription was “not verbatim.” Kissinger was in San Clemente; Dobrynin was in Washington.

2 Kissinger is referring to the January 6 Soviet note; see Document 83. During a telephone conversation at 8:45 a.m., PST, Kissinger and Dobrynin briefly discussed the Soviet note: “D: It is a continuation of the talk between the President and Gromyko. In line of the discussion which took place at the White House. The consultation of the President and Gromyko at one point. K: We are in the process of reviewing that whole issue anyway so I will be glad to get this message.” Kissinger, however, added: “I cannot give you an answer now because I have not seen the message.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

3 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Nixon, who was also in San Clemente, on January 6 from 10:35 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the meeting has been found.

4 January 11.
D: This one and maybe can discuss most useful things to do to speed up.
K: At least I could explain to you how I think it can be done.
D: It probably can be taken care of in 2 or 3 meetings and then see the President—
K: 2 or 3 meetings to narrow the thing.
D: Not how to solve but direction where we go.
K: What we think our needs are and what you can do about them and then we will treat your needs in the same way.
D: Two things—speeding up two major points which was discussed with the President.
K: I thought that is what you were saying but I wanted to check. Now that is taken care of all I have to worry about is what you will do to my waist-line.
D: Don’t worry about that. I have been reading with pleasure about your adventures there. It sounds as if you have been having a good time but it is good for you.
K: Once we get to know each other better perhaps you will show me the file you have on me.
D: No. We don’t have a file seriously. Is our meeting 1 or 12:30?
K: Let’s leave it at 1 p.m. then I will not keep you waiting.
D: 1 p.m. then.

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5 On January 5, Maxine Cheshire reported in the Washington Post (pp. C1, C2) that Kissinger had taken advantage of his time in California “to make the scene in Hollywood” with two actresses, Jill St. John and Joanna Barnes.
January 7, 1971, 12:05 p.m., PST.

D: I have just received a telegram from Moscow and they have asked me rather urgently to come to Moscow for consultations—tomorrow or the day after. I'm checking now on what kind of planes can go. In this case [there will be a meeting on Monday].

K: I just spent three hours with the President.

D: Maybe you could give me it in writing.

K: I can’t discuss it on a call.

D: Maybe the points the same way as I gave them to you, through Mr. Young I could get them.

K: Can you put it off as late as Saturday? I am coming east tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow evening?

K: Yes, but I’m doing something in the evening which I cannot change. But I could see you first thing on Saturday morning.

D: I have to check on planes. My impression is there are none on Saturday.

K: When will you be back?

D: I don’t know—no specifics. Couldn’t you just give ideas in this kind of paper?

K: It’s not technically very easy from here. By the time I got it written . . .

D: I believe it very important.
K: I believe it important too and I have a number of very concrete propositions to make to you.
D: Tomorrow not possible?
K: No.
D: American plane leaves at 7:00 from New York. Latest I could leave maybe 4:00 from Washington.
K: In other words, you are definitely leaving tomorrow?
D: As of now the only plane leaving is tomorrow.
K: Can't you go by London or Paris?
D: It is difficult.
K: You are the best judge of that and you know what your instructions are and I don't. But I personally believe... I am a little reluctant to put it in writing because it depends on a number of explanations. But I wanted to make very concrete proposal on how to proceed on the subject you made yesterday and another concrete proposal in another area. If our relationships are going to be part of your conversation, this will be not at all unuseful. But if I put it in writing it will have to be very carefully drafted because you will study every word of it.
D: I know our relationship will be part of the conversation.
K: I consider this conversation to be in the spirit of what we discussed on putting something into this channel.
D: So you think it would be worthwhile.
K: You will have to be the judge of that. This shows in at least two of the three points concrete steps and possible in the third. So if we could have an hour together on Saturday morning it would be quite useful.
D: I am sure this will be one of the subjects. In general what to do in the next few months.
K: In that case, you will want to wait for our discussion.
D: I will give you a call tomorrow.
K: Okay, I will arrive about 4:00, so I could see you about 6:00 or I could see you on Saturday morning.
D: If I am staying Saturday morning I understand. Tomorrow morning I will call you. You will still be there?
K: No, I am leaving at 8:00 my time. What time will you know?
D: Around 10:00 this time.
K: I will leave my house at 10:30 your time.
D: By then I will know.
K: Okay, you call me any time from 9:30 Washington time on.
D: All right. I will call you tomorrow morning.
K: And my own judgment is that this could be one of the more important conversations we have had.

D: All right. I will call you tomorrow morning.  

5 Kissinger called Dobrynin back at 1:35 p.m. on January 7 and remarked: “I wanted to mention one thing on a semi-personal basis. I think it would be very hard to be understood by the President if you were pulled out in light of the communication of yesterday without waiting for an answer.” Dobrynin replied: “I understand and will check with Moscow.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

86. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)  

San Clemente, California, January 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Our Soviet Policy

Over the years I have found myself in substantial agreement with your conceptions about order and structure in international politics. We have never had particular occasion to talk about these things, either when you were at Harvard or since; perhaps there was no need for extensive conversation because the view of history and the values involved were matters on which we were so close that discussion was unnecessary.

I am much less certain, however, whether we agree about the applicability of the fundamental concepts to our relations with, and to the evolution of the USSR. I cannot write a book but let me state my views (or prejudices) very briefly on the fundamental problem.

I do not believe that for the foreseeable future the Soviet Union can be brought into a rational system of world order. It is incapable of sharing the consensus of values and the concepts of legitimacy that must underpin any such structure. Part of the reason is that for all the

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 22, General Subject File, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut—Miscellaneous Communications. Secret; Sensitive; Personal.
stultification of ideology, the Soviet state remains a revolutionary one committed to the destruction, or at any rate the prevention of any type of order that you and I would consider even remotely harmonious and viable.

Perhaps an even more fundamental reason is that the Soviet system (to use that word loosely and for purposes of shorthand) is fundamentally unstable. It will remain so for a long time because of the fundamental abnormality of the system both domestically and internationally (the Communist movement). Without now going into lengthy substantiation of this judgment (it involves an analysis of the role of the party, the horrendous and unsolved nationality problem, and more immediately, the inability of the regime to provide for orderly succession, etc., etc.), I would simply make the point that you cannot have an unstable participant in a stable order, and it is a disservice to suggest otherwise.

There is, furthermore, another “objective” factor at work which in my view excludes the prospect of early Soviet participation in building order. For complex historical and psychological reasons, the Russians are only just entering the imperialist phase of their development; they are doing so at least a generation, but in some respects more than a century later than other industrialized societies. This is a phenomenon all the more disturbing precisely because the domestic structure on which it is based is unstable. (By domestic I also mean that part of the Soviet system that includes the highly abnormal and fundamentally unstable complex of the Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe.)

In sum, I question that this or the next generation of Russian rulers either wants to participate, or is capable of participating, in an ordered structure of international relations.

It is, incidentally, for this reason that I have not been able to accept the formula, in respect to the USSR, that we will judge another country only by its international behavior, not its internal system. I obviously do not mean that we should polemicize about Soviet internal affairs (although the Leningrad trials\(^2\) show how difficult it is to abide by that principle); I do mean that the international role of the USSR is inextricably intertwined with its domestic order and that we seriously mislead ourselves if we think or say that we must disentangle them. (I have much less trouble with the distinction when it comes to small or medium-sized powers, though even there Chile, some day Italy, and, if we do not watch out Spain, and many others as well may well prove the distinction to be illusory.)

\(^2\) See Document 78.
From these considerations also stem my doubts about the much maligned, much distorted and much misunderstood concept of “linkage.” I had no trouble at all with it as a “fact of life”; i.e., when we were clear that what we meant was that negotiations on various issues must be in some relationship with each other. But when linkage in some of the rhetoric last summer became a dream of far-reaching accommodation with the USSR on a broad front, I could not help but find myself in grave doubt. (Incidentally, as I pointed out at the time, I had strong reservations about the notion seemingly underlying NSDM 15\(^3\) on East-West trade back in 1969, that some day soon a major corner would be turned in US-Soviet relations and in the Soviets’ role in world affairs that would justify our being “extremely generous” in our trade policy. I don’t believe, obviously, in such corners any time soon; and, as I have frequently argued, I believe that large-scale economic technological assistance in the present phase of Soviet development reinforces the rigidity (i.e., essential instability) of the Soviet system because it becomes a substitute for reform.)

Against this background, I found myself having the deepest reservations about the apparent mood of hope developing here in June and July. I cannot now attempt to reconstruct the impulses and factual basis that led to this mood; there seemed inter alia to be expectations about what would happen after our withdrawal from Cambodia. I do not wish to attribute motives on our side, but it is fairly plain that on the Soviet side the American mood and its accompanying (albeit-low-key rhetoric) was perceived as connected with the developing midterm election campaign. I have previously commented to you about the peculiarity of US-Soviet relations in pre-electoral situations (the best, though not complete analogy to 1970 was 1962). We face in election periods a twin danger in our relations with the USSR (apart from the fact that the Soviets instinctively rebel against the notion of being exploited, either on the soft side or the hard side on these occasions).

The first danger is that, sensing our desire to demonstrate progress in negotiations we become vulnerable to minor Soviet concessions or tempting offers. In 1970 this was reflected in Soviet tactics in June on the Middle East and Berlin and on SALT (provocative attack, ABM-only) in July. Almost invariably this situation leads to misunderstandings because in the end, having given the Soviets reason to believe that we are eager to play, we find it necessary to turn them down because the Soviet “concessions” turned out to be too minor to be of value—and the counter-concessions required from us so great as to be

undoable—and the temptations turn out to be fundamentally contrary to our other interests. (I say with pleasure that we avoided the sins of the last administration which was lured into a treaty, the NPT, which, at least in the manner in which it was negotiated did grave damage to our NATO interests, and which, in its dying days, was almost lured into the treacherous waters of summitry and the reckless opening of SALT.)

The other danger is that the Soviets, believing us to want peace and quiet, take liberties with our interests. I do not have the documentation of your dealings with Dobrynin on Cuba; and I have previously expressed my concerns about that entire course of our conduct. I remain convinced however that the result of it all has been to further legitimate the Soviet military role in the Caribbean. Moreover, while fully recognizing the psychological history of the 1962 crisis, I believe we have made an issue of Soviet activities that on the whole are less damaging to our interests than those we have sanctified. (And it remains yet to be seen whether we have successfully solved the issue of the offensive weapons issue.)

I feel that we have let ourselves be dangerously misled in the SALT negotiations. We tended to mistake the atmosphere of the negotiations for a convergence of positions. We have always known that we must somehow cope with the Soviet counterforce threat. But through all the optimistic rhetoric about the prospects we have made no progress in this regard. Yet we have ourselves advanced positions that complicate our ability to deal with the threat. We have also to some extent permitted to let the Soviets con us into a sense of obligation to them because of our FBS and our MIRV decisions, although neither of these elements remotely approach the dangers to us in the Soviet heavy missile deployment. (I cannot, incidentally, take much comfort in a leveling off at 300 SS–9s until I know what warheads go on them and whether we will retain the hard-point defense option.)

You have speculated a great deal about what happened to US-Soviet relations, or to Soviet attitudes toward us in the late summer when the prospects seemed so good earlier on. My view is that the prospects never were that good and that the essential incompatibility of our interests and positions in the world asserted itself (fear of war and rudimentary cooperation on certain traffic rules of international conduct, which I applaud, are insufficient to overcome the basic problem); and that our own conduct, in displaying both a seeming tolerance to Soviet pressures on our interests and an excessive eagerness to come to terms in negotiations, produced the virtually inevitable frustration and disenchantment.

I would make these points with especial force now because we are almost into another election campaign in which, if Vietnam continues
along its present path, the “peace issue” may well turn on our relations with the USSR. Those who are likely to advise the most probable contenders on the Democratic side will not be reticent in advancing grandiose schemes for accommodation with the USSR, or peaceful engagement, or conversion through trade and technical help, etc., etc. I do not mean to be parochial because I fully recognize that domestic issues may play a far larger role in the next two years.

Yet on the basis of the last year I must express to you my greatest concern that the lessons of the past have not been learned with regard to the USSR and that temptations to wrap oneself in the mantle of peace in our time will lead us precisely into the pitfalls that I have tried to outline here, albeit with excessive starkness.

I would like to conclude these comments with an observation about style and method. I make this observation even though I recognize that it may be colored by my undoubted personal disappointment that you have almost completely excluded me from participation in or even knowledge of the more sensitive aspects of our dealings with the USSR. But it stems from a long-held view which I have often over the years discussed with my colleagues and my students.

I refer to the danger of lone-wolf diplomacy with the USSR. Because of the special character of the US-Soviet relationship there is a special emotional component that affects one’s dealings with Soviet representatives. Americans who have sought to carry the burden of negotiation and contact alone or with only the most limited company over the past quarter century tend to forget that on the other side they are dealing with a complex and elusively functioning machine. What comes from the other side in response to our initiatives, or at their initiative, is the product of extraordinarily complex interactions about which we know all too little.

No single American or small group of Americans is really in a position to judge the signals from the other side without attempting to place them in some perspective and weighing them with other signals also being received. But this requires candor and accessibility with respect to others. I know of course that inevitably some of our diplomacy must be conducted in the most restrictive manner. But what concerns me is the gap that has so often existed between the lonely, senior American carrying the burden, feeling, consciously or otherwise a sense of destiny and historic responsibility in the face of so awesome a task, and those who are somewhat more detached and “professional” and who can often provide background or complementary information and judgments. I should add that over the years Soviet representatives, notably the current, much-admired one here, have developed the psychological knack to heighten the sense of expectancy as well as the sense of obligation of their American interlocutors.
I make these observations in part for the obvious reason that I came over here in the hope of being able to assist you in this tough aspect of your job; equally obvious, it has been a source of deep frustration not to have been able to do so.

I can only urge you that in the next two treacherous years you bring to your side some one whose judgment and professional skill in the area of Communist affairs you can respect and with whom you find it possible to maintain a personal relationship such that you will obtain all the help you can get from that judgment and skill. You need it.

87. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers

San Clemente, California, January 7, 1971.

SUBJECT
Coordination of Official Contacts with the USSR

The President wishes to achieve more adequate coordination of our numerous official contacts with the USSR. He wants to ensure that he and members of the NSC can at all times be fully informed of the status of these contacts and that our activities with respect to the USSR are integrated to the fullest extent feasible.

The President has selected the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, reporting to the Senior Review Group, as the vehicle for serving this function. Accordingly, the IG/EUR, including representatives of department and agency heads concerned with one or another aspect of our relations with the USSR, should in the first instance devise effective means whereby our several contacts with the USSR will be...
carried out in a coherent and coordinated manner. These means should take due account of the need for prompt action when this is operationally required. When fully functioning on this matter, the IG/EUR should act as the coordinating body for our activities (other than covert) with respect to the USSR. It will also be the responsibility of the IG/EUR to maintain an up-to-date record of the status of all ongoing diplomatic and other official contacts with the USSR; it will further maintain an up-to-date projection of likely future contacts and activities.

This directive does not affect existing mechanisms dealing with certain aspects of our relations with the USSR, such as the SALT Backstopping Committee, the Berlin Task Force and committees already functioning within the NSC system. The IG/EUR will, however, be responsible for ensuring that heads of these existing groups are aware of ongoing and projected activities with respect to the USSR. Heads of existing groups, in turn, should keep the chairman of the IG/EUR as fully informed as possible of their decisions and the actions deriving therefrom.

The Chairman of the IG/EUR is requested to prepare a report to the Senior Review Group on the effectiveness of this operation after approximately three months, together with recommendations resulting from this initial experience.²

Henry A. Kissinger

²In a memorandum to Kissinger on April 10, the Chairman of the IG/EUR, Martin Hillenbrand, submitted the first report on the coordination of official contacts with the Soviet Union. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII) Although he considered it of “little or no value,” Sonnenfeldt forwarded the report, including several attachments, to Kissinger on May 29. “They are,” he complained, “merely massive compilations of ‘contacts’ ranging from absurdities (tomato and cucumber growing) to important events such as the resumption of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions negotiations.” On June 28, Kissinger approved Sonnenfeldt’s recommendation to “shape the exercise into one involving periodic meetings on Soviet affairs to identify and control action items.” (Ibid.)
88. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison at the National Security Council (Robinson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Soviet Naval Activity in Cuba

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with an analysis of several interpretations which can be placed on the level of Soviet naval activity included within the scope of our understandings on Cuba. Two recent statements are relevant to this review:

—On January 4 the President stated that “in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding.”

—On January 5 the official transcript of Ron Ziegler’s press briefing broadened the above by stating that “...if a Soviet sub were serviced within the harbor or at sea, that would not be in accordance with our understanding.”

(Neither statement mentioned the presence of surface ships.)

In drafting the “note verbale” on October 8, it was our intention to include all submarines, regardless of type, together with those surface ships armed with nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles. The actual wording in the final note, however, was somewhat ambiguous on this point:

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba (2). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on January 9 under the following typewritten note: “After our flurry the other day on nuclear submarines, Robbie was asked to prepare a detailed analysis of what various formulations of restrictive language would mean in terms of actual Soviet capabilities. I thought you should review this before your meeting with Dobrynin. My concern is that the restriction against nuclear submarines, if interpreted as propulsion only, is the worst case we could have.” Haig also wrote in the margin: “Spread sheet gives quick overview of problem.” Kissinger responded with a handwritten note of his own: “Al—Stop riding me on this. I’ve got the point & there is no more I can do.”

2 See Document 81.

3 Ziegler made this statement during his morning briefing on January 5. Later that afternoon, however, he issued the following clarification: “The restriction applies to servicing the Soviet nuclear subs ‘in the harbor, or at sea from the harbor, no matter where at sea.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin American, Cuba–HAK [1971])

4 See Document 6.
"... The US Government understands that the USSR will not establish, utilize, or permit the establishment of any facility in Cuba that can be employed to support or repair Soviet naval ships capable of carrying offensive weapons; i.e., submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. The US Government further understands that the following specific actions will not be undertaken:...

Basing or extended deployment of tenders or other repair ships in Cuba ports that are capable of supporting or repairing submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles. . . .

The basis of the above restriction was President Kennedy's statement of November 20, 1962 in which he said that "As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean . . ."  

The specific Kennedy phrase—all offensive weapons—argued for the inclusion of all Soviet submarines in our note, regardless of type, since the submarine long had been considered an offensive system, employing the elements of concealment, stealth, and suddenness of attack. The problems inherent in the location, identification and destruction of an enemy submarine ruled out the practicality of permitting the presence of certain submarines, while excluding others from basing and support in this Hemisphere. On the other hand, the visibility and greater vulnerability of surface ships, together with the fact that a destroyer traditionally had been considered defensive in nature, enabled us to be more tolerant in the prohibitions concerning their presence. This rationale also was reflected by Admiral Moorer on 21 September 1970 in CM–237–70—An assessment of Soviet military activities in Cuba—prepared for a restricted NSC meeting.  

The Chairman said inter alia that "if Cienfuegos emerges as an active submarine base, it would increase significantly Soviet capabilities in the Western Hemisphere . . . and appropriate countermeasures should be employed to force removal." Attached at Tab A is enclosure (1) to CM–237–70, which assessed the impact of a Soviet naval base in Cuba on Soviet strategic and tactical capabilities.  

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5 For the text of Kennedy's statement, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830–838.  
7 All tabs are attached but not printed. In a memorandum to Kissinger on January 11, Robinson also forwarded a table on Soviet naval vessels (including submarines) near Cuba, showing the "net gain or loss from any particular interpretation" of the "understanding." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba (2))
Despite the foregoing, it is evident that differing interpretations have been given to our “note verbale” and to the optimum restrictions which we now should profess as the basis of our understandings. These interpretations fall into five general categories of activity which can be identified as constituting prohibited naval activity, arranged in descending order of importance to the US:

— all submarines, regardless of type, together with those surface ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (Tab B)
— all nuclear-powered submarines, together with all ships (submarine and surface) armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (Tab C)
— all ships (submarine and surface) armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (Tab D)
— all nuclear-armed submarines. (Tab E)
— all nuclear-powered submarines. (Tab F)

From review of the negotiating history and actual language of the “note verbale,” it would appear that the US negotiator conveyed to the USSR all elements necessary for the most advantageous selection of a hard position. The written text said “submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles,” leading to the possible interpretation that only those submarines armed with such missiles were included. However, if one considers the use of the words “all offensive weapons” by President Kennedy in 1962, the referral by both sides in September–October 1970 to the earlier understanding, the fact that submarines generally are considered to be offensive weapons, other provisions of the “note verbale,” and the tenor of the September–October 1970 conversations, a case can be made that the October 1970 understanding did include all submarines, regardless of type, together with those surface ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. Substantial advantages accrue to the US with this interpretation.

A fall-back position could employ such phraseology as “…Soviet naval ships capable of carrying offensive weapons, i.e., nuclear-powered submarines, together with all ships (submarine and surface) armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles.” Under this interpretation it might be argued by the Soviet Union that the nuclear-powered attack submarine does not constitute a threat in the absence of a missile capability. Nonetheless, prohibition seems justified on the basis of its power plant and the unique characteristics which are associated with submarine operations.

Should it be impossible to reach agreement on either of the foregoing positions, then it would be desirable to achieve clear understanding that our primary concern is the presence of nuclear-armed ships and submarines, rather than nuclear-powered vessels. As a lesser matter, the public record should be clarified at an appropriate time, and in
a low-key manner, to indicate that the October 1970 “understanding” included both surface ships and submarines, armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (The Soviets already know this in view of the content of the “note verbale,” under the most liberal of interpretations.)

The combination of enemy capabilities reflected in Tabs B–F has been refined further in terms of ships, submarines and missiles in the current Soviet inventory. This information is attached at Tab G in the form of a composite spread sheet listing total numbers by classes. These are gross figures and include some units that the Soviets probably would not deploy to Cuba, e.g. ships assigned to the Soviet Far East Fleet.

89. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)

Washington, January 8, 1971, 5:30 p.m.

I: Where do I find you?
I: Henry, I have a couple of things but the principal item is the thing with the Soviets vis-à-vis the bombing and the action by the Jewish people against the Soviet league. I wanted to tell you what we are moving to do. First, I have the group here to see what can be done legally, legislatively, information-wise, etc. More specifically, we have made a proposal to Justice to see if we can seek an injunction on the basis of harming U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and we think the Justice Department will be willing to do this although the decision has not yet been made. I have asked our legal people to talk to the legal people at the White House and I wanted to tell you what we had done and touch base with you.
K: That sounds good.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 On January 8, a bomb exploded at 4:30 a.m. near the Soviet Embassy’s Commercial and Information Office in Washington, causing moderate damage. The Jewish Defense League, which had been linked to similar attacks on Soviet facilities in the United States, denied responsibility for the incident.
I: I think it is a serious situation all around and I want to take all
the action we can. My own feeling on it is that if we are moving in this
way to try to prevent acts of violence, acts that will create problems,
that we will have the support of the Jewish Community and there has
been a letter from Paul Weiss and they wrote, in effect, a letter of sup-
port to Charlie Yost. That is the situation to date and I just wanted to
let you know.

K: I think it is essential, Jack.
I: We are coming up with a paper.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to the Soviet
Union.]

I: I telephoned Dobrynin to tell him how distressed I was about
the incident last night. He accepted that but said his Government could
not understand it and said it was contributing to deterioration of rela-
tions. He said he would pass the message along.

K: I think it is the right thing to do.

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3 Not found.
4 Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, January 10; National Archives, Nixon Pres-
idential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject Files, USSR (Jewish Defense League).
5 In telegram 3952 to Moscow, January 9, the Department reported: “Acting Secre-
tary telephoned Dobrynin [on January 8] to express his and Dept’s distress at this irre-
sponsible and irrational action and give assurance we would do everything we can. Do-
brynin responded that he would report call to his government, characterizing act as out
of all proportion and emphasizing that it definitely damaging to our relations. He
thanked Acting Secretary for calling.” After the telephone call from Irwin, Vorontsov de-
ivered a protest note to Davies, which included the following passage: “USSR Embassy
insists that the State Dept take all suitable steps immediately to ensure security of So-
viet establishments and their employees in the US; to fine and punish criminals who are
perpetrating explosions and other terrorist acts against Soviet establishments and their
employees in US and who publicly threaten lives and security of Soviet personnel in US;
and to pay compensation for damages caused to Embassy by latest explosion.” (Ibid.)

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place at Dobrynin’s invitation. He had been called back to the Soviet Union unexpectedly for consultation only 24 hours after he had submitted to me the attached note on Berlin. He delayed his departure for 24 hours so that he could see me.

Dobrynin began the conversation by expressing his outrage over the behavior of the Jewish Defense League. I told him that the President was unhappy about these actions; that we were seeking indictments where that was possible; and that we would use whatever Federal resources were available to increase the protection for Soviet installations.

Dobrynin said that what rankled most in the Soviet Union was the absence of any court action. It was inconceivable in the Soviet Union that such actions could take place without connivance by the authorities. While he was taking a slightly more tolerant view of that aspect of it, he was at one with his colleagues in his inability to understand why there had been no court action of any kind.

Dobrynin added that, in a synagogue in New York, right across the street from the Soviet Mission, a loudspeaker had been set up that was blaring obscene words at the Soviet Embassy every day. This was intolerable.

I repeated that we were taking the measures that were possible and expressed the personal regret of the President. I said there was no

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing its “highlights” to Nixon on January 25. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Ibid.) According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 10:30 a.m. to 12:25 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) For memoir accounts of this meeting, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 802–803; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 210–211.

2 See Documents 84 and 85.

3 Attached but not printed; see Document 83.

4 See Document 89.
official connivance, but the overlapping of authority between Federal and State governments presented particular complications for us; however, we would seek court action wherever that was appropriate.

We then turned to substance. I told Dobrynin that I had an answer from the President to the Soviet note on Berlin—specifically, whether the President still stood by his conversation with Gromyko. I said a lot depended, of course, on how one interpreted the President’s conversation with Gromyko. In the sense that the President said that he would be well disposed towards the negotiations if they did not cut the umbilical cord between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, there was no problem. With respect to the Soviet proposal that the process be accelerated and that we review again the Soviet propositions, I said the following: I had reviewed the Soviet propositions and wanted to distinguish the formal from the substantive part. If the Soviet Union could give some content to the transit procedures and if the Soviet Union could find a way by which it could make itself responsible, together with the four allies, for access, we would, in turn, attempt to work out some approach which took cognizance of the concerns of the East German regime. I would be prepared, at the request of the President, to discuss this with him in substance, and if we could see an agreement was possible, we could then feed it into regular channels.

Dobrynin said that this was very important because Rush was clearly an obstacle to negotiations since he either didn’t understand them or was too intransigent. I told him this was not an attempt to bypass Rush, but to see whether we could use our channel to speed up the procedure. I was prepared to have conversations with high German officials to find out exactly what they were prepared to settle for and then to include this in our discussions. Dobrynin said he would check this in Moscow and let me have an answer by the end of the week.

We then turned to SALT. I told Dobrynin that the President had decided the following: We were prepared to make an ABM agreement only, provided it was coupled with an undertaking to continue working on offensive limitations and provided it was coupled with an undertaking that there would be a freeze on new starts of offensive land-based missiles during the period of these negotiations. There might be some special provision that would have to be made for submarines, but we would have to leave this to detailed negotiations. I told Dobrynin that if he were prepared to proceed on this basis, I would be prepared to talk to him about it on behalf of the President. We could settle the basic issues in February. Prior to the resumption of the SALT talks there could be an exchange of letters or public statements between the President and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The SALT talks in Vienna could then concentrate on implementing the agreement in principle.
Dobrynin asked how I understood limitations on submarines to operate. I said I had no specific proposal to make, and I mentioned it only in case we wanted to raise it later so that he would not feel that he had been mistaken. I thought, however, that the question of equality was recognized in principle. Dobrynin said he would have an answer when he returned.

Dobrynin then raised the Middle East. He wanted to know whether the President was prepared to move that discussion into our channel also. I told him we would have to see how the Jarring negotiations went first. Secondly, we would have to then see whether the Four-Power forum might not be more appropriate. In any event, he could be sure that the President would take an interest in the negotiations and whomever he negotiated with would have Presidential backing.

Dobrynin then launched into his usual recitation of Mid-East events—how he had been misled by Sisco; how the Secretary of State had never told him the stand-still and the ceasefire were linked; how the Soviet Union could not be held responsible for a document that was handed to it after it had already been given to the Egyptians; and how, above all, the Soviet Union had never had a reply to its last note to Joe Sisco. He said if he talked to Sisco, it would be an endless series of legalistic hairsplittings that wouldn’t lead anywhere. I told him that we would have to see what progress we were making on other matters before I could give him an answer.

We then turned to Vietnam. I said to Dobrynin that we had read Kosygin’s interview with the Japanese newspaper5 with great interest. We had noticed that Kosygin had listed the usual unacceptable Hanoi demands, but he had also indicated a Soviet willingness to engage itself in the process of a settlement. This was stated, it seemed to me, more emphatically than had been said in the past. Was I correct?

Dobrynin merely said that he noticed that sentence also. I asked whether the two statements were linked; in other words, whether the Soviet willingness to engage itself was linked to our prior acceptance of Hanoi’s demands. Dobrynin then said he wanted to ask me a hypothetical question. If Hanoi dropped its demands for a coalition government, would we be prepared to discuss withdrawal separately. I said as long as the matter was hypothetical, it was very hard to form a judgment, but I could imagine that the issue of withdrawals was a lot easier to deal with than the future composition of a government in South Vietnam. Indeed, if he remembered an article I had written in

1968, I had proposed exactly this procedure. Dobrynin asked whether I still believed that this was a possible approach. I said it certainly was a possible approach and, indeed, I had been of the view that it would be the one that would speed up matters. Dobrynin said he would report this to Moscow.

At the end of the meeting, Dobrynin gave me an art book with an inscription for my son, since he had read somewhere that my son was very interested in art.

Reference is to the article published in January 1969 in *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 211–234), which Kissinger had written before his appointment in December 1968 as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

91. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Your Proposed Response to a Message from Jewish Leaders on Recent Violence Against Soviet Facilities

Max Fisher has sent you a telegram, subscribed to by Jewish leaders in some 70 cities around the country, condemning the bombing of the Soviet cultural office in Washington and other recent acts of violence against Soviet facilities (Tab B). The message supplements its strong condemnation with support for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate or, if they wish to remain in Russia, to enjoy religious and cultural freedom. Moderate Jewish organizations feel strongly that they must re-affirm this latter position, lest they create sympathy for the radical Jewish Defense League.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject Files, USSR (Jewish Defense League). Top Secret. Sent for action. A notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum. Butterfield wrote the following note in the margin: “Request your approval prior to Ziegler’s [January 11] 12:30 p.m. press announcements.” According to an attached handwritten note, Jon Howe phoned Ziegler—presumably to give final approval—at 12:35 p.m. on January 11.

2 Dated January 10; attached but not printed. For the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, p. 29.
Your proposed response, which Len Garment\(^3\) and Ray Price have seen and approve, seeks to strike a similar balance, although without explicitly mentioning the plight of Soviet Jews. (Tab A)\(^4\) Your proposed text is designed to put you on record, vis-à-vis the Soviets, not only as condemning violence against their facilities but as being committed to all possible steps to prevent violence and to prosecute individuals that engage in such acts. It draws in part on language provided by the Department of State.\(^5\)

It will be desirable to publish simultaneously, on Monday, January 11, at the Western White House the texts of the incoming message from Fisher and your response.

Recommendation:\(^6\)

1. That you approve the text and dispatch of your proposed message to Max Fisher and other Jewish leaders (Tab A).

2. That you agree to publication at San Clemente in the course of Monday, January 11, the texts of both the Fisher telegram and your response (Tabs A and B).

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\(^3\) Haig sent a copy of the draft message to Garment on January 11. Garment revised the text, which he returned to Haig with the following handwritten note: “Al: The President’s note is too impersonal and foggy. I’ve suggested a couple of changes that would make it less so.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Leonard Garment, Alpha-Subject Files, Box 117, Jewish Matters 1971 [3 of 3]) None of these revisions was incorporated in the final text.

\(^4\) Dated January 11; attached but not printed. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 28–29.

\(^5\) In an undated memorandum to Kissinger, Haig remarked that Kissinger had already rejected a Department of State draft that included a “Presidential expression of support for the plight of Soviet Jewry.” Haig further noted: “The last part of this project is the legal action now being considered jointly between State and Justice. As I told you yesterday, John Mitchell has strong reservations about the legal route. He stated he would call you after proceeding with refining his thinking. You may wish to call him today before talking with the President on this aspect of the problem. As you know, the President, like you, now supports legal action, but he has not been given the benefit of any counter-arguments.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject Files, USSR (Jewish Defense League))

\(^6\) The President initialed his approval of each recommendation.

SUBJECT
Comment on Attached Memo from Mr. Garment

I assume that, in sending the attached memo to me, you are seeking my comment on the foreign policy aspects of the problem. The bulk of Len’s memo, of course, deals with domestic politics.

The essence of the proposal in the attached is that a political strategy be developed for appealing to the Jewish community on the basis of a hard anti-Soviet line. The method proposed is briefing Jewish community leaders on the extent of the Soviet threat and activities around the world.

There are two foreign policy considerations which should be taken into account:

1. The principal problem is this: Encouraging middle-class America (Len’s memo describes the bulk of the Jewish community this way)

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 815, Name Files, Garment, Leonard. Confidential. Sent for information. Saunders forwarded a draft of this memorandum (with Sonnenfeldt’s concurrence) to Kissinger on December 21, 1970, noting: “This is basically a domestic, political question. However, it might be appropriate to provide Haldeman with a judgment as to the foreign policy implications of casting about for the Jewish vote on the basis of the rationale that they have been giving Len Garment. In other words, on the one hand there is the simple political question of trying to appeal to the Jewish vote. On the other hand, there is the question of involving the President with an identified group for mainly domestic reasons on the basis of a foreign policy stance that is developed in connection with non-domestic considerations.” (Ibid., Box 405, Subject Files, USSR (Jewish Defense League)) According to several attached notes, neither Kissinger’s nor Garment’s memorandum was forwarded to the President.

2 Attached but not printed. In his memorandum to Haldeman, November 21, 1970, Garment recommended that the President read an attached paper by Jacques Torczyner, former president of the Zionist Organization of America and national vice president of the World Union of General Zionists. “It is an excellent analysis,” Garment commented, “of the perceptions of American Jews vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Israel concluding with an assessment of the domestic political situation and some specific recommendations.” Garment also reported that Jewish social and cultural leaders had recently met to “discuss community attitudes toward the Soviet Union and to develop support for the President’s policies.” “Consideration should be given to the President meeting with a group selected from these two meetings,” Garment suggested. “Henry Kissinger would be able to identify likely participants for such a meeting and to assess its value and impact. I think it could do much to advance the objectives we have previously discussed.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 815, Name Files, Garment, Leonard)
to take an excessively hard stand against the USSR could later tie the President’s hands. For instance, during the period of Egyptian violations of the Israel–UAR military standstill agreement, the Israeli embassy here exploited precisely this anti-Soviet sentiment in marshalling criticism of the Administration. If the day comes when the Administration decides it must press Israel to accept an Arab-Israeli settlement that Israel does not entirely like, then the Israelis will then marshal the anti-Soviet argument along with others. More broadly, it is conceivable that encouraging increased middle-class skepticism of the USSR could affect ratification of any SALT agreement that might be worked out. The President’s policy has been a combination of firmness vis-à-vis the USSR and keeping the door open to cooperation in common interests. This is a delicate line to tread politically, and it would not seem helpful to fan the flames of strong emotions that could make the President’s road more difficult.

2. A second problem is related to the President’s posture toward the Mid-East itself. The President has, for the most part, avoided personal over-identification with domestic groups representing interests on one side or the other of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Two notable exceptions were in December3 and January a year ago, and the reaction in the area was strong. On balance, his continued aloofness would seem the better course from a strictly foreign policy viewpoint.

3 See Document 82.

93. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

January 12, 1971, 8:15 a.m., PST.

R: Hello Henry. I understood that Dobrynin saw you before he left2 and I was wondering what it was about.

K: Who saw me?

1 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking. Rogers was in Washington; Kissinger was in San Clemente. A typewritten parenthetical note indicates that the transcript was “not verbatim.”

2 See Document 90.
R: I understand Dobrynin saw you before he left Washington.
K: Who? Oh Dobrynin you mean. I only talked to him about these bombings and I have been talking to Irwin on that.³ It was about these goddamned bombings.
R: Bombings? You mean the Embassy bombings? He did not come in to see you?
K: No he did not come in to see me. I talked to him and gave him an apology for the bombings but he did not come in to see me.
R: OK.
K: A soon as I come back, I have talked to the President, and I have worked out a way to keep you fully informed.
R: When are you coming back? I want to talk to you again about the Ivanov case.
K: Thursday or Friday.⁴ I had no discussion with him about that. The last I talked to him was about the bombings.
R: Nothing about Cuba or Berlin? The paper said he stayed over an extra day to see you and I was wondering what it was all about.⁵ How is your vacation out there?
K: Very pleasant. I was back for the weekend for some parties for Ambassador Freeman.
R: I missed the Freeman parties. How were they?
K: The one Sunday night was a disaster. You couldn’t tell who was there because they had it in a restaurant which was partitioned into many rooms. No mood or anything.
R: He is a nice fellow.
K: A very nice human being.

³ See Document 89.
⁴ January 14 or 15.
⁵ The Washington Post reported on January 12 (p. A9) that Dobrynin had been recalled to Moscow for “consultations” but that his wife would remain in Washington: “While the embassy would give no details other than to say Mrs. Dobrynin is remaining in Washington, some State Department officials felt the trip was related to the current U.S.-Soviet tensions growing out of the Leningrad hijacking trial.” No newspaper account has been found of Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin on January 9.
January 12, 1971, 8:45 a.m., PST.

M: About our friends in the JDL and the State request for injunctions of various types.¹
K: Right.
M: Al Haig called about the President’s notation on the brief but I wonder if he has fully considered the consequences . . .
K: Probably not.
M: There are a lot of disadvantages to this picture. There are some advantages too but the advantages may be short-lived and the disadvantages may come back to haunt us like in the Scranton Commission.² I don’t want to be in a position of disagreeing with the President but we’ve got problems here beyond State’s approach. For one, Helms tells me this will affect the Israelis materially if we take this action because of his opinion that the Israelis will look with disfavor on the publicity that will come from it as we being anti-Jewish. Second, I think this will have an adverse political impact. Third, if we go into court for an injunction we’ll have a coalition of all these liberal groups who will fight us in court on the grounds that we are trying to impinge on free speech. It will result in a prolonged court battle which will be on the front pages of the newspapers for a long time. From a legal procedural point of view we will have to subpoena newspaper reporters and we’ll have to have Russian witnesses and there’s a question of whether they will provide them. And there’s a question of whether we can make the case without the Russian witnesses. And, it’s a questionable precedent for the future as far as the Russians and Arabs are concerned. If we get such a court order we may not have the means of enforcing it in the federal establishment. We have only federal marshals with many other duties and they could not properly enforce it. The only facility the government has is the federal troops and if we get into a position of obtaining a federal court order which we fail to enforce we are just in more difficulty with our Soviet friends.

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking. Mitchell was in Washington; Kissinger was in San Clemente.
² See Document 91 and footnote 5 thereto.
³ William W. Scranton, former Governor of Pennsylvania, chaired the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, which was established to investigate the shootings in the spring of 1970 at Kent State University and Jackson State University.
There are some half-way measures which might be brought: an injunction against harassment aspects of it.

K: Let me tell you the thing we are above all interested in. The Russians are complaining bitterly, and in conjunction with other things we are doing, that there is no legal action being taken at all. If we can just show something is happening . . .

M: Do you feel that convening a grand jury to investigate this with respect to the commission of federal crimes would solve the problem?

K: That would help a lot. I have no interest in any particular remedy and consider the arguments you make quite conclusive. If you really think there is a disadvantage I would think if you can do any other legal thing showing the Administration is having recourse to its powers you would serve our purpose.

M: And I am sure that somewhere along the line in the Soviet establishment they realize the federal government has been [omission in transcript] in these activities.

K: To them this is a combination of things: they want to make an issue of it and therefore anything we do doesn’t make any difference. There may be some group thinking this thing can’t happen without government connivance. For them it’s hard to take that there’s nothing getting actions into motion. If you could assemble a grand jury to check whether a crime has been committed I would have no objections.

M: Let me wrestle with State on this.

K: Yes, but fairly soon?

M: I hope to get it resolved today.

K: If not, just do it anyway.

M: Well, they still want the grand sweeping injunctive action.

K: Let’s start with a grand jury and then it can go to an injunction, can’t it?

M: Yes, if it is found to be a crime.4

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4 Mitchell called Kissinger back at 3:10 p.m., PST, and reported: “Henry. We had a meeting with Irwin and the State Department and in accord with the suggestion that I made to you earlier decided to proceed immediately, probably on Thursday [January 14], with the Grand Jury approach . . . judicial process in New York has picked up Kahane and a couple more of his people. They brought an indictment against him today and other indictments which are going to be brought down and I have talked to [District Attorney] Frank Hogan . . . and expecting all of their activities. I think this will satisfy the State Department and the Russians.” Kissinger replied: “Excellent.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)
On January 14, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger received a telephone call at 7:22 p.m. from Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires. According to the transcript, the conversation included the following brief exchange:

“V: Dr. Kissinger, I have got a special message from Moscow especially for you. Would like that you should be told that the reply [to] questions and considerations raised in the talk you and Anatoliy [Dobrynin] had before his departure will be given when Anatoliy returns to Washington next week.

“K: I will do nothing till I talk to him.

“V: That’s the way I understand the message.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

During the White House staff meeting the next morning, Kissinger defended his handling of the secret channel with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, in particular, his reluctance to brief Secretary of State William Rogers. White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman recorded the day’s events in his diary:

“The big deal of the day today didn’t involve the P[resident], but rather K[issinger], who got into his usual tirade against State and Defense at the staff meeting this morning, and I hit back at him on the point that he had created some problems himself by the failure to notify Rogers of his last meeting with Dobrynin. That upset him. He packed up his papers and left the meeting. He came back about ten minutes later and asked [Herb] Klein to leave so that he could talk to the four of us: Rumsfeld, Shultz, E[hrlichman], and me. He then said that he had to make his decision about going back to Harvard in the next day or so, and that if this wasn’t straightened out, he was going to go back and not stay here. He was more uptight than he usually is on the subject, and this was the first time he had raised it with the group, although he’s been discussing his problems with E during this past week in California, while I was away, and has John quite disturbed, although it’s basically the same routine over again. As a result, John and I met with him briefly a little later in the morning and agreed that something had to be done in the way of a showdown with the P on the whole subject, but that it should not be done until after the State of the Union speech. This successfully stalls Henry past the time of his return to Harvard, which I don’t think he has any intention of doing.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, pages 233–234)

On January 16, the President released a letter thanking Kissinger for the “difficult” decision to resign his position at Harvard University in order to retain his position at the White House. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, page 40)
The Kissinger-Rogers conflict nonetheless continued to complicate the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel. On January 16, Under Secretary of State John Irwin called Kissinger at 11:55 a.m. to underscore Rogers’s interest in the President’s annual foreign policy report, which was scheduled for submission to Congress in February. “He wants to be able to review the paper,” Irwin explained, “and have the State Department put something into it and then he wants to look at it and discuss it with the President—the whole formulation of foreign policy.” Rather than debate the issue with Irwin, Kissinger suggested that Rogers “talk to me sometime because sooner or later this always comes back to me.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File) As soon as he hung up, however, Kissinger called Haldeman to complain that Rogers may have received Nixon’s permission to revise the report. “Once this is over there and once he challenges me, and once I lose,” Kissinger warned, “my position here will be untenable.” The two men then briefly considered several contingencies. Haldeman said:

“I can’t imagine there is any agreement that would cover this. On the other hand, I can see the President if Rogers came to him on a specific issue—how you resolve it rather than how you confront it.

“K: I am determined to make him knuckle under. We have Dobrynin coming back next week. I’m not seeing him again until I know what Rogers is going to do.

“H: I think that is right.

“K: I will add this to the list.” (Ibid.)

The list of complaints, from Rogers as well as Kissinger, soon grew longer. On January 18, the New York Times began publishing a seven-part series on the conduct of foreign policy in the Nixon administration. The first article, written by Terence Smith, asserted that the Department of State “is no longer in charge of the United States’ foreign affairs and that it cannot reasonably expect to be so again.” (Terence Smith, “Foreign Policy: Decision Power Ebbing at the State Department,” New York Times, January 18, 1971, pages 1, 14) The second article, written by Hedrick Smith, portrayed Kissinger as “the instrument by which President Nixon has centralized the management of foreign policy in the White House as never before.” According to Smith, the Soviet Union dominated Kissinger’s calculations. “If President Nixon’s wariness arises from an instinctive, almost ideological anti-Communism,” he posited, “Mr. Kissinger’s derives from a commitment to international order. He sees the world as a global chessboard on which the Soviet-American competition is played. A gain or setback anywhere affects the entire relationship in his view, so one must demonstrate strength.” (Hedrick Smith, “Foreign Policy: Kissinger at Hub,” New York Times, January 19, 1971, pages 1, 12)
Neither Rogers nor Kissinger appreciated the publicity. The White House spent considerable time on January 18 dealing with the problem. (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, page 235) While Nixon and Haldeman tried to placate Rogers, Kissinger tried to control the damage, summoning two *New York Times* reporters, Terence Smith and Max Frankel, to his office. Although no record of the conversation has been found, Kissinger met William Safire, the President’s speechwriter, shortly thereafter. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) According to Safire’s memoir, Kissinger vented his frustration against the Secretary and the Department of State:

"'You feel better now?' I asked. 'No!' Henry pronounced, bounding up again—this was good for him, getting it off his chest—'Look what they tried to do with the Cuban submarines. After the Russian tender was on its way back home, State gives a backgrounder to Max Frankel at the *Times* that said I overemphasized the crisis, that no senior official recognized it as such. Can you imagine what the Russians said to the guy who recommended they pull it back? 'You dumb cluck—you see, we never had to.' And then after it was all over, somebody in State turns around and claims in *Newsweek* they were the ones who did it after all.' Henry’s ire was running down. ‘At least that wasn’t dangerous,’ he murmured, ‘—just sick.’" (Safire, *Before the Fall*, pages 402–404)

Kissinger called Frankel that evening to go over the “ground rules” of his own backgrounder, emphasizing that nothing should be “attributed to White House sources.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

On January 24, the *New York Times* published Frankel’s piece (pages 1, 24), the last in its series on Nixon’s foreign policy. According to Frankel, Nixon was determined to conduct a “forward diplomacy”—in spite of the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. In order to achieve his objectives abroad, the President had decided to concentrate decision-making at home, notably in the White House. Under a photograph of Dobrynin, Frankel described the substance behind this “firm Nixon style”:

“The most conspicuous consequence is that he has imposed on all major foreign policy decisions his personal sense of rivalry with the Soviet Union. He has shown himself cautiously ready to negotiate for accommodation in regions of conflict and for some moderation in the arms race. But he has insisted on proceeding from a posture of strength, both personal and national.

“The President has taken or threatened tough action—from Cambodia to Cuba to the Middle East—to prove that he would not hesitate to use his strength and to demonstrate that American weariness was not to be confused with weakness. On several occasions, he has wanted to show himself even tougher than subordinates thought wise.”
Moscow, January 15, 1971, 1545Z.


1. At luncheon today at residence for Senator Muskie, Amb Dobrynin remarked to me ominously that Soviets were engaged in basic review of US-Soviet relations in light of present conditions and in the next few days would make important decision. I said I trusted this would not lead to breakdown of negotiations, discussions, and exchanges in areas of important reciprocal interest. Dobrynin replied this would not be the case and he later told Harriman he would be returning to Washington within next few days. We were unable to elicit anything further from him.

2. In discussion of Middle East, I expressed view Soviets now had greater responsibility and capacity to influence Arabs than we possessed with Israelis since latter had been sadly burned and betrayed by violation of standstill\(^2\) which in turn had led to more dangerous armaments build-up. In replying to Dobrynin’s argument that Israelis had found this excuse convenient, I said our leverage with them was diminished by that much more because of their experience last summer. Dobrynin offered derogatory comments on Jarring’s lack of initiative, claiming US could have promoted settlement had it taken up Soviet proposal of last June on peacekeeping arrangements\(^3\) about which nothing further had been heard. I said Soviet proposal almost a year too late since Sisco had invited Soviet cooperation on this question during July 1969 visit.\(^4\)

3. Dobrynin declined to acknowledge there was any resemblance between present Israeli proposal on guarantees\(^5\) and Soviet June 1970 position, stating Arabs would almost certainly reject former but would have counter-proposals of their own. I said we had hardly expected

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII. Confidential; Exdis.

2 See footnote 5, Document 3.

3 See footnote 6, Document 23.

4 On July 15, 1969, Sisco met Gromyko in Moscow to submit an American proposal on the Middle East. The text of the proposal is in telegram 3485 from Moscow, July 15; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks, April–June 1969.

5 Reference is presumably to the Dayan initiative. See footnote 5, Document 62.
Arabs to accept Israeli initiative but we could at least hope that Arab counter-proposal would offer reasonable basis for discussion.

4. On SALT, Dobrynin saw no reason to link offensive weapons with Soviet ABM proposal since latter stood on its own feet and was equitable to both sides. He claimed an interest in SALT "as former engineer," saying he had participated in review here of recently concluded Helsinki negotiations.

5. Joining in list of complaints, Arbatov, and to lesser extent Gvishiani played up unsuitability of US as site for international meetings, which were constantly being interrupted by extremist minority groups.

 Beam

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7 Dzhermen Mikhailovich Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology (and Kosygin's son-in-law).

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97. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot)


SUBJECT

Report on Kosygin–Muskie Meeting

The President has asked for an immediate full report on the Kosygin–Muskie meeting as prepared by his Ambassador in Moscow. He considers it totally unsatisfactory to have to wait for Senator Muskie’s interpretation of the discussion and anticipates that Ambassador Beam will have a full report from the Ambassador’s perspective available for his review by the opening of business on Monday, Janu-

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2 On January 17, the New York Times (p. 23) reported that Muskie found Kosygin "an easy man to talk with," while the Washington Post (p. 11) noted that the Senator was "heartened" by his talks in Moscow, which included discussion of the Middle East, Berlin, and SALT.
ary 18. Ambassador Beam’s report should include a summary of the full range of discussions as the Ambassador understands them to have occurred, including the Middle East, Germany and SALT.

Please take immediate steps to insure that the Ambassador’s report is available for the President by the opening of business tomorrow morning.4

Alexander M. Haig
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

3 In telegram 8117 to Moscow, January 16, the Department asked for “fullest possible report on meeting as soon as available.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, LEG 7 MUSKIE) The Embassy replied in telegram 323 from Moscow, January 17: “Codel asked Emb not to report since Senator personally reporting to Secretary immediately on return.” (Ibid.)

4 Eliot wrote on the memorandum: “Secretary informed by phone.” Eliot instructed Beam accordingly in telegram 8191 to Moscow, January 17. (Ibid.)

98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 18, 1971, 0850Z.

325. Subj: Kosygin/Muskie Meeting. Ref: State 8191.2

1. Summary. During Jan 15 Kosygin/Muskie meeting which lasted almost four hours, the opening discussion centered on ecological problems and developments in USSR and US. In addition, Senator raised POW issue, indicating importance American public opinion attaches to it. There was also brief discussion of Vietnam, the Leningrad trial and the treatment of Jews in the USSR, and the question of confidence building between our two countries. Discussion of SALT, ME and Germany are treated more fully below. Muskie prefaced substantive part of his views by emphasizing unofficial character of his visit and fact he carried no message and was not negotiating any agreement. End Summary.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR. Secret; Exdis; Immediate.
2 See footnote 4, Document 97.
2. Kosygin took an unyielding, tough line with the Senator with respect to US policies in general. Based on our reading of the Senator’s meetings with Kosygin and with Gromyko (an EmbOff was present on both occasions and took notes along with the Senator’s aides), we see no shifts in Soviet positions on international subjects discussed. On US-Soviet relations, Kosygin expressed a desire for better relations, but with the usual caveats that it all depends on US. Kosygin took a harder line than did Gromyko on our position toward Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Discussion in both instances was serious. Kosygin appeared somber, attentive throughout, with some iciness showing through when talking about Jewish problem and heat when talking about Vietnam, and in general was conspicuously more doctrinaire and polemical than Gromyko.

3. SALT. Muskie began by talking about desire to reduce military expenditures. He said in past two years Senate had subjected defense budget to great scrutiny. As result, administration’s budget in 1969 had been cut by six billion dollars. He expressed interest in MBFR in Europe as part of desire to reduce armaments. He also advocated broadest possible agreement at SALT.

4. Kosygin responded that USSR has always favored disarmament. He asserted that Soviet military budget was 25–27 percent of US military budget, and nothing was hidden in other parts of budget. He said Soviets noticed and “appreciated” Senate’s action in cutting military expenditures by six billion dollars. Soviets also noticed President’s statement that military budget might have to be larger next year. Soviets “follow these events closely.” Specifically on SALT, Kosygin said both sides are approaching question differently, with “great wariness and care,” but “with great desire of finding a solution in limiting strategic armaments”.

5. In Muskie’s discussion with Gromyko, the Foreign Minister asserted he could not give definitive answer regarding whether US seeking a mutually acceptable SALT agreement with USSR, but did not call into question US intentions. Gromyko said Moscow favors broadest possible agreement, but would not commit himself on how Soviets see next stage of negotiations.

6. Muskie said he favored broadest possible agreement noting the SALT talks now appear to be focusing on ABM. He then expressed his interest in a freeze for six months as a start on offensive and defensive missiles, with Gromyko cutting in to ask if he included defensive mis-

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3 Not found.

4 No Presidential statement to this effect has not been found. Laird announced on November 17, 1970, that “inevitable upward pressures” might soon force the administration to seek an increase in the defense budget. (New York Times, November 18, 1970, p. 1)
siles also. Muskie replied affirmatively. Muskie said freeze would give chance to see if national means of verification can work. He also said that there is now parity between US and USSR and if talks last too long, balance might be lost as well as opportunity for agreement.

7. Middle East. Senator Muskie opened up discussion of the M.E. by noting that no area had more potential for destroying any constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, that it has poisoned the atmosphere on both sides, and resolution of this problem will help eliminate others. Kosygin replied in uncompromising harsh terms, charging specifically that:

   a) Israel is settling people on seized Arab territories;
   b) US did not call for settling Arab-Israeli conflict by peaceful means but supported aggression—another example, he said, where US takes position “on other side of barricade from S.U.” where major problem is involved;
   c) Israel is like gangster who in US (where there can be large scale gangster problem) might seize your house and demand that you negotiate with him for its return;
   d) rejoicing in USG circles over Israel’s victory surprised USSR since 200 million Arabs will never be reconciled to loss of territory, and this has become inflammatory factor in the situation;
   e) Arabs will remember US policy and this will not create confidence but rather will build tension by implication between Arabs and US.

8. In a brief exchange on UN question of Israeli security, Kosygin argued that USSR had said all along that Israel must exist as independent state but must give up occupied territories. USSR was acting in accordance with the relevant SC resolution. Muskie replied that the situation is not black and white as Kosygin described it. It is a question of what is really security and “acting as if Israel does not have a security problem is not going to allow a settlement.” It is necessary to deal with both Arab desire to recover territories and Israeli desire for security.

9. Muskie told Gromyko that he had talked with Meir, Dayan, Al- lon, Sapir and the militant-conservative wing, to get a “good cross-section of opinion” on the border and territorial question. He has also talked to Sadat and Riad. While neither side wishes the resumption of hostilities, except as a last resort, their respective positions on territory makes the possibility of settlement discouraging. For Mrs. Meir, the territorial question will recede to the extent that she is satisfied that a

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6 Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister, and Pinchas Sapir, Minister of Finance. Muskie began his four-day visit to Israel on January 6 and his three-day visit to Egypt on January 10.
real peace will follow a settlement. For Sadat, “even one square inch” of former Egyptian territory is an unacceptable price. Sadat supports concept of four-power proposal on guarantees. Muskie said he had urged Sadat to consider that the territorial question may reduce itself to “minor rectifications,” specifically Golan Heights, the narrow waist of Israel along the western bank of the Jordan (involving Syria and Jordan) and Sharm-el-Sheik (involving the UAR). While Jerusalem is not a security problem, it is also an area about which Israelis feel strongly, although they are prepared to be flexible on details. If hostilities are to be avoided, these points of friction will have to be eliminated. In the Jarring talks, Muskie felt that most recent Israeli proposal had represented some substantive movement; while doubtless unacceptable to UAR, it would hopefully elicit a counter-proposal. Muskie said he found strong disinclination to use Jarring talks as first step, with Arabs preferring instead to go to Security Council. Muskie said he urged Arabs to avoid alternative route until all possibilities exhausted in Jarring talks. Gromyko said Israel’s latest proposals only serve to worsen the chances for agreement.

10. Gromyko questioned Israel’s view that it can gain security by clinging to occupied territory, and rejected possibility to obtain really effective guarantees from big powers or UN, sanctified in most solemn way. “It seems to us that when offered peace and effective guarantees, Israel runs away.” There was extended discussion of Israeli view of security with Muskie expressing understanding for Israeli feeling about Golan Heights. “This is not question of logic.” In case of Sharm-el-Sheik, UN presence did not guarantee access to Tiran Straits. Gromyko argued against need for even minor rectifications, saying that USSR would have answer similar withdrawal offer from Nazi Germany with massed artillery salvos. Muskie replied that he distinguished between acquisition of territory in war and rectifications of borders in areas sensitive to security of one or another state. He cited example of Soviet borders with Finland and Poland and the Oder–Neisse border. He also recalled that it was only after Six Day War that UAR was ready to concede Israel’s right of passage through Suez and right to exist. Gromyko argued, in turn, that US position on what is necessary to achieve a settlement has continued to expand since 1967, and he referred to international convention which states that UAR has sovereignty over Canal, and if UAR agrees now to Israeli passage it should be considered a goodwill gesture of peace. Gromyko also asserted that US could exert “sobering influence” on Israel to get it to agree to peaceful settlement.

11. For obvious reasons, Muskie did not pass on to Soviets certain of his impressions of Egypt and Sadat, which the Secretary will find particularly interesting. Muskie told Embassy he was impressed by warm welcome extended to him and Sadat’s unusually frank statement that Egypt needs friendship with U.S. if it is to retain its independence.
12. Europe. With Kosygin, Muskie expressed support for Brandt’s Ostpolitik and normalization of the status of Berlin. Kosygin responded by asking why talk about Brandt’s policy. It was a policy FRG and USSR shared; without Soviet agreement to such a policy, Brandt would not be able to get anywhere. Kosygin then accused the US of adopting a “cool” attitude toward the FRG/USSR treaty.

13. Kosygin also asserted that the US opposed the Soviet proposal for a CES, which he said was aimed at reducing tensions in Europe. It was a great concession by Moscow to agree that US and Canada could participate in a CES even though they were not European states. The US would not be so generous toward the USSR if Washington were organizing a conference of Latin American states.

14. Muskie responded, saying that to work toward a European security arrangement will take protracted work. A CES is not out of the range of possibilities if we generate the right climate and agenda.

15. Gromyko did not talk about CES, confining himself to West Berlin and the FRG/USSR treaty. He said Soviet position on West Berlin was perfectly clear, in case anyone in US has any doubts. He said crucial point, which he emphasized by speaking in English, was respect for previously concluded agreements. He said Moscow agrees completely with American view that nothing should be prejudicial to other sides even if there are differences of opinion on legal aspects of problem or on factual situation. Gromyko then stressed that FRG political presence in West Berlin must be eliminated.

16. Gromyko asserted Moscow and GDR were willing to be helpful in meeting wishes of other side on civilian transport, which he said was not regulated by Allied agreement. He said they were ready to do this “practically on the basis of free transit.” He then said there are three problems relating to West Berlin, which in effect form a triangle. First, FRG political presence in West Berlin which is a Four Power issue and involves eliminating violations of 1945 agreements. Second, civilian transit, which is totally under GDR sovereignty, and is therefore a question of agreement between the FRG and GDR. Third, movement between West Berlin and GDR, which is between Senat and GDR. Each agreement could operate and remain in force only if the other two are operative, even though the participants in each agreement could be different.

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7 Berlin was governed in accordance with several agreements signed in 1945, including the Allied Statement on Control Machinery in Germany and “Greater Berlin,” June 5; and the Allied Agreement on the Quadripartite Administration of Berlin, July 7. For the text of these agreements, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 39–40, 43–44.
17. Gromyko said that the efforts to link ratification of the FRG/USSR treaty to West Berlin would be in vain. Muskie said that he would have a better reading after talking with Chancellor Brandt, noting that, whether or not there is a formal link between West Berlin and the treaty, as a political matter they are connected. Muskie said he disagreed with recent statements by Ball and Acheson. Gromyko said if US approaches West Berlin problem “without prejudice” it will conclude that agreement is possible on the basis now taking shape. He expressed confidence that agreement could be reached in line with wishes of all parties concerned. Finally, he said Moscow appreciated the favorable attitude of USG toward FRG/USSR treaty, and hoped Washington would display “equal realism” on West Berlin.

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9. Although an officer was not present at the meeting in Bonn on January 17, Muskie and Harriman gave the Embassy a “short debriefing” of the discussion. The Embassy submitted the “highlights” of the debriefing in telegram 586 from Bonn, January 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, LEG 7 MUSKIE) After a meeting with Brandt on January 17, Muskie publicly endorsed Ostpolitik with the brief statement: “I like it.” (New York Times, January 18, p. 5)


99. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 18, 1971, 1300Z.

334. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Ref: Moscow 325.

1. Muskie party got red carpet treatment but no concessions, and very little publicity in Soviet press. It is interesting that case was the same with Hubert Humphrey and Arthur Goldberg when they were
here in summer 1969. Dobrynin remarked to me Soviets knew very well who would be around for some time to come.

2. Senator and Harriman conducted themselves responsibly, making it clear they were speaking unofficially and had no mandate to negotiate. They stressed the importance of peaceful solutions in talks on Vietnam, SALT, the ME, and Berlin. Senator supported President’s Vietnam policy by stating that American public accepted idea that President intends to end war. Senator also noted importance for US public opinion of POW issue, and suggested Soviets could play role in resolving POW question. In turn this could help US-Soviet relations. Harriman said his position on Vietnam well known and he paid tribute to assistance given him by Soviets in getting Paris talks started.

3. They also defended our general military posture by reference to decreased expenditures of last two years. (Senator here took some credit for supporting such decreases in Congress.) Muskie urged broadest possible SALT agreement, noted that negotiators were not pessimistic on course of talk. He diverged from official policy in reiterating his proposal for six-months’ freeze on offensive and defensive weapons.

4. While forthcoming in support of Brandt’s Ostpolitik and a Berlin settlement, Senator did not give anything away. By implication he linked a CES to satisfactory Berlin solution. In so doing and by adopting a very cautious approach on a CES, he should have dispelled hopes Soviets might have held about differences in US on this issue. Similarly, although touched on only lightly, he gave Kosygin no reason to think he would support any unilateral reduction of US forces in Europe.

5. While Muskie may have derived some political benefit from trip, his frank and extensive discussion of our policies and problems was undoubtedly helpful here and he was especially effective on Middle East.

6. We are still working on final notes. In rereading them we are struck by doctrinaire position displayed by Kosygin with Senator. If Senator comes to same conclusion, it will have been a useful experience for him and hopefully moderate any criticism he has of administration’s policies vis-à-vis USSR.

7. I agreed to the Senator’s strong request that I not report on meetings before he had chance to brief you fully in person since he had earlier accepted my request that EmbOff be permitted to come along to check translations and take notes. Harriman was also very insistent on this point since he had bad memories of occasion after meeting with

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3 Former Vice President Humphrey and former Ambassador to the United Nations Goldberg were both in Moscow in July 1969 for separate meetings with Soviet officials: Humphrey met Kosygin on July 21; Goldberg met Kuznetsov on July 19.
Khrushchev when his personal remarks, reported by Embassy, were promptly reprinted in US press, while he was still abroad. You may wish accordingly to explain to Senator that I sent in full report at your request. If Dept is not given copy of memcons prepared by Muskie staff, we can provide copy from here.

Beam

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4 Reference is probably to the trip Harriman made to Moscow in June 1959 for private talks with Khrushchev.

5 Not found.

100. Editorial Note

On January 19, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger met President Richard Nixon and White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman in the Oval Office at 1:55 p.m. to discuss the Moscow visit of Senator Edmund Muskie. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) Haldeman described the meeting in his diary:

"A little later, K[jissinger] was in and there was quite a discussion of (Senator) Muskie and the results of his (Europe) trip. The P[resident] obviously is not pleased with the reception Muskie was given by the Soviets and by Willy Brandt. He wants to have Muskie hit on the total irresponsibility of his statement, or his proposed statement, standstill in the disarmament talks. He should be hit on his amazing ignorance. Say it's unprecedented for a Senator to do this. We should get a Senator to hit him when the proposal comes out. The P has also decided that Ambassador (Jacob) Beam has to go. He played Muskie's line too much while he was in the Soviet Union. He [Nixon] made the point that we've got to recognize that the Soviets will play a role in United States politics. They definitely want to get Nixon out, and will do what they can to see that it happens. K argues that they have to balance this against their fear that Nixon may win and they'll have to live with him another four years. The P says: 'I'm willing to try the negotiations,' and so on."

(Entry for January 19, 1971; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition; see also Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, pages 235–236)

According to Haldeman's handwritten notes of the meeting, the President instructed Kissinger to "c[hec]k Logan Act to see if it covers Muskie or just private citizens." Nixon, furthermore, qualified several of
his statements. On the tenure of the Ambassador in Moscow, he declared: “Beam has to go—give him three months, then out.” On the prospects for negotiations with the Soviets, Haldeman noted: “P willing to try—but don’t believe them—better to turn on them now.” After Kissinger left, Nixon told Haldeman of another concern: “K problem re Soviets—makes up his own story.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 43, H Notes, Jan. 1, 1971–Feb. 15, 1971, Part I)

101. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 19, 1971, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Governor Harriman
Senator Muskie

SUBJECT
Senator Muskie’s Trip Report

The Secretary met at 3:30 in his office with Senator Muskie and Governor Harriman who had requested the time to brief the Secretary on their recent trip to the Middle East, Europe and the Soviet Union.

Senator Muskie began his remarks by stressing the personal nature of the trip and that he wanted exposure. He emphasized that it was not a fact-finding exercise and he frankly doubted that he had returned with anything that the State Department did not already know.

He added that the State Department personnel throughout his itinerary had treated him exceptionally well and particularly mentioned Don Bergus in Cairo and Ambassador Rush in Bonn. He added that Wally Barbour in Tel Aviv also impressed him as a shrewd, capable man but because there was less need to depend on the Embassy when in Israel and he came to know Barbour less well.

[Omitted here is Muskie’s report on his trip to the Middle East.]

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Rogers’ Office Files: Lot 73 D 443, Box 1, Memoranda of Conversation for Record. Confidential. According to Rogers’ Appointment Book, his special assistant, Peter B. Johnson, also attended the meeting. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) Johnson presumably drafted the memorandum of conversation. According to an attached note, dated February 1, Rogers decided to show the memorandum on an “EYES ONLY” basis to Hillenbrand and Sisco.
At this point the conversation shifted to the discussions they had had in Moscow. Governor Harriman commented that the Senator had spent three hours with Gromyko and four with Kosygin. Gromyko, the Senator remarked, spoke in both English and Russian. Harriman added that Kosygin seemed to present the tough Soviet line while Gromyko was more prepared to be flexible and less doctrinaire. Senator Muskie said he spent most of his time with the Russians discussing three fundamental questions: 1) disarmament, 2) European security, and 3) military forces in Europe. He found the Russians positive and forthcoming in these three areas as opposed to their tone when discussing the Middle East, which he found negative and even bitter. As ancillary items Muskie said he reviewed the POW situation and talked for three quarters of an hour or so with Kosygin about ecological matters.

On the POW question, the Senator warned that it had the potential of “injecting an emotional quality” into US/Soviet relations and therefore should be dealt with most cautiously.

On disarmament, Kosygin told the Senator that the Russians wanted as broad an agreement as possible and were anxious not to waste much time. Kosygin believes he said that the American people want an agreement on SALT. Kosygin thinks, the Senator reported, that the talks are moving at an appropriate speed and that satisfactory progress is being made. Both Governor Harriman and Senator Muskie remarked that the Russians absolutely refused to go into detail on SALT, saying that they were reviewing their position. Governor Harriman believes that this reviewing posture seems to be the official line until after the next Party Congress and some decisions are taken.

On European security, Kosygin expressed a great deal of concern over our attitude toward CES and our insistence that linkage exist between the Soviet-FRG treaty and a Berlin settlement. Senator Muskie said that he understood that while no formal language is required, there is obviously political linkage. The Secretary pointed out that Brandt himself saw the need to tie a Berlin settlement to the Moscow Treaty. Senator Muskie was highly impressed with both Ambassador Rush’s preparation and Willy Brandt’s presentation of the issues. He added there was not a shadow of a doubt in Brandt’s mind of U.S. support for his Eastern policies, and the Senator was surprised to note the wide press play given stories that reflected lack of U.S. enthusiasm. The Sec-

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retary noted that Senator Muskie had changed his position in connection with American troop withdrawals from Europe to which Muskie replied this had been a result of his discussions with Brandt and Ambassador Rush.

The discussion then moved to the American and Russian tactics in connection with CES. Governor Harriman made the point that Brandt needed some indication from the United States that would encourage the idea of a preliminary meeting. The Secretary replied that the Russians had originally proposed that a meeting be held to precede the CES but he questioned whether there was any point in this meeting if the basic Berlin question could not be treated. Senator Muskie noted that Kosygin seemed to be very tough on the matter of a Federal German presence in Berlin. Governor Harriman noted that the change had been enormous since the Kennedy days, but Berlin simply cannot be expected to become another "Lander." Brandt is flexible on this, the Senator said, and sees the possibility of working out the economic and legal aspects of the access problem without coming to grips with the politics of it. Finally, Senator Muskie remarked that he was happy that we share Brandt’s attitude toward a Berlin settlement. To this the Secretary said the Russians are interested in isolating Berlin by getting the United States and the Federal German Government out. When access is discussed, of course, the Russians return to the position that this is basically a question of East German control and thus out of their hands. Senator Muskie said that Kosygin told him he would be using his influence with the East Germans to work out this problem. In the Senator’s view the Russians genuinely want an agreement.

Moving back to his conversation with Kosygin, Senator Muskie said that he had raised the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Kosygin had told him, he said, that last year some 1,500 Jews had been allowed to depart, although not all of them wanted to go to Israel. Senator Muskie said he pressed on this point, drawing an analogy with the plight of the Blacks in the United States in terms of opportunities available to them and other privileges in the society. He said that Kosygin would not concede the point.

Governor Harriman noted the surprising difference in the Russian attitude today from that of five years ago. He said that at that time they were particularly excited about the Viet-Nam bombing. This time, however, the only thing they showed particular concern about was the Middle East. On this issue they tried to convey the idea that they had twisted the Egyptian arm to good effect and wanted the United States to do the same to Israel.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the Middle East and Vietnam.]
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)


SUBJECT
The Jewish Defense League

The narrow conclusion of Tom Huston’s memorandum to you (Tab A) is unimpeachable: we should not over-react to the JDL provocations. His memorandum also correctly identifies the fact that we have an international responsibility to safeguard Soviet life and property in the US (just as they do with respect to American life and property in the USSR). For us, the situation demands a very careful blend of federal and local actions and of various foreign policy (as well as domestic political) factors.

The main burden of protection and prosecution has rested with local authorities. Federal authorities have been involved only where there has been a clear allegation of a violation of Federal law (e.g. the Federal Firearms Control Act), or where the Federal Executive Protection Service has definite responsibilities. The question of possible use of Federal injunctive powers has been held in abeyance. In short, the federal role has been kept within limits, and there has been no activity by the Federal Government or the Administration which anyone could charge amounts to conducting or planning a witch-hunt of the JDL.

The best basis from which to judge the Administration’s response to JDL activities—and then only statement at the highest level—is the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject Files, USSR (Jewish Defense League). Confidential; Sensitive; Outside System. Printed from a copy that indicates Haig signed the original for Kissinger.

2 Dated January 14; attached but not printed. Sonnenfeldt forwarded Huston’s memorandum and a “self-explanatory response” to Kissinger on January 19. Huston argued that the White House should not “launch a Federal pogrom,” which would needlessly alienate “those lower-middle-class Jews of largely Eastern European origin who tend to identify with the JDL.” “In short,” Huston concluded, “we should attempt to identify those individuals responsible for acts of violence, collar them, and make it clear we will not tolerate lawlessness. However, we should keep the federal presence to the minimum, we should be quite precise in recognizing the legitimacy of the Jewish concern about Soviet treatment of Jews, and we should not be unaware of the political significance of the hard-line attitude emerging in certain Jewish circles. Moreover, we should above all not lose sight of the international significance of the Soviet Jewry question as a point of leverage in our relations with the Soviet Union.” Haldeman wrote the following note to Kissinger on Huston’s memorandum: “K Is he right? H.” (Ibid.)
President’s message of January 11 to American Jewish leaders.\(^3\) This message very carefully stressed the Administration’s continued commitment to freedom of emigration and other human rights (for Soviet Jews), concern over criminal acts of violence, and determination—in cooperation with local authorities—to prevent such acts or take legal action when they occur. This is the sort of proper mix of the various ingredients which we shall continue to use in this issue.

For obvious reasons, I have not treated the domestic political points in the Huston memorandum.

You may also want to check with John Dean, who is conversant with the various legal actions involved.

\(^3\) See Document 91.

103. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, January 23, 1971, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The meeting took place at Ambassador Dobrynin’s urgent request. He called as soon as he had returned from consultations in Moscow on January 21st\(^2\) but the session could not be scheduled due to my trip to Chicago on the 22nd. This meeting was perhaps the most significant that I have had with Dobrynin since our conversations began.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the White House. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing its “highlights” to Nixon on January 27. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Ibid.) According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 11:30 am. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) For memoir accounts of the meeting, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 804–805; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 211.

\(^2\) Dobrynin called Kissinger at 6:05 p.m. on January 21. After a few pleasantries, the two men agreed to meet in “the usual place”—presumably the Map Room—on January 23 at 10 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)
Dobrynin started the conversation by saying that he hoped we had noted the treatment Senator Muskie had received. I said nothing. First, he said Senator Muskie had spent four hours with Premier Kosygin, to be sure, but that an hour of that was consumed with the introduction by Governor Harriman of his grandchildren. Secondly, it must have been noticed that Kosygin mentioned nothing to Muskie that could not be read in the newspapers. I replied that it did seem to me that Kosygin had not been too communicative but I made no further comment.

Dobrynin then said that he just returned from the most extensive US-Soviet relations review that he could remember since he has been Ambassador. He saw Kosygin for four hours and Brezhnev for five hours. He spent all morning with the Politburo and long days with Gromyko in the Foreign Office. He said he kept my schedule which is reported in the newspapers, working 15 hours a day while he was in Moscow. Having ended the unofficial part of our talk, he then said he would get into the official part.

Summit

Dobrynin, who spoke almost uninterruptedly far the whole meeting, made the following points. He said he had been instructed to raise again the Summit meeting and to suggest a specific date, namely the second half of the summer. I asked what that meant, if that meant September. He replied that in the Soviet Union this meant July or August, but, of course, if we preferred September he was certain that this would be acceptable. He had the impression, however, that the Soviet leaders were leaning towards July without wanting to make an issue of it.

Dobrynin said that he had been instructed to reaffirm that the agenda submitted in our communication of August was acceptable and that this agenda should be prepared in private conversations between him and me prior to the meeting. The meeting should have as its purpose the positive improvement in US-Soviet relations and should not deal only with general expressions of goodwill. Therefore the Soviet leaders were interested in having some concrete achievement recorded at the meeting. Dobrynin said the meeting should also have as its purpose not only bilateral relations but issues of benefit to all the countries of the world. When I asked what that meant, Dobrynin said this was a ritualistic phrase which had to be put in in order to avoid the charge that we were establishing a condominium. He said I should not pay any attention to it.

Dobrynin added that the Soviet Union would reduce its press campaign and that it expected that we would show great restraint about
the Soviet Union in the media, insofar as we had any influence, and particularly in our briefings. He said both sides should show some restraint in the interval before the summit.

Dobrynin then turned to the specific topics that I had raised with him.

Berlin

He said first on the issue of Berlin the Soviet leaders wanted to reaffirm their readiness, already expressed in the January 6, 1971 communication which was delivered in San Clemente, to have Dobrynin and me conduct our conversations in this channel. This feeling had been reinforced by a conversation that Bahr had had with Falin (Soviet Ambassador-designate to Bonn) in which Bahr had said he was an old friend of mine; and secondly both Brandt and Bahr believed that I was the only person who understood German conditions well enough to break through the logjams created by our bureaucracy. Dobrynin thought that we should not hold up a Berlin agreement until the Summit, but rather if possible achieve one before then. He wanted me to know that the Soviet Union would approach Berlin negotiations with the attitude of achieving an objective improvement of the situation and not of worsening our position. It expected, however, that we would pay some attention to their specific concern. Dobrynin said that he had been instructed to tell me that my concern that there had to be some appeal to the Soviet Union or some acknowledgment of Soviet responsibility and Four-Power responsibility for access to Berlin was being most carefully studied in Moscow. An attempt would be made to find some consultative four-power body that could play a useful role. Dobrynin said he was prepared to have an expert come from Moscow to help with these talks without, however, necessarily telling the expert what he was here for. I told Dobrynin that I would have to proceed by first talking to Bahr and then talking to Rush and that I would be in touch with him in two or three weeks after these consultations had been completed.

SALT

Dobrynin then turned to SALT. He said that my observations had been studied with the greatest attention in Moscow. While no final decision had been taken he could assure me that there was considerable sympathy for the approach. He had been instructed, however, to ask a number of questions first. First, when I spoke of a freeze on deployment, did I mean quantitative only or did I include qualitative? I replied that since it would be impossible to verify qualitative freeze I meant quantitative only.

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See Document 83.
Secondly, Dobrynin asked, when I had spoken of an ABM agreement had I meant the Washington-Moscow system only or had I included zero ABM or perhaps stopping at the existing sites as I had already mentioned to him? I responded that frankly we had not made a final decision on this but that we were openminded on those three approaches. We were prepared to negotiate a zero ABM agreement if they were prepared to tear down their existing installations. We had also proposed an NCA agreement and lately we had taken some interest in an agreement confined to three sites on our side and the Moscow system on their side. Dobrynin said that he had advanced this in Moscow. He had to tell me honestly that the political people found it easiest to have a Moscow-Washington agreement and that the military people had at first not understood the three-site-Moscow agreement but had now begun to study it sympathetically. All he could tell me was that none of these three possibilities was excluded and that the Soviets were prepared to be very constructive.

Dobrynin continued that the major problem in fact was the issue of forward-based aircraft. I said it was obvious that we could not upset the strategic balance by forward deployments of aircraft. This might be handled more easily under a tacit arrangement pending negotiations, although we could not accept limitations on carrier deployment under those circumstances. Dobrynin replied that he did not have any firm instructions but the tentative thinking of Moscow was that a SALT agreement along the lines of what I had proposed to him should be concluded at the Summit; that preparatory work for it should be done by Dobrynin and myself; and that the Vienna negotiations, in order to show some progress, might conclude an agreement on accidental war. I told him that we did not want the provocative attack issue handled in this forum and he said he understood. However the question of accidental war was simple and could be handled in that forum. I told him I would have to check with the President.

The Middle East

Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East.\(^5\) He said the Soviet Union did not believe that our present procedure could lead anywhere. He said that a deadlock was inevitable in his view, and he wanted to assure me that the Soviet Union was prepared to make a realistic agreement. The Soviet leaders were extremely interested to have him discuss this with me. I replied that we might prefer to have it discussed between Sisco and him. He expressed extreme distaste at this prospect.

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\(^5\) Kissinger summarized this exchange on the Middle East in his “highlights” memorandum to the President on January 27. Nixon marked the section and wrote the following instruction in the margin: “K—see what he [Dobrynin] has in mind.”
He asked if I could at least give him some indication of what we thought on the issue of guarantees in order to avoid the danger that we might get into a confrontation situation at the Four-Power talks. I told him that I would see if I could talk to him about it during the week but I would have to check with the President.

Dobrynin in summing up said this could be the most important year in US-Soviet relations. He and his leaders were convinced that whatever progress was to be made had to be made this year: it was their experience with election years that nothing ever occurred of any significance and then the first year after the election, if there is a change of Administration, nothing occurs either. So they believed this is the best year to make significant progress.

*European Security Conference*

Dobrynin stressed Moscow’s continuing interest in a European Security Conference. He said it would be helpful if we agreed to a meeting of Ambassadors as proposed by Finland in Helsinki before the summer. I replied that we should not bite off too much at once but that I would report to the President.

Vietnam

Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam briefly. He said he wanted me to know that the general observations about the possibility of separating military and political issues had been transmitted to Hanoi without comment and without recommendation, but they had been transmitted. It had occurred only a few days ago, however, and no answer had as yet been received. I said that I hoped he understood that the President was deadly serious when he said that we would protect our interests in Vietnam and that we would handle those matters separately. He responded that Soviet leaders understood this up to a certain point, but beyond that the Soviet leaders would have to react whether they liked it or not. I said I understood that if we landed troops

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7 According to two Vietnamese authors, Soviet Ambassador to North Vietnam Serbakov delivered an informal message from Kissinger to North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong “[a]round the end of January.” The message included the following passage: “If the US undertakes to withdraw all its forces by a certain time limit and possibly does not demand a simultaneous withdrawal of DRVN forces from SVN [. . .], the North Vietnamese should undertake to respect a ceasefire during the US withdrawal plus a certain period of time, not too long, after the US withdrawal; that is the important point. (Kissinger does not specify how long this period will be).” Pham Van Dong told Serbakov on February 3 that there was nothing new in Kissinger’s message, which began with a threat. He reiterated, however, that the North Vietnamese were prepared to meet Kissinger again to present their position. (Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, *Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris*, pp. 165–166) See also Document 90.
in Haiphong the Soviet Union would have to protest. He responded that we could be sure they would have to protest. I said that they could be sure that we were not going to land U.S. troops in Haiphong. Dobrynin smiled and said that he hoped that Indochina would not be an obstacle. He implied strongly that in its present framework it would not be.

**Conclusion**

I then said to him that he must understand the extreme delicacy of the bureaucratic situation in which these matters were being handled. Total discretion was essential; if this failed we would simply have to interrupt this channel and he would have to take his chances through ordinary procedures. I said I had no illusions about his willingness to play various elements off against each other but this could not work. Dobrynin replied that he had never done that and he would not do that in his own self-interest. I told him to make sure that no matter what his diplomats picked up elsewhere it did not come from knowledge of our conversations, because I talked only to the President about them.

I asked Dobrynin when he thought a Summit should be announced. He said this was a very easy matter and could be settled anytime. I suggested that first we make some progress in these talks and then we would see. When Dobrynin left he said, “So the future of Soviet-US relations is in our hands, and I want you to know we are going to make a big effort to improve them.” On this note we parted.

**104. Editorial Note**

After his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on January 23, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger assessed several developments that might affect the “future of Soviet-American relations.” Five days earlier, President Richard Nixon had tentatively approved Lam Son 719, a military operation in southern Laos spearheaded by the South Vietnamese army but supported logistically by U.S. forces to interdict supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and attack the North Vietnamese in Lao sanctuaries. The President worried, however, that plans for an invasion of Laos might complicate plans for a summit in the Soviet Union. Nixon called Kissinger at 2:16 p.m. on January 24 to discuss his concerns. The transcript, while recording only “the tail end of the conversation,” includes the following exchange:
“K: What I will do is keep this thing [Lam Son 719] going forward and keep the others committed to it and then you cancel it if you agree as your decision and not as a result of anybody’s pressure on you.

“P: . . . I think we want to go the summit route and risk the fact that we may not have one or . . . The best legacy we could leave is to kick the hell out of Vietnam. [omission in transcript] Before 1972.

“K: We should think beyond 1972.

“P: We’ve got to think in terms of the fact that every day we are here we’ve got to do those things that no one else will do. [omission in transcript]

“K: I dictated a conversation I had yesterday [with Dobrynin] and I think you will find it significant. In the meantime I’ll keep planning on going forward with the clear understanding that final orders will not be given for another 10 days.

“P: In terms of the announcement I think you are absolutely right. Let that come naturally. My own view is that if we do choose the summit route, once we have done the Cambodian [Laotian] thing then in our interest it is better to get the announcement a little earlier than a little later.

“K: When—about the middle of March?

“P: Yes, March 15. March 15 gives us a ride on it. April 15 troop thing is going to be a dud. I am not going to make it.

“K: With the other announcement, you don’t really need it. I think we can do it around March 15 and by that time we should have shown enough progress in the two areas we discussed and of course you can have launched the Vienna talks. By that time the basis will be in place or they will never be in place.

“P: Let’s see what these options are: We will discuss them at very top level—only among ourselves, first.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

The next morning at 10:33 a.m., Dobrynin called Kissinger to deliver a message from Moscow on the Berlin negotiations:

“D: I received the following reply. The reply goes like follows: the name of the representative who might handle this matter from your side [Rush] as well as from our side [Falin] was not mentioned and will not be mentioned. This is for sure. For your personal information, the boss of that man and himself [Brandt and Bahr] were generally informed of the possibility of a letter on the subject. They warned to handle information with extreme care.

“K: I appreciate this. I will proceed as discussed and make an appointment later this week.

“D: When do you expect this man?
“K: I will let you know when we meet. I talked to the President on Sat. [January 23] and his response was positive.
“D: We will meet this week.
“K: Good.” (Ibid.)

After his telephone call with Dobrynin, Kissinger took several procedural steps on Berlin, including sending a member of his personal staff, James Fazio, to Bonn on January 27 to arrange for Bahr and Rush to visit Washington as soon as possible. (Memorandum from Fazio to Kissinger, undated; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush—Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

Nixon called Kissinger at 11:24 p.m. to discuss the day’s events. After an exchange on their plans for Laos, Kissinger reported on his plans for Berlin, as outlined with Dobrynin that morning:

“K: And I am proceeding with Rush. I had Mitchell—I am sending a letter to him by messenger so that it cannot leak.
“P: Good.
“K: And also a letter to the other fellow [Bahr].
“P: Good.
“K: And told them both to come over here on some other pretext.
“P: Good.
“K: And then we get that game plan working.
“P: . . .

“K: I think that with that is—Dobrynin called me this morning. I told him he had to keep me informed about everything that they were doing so that we do not make any missteps. He told me what they had told the Germans and it was just that they might try to see what they could work out with us together with them. Which is all right. They told it to Bahr.” (Ibid., Box 29, Home File)

Despite some progress on Berlin, the White House remained preoccupied with preparations for the operation in Laos. After a series of meetings on January 26, Kissinger reviewed the situation at 6:25 p.m. with White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. Although no record of the conversation has been found, Haldeman provided the following account in his diary:

“Henry got me into the office, just as I was going home, to go over the general plan of what they’re really up to. They’re planning a major assault in Laos which, if successful, and Henry fully believes it will be, would in effect end the war because it would totally demolish the enemy’s capability. The problem is that it will be a very major attack, with our troops massed heavily on the Laotian border, and the question is whether the heat generated in Congress and across the country will be worth it. Henry’s point is that our action in Cambodia, etc.,
cleared things up so we’ve got no problem in ’71, but could have them in ’72. This new action in Laos now would set us up so we wouldn’t have to worry about problems in ’72, and that of course is the most important.

“Henry does feel that there’s one alternative, which is that we’ve discovered the enemy has our plan and is starting to mass their troops to counteract. By going ahead with our planning and letting them go ahead with their counter-planning, we can draw them into a monumental trap and then move in and bomb them, maybe with the same effect as going ahead with the plan. This of course would be a much more salable alternative domestically. The problem with either of these plans is that all of a sudden the Russians have come around, and Henry had a very productive meeting with Dobrynin that’s resulted in their agreeing to move ahead on setting a Summit for midyear, plus a basic SALT settlement and a couple of other items that we’ve been after them on. The massive Laotian attack would probably abort the whole Soviet effort, and the question is whether the Summit, etc., is worth more to us or whether winding down the war is. This is the tough question that Henry’s got to face now, and he asked me to think about it tonight and talk to him about it some more tomorrow.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, page 239)

No evidence has been found to indicate that Kissinger and Haldeman talked about this “tough question” the next day.

During a telephone conversation at 7:24 p.m. on January 27, Nixon and Kissinger discussed how the “big play” on Vietnam might affect their game plan for the Soviet Union:

“P: This would be all in one package. We are doing this—but clear it with Thieu so he understands—announce the whole program of withdrawal right now but in order to do this we have to destroy the enemy capability. Of course, it still has the disadvantage of our Russian friends.

“K: At least it gives them something to think about, there are limits. There are reports that another group of ships on its way to Cuba. If they keep playing these games with us . . . and it makes it a little worse for them to . . .

“P: Think it is probably—it is another way to play the game.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT’S FILE

Washington, January 28, 1971, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in The Map Room, The White House, 1:00 p.m., January 28

I requested the meeting in order to give Dobrynin the answers to our discussions of the previous week. After an exchange of pleasantries, I told Dobrynin that the President had studied his presentation and had found it positive. He agreed to a Summit in principle, to take place either the second half of July or the first half of September, in the Soviet Union. The Summit could cover the agenda items discussed between the President and the Soviet Foreign Minister. The President wished to confirm the channel of Dobrynin-Kissinger in order to work out the preliminary details of the agenda.

I then went through the various subjects with him.

Berlin

I told Dobrynin that the President was prepared to proceed along the lines that we had discussed; that is to say, that Dobrynin and I would discuss the outstanding issues, and after some agreement in principle, move our conclusions into the Four-Power discussions on Berlin. I also told Dobrynin that I planned to speak to Bahr on an early occasion, and that we were also bringing Ambassador Rush back to make certain that he would be in on these arrangements.

I reiterated the need for total secrecy of this channel, and that if the channel became public or was leaked to people other than those authorized to know, we would simply break it off. Dobrynin said they had always respected the privacy of this channel; moreover, it was very much in their interest to preserve its secrecy and I could therefore be sure. He said that Falin had told Bahr that there might be a separate...
channel, but had not told him its nature and, except for that, no other person had been told. Dobrynin said that he thought this information would be well received in Moscow, and that he was hoping that some significant progress could be made in the next few months.

*SALT*

We then turned to SALT. I told Dobrynin that we had not really had a formal reply to our proposition, and yet it was quite important that we have one. We had to make Congressional presentations on SALT and the ABM. We had to prepare for the next meeting in Vienna. It was therefore quite important that we knew Soviet intentions.

Dobrynin said, speaking off the record, it was important for me to understand that SALT presented the Soviets with tough bureaucratic problems. It was very hard for them to handle it since they have no lateral clearances in their bureaucracy. He therefore thought it would be helpful if I would formulate the proposition in the form of an unsigned Note Verbale which he could transmit to Moscow in order to elicit a response. I said to Dobrynin that, for a response to be helpful to us, it should be forthcoming in the next week or two. He said he would transmit the question to Moscow.

Next Dobrynin said that he had, however, a number of other questions of some interest. He said if he had understood me correctly, I was proposing a freeze on offensive deployments—specifically, land-based missiles—in return for a formal ABM agreement. I said that was correct. Dobrynin then said that this might present some problem with respect to silos that had already been started but had not yet been completed. Would the Soviet Union be permitted to complete the silos that were started? It would be hard for the Soviet bureaucracy to accept the losses of resources involved in an unfinished silo. I said I could not give him a clear answer, but I was certain that this would be considered a reasonable question to which we would try to find some response. Dobrynin said it had occurred to him that one way of handling the problem would be to put the date at which no further construction could take place at some point in the future—say, January 1st of next year. If that were done, Dobrynin said, this would enable them to finish; they would simply have to pay the price for those that were not finished by then. I said as soon as he was authorized to discuss these issues concretely I would be prepared on my side with a formal position.

Dobrynin then asked me how we were going to conclude the SALT arrangement if he and I talked. I said if he and I could agree in principle to proceed along the lines that we had discussed,—that is to say, a formal ABM agreement coupled with an offensive freeze—then I would suggest that the President make a speech early in March in which he puts forward this as an idea and the Soviet Union could respond to it positively. Vienna would then be an exercise in implementing a prior
agreement. Dobrynin asked whether we would, together with the speech, plan a formal démarche to the Soviet Government. I said we had really not thought the matter through, and we would be very receptive to their suggestion. Dobrynin said that, given the way the Soviet bureaucracy worked, it would be helpful to have a formal record in addition to whatever the President might say publicly, and to have that formal material part of the record before the speech is made. I said I did not believe this would present an insuperable obstacle.

Middle East

Dobrynin then turned the conversation to the Middle East and asked me whether the President was prepared to resume bilateral talks on the Middle East. I said he was in principle willing to engage himself more fully, but we first wanted to see how the negotiations went. Dobrynin said again, “The negotiations aren’t going to go anywhere. They are at a deadlock. I hope you do not think you can settle this without us or, even less, that you can settle it against us.” I said we had no such idea and we would make that clear in the President’s report on the state of foreign policy.

I asked Dobrynin whether there was any interest in Moscow in the plan to open the Canal put forth by Dayan. I had reason to believe there might be some possibility that Cairo was interested. (I was thinking of the (Amin?) channel.)

Dobrynin said that, if we could give him some advance warning of what we proposed to do at the Four-Power meetings in New York, he was certain that this would be well received. I said I would look into the matter. I said there was some talk of opening up the guarantees issue, but it would be in a very abstract and academic form. Dobrynin smiled and said, “I guarantee that you are going to produce a complete impasse.”

Dobrynin returned to the Berlin issue and said that the Soviet Union had attentively studied my suggestion that there had to be some guarantees. He then handed me the attached piece of paper (Tab A)
which represents the strongest statement so far that the Soviet Union has made for assuming some responsibility for the outcome of an eventual West German-East German agreement. Dobrynin told me that Rush’s inflexibility had presented a peculiar problem for Abrasimov. Abrasimov actually has instructions to go further than he did on access procedures; however, since Rush was absolutely unyielding, he could not present them. He did not want to be in a position of seeming to keep making concessions. He therefore wondered whether Rush could offer anything at the February 9th meeting to show some move on our part to which, in turn, Abrasimov could then respond.

Cuba

I told Dobrynin that the President noted the Soviet intention to avoid provocative measures during the preparation for a Summit. He was prepared to act on this basis. At the same time, a group of Soviet ships, including a submarine tender, was heading towards Cuba and now was located east of the Azores. This would not be considered a friendly act by the President. Dobrynin said he would report the conversation to Moscow.6

We agreed to meet again after I had prepared the ground with Bahr and Rush and to let Dobrynin know what the procedure would be.

Dobrynin said he would check in Moscow.7

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6 During a telephone conversation at 9:20 a.m. on February 1, Kissinger and Haldeman (who was with the President in Florida) discussed this issue: “K: There were three Soviet ships headed for Cuba. I raised hell with Dobrynin on [January 28]. Yesterday they stopped dead in the water. There was another submarine tender going down there. H: That’s good. You hit them and they stopped. We’ll just sit tight then.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

7 According to a handwritten note in the margin, this sentence was added to the memorandum on February 9.
PARTICIPANTS

Anatoliy Dobrynin, Russian Ambassador
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

I saw Dobrynin at his request on what he called rather urgent business. I fully expected it to concern the reports of an American invasion of Laos. Instead, Dobrynin began the conversation by saying that he had been requested by his Government to make the following points: (1) the Middle East situation was getting extremely alarming; he wanted to reiterate the Soviet Government was anxious for a settlement on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 242. He also wanted to stress that the United States and the Soviet Union should work together in achieving the settlement. Finally, he said that the Kremlin was hoping that the channel established between Dobrynin and me could lead to a solution of the Middle East problem and he hoped that I would engage myself in these negotiations.

Dobrynin then said that his superiors in the Politburo were very receptive to the approach on Berlin that I had outlined. I told him of my conversation with Bahr and I said I would have to have a conversation with Rush before I could get the procedure firmly established. However, I proposed the following approach: Bahr would tell me what the German Government might be willing to consider; I would discuss it with the President; and I would consult with Dobrynin before I established the procedure. I explained that I would have to have a meeting with the President before I could fix the procedure. Dobrynin agreed that this was a reasonable approach.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 2], Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 3:53 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing it (as well as a memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on February 4) to Nixon on February 8. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

2 In spite of publicity beforehand, the President gave final approval for Lam Son 719 on February 3; the invasion began on February 8. During a telephone conversation with Haldeman at 10:40 a.m. on February 4, Kissinger mentioned another motive for the operation: “It’s going to break it one way or the other. A very salutary effect on the Russians even if it shoots the summit for a few months.” Haldeman replied: “That’s not important.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

this with Rush. If they both agreed, I would discuss it with Dobrynin; if the three of us agreed, we would introduce it first in the Four Power Western group and subsequently in the Four Power talks on Berlin. Dobrynin said he would transmit this procedure to Moscow. Dobrynin asked me when I might have an answer from Bahr and Rush and I said that I thought that I would be ready to discuss it in the following week.

Dobrynin then said that he was prepared to talk about SALT in connection with an ABM agreement but he had not yet received instructions on how to handle the offensive weapons. I told him that it would not be very fruitful to talk to him about an ABM agreement alone. Dobrynin said he was quite optimistic though about proceeding on that basis.

Dobrynin asked me to have dinner with him on the 11th of February. I told him I would probably be leaving with the President for Florida, and we settled for the 10th instead.

As Dobrynin was putting his coat on, he said that he had no instructions but he was wondering what we were doing in Laos. He hoped we were not doing anything that would aggravate the situation or interrupt the progress we seemed to be making. I said that we would do everything we could to prevent an expansion of the Indochinese situation so that it would not affect Soviet-U.S. relations; however, in fairness he had to remember that the President told his Foreign Minister that we might have to take measures in Vietnam but that they would not be directed against the Soviet Union. He said, well, they might objectively affect the Soviet Union even if we didn’t intend them to. I said we would keep it very much in mind. Dobrynin ended the meeting by saying, let’s continue to work on the good course on which we are.

PARTICIPANTS

Anatoliy Dobrynin, Russian Ambassador
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

I had asked Dobrynin to come in order to tell him of my conversation with Rush.2 The main purpose of it was to show some interest in continued Soviet-American dialogue during the Laotian episode.

Dobrynin said he had already received a reply to our last conversation3 from the Kremlin. The Kremlin had told him to express to me the pleasure of Moscow at the seriousness with which we approached the subject, that they considered it a very positive contribution to the Summit that we were planning. He had also been authorized by the Politburo to tell me that the Soviet Union agreed to our proposal to talk about both offensive and defensive limitations, with the defensive limitations being part of a formal agreement and the offensive limitations being part of a tacit freeze. He also repeated that he hoped that we could start talking about the Middle East. I said that it would be somewhat more difficult on the Middle East because as he knew from the newspapers I did not have the same detailed bureaucratic control there as in other areas.4 Dobrynin said that he found that hard to believe. I said perhaps if we made some progress in the other areas, I could assert more control on the Middle East. He replied that I was trying to establish linkage again. I told him I would have to check with the President on how I could proceed on Middle East questions.

Dobrynin pulled out of his pocket a verbal note from the Soviet Government warning against consequences of a Laotian move. The

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing it (as well as the memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on February 2) to Nixon on February 8. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 12:34 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 Kissinger met Rush on the evening of February 3 at John Mitchell’s apartment in the Watergate complex. (Ibid., Record of Schedule) Although no record of the conversation has been found, see their respective recollections in Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 807, 809–810; and Thompson, ed., The Nixon Presidency, “An Ambassador’s Perspective: Kenneth Rush,” p. 338.

3 See Document 106.

4 See Document 95.
note is attached. I consider it very mild. I told Dobrynin that I did not think our interests in Southeast Asia were so different since we both had an interest in preventing Chinese hegemony. Dobrynin said it was all a question of timing. I told Dobrynin that I would give the note to the President who, I was sure, would answer relatively quickly. Dobrynin said there was no hurry, no answer was expected.

Attachment

Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

The Soviet leadership already attracted the attention of President Nixon to dangerous consequences inherent in a departure of the U.S. Government from the course it earlier proclaimed, for a settlement of the Vietnam problem by political means, and in its turning toward a new expansion of the military actions in Indochina. Addressing President Nixon with these warnings, the Soviet leadership took account of the intention expressed by the President himself, to adhere to the same line of action in the affairs of Indochina so that the relations between our two countries would not be clouded.

However, the continued expansion of the U.S. military actions in Vietnam, their spreading onto the territory of Cambodia and now also of Laos cannot but cause a legitimate question as to where, in reality, the United States Government intends to lead the whole matter in Indochina.

No matter under what pretexts the United States and the Saigon regime are taking those military actions, these actions, in the conviction of the Soviet leadership, not only cannot bring a peaceful settlement a day closer, but, on the contrary, they inevitably complicate the situation in that area even more with all the ensuing consequences for the international situation as a whole.

The American side cannot but recognize that this course of actions by the United States of America, as a result of which the situation develops toward an expansion of the war instead of progress in achieving a peaceful settlement of existing conflicts, is far from contributing to the creation of favorable conditions also for the undertakings aimed at improving the Soviet-American relations. We would like this to be perfectly clear to the President.

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5 No classification marking. Two handwritten notes read: “Rec’d 2/26/71” and “Note handed to HAK by Dobrynin 4 Feb 71.”
108. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

[Omitted here is discussion of the military situation in Vietnam and of ambassadorial appointments.]

K: Well, our experience, Mr. President, has been that when you put your friends in the key spots we can work with them.

P: Right.

K: Without Watson\(^2\) and Rush\(^3\) in this little game—the Russians have been very mild.

P: And Annenberg.\(^4\)

K: And Annenberg.

P: Oh, incidentally, how about Bruce\(^5\) for Moscow?

K: Oh, that would be a ten strike. Now that is really—that is superlative. Because there we could pull him back for Vietnam if we needed him briefly.

P: Also [omission in transcript]

K: Oh, that would be spectacular.

P: See my point.

K: Oh, yeah. And then we could do some of the other business through him, too, if we had to.

P: Bruce or Dewey\(^6\) could [omission in transcript]

K: Right, but Bruce would be better because he is subtle. Bruce would be a ten strike.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the transcript indicates that it was “typed Feb. 7, 1971” and “may be the end of a previous tape.” Although the transcript is undated, references in the text to a WSAG meeting “today” and a meeting with Moorer “tomorrow” clearly indicate that it took place on the evening of February 4. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon talked to Kissinger by telephone on February 4 from 8:02 until 8:07 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

\(^2\) Arthur K. Watson, Ambassador to France.

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 107.

\(^4\) Walter H. Annenberg, Ambassador to Great Britain.

\(^5\) David K.E. Bruce, former Ambassador to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, was at this time the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.

\(^6\) Thomas E. Dewey, former Governor of New York.
P: I’ve got to get that other fellow out of Moscow.⁷

K: Oh, no, even without the Muskie fiasco he really proved that he can’t do that sort of thing. The Russians just don’t take him seriously enough.

P: It isn’t necessary to speak Russian they translate everything anyway.

K: Oh, it is totally unnecessary to speak Russian.

P: Wouldn’t Bruce be superb?

K: Bruce would be exactly the right man because as it is now Dobrynin is winding up in an absolutely key position because he does all the business and this way we could ship some of the negotiations to Bruce. For example in this . . .

P: [omission in transcript] like what he is doing [omission in transcript] being active—

K: Oh, he loves it.

P: Good.

K: Of course his wife⁸ loves the social life and she probably prefers Paris.

P: Oh, any wife would love to be in Moscow [omission in transcript]

K: Exactly. In any rate he’s a tough old bird, he’ll handle her. No, he’d love that. That I think would be really good and it would also be a signal to the Russians that you really mean to do serious business with them. I got the word to Harriman about Dobrynin and the way I did it.

P: How did you do it?

K: Well, I did it—we had that WSAG meeting today—Sullivan⁹ was there today—so I went over the reactions of various countries and checked again [omission in transcript] the Chinese going to come in and everybody thinks not—that’s the Russian reaction and everyone agreed it was very mild. Then Alex Johnson said the other evening the Secretary met Dobrynin at a dinner and Dobrynin couldn’t have been more affable and never mentioned the word Laos. I said, yes I was at that dinner and what was so amazing considering what’s in the papers about Laos he really lit into Harriman. As if I was just picking up Alex Johnson’s saying. I said he thought he was [omission in transcript]

P: [omission in transcript]

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⁷ Ambassador Jacob Beam.
⁸ Evangeline Bruce.
⁹ William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, had served under Harriman during the initial round of the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1968–1969.
K: Well, that’s what I figured. I figured that Sullivan would be running to a phone before he was out of the White House. Bunker told me that Harriman had been driving him crazy on the phone and he’s having lunch with him today.

P: Will Bunker know how to handle Harriman?¹⁰
K: Oh, yes.

[Omitted here is discussion of estimates on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.]

¹⁰ According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Bunker on February 4 from 5:28 to 5:33 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

109. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹


SUBJECT

Khrushchev Remembers

The Department of State recently organized an interesting round-table discussion on the book Khrushchev Remembers.² The participants included Ambassadors Kennan and Thompson, as well as Sovietologists from government agencies, including the NSC staff.

The following are the highlights of the discussion, as reported to you in a memorandum from Secretary Rogers (Tab A).³

—The participants were unanimous that the book was “authentic” Khrushchev, but had passed through several censors and could

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt, who attended the round-table discussion, forwarded a draft of this memorandum, based largely on Rogers’s memorandum to the President (see footnote 3 below), to Kissinger on February 5. According to a note and attached correspondence profile, the President saw the memorandum on February 17.

² The Bureau of Intelligence and Research hosted the discussion on January 11. For further discussion of Khrushchev’s memoirs, see Document 74.

³ Dated February 2; attached but not printed.
therefore not be accepted uncritically. *Time* hints that actual tape recordings were part of the materials received, and were validated by voice print. *Time* paid $350–400,000 to a numbered account in a Swiss bank.⁴

—Khrushchev himself was probably unaware of the operation with *Time*, but some members of his family probably were involved. Their purpose was to raise misgivings about the increasingly conservative policies of the present regime.

—An understanding of the extent of official Soviet involvement in the entire operation is crucial to any understanding of the import of the book, but the information currently available is not sufficient to permit informed judgments. The Soviet KGB became aware of the flow of material at some point, but perhaps too late to stop it.

—Most of the participants doubted that the operation was sponsored by any high-level Soviet political leader. Nevertheless, the effect of the book’s appearance cannot fail to heighten tension with the leadership, since the major criticism is directed against many of the current domestic policies of the Politburo.

No doubt the mystery of this affair will continue to intrigue Kremlinologists for a long time. It is interesting that in contrast to the American consensus that the book is largely “authentic” and sponsored by the Khrushchev family, some British Sovietologists are convinced that it is totally an operation of the KGB, while others blame the CIA. Some even blame both simultaneously.

All seem to agree, however, that even with the doubts hanging over the book, it does not add much to what is already known of the period covered. Many of the anecdotes and descriptions of events are almost identical to Khrushchev stories previously told by him.

If you have the time, you may want to read some of the memorandum since it is one of the more fascinating tales of intrigue to appear in a long time.

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⁴ The President underlined this sentence.
Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

Dinner lasted about 2 1/2 hours and was conducted with extreme cordiality despite the fact that Vietnamese troops had invaded Laos with U.S. air support two days earlier. Laos was not mentioned directly or indirectly nor was the Indochinese conflict. Dobrynin conducted the conversation in a very precise way. It was divided into segments, which were taken up in the following order:

The Middle East

Dobrynin asked whether I was prepared to give him an answer to his question that he and I discussed in a preliminary way about the Middle East. I said the President had authorized me to discuss with him what he had in mind, and I suggested again that he and Sisco resume their conversations.

Dobrynin said that he was very reluctant to talk with Sisco because he considered the outcome foreordained. I then told him that if they were eager to talk about the opening of the Suez Canal, I could proceed on this immediately because I had some indication that we might be prepared to use our influence with the Israelis for a partial withdrawal to achieve this objective. Dobrynin showed no interest in this at all. He said, “Yes, this is a partial step and if the Egyptians want it, we would be willing to go along but it was not a principal Soviet objective.” He said that my message to that effect had been communicated to the Egyptians and had been reflected in the Sadat proposal. But Dobrynin did not indicate that this was a primary subject for our channel. On the contrary, he said he was most eager to begin talking

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. Brackets are in the original, which was drafted on February 16. David Young forwarded the draft memorandum and another summarizing its “highlights” for the President to Kissinger the next day. After Kissinger corrected the text, Haig initialed the memorandum for the President on Kissinger’s behalf on February 22. Notes on both memoranda indicate that the President saw them. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger left the White House at 8:10 p.m. for his “dinner meeting” with Dobrynin. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 See Document 105.
in our channel about the basis for a settlement, specifically, how to phrase specific recommendations for Jarring—to give Jarring something to talk about. I asked how he proposed to proceed with this. He said that the Soviet Union had accepted all of our proposals on the guarantee side, and now the issue was for us to tell them what we were prepared to give on the withdrawal side. It seemed to him that those were the only worthwhile issues and that Jerusalem could be left for later.

I said that I had mentioned to him that we had a special problem with the Golan Heights. Dobrynin replied that he had heard this in the previous conversation, but he had pretended to ignore it because he wished that it not be raised at this moment.

He returned to the issue of the Soviet proposal of June 1970. He repeated that the Soviet Union had, in effect, accepted all of our proposals and he recommended that I go over the list of the Soviet positions to tell him which were not acceptable and which needed to be strengthened. I mentioned that it seemed to me that to ask for an international force on both sides of the border might be too difficult for the Israelis to accept.

Dobrynin said, “But, Sisco has already accepted it.” Nevertheless, if I wanted to re-raise it, he would be glad to transmit it to Moscow. He said the major problem was for us to give him some clear indication of what frontiers we were willing to ask Israel to return to. This could then be included in a package with the Soviet proposal for guarantees for peace and for control of the Fedayeen; it was the only possible procedure. The Arabs had said very often that they would not make a direct statement of their commitments until there was an Israeli withdrawal, and they were using the Soviet Union to express their commitment. He, therefore, proposed that I go over the list of outstanding issues and that we concentrate on those that were not yet agreed to.

I said I would have to take up the matter with the President. Dobrynin was obviously puzzled by my reluctance to engage myself and repeatedly urged me to make sure to attempt to use my influence. I told him there was a particular bureaucratic problem, an argument he simply rejected. We deferred this issue until a later meeting.

Berlin

Dobrynin asked me what answers I had for him on the Berlin issue.\(^3\) I said that I had discussed the matter with Bahr and also with

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\(^3\) The Western Allies formally tabled a draft Berlin agreement on February 5. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 173.
Rush, and we had worked out a procedure of communicating so that I would know the German position as well as the position of our principal negotiators. Whenever I saw him, I would try to be informed of these two positions. If Dobrynin and I agreed, we could then introduce it first into the four power western context and then into the four power negotiating context. Dobrynin asked me what specifically Bahr had been prepared to give on the issue of Federal presence. I said that Bahr had not been willing to go beyond what had been offered in the document that had been submitted to Abrasimov—that is to say, the constitutional organs should not meet in Berlin. Dobrynin indicated that this would not be satisfactory. I said that at some point there had been a discussion about committees and meetings of the parliamentary party groups, but that the Germans had been unwilling to accept that. Dobrynin said he could not understand how committees could meet if constitutional organs were excluded. I said that committees not being mentioned in the constitution were not considered constitutional organs. Dobrynin said that if the Bundestag was a constitutional organ, its committees had to be. I told him this was not the German interpretation, and Dobrynin said that this was legalistic word-picking.

Dobrynin then asked about the formula by which the German Ministries were to be put under the plenipotentiary of the Federal Government in Berlin. He said that, too, was not acceptable. I said removal of the Ministries was not acceptable to us. He asked, “Well, then, what is the compromise?” I said the only procedure on this issue was for us to query Bahr and Rush and to defer it until the next meeting. We would use our influence for a constructive solution, but a constructive solution depended on some agreement on accesses, Bahr had told me. A great deal, therefore, depended on what the Soviets were prepared to give on access. Dobrynin said he could not understand our point of view on access. We constantly came to the Soviets with a number of principles. The Soviet Union would probably be prepared to grant many of those, but he and I had to recognize that what governed access was not principles, but some detailed technical procedures. Why could we not let the Germans talk about these? I said I was sure that the Germans could talk about these as soon as the basic principles were agreed to and if the agreement between the two Germanys were to be expressed in some common guarantee.

Dobrynin said there was one difficulty with the principles. We were asking the Soviet Union to agree to the Four Power responsibility for access to Berlin; however, this put the Soviet Union into the same difficulty, as if they were demanding participation in the responsibil-

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4 See Document 104; footnote 3, Document 106; and footnote 2, Document 107.
ity for West Berlin. The Soviet Union had agreed that we could express our responsibility in the form of a Three Power declaration, and Dobrynin wondered whether we could not be satisfied with a Soviet expression of responsibility for access in the form of a unilateral Soviet declaration of what the Soviets understand the GDR’s views of the principles of access to be—which would then be included in the general guarantees. I told Dobrynin that this sounded like a distinct possibility. [I based this on a meeting of the Senior Review Group in the afternoon in which I had studied fall-back positions and Hillenbrand had indicated that this was our fall-back position on access.] 

I told him I would query Rush and Bahr and let him know the answer at our next meeting the following week. Dobrynin asked whether he should report this to Moscow. I said that was entirely up to him. Dobrynin said that Moscow found it very hard to understand how somebody in my position could say that he thought something was reasonable without committing himself completely. When Soviet diplomats said something, they always were sure that their government was 100 per cent behind it. I said I was sure about our governmental position but, before making a commitment, I wanted to make sure what the Germans thought about it since we did not want to be in a position of squeezing our own allies. Dobrynin said this was acceptable and we would review the situation next week.

SALT

Dobrynin then asked again whether our proposal foresaw only a numerical limitation or also a limitation on modernization. I said as I had presented it, it foresaw a limitation only on numbers. Dobrynin then asked whether we included land-based systems only or sea-based ones as well. I said we were prepared to do either. Dobrynin then asked me whether I had any particular length of time in mind if an agreement on ABM should include a commitment to negotiate offensive limitations. I replied we had no particular time limit in mind, but something like 18 months to two years would be acceptable.

Dobrynin then made the following statement. He said he had been authorized by the Politburo to convey to the President that the Soviet Union wanted a SALT agreement and the earlier the practical result, the better. The Soviet leaders agreed to a formal agreement on ABM. They preferred an agreement that was limited to capital cities, but they were willing to consider an agreement that included some missile sites on our side and the capital city on theirs.

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They wanted an agreement that was confined to numbers and did not preclude modernization. They were prepared to include in this agreement a commitment to undertake serious negotiations to bring about offensive limitations, and they were open to proposals as to the length of time. They were prepared to discuss sea-based systems, but they preferred not to do so at this point. The Soviet leaders were also prepared to accept a freeze on land-based construction as part of a tacit understanding, and they wondered how that might be expressed. I asked whether the Soviet leaders might be prepared to agree to a zero ABM level. Dobrynin said he doubted this. Dobrynin said that the Soviet leaders would prefer an agreement confined to capital cities—(1) because it seemed more symmetrical, and (2) because if we were limited to three missile fields and they to the capital cities, the Soviet public would think we got the better of the deal, and there had to be something else involved. I laughed and said that anyone who knew him and me would automatically assume that he had gotten the better of the deal. As to the intention to proceed with offensive limitations negotiations, I asked Dobrynin whether they were dealing conditionally—that is to say, would in his view the ABM agreement lapse if the negotiations did not succeed. He said no, it should be expressed not as a condition but as an expression of intention. I asked Dobrynin whether the freeze would lapse after 18 months or whatever limit was specified. Dobrynin said no; the freeze on offensive deployments could continue until an agreement on offensive limitations was signed. Dobrynin then asked me whether I had any ideas on how we could formalize the freeze. I said there would have to be something in writing lest it lead to a series of misunderstandings. Dobrynin suggested also that we come to an understanding prior to March 15 or the resumption of the SALT talks, so that the negotiators could be instructed to work out the detailed agreement.

I proposed the following procedure. Either the President would make a public speech to which the Soviet Union would reply or the President would write a letter to Kosygin to which the Soviet leader would reply, and the exchange could then become a statement of principles. Dobrynin said he liked the idea of the letter, and he suggested that we proceed at the next meeting by my giving him a draft of the letter which he could then transmit to Moscow and which we would then agree to settle on by the end of the month.

The Summit Meeting

Dobrynin indicated that if we followed this process, the agreement would be negotiated in its essential aspects at Vienna and signed at the Summit Meeting to which the Soviet leaders wanted to renew their invitation. Dobrynin asked whether I had gotten any clearer idea about the date of the Summit Meeting. I said the last week of July or the first week in August seemed reasonable. Dobrynin said the second week in
August was good weather in Moscow. I said that we had no fixed idea of the precise date, though the period of the last 10 days of July or the first 10 days in August still seemed the best to us. I asked Dobrynin for how long he thought the meeting should last. He said three days in Moscow. I mentioned that perhaps the President might want to visit another Soviet city. Dobrynin responded very aloofly and said he would have to consult Moscow. I did not pursue the matter.

Dobrynin then handed me a note from President Podgorny containing congratulations for the return of the astronauts. He also mentioned to me that he had been authorized to have technical discussions with Gerry Smith on the problem of improving communications between our two countries in case of accidental launches, a proposal which we had made at Vienna. He asked me whether he should notify Smith or whether this communication to me could constitute official notification. I told Dobrynin that I would let him know.

The meeting ended with an agreement that we get together again next week to pursue further the question of Berlin access and also for me to submit to him a draft letter on SALT.

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6 Dated February 10; attached but not printed.

111. Editorial Note

After his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on February 10, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger began to use “back channel” diplomacy to negotiate a quadripartite agreement on Berlin. On February 11, Kissinger accompanied President Richard Nixon to Key Biscayne, Florida for a four-day weekend. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) The next day, he sent the following message, via the special Navy channel in Frankfurt, to Ambassador Kenneth Rush in Bonn:

“Had long and extremely cordial talk with Dobrynin. With respect to Berlin, Dobrynin said that our draft agreement was unacceptable as it stood. We then talked about access and Federal Presence. About access Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union wanted its obligations stated in a manner analogous to the Western statement regarding Federal Presence as defined in Annex III. In other words Soviets wanted to state the principles on access after prefatory sentence along lines: ‘The USSR
has been informed that the following principles will guide access.' They would then include these in the guarantee of the last part. Do you believe the approach of a unilateral Soviet guarantee is acceptable if the principles are? If so, it would be best for many reasons if word came in this channel for Presidential reasons.

"About Federal Presence Dobrynin said draft would have to say something about committees and meetings of Fraktionen, though he indicated that he might settle for limitation rather than prohibition. If we agreed, you and Abrasimov could work out the details. What do you think?

"I made your points about the guarantee section to him. He indicated this would cause no problems after all other sections are agreed.

"Can you answer fairly urgently—especially on access question? President for other reasons seeks to be forthcoming but sensible." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

Although he did not discuss the details of his strategy in the message, Kissinger mentioned several “Presidential,” or “other,” reasons in his memoirs: “Clearly, if I linked Berlin to SALT,” he recalled, “the Soviets linked Berlin to a summit.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 814)

In a special channel message to Kissinger on February 14, Rush replied that he was “[v]ery pleased to hear of your cordial talk with Dobrynin.” “With regard to access,” he observed, “I believe the approach of a unilateral Soviet guarantee would be acceptable, provided the principles were adequately covered.” The issue of Federal presence in Berlin, on the other hand, was “very sensitive” in Bonn. Neither the governing coalition nor the opposition supported the limitation on the meetings of parliamentary committees and party groups in the former German capital. Rush concluded: “If we take a strong position, however, I believe some limitations on such meetings could be worked out.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

Kissinger returned to Washington with the President in the evening on February 15. (President’s Daily Diary; ibid., White House Central Files) The next day, he sent a follow-up message to Rush: “One question put by Dobrynin which I neglected to ask. With respect to the question of Federal Ministries, Dobrynin said that our proposal was unacceptable but that they were prepared to compromise. Do you have any suggestions?” (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]) Rush replied on February 17 that a “cosmetic approach” might be acceptable; perhaps the Federal ministries could be placed under a single Federal authority. After further discussion of political sensitivities in Bonn, Rush continued:
“As an ultimate, fall-back position, some consideration might be given to some limitation on the number of offices or the number of employees, for example, the same as at present, that the F.R.G. might have in West Berlin. Another possible limitation would be with regard to the nature of the ministries, for example, those dealing with economic, cultural, monetary, but not political, activities might be permitted. As of now there is no indication that any such limitations would be acceptable to the F.R.G., but the issue has never been seriously raised with them.” (Ibid.)

The full text of the messages cited above, as well as a similar exchange between Kissinger and West German State Secretary Egon Bahr, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 180, 182, and 183.

112. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 16, 1971, 1510Z.

956. Subj: Jewish Emigration. Ref: Moscow 902 (Notal).²

1. There have been recent indications that the regime is seeking to cope with Jewish “dissident” problem by permitting emigration of key vocal individuals who have had ties to Western correspondents and stepping up harassment of others in various ways. Experience with Leningrad hijacking trial³ has probably made Soviets more cautious about stirring up world public opinion over Jewish issue. This is undoubtedly reason why subsequently planned Leningrad, Riga, and Kishinev trials of Jews, which would have provided focal point for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–10 USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Munich and Tel Aviv.

² In telegram 902 from Moscow, February 12, the Embassy reported that Leonid Rigerman had just learned that he and his mother would be allowed to emigrate to the United States. (Ibid.) The Department instructed Beam to submit a formal note on exit visa representation “in order to capitalize on possibly short-lived Soviet gratitude on Ivanov and to avoid any inference that we consider Rigerman sufficient recompense.” (Telegram 24816 to Moscow, February 12; ibid.) After waiting until “Soviet reaction to Laos has worn off somewhat,” Beam presented the formal note to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on February 19. (Telegram 848 from Moscow, February 18; ibid.) The Rigermans, meanwhile, left Moscow and arrived in New York on February 20.

³ See Document 82.
international attention, have been suspended. New approach is evidently designed to curtail dissidents with minimum outside uproar.

2. Soviet decision to issue exit documents to Leonid Rigerman (and his mother) coming on heels of exit permission for other Jewish dissidents Tsukerman, Feigin, and Svichenskiy,\(^4\) indicates desire to get rid of individuals who have contributed to world-wide attention to Jewish emigration question. (Western press sources indicate that five additional Jewish dissidents with families are being permitted to leave at about same time as Rigermans.)\(^5\) These departures not only eliminate domestic trouble-makers, but also rob Western press corps of bulk of their contacts within Jewish dissident circles. (Embassy aware that Rigerman and Tsukerman have been primary sources of Western correspondents for information on Jewish developments.) Consequently, Soviets also undoubtedly hope that these departures will reduce flow of news to the West thus dimming spotlight on problems of Jewish life in Soviet Union.

3. At same time there are indications that authorities are increasing their pressures on bulk of Soviet Jews who have applied for emigration to Israel. Western correspondent has received report from reliable source that a Soviet Jewish musician, who has applied to emigrate to Israel, was recently accosted by group of thugs, questioned about his emigration plans and punched repeatedly. Correspondent has refrained from filing story pending receipt of permission from musician to use his name in article.

4. Western correspondents inform us that they have heard of numerous arrests for petty hooliganism of Jews who have sought to emigrate. Jewish circles reportedly preparing list of these arrests which would seem to be designed both to punish emigration applicants and to picture them as morally unsound. Most recent case being cited is that of LV Shenkar who sentenced to fifteen days for allegedly impeding work of service personnel in his apartment.

5. Other measures authorities reportedly taking are accelerating draft call-up of young Jews who have applied to emigrate and making it difficult for emigration applicant to secure work references which are necessary to complete application.

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\(^4\) Boris Tsukerman and Vitaly Svichensky, two prominent Soviet Jewish activists, and Grisha Feigin, a Soviet Jew and former Red Army war hero. All three had emigrated to Israel during the previous three weeks.

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

US-Soviet Discussions on Rules of Conduct at Sea

The US in 1968 offered to discuss with the Soviets methods of reducing incidents at sea between our Navies, such as buzzing and interference during maneuvers. The Soviets have now accepted this invitation, and have proposed opening discussions in Moscow in late March or early April.

State has just informed me that it has accepted the Soviet proposal, and that our team will be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, with a Navy officer as deputy. There has been no NSC or White House involvement in this course of action.

There are several sensitive issues involved in this situation: military, intelligence, legal and also the views of our Allies and significant third countries. There is also a weighty political impact.

In order to avoid uncoordinated US contacts and negotiations with the Soviets, you approved in early January the establishment of the NSC European inter-departmental group (IG/EUR) as the body responsible for this coordination. It was to report to the Senior Review Group, so that all NSC members and you would be promptly and properly appraised of significant issues for decision.

This system was not employed in this case. Indeed, this matter, involving so many agencies and sensitivities, is almost a classic example of what the new system was designed to treat. It is important to put these US-Soviet negotiations back into the proper NSC channel.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–181, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 119. Secret. Sent for action. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft to Kissinger on February 10 with the comment: “Frankly, I find it incomprehensible how State could have decided to undertake what amounts to negotiations with the Soviets on a very sensitive subject—without seeking White House approval for doing so, or at the very least notification prior to acceptance of the Soviet offer.” Sonnenfeldt, therefore, recommended that Kissinger either sign the draft NSSM or raise the issue informally with Irwin. “Since the decision between these alternatives turns in part on your relations with State,” he added, “I find it difficult to offer a recommendation as between them.” (Ibid.) A note and attached correspondence profile indicate that the President saw the memorandum from Kissinger on February 19.

2 For background on U.S. attempts to initiate private talks on the subject, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 266 and 284.

3 Eliot briefed Kissinger on the proposal in an attached February 3 memorandum.

4 See Document 87.
The NSSM at Tab A directs that the NSC IG/EUR should submit to the SRG by March 1 a study of the issues and alternatives, and a negotiating plan for these US-Soviet talks. If you approve, I shall dispatch this NSSM.

Recommendation

That you approve the dispatch of the NSSM at Tab A.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{5} Haig initialed the President’s approval of this recommendation. Kissinger signed NSSM 119 to Rogers, Laird, and Helms on February 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), Nos. 104–206) The deadline for the interagency response, which was set for March 8 in the memorandum, was extended several times at the request of the Department of State. (Memoranda from Davis to Eliot, February 27 and March 15; ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–181, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 119)

114. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\textsuperscript{1}


[Omitted here is a brief exchange unrelated to the Soviet Union.]
Kissinger: The Russians now have put a tender back—
Nixon: Yeah, I saw that.
Kissinger: —in Cienfuegos and a nuclear submarine next to it.\textsuperscript{2}
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And that really is a kick in the teeth in the light of what you said on your—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —television program.\textsuperscript{3} Of course, it was produced by all these leaked stories that came out early in January saying that no one—well, that’s not the story now.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 450–11. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to his Daily Diary, the President met with Kissinger in the Oval Office on February 16 from 10:48 to 11:03 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
\textsuperscript{2} See Document 117.
\textsuperscript{3} Reference is presumably to the President’s televised “conversation” on January 4. See Document 81.
Nixon: The Soviet Union [unclear] that was exactly what they did. Kissinger: That's right. But I then told—Nixon: Isn't that what the understanding was? Kissinger: That is the understanding. But I told Ehrlichman early in January. There were two stories in the New York Times saying State didn’t think—that State thought we exaggerated it and there was no problem. I told him—I said they’d be back there in six weeks and here they are. I think I ought to tell Dobrynin that until this damn nuclear submarine leaves I can’t continue talking to him.

Nixon: Yeah. Well, now do you consider [unclear]? Do you consider that a violation of the understanding?

Kissinger: I would think you should say something very enigmatic: “The Soviets know the understanding and the consequences.”

Nixon: Yeah, I saw that. All right. You could say that. But as a matter of fact, they—

Kissinger: This comes very close—

Nixon: They better not—it’s servicing a nuclear submarine.

Kissinger: Well, it says that when they have a nuclear submarine next to a tender—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: It’s also—if we then say this is servicing unit—if they can establish that, then—

Nixon: Yeah. Okay.

Kissinger: [Mr.] President, they’re really putting it to us. If they put a submarine into Havana and a tender into Cienfuegos, it would be rough but we could close our eyes. But I think on this one, I hate to run any risks on the thing that’s going on now, but our experience with them is whenever we’ve played it hard—if they really want that summit and that agreement, particularly now that we’re giving them their goodies on Berlin—

Nixon: Well, we have to do it because we said so, Henry.

Kissinger: So—

Nixon: Don’t you understand?

Kissinger: Mr. President, what is—

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4 Max Frankel reported in the New York Times on January 7 (pp. 1, 4) that “some senior officials” had concluded that the presence of Soviet naval vessels near Cienfuegos the previous autumn “should not have been represented as a crisis point.” “Mr. Nixon now believes,” Frankel added, “the Russians will not risk a quarrel in the Caribbean for only marginal logistic advantage for their submarines.” According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Ehrlichman on January 7 from 9:55 to 10:10 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
Nixon: What are [unclear]?

Kissinger: That’s what they—sort of, yes. They’re probably going to make the distinction between port visits and servicing. But—and it’s all right if they have a port visit without the tender and the tender next to the—

Nixon: Well, when do we find out? You have to make the distinction if it’s real. This is not a—This is what kind of a submarine?

Kissinger: It’s a nuclear-powered submarine.

Nixon: I know. With missiles—?

Kissinger: I don’t know if it’s an attack submarine.

Nixon: Yeah. But we consider that—oh, I know what we said: “nuclear submarine free.”

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: You didn’t say anything about the other. Remember, I had to raise the question.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: As you’ll recall, all the others said “no,” right?

Kissinger: Well, because the British, the Navy, everybody felt that that distinction—

Nixon: Is meaningless?

Kissinger: —is practically meaningless. No, it’s one of their games. They are just a bunch of thugs.

Nixon: They just are. And then—what else? Well, play it tough with the Soviet, too.

Kissinger: And—


Kissinger: I’ll just tell him until that submarine leaves Cienfuegos I won’t continue my conversations with him. I think it will leave.

Nixon: Just tell him he started this thing.

Kissinger: Right. I think it’s the only thing he respects. I’ve got the whole thing set but I think if we let them put it to us and continue talking as if nothing were happening—

Nixon: I know. [unclear]

Kissinger: You have publicly said “servicing in or from Cuban ports.”

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule, SALT, and Vietnam.]
115. **Memorandum of Conversation**


PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

SUBJECT

Soviet submarine in Cienfuegos Harbor

I made an appointment with Dobrynin on the first day back from Key Biscayne as soon as I had word that the submarine tender and a nuclear submarine had returned to Cienfuegos.

Dobrynin began the conversation in a very jovial mood and asked me whether any progress had been made on Berlin. I told him I had received some answers on Berlin from Bahr and from Rush, but I was in no position to proceed because I had a particular matter to discuss about Cuba.

I said that Soviet behavior puzzled me. At the precise moment that we began conversations leading toward a Summit, a Soviet submarine tender and nuclear submarine appeared in Cienfuegos Harbor. We had made it very clear that we would not tolerate the servicing of nuclear attack submarines in or from Cienfuegos Harbor. We had also made it clear that we considered a submarine tender as constituting an essential element of a base, and here it was back.

Dobrynin rejoined that this was only a port call as the Soviets had told us would take place, and he could not understand why every time a Soviet ship showed up in the Caribbean I called his attention to it.

I said that I wanted to insist once more that this was a matter of good faith. The submarine tender had not been gone from Cuba for 30 days before another submarine tender appeared. If the Soviet Union

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 3:15 to 3:55 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing it (as well as the memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on February 22) to Nixon on February 27. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

2 See Document 111.

3 On February 6, Izvestia published the following TASS announcement: “In February a detachment of Soviet warships completing a training voyage in the Central Atlantic—a large anti-submarine ship, a submarine, a supply ship and a tanker—will make an official visit to ports in the Republic of Cuba in accordance with an agreement.” (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (March 9, 1971), p. 31)
wanted to provoke a crisis, I could understand it, though I would have expected them to provoke a crisis in an area which was more advantageous to them.

Dobrynin asked whether I was saying that every time the Soviet Union appeared in Cuban waters they had to give an account to us. I said that the matter was perfectly simple. The submarine tender in Cienfuegos, together with the installations that already existed there, represented an essential element of a naval base and was, therefore, contrary to our understanding. Dobrynin wanted to turn the conversation to Berlin. I said I was not prepared to discuss it until I had some explanation on the naval base and on the submarine tender.

Dobrynin said that this would be construed as very arrogant in Moscow. I replied that in the United States their behavior was construed as being very provocative. He said, "Will you be prepared to talk again on Friday?" I said I doubted it. Dobrynin said he had a message from Hanoi, but under the circumstances, he was prepared to wait with it. I said that it was entirely up to him whether he wanted to deliver it.

Dobrynin said it was a pity that matters had reached this point, and we had to remember that their military people also presented certain problems. I said I was assuming that each side would take care of their own people, and the meeting broke up in a rather chilly atmosphere.

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4 February 19.

116. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 17, 1971, 9:20 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of Laos and the Middle East.]

P: What about Dobrynin and that submarine?

K: I told him. It was a pretty starchy conversation.² He said, do we have to check every submarine with you? I said no, just nuclear submarines and with a tender then it’s a base. He wanted to talk about

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.
² See Document 115.
the other business. I said we had better wait a few days. He did say he had a message from Hanoi to us. I said if we had a ceasefire through 72 many things could be discussed. He said he had an answer but he wouldn’t give it because of Berlin. He will give it to me. We have to show they cannot play with us while we are negotiating.

P: We have piddled around too much in getting stuff into the Baltic (and Mediterranean). Which will worry them the most?

K: Both. A larger ship into the Black Sea, like a cruiser.

P: Let’s play that. They will talk.

K: It’s a cheap move.

P: I will say we are watching it.

K: Just refer to the statement—“I would like to recall my statement that nuclear submarines being [omission in transcript].”

P: Just leave it where it is. We can’t change it now.

K: He knows that offensive weapons—they have weapons that can reach the U.S. on other submarines. This is an attack submarine.

P: The other was phrased and I don’t think we should fool around with it. Because then we are giving an edge. Perhaps we should have said it before but now we are stuck with it. Leave it “nuclear submarines.” I won’t quibble about that.

[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Vietnam.]

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3 During his press conference that afternoon, the President received a question about the Soviet submarine in Cuban waters. “On December 10, you may recall,” Nixon replied, “I said that if a nuclear submarine were serviced from Cuba or in Cuba, that this would be a violation of our understanding with regard to the Soviet Union’s activities in putting offensive weapons or a base in Cuba. Now as far as this submarine is concerned, the question is a rather technical one, whether it is there for a port call or whether it is there for servicing. We are watching it very closely. The Soviet Union is aware of the fact that we consider that there is an understanding and we will, of course, bring the matter to their attention if we find that the understanding is violated.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. 163) Nixon meant to refer to his remarks on Cuba—not during his press conference on December 10, 1970—but during his televised “conversation” on January 4, 1971. See Document 81.

4 During a telephone conversation that afternoon, Kissinger briefed U. Alexis Johnson on Nixon’s comments to the press on Cuba. According to the transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “K: He said there’s an understanding regarding offensive weapons and nuclear submarines. J: He did that deliberately? I don’t think we are on solid grounds on that. I think it may come back to haunt us. They may come back at us with that. On Jan. 4 statement it was passed over and people read that as—. K: We could go back to the record. J: I went back to your conversation on that and it’s clear. I think we should stay with that. We are on good ground with that. I think we have a problem with what we do with the Soviets. K: What should we do? J: Call Dobrynin in and say, ‘How come?’ Go back on the record on this tender. It’s more than an occasional port call.” Kissinger asked Johnson to “write from record what you think the understanding is in 3–4 sentences. I think time is to hand it to him [Dobrynin] again and say this is it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

HAK TALKING POINTS
WASAG MEETING–CUBA

The purpose of this meeting is to develop the posture we want to take publicly and privately on the latest Soviet submarine and tender visit to Cienfuegos.

(On February 4 a press announcement out of Moscow reported that a group of Soviet naval ships would be visiting Cuba. On February 9 and 10 a group of Soviet vessels entered the Caribbean. The group consisted of a Kresta-I-class light guided-missile cruiser, the merchant tanker Liepaya, an UGRA subtender and an N-class nuclear-powered attack submarine. The cruiser and tanker entered Havana harbor on February 10. The tender and submarine entered Cienfuegos harbor on Sunday, February 14, and remain there. The cruiser left Havana on Monday February 15 and was last located Wednesday 70 nautical miles off the Louisiana coast. The tanker probably remains in Havana. An Okean-class intelligence collector, which entered the Caribbean Monday, was east of Jamaica on Wednesday.

U–2 photography taken Sunday February 14 shows the subtender moored to the four buoys north of Alcatraz Island in Cienfuegos harbor. The N-class submarine and an ocean rescue tug (which has been in the harbor since the last Soviet naval visit) were moored on either side of the tender. The soccer field on Cayo Alcatraz has been prepared for use and the submarine net at the entrance to the naval basin was closed. The two nuclear submarine support barges remain at the Cuban naval base in Cienfuegos.)

You will want to quickly update the situation and then proceed to consider the issues involved in our public and private position. Your Talking Points proceed in this way:

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–080, Meeting Files, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Southeast Asia 2–18–71. Top Secret; Sensitive. The paper was prepared for Kissinger's use during the WSAG meeting on February 18. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger chaired the WSAG meeting on February 18 from 3:05 to 4:22 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Minutes of the discussion on Laos are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1971 [4 of 5]. Although the issue was evidently discussed, no minutes on Cuba have been found.

2 See footnote 3, Document 115.
1. The Situation.

Ask Mr. Helms to update the situation.

—Has there been any further improvement to “Soviet naval support” facilities at Cienfuegos? Where are the Soviet ships now?

—Do we have any indication of Soviet intentions? How long will the tender and sub remain? What is purpose of visit? Is the sub being serviced? (There can be little doubt on this point with the sub tied up to the tender.)

Ask Admiral Moorer to describe briefly the surveillance steps we are taking.

2. Our Position.

—How should we interpret this current Soviet visit to Cienfuegos?

—After our reaction in September and the Soviet withdrawal of the tender, is this visit by the tender and the sub an act of provocation? (It seems to evidence some bad faith at least. The Soviets, however they may be interpreting our earlier statements, seem to be testing the limits of our tolerance again.)

—The President has reiterated his January 4 statement that we would consider servicing of a Soviet nuclear sub in or from Cuba as a violation of our understanding on Soviet offensive weapons or base in Cuba. (He left an opening in the present case by saying it is not clear whether this visit is for servicing or a port call.) (Tab A)³

—We need to decide (1) the position we will take publicly and in private and (2) what specific steps, if any, we should take.

3. The Issue.

—Do we consider the visit and servicing of the N-Class sub a violation of the understanding? (It is nuclear powered but does not carry offensive missiles.)

—There seem to be three principal choices:

1. We can contest it—saying that our understanding precludes the servicing of a nuclear powered submarine.

2. We can take the position that since this type of submarine does not carry offensive missiles, its visit or servicing is not precluded by our understanding. (We would clarify “nuclear” to mean nuclear armed, not nuclear powered.)

3. We can take the position that the visit and servicing of a nuclear-powered submarine (without missiles) is not precluded unless that submarine goes back to sea and operates in adjacent waters rather than returning to the Soviet Union.

³ Tab A is the excerpt on Cuba from the President’s press conference on February 17. See footnote 3, Document 116.
OPTION I

We could contest the presence of the tender and the N-class submarine as a clear violation of the “understanding”. This means interpreting the understanding to exclude any “nuclear” submarines, either offensive or attack. The grounds for contesting it would be (a) that the Soviets have agreed not to use Cuba as a “military base” (in the Tass statement), and therefore, the presence of submarines in Cienfuegos harbor and the servicing cannot be allowed.

The principal questions are:
—Is there a basis for taking this position in the record of exchanges with the USSR?
—What steps would be demanded of the Soviets?
—What steps would we have to take to enforce this position, now, and in the future around Cuba or elsewhere?

If we choose not to contest the current deployment, what are likely follow up measures by the Soviets?
—More “port calls” by N-Class?
—Port calls by Y Class?
—Operations conducted by N-Class in adjacent waters?

OPTION II

We could take the position that “nuclear” applies only to offensive weaponry, that is “nuclear armed” ballistic submarines rather than “nuclear powered” and the presence of the N-Class is thus permissible. This could mean allowing the “servicing in and from Cuba” of attack submarines on the grounds that there is no “understanding” regarding attack submarines as such.

Questions:
What are the probable consequences and new contingencies implied in this position?
—Would we consider it acceptable for the attack submarine to operate in the Caribbean?
—Could it return to Cienfuegos, or would we expect it to return to the USSR?
—Does this position leave open the possibility that a Y-Class submarine could make a “port call”?

In short would this position store up problems for another challenge later?

OPTION III

We could take a position that what matters is not the presence of attack submarines but whether they conduct military operations after servicing in
or from Cuba. Under this approach we would rely on the "understanding" that Cuba cannot be a Soviet military base, regardless of whether the submarines involved were offensive or defensive. We would thereby accept "port calls" provided military operations were excluded.

Questions:

What steps would we expect of the Soviets under this approach:
—That the N-Class return directly to the USSR; could we verify this or would the sub disappear in the Atlantic?
—Does this represent a unilateral broadening of the 1962 understanding or the exchanges of last fall?
—What about non-nuclear powered attack submarines?
—Would limiting operations of attack submarines, rather than limiting presence in any way weaken the case against "port calls" by Y-class submarines; or could we still claim the presence of "offensive" weapons systems was precluded?


There are some important tactical considerations depending on which Option is chosen:

a. Do we want to clarify our position unilaterally, and then approach the Soviets?
   b. Or do we want to try to work out a new clarification with the Soviets, before taking any further public positions.

—Option I (contesting outright) is obviously the most dangerous. We could not embark on it without some more detailed planning:
   1. What are the minimum demands we would put to the Soviets?
   2. What means of pressure can we exert to make our demands credible?
   3. What are likely Soviet reactions?

—If we choose this approach we need a diplomatic scenario for use with the Soviets, a military and CIA scenario of possible pressure tactics, as well as political moves elsewhere, and a contingency statement for public use.

Options II and III are primarily clarifications of our interpretation of the understanding. They would require private discussions with the Soviets, but could begin with a unilateral US public statement.

—If we choose Option II (permitting presence of N-Class on grounds that "nuclear" means only nuclear armed) this can be done by early public statements. Follow up would be to explain to Soviets that this does not mean that Y-Class can make port calls in Cuba.
—If we choose Option III (to try to impose restrictions on operations of all attack submarines from Cuba), this requires that:

—We warn the Soviets that:

a. All missile-carrying submarines are excluded from visits, port calls, or any kind of presence in Cuba.

b. All other submarines cannot use Cuba as a base for operations though we do not exclude them from making “port calls” in Cuba—i.e., visits and departure from the area without operations. Thus, “servicing” per se of attack subs would not be excluded, “servicing for military operations” would be.

—These two points would be the substance of a public statement.

118. Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


Henry:

Re Cuba:

I was not able to work on the options this morning because of the SALT section of the President’s Report.

But I believe strongly that we must consider a really hard option whereby we in effect tell the Soviets that their practices have convinced us that it would be inconsistent with the Understandings if they put a tender and a nuclear submarine into Cuba or adjacent waters simultaneously.

It is argued that this would require them to stop doing something that has been going on for four years. So what? We now have an understanding, or interpretation of the 1962 understanding, that precludes servicing of nuclear submarines. That is the basis from which we must start. Talmudic distinctions near the edge of the understanding simply will not do in an area of the world where we have all the major cards. It is bad enough that other naval “business calls” have not been contested since in fact the “business” includes activities that force us to make expensive dispositions in return.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba [Jan/Feb 71]. No classification marking.
Obviously the maximum position (not all that maximum) could land us in a confrontation. But what if we told the Russians that as long as they do what they are doing now we find it very difficult to resist the constant pressures from Cuban refugees to harass Castro.

On the matter of stopping someone from doing something he has been doing for a long time I refer to the Berlin talks where twenty-year-old practices are constantly being challenged, and, if our proposals were accepted, successfully so.

I hope you will consider the strong option and discuss it fully.

HS

119. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Review of US–USSR Positions on Mid-East

Summary
This memo makes the following points:

—The documents that were the focus of the 1969–70 US–USSR talks have been overtaken by the start of the Jarring talks. Some of the issues remain, but they will be discussed now in a different context.

—If bilateral talks with the Soviets were resumed as long as the Jarring talks were moving ahead, it should logically be either on the subject of the US and Soviet relationship in the Mid-East after a

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General), Vol. 8, 1971 [2 of 3]. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A note on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. In a separate memorandum to Kissinger on February 19, Saunders commented that this memorandum was “in response to your question for a review of where we stand. I assume that what you are concerned about principally is whether we are too much leaving the Soviets out of the current peacemaking effort and will regret this later. This memorandum is written with that specific question in mind and is designed to give you a chance to review our present posture from that angle. It suggests requesting a memo on strategy toward the USSR at the next SRG.” (Ibid.)

2 For additional background on some of the issues discussed in this memorandum, see Document 9.
settlement or on some specific point necessary to break a deadlock. The former includes not only the obvious questions of possible US and Soviet guarantees or participation in peacekeeping forces but the even more difficult question of how to reduce the Soviet combat presence in Egypt.

—The next subject for the SRG agenda, after the meeting on strategy toward Israel, should be strategy for involving the USSR in the settlement process (if any).

The Issues

The US peace initiative last June changed the character of the US-Soviet relationship on the Mid-East in the following ways:

—The US dropped the multilateral effort to launch negotiations and made a unilateral effort.

—Increasingly since, the focus of efforts to achieve a settlement has been on the Jarring talks with the US as a not too veiled prime mover behind them. The USSR (except for the standstill violations) has been left in the wings.

—The documents which had been the focus for the earlier US–USSR talks have been overtaken by the US initiative because they were documents to get Jarring started. Parts of them will go on living because Jarring has incorporated them in his document, other parts may reappear if negotiations proceed. It seems likely now that if the US and USSR were to re-start negotiation on the terms of a settlement, they would start from a new base.

—The Soviets have sought to re-enter the negotiating picture by proposing discussion of guarantees.

The issues raised are the extent to which the USSR can safely be left out of the negotiating process and what kind of US–USSR relationship will exist if and when it is over:

—Is it safe, on the one hand, to assume that the USSR will acquiesce in any agreement Jarring (with U.S. support) can work out?

—Is it safe, on the other, to assume that there is no contribution that could be made by further U.S.-Soviet understanding to the process of achieving agreement?

3 Reference is presumably to the Rogers Plan. See footnote 4, Document 31.
4 After receiving separate proposals from Tel Aviv and Cairo, Jarring drafted a memorandum on “parallel and simultaneous commitments,” which he presented separately to Israeli and Egyptian representatives in New York on February 8. In its reply one week later, Egypt accepted these commitments but added several additional conditions. Israel replied on February 26, offering to negotiate without prior conditions but refusing to consider withdrawal from the occupied territories. For the corrected texts of the Jarring memorandum and the Egyptian reply, see the New York Times, March 11, 1971, p. 8. For the text of the Israeli reply, see ibid., March 8, 1971, p. 2.
Finally, how can we assure that the USSR will not end up with a substantial combat military presence in the UAR?

Where the US–USSR Talks Stand

You are aware of where these talks stand tactically. The question you have asked is where they stand in terms of substance—points of agreement and points of remaining disagreement. Previous memos to you have described the evolution of the respective positions, and I shall be glad to send you another copy if you wish. What follows is a snapshot of where they stand now on the main issues.

The following can be described as points of general agreement, although there may still be remaining disagreement on details:

1. Obligations of peace. The Soviet formulation of June 2, 1970, on Arab obligation to limit fedayeen activity was the last major hurdle to general agreement on this point. By itself, it was satisfactory to us, and the UAR has now explicitly accepted this point in its response to Jarring’s memo. There are remaining details—e.g. end of boycott and trade discrimination—which Israel would like pinned down, but we have not tried to go into that much detail with the Soviets.

2. Nature of agreement. Both sides accept the idea of a contractual agreement between the parties.

3. Waterways. Both sides agree that Israel must have freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. Some qualification on the Soviet and Arab position remains, however, in that both relate passage through the Canal to the Constantinople Convention of 1888. That permits governments sovereign over canals to close them to states with whom they are at war.

The following can be described as points of remaining disagreement in rough order of importance:

1. Negotiating process. In one sense a compromise has been reached in the start of the Jarring talks, but the USSR continues to see these talks in a different light. In short, the USSR seeks to minimize actual negotiation while the U.S. seeks to maximize it. We no longer are arguing over the “Rhodes formula” because Israel agreed last August

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5 See footnote 6, Document 23.
6 The Constantinople Convention prohibited any interference—including in time of war—with free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal. Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey signed the convention in Constantinople on October 29, 1888. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 22, 1956, pp. 617–619.
7 Reference is to the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, negotiated by Ralph Bunche, then acting U.N. mediator on Palestine, and signed on the Greek island of Rhodes, February 24, 1949. For the text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 698–707.
to accept indirect talks at the outset. But the fact remains that the USSR continues to press for agreement on as much detail as possible in the Four Power talks while the U.S. resists any tendency to substitute agreement there for agreement between the parties. The Israelis seem almost certain to reactivate this issue at some point by insisting on face-to-face talks.

2. **Boundaries.** Formally, the USSR continues to insist on “total” Israeli withdrawal to pre-war lines. They opened the door a crack in informal Four-Power deputies’ drafting sessions to the possibility of small rectifications in the lines, but that is not their formal position. In any case, the Soviet position expressed so far does not seem to allow for the kinds of solutions that will probably be necessary in Jerusalem and on the Golan Heights.

3. **Refugees.** The US has accepted the principle of free choice for the refugees between repatriation to Israel and resettlement with compensation. But the US has balanced this with progressively more specific provisions—e.g. annual quotas—to give Israel control over the individuals and total number of refugees allowed repatriation. The USSR simply calls on Israel to implement past UN resolutions on this subject—a procedure which would give the refugees free choice without giving Israel any controls.

4. **Timing of withdrawal and peace.** This issue grew out of the effort to define in the draft documents of 1968 exactly when the peace agreement would become effective. The U.S. (because of Israel’s position) insisted that all commitments and obligations to peace should be in effect before the first Israeli soldier moved back. The Soviets started by trying to date de jure peace from the completion of Israeli withdrawal. In their June 2, 1970, document, they have compromised by saying that, juridically, cessation of the state of war and establishment of the state of peace would begin when the first stage of Israeli withdrawal is completed.

5. **Demilitarized zones.** The U.S. position is simply that the parties should negotiate the size and means of enforcing demilitarized zones, but we work in the knowledge that Israel is adamant against any demilitarization on its side of the border. The USSR (and UAR in its reply to Jarring) says DMZs should lie on both sides of the borders.

**Conclusion:** These disagreements on substance persist, but the documents of 1969 may no longer be the vehicle for US–USSR negotiations. The above are drawn from the 1969–70 negotiating history; it is possible that a new negotiating context would at least alter the emphasis in our disagreements.

**The New Focus on Guarantees**

The start of the Jarring talks technically renders the US–USSR documents of 1969 overtaken by events. Those documents were to be guidelines to be turned over to Jarring to launch negotiations. They can now be drawn on, but the focus has shifted.
Since acceptance last summer of the U.S. formula for getting talks started, the Soviets (and the UAR) have turned the focus to US–USSR and Four Power talk about guarantees.

The idea of turning US–USSR and Four Power talks to the subject of guarantees was broached informally by Malik in early November. Intelligence suggests that this was actually an Egyptian proposal to the USSR, and the Egyptians also say this is the case. There seemed to be these elements behind the Soviet move:

—They may have viewed it as a means of rebuilding some of their credibility following the standstill violations.

—Aware that there was no hope of moving the US by frontal pressure to new positions on boundaries, the USSR may have sought discussion of guarantees as a means of re-opening the dialogue so they could renew pressure indirectly on borders. At the February 12 Four Power discussion of guarantees, for example, the Soviet representative said he thought the Four should discuss peace and withdrawal as well but was willing to concentrate on guarantees for the moment.

—There is no evidence of this, but it is not illogical to assume that the time may have come when the Soviets are thinking of consolidating their diplomatic role and military presence in the Middle East. A Soviet contingent in a peacekeeping force would formalize Soviet parity in the Mid-East. A Soviet commitment to guarantee the peace might be used in some way to justify a Soviet military presence in the UAR.

—Behind the USSR, the UAR wants the maximum international support for Israeli withdrawal and against future Israeli military movement.

Another New Focus—Partial Withdrawal

Since last fall, proposals for partial withdrawal from the Suez cease-fire line have captured increasing attention. Sadat’s speech dramatized the idea, and there is at least an open Israel–UAR channel for discussing it.

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8 Malik floated the proposal during a meeting with Christopher H. Phillips, Deputy Representative of the United States to the U.N. Security Council, in New York on November 11. Saunders forwarded the reporting telegram (telegram 3114 from USUN, November 12) and summarized the discussion in a November 13 memorandum to Kissinger. “We should not reject this out of hand,” Saunders concluded, “but we should not leap at it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. X)

9 In an address before the Egyptian National Assembly on February 4, Sadat announced his agreement to extend the cease-fire by one month, thereby postponing the previous deadline for a more permanent settlement until March 7.
The point that has been commonly overlooked in all this is that the Soviet document of June 17, 1969, centered on a proposal for Israeli withdrawal from the Canal in two stages: (1) the Israelis would pull back 30–40 kilometers and Egyptian troops would move in to begin clearing the Canal; (2) Israelis would pull back to pre-war lines. Actually, this Soviet proposal harked back to an even earlier UAR plan.

The importance of Sadat’s proposal is that he might be desperate enough to be willing to portray any partial Israeli withdrawal as the “first phase” of a settlement, even if at that stage the Israelis were not ready to commit themselves to a timetable for further withdrawal. It seems likely that Sadat would want a general commitment to total withdrawal even if the timetable were left open. But it is barely conceivable, if he is desperate, that he might fuzz that issue.

Embassy Moscow notes the similarity between Sadat’s proposal and the earlier Soviet document. The embassy speculates that Moscow may have urged this on Sadat “in hopes of producing an Israeli response dealing in some fashion with withdrawal and offering some degree of progress to continue peaceful momentum beyond March 7.”

The Embassy also notes that the proposal probably also reflects Soviet interest in having the Canal re-opened. It notes that the Soviet press is now treating the Sadat proposal as offering opportunity for progress toward a settlement and has avoided characterizing Mrs. Meir’s public statements as rejection.

The Embassy concludes by noting that one of the most interesting features of Sadat’s proposal has been picked up in the Soviet press—the avoidance of linking partial Israeli withdrawal to prior determination of the timetable for complete withdrawal. The New Times, for instance, makes the points that even a partial withdrawal would help create a favorable atmosphere for continuation of the Jarring mission and that opening the Canal would mean liquidation of the most serious consequences of Israeli aggression.

Where We Stand Tactically

There are three active issues:

1. Dobrynin asks whether we are going to respond to their formulations of June 2, 1970, and continue the bilateral talks. The following points are relevant:

   —The documents of 1969 were technically overtaken by the start of the Jarring talks.
   —Jarring wrote the Soviets’ June 2 points on the fedayeen (really an earlier U.S. point which the USSR accepted on June 2) into his doc-

ument, and the UAR has now accepted it. That issue is settled. The other—the timing of peace—will be thrashed out in the Jarring negotiations if they go on.

—We may want the USSR to weigh in with the UAR on some issues like refugees or Israeli participation in peacekeeping forces, but it would seem more efficient to deal with these on their merits now rather than in the context of old documents.

—The subject of guarantees which the USSR is now pressing is beyond the scope of the old documents.

—in short, going back to the old documents now would seem to turn the clock back and to revive arguments, some of which are settled. It would seem more logical now to talk about guarantees or partial withdrawal unencumbered by whole documents from the past.

2. The Soviets are pressing us to talk about guarantees, and we have agreed. The following points are relevant:

—The Soviets started out by trying to use discussion of guarantees to elicit discussion of the border issue. For the moment, they seem to be content to concentrate on guarantees leaving withdrawal and peace to Jarring.

—The Soviets began discussing this subject after they had completed the major military buildup in the UAR, including introduction of combat pilots. They may well have been partly trying to restore some of their credibility after the standstill violations.

—The Soviets seem to be concentrating on peacekeeping forces with the idea that they would participate. The US is talking about a range of possible options, leaving big-power participation up in the air for the moment. It is possible that the Soviets are trying to lay a foundation for their own military participation.

3. The partial withdrawal scheme is now in a UAR–US–Israel channel, but this is a subject the USSR seems to have an interest in. Ironically, there might even be advantage for Israel in picking up the Soviet idea of a two-phase withdrawal. This offers an important alternative to Israel for keeping talks going while it digests the decision on withdrawal or tries to negotiate border changes.

It seems logical, therefore, that if the US–USSR dialogue is to be renewed, it will be in the context of the discussion of guarantees or partial withdrawal. If there is a return to some of the other issues, it seems likely that this would be in an effort to break a deadlock in the talks. This would be in contrast to picking up the dialogue of 1969–70 and trying to marry two documents which are now somewhat overtaken by events.

Issues for the Future

The issue now being overlooked is not so much the state of the US–USSR dialogue on the details of an Arab-Israeli settlement but what, if there is a settlement, will be the US-Soviet relationship in the Mid-East. Another way of putting this is to consider how the Soviet
military presence in the UAR might be cut back. Several specific points are raised:

1. In discussing guarantees, should the US resist the idea of US–USSR participation in peacekeeping forces?

2. If negotiations reach a point where an Israeli decision to withdraw is at stake, should the US make withdrawal of Soviet combat forces from the UAR a condition of US support for Israeli withdrawal? Should the US discuss this soon with Dobrynin or Sadat?

3. Or should the US concentrate on an Arab-Israeli settlement and let Soviet activity seek its own level?

In short, a major need now—perhaps from the next SRG—is a strategy vis-à-vis the USSR.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger chaired the next meeting of the Senior Review Group on the Middle East on February 25 from 2:33 to 3:55 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) A “strategy vis-à-vis the USSR” was not discussed at the meeting; the minutes are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

120. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense Laird and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, February 20, 1971, 6:13 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of the military situation in Laos.]

L: One other point on the Baltic. I understood you were going to discuss that yesterday\(^2\) and you didn’t get around to it.

K: In the afternoon. That’s right.

L: When will you do that? We told them they would be able to put forth their points.

K: If they have complaints let them come to me. The President wants it.

L: I would like to make as many port calls in the Baltic as we had in 69.

\(^{1}\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.

\(^{2}\) Reference is presumably to the WSAG meeting on February 18. See Document 117.
K: We want something cruising around in the next few weeks to get the message [across].
L: Do you think they will?
K: They will.
L: Did the meeting work out okay?
K: It was fine and it was [omission in transcript]. From now he will assume [when] you have a complaint you will make it and not listen to anyone.
L: Pursley spoke to Haig. Gardner said they wanted him to make suggestions on improvements. I said I hope you didn’t give the impression we were upset.
K: We have no complaints. It went well.

3 On the morning of February 19, DIA reported that Navy patrol aircraft had spotted a Soviet guided-missile light cruiser 210 nautical miles northwest of Havana: “Call Haig on Baltic/Black.” “Pls advise if you have other info.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Box 63, Cuba 323.3)

4 On February 24, Laird formally approved a plan, outlined by Moorer on February 12, to deploy 4 destroyers in the Black Sea for 11 days, starting on March 27. (Memorandum from Laird to Moorer, February 24; ibid., FRC 330–74–115, Box 3, 560)

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121. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

I asked Dobrynin to call on me at the White House in order to get the conversation started. I behaved in a deliberately aloof but correct manner.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 2], Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 7:15 to 8:25 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Kissinger forwarded this memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing it (as well as the memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on February 16) to Nixon on February 27. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. For Kissinger’s memoir account, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 814, 826.
Cuba

I started the conversation by handing him a sheet of paper (copy at Enc. #1) stating that we considered the presence of the submarine tender in Cienfuegos for such an extended period a violation of the understanding. Dobrynin asked what I wanted him to report to his Government. I said, “Let’s not play any games, Anatoliy. You will report to your Government whatever you choose to report, and what I recommend to you will not have the slightest effect on it.” He said, “Is this a personal note from you or is this a message from the President?” I said it had been personally approved by the President and should be construed as a verbal note from the President to the Soviet Government. Dobrynin folded it and put it, without comment, in his pocket.

SALT

I then said I was prepared to discuss the letter that Dobrynin had said we might send to Kosygin (copy at Enc. #2). Dobrynin corrected my statement by saying I had proposed the letter. He had merely agreed to it. I said, it is true, I had proposed the letter, but he had suggested that at our next meeting—which was today—I should have a draft. Dobrynin agreed with that formulation.

Dobrynin read the draft very carefully and then asked me a number of questions; for example, with respect to paragraph 5.c., he asked what was the meaning of the phrase that there could be no new construction started after April 1. I said since there was a limit of no construction of any sort after January 1, it seemed to me that this was self-explanatory. Since the Soviet Union would not be able to finish anything that they started after April 1, it wasn’t probable that they would start anything. Dobrynin said it would be easier for them to accept the terminal date than the starting date; in other words, they would agree not to do any construction of any kind after January 1, 1972. Do-

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2 The text of the attached enclosure reads as follows: “The U.S. Government understands that the Soviet Union would not establish a base in Cuba and would only conduct occasional visits of a courtesy or ceremonial nature of ships capable of carrying offensive weapons or capable of servicing such ships. The fact that a tender capable of servicing offensive nuclear sea-based systems has been in port or in the vicinity of Cuba 125 of the last 166 days cannot be considered to meet either the letter or the intent of your assurances or of our understanding.”

3 Attached but not printed; relevant excerpts, however, are provided below. See also Document 148.

4 See Document 110.

5 The text of paragraph 5.c., under the heading “Strategic Offensive Armaments,” is as follows: “It would also be understood that as of an early agreed date, for example, April 1, 1971, all new construction of land-based ICBM launchers would cease. It would also be understood that work to complete launchers under construction could continue for another agreed period but would in any case cease as of January 1, 1972.”
brynin also questioned whether it was realistic to propose an agreement on offensive weapons be reached by July 1, 1972. I agreed that that could be extended to January 1, 1973. Dobrynin suggested that we eliminate the two paragraphs on MIRV’s, since it was self-evident that these would be permitted. He also questioned paragraph 6.c. in its context because he thought that this would be a better explanation for paragraph 7, rather than it by itself and, in any case, it was up to the discretion of each side whether it wanted to give such a list.

Dobrynin also questioned whether it was better to have a five-year expiration clause or whether we could have it in the same manner as the nuclear test ban with both sides having the right to abrogate when their supreme national interest was involved. I told him this would certainly be a fair counter-proposal to make by their side. Dobrynin did not question the three missile sites but suggested that the Soviet Union might come back to NCA limitations. Dobrynin suggested that he would have a massive translation job to do that night and promised me an early answer. He said he thought this should be well wrapped up before March 15.

Berlin

The discussion then turned to Berlin. I told Dobrynin that I had heard from both Bahr and Rush and that I was prepared to tell him that the United States would be willing to accept a unilateral Soviet assumption of responsibility which would then be absorbed in the third part of the agreement of a Four-Power guarantee. Dobrynin said that this was a considerable step forward, but could I give him a draft. I said since we had accepted the principle, why did the Soviet Union not make a draft. He said it would be easier if we made a draft, because then at least they knew what was acceptable to us, while if they made one, it would become a big issue.

Dobrynin then said we should also include the principles we considered necessary since I had said that we would accept the Soviet assumption of responsibility only if the principles were acceptable. I

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6 The text of paragraph 6.c. is as follows: “However, in connection with an initial agreement I would plan to inform you, as part of the associated understanding, of the indicators by which we would judge your activities and which, in our view, would raise questions concerning our security interests. You would, of course, be free to provide me with a similar list of indicators concerning the Soviet Union’s judgment of activities on the part of the United States.”

7 The text of paragraph 7 is as follows: “Apart from the inherent right to abrogate the agreement, each side would of course be at liberty to take such steps with respect to its own weapons programs as are not explicitly precluded by the agreement, or the understanding associated with it, and which it deems necessary to safeguard its security interests in the light of qualitative and other changes in the other side’s strategic weapons programs.”

8 See Document 111.
said that since the principles would still have to be implemented by the two Germanys, I would simply take the principles from the Four-Power note which I knew were agreed. Dobrynin suggested that perhaps I might incorporate one or two of the Soviet principles simply to preserve a degree of symmetry. I told him I would have to check with Bahr and Rush.

Dobrynin then turned to the question of Federal presence. He again urged that I come up with some formulation that the Soviets could react to, and that they were in a mood to be conciliatory. I said that this was a most delicate point and it would be much better if the Soviet side could come up with a generous proposal on access because it would help us talk to Bonn on the question of Federal presence. He said that the Soviet problem with the East German Government was exactly the opposite of ours with Bonn and that therefore I should give him some formulation. I said I could not give him any written formulation, but I would see whether I could elicit some talking points which we might discuss. Dobrynin reiterated the Soviet extreme eagerness to come to an understanding on the question of Berlin.

*Middle East*

Turning to the Middle East, Dobrynin said that the offer to discuss it in the bilateral channel was still open. He said, “You notice, we have not interfered with you in the slightest, but we do not believe that it can come to any good end.”

*Vietnam*

Dobrynin finally turned to a message he had from Hanoi. He said he had transmitted my comments of January 9\(^9\) to Hanoi in the form of thinking out loud but not as an official position. Hanoi had made the following reply:

1.—To judge whether there was any possibility of making an agreement separately on military questions, they would have to know what date of withdrawal we were thinking of.

2.—Our recent actions in Indochina made them question whether we were interested in a political solution and whether we still did not seek a military solution.

3.—They were prepared to resume conversations with me in Paris.

[I had told Dobrynin on January 9 that at some point, if Hanoi were willing to separate military from political issues, we might be prepared to set a target date for our withdrawal, provided there was a ceasefire that lasted through 1972 at least and provided that there were serious talks. In that connection, I had told Dobrynin that I was as-\(^{9}\) See Document 90. See also footnote 7, Document 103.
tonished that in my talks with the North Vietnamese they had treated
me like any other American negotiator and had given me exactly the
same speeches that they had given other American negotiators.\[10]

Dobrynin offered to transmit any reply that I might care to make
to Hanoi, which is the first time to my knowledge that the Soviet Union
has made such an offer. I told him we would have to think about his
proposition and I would have to report it in detail to the President.

10 Brackets are in the original.

122. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)\[1\]


P: How did your meeting go?\[2\]

K: It went very well. I gave him that note on Cuba saying first that
I didn’t want to discuss it but that it certainly affects things if we can’t
rely on one another. I gave him your letter on SALT and he was right
with it, started editing it and making suggestions. Some of his sugges-
tions were most constructive. There was a list of what would be permit-
ted but he said whatever is not prohibited is permitted, this isn’t the treaty,
this is just something that gets the negotiations started and I will get the
answer soon, that he realized that it would have to be before March 15.

P: Um-hum.

K: And so he was—he fell all over himself. He offered again to
talk about the Middle East and I ducked that question. On Berlin, I
gave him some of the stuff I had from Rush and Bahr. I think we are
going to make progress on that too, but when you see that fool of a
foreign minister\[3\] . . .

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Tele-
phone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 See Document 121.
3 West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. Nixon met Scheel in the Oval Of-
fice on February 17 from 4:54 to 5:19 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Mate-
rials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A tape recording of the con-
versation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 450–21.
P: I know.

K: . . . But then I had an interesting thing—when I saw him on January 9, we were talking about Vietnam. He said at the time something to the effect, what if they separate political and military issues and I said we can’t/won’t discuss [omission in transcript]. He said, what if we talk about withdrawal separately from that. We had originally just talked about military issues on Berlin. Said he had a message from Hanoi, the Soviets had transmitted to them what we had said about talking out loud . . . (interrupted) . . . that secondly, recent events in Indochina make them doubt that we are serious about military [omission in transcript]. Thirdly, any time we want to resume negotiations, they are ready. It shows that they are not at all, they are willing to transmit messages more than they have ever wanted to do before. In this case these guys seem to me to be [ready to?] talk.

P: Um-hum. Yeah, they seem to be willing to talk.

K: That in itself—they have never talked while they were under pressure.

P: Not yet at least.

K: It is getting a little late.

P: Well, I think I would just let that rest for a little while.

K: They seem to have subsided in their northern flank.

P: Of course, it is night over there.

K: No, it is day but they haven’t launched any attacks within the last 24 hours.

P: The South Vietnamese launched some attacks.

K: They seem to be moving up one of those roads.

P: At least the dialogue is open.

K: Yes, the dialogue is open and I think we have a chance.

P: The fact that they are not jumping up and down means something.

K: They are for some reason pinning (?) after a [omission in transcript].

P: When is their Party meeting?

K: March 24th and I think they want things settled before then.

P: You mean this SALT thing?

K: Yes, Mr. President.
123. Editorial Note

After his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on February 22, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger resumed his efforts to negotiate a quadripartite agreement on Berlin. Kissinger later recalled that Dobrynin’s eagerness for an agreement threw West German State Secretary Egon Bahr and Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush “into a frenzy of drafting, complicated by frequent garbles in transmission of the long texts that were cabled to me in our backchannel.” (Kissinger, *White House Years*, page 826) As a result, the center of action shifted from Berlin—where the Four-Power representatives continued their formal deliberations—to Washington, where Kissinger and Dobrynin began to review draft formulations on West German access to and official Federal presence in the former German capital. In a special channel message to Rush in Bonn on February 22, Kissinger reported his discussion with Dobrynin that evening on Berlin as follows:

“I told him that if access principles were acceptable some formulation or unilateral Soviet declaration could be considered. Dobrynin suggested that I give him an illustrative text. With respect to principles themselves Dobrynin suggested that he was prepared to operate on the basis of the four power note though it would help greatly if we could include some Soviet formulations. Could you suggest a draft text of a Soviet declaration and also of an acceptable list of principles including perhaps some Soviet phraseology.

“With respect to Federal presence Dobrynin pressed hard for some indication of our thinking, claiming it would ease their problem on access. How much of your thinking can I give him on an informal basis?

“Dobrynin tells me that Abrasimov has instructions to discuss some limitation on Committee and Party group meetings though you should make the first move. This implies that they no longer want them banned. Is this the time for it or should we wait? Please let me know before you move on it.

“I am seeing Dobrynin again on Friday [February 26] and would appreciate your answer before then.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

Kissinger also sent a similar message to Bahr on February 22. (Ibid., Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3])

In his reply on February 24, Rush forwarded the draft text of an annex to the agreement (i.e. unilateral Soviet declaration) on access, which included a series of principles and detailed arrangements for the transportation of goods and people between West Germany and West
Berlin. Although the West Germans were in accord with the proposal, Rush reported that the views of British and French—as well as those of the Department of State—were as yet “unknown.” Rush then addressed the question of negotiating tactics, especially in dealing with the Soviet Union:

“None of these changes have as yet been disclosed to the Russians. It may be that you will want to put them to Dobrynin as thoughts which would be passed on to us, if he agrees that they would be helpful in furthering our negotiations.

“The strategy which we now plan to adopt is to press the Russians as far as possible to finalize the access part of the agreement with two objectives in mind: (1) to enable us to allow the FRG and GDR to commence negotiations on the details of access, something which Abrasimov and Kohl have individually been pressing very hard, and (2) to enable us to proceed with the FRG to see how far we can go on the federal presence issue. Brandt thinks both politically and otherwise we can as of now give nothing more on presence until the access issue is resolved. It would be of great value if you could induce Dobrynin to accept this strategy and to assist in having Abrasimov instructed to proceed accordingly. We have agreed with Abrasimov that all issues are interdependent and nothing is binding until all aspects of the agreement are finalized.

“In the light of this, I do not think it would be advisable to outline to Dobrynin any more of our thinking with regard to federal presence at this time, except to indicate that if and when access provisions are tentatively settled, we hope to be in a position, with the concurrence of the FRG, to work out some limitations on the issues of committee and party group meetings and on federal offices in Berlin. Brandt told me yesterday that he feels that there is more possibility of give on the committee and party group meetings than there is on the federal offices. Politically, until we have a good tentative access agreement, Brandt cannot move on federal presence, nor can we. This is particularly true since there are no secrets in this regard in Germany.” (Ibid., Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

Bahr also replied in a special channel message on February 25. For the text of his message, as well as additional excerpts from Rush’s reply, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 187.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated issues, including foreign trade policy, the President’s schedule, and the White House tape recording system.]

Nixon: [The trouble] with Henry’s personality, Bob, is it’s just too goddamn difficult for us to deal with. I mean, let me just put it out there for a minute, for this reason. If we—you know, I have, I beat him over the head time and again, you know, to get him to—you see, he’s trying to get involved in the Mideast again. I said, “Don’t do it.” I mean, I just don’t encourage him, because I don’t know whether that’s going to come out or not. He’s praying every day they’ll have a war out there, because, you know—and I know that. [unclear] I went over that speech. That’s why I sent Safire to see Rogers. But I use that only as an example. We also have the problem too, that in these other areas, he is just so damn jealous of letting even Haig come in. You know, I had—I’ve called Haig a couple of times. And last night, I called Moorer, you know, to keep an eye on this myself. Keeping up on things—I should. I’ve got to. But I only mention that as a problem. He’s a—maybe he was wrong, you know, in those negotiations, you know, to go to Paris and those trips.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: Not all the time, about it. That doesn’t prove anything. I mean, many of us have been wrong.

Haldeman: Hm-hmm.

Nixon: He’s always tried. He was wrong; he tried. But he was wrong in the sense of saying, “Well, they’re ready to start jiggling,” or “They’re—I think they’re going to twitch,” or “We can just hope.” You know, all that sort of thing. He has always felt that. His big pitch last night to me was: he was talking to Dobrynin, and Dobrynin raised the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 456–5. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haldeman in the Oval Office from 10:05 to 11:05 a.m.; Kissinger entered at 10:52 and left at 11:30 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers met Safire on February 22 at 3:21 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) No record of the conversation has been found.
point today—yesterday that they [North Vietnamese] would be willing to talk again to him. 3

Haldeman: Hm-hmm.

Nixon: Now, I don’t believe that at all. I think what has happened is that Henry has planted the idea again. Henry said, “This is the time.” I said, “No, it isn’t.” It’s not. I’ve got to tell him to waste no time. You see, the problem is that, let me put it: Henry’s not a good negotiator. He just is not. He does not know—shit, he does not know how to—you’ve got to keep him the hell out of that sort of thing, because he’s a—he’s in negotiation just like he is in your staff meetings.

Haldeman: It’s an attitude.

Nixon: He’s an admirable worker, he’s a superb writer, he’s absolutely loyal to the country, to us, and so forth and so on. But in a deeper sense, a very, very difficult problem in working with these people that I must work around. We just can’t have a blowup, you know. I mean, I can’t have a blowup with Rogers—or Laird, for that matter. And once Connally gets in there, he could blow up with him. I don’t know. Maybe it’s just a matter of—at the present time, of course, we’re kicking around the possibility of wanting a letter to Kosygin.

Haldeman: Well, we’re back on a sticky wicket there, because on the plane down to Florida, Rogers said he wanted to talk to you about it. 4

Nixon: About the summit?

Haldeman: He said, “You know”—you see, he doesn’t—

Nixon: He thinks that we should have it next year.

Haldeman: He raised the scenario yesterday that—he said, “We aren’t going to get a SALT agreement.” Of course, Henry thinks we have one.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: And, therefore, we—then we might as well forget that and we ought to work to a summit next year. He raised it. I was over there for lunch yesterday going over personnel stuff with him. 5 And he raised that whole thing again, that Moorer said; so then, he thinks the Russians will go along because they needed this as much as we do. They’ve got their own—

3 See Document 122.

4 Rogers presumably talked to Haldeman aboard Air Force One during the flight to Key Biscayne, via Homestead Air Force Base, on February 11. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.

5 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers met Haldeman for lunch on February 22 at 1 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) Although no record of the conversation has been found, Haldeman described the meeting in his diary entry for the day. (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
Nixon: Reasons?
Haldeman: Hm-hmm.
Haldeman: And I—well, I can’t—you know, don’t say anything to him at all—
Nixon: Letters.
Haldeman: —whatever he’s talking about. And get—
Nixon: Henry’s only reason, Bob—
Haldeman: This puts it—I don’t know. It’s this problem there that—
Nixon: It’s a very difficult problem, because I can’t conduct these negotiations, conduct, you know, independent discussions here without—Henry is—goddamnit, Bob, he’s psychopathic about trying to screw Rogers. That’s what it really gets down to. He wants to have a SALT agreement and a Berlin agreement. And I keep him—I keep him out of the Mideast with, just by tugging. But he wants to do that without, so that—I don’t think I’m overestimating the problem. I think it’s a very serious one.
Haldeman: Oh, it is.
Nixon: He’s just goddamn hard. I mean, I can’t—don’t you agree?
Haldeman: And we kept, you know, patching it over with Band-Aids and airbrushing it, but—which we do. Maybe we keep on doing that now. But I’m not sure. It flares up and down and—the problem really is though, at least I think, and as I found when—if you face that there’s an insurmountable problem between the two of them, Henry is clearly, to me at least, more valuable than Rogers is.
Nixon: That’s true.
Haldeman: And more irreplaceable than Rogers is.
Nixon: True. True. Because I don’t trust the State Department.
Haldeman: But if Henry wins the battle with Rogers—
Nixon: That’s right.
Haldeman: —and resulting in Rogers going, then I’m not sure Henry’s going to be livable afterwards, livable with afterwards.
Nixon: He’s going to be a dictator.
Haldeman: And—
Nixon: You got to remember, too, the need for Henry becomes less as time goes on. Do you really realize that? He divides us. And you know—
Haldeman: But it takes—you see, he’s right on a lot of things—
Nixon: I know.
Haldeman: —like procedurally, that don’t interest you and—
Nixon: That’s right.
Haldeman: —that we don’t want to be bothered with and shouldn’t be.

Nixon: That’s right.

[Omitted here is discussion of the National Security Council system.]

Nixon: You’ve got to remember that Henry is a terribly difficult individual to have around, you know, in terms of our, just our whole general morale. I mean, he just really is, Bob. It’s too damn bad. But he’s making himself so, and I think it’s because of his, this psychotic hatred that he has for Bill. What the Christ is the matter with him? What the hell is it? I mean, he—hardly anybody believes that—is Rogers out to get him? Is that it? He’s constantly saying, “I don’t want to—I can’t go into it.” Then he shouldn’t mention it to me. He says, “I can’t go into it now, but—” Well, Christ, then he shouldn’t tell me. I shouldn’t be worried about things that he can’t go into now. He just says—

Haldeman: Did he raise that with you?

Nixon: Every day. It’s something or other. Well, you know about what’s, the way State’s cutting him out, cutting us up, the things they are doing, the horrible things they are doing.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: And then I find it in Joe Kraft’s column. Now, what the Christ bit of difference does that make?

Haldeman: Well, they leak something big they’re going to want to hit you on today.

Nixon: Sure.

Haldeman: I don’t know if saw that story today, put out that State had triumphed over the NSC and got SALT removed from the State of the World message, the basis on which the SALT talks are [unclear].

Not a lot on that other story.

Nixon: Kraft?

Haldeman: No, it’s not a piece of his.

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6 In his February 18 column, Kraft reported that Kissinger was “in the thick of a furious internal fight about the next American move in the arms control negotiations.” Kraft added that the conflict between the National Security Council staff and Department of State on SALT had “come to a head” over the draft text of the President’s Annual Foreign Policy Report. (Kraft, “Arms Control at Bay,” Washington Post, February 18, 1971, p. A21)

Nixon: Just say—I want you to send a memorandum to Rogers and just say that, “The President’s on this and he thinks this is not helpful. He says it makes the task exceedingly more difficult. Really believe that you—” Well, why don’t you call him? Say, “Look that’s it. That’s a real tough thing.” You know, “We have enough [with] our routine to do anything about whether someone would do such a thing.” You see, Rogers overlooks a lot of his damn people too. He will not discipline them. It doesn’t make a goddamn bit of difference whether SALT’s in the State of the World or not. You know it’s—nobody gives a shit, except Henry.

Haldeman: That’s right.
Nixon: That’s the point.
Haldeman: So where does he—?
Nixon: But on this—but nevertheless, they belong—
Haldeman: Except—except really the SALT thing is—the SALT stuff in there was really about the only news there was in the whole thing.8

[Omitted here is discussion of domestic policy and other issues unrelated to the Soviet Union. Kissinger entered at 10:52 a.m.; after a brief exchange on the President’s schedule, Haldeman left at 11:05 a.m. Also omitted here is further discussion on the military situation in Laos and Vietnam, including a proposed trip to Saigon by Haig. During the latter exchange, Kissinger commented: “what I’m most anxious for now, after what Dobrynin said to me yesterday—I consider that Hanoi overture extremely uncharacteristic.”]

Nixon: Let me ask this: Where does everything stand now? Do I understand that—did we, with regard to a letter to Dobrynin—to Kosygin, have I sent a letter to Kosygin?
Kissinger: No, but—
Nixon: That wasn’t a letter.
Kissinger: No, what I have done is—
Nixon: Is to suggest—
Kissinger: No. I have given a draft letter—

8 According to Haldeman, Nixon spent considerable time on February 23 debating how to handle the Kissinger-Rogers problem: “He feels that we definitely have got to develop a new approach. He’s about ready, I think, to face up to the probable necessity of having one or the other go, a suggestion that Henry keeps roaring into my office with at each new problem and threatening. I think that for the long haul that probably is what’s going to have to happen. For the short haul, we may be able to do more than just the temporizing we’ve been doing to keep the thing on the track, and I’m going to try to work something out after the State of the World with Henry, and then with Rogers, to see if we can’t get them both to face up to the larger necessity of doing what’s right.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
Nixon: Oh.
Kissinger: —to Dobrynin—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —which Kosygin will approve.
Nixon: Yeah. And then—
Kissinger: Or not.
Nixon: And then he will clear that through the bureaucracy? Is that the goal?
Kissinger: Then, if he approves it, then we'll know what his answer will be too.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: He will give me a copy of his answer and I'll edit that.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: That Dobrynin is sharp as a tack. The way that he edited that letter of yours—
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: —actually strengthened it.
Nixon: Yeah. Now, the point is, that having done that, then when we get it back, we just bring in the people and say, “Look, here’s the”—what do I do?
Kissinger: If they accept our proposal, you're going to have more trouble with Smith. Smith will tell you they won’t accept it.
Nixon: That’s all right, because I’ll just say that I—that I’ve decided to take an initiative here and I’m going to do it. And that’s that. I’m not going to screw around with Smith on SALT anymore.
Kissinger: And, of course, today they have another story that they made me back off SALT.
Nixon: I saw that.
Kissinger: And—
Nixon: I saw it. Let me first—
Kissinger: And it’s going to hurt me again with Dobrynin.
Nixon: Is it? That’s a screw-up. That’s—that doesn’t make any difference, a long op-ed on this whole—but it’s interested. We have a section on SALT.
Kissinger: Yeah, but I yielded and I—
Nixon: You gave in?
Kissinger: For the sake of peace with Rogers, I yielded on it.
Nixon: Did you?
Kissinger: It was frivolous. Well, because I don’t want to come to you—
Nixon: No, but how much did you—? You had something, but you didn’t take the whole section on SALT?

Kissinger: Oh, no. But I took out much of it. And it’s pure mischief. They had me on the phone ten times in one day. And then they demanded to see you. I didn’t want to put you in the position where you would have to rule either for me or for Rogers.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Because I don’t think it’s the right position for you to be in.

[At this point the President called Haldeman to order an investigation into the leak on the SALT section of the Annual Report on Foreign Policy. Omitted here is Nixon’s side of the telephone conversation.]

Nixon: Getting back to the other thing.

Kissinger: But I—

Nixon: On Berlin. How do we do the—? Don’t worry about this one now. But on Berlin—

Kissinger: Well, on Berlin, we—

Nixon: There—the deal there, it’s all in channels—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: —so we don’t have to worry about that.

Kissinger: With the Berlin deal, the only pity is you won’t get the credit.

Nixon: Yeah. Well, let’s try.

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: Let’s leak a story.

Kissinger: But we can leak it. I’ll tell you when we get the—after the agreement is signed.

Nixon: No. No, I don’t want it before—I want it before the agreement is signed.

Kissinger: Well, before the agreement is signed—

Nixon: I’m going to leak the story that we’re doing it. Screw them.

Kissinger: That’s right. Of course—

Nixon: We’ve got to leak stories that we—well, then, why not leak it now?

Kissinger: Well, because it’s too early. But this is going to be obvious long before there’s a signature. We’ll have plenty of opportunities.

Nixon: When do you think Berlin will come off?

Kissinger: Depending on how quickly we can move the Germans, within two months.

Nixon: All right. Send a letter—send a message to Rush and say that he should indicate that the President is playing a personal role in these negotiations.
Kissinger: Right. To whom?
Nixon: The press. When he’s talking to them, you know, on this background.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: That the President is personally in charge of these negotiations. Let’s just get that in.
Kissinger: I think if—well, Mr. President, if we could wait a week—
Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: Until we could get some answers—
Nixon: All right, fine. As soon as you get the answers—
Kissinger: Otherwise, if it fails—
Nixon: As soon as you get the answers, and you think it’s on stream, have him put out the fact that the President is personally—and have him put it out. It’s much better than having it come from here.
Kissinger: Because at this point—
Nixon: Then, you see, then we could—then the people, the other people in the government, they can’t claim they did it. But I want them to know that we did it.
Kissinger: Because at this point, Mr. President, we’re not—this is not like SALT. SALT, you can make one big play.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: And they’ll accept it or not.
Nixon: And then have the State Department trying to—
Kissinger: And I think they’ll—
Nixon: Now, on this one—on SALT—my view on that is that, if they come back and accept this thing—and you think they may now.
Kissinger: Oh, yes. I think—
Nixon: If they come back and accepted it, then my view is that, I just call in—well, I’d have to have that son-of-a—I have to have Smith in too, don’t I? What do I do? We’ll have an NSC meeting or what? Or just have him—
Kissinger: Well, I’d call in Rogers and Smith and I’d say, “I’ve thought about it.”
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.
Kissinger: Actually, the New York Times yesterday had an editorial suggesting you write a letter to Kosygin.9

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Kissinger: So you say, before they go you want to break the deadlock. And this is the letter you’re going to write. Now, Smith is going to have a heart attack at that point.

Nixon: Smith? I’ll call in Rogers to tell him.

Kissinger: And tell Rogers then.

Nixon: And he just tells Smith. And that’s it. I’m going to tell Bill that’s the way it’s going to be.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: That’s better. I think with Rogers along, I could say that I have strong feelings about this.

Kissinger: And I can get Laird aboard.

Nixon: I’m so sick of that Smith anyway. I don’t like him. I don’t trust him.

Kissinger: Well, I think we can get Laird aboard. The only thing that’s going to cause trouble—there are two things that are going to cause trouble. One, they can’t surface. That’s why they didn’t want the long SALT section, because they didn’t want to get you—the section is long but not as detailed as it was. But [that’s] not important. They don’t want you to get the credit for it, but they can’t say that. The second thing they won’t want is the change in the position on the ABM, because they’ll say the Russians won’t accept it.

Nixon: Could you get Laird to agree to that?

Kissinger: But Laird will back that. I’ve already talked to Laird, because we couldn’t do it without Laird.

Nixon: [unclear] Well, go ahead and work that out.

Kissinger: But to show you something of this labor of Dobrynin: when I gave him the letter to Kosygin—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: —he didn’t say, “I have to refer that to Moscow.” He said that too, but he immediately started editing it to see what would be easier for them to take and what wouldn’t. And I had a section in there about MIRVs. And he said, “Why don’t we both drop that one, since it’s embarrassing for you?” And he’s got a good point. I had in the letter, “MIRVs would be permitted.” He said, “Of course, they’ll be permitted.”

[Omitted here is discussion of the military situation in Vietnam.]
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, February 25, 1971, 0050Z.

31680. Subj: Rigerman Call at Department.

1. February 23, Leonid Rigerman called on Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand to express his and his mother’s appreciation for USG help in establishing their U.S. citizenship and leaving the Soviet Union. Rigerman accompanied to Dept by party of 4 led by Attorney Dan Greer. On arrival in U.S., Rigerman received intense publicity, including appearances on nationwide television and a press conference on Capitol Hill.

2. During conversations at Dept, Rigerman made clear his intention of remaining in U.S. to help Soviet Jewry. He took cautiously optimistic line that problems of Soviet Jewry are susceptible to improvement. Starting from premise that present Soviet regime unsure of itself, concerned about its image abroad, and prone to make mistakes, Rigerman felt that constant pressure from governments and organizations abroad and from Jews inside Soviet Union could eventually persuade Soviets of desirability of permitting substantial numbers of Jews to emigrate. Rigerman’s own estimate is that 500,000 would opt to leave if given chance.

3. Rigerman also drew distinction between other Soviet minorities who hope to change Soviet system and Jews who simply wish to leave. Tenor of Rigerman’s remarks suggested that Jewish movement in USSR is concerned more with securing free emigration than with obtaining religious and cultural prerogatives for Jews in the Soviet Union. This emphasis may perhaps be explained by Rigerman’s conviction that Soviet regime will not reverse its policy of stifling Jewish life in USSR. He regarded use of term “enemy of the Soviet people” to describe “Zionists” in recent Pravda articles as throwback to Stalin’s lexicon, but added that regime barked because it could no longer bite as it had in Stalin’s day. He observed that thousands had vanished without a trace under Stalin, but today imprisonment of only 50 Jews was sufficient to create international clamor.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–10 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Semler and Mainland on February 24, cleared by Okun, and approved by Dubs. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, Tel Aviv, and Warsaw for Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies.

2 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers met Rigerman at 4:23 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers)
4. Commenting on general dissident movement, Rigerman thought prospects were poor for Soviet “democratic movement” of civil-rights dissenters because of lack of Russian democratic tradition, gap between masses and intellectuals, and enduringly conservative Party/state machine. He estimated active dissidents at about 2,000.

5. Asked why regime permitted his departure, Rigerman replied he was obviously a nuisance to regime in light of widespread publicity his case had received. He told Dept officers Tsukerman had been driving force behind Jewish movement, but Rigerman had no doubt other leaders would emerge now that Tsukerman in Israel. In this connection, he mentioned that at farewell receptions for him, new faces had appeared, demonstrating again that movement is replacing itself constantly. He found especially significant fact that appeal of 200 Jews to 24th Party Congress listed signatories from five different cities. This was first time, he remarked, that organizational links had appeared between different cities.

6. Rigerman was asked repeatedly about value of violent tactics espoused by JDL. He said that violence should only be a last resort and that there are many things that can be done before resorting to violence.

7. Pouching memcon of Rigerman call on Secretary.\(^3\)

Rogers

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\(^3\) According to the memorandum of conversation, Rigerman argued that “the Soviets were now more sensitive to public opinion abroad than in the past. It is, therefore, an opportune time for Western governments and public opinion to place pressure on the Soviet Union whenever possible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–10 USSR)

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126. Editorial Note

On February 25, 1971, President Richard Nixon submitted his Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy. Five months earlier, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger had issued National Security Study Memorandum 102, instructing the relevant agencies to submit background papers for the report. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), Nos. 43–103) After receiving the agency responses, the National Security Council staff spent weeks on compilation and composition. William
Hyland, for instance, joined Kissinger for a “working vacation” in California over the New Year’s holiday to draft the sections on the Soviet Union. (Hyland, Mortal Rivals, pages 34–35) Hyland completed his work in Washington on January 20, with a draft on how the United States and Soviet Union had reached a “crossroads” in their relationship. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files, (H-Files), Box H–174, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 102, 1 of 2 [4 of 5]) As Richard T. Kennedy explained in a January 23 memorandum to Kissinger: “The major shift in tone between last year’s chapter and the January 20 draft is a new feeling that this country is ready for a considerable, mutually beneficial improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union will only put aside some bad habits that are inappropriate for a nuclear super-power in the latter part of the 20th century.” (Ibid., Box 327, Subject Files, President’s Annual Review of Foreign Policy 1971 (Memos) [1 of 3]) Kissinger forwarded portions of the draft report, including the Soviet section, to the relevant agencies for comment on January 29. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin, January 29; ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–174, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 102, 1 of 2 [3 of 5])

After two weeks of further revision, the President chaired a meeting of the National Security Council at 10:16 a.m. on February 11 to consider the latest version of the annual report. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Before the meeting, Kissinger sent Nixon a briefing memorandum on the status of both the report and the agency responses. “The only substantial disagreement that has been voiced so far,” Kissinger commented, “is the chapter dealing with SALT which is one of the most interesting and thoughtful in the report.” Kissinger noted that Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. Delegation to the SALT talks, advocated a major cut in the chapter, since it revealed “too much of the negotiations.” The section on the “overall approach” to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was less controversial, emphasizing “the need for mutual respect for legitimate interests, concrete negotiations, and focusing on broader interests rather than maneuvering for tactical advantages.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 327, Subject Files, President’s Annual Review of Foreign Policy 1971 (Memos) [3 of 3]) None of the members of the National Security Council raised any substantive concern during the meeting about the Soviet section. As Kissinger anticipated, however, Secretary of State William Rogers objected to the length and detail of the SALT section. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Minutes Originals 1971) Although Kissinger continued to oppose any substantive change, the SALT section was eventually revised to take account of these objections.

On February 24—the day before the annual report was released—Kissinger held a background briefing for members of the White House
press corps. During the briefing, several reporters raised the question of relations between the two superpowers. Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News asked whether passages on the Soviet Union might be “somewhat pessimistic as well as a warning” to the Kremlin. Kissinger replied:

“No. I think that would be wrong. What, we did in last year’s report was simply to affirm in general the desirability of negotiations. We believe that at the end of the second year of an Administration it isn’t proper anymore simply to talk about the desirability of negotiations in the abstract, and, therefore, we try to draw up as fair a balance, Pete, as we could. We tried to list the factors that make for negotiations and the factors that have in the past represented obstacles to negotiations.

“We attempted, and, of course, one can’t judge how successful one has been, but our intention was to convey that we will approach negotiations with the Soviet Union with great seriousness, with the profound conviction that on our ability to regulate our relationships will depend the future peace of the world, compared to which many of the tactical disputes are really in historical perspective relatively trivial.

“But we wanted to do this in a serious way and not simply in an abstract sentimental way and therefore, we felt that any fair statement to the American people and to the Soviet Union had to lay out also the obstacles that have in the past, and especially in the past year, been an obstacle.

“In addition, though, if you look at the specific subjects of negotiation that we are listing in other chapters, such as the SALT discussion in the Arms Control section, and such as the Berlin section in the Europe section, we are optimistic with respect to both of those in the realistic way. But we are trying to convey to the Soviet Union that we are prepared to make a serious effort to have serious settlements and we do not believe that it is necessary to issue warnings.

“But when we drew up the balance sheet, we had to give the negatives as well as the positives.”

Another reporter followed up by asking whether the Soviet section represented “not a warning, but a bridge perhaps for renewed negotiations.” “I think it is an invitation to the Soviet Union,” Kissinger explained, “to seek to look with us at the problems of the future and among those, the problem, the overwhelming problem, of assuring a stable and just peace.” (Ibid., Box H–175, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 102, 2 of 2 [5 of 5])

President Nixon called Kissinger at 6:09 p.m. for a quick review of the briefing. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange:
"P: How did your second round go?
"K: Very well. They asked nothing about Laos. They had read it very carefully.
"P: You spent about an hour?
"K: About 45 minutes. They asked some tough questions.
"P: They had read it?
"K: Yes.
"P: Good. That’s lots better than last year. They hadn’t read it last year. This was a good idea to give them advance copies.
"K: The questions showed a lot of thought. I will have to read it more carefully next year. They asked questions like on page 126 . . . There were no inconsistencies. They were primarily interested in the Soviet chapters, SALT to some extent, Vietnam. There was only one question on the Middle East.
"P: Of course, Vietnam.
"K: They were not unfriendly questions.
"P: That’s all right. Good. Some of the thoughtful ones asked questions? That’s good. This is something on which you will have stories several days. There will be news stories tomorrow afternoon and evening and Friday. The main thing is there will be a column thing in the news magazines.
"K: And interpretive stories on Sunday.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box [A1], Chronological File)

During a radio address from the Oval Office the next morning, February 26, the President announced the broad outlines of his annual report on foreign policy, including its call for a “new American-Soviet relationship.” “Mutual restraint, accommodation of interests, and the changed strategic situation open broad opportunities to the Soviet Union and the United States,” he declared. “It is our hope that the Soviet Union will recognize, as we do, that our futures are best served by serious negotiation of the issues which divide us. We have taken the initiative in establishing an agenda on which agreement could profoundly alter the substance of our relationship.” After the broadcast, Nixon went to the Cabinet Room for formal signature of the report. For the full text of the address, as well as of the report itself, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pages 212–345.
127. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


Nixon: Hello.
Kissinger: Hi.
Nixon: I thought you were going to see him.
Kissinger: I’m seeing Dobrynin at—
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: —six. And I have an answer from Rush on Berlin.\(^2\) And I’ll just put that to him.
Nixon: Where are you going to see him? Over here?
Kissinger: In the Map Room here.
Nixon: Right. Because—
Kissinger: I have two—three items—and one other thing.
[Omitted here is discussion of Chile, China, and Vietnam.]
Nixon: As far as I’m concerned, I’m not too—
Kissinger: And also—
Nixon: I just thought that psych— I wasn’t doing it because we lost the hill. I just thought that psychologically it was a damn good thing to keep banging them there.\(^3\)
Kissinger: And also, I must then say, the day after the TASS statement,\(^4\) to then hit them—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I’d just like to see whether we get an answer from Kosygin to your letter.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 460–27. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger in the Oval Office on February 26 from 5:47 to 6:08 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) See Document 123.

\(^3\) Reference is to Hill 31, a key defensive position in Laos maintained by the South Vietnamese army. It was overrun by North Vietnamese troops on February 25.


\(^5\) Reference is presumably to the draft letter from Nixon to Kosygin on SALT, which Kissinger gave Dobrynin on February 22. See Document 121.
Nixon: What is the—what’s your evaluation of the TASS statement? I think what you did was written last night.\(^6\)

Kissinger: My evaluation is that that was the—

Nixon: Why did they move it two weeks? And why did they—why did they make it? Because they’re—?

Kissinger: I think it’s the minimum that they could do. They would have had a hell of a lot of explaining—

Nixon: You mean they must have had a lot of argument before they decided to make it?

Kissinger: Well, I think they must have had some hell from Hanoi. Why—

Nixon: Oh.

Kissinger: —why it is this that they didn’t make any statement of support.

Nixon: I see.

Kissinger: And China must have attacked it. And I think it’s the minimum that they can do. But maybe it indicates that they’re shifting to a tougher line. I just—

Nixon: I doubt it.

Kissinger: You couldn’t draw the conclusion—after Cambodia they made an immediate statement. They held a press conference. They went into high gear. This time they said nothing officially—

Nixon: I wonder if they’re doing it because they think that maybe they’ll get public support—try to stir up, gin up support in this country.

Kissinger: I think that’s one of the factors.

Nixon: That’s what I was thinking it would be.

Kissinger: And I think that the public support is—

Nixon: They always react to that, Henry.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: But as a matter of fact, it’s interesting to note, as they said to me, the doves have one hell of a time getting—they’re split without Symington, [Senator George] Aiken and all these other faces, it’ll be faceless.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

Nixon: Well, how did you feel your—what’s your conversation supposed to be about with him today?

Kissinger: Berlin.

\(^6\) Not further identified.
Nixon: Oh.

Kissinger: And I just wanted to—he might, might have an answer from, well, on the letter, but we’ll have to see.

Nixon: Probably not. I’ve prepared the way, incidentally, for the summit thing. Not just the summit, but the SALT thing. I told Rogers I didn’t have any confidence in Smith. I didn’t want him to have any discussions with him until I had him in. But I said, “I’ve been thinking a great deal about this whole SALT mess. I might want to make a statement or I might want to write a letter or something.” And I said, “If I do, look, I’ll tell you, and you’re going to tell Smith, but I’m not going to go let him in.”

Kissinger: No. Excellent.

Nixon: Now, you see, I’ve figured we really don’t need him. If he doesn’t come in, forget it. My view is that we get it, then I’ll get the letter, and I’ll write it out because I’ve already decided on it. This is it. I’m going to do this on my own.

Kissinger: No, I think, Mr. President, if he doesn’t come, you ought to make a public statement offering it publicly.

Nixon: That’s what I was thinking, Henry.

Kissinger: I mean, if Kosygin—

Nixon: Oh, I know.

Kissinger: If we don’t get an answer, then I would make a very forthcoming offer.

Nixon: And before it, so people—so that we can—I told Bill, I said, “We have got—I’ve got to take credit,” I told him, “for anything that happens in arms control.” And I said, “It can’t be Smith who’s going to get the credit.” I said, “He’s a small player and I don’t trust him.” I put it right to him. I said, “Therefore, I’m going to make a statement or”—I didn’t indicate a letter to whom—but “I’ve decided I might want to write a letter and make a statement before the thing begins. And then we’re going to go back. I won’t—I will not discuss it with Smith.” So we’re all set on that.

Kissinger: Okay.

Nixon: Now, “The ball’s in your court and it can go over if you can.” I hope it’s a letter.

Kissinger: Oh, that would be spectacular.

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Nixon: That would be great.
Kissinger: And that would shut up the doves a bit.

[Omitted here is discussion of press relations, in particular, regarding Vietnam.]

128. Editorial Note

On February 26, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met in the Map Room at the White House from 6 until 6:43 p.m. to discuss several issues, including Berlin and Vietnam. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) Kissinger reported the discussion on the Berlin negotiations in a special channel message to Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush on March 3:

“I met with Dobrynin on Feb. 26 and handed him your formulation of the access proposal. [See Document 123.] I said it might be well for Abrasimov to introduce it in the Four Power context. Dobrynin said that he recognized that some advance had been made but the principles themselves were probably too unchanged to meet with Moscow’s approval. I said we had gone as far as possible.

“Dobrynin inquired about the Federal Presence issue. I said that we should make progress on access first and then I was certain the presence question could be looked at in new light. Dobrynin said that their perception was exactly the opposite. He would report to Moscow and let me know.

“We seem to have reached the same deadlock you have in Berlin.

“The only other interesting item is that Dobrynin told me Abrasimov is now instructed to discuss limitations on committee and party group meetings with you. I told him that I doubted we would proceed pending progress on access.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

During the meeting, Dobrynin also gave Kissinger a Soviet note protesting the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos. After a summary of previous statements on the subject, the note presented a summary of the Soviet position, including the following passage:

“Without the United States displaying in deeds their readiness for a peaceful settlement in Indochina on the basis of respect for the lawful rights of the peoples of that region, the situation there will inevitably
continue to be aggravated with all the ensuing dangerous consequences for the international relations as a whole, including the relations between our two countries.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 4 [part 1])

According to the memorandum of conversation, when Kissinger asked whether the Soviets expected a reply to the note, Dobrynin replied: “No, but it might be courteous to do so.” Kissinger said he would see Dobrynin “next week.” (Ibid.) Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing it (as well as the memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on March 5) to President Richard Nixon on March 16. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Ibid.)

During Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin on February 26, Nixon met in the Oval Office with White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman to discuss various issues, including Kissinger’s role in the Middle East. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Secretary of State William Rogers, meanwhile, called the President at 6:18 p.m. to report that the Israeli Government had released its official reply to Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Special Representative in the Middle East, who had proposed starting talks for an interim Suez Canal agreement before expiration on March 7 of the latest 90-day cease-fire. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 460–28) As Nixon left the Oval Office at 6:45 p.m., Kissinger called Haldeman, presumably to report on his meeting with Dobrynin. Although the transcript does not record the beginning of the conversation, Haldeman reported that Nixon wanted Kissinger to assess the Israeli reply. “He wants you to go over it,” Haldeman added, “and he wants to have a meeting off-the-record in the morning with you, Laird, Rogers, and Helms.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. Although the transcript is undated, the context—after the President’s “world report” on February 25 but before his press conference on March 4, and on the same day as Kissinger’s talks with Sisco and Haldeman and Nixon’s talk with Rogers—clearly indicates that it took place on February 28. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule; and National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to his Daily Diary, Nixon called Kissinger on February 28 at 8:37 p.m.; the conversation lasted until 9:03. (Ibid.)

2 Kissinger called Nixon at 11:30 a.m. on February 28 to report that the Department of State wanted to send a telegram to Tel Aviv criticizing the Israeli response to Jarring’s proposal for a Middle East settlement (see Document 119). “I am afraid that time will force us to let [the telegram] go,” Kissinger complained, “but if we had known it was developing this way earlier we could have perhaps worked bilaterally with the Soviets and gotten a great deal more for what we are going to have to do to Israel—perhaps even the Summit.” According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “P: Stay on top of this Henry. Determine where we are going and check with the Soviets. See what we can get from them. K: At this point I think we are bound to get a brutal public confrontation with Israel. If they cave, we will pay a price for nothing. I only wish we had moved with the Soviets and gotten something for it. P: Is this still possible? K: In my private discussions they have certainly offered.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File) The full transcript is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

3 During a telephone conversation with Haldeman at 3:05 p.m., Kissinger advocated wresting Middle East policy away from the Department of State. “Can’t do it with the present management,” he explained. “Dobrynin has been on his knees with me for things like this. We might have gotten something from them and this way will get nothing. This is a major concern and Al [Haig] is with me. I just don’t want the President to think the matter is solved. This week there will be a blow up [with the Israelis].” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)

4 Kissinger called Sisco at noon on February 28 to discuss the situation: “K: My question is why shouldn’t we have done this with the Soviets and gotten something from the Soviets. S: I do not understand. K: Why couldn’t we say to the Soviets [to] get their bases the hell out of there? S: Our position is based on the October 1969 document.
P: Good.
K: One. I got them to stop making . . .
P: I talked to Rogers and he seemed to be—at least he said all the things that we were talking about so I just listened, so that’s that.
K: Right.
P: But that was right after I talked to you so what did Sisco say?
K: They were going to make a public statement tomorrow condemning the Israeli position.
P: Let’s not make any mistake—that’s the wrong thing to do.
K: That just doesn’t get us anything. Then I got them to soften their cable, I couldn’t get them to stop going to a Four-Power meeting even though I think they should have waited for an Egyptian reply. But, I also told him that you needed to see a package deal in which we would tell the Israelis what we do want and . . .
P: What we will do, that’s right.
K: And what we will do for them.
P: That’s what I told, that’s what I told Bill too and that at the right time I would talk to the Israelis.
K: Right, Well, now Sisco is working on that and he will have that by Tuesday or Wednesday.
P: The thing is there, we don’t want to do until we have got something that is really worthwhile and then, of course, you can’t use the big gun very often but I’m prepared to do it. But they have got to get something together that is . . .
K: Well, the smart way to do it would be to get it from them and then to see whether we can broker it with Dobrynin and get something from the Russians for it too.
P: Yeah, that would be, wouldn’t it?
K: Because if we could get the Russians to withdraw their troops.
P: Yeah.

This has been our position for years. Why didn’t we tell this to the Soviets to get them out of there? K: Yes. S: This is wholly unrealistic. Totally unrealistic, Henry. Assuming we get a peace settlement, there will be a general disengagement by the Russians in the Middle East because the Arabs naively think they can get rid of them. But it will be the same as where we have military bases and there is no [action]—they generally want them to move out and the Russian influence will go down with the Arabs as they become disillusioned—this is assuming we get a settlement. K: You do not think this should be used in any way? S: No. God bless you, Henry, I wish it was.” (Ibid.)

5 Nixon called Rogers at 3:41 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.
6 March 2 or March 3.
K: Incidentally, that note I handed them on Monday on Cuba\(^7\) seems to have worked, the Russian ships left today.
P: They left again.
K: Yeah.
P: That’s sort of in and out, isn’t it?
K: Yeah.
P: What was the reason do you think that they were at the UN with it? From some report, I noticed they had such reaction to the World Report.\(^8\)
K: I haven’t read that yet.
P: Well, it was in one of the news summaries, somebody had just saw it being blasted. Oh, what did the Russians say about it, are they . . .
K: I haven’t seen anything except one broadcast directed at Africa.
P: Maybe that was it.
K: In which they tore it to pieces.
P: That was the one I guess, yeah.
K: But that I thought was more for the audience.
P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, I just wondered, I didn’t—they didn’t take it out on—the main thing they didn’t it on—at least they didn’t take it on SALT or anything like that.
K: Oh, no. Oh, no.
P: Well, that’s all I care about.
K: What infuriates them is the China section.
P: Oh, that might have been it too. This was something that—I don’t know where I got the impression that something—where they had said something at the UN. I don’t know what it is.
K: Well, I’ll look it up, Mr. President.
P: It may not be in the new summary, it may have been something that maybe Bush was telling me or something—I don’t know what it was but it was just a fleeting thing that somebody up there at the United Nations was whining around about it. But nothing—maybe it wasn’t anything public. I don’t have the slightest idea. It didn’t come from State or anything but it was just something that stuck in my mind, I don’t know what it was. Well, it may have been the African thing, it didn’t—but I just wanted to see what the—but I guess the China thing would—why the hell—well, of course, it would.
K: Well, because of all it’s the first public document in which we called the Communist Chinese the People’s Republic of China.

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\(^7\) February 22. See Document 121.
\(^8\) See Document 126.
P: Yeah, which I didn’t particularly like that but we did it.
K: And where we say we will talk to anybody—well, you had done it already in your talks to Ceausescu.
P: I know, yeah, yeah, I know. But what I mean is I don’t like the idea but I know we have to do it.
K: Right.
P: That’s not much to give.
K: And where we said we are willing to talk with them anyplace.
P: Um-hum.
K: So, the whole tone of the China section undoubtedly annoyed them. And also, of course, they have to even if they do the things we are talking about, they are not going to give the impression that there is a great reconciliation here.

[Omitted here is discussion of Congress and Vietnam.]
P: Except that we do not want to leave it in any position where we can let a Cooper—not Cooper but more Church, you know he’s got money he’s passing around, to get some sort of a resolution to say that the United States will not support a South Vietnamese invasion of the North. You see that’s what we want to avoid. Now, in two months we will be over it, for the next two months we’ve got to keep it in a situation where we—you see a resolution could be very harmful to the South Vietnamese and to us, and very encouraging to the North. Apart from what we say, we just don’t want to do anything—I just don’t want to leave it in the position where the resolution is inevitable.

K: Well, I was thinking in any event given that note that Dobrynin handed me which wasn’t too aggressive on Friday, if you were to say something at your press conference that indicated that there is no American plan to do anything like this.

P: I’ve already said that, of course, if you will read what I said in the office press conference, I said we have no plans. I just said I won’t speculate on what they would do, you see.

9 Senator John Sherman Cooper (R–Kentucky) and Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho). The Senate approved the so-called Cooper-Church amendment prohibiting American military assistance and activity in Cambodia on June 30, 1970.
11 During his press conference on February 17, the President acknowledged “several limits” on the use of military force in Southeast Asia: “For example, we are not going to use ground forces in Laos. We are not going to use advisers in Laos with the South Vietnamese forces. We are not going to use ground forces in Cambodia or advisers in Cambodia as we have previously indicated, and we have no intention, of course, of using ground forces in North Vietnam.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 158–159)
K: Well, if you were to repeat that, then I think I should tell it to Dobrynin the day before and pretend that it is a response to his suggestion, just to keep that dialogue going.

P: True. I’m not concerned really so much, Henry, about Dobrynin. [Omitted here is further discussion of Congress and Vietnam.]

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130. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Letter from Kosygin on Mid-East

Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday delivered to Secretary Rogers a letter (attached) to you from Chairman Kosygin on the Middle East dated February 26. Addressing you on the “situation shaping up now around the problem of political settlement, he makes these points:

—The impression has been growing in recent weeks that a breakthrough was imminent. This was the result of a constructive UAR position.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 2]. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum and its attachments.

2 Attached but not printed. During a telephone conversation with the President at 7:18 p.m., Kissinger reported: “On the Middle East, the Russians delivered a letter for you to the State Department—the Israeli attitude is our fault and they have asked for a Four Power meeting. That is essentially what we thought would happen.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)

3 According to Rogers’s Appointment Book, Dobrynin called at 9:45 a.m. on March 1 to request the meeting. Before he received the Ambassador at 12:06 p.m., the Secretary summoned Sisco to his office for a quick briefing. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) Sisco called Kissinger at 12:07 p.m. and reported: “Henry, I just want to let you know Dobrynin has asked for a meeting with the Secretary. He is seeing him just about now. I went up to brief the Secretary for about 2 minutes. I told him I think we should take a tough line with him. He has been beating us over the head publicly. Is he interested in peace or propaganda points? We know what the problems are and what is to be done. If he comes back to why haven’t we answered their former note, then he should tell them that part of it is OBE.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)
—The USSR “had an occasion to express in Cairo [its] positive attitude” on this move.

—After the UAR reply, “the rest depended entirely on Israel.”

—Israel clearly wants to retain the occupied Arab territories. “However, we were told on several occasions by the American side, at the most responsible level as well, that the United States stood for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied territories/in the case of the UAR—from all the territory of the United Arab Republic occupied by the Israeli troops/, if the Arabs take, on the question of terms for peace, the position of which the American side spoke both publicly and in bilateral contacts with us. We were taking those assurances by the U.S. Government with all seriousness and, naturally, were proceeding from the assumption that the American side would be able to exert the necessary influence upon Tel Aviv . . .”

—But on February 21 the Israeli government came out with “a defiant statement” declaring its refusal to withdraw troops from the occupied territory of the UAR. This puts in jeopardy all efforts thus far to achieve a political settlement.

—The President will realize “to what consequences” Israel’s position can push events “as well as that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to these events.” Responsibility will “rest with the United States.” Israel could not take such an “obstructionist, bluntly expansionist” position in contradiction to U.S. policy.

—This situation makes the USSR “give serious thought” to the “steps which may be required under these circumstances on [its] part.”

Secretary Rogers in his cover memo (attached) makes these points:

—The USSR is taking a strong line publicly and privately to exploit and reinforce the UAR’s presently favorable position.

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4 All brackets are in the original.
6 Attached but not printed; dated March 1. Rogers briefed Sisco on his meeting with Dobrynin during lunch at 1:15 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers; Appointment Book) Sisco then called Kissinger at 3:34 p.m. to report that Dobrynin had delivered a letter from Kosygin. “It’s a letter which has a good deal of propaganda overtones,” he remarked. “Emphasis in re-emphasizing Egypt’s line on Israeli withdrawal. Holding us responsible for negative Israeli reply.” Sisco added that he was drafting a memorandum, which the Secretary had dictated on the meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File) Sisco called Kissinger again at 10:15 a.m. on March 2 to review the situation. When Kissinger asked if the memorandum from Rogers to the President contained a “fairly full description,” Sisco replied: “Henry, this is what I was told—I was not there. I’m not happy that he sees this fellow alone but there’s nothing I can do about it.” (Ibid.)
—The Secretary told Dobrynin he was disappointed that the USSR, in making a public statement, was exploiting the situation propagandistically. [A Soviet statement was issued yesterday.]

—The Secretary “noted that it was not helpful for the USSR to make it appear that we had adopted the position that Israel should return all of the territory.” Specifically, our position had been that the questions of Sharm al-Shaikh, Gaza, the West Bank and the demilitarized zones had to be negotiated by the parties.”

—The Secretary told Dobrynin that, while the Israeli reply was not satisfactory, more time is needed to work towards a peaceful solution. The USSR should not exacerbate the situation.

—The Secretary objected to the final point above which had overtones of threat.

—A Four Power meeting Tuesday would be premature, but we would talk about Four Power action in lieu of a Security Council meeting on the assumption that the Four Power meeting scheduled for Thursday would take place.

Comment: The letter illustrates some of the problems I discussed with you:

1. The Soviet leaders were obviously told that we supported the 1967 frontier with Egypt and essentially the 1967 frontier with Jordan.

2. As long as we proceed unilaterally, the Soviet Union has a vested interest to undercut us by taking positions where we cannot follow.

3. It underlines the need: (a) for clarifying our views with respect to a package settlement, (b) seeing in what way it can be made part of a Soviet-U.S. dialogue.

4. After the immediate tactical phase is over, we should seriously consider taking up the plan for opening the Canal to gain some time.

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8 March 4.

SUBJECT
Comments on the Soviet Middle East Statements

The Soviets are obviously worried that the current diplomatic impasse will lead to a resumption of fighting. This seems to be the main message in their two statements, a public one on February 28 and the private letter from Kosygin. Their concern that developments could take a dangerous turn is probably sharpened by their own efforts to persuade the UAR to make its concession. This probably involved some argumentation that the US and Israel would have to make counter concessions. Thus, the nature of Israel’s response may have weakened the Soviet position in Cairo and these semi-propagandistic statements are attempts to repair this position.

Beyond this underlying concern the Soviets obviously seem to be scrambling to develop something before the cease fire runs out. Thus, they are extremely anxious that the four powers meet and make some move on guarantee, which they could represent as justifying continuation of the cease fire.

At the same time, they are probably working in Cairo to prevent reactions there from getting out of hand. Thus, their public statement says:

“The Soviet government believes that vigorous actions by all states interested in peace are now especially necessary in a direction to prevent Israel and its patrons from frustrating the cause of a political settlement. If the peace loving states unite their efforts in the struggle for such a settlement in the Middle East, it will be possible to achieve this task.”

While the immediate Soviet aim is to guarantee that fighting does not resume, the longer term political aim in the negotiating context is well illustrated. To some extent the Soviets are achieving their tactical aims: (1) by creating the impression that Israel is the only obstacle to

2 See Document 130.
3 See footnote 7, Document 130.
a settlement at this point; (2) by creating the further impression that the US could, if it wished, bring Israel around. Thus, the Soviets are, in part at least, making a record should the effort to achieve a political settlement fail.

In this situation their tactical line will be to increase pressures on the US. Thus, the veiled threat in the Kosygin letter, which is too obscure to mean much but is sufficiently ominous to worry us.

Meanwhile the whole issue of Soviet presence in Egypt remains excluded from the negotiations or the concept of a settlement, even though in our description of the situation (e.g. the Annual Review) we emphasize this aspect. While this may be too delicate a juncture to introduce this issue, as things are now drifting, we are taking all the blame for Israel, while the Soviets claim credit here and there for pushing their own clients, a move they made, incidentally, after Sadat went on record as guaranteeing that the Soviets would retain their bases in Egypt regardless of a settlement.

4 See Document 126.

132. Editorial Note

During the first week of March 1971, President Richard Nixon spent considerable time managing the conflict between Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, including their differences over the conduct of Soviet-American relations. On March 2, Senator Stuart Symington addressed the “Kissinger syndrome” from the Senate floor, charging that Kissinger had become “the most powerful man in the Nixon administration next to the President himself.” According to Symington, Kissinger—due to his mastery of the National Security Council system—was now the “Secretary of State in everything but title.” The Senator cited several newspaper reports to support his case, in particular the recent series of articles in the New York Times (see Document 95). “According to the Times articles,” he declared, “it was Dr. Kissinger whom the President selected to deal directly with the Soviet Union in connection with the possible installation of a submarine base in Cuba; thus bypassing the Secretary of State, who reportedly had a more restrained view toward the matter.” (Congressional Record, Senate, March 2, 1971, pages 4498–4503) Nixon discussed the fallout from this “big flap” in the Executive Office Building that afternoon with two of his closest advisers: H.R. Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff,
and John Ehrlichman, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. According to Haldeman:

"The three of us had a long discussion about the whole Rogers–K problem, trying to figure out whether there’s any solution. John feels that it’s reached the point where it is actually unsolvable, and that one or the other has probably got to go. He feels that Henry’s at a point emotionally where, when one of these things hits, he’s going to come charging in and quit before he actually even realizes what he’s doing; and that once he does so, it will be too late: there won’t be any more we can do about it. I question whether this is likely to happen, but I guess it might. In any event, the P concurred with my feeling that Henry is much more valuable to him than Rogers, but that there’s a real problem of whether replacing Rogers will solve the K problem. In other words, once Bill’s gone, the problem could very well arise anew with the next Secretary of State.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

While Symington criticized his role in Washington, Kissinger continued to emphasize the Soviet role in Cairo. Three members of his staff—Richard Kennedy, Harold Saunders, and Samuel Hoskinson—addressed the issue in a March 2 memorandum, briefing Kissinger for an upcoming meeting of the Senior Review Group on the Middle East. The meeting had been scheduled to discuss the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli peace process, particularly in the wake of the February 26 response from the Israeli Government rejecting the Jarring proposal for an interim Suez Canal agreement and the letter from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to President Nixon criticizing the Israeli Government for its “obstructionist, bluntly expansionist position.” In their memorandum, Kennedy, Saunders, and Hoskinson suggested that Washington try to break the deadlock by developing a new approach to both Tel Aviv and Moscow. “On approaches to the Soviets, no one has yet developed a serious strategy for dealing with the USSR,” they explained. “The two outstanding questions are how we should try to involve the Soviet Union in the peacemaking process—they have clearly lobbed the ball into our court with the Kosygin message—and how to deal with the question of reducing Soviet combat forces in the UAR. As far as can be seen at the moment, State still is not considering a comprehensive strategy and is at most dealing with a possible response to Kosygin.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1161, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East–Jarring Talks Edited and Indexed, March 1–4, 1971 [3 of 3])

The Senior Review Group met on March 3 but deferred discussion of the Middle East until a later date. Kissinger, however, raised his concerns in a meeting with Haldeman at 8:10 a.m., linking the conflict with Rogers to the conflict in the Middle East. (Library of Congress, Manu-
script Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) Haldeman described the discussion in his diary:

“The big problem today is still the K–Rogers situation. Henry came in this morning and was not at all upset, as he has been in the past, but was talking about his frustration over the fact that we’re going to go ahead tomorrow or Friday [March 5] with, I guess, an agreement for a Big Four meeting and a Soviet-United States blast at the Israelis for not cooperating properly. In any event, we have given away this Four Power talk and the blast at the Israelis.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

According to Haldeman’s handwritten notes, Kissinger qualified his position: “K—frustrated [be]cause we are giving away 4-power talks to Russians—could have traded it for summit.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 43, H Notes, Feb. 15, 1971–March 31, 1971, Part II)

Nixon called Kissinger at 9:58 a.m. to review the issues likely to arise during his press conference the following evening, including Vietnam and the Middle East. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange:

“P: What do you have on the M.E.?
“K: Likely to blow this weekend. Tomorrow we will go with the statement condemning Israel. Then Israel will make a public—
“P: I don’t care about rhetoric—
“K: The next sequence of moves will be—it may tempt the Arabs into an attack. I didn’t want to press State yesterday or today. They are reluctant and I don’t think it’s good now. We will do it over the weekend and take the public heat for a few days. Too much now to overrule it. They have gone too far. It’s not decisive. If we can get a package together saying what they must do but also what we won’t demand.
“P: The condemnatory statement will be done by the 4 powers?
“K: They loaded it and we couldn’t pull back. It gives the Soviets something they wanted but it’s not decisive. At any rate Mitchell was in yesterday and was very concerned. I told him to sit tight.
“P: What about the answer from [to] Kosygin?
“K: At the end of this week. Could you give me advance information on what you intend to say on NVN invasion at the press conference?
“P: I have the briefing book and getting everything together now. I am reading what I have said previously. I will know by tomorrow noon.
“K: If you can give me a few hours advance warning then I can use it as an excuse to call Dobrynin in.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)
According to Haldeman, the President spent nearly two days preparing for his press conference. (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Kissinger contributed an index of foreign policy questions and answers, which he forwarded to Nixon on March 2. Nixon carefully studied the index, underlining various passages and collecting his thoughts in the margin. The index covered a variety of issues related to Soviet-American affairs, including SALT, Berlin, and China. Nixon noted, for instance, that the goal of his diplomacy was improvement in East-West relations, not deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. He also addressed the question of Soviet military presence in Egypt, writing in the margin:

"1. No outsider should seek a permanent military presence—
2. No outsider should seek to dominate the area (not U.S.—*not S.U.*)
3. Nations of Mideast must be dominant." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 166, Foreign Affairs File, Foreign Policy Briefing Book, March 2, 1971 (Pat Buchanan))

The President held a half-hour-long press conference in the East Room at 9 p.m. on March 4. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) During the conference, Nixon followed Kissinger’s advice by sending a message to Moscow—in effect, responding to the recent Soviet note on Laos (see Document 128). When a reporter asked whether the United States would support an invasion of North Vietnam, he replied that “no such plan is under consideration in this Government.” The President expressed some optimism about the prospects for talks on SALT and the Middle East; in the latter case, he indicated that he was prepared to “join other major powers including the Soviet Union” in guaranteeing a settlement. Nixon, however, adopted a less positive tone in response to a question on Symington’s remarks on Kissinger, calling them a “cheap shot.” “[T]he Secretary of State is always the chief foreign policy adviser and the chief foreign policy spokesman of the Administration,” he declared. “At the same time, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs does advise the President, and I value his advice very much.” (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pages 386–395)
Washington, March 5, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

I had sought the meeting in order to have a pretext to introduce the SALT issue. I began the conversation by saying that what the President had said the night before on the South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam constituted the answer to his note of February 26th. The answer had been framed with the greatest regard for Soviet sensibilities.

Dobrynin repeated what he had said on February 26th; namely, that attacks on a fellow Socialist country presented a particular difficulty. I told him that I understood this and we had framed the matter with this in mind. Dobrynin said, “Well, the first point about unilateral American action was clear enough. The second point about South Vietnamese action was clear enough, but how about U.S. support for the South Vietnamese; namely the third point. I told Dobrynin I would stand by what I had said on national television; namely, that it was the least probable outcome. Dobrynin said this was better than nothing but not fully satisfactory.

Dobrynin then asked me whether I had an answer for Hanoi about their willingness to meet with me. I said the answer was that Hanoi knew how to reach me and that I would be happy to see them if they were willing to talk. Dobrynin said we seemed to be passing the ball back and forth. I said no, but that if Hanoi had something specific to discuss, it might interest them to know that I would be available.

We then turned to Berlin and Dobrynin said again that it would make their lot much easier if we could couple Federal presence with Berlin access.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 1]. No classification marking. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing it (as well as the memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on February 26) to Nixon on March 16. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 5:38 to 6:12 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 See Document 132.

3 See Document 128.
Finally, I asked him about SALT. I said that the negotiations were starting on March 16th, and it would be highly desirable if we could have their answer before then in order to be able to formulate instructions. Dobrynin said that the Party leaders were all tied up with the Party Congress and that it always took them a while to organize for a reply. They were in a dacha outside of Moscow and were not doing the day-to-day business; however, he would send a cable that evening and he expected to have a reply by Tuesday or Wednesday.\(^4\)

After some pleasantries about the Symington attack\(^5\) and what it might mean, the meeting ended.

\(^4\) March 9 or 10.
\(^5\) See Document 132.

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134. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

March 6, 1971, 9:20 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of the military situation in Laos.]

[K:] I had a talk with Dobrynin yesterday.\(^2\)

P: What did Dobrynin say.

K: He said I might have an answer by Tuesday\(^3\) on this thing. I told him, “I hope you noticed the President’s press conference.\(^4\) Your communication had some influence on him. It was partially in response to your communication on Vietnam. I hope you also noticed what he said about the air—that he will do exactly what he said he will.” Dobrynin said his party leaders are now getting ready for the Party Congress, so they are only focusing on one thing. But he thought he would have an answer by Tuesday.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File. No classification marking.
\(^2\) Nixon was at Camp David; Kissinger was in Washington. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
\(^3\) See Document 133.
\(^4\) See Document 132.
P: So that we could have an exchange of letters. If it doesn’t turn out we can make a speech. I don’t think SALT should start by some jackass statement by Smith again.

K: The way the instructions are for Smith, they will start and deadlock and then he will want to come to the rescue and our problem is to preempt him by two weeks. Just before the talks start, or by April 1, have you make a statement to break the deadlock.

P: I would rather do it before because they are never going to agree with Smith, are they?

K: No. The talks are guaranteed to deadlock and they will deadlock for a long stretch. So you might want to save it for April.

P: I am talking to the newspapers on April 13.

K: Could conceivably have the talks announcement on the 6th or 7th and then on the 13th make your SALT proposal. We could keep it screwed up in Vienna until then. But I haven’t given up on the exchange of letters.

P: I think there is a good chance. They need it and we need it. We have been conciliatory but firm. Didn’t he feel that we were pretty even-handed in the press conference, or did he mention that?

K: He did not make any comment on that. It was a very short meeting. I said, with March 16 approaching, when do you think you will have an answer? He said he noticed in your press conference you noted our original position on SALT.

P: We will agree on defensive and say next year we will discuss offensive—the letter will say that—right?

K: Yes.

P: And then next year we will have another meeting to do that.

K: He brought [up] that message to talk to the North Vietnamese again and I said, sure, they know how to get hold of me.

P: You told them through Walters,5 didn’t you?

K: They know that. I did not tell him that. We won’t make any move now.

P: No, don’t make any move at all unless to get out of Paris. Make up a scenario whereby we break off the talks and make another move to talk about prisoners—in Geneva or some such thing.

K: The only other thing—the Egyptians have refused to extend the cease-fire.... give us a year’s breathing space. Up to now Sisco and Rogers have been reluctant. I think we should go for the partial solution.

5 General Vernon A. Walters, Military Attaché at the Embassy in Paris.
P: That will give the Egyptians a reason. They don’t want to break the cease-fire.

K: The end of the cease-fire puts the Egyptians under pressure. It gives us the running room here. At the same time we can move some of the general solutions into a private channel and give the Russians an added incentive for a Summit.

P: Things on Berlin are going smoothly?

K: Yes.

P: How about getting the meeting, but not the full NSC. Apart from us, Rogers, Laird, Helms, Sisco—that is all. If you get in Agnew he will want to argue about the merits, etc. Haig should be there to take notes. I don’t like to get into this thing that Johnson was in—to have a lunch. These things are all NSC meetings. Eisenhower used to call them Executive Sessions. You don’t have to have everybody.

K: The only ones you are scrapping are Agnew and Lincoln.

P: Should we have Moorer?

K: No, we don’t need him on this. With Sisco’s impetuosity—the thing to do is slow the thing down.

P: Do you think I should inform Rogers to get at it in a subtle way?

K: There is an advantage to having it Tuesday or Wednesday so that they can’t do anything until we have that meeting. I would recommend Wednesday in order to keep them from buck-shooting cables all over the place. It is the one area we haven’t played the control game where we don’t move until we know where we are going. If we had gone the other way a blow-up with the Israelis and then the cease-fire—Sadat was in Moscow March 1 or 2. Dobrynin told me he had a file, private or otherwise on everything we had given to Cairo. I don’t think he was bluffing.

P: Bob Finch, who is very close to the Jewish leaders in California said they were really reassured by the press conference when I said blankly I wouldn’t impose a settlement.

K: I told Tricia on Thursday night that for diplomatic skill that Israeli statement was a masterful statement.

P: I have a feeling that the press conference came just about the right time on all these issues. On Laos it came at the right time because we had to have a time that would be followed by some news that would

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6 President Johnson held regular “Tuesday lunches” with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

7 During the visit, Sadat reportedly requested Soviet MiG-23s to counter U.S. Phantoms in the Israeli air force. According to Sadat, the Soviets agreed to provide not only the aircraft but also the pilots to fly them until Egyptian pilots could be trained to take their place. (Ro’i, From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 548)
not be too bad. Just sticking it to the press in the way that they couldn’t respond. The press corps needed to have that said to them.

K: They keep saying you were mad at them. I told them you were not mad at them, you were just stating the facts.

P: I don’t think they have ever been so frustrated.

K: We had had nothing but . . . them, then you go on and speak with confidence and say it is going to work out as well as Cambodia and remember you people predicted that it wouldn’t work. Strategically this is more important than Cambodia.

P: It is more important because Cambodia was already done. It is the second battle. We are really choking their lifeline now.

K: They moved one battalion east—the North Vietnamese do a flanking push on Route 9 and immediately ran into some of our reserves and lost 200 men. That is something that a week ago would have driven us crazy when we did not have enough men in there. I think the biggest turning point administratively was your decision to get that private briefing from Moorer a week ago on Thursday because when we called over to the Pentagon and said we needed that they felt they had to answer these questions and get ready for your briefing. And they pushed on together and got themselves a plan.

P: Abrams seems to feel better now does he?

K: Yes, he is on top of it now. Some day I would like to know whether there wasn’t a private understanding with Laird and . . . At any rate you were right, Abrams is now going like the Abrams of Cambodia and for a week there it looked like he was shell-shocked.

P: Maybe it was that he ran into those 100 tanks. It was an awesome thing. I think Laird has held back on the air strikes for two weeks. Now that we have ordered it they will give our people a shot in the arm.

K: The Russians I will have to tell you are going to scream a bit.

P: We know that.

K: Even if it slows down our discussion with them by a couple of weeks.

P: We know them. What is the Chinese political statement?

K: They haven’t made it yet. The North Vietnamese in Paris said we don’t want to go into a conference even if they are urging us to do it. We haven’t urged them to do it lately so maybe the Russians or the Chinese did.

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8 February 25. During a meeting at 12:35 p.m. on February 25, Nixon, Kissinger, and Moorer discussed the possibility of bombing targets in North Vietnam to protect American reconnaissance and strike operations and to relieve the immediate threat to South Vietnamese supply lines in Laos. For the text of a memorandum of conversation of this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 137.
P: The Chinese must think there is not going to be any Yellow River concept. That is the reason they haven’t moved in yet, don’t you think?

K: They just can’t be sure what you are going to do if they tackle you. The second thing—they still have these 36 Russian divisions sitting up there.

P: I will give Bill a call today and tell him we would like to have a meeting Wednesday. When do we have an NSC meeting?

K: On Monday \(^9\) and that will be on SALT.

P: All right, Henry. Thank you.

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\(^9\) March 8.

### 135. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 12, 1971, 8 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Dobrynin

Henry A. Kissinger

Dobrynin set up the meeting urgently and it was held early in the morning because he was leaving for New York. Dobrynin began the conversation by handing me a draft letter from the Soviet Government (Tab A)\(^2\) in reply to the letter on SALT I had handed him on February 17 (Tab B).\(^3\) Dobrynin asked me what I thought of it.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Part 5 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on March 16. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing its “highlights” to Nixon on March 18. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, it lasted until 8:55 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

\(^2\) Attached but not printed. In a memorandum to Kissinger on March 12, Sonnenfeldt assessed the draft letter as “unyielding and, if I understand your previous exchanges correctly, even a step backward.” “I must confess,” Sonnenfeldt added, “that while not ruling out the bargaining theory, we may in fact have a real power play in which the Soviets are simply stonewalling on a manifestly inequitable deal on the assumption they have us at a real disadvantage from which we cannot dig ourselves out.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Part 5 [part 2]) See also Document 148.

\(^3\) Attached at Tab B is the draft letter Kissinger gave Dobrynin on February 22; see Document 121.
I replied that, of course, I would have to discuss it with the President, but my first reaction was that this was merely a restatement of the maximum Soviet position. We could not agree to an ABM-only agreement. We could also not agree to discuss a “freeze” only after an agreement had been made. It would seem to me that the only way we could make progress is by agreeing in principle on a “freeze”—then negotiating the agreement and then going back to the details of the “freeze.”

Dobrynin said that the best way to proceed would be for me to draft the version of what sort of a letter would be acceptable to us. I replied that I had trouble enough drafting documents for the U.S. Government; I could not draft them for the Soviet Government as well. Dobrynin then suggested that I perhaps redraft our original document in a more general way, keeping in mind that perhaps the Soviet Government did not want to commit itself now to any specific dates for implementing the “freeze.” I told him I would have to discuss it with the President.

Dobrynin then raised the Berlin issue and asked whether I had anything new to tell him. I said that we were waiting for the Soviet reply to our access proposal. Dobrynin said it would be a lot easier for them if we could give them ground on Federal presence. I said that we had gone over this before—that it would be a lot easier to sell the reduction of Federal presence in the Federal Republic if the Soviet Union made it worthwhile by being generous on an access agreement, and they still had every hedge in the sense that it was a package deal. Dobrynin said they were in exactly the opposite position with the East Germans.

We agreed to meet again on March 15 at 4:00 p.m. in order to discuss our draft reply.
136. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


Kissinger: Well, I saw our friend.\(^2\)
Nixon: Oh, yeah.
Kissinger: And he brought me a reply, a draft letter, which they would give you. And now we’re in a bit of a negotiation. I don’t know if at first you want to hear the details. They want a shorter letter from you.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: In fact, there was a lot of detail—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —in mine.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And Dobrynin says—
Nixon: Well, at least, it’s a reply though.
Kissinger: Oh, they’re dying to reaffirm the summit meeting.
Nixon: All right. All right.
Kissinger: And they’re saying—
Nixon: They want that announced now?
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: They don’t want it announced?
Kissinger: Not now. [That would be] too fast, Mr. President.
Nixon: Fine. Look, I’m just trying to feel them out.
Kissinger: But—
Nixon: All right. But on this, do they want this exchange of letters to occur now?
Kissinger: Well, yeah. Oh, yeah.
Nixon: Do you think we can? Why don’t you just summarize it for me?
Kissinger: Well, the exchange of letters is that I have proposed with him, in the draft of your letter, a very detailed agreement on freezing.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 467–11. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger from 8:50 to 9:01 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) Dobrynin. See Document 135.
Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: They don’t want to do that. They—and Dobrynin says frankly they don’t want to do it because he thinks that the preparation for the Party Congress they can’t all get together—


Kissinger: So they gave us a much shorter reply and they recommended we give them a much shorter letter, which just talks about the principles rather than the technical details.

Nixon: But does it mention offensive and defensive?

Kissinger: Yes. Now, there we had one point—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —which we have to settle with them.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: They, of course, are driving their usual hard bargain. They say, “Let’s negotiate in detail defensive first and then we will discuss the freezing.” I told him that I didn’t know your thinking—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: —but that that was too vague. I think what we have to ask them is this, Mr. President: that they agree to the principle of the freezing of deployments. Then we will authorize Smith to discuss ABM limits. And then, before the whole thing gets wrapped up, we will agree to the specifics of the freezing. I don’t think with this new Soviet missile buildup we can afford to sign an ABM-only agreement—

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: —that isn’t very specific.

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion with Butterfield of the President’s schedule.]

Nixon: My view is you get what you can get in the beginning and then you do whatever to have an agreement together. It’s nice for their—I don’t mean—you see what I mean? Particularly with an ABM-only agreement. It’s fine, as far as you could do it, but that would be a disaster.

Kissinger: Disaster. Well, on that kind of language, they are—

Nixon: That would be a mistake. Well, I don’t know what you can get.

Kissinger: On this one, too, they prefer Moscow and Washington rather than—

Nixon: What?

Kissinger: Rather than two sites. These are—

Nixon: Well, they can’t compare these things in significance, Henry.
Kissinger: Exactly, Mr. President. I think the significance of this is that they’ve gone this far. This is their first position on the inspection. Obviously, they’re going to try to get the best possible deal.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I don’t believe that he expected for a minute that we would accept this draft, as I said before.

Nixon: Yeah. Keep you both working on it—did he agree to that?

Kissinger: That’s right. And he—

Nixon: But he gives you—you ought to have something very soon.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. He’s dying for you—

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: He wanted to—he said—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —he was going out of town this weekend—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —and he will be delaying coming back.

Nixon: Fine. Why don’t you get back up—? Use your intelligence [unclear].

Kissinger: Well, but anyway—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: We can do that.

Nixon: But I’ll tell you what. You go forward and get it just as fast as you can.

Kissinger: Well, we’re meeting Monday.3

Nixon: And what kind of a—just get it. Don’t hang around long. You’ve got to get something done before Smith gets out there.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange with Ziegler on an unrelated press statement.]

Kissinger: Smith won’t, can’t do any damage, because he’s frozen for four weeks—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —into position. We’ll have this settled in two weeks, leaving only two topics left to go.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: We’ll be done within ten days in my view.

Nixon: Your view is that we might have the exchange of letters in ten days?

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3 March 15.
Kissinger: Within two weeks. If—unless there’s a total deadlock, which I don’t believe.

Nixon: You think you can get something though that’s—

Kissinger: They didn’t come this far—if they’ve agreed to a letter—

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion of textile negotiations with Japan and the military situation in Vietnam.]

Nixon: Listen, we’ve got to stick to our guns but, I think, running this thing now could have an enormous effect. We need something like this about now.

Kissinger: Well, we’ll have this—

Nixon: Just make any kind of a damn deal. You know it doesn’t make a goddamn bit of difference. We’re going to agree to settle it anyway. Just drive the hardest deal you can.

Kissinger: Push the letter. I think, Mr. President—

Nixon: You drive it and I’m going to write the letter.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. What we can do is probably, after being—we may have to give on Moscow and Washington.

Nixon: But what about Scoop Jackson?

Kissinger: Well, he’s only a Senator.

Nixon: Don’t tell him that.

Kissinger: Yeah. But we have to get some sort of recognition that—

[At this point, Nixon and Kissinger apparently continued the conversation as they left the Oval Office.]

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4 During a telephone conversation at 11:40 a.m. on March 13, the President asked Kissinger: “What will be your next move with Mr. D?” Kissinger replied: “I am going to hand him a redraft of your letter. It takes out some of the precise details about the dates of freeze . . . They can be left for negotiation. It can be too complicated. Just so we can get the deadlock broken. We have to do it. There is no one in the bureaucracy who defends the Safeguard system except Laird. I am seeing him [Dobrynin] on Monday [March 15] at 4 o’clock.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Black Sea and Baltic Sea Operations

This is in response to your question concerning planned or scheduled operations in the Black and Baltic Seas.

I have directed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct an enlarged patrol in the Black Sea beginning in mid-April. During recent years this patrol has routinely consisted of two destroyers operating in the Black Sea for four days. The forthcoming patrol will be comprised of four destroyers operating for the same duration. No port calls or unusual activities are planned. The planned track is attached at Tab A.

The aircraft carrier Intrepid and two escorts will be deployed to the Baltic Sea about 12 May for a period of approximately ten days. This will include a four to six day visit in Helsinki if diplomatic clearance is granted. This deployment will follow a scheduled NATO exercise and upon completion of operations in the Baltic these three ships will proceed to the Mediterranean for operations there. At Tab B is an illustrative track of the Baltic Sea operation.

Melvin R. Laird

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject Files, USSR US Ships in the Black Sea (Silver Fox). Secret. In an attached handwritten note, Richard Kennedy commented: “HAK has seen and OK’d. Please hold for Haig.” Haig initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.

2 Laird and Kissinger discussed the proposal during a telephone conversation at 10:40 a.m. on March 11: “L: I understand there’s some feeling that the Black Sea thing should be cut back so I am cutting it back. K: Who wants it? L: You and Alex Johnson wanted it cut to 3 destroyers. K: And a little later because of the Party Congress but not destroyers, because of the tender. L: We have 4 programmed in there and if we pull them off then we will have 3. K: Why not another? L: We can’t keep them there that long. We will have to put in different ones because those have yet to be serviced. K: They shouldn’t go in right at the Party Congress but afterwards. It doesn’t have to be April 15 but the President wants something more than before. L: We have the Baltic visits going in. I will look at it again.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 8, Chronological File)

3 Attached but not printed.

4 Attached but not printed.

5 Printed from a copy that indicates Laird signed the original.
138. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers


Oral Statement to Soviet Ambassador on Soviet Jewry

Your memorandum of January 29 to the President (Tab E) on preventing anti-Soviet incidents mentioned our intention to have a senior officer of the Department give Ambassador Dobrynin an oral statement on the relevance to U.S.-Soviet relations of the plight of Soviet Jewry.

We think it would be propitious to make this statement now because the Soviets, by permitting the departure of Leonid Rigerman and his mother, have implicitly recognized that such humanitarian issues have a legitimate place within the broader context of Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, the World Conference of Jewish Communities on Soviet Jewry, which just met in Brussels, underlined the fact that concern about the plight of Soviet Jewry is not confined to the United States and Israel. Moreover, the exclusion of Rabbi Kahane from the Conference shows that the overwhelming majority of Jewish organizations reject the violence associated with his Jewish Defense League. The Soviet Government showed great sensitivity to the Brussels Conference and the fact that the US Government played no role in it may help to establish our bona fides in this matter.

Embassy Moscow has just reported that since the Brussels Conference the Soviet authorities have begun issuing exit visas to an unprecedentedly high number of Soviet Jewish emigrants to Israel—60 to 100 per day (Tab D). This vastly increased flow of emigrants will naturally become public knowledge very soon and Rabbi Kahane, among others, will no doubt attempt to claim credit for this welcome development. He might well do so in connection with the rally he has scheduled in Washington for March 21. It would be very helpful if the Department were in a position to undercut such a claim by pointing to a recent act of intercession at a high level with the Soviet authorities. Otherwise, Kahane might succeed in attracting additional adherents for his policy of harassing Soviet officials.

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2 Attached but not printed.
3 See Document 112.
4 Attached at Tab D is telegram 1528 from Moscow, March 13.
The statement attached at Tab A has been prepared for your possible use. The text conforms closely to that in your memorandum to the President.

Such a statement would underline our continuing concern and our intention to follow up on conversations which the President and you had with Rabbi Schachter, Dr. William Wexler, and Mr. Max Fisher.

We would not plan to release the text of the statement, at least initially. However, appropriate reference could be made to its general theme by the Department in its discussions with concerned Americans and in our public and Congressional correspondence as an indication of our continued interest in this subject.

Ambassador Dobrynin will probably try to parry your expression of interest in the fate of Soviet Jews by insisting that their status is entirely an internal affair. He may also attempt a counter-thrust by alleging that the U.S. Government is not adequately protecting Soviet officials and exchange visitors from the indignities imposed on them by local “Zionists.” In addition, Dobrynin may try to gain a debating advantage by complaining about your meeting on February 23 with Leonid Rigerman.

A recent exchange of remarks in the British House of Commons on the subject of the Soviet Jews is attached at Tab C. The essential point in Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s response was that, although this matter concerned the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, the policies being pursued by the Soviet Government damage its reputation in the outside world. You may wish to take note of the British Foreign Secretary’s views in your conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin. You may also wish to use some of the additional talking points at Tab B.

Recommendation

That Ambassador Dobrynin be called in soon to receive this statement.

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5 Attached but not printed.
6 See Document 82.
7 See Document 125.
8 Attached but not printed.
9 Attached but not printed.
10 Rogers initialed the disapprove option on March 18 and wrote in the margin: “not timely in view of increased emigration. Our efforts previously made seem to have succeeded to some extent.”
139. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1971, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

Dobrynin began the conversation by handing me a very much abbreviated version of his original reply (Tab A). This eliminated all the references to an NCA type agreement, and also to the subsequent discussion. It was in much more general terms. I told him that this, too, was not acceptable because it did not link offensive limitations to defensive ones—that we considered it highly improper for the Soviet Union to ask us to stop deploying the only strategic weapon which we were building while we had irrefutable evidence that they were embarked on a new strategic weapons program. Dobrynin then asked me what I proposed.

I handed him the draft of a letter which I had brought with me (Tab B). Dobrynin said this was still too complicated and he suggested the following compromise—that we take the Soviet letter together with whatever additions we wanted to make.

I said that for cosmetic purposes I had the following suggestions: we should take the first page of our letter, then the operative sentences

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on March 16. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum of conversation and a memorandum summarizing its “highlights” to Nixon on March 18. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, it lasted until 5:18 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 Attached but not printed. In an unsigned and undated note, Sonnenfeldt assessed the differences between this and previous draft letters. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 1]) See also Document 148.

3 During a telephone conversation at 11:45 a.m., Kissinger told Nixon that the “clobbering” the West Berlin Social Democratic Party received in elections the previous day would “make the Soviets more eager to use our channel.” The two men then briefly discussed the backchannel diplomacy: “K: I’m seeing Dobrynin this afternoon. P: At 4:30? K: At 4:00. But this won’t make any difference. P: I would put it pretty damn tough. Say here it is fellows; it’s not a bargaining position—we’ve thought it all through. If they don’t like the deal, fine. K: They are asking us to dismantle our ABM while they keep theirs and build like crazy while they do nothing.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)

4 Attached but not printed.
of the Soviet letter plus paragraph 3 of our letter. Dobrynin suggested deletion of the last paragraph of our letter, plus the last sentence of paragraph 3 which fixed the duration of the agreement. Dobrynin also said that the Soviet hesitation to accept a fixed date for the end of construction was due to the fact that they were afraid they might be stuck with the end of the construction even if we didn’t come to an agreement. I told him this was not our intention, and we could make the date contingent on the fixed period after the signature of the ABM agreement.

We agreed that I would call him the next day (March 16) to tell him whether these changes were acceptable to us, and the Soviet Union would then reply in the manner indicated and get it in its own draft plus paragraph 3 of ours minus the last sentence.

Dobrynin then turned to the issue of Berlin and raised again the issue of access versus Federal presence. When I told him that it was impossible to make further progress there, he said it would certainly help if he could go back to Moscow and at least show some progress on the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin. He might then be able to sell an answer on the access procedures in return for some increase in Soviet presence in West Berlin.5

Dobrynin said that at the moment all the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States were in his confidential channel with me. He particularly urged that I give him some indication of our Middle East thinking. The Soviet Union had been very patient in this regard, but if we did not move soon, they would have to do something. I told him I never wanted to be in a position of negotiating with him without being able to deliver what I promised. Dobrynin said if I could only give him some indication of how we viewed the situation, there would already be progress. I said I would discuss it with the President.6

Dobrynin then suggested it would be helpful to have a tour d’horizon before his departure. We fixed that for 1:00 on March 19th.

5 “It was indicative of how eager the Soviets were for progress,” Kissinger later recalled, “that Dobrynin immediately offered a compromise: some Soviet presence in West Berlin—for example, a consulate—in return for a Soviet guarantee of access. This seemed to concede the definition of Federal presence put forward by the allies on February 5.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 826)

6 According to the President’s Daily Diary, at 8:04 p.m. on March 15 Kissinger called Nixon, who had just returned to Washington from a three-day vacation in Florida and the Virgin Islands. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the conversation has been found.
After his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on March 15, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger began to explore whether flexibility in the quadripartite talks—in particular, on the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin—might encourage the Kremlin to be more flexible elsewhere. In a special channel message to Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush in Bonn that evening, Kissinger reported the latest news from Washington:

"Dobrynin called on me today to discuss the Berlin negotiations prior to his departure for Moscow to the Party Congress. Dobrynin began by repeating his standard position that their claim on the East Germans for an access agreement would be improved if they could show some progress on the issue of Federal presence. When I refused to be drawn out, Dobrynin said that Moscow might be prepared to move ahead on access if we could show some advance on the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin.

"He will come in Friday [March 19] before his departure for Moscow. What can I tell him?

"I see two possibilities: (a) to give him a concrete proposal, (b) to tell him you are prepared to discuss it in a flexible way with Abrasimov. The best would be a combination of the two with some indication of the direction in which we are prepared to go, coupled with the statement that details are to be worked out by the Ambassadors.

"For a variety of reasons, the President is anxious to keep this channel open, especially at this time." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

In a special channel message to Kissinger on March 16, Rush reported that, due to tactical considerations in Berlin and “political necessity” in Bonn, Allied negotiators had decided that “nothing further” could be done on Federal presence, at least not until their Soviet counterparts did something on access. Rush explained this decision in more detail:

"The Russian tactics are at present to attempt to show that the Four Powers can make no progress on access but that the FRG and the GDR can do so. Also, that the Four Powers can make no progress on inner-Berlin movements of goods and people but that the GDR and the Senat can do so. The purpose of this obviously is to confirm the sovereignty of the GDR and to undercut the position of the Four Powers. Until the Russians are convinced that these tactics cannot succeed, I do not believe any real progress can be made on the access question, irrespective of what is done with regard to Federal presence.”
Although he offered to revisit the issue at a later date, Rush was more interested for the time being in the prospects for flexibility on Soviet presence. Talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin in Washington, and between Rush andAbrasimov in Berlin, on Soviet presence, he argued, might well result in “maximum probing benefit.” Rush reported that he had already sent a telegram to Secretary of State Rogers, requesting authority to offer “minor, tentative concessions” on the issue to avoid an impasse in the negotiations. (Ibid.)

Kissinger replied by special channel the same day: “It is well to keep in mind that any changes in our position should be given to Dobrynin through my channel first so that the President can claim some personal interest. We need this now for reasons to be mentioned when we meet.” Although Rush could negotiate the details with Abrasimov, Kissinger wanted to discuss the “essence” of Rush’s message on Soviet presence during his next meeting with Dobrynin. The Soviets, he observed, “might use this as a fig leaf to move ahead on access.” (Ibid.) Rush replied on March 17 that he would be careful to follow Kissinger’s instructions in Berlin. “I think it would be an excellent idea for you to mention the essence of my cable on Soviet presence to Dobrynin on Friday,” he added. “This might well help move the access discussion along.” (Ibid.)

For the full text of these messages, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 197 and 198 and footnote 6, Document 198.

141. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


Kissinger: Mr. President, if I could just bother you with that letter so that—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —I can get it to Dobrynin today.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 468–5. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 9:30 to 9:50 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 Reference is to the draft letter from Nixon to Kosygin on SALT. A copy of the draft Nixon approved during his meeting with Kissinger is ibid., NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [part 1].
Nixon: Okay.

Kissinger: They have a Politburo meeting on Thursday, which means he’s got to get it out by four this afternoon.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: [showing Nixon several drafts] This is the one where we stand now. We had first given him a long one to which he comes down—

Nixon: Is this the line you’re suggesting?

Kissinger: That’s right, which is drawn from—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: This is what they want to say, so you see it’s a lot more. This was his counter proposal to the previous draft. [pause] Notice it says nothing about a freeze.

Nixon: [reading] “[an obligation to continue active] negotiations and to reach an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.”

Kissinger: I think they’ll accept this one because—

Here follows a long pause as the President reads several drafts of his letter to Kosygin.

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Fine.

Kissinger: We’ll know by Friday if we can’t get an agreement.

Nixon: However that would be seen, do you think we’re going to get it?

Kissinger: I think we may have better than a 50-50 chance.

Nixon: I wonder if, well, if we put ourselves in the [unclear], saying that we shall reach an agreement before we know for sure.

Kissinger: And then we have the freeze. Oh, you mean on the ABM?

Nixon: Well, on the both, Henry. You see, a freeze may—it’s just a document. [unclear] to cover MIRVs. I mean it’s a—

Kissinger: We didn’t ask for a MIRV even in our formal proposal.

Nixon: I know, but I’m getting at—the point I’m getting at, the point here, is whether we just, it puts us any worse off than we are now.

Kissinger: I think it would show an initiative of trying to break the deadlock. If they then deadlock on technical—I have the impression that they want an agreement.

3 March 18.

4 The editor inserted this text based on the draft text referenced in footnote 2.
Nixon: What we’re doing is—say we negotiate an agreement in Vienna that has the opposite effect. It’s still worth doing. With ABM, we could still not get, get together on that. Then we would have a freeze on offensive weapons and agree to negotiate more at a later time.

Kissinger: Well, what it will do, Mr. President—right now the deadlock is—for example, we have a long New York Times editorial again today, not that that matters, but in which they say we’re being obstinate by linking offensive and defensive weapons. This is your way to break that deadlock. Whatever we put in the letter would still—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —you couldn’t possibly cover all the bases because—


Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: They want it, because that’s the drive of everybody who’s opposed to ABMs, is simply to go back and be done with it. Correct?

Kissinger: That’s right. But in that case, we’re doing better than what the New York Times recommended. They accept it because we’re getting an offensive freeze also. You’ll get an ABM limitation with a good chance of one different from what they want—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: —which is Washington.

Nixon: Um-hmm. Do you see anything [unclear]?—?

Kissinger: I mean, we were just—

Nixon: Do they want us to stop?

Kissinger: Yeah. We would instruct Smith to stick with—

Nixon: Three.

Kissinger: —our present program. But his present instructions are four and we could let him fall back to three. Of course, what we really need is the radar, and the radar does the same for three and four. Only we’ll get—three gets us fewer launchers.

Nixon: Fine. Well, let’s go on that. We’ll do it that way.

Kissinger: Okay, Mr. President.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and the military situation in Laos.]

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5 The New York Times editorial on March 16, the day after formal talks resumed in Vienna, assessed the prospects for an agreement on SALT: “Unless Mr. Nixon is prepared to propose a realistic MIRV ban, it runs counter to the deepest security interests of the United States to delay exploration of an ABM agreement by linking it to valueless limitations on offensive missiles.” (“Back to the SALT Mines,” New York Times, March 16, 1971, p. 36)
Nixon: I think what the problem right now is this: I’m not so sure the SALT thing is going to be all that important. I think it’s basically what I’m placating the critics with—maybe it’s just as well.

Kissinger: Well, I think—I met with a group of senior businessmen yesterday.6

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I think it would be considered a generally hopeful thing. And it would be a run-up to a summit. I think, if we got that and the summit—and Rush sent me a cable7 that some of the stuff Dobrynin and I have been talking about is beginning to be reflected where he is.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: I consider it—in Berlin, all we can do is cut our losses. But Brandt has, in effect, has practically given away the ballgame there already. So—

Nixon: Sure. Nothing we can lose.

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: There’s nothing to lose that he hasn’t lost already.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and the military situation in Laos.]

Nixon: Laos was the right thing to do. Cambodia was the right thing to do. But my point is, we did both of those for the purpose of getting to another point. Now we’ve reached the other point.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: And once we reach it—now, every decision is now made not in terms of, well, what’s the effect going to be on Saigon. The decision has got to be made on what’s the effect on us.

Kissinger: Absolutely. I agree.

Nixon: Now—

Kissinger: One thing too—

Nixon: We have to remember that our giving to the Russians—everything is all tied to this. And we have—now, about Thieu, we have to remember that our view of the Russians, everything, is all tied into this, and we—

Kissinger: If we could—the advantage of a summit, even if it gets a sort of half-baked SALT agreement—whatever the SALT agreement is, it’s a lot better than the nuclear test ban.


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6 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met the so-called “Flanigan Group” on March 15 from 12:08 to 12:57 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.

7 See Document 140.
Kissinger: And it—
Nixon: I agree with you. It would stop—
Kissinger: It would defuse people. They can’t very well attack their President when he’s getting ready for a summit meeting.
Nixon: No.
Kissinger: And that would get us a few months of, you know, of quiet here.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and the military situation in Laos.]

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142. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 16, 1971, 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

I asked for the meeting in order to hand Dobrynin the redraft of the letter drawn from some elements of the Soviet version and some elements of our version (Tab A). Dobrynin changed the language to substitute the words “strategic offensive weapons” for “offensive strategic missile launchers.” (The reason is probably to avoid limitations on hardening and perhaps building new silos in replacement of old ones (Tab B).)

Dobrynin then said he would forward the letter to Moscow and have an answer in a few days. There would be a government meeting

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, Kissinger and Young drafted the memorandum of conversation on March 18. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 58, Country Files, Europe, Berlin, Vol. 2 [1 of 2]) Kissinger then forwarded it and a memorandum summarizing its “main points” to Nixon the same day. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 1:17 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 Attached but not printed. Before his meeting with Dobrynin, Kissinger discussed the American draft letter in a telephone conversation with Sonnenfeldt. A transcript is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File. See also Document 148.

3 Attached but not printed.
on it on March 18th. He asked me whether the freeze had to be negotiated prior to the ABM agreement. I said no, that it should be handled simultaneously, but that it would not go into effect until both were signed.

Dobrynin then asked me what was intended by the lifting of the travel restrictions to Communist China. I said they were routine. He said he noticed that travel restrictions were lifted towards Communist China, but not towards Cuba. I said this must be because we are trying to drive a wedge between Cuba and China. Dobrynin smiled sourly.

Dobrynin then asked me philosophically why we were so interested in limitations on offensive weapons. After all, the Soviet Union was offering us an equitable arrangement of defensive limitations. Why were we so interested in getting limitations on offensive weapons? We were greatly increasing the number of our warheads to a point where individual launchers were not really so significant. Dobrynin said that if several of our MIRVs were targeted on one silo, this would increase the probability of destruction of the silo considerably, even if the individual warheads were smaller. Under those conditions, he did not see what advantage the Soviet Union gained by building a few extra offensive missiles. (He was presumably implying that these offensive missiles had only single warheads.)

At any rate, I told Dobrynin that our assessment was that our MIRVs did not increase the destructive potential of our offensive forces while the large size of their warheads made their weapons a particular danger to our land-based missiles. I told him, however, that I would be prepared to discuss this as a philosophical issue when we met for lunch. However, I told him that the linkage between offensive and defensive limitations had to be maintained.

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4 On March 15, Charles W. Bray III, a Department of State spokesman, announced that the United States would not renew previous restrictions on the use of American passports for travel to China. For the text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, April 12, 1971, p. 510.

5 Kissinger called Dobrynin at 3:08 p.m. on March 16 and reported that he had just talked to the President about SALT. The Soviets, he reiterated, should not “misunderstand that we will agree to ABM only. He [Nixon] will not unless it’s in the context of the letter.” After noting that Nixon had confirmed the latest changes to the letter, Kissinger reminded Dobrynin that his remarks at the end of their meeting that afternoon were “philosophical,” and not intended to imply that “our views were less firm.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File) No evidence has been found that Kissinger talked to the President on March 16 about his conversation with Dobrynin that afternoon. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule)
143. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird


SUBJECT
Black Sea and Baltic Sea Operations

I appreciate your memorandum of March 13, 1971 concerning the planned operations in the Black and Baltic Seas. As you know, we had visualized the Black Sea operation as being distinctly different from regular operations there, both as to number of ships and duration. The President desires, therefore, that the operating time of the four-ship patrol be increased to five or six days rather than the four days now planned.

The plan for the Baltic Sea is excellent. I understand that there may be some change in the Port at which the Intrepid will call. This would seem to be of less importance than the number of operating days at sea for the ships in this patrol. It would be most useful if the time in port could be kept to a minimum consistent with operational requirements and appropriate consideration for the crews.

Henry A. Kissinger

2 Document 137.

144. Editorial Note

On March 17, 1971, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin called Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger at 7:25 p.m. and reported: “tomorrow I would like to give you in a sealed envelope a new suggestion on a Berlin question.” Although he did not divulge any details, Dobrynin asked Kissinger for a response to the proposal before the next quadripartite meeting in Berlin. The two men agreed to postpone their next meeting until Monday, March 22, thus allowing Kissinger more time to prepare a “more thoughtful answer.” According to the transcript, the conversation also included the following exchange:
“K: The only other question I have, you will not object if I show
this to our man in Berlin—Rush?
“D: Very privately?
“K: On a very private basis.
“D: I am afraid even our Ambassador [Abrasimov] knows nothing of this, no one knows about it, and if he should—
“K: Let me worry about whom I show it to.
“D: I understand how you do it.
“K: You can be certain it will remain in the Presidential channel.”

(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

During a telephone conversation at 8:13 p.m., Kissinger briefed
President Richard Nixon: “Put off the meeting with Dobrynin till Mon-
day, partly at his request because he is coming in with a big request
for Berlin and I need time to study it.” Nixon replied: “We got till Mon-
day then.” (Ibid., Box 9, Chronological File)

The next afternoon, the Soviet Embassy delivered two documents
on Berlin to the White House: a handwritten note from Dobrynin and
a Soviet draft agreement. The handwritten note presented several com-
plaints on the conduct of the quadripartite talks, especially on the is-
sue of West German Federal presence. According to Dobrynin, con-
trary to assurances, Bonn had failed to curtail its “demonstrative
actions” in Berlin and Rush had failed to contact Abrasimov to nego-
tiate an “appropriate formulation” limiting such activity. “Moscow
wouldn’t like to make conclusions from these and some other facts,”
he observed, “that the channel Ambassador-Dr. Kissinger does not
function effectively when matters concern practical steps. But at
the same time these facts do attract attention.” (Ibid., NSC Files,
Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part
2]) Dobrynin adopted a different tone in a letter to Kissinger, which
accompanied the Soviet draft agreement on Berlin:

“I would like to point out that the suggested formulations take
into account the considerations transmitted through you as well as the
exchange of opinion at the Four Power talks.

“We hope that the American side will duly appreciate the desire
of the Soviet Union to achieve a breakthrough in the principal ques-
tions by giving favorable examination to the considerations and for-
mulations transmitted by President Nixon.

“It is expected that the Soviet proposals will receive objective and
favorable attitude.

“If, in the opinion of the American side, the Soviet proposals could
form a basis for further Four Power talks and for drawing up final
formulations, the Soviet Union could officially table them on its behalf at the Four Power talks.

“If the reply of the American side could be received promptly, the Soviet side could then submit the above mentioned draft for consideration already at the next meeting of the Ambassadors.”

In a handwritten postscript, Dobrynin added that he hoped to receive a response no later than March 22. (Ibid.) Kissinger forwarded for comment the full text of the draft agreement in a special channel message to Rush on March 18. “I would appreciate as full talking points as you can prepare,” Kissinger remarked. “I would not bother you this much without major Presidential interest.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]) The original Russian text of the Soviet draft agreement is ibid., NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 2]. Dobrynin’s letter and the English translation of the draft agreement are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 201.

**145. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)**

Washington, March 18, 1971, 6:12 p.m.

D: You received the paper?  
K: Yes, and am analyzing them now. There are some positive elements and some that may present troubles.

D: We tried what you said to put it as compromise.
K: I recognized that there were many positive elements.

D: Even things we didn’t discuss, for instance about presentation. Can I say to them that I will get your reaction, just to give them a time, by Monday?  

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.
2 See Document 144.
3 March 22.
K: I will give you some reaction on Monday. Whether it will be the formal one . . .
D: No need to be the formal one, just your reaction.
K: You can tell them you will get my reaction by Monday, but maybe not to every point.
D: I understand. Then after I think they have a meeting on the 25th. 4
K: Right. Are you committed to putting it forward on the 25th?
D: I think so.
K: Let me see what my reaction is.
D: Yes, because they have the last meeting of [before?] the Congress then. But I didn’t give it to anyone but you. You can consult with the person [omission in transcript—Rush?] but please observe strictly the instruction not to speak with our people. 5 And on the second point—I think it would be a good idea [omission in transcript—for Rush and Abrasimov?] to begin some private exchange . . .
K: The trouble has been that we have been blocked by the Germans on this.
D: But you remember [omission in transcript].
K: On that point I was not fully clear.
D: You have to give chance to discuss it on very private basis. They were waiting for others but waiting for [omission in transcript] on this particular point.
K: Our trouble has been . . . I had better tell you personally when we see each other but there is a reason for this which is not in our direct control here. I gave you our view . . .
D: But I understand your ambassador was prepared to discuss the two others on a confidential basis with the others involved. They have this in Moscow.
K: Let me see. I will give you an answer on that on Monday also.
D: Okay, so I can say the initial reaction will be on Monday at 8:00.

4 Reference is to the next scheduled meeting of Ambassadors for the quadripartite talks in West Berlin.

5 In a special channel message that evening, Kissinger briefed Rush on this telephone conversation: “My ubiquitous contact Dobrynin called a few minutes ago to say that Moscow was counting on a reply by Monday evening. He stressed that I was the only person in the West to have a copy. When I told him you were being kept informed, he urged me to keep you from making any reference to the Soviet Ambassador who allegedly has not seen the draft. Finally, he said that he recognized some provisions remained unacceptable but no formulation was worse than the previous one and some were better.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])
January 1–April 22, 1971 419

K: Yes, and I’ll see on this other matter. We are approaching it in an attempt to be constructive.
D: This was too.
K: In reading it quickly I can see points where you were. There are also some points that will not be acceptable.
D: But this is not worse.
K: No, it is not worse.
D: And there are points where this is definitely better.
K: That is true. This represents a movement.
D: Okay, Monday evening at 8:00 at my house.

146. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


[Omitted here is discussion of personal matters.]
Kissinger: Dobrynin sent over a message.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: They’ve come up with a draft agreement on Berlin, which on first reading is acceptable. I sent it to Rush on my private channel to him for his analytical comment.² But in the two areas that I’ve discussed with him, Federal presence and—it’s a major, there’s some major concessions.
Nixon: Hmm.
Kissinger: He just called ten minutes ago to say he hoped he’d have a response by—a preliminary response from me by Monday,³ that they’re very anxious to move ahead.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 469–13. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 6:30 to 6:50 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Haldeman, who was also in attendance, recorded the meeting in his diary: “Henry was in for a while and reported that he had received a long proposal from Dobrynin today on the proposed Berlin settlement, which is still not in form to be satisfactory to us, but it’s getting much closer apparently, and Henry thinks maybe there’s something workable that can be developed from it.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, p. 258)
² See Document 144.
³ March 22. See Document 145.
Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: And I said, “Well, you know, as you know, there are parts of it that are totally unacceptable.” He recognized that.

Nixon: On Berlin?

Kissinger: Yeah, on Berlin.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: But he said, “But, as you know, none of the parts that are unacceptable to you are worse, and a lot of the parts are better”—which is true. I think we should use Berlin just to keep him talking—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —and to do the—

Nixon: But he is—but he also expects you to—does he still feel he’ll have some answer on the other proposition⁴ on Monday, too?

Kissinger: Yeah. I won’t give him an answer on this until—

Nixon: Of course not.

Kissinger: —he gives me an answer on the other.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

⁴ Reference is presumably to the latest American draft of a letter on SALT from Nixon to Kosygin. See Document 142.

⁵ During a telephone conversation at 7:15 p.m., Kissinger told Dobrynin: “I have just talked to the President about our conversation and also about your document—I hadn’t had a chance to talk with him before. I will make a preliminary response to you on Monday.” “Lest there be any misunderstanding in Moscow about the document,” Kissinger added, “he wanted to make sure we understood each other about how it would be negotiated [omission in transcript] but that the final conclusion would not take place until the other one was completed.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Moscow–Peking–Hanoi: A new Crisis?

We think it is quite possible to read the latest Chinese ideological attack against the USSR not solely in terms of their continuing dispute with Moscow. Rather it can be seen as the latest move in a developing crisis between Hanoi, Peking and Moscow brought on by the Laotian operations and intimations of an attack against North Vietnam.

For Hanoi the Laos operation raises in an acute form questions about its ability to continue protracted war, and if it chooses to do so, what it could expect if, in fact, South Vietnamese forces launched an attack on the North.

—Xuan Thuy’s repeated efforts to link DRV and Chinese security was a manifestation of the private pressures the North Vietnamese must have been putting on China for a clear-cut commitment.

—Chou En Lai visit went far behind “showing the flag.”

—He was forced to officially identify Chinese and North Vietnamese security, for the first time in years. It seems clear from the record of Chou’s remarks and those of his hosts that he tried to hedge on such a commitment but was forced to agree in the end (e.g. the official communiqué).

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. According to an attached correspondence profile, the memorandum was “noted by HAK” on March 30.


3 Xuan Thuy was the head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks.

4 Zhou visited North Vietnam March 5-8.
—Moreover, this decision already has produced a major crisis in Peking, which was reflected in the new quote from Mao denouncing those “among us” who are reluctant to give aid to Hanoi. This can only be read as “among us Chinese,” i.e. not Moscow. It could mean that a group in Peking resisted giving a firm commitment, and this is why the Vietnamese had to force the issue.

_The crisis was aggravated by Soviet tactics._

—This is good evidence that the Soviets immediately unearthed their old proposals to send in more aid, if they had unhindered access across China, including Soviet railway guards, or to participate in “joint action” with Peking.

—The Soviets knew the Chinese would turn this down, and in doing so would lose credibility in Hanoi.

—In these circumstances we can be reasonably sure that, when the Chinese resisted, the Soviets argued with Hanoi that they simply could not count on Peking or continue a protracted war and must therefore become more flexible politically.

This is the background for reading part of the new Chinese polemic. _It really attacks Hanoi, and indicates that the price the Chinese have exacted for their new military commitment is that Hanoi must persist in the fighting and not fall under the spell of revisionism._

This seems a valid interpretation of the following long statement, which if read in light of the proposals for coalition government, are almost certainly directed at Hanoi:

“In some cases where the revolutionary people had already taken up arms and their armed forces had grown considerably, certain parties handed over the People’s Armed Forces and forfeited the fruits of the revolution because they sought official posts in bourgeois governments or were duped by the reactionaries.

“In the past decade many communist parties have participated in elections and parliaments but none has set up a dictatorship of the proletariat by such means. Even if a communist party should win a majority in parliament or participate in the government, this would not mean a change in the character of bourgeois political power, reactionary ruling classes can proclaim the election null and void, dissolve the parliament, or directly use violence to kick out the communist party. If a proletarian party does no mass work, rejects armed struggle and makes a fetish of parliamentary elections, it will lull the masses and corrupt itself. The bourgeois buys over the communist party through parliamentary elections and turns it into a revisionist party . . .”

As for the Sino-Soviet aspect of this diatribe, it is notable that the ideological aspects are not carried over into state relations. The border problem is not mentioned, nor is there any breath of Chinese charges of Soviet military pressure on Peking.
The Chinese were careful to pull some of their punches in a way
that the Soviets will detect. It is still strong language especially on
Brezhnev, but it is not even close to some of the old attacks on
Khrushchev.

In sum, we think there may be a struggle of some kind going on
over Hanoi’s policies. It may already be over, with the Chinese view-
point again predominant. But the need to launch this polemic suggests
that it is not over, and will continue, with the next round probably to
take place in Moscow, if the Vietnamese attend the 24th Congress.

148. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Exchanges on SALT with Dobrynin

Following is a brief summary of the course of my discussions with
Dobrynin and, in particular, of the evolution of the draft letter of agree-
ment which the Soviets now have in hand in Moscow.

1. On February 17, after having had a prior oral discussion of the
terms of an agreement on how to proceed in SALT, I handed Dobrynin
a draft text of a letter from you to Kosygin. This presented in some
detail the elements of an agreement which would serve as instructions
for the SALT negotiators.

The essence of this document was that we would be prepared to
proceed with an agreement on ABMs provided such an agreement in-
cluded a commitment to negotiate by an agreed date (e.g. July 1, 1972)
and agreement to limit offensive strategic weapons. In addition, and

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, Pres-
ident’s Trip Files, Kissinger/Dobrynin, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 2]. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only.
Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of the memorandum to Kissinger on March 19. Kissinger
wrote “Excellent!” in the margin of the draft and a handwritten note indicates that it was
“sent forward” on March 22. (Ibid., Box 880, SALT, SALT Talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIV) A
notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

2 Kissinger gave Dobrynin the draft letter for Kosygin on February 22. That ver-
sion of the letter, however, had evidently been revised on February 17. See Document
121.
most important, there would be an associated understanding on an off-
densive weapons freeze under whose terms new construction of ICBM
launchers would cease as of April 1, 1971 and no ICBM launchers un-
der construction could be completed after January 1, 1972. The freeze
would not affect modernization or replacement of missiles within the
frozen number of ICBM launchers. On ABMs, the draft proposed that
the agreement be based on the Soviets keeping the Moscow system and
our keeping and finishing the three already authorized Safeguard sites
around Minuteman fields.

Finally, this draft said we would inform the Soviets of the indicators
by which we would judge Soviet strategic weapons activities and which
would be of concern to us in terms of having to take countermeasures.
The formal agreement, the draft suggested, would have an initial
duration of five years.

Dobrynin made a number of comments on some of the formula-
tions and, in particular, saw no need for a prohibition of new ICBM
starts as of April 1 as long as there was a stoppage of completions as
of January 1, 1972. He also thought that the commitment to complete
an offensive weapons agreement should be for January 1, 1973 rather
than July 1, 1972. His other comments concerned explanatory language
included in my proposed draft which he did not think necessary but
which I had deliberately included to provide the Soviets with the ra-
tionale of our proposal.

2. Dobrynin did not respond until March 12, when he handed me
the Soviet version of a draft letter.3

This document proposed a separate ABM limitation this year with
each side defending its capital. Only after such an agreement were the So-
viet ready “in principle” to “discuss the question” of freezing offensive
strategic weapons, with the caveat that modernization and replacement
of weapons would be permitted. The Soviet text also provided that the
ABM agreement would have a clause obligating us to continue active ne-
egotiations on offensive weapons. It did not include a commitment to reach
agreement. Apart from the call for a separate ABM agreement this year,
no dates were mentioned in the Soviet document.

The Soviet paper in effect was a repetition of their formal SALT
position and gave no ground on our requirement for an early offen-
sive freeze. It did, however, broaden our freeze language to include
strategic offensive weapons generally, not simply ICBMs. (We, of
course, are mostly concerned about the SS–9 and possibly newer large
missiles.)

3 See Document 135.
I made clear to Dobrynin that the Soviet text did not advance matters. He indicated that a shorter version of our February 17 draft would be easier to handle in Moscow where the specific dates we proposed could not be readily focused on before the Party Congress. We agreed that each of us would attempt to draft shorter and more generally phrased versions.

3. On March 15, Dobrynin gave me a one-page draft simply calling for instructions to the SALT delegations to draw up an ABM agreement which would also include an obligation to continue active negotiations on offensive weapons. But there was still no reference to a freeze or to an eventual negotiated agreement covering offensive weapons. Again no dates were mentioned. However, the Soviet text dropped the definition of the ABM agreement as involving defense of capitals.

4. Meanwhile, I gave Dobrynin my shorter version. It provided for an ABM agreement, if possible, this year which would include the obligation to also reach an offensive weapons agreement by a fixed date to be agreed. (This removed the previously specific date of January 1, 1973.)

In addition, according to my text, there would be an understanding associated with the agreement under which no additional strategic offensive missile launchers could be brought to completion as of a fixed date to be agreed. This differed from my earlier version by not stipulating the effective date for the freeze as January 1, 1972. It also broadened the freeze to include not only ICBMs but other types as well, i.e., Soviet Y-Class submarines. As before, modernization and replacement would be permitted. The text also said that the freeze understanding would be superseded by a formal offensive weapons agreement as soon as one enters into force. The purpose of this was to make it harder for the Soviets to break out of the freeze, especially, of course, as regards SS–9s.

The text also included abbreviated language indicating that the ABM agreement would include radar limitations and that the geographic definition of where each side could maintain ABMs would be settled in the negotiations. In other words, I did not repeat the three Safeguard/Moscow formula. (In the meantime, Gerard Smith had been instructed to put a four Safeguard site/Moscow proposal to the Soviets in Vienna. This should give us some bargaining room while we seek to obtain further information on, and make additional analyses of the significance of the newly-discovered Soviet missile construction.)

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4 See Document 139.
5 Also at the March 15 meeting; see Document 139.
5. On March 16, in the light of further discussion, a still more abbreviated version of the US text was worked out.\(^6\)

The first point was that the SALT delegations would be instructed immediately to work out the text of an ABM agreement, with the precise nature of the limitation to be settled in the negotiations. The reference to an agreement “this year” was dropped in view of the “immediate” character of the instruction to the negotiators.

Secondly, the text provided that the ABM agreement would contain an obligation to continue negotiations and reach agreement on limiting strategic offensive weapons. This essentially met our point that the ABM agreement contain as an integral part the commitment to reach an offensive agreement. The reference to a fixed date was dropped but the Soviets know from the earlier texts that the absence of an agreement after a lapse of time could serve as cause for abrogation of the ABM agreement.

More important, however, the March 16 text included a provision that there would be an understanding that strategic offensive weapons would be frozen at the level of a fixed date to be agreed. Again, modernization and replacement would be permitted. But in this version, to avoid letting the Soviets “replace” old ICBMs with SS–9s, there was a stipulation that replacement could only be by weapons of the same category.

Before this final version of the freeze provision was agreed, I had proposed the formula that “no additional offensive strategic missile launchers would be brought to completion after a fixed date to be agreed”. But Dobrynin preferred the broader reference to a freeze on “strategic offensive weapons”. Since “freeze” is defined as applying to a level as of a fixed date, this change did not change the substance.

However, we still face in the negotiations the problem of how to define “strategic offensive weapons”. The Soviets may seek to include bombers and forward-based systems in Europe, Asia and on carriers. We would continue to reject any such definition if its effect were to inhibit our present forward deployments and alliance commitments.

I am now awaiting Dobrynin’s official response to this draft which we jointly worked out. If it is positive, I would propose to hand him an oral note making clear that the ABM agreement would not be initiated until the provisions for the offensive freeze, including the date on which it would take effect, were settled. This will mean, in effect that negotiations on defining the terms of the freeze will run essentially concurrently with the formal negotiations of the ABM agreement.

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\(^6\) See Document 142.
The text, as it now stands, is of course only an agreement in principle. The details of the ABM agreement will have to be worked out. But the present text meets our essential requirement for coupling an offensive freeze with any ABM agreement.

149. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 22, 1971, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Soviet Government System

The conversation began with some general discussion about the different methods of government. Dobrynin said that in the Soviet system the method of asking advice from junior people is extremely rare. Brezhnev and Kosygin to all practical purposes never consult anyone on foreign policy other than Gromyko or Kuznetsov. They will, however, discuss all foreign policy issues of significance in the Politburo. Brezhnev can pretty well decide the agenda of Politburo meetings, but every major communication going abroad from the Soviet government is put on the Politburo docket. Communications to Washington are always given high priority.

The draft of the Politburo note is almost invariably prepared by Gromyko. There is no vote in the Politburo, but rather a discussion guided by Brezhnev. Brezhnev states what he takes to be the consensus. If there is significant disagreement, Gromyko is asked to prepare another note, and that means that automatically the matter goes back for another Politburo meeting. Politburo meetings always take place on Thursday so that any decision that is not taken at one meeting of necessity has to go over to the next one. Special meetings are held only on the rarest occasions on matters of extreme urgency. No Politburo member, not even Brezhnev, can take any unilateral decision. This was

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Kissinger/Dobrynin, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The dinner meeting was held in the Soviet Embassy Residence. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger returned to the White House from the Soviet Embassy at 10:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
not the case with Stalin. He would take the decisions; sometimes he might ask the Politburo to ratify them, but he never really consulted the Politburo. It was indeed extremely dangerous to contradict Stalin, particularly if you were a senior official; junior officials could occasionally get away with it. Every member of the Politburo had the right to read every cable, and the docket material for each member is always the same. But, of course, there are only a very few that have any interest in foreign policy and therefore the effective Politburo members concerned with foreign policy do not number more than five.

**Middle East**

Dobrynin then turned the conversation to the Middle East. He said that there was extreme concern to make sure that the discussions with the United States on the Middle East would be resumed. He asked me for my personal views. I said he had to understand that I was speaking informally and that this did not represent the governmental position. I said I thought that the immediate step should be to move ahead on the Suez Canal opening, and that in the time that might be gained by this procedure we might discuss a more fundamental settlement.

Dobrynin asked what I meant by “a more fundamental settlement.” Did I really believe that we would aim for a settlement, or did I just want to gain time to get through the election of 1972? I replied that I had always had the view that a settlement in the Middle East would sooner or later have to be worked out with the Soviet Union. This did not mean that we and the Soviet Union could impose a settlement, but that we had to agree on our broad objective if we were going to get anywhere. Certainly, as the President pointed out in his World Report, we could not imagine a settlement that the Soviet Union had no stake in maintaining.

Dobrynin then asked me whether I had any precise ideas. I said it was of course possible to engage in endless legalistic arguments and to talk about “just and lasting peace” and “security,” but he recognized as well as I that the matter had to be given some concrete content sooner or later. In those terms it seemed to me that Israel would not yield on Jerusalem, the major part of the Golan Heights, and some very significant security guarantees in the Sinai. Dobrynin asked whether I meant security guarantees or security arrangements. I said I really meant both, but the arrangements were more important than the guarantees, or at least as important.

I said to Dobrynin that if a summit meeting came off these were subjects that might appropriately be discussed there. Dobrynin said that his government remained extremely interested in serious talks

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2 See Document 126.
with me on the Middle East, and he hoped that I would soon be permitted to be concrete.

**SALT**

We then turned to SALT. I asked Dobrynin whether he had received any answer to our latest proposal. Dobrynin said no. He told me to remember, however, that SALT represented a very complex decision-making issue for the Soviet Union. It involved both the Defense and the Foreign Ministry, and the Soviet government was not used to inter-departmental clearances. Also, when he had sent a message to Moscow telling of the need for a reply he was told that all the top members were busy preparing the five-year program for the Party Congress. He did not see how an extraordinary meeting could be held since there was not too much urgency.

I told Dobrynin that we would have to make some fundamental decisions between April 15 and May 1, and that if we could not do them with the Soviet Union we would do them unilaterally. He said, “But you cannot do that without our approval.” I said no, if we decide that it cannot be done with secret negotiations we may have to try it with overt. Dobrynin said he would do what he could to get an answer.

**Berlin**

We then turned to Berlin. I told Dobrynin that I had studied the text of the Soviet note. Dobrynin said that he hoped we realized that they had made a major effort to meet us, that none of their formulations had been made worse and many of them had been made better. I said we considered it a positive action on the part of the Soviets that they had submitted a draft prior to bringing it up at the Four Power talks. I also said that on a number of points the Soviets followed the concept of our draft, and that they had made some progress, for example in the matter of FRG representation abroad. On the other hand, there were a number of items which gave us difficulty. I listed them from the summary of comments made on Rush’s cable (attached at Tab A).
I also said there were a number of other issues. Dobrynin pointed out that it would be better if I gave him the whole list in writing. I told him therefore I would give him those in writing the next day on an unsigned sheet of paper. The list is attached at Tab B.\(^6\)

Dobrynin then asked how we could proceed in the future. I told him that it was quite conceivable that our Ambassador would comment on his draft along the line of the comments that I had already made, and that a negotiation might develop in this manner. Dobrynin asked me whether the Ambassadors could meet privately. I said as far as I knew they had already met privately. Dobrynin asked whether I could send instructions to Rush to meet privately with Abrasimov. I said as far as I understood Rush did not need any instructions.\(^7\) At any rate that was not an insuperable issue as long as Dobrynin and I understood each other. Dobrynin then said it was very important for me to submit these comments to him as soon as possible so that they could be considered, hopefully before the meeting on the 26th of the Four Powers. It was not possible to find them reflected in the Four Power document then, but I could be sure that they would be taken very seriously in the subsequent negotiations.\(^8\)

\(^6\) Attached but not printed.

\(^7\) In a special channel message that evening, Kissinger briefed Rush on his “long talk” with Dobrynin. In addition to reporting the discussion on Berlin, Kissinger instructed Rush to forward draft formulations on access, inner-city improvements, and Federal presence. Kissinger stated his intention to give Dobrynin the “essence” of Rush’s comments on the Soviet draft. He also relayed the Soviet proposal for “occasional meetings” between Rush and Abrasimov to discuss the details of a quadripartite agreement. “Since Dobrynin is leaving for Moscow,” Kissinger added, “I promised him an answer on both our formulations and your meetings with Abrasimov by close of business Tuesday, March 23.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

\(^8\) During a conversation that evening, Nixon asked Kissinger about his meeting with Dobrynin: “K: Well, we made some progress on Berlin. He doesn’t have an answer yet on the SALT thing and he says one of the reasons is that they have to get a defense and foreign office position and they told him that they were meeting on the five-year plan right now. Well, so this may slip for a few weeks. P: Humph. K: Well, if we don’t have it by the end of April, I would just make it as a unilateral public proposal and then let them kick you—let them turn it down and then they are on the defensive. P: Yeah, I think so too. I think they may be just bickering about Laos and the big win for them or something of that sort. K: And not give you a success, or it may really be that they—. P: They may be so damn confused. K: This is a tough bureaucratic problem for them to handle with something so [omission in transcript—complicated?] And with the Party Congress coming up.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File)
150. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, March 23, 1971, 5:30 p.m.

D: I hope you arrived on time at your office last night.\(^2\)
K: You should know with your intelligence network.
D: Yes, but I received mixed reports. According to one you went straight to your office; according to the others you went other places.
K: You keep only the agents who said I went to my office. The others aren’t worth their pay.
D: But the other things sounded too official.
K: I’ll let you know when I am doing something unofficial. I am going to send over some partial comments.
D: That would be helpful.
K: On the draft.\(^3\)
D: I remember.
K: But I want you to understand these are not phrased in polite diplomatic language.
D: I understand.
K: They are phrased in terms of what is acceptable and what is not. We will instruct our Ambassador accordingly.
D: Just indicates the direction of your thinking?
K: Yes, they are not formal and are all negative.
D: They are all negative. There must have been something positive.
K: I told you the positives yesterday\(^4\)—these are the things we want changed. But we do not have an exact formulation. We will try to have that tomorrow, but have indicated what we want.
D: Those four major things?
K: They are in there. Was that all you wanted? I gave you comments on every section.
D: That is fine.
K: But we will approach it in a positive spirit. One point on which I may have misled you. We are prepared to upgrade the commercial

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.
\(^2\) See footnote 1, Document 149.
\(^3\) See Document 144.
\(^4\) See Document 149.
representation you have there, but we cannot do anything that has diplomatic status. But this is informal—not in the document.

D: Okay. I understand. I am going to Moscow on Saturday. I know you are leaving on Friday. If I have any questions I will drop them in the mail to you before Friday.

K: Okay, Friday afternoon is when I leave.

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5 Reference is to the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin.

6 March 27.

151. Editorial Note

On March 24, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin discussed the problems involved in coordinating their unofficial talks in Washington with the official negotiations for a quadripartite agreement in Berlin. In a special channel message to Kissinger the previous evening, Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush reported that Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Pyotr Abrasimov had postponed the four-power meeting on March 25, which had been scheduled for the formal presentation of the Soviet draft agreement. “This is because he has been called to Moscow for instructions,” Rush explained, “which of course fits into your discussion with Dobrynin and his return to Moscow.” Although “extreme care” would be required, Rush agreed to meet privately with Abrasimov to discuss the initial American reaction to the Soviet draft; he also agreed that Kissinger should cover similar ground with Dobrynin. In order to facilitate the talks in Washington, Rush forwarded formulations on several issues, including Federal presence, access, and inner-Berlin transit. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]) The message is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 205.

Kissinger called Dobrynin at 9:58 a.m. on March 24 to review these developments on Berlin. The conversation included the following brief exchange:

“K: I have just had a message from Bonn. I need to discuss it with you right away. We have many visitors around here. Could I come right over?”
“D: It’s quite all right with me.

“K: I will be right over.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Dobrynin—presumably at the Soviet Embassy—from 10:05 to 10:26 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.

After he returned to the White House, Kissinger received a telegram from the Mission in Berlin. According to the Mission, Yuli Kvitsinsky, the Soviet Counselor in Bonn, had urgently requested a private meeting on March 25 between Rush and Abrasimov. In making the request, Kvitsinsky cited “recent contact between Soviet and US Governments,” presumably alluding to the talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) Kissinger immediately called Dobrynin at 10:45 a.m. to complain:

“K: I just found out that your super-active ambassador there has asked others too, separately, telling them all not to tell the others which is a brilliant move. Under those circumstances it would be wrong to cancel with ours. He should make it formal and make no reference to anything else.

“D: He decided probably to show them this text.

“K: That’s all right.

“D: I still don’t have anything there. It’s probably really happening.

“K: Some are on Sat.

“D: On the 26th.

“K: What he should do is have a meeting tomorrow with ours on the basis of showing advance copy of the text and no reference to anything else.

“D: I am sure he has instructions. Probably in a general way. As for reference—

“K: He must not mention names or contacts.

“D: With this it’s much more helpful.

“K: Meet and only present the paper. Can I count on that?

“D: I will have an answer today or by the morning. I will send this for additional warning.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

Rush was also alarmed by this breach in security, addressing the issue in a special channel message to Kissinger that afternoon. “When I see Abrasimov tomorrow,” Rush assured Kissinger, “I shall advise
him that he is to make no further such reference in the future, and when I do so advise him that I will have only his interpreter, not mine, present. You may consider it advisable, through the Dobrynin channel, to warn Abrasimov against making any reference to your contact in the future.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]) The message is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 207.

During a telephone conversation at 7:25 p.m., Kissinger briefed the President on the latest news from Berlin:

"K: [T]here was a little screw-up—Abrasimov asked for a private meeting with Rush to ratify some of the things Dobrynin and I had to discuss—little screw-up in the bureaucracy but Rush handled it beautifully.

"P: That’s fine.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)

Several hours later, Dobrynin called Kissinger to relay an explanation of Abrasimov’s conduct from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko: “First, he would like me to tell you that our Ambassador has very strict instructions never to mention or never to mention confidential dinners. It’s just confirmation for your information. He has strictest instructions never to mention it. He hasn’t mentioned it to his associates in no connection at all.” “Second, our Ambassador there,” Dobrynin continued, “[has] dropped his request about meeting with your Ambassador for tomorrow.” (Ibid., Box 29, Home File)
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152. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Reply to Kosygin on the Middle East

You will recall that Chairman Kosygin wrote to you on the Middle East [Tab B] making these points:
—Following the constructive UAR reply to Ambassador Jarring for which the Soviet Union claimed some credit, “the rest depended entirely on Israel.”
—Israeli extremists clearly want to retain the occupied Arab territories. “However, we were told on several occasions by the American side, at the most responsible level as well, that the United States stood for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied territories/in the case of the UAR—from all the territory of the United Arab Republic occupied by the Israeli troops/, if the Arabs take, on the question of terms for peace, the position of which the American side spoke both publicly and in bilateral contacts with us. We were taking those assurances by the U.S. Government with all seriousness and, naturally, were proceeding from the assumption that the American side would be able to exert the necessary influence upon Tel Aviv . . .”
—The Israeli response to Jarring on February 21 puts in jeopardy all the efforts thus far to achieve a political settlement.
—The President will realize “to what consequences” Israel’s position can push events “as well as that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to these events.” Responsibility will “rest with the United States.” Israel could not take such an “obstructionist, bluntly expansionist” position in contradiction to US policy.
—This situation makes the USSR “give serious thought” to the “steps which may be required under these circumstances on [its] part.”

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 765, Presidential Correspondence, USSR Premier Alexei Kosygin Corres. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Saunders and Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of this memorandum in an attached March 19 memorandum to Kissinger. Kissinger wrote in the margin: “Get approval before departure for San Clemente [March 26].” A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
2 All brackets are in the original. See Document 130. Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
3 See footnote 4, Document 119.
4 Reference is in error; the Israeli response to Jarring was dated February 26.
At Tab A is a response to Kosygin for your approval. This makes the following points:

—There are hopeful signs of progress toward a peaceful settlement. Therefore, it is essential that a calm, serious atmosphere be preserved. We regret propagandistic Soviet statements.

—It is also a matter of regret that the USSR opposed an appeal for formal extension of the cease-fire.

—US actions demonstrate deep US concern that peace be achieved.

—The military actions of the USSR over the past year have not been helpful. “We believe the USSR should give careful thought to how it, through its own actions in the coming weeks and months, can foster confidence on both sides in the possibility of a lasting and just peace.”

—Israel is a sovereign government and we support its security. We intend to continue efforts to encourage necessary compromises on both sides.

—The Soviet contention that the US is supporting expansionism is incorrect. A peace agreement must derive from negotiations. A settlement must meet the legitimate needs of both sides.

—It will take time for further changes in Middle East attitudes to occur. “Moreover, to suggest this situation is leading to such grave circumstances as to require special steps on the part of the Soviet government is unwarranted and is not conducive to the fostering of confidence.”

An alternative reply would have tasked the Soviet Union more sharply for not having played a more active role in promoting a political settlement. Particularly, it would have tasked the USSR more critically for not persuading the UAR to extend the cease-fire. These points are present but are not sharply made.

Recommendation: That you approve the message at Tab A. [Text cleared by Price, although he points out that this draft is harder in tone than Kosygin’s letter.]

5 Nixon initialed his approval of this recommendation on April 6. In an April 8 memorandum to Kissinger, however, Saunders suggested: “You should take another look at this before it goes since much has happened in the Soviet Union in the interval.” Saunders and Sonnenfeldt suggested several changes, considering, in particular, the passage of time since the previous draft letter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 765, Presidential Correspondence, USSR Premier Alexei Kosygin Corres.) Kissinger apparently approved these changes on his own authority, i.e. without further referral to the President. The letter was then forwarded to Rose Mary Woods on April 12 for Nixon’s signature. (Memorandum from Houdek to Huntsman, April 12; ibid.) The final, signed letter, dated April 14, is attached but not printed.
153. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Soviet Party Congress

Bill Hyland and I have had a series of discussions over the last few weeks with the best Sovietologists in the Government. Without necessarily attributing all our views of the CPSU Congress and Soviet developments generally to any of them, attached are two memoranda on the Party Congress. The first (Tab A) is for the President,\(^2\) and reflects what seems to be a consensus around Washington of what the Congress may produce, plus some ideas of our own. The second memorandum (Tab B) is much longer and only for you. It is a hypothesis of sorts and quite speculative. At Tab C there is the recent Soviet discussion of the Nixon Doctrine,\(^3\) which is definitely worth reading, when you have some time.

Recommendation

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab A).
2. That you read the second memorandum at your leisure (Tab B).

Tab B


MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT
Soviet Foreign Policy and the 24th Party Congress

Party Congresses, at least since the 17th in 1934, have usually marked a significant turn in Soviet policy. The implications, however,

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\(^2\) Printed as Document 162.

\(^3\) At Tab C is a March 16 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, with an enclosed report on and translation of a recent article by Georgi A. Arbatov on the Nixon Doctrine.
were only dimly perceived at the time: few foresaw the massive purges that would follow the 17th Party Congress, the Nazi-Soviet pact signaled at the 18th Congress, the abortive Stalinist purge following the 19th, de-Stalinization and its repercussions after the 20th, etc.

Now, on the eve of the 24th Party Congress, the consensus seems to be that it will not initiate shifts in major policies. The Brezhnev–Kosygin regime, after all, is awfully gray, rather unimaginative. But “history teaches” we ought to be ready for some doses of change along with continuity.

*The thesis of this memorandum is that the longer term evolution is likely to be in a direction unfavorable to our general relations with the USSR.*

What follows is an examination of some of the major factors that determine Soviet foreign policy.

**Part I.**

**A. Sino-Soviet**

It is appropriate to begin with an appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations for two reasons: (1) Americans have grown accustomed to the Sino-Soviet conflict as one of the “permanent operating factors” of international politics; and (2) of the many aspects of Soviet foreign relations, this is one in which change has been distinct since the 23rd Congress and perhaps least appreciated in the West.

The change has been in great part the result of the new, more effective tactics adopted by the Brezhnev regime soon after taking office. Whereas Khrushchev had led Soviet policy into a dead-end, and in the process lost influence in the communist movement, this regime set out to repair their position among other communist parties and states, to soften the worst aspects of polemics, and, most important, to strengthen their military position in the Far East. This last, the military component, has been extremely costly and spread over four or five years, but in the end it paid off.

Whether by choice or chance the USSR’s new military strength was the decisive element in the border crisis of 1969. The Chinese chose to back down and negotiate. Thus far the Soviets have won tactical points in the negotiations. The Chinese have conceded for now that the Soviets do not have to acknowledge that the old border treaties are unequal. The initial Soviet demand that state relations be normalized before any border settlement has also been met. Ambassadors have returned to their posts and trade will increase.

The basic conflict of course continues and the Soviets cannot help but be worried about their ability to cope with an increasingly powerful Chinese military posture. And the situation is fragile enough that new
outside developments, especially in Sino-American relations or in Indochina, can easily ignite a new period of Sino-Soviet tensions.

Nevertheless, from Moscow’s standpoint the China challenge is not as immediately urgent as it used to be.

What this means for us, is:

—That pressures on Moscow to stabilize its “Western front” because of China have been reduced; to the extent that Moscow felt compelled to make important concessions to the West is less likely now.

—Since Mao’s statement of May 20, 1970 (in the wake of the Cambodian intervention), there has also been some shift in Chinese policy toward a more anti-US stance and a less anti-Soviet one.

—Once Mao departs, the conditions for a rapprochement with Moscow may ripen.

—Our position in the triangular relationship, however, will grow in importance: we can expect private overtures from both sides, depending in part on the future course of the Indochina war.

B. Eastern Europe

Second in importance to this evolution of relations with China is the dangerous demonstration in Eastern Europe that the Soviet empire is rotting from within. Czechoslovakia was sufficient proof of this, but in view of the drastic Soviet suppression and the proclamation of an ominous interventionist doctrine, many observers thought that the fire had been extinguished, perhaps for another decade. Poland exploded this myth.

The Polish crisis, at bottom, only marginally concerned price increases. It was and is a crisis of the “Stalinist conception” of the organization of society. Throughout East Europe the state and the social order is structured along the lines of the famous communist pyramid, in which all power and policy passes from the top downward. In practice, Djilas long ago warned, this must lead to bureaucratization, and eventually to the separation of the party from the masses. In Poland the unique element was that the alienated segment, entirely cut off from the process of decision making, was not the intelligentsia or the youth, but the workers—the very element of society that the system is intended to serve.

4 For the text of the statement, in which Mao urged the people of the world to “unite and defeat the United States aggressors and all their running dogs,” see the New York Times, May 21, 1970, p. 6.

5 Milovan Djilas, Yugoslav Communist leader and author of The New Class (1957).
The most impressive fact about the current situation is that the workers have succeeded in terrorizing the leaders. Gierek has been forced to sacrifice up more and more cadres to the crowd, and to offer a series of economic concessions that confound the whole effort to stabilize the situation on any rational basis. The net effect is that whatever Gierek himself may believe or desire, the imperatives of the situation will impel him into further concessions to popular demands and to reformist positions in order to achieve an illusive stability.

To deal with the economy he will inevitably dilute the “leading role of the party”—the first criterion by which Moscow judges a regime’s legitimacy. The alternative for Gierek, to deter Soviet intervention, would be to seek an alliance with the conservatives which could only rip the party apart once again, and perhaps ignite a new popular rising.

In short, the chances of Soviet military intervention in Poland will remain high.

Even if this terrible day is postponed, the Polish crisis has probably already had its sobering effect on Soviet policy:

—In early December, at the Warsaw Pact summit, Brezhnev and Gomulka pressured Ulbricht into accepting a conciliatory line on the German and Berlin questions.

—The events in Poland provided the basis for an East German counterattack.

—By the time of the Warsaw Pact meeting of mid-February, the Soviet position had hardened; the East German role in talks with Bahr and the Berlin Senat has grown while the four power talks are stalemated.

If Sino-Soviet developments have eased the pressures on Moscow to make major concessions in the West, the situation in Eastern Europe has made such concessions seem dangerous in any case.

The result, however, is ambiguous. There is still the objective of consolidating the status quo in East Europe, but the price that the Soviets would pay has probably been reduced.

C. External Economics

A third factor often cited as a reason that the Soviets must seek some accommodation in the West is the need to obtain Western technology on credit.

Yet, a careful analysis of the USSR’s economic position indicates that regardless of the importance attached to buying technology in the West, the means to do so are limited not by Western reluctance to grant the necessary credits, but by Moscow’s inability to absorb more credit repayments
without mortgaging future exports to a degree no prudent government could afford.\footnote{A CIA analysis concludes that in 1973 Soviet repayments on debts will exceed drawings, and this crossover point might be reached in 1972. “With a marked slowdown in the growth of exports, the USSR will have to slow the growth of its indebtedness to the West in order to hold the ratio of debt service to exports within reasonable bounds.” [Footnote in the original.]}\footnote{Not further identified.}

The irony of this is that at the very time when the notion is most prevalent in Western Europe that détente can be purchased, the Soviets are no longer actively in the market.

This means that the Soviets will have to be more selective in their economic deals with the West, but can pick and choose their partners. The West, in turn, will be all the more eager to share in the shrinking exports to Russia.

It is also worth noting how the Soviets manage to buy American technology by the back door:

“The value of Soviet orders for Free World chemical equipment and technology placed during 1970 ($200 million) was more than twice the value of such orders in 1969 . . . Japan was the largest single Free World seller of chemical plants to the USSR with sales of more than 70% of the total value. \textit{Six of the plants sold to the USSR by Japan in 1970 would use US process technology.} The sale of technology for these Japanese plants made the US a major source of process technology for the USSR . . . In terms of size and efficiency these plants represent a great advance over plants now operating in the USSR.” (Quoted from CIA study.)\footnote{Not further identified.}

What this means is that in one important field the US is in fact subsidizing the Soviet economy (eight year credits at 5.5% interest), but our policy is based on the assumption that by holding back from official Soviet trade and credits we hold out an incentive for a political amelioration so that the USSR can gain access to our technology.

\textit{The economic motive in Soviet foreign policy is thus not growing. The West will obtain less rather than more leverage. In this way, Soviet external economic circumstances reinforce the conservatism that is the byproduct of developments in Chinese and Eastern European policy.}

\textbf{Part II.}

Before turning to relations with the US and a survey of specific issues, it is necessary to touch on some internal factors to the extent that they may or may not influence foreign policy.
A. The Leadership

Rather than try to read the Kremlinological tea leaves, the following seem to be the pertinent observations to bear in mind when reflecting on the last six years of the Brezhnev–Kosygin regime:

—The main character of this leadership both at the top and at the second echelons is that they are by and large the generation raised by Stalin. Almost without exception they are the product of the Stalinist purges; they rose to fame and fortune in a period when loyalty to Stalin was virtually the only criterion for advancement. They are, collectively, “morally crippled,” and, intellectually, a generation “far more constricted in imagination, in the ability to look at the world and conceive new policies.” (Robert Conquest, “Stalin’s Successors,” *Foreign Affairs*).

—There is no prospect for a distinctly different generation to come to power for at least another decade.

—Despite the apparent “permanence of collectivity,” the struggle for power continues, and will be evident at the Party Congress and after. Its influence on policy is virtually unpredictable, but it generates an atmosphere in which major issues requiring decision tend to become institutionalized in the form of personal contests and ultimate decisions and compromises rather than real resolutions.

—The prospects for Brezhnev’s dominance are growing stronger.

B. The Economy

For much too long Westerners have held as an article of faith that Soviet economic problems would lead the USSR inevitably into a prolonged détente with the West. Yet it has never been demonstrated that there is a direct correlation between the state of the internal Soviet economy and foreign policy.

At this particular point in Soviet development, there is probably less reason to conclude that internal economics will force foreign policy in a given direction.

—To be sure the pressure of the Soviet consumer is growing.

—In the past five years, however, consumer goods availability, especially consumer durables, has increased.

—This has been accomplished in a period of major strategic buildup and reinforcement of the Far East.

—Moscow has thus managed to avoid the guns or butter choice.

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Of course this does not mean that all will be well. Even the Soviet leaders admit they have exhausted the potential for "extensive" economic development, and must now concentrate on "intensive" growth. This is, of course, a far more difficult task than confronted Stalin or even Khrushchev.

The present five-year plan, however, is a sober one. It does not appear from any reading of economic targets, growth rates, etc., that the USSR intends to rely on foreign sources more than in the past. Rather the new plan suggests an intention to obtain growth through Soviet resources in the main.

In short, they have made a prudent decision not to mortgage their economic development to outside factors.

C. Brezhnev

Even in the era of collective leadership, most Sovietologists acknowledge that Brezhnev occupies a position above the others. How strong he is can be debated. But in the last year his emergence has been more marked than in any period.

What is intriguing now is the possibility that Brezhnev is falling under the spell of his "place in history."

His behavior since last summer seems to be one of a man in a hurry.

—For some reason he seized the lion’s share of the credit for the German treaty even before negotiations were completed. We know (from special sources) that he was highly pleased last June that the United States and West German press highlighted his conciliatory remarks about peaceful coexistence.9 He told Gromyko that this was just as "planned."

—Last fall he again claimed a major foreign policy role by personally endorsing the SALT talks, breaking down Ulbricht’s resistance to the Berlin negotiations.

—He has openly pressed, unsuccessfully as it turned out, for an early Party Congress.

—He made an unprecedented televised New Year’s Day speech to the nation.10

9 In its coverage of the speech, the Washington Post published a UPI ticker item, which reported that Brezhnev had called for "improved Soviet-American relations ‘to facilitate the cause of world peace’ and said they must be based on a ‘realistic assessment’ of the world situation.” (Washington Post, June 13, 1970, p. A11)

—He personally signed the new five-year plan, a unique occurrence in Soviet history, and pushed it through without a Central Committee meeting.

—He is thus personally identified with the shift in investment priorities from heavy industry to consumer goods, for the first time in Soviet history.

—He has been willing to accept this role, even at the cost of some military grumbling.

In short, Brezhnev may believe this is his last Party Congress to control (he would be over 68–69 for the 25th Congress, four or five years hence), and that he must have an appealing platform to distinguish him in the annals of the Soviet state. Stalinist or exclusively cold war themes are not likely to have much appeal as a platform. A better way may be a display of internal and external success, based on a better standard of living, détente and peace.

This, of course, runs counter to the conservative tendencies created by other factors, but it would not be the first time that personal politics played a dominant role in Soviet history.

Social Discipline

If in fact Brezhnev does try to break out of the confines of collectivity, it must be noted that his internal social policies are likely to become more repressive, more disciplinarian. Though he often tries to remain in the middle of the road, his inclinations in the end are toward the conservatives and reactionaries. It was, after all, under his regime that the police terror against the dissenting intelligentsia was revived.

Thus, it is possible that Brezhnev and his colleagues, foreseeing growing problems of social discipline, not only with intellectuals but the youth and the non-Russian nationalities, will not want a period of acute tensions abroad. It is conceivable that “success” in foreign policy will be prerequisite for an internal tightening, just as more consumer goods divert popular unrest from the increasingly totalitarian aspects of this regime. (The regime’s dilemma of course is that any détente combined with improved material life tends to generate more spontaneity.)

If this is the course Brezhnev intends to follow, one signal could be anti-Khrushchevism, and at the same time, a further effort to restore Stalin’s historical role. Indeed, in some respects, coming to terms with Stalin is one of the major ideological and political issues of the Congress. If Brezhnev tries to increase his power position through the Stalin

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or Khrushchev issues, however, he may overreach himself and initiate a major political crisis. His record, however, suggests he is too prudent to launch a major frontal attack. The resolution of the Stalin issue is more likely to come in nuances.

Part III.

A. The United States

There is obviously still uncertainty of what to make of present day American foreign policy. Some recent sophisticated discussion suggests that the Soviets have made an estimate of our prospects that is distorted in a potentially dangerous manner. They seem to dwell on the following main points in describing and evaluating the United States at this juncture:

—The war in Vietnam, plus domestic factors, have forced the US into a political retreat, which is manifested in the Nixon Doctrine.

—The Nixon Doctrine is, on the one hand, a new and more sober perception of America’s role, but it is also an attempt to gain flexibility in a period when US capabilities are reduced.

—The trend of adapting American foreign policy to the “changing ratio of forces” will continue.

—Domestic factors in the future will act to force further reductions in commitments, but will be offset by a new effort to shift responsibilities to allies.

—America’s “weight” in the various Alliances and in the capitalist world will remain formidable and sufficient to block major shifts, but US friends and allies will inevitably have to act more independently and with less reliance on the US.

(The above is based on a long Moscow symposium on the Nixon Doctrine, printed in the Soviet journal USA. The full text is at Tab C.)

In short, what the Soviets seem to be saying more seriously rather than propagandistically, is that the balance of forces in the world is indeed changing, and this presents an important decision point for the USSR; is it a time for an advance? or, is it a time to seek stability and strike bargains with the more “sober elements” of the bourgeois?

On the one hand, there must be arguments (like the armed forces day speech of General Sokolov, a First Deputy Defense Minister) that the USSR can and should develop a position of military superiority over the US. On the other hand, one can read arguments in public literature that it is impractical and dangerous to aim for military advantages which could provoke the US into renewed military efforts, but, most important, would in the end lead to only marginal military gains.
This has been the underlying debate in SALT on the Soviet side. The ABM-only approach suggests that, as usual, the Soviets are seeking to compromise their own differences on a plan that the military could tolerate, and that the “doves” could also live with. In effect, they are willing to accept some increase in strategic stability, but largely as a holding action, in order to see if the US does, in fact, continue to decline in power and influence as their analysis suggests.

B. Europe

It follows from Soviet analysis of the position of the United States, that American prospects in Europe (as Gromyko’s son has recently argued in a long analysis) are declining.

—In the long run, the Soviets argue, we will be unable to stand the expense of a major military commitment to Europe and trying to shift the burden to our allies we enhance their own freedom of political action and create apprehension over our reliability.

—In this context, Soviet diplomacy will have new opportunities. The spearhead of that diplomacy will be directed at Bonn, which is still the lynch pin in the West European structure.

—If West Germany can be detached, even in part, from the European economic and political structures, the competitive nationalism of the other Europeans will revive, and the old goal of dividing hostile coalitions will be advanced.

This is why the Berlin negotiations are in many respects the key to Soviet policy (perhaps even more so than SALT).

—The Soviets are likely to pay a price for the ratification of the treaties, not only because of the intrinsic political value of the treaties themselves, but because the consequences, as Moscow interprets them, will be important to the continuing forward movement of Soviet policy.

—A European Conference will symbolize the triumph of almost two decades of striving to ratify the territorial and political status quo in Europe.

—From that point Moscow can advance to the next stage of dismantling the Western Alliance (or so they believe).

(There is of course another side to this coin: the destabilizing effect on Eastern Europe of the new fluidity in East-West relations which a successful completion of the German/Berlin negotiations will have. This may be compounded by progress in the European Communities

12 Anatoli A. Gromyko was then a specialist in African and American studies at the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
and their attraction to the East Europeans. Ironically perhaps we may see an evolution in Europe which in the Western half poses serious challenges to our interests and, simultaneously, in the Eastern half poses new dangers for the Soviets. The difference of course is the proximity of Soviet physical power, which in the short run at least, can be applied directly or indirectly to contain instabilities in Eastern Europe.)

C. Middle East

Finally, there are the nagging problems of the Middle East and the conflicting and agonizing Soviet choices in that area. The situation is probably too fluid even for the Soviets to see much beyond each tactical phase. But certain trends must be apparent to all in the Kremlin.

—The Soviets are firmly and probably irrevocably entrenched in the Near East. In an age when there is a secular trend of Western “imperialism” withdrawing from this and adjacent areas (the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean), it is of first importance that the Soviets protect their power position as a base for expansion.

—Only secondarily, does it matter how the Israeli-Arab contest is resolved, as long as the Arabs are not totally defeated.

This is not to say that the Soviets are unmindful of the dangers in this area, or the underlying instability of alliances with Arab governments. But their calculations of the risks must be less disturbing now than last year. They successfully defied the US in the test over the cease-fire violations. They must have recognized that despite their aggressive behavior the Israelis have been reluctant to reopen the fighting, and the United States has exerted increasing pressure on Israel.

Thus, the Soviets probably now foresee that the risk in the Middle East can be contained, and that the outcome is likely to be more and more unfavorable to Israel. If, in fact, the Soviets in the end deliver back to the Arabs most of their losses in the war, they can count on a long term entrenchment in this area from which to expand.

Part IV.

Prospects

In considering the prospects for Soviet policy following the 24th Congress, it is worth recalling the characteristics of the post-Khrushchev period thus far.

In a sense it has been an interregnum. The transition from Stalinism to Khrushchevism was characterized by the emergence of the USSR from a narrow-based European power to a global one. Yet, Khrushchev did not possess the means to carry on such a policy effectively in direct competition with the US; or he could only do so indirectly in various areas of the world.
The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has created the means for a more vigorous competition through a vast increase in strategic power, a better economic base, and a more realistic evaluation of the complexities and uncertainties of political involvement abroad.

Thus, the following seems likely to be the main features of Soviet policy in the post-Congress period:

—At home an emphasis on steady though unspectacular economic advance with some more tangible benefits to the Soviet people. The present leadership will be less concerned about the longer term, since they are not going to be in power to face the consequences of or the failure to make adequate investments to cope with growing demands in the period beyond the present five-year plan.

—Domestically, policies will become more conservative and repressive to cope with social and national dissidence that the present Soviet leaders are incapable of dealing with or understanding.

—Within the Communist world the Soviets will have to work for consolidation in light of Czechoslovakia and Poland; less toleration of independence in Eastern Europe is likely, but, on the other hand, the Soviets will try to hold open the prospect of some modus vivendi with China.

—In relations with the United States negotiations and agreements of a limited character will be entertained and concluded. The motive will in part be to demonstrate that the USSR can deal with the US on equal terms for the first time in history, and has gained recognition of co-equal status as a superpower. Their longer term motive will be to encourage trends they perceive in the United States that will lead to further retrenchment on the world scene.

Their major problems will be:

—The intractability of the Soviet economy in the long run, which will be aggravated by the conflict between social discipline, which the party must enforce, and the need to permit more initiative and freedom to provide the incentive for increased productivity in a period when growth must come through intensive economic development.

—The inherent instability of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and the chance that in a period of détente, initiated for purposes of consolidation in Eastern Europe and disruption in the West, one effect will be to make it more difficult to discipline the Eastern European satrapies.

—The unpredictability of the Chinese, especially in a period when American policy toward China may be thawing and presenting the Chinese with more room for diplomatic and political maneuvers.

—Finally, there is the problem of the Soviet leadership: if Brezhnev does in fact enhance his power and put through a program, he becomes more vulnerable to hostile coalitions. If Soviet policy comes to reflect more and more of his personal prejudices and predilections, his abrupt removal or departure makes longer term prognosis more uncertain.
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Berlin

The meeting lasted an hour and a half. At the beginning I handed Dobrynin the formulas on access, on inter-Berlin arrangements, and on Federal presence that Rush had submitted to me. Dobrynin took them and he said that he noted that even in this channel we rather stubbornly clung to our position. I said so far we had made the major concessions in this channel, but in any event all the channel guaranteed was greater speed, not greater concessions.

Dobrynin then went through the partial comments I had given him and asked for clarification. He said he wanted to know first of all whether, except for the comments I had made, all other points would be acceptable. Specifically he wanted to know whether with respect to the Soviet presence the only thing that was objectionable was the Consulate and everything else was acceptable. I told him that anything that had a diplomatic status was probably not acceptable. Dobrynin said that this presented major problems for the Soviet Union because obviously every enterprise was a State enterprise and their representatives abroad were State officials.

Dobrynin also wondered whether I could assure him that there would be non-discriminatory treatment of Soviet concerns in West
Berlin. I said I would have to check this since this was a technical point. He asked if I were implying that we wanted to write into an agreement discriminatory treatment of Soviet interests. I replied that I was not implying anything; I just had to check it in order to make sure that I knew what I was talking about. I would let him know as soon as possible.

Dobrynin said it was important for him to be able to show some movement on our side, since we had asked for some major commitment from them on access and other issues. He then asked a number of specific questions about every part, the gist in each case being whether, except for the comments, we were accepting all the other points. I replied that he had to understand that I was not conducting any negotiation; I was just giving him the general sense. For example, I said, I had not pointed out, because it seemed to me premature, the fact that we objected to the demilitarization clause in their draft. It was not that we were quite prepared to say that Federal military activities would not be permitted in Berlin. We could not accept a blanket demilitarization clause, considering their remilitarization of East Berlin. I also pointed out that we could not accept the term “West Berlin,” we needed the phrases I had submitted to him in my Partial Comments.

Dobrynin then raised the question of Federal presence and asked again whether, except for the formulations which we were submitting, the other Soviet formulations were acceptable. I said I doubted whether complete prohibitions of committee meetings and party meetings were acceptable, but that we might look for some formula that moved toward the Soviet position. He said, “may I report to Moscow that you will move far enough towards the Soviet position?” I said I don’t know what “far enough” means. I said I thought the best thing to say was that if the Soviet position on access becomes more flexible we will move towards theirs on the Federal presence issue.

Dobrynin next asked why we asked for an additional Soviet commitment on access when the introductory paragraph is verbatim what we had handed them in the draft of the annex on access procedures. He said that he could understand that we wanted different access regulations, so he thought it was an abstruse point which depended entirely on the inter-German negotiations, not on anything that we would settle in the abstract. He added he could understand why we would hold out on the technical issues, but what about the commitment issue? I told him I would check and let him know.

Finally, Dobrynin asked how the ambassadors could proceed with their work. I suggested the following procedure.

I said that on the occasion of the next meeting of the four ambassadors, whenever that would be, Abrasimov could request a private meeting with Rush. That private meeting would be perfectly logical
since it would follow on the aborted meeting of the 25th.\(^4\) Then Abrasimov should discuss with Rush the text of the Soviet submission of March 26. Rush would follow essentially the same points that I had already submitted as partial comments. At the end of the meeting Abrasimov and Rush should talk with only the Soviet interpreter present, to work out any procedures they might wish for additional meetings. However, it was imperative that Abrasimov make no reference to our channel while there are other Americans in the room with Rush. Rush was the only American who to my knowledge knew everything about the procedures and about the negotiations. Dobrynin said he would see to it and that this procedure would be followed.

We then turned to other matters.

\textit{U.S.-Soviet Relations}

I told Dobrynin that we were at a key point in our relationship. He could make his usual skillful debating points with me and stress the fact that the Soviet Union was trying to make progress. The fact of the matter is that at least for a year we had told the Soviet leaders that we were ready to move towards more fundamental negotiations and for one reason or another they had never happened. I could only say that placing the submarine tender in Cuba does not improve our relationship. I also pointed out that there still was no answer to the SALT note. We had been talking about a summit and nothing had happened. I could only repeat that we would be making fundamental decisions after the middle of April. We would not tread water. We would go one way or the other, and I would hate to think that the channel between Dobrynin and me was a channel of lost opportunities.

Dobrynin said that as for the tender, he couldn’t understand our concerns since the tender wasn’t doing anything. As for SALT, he had explained to me why it had been difficult to get an answer. He could tell me confidentially that after our last conversation he had sent another communication to Moscow inviting a response. Finally, concerning the summit meeting—as far as he understood his government had taken a formal decision to have a summit meeting and had extended a formal invitation. It was still on. He expected, and as far as he knew, his government expected it to take place. He asked if the first week of August were still acceptable to us? I replied either the first week of August or the first week of September; this was a matter I had to check with the President. I said if there were a summit there would have to be some progress on SALT, since obviously there would have to be something to be concluded at the summit. Also there would have to

\(^4\) See Document 151.
be an announcement reasonably soon. Dobrynin replied that the announcement was no problem. Finally, Dobrynin said that he would see if he could get things moving, but he thought that a summit was firmly in the plans of the Soviet leadership.

**Vietnam**

Dobrynin then asked me whether I had any communication to make to him for Hanoi. He said he was doing this entirely on his own because he knew he would meet the top Hanoi leaders. I replied I had nothing to add to what I had already told him. Dobrynin said, “are you sure you have nothing to say?” I replied, “I have told you once before that if Hanoi wants to talk seriously, I’m ready.” Dobrynin said, “but is that really all you want me to tell them?” I said, “yes, there’s nothing to add to what I have already told you.” Dobrynin continued, “do you recognize this is a unique chance to talk to the top leadership?” I responded, “I have given you some of my private ideas early in January. We have always been ready to talk to Hanoi, but Hanoi’s representatives have never said anything in their conversations with me that differed in the slightest from what they had already said in Paris publicly. Under those conditions, unless I know there’s something really to talk about I cannot go beyond what I told you on January 8.”5

Dobrynin said he would communicate this but that he thought the Soviet government was prepared to carry messages if we wanted it to. I told him I would keep that in mind.

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5 Reference should be to the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 9. See Document 90.
Washington, March 25, 1971, 7:10 p.m.

K: Mr. President.
P: Hello, Henry. Any news?

K: Well, I had a talk with our friend and most of it was on Berlin and technical points. When we were through with that, two interesting things. Dobrynin asked whether I had any message for Hanoi—they are very ready to pass messages and he said any message I want to pass, he is willing to pass. But I think this is a bad time and I told him, “No, I don’t have any.” But he kept coming back to it. They let me know through him that they still . . .

P: Hanoi?

K: Yeah. He passed me that message in February too but I think it is a bad time to respond.

P: You think they may really want to have a discussion?

K: It is absolutely inconceivable that Dobrynin would raise this on his own. He was reading from his notes which he had on a little slip of paper. That’s the third time he has come back to it. He made an off-hand comment in January that they are ready to but I said the reasons we had not ever gotten anywhere is that they had always made speeches to us. He knew about the meetings and he came back a month later and asked again and now this is the third time. They raised less hell about the bombing than any other and haven’t gloated about their so-called victory.

P: Uh-huh.

K: Not going next week is an excellent consideration.

P: I am just not going to go.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 See Document 154.
3 See Document 121.
4 See Document 103.
5 Reference is presumably to Nixon’s decision to cancel his 10-day vacation in San Clemente, which he then reversed. As Haldeman noted in his diary on March 25: “The P reversed his decision on canceling the California trip on the basis of strong recommendations of all the senior staff and then agreed to go ahead in spite of the fact that the weather’s bad and he’s not particularly pleased with the whole thought.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, p. 260)
K: I have already told State.
P: Yeah.

K: First when we talked about Vietnam, I said don’t let your Allies confuse you. We know that they are in trouble, you have to make a big decision—we are not going to go one way or the other. Fundamentally understands your direction.
P: Uh-huh.

K: . . . What’s the progress on SALT? [omission in transcript] working it out with the foreign minister. I told him we are not going to wait all year about the Summit. He doesn’t know what the problem is. As far as he is concerned it will be the first week of August or September with their preference being for August. I told him the next thing would be when to announce it and we will have to block out some time on the President’s calendar [omission in transcript] about April 15th.
P: April 15th, huh. A meeting in August—as far as he is concerned, he thinks the meeting is on.
K: Unless he is a goddamned . . .
P: That’s an interesting point.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and the President’s schedule.]

156. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, March 25, 1971, 7:30 p.m.

D: It is difficult for good friends to say good-bye.
K: I tell you, you terrify me so much. I don’t see why I get you answers; you never get me any.
D: You saw I was efficient yesterday.²
K: You were straightening out your mess. (laughter)
D: Everything is clear and I have no problem.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.
² See Document 151.
K: It is substantive answers that I need.
D: When you ask me for anything I get you answers very quickly.
K: Only on something you want. You have me so cowed that when I see you I get people out of bed and I talk to the President. I wanted to give you an answer if you would stop interrupting me (laughter). On the commercial business, no problem about equal status and so we are against discrimination.3

D: After one hour of thought I thought you would come to this conclusion.
K: See, you tell your Government you scored a tremendous victory.
D: When I say equal they will say naturally.
K: The last point—consulate general—we can be quite flexible about commercial enterprises. So, you can assume that most of the items on your list are acceptable. We want a little flexibility. And the other points on commitment and on the other two items—I have found a way of communicating there and I will have an answer before tomorrow evening.
D: Fine.
K: But the general sense which I gave you is almost certainly correct.
D: Thank you very much. I always was thinking and deeply believed you were a very efficient man.
K: You also think that I am easily flattered.
D: Oh, no, no, no, come on!!
K: When we are both out of government service, which will be a lot later for you than me, I hope you will let me read the reports you send in on me.
D: I can tell you before. When I get back I will tell you.
K: I will probably talk to you tomorrow. If not, I will put it in an envelope and leave it for General Haig. In that case I would call you Saturday morning.4

3 Reference is to the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin.
4 March 27.
Dear Mr. Minister:

Ambassador Dobrynin’s return to Moscow affords me a good and timely opportunity to send you a personal note containing some thoughts about our relations in the months ahead.

It appears to me that real prospects exist for moving forward on some issues which are of vital interest to both our countries. Progress on concrete issues would help stabilize the political and strategic relationship between our two countries. Such progress would be welcomed by other nations which are seeking to pursue their individual aspirations free of outside interference and under peaceful and secure conditions.

I am convinced that the current talks in Berlin offer a special opportunity to achieve such progress. The Four Powers continue to share important responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole. Only the four of us, working together, can bring about concrete improvements in the Berlin situation. The present time, moreover, is particularly propitious. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is seeking to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union, and with its other Eastern neighbors. We support, as you know, this policy and have welcomed the treaties signed between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic and, subsequently, between the Peoples Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic. The Four Powers now together bear the responsibility of

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Rogers called Kissinger at 1:05 p.m. on March 25 to discuss whether to send Gromyko a letter: “K: On first thought, it might not be a bad idea. Gives them an excuse if they want to come back with something. Not that they need an excuse. R: Assuming this is true, and it might be, he [Dobrynin] said that in the [Party] Congress, if it appears there is great hostility developing, it could be a setback, but, if it showed friendly contact, it might be helpful.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File) Sonnenfeldt suggested several revisions to the draft letter on March 25, which Kissinger relayed to Rogers by telephone the next morning. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 2]: and ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File) A handwritten note on the letter indicates that it was “hand delivered to Ambassador by the Secretary.” See Document 158.

2 During his telephone conversation with Rogers on March 26 (see footnote 1 above), Kissinger suggested revising this sentence: “K: Where you say pragmatic improvements I would say concrete rather than pragmatic. R: That’s fine. K: That may give the idea we don’t mean our proposal. Pragmatic is the wrong word there anyway.”
reaching an agreement in Berlin which will permit these hopeful steps to lead to a more constructive relationship in Europe.

With our Allies, we tabled in Berlin on February 5 a draft quadripartite agreement in the hope that this could lead to a sound and viable accord. I hope that you will recognize its constructive intent and respond accordingly.

As I review developments in the Middle East over recent months, I am satisfied that progress has been made. Obviously, much still remains to be done, and the possibility of a renewal of fighting gives no ground for complacency. Nevertheless, the guns have now been silent for over seven months, and the peoples’ longing for peace has grown stronger. The United States will continue to work to promote a step-by-step negotiating process. The new momentum toward the goal on which all are agreed, the establishment of a genuine peace and not a return to the fragile arrangements of the past, must be maintained. The difficulties being encountered in the Jarring talks today are in large measure the product of the failures and suspicions of the past, and a solution will only be possible if it takes realistically into account the concerns of both sides.

With regard to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, I am convinced that conditions exist for making progress toward the highly important goal of these talks. My Government remains fully committed to achieving that goal. I believe that our proposal of August 1970—to which we have recently added a third ABM alternative—provides a sound framework for reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. This proposal takes into account the important and mutually recognized interrelationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms, an interrelationship which we consider must be reflected in the provisions of an initial agreement. We will study with great care and interest any amplifications or proposals your Government may advance which would take into account this interrelationship and which could provide a means for moving forward in this area of great importance to the two sides and, indeed, to the entire world.

In the period ahead, I hope that we can not only register progress on outstanding political issues which have divided us for many years, but also increase our joint efforts in mitigating problems which are common to mankind. I am thinking specifically of problems such as pollution, hunger, and disease. I am pleased, of course, by the recent successful discussions which have taken place between Dr. Keldysh of your Academy of Sciences and Dr. Low of our National Aeronautics

3 Rather than refer to an “understanding” on Berlin, Kissinger urged Rogers: “Keep suggesting we want an agreement. That’s what Brandt needs.”
and Space Administration. The agreement on increased cooperation in space augurs well for the future. I am certain that there are other areas in which similar types of cooperation are possible.

Although there will no doubt continue to be difficulties in our day-to-day relations, I hope we both can focus on important long-run trends and keep minor irritations in proper perspective to contribute to the resolution of the vital issues confronting our two governments.

I am looking forward to seeing you at the next General Assembly of the United Nations, and the opportunity which it will present to continue the useful discussions which we have had for the last two years.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

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4 For documentation on these discussions, which were held pursuant to the issuance of NSDM 70, July 10, 1970, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Documents 237, 239, 241, 244, and 245.

5 During his telephone conversation with Rogers on March 26, Kissinger commented: "Otherwise the only other suggestion is next to last paragraph where you say could contribute to [ultimate] resolution. I doubt we will have a resolution and we—leave out [ultimate] and say contribute to the vital issues of our time. It may not hurt and may help."

6 Printed from a copy with this typed signature and an indication that Rogers signed the original.

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158. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House

Washington, March 27, 1971, 0038Z.

51570. For the President from the Secretary. Following is Evening Report for the President for March 26, 1971:

[Omitted here is discussion of the withdrawal of Australian forces from Vietnam.]

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, President’s Evening Reading Reports, 1964–1974, Box 3, Memorandum for the President (Master File). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rich (S/S) and approved by Rogers.
2. Dobrynin’s Call—Dobrynin called on me for a tour d’horizon prior to his departure on Saturday to attend the 24th Party Congress. I asked him to deliver a personal letter to Gromyko, noting that it does not cover any new ground but that it was designed to maintain a good working relationship with the Foreign Minister and to avoid misunderstanding.

Middle East. A good portion of our hour’s discussion centered on the Middle East. I referred to my briefing of Senators yesterday and noted that there was general agreement with the administration’s position on the Middle East following my presentation. Alluding to questions I had been asked there, I queried Dobrynin on an informal basis whether the Soviet Union might reduce its military presence in the UAR if we got to the point where a complete agreement appeared to be in the offing. Dobrynin replied by asking: “If a solution is achieved, what need would there be for personnel to stay?” He added that the initiative for stationing advisors had always been taken by the Egyptians and not the USSR.

Dobrynin asked for our views about an interim agreement which would lead to the opening of the Suez Canal. I noted that we felt that such an agreement had advantages so long as it did not slow down negotiations under Jarring’s auspices. Dobrynin said that this was the way the Egyptians felt. He emphasized that the Arabs had been responsive to U.S. overtures and requests and that they had now laid all of their cards on the table and they could offer nothing more. He hoped that the U.S. Government would use friendly persuasion to bring about movement by the Israelis.

Dobrynin suggested that the four powers discuss the question of guarantees for a Middle East settlement simultaneously with the Jarring discussions. I noted we did not feel that we should move too fast on this but are nevertheless prepared to discuss this question a bit more than in the past.

Finally, Dobrynin gave me the signed text of Kosygin’s letter to you on the Middle East of February 26 and asked when a response could be expected. (You will recall that this letter was handed to me on March 1 and merely repeated observations on the Middle East which

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2 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers, accompanied by Adolph Dubs, met Dobrynin on March 26 at 12:10 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers)
3 March 27.
4 Document 157.
5 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers, accompanied by Abshire and Atherton, briefed the “full Senate” on the Middle East at 2:45 p.m. on March 25. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers)
had appeared in a public Soviet Government statement released on February 27.)

SALT. Dobrynin merely expressed the hope that we could get somewhere on SALT, and I said that we maintain such hopes too.

Conference on European Security (CES). Dobrynin asked whether U.S. views had changed any on a CES, namely, whether we were prepared to accept the Finnish proposals advocating multilateral contacts. I stressed that problems involving Berlin and Germany as a whole lay at the heart of European security. These issues were inextricably linked and a fact of life.

Berlin. Dobrynin noted that the Soviet side would today be presenting some new formulations which would represent movement toward the Allied positions. He hoped we would study these with care. He also asked about our current views with respect to elevating the level of the discussion. I noted that this had been mentioned as a possibility and that we could consider this matter if we got to a point where we thought it would be helpful.

Vietnam. In response to a query by Dobrynin, I noted that we still strongly favored a negotiated settlement. However, it appeared that the responsibility for political negotiations will rest increasingly with the two Vietnams. Our presence was being reduced and the U.S. was becoming less and less involved. I noted, too, that we saw no real prospect of Chinese intervention at the moment. Dobrynin said this would probably only take place if North Vietnam were invaded.

China. Dobrynin expressed interest in our position on the PRC’s entry into the UN. I said I might talk to him about this after his return to the States. He was rather evasive when I asked him about the Soviet position, but ended up saying that while the Soviets may not be sympathetic to Mao’s regime there was no change in the Soviet view of the representation issue. In answer to my question, he said that the Soviet Union’s relationship with China on the ideological front remained as before, implying that it was poor. On the governmental level, however, he said that relations had improved a bit. To his knowledge, there had been no clashes since last year and no increase in the level of Soviet troops on the borders.

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6 See Document 130.
7 Abrasimov formally tabled the Soviet draft for a quadripartite agreement during the Ambassadorial meeting in Berlin on March 26.
8 In telegram 51639 to Moscow, March 27, the Department reported the discussion on Vietnam in more detail. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 VIET S)
9 In telegram 51641 to Moscow, March 27, the Department reported the discussion on China in more detail. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM)
Referring to a recent international conference on the Indian Ocean at Georgetown University, Dobrynin asked informally whether the U.S. Government might be interested in the idea of a pronouncement to the effect that this area should be kept outside of major-power competition. He was rather imprecise but went on to wonder whether the U.S. would have any strong opposition to declaring that the Indian Ocean should remain free of military bases and “fleet concentrations.” He emphasized that he was making these queries informally, although I would not be surprised if he were doing so under instructions. I was noncommittal in my reply.

24th Party Congress. Dobrynin was not very forthcoming or illuminating when I asked him about the Party Congress. He did say, however, that no changes in foreign policy would result. He hinted that Gromyko might move up in the hierarchy, perhaps into the Politburo, but that he would still very much be in charge of foreign policy.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Finally, Dobrynin said that the Soviets were prepared to undertake a third round of bilateral discussions related to the utilization of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. He said they are prepared to meet in the first half of 1971 and were looking forward to our response. Signed TLE for William P. Rogers.

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1 In telegram 51640 to Moscow, March 27, the Department reported the discussion on the Indian Ocean in more detail. (Ibid., DEF 15 IND–US)

11 In telegram 51643 to Moscow, March 27, the Department reported the discussion on miscellaneous issues, including the upcoming Party Congress. (Ibid., POL US–USSR)

12 The telegram is otherwise unsigned.

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159. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, March 26, 1971, 3:32 p.m.

K: Anatoliy, how are you?
D: I thought you were on your way.
K: I’m leaving in a few hours. You are working very actively today.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.
D: I am preparing for my way home.

K: Look, I want to clean up the items from yesterday. I gave you one answer already. On the access formulation, we will review our formulations and will carefully compare them with yours to see to what extent they are, in fact, in accord.

D: Our two Ambassadors could do that meanwhile.

K: On the formulation we gave you and the formulation you gave back.

D: Your last proposal?

K: I will have that reviewed in Bonn and presumably our two Ambassadors can take a look at it.

D: It's better not to mention it for the time-being?

K: This is something I can tell Vorontsov [while you are away?]. The access question can be discussed by our Ambassadors. Secondly, on the other points, on the committees and on the party, I can only repeat what I said before—if we can make progress on access, we will make every effort to move toward your position. We don’t like the phrase “far enough.” We don’t know what it means.

D: You will use your formula?

K: We will make every effort to move toward your position. We will—in the spirit of what I have already told you.

D: They mentioned to me in connection with SALT that I promised to give you a reply before I leave Washington. Where can I reach you?

K: In San Clemente. We are leaving today at 5:00. You can call me in San Clemente. Call the White House—they will find me. If you have something before, I will send Colonel Kennedy to pick it up—whatever answer you have.

D: If I receive anything before 5:00, I will call you.

K: If it’s after that time, you can call Colonel Kennedy. Haig will be with me. Colonel Kennedy can pick it up and send it to me. If I have any question, I will call you.

D: Should I call on your usual telephone? If I don’t receive it in a half-hour, I will call Colonel Kennedy. Have a nice trip.

K: You, too. I hope we will do some constructive work when you return. That is certainly our attitude.

D: It is mutual.

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2 See Documents 154 and 156.

3 Brackets are in the original.
160. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, March 26, 1971, 4:23 p.m.

K: Anatoliy?
D: You received it? I just pulled it from the telegram.\(^2\)
K: Anatoliy, where do we go from here?
D: Where do you want to go? Before I go home... Exactly what it said was in my telegram. It was a quote.
K: Our view is this. They should agree on the principle of the limitation and what the limitation should contain.
D: The principle?
K: NCA against NCA or Safeguard against NCA should be settled first. When the negotiations start...
D: In Vienna?
K: First to be agreed upon is what the limitation is.
D: Limitation on offensive weapons?
K: No, on defensive.
D: On ABM?
K: What is to be limited.
D: You mean the sites?
K: They should agree on whether it should be sites—Moscow and Washington, or what. That is the question that should be settled first.
D: They have now to begin with the discussion about the idea of a separate agreement—to discuss as of now the major points of that agreement.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking. A typed note indicates that the call took place "after receipt of note delivered by Sokolov to Colonel Kennedy."

\(^2\) The text of the Soviet note, which was received in the White House at 4:10 p.m., is as follows: "The Soviet side considers acceptable in principle the idea of 'freezing' strategic offensive weapons, having in mind that details will be discussed after an agreement on ABM systems limitation has been reached. As regards an ABM agreement, our position is well-known: we are for a separate agreement on ABM, but on equal terms without giving any advantages to either of the sides." In the margin, Kissinger wrote Dobrynin's phone number in Moscow and a reformulation on SALT ("discussion of the details will be concluded simultaneously with the conclusion on agreement of ABM systems limitation"), presumably during their telephone conversation at 8:20 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 2]) See Document 161.
K: But when we begin discussing an agreement, then we want site-by-site to discuss the principles of a “freeze.”

D: When they come to that one, they discuss freezing things, as you mentioned before?

K: We have this bureaucratic problem. In order to trigger this, we would prefer an exchange of letters or something on the order of a Presidential statement to which you agree. Nobody knows about this position yet.

D: If you don’t mind my repeating, it will be this way: first, as of now, they will begin in principle. You will send a telegram to yours and we will send one to ours.

K: Not yet. My proposal is we have to have some formal way to trigger this.

D: An exchange of letters or some statement?

K: And as soon as that exchange of letters is done, then we will send the instructions.

D: You gave the letter last time. We will give to you . . . Before the last letter, both sides accept in principle.

K: I understand. May I call you tonight when I get out there? I can talk to the President on the plane.

D: Today or tomorrow morning?

K: About 11:00 Washington time.

D: 11:00 is all right with me.

K: I will have discussed it with the President—and I will have it in front of me.

D: Instead of the “Soviet side,” say both sides.

K: We will discuss it tonight.

D: After 11:00?

K: After 10:00.

D: After 11:00 would be better.
March 26, 1971, 8:20 p.m., PST.

K: You and I are going steady. We should exchange telephone numbers.

D: That is right. I will give you my Moscow number. 290–2520.

K: I will not ask you what the area code is.

D: It is in Moscow.

K: I have talked to the President about it and do not completely understand it. Is this in response to our letter?

D: You do not? It is in connection with our last talk and your draft.

K: I will tell you how we are prepared to work it. We are prepared to agree in principle to separate ABM agreement. Then negotiators would begin discussion of what it would be like—Moscow versus Washington, Washington versus—

D: Only involved the place? How many [omission in transcript] etc?

K: At that point they would begin discussing what sort of agreement. Then when they know what sort of agreement would discuss radars and so forth. Simultaneously would discuss freeze. If that is possible agreement would be immediate.

D: I have to check but—
K: When they begin drafting agreement they should talk about freeze.

D: They would discuss how many, etc. I don't know. It seems to be a little bit on the later stage. They will argue about [how many radars and all the little things].

K: Not crucial to us. After you say agreement on ABM—agreement has been reached.

D: What is your position?

K: Certain start on ABM but also discuss on freeze.

D: Simultaneously concluded on separate agreement and freezing at the same time.

K: Exactly.

D: I will pass this along to Moscow. I will be there myself on Monday. No, I cannot check it tomorrow because it is Saturday and no one will be there. You know it is the first week of the Congress to begin. For me it will be difficult to force members of the government to look at this. I will try to do my best and get an answer for you. I am meeting on Tuesday with Gromyko. Even he is involved with the Congress and lots of guests. You can understand the difficulty that this problem exists.

K: Yes. We are prepared to give instructions to start discussions on ABM—the nature of agreement and how many radars, etc. but we must simultaneously discuss the freeze issue.

D: What to discuss. Yes. Freezing I am just putting some thoughts down. [omission in transcript] What kind of freezing. I will send a telegram to my government.

K: Let me ask you as long as we have this conversation. Next part of it. Not many people know about this in our government and we must think of how to get them started. It can be done in two ways. By an exchange of letters. The other is that the President at a press conference could respond to a question along the lines of “Do you

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6 Brackets are in the original.

7 According to an undated note from David Young, Kissinger instructed his staff to revise this sentence to read: “They can start on ABM discussion the number of sites and so on but also they must discuss the freeze practically concurrently.” An unidentified staff member noted that this and other such revisions were “not sanitizations & should be made in all relevant files.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT)

8 March 29.
still believe in the link between offensive and defensive weapons?” Then he says something like “I am willing to make an agreement as long as freezing is in it.” You could say through TASS that is a good idea.

D: I don’t know. Yes I know you are giving an example.
K: This way we could get it into a formal channel.
D: Agreement on basis which you propose. It was our thinking I gave you on discussion after an agreement except for freezing. Do you have my note to you?
K: The one you gave me this afternoon. Yes. I have it.
D: [omission in transcript] details that the summit (?) will discuss simultaneously with the conclusion of the agreement.
K: With the conclusion—no that is a little late for the discussion. With the beginning of the drafting of the agreement.
D: It is very difficult to put in drafting [that we discuss freeze]\(^9\) from very beginning.
K: Will be discussed prior to ABM agreement?
D: Discussion of the details will be discussed simultaneously with the conclusion of the agreement.
K: That would be fine. See how easy I am to get along with. The discussion of the details will be discussed simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement on ABM systems. Yes. Something like that would go.
D: I will transmit this to Moscow.
K: We are prepared to listen to any reasonable proposition. We should make the proposal and that will make it easiest within our bureaucracy. The President could make the statement in a press conference—similar to the letter.
D: I understand. You could reply with what you just have given me.
K: [omission in transcript] notification [omission in transcript] immediately instruct my delegation to—
D: I could not give yes or no now on this. Just get it clearly to present your point of view to Moscow. The point of view of the President.
K: We will receive any counter proposals. That is no problem.
D: Major point is how to formulate this.
K: That formulation. The one you gave me.

\(^9\) Brackets are in the original.
D: You mean the one you gave me.
K: You are a good draftsman. You win every one of our discussions.
D: Everyone called you doctor. I could not get a doctors degree in 10 years. I would have to write a book and—
K: The trouble you have is that if you write a book everyone will be able to understand it.
D: You must give me degree of doctor.
K: When I am back in academic life I will see what I can do for you.
D: I will tell my government but you must understand it might take time.
K: You know we have that one problem in the 2nd half of April.
D: [omission in transcript] this place. No problem. Discuss with them, I will try to do my best and give you answer before I come back.
K: I have great confidence in your influence in Moscow. You remember I got you an answer within 24 hours on Berlin.
D: But in this there are more countries involved in this Congress. It is difficult for me to go and say wait one week to the others and I will take up my business.
K: I understand. On Berlin. It is best thing we get Ambassadors started as soon as—
D: I think on 16th of April?
K: We proceed as we discussed yesterday.
D: They will begin and when they have difficulty then our channel will be again taken up. You will not forget to send instructions.
K: Yes I will. But you tell Abrasimov to be somewhat cautious at first until we see how the communications work out.
D: As you proposed they will proceed.
K: I will be in touch with our Ambassador. If we have any questions on the technical things we can get in touch with Vorontsov. Is that the way you want it done?
D: Vorontsov. In some cases that is not good but in this case it is OK to go through him.
K: I have had no answer from Rush.
D: They will discuss and then they will talk—it is difficult for me to say for them. I think 2 grown up men can work out and agree on these administrative details don’t you?
K: I think so. However, I have heard that Abrasimov is more difficult to discuss things with than you.
D: He could not be worse than me. I am easiest fellow to discuss everything with.
K: I will now see what influence you have in Moscow. Have a good trip.10

10 After his conversation with Dobrynin, Kissinger returned to his meeting with Nixon and Haldeman. As Haldeman wrote in his diary entry for March 26: “That, of course in turn leads to going ahead with the fall Summit meeting and may also help in getting Berlin settled. In addition to that, the P now agrees with Henry’s long-held view that there is a remote possibility of a settlement on Vietnam with Hanoi, probably partly as a result of Laos.” “The mood he [Nixon] has is a very mystic one,” Haldeman remarked, “and he’s not highly optimistic, but certainly not down in the dumps, and has the feeling that something is happening or is about to happen. I think he’s right, in the sense that I think we’ve bottomed out now on most of our bad stuff, and that we’ll have a pretty good balance of the year ahead of us as we get at least some of these foreign policy developments, and as the economy makes some positive progress, which it almost inevitably is going to do between now and the end of the year.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

162. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

The Soviet Party Congress

There seems to be a consensus that the 24th Soviet Party Congress, which opens on March 30, will be a rather dull affair. In part, this is because much of the business will be devoted to a discussion of the next five year economic plan.2 It also may seem routine because some of the real business is done behind the scenes. Moreover, shifts in policy that do occur are often not apparent on the surface. In historical terms, Soviet Congresses have in fact often marked major milestones in policy, but this has only become apparent to outside observers much later.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII. Secret. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of this memorandum to Kissinger on March 24 (see footnote 1, Document 153). The memorandum was pouched to the President, who was in San Clemente from March 26 to April 5. According to a note and an attached correspondence file, Nixon saw it on March 30.

2 See footnote 11, Document 153.
It is thus possible that this Congress, too, will usher in a new period of domestic or foreign policy.

The Internal Situation. Of immediate interest, of course, is whether the top leadership will undergo any important changes.

—Brezhnev's position does not seem to be in any danger; at this Congress, however, he may try to break out of the confines of collective leadership by promoting some of his closest colleagues, or stating some new policy positions.

—Some turnover at the top is almost inevitable because of the age of the Politburo. This will provide us some indication of the balance of forces; the more important changes, such as a new Premier, might come later, but might be reflected in the Congress promotions and demotions.

Many observers have the impression that Brezhnev is a man in a hurry. They are impressed with the fact that he personally signed the new draft Five Year Plan, rather than going through the normal Central Committee approval (which only came this week). Thus, it is possible that his main report to the Congress will have a programmatic character, since he may feel this is his last Party Congress (he would be 68–69 at the next Congress four or five years hence). If so, Brezhnev may decide to play up the new benefits to the consumer, and he may want to emphasize tangible gains in foreign policy.

Economic Plans. The general evaluation of what we know of the new economic plan is that it is a rather sober document, with growth rates set at fairly realistic (i.e. modest) targets. Five years hence, if the plan is realized, the Soviet economy will not look much different in its basic structure. The gradual shift to consumer goods industry will continue, but not at severe cost to heavy industry or the military complex.

Over a longer term, however, the growth of consumer goods production, especially durables, will generate additional demands for a substructure of servicing. For example, by tripling automobile output, the Soviets must face at some point the need for better roads, for service stations, repair facilities, etc. At this point the squeeze on military resources may be felt more severely.

Of interest is the political signal given in the plan. For the very first time light and consumer industries are scheduled to grow faster than heavy industry. This could indicate the regime is more sensitive to popular pressures than we realize.

Social Discipline. But while more responsive to material needs of the population, it seems fairly certain that the increasingly repressive social policy will not be reversed and may indeed get worse. We are likely to hear much about vigilance, social discipline etc. Indeed, the very responsiveness to material demands imposes on the regime more rigid disciplinary policies.
**Foreign Policy.** Related to a harsher internal discipline, the foreign policy parts of the Congress will almost certainly have to contain some rhetoric about “imperialism” and United States aggressiveness, etc. This is more or less normal, and no General Secretary can afford not to engage in a certain amount of polemical outbursts.

For us the more important aspect will be Brezhnev’s assessment of the future of Soviet-American relations in particular and the state of international affairs in general. The very fact of the Congress and his obligation to justify his stewardship forces Brezhnev to define the so-called “general line” of the party at this historical juncture.

In the past such definitions have often heralded new policies. For example, the post-Stalin expansionist policies were based on the doctrinal proclamation of the end of capitalist encirclement. In March 1939, Stalin’s speech turned out to contain a key signal that opened the way to the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

The main points that Brezhnev will emphasize are probably along the following lines:

—He will want to indicate that inside the communist camp, there are still problems that require discipline, vigilance, etc., but that compared to five years ago, the USSR has recovered to some extent from the disarray created by Khrushchev’s anti-Chinese campaigns.

—He will probably imply that the Chinese have been taught a lesson during the 1969 border crisis, and there is hope for a long term rapprochement.

—He will probably cite the agreement with West Germany as a major turn in the European situation regardless of whether the treaty is ratified.

*Thus by implication he may be laying the foundation for claiming that the Soviets have gained some new freedom of action, tempered by caution over the situation in Eastern Europe.*

**The Nixon Doctrine.** The Soviets recently published an interesting symposium of Soviet “Americanists” discussing the Nixon Doctrine. Though containing diverse appraisal and some contradictory conclusions by the participants, the discussion seems to indicate that the Soviets are trying to assess the effect of the changes they now acknowledge in American foreign policy on their own interests.

—Their overall conclusion seems to be that we are adopting more “flexibility” in our posture because our capabilities are being reduced.

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3 See footnote 3, Document 153.
—They suggest that this will mean a change in the “balance of forces” in their favor, eventually, but could pose some dangers in the short run if it became “adventuristic”.
—They assign a high value to domestic factors, which they expect will force us to improve relations with the USSR.
—In turn, they indicate that there is an opportunity for “constructive collaboration” with the US but no prospect for basic improvement of relations.

In dealing with the US at the Congress, Brezhnev’s general line is not likely to be clear cut:

—He will have to emphasize that our policies in some respects are dangerous and the Soviet-American relations have not changed basically.
—At the same time, Brezhnev will want to demonstrate that unlike his predecessors, he is dealing with the US on the basis of equal status and as a world power. He will probably make the classical dialectical point that while acting more dangerously the US in fact is being forced by “realities” to retrench.
—Thus, he is likely to want to point to some tangible gains from the Soviet position of at least co-equal status—agreements on SALT and perhaps Berlin and the Middle East would be such evidence.

Continuing Problems. What Brezhnev will not dwell on will be some of the longer term problems that still face his leadership and indeed the Soviet system as such:

—While there can be further economic advance at home, longer term problems become aggravated by granting shorter term benefits; attempting to impose social discipline runs counter to the initiative that must be permitted to provide the incentive for greater individual productivity and innovation called for in a period of growth through intensive development.
—The situation in Eastern Europe will remain inherently unstable and could grow worse in a period of détente, initiated by the Soviets as an effort to consolidate their position in Eastern Europe.
—China remains an unpredictable factor, especially in a period when our relations with Peking offer the Chinese more room for maneuver.
—Finally, as Brezhnev improves his power position he actually becomes more vulnerable to hostile coalitions, as Khrushchev did. (This seems to be a “law” of the post-Stalin dictatorship.) To the extent policies reflect his personal views, his age and political vulnerability make longer-range analysis more uncertain.
163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Current Soviet Attitude Toward the United States

Recently we have noticed increased acerbity in Soviet criticism of US policies. Soviet press articles have accused the Administration of bad faith and of undergoing a crisis of confidence with the American people. In private remarks to third parties and in statements received through clandestine sources, Soviet leaders have expressed skepticism about US willingness to move forward in negotiations currently in progress. Soviet criticism of our attitude towards European matters—especially towards a Conference on European Security and its linkage with the Berlin talks—has heightened and, during the Laos operation, the standard Soviet condemnation of our Indochina policy has become harsher. More pointed doubts about our interest in strategic-arms limitation have been expressed.

In assessing the significance of this more suspicious Soviet attitude, we would note several points.

—In the Soviet Communist Party Congress which opens today, the Soviet leadership is generally expected to take a hard and orthodox line both internally and externally. We do not expect to see radical departures from present foreign policy lines emerging from the Congress, at which the leadership will try to portray its foreign policy as moving forward successfully.

—With this in mind, the Soviet leaders are probably disappointed at the lack of forward movement (on Soviet terms, of course) in several spheres in which the US is importantly involved, notably in the Berlin negotiations, the Middle East, and SALT. Berlin is particularly

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII. Confidential. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum, as well as a draft covering memorandum for the President, to Kissinger in San Clemente on March 31. "Prior to the opening of the Party Congress," Sonnenfeldt explained, "Secretary Rogers signed off on a memorandum emphasizing the 'increasing acerbity' in Soviet criticism of the US and predicting a 'hard and orthodox line' at the Congress, and a 'critical, blunt attitude toward the US.' As you know from my memorandum [Document 166] I did not find this to be the main thrust of the Brezhnev report. If anything, the report inclined towards moderation and conciliation in tone, if not substance. Thus you have the problem of whether to forward this memorandum." (Ibid.) In an April 2 note, Richard Kennedy suggested that Kissinger "might want to revise" the covering memorandum if he decided to submit it to the President. Three days later, Kissinger wrote his response in the margin: "OBE. Don't forward." (Ibid.)
uncomfortable because it is holding up ratification of the FRG-Soviet and FRG-Polish Treaties and progress towards a European Conference.

—The leadership’s desire to boast of foreign policy successes encounters US firmness on several fronts—and, it may be added, Chinese firmness, for Peking has poured insults on Moscow’s attempts to portray Sino-Soviet relations as improved. Some Soviet leaders may believe, as they claim to, that the US is trying to gain undue advantage in the world power competition, whether through military action in Indochina, through arms steps such as MIRVing, or by tough negotiating postures in the Middle East or Berlin or SALT.

—The outlook for the Congress, therefore, is for a critical, blunt attitude towards us.

Surveying this scene, some observers conclude that the Soviet leaders have decided they cannot do business with the present Administration and are looking for ways around American roadblocks. According to this view, current Soviet acerbity is a harbinger of a tougher policy towards the US in the future, stemming partly from increased Soviet strength, partly from US resistance to Soviet policy directions.

We believe that this view exaggerates the change to be expected in Soviet behavior. While it is risky at this stage to predict changes in the leadership to be announced at the Congress, our belief is that changes will not be dramatic, and that the leadership will show us more of the same policies they have shown in the recent past. The leadership can be expected to emphasize internal programs and external policies which will project an image of stability, confidence and continuity.

What this means, we believe, is that the Soviet leaders, no matter how they line up after the Congress, may not trust us, may indeed attack us sharply—but will continue to realize that in their own interest they cannot afford to disengage from negotiations with the US. Indeed, while increased Soviet strength may make the leaders tougher customers, the heavy burdens they carry—perhaps best symbolized recently by the Polish events and their economic and political implications for all the Communist governments—give them added incentives to seek cooperation with the West.

We expect tough but realistic attitudes in the ongoing negotiations—SALT, Berlin, the Middle East—and think it would be erroneous to assume that the Soviets are turning their backs. Recent events have not changed the fundamental Soviet position—suspicion of us, determination to drive the hardest bargain possible with us, desire to keep chipping away at our positions, but nonetheless a need to do business with us. The Party Congress can hardly change the givens of this equation. We expect this Soviet attitude to continue.

William P. Rogers
164. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

San Clemente, California, March 30, 1971.

SUBJECT

My Recent Conversations with Dobrynin

As you know, this past week I met and talked with Ambassador Dobrynin several times. We made significant progress on SALT and Berlin and covered several other topics. Attached at Tabs I and II respectively are full records of our March 22 and 25 meetings. Following are the highlights of these sessions and several phone conversations.

SALT

On March 26 Dobrynin finally received instructions from Moscow on SALT and passed us a note (Tab III) which accepts in principle the freezing of strategic offensive weapons but with details to be discussed after reaching an ABM agreement. After talking with you on the plane I phoned Dobrynin with our position that there should be simultaneous discussions of an offensive weapons freeze and a separate ABM agreement. Dobrynin will consult the Soviet leaders on the formulation that the details of a freeze would be discussed simultaneously with the conclusion of an ABM agreement. He cautioned that there might be some delay in getting a response because of preoccupation with the Party Congress.

I also raised our bureaucratic problem of getting this approach into formal channels before we could instruct our delegation. I told Dobrynin that we were open to any reasonable proposition and suggested two: (1) through an exchange of letters or (2) with your answering a question at a press conference or a formal statement and the Soviet Union responding through a TASS statement. He said he would check this out in Moscow.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Nixon and Kissinger were both in San Clemente. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
2 Documents 149 and 154.
3 See footnote 2, Document 160.
4 See Document 161.
Berlin

Dobrynin and I had several conversations on Berlin, proceeding from the draft Soviet text of an agreement which he had given us in advance of the formal Soviet tabling at the Four-Power talks on March 26. As you know, I have been in constant contact with Ambassador Rush in order to give Dobrynin preliminary comments on the Soviet draft which Rush will now parallel in his formal negotiations.

On March 22 I told Dobrynin that on some points the Soviets followed the concept of our February 5 draft and had made some progress. A number of items gave us difficulty, however, and I gave him some partial comments based on suggestions from Ambassador Rush (attached at Tab I A and I B). These concerned FRG-Berlin ties and the authority of the Western powers in the Western Sectors; commitments by the other side on access and inner-Berlin improvements; and some other drafting changes designed to strengthen Berlin's status, Soviet commitments, and the Western Powers' authority.

On March 25 I also handed Dobrynin some specific formulas on access, inner-Berlin arrangements and Federal presence that Rush had sent me. (I C) Dobrynin asked for clarification of our comments on the Soviet draft, in particular whether they covered all our objections. I explained that I was not conducting negotiations, but was just giving him the general sense of our reactions. Dobrynin probed specifically on issues of Federal presence and Soviet commercial representation in West Berlin:

—I made clear that Soviet movement on access arrangements was required for our movement on Federal presence. While certain prohibitions on Federal presence would probably not be acceptable, I said we would make every effort to move toward the Soviet position if they became more flexible on access. Dobrynin maintained that the Soviet commitment on access in their March 26 draft was verbatim what we handed them in our draft. After checking with Rush, I later told Dobrynin that we would compare the drafts on this issue.

—I said that a Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin was unacceptable, and that anything that had a diplomatic status was probably not acceptable. Dobrynin said that this presented a major problem for the Soviet Union since obviously every enterprise was a State enterprise and their representatives abroad were State officials. He also wondered whether Soviet missions would be given non-discriminatory treatment. After consulting Rush, I later indicated to Dobrynin that we

5 See Document 149 and footnote 5 thereto.
6 See Document 154.
could agree to an increase in Soviet commercial offices and that we would give them equal, non-discriminatory treatment.

We also discussed how Ambassadors Rush and Abrasimov could proceed. I suggested that at the next meeting of the four Ambassadors, on April 16, Rush could request a private meeting with Abrasimov at which he would follow essentially the same points that I had already given Dobrynin and also work out any procedures they might wish for additional meetings. I emphasized again to Dobrynin the necessity to maintain the secrecy of our channel. (We have had indications that Abrasimov has been indiscreet on this subject.)

Ambassador Rush’s full comments on the Soviet draft are at Tab 1 D.  

**Middle East**

On March 22 Dobrynin expressed his Government’s “extreme concern” to resume discussions with us and said that they remain extremely interested in serious talks with me. In response to this request for my personal views, I said that I thought that moving ahead on the Suez Canal opening might gain time for discussion of a more fundamental settlement. I thought that Israel would probably not yield on Jerusalem, the major part of the Golan Heights, and some very significant security arrangements and guarantees in the Sinai.

**U.S.-Soviet Relations**

On March 25 I pressed Dobrynin hard for Soviet responses, saying that we would be making fundamental decisions after the middle of April. I told him we would not tread water and would move in one direction or the other. I said the presence of the submarine tender in Cuba does not improve our relations, and pointed out that there was no answer to our SALT note and that nothing had happened on a Summit.

Dobrynin replied that he could not understand our concern about the tender, since it was not doing anything. He said that SALT involved complex decision-making in the Soviet bureaucracy (as indicated above we did make progress on this issue after the March 25 meeting). He thought that the Soviet leadership firmly planned a Summit and asked if the first week of August was still acceptable. I replied either then or the first week of September, but in any event I would have to check this with you. If there were to be a Summit, I pointed out, there would have to be some progress on SALT and we would need an announcement reasonably soon. Dobrynin said the announcement was no problem.

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7 See footnote 5, Document 149.
Vietnam

Dobrynin pressed me repeatedly on March 25 for a possible communication for him to carry to the North Vietnamese leaders who would be in Moscow for the Party Congress. I declined to give him any specific message, repeating that if Hanoi wants to talk seriously that I was ready. I pointed out that we have always been ready to talk seriously to Hanoi, but its representatives had never said anything in their conversations with me that differed from what they had already said publicly in Paris. Thus unless there were really something to talk about I could not go beyond what I told him on January 9, namely that a separation of political and military issues was a possible negotiating approach. Dobrynin said he would communicate this; he thought the Soviet Government was prepared to relay messages.

Soviet Decision-Making

On March 22 Dobrynin made some interesting comments on the Soviet decision-making process in foreign policy:

—In the Soviet system junior people are rarely asked for their advice; Brezhnev and Kosygin, for all practical purposes, never consult anyone other than Gromyko or Kuznetsov.

—They do discuss all significant foreign policy issues in the Politburo. Brezhnev generally decides the agenda; every major Soviet communication going abroad is treated, with messages to Washington always given high priority. There is no vote in the Politburo but rather a discussion guided by Brezhnev. He states what he takes to be the consensus; if there is significant disagreement Gromyko prepares another note and the matter is automatically taken up in another Politburo meeting. These sessions always take place on Thursday, with special meetings held only on the rarest occasions, on matters of extreme urgency.

—No Politburo member, not even Brezhnev, can take any unilateral decision. This was different under Stalin who would make the decisions; he sometimes asked the Politburo to ratify them but he never really consulted. It was extremely dangerous to contradict Stalin, particularly if you were a senior official.

—Those on the Politburo who have an interest in foreign policy do not number more than five.
As Soviet leaders gathered in Moscow for the 24th Party Congress, President Richard Nixon and his advisers assembled at the Western White House in San Clemente, California for a less formal session on domestic politics and foreign policy. H.R. Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff, wrote that Nixon spent much of the afternoon on March 30, 1971, in "general conversation" with Henry Kissinger and John Ehrlichman, his Assistants for National Security and Domestic Affairs, respectively. "He discussed with John the problem of working out who K sees and spends his time with, especially in the press," Haldeman noted. "Also the point that we've got a very delicate period coming up now on our relations with Rogers and Laird, as we get into the SALT Agreement and the follow-up to it. So it's terribly important that K lays low in his media contacts and lets them be out in front." According to Haldeman, the President was "obviously in kind of a retrospective mood." Haldeman was reflective in his diary entry for March 30:

"Some general thoughts as of the end of March. Our position, looked at objectively, would appear to be at an all-time low at the present reading. The polls show us the lowest we've been: Gallup at 50, Harris showing a drop just the other day from 43 to 41. The credibility figure is way down; the rating on handling the Vietnam War is the lowest it's been; the magazines did one of their periodic 'this week Nixon's in trouble' sort of orgies. The Laos withdrawal effect is at its peak, or bottom, and there is a considerable base for feeling that we've really gone down substantially. In spite of this, the general attitude of all of the staff people, and certainly of the P, as well as most of the Cabinet members, seems to be very much upbeat, positive, and optimistic. The reason probably is best expressed by the phone conversation I had with Bill Rogers yesterday in which he reported on a talk he had with (Chicago Daily News Washington Bureau Chief) Peter Lisagor earlier in the day. Lisagor had raised the question with him that he couldn't understand why he seemed so happy and optimistic, and why everybody in the White House seemed to be the same way when it appeared to Lisagor that we were in serious trouble and getting worse. Rogers answered that the reason in his mind was that we know what we're doing and where we're going and, therefore, are not concerned about the outlook. On the other hand, the press and, perhaps, the people at this point don't know, and won't for a little while, so they take a more pessimistic view. This is really pretty much the case.

"Rogers went on to say that when we came in here two years ago, we inherited a number of monumental problems and didn't know for sure how to solve them, although we had some ideas. We've put our ideas into practice, modified some of them and now have a clear idea
what we are doing, and see that we’re on the road to solution and know how we’re going to get there. With this in mind, we have no great concern about the temporary setback situation, because we realize that it is temporary. All of this may be overoptimistic, but on the other hand, there are all kinds of potential optimistic factors that aren’t even taken into consideration in it. At the very least, it would appear that the economy has bottomed out and is gradually inching back into a sound position, and that in any event, we’re going to get out of the war one way or another, and we have a pretty fair chance of getting out honorably.

“Looking beyond that, there are a number of monumentally optimistic possibilities. Henry definitely feels he’s got the SALT thing lined up, and that we can announce that in a couple of weeks; that will lead to a Summit and a four power meeting [on the Middle East] after that in the fall. We know that at some point not too far off, we’ll be able to announce that no more draftees will be serving in Vietnam. Henry feels, and now the P concurs, that there’s a 50/50 chance at least of getting a Vietnam settlement this summer and ending the war completely. The Berlin negotiations appear to be reaching some sort of productive possibilities. The economic situation could turn out to be substantially better than we think it is at the moment. Then of course, there are all sorts of unforeseen possibilities on the bright side, as well as many on the dark side, that could come up.

“All in all, the outlook appears to be strongly balanced in our favor, and I think all of us feel it both rationally and intuitively, and that provides the basis for the optimism that everybody seems to have. Overall, the conclusion would be that probably this week, or this period of two or three weeks, will mark the low of the first term, and also that probably the troop announcement next week will be the basic turning point from which things will start moving upward.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, pages 262–263)

Nixon and Kissinger met several times on March 31 to discuss various foreign policy issues, including the Soviet Party Congress. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Although no records of their conversations have been found, Haldeman described in his diary the following exchange on Soviet-American relations:

“In the conversation in the P’s office today, Henry got into the general position we’re now in. He says that he really has the feeling now that he smells some good moves coming up. He’s convinced that the USSR wants a détente, and this is pretty much confirmed by Brezhnev’s conciliatory speech at the Party Congress. He thinks that this is just one more indication that they do want to take a much lower-key position from here on out. The P tends to concur in this view.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Brezhnev Report:2 First Impressions—Brezhnev as the Architect of Peace

The summary of Brezhnev’s six hour report suggests that his main theme is “a policy of active defense of peace and strengthening of international security.”

To document this general line, he revives a number of old Soviet proposals concerning disarmament, and claims that the “greatest achievement” of Soviet foreign policy has been that the USSR has lived in peace for the last 25 years. For a regime with proclaimed revolutionary and internationalist goals this is a rather narrow claim for Soviet policy. It is also self-serving in that Brezhnev seems to be taking credit for a “generation of peace,” which embraces the Khrushchev and Stalin periods, but is a theme responsive to the natural desire of the Soviet people. He adds that “one cannot consider the threat of a new world war to have been completely eliminated,” but the “vital cause” is not to permit this threat to become a reality. He warns that people must not become “accustomed to the idea that the arms race is an unavoidable evil.”

The New “Program”

In other words it seems that Brezhnev is adopting a “peace” platform with special emphasis on disarmament and the political solution of international crises. His six point program includes:

—(1) settlement of Indochina and the Middle East, as well as “full use” of the UN and repudiation of threat or use of force on the basis of regional and bilateral agreements;

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Drafted in Washington by Sonnenfeldt (see footnote 1, Document 163). Nixon and Kissinger were both in San Clemente. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum. Nixon wrote the following message for Kissinger in the margin: “K—Our stuff is pretty dull compared to his! (Though admittedly more honest.)”

—(2) a radical turn toward détente in Europe, including recognition of territorial changes, an all-European conference, and dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and NATO;

—(3) conclusion of treaties (note plural) putting a ban on nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and end to nuclear testing everywhere by anyone, nuclear disarmament of all states, and the convocation of a Five Power conference to this end;

—(4) to “invigorate the struggle to halt the race in all types of weapons,” including convocation of a world disarmament conference, dismantling of foreign bases, reduction of armed forces and arms in area of military confrontation, “above all in Central Europe,” reduction of the probability of accidental war or deliberate fabrication of armed incidents, and reduction of military expenditures;

—(5) abolition of colonial regimes;

—(6) deepening of relations of mutually advantageous cooperation in every sphere with states which for their part seek to do so with the USSR; including settling problems of environment, developing power and natural resources, etc. (This is new, and may be responsive to your foreign policy report.)

This is not a new program by any means. Most of these proposals date to early 1960s or late 1950s. Some were made at the last Congress. What is important is their collection into a new “programmatic” statement which Brezhnev describes as the “struggle for peace and international cooperation.” In the past the unveiling of such a program has sometimes masked a turn toward a more aggressive policy (e.g. 1957–58). This time, however, there is some additional evidence that lends substance to Brezhnev’s rhetoric.

For example, Dobrynin told Secretary Rogers last week that the USSR was prepared to resume the dormant discussion with us on the peaceful nuclear explosions; and he took a sounding on an Indian Ocean deal. He has told me of the intense Soviet interest to resume discussions on the Middle East and he has practically invited a Vietnam initiative. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Soviets reversed their long standing opposition to a separate treaty on BW. While this brings them into line with our position, they probably

3 See Document 158.
4 See Document 149.
5 See Document 154.
wanted to make this shift to save the Conference and special U.S.-Soviet Co-Chairman arrangement, particularly as they consider the prospects that China may enter the UN. (By separating BW from CW, the Soviets also strengthen their case for separating ABMs from offensive weapons.)

Brezhnev’s revival of non-use of force agreements—regional or bilateral—is mildly interesting. Just a day ago there was an obviously inspired press story out of Vienna that the Soviets were going to offer the U.S. a non-aggression pact. The idea goes back to the 1955 summit and in January 1956 the Soviets actually sent President Eisenhower the draft of a treaty. This was rejected by us at the time because it would merely duplicate commitments under the UN Charter and would be used to undermine NATO etc. Subsequently, in connection with the test-ban negotiations in 1963 the Soviets pressed for a NATO–Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty, which commanded some sympathy in the Kennedy Administration. (Harriman maintains he made a commitment, under JFK’s instruction, to Khrushchev to pursue the idea.) The Soviets may thus be planning to revive this whole vacuous business if only to stir up some domestic U.S. disputes but perhaps to hold out the possibility of another “easy” agreement in a year when, in their judgment, this might prove appealing to us.

There is an obvious Chinese angle evident in the nuclear disarmament proposals. At the same time, by emphasizing that all the nuclear powers must participate in actual disarmament, as opposed to arms control, the Soviets strengthen their case for initial limited and partial agreements in SALT with us alone.

The question worth considering is why Brezhnev should move to this position as the active proponent of agreements, conferences, disarmaments, etc. Perhaps it is connected with his own statesmanlike “image” in the leadership. It might reflect the concern, evident in Brezhnev’s speech, that the situation in Eastern Europe is unstable. It might be intended to preempt the peace issue within the leadership. Whatever the motive, Brezhnev, much like Khrushchev, has staked out the peace issues for himself and will tend to be committed to showing some tangible results. It could set the stage for a major effort at détente with us.

Relations with the U.S.

Brezhnev does not dwell on relations with the U.S. at any great length. The passages devoted to bilateral relations, however, seem

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designed to protect him from any unexpected turns, while holding out the “possibility” of improved relations. He claims, for example, that “recently the American administration has hardened its position on a number of international issues,” and that the conduct of American affairs was complicated by “zigzags” because of domestic politics.

One prominent theme in discussing relations with the U.S., as well as international events, is that the USSR is sufficiently strong to deal with the capitalist world and the U.S. on a basis of equality. Thus, he says, SALT could be successful and avoid another round in the missile race only if based on “equal security.”

There is, of course, some sharp rhetoric, especially on Vietnam, but in general there does not appear to be a new line of belligerence or aggressiveness. Nor is there any new doctrinal pronouncement (in the summary) concerning the relations with capitalism that would indicate a sharper turn in Soviet policy.

China

The attempt to appear statesmanlike and play down crises is evident in his balance between criticism of China for its ideological position and his simultaneous offer to continue the normalization of relations. Indeed, he claims that “signs of normalization” have appeared, and pledges the USSR to continue to seek not only normal relations but to restore friendship with China.

In an apparent jibe at the Chinese, reflecting the recent dispute over Vietnam, Brezhnev calls for “joint action” of socialist countries, and mentions that the intensification of US “aggressiveness” is due to the failure to take a united stand among the socialist countries.

Eastern Europe

A more ominous tone is reflected in Brezhnev’s discussion of the Warsaw Pact countries and the dangers of “nationalism.” He defends the Czech invasion at some length and repeats in diluted form the justification of the Brezhnev doctrine. He also speaks of “further integration” of the Warsaw Pact economies and alludes to the “regularities” which must be observed in the building of socialism for “all” the socialist countries.

Thus, he seems to be saying that the USSR is not prepared to accept increasing diversity in Eastern Europe, and if need be will invoke the Brezhnev doctrine. While he may be thinking of Poland, there is also an overtone for Romania in his discussion of the anti-Soviet tendencies reflected in nationalism.

Western Europe

As expected Brezhnev defends the German treaties as a major breakthrough, “confirming” the inviolability of borders. He notes the division in Germany over these treaties, but insists that they must come
into force “more rapidly.” He also states that “the problems connected with West Berlin must also be settled” and forecasts that they will be settled if the Four Powers proceed from “respecting Allied agreements, which determined the special status of West Berlin,” as well as respecting the sovereign rights of the GDR and the interests of the West Berlin population.

There could be a nuance here reflecting recent talks in our channel.

If Brezhnev’s proposal for reduction of armed forces in Central Europe is taken at face value, we may soon be confronted with a MBFR proposal.

**The Middle East**

There is nothing here that has not been said before, but the tone seems somewhat more aggressive in discussing the consequences of failure to reach a political settlement. For example, Brezhnev prophesies that the longer a political settlement is postponed the deeper the hatred of the Arab people, and the greater the harm inflicted on Israel by its rulers. Brezhnev does add, however, that the USSR is prepared to take part in “creating international guarantees” for a political settlement, after which “further steps” would be possible to strengthen peace in the Mediterranean. Presumably this does not commit the USSR to participate physically in the guarantees.

**Vietnam**

The treatment is quite short, though Brezhnev returns to Indochina from time to time to document imperialist aggression. One point of interest: in laying out future tasks he mentions both the Middle East and Vietnam in terms of political settlements and states that the “United Nations too must be used in full measure”—thus seeming to allow for the UN to engage the Indochina affair (this is not altogether clear in summary, however).

These are the highlights only. The full text of such a speech often reveals much more than the summaries, which are designed to focus attention on those parts that appeal to foreign consumption. Of course,
the Congress is only beginning and it will be worth watching how other leaders react to the Brezhnev report, which parts are emphasized, etc. The next major address will be Kosygin’s report on the economy.\footnote{In a memorandum to Kissinger on April 6, Sonnenfeldt remarked: “Premier Kosygin’s long report on the five-year economic plan seems to break no new ground. What little interest there is in this rather dry recital of statistics is in his accompanying emphasis and in discussion of consumer goods, defense, and the growth of industry.” (Ibid.)}

Comment: The thrust of this speech is consistent with the plans we have been discussing with Dobrynin. The speech all but commits the Soviet Union to a major effort at détente.

\footnote{For a condensed English text of Gromyko’s speech on April 3, see \textit{Current Digest of the Soviet Press}, Vol. XXIII, No. 17 (May 25, 1971), pp. 33–34. In a memorandum to Kissinger the same day, Sonnenfeldt assessed a “very brief TASS summary” of the speech: “Like Brezhnev, Gromyko’s message to the U.S. is that the Soviets want ‘normalization’ but that the U.S. should come to the USSR with deeds rather than words and stop ‘fencing.’ The message to China is much the same: you make the concessions and then we can do business. In short, apart from general advocacy of good relations—and thus presumably commitment of Brezhnev and Co. to good relations—the Soviets seem to feel no need at Party Congress to signal any give on their own position on matters under negotiation. In practice, of course, they have, in Geneva, and on marginal issues at Vienna signaled willingness to do real business. But this may well be designed to put the heat on us to be more pliant on gut issues.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII)}

\section*{167. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)}\footnote{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initiated the memorandum.}

\textbf{Washington, April 5, 1971.}

\textbf{SUBJECT}

Gromyko’s Party Congress Speech\footnote{See Document 166.}

On the basis of the full Tass summary of Gromyko’s speech, it appears he added some interpretation and amplification of Brezhnev’s report\footnote{For a condensed English text of Gromyko’s speech on April 3, see \textit{Current Digest of the Soviet Press}, Vol. XXIII, No. 17 (May 25, 1971), pp. 33–34. In a memorandum to Kissinger the same day, Sonnenfeldt assessed a “very brief TASS summary” of the speech: “Like Brezhnev, Gromyko’s message to the U.S. is that the Soviets want ‘normalization’ but that the U.S. should come to the USSR with deeds rather than words and stop ‘fencing.’ The message to China is much the same: you make the concessions and then we can do business. In short, apart from general advocacy of good relations—and thus presumably commitment of Brezhnev and Co. to good relations—the Soviets seem to feel no need at Party Congress to signal any give on their own position on matters under negotiation. In practice, of course, they have, in Geneva, and on marginal issues at Vienna signaled willingness to do real business. But this may well be designed to put the heat on us to be more pliant on gut issues.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII)} to sharpen the criticism of the US.
—He cited Vietnam, the Middle East and Berlin as three instances in which the US had either disregarded treaty commitments, or was encouraging aggressive policies.

—On Berlin negotiations he cited this specifically as an example of Brezhnev’s phrase of the “zigzags in US policy.” (Oddly, however, Brezhnev attributed the zigzags to domestic factors.)

—He claimed that ratification of the German treaties, the “settlement” of West Germany’s relations with the socialist states, the con-vocation of a European conference, and the conclusions of talks on West Berlin had to be implemented in “parallel.” (Nevertheless, he did say that the conclusion of the West Berlin talks was an important step that had to be taken, thus supporting Brezhnev’s phrase that the problems of West Berlin must be solved.)

The most interesting aspects of his speech, however, was the curious defensiveness (1) in explaining how carefully the Politburo managed and supervised the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs; and (2) in defending the policy of solving international problems through negotiations.

—He seemed to pass the buck to the Politburo as a whole as the organ responsible for foreign affairs (e.g., “the Politburo always deeply concerns itself with problems of foreign policy, insuring that decisions that are adopted are timely and look far ahead”).

—This kind of talk is unusual; there was nothing of this sort at the last Congress.

—Gromyko referred to the search for agreements with those states carrying out a different policy, and said that the question is raised “How dependable is this (policy)? How realistic is the making of agreements” if those agreements are “not always honored”. 

—This question he said was sometimes posed “provocatively” in a way that suggested “an agreement with the capitalist states” is almost a “plot”.

—He mentioned the plot thesis twice and went to some length to defend the search for agreements.

The question is why should Gromyko be on the defensive. (Five years ago, at the 23rd Congress, he made a vague reference to people who wanted to “slam the door” on agreements, suggesting that at that time, too, there was Soviet ambivalence about dealings with the West. But this year’s tone is a good deal more polemical and immediate.)

—It could be related to his personal position. If, in fact, he had been considered for promotion to the Politburo, he may have run into criticism, and feels the need to pass the responsibility back to the whole Politburo. This would suggest, however, high level resistance to Gromyko.
—It could mean that Brezhnev’s record (and by implication Gromyko’s) has come under attack for something that has already occurred; the German treaties would be the most likely candidate as an agreement not “honored.”

—Or it could mean that some current issues involving an agreement with the US (probably SALT, but possibly the Middle East) was under debate, and Gromyko was either defending a position, or perhaps trying to prevent the opposition’s case.

Whatever the reason, this strange speech, taken together with the rather cool treatment of Brezhnev’s foreign policy “program”, suggests that there is some internal problem over foreign policy. The remainder of the speech does not add much substance. There is, however, one significant advance over the last Congress, at least rhetorically. Five years ago Gromyko said there was no international problem that was not “of interest” to the USSR. This time he made a much more expansive claim:

There is not a single question of any importance which would at present be solved without the Soviet Union or against its will.

This is in keeping with the more confident tone that Brezhnev sought to convey. But the other parts of Gromyko’s speech suggest the very conditions that give rise to this confidence may also have produced new difficulties in the formulation of foreign policy.

168. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Efforts to Prevent Anti-Soviet Incidents by the JDL

Incidents have continued to occur, though of a markedly less violent character, with respect to Soviet personnel and establishments in the Washington area, and the Soviets have continued to register

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe; USSR, Vol. XIII. Confidential. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of the memorandum, based in part on an attached March 19 status report from Eliot, to Kissinger on April 2. (Ibid.) According to notes and an attached correspondence profile, the President saw the memoranda from Kissinger and Rogers (Tab A) on April 13.
protests. Interestingly, during a recent meeting in Geneva at the Law of the Sea conference, the Legal Adviser of the Soviet Foreign Office, Khlestov, raised this subject with State’s Legal Adviser, John Stevenson. Khlestov took pains to stress the personal concern of the highest Soviet leadership (he implied Brezhnev and Kosygin) with the inability of the US to take effective action to protect Soviet diplomats from Jewish Defense League activities. Khlestov, whom Stevenson believes has a sound understanding of the US legal system, claimed that he spent several hours with the Soviet leadership trying to explain the problems we have, by virtue of the Federal system, in obtaining effective action from local officials. Despite his efforts, Khlestov said he was unsuccessful, and that the Soviet leaders believe that the US could deal with this problem if it had the will to do so.

For our part, there has been a substantial increase in federal investigative efforts which has led recently to several federal indictments of JDL members. State has been working in cooperation with New York authorities to speed up prosecutions, and a State lawyer will be assigned to New York to further improve this cooperation.

As a longer term effort, State has prepared and sent to Justice a proposed legislative package designed to improve federal law enforcement efforts to deter violence against Soviet and other foreign officials.

In the area of public affairs, State increased its public information efforts, particularly within the Jewish community. State officials are engaged in an expanded series of public speaking engagements with Jewish groups. In addition, the Israeli Embassy has been made aware of our desire for official Israeli statements condemning JDL violence and for a sustained private campaign with local leadership of Jewish groups throughout the US.

There is at Tab A\(^2\) a memorandum from Secretary Rogers enclosing a paper providing a comprehensive view of the measures State is taking, in cooperation with Justice and local authorities, to respond to the problems of Soviet Jewry and the anti-Soviet violence it has engendered here.

\(^2\) Dated January 29; attached but not printed.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s upcoming speech on Vietnam.]

Kissinger: One interesting thing happened this morning. That vulture McGeorge Bundy called up.²

Nixon: Yes?

Kissinger: And he’s a great weathervane for them.

Nixon: Is he?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: They were giving money to Muskie all the time, you know. Did you know the Ford Foundation has financed all of Muskie’s trips to Africa? Now that’s a foundation for you. Now, Muskie is a Presidential candidate. I traveled for eight years by myself. I paid it all out of my own pocket. I earned the money by writing for the Reader’s Digest, Henry. And with a $250,000 law firm practice, and I made $250,000 on my book, I financed the whole goddamn thing. Did I ever hear a word from the Ford Foundation? How many foundations suggested, “Look, Nixon, the former Vice President, is going to make this trip abroad. You’re going on a non-partisan basis. We’d like to help”? No. They finance this son-of-a-bitch Muskie. Boy, and he’s had his [unclear].

Kissinger: Well, he [Bundy] was very cagey again. And—

Nixon: What’s he cagey about?

Kissinger: Well, he said, “Well, it’s a tough one.” And—

Nixon: Yes, yes.

Kissinger: —there’s more support than you think. Well, he will never say so. But what—but he did say that when he returns—

Nixon: More support than you think. I think there is more than we think. I don’t—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 245–18. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The conversation began at 1 p.m.

² Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation, called Kissinger at 11:59 a.m. on April 6 to report that in a meeting with Louis Harris, the American pollster, Mikhail Kocharyan, a Soviet official at the United Nations, was “very emphatic on the warm side of the Brezhnev speech.” Kissinger stated that he had received similar expressions from Dobrynin (who was in Moscow at the time) and asked to see Bundy’s record of the meeting. Bundy agreed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File) See also Document 172.
Kissinger: Well, one thing he said was: there’s a fellow at the U.N., with whom he—the Soviet Mission to the U.N.—with whom he was working when he was Assistant to the President. And he said he called him yesterday, or over the weekend, and he said, “We want you to know that Brezhnev is deadly serious about wanting to improve relations with the United States.” He wanted to know if we had an answer to give to this fellow. Well, I—

Nixon: [laughs]

Kissinger: I didn’t give him an answer because—

Nixon: What?

Kissinger: I made the statement, we’re deadly serious too. And—

Nixon: Well, Brezhnev is going every which way. And he probably doesn’t trust Dobrynin’s word and so forth.

Kissinger: It’s very interesting. It’s typically Russian to try to handle it through another channel too.


Kissinger: But I don’t think—my instinct is that the reason they were holding out until spring is what this [Party] Congress is doing in terms of Brezhnev’s preeminence. And I—

Nixon: Well, when will they know? When will they know? The end of the week?

Kissinger: About what happened?

Nixon: The Congress. When will that be over?

Kissinger: Well, it probably will be over—

Nixon: Or is it over?

Kissinger: No, no. It will be over no later than a week from today.

Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: And then he’ll [Dobrynin] be back within a week after some time.

3 On April 6, Reuters filed the following report: “White House officials last night described the speeches at the 24th Communist Party Congress in Moscow as more conciliatory than they had expected. The officials said they had believed the statements by party leader Leonid Brezhnev would take a hard line aimed at whipping up Soviet domestic opinion against the West. The fact that the speeches took a more conciliatory line indicated to the White House that the Russian leaders were anxious for a period of reduced tensions, the officials said. They were speaking on a background basis after returning with President Nixon last night from the Western White House in San Clemente, Calif.” (“U.S. Officials Say Kremlin Conciliatory,” Washington Post, April 6, 1971, p. 13) According to the President’s Daily Diary, several reporters—including representatives of the Associated Press and United Press International—were on board Air Force One on April 5; Kissinger, Haldeman, and several other White House officials, also accompanied Nixon on the return flight to Washington. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) See also Documents 210 and 218.
Nixon: Well, things better start to happen or—you know, I’m—you probably don’t believe me, but I can perfectly turn, I’m capable, that is—even my own, even Haldeman wouldn’t know—I’m perfectly capable of turning right awful hard. I never have in my life. But if I found that there’s no other way—in other words, hell, if you think Cambodia had flower children fighting, we’ll bomb the goddamn North like it’s never been bombed. That’s why we’ve had these planes gotten ready, Henry. They’re not getting ready just to get these people over there.

Kissinger: Well, I will—

Nixon: We’ll start doing it, and we’ll bomb those bastards, and then let the American people—let this country go up in flames.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the President’s upcoming speech on Vietnam.]

170. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

The New Soviet Leadership—Brezhnev Up

The Soviet leaders choose to maintain the appearance of stability and continuity, rather than deal directly with the problem of removing or retiring the older members. The old Politburo of 11 members thus was re-elected, and four new members were added (three former candidate members and one—Kulakov—promoted directly from the Secretariat).
Overall, however, the trend toward a strengthening of Brezhnev’s position continues.

—Kosygin suffered a mild demotion by being ranked third rather than second.

—Brezhnev’s protégés or those thought to be close to him have improved their positions, while those believed to be his opponents have suffered, at least in prestige.

—The fifth position in the Politburo behind Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, and Suslov is occupied by Andrei Kirilenko. For practical purposes he will be Brezhnev’s man in charge of the Secretariat, and Suslov’s probable replacement—a confirmation of what most observers have believed to be the actual fact for the last year or so.

—The promotion to the Politburo of Kunayev and Scherbitsky is a clear gain for Brezhnev, since both are clearly linked to his career.

—The importance of these promotions is reinforced by the downgrading of Shelepin and Voronov in the rankings, suggesting that they are increasingly out of favor. The failure to remove them, however, testifies to the inability of Brezhnev to purge his opponents, at least for now.

The most interesting change was the direct promotion of Kulakov from a position on the Secretariat to the full Politburo, without an intervening tour as a candidate. Given his long experience in agriculture and in the bureaucracy of the Russian Republic, it would appear that he could be an eventual replacement for Voronov as premier of the Russian Republic.

In effect what has happened is that a shadow top Politburo group is shaping up, with certain people, mostly Brezhnevites, standing right behind the older or less influential members as their probable replacements. Since the next Congress is now five years away, the present expanded fifteen-man Politburo cannot possibly survive as a political unit.

Thus what Brezhnev has done is to ensure a majority in the Politburo which will grow to a clear predominance as the older members fall by the wayside. In the next two or three years Podgorny, Kosygin, Suslov and Pelshe can be expected to depart from active politics, thus leaving the Politburo a creature of Brezhnev’s. Ironically, of course,

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3 Andrey P. Kirilenko, Secretary, CPSU Central Committee.
4 Aleksandr N. Shelepin, Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; and Genadiy I. Voronov, Premier of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.
5 Arvid Y. Pelshe, Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee.
Brezhnev himself may not make it to the next Party Congress five years hence, since he is now 64.

Brezhnev's predominance and growing strength does not immediately translate into policy terms. At the Congress he identified himself with the consumer, at the expense of heavy and defense industry, and with his "peace program." He reiterated both themes in his closing speech. More important may be that he is gaining more power and therefore probably some more freedom of action. He may thus be inclined to move on some of the international issues that we are engaged in—SALT, Berlin, etc.

But—and this is an important qualification—it is worth recalling that past patterns of Soviet politics suggest that as collectivity declines and one man emerges, he also becomes more vulnerable, and must maneuver more carefully with the major interest groups. Khrushchev greatly strengthened his power position after 1957–58 but was frustrated in implementing major changes in domestic, including military policy. Again, he seemed to get a second wind in late 1962 and early 1963, which enabled him to sign the test ban treaty, but within a little more than a year afterward he was put out by the very men who we all believed to be his protégés and minions.

Moreover, in the major substantive issues between us, Brezhnev almost certainly sees himself as operating from considerable strength. His propensity for concessions is likely to be limited accordingly since he will expect to be able to wait us out and to let the "peace issue" do its work here as the election approaches.

Nevertheless, a reasonable net judgment would be (a) that Brezhnev has some room for genuine negotiation, and (b) has an incentive for some stabilization with us to help him accomplish his domestic goals and control divisive tendencies in his empire.6

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6 According to Kissinger, Nixon wrote in the margin of the original memorandum: "We will have the answer in thirty days." (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 833–834)

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171. Editorial Note

On April 12, 1971, President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, met at 6:37 p.m. in the Oval Office to discuss various issues, including the impact of ping-pong diplomacy on Soviet-American relations. (National Archives, Nixon
Six days earlier, while competing in the World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan, the American table tennis team had unexpectedly received an invitation to visit China.

The invitation increased speculation of a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing. There was, however, a complication for Kissinger’s triangular calculations. “What made the situation more intriguing,” he later recalled, “was that we were expecting Dobrynin back from the Soviet Union any day with an invitation to a summit. An announcement of a Moscow summit might abort the Chinese overture and too active a Chinese diplomacy might frustrate our Soviet policy.” (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pages 710–711) Although no other record of the conversation has been found, White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman reported in his diary entry for April 12 that Nixon and Kissinger were both “very pleased” with the news from China, especially since the White House was planning to announce in two days the termination of trade restrictions:

“Henry feels that our whole policy and the current moves on China will help to shake the Soviets up, as will Brezhnev’s need to make a big peace move of some kind, which should play in our favor for a SALT agreement and a Summit conference. The P got to talking about timing on these. Rogers [had] made the point to him that he felt we were at the bottom of our cycle now; we have all the worst behind us and can start moving our way upward, which is basically what the P and Henry also feel. He talked about his trip to meet with Thieu, which he’ll be taking in June, and the hope that right after the demonstrations in the early part of May, we can announce the SALT Agreement and a little later announce the Summit meeting. Then make the Thieu trip in early June, get back and get to work on Summit planning, announce the ‘No more draftees in Vietnam’ idea in mid-summer, have the Summit meeting right after Labor Day, and then a new troop announcement in December. All of which should carry us pretty far up the ladder. Henry’s basically very optimistic on this. The big thing now is to make sure we get credit for all the shifts in China policy, rather than letting them go to the State Department, who of course, had nothing to do with it—in fact, opposed every step the P took because they were afraid any moves toward China would offend Russia.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)
172. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Comments on Soviet Conversations with Lou Harris²

A Soviet UN official, Dr. Kocharyan, has had two conversations with Lou Harris concerning the meaning of the Brezhnev Party Congress speech.

—Kocharyan’s interpretation is that the speech represents an important signal of the Soviet leadership’s interest in improving relations with the US.

—Accordingly, in the second conversation the Soviet official stressed the need to establish channels of communication direct to the top Soviet leadership.

—US business leaders were supposed to involve themselves in this channel and travel to the USSR for private meetings with Brezhnev.

—The new channels will make it possible to interpret policy and distinguish serious statements from propaganda.

Mac Bundy asks for some guidance in his covering letter (Tab A).³

Frankly I am skeptical that anything of serious interest is involved. Various Soviet officials in Geneva and New York are interpreting the Brezhnev speech in light of their particular interest. Thus, the Soviet arms controllers are stressing what a major opportunity there now is for a test ban, for BW, etc.

As you know from our memoranda, there is some change of tone in the Brezhnev speech, but certainly not to the point that we could interpret it as a major signal by itself.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Harris, Lou (Soviet Conversations). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Sonnenfeldt and Hyland. (Ibid., Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XV)

² See also Document 169 and footnote 2 thereto.

³ In the attached letter, April 6, Bundy explained: “I usually have no hesitation in commenting informally to Soviet officials on matters like the Brezhnev speech but there is a flavor to this conversation and to Kocharyan’s request for the views of people like myself which makes me think that it may be important to give unusual care to the answer, if indeed I respond at all. Any advice you can give will be a real help to me, and I will of course pass on to Harris anything you may have to tell him.”
It is possible that this extracurricular channel through Lou Harris is meant to develop into something more important. There is a mention of Glassboro, which might be intended as a new interest in a summit. At the same time, it is also possible that the Soviets are interested in developing some new contacts with businessmen for commercial purposes to increase pressures for a relaxation of trade restrictions, etc. They also know the susceptibility of businessmen to bear-hugs.

In your talk with Bundy, I suggest that:

4 —You tell him that you see no harm in developing this channel in a low key and without any sense of urgency.
—You are not all that impressed with the substance of Brezhnev’s speech, or convinced that it is a major signal.
—The proof of Soviet interest should come in concrete issues—Berlin and SALT.

I suspect this is not the last we will hear from various channels of the Soviet interest in improving relations with the US. All Soviet officials will be assigned the task of propagandizing and publicizing their leaders’ remarks. For us, however, the key will be the reactions of accredited Soviet negotiators.

Note: Depending on how candid you want to be, I think you could tell Mac that we do not lack channels with the Soviets. As he himself knows, a proliferation of channels can easily lead to misunderstandings and actually hamper progress in negotiations. For some time, the Soviets have been using businessmen, academics and legislators to generate pressures on us. But the issue is not how to improve atmospherics; it is how to make progress on deadlocked issues. While we are of course receptive to any ideas or to impressions that US visitors may gather in Moscow (discounted for Soviet massaging), ultimately the issues have to be talked out through official channels.

Finally, I think you should tell Mac frankly that some of the reported remarks sound like interest in summitry. On this, as Mac knows better than anyone else, the President will have to make his own decision and it will not help him, or the country, to have him maneuvered into it through any groundswell created by Soviet siren songs to US business leaders, no matter how “great.” (Brezhnev may well want to have a summit as one more jewel in his crown; but it is hard to see how businessmen’s talks with Brezhnev can prepare this for the President in a way that does the President any good.)

4 See Document 173.
April 12, 1971, 9:15 p.m.

K: Mac, I wanted to talk to you for a minute about communication from Harris, which I read with intense interest. Let me tell you what the situation is—this is not inconsistent with what we have been picking up through regular channels but very private channels and we are most anxious for them to stay in these channels. We don’t think that business leaders going around making similar noises are going to help this matter—we want them to stay serious. Any signal that they can get that we are serious that this is the time for major movement would be extremely helpful. Now, how can we get that done? Can you talk to that fellow?

B: Yes, I can.

K: You can do it with more expertise.

B: I can say to Harris on the whole I am interested in what he says and would like to talk to him. Then you might tell me what in particular I can say—what my feel of what my friends in Washington now think.

K: You can tell him for example that the Brezhnev speech was read with extreme seriousness in Washington—made a genuinely positive impression.

B: Can I tell them amendments were noticed?

K: Yes, and at very high levels and that we are interested in a fundamental improvement of relations. That we think SALT is a particularly useful subject on which to make progress but that we are open in other areas as well and that you know from personal conversations with me that this is an unusual opportunity.

B: And whether there is some specific area where they think progress is possible. Put the question back to him but with friendly noises.

K: Correct! I think that would be helpful. If the President thought the Soviets were trying to bring pressure on him, he might tend to pull back.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Bundy was in New York.
2 See Document 172.
3 Kocharyan.
B: That’s true of most Presidents. I will play it that way and let you know what happens. I can send this back second-hand, but you want me to show enough interest in talking to this guy. I probably will see him with Harris in order not to break the channel. No problem.

K: I would appreciate it very much.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

B: Send me what you have in the public domain and I will appreciate it. If I have a brainstorm on how non-government can help, I will let you know. I will talk to that old bird. I don’t know if the Harris papers you have mentioned distinct upgrading of Brezhnev.

K: It sounds authentic. Let me know when you come to Washington. I would like to have lunch or dinner with you.

B: Okay, Henry.

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174. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman), and the President’s Special Consultant (Scali)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of Scali’s new responsibilities as the President’s Special Consultant.]

Nixon: Now, one area that is particularly—it will be particularly important too. And I noticed that, I mean, I was eager to hear your comment on the China thing. And, I think, Henry, that it’s important that you have a talk with John about how all this began—

Kissinger: We’re going to get together. We’re going to get together this afternoon—\(^2\)

Nixon: —how all this began. There’s much more than meets the eye here. For example, you probably were under the impression, and much of the press corps is, that the China initiative came from State.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 478-7. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting began at 11:19 a.m.; Scali and Haldeman left at 11:46 and Kissinger remained until 12:16 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Scali on April 13 from 6 to 6:48 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
Scali: Right.

Nixon: It may surprise you to know that the China initiative I undertook started 20 months ago. The first announcement made 13 months ago was utterly opposed by the Foreign Service. You know why? Well, they’re not—they’re for it now. You know why? The Krem-linologists. Chip Bohlen\(^3\) wrote in a memo.

Haldeman: Llewellyn Thompson.

Kissinger: Tommy Thompson.\(^4\)

Nixon: Tommy Thompson did. The State Department Foreign Service people—not Bill. I’m not referring to Bill.

Scali: Bill Rogers?

Nixon: Bill Rogers plays the game the way that he’s supposed to. In other words, by [unclear]. They opposed it because they said it’s going to make the Russians mad. Sure, it made the Russians mad. We didn’t do it for that purpose, although it may be a dividend. Who knows? It depends. If it makes them mad, it helps us. But the point is, State, from the beginning, opposed it. They only came around on it in the past, perhaps, two or three months. Now, the reason being, that is, that they have the idea that we need a détente with the Russians; we must do nothing that irritates the Russians. Every time Kosygin came to see anybody at State, or anybody in the White House, he raised holy hell about what we were doing with China. And he scared them off—but not me. I deal with the China things for long-range reasons—very, very important reasons. Now, that brings us to the present thing: ping-pong. It’s very important now—we’re going to have another announcement tomorrow, which you should fill John in on—it’s very important now that we, while we want to get every dividend we can on this, that we not appear to exploit it. Now, the reasoning is that, much as we want the publicity, we’re playing for much higher stakes. We’re playing for much higher stakes with the Russians—and this thing is sending them right up the wall, the ping-pong team. And we also are

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\(^3\) Charles E. “Chip” Bohlen, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

\(^4\) Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union. During a meeting with Nixon and Kissinger on February 7, 1969, Thompson warned that the United States “should be careful not to feed Soviet suspicions about the possibility of our ganging up with Communist China against them.” (National Archives, RG 59, Rogers’ Office Files: Lot 73 D 443, Box 4, White House Correspondence, 1969) According to Kissinger, Thompson and Bohlen “courageously” expressed similar concerns to the President in early June 1969. (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 189–190) No record of the conversation has been found. Six months later, Thompson and Gerard Smith proposed that Dobrynin be informed before public announcement of the resumption of Sino-American talks in Warsaw. After consulting Nixon and Rogers, Kissinger formally rejected the proposal on December 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 11 and 105.
playing for high stakes with the Chinese. It makes good—it’s very good copy here for us to appear to be the people that are, have opened up the Chinese thing, and so forth and so on. But our major goal is to open it up. And whenever a propaganda initiative will have the effect of hurting that goal, we can’t do it.

Scali: Sure.

Nixon: Now, the reasons why, at this point, what I think we can get when we—and this is where subtlety is involved—where we can get maximum benefit here. When this announcement is made tomorrow, everybody’s going to read into it a hell of a lot more. Incidentally, this announcement that’s going to be made tomorrow, we’ve been planning for months. It just happens to fall right after the ping-pong team. See, we didn’t know the ping-pong team was going to happen like that.

Kissinger: We had some feeling that something was going to happen. They—

Nixon: Oh, yeah. Because they have been dropping little hints around the world at the various Embassies, and for months we’ve been expecting some thaw. We didn’t expect—but I suppose we were looking more to the fact that the thaw might come in Warsaw. But the Chinese, with their usual subtlety, had the thaw—we’ll call it a “thaw” for lack of something else; the press will all write it that way anyway—it comes in another area. Right?

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: You never can predict how the Chinese are. They’re much less predictable than the Russians. The Russians are predictable. The Chinese are not predictable.

Kissinger: But they’re subtler.

Nixon: Because they are Chinese, not because they’re Communists. The Russians are more predictable because they’re doctrinaire, but you can goddamn near tell how the Russians will react to the Chinese ping-pong thing. I can almost tell you what Dobrynin will say when he comes back—and particularly on this announcement.

Kissinger: Well, if Dobrynin were here, he’d be over here already.

Nixon: So—but my point is, and this is the thing where John can probably get the word out, we—now, let me say: we don’t want to start a fight with State about this—actually, with the career guys. We’re not trying to, even though they constantly may try to cut us out, but—at the White House. And we don’t want to embarrass—we don’t want to, particularly, have anything with regard to the—with regard to Rogers, you see, because that’s very important to maintain that.

Scali: That’s right.

Nixon: But on the other hand, we cannot allow the myth to exist, to get [unclear], that this whole thing, which was mine alone—
Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Henry, you recall I put it out. It didn’t come from the NSC staff either. I put the whole damn thing out 20 months ago, starting that trip around the world.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: He’ll give you the chapter and verse. It’s a fascinating story, and some day it’s going to be written. But anyway—and maybe now, maybe a little bit of it now. A little bit of it now, before it’s announced, just to see if we can’t—

Kissinger: I think we should get a little further. It’s—the danger is that this whole operation will stop again. And we’ve had it started once and it stopped.

Nixon: And it stopped. That’s right.

Kissinger: We shouldn’t crow too early.

Nixon: We don’t want to crow. We don’t want to crow. We simply want to say we’re watching with interest and all that sort of thing. The point is that I think that it’s important, Henry, for John to know what the game is.

Kissinger: I’ll give him the picture this afternoon—

Nixon: Now, John, the main thing that you have to know is that first, everybody around here, and everybody in the government, in the NSC, is not told everything. They are not. But I told Henry that I want you to know anything that—in these critical areas. But you must remember that when we are telling you these things, as I’m sure you know, that, usually, there’s an awful good reason not to tell others.

Scali: I understand.

Nixon: And so, you know what I mean. And that’s the reason on the—I use the China thing as an example; I don’t know of a better one. It’s a very delicate situation. Maybe in three weeks we’ll want to tell a little more of the story. Maybe not this week. Maybe a little of it comes out this week. As I suggested to you this morning, I may have to remind you—

Kissinger: We can get a little out. Well—

Scali: I want to be in the position of knowing so that I can recommend to you, perhaps, when.

Nixon: That’s right.

Haldeman: That’s—

Nixon: Sure.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Scali’s responsibilities; Scali and Haldeman left at 11:46 a.m.]

Nixon: I don’t think you’ll have any—I know you’ll have no problem with leaks from him [Scali]. None.
Kissinger: I won’t tell him, though, about the summit game yet. Nixon: Oh, God no. I don’t want anybody to know about the summit game—
   Kissinger: Right.
   Nixon: —that hasn’t been told. The only one that knows is Haldeman.
   Kissinger: Yeah.
   Nixon: Shultz doesn’t know.
   Kissinger: No.
   Nixon: Ehrlichman doesn’t know.
   Kissinger: No.
   Nixon: Jesus Christ! If that ever gets out, it’s down the drain.
   Kissinger: Right.
   Nixon: The summit game should be absolutely between us.
   Kissinger: That’s right.
   Nixon: Until Dobrynin gets back. And also the SALT game.
   Kissinger: That’s right.
   Nixon: Don’t tell him about the SALT game—the SALT game, the summit game. But the China game is something else again. He should know that background. Tell him why we don’t want a broker.
   Kissinger: Incidentally, I thought I’d have Dobrynin’s replacement in for five minutes this afternoon, because there’s a meeting—it’s just a technical thing—between Rush and Abrasimov that I’ve set up for Berlin for Friday.5 And I’ll just review the arrangements with him. It will take five minutes, but it’s—it shows them that this channel has some uses for them. I won’t say anything else except the technical arrangements of that meeting.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and China, including U.S. diplomatic representation in those countries, as well as other matters unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Kissinger: But now, if a few good things happen, people will say, “He [Nixon] knew all along what he was doing.”
   Nixon: Yes—
   Kissinger: And, of course, if we pulled off a spectacular and—
   Nixon: I know.
   Kissinger: —settled it this year—

5 April 16. See Document 175.
Nixon: Well, let’s not even think about that.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: The only good thing that I would like to see—
Kissinger: It could happen, Mr. President.
Nixon: Well, it could.
Kissinger: I really think it could—
Nixon: It could. But the good thing that I would like to see—I mean, I’m shooting low. At the lowest, I want the summit.
Kissinger: Yeah. I think that will—
Nixon: Even without SALT. Just the summit.
Kissinger: I just don’t see how they cannot have a summit.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I mean—
Nixon: If we have the summit—
Kissinger: —looked at from their cold-blooded point of view, they may—after all, you don’t like Brezhnev and you would just as soon screw Brezhnev. But why would you expend your capital on somebody who is irrelevant to you? They may not like you. If this were ’72, they probably would hang on. But the fact that Brezhnev has just been elevated to the top spot, and you would be the first President to come to Moscow—the Russian people are pro-American. It would mean one hell of a lot of symbolism to them if they can get a SALT agreement signed in Moscow, so that the—
Nixon: The Russian people are pro-American.
Kissinger: Yeah. It’s a Moscow treaty. He can claim credit for it all over the Communist world.
Nixon: Incidentally, could I—could you make a note, and I know that it’s a silly thing to even think about, but why not—why don’t we consider the possibility of a, which you raised with Dobrynin, of a non-aggression pact? Why not?
Kissinger: No. That’s dangerous because that would be the end of NATO.
Nixon: No, I mean with NATO.
Kissinger: Well, that’s what they’ve always offered.
Nixon: No, no no, no. What I meant is the whole wax—the whole ball of wax.
Kissinger: Yeah, but the danger—
Nixon: Not with America in, not the Soviet Union and the United States in—
Kissinger: No, but the danger—
Nixon: Now, look, I know that—
Kissinger: The danger is that then they’ll say you don’t need a NATO. But what we can do is have a European security conference next year.

Nixon: Well, we agree to that next year.

Kissinger: No, we agree to it at the summit for next year, so you have had—

Nixon: And that’s got to come for a reason.

Kissinger: —a big conference next year.

Nixon: Have that next year, but what the hell comes out of that? Hope?

Kissinger: Nothing but a conference.

Nixon: Well, we can have a lot of nice little truisms about travel.

Kissinger: Well, it just keeps things moving. I mean, at this stage of the game, if we can play a cold-blooded game, in which we don’t give anything away, we can make them work for it, because I really think your re-election is essential for the country. There just isn’t anybody else.

Nixon: Except Connally.

[Omitted here is discussion of Connally’s qualifications and of the President’s schedule.]

175. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 13, 1971, 5 p.m.

Conversation with Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov, April 13, 1971, 5:00 p.m., in the Map Room of the White House

I saw Vorontsov at my request in order to have a pretext to put something into the Soviet system and to find out when Dobrynin might be coming back. I told Vorontsov about the technical arrangements for the meetings between Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, Abrasimov, and Ambassador Rush. The procedures are as follows: at

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 5 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation and an undated memorandum summarizing its contents to the President. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 5:30 until 5:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
the next meeting of the four Ambassadors slated for April 16th, Abrasimov is to ask Rush for a private meeting; the subject of that meeting is to be the Soviet draft proposal of March 26th, and Rush will raise the issues contained in the oral note already given to Dobrynin (copy of note attached at Tab A).\(^2\) I also suggested the possibility that Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Falin might talk to Rush along the lines of the backchannels between Rush and myself (copies attached at Tab (a)).\(^3\) Vorontsov said that it sounded to him like a good idea and he would report it to Moscow.

Vorontsov then said that he had noticed with interest that a high Administration source on Air Force One had interpreted Brezhnev’s speech to the Party Congress in a very positive way.\(^4\) It had been the Soviet hope that this would be done and they were gratified by our response. I said that the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union remained a high priority of this Administration but that it was time to make some concrete progress.

Vorontsov said he was certain that the Ambassador would have new instructions when he returned which he thought would be early the following week, i.e., the 20th. And he was certain that the Ambassador would call me soon after his return.

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\(^2\) See Document 154.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed at Tab (a) are copies of the following messages: Kissinger to Rush, March 29; Rush to Kissinger, April 1; and Kissinger to Rush, April 12. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, Documents 211, 214, and 217.

\(^4\) See footnote 3, Document 169.
176. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


Kissinger: Mr. President?
Nixon: Yeah, Henry.
Kissinger: I just wanted to mention a number of relatively minor things to you.
Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion of a South Vietnamese “raid-type” military operation.]

Kissinger: Secondly, I talked today to this fellow, Vorontsov, from the Soviet Embassy.\(^2\)
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: The reason was that there’s a meeting between Rush and Abrasimov—
Nixon: Yes.
Kissinger: —on Berlin. And I just wanted to make sure that they didn’t blow—that they understood which way the channels were going.
Nixon: Yes.
Kissinger: And—
Nixon: He understood that?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah. He understood it and he said that Dobrynin was coming back Sunday\(^3\) with new instructions, and that we should take the Brezhnev speech\(^4\) very seriously, and he was slobbering all over me.
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: And—
Nixon: Well, we’ll see Sunday what he saw—tells you.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 1–79. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 7:46 to 7:52 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) An informal transcript of the conversation is ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File.

\(^2\) See Document 175.

\(^3\) April 18.

\(^4\) See Document 166.
Kissinger: And then I did something, which was a little unorthodox. I told him that Dobrynin had given me his phone number in Moscow.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: So he called me up an hour—and I’d lost it—so he called me an hour later and said it might be a nice thing if I called Dobrynin and congratulated him on his Central Committee membership.

Nixon: Good. Good.

Kissinger: So I—in fact, I did it.5 And Dobrynin said, “We’ll have something on that exchange of letters when I get back.”

Nixon: He said that?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: But he didn’t say what it was.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And he also said he was coming with new instructions.

Nixon: But not indicating anything on the summit thing?

Kissinger: Well, he couldn’t, Mr. President, on an open telephone.

Nixon: Oh, it was open telephone. Okay.

Kissinger: Yeah, we don’t have a secure line.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: We have the hotline, but I didn’t want to use that.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: This was a commercial phone.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: But he probably—how’d he sound?

Kissinger: Oh, he sounded—they’re doing, they’re going to do something, Mr. President.

[Omitted here is discussion of Congressional relations and China.]

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5 A transcript of the telephone conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Dobrynin File.
177. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of several issues, including Kissinger’s schedule, Vietnam, and the Middle East.]

Kissinger: Chou En-lai gave an interview to that ping-pong team\(^2\)—he’s such a subtle guy—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —in which he said that this begins a new era of Chinese-American relations.

Nixon: Really?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: [laughs] To a ping-pong team?

Kissinger: [laughs]

Nixon: You know, what they’re really—

Kissinger: Right—

Nixon: —they’re really trying to drive at: irritating the Russians.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Two questions: I don’t know, but are we unnecessarily irritating the Russians about this right now?

Kissinger: Well, I am slightly—I’m thinking this, Mr. President. Well, first of all, my call to Dobrynin was a good move.\(^3\)

Nixon: Well, you think that may have been too eager?

Kissinger: Oh, no.

Nixon: No, I wondered, in light of this, that whether or not you—

Kissinger: No, I just called him to congratulate him on the Central Committee election and—

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 479–1. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office on April 14 from 9:10 to 9:45 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) During a reception in Beijing on April 14, Zhou told members of the American table tennis team that their visit to China had “opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American people.” (John Roderick, “Premier Tells U.S. Team ‘Friendship’ Begins Anew,” *New York Times*, April 15, 1971, p. 1)

\(^3\) See footnote 5, Document 176.
Nixon: Yeah, but I mean, you call him and then today we—wham.4
Kissinger: Well, I think what I might do is to get this fellow Vorontsov over here again and say, “Now, look, our top priority is the relation with you.”
Nixon: That’s right. And that this is something that’s been in the works for six months.
Kissinger: And now let’s not miss the opportunity.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I might do that because Dobrynin is coming back. But he’s coming back with some instructions, because—first, Vorontsov. The way this call came to pass was this: I told Vorontsov—it’s too boring, the technical details—how Rush was going to talk to Abrasimov, because we have to be able to get rid of interpreters for that. And I just want to make sure that they didn’t screw it up.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: Then he said that he had noticed I had said some friendly things about the Brezhnev speech and that pleased him very much.5 And he slobbered all over me. And he said the Ambassador would come back with new instructions on Sunday.6 And they hope—
Nixon: He said we should pay attention to Brezhnev’s speech?
Kissinger: Yes. And he said, “Now, you noticed that we were paying constructive attention.” Because I had said on Air Force One—
Nixon: Oh, yeah.
Kissinger: —that it was a conciliatory speech, coming, when I was coming back from California.
Nixon: And he said we should know?
Kissinger: Right. Then I said as a joke, I said, “You know, your Ambassador gave me his phone number in Moscow, and I lost it, and it’s too late in the day now anyway to call him”—there’s an eight-hour difference—“otherwise, I’d congratulate him for his, on his election to the Central Committee. Why don’t you do it for me?”
Nixon: That’s fine.
Kissinger: A half-hour later, they called over and they said, “The time difference doesn’t, is of no account. Why don’t you call him? It would please him very much,” and gave me the Moscow phone number—

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4 On April 14, the White House announced a series of measures designed to “create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and American peoples,” including the lifting of several trade and travel restrictions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)
6 April 18.
Nixon: Oh, the phone number. Good.

Kissinger: —which, as you know, they don’t give out Moscow phone numbers.

Nixon: No, no.

Kissinger: Well, I called him in Moscow. I said, “I just want to con-
gratulate you.” And I said, “I just want to tell you I discussed some
procedural things with your man here.” And he said, “Was it about the
exchange of letters, because I’ll have something to say about that?” I
said, “Oh, no. They’re just purely technical things.” And he said, “Well,
I’m coming back with new instructions on Sunday.” He was very—
Haig listened into it, on it. And he said it was—

Nixon: Of course, the instructions—well, we’ve been through this
before Henry.

Kissinger: Well, it looks—

Nixon: The instructions could turn the other way too.

Kissinger: I doubt it. They could but I doubt it. I’m looking at it
from Brezhnev’s point of view. Now, Brezhnev has two choices. He
can’t continue the way he’s going. He’s got to break out, one way or
the other, just as we do.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: So he’s going to go either very tough, which I think is
premature for him, or he’s going to go the way we want him to go.
Not to help—certainly not to help us out. You see, I’m beginning to
think we can get that Ambassador into Peking before the year, before
another calendar year has passed.

[Omitted here is further discussion of China, including support
from Mansfield and opposition from the Department of State.]

Nixon: Be sure that this one—they [Department of State] have been
screwing us so much on leaks. Now, we’re about to screw them on this
one. For this thing, just a little lightly.

Kissinger: Yeah. Well, I think this China thing is completely conf-
using our opponents also. That’s a tremendous break that—

Nixon: You really think it is?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. They just can’t tell what else is going on. And,
of course, they’re right.

Nixon: What’s going on—

Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, this is going to have a significant
backwash on Hanoi.

Nixon: That’s the point that I think you—that I hadn’t thought of,
but you’re right. They’ve got to worry about our looking at China. They
don’t—no Communist trusts another Communist. He doesn’t trust his
own mother. Isn’t that right?
Kissinger: They—and no Vietnamese trusts any foreigner, so they must think that they could become an insignificant plaything.

Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: And they must figure, as they correctly do, that unless the Chinese, who are very worried about the Russians—see, I think if Brezhnev jumps anyone, it will be the Chinese. Not us.

Nixon: He’s not going to jump us—

Kissinger: If—

Nixon: —as we get re-elected.

Kissinger: Yeah. And if he’s not going to jump us, he’s got to go the other way with us. Anything else will look like stagnation. And he needs some sort of big leadership ploy. It’s a—in my view, it’s a coincidence of needs.

Nixon: And his aim—

Kissinger: We need a leadership ploy and he needs one.


[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics, including rhetoric on Vietnam and draft legislation on the ABM system.]

Nixon: On ABM, I must say, throw at them what we know privately. But that means that in our discussions with this son-of-a-bitch [Dobrynin] when he comes back, you’ve got to—if there is just—you’ve got to remember, there isn’t much to deal with. To me, the worst of both worlds would be for us to get nothing.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: Henry, if you get any kind of a letter or any kind of a, even a half-assed statement, you could get another year. That’s good.

Kissinger: Well, we’ll get a half-assed statement by June 1st.

Nixon: How do you do that? We can say—

Kissinger: I think—

Nixon: We can say—
Kissinger: I don’t know why I’m so confident, because if they figure we’re going to lose it anyway, why should they make a deal?

Nixon: Yeah, well, maybe they’re not so sure. They—we’ve surprised them before. I think maybe that’s part of it. But I think you should know it’s awful tough. The ABM one is very tough because of the way the damn split has come. If we were—just figure—if we could just figure what happened on, in our states, it’d be fine. But the two Southerners that we lost—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Goddamn.

Kissinger: Lawton Chiles.

Nixon: And Lloyd Bentsen. Then they may be better, better than they seem so far.

Kissinger: He may vote with us on that.

Nixon: Might they? They were very mad.

Kissinger: I think he’ll vote with us on that.

Nixon: Put the heat on but—Bentsen may. I think you ought to—I think that when he [Dobrynin] gets back, he probably will have something to say. But I don’t want this damn Chinese action to infuriate them so damn much—

Kissinger: No, well—

Nixon: —that they figure they got to keep us waiting a month.

Kissinger: They are tough customers, Mr. President. They don’t play it that way.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: And I think from—our experience with them now has been that whenever we put it to them—I’m—when he comes back, I’m going to tell him that if we don’t settle it in two weeks, I’ll send him back to the State Department. Might as well go for broke on it.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: That I won’t deal with him anymore. If we can’t settle a simple matter like a SALT exchange of letters in this channel, there’s nothing worth doing.

Nixon: That’s right. That’s right.

Kissinger: Now, if it fails, it fails.

Nixon: That’s an impediment.

Kissinger: With this luck, they’ll—but I don’t think it will fail. And really, I think these Russians are so tough that if we—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —if they have any sense of insecurity on our part—they will be impressed by this Chinese thing—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —if we give them a way out.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: We’ll get them that message to say that our priority is Soviet relations and that’s it’s really up to them—
Nixon: I think you could get that to Vorontsov.
Kissinger: Yeah, I’ll—just so—because they’re meeting tomorrow.
Nixon: He’ll dutifully report it.
Kissinger: Yeah. Thursday is the Politburo meeting there.
Nixon: Right. The Politburo meeting.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Another thing: they did launch that raid yesterday, or they’re going today, or what’s—?
Kissinger: They’ve started the movement, yes.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: The first part of it is inside South Vietnam—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —down the Ashau Valley.
Nixon: Well, you’re right about one thing. We are not interested, Henry, at this point—particularly at this point too—in anything, whenever they’ve got to take any risks on our casualties.
Kissinger: Yes.
Nixon: It just isn’t worth it now.
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: We’ve got too many other fish to fry.
Kissinger: No, no. We’ve got—you know—
Nixon: Yeah, but even there, we could—
Kissinger: —I’ve always been for a tough policy on Vietnam—
Nixon: So have I. Already—
Kissinger: —but we’ve got to cool it a bit there now.
Nixon: We always have—actually, Henry, we’ve given them everything now.
Kissinger: I know.
Nixon: I mean, they’ve fouled everything up. We just got to—we have to do a little bit, little bit different game.
Kissinger: Yeah. I told him that. We can’t have it. We can’t have many helicopter losses, because we’re now, if we get—this Chinese thing is deflating matters. With half a break, we should get that SALT thing wrapped up in two weeks.
Nixon: The SALT thing, huh? You think the China policy—the SALT thing will have one enormous wallop.
Kissinger: That’s two weeks more, and then, if the SALT thing works, we’ll have the summit by the middle of May, and then we have the summer free.

Nixon: [The] whole thing will pack a wallop such as you can’t imagine.

Kissinger: Well, that’s good. And on SALT, State won’t be to leak a damn thing because they won’t know it—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: —until you’re ready to do it.

Nixon: And the summit, they won’t be able to leak a thing, because—

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: —they won’t know it either. You know, I think we should—while on the summit, just as soon as it gets down to any kind of an understanding, we ought to get it out. Do you understand?

Kissinger: No—oh, no question.

Nixon: Don’t let it hang around any, because Beam is good at that. State, too, you know. You can’t trust any of our people.

Kissinger: Yeah, but they don’t talk to Beam. Yeah—

Nixon: Don’t let it even get around in any channel.

Kissinger: Oh, no. No.

Nixon: It’s just got to be—

Kissinger: No. No, no.

Nixon: The summit thing has got to be—the moment that it’s firm, we’ve got to get an agreement to announce it, Henry. Any time you’re ready. Don’t try to pace the summit announcement. The summit announcement should come just as quick as we can get it.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Don’t have to wait.

Kissinger: Yes, I agree.

Nixon: We don’t have to wait. I mean, there was a time before we didn’t want to have it go. But now, you see, then we don’t—we’re not doing any more in Vietnam. So, therefore, we don’t have to keep it for that reason.

Kissinger: The reason, the only reason, would be entirely your own: whether you wanted SALT and summit to close on it, on top of each other.

Nixon: No, I’d like to have them one day after another.

Kissinger: Yeah, well that’s—

Nixon: Think we can do it? I don’t care whether—

Kissinger: That, they probably won’t want to do, but—
Nixon: I know. I don’t care. That’s my—it shows you how little difference it makes.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: The main thing: what pace it is, is not important now. That will set them talking. I mean, the press corps here will be writing speculation stories, and so forth, fighting to get out, over there, and trying to, you know, determine who’s going to get to go, and who’s going to cover it and all—an American President to visit Russia. If it comes, do you realize what that’s going to be? The damnedest show you ever saw in the world.

Kissinger: One thing—maybe another thing I ought to tell Vorontsov, which I haven’t told Dobrynin yet, just so that we get it into the system, that August is no longer possible for a summit. We’ve got to have it in the first half of September.

Nixon: After Labor Day.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: We can leave—that I have a very important—I have a schedule right through Labor Day, but I can leave the day after Labor Day. You know, let’s just put it that way.

Kissinger: So that we don’t waste any exchanges of—

Nixon: Yeah. I wouldn’t fall on that but that’s a good point [unclear].

Kissinger: Just—one reason why it’s a pleasure to deal with these sons-of-bitches is you know that you can’t hurt their feelings.

Nixon: No. No.

Kissinger: And you can—you can get them mad. And that’s why perhaps it would be useful if I saw this guy today.

Nixon: That’s quite interesting.

Kissinger: All our experts were again wrong. All of them said it would hurt us with the Soviets—Laos would hurt with the Chinese, with the Soviets, and with everybody else. It hasn’t. It—if anything, it’s helped with the Chinese.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam, China, and the President’s schedule.]

K: Mr. President.

P: Hello, Henry. I was wondering how the—have you checked in to see how they played the Chinese thing today.

K: Oh, yeah. It was tremendous, it was the lead item on every—I didn’t see it myself, I was with Bob Griffin,2 but I talked to Haig.

P: Yeah.

K: But he says it has been a tremendous thing on television, it has been the lead item on every television thing and on—

P: You mean rather than Vietnam for a change.

K: (laughter) Yeah, it’s gone on, and on and on.

[Omitted here is discussion of public reaction to developments in Vietnam and China.]

[K:] For every reason we have got to have a diversion from Vietnam in this country for a while.

P: That’s the point, isn’t it? Yeah.

K: And we need it for our game with the Soviets.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: I mean it would be absolutely impossible—we would be doing the Soviets the greatest favor if we rejected this overture and we would get nothing for it, it would lead to tougher relations between us and the Soviets, rather than easier.

P: That’s right, that’s right. That’s what they would like for us to do, they would like for us to sort of slap the Chinese in the face but we’re not going to. We’re not going overboard but we’re saying well, if they open the door, we’ll open the door.

K: That’s right. And actually now one would have to expect the Hyades (?) [hiatus] of a few weeks.

P: Oh, of course, nothing is going to happen for a while but that’s all right, just let this rest awhile. You know, mutter around about it for a while.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the call lasted from 8:05 to 8:12 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 Senator Robert P. Griffin (R–Michigan). According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met “Senator Griffin’s Group” in the Shoreham Hotel West on April 14 at 5:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
K: And of course with some luck, we will get some nibble on the Soviet front now.
P: Yes, we might.
K: Well, it isn’t even luck so much; it really logically ought to happen.
P: Ought to happen logically, that’s right. If they are at all logical, it damn well better or they are a lot more rigid and stupid.
K: I mean there is nothing new they are going to learn about SALT, they are either going to move on that or not. And the other one, the Summit, we have been kicking around for a year.
P: I talked to Colson and I told him to—Dole was in and said that both Case and Brooke were making speeches on the floor today about it. Essentially to set a date and all that sort of thing and I said get hold of Brooke and tell him to keep shut for a month. You know, that’s all you can ask of Brooke.
K: Right.
P: And without promising a thing, you see. Just wait a month and then wait, you know what I mean, you can’t expect him to do more than that.
K: Right. Actually it doesn’t make any difference what Case and Brooke say because they have been saying that for a year.
P: True, but if we could just get a few of our own to quiet down—
K: Right.6

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam.]

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3 Nixon called Colson on April 14 at 7:27 and again at 7:41 p.m. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)
4 Nixon met Senator Robert Dole (R–Kansas), Chairman of the Republican National Committee, on April 14 from 5:40 to 6:15 p.m. (Ibid.)
5 Senators Clifford P. Case (R–New Jersey) and Edward W. Brooke III (R–Massachusetts) were both outspoken opponents of the Vietnam war.
6 Kissinger called Haldeman that evening and complained about how domestic politics on Vietnam might affect his backchannel diplomacy with the Soviet Union: “K: I really think we ought to keep things quiet now, let them hit us for a month, I don’t give a damn. H: Well, maybe you don’t but it isn’t going to help us any. K: No, but nothing is going to matter as much as what we are playing with the Soviets. H: That’s right. K: And if they find out that we are counting on the thing too much, we are never going to get it.” Haldeman asked Kissinger about his telephone conversation the previous day with Dobrynin: “K: He said he was coming with new instructions. H: Did he? K: Oh, yeah. Oh, he was very effusive, oh, yes. H: Was he? K: Oh, yes. H: Huh. God, it really would be fun if some of that falls together. K: Well, if it falls, part of it could fall next week. H: Yeah. K: God, we’d have those guys. H: Wouldn’t that be something?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File)
179. Letter From McGeorge Bundy to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

New York, April 14, 1971.

Dear Henry:

I had a meeting with Kocharyan and Harris this afternoon, and I enclose the memcon. I had to leave after about forty-five minutes and Kocharyan stayed on. He managed to convey to Harris an impression which both of us think you should know about—namely, that his masters may be looking for some public as well as private signal that Brezhnev’s statements were affirmatively noted in Washington. Kocharyan did not quite say this himself, but Harris nevertheless has the impression, which sounds plausible to me, that in Moscow as in Washington both public and private signals are often important—perhaps partly for bargaining with one’s colleagues.

In any event, my own feeling is that you and the President may wish to consider whether at a convenient moment either the President or the Secretary might wish to speak once more of the importance of SALT, and say a word or so welcoming and sharing Brezhnev’s view that progress in this field is important and possible. You will know better than I whether this is practicable. Obviously too warm a public statement might rouse hopes beyond what makes sense, but even a fairly calm comment could be pointed to privately, if you wanted.

Alternatively, if no such comment is likely in the next little while, I think I could help in reinforcing what I said today if I could have a suggestion from you as to the right way of telling Kocharyan that it

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Harris, Lou (Soviet Conversations). No classification marking. In a memorandum to Kissinger on April 20, David Halperin forwarded a draft reply to Bundy’s letter. Kissinger, however, wrote in the margin: “No reply. Have handled by phone.” (Ibid.)

2 The meeting was held in Harris’s office in New York. According to the attached memorandum of conversation, Bundy told Kocharyan that the Nixon administration “fully shared” the view that Brezhnev’s Party Congress speech was “highly significant” and that “the immediate future was a time in which there could be a prospect of real and serious action.” Bundy emphasized that, while “an informal process of communication” could be valuable, the “main line of serious negotiation must be from government to government.” He also added that “there was every reason to have confidence in the strength and effectiveness of communication between Ambassador Dobrynin and Mr. Kissinger.”
would be wrong to take the absence of comment in Washington as a negative sign.  

As ever,

Mac

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3 Bundy called Kissinger at 4:17 p.m. on May 14 to report that Kocharyan wanted to deliver an “important message” to the White House. “I thought I’d call his attention to the President’s press conference about relations with the Soviet Union,” Bundy told Kissinger, “say that it was as constructive as anything Brezhnev said which everyone has been quoting.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) For Nixon’s press conference on April 29; see Document 199. After he met Kocharyan, Bundy called Kissinger at 5:25 p.m. on May 18 and commented that this contact was “more his initiative than a push from Moscow. I told him [Kocharyan] that the formal lines were very important now. He said yes.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) Bundy provided further details on his meeting with Kocharyan in a May 20 letter to Kissinger. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 809, Name Files, Bundy, McGeorge)

180. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Minister (Vorontsov)  

Washington, April 15, 1971, 8:57 a.m.

K: You know I called your Ambassador in Moscow?  
V: Indeed, and did you talk?  
K: We didn’t discuss substance. I told him that you and I had talked. I called him to congratulate him on his elevation to the Central Committee.  
V: When is he coming back? That is something of great interest to me.  
K: He said early next week, so I assume Sunday.  

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File. No classification marking.  
2 See footnote 5, Document 176.  
3 April 18.
assistants have claimed that whatever is happening with Peking is going to speed up Soviet actions in other fields. First, no authorized Presidential assistant has talked to them. Second, I am putting out strict orders today that there is to be no discussion of this. Third, this isn’t our policy. Our policy is to make the maximum effort to have better relations with the Soviet Union. We don’t want any confusion in Moscow about where our priorities are. We are waiting for some answers from you, but what is happening on other fronts is totally independent, in a different direction, and does not have the same priority.

V: I see.
K: We can never be sure which fifth-level official wants to prove he’s important by talking to a newsmen.
V: That happens some times.
K: Not so much in your country. But if you can let them know in Moscow about this conversation . . .
V: I will do that. You can be assured of that.
K: Okay, and if you will let me know when the Ambassador is coming back . . .
V: I will do that.
K: Good. Thank you.


5 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Evans for breakfast on April 12 from 8:50 to 9:52 a.m.; on April 15, Kissinger left his office at 7:45 for dinner with Evans and Katherine Graham, publisher of the Washington Post. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of either conversation has been found. Kissinger also called Evans at 2:45 p.m. on April 16. During the conversation, Evans remarked: “I want the deed on that story. I want to break that—a full column.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)

6 In an April 14 memorandum to Irwin, Kissinger issued the following instructions: “the President has asked that all substantive comments by U.S. officials, including responses to formal press inquiries, background statements, on and off-the-record remarks and guidance to Posts abroad, concerning U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China be cleared with him through my office.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 283, Agency Files, Dept of State, Vol. X)

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s meeting with Henry Hubbard of Newsweek.]

Nixon: Henry, you know, we don’t realize—I think China, more than Moscow, is a goddamned nerve thing for these people. What do you think? I don’t know.

Kissinger: Because it’s so new.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Of course, let’s face it, in the long run, it’s so historic. You know, when you stop to think of 800 million people, and where they’re going to be. Jesus, this is a hell of a move.

Kissinger: Of course, I don’t want to get our hopes up too much, but one of the things that has occurred to me, that I did not tell to this fellow [Hubbard]—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —is that it is conceivable—indeed, it is very possible—that they know Hanoi’s going to make a peace move and they don’t want to be left out.

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Yeah. Well, that’ll take care of itself. Getting back to the Russian thing, I was concerned about the TASS thing. I don’t know how—are you—are you concerned that much? Are we—let’s—or do we—can you call Vorontsov again and—or that would be too much?

Kissinger: No, I think that would make us look too eager, Mr. President.

Nixon: Well, I don’t want them to think, though, that—you know what I mean? Maybe you should call Dobrynin.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 1–101. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon called Kissinger at 7:33 p.m., the two men then talked for 10 minutes. (Ibid., White House Central Files) A transcript of the conversation is ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File.

Kissinger: No, Mr. President—
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: I’ve called Dobrynin once.3
Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: I’ve had Vorontsov in.4
Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: I’ve called Vorontsov this morning.5
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And I’ve had Ziegler put out a statement.6
Nixon: Right, that’s enough. Okay.
Kissinger: And I think any more would really be over-eager—
Nixon: Yeah. And now, at this point, they’re basically, TASS is simply—but TASS, that shows that they must be hysterical about this damn thing.
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: Huh?
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: [laughs] Because they said, “This removed the mask of U.S.-China”7—[laughs] shit, we don’t have any relations with the Chinese.
Kissinger: Well, they’re also—
Nixon: They must think we’re doing something.
Kissinger: Well, they’re also using it against the Chinese.
Nixon: Oh, how’s that?
Kissinger: Well, because one of the things in which the Chinese have been driving them crazy, is by claiming they were revolutionary purists while the Russians were opportunists—

3 See footnote 5, Document 176.
4 See Document 175.
5 See Document 180.
6 During a telephone conversation at 10:46 a.m. on April 15, Kissinger gave Ziegler the following press guidance: “Make sure you take an occasion in a low key way to deny any anti-Russian intent. Say our basic policy is one to be a friend of the U.S. without being an enemy of the Soviet Union. The President has said this. We have no interest in exacerbating relations between Communist China and Soviet Union and we recognize the Soviet Union will not succumb to petty pressures and [omission in transcript] with anything to the Soviet Union. We hope for continuing improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File) Ziegler adopted this line during his briefing at the White House that afternoon. (Terence Smith, “Soviet Assured by U.S. on China,” New York Times, April 16, 1971, pp. 1, 11)
Nixon: Yeah, I see.

Kissinger: So this is part of their internal problem.

Nixon: I see. So they’re saying that we are the—they are, the Chinese, colluding with the capitalists.

Kissinger: That’s right. I think this was more directed at them.

Nixon: You know, I would say this: The columnists and the rest, they should have enough to write about for at least two weeks. I don’t say it’s a month—

Kissinger: Oh, yes—

Nixon: —but two weeks—

Kissinger: —but, of course, at the end of those two weeks, we may have something else to tell them.

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and China, including the following brief exchange: Kissinger: “I will send a message to them [North Vietnamese] by the end of next week no matter what we hear from Dobrynin.” Nixon: “Oh, hell yes. Look, whatever Dobrynin does, you’ve got to move on this front.”]
SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA

Principal Observations

A. The roots of the conflict between the Soviet Union and China have grown strong and deep. There will certainly be changes in the intensity of the struggle—even, as now, periods of relative calm and modestly improving state relations. But differences between the two states—contending national interests, warring ideologies, and antipathetic cultures—are simply too basic and too vital to permit a durable resolution of the dispute.

B. Soviet policies toward China have been fairly restrained since the tense spring and summer of 1969. In effect, the Soviets are trying to buy time; time in which to contain Chinese power in Asia and elsewhere; time in which to improve their already impressive military position along the Sino-Soviet border; and time in which somehow to convince the men who will one day succeed Mao that their future must lie in closer, or at least less troublesome, relations with the USSR.

C. The Soviet leaders seem to be at least mildly satisfied with the results of their moderation. China, though still antagonistic, is behaving with much greater circumspection than it once did and has ceased altogether its efforts to aggravate tensions along the border. Thus, assuming that Peking does not itself revert to a more actively hostile policy, the Soviets are likely to try to maintain their restrained approach, at least for the next few years.

D. But whatever their plans and hopes, the Soviet leaders remember the bitter past and must also allow for some grim possibilities in the future. They are apprehensive that Chinese political and economic power will grow at more impressive rates; that Chinese foreign policy will become increasingly vigorous and effective; and that China

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board, except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. This estimate supersedes NIE 11/13–69, “The USSR and China,” August 12, 1969; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 24.
will further damage Soviet interests in East and South Asia and will in general undermine the USSR’s role as a world power. And they are fearful that by the mid-1970s China’s offensive strategic strength will be sufficient to pose a major threat to important targets in the USSR.

E. This serious concern about long-term Chinese military capabilities, together with anxieties about Mao’s intentions, particularly along the Sino-Soviet border, has led the Soviets to ponder the use of force against China. The continued strengthening of their forces along the border certainly suggests that the Soviets have decided to keep this option open. But they seem also to have concluded, at least for the time being, that the disadvantages of this alternative—including certain military risks and possibly severe political costs—would outweigh the rather uncertain net advantages in any situation short of imminent threat or extreme provocations from China. And if the Soviets should decide that military action were necessary, they would be more likely to engage in cross-border operations, limited in both time and scope, than to undertake more ambitious and risky efforts to neutralize China’s strategic potential or to occupy large portions of Chinese territory.2

F. The problem of China—especially the problems of trying to contain Chinese power and influence—has come to be seen in Moscow as central to Soviet policies throughout most of Asia. But concern about China is not the only major motive force behind these policies. Efforts to undermine US and Western positions is also an important common theme, one which, moreover, would (and did) exist independently of Soviet troubles with China. And much of Soviet policy in Asia is, of course, formed by and tailored to the particular—and perhaps unique—problems and opportunities presented by the individual Asian states. (A discussion of these may be found in paragraphs 39 through 61.)

2 Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, does not agree with this paragraph. Brig. Gen. David E. Ott, for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and Brig. Gen. Edward Ratkovich, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, join him in this dissent. All three believe that the thrust of this and the foregoing conclusions concerning the Soviet policy toward China imply that the Soviets have decided to live with the Chinese threat and hope for the best in the post-Mao period. They believe it more likely that the Soviet leadership has not yet decided among basic policy options toward China and is probably not content with the results of its current moderate tactics. In particular, they believe that the question of military action against China is still under active consideration in the Kremlin. This is indicated by the continuing buildup of military capabilities opposite China which are already more than adequate for defensive needs. If the Soviets should choose to attempt a military solution, whatever course of action they adopt would probably include a strike against Chinese nuclear weapons production and delivery facilities. For a more complete treatment of this view, see footnote to Part II, page 12. [Footnote is in the original.]
G. The Soviets face a formidable problem in seeking to assess the overall correlation of forces in Asia in the decade ahead. They face, in fact, a series of crucial imponderables: the policies and strengths of post-Mao China; the scope and intensity of US interests in Asia; the impact of Japan’s growing strength; and, in general, the effects of the emerging quadrilateral balance of forces in Asia, i.e., the consequences of the interaction between the four major powers on the scene.

H. The growing complexity and uncertainty of international politics in Asia is not likely of itself to diminish the USSR’s interests or lessen its opportunities in the area. On the contrary, Moscow may over time find itself forced and in some cases encouraged to devote more and more of its energies to its position in Asia. There could be new crises vis-à-vis China, arising either from renewed troubles along the border or from conflicts elsewhere in Asia. But aside from its relations with China, the USSR is not likely deliberately to press its interests to the point of confrontation, and, in general, the more complicated the circumstances, and the more perplexed the Soviets are about the likely shape of the future in Asia, the more Moscow will be inclined to react rather than to initiate, to play it warily and by ear, rather than incautiously by some sort of pan-Asian grand design.3

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the Estimate, including paragraphs on historical background, Soviet policy toward China, Soviet policies elsewhere in Asia, and Soviet perceptions of Asia in the 1970s.]

3 Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, does not agree with this paragraph. Brig. Gen. David E. Ott, for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, joins him in this dissent. They believe that these longer range predictions tend essentially to rule out the possibility of a Sino-Soviet military clash. This possibility does not appear to be foreclosed either in Moscow or in Peking. Should a major military conflict occur by design, miscalculation or accident, the Soviet perceptions described in this section would be drastically affected, as would the interrelationships of countries world-wide, especially those in Asia. [Footnote is in the original.]
183. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense Laird and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)\(^1\)

Washington, April 16, 1971, 1:20 p.m.

L: Is Henry aware I talked to the President about the Baltic Sea operation?\(^2\) He authorized me to go ahead with it—

H: Right.

L: I told Bill Rogers I had authorized it and it has created a flap at the State Department. They backed away from it.

H: Irwin raised it with Henry at lunch yesterday.\(^3\) Henry told Irwin just calm down, the President wants it done.

L: Just so Henry is aware. Before I go ahead and approve orders I always call and talk to Bill personally. He knows about this. Alex is raising hell with me today that this should have been discussed. I wanted you to know. If I am going to back down, let me back down gracefully.

H: Right, sir. Henry will be back here in an hour-and-a-half.

L: They have not decided to back away have they?

H: Oh, no. You know what it is and the situation is somewhat different, but I don’t think there is a decision to back off. If there is any change I will have Henry call you immediately.

L: It would help. You know, I was taking a hard line on the trucks to China . . . if I could back away once in a while from some of these things it kind of helps me. I always take the lumps. I always get it put to me. I kind of worked it out over a year in this goddamn building because if I take the hard line in Asia we are going to have air and naval power, everybody over here thinks . . .

H: Henry went over that with me this morning and the dates. He said he never intended to convey the impression he was going to pull out.

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\(^{1}\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File. No classification marking. A typed parenthetical note on the transcripts states: “Secy Laird had asked for HAK first.”

\(^{2}\) No record of this conversation has been found.

\(^{3}\) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger and Irwin met for breakfast on April 16—not lunch on April 15. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
L: Yes, I understand, but now this Baltic thing. I have to have at least 48 hours to back out of it.

H: Henry said to me State is upset about the Baltic thing, but I understood from the way he said it that nobody succumbed to that pressure.

L: I can back out but I have to have some cover—not always out here on the goddamn limb. 4

4 During a telephone conversation at 10 a.m. on April 18, Laird and Kissinger discussed the proposed operation: “L: That movement into the Baltic takes place in early May. K: Okay. L: But they will be operating in the North Sea on an ASW mission. Now what if it—the task force is made up of 4 destroyers and an ASW carrier. K: That’s great, that’s what we want. L: And they will be operating this month in the North Sea, ASW exercises and so forth, then they will move in the Baltic on the—early in May. K: That’s terrific. I wouldn’t worry about that, if there are any changes, I will be in touch with you. L: Yeah, let me know so I can back up from it if there are any. K: Right, but I am up to—just continue it as it is. L: Yeah, okay.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File)

184. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman) 1

Washington, April 17, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of China, including the proposed visit of Senator Mansfield.]

Nixon: We’re not moving too fast on that [China]. We’re moving goddamn slowly.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: We’re going to continue to move slowly, Henry.

Kissinger: I don’t think we have to hurry now.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 481–7. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger and Haldeman in the Oval Office from 2:36 to 3:30 p.m. on April 17. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
Nixon: If we push—
Kissinger: First of all, we now have to hear from the Russians. We have to hear what they’ve got to say.
Nixon: That’s right, if anything. And also what Chiang [Kai-shek] has to say.
Kissinger: No, the Russians, after that first bleat, I think we’ve quieted them down with our statement. See, that Ziegler statement—
Nixon: —was very good.
Kissinger: —was front page in the New York Times and they reported it in Moscow.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. And you, of course, calling him—
Kissinger: And my calling Dobrynin.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: And my calling Vorontsov.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: And while I’m sure they’re spinning like crazy—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And we’ve got their paranoia working for us. No matter how much we protest, they don’t believe it anyway.
Nixon: They particularly won’t believe me.
Kissinger: Yeah. But on the other hand—
Nixon: You see, they really think I’m a tricky bastard. And they’re right.
Kissinger: Well, you’re the toughest President they’ve dealt with.
Nixon: You see, the others—
Kissinger: If you had the nuclear superiority—
Nixon: You see, the sentiment that—if they thought I was sentimental, you know, if they thought I was really like I was talking last night, you know, about wanting to visit China and the whole joke, you know, and all that crap, then [laughs] there’s nothing—but they know that—

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2 See footnote 6, Document 181.

3 The previous evening, the President participated in a “panel interview” during the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the Shoreham Hotel. For the full text of the interview, during which Nixon answered questions on foreign policy on Vietnam, China, Cuba, and Chile, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 534–550.
Kissinger: No, they know you.
Nixon: They know that’s cosmetic.

[Kissinger: And—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: —with the Chinese, the Russians, there is an enormous respect. And in this respect—from this point of view, your April 7th speech—

Nixon: Helped?
Kissinger: —was crucial.

[Omitted here is further discussion of press relations and China.]
Nixon: You know, I was glad to do one thing the night I presented to your friends at State: to nail that Cuban thing. That paper—
Kissinger: Oh, that was well done.
Nixon: Tell them, by God, that, you know, with the Chilenans, that as long as they treat us right, we would treat them right. The Cuba thing, they weren’t treating us right. That’s so damn true.
Kissinger: Oh, absolutely.
Nixon: I could’ve mentioned—the reason I didn’t mention it—I know you had it in the briefing material—because they’re receiving arms from the Soviet. I just thought that right now, that there’s no reason, before your meeting—
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: No need to throw another bomb in there. You noticed last night, we avoided any major Soviet thing, or—
Kissinger: Although if the Soviets don’t make a major move with us, Mr. President—
Nixon: Ho!
Kissinger: —I am afraid we have to go hard on them. Because what they are doing now in strategic deployment is scary.
Nixon: Well, I was all set for that.
Kissinger: Of course, they’ve got—
Nixon: I think that, however, is about right. See, now, I—I’m going to have a press conference two weeks from Thursday, this last Thursday.

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4 For the text of the President’s April 7 speech, in which he reported the “success” of Vietnamization and the South Vietnamese raid into Laos, see ibid., pp. 522–527.
5 April 15. The press conference was held on April 29; see Document 199.
Kissinger: Hmm.
Nixon: That’ll be the time—
Kissinger: By that time we’ll know.
Nixon: —we’ve got to know. And then, at that time, if they haven’t moved then, Henry, I’m going to have to lay it out there. That’s when we’ll get the question on SALT.
Kissinger: I think that’s right.


Kissinger: But we’ll know by Wednesday,6 I would think, what—where the Russian thing is going. I mean, if we know that the week after next we have a SALT announcement—
Nixon: That’ll—well—
Kissinger: —then that’s going to be a tremendous thing.
Nixon: And, hell, that’ll take—that will take care of China for a while? And—

[laughter]
Kissinger: If we get this—
Nixon: If we could get—to be perfectly frank with you, Henry, maybe we want it after the demonstrations.
Kissinger: I think it’s better that way.
Haldeman: I would.
Kissinger: Well, we couldn’t.
Nixon: Why is it better? Why have the demonstrations afterwards?
Haldeman: Let them have them. Let them run their course through May 5th. We can’t make it by then anyway. Can you?
Nixon: Yes—
Kissinger: No. I think you can get the SALT announcement—not next week. I think you could get it the week after next by around the 30th.
Nixon: That’d be before the demonstration, then?
Kissinger: No—

6 April 21.
Haldeman: No. No, you got one demonstration—the big demonstration’s on the 24th. Then you have—
Nixon: When’s that?
Haldeman: This—a week from today.
Nixon: Right.
Haldeman: That’s—
Nixon: Well, it’s my view that—it’s my view, I’ve just decided—I told you, Henry—I decided, Henry, not to do—I was going to have an office press conference next week. Then I decided not to—
Kissinger: I think—
Nixon: I think this serves as two press conferences. That’s enough.
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: Don’t you agree?
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: Now, two weeks, however, from now, I’ll have a press conference.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: I’m not getting frozen into it, but I—about the time, I’ll want to hit television.
Haldeman: You won’t be—we are just getting to the point where you have to do one on TV.
Nixon: TV? That’s right. You get back to the TV leadership. Now—
Haldeman: And that’ll have been three weeks after your—
Nixon: That’s right.
Haldeman: —your troop announcement.
Nixon: Three weeks after the troop, which is about right. See, we’re trying to hit about every three weeks.
Kissinger: No, that’s, that fits very—
Nixon: Now, if that—by that time we might have SALT.
Kissinger: Yeah. Or at least we would know whether we won’t have it.
Nixon: We’ll know. We’ll know if we won’t have it.
Haldeman: If we do have it—
Nixon: Yeah.
Haldeman: —I sure wouldn’t announce it at the press conference.
Nixon: Oh, hell no! Come to think of it, you know what I could do? [laughs] Well, we—it depends on how we want to play it. Rather than having a press conference, we may just go on—
Haldeman: TV.
Nixon: —go on TV for five minutes at night.
Haldeman: Yeah.
Nixon: See, Henry?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Five minutes at night in prime time to make an announcement—
Haldeman: All from here.
Kissinger: Another possibility—but I think Bob is right. The more likely thing is that it would be around May 7th. This stuff probably will have to go back and forth once, and they [the Soviet Politburo] meet every Thursday.
Nixon: Okay. Right.
Kissinger: But we’ll know all of this when Dobrynin is back.
[Omitted here is a brief exchange on the President’s schedule.]
Kissinger: But if we get this thing moving, we can literally have something happening every two or three weeks in foreign policy right through the summer.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: In fact, maybe right through the year. We can do this, then the summit, then the Thieu meeting, which if we get the Hanoi stuff moving, could have a very positive news story. By that time the summit will be approaching.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: Once we have something going with the Russians, we ought to try to open talks with the Chinese on something.
Nixon: What agreements?
Kissinger: Oh, I’d be cold-blooded. I’d—
Nixon: Hell, I said last night we’d be glad to open the talks in Warsaw right away—
Kissinger: And I will—or do it in some other channel and—
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: I would tell Dobrynin we are going to do less if these things work. But since he doesn’t know what we’ve planned, less is whatever we’re doing.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: I’ll just say that’s less. And—
Haldeman: [We] can’t turn it off altogether but we’re willing to interplay them.
Kissinger: That’s right. So if not much is going on, we’ll take credit for it. One other: we need them so that we can play them off.
Nixon: Well, we may not get them.
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: If we don’t, then we’ll find another game. What the hell?
We’re doing pretty—
Kissinger: Oh—
Nixon: We’re doing about as well as anybody could expect.
Kissinger: I—
Nixon: I don’t think the demonstrations are going to hurt too much. I don’t, in my view—
Kissinger: We need it—
Nixon: And if they demonstrate—
Kissinger: Hell—
Nixon: —just so they demonstrate hard.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam, China, and the President’s schedule.]

Nixon: I think you can tell me when he [Dobrynin] gets back whether he’s going to diddle you.
Kissinger: I’m not going to let him diddle me. I’m—my judgment, Mr. President, if you agree is that we should go for broke with this fellow now. And then—
Nixon: Oh, hell, yes.
Kissinger: —I’ll just tell him this is—I’ll break the contact, I won’t see him anymore, because if we can’t settle a simple exchange of letters, then let him work with the State Department.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: I mean, that’s a daring ploy, but they want this contact.
Nixon: If they want Berlin. That, really, is probably—
Kissinger: [6 seconds not declassified]
Nixon: [6 seconds not declassified]
Kissinger: [11 seconds not declassified] And, as for Berlin, they can never get it by themselves.
Nixon: You don’t think so?
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: Yeah. He [Brezhnev] needs some successes. He, Mr. President, in his way, he’s got a domestic situation as complex as you have and more intractable. He’s got to do something that he did. And he’s got a lot of opponents in the Politburo, and he’s got to make the same decision. He’s got to get—I think he needs you in Moscow at least
as much as you need to be there. The best thing the Chinese have done for us is not so much in domestic opinion, which is good enough, but it’s given us the maneuvering room with the Russians. The thing that worried me with the Russians was that they might think you are so vulnerable—

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: —that they’re doing you a personal favor that they wouldn’t have done.

Nixon: So what if maybe they couldn’t. But now they may have to do it for themselves.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: In other words, they figure that the Chinese—the race to Peking is on. Well, just so we can keep Peking from slapping us. Well, it isn’t—well, we can’t control that either. They might. Do you think they might?

Kissinger: No, but we should just—insofar as possible, if we could just be a little more disciplined. The government has been superb.

Nixon: Yeah, but the—

Kissinger: What you said yesterday was—

Nixon: Well, but what about the press shitting and the rest? Should we—

Kissinger: But there’s nothing we can do.

Nixon: That’s right. They’re going hog-wild.

Kissinger: Well, after that first orgasm, I think they’ve got to quiet down. And they can’t keep sending telegrams.

Nixon: Let’s see. They’re probably thinking [unclear] hay out of the China policy again. Because, as I said last night, implied, if you try to make hay out of it, it won’t work.

Haldeman: With all we’ve done, you don’t really need to make much hay out of it.

Nixon: I think what we do—

Haldeman: It makes hay out of itself.

Kissinger: That would—

Nixon: We should just let it rest. And, well, also, there’s this other danger: you might make hay out of it and then—

Kissinger: Could I make a [unclear]—

Nixon: —and it’d be a disappointment.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: They could turn on it.

Kissinger: That—
Nixon: Well, we’re prepared for that. We’re prepared.
Kissinger: Well, you’re, publicly—you have been less enthusiastic
than some of the people who have been praising it.
Nixon: That’s right.7

7 Haldeman described this “long, typical Saturday afternoon gab session” in his
diary: “Henry feels that what makes the P so formidable in his dealings with the Com-
munists is the fact that he has turned their theory of protracted war against them, and
apparently the Communists have that same feeling. He wanted to give some thought to
letting the Ping-Pong team come in, just as another hype to the fact that this was what
was done. Henry’s basically opposed to that and doesn’t want to overplay the China
ting until we get something more going.” “Another point that was made,” Haldeman
added, “was that the whole China thing has given us maneuvering room with the Russ-
ians, because now we’re not backed against the wall. The problem now is that we’ve got
to avoid making too much hay out of China, because they might pull the rug out from
under us; and we don’t want to get our neck out that far. The P’s concerned that we still
keep the heat on the opposition. They’ve all joined with us on the China thing, and that,
in a way, is not as good as when they opposed us, such as in Laos.” (Haldeman, Halde-
man Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

185. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, April 18, 1971, 10:30 a.m.

K: Mr. President.
P: Henry, are you in New York or here?
K: No, I’m here.
P: What’s new? Anything this morning?
K: Nothing of very great consequence. In fact, there’s nothing
really going on. The Chinese keep needling the Russians where they put
indications that they were easing their terms and diplomatic relations
with us, half implying that maybe Taiwan wasn’t a complete obstacle.
P: Yeah, I saw that.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Tele-
phone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. The tran-
script was prepared from two tape recordings of the conversation, which were “brought
in” on April 19 and typed on May 7. A typed note on the transcript of the second tape
indicates that it was a continuation of the first.
[Omitted here is discussion of press relations, Vietnam, and China.]

[K:] The China story of course is very big and very favorable to you—everywhere.

P: The thing I feel is this. You will probably see Dobrynin Tuesday,2 right, maybe Monday.

K: If he comes back. He comes back either tonight or Wednesday night. Those are the only two flights they have this week. It’s just barely conceivable that this China thing kept him back a few days for reassessment. But I will see him either tomorrow or Tuesday—

P: What I was thinking is this. I don’t know just quite how it would work. I would delay your meeting with Bogdan3 until after you see him.

K: All right.

P: Or have you already set it up.

K: No, no.

P: Let me tell you why. After you see him we may want to play a very different game. Let’s suppose, for example, running it out—let us suppose that we get a straight cutoff. You see what I mean. Then instead of diddling around with this sort of thing we might go immediately to the highest level. Do you see what I am getting at?

K: Oh yes.

P: I don’t mean on the—this time we would have to play that kind of a game and knowing the Asians the way they operate—well they will go like molasses on things of this sort. In a moment like this they just might bite for the whole thing. Do you see what I mean?

K: Right.

P: So rather than wasting anything with telling Chou En-lai that we would like to have Mansfield and Scott received and the rest. Let’s just wait.

K: I think that is a good idea.

P: Now he is our best contact isn’t he, the Bogdan?

K: We would have to think about that.

P: I was thinking—

K: Bogdan is better than Pakistan right now.

P: What I was thinking was—well—are we sure of that?

2 April 20.

3 Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the United States. After the President’s visit to Bucharest in August 1969, the White House used the Romanian channel—in particular, Bogdan in Washington—to send messages to Beijing. See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 181, 191, 703–704.
K: Yes.
P: What I was thinking of was how secure are their lines?
K: They always send a messenger.
P: OK, that’s fine. I was going to say if they will send a messenger that’s good. They will send a messenger to Bucharest?
K: Right.
P: Good. Otherwise we could send somebody to Bucharest.
K: Another way of doing it is when I go talk to the North Vietnamese I talk to the Chinese Ambassador in Paris.
P: Yes.
K: And get it set up that way.
P: You see what I am getting at. We may as well play our little games. So just forget what I told you to do about Bogdan right now, OK.
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: I don’t think it is going to play that way. I think that the Russians—
K: No, no, they are going to come.
P: They are going to come. But you know what I mean is if we now have got—we are playing for very high stakes and we have very little time left and we can’t diddle around, with the Russians or with anybody else. OK.
K: Right Mr. President.

186. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 18, 1971, 10:45 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of press relations, Vietnam, and China.]
K: I think on this one [China]. Sure the Democrats are going to start yelling now. They are going to come up with 50 hot gimmicks but we are so far ahead . . .

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. The transcript was prepared at the time from a tape recording of the conversation.
P: What they will come up with now is why don’t we admit them to the UN? Why don’t we recognize them and so forth. Well, that’s all premature . . . debate.

K: Also, Mr. President, it helps us with the Russian game.

P: I think so.

K: Because if the Russians see that the Democrats are more hog-wild than you are vis-à-vis China then—

P: I hadn’t thought of that, but it’s true.

K: Then they have much less of an incentive to bring them in. They already don’t trust them on the Middle East, then with China they also turn out to be a disaster. So I think—my major worry is that if we get too eager that the Chinese will start going back into a shell. And that’s why the way you have played it and that’s where the Democrats could do damage.

P: I sure as hell don’t expect to get eager at all with the Chinese. Unless the Russian thing drops. Then the Chinese may want to be eager and we will too.

K: That’s right.

P: We can’t just assume we will wait until 1974.

K: Oh no, oh God no.

P: This is one of those things where I don’t believe, I think—I think our Chinese game, Henry, should be played exactly as it is being played. Very cool and aloof and yet the door is open now you walk in kids. It’s your—

K: Mr. President, I must tell you honestly I believe that we have a 30% chance, even if we played the Russian game, of having a high level Chinese one next year. That may not have to wait until ’74.

P: We want to use it. We want it at the highest level too.

K: That’s what I mean. That’s not at all excluded.

P: Let me say that the more I think about the envoy thing. If we are going to go I think we ought to go at the highest level.

K: Well, I think the envoy could prepare for it.

P: It might, but it might take a lot of the zip out of it too. You know what I mean Henry. You just can’t tell. I don’t know if there is anybody we trust to send over there. That’s—

K: That’s a bit down the road yet. First we need a reliable channel.
187. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of opponents to the President’s policies, in particular, his conduct of the war in Vietnam.]

Nixon: You say Dobrynin will be back tomorrow night?
Kissinger: Tomorrow late afternoon. I’ve got it—we’ve—I’ve got the FBI checking passenger lists.\(^2\)
Nixon: You expect, then, to hear from him probably Thursday,\(^3\) don’t you?
Kissinger: No later than Friday. He may have to translate something he’s bringing back.
Nixon: Translate. All right.
Kissinger: Oh, he’ll bring something back.
Nixon: Now, hold the horses: he’s going to bring something. He said he had a message.\(^4\)
Kissinger: Well, if not, I’ll call him.
Nixon: If not, you say, “What the hell is the message here?”
Kissinger: Yeah. I’ll tell him—
Nixon: I mean, don’t—
Kissinger: Either now or we’ll break the channel. I think we—
Nixon: Hell, no. No fooling around. But I think it’s got to be, it’s got to well be understood—I mean you, for your bargaining purposes—that if they, if he ain’t going to play, then we’ll explore the Chinese one to the hilt if there’s any way of exploring it.
Kissinger: Yeah—

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 483–13. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 1:12 to 1:25 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) Several reports on Dobrynin’s whereabouts, transmitted through Haig to Kissinger, are ibid., NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1]

\(^3\) April 22.

\(^4\) See Document 176.
Nixon: The other way—the other thing is, Henry, if he isn’t go to play, even though probably it’s going to get a little—it will cost us, however, our electoral future—by God, we’re going to wake this country up to the danger. And I’ll do it. I’m going to tell the country that things are—that we’ve got to get re-armed.

Kissinger: I’m not sure it’s going to cost us.
Nixon: I’m not sure. It may be—it may, it may.
Kissinger: It would put the other side into a hell of a position.
Nixon: The country is so, you know, weary trying to get peace.
Kissinger: But I think—
Nixon: Our problem—
Kissinger: But I think they’re going to play, Mr. President. I can’t imagine—
Nixon: No.
Kissinger: I think the best explanation for the Russian—for the Chinese behavior is that they’re—that they had to get in before Brezhnev did.

Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: Because then, on any other ground, they could have waited a month or two.
Nixon: Let me tell you this though, Henry. If they play, God knows—we all know—but if they play, it will be because you and I planned the whole goddamn thing. It wouldn’t—listen, there wouldn’t be a chance of a Russian play now, a year before the election, if we didn’t have the Chinese warming. There wouldn’t be a chance. You know that. Is that right?

Kissinger: And there wouldn’t be a chance with the Russians if we hadn’t played them so cool all along.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Hell, they were going to give SALT away the first year.
Nixon: That’s right. Oh, sure. SALT. Yeah, they would have given the Mideast away—not the Mideast but Berlin.
Kissinger: Berlin.
Nixon: They were going to give Berlin away. They’ll do anything for Willy Brandt.
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: Right. To hell with them. Don’t give them a thing.
Kissinger: And if we hadn’t—if you hadn’t done Cambodia—
Nixon: Ha!
Kissinger: Basically, we gained with the Russians with these tough moves. They screamed a bit, but that’s something they understand.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: We'll know by Friday what he's come back with.\textsuperscript{5}

\[\text{[Omitted here is further discussion of opponents to the President's policies.]}\]

\textsuperscript{5} During a meeting in the Oval Office the next afternoon, Kissinger reported that Dobrynin would return to Washington on April 22—one day later than expected—due to problems with his flight connections. “We might as well find out what they’ve got to say, if anything,” Kissinger commented. “And if he has nothing, that too will be significant. Trying to sweat us out—in that case, we have to go unilaterally.” Kissinger suggested that Nixon might want to “make the SALT offer then public.” The two men also discussed how to proceed with Dobrynin. Kissinger: “I’ll ask him for lunch on Friday.” Nixon: “Well, that doesn’t make any difference about whether you appear to be too eager. Screw them. Right now, there’s no eagerness. It’s cold turkey. Understand?” Kissinger: “It’s cold turkey. I’m just going to tell him—” Nixon: “All right. [unclear]” Kissinger: “—If you have nothing—?” Nixon: “What’s up?” Kissinger: “If you have nothing, go and see Rogers from now on.” Nixon: “That’s right.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 484-13)
“One of Two Routes”: Soviet-American Relations and Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China, April 23–July 18, 1971

188. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


[Omitted here is discussion of Chile.]

Nixon: What I was going to say, that—it had to relate to your meeting with Dobrynin. You may come to the point where—first, you may—you may have the point about, first, the SALT thing. The second point that you may have, either with it, or have to consider, is the summit thing.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: What we want [them] to understand is that while we, of course, want SALT—

Kissinger: No, we can do the summit—

Nixon: —we also need to have the summit. We will take it with it—we can take the summit without it.

Kissinger: I’ve understood that.

Nixon: And we’ve got to—I mean, I’d indicate that to him, that I may. But the other point is that I think that in terms of the announcement of it, now, we’re not going to screw around.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: I want the announcement made early.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: I don’t mean three weeks from now. I don’t mean two weeks from now. If he’s—let’s put him right to the sword and find out, “When do you want to announce it?”

Kissinger: Well, Mr. President—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 487–7. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met in the Oval Office on April 23 from 11:56 a.m. to 12:19 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
Nixon: We need to start talking about this. In other words—

Kissinger: I—

Nixon: —let’s try to move his timetable up and get it sealed, because, you know, things can happen between now and that demonstration, of course, which might change their mind.

Kissinger: My—I will do that. My judgment is that, given the fact that they have these damn [Politburo] meetings every Thursday, that two weeks is the earliest they can do it.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: But I will push for the earliest possible summit announcement and in less than—in a matter of a week or two. And for all we know—

Nixon: He may—and the SALT thing, be ready to announce it as soon as we can.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: You see what I mean?

Kissinger: The SALT they ought to be able to announce within a week. There’s just no excuse why we can’t do that and then this summit, two or three days afterwards. I may just—it would be, if we could write the script, be best if they came in sequence. But I—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: They shouldn’t be held up for each other.

Nixon: The reason that we cannot do it on that basis at the present time—there are some advantages to us in having something positive in the near future.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Now, if we can’t get it, you won’t get it. I understand that.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: But we know how—what kind of game he plays too.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: If they play with us now, it’s cold turkey. If he wants to do something, fine. We should hold them—

Kissinger: That’s exactly—

Nixon: But I don’t want to have a long tortured deal where he’s really diddling us and—because that’s what they did before. They’ve been doing that a long time. This is fish or cut bait.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: So today, we decide when we’re going to—if we’re going to have an agreement on the SALT, when we release it. And second, if we’re going to have a summit, when we’ll announce that. And let’s go on it. As I hinted, I believe we should go on it now—
Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: —on the announcement. In other words, I’m not thinking in terms of, “We are reasonable, we’ll wait two or three weeks and try to pick a time,” and so forth. Do it whenever the time is good for us, because that will override a lot of other things that are going on.

Kissinger: Right. Right.

Nixon: For a while.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: [By] override, I mean, like the—as you know, it won’t last too long. The China thing has lasted, I mean, it lasted a couple of days and then it flew out the window.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Now, we’ll—

Kissinger: I think this China thing—

Nixon: This one is longer—

Kissinger: Oberdorfer had a very good story today—

Nixon: I know. I know. But that’s just been one article.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: If it’s not television, it’s gone. You see, the point is that you have to realize that that’s what really matters in terms of the public thing. After all, the television at the present time is—has zeroed in on these people. It’ll zero in on the demonstrations Saturday. And then they’ll try to play it with the next two weeks. They’re stringing it out, and it’s highly unconscionable reporting on the part of television.

Kissinger: Oh, it’s awful.

Nixon: Highly unconscionable. They’re just—

Kissinger: Well, they want to destroy you and they want us to lose in Vietnam.

Nixon: I really think that it’s more, it’s more the latter. If they destroy me, I think it’s—if they think, they know, they know that they’re both the same.

Kissinger: That’s right.

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2 In his article, Oberdorfer observed: “Mr. Nixon’s change in direction, reflecting a lengthy process of personal and official consideration, is a sign of his own growth as well as a sign of the times. The emerging turn in China policy may prove to be one of his historic moves as President.” (Don Oberdorfer, “Nixon’s Swing on China,” Washington Post, April 23, p. A23) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Oberdorfer on April 20 from 3:05 to 3:46 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No other record of the conversation has been found.

3 April 24. A coalition of anti-war groups and labor unions organized a mass rally in Washington on April 24, attracting an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 demonstrators.
Nixon: But deep down, basically, you want to realize that critics of the war are furious, that when they thought they had it licked, when they threw Johnson out of office, they thought, “Well, now, we’ve won our point on the war.” Now, we’ve come in and it looks like we’re going to—they know what it is.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: They do, because, despite all the way we, look, put the cosmetics on, Henry, they know goddamn well that what our policy is, is to win the war.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: And winning the war simply means—

Kissinger: But it—

Nixon: —that South Vietnam survives. That’s all.

Kissinger: To come out honorably—

Nixon: That wins the war.

Kissinger: That’s right.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam, including opposition in Washington and negotiations in Paris.]

189. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 23, 1971, 1 p.m.

Lunch Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, April 23, 1971, 1:00 p.m., Map Room

I invited Dobrynin to lunch when he called me for an appointment upon his return from Moscow. The conversation was cordial but businesslike. Dobrynin began the conversation by saying he had read the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original. According to another copy, Kissinger and Young drafted the memorandum of conversation on April 26. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Berlin, Vol. 3 [1 of 2]) Kissinger then forwarded it and a memorandum summarizing its “highlights” to the President on April 28. A note on the summary memorandum indicates that the President saw it. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 3:13 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) For their memoir accounts, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 817, 827–828, 834; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 220–221.

2 No record of the telephone conversation has been found.
accounts of the Party Congress with great interest. He did not read in them a particular direction or new departure in foreign policy. On the contrary, he thought it in effect reaffirmed the direction of the previous Party Congress; that is to say, it stated a general proposition vis-à-vis the United States which would have to be given content by the Soviet Government later. However, it was in general to be stressed that the Soviet Union desired to improve relations. Dobrynin added that he thought the composition of the Politburo had not changed, contrary to what Western newspapers had said. The four new members had been candidate members previously and had attended the meetings. The fact that Kosygin followed Podgorny in the rank order was of no significance but reflected only the higher offices in the state that Podgorny occupied. It was clear that Brezhnev was the stronger figure but then the Party Secretary had always been strong. He had until recently not been as interested in foreign policy as some of his predecessors but this was beginning to change.

We then turned to current matters. I first asked Dobrynin what had happened to the private meeting between Abrasimov and Rush.\(^3\) Dobrynin answered that Abrasimov had had the impression that Rush was evading him. He had left early from a lunch that he had attended and at which Abrasimov had intended to ask him for a private meeting. [\textit{Note:} I consider this very improbable. If Abrasimov had been instructed to have a private meeting, he would have found a way of making this known.]

We then turned to SALT. Dobrynin pulled out of his pocket a draft reply to a proposal of the President which conceded most of our points except for the Safeguard/Moscow arrangement. [A copy of the Soviet letter is attached at Tab (a).] I told Dobrynin that we would have difficulty accepting a Moscow/Washington exchange. Dobrynin said that it would be politically very difficult in the Soviet Union to accept it on any other basis. He said it would be hard to sell to the Politburo, that we could protect weapons while they had to protect their populations. He said that this might look like a cover for improving our ability to attack them.

I said this was wrong on two grounds. One, if we wanted to attack them we did not need to protect the missiles. The missiles were protected against an attack by them and therefore it was clearly a de-

\(^3\) In an April 19 message to Kissinger, Rush reported that Abrasimov had canceled their meeting, which had been scheduled for April 16; see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 221. In his summary memorandum to the President, Kissinger added the following parenthetical comment: "I have since queried Rush on this and he answered that Abrasimov had ample opportunity to indicate to him that he wanted to arrange a private meeting. It is more likely that Abrasimov was not instructed, though Dobrynin says that it is untrue."
fensive intent. Secondly, the Soviet ABM ring around Moscow did protect 500 of their missiles. Dobrynin said this was nonsense, that no Soviet missiles were within a hundred kilometers of Moscow. I said I did not say they were within a hundred kilometers of Moscow, but that they were protected by the ABM ring within a hundred kilometers of Moscow. Dobrynin said that this was highly unlikely and even if it were true, it would be next to impossible to explain to the ordinary Soviet citizen. I said he was not doing justice to the ability of his government to convince their citizens. Dobrynin said it would be a really major matter to reopen the issue within the government. I said I would have to take up their reply with the President and let him know.4

The conversation then turned to Berlin. Dobrynin said that the Western response had been very disappointing to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had tried to meet our points on a number of key issues but had failed to obtain our support. At the last meeting, Rush had been very negative and so had Hillenbrand in conversations with Vorontsov. The Soviet Government was wondering just what was going on. I told Dobrynin that the President was not prepared to issue orders until we had agreed in principle on the direction we were going to take and that until then Rush was going to get the ordinary instructions from the bureaucracy.

Dobrynin agreed to my proposal that instead of Abrasimov and Rush meeting, there should be meetings between Falin and Rush. Dobrynin wondered whether we could not ask Hillenbrand to participate in these meetings. I said this would be very hard from the instruction point of view—it would put matters into normal bureaucratic channels. Dobrynin wondered whether I could have a talk with Bahr, since Bahr, he said, knew the Soviet position very well and might have some ideas on how to handle it. I said I would talk to Bahr in Woodstock, Vermont this weekend. I would assure him that we would go as far as we could consistent with our obligation to our Allies and our relationships with the Federal Republic. But it was necessary that the Soviet Union understood our special problems.

4 In an April 24 memorandum to Sonnenfeldt, Haig reported: “Henry would like you to prepare a reply to the note which he got from Dobrynin Friday [April 23] which is attached.” According to Haig, Kissinger wanted a “very brief reply,” expressing appreciation for the Soviet draft but emphasizing the “fundamental principle of simultaneity” as a “non-negotiable precondition.” Haig, however, added at the end of the memorandum: “Henry called me Saturday morning and suggested that he was now thinking of a tougher response to the Soviets which would attempt to preserve the Safeguard option while of course not giving on the principle of simultaneity for the ABM agreement and the offensive freeze.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1])
I then asked Dobrynin about the prospects of a Summit Meeting. Dobrynin said he wanted to repeat the invitation of the Soviet Government for a visit by the President. He also wanted to make clear that September was a reasonable date. On the other hand he was bound to tell me that he did not think that a visit was likely until after the Berlin question was settled. It would be impossible to convince their Allies—Soviet Allies—that such a meeting could be fruitful unless the Berlin question was settled first.

I reacted very sharply. I told Dobrynin that I had heard many eloquent descriptions of the difficulties of linkage. We had proposed a Summit Meeting over a year ago in order to make some progress in basic Soviet/American relationships. If this was to be the case, then it was inconceivable for the Soviet Union to make prior conditions. I did not yet know what the President’s reaction would be but I suspected that if there existed a definite plan to have a conference, the President might feel that he had some obligations of good faith. If the conference were used to bring pressure on him, his reaction was likely to be the opposite.

Dobrynin then said that I must have misunderstood him, the Soviet Government wanted a Summit Meeting but it was a reality that there should be some progress on Berlin, not a condition. I told him I was familiar with that formulation since I had used it very often to justify the theory of linkage and I simply wanted to stress that it was an unacceptable formulation to use towards the President. We agreed that I would consider further the issue of the SALT exchange and that we would be in touch next week.

With respect to the agenda of a Summit, Dobrynin said that it could include Middle East and SALT, and he also wanted to stress that the Soviet Union was prepared to sign something on provocative attack. I told him that we would probably not be prepared to sign anything regarding provocative attack, but we would be prepared to discuss it in a very restricted circle. Dobrynin said that the Soviet leadership was relaxed about the subject, but they just wanted to indicate that they remained ready to discuss it.

5 According to Dobrynin, the Politburo met after the Party Congress in early April to discuss its response to Nixon’s “message” on the summit. During the meeting, Gromyko convinced his colleagues to delay agreement on the summit in the hope that Nixon would then expedite an agreement on Berlin. “When the Politburo meeting was over,” Dobrynin later recalled, “Brezhnev told me in private that although the decision of the majority not to agree right away on a summit had to be respected, I was on the right track toward a summit and should ‘proceed along these lines.’ He added, ‘The summit is most likely to be held next year.’” Dobrynin further noted: “I knew perfectly well why Kissinger was disgruntled, but I was bound by the Politburo decision. I was not surprised later that our tough response on Berlin made Nixon set his sights on visiting China before he would visit the Soviet Union. That was a direct result of Gromyko’s Politburo proposal.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 218–221)
Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East. He asked me whether I could give him some details about the Israeli proposal on the Suez Canal. I said that it had been essentially covered in the press. Dobrynin said that he could not understand the Secretary’s trip. The United States seemed to be mediating, negotiating, coming up with all the proposals, and then receiving them at the other end. He said there was a lot of activity, but it wouldn’t get anywhere. At some point, he said, you will have to wind up talking to us, but we will not propose it any further.

[End of Conversation.]

Tab (a)

Draft Letter From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

“The Soviet Government has carefully considered the course of the exchange of opinion between the USSR and the United States delegations at the strategic armaments limitation talks.

Proceeding from the situation shaping up now at those talks, the Soviet Government believes it expedient to concentrate in the current year on solving the questions related to the limitation of ABM systems in order to conduct after the conclusion of a separate agreement on ABM limitation, active talks aimed at limiting strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet Government proceeds in this from the mutual understanding to the effect that the ABM limitation will constitute an important factor also in restraining the strategic offensive armaments race.

In order to facilitate more favorable conditions for finding ways of reaching an agreement on strategic offensive weapons limitation, the Soviet side considers acceptable in principle the idea of ‘freezing’ strategic offensive weapons and is prepared for reaching a basic understanding on this point having in mind that concrete details of such understanding—including questions related to the composition of strategic offensive weapons, as well as to the nature and dates of possible ‘freezing’—could be discussed before the work on the separate ABM agreement is completed. We proceed from the assumption that a ‘freeze’ on strategic offensive weapons should not affect the possibility of modernization and replacement of such weapons.

6 Rogers attended a SEATO Council meeting in London and a CENTO Ministerial meeting in Ankara before beginning his tour of the Middle East on May 1, which included stops in Riyadh, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

7 No classification marking. A handwritten notation at the top of the first page reads: “Delivered 1:00 pm, 4/23 to Mr. Kissinger by Amb D.”
Guided by this, the Soviet Government will give instructions to its delegation at the strategic armaments limitation talks with the United States delegation to conduct negotiations in Vienna, aimed at drawing up the text of the ABM agreement proceeding from the assumption that deployment of the ABM systems by the USSR and the United States should be limited to the systems needed for the defense of the capitals—Moscow and Washington.

In such an agreement the obligation of the sides to continue active negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons will be fixed.”

190. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


Kissinger: Hello, Mr. President.
Nixon: Who won?
Kissinger: It was a draw.² To sum it up, Mr. President, they’ve, to all practical purposes, given in on this SALT thing. They’ve come back with a letter from Kosygin and they’re willing to have the exchange of letters published. Up to now, they wanted it secret. There’s still one point, which I will raise in a minute. On the summit, they reaffirmed the invitation and they want it in September. I mean, they agreed with us that it should be September. They do not want an announcement now. And they say there has to be some progress in Berlin; they can never explain it to the Politburo. And I—when he said that, I blew my top—I mean, deliberately. I said, “Now,” I said, “You’re making a terrible mistake.” I said, “If we have a goal, then the President, who never plays for little stakes, would recognize that it has to fit into this framework. If you’re trying to hold him up with Berlin as a means to get to the summit, you don’t understand him. I’m not even sure if he’ll let me continue talking to you on Berlin under these circumstances.” I thought this—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 487–21. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 3:20 to 3:36 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² See Document 189.
Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: This was the only way of doing it, because we really cannot promise to be able to deliver on Berlin.\(^3\)

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: I mean, the Germans have screwed it up to such a fare-thee-well that they may not be prepared to yield anything. I’m seeing Bahr this weekend. He’s up there. And I’ll have a better estimate at that Woodstock conference. My estimate is—oh, he was really—then he started explaining, “Oh, they’re enthusiastic. Don’t you realize what a tremendous thing it is for us, the first American President in the Soviet Union? That we have four new members in the Politburo?” “I try,” he said, “you have only one man to convince. I had to talk to all fifteen.”

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: He said, “To sell this was almost impossible.” That I even believe—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: —because on this one they have yielded 98 percent. They’ve practically accepted our position on the SALT. They’re giving us a hell of a lot more than—

Nixon: What is left? Well, let’s look at where we start from here. What about the SALT position? What’s—

Kissinger: Well, they [unclear]—

Nixon: What is the timing?

Kissinger: Well, that we can settle next week. We could publish the exchange of letters within a week.


Nixon: Why don’t you get back to him [Dobrynin] now, though, as time is of the essence here now? We’ve got to, you understand? We have a—we have a little bit of a problem in terms of—

Kissinger: All right.

\(^3\) Haldeman, who also attended this meeting, described the outcome in his diary: “It turns out [Kissinger’s] got the SALT Agreement at least 90 percent okay; the only question the Russians raise is that they want to go back to the Washington Plan rather than the Safeguard Plan, whereas we’ve just shifted from Washington to Safeguard. The P agreed we could work that out, not in the open agreement, but under negotiation.” “The [summit] thing has stalled on the problem of the Berlin settlement,” Haldeman added, “and the Russians will not announce it until they have something worked out on Berlin.” “Henry says they’re in complete agreement on it. They like the idea of September instead of August, so we’ve won that point; and they are pushing hard to get the P there, so he thinks it’s going to work out, that we don’t have any real problem in keeping them hanging in on it.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
Nixon: —what benefit it is. Look, let me put it this way: all this is a bunch of shit, as you know. It’s not worth a damn. But the point is that in terms of our public relations, we can use something like this at this time. I—

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: —don’t want to have anything wrong for public relations reasons, but I don’t want to horse around and put it out three weeks from now when it doesn’t make a goddamn bit of difference.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: You see my point?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: And so, I—you can work the thing out. Fine.

Kissinger: All right. I’ll call—

Nixon: How would you—?

Kissinger: I’ll call him. I said I’d talk to you—

Nixon: You could call him and say, “All right, we’ve talked about it,” and that I suggested a formula. Why don’t you put it that way?

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: That we’ll have here—that I suggested a formula, whereby we’d move to a private undertaking on this, and keep it out of the—let’s—don’t get specific in terms of the Moscow-Washington thing.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: We’ll have an answer right away.


Nixon: What do you have to talk about at the summit?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: What do you have left to talk about?

Kissinger: Oh, at the summit? Oh, the final agreement on this. And that won’t be all straightened out. It will be signed at the summit.

Nixon: I see.

Kissinger: And we’ll have—

Nixon: I—you see what I mean Henry? I think we’ve got to have something that will come out of that, you know [unclear]—

Kissinger: I’ll fix that. I’ll guarantee you that it won’t be settled before. You see, once we get this exchange done, Mr. President—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —the next thing, the next move you can make—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —is to separate out the accidental issue.

Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: And get that agreement signed this summer. They’ve already offered it.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: That you can get done in four weeks.
Nixon: Well, you feel then that they came out about like you expected then, right?
Kissinger: Yeah, I thought, they’re—they’re a cool bunch. I thought—they are dying to get you to Moscow, Mr. President, and I think it would be a mistake for us to promise them a Berlin agreement. In fact, what I’m inclined to say, when I see him, is to say “Your reaction was just what I predicted.” That you just make no commitments until then, when they are ready for the summit. I said, “You think you’re doing the President a favor about the summit. You’re absolutely wrong.”
Nixon: That’s right—
Kissinger: “—we’re not going to pay any price for the summit. We make agreements in our mutual interests or not at all.” But they want you there. About that there’s no doubt. Because as soon as I got tough—
Nixon: Yeah.
Haldeman: The sooner—
Kissinger: Because as soon as I got tough, he started pulling back. He said, “No, no, no, you misunderstood. You have to tell the President we are renewing the invitation. September is an excellent time. It’s a good time, still good weather”—
Nixon: Yeah, but when do they—when do they want to announce it?
Kissinger: Well, then I said, “Look, we would like to make the announcement four months ahead of time. That’s what we always do with state visits.” He said, “Well, two months is a little better.” I think they have a massive problem of getting their government to [unclear].
Nixon: Make it three months.
Kissinger: And I think they really want it. They probably may need some progress on Berlin. But I think—I’m seeing Bahr this weekend, and I think they know there’ll be progress on Berlin. And they’re using this to—
Nixon: Um-hmm [unclear]. So it came out pretty well? Didn’t it?
Kissinger: Well, I think this one, I think your SALT agreement, Mr. President—
Nixon: Without China—without China, they aren’t going to [unclear]—
Kissinger: The SALT agreement is going to drive Berlin.
Nixon: Let me tell you something: without China, they never would have agreed to the SALT.
Kissinger: Because this—
Nixon: Yeah—?
Kissinger: [unclear] SALT. I don’t plague you with it. What they started with—
Nixon: I know. And a hell of a long way.
Kissinger: This is 90 percent of what we—
Nixon: Can I—but I just say I think you’re absolutely right. Make the private commitment, like we did with the other. All right, leave Washington and New York out of it—leave Washington and Moscow out of it. We’ll just work out an agreement on that at the proper time. Is that what we do?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Provided they agree to the freeze on January 1st.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: But he can put that date in, can’t he? What the hell, you’ve got to have a date in it.
Kissinger: He can’t put it in the letter.
Nixon: Huh?
Kissinger: It has to be negotiated.
Nixon: The date of January 1st?
Kissinger: Of the freeze.
Nixon: Oh, I see. But you want to have a private understanding—?
Kissinger: I want him to agree. We—we promised him we’ll yield on this—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —and, we want them to promise—
Nixon: Yeah—
Kissinger: —[unclear] that what I had originally proposed—
Nixon: Right. And that when we agree to the summit, we will set that date.
Kissinger: Right.4

[Omitted here is further discussion of several issues, including how to handle the Secretary of State.]

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4 During a telephone conversation at 5 p.m., Kissinger and Dobrynin continued their discussion of SALT and Berlin: “K: I have had a talk with the President. The Berlin reaction was what I predicted. D: On the first or second? K: On language. D: On that one. K: On specifics I will talk to you next week after the weekend conversation [with Bahr]. On the letter I—many positive aspects in it and only one problem that concerns the President at this point I made to you on which I will have a compromise suggestion that will try to meet your point.” The two men agreed to meet again on Monday, April 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)
191. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of the United Nations and Vietnam.]
Kissinger: I’m seeing Dobrynin at noon and I wanted to check with you before I did.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I believe, Mr. President, that your instinct on Saturday\(^2\) is the right one, that I ought to be—
Nixon: Oh, yes.
Kissinger: —tough with him.
Nixon: Tough as hell. So what—you can’t do anything?
Kissinger: No, what I was—

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, in particular, the politics of the POW issue. During this discussion—a portion of which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 191—the subject of Kissinger’s upcoming meeting with Dobrynin was briefly mentioned three times.]

Kissinger: But on Dobrynin, what I thought I was going to tell him is that you’re developing serious doubts whether these talks—
Nixon: Yes.
Kissinger: —are ever going to get anywhere.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: That, as far as the summit is concerned, we’ve now talked about it for a year. We are not going to raise it again.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: When they are ready to have it, they should give us the day. And that it must be summer.
Nixon: But the President—we—the President’s now going to make other plans—
Kissinger: Yeah.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 489–5. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 11:52 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) April 24.
Nixon: —on that period. We have to plan four months in advance and so we’ll just have to wait and see.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: You see what I mean?
Kissinger: That’s right. Now, on the other things, I think—
Nixon: SALT?
Kissinger: —on the SALT, we should stick to our position. We’ve gone very far by offering them a separate ABM agreement.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And, there’s no—they may give—well, it’s just absurd for them to tell us that—
Nixon: What we—
Kissinger: —we have to tear down what we are building—
Nixon: No.
Kissinger: —but how they can keep what they’re building.
Nixon: Just say, “I’m sorry,” and strike it out. And don’t tell them we agree to [unclear]. You’ll say that’s—are you going to say it’s negotiable?
Kissinger: No, I’m going to say that they can raise it but our position will be—I was going to hand him a note saying our position will be, that for the United States it will be based on the system and the process of deployment.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. That’s right. That’s right. That’s right. Good. And then, if he turns you down, that’s it.3

3 Haldeman, who also attended the meeting, described the conversation in his diary as follows: “He did have Henry and me in at one point this morning, and Henry obviously was very much depressed because the general developments had not been what he had hoped. I didn’t get a full reading on what the problem was. I suspected at the time that his SALT plan had probably fallen through, and I don’t know whether that’s the case or not. In any event, the P made a very determined effort to try to cheer Henry up and didn’t really succeed.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
192. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 26, 1971, noon.

Meeting with Dobrynin, Noon, April 26, The Map Room, The White House

The meeting took place at my request. It was conducted in a deliberately businesslike and aloof manner. It covered the following topics.

Summit Meeting

I began the conversation by telling Dobrynin that the President had over the weekend reviewed the discussions on the Summit. He had come to the conclusion that we had been proposing a Summit for a year now and, for one reason or another, it had never been seriously taken up. Last August, an invitation to Kosygin had not had a response for two months. Then when Gromyko renewed the discussions, and we accepted them in principle, there had been another hiatus of three months. The Soviet Government then renewed the invitation. Now, there was another hiatus.

We therefore wanted to make the following points clear. (1) The linkage of the Summit to any preconditions was totally unacceptable to us. The Summit would take place when it was in the mutual interest of both parties, and could not be used as a lever on other negotiations. (2) The President believed that he had made his views clear, and he was not prepared to discuss it any further. The next move was up to the Soviet Government. We made our plans several months ahead, and if they could not be realized on that basis, we would have to make some other arrangements. The next time the Soviet Government approached us, however, on the Summit, it had to be prepared to announce it. We were not prepared to engage in what Gromyko, himself, had called fencing. Dobrynin said I must have misunderstood him. The Soviet Government did not insist on protocol—the invitation, of course, still stood, but he would convey this to the Soviet Government.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on April 27. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation and an undated memorandum summarizing its “highlights” to the President. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it on April 28. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting began at 12:14 and lasted until 1:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)


3 See Documents 24 and 103.

4 See Document 167.
Berlin

I then turned the conversation to Berlin and mentioned to Dobrynin my conversation with Bahr over the weekend.5 I said that the only way we could see of breaking the deadlock would be to redraft both documents and to remove the juridical claims from both versions. The documents would then retain the existing form, but would simply state the obligations and responsibilities of both sides but not the legal justification for it.

If this approach was acceptable to the Soviet Union, we would introduce it at the Western Consultative Meeting on May 17th and, after that, draft a document accordingly. Falin and Rush could meet secretly to work out the details and possible compromises of the drafts, and Bahr would be prepared to join these meetings. This seemed to me the best way of making progress.6

Dobrynin said it seemed to him a reasonable procedure but, of course, he could not tell until he had seen some formulations. I said that Bahr would be prepared to give him the formulations on May 4th after consultation with Rush and Brandt. Bahr would give the formulations to Falin.

Dobrynin asked whether Falin should take the initiative for a meeting or whether Bahr would. I said Bahr would take the initiative. Dobrynin, nevertheless, wondered whether I could give him an informal basis some ideas of what we had in mind. I said I would try on a thinking-out-loud basis.

SALT

I told Dobrynin that the President had carefully studied the draft reply of the Soviet Government.7 I said from our point of view there

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5 While Nixon spent the weekend at Camp David, Kissinger attended a meeting of the Bilderberg Group in Woodstock, Vermont, where he discussed the Berlin negotiations there with Bahr, including a German draft agreement. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 230.
6 According to a handwritten note, Kissinger went to the meeting with an excerpt from Rush’s April 25 message on his aborted meeting with Abrasimov, presumably intending to show the text to Dobrynin. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [part 1]) In an April 28 message, Kissinger assured Rush that he had given “Dobrynin hell about Abrasimov.” Kissinger also reported on the process for secret talks on Berlin: “I agreed with Bahr that he go over with you the draft of the approach which meets the juridical formulations. If you agree, Bahr would then take up the neutral formulations with Falin as an illustrative approach. If the Soviets indicate to us that this is a possible approach, we then introduce it in the Western Four. Falin and you can then meet privately with the occasional assistance of Bahr. You would conduct most of the negotiations with Falin, while Dobrynin and I backstop on big issues.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) Rush replied on April 29 that this procedure was “excellent and will enable us to operate effectively.” (Ibid.)
7 Printed as an attachment to Document 189.
were two major problems with it. Point one was it only offered to discuss the idea of a freeze, not to conclude it. This I did not consider a concession since they were already obligated to discuss offensive limitations under the SALT agreement. Secondly, we could not accept any exchange that we would confine the ABM deployments to Washington and Moscow. This had to be settled during the negotiations.

I said the Soviet Government had an important decision to make. If this exchange foundered, they could, of course, see whether in the direct negotiations they could do better. My own view was that whatever the ultimate outcome, it would take a lot longer to resolve the issue than at present, and I therefore felt that if the Soviet Government wanted progress, it should agree to this exchange of letters.

I also showed Dobrynin the draft reply from the President, and I read him the verbal note. Dobrynin said it would complicate matters too much if we let their letter stand and it would be easier if we included the sentence about the requirement of an agreement on a freeze, as well as delete the Washington/Moscow reference. However, he would have to refer to Moscow in order to be able to get an answer. We then drafted a sentence which read as follows:

"The agreement on limiting ABM systems and the understanding on freezing offensive deployments would be concluded simultaneously."

I told Dobrynin that we would like to release these letters in order to give the proper impetus and that we would call Smith back from Vienna for that purpose. Dobrynin said that he would have an answer in a week. He also said that if the Soviet Union deleted the reference to Washington/Moscow, it would like to be able to count on the fact that we would eventually yield on it. I said this was obviously absurd. He asked whether we were absolutely locked into our position. I said we were prepared to negotiate, but I cannot be hopeful that we are going to change our view. However, after an interval of serious negotiations, both governments should look at the positions and see where they are. We could hardly want an exchange if we were determined to produce a deadlock, but we believe that the Soviet proposal is inequitable since it asks us to tear down what we have built while they keep what they have built. We believed that the Soviet Government, once it considers the matter, will see that we are essentially right. Dobrynin said he would have to refer the matter to Moscow and again promised an answer within a week.

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8 Attached but not printed. See footnote 4, Document 189.
9 Attached but not printed.
193. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule.]

Kissinger: I think we’re going to get that SALT thing, Mr. President.
Nixon: How’d you get along with Dobrynin?2
Kissinger: Well, I decided to follow—I mean, I did exactly what
you told me.3

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on scheduling.]

Kissinger: Well, to sum it up. I said [unclear]—I said to him,
“What about the summit? We’ve been to—you must be suffering from a
mis—’ I said, “You must suffer from a misapprehension. The sum-
mit must reflect mutual interests, or it isn’t worth doing. So, we’ve
talked to you about it for a year. There’s no sense—your Foreign Min-
ister said, ‘Let’s not have fencing matches.’4 We seem to be having a
fencing match, so the President has said he’s got to make—he’s mak-
ing his plans. When you are ready to have a summit, you let us know,
but don’t come to me unless you are ready to set a date and announce
it quickly.” He said, “Oh, no, no, we’re planning on it. September, of
course, we’re planning on it.” I said, “Well, it’s all right. You, you
come to us when you are ready.” He said: “Oh, we are not insistent
on protocol.” Well, so we left it at that, then.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Then I, I have worked out a—

Nixon: Your feeling there is that they want the summit [unclear]
but that they don’t want to announce it for a couple months—

Kissinger: Well, they don’t want to announce it for two reasons.
One, they want to show that Brezhnev negotiated the thing—

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: —and he just took over. Second, they’re thugs and they
always try to pick up some loose change along the way.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Con-
versation 489–17. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the
tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s
Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 3:56 to 4:12 p.m. (Ibid., White
House Central Files).

2 See Document 192.
3 See Document 191.
4 See Document 167.
Nixon: Oh, yeah.
Kissinger: And they just ran up against the wrong guy.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: You just didn’t give them any loose change. Secondly, I have worked out with Bahr, who was up at Woodstock—
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: —and with Rush, a very intricate way of handling the Berlin problem,5 which I don’t want to bore you with, but which I really think now has a chance, and which has the other advantage of putting the control in our hands. It’s to take out all the legal phrases—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —and just talk about the facts, who will do what, but not on what basis.
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: And this has the great advantage that if they don’t play ball, we just tell Rush not to come to any meetings.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: So I’ll put that to him. And thirdly, I mentioned SALT.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I said, “Frankly the President wonders whether, if we can’t work this out, whether there is any sense of having any further talks.”
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: And—
Nixon: Absolutely.
Kissinger: —I said, “Here is the fact: you are asking us to tear down what we built as the first step of a negotiation. How can the President go to the Congress, leaving aside his convictions, and say the Russians are dealing with us in good faith? We’re doing this.” So I said, “Either you take out that sentence or we’ll put in a sentence in the President’s reply saying we disagree with it, in which case it’s pointless. Also, we must have another sentence in that, your letter, that says—” They had said they will discuss simultaneously the freezing. I said, “You can’t just discuss it, you have to agree to it, the limit-freezing of offensive weapons.” Now, that second sentence, he agreed to immediately. He said, “We’re willing to conclude that.” On taking out the Moscow one, he said he had to refer to Moscow, but he thinks he has an answer by the end of this week. And—
Nixon: Do you want to stay [unclear] to work on it?

5 See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 192.
Kissinger: No, I said, “Also the President wants to announce it, if we exchange these letters.” So we could announce that, probably—I—he was really chastened. I didn’t joke with him this time. I said, “Mr. Ambassador,” this, this, and this. And I think we’re going to get it.


Nixon: My guess is that Dobrynin will take a little time.

Kissinger: Well, I think it’s so close. They are either going to do it now or not.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: There’s no more in it.

Nixon: Yeah, yeah. Except, the really—the key point is whether or not they are willing to take out the sentence with regard to Washington only.

Kissinger: Right. They will be.

Nixon: They will be?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: But, he wasn’t—he didn’t have any authority to concede that, though?

Kissinger: No. But I just cannot conceive them challenging you directly, particularly—even though I didn’t say so to him, since they know we can screw up the Berlin negotiations to a fare-thee-well.

Nixon: That’s right. We will.

[Omitted here is discussion on Vietnam.]

Nixon: Well, this meeting you had with Dobrynin will get back to them [the North Vietnamese] too.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: I think—don’t you think that the tone of that will get back to them?

Kissinger: Oh, I was really tough.

Nixon: You have to be.

Kissinger: That was the toughest since Cuba—

Nixon: Cuba.

Kissinger: —and his reaction was exactly the same.

Nixon: Since the time I had him in here?

Kissinger: No, since the time on the Cuban missile—

Nixon: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Kissinger: Of course, they’ve had their tender out of there now for three months.

Nixon: Well, put it right—put it right to him now. I mean, “As far as the summit is concerned, you let us know.”
Kissinger: I—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I think that’s can’t miss.
Nixon: Pursue the Chinese thing as hard as you can.
Kissinger: Yeah, I—
Nixon: It has to be pursued.
[Omitted here is discussion on China, Vietnam, and the President’s schedule.]

194. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Black and Baltic Sea Operations

The attached memorandum from Secretary Laird (Tab 1)\(^2\) encloses tracks of both the Black Sea (Tab A) and Baltic Sea (Tab B)\(^3\) non-reconnaissance operations revised in accordance with your wishes.

The Black Sea Task Group comprised of four destroyers entered the Black Sea on 16 April and will remain there for a total period of five days including two 12-hour loiter periods.

The Baltic Sea Task Group comprised of the aircraft carrier *Intrepid*, two destroyers, and a destroyer escort will operate in the Baltic Sea area from 16 to 26 May with a three-day port visit to Kiel, West Germany, during the period 21–24 May.

Ambassador Peterson requested cancellation of a port visit to Helsinki as the scheduled presence of two British ships there at the same time would place a strain on Finnish hospitality. An appropriate U.S. visit to Helsinki will be arranged at a later date.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject File, USSR US Ships in the Black Sea (Silver Fox). Secret. Sent for information. According to a notation and attached correspondence profile, the President saw the memorandum on May 5.

\(^2\) Dated April 17; attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
195. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 27, 1971, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place at my initiative in order to put before Dobrynin the general outline of our approach as it was developed between Bahr and me at Woodstock the previous weekend. I told Dobrynin that if the Soviet Government agreed to the general approach, we would try to find juridically neutral formulations to introduce the substance of each section and to confine the negotiations on Berlin to the practicalities of access, Federal presence, and similar matters.

Dobrynin said that he would have to transmit this to Moscow but, in principle, it seemed to him like a fruitful approach. I handed Dobrynin the German formulations since I was afraid that, if I undertook the translation, I would miss some words of art and because the draft had been prepared by Bahr. Dobrynin took the formulations, and there was some discussion as to whether they could be transmitted in the clear without indicating what they were, or whether there was some other way of transmitting them. I told him I would check and later called him to say that it would be better if they went in code.

We then discussed general subjects. I told Dobrynin that our approach on Berlin should indicate our good faith in attempting to come to some understanding with the Soviets. However, we were struck by the rapidity of their responses on Berlin and the slowness of their responses on SALT. I said I understood that they had a great interest in Berlin, but our interest as a nation was relatively less. Dobrynin said this was true—that the Soviet Government would appreciate it very much if there were some progress on Berlin, and they would take it as a sign of our good will. On the other hand, Dobrynin said that SALT...
was not a matter of such great concern to the Soviet Union because it ran into a lot of vested interests and the Soviet Government could take it or leave it. I told Dobrynin this was astonishing. Ever since the first six months of our stay in office we were being constantly pressed by the Soviets to move on SALT. He said, yes, but that had been on the basis of an agreement on general principles which Johnson had proposed to them. It was not in order to produce the sort of detailed solution that we were now advocating. Moreover, Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government thought their latest response to us had been within the framework of what we had wanted and now they would have to go back to the whole machinery again, and he was afraid that it would take some time. He did not think that there could be an answer until there had been at least two meetings of the Politburo. I told Dobrynin that some speed was important, for various reasons, and he said he felt there would be an answer during the week of May 10th.

Dobrynin then raised the issue of China policy. He said he hoped we were not trying to blackmail the Soviet Union by the moves we were making on China. The reaction in the Soviet Union would be very violent. I said to Dobrynin that, first of all, we had not initiated the moves. Secondly, we were too realistic to believe that we could blackmail the Soviet Union. We had stated publicly on innumerable occasions that we were prepared to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. We did not see how that could constitute any threat to the Soviet Union. Moreover, as Dobrynin well knew, there were a number of issues outstanding between us and the Soviet Union which, if resolved, would produce such an enormous improvement in our relationship that the whole issue of who was blackmailing whom would become academic. Dobrynin said again that he hoped we were not trying to blackmail them because the reaction in Moscow would be very negative. I assured him that it was not our intention to blackmail them, but it was our intention to conduct our own foreign policy which we had stated repeatedly, to the effect that growth of relations with one Communist country did not have to be purchased by the enmity of that country to other Communist countries.

On this note, the meeting ended.

196. Editorial Note

During his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on April 27, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger received a telephone call from Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly. Although Kissinger was unable to take the call at the time,
Harold Saunders of the National Security Council staff later informed him that Hilaly wanted "five minutes of your time as soon as possible" to deliver "an urgent message from his President having to do with Communist China." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK’s Trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) When they met in the White House later that evening, Hilaly gave Kissinger a handwritten note, forwarded by Pakistani President Yahya Khan, from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, which included the following invitation: "the Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions." (Ibid.) The note is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVIII, China, 1969–1972, Document 118. Kissinger immediately took the message to Nixon, who was in the Lincoln Sitting Room. "There was little need for conversation," Kissinger recalled in his memoirs. "The message spoke for itself." (Kissinger, White House Years, pages 713–715) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 7:05 to 7:50 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of this conversation has been found.

Nixon, however, called Kissinger later at 8:16 to discuss the situation by telephone. The two men first reviewed a list of possible envoys to China; they then considered the possible implications of the message for their foreign policy:

Nixon: “All in all, of course, the whole thing that you can take some comfort in, you know, when you talk about how this happened, that it wouldn’t have happened if you hadn’t stuck to your guns through this period too, you know. We—”
Kissinger: “Well, Mr. President, you made it possible. It’s—”
Nixon: “We have played a game, and we’ve gotten a little break here. We were hoping we’d get one, and I think we have one now. If we—”
Kissinger: “Well—”
Nixon: “—play it skillfully. And we’ll wait a couple weeks and then—”
Kissinger: “But we set up this—”
Nixon: “Yeah.”
Kissinger: “—whole intricate web over—”
Nixon: “Yeah.”
Kissinger: “When we talked about ‘linkage,’ everyone was sneering.”
Nixon: “Yeah. I know.”
Kissinger: “But we’ve done it now.”
Nixon: “That’s right.”
Kissinger: “We’ve got it all hooked together.”
Nixon: “And—”
Kissinger: “I mean, we’ve got Berlin hooked to SALT.”

After further discussion of the message itself, Nixon and Kissinger assessed this latest development in their triangular diplomacy:

Kissinger: “Well, Mr. President—”
Nixon: “Yeah?”
Kissinger: “—the difference between them [the Chinese] and the Russians is that if you drop some loose change and try to pick it up, the Russians step on your fingers and fight you for it. The Chinese don’t do that. I’ve reviewed all the communications with them. And all of it has been on a high level. I mean, if here you look at the summit exchange, they haven’t horsed around like the Russians.”
Nixon: “No, they haven’t.”
Kissinger: “And compared to what the game was, the Russians squeezing us on every bloody move—”
Nixon: “Yeah. Yeah.”
Kissinger: “—has been just stupid.”
Nixon: “Yeah.”
Kissinger: “And so I think that they probably figure they cannot trick us out of Taiwan, but they have to have a fundamental understanding.”
Nixon: “Yeah. Well, we’ll put Nelson [Rockefeller] in the back of our minds as one possibility.”
Kissinger: “That’s right.”
Nixon: “Incidentally, what’d Haig think of this?”
Kissinger: “Oh, he thinks this is one of the great diplomatic breakthroughs.”
Nixon: “Does he really? Yeah?”
Kissinger: “Oh, yeah. And he thinks if we play it coolly and toughly and with the same subtlety we’ve shown up to now—”
Nixon: “Yeah—”
Kissinger: “—we can settle everything now.”
Nixon: “He thinks we go—he goes that far [unclear]?”
Kissinger: “Oh, yeah. I have absolute—I’ve never said this before. I’ve never given it more than one in three. I think if we get this thing working, we’ll end Vietnam this year. The mere fact of these contacts is one of—”
Nixon: “Another thing, of course, that is important is [laughs], you know, we do have a little problem of time, in terms of wanting to announce something in this period of time. And—”

Kissinger: “Yeah, but we ought to be able to announce this by the end of the first week of June anyway.”

Nixon: “Well, we’d have to if you’re going to be there in June.”

Kissinger: “And if we have the SALT—”

Nixon: “If we could—if we could get it earlier. Now, the thing is, is SALT going to turn them off? No. No?”

Kissinger: “No.”

Nixon: “No, particularly—yeah, but, I must say, we’re going to drag our feet with on that summit with the Russians, though. They’re—”

Kissinger: “Well, nothing can happen on that for a while now.”

Nixon: “No, no. They—that’s—the ball’s in their court and—”

Kissinger: “Yeah.”

Nixon: “—they’re sitting there piddling around. All right, they can piddle. And—”

Kissinger: “They won’t—they won’t move fast.”

Nixon: “No?”

Kissinger: “And they’ll be confused by the protests in this country.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 2–52) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.
197. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
US-Soviet Incidents at Sea: Prospective Negotiations

The Under Secretary of the Navy, John Warner, will be flying with you to California on April 30. He is scheduled to head the US delegation to the proposed bilateral talks with the Soviets on avoiding incidents at sea, a study on which is nearing completion within the NSC system. Mr. Warner may raise this with you and I thought you might wish a brief status report.

In February you approved the issuance of NSSM 119 requesting a study of the issues, alternatives and negotiating plan for the prospective talks with the Soviets. (The previous Administration had suggested bilateral discussions in 1968, and late last year the Soviets finally responded favorably.) The basic study has now been completed, and we are seeking formal agency comments. I shall provide you with a more detailed memorandum as soon as all comments have been received.

The main US objective in the talks, which will be held in Moscow, will be to obtain Soviet agreement to interpret the international Rules of the Road in such a way as to impose a duty on (Soviet) ships to stay well clear of (US) ships conducting air operations, underway replenishment, underwater operations and maneuvering in formation. In return for Soviet agreement on these points, we would agree that our aircraft and ships would remain more distant from Soviet surface ships—but not to a point which would seriously impair our intelligence collection capabilities.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII. Secret. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of this memorandum to Kissinger on April 26 for "prompt action." Haig approved the memorandum for Kissinger. A notation and attached correspondence profile indicate that the President saw and noted it.

2 According to his Daily Diary, the President flew by Air Force One from Andrews Air Force Base at 9:28 a.m. on April 30 and arrived in California at 11:25 a.m. (PDT) (Ibid., White House Central Files)

3 See Document 113.

4 Robert C. Brewster, Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State, forwarded the interagency study in an April 16 memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–181, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 119) Jeanne Davis circulated the study to the relevant agencies on May 4. (Ibid.)
In light of the significant third-country interest in these talks, the NSC study provides for consultation in advance in NATO and with other countries (e.g., Japan, Philippines, Spain), and will give the British a special advance briefing.

A successful outcome of the talks is by no means assured. The Soviets might try to make it a propaganda exercise either by one-sided allegations against us or by making grandiose proposals. However, the draft NSC study concluded that a low key approach dealing with specific maritime practices may possibly reduce the number of incidents and resultant exchanges of protests.

198. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)


[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s schedule, including his meeting that afternoon with Hilaly on the opening to China.]

Kissinger: I talked to Dobrynin this afternoon about Woodstock. Rush always takes so much time to prepare this four-corner thing. He had some practical point on how Rush and Dobrynin—Rush and Falin, they are desperate to talk to Bahr for negotiations, you know, with regard to Berlin. He said, “A newspaper let us know [unclear].” He [then] embarked on a long speech. He said, “When are you [going] to Red China?”

Nixon: Did he really?

Kissinger: So I just said, “Anatol—”

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 252–20. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Executive Office Building from 4:51 to 5:49 p.m.; Haldeman joined the meeting at 5:20. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Haldeman described the discussion in his diary as follows: “We had another session in the afternoon at the EOB, and Henry had his thoughts more in line then and made the point that he was the only one who really could handle this [secret trip to China], and that the way to go at it was in effect to set it up for the P, with a secret meeting prior to that with Henry; and that’s the way it was left as Henry took off late this afternoon for a week in Palm Springs. No action will be taken for a week or ten days, and then we’ll start moving from there.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

2 No record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin that afternoon has been found.
Nixon: Did you tell him—
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: —there was anything to it?
Kissinger: “The President is doing it for our relationship—”
Nixon: [unclear] will this?
Kissinger: Yeah. Well, also it shows how nervous they are.
Nixon: Well, it has nothing to do—
Kissinger: “It has nothing to do with the Chinese,” I said. “The President is eager to do—and he said—negotiating with you. He’s not pressing you. He just wanted a sense of normalcy.” After a while, he said that SALT, he could promise me, would deal with the summit right away. [He said,] “The point is the President took the view—and it looks like it may—[that] it would be a better chance to lead by public speeches.” [I said,] “As you know, we had no choice.” I don’t see how we can, in front of our bureaucracy. If we want to yield, we can. After the negotiations start, in the context of negotiations, we can, because I told him, I said, “Look, if you don’t sign this letter, you’re right back in Vienna, which is where we want to push you anyway. The letter says you should negotiate it in Vienna with a Presidential commitment.”

Nixon: [unclear] in Vienna next week?
Kissinger: In fact, we don’t have to decide until next week. The only disadvantage with that is we’ll have to do it while I’m in Palm Springs.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I don’t see how you, in a Presidential letter, Mr. President, [can] agree when the basis of the agreement is that we tear down our, what we’ve been building, a new expensive—
Nixon: [It’s] illogical.
Kissinger: —platform—
Nixon: Yeah.
Nixon: And then we have to build one in Washington.
Kissinger: And build one in Washington. I think we’re better off if that, if a desire for that develops, to let it emerge out of a deadlock in negotiations.
Nixon: Right—in exchange for a letter.
Kissinger: [If they] come back and say no, you could tell them to sit down for now.
Nixon: Right. Henry, this is not an acceptable letter.
Kissinger: [unclear] say we won’t yield, eventually. I told him—well, I have told him it would—
Nixon: It’s something to negotiate.
Kissinger: I said, “Let them negotiate it. The fact that the President signs the letter means he won’t, that we both are committed to try to get an agreement. And it’s not reasonable to negotiate with a deadline. Let both governments look over the record first.” [unclear] many hours and weeks they screwed around though, if we yield.

Nixon: Then what we really gain, if that is the case, out of our ABM position, is simply an agreement on their part to freeze the further development of offensive missiles. The Soviets are ahead. Indeed, though we did carry it out, it’s worthless. Point that out to him. [After] a day or two, it’s worthless, you know. [unclear] But I mean, it’s worth it for—

Kissinger: You could justify—
Nixon: —ABM.
Kissinger: You could justify it on ABM.
Nixon: That’s my point. You know, here we are; they’re ahead.
Kissinger: If you were a cheap politician, you could do it now.
Nixon: Yeah, I know. But I’m not going to do it.
Kissinger: I think it will help you in the long run. They respect you more.
Nixon: That’s right.

[Omitted here is discussion of sending a Presidential envoy to China, during which Kissinger commented: “My own current view is, if the Russians accept SALT, then it would be an argument against my going. I would wipe my hands clean. If they reject SALT, then we have to go for broke, at least before announcing it formally.”]

Nixon: We’ve got to deal with the Russians. The Russians can cause us too goddamn much trouble. Between now and 1972, I feel, if there’s any place in the world, they can screw us in Cuba. They can screw us in—in Berlin we can screw them. We got the ball there. We got—

Kissinger: Well, oh, we can certainly wreck the Berlin—
Nixon: I mean, as far as SALT is concerned, it’s dead. I mean, the Russians, let us suppose that they come back, you know—the Soviet summit is still possible. Did Dobrynin raise the summit today? Or you just didn’t raise that?

Kissinger: Well, I said, “Anatol, you remember the—”
Nixon: You just mentioned it to him.
Kissinger: To him. “Now, look,” I said, “You know, the big issue, the only reason there’s any movement on Berlin at all is because of me.” And I said, “The President”—a minute later, I said, “Anatol, of course, the President believes [I should break] this contact, if it doesn’t work out on SALT.” Instead of—

Nixon: His position is going to be that—
Kissinger: Instead of Rogers—
Nixon: Don’t call—
Kissinger: Well, I had to give them a name. I told him.
Nixon: I’d add something else: you have decided [against the] summit. Say, I know with Bill, bureaucratic problems here, that you—the problem you weren’t at the State Department, the problem with the Russians—you figure the Russian game is over. You know, that’s just sticking it right to them, right? I don’t know if they’re going to be upset. But that’s my approach. Nice to have these phrases.

[Omitted here is further discussion of sending a Presidential envoy to China.]
Kissinger: Having gotten to this point, Mr. President, they’re not going to bail.
Nixon: Yeah.
Haldeman: But the Russians didn’t get diplomatic relations—
Nixon: Of course, you want to—that’s right, that’s right. You want to—if we’re going to get a summit with the Russians, then you were wrong.

Kissinger: I wasn’t wrong. We’re going to get a summit, [Mr.] President.
Nixon: Well, we’re certainly not sucking after it, believe me.
Kissinger: I’m not so sure we want it in this way.
Nixon: That’s right. Yeah.
Kissinger: My instinct tells me we’re going to get the SALT and the summit. Look at their choices: what—where else are they going to go?

[Omitted here is a brief discussion on Vietnam.]

199. Editorial Note

On April 28, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger left Washington for a two-week “working” vacation in Palm Springs, California, to prepare for his upcoming secret trip to the People’s Republic of China. Secretary of State William Rogers, meanwhile, left Washington two days earlier for a two-week diplomatic tour, which included stops in London, Paris, Ankara, Riyadh, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Rome. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) Although his primary objective was to discuss a settlement in the Middle East, the Secretary began the trip by discussing the advent of “ping-pong diplomacy.”
During a meeting of the SEATO Council in London on April 28, Rogers speculated on the motivations behind China’s initiative: “Some say it is part of a general diplomatic campaign for international recognition—others that it was mainly a reaction to Peking’s differences with the Soviet Union, or to an effort, as a leading Soviet journal has charged, on the part of the People’s Republic of China to become ‘the world’s main superpower.’ Whatever the motive, we welcome the Chinese overture.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1971, pages 682–683) The Secretary also addressed the China issue in a BBC interview, taped that afternoon but broadcast the next day. When the interviewer asked about the role of the Sino-Soviet split in U.S. policy, Rogers replied: “We are pursuing a policy of attempting to have improved relations with the Soviet Union and to have better relations with Communist China. Now, the fact that they are having a feud doesn’t to us seem to affect that policy. Why shouldn’t we try to get along better with both the Soviet Union and Communist China? Now, if, incidentally, that irritates one or the other, that just happens to be a dividend, but it’s not our policy.” (Ibid., pages 686–691)

Kissinger later recalled how the Secretary’s remarks, which attracted little notice in London, were received in Washington: “Nixon and I were thunderstruck. We were concerned that Peking might construe Rogers’ statements as our reply to its message or conclude that we thought China was susceptible to pressure despite its warnings months earlier not to treat its opening toward us as a sign of weakness.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 720) H.R. Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff, described the reaction in his diary entry for April 28:

“Earlier today we were in something of a flap over Rogers’ speech yesterday in London at the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) meeting, where he gave a speech on China, which was singularly inappropriate. Haig called me at home tonight even more upset because he’d given another speech today, this time saying that in our moves with China or Russia the action might offend the other party, but if it did, that was just a dividend that we would get out of it. This, of course, is a horrifying thing, and Haig wanted me to send a cable, as did K, to Rogers telling him to say nothing more on China. I agreed to do it, and then later in checking with the P by phone, he felt I should not send a cable, but should wait and call Rogers on the phone tomorrow.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

According to Haldeman’s handwritten notes, the President sought to dispel the notion that his moves on China were directed against the Soviet Union. Rather than refer to any “dividend,” Nixon wanted to “play down Sino-Soviet rift—not exploit [it in] any way.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 43, H Notes, April 1, 1971–May 19, 1971, Part I)
In addition, at the daily press briefing on April 28, Charles W. Bray, a Department of State spokesman, suggested that, rather than rely on the international community, Beijing and Taipei might resolve their differences through direct negotiations. (Tad Szulc, “U.S. Urges Peaceful Solution for Taiwan,” New York Times, April 29, page 4) During a telephone conversation with Nixon the next morning, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig argued that such publicity “could be very bad with respect to what we’re doing with the Soviets right now.” The two men then discussed the incident in light of the President’s press conference that evening:

“P: The New York Times said some guy from State named Bray made a statement. Did he consult with us?

“H: No, and he’s McCloskey’s replacement while McCloskey is with the Secretary.

“P: But that’s not something we approved?

“H: No.

“P: Well, if it’s raised today Ziegler can just say listen to me tonight. But the whole attitude should be to cool it—it’s not helpful.

“H: It’s not at all. It’s harmful to both sides; it may scare the Chinese, but it will drive the Soviets right up the wall.

“P: No, it may not scare the Chinese, but it will give the impression that we are so anxious.

“H: It looks like we are just playing games for our own purposes. We have been so good up to now. We know there would be speculation, but when we contribute to it ourselves!” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1971 [2 of 2])

After his conversation with Haig, Nixon instructed Haldeman to send a “memo to State et al—to keep quiet.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 43, H Notes, April 1, 1971–May 19, 1971, Part I)

Haldeman first called the Secretary in Turkey to relay the President’s views on the “dividends” of triangular diplomacy. As Haldeman reported in his diary:

“I had to call Rogers this morning as a result of his speech flaps yesterday and the day before. Finally got him in Ankara after a couple of abortive attempts to talk to him on the plane. Covered the point the P wanted to raise, using the press conference tonight as the lead-in thing; the P, if pressed, was going to have to, in effect, say that the Secretary didn’t mean what he said. This had the desired effect on Rogers, and he backed off completely from his point that any Russian-Chinese differences that arise from our initiatives would be a dividend. He said that isn’t what he meant at all. He was concerned enough that, after
we’d discussed it thoroughly and hung up, he called back in a few minutes to reiterate his view as the how the P should approach the question at the press conference tonight. In the meeting with Haig in the P’s office at midday, the P told Haig to call Dobrynin and clear up the points raised by Rogers, so that he wasn’t given the impression that we were trying to play a game with the Soviets.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

No record of a telephone conversation between Haig and Dobrynin on the “points raised by Rogers” has been found.

The President spent two days—much of it in the Executive Office Building—preparing for his press conference on April 29. (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) Nixon, for instance, drafted handwritten notes on a series of foreign policy issues, including the following response on his triangular diplomacy:

“One element is not helpful—

“1. It is not our policy to play one against other—
   • “We want good relations with Soviet
   • “We want good relations with China
   • “We want good relations between China & Soviet
   • “A dangerous game to get two rivals into a fight
   • “End up in a 3 way brawl.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 66, President’s Speech File, April 29, 1971, Press Conference)

According to Haldeman’s notes for April 28, Ronald Ziegler, White House Press Secretary, was told to plant a question on “China vs. Russia.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 43, H Notes, April 1, 1971–May 19, 1971, Part I)

President Richard Nixon went to the East Room at 9 p.m. and for 35 minutes fielded a series of questions on foreign and domestic issues, including the implications of his China initiative. One reporter asked, for instance, whether Washington would support direct negotiations between Beijing and Taipei on the “legal question of the future of Taiwan.” After he answered the question, Nixon made the following statement:

“There is one other point I think it is very important to make.

“There has been speculation to the effect that the purpose of our—or one purpose of our normalizing our relations or attempting to normalize our relations with Mainland China is to some way irritate the Soviet Union. Nothing could be further from the truth.

“We are seeking good relations with the Soviet Union, and I am not discouraged by the SALT talk progress. I can only say that we believe that the interests of both countries would be served by an agreement there. We seek good relations with the Soviet Union; we are seeking good relations with Communist China. And the interests of world peace require good relations between the Soviet Union and Commu-
nist China. It would make no sense for the United States, in the interest of world peace, to try to get the two to get at each other’s throats, because we would be embroiled in the controversy ourselves.” (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pages 592–602)

The President did not rely on his press conference to pass the message within the bureaucracy. Although he briefly considered a written directive, Nixon opted instead for a more informal approach. According to Haldeman’s handwritten notes, Nixon issued the following oral instructions on April 30: “Essential everyone at State & WH—say nothing about China or Sov-Am[ericans] relations. Also K—and everyone at WH. Birch—Price—Safire etc., Colson. Also all Cab[inet] members—No memo—all by voice.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 43, H Notes, April 1, 1971–May 19, 1971, Part I)

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200. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

May 3, 1971, 10:05 p.m.

H: It took a little bit to get our friend (Dobrynin) but I just talked to him and he said, I guess so. This is in response to what Dr. Kissinger mentioned to me but then he went on to say this is not any big deal. Just thought it would be to explore this channel, this way no pre-conditions and we shouldn’t read anything into it.

K: What the hell does he mean?

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File, Haig Telcons, 1971 [2 of 2]. No classification marking. Haig was in Washington; Kissinger was in Palm Springs.

2 Haig called Dobrynin at 10 p.m. to discuss the Soviet note on Berlin, which had been delivered to the White House that afternoon. Dobrynin was reluctant to discuss the issue with Haig over the telephone and asked when Kissinger was scheduled to return. Haig replied that Kissinger would be back in Washington on Saturday, May 8. “By that time,” Dobrynin interjected, “we will have more clear picture, this is a major message.” (Ibid.) The text of the Soviet note is as follows: “The Soviet side is ready to conduct in Bonn confidential meetings of the USSR, US and FRG representatives for exchanging opinion on the West Berlin question in parallel with the continuation of the official negotiations of the Four Power Ambassadors.” (Ibid., Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2])
H: It was my distinct impression that this is along the lines of what you mentioned to him.3
K: They only pay off on what people say.
H: That’s what he said.
K: Okay.
H: Now, I have got this message to Farland ready to go. I have offered him two options—(1) telling him where you will be until May 8 and if he could arrange a pretext to come to the Coast, you could meet him perhaps from some overt location such as Los Angeles but he has got to have a bona fide reason to be there. I have looked into using the Navy side but the problem with it is it is going to take some time—4 hours for transmission and decrypting and travel from [omission in transcript] to [omission in transcript]. [less than 1 line not declassified]
K: If he can come back before the 8th, make it the West Coast.
K: Can’t he have some personal business and pass through Washington for the day?
H: He can’t be here any more than 24 hours.
K: Or 48 hours. It would be ridiculous if the State Department wanted a [omission in transcript].
H: You said 24 hours, I have a note here.
K: I would say 48. What worries me is Dobrynin.
H: Yeah. Well, I think you could call him.
K: I won’t call him. What did he say? We shouldn’t read too much into it.
H: To the proposal that they have given us. It would be useful to explore.
K: Explore the forum, or in the context of your proposition?
H: In the context of your proposition.
K: The forum was established a long time ago.
H: This is in response to what you told him. This is the way my government has responded to the proposal made by Dr. Kissinger last week.
K: Yeah. Have you got a backchannel to the Ambassador? I am just worried that a God-awful mess will occur if everybody doesn’t read from the same sheet.
H: I couldn’t agree more.

3 See Document 192.
K: Basically, we are not sure what the goddamn thing means. Best thing to do is send it to Rush with explanation of how it came about.4

H: Right. He linked it directly to your proposal but that funny business about, I guess so threw me off the track. Maybe my question threw him off.

K: What was the question?

H: Is this proposal in the context outlined by you to him last week.  

K: That’s correct, that’s exactly right.

H: And his first answer was I guess so and then he went on and talked very quickly and saying this not by [would not be] a substantive set of conditions and his government thought this would be a useful way to explore this.

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4 In a special channel message to Rush on May 3—presumably drafted by Haig that evening—Kissinger forwarded the text of the Soviet note and provided some additional background on his talks with Dobrynin on Berlin. “I leave to you and Bahr,” Kissinger added, “the judgment on whether we should provide them with any additional material at this time.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) Rush replied on May 5 that Bahr would seek confirmation from Falin that the “neutral formulations” in the German draft were acceptable. “If this is confirmed,” Rush commented, “it would be a major breakthrough, for in essence it would mean that the Russians had taken a substantial step away from their position that the GDR, not the Russians, should be the primary contracting party on questions involving access and inner-city movement.” (Ibid.) The two messages are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 231 and 234.
Meeting Between Ambassador Dobrynin and General Haig on May 4, 1971, at 1:00 p.m., in Dr. Kissinger’s Office at the White House

[Note: The occasion for the following meeting was the receipt of a message (Tab B) from Gerard Smith which indicated that he had, the previous evening, been told by Soviet Ambassador Semyinov that the Soviets were thinking of offering a halt to new starts on ICBM’s in connection with an ABM/NCA agreement.]

In light of the above message, Dr. Kissinger instructed General Haig to summon Ambassador Dobrynin to the White House on an urgent basis in order to ascertain the circumstances which led Semyinov to make this statement.

General Haig greeted Ambassador Dobrynin and told him that in Dr. Kissinger’s absence and because of a sudden turn of events he had been asked by Dr. Kissinger to meet urgently with the Ambassador. General Haig explained that the purpose of the meeting was to outline our current thinking with respect to the special channel between the Ambassador and Dr. Kissinger.

General Haig first showed the Ambassador a message from Ambassador Rush (Tab A). The Ambassador read the message carefully. Gen-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip File, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Brackets are in the original.

2 Kissinger was on a working vacation in Palm Springs, California. Although dated May 4, the available evidence—in particular, the reference to the letter from Smith (see footnote 2 below), as well as references in Documents 202 and 203—indicates that the meeting took place on May 5. Haig also prepared a sanitized version of the memorandum, dated May 5, for Kissinger to give Rogers on May 19. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 79, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT Announcement State Department) For his memoir account of this “bizarre incident,” see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 817–818.

3 At Tab B is a letter to the President, May 5, in which Smith reported: “After dinner last night, Semenov, speaking from prepared notes and on basis of new instructions, foreshadowed Soviet position offering to halt new starts of ICBMs in connection with ABM/NCA agreement. He also suggested SALT adjournment May 28 and Helsinki resumption about end of June.” For his memoir account of the dinner, see Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 218–219. When Nixon failed to reply to his letter, Smith became suspicious. “The first inkling I had had that something was up,” he later recalled, “was when my message reporting Semenov’s offer of May 4 to stop ICBM construction starts when an ABM agreement was reached went unanswered. Here was a major negotiating signal and Washington was silent.” (Ibid., p. 222)

4 Dated April 29; not attached. See footnote 6, Document 192.
eral Haig noted that it was evident from that document that our side was moving constructively in response to the agreement which had been arrived at between Dr. Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador in their special channel. General Haig continued that both the President and Dr. Kissinger were now, however, beginning to question the value of this special channel because of various actions taken on the Soviet side.

General Haig recalled the discussion between Mr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin on February 8th of this year, in which the Soviet Foreign Minister had stated that the Soviet Government was interested in arriving at an agreement on SALT and “the sooner the better.” Subsequently, however, in his last meeting with Dr. Kissinger, the Soviet Ambassador had commented to the effect that the Soviet Government was approaching the issue of a SALT agreement as a matter which lacked urgency. This apparent change in Soviet attitude was a source of some confusion in the minds of the President and Dr. Kissinger.

General Haig continued that, in addition, during the last meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin, Dr. Kissinger had provided the Ambassador with a formal U.S. proposal which would provide the basis for a possible agreement between the two governments. Since that time, our side has been waiting for a formal response to this proposal from the Soviet side. Then, today, we learned, through our Ambassador in Vienna, of the approach made by Soviet Ambassador Semyinov with respect to the future Soviet position at the Vienna talks.

General Haig then permitted Ambassador Dobrynin to read Ambassador Smith’s reporting telegram. After the Ambassador read the message, General Haig continued to the effect that both the President and Dr. Kissinger were shocked that the Soviet side would see fit to convey such a message in Vienna before a Soviet response to the last exchange between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin had been received here in Washington. Because of this turn of events and the apparent shifting Soviet attitude on SALT, both Dr. Kissinger and the President were beginning to seriously question the value of continuing with this special channel and wondered whether or not it might not be more advantageous to terminate this channel now and return the discussions on the range of issues which had been covered in this channel to their regularly established forums.

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5 During his meeting with Kissinger on February 10 (not February 8), Dobrynin told Kissinger that the Politburo (not Gromyko) had instructed him to deliver a message to this effect to the President. See Document 110.
6 See Document 195.
7 Reference is presumably to the draft texts Kissinger gave Dobrynin on April 26, not at their last meeting on April 27. See Document 192.
Ambassador Dobrynin reacted somewhat sharply and asked General Haig what he interpreted the word “foreshadowed” to mean in Ambassador Smith’s telegram.

General Haig stated that in his view it could be interpreted to mean that Ambassador Semyinov “had suggested” or “predicted” or “forecast” how Soviet thinking was turning toward the framework of a possible SALT agreement.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that this was exactly his reading and that, at most, it was probable that Semyinov had merely hinted at the direction in which Soviet thinking was progressing. He stated that the U.S. side should be encouraged by the Semyinov comment because it indicated that the Soviets had, in fact, accepted the linkage between an ABM/NCA agreement and the simultaneous acceptance of a freeze on offensive ICBM starts.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated that he could not be sure what Semyinov had actually said or why he had chosen to hint in this manner during a dinner conversation with the U.S. Ambassador. He added, however, that he had had similar problems with Semyinov in the past and that he would promptly communicate with Moscow with a view toward putting an end to this kind of speculation. He reaffirmed, however, that the U.S. side should be encouraged by this turn of events in that it suggested an acceptance by the Soviet Union of the U.S. position.

With respect to the Soviet position, Ambassador Dobrynin stated he anticipated a formal response to Dr. Kissinger’s last proposal on Thursday or Friday of this week. He added that he would be perfectly frank with General Haig and point out that he had personally cleared with the Politburo the earlier versions of the proposed exchanges of notes between the Soviets and the U.S. which would provide the basis for a viable agreement. This clearing process, he emphasized, required the personal attention of the Soviet leadership and a meeting of the full Politburo. He added that the Soviet leadership did not welcome becoming involved in this kind of detail and that in doing so, they had required Ambassador Dobrynin to assure them that the language which they were approving would be acceptable to President Nixon.

Ambassador Dobrynin inferred that he had provided them with this kind of specific assurance. Then, when he presented the proposal to Dr. Kissinger, he was shocked that the U.S. side now wanted to make a substantive deletion in the Soviet note. This fact had resulted in some irritation in Moscow and would require a complete review of the matter by the Politburo.

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8 May 6 or 7.
Ambassador Dobrynin then stated that as he had informed Dr. Kissinger, this procedure would probably require two full sessions of the Politburo. He added that in addition, Premier Brezhnev had been away from Moscow for a holiday and that for all these reasons he was unable to get a substantive response at an earlier date.

Ambassador Dobrynin then restated the fact that he did not know how the Soviet Government and leadership would respond to the modifications asked for by Dr. Kissinger but that he was confident that a reply would be forthcoming in the very near future. He added somewhat sarcastically that had Dr. Kissinger accepted the original language which he, Dobrynin, had cleared with the Politburo, both sides could have made a formal announcement on a SALT agreement this week, but that the U.S.’s sudden change with respect to the timing of a freeze agreement had definitely thrown the entire matter off schedule.

Ambassador Dobrynin then asked to read again the message at Tab A. After doing so, he asked General Haig whether or not this message was designed to convey to him the fact that progress was being made on the Berlin issue.

General Haig stated that the message spoke for itself, adding that obviously the U.S. side had been and was prepared to continue to act in good faith as a result of the discussions which were held in the special channel between Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger. However, when incidents arose such as that which occurred yesterday in Vienna, it could not help but shake our confidence in the value of continuing these discussions.

General Haig stated that the Soviet side must understand that the U.S. Government had to maintain a level of discipline within its own bureaucracy in its dealings with the Soviet Union and comments like those made by Ambassador Semyinov could be the source of serious confusion and make the continuation of the special channel counterproductive. For this reason, it was important that the Soviet side deal solely in the special channel and coordinate carefully with Dr. Kissinger before new initiatives can be taken in the Vienna forum.

Ambassador Dobrynin smiled and reiterated that we should be assured by the statements made by Semyinov and not be so suspicious of Soviet intentions.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Brigadier General U.S. Army

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9 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
202. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Possible SALT Agreement with the Soviets

At dinner last night, the Soviet Ambassador to the SALT talks, Semenov, hinted to Gerard Smith that the Soviets might soon offer a proposal which would halt new starts on ICBMs in conjunction with a proposal for an agreement on ABMs/National Command Authorities.

I discussed this turn of events with Dr. Kissinger and at his direction, summoned Ambassador Dobrynin to Dr. Kissinger’s office and confronted him with the question of why the Soviets would take such action in the Vienna forum when they were fully aware that we were awaiting a formal response from them on the final exchange of notes here in Washington.

Ambassador Dobrynin indicated that he was unaware that Semenov would be making such a statement and would take prompt action to prevent this kind of speculation within the Vienna forum. He added that he was awaiting word from Moscow on Dr. Kissinger’s last proposal and anticipated that it would be forthcoming on Thursday or Friday of this week. He refused to comment one way or the other as to whether or not the U.S. proposal would be acceptable but the obvious acceptance of an offensive freeze with an ABM/NCA agreement hinted at by Semenov yesterday suggests the Soviet reply will be affirmative. If so, it is probable that we could move with an announcement as early as Thursday or Friday of next week.

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2 See footnote 3, Document 201.

3 See Document 201.

4 May 6 or 7.

5 May 13 or 14. Nixon wrote the following message to Kissinger in the margin: “K—we will have to move Wed. [May 12] because of a House vote on setting a date for V. Nam—if we can’t move Wednesday—delay for 2 weeks or more—.”
203. **Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**


Nixon: Hello.
Kissinger: Mr. President.
Nixon: Well, how's your weather, Henry? Pretty good?
Kissinger: Oh, it's perfect.
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: It's perfect.
Nixon: Everything's going well? You know—?
Kissinger: Yes. We've had a number of developments that Haig may have mentioned to you.
Nixon: No, he was out today over at CIA. I didn't get a chance to talk to him.
Kissinger: Yes. Well, one is that the fellow in—
Nixon: Pakistan?
Kissinger: Semenov dropped a hint to Smith at a private meeting—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —which pretty well indicated that they're going to accept our position, but Smith didn't know what the hell he was talking about.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: And I had Haig call in Dobrynin right away and then raise holy Cain. And he said, "Look, you read it carefully." And he said, "It doesn't"—what he, in effect, proposed was—he told us, in effect, not that they were giving us fits, but it would fit the outline they were going to take. It was almost the one we had asked them to take.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: It’s the same now. And, actually, there’s no change. They can take that position, and we take ours, and then we see what happens.

Nixon: Yes.

Kissinger: And then he said they recommend an adjournment on May 28th, and reassembly in July, which is, very much stems directly from the summit. And, actually, that would be, I think, Mr. President, ideal from our point of view—

Nixon: I see.

Kissinger: —because we could get the announcement out and for six weeks everybody would be finished, because no matter what happens, they’ll have to wait until these people reassemble.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And he doesn’t need to put out the announcement of this new approach in the next two weeks. Then they could adjourn and say these are the instructions they’re going to get at the end of June, when they reassemble on July 1st.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: And then, that would feed in very nicely, the culmination of the other things we have in mind.

Nixon: But Haig called Dobrynin in, did he?

Kissinger: Yeah, at my request. I told him that they just had to stop. I said—you know, I just wanted to give him hell anyway.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And I said, “Look, they have—they haven’t answered—you have first to answer to the President. You haven’t answered yet.”

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: And he—I said, “We don’t want any of these hints in other places. If you have something to say, say it to us.”

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And he said, “Look, you ought to be encouraged by that. That’s special for him.” He wants to give a little encouragement to Smith.

Nixon: Yeah. Don’t give him too much. [laughs]

Kissinger: Well, that’s—

Nixon: Well, we’ll handle Smith.

Kissinger: Well, we’ve—I’ve told Haig to call all the departments and tell them to—that that reporting cable is to be given only the most restricted circulation.

Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: And then he promised us an answer by Monday.¹
Nixon: I see. On the summit—not on the summit.
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: But on the SALT, right?
Kissinger: Yeah. And he thought that if—he said his personal opinion is that it’ll be positive.
Nixon: Dobrynin thought that?
Kissinger: Yeah. And that’s mine too.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And actually that is—
Nixon: They’ve had a few other little—I noticed in reading the daily reports that they’re sort of saying, “Look, that Brezhnev’s speech indicates a more positive line.”
Kissinger: Yeah. Oh, they have to come in that way, Mr. President, or go very hard. And I don’t think they’re ready to go very hard.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: One thing they told Smith, unfortunately, is that they were accepting the idea of no new starts.
Nixon: I see.
Kissinger: Which is more than anyone ever suggested we would get.
Nixon: Yeah. Well, that’s all right. Let Smith think he accomplished something, too. That—
Kissinger: Well, next week, when those letters surface, Mr. President, there’s no doubt who did it.
Nixon: Oh sure. Right. Right.
Kissinger: We’ve had—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —the idea, that would mean that we make the announcement at the end of next week.
Nixon: Yeah, I suppose so, if—unless they’re ready to make it earlier, then we should do it earlier. There may be a reason why we want to do it a little earlier, because of a vote that’s coming up in the Congress.² But that’s all right. We’ll see—
Kissinger: Well, we can do it, I think, within three days of getting their answer. It will take that long to—you know, we have to notify a

¹ May 10.
² Reference is to a Senate resolution on the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. See Document 204.
few allies, and then we have to find a common time with Moscow, and so forth.


Kissinger: And this Pakistan fellow was in today. I asked Haig to write a memo for you.6

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: They—he said that he had had word that [unclear] that the Chinese [unclear] the Chinese let loose a blast today—

Nixon: I saw that. Yeah.

Kissinger: They communicated our message to them the same evening.

Nixon: I see.

Kissinger: They did it last Thursday7 [unclear].

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: And he said the reason they let loose a blast was because of those two State Department statements last week.8

Nixon: Yes, which, of course, should not have been made, because—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: —they were not consistent with my view of just saying nothing.

Kissinger: That’s right. But—

Nixon: They aren’t going to say anything more.

Kissinger: No. We’ve got that under control. And I have—

Nixon: And the State Department statements probably didn’t do any harm anyway, because—

Kissinger: That’s true.

Nixon: —we had to assure the—we’ve got to—with the Chinese, we have to play a hard game with them too.

Kissinger: Absolutely. I don’t think it’s—there are going to be ups and downs in that relationship anyway. And they have to know that we’re no pushovers.

Nixon: Right.


7 April 29. During their meeting on May 5 (see footnote 6 above), Hilaly told Haig that Yahya had given the message to the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad on May 1.

8 See Document 199.
Kissinger: And he’s got—I’ve got this fellow Farland coming in—
Nixon: Yeah, I know. I saw that. Saturday.
Kissinger: Yeah, Saturday.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I’ll be able to give him a message.
Nixon: Well, when are you going to send the message to the Chi-
nese? I would—I would not wait for Farland.
Kissinger: I’ll give it to Farland. That’s the fastest way to get it there.
Nixon: You mean Farland gives it to Yahya?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Kissinger: That’s the fastest way, Mr. President, because the oth-
ers have to send a courier any way.
Nixon: Right. Fine.
Kissinger: They can’t send it on their cables, [2 seconds not declas-
sified]
Nixon: Right. Good.
Kissinger: And, so those things seem to be, seem to be in order.
Nixon: All right. All right. Well, that’s good. That sounds fine. Do it—do it through Farland. That’s good.
[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, including domestic sup-
port for the war.]

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9 In a May 4 memorandum to Nixon, Haig reported that he was arranging an “ab-
solutely covert meeting” between Kissinger and Farland in Palm Springs on May 8. Nixon wrote the following instructions in the margin: “Just inform Farland—no need to delay until after K’s meeting with him.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materi-
als, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Ex-
changes leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) The meeting was
subsequently rescheduled for May 7. For a memorandum of conversation, see For-
15 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon on the meeting is printed ibid., volume XVII,
204. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of the impact on domestic politics of the President’s foreign policy, in particular, Vietnam and SALT; the latter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 153.]

Nixon: Now, it [SALT announcement] could be ready next week, of course, if he [Dobrynin] comes back with some kind of an answer.

Haig: If he has an answer.

Nixon: If he has an answer. If he doesn’t have an answer—it probably isn’t going to be ready anyway for two weeks, so it’s probably a moot question. Now, what could happen, what could have an effect. I will agree what could have an effect is an announcement of a summit with the Russians. That would have an effect on this whole thing. However, they aren’t ready to do much else—

Haig: They’re not—

Nixon: —and we’re not going to press them for an announcement. They’re—we’ve told them already, “When you’re ready, you tell us.” Now, they’ll tell us. If they should come in, unexpectedly, and say, “Look, we’d like to go forward with an announcement and so forth”— because we’re not going to ask; no more, no more; we can’t appear anxious—that could have a very dramatic effect. See, that’s the kind of announcement, though. And that’s what an announcement will be with the Chinese—of a meeting, you understand, as distinctive from—well, that the President will receive the table tennis team when it comes over, and we’re going to release some more items for trade with China. You see? These—so, here’s the things that will happen. The SALT thing can have a little blip effect on the Congress for a day or two, so if we can get ready for Wednesday, go Wednesday.\(^2\) If not, hold it for two weeks, and we’ll do it then. Then the summit thing, if something comes on that it could have an effect. It could be the big play in early June, if they’re ready to announce it. But if not, then let it go. Then we might only have only one bow left at this time, in the political field, and that’s

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 493–10. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Haig in the Oval Office from 11:26 to 11:58 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) May 12.
the meeting with Thieu and the combat troop thing. And that would help. But it would have to come June 8th. If it comes later in the month, it could be—it would be past the votes. And I would hate like hell to go over and have a meeting with him and announce that no more combat troops are going to be there after the Senate had voted a terminal date. You see my point? I don’t want to have actions taken which appear to be the reaction to the House—

Haig: Riots.
Nixon: —or to the Senate.


Nixon: The only other thing coming up is SALT. SALT isn’t enough. I know that.

Haig: No.

Nixon: SALT is not enough, because it is not, you see, too directly enough related to Vietnam. A summit would be enough, because people would think that you’d, at the summit, you might talk about Vietnam. See?

Haldeman: The summit—summit—people understand a summit.
Nixon: Sure.
Haldeman: People don’t understand SALT.
Nixon: SALT is way over their heads. They haven’t the slightest idea what SALT is. It’s too goddamned complicated.

Haig: Of course, the China thing, I think, has the greatest impact.
Nixon: It has an impact. But there, they’re going to need [unclear exchange]. But the China thing, the China thing, which—a China—an open meeting by a Presidential emissary, or actually a Presidential visit. You see, the difficulty with our whole China thing, though, is that there we have the Russian game. We can’t announce that, “Well, there will be a Presidential visit to China.” First, there can’t be a Presidential visit to China as long as they’re supporting South Vietnam—North Vietnam. So that’s the deal. It’s got to be a straight cold turkey deal on that. Second, we don’t want to throw the China thing, until we get the Russian thing, one way or the other. Because once you do that, you knock off the Russian summit. And the Russian summit is more important. It may be that we don’t want it, but my point is you’ve got to play, you’ve got to let both strings play out a bit.

Haldeman: The Russian summit is more important substantively. It sure isn’t more important, I don’t think, in public drama in this country.
Nixon: Could be.
Haldeman: We get more out of China [unclear].
Haig: The China thing, I think, means more in terms of the war in Southeast Asia.
Nixon: To the postwar order?
Haig: Yes, sir.
Haldeman: China—
Nixon: On that note, you see, we got down to—
Haig: And by then the war will be—
Nixon: You see, Bob, you see, Al, you’ve got that position in a way that—Henry’s now sent a message. I understand he’s going to send it through the Ambassador, Farland, Saturday. I talked to him last night.3
Haig: Yes.
Nixon: And that’s fine. Farland will carry it back. So then they’ll fire it off to the Chinese. And then the Chinese, they don’t have to respond. Then the question is: when does he go?
Haig: Yes, sir, the timing on it is just—my personal view is that I don’t think these things are going to solve the Congressional problem. I think we have to take it head on. But I personally think that the position you’ve taken is the right position, and the responsible ones would be afraid to overtake it.
Nixon: No question about it. It is the right position. It is responsible. And I’m going to continue to take it, you understand. And I—but don’t think it won’t have an enormous effect on the Congressional problem if you announce a summit with the Russians. It’ll have an enormous effect. You could then take—you could take those bastards to task for undercutting the President when he’s about to do this. You tell them this story: [unclear] “You’re going to look awful bad, taking the President on, blah, blah, blah.” Scare ‘em.
Haig: That’s right.
Nixon: That’s it. But when you don’t—but we don’t have the card to play yet. See?
Haig: Right.


Haig: I think—I read—I was encouraged by what Semenov said yesterday.4 I think what he was saying was, in effect, they will take the Moscow package; you can have ABM anyplace you want it; but, you’ll have a ceiling on the number of missiles.

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3 See Document 203.
4 See Documents 201 and 202.
Nixon: No, I got the impression that the National Command was his concern.
Haig: No, I think they were talking about their own.
Nixon: Oh.
Haig: It could be either but I think they’re going to come back to it—
Nixon: Well, on the other hand, why does Semenov tell it to that asshole Smith? I mean, Henry’s always so jealous of his channel, and I—and there are good reasons for it—
Haig: Well, I think the reasons for that are just as simple, sir. To the degree they can keep you from getting the credit, they’re going to do it. They don’t want you to be re-elected—not one goddamn bit.
Nixon: That’s right, too. So they may want to have it come from Smith and all the rest.
Haig: That’s right, sir.
Nixon: Well, that won’t happen. They don’t know how much I control it.
Haig: No, that’s it. If we—that’s the other reason why we have to move before then: the summit.
Nixon: That’s the reason, too, that may be moving with the summit venture too late.
Haig: [Joseph] Kraft is back in town and he said that everyone he’s talked to in the Soviet Union said that you’re too tough. They don’t want to deal with you. They want to get another man in.
Nixon: What’s that? Did he write that or the Post has written it?
Haig: He hasn’t written it. I got this from the cocktail circuit.
Nixon: Well, good. Of course, he’s a little—of course, he knows that. Well, he’s one of them.
Haig: [laughs] Exactly—
Nixon: For Christ’s sakes. Of course. And he knows goddamn well I’m too tough. In this last two weeks was the first instance I’ve heard of that. This last month they’re showing it again. And they—this really must rub it. They’re having their problems.
Haig: Right. I think actually, sir, that you’ve got everything postured just beautifully in timing it, with the exception of this Senate—
Nixon: Yeah?
Haig: —Senate problem, which is where we have a short fuse on it. But, the other things are ideal.
Nixon: You just have to have something when it comes off.
Haig: They want a summit. I think they don’t want us to move with the Chinese. We can’t—that’s the other reason why we can’t move too quickly with the Chinese—
Nixon: Oh, now that’s—you understand, I’m not saying we’re going to move with the Chinese or the Russians. And on ABM, I’ll delay that goddamn thing ’til hell freezes over if necessary. But I do say that we have to do something—

Haig: We have to get it—

Nixon: —tangible on Vietnam. And since we don’t have—if we can’t do it with regard to the draftee thing, then we’ll have to move the Thieu thing up to the 8th. That’ll work, and that’s good enough. It’s the best we got. It’ll help.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, including reports in the news media.]

Nixon: First, he [Kissinger] gets the man a message out through Farland. Second, on SALT, if we can’t do it Wednesday, then I don’t care.

Haig: It will take time, though—

Nixon: There’s no timing problem on SALT.

Haig: Yes.

Nixon: We’ll do it on our own, deliver it at that time, and, if it suits our purpose to wait two weeks, wait two weeks. See? There’s nothing in it for us to go the balance of that week that I can see. Now, on—

Haldeman: You know, Wednesday you’re not doing much in the morning.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: For TV, you ought to do it Tuesday night.

Nixon: Well, hell, if at all, we could get the word out earlier than that. There are ways to hold them.

Haig: If that doesn’t turn then, then the—that influences your timing and your—

Nixon: With China?

Haig: —the agreement with China.

Nixon: Sure.

Haig: It’s that simple.

Nixon: Absolutely. We do have another card to play. That’s the—

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: That’s the beauty of our situation today, which we haven’t had before, and the Russians don’t know this. And assuming the Chinese mean what they say, we just ought to accept the goddamn deal in the Senate, in a way that it helps with the—we hope—the prize it would be. Well, we see our problems developing, but don’t—move it, move it in a way so that we think what we will do, make all the plays on our domestic thing. Now, the idea of—I’d much prefer, myself—I’d
prefer to have the Thieu visit later in June. Press on the SALT a little. Don’t assume that SALT will buy us the time we need. It will not.

Haig: No.

Nixon: SALT will help if it comes. But, you—we either have to have a summit announcement with the Russians, or an announcement of some kind of a visit with the Chinese, a public announcement of progress on the Chinese front, a significant thing. I don’t mean the trade crap. Or, we have to have the meeting with Thieu by the 10th of June. You see what I mean? There’s our problem. So, if one of those three come off, fine. SALT alone will not do it. I’ve analyzed the whole thing—

Haig: Yeah, I think if you end up with SALT and you end up with the Thieu meeting, it’s going to be tight and it’s going to be tough. But you’re going to have right on your side. Now, when you follow that with a summit or—and a high-level Chinese meeting—one or the other, or perhaps both if we do it very well, I think we’ve got it—

Haldeman: Created enough for a loop then—

Haig: I just think that—

Haldeman: You put all that together then you—

Haig: You just can’t—

Nixon: Right.

Haig: Your foreign policy would have been absolutely revolutionary—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: But you’ve got to get it all done.

Nixon: The only trouble is, though, that how can you get both summits—the Chinese and the summit with the Russians?

Haig: Well, I say if the summit with the Russians, and a high-level delegation with the Chinese.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. And that would buy those Senators.

Haig: That could be done.

Nixon: Okay. Okay. That’s about the way the game looks to me this morning.5

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5 Haldeman reported in his diary that evening: “He [Nixon] had Haig in to discuss the general need for action regarding Vietnam.” “He is concerned about the Senate and House and, to some degree, the public reaction in this country, but he’s as hard line as he’s ever been on running out the war on the proper basis as we see it. And I’m very certain in my own mind that’s the case. I don’t think there’s any thought at all in the P’s mind of being pushed into setting a date, because he’s still very optimistic, not only about Vietnam (although he doesn’t think Henry’s going to make any headway on an effort for negotiation), but I think he does feel the Chinese might put on some pressure, and that in any event we’re in good shape and can go ahead with our withdrawal program. He’s also very optimistic about the SALT possibility plus the Summit, plus the China breakthrough. So I don’t think there’s any danger of his softening at this point, at least, not until all these other things fall through.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Arbatov on Monday, May 10

He is here for a round of discussions in New York and Washington. I talked to Marshall Schulman, who had lunch with Arbatov and “debated” him in a Council session. According to Marshall (and others who have seen him since the CPSU Congress) Arbatov is in a brash mood, having been recently elected to the Central Auditing Commission at the Party Congress. In New York he took a rather tough line on US-Soviet relations, (replying to George Ball) and some of this was also reflected in an article for Pravda written just before he left Moscow.

His main pitch seems to be that we are in a dilemma caught between opposing forces: until now this Administration has bent to the military hardline, and using the “era of negotiations” to pacify public opinion. Marshall described his line as a mirror image of the breakfast talk we had on Soviet relations before you went West, i.e. that we are not responsive to the Soviets, there has not been much give in our positions etc.


2 Marshall D. Schulman, Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University and a member of the Soviet-American Disarmament Study Group.

3 Council on Foreign Relations.

4 In the article, entitled “American Imperialism and New World Realities” and published in Pravda on May 4, Arbatov argued that the Party Congress had adopted a “Leninist” foreign policy on relations with the United States, “which combines a readiness to normalize these relations and to resolve disputed questions by means of negotiation with a firm rebuff to the aggressive impulses of American imperialism with respect to the U.S.S.R or any other country or people in the world.” For a condensed English text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 18 (June 1, 1971), pp. 1–3, 8. An Embassy assessment of the article is in telegram 2891 from Moscow, May 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR.

5 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Schulman and two other members of the Soviet-American Disarmament Study Group—Paul Doty, Professor of Biochemistry at Harvard University, and Franklin Long, Professor of Chemistry at Cornell University—from 8:20 to 9:49 a.m. on April 26. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
On the other hand, he was mildly optimistic about SALT, though judging by Marshall’s account he is not knowledgeable of the negotiating details; he was surprised for example, that we had offered a zero ABM (Dobrynin may fill Arbatov in on recent SALT developments). In discussing the new ICBM silos (he claimed not to know their purpose) he used the argument we are hearing more and more from the Soviets—that the new silos are in effect the answer to our MIRV program. He adopted the Jeremy Stone line that our concern about SS–9s and MIRVs is using a future danger to justify our creating a current instability by deploying our MIRVs.

On Eastern Europe, he was fairly tough in defending Soviet security interests, warning that it was dangerous for us to play around in their backyard.

Arbatov also remains critical, as he has been since the summer of 1969, of our East-West trade policy and of our moves with regard to China which he sees calculated to put the Soviets under pressure.

I assume you will hear much the same from him, and he may take the position that this is a “critical” time in Soviet-American relations and it will be important for him to carry back to his level clients (he always implies the Politburo) a favorable response.

That the Soviets may be preparing the ground work for claiming that in fact American policy is shifting was apparent in his article, in which he described the “second direction” we could take to “correct” our policies by taking account of “realities.” He claims the struggle is intensifying in American ruling circles, as the election approaches, and that a growing number of “people” are for change. Finally, he warns (as Gromyko did at the Congress) against the Soviets rejecting “elements of realism” in America.

You might ask him:

—How are we to read the Brezhnev program at the party Congress?

—What exactly would the Soviets consider a “realistic” response on our part?

—What can we expect from Soviet policy, if, as Brezhnev said, they proceed from the assumption that US-Soviet relations can be improved?

He may bring up the harassments of Soviet offices and personnel by the JDL, he claimed that Dobrynin said that morale of their people is suffering and that Moscow is becoming increasingly incensed at what they believe is our unwillingness to provide better protection. Tell him

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*Jeremy J. Stone, Executive Director of the Federation of American Scientists.*
we are doing everything possible, within the law, and that incidents have actually declined despite the bombing of Amtorg.\textsuperscript{7}

He will have seen Harriman on Saturday\textsuperscript{8} before seeing you on Monday.

Also he wants you to help arrange for him to see Ehrlichman and Garment to discuss “reorganization” of government (not clear whether he means our government or theirs).

\textsuperscript{7} On April 22, a bomb exploded outside the New York offices of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the Soviet trade agency. Ambassador Bush issued a statement at the United Nations that evening condemning the attack. The next morning, Vorontsov delivered a “strong written protest” at the Department of State. (Telegram 69848 to Moscow, April 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 USSR) Three members of the Jewish Defense League subsequently pleaded guilty in Federal Court to charges related to the incident.

\textsuperscript{8} May 8.

\section*{206. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)}

\textbf{Washington, May 10, 1971.}

Nixon: Hi, Henry.

Kissinger: Mr. President.

Nixon: How are you?

Kissinger: Okay.

Nixon: You look good.\textsuperscript{2}

Kissinger: Yes, I had a good vacation.

Nixon: You have a meeting as soon as you get back?

Kissinger: Yeah, I’m seeing the head of the Institute of World Politics in Moscow.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 496–9. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 12:57 to 1:30 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\textsuperscript{2} This meeting was the first between the two men since Kissinger’s return to Washington the previous day from his two-week working vacation in Palm Springs, California. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

\textsuperscript{3} Arbatov.
Nixon: Oh, I see.
Kissinger: And he’s well connected at the Politburo. But—but they really are playing a rough game with us on that SALT business, and—
Nixon: Oh, I expected they would.
Kissinger: Because what they’re doing now is, they’ve put into Vienna the proposal which we turned down. They made as a formal proposal.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: And, I had Haig call in Dobrynin and raise hell with him last week, as he probably told you.4
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And Dobrynin said, “Oh, it was all a mistake.” But of course, they’re—what they may do is, they may finally accept our proposal.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: But deprive you of the credit for it by putting it into Vienna.
Nixon: Huh?
Kissinger: I mean, they won’t deprive—it’s just a cheap little stunt.
Nixon: They’ll try, and if anything happens in Vienna, they’ll take the credit for it.
Kissinger: Of course. Now, this is the message that I’m—
Nixon: What about the reporting of—?
Kissinger: Yeah, the Chinese—
Nixon: What about the—well, when are you supposed to hear, if at all, from Dobrynin, since he’s out?
Kissinger: This week. I think, Mr. President, my view is, I—
Nixon: You’re not going to hear from him, are you?
Kissinger: Well, my view is this, Mr. President: we can’t let them diddle us along.
Nixon: That’s right.
Nixon: The way it looks, you’re not going to get anything on SALT before Sunday.
Kissinger: Well, I’m not sure yet on SALT. If we don’t get anything by a week from today, we have to assume we won’t get anything.

4 See Document 202.
Nixon: You should have it by now, though, shouldn’t you?
Kissinger: He said two meetings of the Politburo, which means we
should have it this week. Of course, it will take them a few—if the
Politburo met Friday, then it will take them two or three days to draft
instructions. We should have it by Wednesday night—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —if it takes a normal course.
Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: Now, on the Vietnamese, on Hanoi, Mr. President, I
think we might seriously consider the following: that if they come back
with an unsatisfactory reply, that we just drop it. And that you might
consider this Howard K. Smith idea of going to Congress and make
the whole proposal. And you could say, which would be true, that on
January 8th we in effect told them through the Russians that we would
be willing to set a deadline if they gave a ceasefire. I did suggest to
Dobrynin the general—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —outline of it as a, in a somewhat vaguer way but it
was clear enough. They then said they—they waited for two months
before they replied and said they’re willing to talk. We offered to talk,
and they didn’t talk, so we’re making it public. Make it as a public of-
fer, and then we’ll be on record. And, I think we have to find some
way of going on the offensive on this issue instead of always defend-
ing ourselves.
Nixon: Well, yeah, we have to for other reasons, too.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam printed in Foreign
Document 200.]

Nixon: Getting back to the Russians. I think that the—I think that
when he [Dobrynin] came back, they watched the demonstrations and
the rest. You noticed Joe Kraft’s been worming around to the effect that
the Russians don’t want Nixon and so forth. I think the Russians may
be playing a strict political game.
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: And if they are, they can’t play it with us.
Kissinger: Well, that’s what I mean, Mr. President. I don’t think we
should get into a position where we are caught between the doves and
the hawks.
Nixon: No.

5 May 7.
Kissinger: And where the Russians are whipsawing us.
Nixon: So, how do you avoid that?
Kissinger: Well, what I think, if they—what I would suggest is the following: if they don’t come through with an answer by next Monday—\(^6\)
Nixon: Right. One week.
Kissinger: One week. We tell Rush he’s no longer authorized to talk on Berlin, except in formal channels. No private meetings with the Russians on Berlin—
Nixon: Good. Do you think that will hurt them?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Nixon: All right. Good.
Kissinger: I will stop talking to them about—
Nixon: China?
Kissinger: —Berlin.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: And indeed about anything until they come with a proposal—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —that comes along.
Nixon: Does Rogers know that Rush has been talking privately?
Kissinger: No. He [Rush] hasn’t started talking privately yet.
Nixon: Well, then—
Kissinger: We just authorized it.
Nixon: Oh, oh. I see. Okay.
Kissinger: No, and Rogers does not know, so it’s easy to—
Nixon: Well, then, you tell him, “No.” He doesn’t talk to them. They haven’t taken it up with him at any rate.
Kissinger: Oh, they have taken it up, but their Ambassador [Falin], to do it, has just arrived.
Nixon: Okay. Good. All right. We’ll stop that.
Kissinger: We’ll just tell Rush not to do it.
Nixon: Stop that. Stop this. Fine. Good.
Kissinger: And, we’ll just drag out our feet on Berlin. We’ll tell Rush he should be slow as hell on Berlin. We’ve been—
Nixon: Oh, absolutely! That’s—
Kissinger: We’ve been the ones—

\(^6\) May 17.
Nixon: We’re not going to give them a goddamn thing on Berlin—!
Kissinger: —who kept it going. And, then, I think, Mr. President, if we know we are going to be in trouble with the Russians, you might consider—

Nixon: The Chinese?
Kissinger: Well, the Chinese anyway—going on television with the facts of the military situation, and just put it to our opponents.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And play it very tough in SALT. What we mustn’t do is yield in SALT—
Nixon: No!
Kissinger: —beyond the point which we’ve already given them in my channel, because that will just encourage them to whipsaw us.


Kissinger: They [the Soviets] have asked for a recess on May 28th.
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: And a reassembly on July 1st.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: Now, that would be consistent with phasing it into the summit schedule. Well, it’s—and it means that they’re not going to beat us over the head for four weeks.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: Secondly, you could argue that they’ve put forward their proposition—
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah?
Kissinger: —for their own bureaucratic reasons, that they can’t turn around 180 degrees—
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: —without having made some bureaucratic record from which they then retreat.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: Actually, their proposal is making our bureaucratic position easier on the exchange of letters, if they still come through. If—if they don’t come through by next Monday, then we know they’re stonewalling us. Up to now, it’s still a normal decision-making time. It does take them about—
Nixon: Why is that?
Kissinger: —two to three weeks.
Nixon: You’ll know next Monday. Don’t fool—don’t have any illusions. If they don’t come through next Monday, then it’s done.
Kissinger: Then it’s done.
Nixon: And then I would let Dobrynin know, coldly, that, “That’s it. We’ve got our answer.” From now on we can play it, and I’d stonewall them in Berlin. That will bring Brandt down, won’t it? Being a good person—
Kissinger: I can make it tough for Brandt. Yeah.
Nixon: That’s too damn bad. That’s fine. Let it be tough for him.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: That’s my view on that.
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: I thought they were supposed to know this Monday. You rather thought they were, didn’t you?
Kissinger: Well, I—no, this week. If it goes beyond this week, they’re either having a serious disagreement or they’re playing us tough.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: Beyond next—until next Monday evening, you can give them the benefit of the doubt. After next Monday, you’ll know that there is—that they’re maneuvering us. I mean, I’d put it that way.
Nixon: Well, all right, so we won’t get—I think looking at what’s probably going to happen, the Russians will not do anything. Let them—we’ll let them sweat and die on Berlin. I think with regard to going on—
Kissinger: Of course, one week may—
Nixon: —and trying to get people all mobilized to support national defense, we’ve got to be sure we have some soundings to see what kind of support we’re going to get on that. You see—
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: —you can’t go out and play it around without having some chance.
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: We’ll do a little polling on that.
Kissinger: One week, Mr. President, may be caused by this statement that Sino-Soviet disputes. I told—
Nixon: Rogers’s statement?
Kissinger: Yeah. I told Bob right away that this might delay the SALT thing by a couple of weeks, because that—
Nixon: That has to—for both China and Russia.

7 See Document 199.
Kissinger: Yeah. It was a disaster.
Nixon: The dividend statement? Is that the one?
Kissinger: The dividend statement.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: The Taiwan Straits one—that was, that was also—
Nixon: But, we tried to clear it up? Do you think we could—?
Kissinger: Well, you did it very—
Nixon: Yeah, but I mean it’s a—I mean, the point is that the dam-
age is done. Four days later we tried to clear it up.
Kissinger: Because it happened, unfortunately, a day after Do-
brynin told me that if we played them off against each other, there’d
be a very tough reaction out of Moscow. 8
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: It’s hard for them to believe that it’s—
Nixon: That Rogers didn’t do it at our instructions.
Kissinger: Exactly. You know, that’s awfully hard to convince peo-
ple of.
Nixon: Well, he just dropped it. It was at a press thing, apparently.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Coming back to this, the Russian thing. The other play we
have to do is on Vietnam. See, that’s the game now. Let’s forget the
Russian thing and the rest at the present time. The game is where it is.
All that matters here is Vietnam now.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and preparations for
Kissinger’s secret trip to China. A portion of the former is printed in
1972, Document 200.]

Nixon: Let’s just think about that a minute. Did you give this to
the Pakistan Ambassador this afternoon? 9

8 See Document 192.
9 Before this meeting with Nixon, Kissinger met Hilaly at 12:10 p.m. to deliver the
reply to Zhou Enlai’s latest message; see Document 196. (Library of Congress, Manu-
script Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) In
the reply, Nixon proposed a “preliminary secret meeting” between Kissinger and Zhou
to prepare for his subsequent visit to China. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Ex-
changes leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) The reply is printed
record of the conversation between Kissinger and Hilaly has been found. For Hilaly’s
record, see Aijazuddin, ed., From a Head, Through a Head, To a Head, pp. 66–70; see also
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 724.
Kissinger: I’ve already told the essence of it to Farland, who’s giving it to Yahya.\textsuperscript{10} Yes. This is going with the packet.
Nixon: You’ve already given it to him. Okay.
Kissinger: But we could have, if this comes off—
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: —we could have a public—that’s why I put in this idea of a special emissary.
Nixon: Yeah, I know. I saw that. That was to follow the secret meeting. You see what I’m getting at is that the Russians are going to play this kind of game with us, so we may have to play the public—if we only had a man to send over there. Goddammit. I’ll try to do this tomorrow. A half-hour thing won’t work, will it?
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: It won’t work.
Kissinger: I think it’s the best way to get results, because—
Nixon: You can talk turkey.
Kissinger: I could talk turkey and we could announce this, if it works at all, say, August 1st, and then have an emissary, and then have you go.
Nixon: I wouldn’t have the emissary if that was the case.
Kissinger: No. Well, you might, but—
Nixon: Well, if we’re going to announce me going, why have somebody else take the cream off?
Kissinger: Well, if we sent an inconspicuous—if we sent a guy like Bruce, he wouldn’t take any cream off.
Nixon: Hmm. Maybe.
Kissinger: Or even Murphy. Just in case the Chinese want some public demonstration.
Nixon: I see. Well, we’ve got other plans. We’ll see what happens. I’m not—I think—I’m inclined to agree, to say a little bit. We have weathered this storm of demonstrations and so forth, extremely well.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: We—it’s to the consternation of all the intellectual, all of the intelligent critics of our policy. They’re worried as hell about it, that we didn’t cave for—by God, I just don’t know, Henry, whether—how you can be a lot tougher now. Right now—I mean, I don’t know what we can do at the moment. We’re certainly prepared to do something.
Kissinger: Well, we can—

\textsuperscript{10} See footnote 9, Document 203.
Nixon: We’ve got to turn on the goddamn Russians though.
Kissinger: We’ve got to turn on the Russians.
Nixon: With Russia, there’s no question, and that’s why the public surfacing, the surfacing of the visit to the Chinese, it’s quite apparent, is worrying the hell out of them.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: I wouldn’t diddle it away, though. I think that’s—
Kissinger: I just think that once—what we absolutely have to have to the Chinese is a reliable contact and a game plan, which they and we follow. And if we can get—once we get that visit set up—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: —we may still get—the secret meeting has the other advantage. Of course, you’re assuming we won’t get the SALT—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I’m not so sure on that yet.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.
Kissinger: We’ve got to do it—
Nixon: Well, anyway, we’ll see. [laughter] I’ll see you later.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Have a good time.

207. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Luncheon Meeting, May 10, 1971, Dr. Kissinger and G.A. Arbatov, Chief of Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A.

Dr. Arbatov began by noting that the 24th Party Congress had expressed a desire for improved relations with the United States, but many in Moscow had doubts that this was possible. The doubts were
based on the view that there had been no progress on major issues, no improvements in US-Soviet atmosphere. Earlier, in 1969, there had been hope in the USSR that progress was possible. They had welcomed the era of negotiations concept, but now there was no affirmative hope of improving relations with the US.

One sign of this, Arbatov added, was that special channels that had been hopeful early now seemed not to yield any results. Under questioning he indicated he meant the channel to Dr. Kissinger through Ambassador Dobrynin. There seemed to be a difference between this channel and other official channels.

Dr. Kissinger replied that we could say much the same thing about the USSR. Frankly, we were getting fed up. The President especially was impatient with the fact that his messages were not answered for weeks. While we recognized that there was a different policy mechanism in Moscow, this situation was not acceptable. Dr. Kissinger added that we would not say that mistakes had not been made on both sides and every opportunity may not have been seized, but the fact was that for well over a year we had made a serious effort on a number of important issues. We had seen no sign of reciprocity. Maybe this was a wrong evaluation, but we were beginning to wonder if any agreement was possible with the USSR. We had been impressed with the Brezhnev speech, and, in fact, Dr. Kissinger had said publicly that its tone was constructive and positive. We have tried to show goodwill toward the USSR. This year would be decisive for Soviet-American relations. Next year there would be problems associated with the elections. Dr. Kissinger wanted to reiterate that we had a genuine interest in improving our relations with the USSR. We realized that if our two countries, as the nuclear superpowers, could reach better relations this would strengthen peace, and the remaining world problems would be assured of peaceful settlement. Our relations with China were minor in comparison with our relations to the Soviet Union.

Arbatov replied that nevertheless there were doubts there could be achievements in practical fields such as SALT or West Berlin. As for the delay in replying to messages he did not know the details, but the mechanism in Moscow was quite different from the United States where the President could make decisions rapidly. The main thing, however, was that when the USSR made approaches on issues, they found that the US took actions that in themselves were only nuisances but that accumulated to create a bad impression. Asked for examples, he cited the refusal to participate in the Moscow film festival, harassments by the Jewish Defense League, and our refusal to grant a license

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3 See footnote 3, Document 169.
for the sale of Yak–40 commercial jets in the US. (On this latter, Arbatov did not really know the details.)

Dr. Kissinger said he could understand the Soviet government’s view of the Jewish Defense League activities, but he assured Arbatov that these activities in general were carried out over the strongest opposition of the White House. The Government has used all legal procedures for restraining them. As for the film festival, this was related to the controversy over carrying out the Cultural Exchange Agreement and the conditions the Soviets were posing. Dr. Kissinger said he was unaware of the Yak–40 incident, but, in any case, it would be ludicrous for the White House to pursue a policy of deliberate minor needling in order to thwart a major agreement.

Dr. Arbatov said that while he recognized this because he was familiar with the US, others in Moscow did not. He said they seemed to see a policy of linkage and that this could only be counterproductive.

Dr. Kissinger responded that the Soviets seemed to be linking issues more than we. Arbatov said that we tend to underestimate the emotional side of politics. There are those in Moscow who have the impression that we are deliberately seeking crises, to blame the Soviets for lack of progress.

Dr. Kissinger replied that he could say on behalf of the President, with whom he had just had a brief conversation on Soviet relations, that the President now felt frustrated, impatient and personally annoyed. (At this point Arbatov asked that this be repeated and took notes.) Dr. Kissinger continued that the President was not used to having his messages go unanswered for a month at a time. What seems ridiculous is that, on the one hand, the Soviets say they want to improve relations based on reciprocity, and, on the other hand, we want exactly the same, but that we cannot seem to make a breakthrough. It may have been that in the beginning of this Administration we made some mistakes, but for the last year we had made a major effort to achieve such a breakthrough but had not succeeded. If there were ma-

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4 Reference is to the small jet aircraft developed by the Yakovlev Design Bureau and manufactured in Saratov. In a May 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that the Department of Commerce, acting on the advice of the Department of State, had refused to issue the requisite certificate of “air-worthiness” for selling YAK–40 aircraft in the United States. In view of Arbatov’s complaint, Kissinger wrote in the margin: “Hal—How about the YAK 40? Should they be reconsidered?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII) Sonnenfeldt advised against reconsideration in a memorandum to Kissinger on June 18. “To my knowledge the only complaint was from Arbatov,” Sonnenfeldt observed, “and even he did not know what it was all about. Later, if trade and other matters are moving we might reopen it, but in light of present publicity to Mack Truck etc., I would recommend we ignore the YAK–40.” Kissinger approved this recommendation. (Ibid.)

5 See Document 206.
jor differences this would be understandable, but there did not seem to be this kind of insurmountable differences. Thus we could achieve a breakthrough if the Soviets met us half-way. He had noted Gromyko's formulations that we should stop “fencing.” This was a good formulation. After the Party Congress we had expected a change but we were still waiting.

The President is now wondering about the prospects of relations with the USSR. The President is not determined to be anti-Soviet. This President could reach agreements that probably no other President could.

Arbatov said again that there was a difference in procedures of decision making. They had said before that they wanted to improve relations, but what had happened? There were difficult and easy problems. Some could be solved now, but the Americans have the idea of extracting a price, for example, in Europe. For obvious reasons European matters were high on the Soviet list. But Moscow feels that the US is deliberately making matters worse by blocking agreements.

At this point Arbatov again complained that the special channel through Dobrynin did not seem to be producing any practical results. Though European affairs were important to the Soviets, they could live without a European settlement; it could be postponed as long as necessary for the West to show its readiness. Dr. Kissinger said that we have used our influence to keep the Berlin negotiations going. This should be obvious to those who know the details of the negotiations. There was a difficult internal situation in West Germany and we had tried to play a constructive role.

Arbatov said that they had the impression that we were using these internal German difficulties to turn the negotiations against the USSR. Dr. Kissinger replied that with all the problems we had, we scarcely needed to add the German domestic problem.

Arbatov turned to the matter of trade as an example of linkage. There were many in the Soviet Union who said there was no prospect for economic relations with the US, and that the Soviets could leave trade with the US outside their calculations. Nevertheless, they had decided to try to improve trade relations. However, people in Moscow have the impression that we are using trade prospects to influence other negotiations.

At the Party Congress there had been a “success,” in that the Soviet Party had laid out its plans and principles. They intended to pay attention to improving the life of the Soviet people. They had laid down

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foreign policy principles that accompanied this. There was no sense of urgency and they would now begin to elaborate what these principles meant.

Dr. Kissinger said that on our side as well there was a serious interest in arrangements with the USSR that were compatible with Soviet security. We would not try to trick the Soviets into agreements simply because they were too intelligent to fall for such tricks and if they should, such agreements would not be kept. We wanted a relationship in which both sides acquired a stake in maintaining agreements. The problem now was how to give tangible expression to this mutual desire. If we made a breakthrough then trade would take care of itself. We recognize that settlements would be decided on their merits and not be influenced by trade.

Arbatov said that in Moscow, looking back at the last two years, there was an impression that we either deliberately made certain moves, or that we did not control our bureaucracy. Dr. Kissinger said that the latter is true to some extent. Some agencies do take actions that depart from the central theme of Administration policy. The Soviets must have somewhat the same problem.

As examples of actions he was complaining about, Arbatov cited statements last year by Frank Shakespeare and William Buckley concerning the sharpening of official “anti-Soviet” propaganda. He added that the personnel quality of the Embassy was declining which they believed to be deliberate, and that Ambassador Beam had supported Shakespeare proposals for a tougher anti-Soviet line. Dr. Kissinger replied that if there was an atmosphere and attitude of profound suspicion then something was bound to happen to confirm suspicions. The answer was some success in our relations. We believe that SALT would be the starting point, and perhaps Berlin. The issue was how to break out of the pattern. The President questions why it takes so long to receive Soviet responses. If there was a major issue in dispute, this would be understandable, but the differences between us on concrete issues were much narrower. We seem to come close but never quite succeed. We had hoped that after the Party Congress we would see movement that would permit a serious dialogue. We could continue to score debating points but in this contest no one really wins.

Arbatov again said that the question was one of US policies (but never completed his thought). Dr. Kissinger continued that he would cite a recent example of problems from our standpoint. There were the new ICBM silos. There could be many explanations. He could understand if the Soviets were only increasing numbers. The problem was

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7 See footnote 22, Document 74.
that we were told in various ways last year that the Soviets had stopped and this was some sort of signal and then we were confronted with new deployments; not just more numbers but something new and apparently different. Some people in the United States naturally conclude that there is something devious involved. In itself this may be a minor matter; if it were to suggest some important change in the balance, we will do whatever is necessary in our own programs. Nevertheless, we did not understand Soviet actions in this respect.

Arbatov said the United States had to understand that for years after World War II the Soviets felt inferior. Indeed this went back to historic attitudes of Russians. Now this is changing. The Soviets felt no obligations to put aside their defense programs. When this question came up in Moscow, someone usually said look at what the Americans are doing. For example, the deployment of MIRVs and Safeguard. Why should the Soviets put aside their programs. Last autumn there was a feeling that they were exercising some restraint. We should know that on the Soviet side (military) experts played a large role, perhaps more so than in the United States. But the US plays a different game. When the Soviets agree to a proposition, the US withdraws it. The conclusion seems to be that the United States is trying to create justification for propaganda to blame the Soviets for failure. The purpose of our proposals might therefore be only a trick.

Dr. Kissinger said that we could have no interest in such marginal propaganda games. Perhaps we could trick the USSR once, but then we could never expect to do serious business with them again. As for US programs, we had demonstrated considerable restraint in pressing ahead without Safeguard. The Soviets also were testing their MIRVs. When we made our proposals last August the Soviets were beginning a new ICBM program. Nevertheless, he could say that we were interested in serious SALT agreements. We believe an agreement can be accomplished this year. It is time to stop fencing. (Arbatov was taking notes at this point.)

Arbatov started to refer again to Jewish Defense League and the Yak–40, but Dr. Kissinger interjected to say the White House attitude toward the JDL was clear and that he would look into the Yak–40. He added that from Moscow it might look as if we were not active enough in restraining JDL activities.

Arbatov took his leave and thanked Dr. Kissinger for taking his time to see him.

W.G. Hyland

P.S. The following morning while waiting to see Mr. Ehrlichman, Arbatov told Mr. Hyland that he wanted to assure Dr. Kissinger that he had not been the source of the story by Joe Kraft concerning
Arbatov (which mentioned that Arbatov had lunch with Kissinger).\(^8\)

In fact he disagreed with Kraft’s conclusion that the outlook was for “more tension than accord” in Soviet-American relations. On the contrary, at the Party Congress the Soviet leaders had taken a position on internal affairs and it would make no sense to take an entirely contrary position on foreign policy. He said he hoped that he had not added to tensions in his talks with Dr. Kissinger. He then went to his appointment with Mr. Ehrlichman.

W.H.

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\(^8\) In his syndicated column on May 11, Kraft reported that Arbatov had been “cordially received in very high places,” including his lunch with Kissinger at the White House. Kraft concluded that, in spite of Arbatov’s conciliatory efforts, the immediate outlook for Soviet-American relations was “much more for tension than accord.” (Kraft, “Big Two Impasse,” Washington Post, May 11, 1971, p. A19)

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208.  Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers\(^1\)


New Leningrad Trial and Anti-Soviet Violence

We have just received word from Embassy Moscow that the long delayed trial of Soviet Jews charged with “anti-Soviet slander” began today in Leningrad (cable at Tab F).\(^2\) Similar trials in Kishinev and Riga reportedly will begin in a week or so.

In view of this, we can expect heightened concern and agitation from the U.S. Jewish community. The chances of new anti-Soviet acts by the Jewish Defense League (JDL) are increased, and the numbers of American Jews inclined to sympathize with violent or militant tactics in behalf of Soviet Jewry will grow.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 USSR. Secret. Drafted by Mainland; cleared by Atherton. Davies initialed the memorandum for Hillenbrand. Eliot also initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.

The Soviet Government is using a "carrot and stick" approach to contain the outspoken minority of Soviet Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel. On the one hand, Moscow allowed emigration to Israel during March and April at rates which, although small in absolute terms, exceeded those of any prior two-month period. More than 2300 exit permits were issued compared to only about 1000 in all of 1970. Between March 16 and May 1, 1200 left. The post-Party Congress rate—200 per week—is still five times the monthly average for 1970. This upsurge has sent some of the most articulate Jewish dissenters to Israel and has helped to counteract Western criticism of Soviet restrictions on free movement of persons (see Tab B for additional statistics).  

On the other hand, new trials will again remind Soviet Jews of limits set on permissible activity as Soviet authorities attempt to intimidate further those who remain in the USSR. The trials could be exploited by the Soviet Government to link Jewish dissenters with alleged "interference from abroad" in Soviet internal affairs.

The defendants are apparently being charged under Article 70 of the Criminal Code ("anti-Soviet slander"). This is an open-ended provision of the Soviet code widely used against a variety of dissenters. Maximum sentence is seven years at hard labor. According to several reports, they may also be accused under Article 72 ("anti-Soviet organization"). This is a much rarer, more serious charge usually resulting in severe prison terms (Tab C). Treason may also be charged.

Reports indicate the accused were active in unofficial Jewish cultural circles. Some may have personally known the Leningrad "hijackers" tried in December 1970. Since, like other Soviet dissenters, the Jews are being tried for activities that would not be considered crimes in most countries, the outcry abroad will be considerable.

We have requested all involved agencies to make greater protection available to Soviet establishments and officials in the United States. The Department’s press spokesman has been furnished press guidance underlining the U.S. Government’s concern for Soviet Jewry and the effect of the issue on U.S.-Soviet relations (Tab D). However, we may well face a situation similar to December 1970, with protests and unrest among American Jews.

We note that for more than a year, United Nations Secretary General U Thant has been making behind-the-scenes representations on

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3 Attached but not printed.

4 At Tab C are the relevant pages from an English translation of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.

5 See footnote 2, Document 77.

6 At Tab D is a press briefing paper on the trials of Soviet Jews, prepared by the Bureau of European Affairs on May 10.
behalf of Soviet Jews who wish to emigrate (Tab E). The Soviets have apparently not found this kind of representation inappropriate and, in fact, many Soviet Jews mentioned in appeals which U Thant has forwarded to Soviet authorities have been successful in obtaining exit permission.

Under these circumstances, we believe it advisable for the Department again to show concern for Soviet Jews on trial. This is not only a political and moral requirement. It would serve also to support the "established" and moderate Jewish organizations who are under heavy fire from JDL-minded militants to adopt extremist tactics. Since your memorandum to the President on January 29 on anti-Soviet violence, our policy has been to bolster the responsible segments of American Jewry who have been vigorously combatting a philosophy of anti-Soviet violence and disruption. In connection with this latest Leningrad trial, we have been informed that the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations is sending a telegram to the President asking for a meeting in order to discuss the situation (Tab G). 9

We believe that one effective way to register our concern and dampen renewed anti-Soviet violence would be to reconsider delivering the previously submitted statement about Soviet Jewry to Ambassador Dobrynin. (Statement at Tab A, earlier memorandum at Tab H)

Recommendation:

That you deliver the statement at Tab A to Ambassador Dobrynin. 12

Approve
Disapprove
Other
209. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, May 11, 1971, 9:10 a.m.

K: I just had a talk with Gerry Smith\(^2\) and apparently our channel is not working properly. Semenov is going along accepting my proposition to you which Gerry Smith doesn't know about. Semenov has not said what it is but it's the main lines of my proposition to you. The President will be beside himself because we haven't got a reply yet to our proposal.

D: Semenov didn't have instructions and I have a telegram that says it.

K: Semenov on a boat trip went into great detail and Smith is so surprised that he has propositions we didn't make to him.\(^3\) Proposed ABM agreement, a freeze on offensive missiles—Smith never heard of it. He hinted that you would accept a ceiling on longer [large] ones within this. Smith thinks he will conclude this simultaneously. He [The President] didn't object to the proposal but it isn't easy that when he makes a proposal to the Council of Ministers and gets no answer.

D: He has no authority.

K: We are in the position now that as far as Smith is concerned a Soviet proposition exists and the President doesn't have a response to his proposal.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking. Kissinger corrected a copy of the transcript; these corrections were non-substantive and have been silently incorporated in the text of the transcript printed here. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT, Jan. 9–May 20, 1971) For his memoir account of this “rather blunt conversation,” see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 818–819; see also Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 214–215.

\(^2\) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Gerard Smith for breakfast on May 11 from 8:25 until 9 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Sonnenfeldt and Wayne Smith briefed Kissinger for the meeting in a memorandum the previous day. “From the grapevine,” they reported, “we understand that the delegation as a whole is returning from the Washington review in a state of near euphoria, believing that an important breakthrough has virtually been achieved and that the deliberations this week must produce a new American proposal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT Talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV) No record of the breakfast conversation has been found.

\(^3\) Smith and Semenov discussed the “state of negotiations” aboard a steamer on the Wörthersee in Carinthia, Austria on May 9. Smith forwarded memoranda of this and related conversations with a May 13 letter to Kissinger. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT, January 9–May 20, 1971) For his memoir account of the trip, see Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 219–221.
D: They haven’t discussed it in the govt. I know what I am telling you. The Minister directed him and he is not authorized. Gromyko is not deceiving me.

K: The President can only conclude one of two things. Either there’s confusion in Moscow which we don’t believe or a deliberate attempt to mobilize his people against him or by-pass him.

D: It’s not so. On this matter Semenov has no authority. What he makes a hint—I don’t know.

K: In order to keep our channel intact and avoid on either side a refusal [omission in transcript]. Now we are in a position that as far as I am concerned it has to be treated formally. Smith is telling everyone what Semenov said. That there should be an ABM agreement and a less formal phrase—we have discussed it and it’s all right. A ceiling which would include large missiles and radar limitations.

D: I don’t know what’s going on. Does he really make a proposal or just a talk and he picks it up piece by piece.

K: He talked with Smith alone.

D: Was it a proposal or picked up by Smith?

K: Smith thinks it’s a proposal and since it’s never been discussed by me and Smith never knew or authorized to discuss it—if Smith had proposed it—well, you know. But it’s so close to what you and I have discussed—what is the Soviet position and secondly, you may do this deliberately but the President will take this as a personal affront.

D: It’s not necessary.

K: What would Brezhnev think if he proposed to us through a channel and we went [to] a subordinate official and made a reply?

D: Only two days ago we got a copy of a telegram where he was denounced in strongest way. I have known Gromyko for 20 years. I am just telling you. It’s for my information but it was not for yours. I have the telegram. Direct information from my talk with Haig. It’s not to mislead me. Why would they? It’s for my information and it’s for the record.

K: We have the serious problem now—

D: [omission in transcript] reply.

K: We have to construct a reply from Smith to Semenov and I can’t say it’s not the Soviet position because no one knows I have talked with you.

D: I know the story and you must say what you will to the President. Semenov when I was in Moscow he was told not to talk.

4 See Document 201.
K: I don’t understand it. You can reject the proposal but why when we are trying to do so many things—Smith talked about the summit but he might have gotten that himself.

D: Only two days ago I [omission in transcript] that emphasized the same point. If you do not believe it—

K: There’s no sense in your lying. I just want to be sure you want to work with me.

D: This case they discuss through you and me. No reason for misleading me.

K: I now have a message. The problem you have to remember and Moscow must understand is that Smith wants to go to Vienna and give an answer to Semenov.

D: Semenov probably wants to correct it and made it worse.

K: He went further. Spelled it out in detail. In a telegram two junior members went into detail with Garthoff. I will show you.

D: I believe you. He didn’t reply to what you proposed.

K: He replied without saying what it was.

D: We didn’t discuss the text.

K: No, not a text. He made a proposal identical to what you and I discussed with details.

D: Formally or in discussion?

K: In private discussions with Smith. He described it as elaboration of what he said at dinner. Two junior members spelled out what Garthoff said—freezing and Safeguard sites and discussed what Safeguard site might be acceptable.

D: They have that on instructions. Probably we don’t understand what they are talking about. Their delegation there has own instructions—they know nothing about our discussions.

K: They don’t mention our discussions. They made a proposal. If we defend ABM, 4 is not acceptable but 2 would be acceptable. Deliberate that Soviet position only refused 4 and 3. How about 2? They said it was deliberate that they mentioned 4 and 3.

D: You have to understand if you base on 4 or 2 they have [omission in transcript.]

K: You can argue with me but the fact is our government believes you have made a formal proposition to which we have to reply and the President believes he made a proposition to you and you are replying in a bureaucratic channel and he will think you are trying to box him in. It’s not going to be considered a friendly gesture.

D: What can I say when I tell you it was not an intention? What else can I tell you? Just a delegation fishing. 4 or 2 sites when I know for sure—otherwise why would we wait so long?

K: Unless you want to ignore the President.
D: We are not children. We know who is boss.

K: It’s incomprehensible to me.

D: We know who is boss in the WH.

K: I will grant that this was done in good faith on your side. The fact is we now have a problem because we have to give Smith a formal instruction. I don’t know really. We can play it your way. Make a proposal to Semenov that we have made to you. No sense any more in discussion. We have to make a reply. I can’t say that this—to ignore Semenov.

D: I know he has no authority.

K: Why don’t you do the following? It’s a Soviet problem.

D: No problem.

K: What should we do?

D: Was it an official proposal or a guess of Smith? Semenov can discuss many things for 5 hours and you can construe what you want and he will say he said nothing. Was it formal?

K: No. Semenov made the proposal that Haig showed you.

D: It said that Mr. Semenov hinted. This point—Semenov will say they didn’t understand me.

K: If it stopped there, no problem. On Friday—[omission in transcript] you. Take the proposal that Semenov made because it’s very important.

D: Who said?

K: I will get you the memos. On Sunday on the boat Semenov went into great detail. Smith talking with—all right first. I will read the first paragraph. May 6—“At dinner for the Soviet delegation May 4 Semenov from a written brief and [on] new instructions introduced coupling of offensive [restraint of ICBMs with ABM only agreement.]”

D: I received a telegram on that. What happened next?

K: This is May 6. “At Soviet Reception Timerbaev and K[ishilov] took initiative in taking Garthoff aside on new Soviet proposal and they emphasized [high importance of reaching initial SALT agreement this calendar year, and need for U.S. to consider seriously and respond affirmatively] to the general approach [indicated by ‘very significant’ Semenov statement to Smith on May 4.]” On the evening of the 6th.
D: What these two boys really—Semenov wouldn’t show them the telegram.

K: On Sunday Semenov spoke with Smith for 5 hours and gave him the details of what he considers the new Soviet proposal.

D: He went more and more?

K: He did that on a boat and not a plenary session and there’s not a record but when a Deputy Minister speaks for 5 hours he must have something to say.

D: It’s not necessary. The thing is Semenov could speak for 5 hours is well known in my govt. He can talk on anything he likes. He wouldn’t know anything about the military thing but he can philosophize many things. They will be very strongly scolded and he is my friend. Was it a proposal or did Smith think so?

K: It’s not a difficulty because Smith thinks he has and we must now respond. If I do nothing else now you will get a formal answer to Semenov from Smith.

D: A telegram coming in now. Will you hold a minute?

K: Yes.

D: So I will sum up this way. Smith gets a definite proposal and Semenov continued to elaborate. But he didn’t say we are ready to make this proposal.

K: He thinks that if we now say all right we accept an agreement on ABM and freeze, he thinks there will be an agreement. Smith feels we can get an agreement along the lines of what you and I talked about. Simultaneous freeze. ABM vs. Moscow. That’s what he thinks.

D: No authority because it contradicts his instructions. If I mention this to Gromyko, he will say Smith invented it.

K: Smith believes it’s an ABM agreement with offensive freeze concluded simultaneously with limitations on radar and limitations of testing of surface to air missiles (which we haven’t discussed).

D: He has instructions not to discuss specifics.

K: I just finished talking with Smith. This is not something he asked Smith to raise with him and not our major issue.

D: I have the telegram. This is a copy from Moscow on what Semenov reports. Acting in accordance with instructions and said nothing more. [omission in transcript] minister and discuss with Smith what we didn’t talk through Smith and Semenov(?). Semenov emphatically denies he talked with Smith about it.

K: I don’t know what to do now.

D: I could tell you from this telegram that answer to what you proposed is still not approved. This telegram is the second from Gromyko. He emphatically denies it here.
K: What’s going to happen—if we don’t straighten this out we will be forced to give a formal answer in Vienna and it will be total confusion.

D: Smith is confused and trying to present a case he didn’t know.

K: A case he didn’t advocate before. He had other ideas before.

D: Safeguards against Moscow.

K: Then he wouldn’t get if Semenov—

D: Everything you mentioned was his interpretation.

K: Semenov made those points on the boat.

D: He has his instructions. I don’t know whether—I don’t know. Semenov has to follow instructions or he will lose his job. When he denies it I am sure Semenov will not on a second time report the same story. What he could do if they discussed in detail, he will see how Smith will react and then report back to Moscow. What’s important and you should ask Smith was there an official proposal?

K: No text. I will get his memo.

D: It would be helpful to me.

K: I will have it by the end of the day.

D: A brief summary.

K: I have to tell you that the—your formal position I understand but the fact is that Smith believes sincerely and since he doesn’t know I ever discussed it and he has had different ones—

D: I can now finish this telegram. Semenov said he discussed only what was discussed before. He emphasized that he was on previous position which I gave to you before and that freezing would be settled after ABM. You check it. Semenov said simultaneously or before.

K: I can tell you that really there’s a hell of a strange feeling. We find it strange that there should be an answer as far down as Garthoff. And Arbatov is going around [saying] that the WH channel is not functioning properly. To Ruina and others. He shouldn’t even know there is a WH channel.

D: Did he mention who?

K: He mentioned specifically and to people who don’t know it.

D: This is strange. I will speak with him.

K: After Haig mentioned to you outside of our channel should stop and there are more discussions—the same range of issues. When you make a proposal to me on Berlin and I send Rush to Zorin or [Abrasimov] rather than answering Gromyko, it would create a bad impression in Moscow.

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8 See Document 207.
9 Jack P. Ruina, member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee.
D: It’s very clear that they discussed freezing and so on but they have no instructions to discuss it. Such an idea of freezing would be after ABM is signed. Did anyone tell him or subordinates that this freezing would be before?

K: They think it’s manageable. What matters to me is that when you and I have confidential negotiations we agree in principle and then it’s presented to our bureaucracy. If in good faith it’s not possible that high [omission in transcript] or subordinate officials. Garthoff had no instructions.

D: They discuss many things. Fishing with each other. Officials are one thing.

K: You said they were instructed to discuss freezing.

D: No, if it arises then Semenov has instructions. If it arises then [it’s] to be discussed only after.

K: They raised it and we didn’t. The way this looks to the President is that we in carrying it out have been very rigid to give your Politburo every opportunity but you do this and if it leaks to the press it will look that you are bringing pressure on us. We have explained the point. As far as Smith is concerned he believes that there was a formal proposal.

D: On what?

K: ABM.

D: They have discussed it for 4 months.

K: ABM coupled with offensive freeze.

D: Before or after?

K: The formal freeze is after but he thinks it’s manageable.

D: That’s all he said?

K: Semenov went into great detail with him.

D: That’s why he thinks it’s manageable.

K: That’s what he thinks.

D: I can tell you, you have nothing. This decision was not made. You have to accept it or not.

K: It’s not in the good of our relationship that while you and I are discussing something, subordinates are discussing the same thing.

D: [omission in transcript] you said no. I have what he said officially. We cannot accept ABM without an offensive. So he asked what are the compromises and one said something about freezing. Semenov probably said OK, we will do it afterwards. This was the position two months ago. He didn’t know it.

K: It’s known to me but no one here knows we decided this.

D: We sent our delegation—agreement on ABM. What do you want then? Your delegation says [omission in transcript].
K: You make up your mind with whom you are talking. If it’s me, we will instruct our delegation.

D: We have not reached a decision on the proposal. Therefore, we can tell our delegation to do nothing.

K: You could. (You could discuss ABM).

D: But your delegation refused to discuss ABM. Then we will have to go back through official negotiations. It’s a question of the real thing.

K: The President feels in our discussions we have had that this could have been a good turning point. We have to succeed sometimes. He has tried to be very careful of your concerns and we are now in this position which in fact will be treated in our govt. as a formal Soviet proposal. What Semenov did was propose the last draft of the letter you brought me from Moscow. Not the one I suggested. It has to look to the President as if rejecting it, you have introduced it to our bureaucracy (to see what they do).

D: That makes no sense.

K: It embarrasses the President.

D: [omission in transcript]

K: What Semenov proposed was what you brought back from Moscow.

D: What he could say from instructions was ABM and only that.

K: That was in the letter.

D: No it went about before freezing.

K: No, it’s what I asked you to put in.

D: That part that I said fine if we [omission in transcript]. Otherwise it was all right with you. Just the two points and we announced it two weeks ago.

K: Are you telling me that you are accepting the two agreements should be signed simultaneously?

D: Before signing on ABM we will reach details before signing the agreement. First we have to sign ABM and its details. That’s Semenov.

K: Just look at the mess this creates. By Semenov raising this. Suppose Smith backs this position, we will have a problem here.

D: Semenov has instructions that are two months old deliberately. Any decisions on freezing would be after ABM signed.

K: I think we understand the problem.

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10 Reference is presumably to the draft letter that Dobrynin gave Kissinger on April 23. See Document 189.
D: What he said was this should be done before the signing. On this point Semenov couldn’t say a point.

K: So it’s the one sentence.

D: If you accept it but you made it again difficult. Those two points. The govt. is meeting. I am now waiting. I have to receive an answer on this point. Otherwise you said it was acceptable to you.

K: I have explained to you the impression it makes here. I understand but it will be hard to explain. Such fine points it will be hard for our people to follow it. I understand it and you can report it to Moscow.

D: I don’t know what to report. Semenov only reported something two months old.

K: Smith thinks it’s a formal proposal. This will force us to respond in plenary session. Then you reject it and everyone knows we have a deadlock.

D: We can work it. Semenov is telling you a position two months old. There’s nothing about the proposal that’s new. Only two men here know.

K: It’s funny that what he thinks is what I know to be true.

D: The difference between us was before or after ABM, the freezing. You raised it last moment less [omission in transcript] the two cities. We have done what your govt. has asked. Semenov said nothing about that.

K: I told the President three weeks ago that you were making (promising) moves and we were going to make progress. It will raise—

D: They are talking different things. It’s an old position.

K: I can hold Smith here until Tues of next week. If we don’t have a reply from you we will have to give him a reply. You know what it will be and it will be in that channel.

D: I can make it easier. You listen to Smith and ask him the crucial question. Does he understand?

K: He thinks it can be negotiated.

D: Then let’s discuss it with Semenov again and repeat it. He will say it will be no. You will have an official answer from me. Semenov will not have it officially. Then they can clarify the points. He can ask before or after. Then you will have reply. It will be for their own amusement.

K: I will discuss it with the President. It’s a bureaucratic fine point. The fact of the matter is that a matter we have handled with discretion.

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11 May 18.
here is now a part of the record of our bureaucracy. It creates internal problems for us which we can handle but we could have gone to Semenov first.

D: You can do that. He can handle it.

K: Do you want to deal with the President or the bureaucracy?

D: Semenov says he discussed what was before.

K: I understand.

D: Now you do not care but it was a major point for two months. This was a point. Then I brought you an answer, yes, and Semenov is discussing after the decision.

K: I tell you honestly that the President will not engage in many more exchanges when it gets so complicated. He will probably decide to handle it formally.

D: I tried to explain to you but you don’t listen. The disagreement was whether to accept before or after.

K: The crucial point is after 2 and a half years and months of discussions with you and me, we will get something important. We are one sentence away from that. One sentence that commits you to nothing. At that precise moment the issue goes into the bureaucracy and deprives it of the symbolic thing which could have had or a start in our relationship for significant progress. All the rest is legalistic. You can say he stayed within the instructions. I will not accuse him of not. But while the President is waiting for a reply from you to receive 3 telegrams in succession that Soviet diplomats discussed what he is waiting for and that Soviets have made no move, he will not understand. You can explain or I can but he doesn’t read—

D: Your President can be told it’s [omission in transcript].

K: The idea made on freeze before this.

D: After or before this is it really. Our delegation (discussions) are 3 months old.

K: Our delegation doesn’t even know about the freeze.

D: Whether on or off the record it’s 3 months old.

K: You will find the correct way of reporting our feelings.

D: I don’t see what it is. Semenov didn’t raise after the decisions.

K: He talked for 5 hours. Smith considers it important enough to tell the Secy. of State, Secy. of Defense and the President. Smith isn’t a fool. He doesn’t report to these people unless he thinks there’s a new proposal. Whether legally Semenov stayed within his instructions.

D: You check with Smith if it was before or after.

K: He is just one exchange behind you and me.

D: We can have agreement 4 months ago. You raised this question.
K: Do you want the President to think that after he turned it down you are then raising it with one of his diplomats to see if they will raise it?

D: Why? Our diplomats don’t know what’s going on through this channel.

K: After Haig talked with you it’s raised two more times. After I raised (an item on Berlin) you stopped it.12 (So it can be done.)

D: He didn’t say anything on the crucial points.

K: Sure, he raised something that was turned down.

D: You will turn it down again?

K: Of course. (I would like to see what would happen if you in our channel opposed something and then we raised it in a lower level.)

D: He has no instructions. It’s just talks. Feel out the timing.

K: It’s a curious coincidence. Smith said it was a written brief and some new instructions.

D: It’s Smith’s interpretation. He didn’t have any new instructions.

K: You are doing a great job.

D: You don’t have to believe me. It’s a very sensible explanation. They don’t know what’s going on. How could we believe that a second rate diplomat can make a decision you cannot get from the President?

K: There are 50 explanations.

D: They don’t know what’s going on! Why go through you or Smith on a 3 months old position?

K: You have to believe me. Our feeling here is—I talked with the President on the basis of the two cables yesterday.13 We just have a grave doubt whether there is an attempt to make a departure and we cannot see this as good faith. We have tried very hard.

D: If you accepted text—

K: We never agreed on NCA. We want each side to reserve their position.

D: Our govt. has not decided.

K: That’s where we will be in practice. Even if you don’t agree, we will adopt the decision.

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12 See Document 151.

13 See Document 206. Kissinger also called Nixon at 7:29 p.m. on May 10; the two men talked for 15 minutes. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.
D: I cannot make the decision for the govt.

K: While you were discussing it and while we were stopping the bureaucratic process to decide it they can throw in new things for them. [omission in transcript] The fact I heard it 3 months ago means nothing.

D: You only have to discuss ABM. You can tell them.

K: You can waste two weeks if you want.

D: It’s the decision about after.

K: The only thing—we are going over old ground. I have told you what will happen. I will hold Smith until Tues. We will have to send him back with new instructions. You can decide if it’s handled in Vienna or here.

D: I am not responsible for there. If you want [omission in transcript] it’s all right with me and my govt. You can tell Semenov no. We don’t care.

K: But it’s a problem here because our officials will run around—

D: Tell Smith to check with Semenov again. Then just say we cannot accept this after. Then say before we will discuss. Semenov will say no. He doesn’t know about this and it will be closed chapter. It will happen. I know. You are looking suspiciously of things that are not.

K: In Smith’s mind it’s a new offer and it’s considered bad faith by the President as if we tried to work with you. I can produce a stalemate 50 ways in Vienna. What’s hard is to achieve progress. Whether you get a reply or not I have not pressed you on that. We wanted silence until it was a reply.

D: You asked me to tell you. I have read the telegram from Gromyko. Semenov has no authority.

K: Whether he had authority or not he has produced the impression.

D: That’s difficult to catch.

K: It’s the impression that has been created. That impression has made irritation in this building.

D: When you report to the President, report what I have said. Privately between you and me I have a telegram to tell you that Semenov has not authority. What they discussed on freezing. On agreements with offensive missiles only after ABM.

K: The fact of enforcing us to reject it is unfriendly. If I surfaced the letter you didn’t accept and forced you to reject it—

D: There was no proposal from Semenov.

K: Smith has a misapprehension.

D: You can tell Smith you ran into me and—

K: No, it puts me in a position of thwarting initiative.

D: I will talk with Smith.
K: No, just ask that there be no further discussion with Americans at any level until we hear from you.
D: Not to discuss anything except ABM?
K: Right now we have Smith here.
D: Semenov can receive a telegram to discuss nothing but ABM.
K: There’s no way of avoiding instructions to Smith now.
D: No official proposal made of any kind. It’s on the record. It’s up to you to handle your case. He didn’t mention any specific proposal. It’s for your understanding. How you handle it is up to you. How you handle it is your business.
K: Smith goes back next week. If no answer from you I will tell you what his instructions are. I will also tell you then if we are interested in handling it in our channel.
D: That’s fair enough.
K: Now that’s been thrown into Vienna channel we will have to bring it to a conclusion in ours before it goes further.

210. Editorial Note

After his telephone call with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on May 11, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger decided to link the tactics of Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Semenov in the SALT talks to the tactics of Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush in the Berlin negotiations. Kissinger met President Richard Nixon in the Oval Office from 10:27 to 10:41 a.m., presumably to discuss the decision. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) No record of the conversation has been found. Later that day, however, Kissinger sent the following special channel message to Rush in Bonn:

“For the time being, the President desires that there be no private meetings with Falin and that you cool matters with Bahr. Adoption of this tactic is due to circumstances not related to the Berlin issue. It is important that in cooling things you do so in such a way that the obstacles appear technical at your end rather than a result of instructions from here.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1)
Kissinger later recalled that his message to Rush was intended “as a response to Semenov’s conduct in circumventing the Channel during the SALT talks.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 829)

Before he received these instructions, Rush reported on his conversation the previous evening with West German State Secretary Egon Bahr and Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Valentin Falin. The meeting—the first of the so-called “Bonn triangle”—began the process of secret negotiations for a quadrupartite agreement. In a special channel message to Kissinger on May 11, Rush noted that Soviet behavior on Berlin, without the “rigid, polemical approach” of Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Pyotr Abrasimov, had suddenly improved: “Falin whom I met last summer in Moscow, adopted throughout a low-key, non-controversial negotiating stance of give and take. The discussion of our respective points of view was very helpful to Bahr and me in clearing up many ambiguities of the Russian position, and in turn Falin evidently understood for the first time much of the reasoning underlying our position. A continuation of this type of approach could lead to substantial progress and possibly a final agreement in the near future.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1)

The decision to punish the Soviets for Semenov’s conduct placed Rush in a difficult position. Although he promised to follow Kissinger’s instructions closely, Rush replied the next day, May 12, by raising “some serious problems” in their execution, in particular regarding his next meeting with Bahr and Falin, scheduled for May 19:

“I shall cancel this so far as my attendance is concerned. However, Bahr may take a strong stand with regard to his seeing Falin alone, something which, as you know, he has done rather frequently for some time, according to our intelligence information. Also, since the Chancellor and Bahr have been pressing hard to give to Falin the substantive portions of the Bahr draft, it will be very difficult to persuade them not to do so, particularly since the meeting with Falin on May 10 seemed to go so well and has aroused high hopes with the Chancellor and Bahr for real progress. I assume that I should make every effort to attempt to persuade them not to pass the substantive parts to Falin and, in fact, for Bahr not to have private meetings with Falin concerning Berlin. Please give me your thoughts concerning this as soon as possible.” (Ibid.)

After his meeting with Dobrynin that afternoon (see Document 211), Kissinger informed Rush that the situation had already changed. “The obstacles to your attending the next meeting have been substantially removed,” Kissinger reported, “though if it could be conveniently delayed by a few days say to the week of May 24 it would still be very helpful. But I prefer you to attend than to have Bahr go to the meet-
ing alone. Do your best to get a postponement. I agree that at the next meeting you should give Falin the substantive portions of the draft.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1) Rush expressed considerable relief on May 14 that Kissinger had been able to overcome the problems in Washington that would have undermined progress with Bahr and Falin in Bonn. “[T]hese talks show such promise,” Rush advised Kissinger by special channel, “that I feel we might miss some real opportunities if they should be discontinued at this point.” (Ibid.)


211. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 12, 1971, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting was at Dobrynin’s request. Dobrynin opened the meeting by making a general observation. He said that the negotiations on SALT with me had been the most difficult in which he had engaged in Washington. They had produced both hope and irritation in Moscow—hope because there was some desire for progress, but irritation because it was the first time in his experience that the whole government was actually involved in drafting documents. This was partly due to the fact that more than one department was involved.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. David Young and Winston Lord prepared the memorandum of conversation from Kissinger’s “somewhat cryptic” dictated notes; they also drafted a memorandum to the President summarizing the “highlights” of the meetings between Kissinger and Dobrynin on May 12 and 13. Kissinger, however, decided on May 20 not to forward the memorandum to the President. (Memorandum from Young to Kissinger, May 18; ibid.) The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting began at 4:35 and lasted until 6:10 pm. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
The result was that he hoped very much that the texts he was going to give me would be the final texts and that I would not be difficult about them now. I said, of course, I would have to see the texts.2

Dobrynin handed me the texts and we first discussed the paragraph on ABM’s in the letter—they had dropped the NCA deployment stipulation to which we had objected. I then asked about the problem of simultaneity in concluding the agreements. Dobrynin said that he had been instructed by his government to say that the issue was covered in the body of the paragraph, and that his government saw no need for it. And, in any case, the announcement took care of it. I said, in that case, why not just change the word “discussed” to “elaborated” or “worked on.” Dobrynin said he could assure me that the text was strong and clear and left no question about the intent.

Dobrynin then handed me the Russian text of the letter and suggested I try a translation of it because it would leave no question about its meaning. He said, of course, he would go back to Moscow if I insisted and they would probably agree, but it would take another two weeks and he wondered whether the irritation was worth the benefit. I said that I would take the two texts (letter and announcement), get them translated into an English that was more acceptable than his and see where we stood.

We then discussed the issue of whether there should be two separate letters or a single one. He said that, in Moscow, the strong preference was for a single document, though I could have the introductory two paragraphs from the President’s letter3 if I wanted to, which then the Soviet Union would not repeat, in order to have some distinction between the two letters. I told him that I would have to check that with the President—that we would have preferred to have two separate exchanges. Dobrynin said, frankly, this would raise the issue of who had taken the initiative and the Soviet Government would like to have it a joint effort. Dobrynin also said that it was quite important that the existence of the letters not be divulged, and that strict security be kept on our discussions except for the general fact that confidential discussions had been taking place.

We then discussed Berlin. I told Dobrynin that Rush was under the impression that matters were progressing satisfactorily and asked

2 Attached but not printed is a draft letter from Nixon to Kosygin. Dobrynin also gave Kissinger three other documents: a draft Soviet letter, a draft public statement, and a draft oral note. The Russian originals and English translations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2].

3 Reference is to the letter that Kissinger gave to Dobrynin at their April 26 meeting; see Document 192.
him what his reports were. Dobrynin said that his impression was that this was the case and that he, therefore, was hoping that we would make some progress.

I told Dobrynin I would call him later to let him know the President’s reaction.4

4 During a telephone conversation at 6:14 p.m., Nixon and Kissinger discussed their backchannel diplomacy: “P: Have you finished your meeting? K: Yes, I just got out. They have, in effect, accepted everything. P: You think so? K: I know so.” “K: In the meantime, they are thinking of making an announcement next Thursday. We got practically everything we asked for. P: Conciliatory? K: Oh yes. I really shook him yesterday. P: Good.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

212. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)4

Washington, May 12, 1971, 7:30 p.m.

D: I would like to tell you a few things. First, I am leaving for New York on Friday2 and will be back late on Sunday. I am just telling you this if you feel you could do it tomorrow. If not, let’s do it on Monday.

K: I am on the way to see the President now. I had an earlier talk with him3 and I am getting these documents translated into better English4 and then if your view is correct . . .

D: Oh, come on. Come on. It is correct.

K: I cannot make my own judgment on the Russian. Anatol, you are much more devious than I. If it is possible to translate your letter to be consistent with your release, I think we can solve most of the problem.

D: I could make another suggestion but it is only on my own. Maybe put it this way—one letter to say I am honored to confirm we have reached an agreement and then a supplement to this particular letter and instead of saying one government, we would say both governments.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

2 May 14.

3 See footnote 4, Document 211.

4 See Document 211.
K: Right.

D: Or maybe just a letter saying I would like to confirm we agreed about following instructions which we will both give our determination and then quote and unquote but instead of one government both governments then it will be just a confirmation on reached agreement and nothing else.

K: Let me see. That is a variation. The easiest thing would be if your letter could be put into better English and then we look at it and I am now on the way to see the President and I may call you in the morning to tell you what his initial reaction is.

5 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Residence from 7:40 until 8:15 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the conversation has been found.

213. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)1

Washington, May 12, 1971, 8:20 p.m.

K: Our pal gave in on all disputed points.2

H: He did! You are kidding!

K: There is only one minor issue. It may force one more go-around. Chances are—nine out of ten—that we can make an announcement next Thursday.3

H: Boy, that would be great. You don’t know whether he is going to have another go-around?

K: Almost certain not. The issue is whether it is possible to translate the Russian text the way he said it can be. They already agreed to a press announcement. The only other point is to see whether the text of the letter also has the same formulation as the text of the press announcement. If that’s the same then we have no problem at all. We can

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 Dobrynin. See Documents 211 and 212.
3 May 20.
handle it in two ways—get another formula out of them which would take two weeks or to make the press announcement—in other words we got exactly what we wanted.

H: That was a worthwhile afternoon. How long did you spend with him?
K: About one and one-half hours.
H: What is his mood?
K: After I let him have it yesterday—a—he is abject now. He says I am the toughest guy he has had to deal with here.
H: Good! That’s exactly what he ought to be thinking. That’s really great if we could actually tie it together.
K: The thing, Bob, you have to prevent is to oversell this thing. This is only an agreement to negotiate. If we lock ourselves into [omission in transcript] then they will screw us in actual negotiations. That’s something we will discuss next week. Let’s wrap it up first.
H: The tendency is to go all out on it.
K: That’s right and you have to help me resist it. We have not gone wrong by playing it cool. The beauty of it is that no one will look at it for four weeks.
H: Smith doesn’t go back to Vienna?
K: Just to wind it up. For four weeks that [they?] can’t attack us—it would be just suicide.
H: Smith would not make the announcement?
K: The President would make the announcement.
H: Does he know we are going to do it?
K: No. The Russians have offered him one-half of what they offered us and he was just panting to take it.
H: How is he going to deal with his friend on it? I don’t see how it is all that big of a problem but it worries him.
K: It is a crucial situation where the President has to worry about achieving an arms proposal by putting up proposals which his bureaucracy said was impossible.
H: But we can’t make high [hay?] of it because we have to wait for the negotiations.
K: We already got more than what most people thought we could get—an agreement to negotiate.

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4 See Document 209.
5 Semenov.
The House of Representatives voted on May 12 to restore funding for supersonic transport (SST) aircraft.

Mansfield announced on May 12 that his amendment limiting the number of American soldiers stationed in Europe would come to a vote in the Senate on May 19.

China. See footnote 9, Document 206.


Haldeman wrote an addendum to his diary entry for May 12: “This items added as Henry K called me after I had done the other tape, to report that in his meeting with Dobrynin today, he had gotten agreement in all of the specifics of the SALT thing except for one minor technicality that relates to translation in the letter, as related to the wording in the press release. Henry says there’s a 9 out of 10 chance that we’ll be able to make the announcement next Thursday, and that if it gets hung up at all, it will only be hung up on this technicality, which can be worked out in two weeks, but it would take that if they do have to actually move in and work it out. He’s very pleased and thinks he’s gotten over the first hurdle in his series of negotiating plans, and now we will anxiously await the next one.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)
214. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 13, 1971, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting was at my request to give him the President’s answer. I told him that the President found acceptable the idea of a joint letter and that the announcement was, in general, acceptable also, but I wondered still whether we could not replace the word “discussed” with the word “elaborated” or “worked on.” Dobrynin said that he had no authority to make such a change and that, if I insisted on it, he would have to go back to Moscow. Then the question was whether Gromyko felt able to do it or whether Gromyko would have to go back to the Politburo. This was really the issue. If it went back to the Politburo, it would have to be put on the agenda of the government and that would take at least a week or two. Dobrynin continued that, in that case, I would get very irritated again, and he thought the Soviet Government would get very irritated, too. He wondered whether I could not just hand him an oral statement that left no doubt that he had explained to me that in the view of the Soviet Government there was no question about simultaneity of coming to a conclusion. I suggested a rough text and later confirmed it on the telephone (Tab D).}

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. David Young and Winston Lord prepared the memorandum of conversation from Kissinger’s “somewhat cryptic” dictated notes; they also drafted a memorandum to the President summarizing the “highlights” of the meetings between Kissinger and Dobrynin on May 12 and 13. Kissinger, however, decided on May 20 not to forward the memorandum to the President. (Memorandum from Young to Kissinger, May 18; ibid.) The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting began at 10:08 and lasted until 11:45 am. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76)

2 Dobrynin called Kissinger at 3:55 p.m. A transcript of the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. Tab D is attached but not printed.
We then went over my English text and the Russian version and spent about 45 minutes trying to determine whether the translations were adequate.3

Dobrynin then turned to other issues. He said that he hoped this would mark the beginning of a better phase in our relationship. I said that once this was concluded, they would see some unilateral steps on our part for which we did not ask reciprocity but that showed our good faith.

Dobrynin replied that this would certainly be helpful, and he gave me an example of matters that caused irritation. He said that it would not be understood in Moscow why I had seen Arbatov4 while Peterson had refused to see the Deputy Minister of Trade Komarov. I said I frankly didn’t know about that, and I would look into it. Dobrynin went into a long explanation to say that it really didn’t make any difference to the Soviet Union, but their basic decisions about the placement of foreign orders had to be made within the next six months because they were at the beginning of their five-year plan, and they now had the funds available to spend abroad. I told Dobrynin that I would look into the matter.

After finding out that Peterson was seeing Komarov in New York, I called Dobrynin back later in the day to tell him that I had arranged it, which was not strictly true but gave us an opportunity to claim some credit.5

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3 During a telephone call with Dobrynin at 1:28 p.m., Kissinger reported that he had revised the English text of two documents: the draft letter from Nixon to Kosygin and the draft public statement. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “K: I am sending you what I think is the text we agreed on. You look it over and call back. The President is still somewhat restless about that one thing. D: You mean on the public communication? K: No, the public is agreed to. We would like to add the word ‘this year.’ D: That’s all right. K: Also I might as well send you the text on the public announcement. I am still trying to figure out some way—are you committed to the sequences of the sentences? D: It’s the identical text. K: Could we move a sentence to the end? I will send you the text and then I will discuss with you a suggestion.” (Ibid., Box 10, Chronological File)

4 See Document 207.

5 No record has been found that Kissinger called Dobrynin that evening. Haig, however, called the Soviet Ambassador at 8:35 p.m. A transcript of the conversation records the following exchange: “H: Henry asked me to tell you that regarding the matter you discussed with him about the Trade Mission, Mr. Peterson is meeting with the group on Monday in New York. D: On Monday in New York. H: He is making a special trip to go up and Henry hopes you will let your people know this is a reflection of the White House’s attitude. D: Yes, thank you very much.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1971 [2 of 2] See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 332.
215. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)  


Kissinger: I had another go around with our friend this morning.  
Here is the problem: he says this has been drafted by the Politburo.  
And he says they’ve never done this before. I believe it, because there’s  
so many conflicting interests involved.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And that the previous time when I told them to substi-  
tute a word, they said that it’s already implied in the text. And just to  
make sure, they are willing to make a public statement that says they’re  
committed to making an agreement simultaneously.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: He said if I want to change—he has no authority to  
change the text of the Politburo. If we want to change that word—  

Nixon: It has to go back.

Kissinger: —then he has to go back and it will take two weeks.  
Now—and it’d cause some irritation. Now, we have these choices and  
I just want to put them to you. What he is willing to do—and I’ll show  
you the text—he’s willing to, when we exchange these letters, is to give  
him a statement saying, “When I told Ambassador Dobrynin that the  
agreements should be simultaneous, he told me on behalf of his gov-  
ernment that this was unnecessary, because it is already implied in the  
text.” And, of course, there is the public statement they will make,  
which commits them to it. Now, we have three choices. We can go back  
to them for two weeks, for another go-around. And he said they’ll al-  
most certainly accept it. What he asked us to consider is whether it’s  
worth the irritation it will cause there. Secondly, we can accept it. And  
thirdly, we could do something in between, which is to say, that I would  
call him in and say, “The President accepts this. However, since you  
tell me that it doesn’t make any difference to you, and since he feels it  
makes a difference to him, he would like to ask you to change this  
without making it a condition. And he would certainly appreciate that.”  
The advantage, if there were no other consideration, in general, one

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 498–11. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 2:15 to 2:34 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 See Document 214.
should play it hard with them. The other hand, looked at from our side now, the danger that I see in waiting is the following: if this goes another three weeks, two weeks, they'll babble on in Vienna for ten more days; their proposal will leak, so that by the time you go public, it will look like scavenging on Smith’s deal.

Nixon: Yeah. Well, I think that’s the fundamental consideration. Now, the point is, it just depends on whether we think they’re going to break their word.

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: What does it really say? What does it say now?

Kissinger: May I read you—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —the operative part? There are two hard and closed paragraphs, which you—

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Now, this is—will this be made public?

Kissinger: No. What—

Nixon: Now, what’s the hard part?

Kissinger: What is made public is easy. What’s made—

Nixon: Read what is made public.

Kissinger: What is made public, we are on easy street. “The Governments of the United States—”

Nixon: They agreed to make this public timing?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: They will say the same thing publicly?

Kissinger: Word for word.

Nixon: All right. Fine.

Kissinger: “The Government of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic arguments—armaments, have agreed to work out, this year, an agreement for the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems. They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures—”

Nixon: To eliminate?

Kissinger: “—to limit—”

Nixon: To limit ABMs.

Kissinger: “—to limit ABMs. They will also agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons,” that is—

Nixon: Certain measures?

Kissinger: Yeah. Well—

Nixon: There’s a pattern.
Kissinger: —what they are, there isn’t—“The two sides—”

Nixon: That’s the public statements: “The two sides.” Go ahead.

Kissinger: “The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.” So in the public statement—

Nixon: That’s good.

Kissinger: —they are committed. There’s no problem with the public statement.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. All right. Now go ahead with the private thing.

Kissinger: The one thing we have—they—he hasn’t yet agreed to, for “this year.” But he says there’s no problem. He just has no authority; he has to check.

Nixon: No authority. How long will it take?

Kissinger: One week.3

Nixon: I think you’re going to have to put “this year” in, Henry.

Kissinger: He says it’s no problem. It’s—

Nixon: That’s what we’re talking about, doing a priority basis. Otherwise, we’re saying we’re just going to continue to do what we’ve been doing.

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: “An agreement for the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems.”

Kissinger: I mean, that’s—there’s no question about—

Nixon: That’s good.

Kissinger: —simultaneity here.

Nixon: Exactly.

Kissinger: And they will publish that as a Soviet government statement.

Nixon: Now, the private statement.

Kissinger: The private one is a little—

Nixon: Who sees this? Everybody? Just the—

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: —principals.

Kissinger: Just the principals.

Nixon: Dobrynin—

3 May 17.
Kissinger: The first two paragraphs, they’re peculiar to ours. That’s not in theirs. Theirs picks up with the third paragraph.

Nixon: What do we—how much of this becomes public? Anything?

Kissinger: Nothing. Except that the fact that there has been an exchange.

Nixon: We should—we show all this to Rogers and Smith?

Kissinger: Yeah. If you don’t, Mr. President, your active role will really not be that—

Nixon: Oh, of course. Henry. We just want to be sure we do.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: We’ve got to be goddamn sure that they know who has done this. And, look—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: —I know how these boys play the game.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: They’re going to know. Well, I think you’ll convince Smith.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: Won’t you? Huh?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah, and Rogers, too.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Smith will convince Rogers.

Nixon: [reading] “Proceeding from the situation that now exists in the talks, the Government of the United States is prepared—” Is this the same thing in theirs?

Kissinger: Yeah. Word for word.

Nixon: It would help if it were “this year” in this.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah, that’s why he says they’ll certainly accept it.

Nixon: “After concluding—after concluding the agreement—”

Kissinger: No, that’s a different—that’s the long term one. The next paragraph.

Nixon: Limiting strategic—put that in your paper.

Kissinger: For all of this. I wanted to change—I wanted to have the word “worked out” in there. This is a commitment to fin—to make the basic understanding before the other one is completed.

Nixon: Three and a half years.

Kissinger: You see, there’s a difference between an “agreement” and an “understanding.”

Kissinger: It has the same degree of formality.
Nixon: “Agreement to discuss—”
Kissinger: That’s also why we want to use the word “discuss.”
[Omitted here is further discussion of the agreement on limiting ABM systems and the understanding to freeze strategic offensive weapons, in particular, the respective texts of the joint statement and the unilateral private statement on the simultaneity of talks.]
Kissinger: The only question is—
Nixon: Whether we get something—
Kissinger: —if they want to play rough in Vienna, or Helsinki when the meeting takes place, whether they can then say all they are bound by is the letter, not the public statement. But if they don’t want an agreement, they can find 500 other ways of stopping the agreement. And they can then say we drafted this thing sloppily. And that will be partially true.
Nixon: You mean our critics can say that?
Kissinger: Yeah. And we’ll have some vested interests in the bureaucracy, which will want to prove that doing it out of the White House has its disadvantages. On the other hand, the price we pay, if we wait, is when their offer, or alleged offer, becomes public, that then the impact of this is going to be substantially lost.
Nixon: Well, look, when this—if this reads, “discuss,” isn’t that what Smith’s already done in Vienna?
Kissinger: No, with him they didn’t even agree to discuss it before. They said “discuss” afterwards.
Nixon: In other words, for us to conclude in there just—
Kissinger: Was that they agreed that they will make or reach a basic understanding.
Nixon: But what does it say there?
Kissinger: It says, “The Soviet Government”—I’m just now reading how it’s worded.
Kissinger: “The Soviet government favors the principle of freezing strategic offensive weapons and is prepared to reach a basic understanding on this point.”
[Omitted here are a brief exchange on the President’s schedule and further discussion of the SALT announcement.]

[Omitted here is discussion of the Nixon administration’s efforts to defeat the Mansfield Amendment.]

Kissinger: I had another session for an hour and a half with Dobrynin. All nitpicks on language.

Nixon: On what? Which part? The news release? Dobrynin knows that that’s—

Kissinger: Just to conform it as much as possible to his text, because he’s got the problem that any major changes now have to go to the government. But then I read him a memorandum—

Nixon: Did you get this, “this year” put in? Did he buy that?

Kissinger: Yes, but the way they say it—what they want to say is, "to concentrate this year on working out an agreement," rather than, "to concentrate on working out an agreement this year." I think the average reader—that’s so elusive a point.

Nixon: Yeah. Right.

Kissinger: I got the “this year.” The next thing is: he says he’ll try to get them to change that word. If not, he has accepted—I’ve dictated and I’ve got the record of the telephone conversation, so if they screw us—

Nixon: In which you dictated—

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 498–18. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 6:05 to 6:28 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 No record of this meeting has been found. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger attended the President’s meeting on NATO forces from 4:40 to 6:13 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon, accompanied by Haig—not Kissinger—chaired the meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room, from 4:31 to 6:03 p.m. Kissinger’s name, however, was included on an attached list of attendees. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Although no direct evidence has been found, Kissinger may have left the meeting, or skipped it altogether, to meet with Dobrynin. During a telephone conversation with Nixon on May 17, Kissinger mentioned that he “got through talking to him [Dobrynin] at 6:00 on Thursday,” May 13. See Document 221. According to handwritten notations, a draft American letter was “delivered to Amb D” at 4:30; the text was “changed by K” at 4:45; and the revised text was “delivered to Amb D” at 5; a draft press release was also “delivered to Amb D” at 5. (All in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2])
Kissinger: In which I dictated—I said, “I’m reading to you a memorandum that I’m putting into the President’s files, which I will hand to you a copy for your information,” in which I said: “Dr. Kissinger has proposed to Ambassador Dobrynin that we add a sentence indicating that the two—that the agreement and the understanding would be achieved simultaneously. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that, on instructions of his government, he could state that such a sentence was unnecessary, because it was fully covered and implicit in the whole text of the paragraph and was also covered in the public statement.”

Nixon: The public statement is what—

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: —I think, is most important. Now, their agreeing to the public statement—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: I consider that part of the agreement.

Kissinger: Of course.

Nixon: Yeah, it is.

Kissinger: Well, it’s a Soviet Government statement.

Nixon: Well, a Soviet Government statement—

Kissinger: I’ve now set it, if that’s still agreeable to you, for—

Nixon: You see, the ability of the Soviet—the fact that that is a Soviet Government statement answers my question, because that’s an interpretation of the other.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: To hell with them. If they’re going to nitpick that, we’ll just—we’ll screw them.

Kissinger: Now, we have to be—we have to do this precisely.

Nixon: Exactly.

Kissinger: He wants—I gave, I said—

Nixon: Pick a time. That’s right.

Kissinger: —we’ll do it at noon on Thursday.3 Or will you prefer 11?

Nixon: Sure. Pick either.

Kissinger: Well, he’d slightly prefer noon, because—

Nixon: Noon’s fine.

Kissinger: —because they have their big evening news at 7—

Nixon: Fine.

Kissinger: —and they want to have it the lead item on their radio.

Nixon: Fine. Good. Noon is fine. Just let him have his own time, because we don’t give a damn. Just so it’s before 4 o’clock.

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3 May 20.
Kissinger: Noon here, 7 o’clock Moscow. And it will be on the radio at 7 o’clock sharp in Moscow.

[Omitted here is discussion of how to brief Rogers and Smith on the SALT “breakthrough” and of Nixon and Kissinger’s respective schedules.]

Kissinger: If we get 50 percent of the things we’ve now got cooking—if we get Berlin and SALT this summer, or this year, we’ve literally—we can then go back and remind them of the linkage problem.

Nixon: Yeah. Oh, well, look, [with] this SALT announcement, it’d look like we damn near got the SALT challenge. [unclear]

Kissinger: Well, now we do.

Nixon: Huh? It will read that way to most people.

Kissinger: And the beauty is that we got five weeks where no one can contradict it, because they will now recess and not reassemble until July 3d.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And then, if we’ve got the summit coming up—well, we got to get the Chinese thing working.

Nixon: Yeah. Right. You got to hear from them.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and the Mansfield Amendment.]

217. Editorial Note

On May 14, 1971, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev elaborated on the “peace program” he had announced six weeks earlier at the 24th Soviet Party Congress. During a speech in Tbilisi, Brezhnev addressed, in particular, various proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe; he also offered a signal of the Soviet intention to negotiate an agreement:

“Some NATO countries are displaying an appreciable interest, and in part some nervousness as well, on the question of the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Their representatives ask: Whose armed forces—foreign or national—and what armaments—nuclear or conventional—are to be reduced? Perhaps, they ask, the Soviet proposals embrace all this taken together? In this connection, we too have a question to ask: Do not such curious people resemble a person who tries to judge the taste of a wine by its appearance alone, without touching it? If there is any vagueness, this can certainly be elimi-
nated. All that is necessary is to muster the resolve to ‘taste’ the proposals that interest you, which, translated into diplomatic language, means to enter into negotiations.” (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XXIII, No. 20 (June 15, 1971), pages 1–5)

On the day before Brezhnev spoke in Tbilisi, President Richard Nixon met at the White House with members of the “old guard”—Dean Acheson, George Ball, and other members of the foreign policy establishment—to discuss the amendment submitted by Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield on May 11 to withdraw American military forces from Europe. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Brezhnev’s speech, therefore, attracted considerable attention both at the White House and in Congress, where the Senate was already debating the Mansfield Amendment. Hoping the speech might influence the debate, the President instructed White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman to contact Secretary of State William Rogers. As Haldeman reported in his diary on May 14, Nixon “wanted Rogers to try to get Mansfield to withdraw his amendment on the basis of the Brezhnev statement and this development. I called Rogers after we got to Key Biscayne, covered this with him. He fell for it pretty well. He didn’t think there was much chance of Mansfield withdrawing his deal, but he said he would try.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) According to his Appointment Book, the Secretary met that evening with several Senators, including Hubert Humphrey (D–Minnesota). (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) No record has been found to indicate, however, whether Rogers cited Brezhnev in an effort to convince Mansfield to withdraw his proposal.

In a memorandum for Nixon on May 15, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger assessed the substance of Brezhnev’s speech, including its likely impact on diplomatic and political developments:

“The major question is why, after considerable stalling on this issue, the Soviets seem ready to negotiate.

“—It may be that there are genuine economic pressures resulting from the continuing buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East, which recent intelligence indicates is continuing.

“—It could also be related to Czechoslovakia, and a Soviet desire to lower their profile there. In this regard the Soviet greetings to the Czech Party Congress noted that the situation has been ‘normalized’; such a claim could be a justification for some withdrawal of some Soviet forces there. Brezhnev may try to trade in any such withdrawal for Western cutbacks.

“—The Soviets may be coming to see negotiations on force reductions as a way to get to their goal of a European Security Conference. The West has made progress on Berlin a precondition for such a conference but not for troop negotiations. Any such negotiations would
almost certainly have to involve the GDR, a major Soviet goal in the European security conference proposal.

"—Finally, the Soviets may be convinced that this is a serious Western offer, and see some advantage in exploiting the desire among all Europeans for reductions in military spending. As we move into the more intensive phase of improving the quality of NATO forces through the plans worked out last year, the prospect of negotiations on troop reductions with the Soviets could slow down or undermine the effort. This risk has always been inherent in the Alliance's dual approach to mutual force reductions, negotiations and improvement of forces.

"In short, Brezhnev's offer 'to start negotiations' can be turned to our advantage in the next few days. At the same time, it means that we may be entering the path of new negotiations, which our studies have shown could be turned against the Alliance, if not handled properly and with prudence."

Nixon noted in the margin that the opportunity to frustrate plans for improving NATO forces was "probably a major factor in [Brezhnev's] move." The full text of the memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 49.

Although he misdated the speech—on the assumption that Brezhnev spoke on May 15 rather than May 14—Kissinger also addressed the relationship between Soviet rhetoric and American politics in his memoirs:

"What possessed Brezhnev to make his mutual force reductions offer on that particular day is not clear. It was long-standing Soviet policy; he had said exactly the same thing in a speech in March. The Mansfield amendment must have caught the Kremlin even more than the Administration by surprise. Nor could Moscow have expected it to pick up such a head of steam. The Brezhnev proposal was undoubtedly planned to give impetus to the Berlin negotiations by suggesting that they would unlock the doors to a hopeful future. Nothing illustrates better the inflexibility of the Soviets' cumbersome policymaking machinery than their decision to stick to their game plan even when confronted with the Mansfield windfall." (Kissinger, White House Years, pages 946–947)

The Senate defeated the Mansfield Amendment on May 19 by a vote of 61 to 36.
218. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post

Washington, May 14, 1971, 7:04 p.m.

R: I have got a double problem—I have got to do something for Sunday on this Mansfield thing and on the flap it has created. Brezhnev has killed Mansfield at this point and you are all safe there.

K: On deep background, we don't have that hot line for nothing.

R: It seems to me that you didn't get it on the hot line. I would have to see the traffic on that one. On this Brezhnev thing, he has introduced not just mutual balance force reduction but nukes, right?

K: Right.

R: Nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the problem of forward based systems based on SALT, you are prepared to take [tackle?] that issue in some form?

K: Right.

R: Is this an opening where they might lead us out of that deadlock?

K: I will have to say that what I am saying now is no better speculation than yours, at least that's right.

R: This is something to explore. Have you got any general reflections on Mansfield with things as complicated by Brezhnev now, how does it look to you?

K: How does what look to me?

R: The whole smear between us and the Russians?

K: I was not surprised, what Brezhnev is doing is what you would have expected him to do after a Party Congress.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 May 16.

3 In his May 16 column, Roberts discussed the ramifications of Brezhnev's speech and Mansfield's amendment. "There is a possible tie here to SALT, as officials see it, since those talks are now deadlocked because of the American refusal to include such aircraft, either land-based or on carriers, in a SALT pact," Roberts observed. "It was because of this deadlock that Moscow offered the 'ABMs only' proposal. Thus if negotiations can be arranged covering nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as troops, as Brezhnev suggested, the SALT deadlock might be broken." (Chalmers Roberts, "NATO: Old Order Changing; Spurns Compromise," Washington Post, May 16, 1971, p. A16)

4 See Document 217.
R: Arbatov is going around telling people we have not been paying enough attention to what he said at the Party Congress.\(^5\)

K: Sometimes I wonder about Arbatov.

R: At any rate, it will give this Lisbon Foreign Ministers meeting\(^6\) something of a goose. How did we negotiate with the [omission in transcript] subcommittee of NATO and subcommittee of Warsaw?

K: Haven’t settled on it.

R: Has Gerard Smith seen the President yet?

K: He is seeing him Tuesday.

R: Is there any possibility of changing on the ABM position only do you think?

K: We are reviewing the whole SALT situation and the President doing next week and I don’t want to prejudge what he will do.

R: This Brezhnev thing—is there an additional reason not to go for ABMs only at this point?

K: [Not] Very likely to go for ABMs only in any circumstance.

R: Is there an NSC meeting on it next week?

K: No, next week we will just have a small group meeting and then there will be an NSC.

R: Is the actual negotiating going on on the part of SALT making progress?

K: Actually the negotiations are doing quite well.

R: When you say you are not surprised, that you expected the Brezhnev thing after the Party Congress, were you reading the Party Congress as pretty positive?

K: Well, I said on Air Force One and some of the newspapers picked it up—\(^7\)

R: I know.

K: That I thought it would result as positive and constructive thing and I expected it to lead to some progress.

R: He hasn’t made a speech just on MBFR, he has introduced something else here.

K: Right.

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\(^5\) See Document 207. In his May 15 column, Roberts reported not only Arbatov’s remarks but also Fulbright’s claim that “the Mansfield amendment had helped produce the Brezhnev proposal.” “But administration officials,” Roberts added, “said the Brezhnev statement was clearly a follow-up” to his Party Congress speech on March 30. (Chalmers Roberts, “U.S. Welcomes Moscow Move,” \textit{Washington Post}, May 15, 1971, pp. A1, A12)

\(^6\) The semi-annual meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers meeting was held in Lisbon June 1–6.

\(^7\) See Document 175 and footnote 3, Document 169.
R: Do you think before Brezhnev that Mansfield had done you a
lot of harm in Europe but now it might serve some useful purpose?
K: Had it passed in the Senate, he would have done us some harm
but if it is stopped at this point, it will have been useful and we can
go to the Europeans now and say we can’t continue to fight this each
year. Chalmers, I really must run off.
R: All right, Henry.
K: Right, Chalmers.

219. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)¹

May 15, 1971, 11 a.m.

P: Well, you got everybody under control there?
K: Yes. You know it is tough going. I have a Verification Panel
meeting now² and Smith is dancing all over the place. He is so
delighted with what he has that he wants to announce it. If we don’t go
on Thursday³ something may leak.
P: We are going on Thursday.
K: I talked to Gerry—
P: Has he talked to Rogers?
K: Yes, Rogers knows.⁴
P: Will Rogers know the difference between the two?
K: Yes. We will explain to him. We have 2 problems. The proposal
made to Smith was the one that we had talked about in February or

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone
Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking.
Kissinger was in Washington; Nixon was in Key Biscayne.

² According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger chaired the Verification Panel
meeting from 10:10 to 11:51 a.m. but left at 11 for 25 minutes to take the President’s tele-
phone call. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Mis-
cellany, 1968–76) The summary of conclusions from the meeting is printed in Foreign Re-

³ May 20.

⁴ According to his Appointment Book, Rogers met Smith on May 11 at 10:46 a.m.
(Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) No record of the conversation has been found.
March. All that they did was take what we said to them at that time and gave it back to Smith now. We have got more than Smith did but in a whole different concept.

P: Smith is not to go out and State not to go out and say that all because of Smith’s brilliant negotiation we got this. I think that we should have some of the media people in—not all of them—just some of the main ones. Chancellor, Sevareid,5 Howard K. Smith. Even the column[ist]s I would talk to. Roberts, is OK. I do not know who you have in the Times.

K: Frankel will understand it.

P: He (Smith) certainly must be surprised he got this offer.

K: Of course, because—This is what they were going to recommend to you.

P: And he is suggesting we take it.

K: I am telling him that the President is in Key Biscayne, he has all the papers with him and he is thinking about the whole thing. I told him you would see him on Tuesday.

P: I have to see Rogers before him and I think I should see him alone. What should I tell him?

K: Simply that we have this proposal. You should not be too modest about the agreement. The Soviets have accepted this and it is much beyond the agreement they offered Smith.

P: Say in March they came back and this and that. I have no problem with Smith. I don’t give a goddamn about what he thinks. But when Rogers comes in how to say we handled that.

K: Well, you could just say that we got a reply in early April when he was away.

P: But we got it earlier than that. I will just tell him that we proposed this in January and they came back in April while he was away. This is simultaneity, right?

K: They have accepted the ideas of linkage and simultaneity. Even linkage we got through your efforts.

P: I think I will start with Rogers simply by saying that we started in January and while you were away they came in with a response. We are going to turn down what they submitted to Smith and then they came through with this. Have you told Smith to keep his mouth shut?

K: Yes. They all think that you are thinking over the proposal and they wouldn’t say anything to jeopardize that. They have been pretty quiet.

5 Eric Sevareid, television commentator for CBS Evening News.
P: They must not put anything out on it.

K: Chalmers Roberts called me yesterday\(^6\) and he knew nothing about it so they haven’t gotten wind of it.

P: When we put it out it will have to go further than Chalmers Roberts. I don’t like this business about putting ourselves under a gun. Any agreement to agree on ABM and . . .

K: break the deadlock.

P: Forget the deadlock. What is this going to mean to the common person and will they understand it. Danger that it will not be understood. Point is we are saying that two governments commit themselves to an agreement?

K: Not exactly that far. But the common person does not know about these things. They will take their lead from the person who does know something.

P: Yes. Another thing we will have to keep the Senate and Congress in line because I do not want them to defer funds for ABM.

K: We should just tell them that everything has come through just like you said. You said that if they voted for ABM it would help with the negotiations. It has. I think this would help with the Congress.

P: But to what extent does this point [put] us under the gun and put the Soviets under the gun to come up with an agreement and to negotiation [negotiate a] freeze. There is not a goddamn thing in it—

K: That is what the Soviets will try to do but we aren’t going to let them and that is not what we have now.

P: The way the paper is written now does not provide for action this year?

K: No.

P: Just serious discussions? If we don’t get some sort of agreement—that should be our goal internally. If they do not have action this year they will be yapping.

K: Come back from . . . ABM only with just an agreement.

P: How does it differ? I know but you tell me. Read it to me.\(^7\)

K: I don’t have it in front of me at the moment but it says we will agree also on certain measures to limit offensive weapons. Does not use the word freeze.

P: Smith will see the difference. Have to get the papers to see the difference.

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\(^6\) See Document 218.

\(^7\) Reference is to the draft letter from Nixon to Kosygin. See footnote 2, Document 211, and footnote 3, Document 214.
K: Chalmers Roberts will write it is great.
P: We want it far beyond Chalmers Roberts. It is important for you to sit down with Scali and Rogers and decide who should be briefed.
K: I see, but I think I must do that.
P: We must sell two or three of the leaders.
K: I must do it because I understand it better than Scali.
P: Oh yes. But I don’t want you to waste your time. You should see only about 1/2 dozen people. That’s right. Only you can brief. We need the three networks, Post and Times and Stuart Hensley (phonetic).8
K: I will sit down with Scali on Monday.
P: You are going to tell him on Monday.
K: No, I will do it on Tuesday after you have talked with Rogers and Smith.
P: I want you to scare people to death if word leaks before 12 noon Thursday, this puts us in a very awkward position because we have agreed with the Soviets.
K: One word—just language to work out. Nothing at all.
P: But as far as he is concerned we have agreement that we go on Thursday noon.
K: Yes.
P: On this Mansfield thing—I just talked with McGregor9 who is going to be on Face the Nation or Meet the Press . . . those who would vote unilaterally to bring forces home are looking at only one side—reducing American costs—reducing the danger of war is another thing they should look at and reducing tensions. If there is an imbalance created then this would have the effect of increasing the chances for disagreement. Southeast Asia, Middle East.
K: I think that is an excellent way of putting it Mr. President.
P: In the 19th Century any sort of stability was built on the balance. This was the way the British foreign policy worked. All on a balance of power.
K: I think that is an excellent way of putting it.
P: This Brezhnev thing has been of help to us.
K: It has had a good effect for us. I think we are well covered.

8 Stewart M. Hensley, United Press International.
9 According to his Daily Diary, Nixon called Clark MacGregor, Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations, at 10:36 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the conversation has been found.
P: I do not think that it was bad. He asked for it. We didn’t know that Acheson was going to use that word, but everyone knows his tongue.\textsuperscript{10} It was an asinine proposal. You feel pretty good about that one?

K: I think we could come out excellent.

P: You know I tried to imply with Brooke.\textsuperscript{11} That any person who votes against the President on Monday will look bad on Thursday. They are not going to look very good when this thing comes out on Thursday if they voted against the President.

K: These things altogether are getting them really upset. Said at the time of Laos that the Chinese would come in and the Chinese moved toward us. The Mansfield thing then SALT comes up. They have got to think that you have a hell of a lot more up your sleeve and you have.

P: We have Muskie in a trap.

K: If you would want to shoot a bullet in June we could break out the hotline part of it.

P: Save it for a Summit. We have to have a few things to talk about.

K: We can break that out at 10 days notice.

P: We have to get this out though. I think you should talk to Wilson, Bill White.\textsuperscript{12} Reducing our costs is a laudable objective but should think of the balance of power and reduction of tensions also.

K: I think that is an excellent way to put it.

P: Europeans will become nervous and there will be an increase in tensions. Haldeman was telling me about how Rogers caught Symington.\textsuperscript{13}

K: Yes.

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\textsuperscript{10} During a press conference at the White House on May 13, Acheson declared that to reduce American forces in Europe without a corresponding reduction in Soviet forces—as envisioned in the Mansfield Amendment—would be “absolutely asinine” and “sheer nonsense.” (Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–1971, pp. 298–299)

\textsuperscript{11} Nixon and Kissinger met Senator Edward R. Brooke (R–Massachusetts) on May 14 from 12:57 to 1:41 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A tape recording of the conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 499–24.

\textsuperscript{12} Richard L. Wilson, Washington bureau chief for Cowles newspapers; and William S. White, syndicated columnist.

\textsuperscript{13} The Secretary testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 14. Rogers told Haldeman about his exchange with Symington during a telephone conversation that afternoon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 43, H Notes, April–June ’71)
P: . . . 7,000 tactical weapons. Bring them back here, and Rogers said that we don’t want them back here. I think these guys are in an awfully bad wicket. They are playing on the Nation’s terrible, terrible fatigue over the war. The Nation thrashes out—like on Calley.14 We just want to be sure that they don’t thrash out and do not bring down the whole house with them.

K: I think we have scared them.

P: You are going to Paris on the 30th? You are going to England first and then—

K: I don’t know if I can work that out now.

P: Well you can go to Paris if you want to. Take a weekend. You don’t have to go to England as an excuse—you can go to Paris if you want to.

14 Lieutenant William Calley, USA, was court-martialed on March 29 for premeditated murder in the so-called My Lai massacre of March 1968; he was sentenced two days later to life imprisonment with hard labor.

220. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 17, 1971, 1255Z.

3243. London for Hillenbrand.2 Subj: Call on Gromyko on Force Reductions in Central Europe. Ref: State 085212.3


2 Hillenbrand was in London May 17–18 to discuss the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin with British, French, and West German senior officials.

3 In telegram 85212 to Moscow, May 15, the Department instructed Beam to meet Gromyko and probe the Soviet attitude on MBFR in the wake of Brezhnev’s Tbilisi speech. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII [2 of 2])
1. I saw Gromyko at noon May 17 for 30 minute discussion of force reductions in Central Europe. Klosson and Polansky accompanied me. Referring to my earlier discussion with Gromyko about Brezhnev’s Party Congress speech, I told Gromyko I wished to lay before him some lines of our thinking on the subject of force reductions and to seek Soviet clarification of their attitudes on this matter. I then read and left with him talking points in ref tel and also gave him copy of pertinent portions of Rome communiqué.

2. Gromyko read through copy of the Rome principles, apparently looking for word “balanced,” which he found, and which he commented on subsequently in the discussion. After Gromyko made the point that he understood my call was to ascertain whether the USSR was ready to discuss the question of force reductions, with due regard for the principles in the Rome communiqué, he said he had several observations of a preliminary nature.

3. First, he said, the question of force reductions deserved serious attention. With respect to the Rome proposals, Moscow proceeded from the assumption that the West had once posed the question in the context of a CES. While the USSR deemed it a positive fact that NATO had referred favorably to a CES, Gromyko said they had expressed the view that discussion of this question at a CES, at least at the first meeting, would complicate the situation and put too heavy a burden on the conference. Therefore, the Soviets posed the question in terms of the possible reduction of foreign forces in Europe. This is simpler way. It could be done by a special body of the CES or in any other forum. If the Western powers agree that the question should be examined outside a CES, this would be much simpler and more productive. A number of questions arise, such as scale of reduction of foreign or of national troops as well and other questions. Therefore, a non-CES forum would be better.

4. Another factor, which Gromyko said he wished to draw to my attention and that he assumed I would report to the USG, was that Western proposals—at Rome, Reykjavik and until now—had introduced the idea of “balanced” reductions in connection with certain other reservations. Gromyko said this concept introduced an element which could prevent troop reductions. The idea put the Soviets “on the
alert” in a sense. The Soviet view was that no preconditions should be set up for the very idea of discussions.

5. Lastly, if he, Gromyko, understood correctly, the USG shows interest in discussing the reduction of forces question. If so, this is a “positive indicator,” and we can continue to consult.

6. I told Gromyko we were not attached to any particular forum for discussing the question, as the Secretary had made clear in his TV remarks of Sunday. The forum and means were open to consideration. I did, however, wish to emphasize we would be unable to make any specific proposals until we had held discussions with our allies.

7. Regarding his comments on the word “balanced,” I reread to him the first principle of the Rome communiqué, indicating this was the rationale for the use of that term which protected both sides. I added, however, this was a matter to be considered and discussed in the framework of setting up an agenda for force reduction talks. Both sides appeared interested and seemed to agree that a way should be found to get talks started.

8. Gromyko suggested both sides review each other’s position. He then said that either side should feel free to discuss the question additionally with each other, adding in English “between us.”

9. The discussion concluded with my stating that both sides will wish to think over the matter of timing for such discussions, and with Gromyko saying it would be good to find a more realistic, more attainable ground on which to discuss the reduction of force question.

Beam
221. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, May 17, 1971, 10:45 p.m.

P: I was thinking that if we don’t get the reply until tomorrow—well, if you get [it] then we can still make our Thursday date.\(^2\)

K: Well, if they agree, Mr. President, it would be a nuisance to change it again.

P: That’s right, if they agree. The difficulty is that if they didn’t agree until Wednesday, it would be almost impossible for us to get our—

K: No, we could do it. I have reviewed all my telephone conversations with D[obrynin], and have asked Haig to review them and we just don’t see that it is probable or completely conceivable that anything could go wrong.

K: And he is just being [a] super-meticulous being after all just wanting to make absolutely sure that it is in order.

P: Particularly, if the way you put it that you said we agreed, but would like to check this other thing, I suppose—

K: That’s right, and I told him specifically not to put [it] to the government, just to do it if the Foreign Minister has that authority.

P: Well, that may be, of course, but by the time they get it translated—

K: Well you see, I got through talking to him at 6:00 on Thursday,\(^3\) it was already 1:00 in the morning in Moscow Friday. So even if you put it on the wire right then and there, it couldn’t have arrived there before Friday noon. Brezhnev was in Tiflis [Tbilisi]—he didn’t get back until today.

P: What I meant is that it may be that they or I can see why, even with that kind of suggestion, they would check it in the government—and it just takes time. They know very well that we have got to know about 48 hours in advance of an announcement—it [is] a difficult situation. Let me put it this way: I think that probably—not in terms of appearing anxious or anything, that you probably should call Dobrynin

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. Transcribed from a tape recording made at Kissinger’s residence. According to a typed note on the transcript, the tape was “brought in” to the White House on May 18.

\(^2\) May 20.

\(^3\) See Document 216 and footnote 2 thereto.
Kissinger called Dobrynin at 3:40 and 4:15 p.m. to discuss the date of the SALT announcement. During their conversation at 4:15 p.m., Kissinger also reported a “purely bureaucratic” problem: “If we don’t go with it Thursday, we have to make an announcement on a day Congress is in town. If it is not Thursday it can’t be before next Tuesday.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

K: Well I just think, Mr. President, that as soon as he has something he’ll call me.

P: The reason I would call him only is to say look if we are going Thursday, we have got to know. Don’t you think—

K: Well, I have already called him twice today. I called him first to see if he had an answer and then I called him back to say look if the hold up has anything to do with that word, just forget about the word, but I didn’t say forget about the word, I said give us an answer first about the date—we don’t have to have the answer on the word until Wednesday. Too much depends on it for them, Mr. President, to screw it up now, it is just inconceivable. If they screw it up now, they know they lose Berlin.

P: Well, they goddamn well will, but they know it, because we can make them lose it—

K: Now we can still kill it. That’s why I delayed the meeting from the 19th to the 27th.

P: Well, okay. Then I would not call him—he should call you tomorrow. The only thing that I see is that—let’s suppose you don’t hear anything tomorrow—you have got to call to find out whether we are going to go Thursday. You know we’ve got too damn many things—

K: Well, if I don’t hear from him tomorrow, then I call him at 9:30 on Wednesday to say whether we shouldn’t—what he thinks about it.

P: You may want to call him tomorrow only for the purpose of saying, “Look—do you want to slip it a day or what the hell is going on?” That’s the point that I see. I wouldn’t do it until—late in the day.

K: And that gives him a chance to get another cable out to Moscow—tell him we are all prepared and ready to go on Thursday so we have got to know—I think that is a very reasonable thing to have and he has indicated that he has no, or rather that that’s the way it is to be.

K: Oh yes. I just can’t conceive the text is all agreed, we went through it word for word to make sure the English conforms to the Russian, the announcement is their announcement and so I just don’t

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4 Kissinger called Dobrynin at 3:40 and 4:15 p.m. to discuss the date of the SALT announcement. During their conversation at 4:15 p.m., Kissinger also reported a “purely bureaucratic” problem: “If we don’t go with it Thursday, we have to make an announcement on a day Congress is in town. If it is not Thursday it can’t be before next Tuesday.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

see where the slip up could be unless they are trying to accommodate you on that word and that word we are just doing for the record so that we don’t get screwed up there and people accuse us of sloppy drafting, but we are still protected by their exchange.

P: Yes. I would say then by tomorrow afternoon at 3:30—that’s 10:30 Moscow time—well there is a transmission time and decoding and stuff like that.

K: That’s right, that’s what I told him this afternoon.

P: It is the day that we are worried about—we need to know about that.

K: That’s what I told him this afternoon.

P: We have other problems ourselves about what we schedule on Thursday and what we schedule on Friday.

K: Right, Mr. President—Good-bye.

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222. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)


K: Where are you, in the office?

H: No I just walked in the door here.

K: Well, I see. The leader of the Western world has had me on the phone. He wants me to call Dobrynin again. I think it is insane.

H: I think it would be too.

K: I won’t do it. I don’t see what I can add to it, now do you?

H: No, I just think it would look so damn goosey, that it would be unproductive.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking.

2 See Document 221.
K: Can you conceive what would go wrong? I just don’t know what they would tell us.

H: I don’t either. I don’t think that there would be anything that could go wrong. I just don’t believe it.

K: The only other mistake I could have made was to ask for that other word.

H: No that’s easy for you to worry about now, but in the long run, that will be exactly what you want. Probably since you have such a goosey matter there. This can’t be any problem.

K: Look, Brezhnev was in Tiflis [Tbilisi]. He probably just came back today. Don’t you think—

H: I think there is a good chance of that—there is also a good chance that they are just taking their sweet time. If he has to slip the priority, that is no calamity.

K: That is what I think.

H: I would wait until tomorrow at about maybe 10:00 and then I would tell him that because of timing, that we are going to slip it to Friday.3

K: To Dobrynin?

H: Yes.

K: Hell, that’s another exchange—I will wait until 5:00 in the evening. We can handle it with—if we get it as late as Wednesday morning.

H: That’s right, but that is an excuse for a little more squeeze.

K: If I don’t hear from them by 4:00. I will call and tell him that we will slip it until Friday. But if we don’t hear from him by 9:30 the next morning, we have to slip it.

H: Yes, that is what I would do and then that’s coordination—that is all that is.

K: Okay, fine.4

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3 May 21.

4 During a meeting with the President in the Oval Office the next morning, Kissinger adopted a different approach: “I thought of a way of calling Dobrynin later today. I am going to tell him that you had planned to go away on Friday and that that’s the reason that we need to know the time.” “I just can’t imagine what could go wrong now,” Kissinger added. “It’s that word. It’s—I’m sure it’s the word we won’t change. They—you know, when we say it’s difficult, they wouldn’t do it, Gromyko cannot refuse a request by you on his own by saying it’s difficult. I’m sure he’s taking it up with Brezhnev. And I’m sure it takes a day.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 500-6)

Kissinger: I called Dobrynin, Mr. President, and Vorontsov picked up the phone.\(^2\)

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And I put it on the ground that Smith was—I said, “I need your advice as a fellow bureaucrat.” I said, “Smith is scheduled to get back to SALT tonight. I had to keep him here. What do you think?” He said there’s no problem. He said let him go. He said it’s—he said this is such an important thing that Gromyko can’t do it on his own, even the announcement. And he’s probably going around Moscow checking with the four or five key people. He says there’s no problem.

Nixon: Exactly. No problem. But we don’t know about a date.

Kissinger: That’s—

Nixon: Huh?

Kissinger: He thinks there’s no—he is in the box that, until he gets the word, he can’t say yes. But he just doesn’t think there is an issue. I just don’t want to speculate, Mr. President, because—

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: —there may be a hundred reasons why in their bureaucracy—

Nixon: Yeah. I think—it seems to me—I can’t see why—or I can’t see one reason in a thousand why they aren’t going to do it. But the point is, you see—

Kissinger: I can’t see any.

Nixon: —you’ve got to—I can’t see. As I said, one in a thousand. I don’t know. Except—

Kissinger: If they had wanted to stop it, Mr. President, the easy way to stop it was last week, to tell us our proposal is unacceptable.

Nixon: Yeah.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 500–10. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 9:41 to 10 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) A transcript of the conversation is ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File.
Kissinger: To get an agreed text and then, at the last minute—we’ve got too many things hanging over them: China, Berlin—
Nixon: There’s nothing he can do to find out what the hell the story is?
Kissinger: No, he said he sent a cable last night. He said it—and he said it’s too early for him to have heard today.
Kissinger: Well, there’s a two-hour transmission time, because—
Nixon: The problem is that we need to go—we need to know, well—
Kissinger: Well, I think—I have canceled—
Nixon: —whether we go Thursday\(^3\) or not. That’s the point.
Kissinger: Well, I’ve canceled Smith for now.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And you might consider canceling—
Nixon: I canceled Rogers.
Kissinger: —canceling Rogers.
Nixon: I did.
Kissinger: But—
Nixon: I’m not going to tell him though that we’re, of course, we’re doing this thing.
Kissinger: In concrete—
Nixon: If the son-of-a-bitch [Rogers] should turn back on us, this would be a—we just can’t—
Kissinger: No, your—
Nixon: —let him know. You know what I mean, Henry?
Kissinger: Your one—
Nixon: Never take such a chance.
Kissinger: Your one thousand—if there’s even—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —one chance in ten thousand—
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: —why make ourselves look bad?
Nixon: That’s right. That’s right. Well, because then they’ll think we’re—we give away the game without getting anything for it.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: So would a—

\(^3\) May 20.
Kissinger: Well, we’ve kept the Smith appointment with you for 3.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: If we haven’t heard, we can say you got locked in the
Congressional battle.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I’d like to get him out of town, quite frankly.
Nixon: But you think you can get him out?
Kissinger: Of course, we can get him out of town without telling
him anything.
Nixon: I think I’d get him out of town without telling him any-
thing and then come back and tell him. You could even—
Kissinger: Or we get Farley in and have him tell.
Nixon: Why don’t you get Farley in and tell him?
Kissinger: All right.
Nixon: I think it would be better to get Smith out of town.
Kissinger: Right. Then I just—
Nixon: It’s too late to react.
Kissinger: Then I just have to make sure that Semenov doesn’t say
anything to him. And I can handle that.
[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s meeting earlier that
morning with Republican Congressional leaders.]
Kissinger: And I think after the SALT announcement, which—
Nixon: If—
Kissinger: —after all, we’ll have within a week—
Nixon: If we get it. If we get it.
Kissinger: Oh, Mr. President, I cannot—if they negotiate for four
months, make that many concessions, and then kick it over when an
agreed text exists, that would be so unconscionable. They paid such a
price for it. They also—they have a truck plant they are negotiating
with us, and I arranged for Peterson to see their man on it. 4 And I—
we’re holding that.
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: It can’t fail. This is just a terribly bureaucratic govern-
ment, Mr. President.
Nixon: I know. I think it’s going to come, but my point is—
Kissinger: No—
Nixon: —I’m just taking that extra degree of caution that I know
in dealing with this, in dealing with—

4 See footnote 5, Document 214.
Kissinger: You’re a thousand percent right.
Nixon: In dealing with Smith and Rogers, we must never go unless we got them by the balls.
Kissinger: You couldn’t be more right.
Nixon: We got them by the balls, then we go, right?
Kissinger: You couldn’t be more right.

[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics, including the President’s meeting with Republican Congressional leaders.]

Kissinger: Well, I’m inclined to think, Mr. President, maybe we ought to let Smith go tonight, even if we haven’t got an answer. Because if the thing is—
Nixon: With all this, haven’t you got a secure telephone line?
Kissinger: Yeah. I’ll get Farley in and let him worry about telling Smith. Farley won’t give us any—it also gives Rogers something to do—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —with Farley.
Nixon: Well, I’ll tell you what I would do. I would, I’d let—where is Smith going? Helsinki?
Kissinger: To Vienna.
Nixon: Let him go. Then, have him come back because of this breakthrough to get new instructions, and so forth and so on. Why not? He’s got to do it. And then he gets in the play. Call Smith back. Have that as part of the scenario.
Kissinger: All right. I just don’t want him to stand on the platform with you when you announce it.
Nixon: Oh, no, no, no. After I make the announcement?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: You’re right. [laughs] No.
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: Nobody. I’m going to be alone on that.
Kissinger: Neither Rogers nor you—nor me.
Nixon: After what I’ve been through? Hell, no. Not Rogers. Nobody. I’m going to do it myself. I’m just going to—
Kissinger: Because Scali—as Scali said to me yesterday, that if you would have put this proposal into the bureaucracy, they would have all accused you of sabotaging the SALT talks.5 It would have leaked

5 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Scali on May 17 from 6:05 to 6:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
all over town. Because we really did something on these negotiations. We pulled away from our own proposal on ABM and got the offensive link. Well, it’s—

Nixon: It’s a hell of a job. I read the, your memorandum. It’s a hell of a job.

Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, if it fails—

Nixon: And I know the hours that went into it.

Kissinger: Oh, God, but—

Nixon: Well, if it fails, we—

Kissinger: It cannot fail.

Nixon: Eight years [unclear]—

Kissinger: It cannot fail.

Nixon: If it fails, listen, we’ll burn the house down ourselves. If it fails, I don’t see anything else to do but to fight on everything. I mean, then we’ll have to go out and—and if the Russians turn this, we’re going to have to go out and say, “To hell with elections and the rest. Let’s build up American forces.”

Kissinger: It can’t fail.

Nixon: “There has to be more taxes”—

Kissinger: They’re not that stupid, Mr. President. If they wanted it to fail, after having made six major concessions, for them to let it fail now, would be nuts. It—

Nixon: Did they make them? Or did Dobrynin make them?

Kissinger: Oh, no. They are—Dobrynin always has a note. This is why I’m so confident, because Dobrynin, if he had the slightest doubt about the date—

Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: —would tell me there’s a problem. All he is telling me—what he says is, Gromyko—he says Brezhnev was out of town, Gromyko can’t set the date alone, and he’s now going around town talking to the senior government officials because they don’t want to call a new government meeting. That would be too time-consuming.

[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics.]

Nixon: By God, if we can get this SALT thing, this will really make these bastards look like a bunch of cheap politicians and cowards—

Kissinger: Oh, that’s why it’s so important, Mr. President, because—

Nixon: That’s why we’ve got to get—I wish [unclear]—I know I was the one who wanted that word changed but—

Kissinger: I don’t think that’s the thing.

Nixon: —that’s denial or the—
Kissinger: I think Dobrynin—I don’t think Gromyko has the—

Nixon: It may be that they, however, they could be—the only danger we have is this: they could be looking at the—they have people. Look, they’re Communists. They have an American section analyzing American opinion. They also have American agents over here. You got a fellow like Joe Kraft, who’s a slimy son-of-a-bitch, constantly saying, “Nixon can’t get along with the Russians.” Now, it just may be they decided they could—that is what could move them, those great historical facts.

Kissinger: Yeah, but if they do that, they also know that they won’t get a [Berlin] agreement.

Nixon: Well, if they know that. That’s—

Kissinger: If [laughs]—Mr. President, I’m going to do a memo for you summing up what we did on Berlin,6 because if you think this is—

Nixon: Do they think—does Dobrynin know that we’ll flush it?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: Listen, don’t worry. There ain’t going to be no doubt about flushing it. I’m not going to—

Kissinger: Dobrynin—Dobrynin said to me last week that, that I’m the toughest fellow he’s negotiated with since he’s come here, and he says his government is just up a tree, because they’ll—because I fight over every word. Now, basically, you know, I’m sure they’re irritated with me. On the other hand, that’s what they respect.

Nixon: That’s what they do. They fight over every word.

Kissinger: I don’t—it’s that word, Mr. President. Maybe we should have let it go. But I think for them to announce—what I am afraid happened is not the word. Basically, that announcement, which they drafted themselves, is a mistake—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: —from their point of view. The word is nothing. But the announcement is where they made their mistake. And I am afraid what happened is that Semenov came back to Moscow from Vienna, saw that announcement, and said, “You idiots, you gave away too much.” That’s what worries me, because that announcement gives us more than we asked for. Even I didn’t have the heart to say—to use the word “agree,” “agree.”

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: That’s the—

Nixon: Oh, well, I think—I don’t think they can—

6 No such memorandum has been found.
Kissinger: But I don’t see—
Nixon: I doubt that they can screw around on the announcement.
Kissinger: But I don’t see how they can pull off from an announcement, which is verbatim the text they gave us. That’s not—I didn’t change a word in the announcement, except put it into English. But I’d worked that out with his own man, with—I mean, with Dobrynin. We’ll have it. It’s too far down the track.

[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics.]
Kissinger: By this time tomorrow, we will have heard. No question. They just cannot not do it.
Nixon: Well, we will have heard what though? You can’t tell.
Kissinger: We’ll have heard—
Nixon: You’ll hear?
Kissinger: —that they want to announce it either Thursday or Friday.
Nixon: I think you’re probably right.
Kissinger: I just—
Nixon: And if they say “No,” though, then we know what we’re up against. We’re up against a hell of a—
Kissinger: Mr. President, if they say “No,” then we know that we’re dealing with an insane government.
Nixon: That’s right.
Washington, May 18, 1971, 4 p.m.

K: Hello.

D: Hello. I have received an answer from my government to the question you asked yesterday. The answer is yes. The announcement will be Thursday—your time will be 12 o’clock and in ours will be 19. That is Thursday, May 20th. This is official confirmation. They said yes I could reaffirm agreement of my government to you. If you could wait for the other, I should have an answer tomorrow.

K: The text as it was we agreed.

D: They are prepared to accept text we agreed on with you.

K: As we agreed with one difference. The one word—

D: I do not have confirmation on that. I cannot officially confirm it. You asked me to put in at the present time but in this year—

K: I have checked with the President and he prefers to have it as you would like to have it. Concentrate this year . . . rather than . . .

D: Perhaps it would be good tomorrow I will drop in and talk with you in the morning.

K: Should we set a time?

D: 11 o’clock? How about 12 o’clock tomorrow?

K: That would be good. We can run through the text then. There is a slight possibility that one word may be changed.

D: When we meet at 12 o’clock, I will have word from my government on that. This is official confirmation to you on the subject except for this one item.

K: We are all set as far as we are concerned.
On May 20, 1971, the United States and Soviet Union announced a “breakthrough” in the talks on strategic arms limitation. President Richard Nixon and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger spent much of the morning preparing for the announcement. The announcement consisted of two parts: the public statement Kissinger had negotiated with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and the President’s remarks placing the statement in context. The two sides also exchanged—but did not publish—letters on their intention to reach agreement “this year” on both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. After briefing his staff at 8:25 a.m., Kissinger joined Nixon at 9:02 and 10:15 for separate meetings on the announcement with members of the Cabinet and members of Congress. Throughout the day, Kissinger also conducted several background briefings for television commentators, newspaper reporters, and other media representatives. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The President, meanwhile, placed the finishing touches on his remarks for the occasion, which Kissinger and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff had drafted during the previous week. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 886, SALT, Presidential Statement May 20, 1971, re: Soviet-American Talks on SALT) According to his handwritten notes, Nixon planned to emphasize his “personal initiative” in breaking the deadlock. (Ibid., President’s Personal Files, Box 66, President’s Speech File, May 20, 1971, Statement re SALT Talks)

The President went to the Briefing Room at 11:59 and read the following brief announcement on live radio and television:

“As you know, the Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear arms have been deadlocked for over a year. As a result of negotiations involving the highest level of both governments, I am announcing today a significant development in breaking the deadlock.

“The statement that I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Moscow and Washington: Washington, 12 o’clock; Moscow, 7 p.m.

“The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.
"The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued."

This agreement is a major step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. Intensive negotiations, however, will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement.

"This statement that I have just read expresses the commitment of the Soviet and American Governments at the highest levels to achieve that goal. If we succeed, this joint statement that has been issued today may well be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations will devote more of their energies and their resources not to the weapons of war, but to the works of peace." (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, page 648)

Nixon returned to the Oval Office at 12:05 p.m. and met with White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman to review the morning’s events. During the meeting, Haldeman summoned several other advisers—including White House Press Secretary Ziegler and Special Consultant Scali—to discuss how to proceed in the days ahead. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to Haldeman, Nixon warned Scali that “we’ve got to be very careful not to get crosswise with the Soviets by saying that they gave in on everything and we gave in on nothing.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) Rather than concentrate on what to say, Nixon later decided to eliminate such statements altogether. In a May 21 memorandum to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the President issued the following instructions:

“I want all speculation or disclosure by officials of the Administration to the press or any other unauthorized individual concerning the substantive positions we may take in the SALT talks to cease immediately.

“I expect that prompt disciplinary action will be instituted against any person found to be responsible for stimulating the kind of press speculation on our negotiating position that appeared in the press for May 21, 1971.

“The successful outcome of the strategic arms limitation talks hinges crucially on the utmost discipline within the Administration and on my complete freedom in reaching the substantive decisions required for the further course of the negotiations. Any leaks will be prejudicial to these objectives and must therefore be ended at once.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV)
While Nixon met with Haldeman, Kissinger summoned Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly to the White House to deliver a message for Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) In addition to providing the text of the SALT announcement, the message emphasized that the United States would conclude “no agreement which would be directed against the People’s Republic of China.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) The text of the message is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 126. When Hilaly expressed concern about the cost, Kissinger decided instead to use Ambassador Joseph Farland as a courier. On May 22, Farland gave the message to Pakistani President Yahya Khan, who delivered it to the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad the next day. (Aijazuddin, ed., From a Head, Through a Head, To a Head, pages 71–73) According to Kissinger, sending a message to the Chinese about an agreement with the Soviets was an exercise in triangular diplomacy. “It showed Peking that we had an option toward Moscow,” he later recalled, “while giving us an opportunity to demonstrate that we understood fundamental Chinese concerns. We used the Pakistani channel to inform the Chinese leaders of our decision and the reasons for it, making clear that we rejected any ambitions to condominium.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pages 822–823)

According to Haldeman, Nixon was “very cheerful” about the initial reaction to the announcement in Washington. (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) The news from Moscow, however, was less encouraging. Kissinger called Dobrynin at 1:48 p.m. on May 20 to complain that the TASS news agency had released a different version of the announcement in English—a version which, he believed, implied that the interim agreement on offensive weapons would be negotiated “after” rather than “together with” the ABM treaty. Although he thought the difference was insignificant, Dobrynin suggested that the Soviet Embassy could release the “authentic” text within several days. Kissinger, however, wanted the Soviets to take action as soon as possible. “Moscow has got to straighten it out,” he insisted. “This gets things off to the worst possible start.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File) When he called back 20 minutes later, Dobrynin assured Kissinger that the TASS representative in Washington would soon send an “urgent telegram” to Moscow. (Ibid.) Within two hours, the Soviets had released the “authentic” text not only in Moscow but also in Washington—in time for Kissinger to distribute it during his press briefing that afternoon. “It was probably the only time,” Kissinger later recalled, “that a press release with a Soviet
letterhead was distributed from the White House press office.” (Kissinger, *White House Years*, page 820) For the complete English text of the Soviet announcement, published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on May 21, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Volume XXIII, No. 20 (June 15, 1971), page 32.


226. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Senator Henry M. Jackson

Washington, May 20, 1971, 7:40 p.m.

K: Scoop. People who get invited to these leadership things are not always the ones that should be. We think this agreement is a step in the right direction and when the discussions are concluded it will be simultaneous on both.

J: That is the important thing. One thing I have been thinking Henry, was this statement made to save them a little face?

K: That is the thing. But we cannot say this publicly. Get the talks going and they could not say agree on both offensive and defensive because that would look like they were backing down.

J: That is the objective. But you have some sort of understanding where we are going to end up.

K: We have an explicit understanding which I don’t want you to talk to anybody about.

J: But it is all right if I continue to stress that we must have some sort of agreement which would deal with both.

K: You would be doing the country a great service if you did keep up this pressure. If you say something about hoping the Administration will not waiver or whatever you want to say.

J: This, of course, I am worried about the ABM-only guys on the Hill.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 The President briefed Congressional leaders on the SALT announcement in the Cabinet Room at 10 a.m. A record of the conversation is ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President’s Office Files, Box 85, Beginning May 16, 1971.
K: They will get no support from us. We will continue to push ABM.
J: I think they should postpone this ABM thing for awhile.
K: It would be a disaster. . . . We would have nothing to negotiate.
J: How much of the loosening up of the Russians, Henry—the Brezhnev speech—how much loosening up is China?
K: I don’t know but some of it must be.
J: Russia is paranoid on China. But must negotiate both. This is the line I have been taking.
K: The theories that these guys have been expounding just are not true. They said that Laos would wreck it with China and it didn’t. They said rapprochement with China would break with Russians and it didn’t. One other thing you should know is that it is understood that Safeguard would be our position.
J: This would be the Minuteman position. Would this affect the sites?
K: . . . Well no, but in other words in the Washington . . . this is our position but we would have to negotiate.
J: We would still have 4 sites?
K: We would have to negotiate but that is our position. You can’t talk about this though. This is just your information.
J: This is very helpful and I will not repeat any of this. But I am talking to World Affairs Council in Los Angeles and I am going to talk about getting both—ABM and freeze on offensive. You think they are loosening up here?
K: They could be.
J: I don’t understand it after the Mansfield thing. Brezhnev speech.
K: I think that was on their program and they did not know how to turn it off.
J: It’s the system, isn’t it?
K: They cannot fine tune it so well.
J: They must have known when made the Dubranski (phonetic) speech that Mansfield must have proposed it.
K: I just don’t think they can fine tune something that closely. This is all for your information Scoop and is very delicate at this stage.
J: Thank you very much Henry. I realize that.

3 See Document 217.
4 Tbilisi.
Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and David Kraslow of the Los Angeles Times

Washington, May 20, 1971, 8:15 p.m.

K: Did David give you my message?

HK: That we may be starting a new era of foreign policy? I agree. I am serious. That depends if both sides have enough vision to do it. At this point we are in a period where you are seeing a lot of developments—the Chinese thing, the Soviet thing. Obviously no government would put out a statement like this if we didn’t think we could bring about an agreement. We think that this may be the beginning of a new attitude towards relations with states with different ideals.

K: By this you mean the SALT thing?

HK: Yes, and reduction of forces.

K: Brezhnev’s speech on reduction of forces, you mean?

HK: SALT, Brezhnev’s speech on reduction of forces, China, new approach in Asia in general.

K: How about the Middle East? No shooting in ten months.

HK: Berlin negotiations which so far are stalemated—but so was SALT.

K: But no regression.

HK: No, but some slight progress.

K: If you were in the position outside looking in, what would you do about Vietnam at this stage?

HK: Vietnam is a phenomenon.

K: What does that mean?

HK: It was something that was inherited—it in itself is not a new concept of foreign policy. The fact that we are improving relations with the Soviet Union may turn Vietnam into just a [omission in transcript] issue. It may make it easier to settle with negotiations.

K: What sort of time-frame should we talk about? How much time would you give Nixon Administration?

HK: By 1976 we will have brought off . . .

K: You would wait that long?
HK: I’m just kidding. I think if things break out right you will see significant progress in the next two years. You will not quote me—this is just a backgrounder.³ I have to go the President is calling.⁴

³ On May 24, the *Los Angeles Times* published Kraslow’s article (p. 14) on how a SALT agreement might usher in a “bright new era” in triangular relations. After citing several unnamed critics, Kraslow quoted one of Nixon’s “close advisers,” who stated that “an agreement of such significance must lead to agreements in other areas. If we can improve relations with China and the Soviet Union on the larger questions, the war in Vietnam may become a local issue and it may become easier to settle.” “If all that happens before November 1972,” Kraslow commented, “Richard M. Nixon may have assured himself a place of first rank in history—as well as another four years in the White House.”

⁴ During his telephone call with Nixon, Kissinger reported that Kraslow was “writing an article not just about this but about your being a hero for foreign policy.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) Kraslow called Kissinger back at 8:18 p.m. to continue his line of questioning. Kraslow: “Would you regard the SALT thing as the most momentous thing or advent of them all of the Nixon administration?” Kissinger: “If the Soviets want to be bloody-minded and get just one ride, it is just one blurb. If you assume they deal with the President directly or even personally and make a serious statement with serious consequences, then your statement would be correct.” “If we can get agreement on something of this significance,” Kissinger added, “then there could be other breakthroughs.” (Ibid.)

228. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 21, 1971, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

I initiated the meeting when I saw a news report that the submarine tender and some submarines were going back to Cuba.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum and another summarizing the “main points of the exchange” to Nixon on May 28. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting began at 5:45 and lasted until 6:35 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76)
I opened the conversation by showing Dobrynin the TASS announcement.² Dobrynin asked whether the submarines were nuclear. I said no. I said, nevertheless, I had told him previously that the presence of the tender was all that was needed to make Cienfuegos a base and that we considered it inconsistent with our understanding. I recalled the oral note I had handed to him previously.³ I said that to make such an announcement the day after our SALT announcement certainly did not help matters and, frankly, infuriated the President.⁴

Dobrynin said that it was not a deliberate move and that I had to understand the Soviet system. In the Soviet system, military movements of this kind are taken by the Defense Department. The Politburo keeps an eye on nuclear submarines, but not on conventional ships. He could assure me that the operations of nuclear submarines in the Caribbean had been severely curtailed. Indeed, when he was in Moscow for the Party Congress, the military had been outraged at the understanding at which he had arrived. The military took the view that once the Soviets circumscribed their military movements at all, we would keep pressing and pressing until there would be no military operations in the Caribbean whatever. He did not understand why this was elevated to the Presidential level.

I told him that on a number of previous occasions he had pointed out that matters certain to irritate both sides should be avoided. Of course, if the Soviets serviced nuclear submarines or any submarine carrying offensive weapons from Cuba, it would lead to a show-down, and it is precisely for that reason that I could not understand the Soviet position.

Dobrynin said the position was clear—that nuclear submarines and submarines carrying offensive weapons could not be serviced from Cuba and this was understood, but it would be better if we did not constantly raise military operations since this would just get their back up. He could assure me that there was a massive problem with

² The English text of the TASS announcement, as published in Pravda on May 22 and Izvestia on May 23, is as follows: “In accordance with a mutual arrangement, a detachment of Soviet warships, consisting of a submarine and an auxiliary vessel that are on a training cruise in the Central Atlantic, will pay a friendly visit to ports of the Republic of Cuba at the end of May and the beginning of June for the purpose of taking on supplies and granting a brief shore leave to the crews.” (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 21 (June 22, 1971), p. 19)
³ Reference is presumably to the oral note Kissinger gave Dobrynin on October 9, 1970. See Document 6.
⁴ No evidence has been found that Kissinger mentioned the TASS announcement to Nixon before his meeting with Dobrynin the afternoon of May 21.
the Soviet military about restrictions on any military operations, and
the understanding had not been well received in Moscow. He looked
at the announcement and said he wanted to assure me he did not know
about it and indicated that if it had not already been stated publicly,
he would try to reverse it. We left matters at this point.

229. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The meeting was held at my initiative. Its purpose was to inform
Dobrynin of some unilateral relaxations of trade restrictions. It was
made necessary because I learned that we had already made the deci-
sion on authorizing the sale of the British computer. I at least wanted
to get some political credit.

I told Dobrynin that the President had decided to authorize the
sale of the Gleason Gear contract and also the sale of the British com-
puter. I further told him that we would authorize the sale of some ma-
chine tools. Dobrynin said he was very glad about the computer which
would have great symbolic significance, and also the machine tools
would come in very handy.

Dobrynin then asked whether there was some possibility of a fa-
vorable decision on the Komarov request because of the Soviet need

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, Presi-
dent’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2], Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum and another summarizing its “main points” to
the President on May 28. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House.
According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 5:45 to 6:30 p.m.
(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany,
1968–76)

2 On May 12, Nixon informed Heath by letter that an arrangement “should be pos-
sible” allowing the sale of two British computers to the Soviet Physics Laboratory at
Serpukhov. The letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign As-
ther discussion of the details, the United States formally lifted COCOM restrictions on
the transaction on June 25.

3 See Document 230.
to allocate some resources and to start their planning process. He asked whether it was possible to have an answer by the end of June. I told him that was unlikely, but that I could give him some preliminary indication by the middle of July of where we were heading. He said that these were very positive indications and that they might lead to bigger things.

Dobrynin then turned to Berlin. He said he had tested Hillenbrand and realized that Hillenbrand didn’t know anything about our channel.\(^4\) I told him that it was really not very helpful to play these games—that he could trust me on giving him the correct information.

Dobrynin then raised the question of whether at some point a Foreign Ministers meeting might not be helpful. I said that I thought a Foreign Ministers meeting, given the variety of channels, would be highly ineffective at this moment. If there was to be an agreement, it would be through the Falin/Bahr/Rush channel, and we should give that an opportunity to work. Dobrynin said he thought matters were going along rather well.

Dobrynin then turned the conversation to the issue of Chinese representation. He said he did not understand why we did not accept the dual representation formula, since this was a good way out. He said they were not particularly eager to have China in the United Nations, especially since China would give them even more trouble than it would give us. On the other hand, he said it was better to have China in the United Nations, where it could learn first-hand some of the complications of international life, than have it in isolation taking abstract attitudes. I asked whether the Soviet Union might be switching to a two-China solution. He said, “No, that would be a big shift in our position, but we think it would be a good policy for you to take.”

Dobrynin then raised the issue of Vietnam. He asked why we did not give a deadline. I said in the past, the North Vietnamese skill had been to offer to talk in return for our making a substantive concession. He said that in this instance, this did not seem to him to be the case. He was certain that the North Vietnamese would release prisoners if we gave a deadline. I asked him how he knew. He said he had read the record of the Le Duan conversation in Moscow,\(^5\) and that was his definite impression. However, if I were interested, he would check

\(^4\) No record of this conversation between Dobrynin and Hillenbrand has been found.

\(^5\) Le Duan met with Brezhnev and other Soviet officials in Moscow on May 9 to discuss developments in the international situation and bilateral relations since the Soviet Party Congress. For the English text of the joint communiqué, published by Pravda on May 10 and Izvestia on May 11, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 19 (June 8, 1971), p. 32.
and let me know. I told him if there were any interest, I would let him know.

We then discussed the formalities of the exchange of letters. He said he expected Kosygin’s letter within a few days and he would then call me to complete the exchange.6

6 Dobrynin called Kissinger at 12:50 p.m. on May 25 and reported: “I received a letter signed by Chairman Kosygin. Anytime you wish, I could come today or tomorrow.” Due to the President’s absence, Kissinger replied that the formal exchange of letters would have to wait; he promised to call Dobrynin the next day to arrange a meeting. The two men agreed, however, that the letters should be dated May 20. As Dobrynin explained: “That’s the day of the announcement—for history.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

230. Editorial Note

After his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on May 24, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger sent a special channel message to Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush in Bonn with the following instructions on his linkage strategy:

“We would like to keep the Berlin talks and SALT in some sort of balance. This means that we want to make progress in Berlin and show good faith. At the same time, we want to keep open some recourse for the contingency that the Soviets go back on the understanding with the President regarding SALT. This may not be manageable because we do want to keep the Berlin talks moving forward for other reasons. So perhaps my only useful advice is to avoid being stampeded into too rapid a pace.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2])

On May 28 Rush reported by special channel that the second meeting of the “Bonn triangle” the night before had “proceeded in the same amicable, cooperative manner as our previous one.” According to Rush, Soviet Ambassador Falin not only was “thoroughly familiar” with the subject but also had “full authorization” to negotiate an agreement. After providing details from the discussion, Rush replied to the strategic concerns Kissinger raised in his last message: “It is very difficult to say to what degree the Berlin talks can by synchronized with SALT. Judging by Falin’s approach yesterday, there is a fair probability that the Berlin talks [will] move ahead quite rapidly by virtue of the Russians
taking an easy position on all the remaining issues.” (Ibid.) Both messages are printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, Documents 241 and 244.

The White House, meanwhile, also reconsidered its position on trade restrictions with the Kremlin. In a May 24 memorandum to Kissinger, Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council staff delivered a status report on several export control cases, including the application of the Gleason Works of Rochester, New York, to sell truck manufacturing machinery to the Soviet Union. Although the initial application had been rejected in September 1970, the company had been pressing the Nixon administration to reconsider. “[I]f the President wishes to use relaxation of export controls as a signal to respond to the arms control developments,” Johnston explained, “we are in a good position to have some cases move very fast.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 402, Subject Files, Trade, Vol. IV [2 of 2]) During a telephone conversation with Secretary of Commerce Stans on May 25, Kissinger reported: “If you will send the Gleason case over now we will approve it.” In addition to Gleason, Stans agreed to forward several of the “least sensitive” export control licenses for Kissinger’s approval. (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) Johnston advised Kissinger on May 26 that Stans had not only resubmitted the Gleason case but also forwarded $30–40 million in additional applications. According to Johnston, the Department of Commerce understood that, due to the sensitivity of the issue, “it should make no dramatic announcements when these projects are approved and there should be no public linking with any improvements in U.S./Soviet relations.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 402, Subject Files, Trade, Vol. IV [2 of 2])
231. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Billy Graham of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association

May 24, 1971, 6:50 p.m.

G: Sorry to bother you again but the matter I raised with you quickly on the plane—

K: Incidentally I am sorry I ran away from you but the President had called me.

G: I understand. This has taken on quite a larger proportion than on Saturday when I talked with you. The lady spoke at the UN, Mrs. Arthur Goldberg was in the Chair. There were Protestants there, Jewish leaders there and Black leaders and so forth. They all signed the strongest petition to the Soviet Union and they sent a letter to the Pope. They had her speak and she was the first Jewish woman to speak. Right now meeting in Rochester, New York. They passed a terrific Resolution. Her daughter has become a symbol—the youngest political prisoner, probably in the world.

K: How old is she?

G: 23 years old. All they will want to do is mold public opinion—nothing anti-Soviet, nothing Cold War or this type of thing. She thinks her daughter will die. The trial is in Riga and she is on trial for spread-
During a meeting with Nixon at 10:18 a.m. on May 26, Kissinger briefly mentioned the Aleksandrovich case: “Billy Graham has been calling—there’s nothing you need to do about it—about the daughter of some Jewish lady, who is being tried in Riga. And every Presbyterian, Jewish, and other group is passing resolutions.” Thinking out loud, Nixon suggested approaching Dobrynin but then quickly reconsidered: “We probably—we don’t want to screw it up.” Kissinger: “I think we ought to stay the hell out of it, frankly.” Nixon: “That’s right. Ain’t nothing going to happen.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 505–4)

The Latvian Supreme Court convicted Ruth Aleksandrovich and three co-defendants of “anti-Soviet agitation” on May 27; she was sentenced to one year in prison. (Bernard Gwertzman, “4 Riga Jews Given Terms to Three Years,” New York Times, May 28, 1971, p. 1) On June 1, Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, Director of Interreligious Affairs of the American Jewish Committee, called Kissinger to plead her case. Tanenbaum reported that Aleksandrovich had been “put in ‘private punishment,’ which is worse than solitary confinement.” Tanenbaum added that Rivka Aleksandrovich was “extremely concerned and willing to make any arrangement providing they release her daughter.” “Let me see what I can do,” Kissinger replied, “but for us to do anything publicly would be counter-productive. But let me see what I can do through other channels.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)
Washington, May 25, 1971, 8:30 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, including a proposed meeting in June with South Vietnamese President Thieu.]

K: By the end of the month—by June 25th, you will see your cards much more clearly.

P: Yeah.

K: Mr. President, one thing I was going to suggest to you tomorrow—we ought to give the Russians an ultimatum in about two weeks. If they don’t deliver now, we will just delay till next spring on the Summit.

P: This is June—in 2 weeks you say we would do this?

K: Yes. We have announced a Summit or know we are going to get a Summit.

P: I don’t know if you can get anything out of them on that.

K: We have just given them the Gleason [Gear contract], a huge package on economics they want—²

P: I spoke to these editors down there today³—I talked generally about the whole thing. I said it could open to other things but a lot of negotiating to go forward and so on.

K: They are trying to play Berlin. If we get a commitment out of them, [omission in transcript] pressure on SALT.

P: A commitment isn’t enough.

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¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking. A tape recording of the conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 3–118.

² See Document 230.

³ The President held a briefing on domestic policy in Birmingham, Alabama, that afternoon for representatives of the Southern news media. During the briefing, Nixon stated that the May 20 announcement on SALT “indicates and gives us at least some hope that a different relationship between the two powers will, in a step-by-step basis, develop in the years ahead.” For the full text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 664–676. According to Haldeman: “the P delivered a 55 minute talk on foreign policy, which according to [Secretary of Labor] Romney and others, was absolutely superb, although E[hrlichman] was somewhat upset because it hadn’t been on domestic policy. The P’s feeling was that the other subject would have far greater interest with that audience.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
K: I mean an announcement. They are going to harvest everything and we will end up losing.

P: You didn’t talk about SALT today?

K: No, no; on Monday. He said if these things work out, bigger things will follow.

P: What the hell bigger can follow?

K: We can speed up the Berlin negotiations. If there isn’t a Summit—there is no earthly reason to refuse a Summit now.

P: And we have settled on SALT—I mean [omission in transcript].

K: We have given them the economic package. Mr. President, if you agree, fairly soon—after the first of June, around the 4th or 5th—I will say we have been horsing around for a year that we would be that we would be glad to come to Moscow but will delay—. On SALT, I gave him 48 hours—and he came back in 24.

P: We will just say we will have to postpone it indefinitely.

K: Then let’s just forget about it.

P: As far as this year is concerned.

K: That’s what I mean. We have all the cards in our hands. We will know yes or no from them. We will have the Chinese answer and see Thieu and they won’t scream so much.

P: Yeah. Well, that doesn’t bother me any to push them on that. The only thing that worries me is that it appears we are begging for the goddamn Summit. I would think they would want it too.

K: They want it. They are playing a cute game. I think this way if we keep giving them economic aid—

P: Gleason is all we are going to give them.

K: And the computer. You had already given them your approval when Heath was there.

P: The computer, yeah.

K: We have a chance to give them more economic things—

P: I would do it in a weak thing.

K: On the 2nd or 3rd of June.

P: Right after Memorial Day, Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

K: Exactly.

P: Alright.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

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1 May 24. See Document 229.

2 See footnote 2, Document 229.
 Anything else new—You think the SALT thing is eventually going to get understood by everyone?

K: It is understood now.

P: By people that know anything about it.

K: By people that don’t know anything, they think you have achieved something they don’t understand. The whole press [and everyone]6 very positive. Henry Brandon had a very good article in the London Sunday Times although I don’t know what distribution is here—a very good response.

P: It is kind of like the China thing, it has the same positive response.

K: Everyone feels in foreign policy you know what you are doing.

P: Except in Vietnam. Really the problem—our enemies and press, people like Resor7 keep hacking away. We are carrying a burden then we have to make a sale nobody will buy.

K: People will buy it.

P: Except in Vietnam. The polls are pretty rough and they have some effect on the jackasses that read them. Well, we will hope for the best. Go right ahead with the Thieu thing and get it out of the way. I don’t mind putting it off.8

K: Right, Mr. President.

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6 Brackets are in the original.


8 Haldeman reported in his diary that Nixon called him at home later that evening, “mainly to change the dates on the Midway trip. He’s talked to Henry, and because of the meeting with Sainteny in Paris and the unlikelihood of an answer before the 8th, or actually the impossibility of an answer before the 8th, we have to put the Thieu meeting off until after the 20th. So we’ll work out a change for that.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
233. Memorandum From the President’s Special Consultant (Scali) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Pre-SALT Strategy

I have burrowed through the avalanche of favorable comment that has been unloosed in the news media since the defeat of the Mansfield Amendment and the SALT announcement.

At this moment, I believe you are in the curious position of being overly praised by news critics who, just a few days ago, were deeply suspicious of your basic strategy and, indeed, of your desire to reach reasonable agreements with the Soviet Union.

I believe that this praise, instead of subsiding, will multiply in the weeks ahead because it is coming from many of the key opinion molders whose compilation of facts and analyses other less enterprising reporters are quick to adopt.

After a day or two of hesitation, the reporters from the New York Times and the Washington Post have joined the chorus. I will mention only a few: Harrison Salisbury, Robert Kleiman, James Reston, Max Frankel and Ralph Lapp in the New York Times; Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post. There are others: Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News, Tom Ross of the Chicago Sun Times, Stewart Hensley of United Press. I would add today’s news magazines, plus the assorted remarks of network news commentators.

After months of enduring criticism, I would not blame you for sitting back for a period to savor the sweet success your efforts have wrought, while your aides encourage a second and third wave of praise. However, there is a danger.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT Talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Butterfield advised Scali in writing on May 28 that Nixon had read his memorandum, fully agreed with its recommendations, and wanted a copy sent to Kissinger. Butterfield forwarded both memoranda to Kissinger and explained in a handwritten note: “I have rewritten the President’s comments precisely as, & where, they appeared on the original.” The original memorandum has not been found. The President’s comments, as indicated by Butterfield, are provided in the footnotes below.

2 Nixon wrote in the margin: “K—note.”
Inevitably, and far more swiftly than might have been predicted, a national euphoria is developing that will backfire if, as seems likely, the slow pace of developments fails to keep step with the rosy expectations.\(^3\) This could lead not only to deep disappointment later but, in the longer range, make it more difficult for you to achieve the foreign policy agreements you seek as a solid basis of accommodation with the Soviet government. Too much praise, too much talk, will encourage suspicion in Moscow.

I know you sought to anticipate this problem by warning that intensive negotiations lie ahead before there is agreement on SALT and progress in achieving balanced force reductions in Europe. But this has not been enough to discourage newsmen from talking about a triumphant summit conference in Moscow later this year, to look ahead optimistically to a Berlin settlement, reduction in ground forces, even to speculate hopefully on a settlement of the Vietnam War. They may encourage a belief that a train of events is building up which can produce an instant heaven, only to have these hopes dashed. It is not that the newsmen are seeking to be deliberately mischievous—they believe they are old hands in spotting important developments in the making, despite disclaimers and warnings that tough negotiations are in store. Predicting the outcome is part of the game.

Therefore, I recommend that:

1. At your next news conference you seek to cool off the air of great expectations by stressing the enormously difficult, time-consuming negotiations that lie head.\(^4\)

2. You again generously credit the Soviet government for its contribution in making it possible for the negotiations to begin and that you give notice that secrecy is indispensable to a successful result.

3. Now that you have earned the first wave of high praise for your efforts, you instruct your aides to low-key rather than accentuate further hoorays.\(^5\) I have detected a tendency to re-emphasize the initial breakthrough. I do not propose to suggest what your aides do for domestic, political purposes. But, it strikes me that there is plenty of time

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\(^3\) Nixon underlined this sentence, marked the passage in the margin, and wrote: "right!"

\(^4\) Nixon wrote “OK” in the margin next to each of the three numbered paragraphs.

\(^5\) Nixon underlined this clause.
to unleash the superlatives after you have achieved the solid results which will speak eloquently for themselves.⁶

⁶ Nixon wrote “(correct!)” in the margin. Nixon elaborated his position during a meeting with Kissinger and Haldeman at 10:08 a.m. on May 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to Haldeman: “[Nixon] got to talking about the fact that foreign policy was not doing us any real good, although we had accomplished a lot of things. And he explained that to Henry’s country—the intellectuals and the social jet set, etc.—we’re doing an outstanding job; but in what he referred to as ‘my country’—that is, the plain folks out in the middle of America—they don’t know anything about what you’re doing on SALT and all these other things. They just want things to simmer down and be quiet, and to them we have not accomplished very much. Then he got to talking about election issues and made the ironic point that of all the major issues, the only one that is a sure thing for us is Vietnam.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

234. Editorial Note

On May 26, 1971—two days before the final meeting of the fourth round in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)—Vladimir Semenov and the Soviet Delegation hosted a dinner in Vienna for Gerard Smith and the American Delegation. According to Smith, the “main topic of conversation” was the May 20 announcement. “There were some heated exchanges,” Smith later recalled. “The Soviet interpretation of the sequence issue was that after an ABM agreement had been fully negotiated the sides would turn to measures affecting offensive arms, and the two agreements could then be concluded together. But we had no interest in completing an ABM treaty, which would probably involve concessions during the negotiation process, until we were much clearer as to what was going to be possible in the way of restraints on offensive arms.” After the dinner, Smith sent a backchannel message asking Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to “straighten out” the differences in interpretation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and to do so before the final meeting on May 28. (Smith, Doubletalk, pages 244–245) A copy of the message is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, SALT, 1971.

Kissinger had already scheduled a meeting with Dobrynin the next morning, May 27, to exchange formal letters on SALT. The message from Smith, however, meant that the meeting would be more than a mere formality. Kissinger first met the President in the Oval Office at 9:57 a.m. to review the situation. Their meeting included the following exchange:
Kissinger: “I’m seeing Dobrynin today to exchange the letters. And—”
Nixon: “Fine.”
Kissinger: “Then—the fellow in Vienna [Semenov] is making some noise about not discussing things simultaneously. And I’m going to be very tough with Dobrynin and say, ‘You’d better not horse around or we’ll just publish the telephone conversations I took, which I have—I have every conversation word for word.’”
Nixon asked Kissinger to explain his remarks:
Kissinger: “Well, there it was agreed that it would be discussed simultaneously.”
Nixon: “Why? Are discussions going on again?”
Kissinger: “No, but—all I want is that they don’t, at the concluding session tomorrow, make a reference. By July, we might settle. Gerry is worried that Semenov will say tomorrow that first we do this and then we do that. And that wouldn’t be good. And I think I can get that settled.”
Nixon: “Well, for Christ’s sake, that’s the whole purpose of the deal.”
Kissinger: “It’s in the letters. There’s really—”
Nixon: “So, put the letters out.”
Kissinger: “Yes.”
After a brief exchange on the Kremlin’s policy in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the two men compared how the Soviet Union and China approached relations with the United States:
Nixon: “We have a situation here with them and with the Chinese. We are still dealing with governments that are basically hostile to us.”
Kissinger: “Oh, no question.”
Nixon: “So hostile to us that we, therefore, have got to do those things that are in our interests. And here it’s cold turkey: if sons-of-bitches don’t play, fine.”
Kissinger: “And, actually, I think the Russians are really, basically, gangsters as types.”
Nixon: “That’s true.”
Kissinger: “The Chinese are a little more civilized.”
Nixon: “That’s about all. Those Chinese are out to whip me.”
Kissinger: “Oh, they’re both out to get us. The difference is that the Chinese will probably go for a big knockout, while the Russians will try to bleed us to death with the—”
Nixon: “Yeah, the Russians. But, we’re going to play it very—with Dobrynin say, ‘Look, that the President has called it to your attention—”
this Semenov or whatever—he saw this news summary and he said, “Now, look, we’re not a bit, a goddamn bit, interested in this, this kind of a thing.” If he—if they want to play that kind of a game, it’s—then all bets are off. And I think you got to get to the summit thing faster. Remind me next week, sometime, you—when you get back [unclear]—”

Kissinger: “All right. I’ll do it next week.”

Nixon: “And I’d put it right to him hard: ‘What the hell are you going to do?'”

Kissinger: “That’s right. I’ll tell him. But the threat has to be there: if they can’t accept it now, we won’t go in September, no matter what they do.”

Nixon: “Yeah.”

Kissinger: “That’s the threat we have to—otherwise it’s bleeding us.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 504–2) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

Rather than wait for their meeting, Kissinger called Dobrynin at 10:43 to discuss Smith’s message. According to Kissinger, the problem had become a matter of “time urgency”:

“K: The problem is Semenov in Vienna has been saying to Smith that his understanding is first there will be negotiations on ABM agreement and afterwards there would be discussions on offensive limitations, which is not my understanding. But I don’t want to get that issue settled today. However, Smith is afraid that Semenov will say publicly tomorrow at the closing session that this [is] the understanding. If he says it publicly, Smith will have to say the opposite publicly. And the negotiations will be ending on a note of disagreement. This is the plenary session which closes the negotiations in Vienna.

“D: It’s a closed session.

“K: Yes, it is a closed session, but I wanted to recommend—and I just talked to the President—that neither side states anything. We can get this worked out during the month. We now have agreement and we should not immediately record disagreement. My understanding is that we will discuss offensive limitations while the other is being discussed.

“D: My understanding—I did not specifically mention it to him recently but said it in a telegram long before when we discussed that—that there would be two parts so to speak. There was no specific agreement between you and me. My understanding is that at the beginning of the first part we will discuss this one, but on the second part, we will begin half-way. They will do ABM and the second part when they begin to discuss this one.

“K: We can work that out. My understanding is they will begin on ABM but well before that is completed they will have to discuss offensive limitations. I don’t think you would find in the record ‘half-
way.' But this is not an issue that cannot be worked out. The major thing is there would be no useful purpose served if there is a record of formal disagreement at the closing plenary session tomorrow. Whether it is half-way or a third of the way . . .

“D: My understanding is they would concentrate on ABM and when a substantial part is completed, continue on ABM and then proceed with the other one. That was my understanding which I sent to Moscow.

“K: What sort of ABM agreement, whether it would be capitals, or what else . . .

“D: I didn’t go into details. I didn’t send what kind—SALT or what else. It was a simple understanding—not a specific question.

“K: We don’t have to settle it this minute. The major thing is it would be very helpful if we ended the session tomorrow on a positive note. Nothing can be accomplished by recording disagreement tomorrow. If you could get that word to Semenov. I will show Smith’s cable to you when you come.”

Although they agreed to meet in his White House office at 11 a.m., Kissinger suggested that that Dobrynin could “come a few minutes late” in order to draft a telegram to Moscow before Smith and Semenov met on May 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

Kissinger met Dobrynin at the White House on May 27 from 11:40 a.m. to 12:35 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) During the meeting, the two men exchanged the formal letters on SALT; in addition to the circumstances surrounding Smith’s message, they apparently also discussed how the Department of State handled such issues as the emigration of Soviet Jews (see Document 238). Although no record of the conversation has been found, Kissinger briefly reported to Nixon in the Oval Office immediately afterwards. According to this account, Kissinger told Dobrynin: “Look, every problem you raise now is at the Presidential level, so you better be careful what you [say].” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 504–8)

Dobrynin called Kissinger at 5:30 p.m. and reported that Moscow had sent a telegram to Vienna, instructing Semenov to refrain from any further “interpretation” of the May 20 announcement. (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 26, Dobrynin File) Before the final plenary session on May 28, Smith and Semenov met privately and agreed to avoid in their closing statements any controversy over the sequence of negotiations between offensive and defensive strategic weapons. (Telegram 761 from USDEL SALT IV, May 28; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–3 AUS (VI)) As Smith later recalled: “The dispute was left for another day.” (Smith, Doubletalk, page 245)
235. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

US-Soviet Incidents at Sea

Late last month when you were flying to California with Navy Under Secretary Warner, I reported on the status of the interagency study for proposed bilateral talks (Warner will head US Delegation) with the Soviets on avoiding incidents at sea. The previous Administration had suggested these talks in 1968, and late last year the Soviets finally responded favorably.

The interagency study has now been received (Tab B) and all interested agencies have formally approved it. Since there was no disagreement among the agencies, I approved the study as the basis for the talks, and have requested the Under Secretaries Committee to assume responsibility for the detailed preparation and coordination (Tab A).

The main US objective in the talks will be to obtain Soviet agreement to interpret the Rules of the Road in such a way as to impose a duty on Soviet ships to stay well clear of US ships conducting air operations, underway replenishment, underwater operations and maneuvering in formation. In return for Soviet agreement on these points, we would agree that our aircraft and ships would keep further away from Soviet surface ships (but not to a point which would seriously impair our intelligence capabilities).
There will be third-country interest in these talks (NATO, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, Korea, Philippines, Spain and Iran). The paper proposes that we consult in NATO and brief our other allies prior to the talks. The British, who have had naval incidents with the Soviets, would receive a special advance briefing.5

5 In a June 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that implementation of NSDM 110 was already "proceeding according to plan." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 110) The United States and Soviet Union announced in October 1971 that they would begin to negotiate an agreement to avoid future "incidents at sea." See also Winkler, Cold War at Sea.

236. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers


New Trials of Jews and Anti-Soviet Violence

On May 18 you authorized Ambassador Johnson to deliver a statement about Soviet Jewry to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin (Tab B).2 We hoped thereby to register our concern, show support for moderate American Jewish organizations, and thus help forestall anti-Soviet violence by militants during the current trials of Jews in the USSR.

On May 19, Ambassador Johnson’s prospective representation was cancelled in conjunction with the President’s announcement on SALT. However, we continue to believe that the statement to Dobrynin is necessary.

With the beginning of another trial in Riga—the third in this series—twelve Jewish leaders met with Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies May 24 to express concern over the widespread frustration among American Jews that more is not being done by the Government,

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Mainland on May 25; cleared by Atherton; forwarded through Johnson. Eliot initialed the memorandum.

the press, and Jews themselves.\textsuperscript{3} They said it was increasingly difficult for responsible organizations to restrain some members from drifting toward tactics of disruption. They reported demands being made even in some responsible organizations for picketing of the White House and the Department. They said that respectable Jews, who had never run afoul of the law, are now talking about courting arrest in order to publicize the deprivation of human rights being practiced by the Soviet Government towards Soviet Jews.

The American Jewish leadership views this period of trials as crucial for the mood not only of American Jewry but also of the Soviet regime, which apparently is testing how far quasi-legal repression can be pushed without an outcry abroad.

The Jewish leaders believe they can restrain extreme actions by responsible organizations and Jewish personalities if they are able to point to a responsive attitude on the part of the Administration.

\textit{Recommendation}

That you authorize Ambassador Johnson to telephone Dr. Kissinger at the White House, using the talking points attached (Tab A),\textsuperscript{4} and to clear our previously suggested approach to Ambassador Dobrynin on Soviet Jewry.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{Approve}

\textbf{Disapprove}

\textbf{Other}

\textsuperscript{3} A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 USSR.

\textsuperscript{4} Attached but not printed. According to the talking points, Johnson would emphasize that the Department wanted to support “Jewish moderates to contain the anti-Soviet violence that has complicated our relations with the Soviets during the past year.” Johnson would also assure Kissinger that “[m]aking the approach to Dobrynin will in no way affect SALT, Middle East policy, or other key substantive questions. The Soviets do not confuse vital security questions with secondary issues.”

\textsuperscript{5} The Secretary did not mark any of the options.
237. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) and for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers


Meeting with Jewish Leaders

On May 11, four top American Jewish leaders sent a cable to the White House requesting a meeting with the President to discuss current trials of Soviet Jews (Tab B). This request was subsequently publicized in the press, but the White House has not yet replied to it.

We understand that the failure to reply to this request resulted from an administrative oversight by the White House. Apparently as a result of a Departmental query to the White House staff about the cable, Leonard Garment on May 26 forwarded it to Joe Sisco, suggesting that perhaps you might respond to the cable and meet with the four-man group (Tab C).

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Mainland. Davies initialed the memorandum for Hillenbrand.

2 The tabs are attached but not printed. In addition to Fisher and Schacter, the telegram was signed by Rabbi Israel Miller and Jacob Stein, co-chairmen of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

3 In a May 13 memorandum, David Parker asked Kissinger for his advice on how to respond to the request for a meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Leonard Garment, Alpha-Subject Files, Box 117, Jewish Matters 1971 [2 of 3]) Kissinger replied on May 18: “From the strictly foreign policy viewpoint, I believe the proposed meeting would be detrimental to current relations with the USSR. The President made his position known in a public statement from San Clemente last January. However, there may be other considerations bearing on a meeting apart from the negative foreign policy effects I have noted.” (Ibid.) Parker forwarded Kissinger’s memorandum to Garment on May 19 to consider in drafting a reply to Fisher’s telegram. Garment, however, wrote in the margin: “Dave. What reply? To what request?” (Ibid.)

4 During a telephone conversation with Kissinger at 2:38 p.m., Garment remarked: “We want to keep this cooking along without too many of our Jewish friends picketing the White House.” When Kissinger asked about the subject, Garment replied: “Soviet Jewry.” Kissinger suggested that Garment “[c]ome on over” to discuss the issue. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Garment from 2:44 to 2:55. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
He is looking to us to take the White House off the hook; I gather from Garment the President prefers not to respond to the cable.\(^5\)

In the period of tension during the December 1970 trial of Soviet Jews in Leningrad, you and the President met with American Jewish leaders (Tab D).\(^6\) A similar gesture now would do a great deal to demonstrate continuing U.S. Government concern about Soviet Jewry and help the moderate American Jewish leadership cope with the rise of anti-Soviet violence on the part of an extremist minority.

In view of the short time remaining before your departure for the NATO ministerial meeting, we believe that it would be appropriate for the Under Secretary to meet with these leaders in your stead. Max Fisher indicated today to Joe Sisco that offering to meet with the group would be a welcome gesture, whether or not they accept the offer.

It would be most helpful if Ambassador Johnson’s approach to Ambassador Dobrynin on Soviet Jewry (which EUR has resubmitted in an action memorandum of May 26)\(^7\) were made before the meeting with these Jewish leaders. We would not publicize this approach other than to say that the subject of Ambassador Johnson’s conversation with Dobrynin was Soviet Jewry. However, we could use the approach to excellent advantage privately with the Jewish leaders.

A reply to the leaders for your signature is attached (Tab A).

We would suggest the attached press guidance (Tab E)\(^8\) for use after the meeting with the Jewish leaders.

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\(^5\) Kissinger mentioned the request for an appointment during a meeting at 10:08 a.m. with the President, who replied: “Never. No.” “We’ve been sitting on it,” Kissinger explained, “but there’s a telegram on the plight of Soviet Jewry.” The two men agreed that the President “shouldn’t see them now.” As Kissinger argued: “it will infuriate the Russians for no good end.” Nixon added: “People would say, ‘What the hell? Are the Americans going to get into a fight with the Soviet about the Jewish persecution?’ They don’t want it. You know what I mean? Now, that doesn’t mean that we don’t stand up for them. But the American people, now, at this time, are goddamn sensitive about getting into a fight with anybody, except for themselves.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 505–4)

\(^6\) See Document 82.

\(^7\) Document 236.

\(^8\) Some of the press guidance was subsequently incorporated into the “short statement” Bray read at the daily press conference on May 27. See Document 238.
**Recommendation**

That you approve a meeting by the Under Secretary with Rabbi Schacter and Miller and Messrs. Fisher and Stein.

Approve __________
Date __________ Time __________

Disapprove __________
Other __________

That you authorize sending the attached telegram (Tab A) to the Jewish leaders.9

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9 The Secretary marked neither approval nor disapproval of either recommendation on the memorandum. Rogers, however, approved the message to Fisher, Schacter, Miller, and Stein on May 26. (Telegram 95340 to USUN, May 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 USSR)

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**238. Editorial Note**

On May 27, 1971, the Department of State acted on its own initiative to enunciate the administration’s policy on the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. According to his Appointment Book, Secretary of State William Rogers met at 11:40 a.m. with Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations, and Richard T. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) Davies was the Department’s principal officer on Soviet affairs, including the Jewish question. Although no record of the conversation has been found, the three men presumably discussed the Department’s daily press conference that afternoon. Charles W. Bray, Director of the Office of Press Relations, opened the press conference at 12:12 p.m. by reading the following “short statement” on the recent trials in Riga and Leningrad:

“The continued Soviet practice of trying people in secret is a matter of deep concern to us. There is great interest among Americans in these trials which, as I said here a week ago, have not been open to any impartial foreign observers. We understand that foreign newsmen have applied to cover the trials but that the Soviet authorities have refused each application. Based on accounts from TASS, the trial which concluded today in Riga claimed that four Jewish defendants were
charged with, quote, ‘fabricating and circulating slanderous materials for subversive purposes’, unquote.

“It would appear that the defendants were tried for an action or actions which are not even considered a crime in most countries. We trust that the Soviet Government realizes that Americans of every political persuasion and religious belief deplore the persecution of persons simply for studying a foreign language—in this case, Hebrew—and for running materials off on a mimeograph machine, as seems to have been the case, judging from TASS reporting of the Riga trial. These trials and the previous trials at Leningrad are abhorrent on three grounds—the denial of the right to an open trial, persecution of people for their beliefs, and the denial of the right of people freely to leave any country and to travel or reside abroad in the country of their choice.

“We deeply regret these deprivations of fundamental human rights, rights which should not be in question anywhere in the second half of the Twentieth Century.”

During the conference, Bray received several questions on whether this statement represented a departure from the administration’s policy:

“Q: Charles, a historical question which maybe you can answer: Is there any precedent for a statement like this from the State Department about a criminal trial in the Soviet Union?

“A: I wasn’t incarnated at the time, but I think that you will find a statement in connection with the first Leningrad trial and a number of statements issued, either in the name of the Secretary or in this forum, with respect to the right of peoples to their beliefs and to the right of emigration.

“Q: Nevertheless, Charles, frequently the Department has declined to comment on trials or political actions within any number of countries on the grounds of noninterference with internal affairs. Could you elaborate a little further why interference was deemed necessary in this case?

“A: Well, I’m not sure that I would characterize it as ‘interference,’ Gary.

“Q: Well, simply becoming involved in the internal affairs of another Government.

“A: We’re addressing ourselves here to what seems to us to be a very clear violation of the Declaration of the Universal Rights of Man.

“Q: Well, Charles, you set down three criteria for things that are abhorrent and denial of the right to an open trial and so forth. Are these covered in the Declaration of Human Rights? I don’t think they’re covered in Soviet law, and I’m just wondering the basis for finding this abhorrent—an action at a trial and internal affairs in the Soviet Union.

“A: I’ll have to check that as a factual matter, Stu.”
When a reporter asked whether the statement had been “cleared with the White House,” Bray replied: “I simply don’t know the answer to that question, but I think you can take this as a statement by the Department of State on behalf of this Government.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of News, Transcripts of Daily News Conferences of the Department of State, Vol. 60)

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin called Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger at 5:46 p.m. to complain about the Department’s statement, as reported in a ticker item released that afternoon by United Press International. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange:

“D: In connection with the talks about the White House and State, I have just seen UPI 117 [read it] to the effect that the U.S. today publicly condemned Russia for the conviction of the four Jews. The ticker said it was the strongest ever issued by the Department.

“K: God-damn them! When was it issued? I gave them instructions at 1:00 . . .

“D: It’s on the ticker.

“K: Oh, God-damn. You have to believe me—I did not know about this. The President did not know about it. I will have to check into it. I haven’t seen the ticker, but I’ll look at it immediately.

“D: It is the strongest ever.

“K: Tell them that I instructed the Department . . .

“D: What kind of fools do they have? It is our law. Why should the Department be involved in our condemning them? I just want to know.

“K: Tell them that you brought it to my attention.

“D: And that from now on you will use much more control on this?

“K: From now on, I will take responsibility for matters of this kind. I will found out what happened.

“D: It definitely looks political.

“K: It may be something that was authorized three days ago. I will look into it and give you an informal opinion tomorrow.

“D: You don’t have to give me an opinion. It’s public—on the radio.

“K: You mention to them this was done prior to my discussion with you.

“D: Okay.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

Kissinger’s instructions to the Department that afternoon have not been found.
As soon as he was finished with Dobrynin, Kissinger went to the Oval Office to brief President Richard Nixon. When Kissinger arrived at 5:56 p.m., Nixon was discussing domestic policy with his Assistant for Domestic Affairs John Ehrlichman and White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. Kissinger reported that Dobrynin had already “complained this morning that he was being constantly called in by the State Department, the lower officials, to make petty complaints to him.” In response to Dobrynin’s complaint, Kissinger pledged that “we will now check these things personally to make sure that there was no harassment.” According to Kissinger, however, the situation had suddenly become “quite serious”:

Kissinger: “The State Department issued a terrific blast against the treatment of Jews in—”
Nixon: “Yeah.”
Kissinger: “—the Soviet Union.”
Nixon: “Oh, why—didn’t we stop that? Goddamn, I thought we just had that little—”
Kissinger: “I had thought—I reaffirmed—I may ask you to sign—”
Nixon: “All right. I’ll sign a letter.”
Kissinger: “—that they—any statement concerning the Soviet Union for the next two months has to be cleared here no matter how trivial.”
Nixon: “I think you should get the memorandum to me today. I mean—”
Kissinger: “Yeah.”
Nixon: “—first thing in the morning, Henry. It’s so important.”
Kissinger: “Because it’s a—”
Nixon: “Yeah.”
Kissinger: “—it gets us nothing to—”
Nixon: “Yeah. But I don’t want to—because of very high considerations, indeed, I want no statement concerning the Soviet Union of any kind, public statements, to be made without clearance with me. [unclear]”
Haldeman: “Unless somebody comes—”
Kissinger: “With all—you know, I’m Jewish myself, but who are we to complain—”
Ehrlichman: “[laughter]”
Kissinger: “—about Soviet Jews? It’s none of our business. If they complain—if they made a public protest to us for the treatment of Negroes, we’d be—”
Ehrlichman: “Yeah.”
Nixon: “I know.”
Kissinger: “You know, it’s none of our business how they treat their people.”

Nixon: “Yeah. Well, we—that’s why I think your—that’s why I couldn’t see Max Fisher and that other fellow, Schacter. Christ, I can’t see these people about the treatment of—we’re—they know how we feel for Christ’s sakes.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 504–15) The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

Before Kissinger could draft a memorandum, Rogers called at 6:40 p.m. to review the day’s events:

“R: I am just calling on that damn statement Bray made at the briefing.

“K: Yes, I mentioned to the President that you were mortified and it was a mistake and he understands.

“R: I said if the question was asked we should express our concern and say we still believe in the Human Rights Convention and that people should be able to emigrate. Said don’t know about evidence in the trial. Instead of that we volunteered a statement.

“K: The President feels, for obvious reasons, that he would like to cool the debate between us and the Soviet Union.

“R: I think there is this to be said—and I’m not trying to justify the mistake; it was a mistake and I was screaming about it before I heard from over there—but the only bright side is that this may help cool those who might help the JDL. Every time the JDL gets aroused it causes additional problems in the Soviet Union.

“K: I think that is right and it’s done now, but we are going to make sure we don’t make any belligerent statements. We can always go back to the hotline.

“R: This is just one of those mistakes. You don’t have to send any memo to me.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

Kissinger called Dobrynin at 6:48 p.m. to report that the administration would henceforth speak with one voice on the Soviet Union, including the emigration of Soviet Jews. “I just wanted to tell you,” Kissinger explained, “that I have looked into this and it was done before our instructions reached them, or so they say now. At any rate, we will send out a Presidential order tomorrow preventing this, and you can assure them that what I told you is correct. No department will be permitted to say anything about the Soviet Union that has not been checked in the White House. I regret that this happened and so does the President with whom I have taken this up personally.” Dobrynin thanked Kissinger for the call. (Ibid., Box 27, Dobrynin File)

On May 28, the President signed and sent the following memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence: “Until further notice any public statements or press guidance, on or off the record, dealing with the Soviet Union or the status of U.S.-Soviet relations will be cleared by the White House.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 284, Agency Files, Dept. of State, Vol. XII)

239. Letter From Senator Henry M. Jackson to Secretary of State Rogers


Dear Mr. Secretary:

Last December a Soviet court in Leningrad convicted ten Jews of attempting to hijack an airplane in an attempt to flee to Israel. Two of the accused received the death penalty and the others harsh sentences in labor camps.

The world response to these sentences was immediate and forceful. Public demonstrations and official expressions of concern were heard across the world. The Senate passed Resolution 501 expressing its concern and calling upon the President to convey that concern to the Soviet Union.

There is ample reason to believe that the effect of these actions on the Soviet Union was considerable: the death penalties were commuted and three trials involving 21 other Jews were indefinitely postponed. At the time it was reported that the new trials would not be held at all.

Now, in past weeks, these trials have been resumed. The alleged crimes of the defendants are vague and unspecified. The trials have been held in closed courts. No foreign press has been allowed to attend. Only very scant information on the trials has been published in the Soviet Union itself, and that is from official sources. Charges are heard of accusations and confessions that are denied by reports from close relatives of the defendants. Potential defense witnesses, many of whom have long requested permission to emigrate to Israel, have only now had their exit visa requests approved. The nature of these approvals and their timing was such as to make it impossible for the in-
individuals in question to appear as defense witnesses without losing their long sought opportunity to leave the Soviet Union. Other defense witnesses are simply not allowed access to the courtroom. Prosecution evidence consists of possession of material of Jewish cultural interest: Hebrew grammars, Jewish histories and the like.

The letter of Ruth Alexandrovich, whose trial began in Riga on Monday, May 24, is typical of the “confessions” heard in the Soviet courtroom:

“One after another, my friends are arrested and, evidently, it will soon be my turn. Of what am I guilty? I don’t know how the charge will be formulated and what statute will come to the minds of my accusers. . . . I shall be put on trial only because I am a Jewess and, as a Jewess, cannot imagine life for myself without Israel. My entire conscious existence has been tied with the Jewish State . . . I who was born in faraway Latvia, call Israel my homeland, because that country is the true homeland of the Jewish people and I have not ceased feeling myself as a part of it.”

This is the crime. This, and acting on these feelings by studying Jewish culture and history, and applying, according to Soviet and international legal procedures, for a visa to emigrate to Israel.

On December 29, 1970 the Senate expressed its grave concern over the injustices to which the Jewish population of the Soviet Union was then—and is now—subjected. At that time the Senate called upon the President to convey to the Soviet government the concern of the American people as expressed in Resolution 501.

The trials continue. The persecution continues. And the simple desire of many Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel continues despite the risks to life and liberty that the expression of that desire entails.

Once before the cruel persecution of an innocent people took place while the world stood by. It must not happen again. We as a government cannot remain silent. I strongly urge you to convey to the Soviet government the sense of outrage of the American people at the senseless and inhuman oppression of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union.3

Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Jackson

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3 Rogers asked David Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to reply on his behalf. In a June 14 letter, Abshire assured Jackson that the Department shared his concern for the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union and cited as evidence the statement Bray made on May 27. See Document 238.
240. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


[Omitted here is discussion of China and Europe, including talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.]

Kissinger: For them, Mr. President, after all, they [the Chinese] are revolutionaries. But you think of this peasant, former peasant, Mao, the Great March, and then the President of the United States comes to Peking at the end of his life. That’s—

Nixon: Well, that’s why this former peasant—Brezhnev has goddamn well got to decide whether he wants us to come or not. And—

Kissinger: I think they’re—Dobrynin again this morning talked about that trade deal, that $500 million trade deal.²

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: We just don’t have enough information to act on it.

Nixon: Well, he didn’t—but he didn’t raise the summit. He never raises it, does he?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: Well, he must have a reason, you know.

Kissinger: Well, no. They are very cute. They figure you’re very eager, so they figure they’re first going to make you pay on Berlin. Then they’re going to make you pay on trade and after that they give you the summit.

Nixon: What the hell are we going to talk about there?

Kissinger: But I think—well, we can have—we need the summit for a number of reasons. It will discipline them during SALT.

Nixon: Right. Well, we got—we need the summit for the reason of getting a deal on SALT.

Kissinger: That’s what I mean.

Nixon: If that fizzled, then we’ve got to hang.


² See Document 234.
Kissinger: And we can—

Nixon: Dobrynin said he’d let Semenov know that he’s not going to screw around on that final announcement?

Kissinger: Yeah. That’s right. Well, they always try to cut a little deal. He said, “Can’t we talk the first two weeks about ABM-only?” I said, “Anatol, let’s not horse around. If we want an agreement—you need some face-saving thing; you want to talk about ABM for a week. That’s one thing. But, essentially, it has to be concurrent. And if you read the letter, it says ‘to be discussed before,’ so we know what we have.” And I have tapes of conversations.

Nixon: Oh, I know. Yes. But anyway—

Kissinger: So what I think we should do is—it’s playing dangerously, it’s living dangerously, but that’s how you’ve got where you are in foreign policy and in other things too. The thing to do is to tell, in my view, is to tell Dobrynin in early June, “We’ve reviewed our, the state of relations. Things are now moving on a number of fronts. Either you can commit yourself now for a summit in September or we won’t have one this year.” He thought I’d heard—

Nixon: Will that appear too eager?

Kissinger: That’s less eager than just sitting there waiting for them. Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: And then we—and then, if they turn us down, Mr. President, then I would drag our feet on trade, on Berlin, for at least—yeah, I’d certainly, on trade, drag our feet. Otherwise, we’ll have given them almost everything they need, and they don’t need the summit any more.

Nixon: Well, we’re going to drag—trade? Hell, I’ll never sign another goddamn thing for them if they don’t do the summit.

Kissinger: My feeling, Mr. President, has been that I gave them an ultimatum on their exchange of letters.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Kissinger: [Llewellyn] Thompson would have had a heart attack.

Nixon: I know. And incidentally, we’re going to be—but can we still drag on Berlin if we have to?

Kissinger: Yeah. I just cabled to Rush: for Christ sakes, not to settle it too quickly.3

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Does he know this? You’re sure he understands it?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. For all these reasons, if—we should not let them control the pace of events, if you’re willing to forgo the summit in September.

3 See Document 230.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: But I think we—let's wait through the next week and see.
Nixon: If we don't have a summit at all with the Russians, to hell with them. You get a deal with the Chinese; we'll go to China earlier. Why not?
Kissinger: It also has the advantage that then we know where we stand.

[Omitted here is further discussion of China and domestic politics.]

241. Editorial Note

On May 14, 1971, less than two weeks after his dismissal of Vice President Ali Sabri, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat announced that he had arrested several pro-Soviet members of his cabinet, including the Minister of Interior and the Minister of War. Although the crisis was sparked by domestic politics, the men had opposed Sadat's attempts to secure American rather than Soviet support for his foreign policy, including negotiations for an interim settlement on the Suez Canal. Secretary of State William Rogers, who had recently returned from an eight-day trip to the region, assessed the situation in a May 16 memorandum for President Richard Nixon. While he found no evidence of intervention from Moscow, Rogers observed that the Soviets were clearly unhappy at the elimination of their supporters in Cairo. "[T]hey wield significant continuing influence on Sadat through his dependence upon them for arms and advisors," Rogers warned, "and they would undoubtedly use this leverage to prevent Sadat from going too far on an anti-Soviet course. Conceivably, the Soviets might also resort to military movements—such as by their Mediterranean fleet—to try to intimidate Sadat, but we have no evidence of this so far." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 637, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. VI [1 of 2])

During a meeting in the Oval Office at 9:05 a.m. on May 19, Nixon and Rogers discussed Egypt's efforts to steer a course between the two superpowers. Although he had already reported the results of his visit to Cairo by telegram (telegram 2660 from Tel Aviv, May 7; ibid., Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. II [2 of 3]), Rogers now briefed Nixon in more detail on his May 6 meeting with Sadat:

Rogers: "Now, Sadat is a very forceful man. He has a lot of strength. He is nationalistic as the devil. He probably is untrustworthy, so I don't want you to think that I'm trusting him."
Nixon: “Sure.”

Rogers: “But he has decided to—I am convinced—to change his position. He is determined to become closer to the West for economic and political reasons. He’s got a hell of a situation there. He’s spending his money on his arms; he knows his people can’t operate them, can’t fly the damn airplanes. He’s surrounded with Russians; he doesn’t like that very much. Now, what I wanted to say to you, and he told me this in private and then he told Joe [Sisco] the same thing—and he didn’t say it unequivocally; he said it as categorically as you possibly can. And I haven’t briefed, I haven’t told anybody at the State Department or anywhere else because it would be a disaster if we did—”

Nixon: “[If it] got out.”
Rogers: “He said, ‘I have to have the Soviet agreement.’”
Nixon: “Sure.”

Rogers: “It’s important for me to have the new agreement. You’re the only one who can help us get it—you, the United States.”
Nixon: “Hm-hmm.”

Rogers: “I don’t like the presence of the Russians. I am a nationalist but I have no way of defending our country—we had no way of defending our country—except to get Russian help. You wouldn’t give it to us; nobody else would. It’s costing me a lot of money. I’m paying the salaries of the Russians. I’m paying cash for the equipment I get.' And he said, ‘I want to give you this promise: that if we can work out an interim settlement—and it will take me six months to open the Canal—I promise you, I give you my personal assurance, that all the Russian ground troops will be out of my country at the end of six months. I will keep Russian pilots to train my pilots because that’s the only way my pilots can learn to fly. But insofar as the bulk of the Russians are concerned, the ten or twelve thousand, they will all be out of Egypt in six months, if we can make a deal.’”

Nixon: “On Suez?”
Rogers: “On the interim—Suez.”
Nixon: “‘Interim,’ means Suez in other words.”

Rogers: “Suez.”
Nixon: “I see.”
Rogers: “The final peace agreement is—”
Nixon: “[unclear]”

Rogers: “—[unclear] The interim is—we’re talking about the Suez Canal. Now—and I said, ‘Well, Mr. President, you know, based on that, we may be able to work it out.’ I said, ‘The complicating factor is the Russian—the presence of the Russians troops. If you can assure us that they’ll be out in six months, that makes our problem a lot easier.’ I said, ‘You tell us that we shouldn’t be so pro-Israeli. We have to be sup-
portive of Israel’s position because you got the Russians here in large numbers.’ I said, ‘For as much as we would like to be friendly as hell with you, we can’t as long as you have this number of Russians here. You might as well realize that.’ I said, ‘We have to supply Israel with arms as long as you’ve got a large number of Russian troops in your country. On the other hand, once that is not the case, once they’ve left, or most of them, it’s a different ballgame.’”

According to Rogers, Sadat had also decided to communicate with Washington outside normal channels, using Mohammed Heikal, editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Al Ahram*, as an intermediary. Rogers was optimistic about the outcome of his meeting with Sadat, telling Nixon: “I think it is possible, if he stays in power, that we can make a breakthrough here that will have tremendous importance.” He added: “If we could pull it off, it will be a step toward peace that no one thought was possible.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 501–4) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

The President followed up on this conversation in an “eyes only” memorandum to the Secretary on May 26. After placing his views in historical perspective, Nixon declared that politics would not determine his decisions on the Middle East. The United States would maintain “a totally even-handed policy” in the region, tilting toward Israel only when Soviet influence in Egypt was “particularly strong.” Nixon summarized his position as follows:

“I am convinced that unless we get some kind of a settlement now with the Israelis on the Suez or some other issue, we aren’t going to get any kind of settlement until after the ’72 elections. By that time, even though the Israelis don’t think this can happen, the Soviet will have had no other choice but to build up the armed strength of Israel’s neighbors to the point that another Mideast war will be inevitable. As far as Sadat is concerned, he obviously does not want to have a Soviet presence in Egypt. On the other hand, if his policy of conciliation fails, he will either have to go along with a new program of accepting Soviet aid or lose his head, either politically or physically.”

Nixon instructed Rogers to act accordingly, expanding his leading role in the implementation of U.S. policy in the Middle East:

“I do not want you to report to me on the day-to-day negotiations you undertake. Just keep me posted when a major decision has been made. You can also have in mind that by my being somewhat detached from the negotiating procedure you will have me in a position where when the time is ripe I may be able to be the ‘persuader’ in getting Israel to accept what is a reasonable settlement and one which is in the interest of the United States.” (Ibid., RG 59, Entry 5439, Rogers’ Office Files: Lot 73 D 443, Box 25, WPR–President Nixon)
Few analysts in Washington expected a major decision in Cairo the next day. On May 27—after 3 days of secret negotiations—Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Under the terms of the treaty, the two sides agreed to hold regular consultations or in the event of an imminent threat to peace to “immediately contact one another in the interests of removing the threat that has developed or restoring the peace.” (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XXIII, No. 21 (June 22, 1971), pages 2–4) Before Rogers could report to Nixon, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco called Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger at 11:10 a.m. on May 28 to provide his preliminary analysis of the treaty:

“S: The first part’s obviously legal [omission in transcript] around arrangements which are very political and psychologically true in the area. It assures long-range support—political, economic and military over next 15 years. Undoubtedly Soviet initiated due to the internal events in Egypt and to keep them from making overtures to the U.S. I think it will cause waves in other countries in which they hope the influence without treaty will be increased.

“K: What do you mean?

“S: In countries like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, etc. they may make overtures to the United States if they do not have a treaty with the Soviet Union.

“K: Loosen their ties.

“S: Yes. These are countries which are on our side of the fence anyway. Now where this leaves Sadat. Gives pledge that they will not be involved in the internal affairs and an ex post facto changes made by Sadat are OK with the Russians. There is a firm commitment to consultation with the Egyptian Government. There is an overall packet on consultation. From Sadat’s point of view it eases his pressure on the military. The military is dependent on the Soviets and if he has an agreement with the Soviets that solves the army question. This will leave Sadat with as much or as little influence as he had before.”

After assessing the impact on Israel, Sisco commented on the implications of the treaty for Moscow: “We will see not so much change on substance—just manifest procedurally because Russians want to be in if there is any settlement. The Russians are saying to us that nothing will happen unless we get in.” The two men then briefly discussed the element of surprise in Soviet diplomacy:

“S: This thing looks like it is a Soviet draft. It has been concocted in a hurry.

“K: It seems to have been happening often lately.

“S: We had no advance warning that this was coming. It could be we have lousy intelligence or—
“K: It couldn’t be true!!

“S: Or the Russians drafted it and we knew nothing about it. There is no such treaty in existence in other places. In quick capsule form this is a political move to protect their major commitment in that area and they are putting the rest of the world on notice that they plan to be there for a good long time to come.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

Rogers forwarded this preliminary analysis in a memorandum for the President drafted by Sisco that afternoon. On May 31, Kissinger summarized for Nixon the main points not only of Rogers’ memorandum but also of the treaty itself. Kissinger, however, offered an alternative analysis in his memorandum:

“The Egyptian army is dependent on Soviet support. In turn, Sadat is at the moment dependent on his military for his base of power, having purged the party and the bureaucracy. Rather than strengthening Sadat’s flexibility with respect to negotiating the Canal settlement, the treaty could give the Soviet Union a veto over the future negotiations. Thus, whatever the outcome of the negotiations—and after all the Soviets are the chief beneficiaries of a Suez settlement—recent events may have enhanced Soviet long-term influence. Certainly the Soviets are committed to engage themselves as never before in case of resumption of hostilities.”

The President noted this passage and wrote the following instructions in the margin: “K—We must not allow this to be a pretext for escalation of arms to Israel. We should act only in response to incontrovertible evidence of a Soviet military aid which we evaluate as significantly changing the balance of power.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. II [2 of 3])

The Egyptian President, meanwhile, sought to reassure the United States about the Soviet role in his country’s affairs. On May 30, Sadat summoned Donald C. Bergus, head of the U.S. Interests Section in Cairo, to convey a personal message to Nixon and Rogers. In a June 3 memorandum, Kissinger briefed Nixon on the main points of Sadat’s message. According to Kissinger, Sadat told Bergus that the Soviet-Egyptian treaty was “nothing new; it merely set forth the shape of the existing relationship.” Kissinger also reported that Sadat promised that Soviet military personnel would leave Egypt “as soon as the first phase agreement (presumably Canal settlement) was reached.” After reading the memorandum, Nixon approved the Department’s instructions for Bergus to deliver Sadat’s message to Rogers in Lisbon (where he was attending a NATO Ministerial meeting) but to warn the Egyptians beforehand that any publicity “would be interpreted by the American public as a Soviet effort” to pressure the United States. (Ibid.)
242. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Export of Gleason Machinery to the Soviet Union

Secretary Stans has written to ask that you send him formal notification of the decision to issue an export license to the Gleason Company for the sale of truck manufacturing machinery to the USSR. This should be done promptly so Commerce can in fact issue the license.

I assume that the decision has already been made by the President, but I have nevertheless drawn up a memorandum to him in case you believe it necessary. I also presume that you see no need for any prior notification to Secretary Laird.

In line with your telephone request, Secretary Stans has also proposed that further licenses be authorized for the export to the Soviet Union of $64 million of truck manufacturing equipment for various projects other than the Kama River truck project. He considers these the least strategic of the pending license applications. You had asked him for a proposal for $40 million, but he argues that there is no rational basis for subdividing the $64 million, since the equipment is all so similar and so close to that covered by the Gleason application.

I believe that Secretary Stans’ request is reasonable, but I have nevertheless asked Commerce to come back with some proposal for differentiation within the $64 million, in case you believe that the $40 million is an absolute limit. You could now approve the entire $64 million, or you could await the differentiated package and then decide.

Formal notification on the Gleason case should not wait, however, since Gleason has already lost part of the sales because the Soviets were tired of waiting. An additional reason for moving fast is that the matter will shortly leak. Governor Rockefeller has already called the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, The Gleason Case. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt. Haig initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.

2 Attached but not printed is a May 26 memorandum from Stans to Kissinger.

3 See Document 230.
Gleason Company and claimed some credit for the decision, and he will undoubtedly talk to others.4

As a result of your telephone call to Peterson, he now believes that the current decisions fit in well with the small group you and he decided to establish to look at a possible scenario on further relaxation of the trade controls. (See Peterson's note at Tab IV.)5 I am working closely with the group.

Recommendations

1. That you send to the President the memorandum at Tab I, or if that is unnecessary, that you sign the memorandum to Stans at Tab II informing him that he may issue the Gleason license.

2. That you inform Secretary Stans he may issue licenses for $64 million in truck manufacturing equipment, which you may do by signing the memorandum at Tab III (rather than the one at Tab II) approving both the Gleason case as well as the $64 million.6

Approve
Disapprove, prefer to await the Commerce breakdown before deciding this issue.

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4 Kissinger called Rockefeller at 2:40 p.m. on May 25 to report the approval of the permits for Gleason Gear Company, located in Rochester, New York, to sell trucks to the Soviet Union. The conversation included the following exchange: “K: I thought you might want to call them and take the credit for it. R: Aren’t you nice. K: Could you wait until tomorrow morning? I have told no one here yet. We will tell them this afternoon. I thought maybe you want to call and say because of your intervention this was approved or whatever you want to say. R: You are great. My friend Henry did it again.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

5 Attached but not printed is an undated note from Peterson to Kissinger.

6 Tabs I–III are attached but not printed. Rather than forward the draft to the President, Kissinger approved on his behalf the memorandum to Stans attached at Tab III. The text of the memorandum, dated May 28, is as follows: “The President has reconsidered his previous decision and has now decided to approve the application by the Gleason Company for the export of gear making machines for truck manufacture to the Soviet Union. You may also approve the additional pending applications for export of $64 million of truck manufacturing facilities not related to the Kama River Project.” According to an attached correspondence profile, the memorandum was “temporarily held, but released by Gen. Haig, PM, 1 June & hand carried.” See Document 248.
243. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹


[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics and Vietnam.]

Kissinger: When the Russians want to, they can certainly move fast.² I called Dobrynin yesterday morning and said that, “Look, you don’t want to end this on a sour note.” And we had a cable from Sem—from Smith saying that Semenov took him aside at the beginning of [unclear] Smith.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: Kishilov told Garthoff—that’s our guy—after the meeting that the Soviet statement had been changed as a result of your talking with Dobrynin, and gave Garthoff to understand that the Soviet Delegation had not been happy. Well, I talked to Dobrynin—

Nixon: Well, you know, it’s quite an arrogant establishment too—

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: —just like there is in ours. Their guys probably play a tougher line.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: That may be that Dobrynin and Brezhnev would throw them down the line—throw them down the well. It’s good.

Kissinger: He did just what we asked him to. I told—I called him at 10:30 in the morning. He called me at 6:30 and said the instructions have been issued. Smith—I didn’t tell Smith what the instruction was but they told him to omit any interpretation of the statement; just stand on the statement.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: With Smith, now, it’s not a concession that means a hell of a lot, except it shows how much importance they attach—

Nixon: Maybe—

Kissinger: —to your channel.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 505–18. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Nixon in the Oval Office from 9:50 to 11 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

² See Document 234.
Nixon: Maybe it shows that they’re—we’ll find out if they’re going to deal on anything else.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, the President’s schedule, and China. During this period, the President also met with Representative William O. Mills (R–Maryland), who entered the Oval Office at 10:07 and left at 10:20 a.m.]

Kissinger: And if the thing works right, Mr. President—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —we may be able to announce the Peking visit by the middle of August.
Nixon: Oh, yeah. Oh, yes. I know. I know. You’re—
Kissinger: Because I—after they talked like this—
Nixon: If we get any, Henry, if we get the kind of breaks to—and that’s the way we—but you see, that’s what I mean: where you’ve got to have the word from Dobrynin first in the event you do meet them. If Dobrynin does not come forth on the summit, the Peking visit’s going to come forth this fall.
Kissinger: Yes.
Nixon: Period.
Kissinger: Well, that’s why we—
Nixon: What the hell? Why not? Let’s go there and talk about anything, even though they don’t agree with us on Vietnam. In fact, we could go there and I’ll repeat it at the Russian summit.
Kissinger: Well, you have to decide what’s worth more to you: the announcement of a visit, and then the anticipation of it; or whether you want to actually have the visit this year, which would be a very dramatic turnaround.
Nixon: Just as long as I have the visit. Again: one or the other.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Let me put it this way: don’t wait. Next year is a political year. Everything will be cast in a political connotation. Everything we do.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: It is not good, therefore—and also, if you get into next year, nothing can occur after July 1st, when the Democrats nominate. Because after that time, all the goddamn press will insist that the Democratic candidate had to go along. You understand?
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: That’s the other problem.
Kissinger: That’s—
Nixon: Or his adviser will want to go along. Now, Johnson didn’t do that. The son-of-a-bitch didn’t tell me about the bombing pause, ex-
cept on the telephone. Nevertheless, that’s what they’re going to say. So, therefore, all of our foreign policy initiatives have to be completed by the 1st of July. There ain’t nothin’ else that could be done.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: You see what I mean?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: So there’s our—there’s the deal. That’s why, Henry, what we’ve got to think of: I prefer a Russian summit this year, and a Chinese next year. But it would have to be in the spring.

Kissinger: Oh, yes. Absolutely in the spring.

Nixon: Not in July. You see, beginning—

Kissinger: Oh, no. April or so—or May, or whenever you want it.


Kissinger: Or March.

Nixon: What I’m getting at is, the further away from the election—

Kissinger: Sure.

Nixon: You know how these damn bastards react to everything. Even now, they say it’s all political. Now, that doesn’t bother me particularly, except that, as you get to the point where they have selected a candidate, or where it’s quite obvious there’s going to be one, the pressure is going to be enormous.

Kissinger: But we don’t—

Nixon: They never did that when I was running, but they will do it.

Kissinger: We don’t have to make the decision now. The one advantage of having something like it happening in—apparently, as I got it from that Harvard professor—

Nixon: Something. Where we—

Kissinger: You see, if you were—

Nixon: But you can’t tell—he’s, that’s just a lower-level person.

Kissinger: Yeah, but the Chinese wouldn’t dare to speak—

Nixon: If you think so.

Kissinger: —like this without instruction.

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3 As Kissinger later recalled: “On May 26 an old colleague from Harvard called up to say excitedly that he had been in Ottawa the day before and that members of the newly established Chinese mission there had complained that President Nixon had been invited to China but would not come.” (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 726) A transcript of the telephone conversation between Kissinger and his “old colleague”—Professor Jerome Cohen—is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File.
Nixon: Maybe they’re lying.
Kissinger: No, they wouldn’t do that. No, assuming—I don’t want to draw too many conclusions, because we’ll get our answer within two weeks—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —but they obviously don’t want to have opposition people come to Peking before you’ve been there. And—
Nixon: They may just announce a couple of opposition people, doing it just to be screwing with me.
Kissinger: Yeah, but if a summit were announced, in the interval between its announcement and your going there, they don’t want to irritate you, I think. Well, let’s see what Dobrynin brings back. I’m going to give him the ultimatum very shortly and tell him if it isn’t now, we can’t do it this year. That’s the only way they’ll believe it. I cannot—if I just ask him for an answer—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —then we’ll look like plead—it’d look like pleading and nervousness. If I tell him it’s now or never—so far, brutality has been the only—and daring, gambling have been—
Nixon: Just put it—you have to put it on the basis that our—“The President has got varying constituencies, you know.”
Kissinger: I said we just will not be in the position—
Nixon: “He can’t be in the position. He’s filling it out for the balance of the year—state visits, and so forth and so on,” and—
Kissinger: “And we just won’t let you play this game. You know as much now as you’re going to know from us. And if you can’t make up your mind, then let’s wait for a time when you can make up your mind, which cannot, then, be this year.” That’s—that language, he’ll understand.
Nixon: Then—
Kissinger: It has a lot of advantages, because if—
Nixon: It may be that you ought to have both do it now—it may be that—actually, the best of both worlds would be to have the China card in your pocket before the—
Kissinger: That’s why I hope—that would be—
Nixon: But you aren’t going to get that this week. You aren’t going to get the message?
Kissinger: No, the Chinese will wait two weeks. That’s their system, Mr. President. There’s just no way they—
Haldeman: Has it been one week?
Kissinger: Nineteenth, twenty-sixth, it could happen next week. It could happen by the end of next week. Very soon next week.
[Omitted here is further discussion of China and domestic politics.]

Kissinger: You know, I proposed to Dobrynin yesterday that Semenov come over here—

Nixon: Oh, what’d he say about that?

Kissinger: —and sign the hot line agreement. And he said he thought that was a good idea. Now, of course, the hot line agreement doesn’t mean a damn thing, but everyone will figure—

Nixon: For accidental war, you mean?

Kissinger: No, the accidental war, I—

Nixon: Well, the hot line we’ve already got. Is it a new one?

Kissinger: No, no. But we’ve got a new one via satellite.

Nixon: Oh, I see.

Kissinger: And—

Haldeman: Is it hot or not?

Kissinger: No. Dobrynin—this, incidentally, is interesting—Dobrynin said, “Why don’t we keep the accidental war for a possible higher-level meeting?”

Nixon: Good. We need something. I couldn’t agree more.

Kissinger: Because just in case there is no SALT agreement, we’ve got that.

Haldeman: We got that.

Kissinger: And as far as the public is concerned, they figure if the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister comes over here to sign anything on arms control—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: —it must mean that things are going on.

Haldeman: That’s right. It would—it doesn’t matter at all what you’re signing, if you’re signing something.

Kissinger: They don’t know the difference between—

Nixon: Well, they don’t even know what this statement was we made last week.4

Haldeman: That’s right.

Nixon: They just don’t know.

Haldeman: That’s right. They don’t.

Nixon: Most people are confused as hell.

Haldeman: I’ve done—

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4 See Document 225.
Nixon: The intelligent people that I run into—
Haldeman: They don’t—
Nixon: You know, I talked to—you know, when I went out there and was talking to people on that plane while going to the Johnson thing, and they asked me, I mean, and I don’t know what it was. You know, a lot of them didn’t get the idea that—first, they missed that it was a Presidential initiative. The first couple days, apparently, it didn’t get across. Well, I—apparently, it got across in the Senate, because we got [it] across later. You see, they missed the idea that it was mutual. But now, I think both those things are getting across.

Kissinger: Also, you know, little straws in the window. At the Kennedy Center yesterday, Dobrynin was there with Tommy Thompson.
Nixon: Oh.
Kissinger: And when he saw me, he came dashing across the hall, and he said, “Henry”—Thompson was trailing behind him—and he said, “Henry, just let me know when you go back to the office, because I can’t have you in the office and me here. You’ll get too far ahead of me.” And—

Haldeman: [laughs]
Kissinger: And Thompson [laughs] said to me, “God, you really have some relationship with Dobrynin.” Well, I don’t kid myself. I have no relationship with Dobrynin as an individual—
Nixon: Right. No. Thompson is naive to think that a relationship is what does it. You do have a relationship—
Kissinger: It’s because of you.
Nixon: —the reason is that the relationship is at the summit.
Kissinger: They want you—
Nixon: It’s the summit.
Kissinger: —a relationship with you.
Nixon: The reason that Henry’s got us into some—now, Bill, actually and Bill—well, frankly, let’s put it another way: if it were Elliott Richardson, rather than Rogers, we could use Richardson with a lot of this stuff.
Kissinger: A lot of it. Or—
Nixon: But you cannot use him now, because—you cannot use Rogers, because Rogers, he’s got to go back and debrief the goddamn State Department. And some of this stuff, too—

5 See footnote 2, Document 231.
6 Reference is to the grand opening the previous evening of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.
Kissinger: And he—
Nixon: —I don’t think he really understands.
Kissinger: He doesn’t understand.
Nixon: You agree? Do you?
Kissinger: He’s too impatient.
Nixon: He’s too—
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: —gullible. He thinks, “Well, let’s go out and make the deal.” “Well, if we could do this or we can do that.” You know? Or, “Can’t we even say this much or do—?”
Haldeman: Is this whole string—?
Nixon: What he’s really, Bob—
Haldeman: Just play it out.
Nixon: You know, Bob, the main thing with Bill is that he’s just panting to get into the news. The man—but coming back to the whole thing, do you not agree with me that it’s just as well to let Rogers make the announcement, then when we—that is, when we move to do China?
Kissinger: Well, let’s see. I—basically, yes.
Nixon: What do you think, Bob?
Haldeman: Domestically, I think it very much is, because I think it’s one that ain’t going to do you any good.
Kissinger: And also—
Nixon: Despite the polls.
Kissinger: —quite honestly, Mr. President, it will help us with the Russians.
Nixon: Yeah.
[Omitted here is further discussion of China, Vietnam, and domestic politics.]
Nixon: We got to milk the publicity out of every achievement. And everything has got to be a Presidential initiative. Now, as far as Berlin is concerned, we did it. And we’re going to—
Kissinger: We’ve got to leak that, because, really, that is a—
Nixon: Well—
Kissinger: —it sounds as if—
Nixon: When will it come?
Kissinger: It’s moving. Now, we can—I’m slowing it down a little bit—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —just to get the summit.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.
Kissinger: July, I think.
Nixon: All right. That’s got to be a Presidential initiative too. I might announce it.
Kissinger: You may get credit, Mr. President. I set up that procedure, on your instructions, on an airplane. I got Bahr invited to the moon shot in January—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —so that I’d have an excuse to see him.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: I rode up on a plane with him to New York, and we worked out that whole procedure. And we’ve got a file this thick—
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: —of backchannel traffic to Bahr and Rush.
Nixon: Right. Yeah.
Kissinger: And the Russians—
Nixon: It’s a hell of a job. I know.
Kissinger: And, actually, that was a trickier one, because we had another party involved, than—
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: —than SALT. And that—
Nixon: It’s a hell of a job.
Kissinger: Now, if that happens in July, we can say they had a Berlin crisis and we solved it.
Nixon: [unclear]
Haldeman: They had an escalating war and we brought it down. They had a missile—
Kissinger: The Berlin thing—actually, and the way it—
Nixon: The Berlin thing is really more important, really, in terms of world peace, than either the Mideast or—I mean, in order of magnitude, the least important is Vietnam. It never, never, never has risked world war.
Haldeman: Right.
Nixon: You know that. Hell, we all know that. I mean, I’ve been making that speech for 20—for 10 years. You know it’s true. China’s going to intervene? Russia’s going to intervene? None of them will ever intervene. Second, the next is the Mideast. That has the elements that could involve the major powers, because it’s important. But, compared in the order of magnitude, the Mideast to Berlin, Christ, it’s light-years difference. Berlin is it. Shit, if anything happens in Berlin, then you’re at it, right?
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: That’s why Berlin is so enormous, and also—
Kissinger: And—
Nixon: —it’s more important to the Russians.
Kissinger: And, what we—
Nixon: The Russians will let—they’d let Egypt go down the tubes. They will never let Berlin go down the tubes.
Kissinger: And we got a number of very significant concessions out of them. For example, they had always insisted that we call—these are minor things—that we describe in the document—
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Kissinger: —Berlin as “Berlin (West).” We’ve insisted that they say, “The Western sectors of Berlin,” so that it shows—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —that, the Four Power responsibility. They’ve now accepted this.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: Secondly, which is more important: They had insisted all along on legal justifications that gave East Germany control over access.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: They’ve now accepted legal formulations in which they have a responsibility for access, which they never did even in the ’40s. That’s more than Truman or Roosevelt got out of them.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: And, under those conditions, the Berlin agreement—which I always told you, we had to cut our losses—will actually be a small net plus on the ground. I would like to call Dobrynin to discourage him from—he’s going over to State today—from mentioning a Foreign Ministers meeting on Berlin.
Nixon: Foreign Ministers?
Kissinger: Because—
Nixon: Now, Bill didn’t raise this point at his crazy meeting with—
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: He’s—well, he can—
Kissinger: He can’t float it. It’s too complicated—
Nixon: Oh, it’s the silliest thing I ever heard of. Gromyko?
Kissinger: I think if there are high-level meetings, Mr. President, for this year and next, they ought to be yours.

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the President’s schedule.]
244. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, May 28, 1971, 11 a.m.

D: Good morning. You are just now getting back from yesterday’s Kennedy party?
K: As soon as I heard from the Secret Service that you left I got there. It was a nice party.
D: I left just after Kennedy arrived to go to the next affair.
K: I stayed until one as your agents no doubt told you.
D: I know this myself.
K: I have two or three things I wanted to go over with you. I had a cable from Smith who said it worked out very well.² Semenov carried out his instructions and didn’t ask for any interpretations at all so Smith took out one sentence which asked for interpretation. Said he was not given any interpretations so we took ours.
D: Do you see how easy it is to make our two boys there happy?
K: Smith says that a junior member of your delegation, Kikilov (phonetic) [Kishilov], said he was not happy about having to change the interpretation. He said it to one of our junior delegates³ who didn’t know anything.
D: He probably did not have instructions. I received a telegram that said no interpretations were to be given. Otherwise no one will specifically look what he is saying.
K: I told the President about the exchange and he was very pleased.
Second, the foreign ministers idea you raised with me yesterday.⁴
D: You mean on . . .
K: Berlin. If you could avoid raising it any place else because the President is very much opposed to it.
D: OK.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.
² The May 28 backchannel message from Smith to Kissinger is ibid., NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, SALT, 1971.
³ Garthoff.
⁴ See Document 234. Dobrynin first raised the proposal of a Foreign Ministers meeting on Berlin during his meeting with Kissinger on May 24. See Document 229.
K: Thirdly, clarification on these items for licensing. We are approving $64 million rather than the $40 million we talked about yesterday.

D: Machine?

K: For truck manufacturing tools other than for Kama River project which will not be included in this.

D: Kama River, you say.

K: Is not included in this decision. We took that out and decided the other things rather than have them piddling out.

D: $65 million is the $40 million you mentioned to me yesterday?

K: Yes. We are approving all the Gleason plus the [omission in transcript] for machine tools. This clears the books except for the big one which we will treat separately as I told you.

D: Thank you.

K: Good and we will be in touch.

D: Of course.

245. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Soviet Cruise Missile Submarine in Cuban Post

Good U–2 photography shows that the submarine in the Cuban port of Antilla is a E–II class: that is, a nuclear-powered, cruise missile sub with 8 tubes of 250 mile range. Previous reporting from sightings in the Atlantic had suggested that the submarine going to Cuba along with the tender would be a F–Class diesel, attack submarine. The E–II is tied up along side the submarine tender.

What does it mean?

First of all, there has been a similar E–II class in Cuban ports, including Cienfuegos in May 1970. But, of course, this is the first offensive missile submarine in Cuban waters or ports since the imbroglio of last fall.

Second, this time it was announced as a visit of a “submarine” to “replenish stocks.” This comes awfully close to saying that it is being “serviced” from Cuba.

It has not yet gone to Cienfuegos so technically the Soviets may feel that they are skirting the “naval base” issues. Moreover, the E–II is an in-between type which the Soviets may consider useful for feeling our tolerance.

It could be:

—that this is the pound of flesh that Brezhnev has had to pay the military for his recent SALT agreement;

—it could be another round of tit for tat, in view of our demonstration in the Baltic, which the Soviet press picked up and attacked;²

—the Soviets may be engaged in their time-honored habit of using the détente surrounding SALT to garner some benefits on the side.

In any case, it will probably become public, and stir up again the whole question of what, exactly, is the nature of the understanding with the Soviets.

Washington, May 28, 1971, 5:50 p.m.

H: Happy Birthday.²
K: Thank you.
H: That’s what I was calling about . . .
K: I appreciate it. I had a question: Are you sure the Soviet submarine is nuclear powered?³
H: No, I am not. We had a conversation about that yesterday. It is not clear what that submarine is. TASS has made an announcement to the effect that it’s going to be there.⁴
K: But if it’s nuclear powered and cruise missile . . .
H: It’s okay.
K: Well, technically, but I would then let Dobrynin know that they are getting to the limit of the understanding and it’s a hell of a time to annoy us. But if it’s a diesel submarine it’s okay. We haven’t even heard that it might be a Y-Class submarine.
H: It might be some kind of communication link between two things. But it was too inconclusive and couldn’t be proven.
K: Can you find out for me as fast as possible if it is nuclear-powered with cruise-type missiles?
H: I don’t know if I can . . .
K: It’s supposed to be an #–2 [E–2] type submarine.
H: I’ll check on that.
K: Would you and give me the best judgment of your people?⁵

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923, in Fürth, Germany.
3 See Document 245.
4 See footnote 2, Document 228.
5 Helms called Kissinger back at 5:55 p.m.: “H: You had more information than I had faster than I did. It is an E–2, nuclear powered, with cruise missiles. There was a photo taken. K: That you are sure about? H: Yes, no question. You’re on good grounds. K: It’s on the margin of the understanding.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)
Washington, May 28, 1971, 6:05 p.m.

K: Anatoliy, I am unhappily calling you about the matter we discussed a week ago today. I gave you the wrong information about the submarine. I told you at the time we thought the submarine was a diesel. You told me nuclear subs were under the control of the Politburo.

D: It was announced as a submarine without telling what . . .

K: I wanted to inform you there is a submarine tied up together with the tender. It is nuclear-powered and has 8 missiles on it of the 250–300 mile range.

D: That was not a condition of a “visit.”

K: The understanding—as we understand it—is servicing of nuclear submarines and submarines carrying offensive weapons in or from Cuban ports.

D: What servicing? In what way are they servicing?

K: If a submarine is there independently—but it is tied up with the tender. We will not debate it, but at the best, it is at the very edge of the understanding. I wanted to point out that our information last Friday was not good.

D: I don’t have any information except what was published in our press.

K: The appearance of a nuclear submarine with missiles of a 300-mile range and tied up with the tender is . . . You can have no doubt how gravely we would consider violations of the understanding. Whether this is a violation we don’t have to debate now, and we will not make any public statement for the time being.

D: The understanding in Moscow is that a visit which is published beforehand . . .

K: It’s a combination of the visit of the nuclear submarine and the tender and those two being together is a very unfortunate incident.

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1 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.
2 See Document 228.
3 May 21.
4 See footnote 2, Document 228.
D: I will transmit that you say this is unfortunate. As it was announced, I don’t know whether they do anything about it.
K: I am not asking for anything in particular.
D: I will send to Moscow what you say.
K: There is nothing else to do for the time being.
D: I will send right away a telegram—with missiles.
K: With missiles with a range of some 300 miles. They are not ballistic but the other missiles.
D: The small ones.
K: Like the German V–1.
D: Not long-distance.
K: They are 300 miles—when it becomes a violation of the understanding, it will be a first-class crisis.
D: In Moscow, the understanding is that if it were announced.
K: I told you last week we thought it was diesel. I have to point this out now as a matter we have to consider unfortunate.
D: I will send a telegram on what you mentioned to me for their own information.

248. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Commerce Stans and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 28, 1971, 6:25 p.m.

S: Henry, on these permits to ship to Russia?²
K: What we would like is some noticeable foot dragging. The Russians have done something which is a cheap shot³ and I would like to harass them for a week or so. Is there some way we can slow up the permit without actually withdrawing it?
S: I just wanted you to know that our procedure is that we notify the companies involved immediately, then we notify the Senators. Also

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking.
² See Document 242.
³ See Document 247.
we got word that Rockefeller had gotten the word from Dr. Kissinger. 4
What would you think of issuing one or two, then waiting three or
four days and issue several more a few days later and so on.

K: I would like to drag it out a couple of weeks. Let the Gleason
one go and then drag the rest out a couple of weeks bureaucratically.
It would be a big help if you could drag it out for a few weeks. I have
your interests at heart but we want you to teach them discipline at the
start of this thing. Sorry I am such a son-of-a-bitch.

S: It’s alright Henry. We will do it your way.

4 See footnote 4, Document 242.

249. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1


[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the President’s schedule and
of Kissinger’s plans for secret talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris.]

Kissinger: Now, I had a cable from—
Nixon: Rush.

Kissinger: —from Rush. 2 And [laughs] we are in the ridiculous po-

tion, Mr. President, that—
Nixon: Yeah. What did he want?

Kissinger: —the Berlin talks are going so well that we may not be
able to slow them down enough. I think we’ll have the Berlin agree-
ment, unless there’s a snag, by the middle of July, which makes it im-
perative that I talk to Dobrynin and tell him—
Nixon: Yes.

Kissinger: —“This is it, now.” And actually the Russians are mak-
ing two-thirds of the concessions.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Con-

versation 507–4. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the
tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s
Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 9:08 to 10:32 a.m. (Ibid. White
House Central Files)

2 See Document 230.
Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, if we get Semenov over here to sign the hot line agreement—it doesn’t mean a goddamn thing. It just—
Nixon: It helps.
Kissinger: It helps. If—the Berlin thing is going to break—
Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —in the next two or three weeks.
Nixon: I think that what we’ve got to figure, in the least, is that we get those two. But, on the other hand, the Berlin—can we keep Berlin from breaking if they don’t agree to a summit?

Kissinger: Well, I’m going to give him [Dobrynin] an ultimatum on the summit a week from Monday.3 The next—
Nixon: It might work but I’m just asking, in order to go, whether we can mess it up.
Kissinger: Yeah. We can keep it—
Nixon: You see?
Kissinger: —we can keep it from breaking.
Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: We have to be bastards but we just—
Nixon: All right. We’ll be bastards. That’s right. Just say the President—all right, and when he gets to that say, “We’re not going to agree to Berlin. It’s up to you.”

Kissinger: The next time they’re going to meet is on June 4th. And that’s mostly technical stuff.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: Then Brandt and Rush are going to come over here.
Nixon: Then we see Brandt?
Kissinger: And we see Brandt. And before Brandt gets here, I’m going to tell Dobrynin, “That’s it now. We’ve horsed around long enough.”
Nixon: We have.
Kissinger: “We have to make our basic decisions.” The only thing is, the only way we’ll make it plausible is to say, “If you reject it now, that’s it for this year.” That’s the one thing—
Nixon: The submarine that’s in Cuba is not nuclear, is it?
Kissinger: It is nuclear.

3 June 7.
Nixon: Huh?
Kissinger: It is a nuclear-powered submarine. It doesn’t have missiles on it. It’s one of these cheap gangster shots. At first, I thought it wasn’t nuclear.
Haldeman: Did you know it wasn’t?
Kissinger: No, that was another conversation. No, it is nuclear.
Nixon: Hmm. Is that right?
Kissinger: That’s what I found out yesterday.
Nixon: I read something incorrectly.
Kissinger: No, that’s right. He told me it wasn’t.4
Nixon: I told him that although the submarines were not nuclear—
Kissinger: Yeah. Our information was wrong.
Nixon: —there was a submarine at a base in Matanzas.
Kissinger: And I corrected that. I called him back and said that—
Nixon: [unclear] All right.
Kissinger: —we had gotten new photography, and it was nuclear.
Nixon: Yeah. So?
Kissinger: Well, he says they announced it. It’s at the very edge of the understanding. It’s just at the edge of it. And they’re not in Cienfuegos. It’s a gangster thing to do. And I think if it comes up in the press conference, as it may because now the word will get out, I wouldn’t get into the question of whether it violated the understanding.5 But I’d be very tough on what we’re—
Nixon: I’d just say, “There is an understanding and we expect it to be complied with. The Soviets are quite aware of it,” and let it go with that.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: And that I—
Kissinger: I won’t comment on every single trip—
Nixon: “I’m not going to comment on it. The Soviets are quite aware.”
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Is that enigmatic as hell?
Kissinger: Much better.

[Omitted here is discussion of China and Vietnam.]

4 Reference is probably to Kissinger’s telephone conversation with Helms. See Document 246.
5 The presence of the Soviet submarine in Cuban waters was not raised at the President’s press conference on June 1; see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 688–697.
Nixon: The problem here, though, with the Russians and the Chinese, what really helps us, is that they have an enormous problem between each other. They try to cut us, our balls off, and here we are—

Kissinger: I think they’ve never had as tough an opponent in here as you’ve turned out to be.

Nixon: Hm-hmm. In a minute here you’ve got to give [Senator Strom] Thurmond a call, right? And have, I mean, the Russian line that we had agreed to quit, to give up ABM before we have an offensive limitation. But it’s rather awkward language of the communiqué to have at all.6

Kissinger: It says, “Together with.”

Nixon: “Together with.” Goodness, if—are these people stupid up there, though? We say, “We shall concentrate this year on negotiating—”

Kissinger: But, of course—

Nixon: “—an ABM agreement.” And then, it goes on in the next sentence—

Kissinger: “Together with, we will agree on—”

Nixon: “Together with this, we will agree with that.” You see? That’s all we have to do: say, “Look, you’re off-base, Senator.”

Kissinger: They are—but what is happening is, Mr. President, I really think that the Communists are beginning to dominate some of our media. Six weeks ago, they were—

Nixon: On that, I agree with you.

Kissinger: Because now—

Nixon: I’ve been saying that for years.

Kissinger: I saw a New Republic article in which they castigated you for the SALT thing because you maintained the relationship between offensive and defensive limitations. Here the Russians have already agreed to it, and they’re still hitting away at it, which is, of course, what the Russians really want. And that’s what, if they babble away enough, of course, the Russians will pick it up at the next Helsinki thing. That’s why we should get the summit date fixed.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Because then they’ll be reluctant to be too—

Nixon: Well, Henry, no summit, however, under any circumstances, unless we do have an interim SALT agreement to put it to, to put it on the finish there. We have to do that, Henry. To go there without doing that, that’s not even worth our time.

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6 See Document 225.
Kissinger: They may agree to it now, because we can’t be sure. But—

Nixon: Perhaps.

Kissinger: —we’ve got to gamble, I think. We can always sign the Accidental War agreement. We can announce some progress on SALT. If there is a deadlock in Vienna, we can break it at Moscow.

Nixon: Why do you have a summit, then? Fisheries?

Kissinger: Frankly for—partly for domestic reasons, and partly—I frankly feel, Mr. President, at this point, that to keep the Democrats out of office next year—

Nixon: Right. Is the main thing.

Kissinger: —is a major national necessity.

Nixon: That’s right. It’d be terrible if they got in.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Terrible. You know, really, really, with the irresponsibility that they have displayed, it—

Kissinger: The [Democratic] Party is unfit to conduct foreign policy. These are the radicals.

Nixon: Well, it’s just the Eastern establishment.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: That’s where the damn radicals are.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Basically.

Kissinger: And another argument for the summit is we have a better chance of getting the SALT with the summit then—

Nixon: I agree. I agree. They’ve got reasons as well as we have to have something come out of the meeting. So we can be sure on that. I’ll put this—the other side of the coin. That we’re not going to have a summit and come out with an ABM agreement.

Kissinger: Out of the question. That we can’t do—

Nixon: Never, never, never.

Kissinger: That we cannot do.

Nixon: I don’t think it’s all that difficult. I think they can get—we can have an ABM agreement and a limitation on offensive weapons.

Kissinger: It’s on offensive weapons, so it shouldn’t be so hard—

Nixon: It’s all we’re asking.

[Omitted here is extensive discussion of numerous issues, including the news media, domestic politics, and Laos.]

Kissinger: Mr. President, for us to get Berlin, SALT, China, the summit, all into one time frame, and to keep any of these countries—
Nixon: To keep Europe happy.
Kissinger: To keep Europe happy, to keep Vietnam from collapsing—
Nixon: Yeah. [unclear]—
Kissinger: —that takes great subtlety and intricacy.
Nixon: All of this, everything is close. But on the whole, everything worthwhile in the world is close. Nothing is easy. Nothing is easy in these times.
Kissinger: To get this Berlin thing is, I now consider, practically certain. We’ve got that where we had SALT in March—
Nixon: I ought to get into that, don’t you think?
Kissinger: I beg your pardon?
Nixon: I probably ought to get into that act sometime.
Kissinger: Berlin?
Nixon: Yes.
Kissinger: Still—
Nixon: Get a little credit.
Kissinger: When Brandt is here, you may be able to do something with that—
Nixon: Well, we’ll see.
[Omitted here is further discussion on Germany and Berlin, as well as a brief exchange on Presidential appointments and Kissinger’s schedule; the discussion on Germany and Berlin is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 245.]

SUBJECT

Some Thoughts on Soviet Policy

There seems to be a growing feeling that with the SALT agreement of May 20 a logjam has been broken in our relations with the USSR, and that we are now more firmly on a new course. In addition to the SALT agreement one could point to considerable Soviet flexibility in the Berlin talks, Brezhnev’s gratuitous assistance during the Mansfield debate, and the probability of yet another East-West negotiation, on MBFR. Only the Middle East does not quite fit into this pattern, at least not as yet.

In short there is some reason to speculate, as Max Frankel was moved to do a while ago, that we are witnessing an important thaw in Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, there is a counterpoint developing (Kraft and Alsop) that stresses how little has changed in Moscow.

The Current Setting

Some perspective is gained by placing recent events in the setting of the 24th Party Congress. We had concluded that the Congress had

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIV. Secret. Sent for information. Haig initialed the memorandum. Kissinger returned the memorandum to Sonnenfeldt on June 8 with a handwritten note in the margin: “Turn into memo for Pres. 1st class.” In a memorandum to Kissinger the next day, Hyland reported that he had done a brief covering memorandum from Kissinger to the President, recommending that Nixon read the first and last sections. Kissinger responded: “Damn it. I don’t want to see another memo for Pres. with that ambiguous heading. Pres. knows damn well I don’t write these memos. Pres. doesn’t read tabs. Turn into one memo. Anyone not wanting to work this way should resign.” Kennedy returned the package to Hyland on June 15 with instructions for further revision. No memorandum to the President, however, has been found.

2 See Document 217.

3 Frankel’s comments were not found. Alsop contended on May 31 and June 2 that the recent SALT “breakthrough” was neither “as encouraging as most have supposed” nor “as hopeful as it has been made out.” (Alsop, “The Real Story of SALT,” Washington Post, May 31, 1971, p. A23; and “Playing Russian Roulette,” Washington Post, June 2, 1971, p. A19) Kraft, meanwhile, argued on June 1 that there had not been in Soviet policy, “as many supposed, a deviation in favor of détente with the West.” (Kraft, “Russians Back in Form,” Washington Post, June 1, 1971, p. A17)
certain tentative results: (1) Brezhnev improved his power position considerably; (2) he outlined a program that seemed to rest on “peace and prosperity”; (3) he thus put himself in the position of having to show some movement or tangible results that the “peace program” (this is the phrase all Soviet publications now use), is more than rhetoric.

The motives behind this shift are mixed.

Brezhnev had made himself the spokesman, in 1964, for a program of internal rectification of Khrushchev’s mistakes. He therefore tended to draw support from conservative, status quo elements which Khrushchev had most offended—the party apparatus, the heavy industrialist interests, and especially the military. From Brezhnev’s viewpoint, after six years there was little more to be gained in terms of his own position from playing this role, particularly in view of the internal economic problems. There was the possibility, however, that he could outflank his opposition (as ill-defined as it may be) by preempting some of their program, that is, by championing the consumer goods program as his own, by identifying himself with various foreign policies, including the German treaties and to some extent SALT.

Aside from these internal considerations, a more flexible stand was probably dictated by the frustrations of the last year or so. The failure to bring the German treaties to a conclusion, for example, was a setback which Gromyko was more or less forced to defend at the Congress. The Sino-American rapprochement was another potentially dangerous development that was not likely to be solved by new Soviet pressures on either Peking or Washington. And general Soviet policy in Europe seemed to have run into problems: the Europeans were preoccupied with the EC, suspicious of Ostpolitik, and in general unwilling to move toward a détente if American-Soviet relations remained strained.

Yet in light of Czechoslovakia, and more recently Poland, the Soviets wanted and needed more than ever the tangible sign that the West conceded the political and territorial status quo.

If, in fact, there is this defensive aspect to the present phase of Soviet policy, it is also true that the terms of the détente that might be emerging are not all that unpalatable to the Soviet regime:

—The SALT agreement now seems likely to be close to the ABM-only approach first surfaced in the summer of last year.  
—Any Berlin agreement will have to involve some Soviet concessions, but these they have always been willing to consider if the return was large enough. And the ratification of the Eastern treaties apparently justifies concessions.

4 Kissinger wrote in the margin: “No.”
—MBFR is not as clear cut, but it too fits into a general scheme of trying to loosen up the Western Alliance at a time when the consolidation of Britain’s place in Europe threatens to provide the Western Alliance with a greater underlying political and economic cohesion and create a more powerful magnet for drawing the countries of Eastern Europe into more East-West economic involvements.

Nevertheless, there is change. The Soviets obviously had the option of waiting some 18 months to determine whether this Administration would be re-elected. In view of the positions taken in the Congress on defense issues such as ABMs and European forces, this might have seemed a prudent and attractive option. But one must conclude that the Soviets have decided instead that there are gains to be made now in dealing with this Administration. This is the major shift of policy.

We also felt that at the Congress, and since then, this general line has not been without challenge. The Soviet military-industrialist clique, among others, has seemed skeptical about Brezhnev’s foreign and internal positions, if not opposed to them outright. Events would suggest, however, that Brezhnev is moving cautiously; partly because it is a maneuver that offends strong vested interests inside the USSR, and partly because he is under no pressure of deadlines.

SALT

This line of reasoning seems best demonstrated in the strange Soviet treatment of the SALT agreement. It has been virtually buried in the Soviet press and commentaries. Not only that, but at the time it was announced the Soviets seemed to go out of their way to emphasize vigilance and militancy.

—For example, the only Soviet press discussion of a freeze came at the very moment Semyonov and Dobrynin were discussing it; this was an attack on Senator Jackson’s proposal, which was criticized for failing to take account of FBS (an authoritative article of last February in Pravda was recalled as supporting evidence)\(^5\).

—On May 20–21, in addition to the SALT announcement on page 4 of Pravda,\(^6\) there was an announcement of the submarine visit to Cuba,\(^7\) the attendance of the top Soviet leaders at an inspection of new


\(^6\) See Document 225.

\(^7\) See footnote 2, Document 228.
“warplanes,”9 the first of several attacks on our naval maneuvers especially in the Baltic,9 and the announcement of major summer maneuvers in the USSR.

—The pronouncements of the Soviet military immediately preceding the SALT agreement, and since, are strong on the need for increased defense efforts, with only limited support for the notion of Soviet “sufficiency.”

MBFR

If Brezhnev felt it was prudent to make some gestures to the military, why did he go out of his way to intervene in the Mansfield debate in a manner that could only cause further concern? His revival of MBFR—especially concerning foreign forces—rather than allowing the American debate to run its course must be dismaying to some Soviet leaders. There is a thesis now prominent in this country that Brezhnev or his speech writers simply goofed. But this is not at all tenable. The speech he gave came after several days of publicity to the Mansfield debate in the Soviet press (and we are fairly certain that each Politburo member receives a foreign press summary). Moreover, this was a special speech, since it was given in Stalin’s home territory of Georgia. Brezhnev carefully dealt with the Stalin issue and it is reasonable that he would have carefully read this speech in advance. Finally, it was not really a foreign policy address, and the part on MBFR almost appears as an insertion.

In other words Brezhnev made a deliberate statement knowing (1) that it would probably receive inordinate publicity, and (2) that it would virtually force us into a negotiation on terms that the Soviets could easily exploit.

Berlin–Germany

A decision to turn toward MBFR makes considerable sense if one considers what the Soviet leaders must regard as a major frustration in dealing with the Eastern treaties, Berlin, and a European Security Conference. While tacitly accepting the ordering and linkage defined by the West, the Soviets have been far from content and for some time have tried to break out of the Western formula, mainly by exerting direct pressures on Brandt.

That this line was considered fruitless was signaled at the Party Congress by Gromyko’s formula that all European-German issues

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9 See footnote 2, Document 245.
10 Erich Honecker succeeded Ulbricht as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party on May 3.

11 Brezhnev invited Honecker for a “friendly visit” to Moscow on May 18. After the meeting, the two sides issued a joint communiqué on their discussion, which included a section on the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin. For a condensed English text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 20 (June 15, 1971), p. 37.

12 See Document 241.


ought to be dealt with “in parallel.” It was in this context that Brezhnev broke the Soviet linkage of MBFR to CES—thus opening the way to circumvent the Berlin condition to CES and to strengthening the Soviets’ hand in the Berlin negotiations by raising the specter of GDR participation in MBFR.

Along this same line the Soviets have continued to work on the CES, mainly with the French with some success, to weaken the linkage to Berlin.

Finally we come to Berlin itself and what appears to be the most significant of recent Soviet decisions.

—First of all there was the succession to Ulbricht, which seems too convenient for post-Congress Soviet policy to have been entirely fortuitous.10

—If there was to be a new period of European détente based on the ratification of the German treaties and a prior Berlin agreement, it would have to be at the expense of East Germany’s claim to sovereignty (over access).

—That this was the Soviet intention seems fairly clear from the way they handled their initial meeting with Honecker. The GDR-Soviet communiqué was the prerequisite to the flexibility the Soviets have subsequently shown in the Berlin talks.11 The importance the Soviets attached to achieving some negotiating room is also apparent if one considers how delicate and potentially dangerous a succession period is in East Germany, and yet the Soviets were willing to virtually humiliate Honecker in their first encounter.

The Middle East

The current situation in the Middle East does not easily fit into the preceding scenario, mainly because other factors—US diplomacy and internal disruptions in the UAR—have influenced Soviet policy.

The Soviet position in the UAR had undoubtedly suffered a setback. The new treaty has partly covered up this defeat, but represents only a limited gain.12 The Soviet position has always profited and grown when tensions have been high. But over the years the vulnerability of Soviet influence to the rise and fall of Arab-Israeli tensions has
been protected by a growing influence within the UAR and particularly within the Arab Social Union. The prospects of an interim settlement that appeared as a result of what the Soviets considered unilateral US diplomacy might have been irritating, but it became much more serious in light of realignment of internal UAR political forces at the expense of Soviet influence. It would be natural for the Soviet leaders to trace their setback to the US.

The effect of the new treaty is difficult to divine. Sovietologists see it as a major gain in consolidating a long-term Soviet position. Arabists see no essential change. Israelis worry that the prospects of Soviet military intervention have increased and some Americans seem to think it will promote an interim settlement.

It would seem that the treaty reflects a Soviet sense that there will not be a resumption of fighting, that tensions will begin to recede, beginning with an interim agreement, and that their best course was to look to the longer term, no longer being able to count on a manipulation of internal Arab forces. Thus the treaty leaves Sadat free to negotiate for terms less than full withdrawal (the UN resolution is conveniently skipped over and only a "fair peace" consistent with UN principles is mentioned). It provides a legal basis for a continuing Soviet military presence and suggests, but does not so stipulate, that the Soviets have a veto over UAR military actions.

In short the treaty is reminiscent of the 19th Century treaties that Great Powers used to define a sphere of influence. In this sense it also suggests that the Soviets are less concerned about the near term and more about the longer term. If a period of European and Soviet-American détente develops, the Soviets will retain a base for political influence in the Middle East. (It will be interesting for the lawyers to sort out the relationship of the Soviet-UAR treaty to the new Arab Federation. Do the Soviets obtain similar rights and obligations for Libya and Syria?)

A word of caution is in order, however. If the interim arrangement fails to come off, the Soviets by virtue of this treaty are somewhat more committed to the UAR than before, at least they are more vulnerable to UAR demands for help. Given the enormous stake in the area, the Soviets, as they demonstrated last year, are willing to pay a high price in terms of damage to the political atmosphere with us, if forced to do so by events in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Also, the Soviets may move against Sadat at some point since his unreliability from their standpoint has been amply demonstrated.

Prospects

If we are right in speculating that the Soviets are experimenting with détente, there are some relevant considerations for our policy:
First of all, to the extent this line represents a personal commitment of Brezhnev—to SALT, the German treaties and Berlin—then we have somewhat more leverage than sometimes imagined.

Second, the terms of the détente are nevertheless going to be tougher than in previous periods, simply because the Soviets are much stronger.

Third, whatever the improvements in our relations, even if based on SALT and Berlin, they are going to be fragile and vulnerable to shifts inside the Soviet Union and to outside events.

Finally, and most important, we must recognize that the Soviets are pursuing their current line not only because it suits Brezhnev’s internal requirements at the moment, but also because of Soviet concern over the Sino-American rapprochement; the Soviets must have concluded as well that the period now opening will offer some new opportunities that usually accompany a relaxation of tensions: economic contacts, expansion into new areas, a relaxation of Western defenses, etc. Thus, there is some reason to doubt that we are operating on the basis of common interests and certainly not convergent ones.

In sum this is an extremely tricky period: one in which our opportunities may be expanding, but also a period in which our stake in the détente will loom much larger than the USSR’s. Inevitably the durability of whatever we achieve will be tested, just as it was in 1956, 1960, 1964–65, and the risks of failure and setbacks will have far greater consequences in this country than in Russia. And our ability to react to challenges less than major confrontations will be more constricted.
251. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Your June 8 Meeting with Dobrynin

This memorandum contains background information and suggested talking points for the principal subjects you will want to raise with Dobrynin this evening. Relevant documents are tabbed as indicated in this book. You may also wish to look at your separate briefing books on the Summit and Berlin.

Summit

Background

Your last meeting with Dobrynin at which the Summit was discussed was April 26. (See last item in your “Apex” book which contains everything on this subject.) You emphasized that:

—linkage to any preconditions is unacceptable;
—President is not prepared to discuss it further;
—next move is up to Russians. The next time they approach us on the subject they have to be prepared to announce it.

Talking Points

—We must have a definite agreement on a Summit by the end of this month.
—We envisage a public announcement July 15–20.

Vietnam

Background

On January 9 you indicated to Dobrynin that we might be interested in a settlement that would separate political and military issues.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig initialed the memorandum.
2 See Document 192.
3 A collection of copied documents on the summit, which Kissinger’s staff maintained in a binder for reference purposes. The “Apex” book is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Apex.
During February and March Dobrynin asked you several times whether we had any message for the North Vietnamese leaders who would be in Moscow for the Party Congress, and you expressed a general willingness to meet again in Paris if they were ready to do so.

Talking Points

—Since I last saw you we have made a final offer to the North Vietnamese along the lines that we had discussed previously; 4
—We will be meeting again in the near future to hear their response;
—Our proposal represents the last chance for a peaceful resolution of the conflict with meaningful U.S. participation. There will be no further offer in this Administration;
—If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate on the basis of this package, this could mean an early end to the conflict which would have greatly beneficial impact on the world scene, including U.S.-Soviet relations;
—If the North Vietnamese reject this offer, this will mean continued fighting in Indochina. In this case, the President will not hesitate to take whatever strong measures are required to protect our interests. 5

Soviet and U.S. Ship Movements

Background

Attached at Tab 1 is a rundown of the latest Caribbean movements of the Soviet naval vessels. 6 At present the tender has entered the Atlantic after departing Antilla yesterday afternoon. The E-II class nuclear powered cruise-missile submarine remains unlocated. Note: It is not at all clear that the Soviet ships are moving out and it is therefore premature to credit Soviet reasonableness in response to your démarche.

At Tab 2 is Admiral Welander’s memo to you on possible correlation between the Soviet naval visit and U.S. Baltic and Black Sea operations, including a chronology of all these movements. 7 He says there is not conclusive evidence that the current Soviet Cuban deployment is in reaction to either the U.S. Baltic or Black Sea operations.

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5 Haig bracketed most of this sentence and suggested in a marginal note that Kissinger tell Dobrynin instead that the President would “be forced to resort to the strongest measures.”

6 Undated; tabs 1–10 are attached but not printed.

7 Dated June 1.
Talking Points

—In recent weeks your ships have been once again in Caribbean waters. We in turn have had our ships in the Baltic and Black Sea.
—Neither side will of course wish to give up its rights to conduct routine patrols.
—But it is in our mutual interest to be careful about our movements in sensitive areas and to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to escalation.

Berlin

Background

Your big Berlin book includes all your exchanges with Rush and Bahr (see especially Tabs 53–54). Enclosed are Sonnenfeldt’s comparison of the Soviet and Western drafts (Tab 3) and the report on the June 7 Ambassadors’ meeting (Tab 4).

Bahr and Rush met with Falin for 2 hours on June 4 and for 9-1/2 hours on June 5. (Their cabled reports are at Tab 5.) Falin returned from Moscow with a Soviet re-draft of the whole agreement. He continues to be authoritative and somewhat flexible. The three men discussed:

— the “special ties” between the Western Sectors and the FRG. (Falin sought to weaken the language. Brandt is apparently willing to drop the word “special”);
— the phrase “international practice,” for treatment of transit traffic, insisted upon by the GDR. (Rush sees question as resolved.);
— inspection and clearance procedures for traffic. (Falin made “major concessions.”);
— Federal presence. (Time ran out with session bogged down over meetings of fraktionen and committees and acts of individual FRG officials in the Western Sectors.)

Rush is due in Washington tomorrow. Next Ambassadors’ Meeting is June 25. Next advisors’ session is June 9–10.

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9 At Tabs 3 and 4 are, respectively, a June 4 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger and telegram 6902 from Bonn, June 7. Haig wrote in the margin: “This is latest draft.”

10 At Tab 5 are a message from Rush, dated June 4, and separate messages from Rush and Bahr, both dated June 6; printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 247, 248, and 249.
Bundestag Inner-German Affairs Committee is planning Berlin meeting June 10–11. Abrasimov has threatened autobahn harassments if this occurs.

_Talking Points_

—The Rush-Bahr-Falin meetings seem to be making good progress (i.e. better than with Abrasimov).
—It is absolutely essential that the secrecy of HAK–Dobrynin and Rush-Bahr-Falin meetings be maintained.
—We hope the SALT negotiations will go as well as the Berlin talks.

_Trade_

_Background_

Attached at Tab 6 as a refresher is the Stans memo to you which outlines what has been approved for export (Gleason case and $64 million for truck manufacturing facilities in addition to British computer) and what is left for future action (the Kama River project—pending applications for $140 million plus possible upcoming Mack Trucks application for $700 million, with the latter having a deadline of June 25, 1971). Other related memos are also at Tab 6.11

At your last meeting on May 24 Dobrynin asked about a favorable decision by the end of June on the more comprehensive request made by Soviet Deputy Trade Minister Komarov.12 You said you might be able to give the Russians some indication of our general direction by mid-July.

_White House Fellows_

_Background_

At the last minute, the Russians objected to active duty military men (including Lt. Colonel Loeffke of your staff) visiting the Soviet Union. We arranged for them to visit NATO countries rather than scrubbing the whole project. (Dobrynin had talked to the Fellows several weeks previously and thus knew well in advance that they included military personnel.)

_Talking Points_

—We were surprised at the last minute objections to military personnel among the White House Fellows visiting the Soviet Union.
—In order to be cooperative and avoid an incident, we withdrew their request to visit your country.

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11 Attached at Tab 6 are Stans’s May 26 memorandum and four other memoranda; see Document 242.
12 See Documents 229 and 230.
—Frankly we consider this ploy as unfortunate, unnecessary, and annoying.\(^\text{13}\)

**NATO Communiqué and MBFR**

**Background**

Attached at Tab 7 for your information is the Lisbon communiqué which covers such subjects as SALT, CES, Berlin, and MBFR (see paragraphs 13–16).\(^\text{14}\)

**Personal Projects**

**Background**

There are three items which have been raised with you by private American citizens which you may wish to pursue with Dobrynin:

—*Taft Schreiber* wishes to arrange for a mutual loan of art, bringing a collection from the Hermitage to the National Gallery and the Los Angeles County Museum in exchange for some American art. (Tab 8)\(^\text{15}\)

—*Stephen Graubard* has asked your help, or the use of your name, in contacting the Soviet Embassy in order to mobilize Soviet interest in a Daedalus project focused on how industrial societies organize for research activity. (Tab 9)\(^\text{16}\)

—*Billy Graham* has expressed a personal interest in the plight of the daughter of Mrs. Rivka Alexandrovich who is on trial in Riga for anti-Soviet propaganda. According to Graham, all she did was to print a pamphlet in Yiddish. At Tab 10 is your May 24 telcon with Graham giving further background information.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{13}\) On July 26, *U.S. News and World Report* published an unauthorized account of the trip, written by Thomas Pauken, the Fellows’ Associate Director. Kissinger assured Dobrynin by letter two days later that he was “very disturbed” by the account, which “neither represents the consensus of the White House Fellows nor was it cleared here at the White House.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2])

\(^\text{14}\) At Tab 7 is telegram 1865 from Lisbon, June 4. For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1971, pp. 819–821.

\(^\text{15}\) At Tab 8 are a March 5 letter from Schreiber to Kissinger and a March 15 summary memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger.

\(^\text{16}\) At Tab 9 are an April 16 letter from Graubard to Kissinger and a May 4 summary memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger.

\(^\text{17}\) Printed as Document 231. No evidence has been found to indicate whether Kissinger raised the Aleksandrovich case with Dobrynin. After four months in a Soviet labor camp, Aleksandrovich was finally released; on October 29, she arrived in Israel and was reunited with her mother. (“Nurse Soviet Jailed Arrives in Tel Aviv,” *New York Times*, October 30, 1971, p. 6)
252. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, Maryland, June 8, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The three-hour dinner, interspersed with social talk, took place in order to give us an opportunity to review the international situation. The following subjects were covered in this order.

Vietnam and China

I told Dobrynin that we had made our final offer to the North Vietnamese. He was surprised by the fact that I had seen them. This, in itself, is significant since, in the past, he had always been informed when these meetings had taken place. He asked me what the offer was. I said that I had no objection if the North Vietnamese told him, but I did not feel that I could. I said that I thought it was a fair offer, and I wanted it understood that it would be the last one in this Administration and that if it were rejected it might lead to serious consequences.

Dobrynin asked whether I thought the Chinese would really permit peace. I said I didn’t know but they had moderated some of their public statements. Dobrynin said, well, in their talks to Moscow, the Chinese were taking a very tough line about the United States, accusing the U.S. of being the hotbed of imperialism. I said that we had very little direct contact with the Chinese but what there was was not quite that recriminatory. Dobrynin said he couldn’t understand why we seemed so eager to make concessions to the Chinese. There didn’t seem to be that much public pressure.
I told him that we were not responding to public pressure so much as we were trying to remove some anomalies in the international situation. I asked whether the Soviet Union objected to an improvement in our relations with Communist China. Dobrynin said it would depend entirely on how it was done. If it were done in a manner that was designed to embarrass the Soviet Union or if it were publicly justified on the grounds of encircling the Soviet Union, then the reaction would be very strong. If, on the other hand, it were put on the basis of normal diplomacy and if it were kept within some bounds, reactions would be different. He asked whether we had sent a message through Ceausescu. I replied that there were limits to the messages third parties could carry.

Dobrynin then asked about the Chinese representation issue. I told him that we were still considering it. He said he didn’t see any future in our current position, but then he had to say he didn’t see any future in any new position either, and he thought it was essentially a tactical problem. The people in New York were all excited about it, but he didn’t attach too much importance to it. He repeated what he had said earlier—that he wasn’t sure whether China really wanted to be in the United Nations.

Middle East

The conversation then turned to the Middle East. Dobrynin professed to be completely baffled by our policy in the Middle East. He said, “Did you really think you can push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East?” The Rogers trip was taken very badly in the Soviet Union, but it didn’t make any sense from any other point either. Sadat was genuinely astonished that Rogers had come to Cairo without any proposals of his own. Now we had made a new suggestion from Bergus to Sadat, but Dobrynin didn’t know whether the Israelis were in favor of it and, therefore, it might just be another theoretical exercise. The plan apparently was for Israel to withdraw to the east of the mountain passes leaving some demilitarized zone in between them and the Egyptian forces.

Dobrynin said that the Politburo was still eager for direct Soviet-U.S. conversations and that he was authorized to talk to me, but he had the impression that the United States was not prepared to engage in such conversations and, therefore, the initiative was up to us. I told Dobrynin that the time might come where direct talks between him and me were possible, but first we had to construct a negotiating context in which we could bring about some results. We also had to agree on what objective we were trying to achieve. I therefore thought that the best possibility was to let the Suez Canal opening talks proceed and then we could see further. Dobrynin said, “But do you not believe that we have an interest in opening the Suez Canal? Why, therefore,
don’t you talk to us? We can always prevent a settlement if you push us to it. We got a 15-year treaty out of the Rogers visit and we have taken adequate precautions, you can be sure.” I said that it was not our policy to push the Soviet Union out of the Middle East. Politically, though, some reduction in the Soviet military presence there had always been part of our program.

Berlin

The conversation then turned to Berlin. Dobrynin said that his impression was that matters were going forward well. There was, however, the fact that Rush, at the end of the last private meeting, had said that he had not studied the problem of Soviet presence in West Berlin, while Dobrynin had reported that we would be prepared to concede a trade mission. This was true. I had been told this by Rush. I told Dobrynin I would have to check into it since Rush was coming home for consultations. Dobrynin also made some comments about our alleged recalcitrance on the issue of Federal presence in West Berlin. But, on the whole, he thought matters were on the right track.

SALT

We then turned to SALT. I said that I hoped that the Soviet negotiators would come to Helsinki in a positive spirit—that this had become a test case, and it would be very important for us to proceed properly.

Dobrynin said that in a way he regretted that SALT had become the test case of our relationship. “In a way,” he said, “you’ve even imposed it on us.” The reason he regretted it was because, whether I believed it or not, he was in favor of closer Soviet-American relations and so, on the whole, was the whole Foreign Office. On the other hand, this was an issue which was essentially out of their control because the military played a very important role. Moreover, he said, in the Soviet system they did not have the cushion that was provided by our staff system. When any issue arose, therefore, it was taken directly to Brezhnev by the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The Foreign Ministry was precluded from making any comments on military issues. They could only defend their proposals on the grounds that it would help relations with the United States. The military were precluded from making any political judgments, but on the other hand, their military judgments were pretty definitive. This separation was being strictly maintained. For example, when Dobrynin was in Moscow for the Party Congress, he wanted military briefings. This required special Politburo clearance which was reluctantly granted, partly on the basis of his new membership in the Central Committee.

Therefore, Dobrynin could not in good conscience predict just how things were going to go in Helsinki. He was strongly advocating, and
he knew Gromyko was also, that progress be made. But he also knew that this was not a matter entirely up to them. He thought that the issue of missile defense as against NCA would present some conceptual difficulty since their military frankly didn’t understand why we were so interested in that. He also said that he did not think the idea of Semenov coming over here in the interval would work because Semenov would be too busy preparing for Helsinki.

**Summit**

I raised the Summit issue by pointing out to Dobrynin that we had now been talking about a Summit for 14 months, and there was nothing we were going to find out that we did not already know. It, therefore, now simply came down to the issue of whether a Summit was wanted. The President felt that we had to know by the end of this month, and if we didn’t know by the end of this month, we would have to defer a decision until later this year and plan on a Summit sometime next year.

Dobrynin said he thought on the whole it would be better to have the Summit after the Berlin negotiations were concluded. I said they were far enough down the road, and we could not have them used as a blackmail. In any event, we would be unable to meet in September if we could not decide it by the end of June.

Dobrynin then said that he knew that Brezhnev was planning to go to Paris in October, but he would have to get instructions. He literally did not know what the thinking was in Moscow on the Summit. He wondered whether a Summit in the winter might be possible. I said if it weren’t in September, it would probably be best to defer it until early spring. I said that, from a political point of view, it would come in very handy next year, but from a substantive point of view, we strongly favored it this year.

Dobrynin said that he thought that our political situation was good and was improving. He saw no Democratic candidate who could beat the President. Moreover, we were mistaken if we believed that the Soviet Union preferred the defeat of a Republican President. From many points of view, a Republican was easier for them to deal with than a Democrat. Dobrynin said he would have a reply within two to three weeks.

**General**

We finally talked about odds and ends. For example, Dobrynin said that of American post-war leaders, Eisenhower was the one who had impressed the Soviets most as an honest man, and Dulles had impressed them most as being in command of the subjects.

Dobrynin said we had no idea of how little was known in the Soviet Union about the American mentality. For example, the Soviet
leaders and public had been very impressed by the demonstrations against the Administration in late April and early May, despite Dobrynin’s reports that they were helping the Administration. What turned the tide was the showing of some television films of some of the demonstrators which offended the Soviet puritanical sense and which were barred from Soviet television after some viewers protested.

Dobrynin continually returned to the Chinese theme, saying that Chou En-Lai was their ablest man, but that they were dedicated to tension between the United States and themselves. He also thought that Southeast Asia would be a natural area of expansion for China. He rejected my suggestion that the Soviet Union might begin to take an interest in Southeast Asia.

Dobrynin at one point mused whether Japan would cooperate with China or become a rival. He thought that they might cooperate with China on an anti-white basis. When I said, well, maybe they’ll agree on some spheres of influence, Dobrynin said, “Well, they compete in all the important spheres.” I said what about Siberia? He laughed grimly and said, “We are building it up at a very rapid pace and we even told the Chinese we would let them do some investing there.” I asked, “How about Chinese immigration?” He replied, “We are not crazy.”

I recounted to Dobrynin some of the naval moves of recent months, and he said he would report to Moscow what the interaction could be between their tender and some of our maneuvers in the Black and Baltic Seas.

The meeting ended on an extremely cordial note, since he was very impressed by Camp David.3

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3 Kissinger called Dobrynin at 11:31 a.m. on June 9 and proposed the following cover story for the meeting: “I have told our bureaucracy that you and I had breakfast and I took you for a helicopter ride around the city. You don't have to say anything but just don't say the opposite.” Kissinger also reported: “On that issue of your presence in W. Berlin, I have now received other communications from Rush and it will move in the direction I talked about with you.” (Ibid.)
253. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s schedule.]

Kissinger: He [Dobrynin], of course, was in no position to—
Nixon: I understand.
Kissinger: —give me an answer.\(^2\) He was extremely conciliatory and asked a lot about Berlin—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: He thinks we have Berlin on the way to the summit.
Nixon: Well, Henry—
Kissinger: He—I told him we have made our last offer to the [North] Vietnamese. I mean, all these—Xuan Thuy gave an interview yesterday.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And we’re getting in position, because yesterday, for the first time, he said that the political and military things didn’t have to be absolutely linked—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —which they always have sought. So now we’re on the same—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: But everything he’s saying publicly now is an answer to what we said to them.
Nixon: What did you say with the—
Kissinger: With respect to the summit?
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: With respect to the summit, I said that we have—
Nixon: Just laid it out.
Kissinger: Yeah. “We have been talking for more than 14 months. There’s no doubt about it: we’re making [our] final offer.” He said, “Would you be interested in coming by September or spring of next

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 255–30. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Executive Office Building on June 9 from 9:24 to 10:29 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) See Document 252.
year? You have to recognize”—actually, I said, from the political, the President’s point of view, that we wanted it, but our strong preference was to have it be this year. And I said if they turned it down, it’d be a huge mistake, because the—we have the ball. He said Berlin’s linked to SALT. It’s the other way around.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I still think the odds are three to one that they—

Nixon: Did you talk to him about the, you know, the Cubans?

Kissinger: Yeah. That they have actually—I talked to him about that two weeks ago. When the tender never went into Cienfuegos, I simply forgot to mention it. It ventured into Cuba, went to another port and it’s now on its way back. It never did any exercises—

Nixon: Don’t take any crap.

Kissinger: No crap. He said on SALT—very seriously, he said there would be an agreement by the end of the year. He said, “We regret it in one way that it was, that SALT had become the test case for our relations.” He said I might not believe that—the Foreign Ministry didn’t have a major input. Their military had a major role. And they don’t have—he said that he envied our system. He said, “It’s as if you had written directly to the Chiefs of Staff without any staff of your own—”

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: “—and with the State Department, then had to make up your mind.” He said, “Brezhnev wishes he had a staff that he can call his own.” We have advantages.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And he says that if it were anything in the Foreign Ministry’s bailiwick, he could almost guarantee success.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: But the military, he says, showed these briefings this year. It sounds plausible, because, God help them, they do it to us.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: He said when he was there for the Party Congress, they showed the briefings and he said, “The Americans have this and who are you to contradict me?” But he said he thought there’d be an agreement by the end of the year on SALT. Brezhnev apparently is going to France in October.

Nixon: Yeah.

3 See Document 247.
Kissinger: But he [Dobrynin] was extremely, [laughter] absolutely—
Nixon: Yeah. He’s getting special treatment now.
Kissinger: We’re giving him special treatment.
Nixon: It was. Well, so he knows that this is the last offer on Viet-
nam. He knows that, as far as the, any summit meeting is concerned,
we have to know by the 1st of July.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: And [unclear].
Kissinger: That’s right. I said, “I can’t guarantee you”—then he
wanted to know, if for any reason it fell through for September, what
would be a good month. Whether November would be possible—I said
no.
Nixon: No.
Kissinger: Recognizing there has to be sufficient television cover-
age there in November in Moscow—
Nixon: And more after the New Year. They’ve got to do something
more about, you know, whether or not we see them.
Kissinger: They have protected—the great temptation—what
they—they’re playing a cute game now. They’re—if they can get us to
settle Berlin for them—
Nixon: They wait for the election.
Kissinger: And then they go to France and they get vintage Pom-
pidou. Well, but maybe then they’ll go all out.
Nixon: And wait for the election.
Kissinger: Their analysis now is that you’re sure of an economic
-crash landing. He said—well, he thought you were in trouble about
three months before now.
Nixon: [unclear] Did you share it with him?
Kissinger: I don’t believe that they do prefer a Democrat to you.
Nixon: Oh? That’s what we and everybody else believes.
Kissinger: I’m not absolutely sure that they do prefer a Democrat.
Nixon: You said you don’t believe that they prefer a Democrat.
Kissinger: [unclear]
Nixon: [unclear] a hell of a lot more if you make that announce-
ment Monday morning.⁴
Kissinger: Well, they’ll be practical. But when—

⁴ June 14.
Kissinger called Jay Lovestone, Director of the AFL–CIO’s International Affairs Department, at 2:30 p.m. on June 4 to discuss the political implications of lifting the embargo on exporting grain to Communist countries. “We are trying to do some complicated things with the Chinese,” Kissinger explained. “It is not always clear you are supposed to support the stronger against the weaker. We are considering lifting the claims embargo on the shipment of wheat and in order to do that and have it mean anything, we would also have to lift the requirement that it go in American bottoms because otherwise it would not mean anything.” Lovestone suggested that Kissinger set aside “10 minutes” to talk to Teddy Gleason, President of the International Longshoremen’s Association. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) Kissinger met Gleason and Lovestone at the White House at 2:40 p.m. on June 9 and reported: “The reason for this move is to throw a bone to the Soviets. We are in a complicated ball game and are trying to keep them from going crazy. And we are doing this for impact on the Vietnamese situation.” “I have sat on exports to the Soviet Union in the face of screams from the business community for 2½ years,” Kissinger added. “We opened the faucet a little bit after the SALT announcement. We are dealing with this as a political problem, not a commercial problem.” (Ibid., RG 59, Entry 5027, Policy Planning Staff, Box 330, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, China Exchanges—July–Oct. 20, 1971)

5 Kissinger called Jay Lovestone, Director of the AFL–CIO’s International Affairs Department, at 2:30 p.m. on June 4 to discuss the political implications of lifting the embargo on exporting grain to Communist countries. “We are trying to do some complicated things with the Chinese,” Kissinger explained. “It is not always clear you are supposed to support the stronger against the weaker. We are considering lifting the claims embargo on the shipment of wheat and in order to do that and have it mean anything, we would also have to lift the requirement that it go in American bottoms because otherwise it would not mean anything.” Lovestone suggested that Kissinger set aside “10 minutes” to talk to Teddy Gleason, President of the International Longshoremen’s Association. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) Kissinger met Gleason and Lovestone at the White House at 2:40 p.m. on June 9 and reported: “The reason for this move is to throw a bone to the Soviets. We are in a complicated ball game and are trying to keep them from going crazy. And we are doing this for impact on the Vietnamese situation.” “I have sat on exports to the Soviet Union in the face of screams from the business community for 2½ years,” Kissinger added. “We opened the faucet a little bit after the SALT announcement. We are dealing with this as a political problem, not a commercial problem.” (Ibid., RG 59, Entry 5027, Policy Planning Staff, Box 330, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, China Exchanges—July–Oct. 20, 1971)
Nixon: Yeah. That’s right. And also, look, [we] can’t argue at the summit. We want to stop.

Kissinger: Stop them?

Nixon: We can’t do a turn and so forth. But play it very hard with him, because we’re going to have to roll him.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: We’re going to have to roll him. I think we—

Kissinger: I saw him yesterday.

Nixon: I swear, if we’re going to move in that direction, then—

Hardin,6 I told him and Ford—he gave you a letter?

Kissinger: He gave me a talking.

Nixon: A talking?

Kissinger: But the enthusiasm—I saw Gerry Ford.7

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: He said, well—he hesitated.

Nixon: They all seem to feel that this would mean a lot to the farmers.

Kissinger: That’s right.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Canada and Mexico.]

Kissinger: If we have the summit—if we have the two summits, then we can work this.

Nixon: Right. I understand that. If we have even one, as you know—I mean, some sort of election summit. If you have the summit ballgame: the Soviet [and] the Chinese. Good God, we have to hit them goddamn hard if we don’t get the summit.

Kissinger: We have given them every opportunity.

Nixon: Good God, yes.

Kissinger: What they’d like us to do now is to—

Nixon: Ho! Give them Berlin?

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: They cry—

Kissinger: —do the trade thing.

Nixon: [laughs] Yeah. Well, I’m not going to do that either.

Kissinger: Well, I—

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6 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Secretary of Agriculture Hardin and Secretary of Commerce Stans on June 8 from 4:40 to 5 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.

7 No record of Kissinger’s meeting with Ford has been found.
Nixon: Let me ask you what we can do on the—well, we're holding something back, right?
Kissinger: Yes, we've given—we won't give them any more now until we hear about the [summit].
Nixon: Right.
[Omitted here is discussion of Japan and Vietnam.]

254. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Visit of Soviet Ships to Cuba

The Soviet submarine tender, which recently had been in Nipe Bay off Antilla, Cuba for twelve days, has left the Caribbean. The Soviet nuclear powered cruise missile submarine which had been alongside the tender departed on June 4 and has not been located subsequently. U–2 photography yesterday confirmed that the submarine was not in Cienfuegos. Although it is possible that the tender will reverse course and return to Caribbean waters or that the E–II class submarine will visit Cienfuegos or another Cuban port, it appears that this Soviet visit has been terminated.

As you may recall, when TASS first publicized the visit on May 21, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin and emphasized the seriousness with which we regarded the announcement. During that conversation I reminded Ambassador Dobrynin that the presence of a tender in Cienfuegos was all that was needed to make it a base. Dobrynin claimed to be unaware of plans for a visit and said that he would try to reverse

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; [codeword not declassified]. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A map showing the movement of the Soviet submarine tender, May 20–25, is attached but not printed. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Haig forwarded a draft at Kissinger's request on June 9. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin America, Chronology of Cuban Submarine Base Episode, 1970, 1971 [2 of 2])

2 See Document 228.
them if they had not already been stated publicly. The places to be visited and the type of submarine had not been announced. After the cruise missile submarine was identified alongside the tender on May 28, I called Ambassador Dobrynin and emphasized that this was an unfortunate development. He promised to transmit our views to his superiors but remarked that Moscow felt the understanding provided for a “visit” announced in advance.

While the first visit of a nuclear powered cruise missile submarine to Caribbean waters since our clarification of the understanding with the Soviets last October indicates a continuing pattern of testing the limits of our tolerance, there are some positive aspects to the Soviet response to our firm démarches concerning this visit.

—The Soviet submarine tender did not visit Cienfuegos. It appears that a visit to Antilla was planned well in advance. A salvage tug, associated [less than 1 line of text not declassified] with the tender on May 13, departed Cienfuegos on May 17 and was in Antilla several days prior to arrival of the tender. However, an article in the Soviet military newspaper Red Star on May 22 referred to a visit to Cuban ports. While this may be the result of sloppy editing, the fact that the tender only visited one port may indicate a certain Soviet responsiveness to my emphasis on the seriousness of a tender visit to Cienfuegos.

—The submarine and tender left before my meeting with Dobrynin at Camp David last night. In my conversation on May 28 I had stressed that the mooring of the submarine to the tender was particularly unfortunate. The submarine left on June 4 and the tender departed Nipe Bay on June 7. It is possible that the Soviets were trying to create a better atmosphere for yesterday’s meeting.

—There were several other indications that the profile of this visit was kept low. The tender did not go into a pier, the visit was not well-publicized, and the duration of the stay in Cuba was relatively short. On at least one of the three visits to Antilla in the past the tender has tied up to a pier rather than remaining anchored at Nipe Bay. Checks of information up to May 28 revealed no mention in Cuban or Soviet newspapers of the visit other than short articles on May 22 reflecting the TASS announcement. This low key publicity, however, is not uncharacteristic. The Soviet sailors may not have gone ashore even though the TASS announcement said they would, but it will be some time before our sources can confirm this.

The Soviets will undoubtedly continue to visit Cuba periodically and make further tests of the limits of the understanding. There may,
however, be, as Dobrynin alleges, some differences between the military and other segments of the Soviet bureaucracy concerning these operations. Therefore, although the evidence is not conclusive that our timely and firm démarches affected Soviet decisions concerning this visit, it would seem prudent to repeat these tactics in dealing with future Soviet ship visits to Cuba.

255. Memorandum for the President’s File


SUBJECT
The President’s Talk with Ambassador Jacob Beam, June 10, 1971

The conversation began at about 10:35 a.m. and ended shortly before 11 a.m.

The President referred to Kosygin’s speech the previous day and asked Mr. Beam’s reaction. The Ambassador thought it was harsh but in fact was preparing the ground for possible agreements with the US. He felt the Soviets had to protect their flanks against the Chinese and that there probably were also skeptics within the USSR who had to be placated. In addition the Soviets were trying to say that progress in negotiations would be swift if the US was “reasonable.” An additional Soviet motive, Mr. Beam thought, was to try and create differences among Western powers.

The President was interested in how serious the disagreements in Moscow might be and whether the Soviet bureaucracy, especially the military, opposed negotiations. The President commented that this sort of opposition was not unnatural and could be found in many countries. Mr. Beam thought opposition did exist in Moscow, chiefly among the military and the party apparatus. He also thought that Kosygin, being principally concerned with the economy, favors negotiations. The

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President’s Office Files, Box 85, President’s Meeting File, Beginning June 6, 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt.

2 For the condensed English text of Kosygin’s speech, delivered at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow on June 9 and published by Pravda and Izvestia on June 10, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 24 (July 13, 1971), pp. 1–4. See also Document 259.
President said it was almost inevitable that some one like Kosygin would be inclined to favor negotiations, given his responsibilities.

The President inquired about the Soviet economy. Mr. Beam said it was basically stagnant but there was a slight improvement of perhaps 2% a year in the consumer sector. This, however, fell short of the 6% the Soviets would like. In response to the President’s further inquiry, Mr. Beam thought that the present rate of improvement was not especially noticeable as one moved around the country.

The President then commented that the Chinese problem undoubtedly made the Soviets very anxious. Our position was that we sought good relations with both the USSR and China, consonant with our own interests; and that we did not want to give either the impression that it was being used by us against the other. This would merely produce additional obstacles to our policy. In practice both the Soviets and Chinese would draw their own conclusions. Mr. Beam said he had stuck very closely to the President’s line in his own statements in Moscow.

The President wondered to what extent the Chinese factor influenced the Soviet position on SALT. Mr. Beam felt sure that it did exert an influence though he could not say precisely how. The President thought that because of China the Soviets would wish to maintain certain levels of forces, especially in regard to ABMs. The area of negotiation was above that level.

The President then turned the discussion to prospects for trade, noting that an announcement concerning trade with China as well as the USSR would shortly be made. Mr. Beam welcomed the recent issuance of export licenses to Gleason and other firms who had contracts with the USSR. The President stressed that we should make a careful examination of how much trade with the Communist countries will in practice amount to. He felt that many people had imprecise notions on this. In any case, as Vietnam winds down there should be further relaxation, for example as regards credits, and our own economy would benefit from trade. Mr. Beam felt that if trade rose much above half a billion dollars in US exports per year, there could be some gain for the Soviets from a military standpoint. For the moment the level would be

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4 See Document 242.
well below this, however. The President noted that the Soviets would be able to benefit from our relaxation on grain exports and from the removal of the requirement that 50% of such exports be carried in US bottoms. Perhaps the effect would be felt in the next several months.

In conclusion, the President told Mr. Beam to be sure to see Mr. Peterson before departing from Washington.\(^5\)

The Ambassador extended congratulations on the occasion of Tricia’s marriage.\(^6\)

\(^5\) No record of a meeting between Beam and Peterson has been found.
\(^6\) Tricia Nixon married Edward Cox on June 11 at the White House.

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256. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is an exchange on Le Duc Tho’s visit to Beijing and Moscow, as well as discussion on Vietnam and the Middle East.]

Kissinger: The thing we need for the next two months is quiet, because we don’t want to get the Russians lining up with the Egyptians and get everybody steaming up with a big Mideast crisis. And I think we should just slow that process down a little bit for the next two or three months and not get so much out front. Frankly, I think we have two ways we should have done it: either the way I suggested, by working out again with the Israelis; or to do it together with the Soviets.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: After the brokering around without objective and floating plan after plan, which puts us right into the middle of it, it’s going to—the problem now is to keep the Middle East from blowing up

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 518–3. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon—who had just returned from a weekend vacation at Key Biscayne—met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 10:32 to 11:11 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
until the end of August. If we can get the other things going, then they will play back on the Middle East.

Nixon: Yeah, of course. Apparently, in terms of trying to—as far as the Soviet is concerned, there isn’t much of a problem. They won’t—

Kissinger: No, they’re mad that they—

Nixon: They may come back. No, what I meant is, if they come—

I’m speaking of a summit—

Kissinger: Oh, the summit.

Nixon: If they come back, I’m happy just to have him [Dobrynin] come in and offer it to me.

Kissinger: The summit?

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Oh, the summit is easy.

Nixon: It’s the easiest, because, I mean, he just comes in and says, “I have instructions from my government to invite you.” I’ll just tell everybody. I’m just going to do it that way.

Kissinger: [That’s] how it should be.

Nixon: That’s right. Then—

Kissinger: And that doesn’t involve me at all.

Nixon: Well, it doesn’t have to be done—what I mean, if you had suggested we do that, you know what I mean, go over and suggest it to State and so forth—

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: The difficulty, if they do it over there, I have no control over the damn thing. It will get out in the press and screwed up beyond belief. So I’ll just have him come in here. It’s no problem.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Nixon: Call Bill in—

Kissinger: And then we’ll announce it out of here.

Nixon: —just call Bill in and tell him. That’ll be that. The Chinese thing—that’s a tough one. That is really something. You see, we’re playing with fire, playing with fire. [On] Dobrynin, I guess we could do the—I think it’s—your thought is that when you’re there, I should send a message to arrange for you to have a meeting with Haig. My talk with—do you see—? I mean, how do we get there? How do we get Bill informed?

Kissinger: Well, I think once I am on the way, you might tell Bill that Yahya offered to arrange for me talk to the Chinese when I’m there.

Nixon: Exactly. Without saying: what, how, when, who?

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: And then blame, you know—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Then just say that I improvised everything once I got there.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: And I mean, his concern—my impression of Bill is that he doesn’t give a damn what I do as long as I don’t get any credit for it. And as for what we could still consider, it depends on what the Russian game is. If the Russians don’t have a summit, then we would just announce a Chinese summit—
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: —and we wouldn’t have to explain how it was arranged.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: We would just say, “As a result of high-level contacts—”
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: “—Prime Minister Chou En-lai has—”
Nixon: No, I think we could tell Bill in that case. We’d just say that—
Kissinger: Oh, we can tell Bill, but—
Nixon: No, Bill, I think you could just say that when you were there you saw the Chinese. You don’t tell him about seeing Chou En-lai or anything. Or I guess you’d have to then, don’t you?
Kissinger: I don’t think that Bill cares as long as we don’t let it out.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And we’ve now proved with SALT—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —where my name is—
Nixon: But you could just then say that when you got there, Yahya said Chou En-lai would like to you see here, and you went over and saw him.
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: After you leave, I guess the thing to do is to say, now, you’re going to Pakistan, Yahya is very interested for you to see the, talk to the Chinese Ambassador, I’ll say, while you’re there. Then it develops beyond that—
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: —and I say not to go ahead—
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: —off this trade event, so then you just go on as it was. Then it comes from there. Right?
Kissinger: If I—
Nixon: You know, there’s too goddamn much been going on. That’s the problem.

Kissinger: If we don’t have the summit right way, then we can announce a mission of Bruce and have the summit emerge out of that. Or announce in principle that we are accepting the summit and sending Bruce in the interim. If you have a Russian summit, there’s something to be said, not to announce a Chinese summit—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —before you’ve been in Moscow.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. This—would you have Bruce there before?
Kissinger: No. My suggestion would be the way—
Nixon: Have nothing announced?
Kissinger: No. No, we have to have something—
Nixon: I don’t think the Chinese are going to stand still for that kind of thing.

Kissinger: No, no. They’ll insist on announcing something. Therefore, my recommendation would be that we announce, say, early, the first week of August, that, as a result of high-level contacts between the Chinese People’s Republic, you have decided to send Ambassador Bruce as a special envoy to Peking. Whatever the date is, the visit should be—

Nixon: How do we, can you, could we just explain that to Bill in terms of the fact that that was stuff you arranged when you were with—in Yahya’s place?

Kissinger: And Bruce—well, and Bruce goes in the middle of October.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: I will have it all arranged with Chou En-lai, or whoever, that Bruce’s—after Bruce’s return, which would then be the first week of November, say—
Nixon: We’ll announce it. My thought—
Kissinger: —we announce the summit. If they want more than that, which they may, then we may have to say that they have invited you to Peking, you have accepted in principle, but in order to pave the way, you are sending Bruce.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: It would be a little better if we didn’t drive the Russians straight up the wall—if there is a summit.
Nixon: We’ll worry them.
Kissinger: Bruce alone is going to worry them.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. [unclear] the Russians are not aware of the fact that we could turn towards the Chinese. They must be aware of it.

Kissinger: Oh, you—

Nixon: They can’t possibly be aware of the magnitude of it at this point. They just wouldn’t believe it. That’s the thing.

Kissinger: Mr. President, what we are doing with the Chinese is so daring on our side and on their side. They’ve been negotiating—Dobrynin told me—you’ll see it in the memorandum that’s coming in to you—²

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: Dobrynin told me that their Ambassador there never sees anybody higher than a Deputy Foreign Minister. They’ve had a border negotiation going on for two and a half years. I don’t think any Soviet person except Kosygin has seen Chou En-lai in two years. So the idea that you might go to Peking, and that we might have talks at this level, cutting through all this stuff—Dobrynin asked me whether Ceausescu is carrying a message for us.

Nixon: [laughs]

Kissinger: Well, you know, it’s—

Nixon: What are you going to say?

Kissinger: I said—I didn’t answer him that way. I said, “You know, Anatol, you’re an experienced diplomat. What can you really say through a third party?” And he said, “That’s right.”

Nixon: Maybe he doesn’t believe you. But that’s, nevertheless, good. You just got him worried there. He knows.

Kissinger: And I sent a half-assed message to Ceausescu. That’s in order not to make the Romanians lose face—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —or wonder why the hell—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —we’ve suddenly dropped them. But the Chinese are really rough. They’ve now published a communiqué strongly supporting Romania and Yugoslavia. They are really kicking the Russians.

Nixon: Are they?

Kissinger: Oh, God.

Nixon: You see, the way this might sort out, the Russians could continue to—could put it to us because of the upcoming election—I have this in mind—and not want to go forward on a lot of things. If

² Document 252.
they do, then we turn right on arms, and we also make a straight deal
with the Chinese, by God.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: And we play it right out. That will give them some pause. If
they see the United States with 800 million Chinese, that will scare
the living bejeezus out of them.

Kissinger: Well, the main thing is we have to keep the Middle East
quiet as far as the Russians are concerned for the rest of the summer. If
you see Dobrynin—Brezhnev, and if you then make a deal with
Brezhnev, which we both enforce, that’s one thing. But we can’t piddle
it away on the Sisco level and have a premature crisis. And the
Russians won’t dare to turn you down when it’s all said and done.
Kosygin gave a fairly hard speech; Podgorny made a very gentle one;
Brezhnev made an even gentler one. They both—Kosygin didn’t make
much reference to the SALT thing; both Podgorny and Brezhnev did.
See, Kosygin dropped one notch in the hierarchy, and he may be want-
ing to line up the hard-liners against Brezhnev. It’s just a bunch of—you
know, everyone always said he’s a soft-liner.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: But they’re cutthroats. They’re using whatever is avail-
able.

Nixon: Anything to get to the top.

[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics, public relations,
and Vietnam.]

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3 See footnote 2, Document 255.
4 Podgorny spoke at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow on June 10; Brezhnev addressed
an election meeting at the Kremlin on June 11. During his speech, Brezhnev urged the
United States to adopt a “constructive position” on arms control. “[T]he importance of
the Soviet-American talks on limiting strategic armaments,” he declared, “is growing; in
our opinion, a positive outcome in these talks would be in keeping with the interests of
the peoples of both countries and with the task of strengthening world peace.” For the
condensed English texts of their speeches, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXIII,
Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

I met with Dobrynin at his request. He began the conversation by saying the recent alleviation of trade restrictions had been noted in Moscow as a very positive development. He wondered, however, whether one could not reinforce those measures by easing some of the harassment of Soviet ships in American ports. He could assure me that the Soviet Union would reciprocate immediately if we eased our restrictions on Soviet ships in American ports. I told him I would look into the matter and let him know within two weeks.

Dobrynin then handed me a note which he had been instructed to give to the U.S. Government on the convening of a Five-Power conference with respect to nuclear disarmament. He asked me whether I could take official delivery of the note. I told him that since it would

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Young submitted this memorandum and another summarizing it for the President to Kissinger on June 18. Kissinger then forwarded both to Nixon on June 21. Notations on the memorandum indicate that the President saw them. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 5:11 to 5:47 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 See footnote 3, Document 255.

3 Dobrynin is probably referring to the legal case of a Soviet freighter, *Suleyman Stalsky*, in California. In a June 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that the *Stalsky* had been “arrested in Alameda last evening and was served with a writ of attachment in connection with alleged damages by Soviet vessels to U.S. lobster fishermen in the North Atlantic.” Kissinger wrote in the margin of the memorandum: “We should be as helpful as possible.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII) Dobrynin formally protested the “unlawful detention” of the Soviet ship in a letter to Rogers on June 13. (Ibid.) No evidence has been found that the United States formally intervened in the case. A U.S. District Judge in San Francisco, however, dissolved the writ of attachment two days later, allowing the *Stalsky* to leave the harbor that evening. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, June 16; ibid.)

require a formal reply, I suggested that it be taken to the State Department. Dobrynin then added that it would make a very good impression in Moscow if he could deliver it personally to the President. It would not require a long meeting, and the fact that he was received by the President would be taken as a positive interest at the highest level. I told him I didn’t know what I could do on such short notice, but I would do my best.5

Dobrynin then said that in view of the upcoming conversations with Brandt and Bahr,6 he wanted to let me have some formulations on Berlin (Tab I)7 which the Soviet side would find acceptable, and he hoped that I would use my influence with the Germans. I said I would have to study them. I also said I would talk to Bahr and Rush in great detail and have a brief meeting of Rush, Dobrynin and myself set up for Monday.8

As Dobrynin left, he said he could not understand the motive behind the publication of the documents in the New York Times.9 As far as he could tell, it would hurt the Democrats a lot more than the Republicans except insofar as it might influence the McGovern/Hatfield vote.10 Dobrynin said that he continued to hold to his belief that the President’s domestic position was growing stronger.

SUBJECT
Your Questions Regarding Our Trade with the Soviets and East Europeans

In your conversation with Ambassador Beam on June 10\(^2\) you mentioned the need to study the potential for trade between the United States and the USSR over the next two or three years should we further relax some of our trade barriers. Peter Peterson has already quietly begun an interagency study on the U.S. stake in East-West trade and he now has a report.\(^3\) The study discusses U.S. trade potential in 1975 as it would be affected by diminution in our export controls, relaxation of financing restraints, granting of most-favored-nation treatment and releasing our shipping restrictions on grains.

You had also asked what prevents us from doing the same as the Canadians in their recent grain deal with the Soviet Union. Your announcement on June 10 that we are suspending the 50 percent U.S. shipping requirement\(^4\) means that we will be in a position to do the same as the Canadians. However, as you know, we will face a severe practical problem if Gleason maintains his refusal to allow the East Coast longshoremen to load these ships.\(^5\)

You asked what we can do to end the restriction on credits to the Soviet Union. The Senate has already passed a new Export-Import bill which eliminates the Fino amendment prohibiting credits to countries such as

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII. Secret. Sonnenfeldt and Johnston forwarded a draft of this memorandum, with Peterson’s concurrence, to Kissinger on June 11. (Ibid.) According to a notation and attached correspondence profile, the President saw the memorandum from Kissinger on June 22.

\(^2\) See Document 255.

\(^3\) In a June 11 memorandum forwarding the report to Kissinger, Johnston explained that Peterson had concluded that “a total relaxation of our East-West trade barriers would improve our balance of payments position by about $500 million in 1975.” Johnston further noted Peterson’s belief that a change of policy, allowing U.S. companies to supply the Kama River Project, might eventually result in $200 million of commercial benefits. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII)

\(^4\) See footnote 3, Document 255.

\(^5\) See footnote 5, Document 253.
the Soviet Union trading with North Vietnam. The House has just held hearings on this bill and our spokesman informed the subcommittee in low key, according to your directive, that the Administration is still opposed to elimination of the amendment. The subcommittee has rejected our position, but there would still be support for it in the full committee and on the floor of the House. There is some possibility that the House might pass the bill, even over low key Administration opposition, and a change in the Administration position would probably assure House action.

Peterson also has a group looking at a series of steps we could take in the East-West trade area should we wish to do so.

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6 Under this amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, sponsored by Congressman Paul Fino (R–New York) and passed by the House on February 7, 1968, the Export-Import Bank was prohibited from extending export credits to countries trading with North Vietnam, including the Soviet Union. Three days after a Senate vote, the House voted on August 5 to repeal the amendment, giving the President discretionary authority to authorize credits to the People’s Republic of China and other Communist countries. Nixon signed the new bill into law on August 17. For further discussion of the issue, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 340.

7 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Peterson for lunch on June 16 from 1:10 to 2:15 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) In a June 18 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnston reported that Peterson had informed his staff that Kissinger was against a proposed telephone call to Henry Ford on the Kama River project. Johnston also noted that Peterson wanted to send a telegram to Moscow, which would “merely inform the Soviets that the U.S. has not come to a decision on this issue.” Kissinger marked this passage and instructed Haig in the margin: “There is to be no separate Peterson communication to Soviets. Al, please make sure. The memo must go through me.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 402, Subject Files, Trade, Vol. IV [1 of 2]) The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 334.
259. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Premier Kosygin’s Speech

In many ways the Premier’s “election” speech of June 9 was a curious presentation. It combines rather harsh criticism of the US with some more positive forecasts that relations may improve. It is also contradictory: he refuses to make a distinction between bilateral relations with the US and our “aggressive policy,” yet he announced, at the same time, that the USSR is prepared for talks with the US on a “wide range of questions of mutual interest.” The ambiguity in treatment of the US carries over to several areas.

—Kosygin acknowledges that relations with the US merit “special attention.” On the other hand, he went out of his way to deny that the USSR would ever engage in “super-power” collusions with the US to settle international issues.

—He criticized us for attaching conditions to international issues and linking one issue with another, especially pointing to delaying tactics in taking up the Soviet MBFR proposal (after the Soviets waited three years). But he made his own linkage by stressing that our support for Israel worsened the Middle East situation, and could not fail to have an effect on other areas.

—He noted that relations with the US were “far from satisfactory” and went on to talk about the so called crisis of capitalism and US ex-
ploitation of its allies. Yet, he ended the foreign policy section of his remarks by concluding that the USSR had reason to be optimistic concerning the developments of international affairs.

In short the Premier gave an “election” speech in which he carefully covered all bets. For him this may have been necessary. You may recall he suffered a demotion in the hierarchical rankings at the Party Congress, and his is the first of three major speeches. He will be followed by President Podgorny and then on Friday by Brezhnev. Considered in this light, it was probably prudent for Kosygin to balance his remarks and avoid straightforward positions.

Since there will be two important speeches coming, too much importance should probably not be attached to Kosygin’s alone as a clear policy signal. What will be more interesting will be the emphasis Brezhnev chooses in discussing relations with the US. Kosygin, for example, totally ignored the subject of SALT, which may be reserved for Brezhnev.

For now, one could conclude that the Soviet top leaders seem to be cautiously avoiding any verbal commitment to the thesis that relations with the US are improving, but suggesting to their audiences, that this is the more likely trend. This was evident in Kosygin’s standard descriptions of the two choices facing Washington: continuing tensions, or “mutually acceptable solutions to pressing problems.” He implied that the second road was the more likely choice.

\footnote{See footnote 4, Document 256.}
Washington, June 15, 1971, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting was arranged by Dr. Kissinger in response to the request by Ambassador Dobrynin that he personally deliver the message of the Soviet Government for a Five-Power nuclear conference. Ambassador Dobrynin opened the conversation by handing to the President the official Soviet text and a translation. He said, “As is obvious, the Soviet Union is asking for a conference of nuclear powers to discuss the question of general and complete nuclear disarmament. The place can be wherever is convenient and the agenda is open. A preparatory meeting is acceptable. The Soviet Government hopes that your reply will be positive. Of course, Soviet/US talks will continue bilaterally outside the conference as part of the SALT talks. The note is being delivered today in Paris, London, Peking and Washington.” (Copy of note is attached)

The President asked what preparatory work Ambassador Dobrynin had in mind. Was he thinking of Foreign Ministers? The Ambassador said, no, they were thinking of Foreign Ministry officials and Ambassadors. The time, place and modalities could be handled either through diplomatic channels or otherwise.

The President then said, “Let’s be realistic. The key to this sort of thing is what the two major nuclear powers will do. It is a question of leadership at the top—I don’t mean at the top of the governments, but at the top of this group of five.”

Ambassador Dobrynin asked, “Do you have anything in mind, Mr. President?” The President replied, “We will consider your proposal seriously. The way our two governments can make the most progress is

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 3 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) A tape recording of the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 521–5.

2 See Document 257.

3 See footnote 4, Document 257.
through the talks that you and Kissinger have been having. They are completely confidential with nobody leaking. Your government has confidence in you; Kissinger has a special relationship with me. Apart from the cosmetics of a Five-Power discussion, the real issue is the Two-Power relationship.”

Ambassador Dobrynin said, “Well, how shall we do it?” The President answered, “We will make a formal reply. Then you have a little talk with Henry Kissinger.” The Ambassador said, “What do you think of US/Soviet relations in general?” The President said, “We can make a breakthrough on SALT and Berlin, and then our whole post-war relations will be on a new basis. The whole relationship can, indeed, be on a new basis. The press last week spoke of the failure of Berlin. You know better. We are at a point where we should make some agreement. If we culminate one, it will have a massive effect.”

Ambassador Dobrynin said, “Are there any other areas of discussion?” Dr. Kissinger said, “Mr. President, he is trying to lead you into the Middle East,” and the Ambassador laughed. The President said, “As for the Middle East, there is, of course, a fear of a US/Soviet condominium. Of course, Soviet and U.S. interests are quite different. We both have constituents we may not be able to control, and this makes the situation very explosive. The Middle East is very much on our mind and, at some point, discussions between us will be possible.”

The meeting then ended with an exchange of pleasantries.4

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4 After his meeting with Dobrynin, Kissinger met Haldeman for 10 minutes to discuss several issues. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) Kissinger, for instance, told Haldeman that “we’ll probably drop the Midway visit now.” “Henry’s quite optimistic about all the rest of his initiatives,” Haldeman reported in his diary, “and feels that we don’t need this on top of all the rest. He had Dobrynin in today to present some proposal of no significance to the P and feels that the way things are rolling along, it’s all going to come together.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) Kissinger then met Nixon in the Oval Office from 3:19 to 3:31 p.m. to review the afternoon’s events. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The two men agreed that “something’s going to happen.” Nixon: “Henry, can you wait to see their faces, though, if they do not give us the summit?” Kissinger: “And you announce [China]? [laughs] Mr. President, no matter what we do—what they do, we are so, for once, we are ahead of the power curve with them.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 521–7)
261. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Some Unusual Light on Brezhnev's Personality and Policies

The Canadians have provided the State Department with a fairly detailed account of Brezhnev's recent talk with Prime Minister Trudeau (Tab A). The Canadian rendition is almost certainly accurate, though possibly abbreviated. Brezhnev, for his part, undoubtedly tailored his approach and substantive comments to his audience, which he presumably was certain would ultimately also include the US Government. Even so, there emerges a rather unusual picture of the Soviet leader, who has often been portrayed as rude and overbearing as well as intellectually pedestrian.

You may wish to scan the entire Canadian text which Secretary Rogers forwarded for your attention. Its more interesting elements include:

—Brezhnev's highly unusual, explicit effort to deny published reports that he is a hard-liner;
—his concern with his image in history as a "realist," "humanist" and "democrat" rather than a "rabid reactionary" (we had felt that at the 24th Party Congress Brezhnev had shown distinct concern with his historical role);
—his unusual references to his personal background and to his long tenure in the top Soviet leadership and resultant experience with five American Presidents;
—his clearly one-sided view of American post-war behavior (unresponsiveness to Soviet overtures, concern with building overseas military positions to "encircle" the USSR) but at the same time his apparent recognition that the Soviets have a problem of establishing "confidence" in themselves;
—his obvious pre-occupation with Soviet-US relations;
—his view that the behavior of American Presidents toward the USSR is cyclical: starting out with friendly overtures which then give...
way to a harder line which in turn, “at the end” is again replaced by “good”-sounding speeches;

—finally, his view, which he has recently stressed in speeches, that American public opinion is gradually producing desirable changes in US policy, for example with regard to Vietnam. (Brezhnev said he had seen movies of anti-Vietnam demonstrations by US veterans.)

In sum, the Trudeau conversation tends to support the view that some time before the 24th Party Congress Brezhnev decided to stand on a “peace and prosperity” platform, presumably because he considered this most advantageous in terms of domestic Soviet politics, Soviet opportunities in international affairs and the historical judgment of his period of leadership. It is interesting, in this context, that Kosygin, who in the past had been cast in the more pragmatic and reasonable role has of late consistently taken a harder stance than Brezhnev on international relations. (In his recent “election” speech, Kosygin failed to mention the May 20 SALT announcement and intimated that Vietnam would continue to cloud bilateral US-Soviet relations.) Kosygin appeared to move down one notch in the Soviet pecking order at the Party Congress and the marked contrast between his and Brezhnev’s stance may signal the approaching end of their alliance or at least a reversal of their traditional roles in the Kremlin.

Recommendation

That you take the opportunity to look through the Canadian report on Brezhnev at Tab A.

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3 See Document 259.

SUBJECT

Russian Suggestions to Use the International Monetary Crisis to Separate the United States and Western Europe

Arthur Burns has written to you at Tab A to report a conversation with Dr. Wolfgang Schmitz, President of the Austrian National Bank.

Schmitz reported that the Russians have recently suggested a package of three proposals in the monetary sphere:

— to convene a European economic conference without the U.S.;
— to revise the international monetary system by a new Bretton Woods conference;
— to find a substitute for the dollar as the world’s key currency.

Schmitz is opposed, and Burns thinks these proposals have no practical significance, but they are important as an indication that the Russians would like to use monetary questions to separate the U.S. and Western Europe.
263. Memorandum of Conversation

WASHINGTON, JUNE 21, 1971, 5 P.M.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Dobrynin

The meeting took place because I had promised Dobrynin to introduce him to Rush and to make clear that we understood the agreed procedures for proceeding on Berlin.

After introducing Rush and some pleasantries, I told Dobrynin that the President had met twice with Rush. I had met separately with Rush and Bahr and jointly with them for extended conversations. As a result, we had agreed on the following: (1) The President wanted to reaffirm his desire to expedite a Berlin agreement; (2) Rush had been instructed to be as flexible as possible within the general framework of American policies; (3) we proposed a continuation of the Bahr/Falin/Rush talks. As they were finishing each section, they were to agree on how to handle it in the Four Power context; (4) the Advisors’ meetings were a bad forum because our advisors were instructed by the regular bureaucracy and would, therefore, reject even matters that Bahr, Falin and Rush had already agreed to. Therefore, there should be a stalemate in the advisors’ talks, and Abrasimov should suggest at the next Ambassadors’ meeting on July 7th or 8th that henceforth matters...
be moved into the Ambassadorial context. At these Ambassadorial meetings, Rush could propose compromise formula that had previously been concerted; (5) Falin, Bahr and Rush should agree among each other how to handle it. For example, the question of transit could be handled by Abrasimov putting forward a modification of the Soviet position which was still unacceptable, but which showed some progress. Rush could then propose a compromise which knocked out some of the ideas of Abrasimov, but which would come close to or be the agreed language. On other topics, the process could be reversed. In any event, there had to be some bargaining or some seeming bargaining in order to explain why the progress; (6) I told Dobrynin that I had carefully gone over with Bahr and Rush the proposals that he had made for specific formulations and that the answer would be given by Rush. I did not want to inject myself into the detail drafting process; (7) on the specific matter of Soviet presence in Berlin which he had raised at the last meeting with me,4 Rush had been given new instructions to conform with what I had already told Dobrynin;5 (8) I had worked out a procedure with Rush and Bahr according to which, if nothing new happened, the three would agree by the end of July on a Berlin solution and the Four Powers by the end of August.

Dobrynin asked whether, under the formula we proposed, it was the Soviets who had to make all the compromise proposals in the Big Four context. Rush explained that this was not the case, and that either side could make proposals, but that the precise details should be worked out by the three. Dobrynin said he thought this was a positive program and that it might lead to a result.

I then asked Rush to wait for me outside, and turned to other matters. First, I pointed out that the Izvestia comments6 on our papers which linked the Nixon to the Johnson Administration and criticized the President were taken extremely ill, and that I hoped there would be no continuation of it. Dobrynin said that the press had general instructions to oppose the war in Vietnam and to show an unbroken web. He was certain that this was not done on governmental instructions—all the more so as Brezhnev was actually out of the country.7

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4 See Document 257.
5 In spite of Kissinger’s assurances to Dobrynin, Rogers instructed Rush on June 23 that any increase in the Soviet presence in West Berlin must be both limited and unofficial. (Telegram 112959 to Bonn, June 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
7 Brezhnev attended the SED Party Congress in East Berlin, where he delivered a speech on June 16. (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 25 (July 20, 1971), pp. 2–4)
I then raised the question of the Summit and said that I hoped we would get an answer by the end of next week because if we did not, I thought we should call off the whole project. Dobrynin said that he must have misunderstood what I told him at Camp David because he had told Moscow that we might be willing to agree to either the period between March and May, if September was not suitable, though we preferred September. He said it would give an impression of a profound reversal if he now had to notify Moscow that the Spring was no longer possible. I told him, no, we preferred September, but I’d have to check with the President and let him know about the Spring. I called him back an hour and a half later and told him to stick with his present instructions.

Dobrynin then handed me a piece of paper (attached) which lifted some discrepancies between our English text and their translation of the SALT letter. He said it was not a major matter because we were not responsible for their translation of the text. I said that I did not think that any issues would have to be settled by recourse to the text and that I hoped they would approach matters in a positive spirit. Dobrynin said they would but that it would be extremely helpful if we did not insist from the beginning that we talk about ABM and offensive weapons jointly. He said this would create a major bureaucratic difficulty for them and weaken the influence of the Foreign Office. He could assure me that if we concentrated on ABM for the first two or three weeks, that then there would be no difficulty linking the offensive discussions. I told him I would take this up with Smith.

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8 See Document 252.
9 A transcript of the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File.
10 Attached but not printed.
11 Kissinger called Smith at 8:45 a.m. on June 23 to report on his meeting with Dobrynin. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “K: I think if we just table something and say our understanding is we are going to take up ABM first it will be all right. S: I said there was no chance of talking about the [defensive] part without also discussing the [offensive] part. K: You are right about that. If you could find a work modality I think they would consider it a sign of our good faith. Say first defensive, then offensive and then concurrently. S: Let me work out a paper on this and send it over to you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)
264. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)


[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s and Kissinger’s schedules.]

Kissinger: I talked to Dobrynin yesterday—
Nixon: What did he have?
Kissinger: —mostly about Berlin and the complicated machinery set up on how to get it settled.  
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: Well, I want to give them a maximum incentive.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: Also I set up a machinery that strings it out through July and August. At the end of that meeting, then—
Nixon: It’ll be strung out for your trip.
Kissinger: —he raised—I first said two things. I said that we were outraged by their linking this administration to the previous one through the Vietnam papers in Izvestia, and if they were going to—
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: —start playing that sort of a game, we would know what to do.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: We then—but then, the major topic was the summit. As you had told me the night before,  I said, “Now, I just want to remind you, I expect an answer by the end of next week. If you can’t decide on it, we’ll just have to let it lapse.” Well, that got him very, very excited, because he said, “Oh God, no!” He said, “Then I’ve misreported.”
Because he said, “You told me in Camp David”—and that’s true—“that if it isn’t in September, then the only other time it can be is in the spring.”

Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And he’s now reported that to Moscow. And he said—
Nixon: Huh.
Kissinger: So he pulled back from that. In any case, he has told Moscow that they must make a definite decision by the end of this month; that we will have it no later than July 4th. He said Brezhnev was in Germany and, therefore, the decision couldn’t be made right away. Now, I then tried to reach you; you were at dinner. I tried to reach Bob; he was at dinner. And I decided we didn’t have any choice anyway, because—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —if I insisted that it had to be September or nothing, and then they said September, and then we kick them in the teeth with the Chinese, it would really be brutal if they then didn’t give us September. So, I told him to leave it stand. And it has this other advantage, that, if they don’t give us September, and we then do go to Peking in October or November, let them cancel the spring. Why should we do it? It’s—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And the spring—
Nixon: Right after—
Kissinger: The spring wouldn’t be announced.
Nixon: The other thing, of course, that really should be—I would assume you have already made to him—that what we are thinking of, if they go in September, is a return visit on their part next spring.
Kissinger: I haven’t said that yet. I thought you should do that in Moscow.
Nixon: Well, I’m inclined to think that that’s what we want. I mean, it may be that Brezhnev—he has dropped, I noticed, several hints with regard to his not traveling abroad and wanting to do some foreign travel and so forth and so on.
Kissinger: Yes.
Nixon: And it may be that that’s what we want. If we wanted—if that’s what we really want, that’s what, we should put it up to them.
Kissinger: I’m gradually coming to the view that we might even be better off not having Moscow this year and having Peking, getting

4 See Document 252.
that up—that’s the one. And taking our chances on Moscow next year and—
  Nixon: Right.
  Kissinger: —giving Moscow an incentive.
  Haldeman: Except if you got Peking locked for next year and get, still get Moscow this year, you’re in pretty good shape.
  Kissinger: Yeah.
  Nixon: That’s the point.
  Kissinger: Well, we’ll know—
  Nixon: Well, we’re doing fine. Hell, you’d love to be in the position to get both—
  Kissinger: Well, we got another panting message from the Chinese that all technical arrangements—
  Nixon: Right.
  Kissinger: —are going forward.
  Nixon: Let them—look, we’ve gone as far as we can, and the Soviet, damn it, they know what the score is. You’ve been perfect—totally honestly with them. And, now, it’s up to them.
  Kissinger: Right.

[Omitted here is discussion of Congress, Vietnam, and the Pentagon Papers case.]

265. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

The conversation concerned the fact that a subordinate Soviet Official, Kvitsinskii, had approached Jonathan Dean from our Embassy

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Young forwarded a draft of this memorandum and another summarizing it for the President to Kissinger and Haig. On the issue of whether to forward the memoranda to Nixon, Kissinger wrote: “Just file.” According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting, which was held in General Hughes’s office, lasted from 2:34 to 3:29 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
in Bonn and mentioned to him a special channel [related Rush cables attached].
I pointed out that this was an impossible situation and had to be rectified.

Dobrynin said he could assure me it was a mistake—that in Moscow now, there was a feeling that definite progress was being made, and he was certain that it was not a deliberate action. He would take measures in a gentle way because he thought Kvitsinskiiy was a very valuable person and he didn’t want him to be punished. He said I had to understand that our system of government was hard for the Soviet leaders to understand.

We then turned to random matters. I told Dobrynin that I would give him a preliminary reply to the Kama River Project on Wednesday evening, and particularly the stages at which it could be accomplished. I told him also there was no sense bringing public pressure on us and that we would appreciate it if this pressure would stop. We were moving as fast as was possible.

Dobrynin then turned to SALT. He said that Garthoff had had a conversation with Vorontsov and had talked in great generalities about a treaty form and, secondly, had mentioned a very broad agreement on offensive limitations. Dobrynin wanted to tell me that in his view, Moscow was prepared for an ICBM freeze, but the broader the freeze on our side, the more difficult their bureaucratic problem would become. I told him I would discuss it when we had a general review of the situation Wednesday evening for dinner.

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2 Not attached. Brackets in the original. In a special channel message to Kissinger on June 26, Rush commented: “Dean and Kvitsinsky have developed a close relationship which is very valuable to us, and it would be a mistake to kill this relationship. Accordingly, I think it would be best if you did not mention this situation to Dobrynin, who might take strong action.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) The message is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 261.

3 June 30.

4 Memoranda of their June 25 conversation on SALT, MBFR, and the Soviet proposal for a five-power disarmament conference are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–3 and DEF 6 EUR.

5 Kissinger called Dobrynin at 11:35 a.m. on June 29 to review arrangements for the meeting. After agreeing to meet the next evening at the Soviet Embassy, Kissinger asked about security for Soviet shipping in American ports and reciprocity for American ships in Soviet ports. Dobrynin replied that he was unfamiliar with the issue. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)
After his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on June 28, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger informed Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush by special channel on the discussion of Berlin. Kissinger reported that, when he raised the Kvitsinsky-Dean episode in a “very low key way,” Dobrynin promised that the Soviets would henceforth “guarantee discipline” in their conduct of the talks. Kissinger, however, also issued the following instructions, linking progress on Berlin to his upcoming trip to Beijing:

“I am a little bit disturbed by the pace of your negotiations. It is imperative that you do not come to a final agreement until after July 15 for reasons that will become apparent to you. The ideal from our point of view is to make some progress but prevent a final conclusion until the second half of the month sometime between the 20th of July and the end of the month. I know this puts you in a tough spot with Falin and Bahr but it is essential for our game plan. Please try to tread the fine line between progress and ultimate success. Above all, please keep me fully and immediately informed. No one will believe what we did here.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2])

Rush replied on June 29 that he would follow Kissinger’s instructions and attempt to delay a final agreement on Berlin until after July 20. “If unusual difficulties arise,” Rush assured Kissinger, “I’ll let you know.” (Ibid.)

In a special channel message to Kissinger on June 30, Rush reported on his meeting the previous evening with West German State Secretary Egon Bahr and Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Valentin Falin. Rush noted that Falin had been in his “usual relaxed friendly un-Russian mood,” leading to progress on such issues as the right of West Berliners to visit East Germany, including East Berlin. Rush expressed some concern, however, about carrying out Kissinger’s instructions. According to Rush, the three men planned to meet next on July 6, after Falin returned from consultations in Moscow:

“I think it will take some time for him [Falin] to work out an acceptable posture on Federal presence, but if instead he returns with one, we may have a small problem of avoiding embarrassment with the Germans as we carry out your time schedule. However I think it can be done by delaying consideration and final agreement on the issues of representation abroad and Soviet interests in West Berlin and by other means.” (Ibid.)

Before leaving Washington on July 1, Kissinger drafted a message for Rush, sent by special channel the next day, with some last-minute
advice: “Could you not use my Asia trip to bring a delay by claiming difficulty in getting instructions? At any rate, keep things fluid until I am back from my trip and various things have fallen into place.” (Ibid.)

The full text of these messages is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, Document 262 and footnote 4 thereto and Document 265 and footnote 3 thereto.

Although he did not reveal his strategy to Rush at the time, Kissinger later recalled: “Once it became clear that there would be no summit in September, I sought to delay the conclusion of the Berlin agreement until after the announcement of my Peking visit. This would ease Soviet temptations to use our China opening as a pretext to launch a new round of crises. I succeeded, but only with some difficulty. Even Rush, like all negotiators, was getting carried away by the prospect of an agreement and procrastinated only with great reluctance (not knowing, of course, the reasons involved).” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 829)

267. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


[Omitted here is discussion of scheduling a meeting to consider the upcoming secret trip to China and a possible Soviet reply on the summit before Kissinger’s departure in the evening on July 1.]

Kissinger: We could do it Thursday morning. If you’d like to do it tomorrow night, I’ll cancel Dobrynin. I’ll do whatever you say.

Nixon: What’s this about? You already saw him, I thought.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 531–27. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 4:21 to 4:31 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

July 1. During a telephone conversation at 4:16 p.m. on June 29, Nixon and Kissinger briefly discussed scheduling a meeting: “P: Henry, I have nothing to go over with you at this point. As you know, we want to have our talk. I have set time aside tomorrow or tomorrow night. K: I have made a tentative date with Dobrynin for 8:30 tomorrow night. But it is crucial that you and I talk. P: Where are you now? K: In my office. P: We can decide it now or do it on the phone. K: Why don’t I come over now? P: All right.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)
Kissinger: Well, I thought I’d review the whole sit—I just saw him for 15 minutes yesterday about the technical side.  
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I thought I could review this whole situation with him tomorrow—
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: —and trigger a final response on the summit by next Tuesday.  
If we don’t get it by then, I’ll just go ahead on—and I thought I could do that best in a somewhat—
Nixon: If they really wanted it, they’d let you know already, don’t you think? Their summit thing.
Kissinger: No, I think they want it. Every indication we have is that they want it.
Nixon: Yet there seemed to be some reason though—
Kissinger: I mean, the fact that they told Charlie Bartlett. The fact that they haven’t—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —the fact that they haven’t published those papers. 
[Omitted here is discussion on arrangements for the meeting.]
Kissinger: Now I want you to know—
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: —I have cancelled—I have sent out instructions that there are to be no backgrounders—
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: —no meetings with the press.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: Each of these ambassadors that you may run into may tell you—
Nixon: Oh, I understand. Sorry, I just want to—
Kissinger: —that that’s what they want for themselves.
Nixon: The play—I mean the play that we’re making—I’m not a damn bit concerned if we—if you were just taking a trip normally, I wouldn’t be concerned. But, boy, on this one, I just want to make that big play.
Kissinger: July 15th, Mr. President. It’s the big play.

3 See Document 265.
4 July 6.
5 Charles L. Bartlett, syndicated columnist.
6 Reference is presumably to the Pentagon Papers.
Nixon: Yeah. If we can make the new China on something.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: My current thinking is still, if we don’t get the answer from Dobrynin—you’re going to tell him we’ve got to have answer by when?
Kissinger: Well, my thinking is we should be done by July 4th.
Nixon: And he’s got to inform Haig of that.
Kissinger: Yeah. You’re leaving here for the West Coast when?
Nixon: On the 6th. I’ll be here.
Kissinger: I’ll give him till the evening of July 5th.
Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: So that Haig can get it to me.
Nixon: That’s why [I] have him here. Well, can I just say we got to know by, you know, around the evening of July 5th? Good. Fair enough.
Kissinger: And—
Nixon: Then, in the meantime, if he doesn’t make a move, then we go.
Kissinger: Then we go this year. On the whole, Mr. President, I have to—my candid judgment is that the impact on Asia of immediately announcing this, announcing a summit, would really be a price we shouldn’t pay lightly, in terms of impression. I think it would help, if we can afford it, it would help your posture best, through ’72, if we—you can be seen to have moved deliberately but decisively. We’ve been talking about a summit so long that we forget how it, big it will [be] even if we had to send a special emissary to Peking. But if we don’t get a Russian summit, we may be—
Nixon: We may have to, Henry.
Kissinger: If you feel you need it, nothing is more important—
Nixon: I understand. The impact on Asia, I know, is bad—I don’t want to complicate it—but we’re going to have to make some play [showing] that Nixon’s still in the arena.
Kissinger: I agree, Mr. President.
Nixon: That’s it.
Kissinger: And I’m just putting—
Nixon: I know the impact is going to be enormous.
Kissinger: The ideal: if we could get the Russian summit and if we could string the Chinese one into April—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —with a Bruce visit before—and Bruce will play it so low-key that he won’t skim the cream off.
Nixon: In the meantime, though, you realize that others will go skim the cream off. They won’t wait that long.
Kissinger: But they—
Nixon: I mean, I’m just thinking of what we got to think about, what is possible.
Kissinger: Yeah. But, you see, I think if we announce that we’ve had high-level conversations with—
Nixon: I should be the first; I should be the first to go after you do it this time. Other case—unless it’s Bruce. Right?
Kissinger: Well, you’ll have been the one that opened it.
Nixon: Yeah, I know—
Kissinger: You’ll have been the first one—
Nixon: —but that’s not the same thing. It isn’t the same thing. The first time an American politician goes there, that’s going to be it. Everything else will be encores.
Kissinger: Well—
Nixon: Maybe it’s a Presidential candidate, see? That’s what we’re up against. We’re up against the Kennedys, the Muskies, and the rest, panting to get over there—and knowing the Left, with all the rhetoric. And also, we got—we get into the election year and, you know, and the primaries, and so forth and so on—
Kissinger: Well, you—
Nixon: So I think you’ve got to weigh that too. I know—
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: —that everyone’s the other way but weigh this one briefly.
Kissinger: Well, first of all, we’ll have to see what they really have in mind.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: Secondly, if they’re very tough, and if it looks as if they’re going to play this into a humiliation, then it’s not in our interest to do it.
Nixon: Not at all. Oh, hell no. I know. I know.
Kissinger: But—
Nixon: That’s a different game.
Kissinger: But we got a message again from Pakistan today. They sent a navigator down, and they’re begin—going to start flying this weekend to handle it.
Nixon: Hmm.
Kissinger: Well, I will—well, we can—if we get a Russian summit, then we’re in good shape, as I understand it.

7 Not found.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: That’s what we’re talking about. And then, we would play the Bruce thing up.

Kissinger: Then we’d play the Bruce thing. And we can still say that you’ve accepted a summit in principle.

Nixon: Yeah. “Ambassador Bruce will go.”

Kissinger: “To discuss the—”

Nixon: “The agenda.”

Kissinger: Well, and “to prepare the ground” and so forth. And we’ll have that phrase about peace in the Pacific and peace in Asia.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Well, we’re in that curious, curious time. If we didn’t have an election coming up next year—if you have two years, it wouldn’t make any difference. But we’re in a curious time now when what we do is far—say is far more important than what we do. And we have to play to the galleries. It’s too bad. It’s the way the game is, Henry.

Kissinger: We just don’t want to get it completely unraveled.

Nixon: No. Oh, no.

Kissinger: That’s because playing the Russian—

Nixon: Very positive.

Kissinger: Playing the Russian and Chinese things simultaneously is—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —is going to be tricky as hell.

Nixon: And the Vietnamese too.

Kissinger: We need a strong announcement on July 15th to sock the Vietnamese between the eyes. That will really jolt—

Nixon: You mean about China?

Kissinger: Yeah. Whatever it is, it will jolt them [North Vietnamese].

Nixon: You won’t tell them, of course, when you see them at all then?

Kissinger: Oh, not a word.

Nixon: Not a word. All right. See you tomorrow at 9 o’clock. No, Thursday—

Kissinger: Thursday at 9 o’clock. Right?

Nixon: That’s good. You don’t think you’re going to appear anxious to Dobrynin though?
Kissinger: Oh, no.
Nixon: I don't.
Kissinger: I'm holding Bruce—I'm holding Rush,8 and I'm holding the trade thing. I've worked it out with Peterson—9
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —so that we won't agree to anything until after they answer on the summit.

8 See Document 266.
9 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met with Peterson from 3:47 to 4:20 p.m., immediately before his meeting with the President. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

268. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


[Omitted here is a brief exchange on the President’s schedule.]
Nixon: [Do] you see Dobrynin today?
Kissinger: Tomorrow night. But I'll change it if you prefer.
Nixon: No, no, that's fine, Henry.
Kissinger: I’m seeing him for dinner tomorrow night.
Nixon: [unclear] just lay down my ultimatum in front of them. Okay?
Kissinger: Yeah. And to review where we stand, and to put out a few carrots—not for the summit. But we really have, assuming they don't give us the summit, and we do the, really, other thing, we need a big ploy. We need to have some carrots out there so that—
Nixon: For them?
Kissinger: —for them—
Nixon: It's a crap shoot.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 531–31. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger and Haig in the Oval Office at 6:29 p.m. Haig left at 6:54, and Nixon and Kissinger continued to talk until 7; the transcript printed here covers this conversation. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
Kissinger: —so that they don’t kick over the traces.
Nixon: [sighs] No way [unclear]—
Kissinger: [It’s a] dangerous game. On the whole, it’d be a hell of a lot better if we got—they just have no leg to stand on. If they give us a summit in Moscow, how can they object to our going to Peking? It will infuriate them, but the other one will just shock them to—and we just may have a year of absolute unshirted hell from them in the Middle East—
Nixon: That’s the problem.
Kissinger: —and elsewhere.
Nixon: On the other hand, let’s look at what you’re looking at though. You’re looking at the possibility that you’re not going to get any word on the summit. That’s why I just say to you: [after] tomorrow, the train—there’s going to be nothing you can do about the summit.
Kissinger: Well, the one advantage of our meeting on Thursday morning,² Mr. President, is that I’ll have had the talk with him on Wednesday night. I don’t think he’ll have had an answer by Wednesday night because their Politburo meets on Thursdays. So he’ll probably get his answer, if he gets it, on Friday.
Nixon: We ought to—you think we ought to, we really ought to go for the summit?
Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, in their brutal, cheap, third-rate way, they’re a miserable bunch of bastards. I mean, if you look at—
Nixon: It’s terrible.
Kissinger: —the way the Chinese have done business with us, and the way they do business. You just don’t treat the President of the United States this way. Here is Gromyko sitting in here, inviting you to Moscow, and now they’ve been stringing it along, maneuvering, dancing around. And basically they’ve always been forthcoming when we scared them most.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. That’s true. [unclear] the truth.
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: Boy, if they only knew what the hell was coming up, they’d be in here panting for that summit, wouldn’t they? Huh?
Kissinger: I’m sure.
[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s secret trip to China and negotiations on Vietnam.]

² July 1.
269. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin Tonight²

In Pete Peterson’s absence, his assistant, Deane Hinton, has forwarded talking points (Tab A),³ as you and Peterson agreed, for your discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin on the Kama River Project.

I suggest that you modify these talking points somewhat in your discussions. In the first place, they are excessively positive on the prospects for U.S. approval of the Kama River Project prior to a firm decision. In the second place, they imply that we may license the Kama River Project only if the Russians also agree to additional purchases of non-strategic commercial imports from the United States, i.e. pencil factories. Such an approach would very likely hinder any U.S. participation in the Kama River since it would burden the American participants with extra obligations not required with Western European contractors. Also, it would open the possibilities of negotiations in which the Russians are sure to demand credits and most-favored-nation treatment. In other words, such an approach would hinder the U.S. commercial opportunities, be less forthcoming with the Soviets, and would open the possibility of a comprehensive trade negotiation with the Russians, which would expose us to exceptional demands and might prove fruitless.

Al Haig has also suggested that I include the proposed memorandum from you and Pete Peterson for the President on the scenario

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [part 1]. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger with the comment: “I am afraid something has slipped the cog here because I don’t see anything for your use tonight except the more general considerations outlined in the strategy paper at Tab B.”

² According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger left the White House at 8:45 to attend a “dinner meeting” with Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found. According to Dobrynin, Kissinger reported during the meeting that his upcoming Asian trip “was supposed to acquaint him with the rising tensions between India and Pakistan.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 224–225) Dobrynin also recalled that Kissinger was optimistic about progress both on SALT and in Berlin. (Dobrynin, Собой доверитель, p. 211)

³ Attached at Tab A is a June 30 memorandum from Hinton to Kissinger.
for future East-West trade decisions. It is at Tab B. This is the staff draft which Peterson has been considering but he has not approved it. He is out of town and he will undoubtedly wish to work with it more. Nevertheless, it will provide further background for your discussions with the Ambassador. The section describing possible U.S. moves begins on Page 2.5

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5 The possible moves in Tab B on the participation of U.S. companies in the Kama River project were described as follows: “There are several options available on approaching this question, including: continued delay; approval of piecemeal U.S. participation only in segments of the proposal; approval of U.S. participation provided the Russians agree to other commercial purchases from the U.S.”

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270. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1


[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, including publication of the Pentagon Papers, and Kissinger’s secret trip to China.]

Nixon: Now, let me say, just a few other odds and ends as I read this thing.2 As I say, it is a brilliant job. You just tell your staff, get them

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 534–3. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger and Haig in the Oval Office on July 1 from 9:54 to 10:26 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Haig drafted a memorandum of the conversation; printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 137. For his memoir account, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 734–736.

2 Reference is to Kissinger’s briefing book for his secret trip to Beijing; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Briefing Book for HAK’s July 1971 Trip, Polo I. For excerpts from the briefing book—including Nixon’s handwritten notation on the title page, a scope paper, and talking points on India and Pakistan—see Aijazzudin, ed., The White House and Pakistan, pp. 159–170. Kissinger later recalled: “I cannot tell how thoroughly Nixon reviewed this material; his usual procedure was to concentrate on the cover memorandum and ignore the backup papers.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 735)
together and tell them that I was enormously impressed; I’ve been reading the damn thing. Now, you’ve got to put in, more than you have here, a very real fear. Now, I want to say, “The President has been generous.” This general thing comes through as me being too soft and puts—it talks about [how] I’m a very reasonable man; I am not trying to do this; I am trying to have a position where we can have—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: —less presence and more permanence, and so forth. That’s all nice and so forth and so on. But I want you to put in that this is the man who did Cambodia. This is the man who did Laos. This is the man who will be, who will look to our interests, and who will protect our interests without regard to political considerations.

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s trip, including instructions on how to handle Vietnam.]

Nixon: Now, I think without being obvious about it—I mean, without being, without saying in so many words, but you should put in a little more about the necessity for our moving toward the Soviet. In other words, “With regard to the Soviet, we have to realize”—I mean, “They [the Chinese, have to realize]”—“We are seeking détente with the Soviet. It is not directed against you. But we have—our interests clash in Europe. Our interests clash in the Mideast. Our interests clash in the Caribbean. We intend to protect our interests. But we are going to seek it. And our interests clash, of course, as we have competition on arms.”

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s trip, including instructions on how to handle Taiwan and Japan.]

Nixon: And, in the same vein, we got to make it—put in fear with regard to Soviet.3

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: We fear—we don’t know what they’ll do. We know, for example, that—one thing you didn’t have in there: we have noted that our intelligence shows that the Soviet has more divisions lined up against China than they have against Europe.

Kissinger: The one reason, Mr. President, I—

Nixon: You can’t put that in? [unclear], but why?

Kissinger: Well, they’re undoubtedly going to tape what I say, and I didn’t want them to play that to the Soviet Ambassador.

Nixon: Sure.

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3 In his handwritten notation in the briefing book, Nixon expressed this point as follows: “Put in fear R.N. would turn hard on V. Nam. Play up our possible move toward Soviet.” “Put in more fears re Japan.”
Kissinger: But I’ve got some stuff in there—
Nixon: Well—
Kissinger: —about exchanging military information.
Nixon: Well, I’d just put it in, that there are reports in the press then. Put it that way. Not that we show what you want. Reports in the press indicate that the Soviet has—that it has this. We were aware of that. Just sort of a low-key way. And we are also aware of the fact that in the SALT negotiations the Soviet are against zero ABM because they are concerned about China. Put it in. I want to build up their fears against Chiang [Kai-shek]. I want to build up their fears against Japan. And I want to build up their fears of what will happen on Vietnam. Those things are going to move them a hell of a lot more than all of the gobbledygook about all—
Kissinger: Oh, no question.
Nixon: —about, you know, our being civilized—which, also, is important.
Kissinger: Well, that’s just—
Nixon: But, Henry, it’s excellent.
Kissinger: Yes.
Nixon: And it’s excellent for the historical record. And it might have some effect. I don’t know. But I’m just telling you that I—my own inclination is to feel that you got to get down pretty crisply to the nut-cutting. And, but—in other words, I like all that, but I would thin it down a bit so that you can get to the stuff that really counts very soon.

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s trip to China, including instructions on how to handle such issues as an agreement on accidental nuclear war.]

Kissinger: Well, I think, Mr. President, we have now positioned the Russians. I haven’t—didn’t have a chance to tell you.
Nixon: You had Dobrynin in. Did you tell him?
Kissinger: Yeah. From Dobrynin. I told him. He said—he said this: he thinks, his own guess is that the answer is, “Yes.” But, he says, Brezhnev was in Berlin until the 20th, and now he is afraid that the session they had scheduled today of the Politburo is going to be cancelled because of the cosmonauts. So he—

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4 See footnote 2, Document 269.
5 After 24 days in the Salyut 1 space station, the Soyuz 11 spacecraft was destroyed on June 29 upon reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere, killing its crew of three cosmonauts. Nixon called Dobrynin the next morning to express his personal condolences. A tape recording of the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 6–40.
Nixon: Well, you should tell him, “Look, we’ve got to have an answer—”
Kissinger: I said, “I’ve got to have an answer.”
Nixon: Or if he doesn’t have it, they’ll be embarrassed [by] what we do.
Kissinger: I said, “We’ve got to have an answer by the close of business on the 6th. And, if it comes in any later than that, I just want you to know, the President has already extended it. He may—he’s got to make other plans.” And so in a way now—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —if they can’t—if they—the best way for us to get off the hook with them is to say, “Anatol, I’ve told you and told you. I told you June 10th we had to know it on June 30th”—
Nixon: Right. Right. Right. I know, you said that. You set it up now that we could go visit China, well, as far as the Russians are concerned.
Kissinger: If the Russians do not give us a summit, we could go in December or—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —late November, a summit to China—
Kissinger: Don’t you think, Al?
Haig: Yes, sir, I do.
Kissinger: And we can tell the Russians, and Anatol can go home and say, “You crazy-sons-of-bitches, you screwed it up.”
Nixon: Yeah. That’s right.
Kissinger: And—actually, technically, if we don’t get it by the 7th, it doesn’t make any difference what they decide.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Al can’t get it to me fast enough.
Nixon: Yeah. The other point, of course, is this: if we don’t get it there [by] the 7th of—
Kissinger: On the other hand—
Nixon: You have to fear—you’ve got to figure that the Russians then, if we go to China, there is a chance that they’ll blow Berlin—no, they won’t blow Berlin—
Kissinger: Berlin they won’t blow, but—
Nixon: —we’ll blow that—but that they’ll blow SALT. And they’ll risk the summit.
Kissinger: The Russians—the risk we run with the Russians—
Nixon: On the other hand—on the other hand, this or this presents hellish problems for them.
Kissinger: Well, if they blow SALT—they could blow SALT. They could—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: They could jack up the Middle East. And they could start—
Nixon: Definitely.
Kissinger: —raising hell in the Caribbean.
Nixon: That’s correct.
Kissinger: Now, of course, we can go hard right.
Nixon: They won’t do Berlin, because they want to get along with the Germans.
Kissinger: Yeah. That’s right. And, in fact, our major problem in Berlin now is we are coming up with—I know we’ll never get credit for it—but we are coming up with a really superb agreement on that—
Nixon: Yeah. I want to—
Kissinger: —which is actually an improvement—
Nixon: Can we still sink it?
Kissinger: Yeah, but, you know, they are, the Russians are making so many concessions now that it’s getting tough to—
Nixon: Yeah. Fine.
Kissinger: I’ve got Rush held until July 20th.\(^6\)
Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s trip, including instructions on Taiwan.]\(^7\)

\(^6\) See Document 266.

\(^7\) Kissinger left Washington at 8 p.m. on July 1 for a 10-day tour of Asia. “I was to visit Saigon, Bangkok, and New Delhi,” he later recalled, “before landing in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan and springboard to my real destination,” Beijing. (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 736)
Beginning with Brezhnev’s proposals presented at the Soviet Party Congress, the Soviets have maintained what has been called a “peace offensive.” (A chronology of pertinent Soviet actions and statements is at Tab A, excerpts from Brezhnev’s speech at Tab B.) We have been studying this new face of Soviet policy—its motivations, goals, and implications for us. Undoubtedly there is a large element of propaganda and image-seeking in the “peace offensive” and part of it is clearly directed against our interests. We believe, nevertheless, that a willingness to negotiate seriously about certain questions is an important part of Soviet policy today, since the Soviet leaders in our judgment are impelled by a variety of domestic and foreign constraints to move in the direction of negotiations.

**Soviet Motivation**

Historically, the Soviet Union has varied between periods of truculence and refusal to negotiate and periods when negotiation was preferred. The ascendancy of a strong leader in Moscow seems to be necessary for a forceful policy in either direction. A collective leadership of more-or-less equals tends to the more cautious middle ground. Although there is still a collective leadership in Moscow today, Brezhnev has emerged from the 24th Congress clearly silhouetted above the rest of the Politburo, and he has been the voice of the new policy posture.

Nevertheless, the debate about the policy of seeking negotiations with the West is evidently continuing. Gromyko has twice referred to opponents of this line—in 1968, when he announced Soviet acceptance of the SALT negotiations and at the Party Congress in April of this year when he discussed the Brezhnev “peace offensive”—and Brezhnev defended his own policies in very similar terms in his speech of June 11 (excerpt at Tab C). These and other signs of internal debate suggest
that the current line about negotiations is not without its strong opponents within the leadership and was not adopted lightly.

Why was it adopted?

—Although the USSR has grown in military strength, the Soviet leaders are aware of their insecurity and their continued inability to solve their internal and external problems through the mere application of power.

—The best example is the economy. Growth rate indexes are not what they must be if the Soviet economy is to compete satisfactorily over the long term with the West and Japan, and the new five-year plan gives no sign that the Party or industrial bureaucracies can solve their problems by reform or adjustments. Productivity remains low; certain sectors like the military are sacrosanct, agriculture cannot be squeezed any more, and foreign military and aid commitments will continue. Help must therefore be sought in the West in the form of credits and technology, or the problems will get worse. (In this context, the significance of Soviet interest in help for the Kama River truck plan, or their thirst for computer technology, becomes plain.) Behind all this lie the growing expectations of the Soviet people for higher living standards. Some Soviet leaders must have perceived the relevance of last winter’s Polish disturbances which had their origins in consumer dissatisfaction.

—Within a rigid system, such stresses are more serious than stresses within the open Western societies. The Soviet leaders face a series of problems ranging from alienated Jews and dissident intellectuals to the less immediate but broader concerns of non-Russian nationalities wanting more independence and apathetic youth who reject major tenets of the Leninist faith.

—Abroad, for all their nuclear power and expanding naval presence, the Soviets must cope with concentric circles of serious problems. In Eastern Europe, despite twenty-six years of Soviet hegemony, Moscow still must rule by force and nationalist currents continue to run deep and strong. The attraction of the West for Eastern Europe continues unabated—ideologically, politically, economically. Whichever way the Soviets turn—towards tightening their control (Czechoslovakia) or allowing some economic and political diversity (Hungary and Romania)—their dilemma stays with them and their hold on the area will remain precarious.

—On the other flank, the Soviets are concerned about China as the Chinese increase their power and re-emerge into the world at large. Competition and enmity between Peking and Moscow remain pressing elements in Soviet policy-making. United States policy towards China has reinforced this pressure.

—In Western Europe, British entry into the Common Market and the post-de Gaulle movement towards West European cohesion give
the Soviets concern economically and politically. In the East, Japan poses a similar problem. And from Moscow, the U.S. is seen as a most formidable opponent whose capacity to compete in every area does not seem to diminish substantially.

—The men in the Kremlin face a challenging agenda of problems—manageable, no doubt, but still imposing severe constraints upon their goals and their policies. The necessity for lessening expenditures, competition, and risk are evident to many Soviet policy-makers.

Another important dimension is the effect of U.S. policies upon Soviet policy-making. From 1964 to recent months, the Soviet leadership was busy consolidating its position at home and in the world and there was little evidence of interest in negotiations with us. During the first two years of the present Administration, the Soviet leaders apparently hoped the United States had been so weakened by Vietnam that it would give something for nothing. U.S. policies had an important effect on Soviet policy during this period. While stating our willingness to negotiate, we showed that Soviet refusal to negotiate was not likely to improve their position and could entail unacceptable risks. We took up reasonable positions in SALT and Berlin, but also proceeded with the Safeguard and MIRV programs, and stood firm in the Cienfuegos and Jordan crises. Meanwhile, moves to improve our relations with Peking made a deep impression. And, by indicating that the USSR could obtain concrete political and commercial benefits if relations improved, we provided a positive incentive for negotiation. As the Party Congress approached, the U.S. posture made the path of negotiation and at least partial accommodation appear more rewarding than any affordable alternative.

**Soviet Goals**

We count the following as major goals:

—First, the Soviets hope to keep their adversaries from converging at their expense. Above all, they hope to hold off any Sino-American rapprochement. They hope to divide the Western Allies and slow the movement towards West European consolidation.

—Second, they hope for economic advantages. Political détente should offer them access to Western and Japanese credits and technology on an amplified scale and on easier terms. Even more important, arriving at certain arms-control agreements could lighten a military burden which the Soviets find onerous, as Brezhnev implied in his June 11 speech.

—Third, the Soviets hope to consolidate their own present position. By negotiations and agreements such as Brezhnev proposes, they hope to buttress the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe, to increase their influence in Western Europe, and to attain, in image and
in fact, a recognized status of parity with the United States as one of the two global superpowers.

—Fourth, the Soviets wish to encourage the American mood of withdrawal in the wake of Vietnam.

—Fifth, the Soviet leaders hope to increase their prestige as peace-seekers whether their proposals succeed or not. They also wish to be able to tell their own people that they would prefer to put butter before guns, but cannot do so until the West responds in kind.

To the extent of their needs—and the need may be considerable—the Soviets are in earnest in adopting an overall posture of favoring negotiation rather than confrontation.

U.S. Policy

We suggest the following conclusions for U.S. policy:

—To look at the substance of each Soviet proposal or counter-proposal on its own merits, rather than attempting a coordinated approach.

—On the level of public discourse, to avoid being negative about the present Soviet posture and to be forthcoming about our willingness to discuss any negotiable issues.

—In high-level diplomatic contacts with the Soviets, to adopt a generally forthcoming attitude towards the Soviet posture, but without taking up individual proposals in specific terms.

—To keep foremost in mind the necessity to consult adequately and well in advance with our Allies about each individual measure and to avoid the appearance of "superpower dealings" behind their backs.
Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)


[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

Haig: Henry came back. He said that—he asked me to get your guidance. If we get an affirmative Soviet response on the summit, and if the Chinese insist on an early summit in December, we’ll have these two, and he wanted to know if you would authorize him to—

Nixon: Oh, sure. Oh, absolutely.

Haig: All right.

Nixon: Don’t hold it. I’ll see the Soviet then have a return Soviet visit next year. We got to get everything out of the way before July. Nothing can be done after that for this summit, see? You see, anything to do with foreign policy, because after the damn guy—

Haig: Exactly.

Nixon: —the other guy is nominated, the left-wing around here will try to say they got to go along. They never said that when I was nominated, I must say. They didn’t say the President ought to participate [et cetera].

Haig: No.

Nixon: Did the President allow me to participate in the bombing halt thing? No. Johnson just told me on the phone what he was going to do. But you know what they would do, these bastards.

Haig: You betcha.

Nixon: If they had a Teddy Kennedy or a Muskie, they’d say, “Well, he must go in the interest of bipartisanship. He must go.” You know what I mean?

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 536–14. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Haig in the Oval Office on July 3 from 10:01 to 10:15 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 In message Tosit 2, July 2, Kissinger asked Haig to seek the President’s instructions on “whether I may accept second summit for December even if Soviets come through should my hosts insist.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables)

3 In message Sitto 23, July 3, Haig relayed the President’s instructions to Kissinger: “you should accept second event for December even if other party comes through assuming, of course, your host insists.” (Ibid.)

4 During the 1968 election campaign, President Johnson regularly briefed the candidates—including Nixon, the Republican nominee—on his efforts to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam and arrange a summit in the Soviet Union.
Haig: Exactly.
Nixon: We’re not going to have one damn thing after July. Don’t you agree?
Haig: Yes, sir. I do.
Nixon: Nothing must be after July. After that, we just got to brazen [it] through.
Haig: Yeah, he’ll have it by then.
[Omitted here is discussion of the peace talks on Vietnam in Paris.]
Nixon: I was thinking a little about this whole business of Henry will clear it up, whether he really oughtn’t to say to them—I just don’t know what the hell Chinese are going to say about what they want to do. I think he’s got to tell them, of course, that we’re—he’s got to be very forthcoming with regard to the fact that we’re meeting the Soviet.
Haig: That’s correct.
Nixon: I mean, you can’t just slap them, or they’ll say, “To hell with you,” and they’ll get tough.
Haig: Right.
Nixon: You got to be—but this thing with the Soviet, that son-of-a-bitch Dobrynin comes in, which I won’t—Henry thinks he will. I don’t. Well, I don’t know. I mean, I won’t guess on that.
Haig: I rather think he will. Your—
Nixon: Do you really think he’s going to come around? I want to know.
Haig: Yes, sir. Everything they’ve done the last six months has been very much in the direction of—
Nixon: Yeah, I know. But whether they want to have a summit, they may be thinking that they can knock me over. I think they’re petrified of the thought of my sitting in this place for another four years.
Haig: Oh, ho! No question about it.
Nixon: Yet, on the other hand, if they don’t get along with me now, they figure it’ll be worse.
Haig: Could be. The one thing is that we’ve got two alternatives, and maybe we can get both of them, which would be the ideal. But either one of them is a very significant achievement. Very significant.
Nixon: Isn’t the Chinese—? Now, in terms of what we’d accomplish, in the short term, the Soviet thing is infinitely more important. In other words, we got SALT, we got Berlin, and we got the Mideast that we can talk about.
Haig: Yeah.
Nixon: In terms of, on the other hand, what we can bring back from the Chinese thing is the biggest—
Haig: Much, much more imaginative, and much more than that.
Nixon: Well, [unclear] people will be incredulous and that indicates—

Haig: That’s right, sir.

Nixon: —that anything is possible.

Haig: That’s right. But in the realities of the dangers of our position, the Soviet is—

Nixon: The Chinese is a long way off.

Haig: Long way.

Nixon: Although they should be our natural allies, interestingly enough, shouldn’t they?

Haig: They should.

Nixon: Against the Soviets, they need us. And also they need us against the Japanese.

Haig: Exactly.

Nixon: You know, we aren’t [but] they must be petrified of the Japanese, because the Japanese did it to them once before. And here sit the Japanese over there, needing breathing space. Who’s going to keep the Japanese restrained? Who, but America?

Haig: Who has all the economic power—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Haig: This is very bad.

Nixon: God, they need us. If you really—if they really think straight, they need us desperately.

Haig: Yes, and very much back in the traditional power configuration there, where the United States has got to give them some hope, some kind of threat on Japan’s flank, and some kind of a threat on Russia’s. Well, I think it’s a natural alignment, but [there’s] no sense kidding ourselves about the ideological problem. Those bastards are tough.

Nixon: Oh, yeah.5

[Omitted here is discussion of foreign policy and domestic politics.]

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5 Nixon left the White House that evening to spend the July 4 holiday at Camp David. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Before his return mid-afternoon on July 5, the President called Haig at 2:15 p.m. to ask about the status of the Soviet reply on the summit: “P: What was the deadline? H: The night of the 6th. P: You will be going out with us. H: Yes sir, but I have my Colonel here and he will call us on the secure phone if it is classified. There will be nothing to worry about the phone—it is a secure phone. P: All right.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1971 [2 of 2])
Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

The President has already been informed of the Soviet leadership’s position on Soviet-American summit meeting including our considerations as to the preparation of such a meeting and creating the conditions which would facilitate its positive outcome. The President, no doubt, remembers the statement of the Soviet side of importance which the Soviet leadership attaches in this connection to the lessening of tension and to normalization of the situation in Europe on the basis of recognition of the territorial and political realities formed there, which in our conviction responds to the interests of all states, including the United States.

Since President Nixon has agreed with the considerations which were put forward by the Soviet leaders in connection with the prospective summit meeting, this relieves us of the necessity to once again state them in detail.

In Moscow has been noted that there have been lately positive movements in discussions of some questions; on the part of the U.S. representatives there is greater understanding of the situation and more realistic approach towards finding mutually acceptable solutions,—this seems to be the result of the attention which the President has begun to pay personally to these matters.

At the same time there is yet no full certainty whether agreement could be reached as soon as desired. Having this in mind and also taking into consideration that there is not much time left till September, it would obviously be more realistic to agree on some mutually acceptable time which would be closer to the end of this year—for example the end of November or in December. We agree that both sides will in fact proceed from the premises that by that time all what is necessary will be done in order to put into practice that important

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. No classification marking. Dobrynin forwarded the Soviet note to Kissinger on July 5 with the following handwritten message: “I am sending herewith a communication from Moscow which I am instructed to forward to you and through you to President Nixon in connection with the conversations we had on this subject.” Kissinger later recalled that Vorontsov gave Haig the Soviet note on July 5. (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 835) Dobrynin claimed, however, that he delivered the note to Haig himself. (Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 225) According to Haig (see Document 275), Vorontsov (“our friend”) delivered the note to the White House at 5:15 p.m.

2 As our exchanges in the end of January this year showed. [Footnote is in the original.]
understanding between the President and the Soviet leaders which
President Nixon confirmed to the Soviet Ambassador through Dr.
Kissinger on June 30.3 The final time of the meeting and a date of an
appropriate publication about this prospective meeting could be pin-
pointed additionally.

Of course in any case it is important that in anticipation of the
meeting both sides would pursue in the relations between themselves
and in international affairs such a course which to the maximum de-
gree would ensure the fruitfulness of the meeting. In other words, it is
necessary that both sides will allow in their activities nothing that
would make the situation unfavourable for the preparation and hold-
ing of the meeting and would weaken the chances of getting positive
results at such a meeting.

3 See Document 269.

274. Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the
President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Haig)3


[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, including Kissinger’s visit
to Saigon on July 4.]

Nixon: Well, let me know if anything happens on the other fronts:
either the Pakistani or, of course, the Russian front. Well—

Haig: Well, I—

Nixon: I doubt it’s—probably you won’t hear from Dobrynin be-
fore you leave now. It’s—

Haig: No, I think we will, sir. I think we will.

Nixon: Before—I mean, before you go to California?

Haig: Yes.

Nixon: You think you will. Let’s see. We leave tomorrow at noon,
you know.

3 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Con-
versation 6–153. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the
tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s
Daily Diary, Nixon called Haig at 9:08 p.m.; the two men talked until 9:13. (Ibid., White
House Central Files)
Haig: Yes, sir.
Nixon: Well, you might hear tomorrow morning.
Haig: Right.
Nixon: And if you don’t, it’ll be done. Because we—he’s been told we have to know and that’s that.
Haig: Yes, sir. That’s right. He knows.
Nixon: And either way, it’s fine if—
Haig: Well, when I saw him yesterday morning, he—
Nixon: Yeah.
Haig: —he went over the routine of, if we had gone to California, he would come in—
Nixon: Yeah.
Haig: —and use your phone.
Nixon: Sure. Sure. Sure. Good. Well, we just need to know one way or another. We’re not going to appear anxious about it, because we’re not. We can [laughs] we can take it one way or another, as it turns out. Okay.
Haig: Right, sir.
Nixon: Fine.
Haig: Yes, sir.

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2 Haig met Dobrynin on July 4 to deliver a formal letter of condolence on the recent death of Soviet cosmonauts.
275. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 6, 1971, 0333Z.

Sitto 39. Send directly to aircraft, Tail number 53118. Our friend delivered a written response at 5:15 p.m. Washington time today (July 5).² The response was indefinite, suggesting delay from September to some mutually acceptable time closer to the end of the year, for example the end of November or December providing by that time all that is necessary is done. Note says final time for the event and its publication could be pinpointed subsequently assuming progress in other preparations toward meeting the understanding you discussed with messenger June 30,³ the whole scenario contingent upon nothing occurring in the interim which would make the situation unfavorable or jeopardize positive results.

The foregoing appears at best to be a holding action which seeks both delay and further progress in areas of particular interest, with such progress a pivotal factor. I will not discuss this message with anyone, pending further guidance from you since response is somewhat different than anticipated and I want to be absolutely sure that you have had an opportunity to assess its implications while on your trip. I will not contact messenger until I hear from you. Please acknowledge upon receipt.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig used the following pseudonyms in the message: the “friend” is Vorontsov; the “messenger” is Dobrynin. Kissinger later recalled that he was in Bangkok when Haig telephoned Lord at 3 a.m. to deliver the news, “speaking in double-talk (which an illiterate child could have deciphered).” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 835) Kissinger’s recollection, however, is evidently in error on the issue of when Haig called Lord. Although no record of the conversation has been found, Haig could not have called Lord before delivery of the Soviet note in Washington at 5:15 p.m., or 5:15 a.m. (July 6), Bangkok time. Haig, on the other hand, may have called Lord before drafting this message to Kissinger, which was sent on July 6 at 3:33 a.m. GMT, or 9:33 a.m., Bangkok time.

² Document 273.

³ See Document 269.

⁴ In message Tosit 11 to Haig, July 6, Kissinger provided his initial response: “Please inform the President of essentially holding response by messenger. Will therefore proceed with other alternative letting messenger’s proposal sort itself out.” Kissinger added: “Re messenger, there should be no reply.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971)
276. Editorial Note

After delivery of the Soviet note on the summit, the White House moved to slow down the secret talks on Berlin. While Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger continued his 10-day tour of Asian capitals, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Al Haig issued repeated instructions to Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush in Bonn. In a backchannel message to Haig on July 6, 1971, Kissinger insisted that “Rush should avoid further meetings on some pretext till I return.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) Before Haig could take action, Kissinger qualified these instructions: “On second thought Rush should attend any meeting already arranged but go as slowly as decently possible. He should also avoid new meetings on some excuse until I return.” (Ibid, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables) Later that morning, Haig sent the following message to Rush: “Due to circumstances which will be explained subsequently, Dr. Kissinger has asked me to flash to you the essentiality of going as slowly as decently possible during any meeting which may be already arranged. He also asks that you avoid, on some pretext, any new meetings to which you are not already committed until he returns from his trip on or about July 12.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) Haig then advised Kissinger by backchannel that he had instructed Rush accordingly. (Message Sitto 41 from Haig to Kissinger, July 6; ibid, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables)

Before he received this message on July 6, Rush met, as previously scheduled, with West German State Secretary Egon Bahr and Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Valentin Falin. In a special channel message to Kissinger the next day, Rush reported that Falin had returned from Moscow with some “good news”: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko approved Falin’s conduct of the negotiations and “thus he [Falin] had not needed to go to Kosygin or Brezhnev for a resolution of differences.” The Soviets also introduced a new proposal on West German Federal presence in West Berlin, which Rush considered a “great advance” over the previous position. In spite of such progress, Rush assured Kissinger: “We should have no difficulty in meeting your timetable of post July 20 for the final agreement. We can use your trip plus the new proposal of Gromyko’s for delaying purposes.” (Ibid.) Although he did not see the message until his return from Beijing, Kissinger later recalled that the news from Moscow confirmed “that the Soviets meant to press Berlin to a rapid conclusion.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pages 829–830)
Haig, meanwhile, replied to Rush’s message on July 8 by repeating Kissinger’s instructions: “I wish to emphasize again the essentiality of employing delaying tactics during those sessions to which you have already been committed and the need to avoid commitments on any pretext for future meetings.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) Rush reported the next day, however, that the situation had already become more complicated. “I can employ delaying tactics,” he explained, “but a failure to agree on future meeting would arouse deep suspicions on the part of both the Russians, and more importantly the Germans, that is Brandt and Bahr. Before your message of July 6 arrived, I had agreed to meetings of next week and do not think these can be cancelled without serious effects.” (Ibid.)

277. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Soviet Response

The Soviet response has been received in writing (Tab A).2 The Soviet note delivered by Minister Vorontsov is holding in nature—suggests delay from September to some mutually acceptable time closer to the end of this year (end of November or December), providing by that time all that is necessary is done—the time for the event and its publication to be pinpointed subsequently assuming progress in other preparations—the overall project contingent upon nothing occurring in the interim which would make the situation unfavorable or jeopardize positive results.

In summary the Soviet response appears to be a holding action seeking both delay and further progress in areas of interest to the Soviets (Berlin, SALT) with such progress a pivotal factor.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

2 Printed as Document 273.
Recommendation

That we make no comment to the Soviets at this time.
That Dr. Kissinger proceed with the other option seeking an early summit in Peking. 3

3 The President initialed his approval of these recommendations.

278. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1


Nixon: Well, it means we almost have—the purpose of that is it puts us on the hook. 2
Haig: That’s exactly right.
Nixon: Like I said, well, we’d do well—there isn’t much time left in September. What the hell? Who’s had the time to wait? They’re taking—the odds had to be—
Haig: Exactly.
Nixon: It’s a just a, it’s a rather crude, crude and obvious attempt to put it off. I mean, they have held—I mean, their reasons so obviously are—I tried to get a [unclear] but I feel that that’s what their line will be. They mainly want to keep us—they want to get everything they can from us.
Haig: Exactly.
Nixon: But they aren’t getting—I mean, we aren’t. And, now, the thing to do is tighten up on them. Very tough. Don’t you agree? Like on Berlin. I wouldn’t give them a goddamn thing.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 538-4. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Haig in the Oval Office on July 6 from 9:10 to 9:25 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 The tape machine apparently did not record the beginning of the conversation, which presumably included a clearer reference to the subject, the Soviet note, Document 273.
Haig: Well, I just sent a message to Rush and told him to delay everything, not to accept any new meetings on the subject, and just to hold up. Sweat them a little. That’s what they really want. They’re pressing to get that thing locked into shape.

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Can we still stop it?

Haig: Well, it’s still manageable, sir. It’s going to take a little gasping, because of the German side. They’re so goddamn panting on this thing.

Nixon: Sure.

Haig: But we can make it very difficult. I don’t know. I think they— they’re also quite goosey about the SALT thing. They want to keep it more in their direction and, with ABM and maybe something general and fuzzy on the offensive.

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Hm-hmm. Well, that’s the way they’re playing it. And we have to play the—there isn’t any question that we have to play the other option now.

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: What do you make of it?

Haig: It really makes it little easier for us. It’ll be a good goddamn lesson for them.

Nixon: Yeah. Well, the point is that the—Henry, of course, has been so terribly concerned—well, there are—the major concern is that, the meeting in Tibet. And this is my major concern: as we move into the Pacific, and toward China, it raises us all sorts of problems in the Pacific. And it does.

Haig: Exactly. It does.

Nixon: Yet it’s going to come. It’s going to come sometime, and I think those problems will have to be taken sometime. I’m not sure that just slipping into it is going to be—perhaps it might. I mean, I think it’s—otherwise, others are going to start to move. It’s—that movement’s going to be taken. But, nevertheless, that’s that. The other side of that, of course, is that—he’s [Kissinger] been concerned that, well, if we move toward China, then the Russians will really put the squeeze on us. Well, now how? So, they can raise hell in the Middle East. Fine. I don’t care. I mean, they’re sure to send a submarine in—that sort of thing. I can puff around too. But on SALT, so they delay.

Haig: No, I think we have to do something.

Nixon: What’s the plan on that?

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3 See Document 276.
Haig: We—they obviously have heard that—
Nixon: In other words, we can use the—we just use the Chinese for our major diplomatic move this year—
Haig: Yeah.
Nixon: And a weeping SALT delegation will have to come home. Good.

Haig: Oh, I think they'll get the word on this thing. We've played this thing very, very straight with them. These are not something that have—some discussions that have just occurred. My God, we've been talking about it for a year. And they knew it. And we've made some very major moves in the direction of—
Nixon: Well, we gave them that ball-bearing plant. Isn't it [one of the] things we did for those—?
Haig: Right, sir. And, mostly, this Berlin thing. My God, we've done things for them there that they never could have accomplished.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Haig: And we played it very conciliatory on the SALT business. We met them half-way.
Nixon: Oh, I'll say. We met them at least half-way.
Haig: Yes, sir.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. Well, that's right. Now, you sent it off to Henry—all right, so he knows. You've already told people that, to hold up on Berlin.
Haig: I've sent him a message there—
Nixon: Just say that I—
Haig: —with doubletalk. Right.
Nixon: I think, let's go for the marbles on that one. And, incidentally, without a—and I mean directly now; no Bruce visit, if they're playing that. You see my point?
Haig: Yes, sir.
Nixon: I think this, now, is one where, rather than going for the Bruce thing that they're playing, no use to screw around with that. Just go for a Presidential visit in November.
Haig: Right.
Nixon: Make some arrangements. I mean—
Haig: And—

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4 See Document 242.
Nixon: —it’s a little cleaner way to handle the Chinese thing anyway.

Haig: It is cleaner.

Nixon: It’s the way they wanted it. And they suggested that. We—it would be that they—they’re smart enough to know we’re diddling them along when we send Bruce. We just come right out and hit them right like that. And we’ll let the Russians say what they goddamn please.

Haig: That’s right. The next time we discuss something with them, they’ll give it a little harder thought.

Nixon: Hmm.

Haig: I’m inclined to think, knowing those bastards, that this is the way to deal with them and not the other. They don’t understand—

Nixon: No. No. No, they want everything that they can get. And we’re doing—and we didn’t give it. But we have played the other pretty tough. And, I mean, pretty—we’ve been very measured and orderly. And we have got now to play the Chinese thing. And then—

Haig: And, obviously, the wording of that thing, they really stretched the point to be affirmative and yet to hold. They didn’t—it could have been much more—

Nixon: Well, the—

Haig: —negative.

Nixon: —the wording is pretty good, except that that doesn’t mean anything here. That they’re just throwing that in, that’s cheap. Words don’t cost them anything.

Haig: No.

Nixon: But—what did they talk about, November or December? That’s what that response we have would amount to.

Haig: That’s right, sir. And they didn’t make a commitment either.

Nixon: No.

Haig: If anything, they could use any pretext to delay it.

Nixon: No, well, their idea that, “Well, look, we’ll let you come provided you do things for us.” Well, bullshit. We don’t want to come that badly.

Haig: Right.

Nixon: That’s the point that we have to be at. We don’t have to wait for a summit that much. That’s just the way it’s going to be. We’ve got to play the negotiating right down to the nub.

[Omitted here is discussion on India.]

Haig: Well, this’ll get their attention. I’ll tell you that, sir. They had no more conceived of the alternative here.
Nixon: Hmm.
Haig: They obviously thought that they would—they could play it.
Nixon: However—
Haig: They obviously think they can play us at their pace and on their terms.
Nixon: They also look at the—they also probably are figuring—they want to get everything they can out of us. They think we want it too much; you know, that we want to come and that we’re pressing; and that they—they think that they would, they probably would hold it if they can.
Haig: Exactly.
Nixon: It’s their business.
Haig: [unclear] and you know they’re not going to support you. They never would. They’d do anything they could to keep you out.
Nixon: I know. You notice that they play around that way.
Haig: It puts a shock to us.
Nixon: It must be quite a disappointment to Henry. If anyone, he was certain that—
Haig: Well, sir—
Nixon: Do you agree that he was—? No, he was convinced they were going ahead.
Haig: Well, I think he expected an answer that would be affirmative, but I think he was hoping for a negative one, because it makes the whole exercise cleaner. It’s not either. It’s not really negative. It’s essentially a wishy-washy blackmail, I think.
Nixon: Oh, hell—it’s clean. You’re right. It doesn’t mean, it doesn’t mean one damn thing, except that they think there’s—[reading] “Of course, in any case, it is important that both sides would pursue in the relations between themselves such a course which to the maximum degree would ensure the fruitfulness of the meeting. It is necessary that both sides will allow in their activities nothing that would make the situation unfavorable for the preparation and holding of the meeting and would weaken the chances of getting positive results.” Well, they seem to think we’d get more positive—[reading] “At the same time there is yet not full certainty whether agreement could be reached as soon as desired. There is yet not full certainly whether agreement could be reach as soon as desired. There is not much time—” Well, [that] puts it better. That’s a little crude.
Haig: That’s right. That’s—
Nixon: They’re obviously very good at—[reading] “put into practice the important understanding between the President and the Soviet
leaders which President Nixon confirmed to the Soviet Ambassador through Dr. Kissinger.” What the hell was that—beyond courtesy? 5

Haig: Well, I think what he’s talking about is progress in Berlin and SALT, which would lend itself to—

Nixon: Good. Well, that’s all right. We have to play another round. We’ll see now what happens on the, [on] Dobrynin’s front. They ought to be quite exercised.

Haig: Well, this is going to be very—

Nixon: They’re also—

Haig: [unclear] through this, sir, is that they’re not going to be able to stand up on a soapbox and say we’ve practiced duplicity, or we deceived them, or we—

Nixon: Hmm. This is going to get out there.

Haig: Right, which would set the stage for exactly what we’re doing.

Nixon: [unclear]

Haig: We didn’t have a good picture before. If they had come back affirmatively, we were going to have one hell of a time—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —bridging these two things.

Nixon: Now, as this comes out, as it turns out, you know, the real thing we’d like to do is to have both. But, in a sense, having both, it would have been awfully difficult to figure out how the hell to play it.

Haig: Yes. I think they would have—

Nixon: I think if we had announced them, and then announced China, they might have knocked it off.

Haig: That’s right, sir.

Nixon: We don’t want to—now, we’ll go to China and then it’s up to them. I mean—

Haig: We’ve got the psychological edge here.

Nixon: We’ll see what the hell they’re willing to do.

Haig: Right.

Nixon: I suppose that they’ll be damn difficult on SALT.

Haig: Even if they—they want that. They want that. They’ll have to readjust their entire timetable, because I’m convinced they’re planning to go into China. And to do that, they’ve got to have a settled flank, a settled rear.

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5 See Document 269.
Nixon: You mean you think they’re probably going to attack the Chinese sometime?

Haig: Yes, sir. I think probably—

Nixon: [unclear]

Haig: —in about two years.

Nixon: Huh?

Haig: I think they’ve been planning, in about two years, to go in there. This is just going to shake that up. And the best part of it is that, by God, we have the psychological initiative. They are the ones that have been intransigent. And we were forced to react.6

6 After his meeting with Nixon, Haig reported by backchannel to Kissinger: “Discussed message with President. He has approved course of action you outlined in Tosit 11 with respect to that subject. He suggests that, if possible, you eliminate the interim visitor [Bruce] and propose moving directly to final round.” Haig also assured Kissinger that “no response has nor will be given [to Dobrynin] until further instructions from you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables) See footnote 4, Document 275.

279. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1


[Omitted here is discussion of the Pentagon Papers case.]

Nixon: I think that the whole business here with regard to the Soviet, on reflection, is the more that he—I’ve come closer to your view of it. First, it’s what I expected, because I just was, as I told Henry, I said, “Henry, what the hell do you think? What’s in it for them?” He says, “Well, we got Berlin.” He says, “I’ll tell them I’ll cut off this channel” and all that. But, anyway, he could get it.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 538–13. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Haig in the Oval Office on July 6 from 11:26 to 11:45 a.m. The two men left the White House at 12:20 p.m., EDT, and, after a stop in Kansas City, Missouri for a briefing of Midwestern media representatives, arrived in San Clemente at 6:46 p.m., PDT. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
Haig: Yeah.
Nixon: There isn’t a Soviet [unclear]—you know what it’s like. Well, that’s why I’m for getting out of this Paris meeting.
Haig: Exactly.
Nixon: What’s in it for them, they get out anyway.
Haig: That’s exactly right.
Nixon: Do you feel he’s going to get out of this Paris meeting?
Haig: No, sir. I never have.
Nixon: Really?
Haig: No.
Nixon: Huh?
Haig: I had not. And I do not.
Nixon: No. I think he’s going to get a straight opinion. But the thing we’ve got to do with Henry on this is be very tough on him.
Haig: Exactly.
Nixon: “What’s done, Henry”—you know what I mean? He just can’t keep going over there and diddling around, because he gets too impressed by the, basically, the cosmetics. He really does. I mean, as much as he’s—as realist as he is, you know, it does impress him. Cosmetics usually impress him. Now, he’ll—
Haig: His background is a problem. He’s cut from that goddamn—
Nixon: That’s right.
Haig: —left-wing and he, even though he’s a hard-line, tough guy, he’s working for the [unclear] class.
Nixon: You see, he wouldn’t realize, for example, that when I write a letter to an astronaut, I’m not doing it for the goddamn Russians. Fuck them. I’m doing it because it would look awfully good here, right now. You see what I mean?
Haig: Yeah.
Nixon: People like to do that. But Henry’s just got to get him a little bit, got to be more—you know, he always has these long, goddamn tortuous meetings with Dobrynin, and it seems very interesting, very exciting, and all that sort of thing. Al, they’re suckering us along.
Haig: That’s right.
Nixon: —and I think you’ve got to be—now, it may be that their interests require a SALT agreement. Think so? Do they want a SALT agreement?
Haig: I think they want an improvement in relations because they think they can unravel the NATO alliance—
Nixon: Yeah.
Haig: —and split Germany up.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Haig: That’s what they’re after.
Nixon: They want a Berlin agreement? Right?
Haig: Yes, sir.
Nixon: Oh, we’ve got to screw that up. Now, that is, I mean, awfully clear to Rush. Is it?
Haig: Yes, sir.² And it’s sufficiently complicated—
Nixon: Yeah. Sure.
Haig: —and still has a long enough way to go that we can do that. And this announcement, when it comes, will hit them right between the eyes. They’ll know goddamn well that they’re not fooling with people that are going to sit and get raped.
Nixon: Well, I just hope Henry gets in there.
Haig: Well, I think that—that’s what I’m concerned about. I think it will work fine. I—
Nixon: You haven’t heard from the Paks yet?
Haig: No. No.
Nixon: He said he thought there was another message here.
Haig: Well, I think he said that he had alerted his number two—
Nixon: Yeah.
Haig: —to convey additional messages because he felt there would be more.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Haig: Because all they did was register their concern.
Nixon: Hm-hmm. Now, well, let me say this: if they—if it’s knocked down, if this one goes because of that, it was too tenuous to begin [with] anyway.
Haig: That’s right, sir.
Nixon: You see my point? If this—we better find out right now that if it ends because of some little pipsqueak story, they’re going to knock it down as too tenuous. Do you understand?
Haig: No, I think they want it, sir. They’ve really made a firm commitment.
Nixon: Well, he sort of thought that, Henry’s always felt, the Russians wanted it. You sort of felt so too, didn’t you?

² See Document 276.
Haig: Well, I did. And I still think they do, but they want to suck us dry.

Nixon: I guess they think, they think they can get more out of us for it. They’re going to ass pick to pay a bigger price, which we have to consider.

Haig: No, that response was an effort to just suck us dry, not to turn it down.

Nixon: Yeah, that’s right—

Haig: They kept it open.

Nixon: “We hope our relations will improve. We’ve noted some positive things. What else are you going to do, boys?”

Haig: Exactly.

Nixon: Well, what we’re going to do is kick them right in the teeth.

Haig: Yeah.

Nixon: But the message to Henry is that no—I want him to be—and this is absolutely categorical—there is to be no intermediary. No Bruce trip.

Haig: I sent him that this morning, sir.3

Nixon: Don’t you agree?

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: And you can see why, Al, that the Bruce trip is now irrelevant. I mean, why do it twice? And we will just announce that, as I already said, that I’m prepared to go. And that’s much more frank with them, and they—

Haig: Well, that’s one thing. You’re dealing with a more straightforward customer. They’re tougher. But I think the Chinese are more direct and honest. When they say something, they mean it. They’ve made a decision. Oh, I think that’s going to go. They never would have sent you the message, if they didn’t mean it. Now, they may ask a price that you may—might not be willing to pay.

Nixon: Christ, yeah.

Haig: That would be the complication on the Chinese. But the Soviets are just playing pussyfoot. They’re—

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion of the military and diplomatic situation in Vietnam. During this part of the conversation, Nixon told Haig to advise Kissinger that in view of events on July 5—including the Soviet note on the summit and a North Vietnamese attack on Danang—his next meeting with Le Duc Tho in Paris “should be the last meeting.”]

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3 See footnote 6, Document 278.
280. Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in New Delhi


WH 10611/Sitto 42. To: David Halperin for Henry A. Kissinger.

The President has called me in for a second time just prior to our departure for San Clemente. He is increasingly concerned about response from our messenger and its future implications. He asked me to re-emphasize to you his desire that intermediate visit be cut out and proceed directly to the main round. Concerning your other discussions in the Kirschman forum, he feels strongly that they be terminated and that the record is made clearly by Kirschman.

Considerable concern has been expressed about the Danang shelling and he wants it clearly conveyed that future activity of this kind will not be tolerated nor will tit-for-tat modus operandi be pursued.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. On Haig’s behalf, Kennedy initialed the message, which was sent from the White House at 1:04 p.m.

2 See Document 279.

3 Dobrynin. See Document 273.

4 See footnote 6, Document 278.

5 Reference is to Kissinger’s secret talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris. Walters, who was responsible for managing the channel, gave Kissinger the pseudonym “Harold A. Kirschman.” (Walters, Secret Missions, p. 514) See also Kissinger, White House Years, p. 439.

6 Early in the morning on July 5, North Vietnamese artillery struck the U.S. airbase at Danang, killing three American soldiers.
New Delhi, July 7, 1971, 0631Z.

Tosit 15. To: White House eyes only for General Haig. Re: Your WH 10611. My analysis is that messenger’s response is largely due to our domestic situation. President will remember that I told him Pentagon Papers and Congressional situation will have its greatest impact in that quarter. It is not an unalloyed disadvantage for it eases other mission and sets up later visit to messenger if still desired in better psychological circumstances.

As for other visit host must suggest date. If this year intermediate visit will be eliminated. If next year it would be desirable. In either event there needs to be contact about modalities. Please get President’s reaction. What is your view of best date for country?

As for Kirschman channel let us make the judgement after the meeting. To me it seems things are moving though slowly. Also one more meeting is needed before final decision.

I agree about the response to the Danang shelling and will have proposal based on Saigon discussions when I return.

Keep things cool. Let us not throw things overboard out of pique.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig was in San Clemente. The message was received at the White House at 2:14 a.m. and relayed to San Clemente. The “messenger” in the text is Dobrynin. Kissinger described the message in his memoirs as follows: “I cabled Haig that Vorontsov’s note had its advantages. We could now complete the summits in our preferred order. The Soviet Union would find it more difficult to accuse us of bad faith in our opening to Peking (not a decisive factor, but helpful). And if the Soviets still wanted to go ahead with a Moscow summit—as I thought probable—it would take place in circumstances where the balance of interest was more visible.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 835)

2 Document 280.
282. **Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in New Delhi**

San Clemente, California, July 7, 1971.

Sitto 52. Leader agrees completely with your analysis concerning better psychological circumstance resulting from messenger’s response. On the other hand, does not appear to share view concerning Congressional and domestic situation but prefers to view response in context of messenger’s overall assessment that additional squeezing will accomplish more than enterprise in question. I made point strongly that we must play cool deliberate game to insure proper outcome and to avoid succumbing to pique. Leader agreed but phenomenon can be expected to persist.

Concerning other visit, leader recognizes initiative not completely in our hands but prefers following scenario for domestic reasons and because he believes a “sooner rather than later” approach will have greatest psychological impact on messenger:

1. September first preference.
2. November or December second preference, with no intermediate in either of first two.
3. Third preference would be adopted only if final act not feasible this year, under this course, essential that we have intermediate as planned earlier, with final round, hopefully, in the spring.

Re Kirschman channel, leader understands problem but as you are aware harbors residual skepticism on overall value of exercise.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The copy printed here is the draft as approved for transmission. The message number is handwritten. According to a handwritten note on another copy, it was sent at 2:35 p.m. (Ibid.) Haig used the following pseudonyms in the text: the “leader” is Nixon, the “messenger” is Dobrynin, and the “proponent” is Rogers.

2 See Document 281.

3 See footnote 5, Document 280.
Concerning visit on subject in which Helms was involved, we had a lengthy and at times starchy discussion enroute. Proponent was adamant and Helms most helpful in terms of futility of exercise based on his recent visit. Nevertheless, proponent remained adamant and it was necessary for me to pose hard questions. My stand was obviously resented strongly by proponent especially since decision was not made at the meeting. Nevertheless, and despite best efforts, I am confident that proponent’s activities are proceeding apace without our knowledge and may soon bring us to point of no return. Note Hakto–32 forwarded to you separately. I had call this morning from agent of prospective host and he stated that he will be able to delay at least until week of nineteenth in giving go-ahead. He plans to give such a response on Friday, July 9. He added, however, that it would be impossible to reject outright and hopes that we will be able manage the problem at our end. As you might have expected, proponent has made the rosiest of predictions with respect to the other party involved and his good will. I expect today or tomorrow this will be further reinforced by reports from the field emanating from the exercise which was launched without our clearance. I wanted you to be fully abreast of the difficulties we are facing on this proposition and to be aware that I lost considerable virginity in yesterday’s meeting in an effort to prevent precipitous action.

We hope that you did not run into too much flak at most recent stop. Overall portrayal of your trip thus far has been superb and leader noted this morning that it is being conducted with the greatest skill and sensitivity. I will send message later today with respect to venue problem on which I will bite bullet this morning.

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4 According to Haldeman, Nixon met Helms, Rogers, and Haig on July 6 on board Air Force One en route to San Clemente to discuss Rogers’s proposal for a new Suez Canal initiative. (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) In a July 2 memorandum to Nixon, Haig summarized the proposal but argued that “considerable thought” was required before taking any action. “I believe we should, above all,” Haig concluded, “consider our future initiatives with respect to the Middle East in the light of the event which will occur during and just after Dr. Kissinger’s trip when our longer term prospects with respect to the Soviets and Asia will come into sharper focus.” Nixon approved Haig’s recommendation to reserve judgment and “approach this important decision in an orderly manner.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 657, Country Files, Middle East, Nodis/Cedar Plus, Vol. III [1 of 2])

5 Not found.

6 Rabin.

7 Not found.
On July 9, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger arrived in Beijing for three days of secret meetings with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Although the purpose of the visit was to prepare for the announcement of President Richard Nixon’s trip to China, Kissinger and Zhou conducted an extensive review of regional and global issues, including the Soviet role in Sino-American relations. The subject first arose in connection with a news briefing three days earlier in Kansas City, Missouri, where the President asked Americans to reexamine their presumption of preeminence in international affairs. Twenty-five years after the Second World War, Nixon declared, the United States needed to move beyond involvement in Vietnam toward engagement with the Soviet Union and China, relaxing political tensions with the former and economic restrictions with the latter. Without revealing Kissinger’s secret trip, Nixon linked ping-pong diplomacy to triangular relations, hinting that further developments might eventually “open doors” in Beijing, if not Moscow. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pages 802–813) Meeting with Kissinger on the afternoon of July 9, Zhou—referring to American involvement in Vietnam and Korea—offered an informal response to Nixon’s remarks:

“We believe that the peoples of any country should be capable of solving their own affairs without outside interference by others. There is the fact that twenty-five years after the Second World War, your hands are stretched out too far and people suffer from it in another country. Now if you do not withdraw, there will be a sticky situation. The President was right in Kansas City when he said that 25 years ago nobody would believe the U.S. could be in such a difficult position today. But Chairman Mao foresaw this at the time. He wrote an article shortly after World War II on the international situation. The word had spread that an attack was imminent against the USSR. Chairman Mao disagreed, and said that this was only a slogan whose purpose was to gain control over the intermediate areas of the world between the USSR and the U.S.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, China Memcons & Memos—Originals, July 1971)

Kissinger later recalled his initial reaction to Zhou’s response: “This put me at some disadvantage since I was unaware of either the fact or the content of the speech, proving that even the most meticulous preparation is prey to the accidental.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pages 748–749)

During his meeting with Kissinger the following afternoon, July 10, Zhou addressed several contingencies for China’s national security,
in particular, those posed by the Soviet Union. "The worst would be that China would be carved up once again," he explained. "You could unite, with the USSR occupying all areas north of the Yellow River, and you occupying all the areas south of the Yangtze River, and the eastern section between these two rivers could be left to Japan." After describing this point in more detail, Zhou returned to his central theme:

"We believe that at present there is chaos under heaven, and believe that in the past 25 years there has been a process of great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization. Your President also said (in Kansas City) that 25 years ago you could not imagine that the present situation could emerge. He also said that in the remaining third of the century that efforts should be made to cease military competition and to embark upon economic competition. However, economic competition in itself involves economic expansion, and then will necessarily lead to military expansion. Japan is the most telling case in point, but the danger may not be less in the case of West Germany in relation to Europe.

"Yesterday I also mentioned the USSR. The Soviet Union is following your suit, in stretching its hands all over the world. You said that you were triggered by the Soviet Union’s probing throughout the world. No matter whether there is a case of contention or a case of being triggered, anyway there is a situation of tension, of turmoil. This is the objective situation. If we look at the development of the objective world in a cool-headed manner, then we are called upon through our subjective efforts to attempt to undo some of the knots."

When Zhou had finished, Kissinger delivered his own presentation on "great power relations." Citing Zhou’s phrase "chaos under heaven," Kissinger vowed that the United States would oppose military expansion, whether by Japan or by the Soviet Union:

"With respect to Soviet intentions, contrary to some of my American friends, I do not exclude the possibility of Soviet military adventurism. In fact, speaking personally and frankly, this is one of the new lessons I have learned in my present position. I had not believed it previously.

"But that is a problem essentially between you and the USSR. As far as the U.S. is concerned, I can tell you flatly that there is no possibility, certainly in this Administration, nor probably in any other, of any cooperation such as you have described between the U.S., the Soviet Union and Japan to divide up China.

"We are facing many potentially aggressive countries. How could it conceivably be in our interests, even for the most selfish motives, to encourage one superpower to destroy another country and even to cooperate with it? Particularly one with which, as the Prime Minister has
himself pointed out, after the solution of the Taiwan issue, which will be in the relatively near future, we have no conflicting interests at all.”

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, Kissinger not only offered to brief Zhou on “any proposal made by any other large country which could affect your interests” but also promised to “take your views very seriously.” He continued:

“Specifically, I am prepared to give you any information you may wish to know regarding any bilateral negotiations we are having with the Soviet Union on such issues as SALT, so as to alleviate any concerns you might have in this regard. So while these negotiations will continue, we will attempt to conduct them in such a way that they do not increase the opportunity for military pressures against you.”

Zhou tested Kissinger’s offer, asking whether the President had “ever considered the possibility” of a summit meeting with Soviet leaders. The two men then discussed at length Nixon’s plans to visit both China and the Soviet Union:

“PM Chou: If there is such a possibility, it would be best for President Nixon and the Soviet Union to meet before President Nixon visits China.

“We are not afraid of a big turmoil. With the objective development of events, this might be possible. But we would not want to deliberately create tensions. You saw, just throwing a ping-pong ball has thrown the Soviet Union into such consternation. So many Americans going to the Soviet Union, and Russians to America, did not create such a stir. We paid no special attention to that.

“Dr. Kissinger: I will be candid. This subject has been discussed. The President has received an invitation to visit Moscow.

“As you know from your own dealings with the Soviet Union, there is a tendency on the part of Soviet leaders to attempt to squeeze every advantage out of any situation. (Chou laughs.)

“Therefore, after extending the invitation, certain conditions were attached which we can meet as a matter of fact, but as a question of principle it is now held in abeyance.

“It is not a question that we cannot meet them, but that we believe that if the President talks to the Head of State of another government it must be on its own merits. The same is true in your case.

“But the principle of a meeting between the President and the Soviet leaders has been accepted. The visit [invitation?] has been extended by the Soviet leaders and a visit may still take place within the next 6 months.

“PM Chou: In that case, we might set the date of the President’s visit sometime in the summer of next year, say after May 1. That might be a more appropriate time for your President.
"Dr. Kissinger: One difficulty with this is that after May the political campaign begins in America. While it would be advantageous from a political point of view to have the visit during that season, I think, frankly, for our mutual interest, that we would not start our relationship under the suspicion that it has this short-term motivation.

"So it should be somewhat earlier; a few months earlier would be better than in the summer. March or April.

"PM Chou: Fine. I will report this to Chairman Mao and then give you a reply. But you do agree to the principle that it would be good for the President first to visit Moscow and then China? This would be better for you?

"Dr. Kissinger: The problem in our relations with the Soviet Union is different from the problem of our relations with the People’s Republic of China.

"I understand your hesitation to begin with. In our relations with the Soviet Union we have a number of concrete issues but no overwhelming political issues.

"PM Chou: Much more concrete issues.

"Dr. Kissinger: But no overwhelming philosophical issues. You have had your own experience in negotiations with the Soviet Union, so I need not describe it. They lend themselves less well to meetings at a very high level because they always get lost in a great amount of detail. And some very petty detail.

"Our relations with the People’s Republic of China are at an historic turning point which requires the intervention of top leaders who can set a basic direction and then let the details be worked out later.

"So the problem is that with the Soviet Union we can do a lot of business in regular ways, while with the People’s Republic of China we can do the most important business really only between Chairman Mao and the President. That is the difference. (Chou nods)

"But in principle, I repeat, there is a formal agreement that makes clear we are prepared to meet with the Soviet leaders, and they have expressed their willingness.

"In all honesty, I cannot promise you it will happen no matter when we set a date. We shall try, but we will not meet prior conditions either with Moscow or with Peking; but you haven’t made any prior conditions.

"PM Chou: That’s right. We agree." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1033, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, China Materials, China Memcons & Memos—Originals, July 1971)

For the full text of the memoranda of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Documents 139 and 140.
While Kissinger met secretly with Zhou in Beijing, the President was secluded in San Clemente with a small entourage, including White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander M. Haig, Jr. “Because of the need for complete secrecy and the lack of any direct communications facilities between Peking and Washington,” Nixon later explained, “I knew that we would have no word from Kissinger while he was in China.” (Nixon, RN: Memoirs, page 553) Nixon met Haldeman and Haig early on July 10 to discuss various issues of domestic politics and foreign policy. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) The principal subject for discussion, however, was China. The President dwelled on past developments, recalling, in particular, the moment Kissinger gave him the message from Zhou on April 27. According to Haldeman, Nixon exclaimed: “This is the first time the Russians have to react to us.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 37, H-Notes) During a telephone call with Haig the next morning, Nixon issued instructions on how to handle Kissinger’s secret trip:

“P: I think we should get together an order that there is to be no discussion of Sino-Soviet relations. No speculation. No backgrounding. It should go to State, Defense and CIA. And anyone who does is subject to removal.

“H: Yes sir. I will have one ready this afternoon. And this will also keep Henry from doing anything along that line.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1971 [2 of 2])

After a brief stop in Paris for talks with the North Vietnamese, Kissinger returned to the United States on July 13, arriving at San Clemente in time for breakfast. “I spent from 7:20 to 9:30 a.m. with the President,” Kissinger later recalled, “giving him a detailed account of events and my long written report. We both recognized that we had opened up new opportunities for our diplomacy. Inevitably, there would be repercussions with the Soviet Union; we thought that over time they would be beneficial.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 757) Nixon then met Kissinger, Haldeman, and Haig at 10 a.m. to prepare for the announcement in two days of his “big play” on China. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) As Haldeman reported in his diary:

“The P[resident] got into some reflection of how everything all turns around. Years ago he fought the battle for Chiang, and he led the fight; and he’s always taken the line that we stand by the South Koreans, and that we stand by the South Vietnamese, etc. It’s ironic now
that Richard Nixon is the one to lead the move in the other direction.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, page 318)

According to Haldeman’s handwritten notes, Nixon also reviewed the international implications of the “opening” in Sino-American relations:

“q[uestion] of what the Chinese do to us some day
“[be]cause of their native ability
“pt. of how this changes world balance
“shatters old alignments
“pressure on Japan—alliance with Soviets
“fundamental shift in power balances
“Soviets will move to Japs & Indians
“how answer timing q[uestion]—
“Chinese say this came now [be]cause of Cambodia
“concern re Soviets has grown
“so deal with us.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 37, H-Notes)

After this review of geopolitics, the four men discussed the more mundane issues of timing, including when to schedule Nixon’s trip and when to notify the Soviets of Kissinger’s trip. Haldeman noted that “they agreed that the second half of March might be the best time” for the President to visit China: “It would give us a chance to see what the Soviets do, and it would be good to hit the Democrats at primary time. Then the P said that maybe he’d go in January, so he could avoid the State of the Union. We got into some discussion of notification; it was agreed that K should talk to Dobrynin.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) During a meeting the next morning, Kissinger advised Nixon that he would first give Dobrynin the announcement and then tell him that it’s “up to you how you react.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 37, H-Notes)

In a memorandum for the President on July 14, Kissinger formally reported the substance and assessed the significance of his secret trip to China. Throughout the memorandum, Kissinger favorably compared Chinese to Soviet conduct, suggesting that Zhou was a more reliable interlocutor than Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. “There was none of the Russian ploymanship, scoring points, rigidity or bullying,” he explained. “They did not turn everything into a contest.” Kissinger believed, above all, that the Chinese were “deeply worried about the Soviet threat to their national integrity, realistically speaking,
and see in us a balancing force against the USSR.” After providing details of his discussions, Kissinger presented his conclusions on the immediate prospects for triangular diplomacy:

“[T]he process we have now started will send enormous shock waves around the world. It may panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility. It could shake Japan loose from its heavily American moorings. It will cause a violent upheaval in Taiwan. It will have a major impact on our other Asian allies, such as Korea and Thailand. It will increase the already substantial hostility in India. Some quarters may seek to sabotage over the coming months.

“However, we were well aware of these risks when we embarked on this course. We were aware too that the alternative was unacceptable—continued isolation from one-quarter of the world’s most talented people and a country rich in past achievements and future potential.

“And even the risks can be managed and turned to our advantage if we maintain steady nerves and pursue our policies responsibly. With the Soviet Union we will have to make clear the continued priorities we attach to our concrete negotiations with them. Just as we will not collude with them against China, so we have no intention of colluding with China against them. If carefully managed, our new China policy could have a longer term beneficial impact on Moscow.” (National Archives, Nixon President’s Materials, NSC Files, Box 847, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Book III)

284. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

July 15, 1971, 9:45 p.m., PDT.

D: Hello.
K: Hello.
D: How are you?
K: I am fine. The President asked me to call you personally. We have an oral note for your government when I am through. I will read the announcement the President is going to make and then I have a few comments to make and you will be given an oral note [omission in transcript].

D: Which he is going to make on address?
K: “Premier Chou En-Lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of President Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Republic of China, Premier Chou En-Lai, on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has accepted this invitation with pleasure. The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.”²

D: This is the text you just read? [omission in transcript]
K: The comments are as follows: The President asked me to tell you to transmit these comments to your Government. [omission in transcript] handed an oral note from President.

D: Comments by Col. Kennedy?
K: He will hand it to you after I am finished. Consequently (?) “It is essential that [your government not misread the meaning of this event] and that our two countries continue to work [cooperatively] on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Dobrynin was in Washington at the White House. For their memoir accounts, see Kissinger, White House Years, p. 835, and Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 226–227.

² The text Kissinger read is identical to the announcement Nixon made that evening, which was simultaneously released in Beijing. For the full text of the President’s remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 819–820.
all the issues we have been discussing. This is the spirit of the note
[which Colonel Kennedy has just handed you,] and for which we hope
[you will] transmit [promptly] to Moscow.”

D: Just a minute. The note which Col. Kennedy is going to give
me is from the President to go to my government? Message of the
President?

K: Col. Kennedy is giving you an oral note. I am giving you some
additional comments [from] the President.

D: [omission in transcript] What you just mentioned?

K: I am not finished yet.

D: Repeat, please.

K: “You know better than anyone the great efforts we have made
over the past two years to make progress.”

D: Just a minute.

K: “And in particular [to give] priority [to] a meeting of our
leaders.”

D: Yes.

K: “Your recent decision to delay [the date for such a summit] has
caused us to proceed [first with the announcement the President is
making this evening].”

D: Just a minute—yes.

K: Okay, I continue. “This announcement changes nothing in U.S.-
Soviet relations.” We can take [one of] two routes—We can proceed
promptly with the various subjects you and I have discussed and which
we are hereby reaffirming, or we can both undertake an agonizing reap-
praisal. We are prepared for either course, though we prefer to proceed
on our present course.” Now, what I have read to you are oral com-
ments of the President.

D: Of the President?

K: You will be handed an oral note. This was comments on the
oral note.

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3 The editor corrected the text of these comments in brackets on the basis of
Kissinger’s talking points. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,
Box 1036, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, China—General,
July–October 1971) Two substantive omissions from the talking points are also noted
below.

4 The transcript omits the following sentences from Kissinger’s talking points: “It
is not directed at you. We are still ready for a US-Soviet summit and to move ahead on
our various negotiations.”

5 The transcript printed here omits the following sentence from Kissinger’s talking
points: “We see no reason to take the second course.”
D: Oral note is from President and [this] is oral comments from President. [omission in transcript]
K: I am prepared to discuss future promises with you if you are interested. Suggest lunch on Monday.
D: How about 1:00 p.m. on Monday?6
K: Okay.
D: I would like to check on one phrase. “And we should both undertake—”
K: What we are reaffirming is what I told you on June 8 and 30.7
D: Because this is not quite clear you mean toward (?) what you have discussed on June 8 and 11 [30].
K: I think the oral note will explain it.
D: I understand [omission in transcript] reaffirm [omission in transcript] of new defense up to both governments to decide what to do. Lunch Monday at 1:00.
K: Come to usual place in White House.
D: I understand. [omission in transcript] this is what the President is going to say.
K: He is going to say on television. He is going to add a few sentences that this is not directed toward anyone.8
D: Okay, I see you.
K: See you Monday at 1:00 p.m.
D: Bye.

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6 July 19.
7 See Documents 252 and 269.
8 The President’s remarks included the following passage: “Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends. It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly relations with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation’s enemy.”
285. Oral Note From President Nixon to the Soviet Leadership


The Government of the Soviet Union is aware of the sequence of events which has preceded the July 15, 1971, announcement of the President of the United States.

The United States Government has repeatedly expressed the priorities of its foreign policy. The President wishes to reaffirm the content and spirit of the remarks about US-Soviet relations that Dr. Kissinger made to Ambassador Dobrynin at Camp David on June 8 and again on June 30, 1971. The United States Government is willing to continue, and indeed to speed up, the process outlined in these conversations.

The announcement is not directed against any countries as the President pointed out in his accompanying statement. Any reversal of recent positive trends would, of course, have serious results for both countries.

The President very much hopes that the Government of the Soviet Union will choose to join with the United States in a policy of furthering and accelerating the positive developments in their relations in recent months.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. No classification marking. Kissinger made several handwritten corrections on a draft of the note (ibid.); substantive changes are noted below. According to Kissinger: “On July 15, about forty-five minutes before the announcement [at 10 p.m.] of my trip to Peking, we sent a message to the Soviet leaders through Vorontsov.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 835) Marginalia on the original, however, indicate that it was “handed to Amb D by Col Kennedy 9:45 p.m., 7/15/71.” See also Document 284.

2 Kissinger inserted this paragraph by hand in the draft. The draft also included the following sentence, which Kissinger crossed out: “It is also prepared for any other course of action, although this could lead to serious results for both countries.”
Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

San Clemente, California, July 16, 1971, 9:15 a.m., PDT.

Mr. Ziegler: We are going to do the session this morning on a background basis. You can attribute it to “White House officials.” You can directly quote “White House officials,” unless Dr. Kissinger says to you that it is on deep background, and then you should not quote him directly.

We will have a transcript for you to read after the briefing.

There are two announcements before we go to Dr. Kissinger. I have stated the ground rules to you and know you will abide by them.

On Monday, President Nixon will have a meeting with the bipartisan leadership at 8:30 in the morning. Then at 10:00 o’clock on Monday, President Nixon will meet with his full Cabinet. The purpose of the meeting with bipartisan leadership and the Cabinet is to discuss the recent events which were announced last night.

With that, I think we can go directly to Dr. Kissinger. I believe he would like to go directly to your questions.

Let me again repeat the ground rules. Dr. Kissinger’s remarks this morning will be on Background, as I indicated to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say one thing, and then we will go right to questions.

I will not be able to go into substance other than some of the surrounding circumstances, and I hope you will be patient with me if I don’t speak as fully as I would like to.

Q. Is it likely that the President’s journey will include a visit to the Soviet Union on the same trip as China?

Dr. Kissinger: The President’s view on a meeting with the Soviet leaders has been frequently stated. It is one that, of course, he has always been, in principle, willing to undertake. It would seem to me that the occasion of a visit to Peking is not the best to also visit Moscow.

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2 July 19.
The issues to be discussed between the two countries are too various. But in principle, we are prepared to meet with the Soviet leaders whenever our negotiations have reached a point where something fruitful can be accomplished.

Let me make one other point: Nothing that has been done in our relations with the Peoples Republic of China has any purpose or is in any way directed against any other countries, and especially not against the Soviet Union. We are taking these steps because we cannot imagine a stable, international peace in which a country of 750 million people is kept in isolation. We believe that by improving relations with the Peoples Republic of China we are contributing to peace in the world, and therefore are contributing to all nations.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Kissinger’s secret trip to China.]

Q. Do you expect the President might go to the Soviet Union before he goes to China?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want to speculate about any prospective trips. It would seem to me more logical that the trips would be taken in the order that they are announced, if indeed there is a trip.3

[Omitted here is the remainder of the briefing, including a review of the ground rules for attribution.]

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3 In their coverage of the background briefing, the New York Times and Washington Post both reported that, according to “White House officials,” the President was still interested in a trip to the Moscow—but not before his trip to Beijing. Neither, however, reported Kissinger’s assertion that the opening to China was not directed against the Soviet Union. (John Herbers, “Nixon Is Expected to Visit China Around End of Year; To See Both Mao and Chou,” New York Times, July 17, 1971, p. 1; and Carroll Kilpatrick, “Formal Relations Not Likely by Then,” July 17, 1971, Washington Post, p. A1)
Between Beijing and Moscow: Summit Announcement, July 19–October 12, 1971

287. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Economic Items for Use in Dobrynin Discussions

At San Clemente you asked for alternative piecemeal approaches that might be used in your meeting today with Dobrynin.²

1. Kama River

I have pressed very hard again to find a separable item and I think the best possibility we have come up with is the Foundry portion (see Tab A).³

It is a reasonably discrete element of the total Kama River project. One could argue whether a decision on our part to authorize participation of a foundry is similarly discrete in the minds of U.S. business. In other words, U.S. businessmen would probably have trouble understanding why the foundry was cleared but nothing else. It may be that we should even consider at some point saying that it is mixed in with other non-economic considerations and we don’t therefore expect it to make economic sense. I am presuming the Russians know the linkage in any event.

We now have three foundry applications that have an aggregate value of $175 million but there is undoubtedly redundancy here. Thus, in actual practice if all three were accepted, we would probably find the total volume significantly less than this.

Even so, if this kind of number bothers you, you can always try getting some Russian purchases of consumer goods and consumer

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [2 of 3]. Top Secret.

² According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Peterson in San Clemente on July 16 from 1:49 to 2 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.

³ Tabs A–D are attached but not printed. At Tab A is an undated and unsigned paper entitled “The Kama River Foundry.”
goods manufacturing equipment. You will remember the argument to them might be that anything that appears to U.S. critics to result in a diminution in defense effort (as consumer goods spending might) helps assuage concerns of segments of U.S. public who might feel the Kama River project by itself has too much potential defense content.

In case you have any time for more reading, I show in Tab B the current status of the Kama River inter-agency draft you and I agreed we should try to get done soon, including Defense.

Also, included is the latest Mack Truck wire to the Soviets which went out Friday indicating the particular questions they have but keeping it open (Tab C).5

2. Control Data Computer

The other significant pending application is by Control Data Corporation for a Model 6400 computer (quite advanced) for the Institute of High Energy Physics at Yerevan.

This involves COCOM clearance and if you decided to go ahead with it, I would assume you would want to impose the same kind of safeguards we imposed on the British on their recent computer deal with Russia (ICL computers).

Also, you should know that this is not too far along in the inter-agency process but I suppose this could be speeded up.

This strikes me, Henry, as the kind of item you could offer (a) if you were looking for something quite symbolic in the aftermath of the China move, and/or (b) something you could talk about conditionally (i.e. it would take time for example to work out safeguards) in the event you wanted something positive with stalling potential if later it did not seem appropriate.

I have talked to Ed David about this and he has written a very brief memo in Tab D that summarizes the situation. Please read it and note he emphasizes inspection safeguards are required but, on balance, he feels it is a reasonable possibility.

3. Petroleum-Hydro-Cracker Technology

While we have no specific applications on this, we do know there has been general Soviet interest in U.S. technology in this field in the past.

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4 At Tab B is a draft memorandum for the President, dated July 16, entitled “Proposed Exports of Technology and Equipment for the Construction of a Soviet Truck Manufacturing Plant Located on the Kama River.”

5 Dated July 16.

6 Dated July 19.
On your desk somewhere, you will probably find a letter for your signature to the President on similar technology to Poland.\footnote{Kissinger signed and forwarded the memorandum and attached letter to the President on August 13; Nixon subsequently approved the issuance of the export licenses to Poland. The memorandum is printed in \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1972, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 151.}

It might even fit your negotiating plans to offer this to the Russians at the same time or even first, indicating you did not want to appear to be discriminating in favor of the Poles. The difference here, of course, is that the Poles have expressed very specific interest in this technology (to me directly and to Dr. Edward David) whereas the Russian interest has been more general. Thus, its leverage potential with the Russians is conjectural.

I hope one or more of these is helpful to you.

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\textbf{288. Memorandum of Conversation}\footnote{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Lord and Rodman forwarded this memorandum and another summarizing its “highlights” for the President to Kissinger on July 24. Kissinger approved both, which were then submitted to Nixon on July 27; a note on the “highlights” memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 2:55. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) For their memoir accounts of the meeting, see Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, pp. 766–767, 835–836, and Dobrynin, \textit{In Confidence}, pp. 227–228.}

\textit{Washington, July 19, 1971, 1 p.m.}

\textbf{PARTICIPANTS}

Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Dobrynin

The meeting took place at my initiative\footnote{See Document 284.} so that I could get a feeling for Dobrynin’s attitude following the announcement of the Peking Summit. Dobrynin was at his oily best and, for the first time in my experience with him, totally insecure.

I opened the conversation by telling Dobrynin that we might have a general review first. He thought it was a capital idea. Indeed, he said
he had been so interested in seeing me that he had immediately left New York, where he had seen his wife off for a vacation in the Soviet Union, despite his intention to spend a day there. I said I would have been glad to reschedule the lunch. He said, “No, no, no. This is important.” I then turned to recent events.

**U.S.-Soviet Summit**

I said that I wanted to be frank with him. Perhaps in the first year of our Administration we had not always been forthcoming in improving relations with the Soviet Union, but ever since April 1970 we believe we have made an unending series of overtures. The Soviet response has been grudging and petty, especially on the Summit Meeting. They simply did not understand the President. The President thought in broad philosophical terms and had sincerely believed that his meeting with the Soviet leaders might open new vistas for cooperation around the world; instead, he found himself confronted with one evasion after another. As Dobrynin very well knew, I had urged him to have an answer by July 1st and even then it had taken till July 5th, and he had then been evasive again, saying that the meeting could take place in November and December. This was in effect a rejection, because I had already told him that November and December were highly inconvenient. Indeed, I did not know whether Dobrynin was even saying we should fix a date.

Dobrynin in reply was almost beside himself with protestations of goodwill. On the contrary, he said, he could tell me strictly off the record that a meeting between his leaders and the President was very much on their minds. What in fact had happened was that September did not seem possible, and now November was the earliest possible date. He was certain the Soviet leaders would be willing to set another date for a Summit, but now they did not know whether our meeting with Peking made it impossible. Would we be willing to come to Moscow before going to Peking?

I replied that it did not seem to me proper to go to Moscow before having gone to Peking, that we should go in the order in which the announcements were made. He asked whether we would be prepared to announce a meeting before having been in Peking. I said that that was a distinct possibility but that I would have to check this with the President and let him know later in the day.

[I called Dobrynin at 7:00 that evening after checking with the President and told him that we would be prepared to announce a meeting

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3 See Document 273.
in Moscow after having set the date of a meeting in Peking but before we had actually visited Peking.]

Other Bilateral Issues

Dobrynin then reviewed the international situation. He said he thought that our relationship actually was going very well. He had every confidence that the Berlin talks were proceeding well and that SALT too was going according to program, so it was a pity if there were any misunderstanding in our relationship. Following my request at the meeting of June 30, Dobrynin handed me some specific suggestions on the port security program which I promised him to staff.

I also told Dobrynin that we might be able to do the foundry part of the Kama River Project separately, to the extent of $175 million, if this were of interest in Moscow. In short, it was quite possible for us to have a useful relationship. Finally I told Dobrynin that we were prepared to proceed with the accidental war treaty with the Soviet Union separately in order to mark some progress on our relationship.

All of this was greeted by Dobrynin with the oiliest of reassurances.

My Trip to China

Dobrynin then said it would be extremely helpful to his people in Moscow if he could tell them that he had been briefed about the meeting in Peking. I said I would be glad to do so. I said we had talked essentially in general review of the situation, and of course Taiwan was very much on China’s mind.

4 Brackets are in the original. A transcript of the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File.

5 In a July 14 special channel message to Kissinger, Rush reported that he had “encountered difficulties” in employing delaying tactics to postpone any new meeting with Falin and Bahr until after July 20. “The Chancellor and Bahr pushed me very hard to conclude the talks with Falin this week,” Rush explained. “This, of course, I insisted was unrealistic and your trip was cited as an important reason for delay.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2)

6 Kissinger replied on July 19 (presumably before his meeting with Dobrynin that afternoon): “As you can gather Berlin has not been at the forefront of our attention. You can proceed with deliberate speed but leave a little margin as long as you can. We still do not have Moscow’s reaction to the Peking caper.” (Ibid.)

7 Dobrynin gave Kissinger an informal note stating that the Soviet Union “would welcome the signing of a general intergovernmental maritime agreement with the U.S. or, to begin with, the solution of more specific matters which stand in the way of broader economic relations between our two countries.” The note specified a number of items to improve Soviet access to American ports. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2])
He asked me whether the Soviet Union had come up. I replied that realistically it was obvious that we could do nothing to help Communist China against the Soviet Union. In any event to us the Soviet Union was a world power, while we recognized that China was primarily significant for Asian settlements. Dobrynin asked whether Chou En-lai had indicated any worry about a Soviet attack. I said there were practically no references to the Soviet Union except an occasional vague allusion, while it seemed to me that the primary fear of Communist China was Japan.

Dobrynin brightened considerably and said that this was exactly his conviction of Chinese priorities. He asked what there really was to talk about between us and the Chinese? Were we interested in Chinese domination of Southeast Asia? He had always thought that the Soviet interests and ours were much more nearly complementary with respect to the defense of Southeast Asia. I said that I wasn’t certain that the Chinese had aggressive tendencies in Southeast Asia but that in any event we would not favor Chinese expansion beyond their borders.9

India and Pakistan

Dobrynin then asked me about India and Pakistan. I replied I had heard some reports that the Soviet Union might encourage military adventures by India.10 Dobrynin answered that the Soviet Union was giving them political support but was strongly trying to discourage military adventures. I said my impression was that a war between India and Pakistan could not be localized to East Pakistan. He said that of course the Pakistanis consider East Pakistan an integral part of their country, just as the Soviets consider the Ukraine or we consider Alaska. I said that seemed to be my impression, and moreover the war might not be confined to the subcontinent. Dobrynin said that that was their judgment and this is why they were trying to localize it.

The Two Summits

As the meeting broke up, Dobrynin asked me again how my trip was affected by their summit decision. I said that in all candor I had always intended to go to China but if they had accepted the September summit we would have stalled a Chinese summit until much later. But that was water over the dam now. Dobrynin responded, “I wish you had given me some advance warning; it might have affected

9 In a July 20 letter, Haig briefed Walters on this meeting, including Kissinger’s assurances to Dobrynin about his talks in Beijing. Walters passed this information to Huang Chen during a meeting in Paris on July 21. Haig’s instructions and Walters’s report on the meeting are published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E-13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Documents 10 and 11.

10 See ibid., volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 98.
our decision.” I said that that did not seem to me possible and that he understood that we could not jeopardize the secrecy of the enterprise.\textsuperscript{11}

Dobrynin agreed, and said he would stay here the better part of the summer to work on our relationship. I invited him to come to the West Coast at some point and I would give him a tour of a movie studio.

\textsuperscript{11} Kissinger later suggested that Dobrynin must have been in “deep trouble in Moscow for not having foreseen our move” in Beijing. (Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p. 836) Dobrynin, however, recalled: “I felt we had allowed ourselves to be outplayed by the Americans and the Chinese, although I certainly did not let Kissinger know that.” (Dobrynin, \textit{In Confidence}, p. 227)

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289. \textbf{Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)}\textsuperscript{1}


Nixon: Well, Henry, tell me about your meeting with Mr. D.\textsuperscript{2}

Kissinger: Oh, God, he was [unclear]—

Nixon: Who isn’t—? How was your staff?\textsuperscript{3} I bet they were ecstatic.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah, Mr. President. Their morale is way high.

[\textit{21 seconds not declassified}]

Nixon: Well, Henry—

Kissinger: They have—

Nixon: But I think it’s too late.

Kissinger: Every sophisticate—

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 262–9. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Executive Office Building from 5:10 to 5:35 p.m. on July 19. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 288.

\textsuperscript{3} According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met members of the National Security Council staff in the Executive Office Building at 4:40 p.m.—presumably to discuss his secret trip to Beijing. Kissinger apparently left the meeting early to see the President. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No substantive record of the staff meeting has been found.
Nixon: Well, sophisticate? I want the people.
Kissinger: Well, the people—
Nixon: I don’t give a shit, but the story has now set in.
Kissinger: Yes.
Nixon: State cannot—
Kissinger: They can’t do it.
Nixon: I’m not going to let them do it.
Kissinger: State can’t do it.
Nixon: On that, we did something that’s good. They’re not going
to come in and preempt it.
Kissinger: Well, they sure as hell—
Nixon: You’ve given Rogers one hell of a lot more than he pleaded
about.
Kissinger: They sure as hell weren’t claiming that they participated
in the Cambodia decision, although they did a lot more there.
Nixon: Or Laos.
Kissinger: Or Laos. Or anything else that was tough. Well, I told
Dobrynin that I—I began to doubt that there is a God, because I lied
to him actually. I’m sure that if there were one, I would have been pun-
ished. But—
Nixon: [laughs]
Kissinger: But I started off and then he—first of all, I’ve never seen
him so forthcoming before today.
Nixon: Good. Really?
Kissinger: Well—oh, yeah. Even the State Department will some-
day—
Nixon: Ambassadors.
Kissinger: —know—
Nixon: Rogers.
Kissinger: But it’s best not to talk about it. I’ve got a lot of details
here to show you.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: Let me—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: [I said,] “Let me give you a picture of how the Presi-
dent’s mind works. This isn’t to pacify you. He just—and he wants me
to tell you that, in terms of world leadership, he recognizes only the
Soviet Union and the United States will lead. But after June, we’re us-
ing every stop.”
Nixon: Precisely.
Kissinger: “I want to tell you, under one trivial condition, which, well—which I’ve heard here as well.” I said, “Remember, we gave you until July 1st. I can tell you in strictest confidence that, before we left Washington, my instructions to the President—I was going to go to China in June. My instructions to the President—from the President.”

Nixon: Which? Your role?

Kissinger: It’s not that kind of relationship.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: But that—the burden’s on them.

Nixon: Him.

Kissinger: And then I said, “We have no choice. The President has said if anything we conduct will destroy us all, it’s the arms race.” I think here we could tell Rogers what we’re doing.


Kissinger: Again, I told him that, he said I told him that—I said, “Moreover,” I said to him, “I told you six months ago that we couldn’t do it in November or December. So when you said you wanted it in November or December, well, the President had to assume that this was a nice way to back out.” He said, “No, no, no, no. We want it. We very much want it. I can tell you in strictest confidence, off the record.” Well, we’re both pushing at each other.

Nixon: Yeah, I know.

Kissinger: You know, pushing this strictest confidence, off the record.

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: And they had already made their decision. They were getting ready to pick the date. Well, he said—“But now,” he said, “can we pick the date now? What can I report?” Then I said, “Well, in principle, yes, but, of course, now we have a new situation.” He said, “Would you be willing to come before going to Peking?” I said, “Anatol, be classy.” I said, “We have to go now in the order in which we announce it.” He said, “Would you be willing to announce it before you go to Peking?” I said, “Well, I’m not sure what the President’s”—but I said, “We may consider it. But I’ll talk to the President. The President makes decisions.”

Nixon: That’s right. I’ve approved anything—

Kissinger: He said, “Well, it better go tonight; they’re having a meeting on it on Thursday.” So, what I think—

Nixon: Right.

4 July 22.
Kissinger: Then I said—then he said, “Well, if you go”—[laughs] the shoe is really on the other foot now—he said, but he said, “If you come after you’ve gone to Peking, why won’t Peking hold you up until May?”

Nixon: They can’t.

Kissinger: I thought it was somewhat of a cheesy play. I said, “Sorry, I don’t know what Peking is going to do, but if they try to make conditions—” What reason would they have for treating you, the President—

Nixon: Just one.

Kissinger: —to such a condition? “But I have no reason to believe that they would make such—” Well, he was just sniffing in a conniption. So what I think is going to happen now, unless they make public the decision to go very tough—which would be but, well, maybe 30 percent—I think they’re going to calm down. I think we can announce the Moscow summit before you go to Peking. And that would actually help—

Nixon: Exactly.

Kissinger: —with the Chinese because—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —taking effect after we go to Moscow.

Nixon: Before.

Kissinger: And the sequence that I now see is I might go to Peking at the end of September, get the damn thing locked up.

Nixon: Then announce it.

Kissinger: Then announce the summit for Peking.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Then while I’m in Peking tell them that you’re going to announce the summit for Moscow. And then at the end of October announce the summit for Moscow for the end of March.

Nixon: So, April is too early.

Kissinger: Is April early for that?

Nixon: We could still do it in April. Work out your—you don’t have to worry about, well, going in the order we put ourselves in.

Kissinger: Well, that’s April.

Nixon: April. Yeah. I hope they embrace it, that the Russians will do that time and play over there.

Kissinger: But I think we could have one spectacular after another.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: The other trip to Peking; the announcement of—

Nixon: Why don’t you let him know—?
Kissinger: But I’m going to phone him tonight.
Nixon: I’d let him know that, well, there really are several—let me put it: I will hold the period around the 1st of May.
Kissinger: I won’t even give on that.
Nixon: Okay. The spring of next year.
Kissinger: No, I think what I would do is to say—we tell them in Sep[tember]—as I told them, that we’d do it after Peking. And they sort of—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —come in with a specific proposal of when to announce it and so forth.
Nixon: We’ll ask them—
Kissinger: We’re thinking of roughing [out] our schedule.
Nixon: That’s right. And we’re seeking accommodation on other things and so forth. But he was certainly not unpleasant.
Kissinger: Then he asked me, he said, “It would really help,” he said, “if you give our people a briefing—”
Nixon: [laughs]
Kissinger: “—of what went on in Peking.” Well, I gave him a briefing about this Aviation Week.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: He said, “Did you discuss Soviet air defenses or Soviet bases?” I said, “We avoided it for the first powwow.” He said, “Well, are they worried that we’d attack them?” I said, “Anatoly, you seem to be very [more] worried about China than Japan.”
[Omitted here is discussion of China and Vietnam, including domestic reaction to recent developments.]
Kissinger: I think they [the North Vietnamese] have got to settle now, because if we—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Mr. President, if we get a Russian summit, I think—oh, another thing Dobrynin said is—who knows about these things?—”What can you really settle with the Chinese?” He said, “I thought we were your natural partners in Southeast Asia. We’re both trying to avoid Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.”
Nixon: Shut up and get out! [laughter]
Kissinger: Then he said about India and Pakistan. He asked me what my impression was of, due to the fact there hasn’t been any war there for a while, whether it should become international.
Nixon: I agree.
Kissinger: Exactly. The U.N. is chained up. He [Dobrynin] talked to me with a respect that I hadn’t encountered before.
Nixon: Did you see Harriman? Was he more affected?
Kissinger: Oh, I saw him with the Indian Ambassador.\(^5\)
Nixon: Was he shaken?
Kissinger: He was shaken.

Nixon: Oh, well. You know, it shows what you’ve done. You know another thing too that shakes them, Henry. They worry, worry in a different sense: the information, gut issue. I was their fear. This shakes them up completely because people say, they say, “This son-of-a-bitch went into Cambodia; this son-of-a-bitch went into Laos; this son-of-a-bitch may be a disaster; this son-of-a-bitch is unpredictable. We don’t know what he’s going to do.”
Kissinger: Yeah, but I—
Nixon: You see? That’s a good thing.
Kissinger: “But he has big plays.” I mean, here you were, by any reasonable prediction, you were totally on the ropes.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: And if you, then, by any reasonable prediction, however, save yourself—
Nixon: Who would’ve dreamed—?
Kissinger: Oh, absolutely. But that you held it with ice cold nerves for two months.
Nixon: That’s something—
Kissinger: You took the shellacking.
Nixon: That’s something that you could use with the people tonight, you know.
Kissinger: Now, who, in God’s name—
Nixon: Yes.
Kissinger: —which other American political figure would have just had the effrontery to take the riots, the Congressional action for two months—?
Nixon: Without saying, “Gee whiz, fellows.”
[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and China.]
Nixon: We’re going to be goddamn loose on Vietnam though, Henry.
Kissinger: I thought I’d be in my manner much, very gentle with them.

\(^5\) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Indian Ambassador Jha for lunch in San Clemente at 1:12 p.m. on July 17. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
Nixon: Exactly.

Kissinger: Because they—I’d put it right into their heart, for one thing.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: They know now I’m not a pushover.

Nixon: I think that we—and I think in general it burns to say, you know, “Here’s what we differ on”—that kind of a spirit, Henry. “What do you have to offer?” and so forth; “Well, we’ll look it over,” then, “Screw you.”

Kissinger: But never—that shouldn’t be gloating.

Nixon: No gloating ever. No. No, I agree. I agree. I think that the very cool and strong position that we know what we’re doing, we’ve got the hole card, and we’re not going to gloat over you. What do you got to offer? Another settlement.

Kissinger: I—

Nixon: Now, what in the hell are they [North Vietnamese] going to do? What the Christ is their option now—except, I guess, to fight on?

Kissinger: Well, but Mr. President, I think—there’s one point I made to Dobrynin here today: “You know, he [Nixon] has guts. There never was, to tell the truth, a tougher guy.”

Nixon: You told him that too?

Kissinger: Yeah. I think—the Russians cannot control the Berlin thing. They can try to stir up the North Vietnamese people. And the North Vietnamese have to decide whether they want another series of bloodbaths. The Russians have to decide whether, that, having caused one great play, they might still go into a few other places. I mean, I can tell Dobrynin what I want, but I’m not concerned with the Soviet Union. That doesn’t, that’s just something for the record. We don’t have to discuss it. The mere fact though that those with ties to the Chinese, who have troops on the border—

Nixon: That’s fine. You know, they’re capable of bringing a freeze, a deep freeze, you know, with the Chinese attacking the Russians for their program—that would be after SALT, you know.

Kissinger: But when you consider that Kuznetsov has been—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —their Deputy Foreign Minister, has been in Peking for nearly two years and has yet to see Chou En-lai.

Nixon: But, what I mean is, with the Chinese fear of the Russians on this, they would be close to us.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: Now, now that this—this is just a total upheaval.
Kissinger: We’ve got to play it out. We can’t afford to play a dirty game.

Nixon: We can’t afford the time.

Kissinger: But we’ve got to get the basic script, not the content, of course, but we’ve got to do it the way with consultation—

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: —with Gromyko on their answer, that we know which sequence to do—

Nixon: Will it hold the value—?

Kissinger: —and what is possible, so that he doesn’t ask something of you, that there is no other trip competing. And the meeting ought to be—

Nixon: Will Bruce be present for all your meetings?

Kissinger: Yes, I’m sure.

Nixon: Good. Talk maximum first. You see—and also Bruce knows that Bill just can’t handle this.

Kissinger: Oh, God. When I told Bruce that Bill was going to speak on Vietnam next month—

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: —he said if you write a speech and you tell him he can’t answer very many questions—well, naturally, he assumes the President—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: You’ve got him on the right road. This Congressional thing is too bad.

Nixon: Oh, I don’t want to do it. They come down to you—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: —and you deal with the committee. But when they talk to Rogers [laughs]—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: You see, you got to remember, now, you were in the position—

Kissinger: Yeah.


Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: That’s very good though.

Kissinger: I—

Nixon: That’s why—and also why be bored with the goddamn Senators, Henry? You had to—
Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: You had to babysit them all this time. And now that will allow us to concentrate on more important things. I’m a little tired of them, aren’t you?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. But I think we have—I tell you Dobrynin—oh, he said, “SALT is going along fine. Berlin is going along fine.”

Nixon: Good. But we’re not going to be in any position—

Kissinger: He just thought he had you on the run.

Nixon: And he doesn’t.

Kissinger: [unclear] I should—

Nixon: No gloating on China. Now, he says he’ll—

Kissinger: I’ll either be going home for vacation soon or—

Nixon: You’re all packed.

Kissinger: —I got to stay here and handle our relationship.

Nixon: Now, he’s saying—

Kissinger: When I was on the West Coast—

Nixon: —if we had a meeting before theirs? Never.

Kissinger: That was crazy.


Kissinger: That would be putting it to the Chinese.

Nixon: Yeah. Or, and you know—but he then came to the conclusion: well, maybe we should have one afterwards and announce it before?

Kissinger: Right. I suppose. I’ll have to think about that.

Nixon: Absolutely. We want a meeting.

Kissinger: We want a meeting. A settlement for a meeting would be very useful. Tell him, if he comes back today, that I can’t keep travel-

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6Nixon raised the issue again during a meeting in the Executive Office Building at 5:05 p.m. on July 20 with Kissinger, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to Haldeman, Nixon was discussing plans for China, including a preliminary trip in September to prepare for the President’s visit: “Then K came in, and the P raised with him the point of whether we ought to consider doing the Russian Summit first, and Henry definitely says no. Instead we should plan on Russia in the spring, but announce it before we go to Peking. This is the way he’s put it to the Russians, and he wants to hang tight on that.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
ing all the time. Say that I’m sick. All right. Well, get a rest before your 7 o’clock meeting.\footnote{According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger held a press backgrounder that evening at Tayloe House. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)}

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: It’s a long day.

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290. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\footnote{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIV. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on July 21 with his own assessment of the China initiative (Document 292). Kissinger wrote in the margin: “Hal—outstanding, HK.” Haig also initialed the memorandum.}


SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations in Light of the President’s Visit to China

Over the past two and a half years the Soviets have been highly sensitive about the warming trend in US-PRC relations. As with our Romanian policy, they have seen our basic motives as hostile to themselves. Our more immediate purposes, in their view, have been to bring the USSR under pressure in various negotiations and to delimit the “legitimate” Soviet role in Asia and the Pacific. These suspicions, powerfully reinforced by deep-seated antagonism toward the Chinese, will obviously have been drastically raised further by the latest turn of events.

Yet the fact remains that in spite—or more likely because—of their anxieties the Soviets have staked much on improved relations with the US. Brezhnev personally is closely identified with this policy and the calculus underlying it. That calculus involves the recognition that US and Soviet interests are uniquely intertwined in numerous areas and on numerous issues and the belief that the time is propitious for achieving certain advantageous arrangements with the US at a tolerable price.
Brezhnev has not been without opposition and in dealing with it he has no doubt argued that domestic trends in the US and other Western countries and the fact that Chinese power is as yet only incipient make the present period in US-Soviet relations one of unusual opportunity for the Soviets.

The question now is whether the anxieties that have accompanied and to some extent impelled recent Soviet policy toward us will become so overwhelming as to throw that policy off the present line. This could occur either because the dominant Soviet leadership group feels compelled to demonstrate that it will not be dealt with under pressure of the new US-Chinese rapprochement or because opposition forces manage to use this rapprochement to undermine Brezhnev’s room for maneuver or even his power position.

It has long been a tendency in the US to view whichever Soviet leader or leadership group happens to be in power as preferable to any alternative. In fact, the fortunes of individual Soviet leaders should be of less concern to us than how the Soviets perceive and structure their interests and how we can best pursue our own with respect to the USSR. Thus, whether Brezhnev personally is damaged in his position is of less concern than whether we can continue to develop our relationship with the USSR along lines we desire. To the extent that the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship and our policy toward China to date have exerted a beneficial influence on the US-Soviet relationship, this influence should over time be reinforced by what has happened. The immediate sense of shock and even outrage in Moscow may cloud the situation at the moment; and it could produce a political convulsion in the Kremlin. But it seems probable that when faced again with the prospect of open hostility on two fronts any foreseeable Kremlin leadership will seek relief on one of them. For the time being, and after the shock has worn off, the Western front will still seem the most promising to the Soviets.

**General US Stance**

We obviously have no interest in stimulating the anxieties of the Soviets to the point of irrationality. While nothing that we can say will remove Soviet suspicions it is clearly desirable to keep our rhetoric moderate and to avoid public or, for that matter, private diplomatic speculation that the Soviets must now choose between conflict on two fronts and concessions toward us.

By the same token, the Soviets are past masters at playing the aggrieved party and demanding compensation for injuries allegedly done them. If we are to benefit from our Chinese move in our Soviet relationship we should clearly not be drawn into excessive conciliation of the Soviets. Reciprocity and equity should remain the standards in our dealings with them.
Third Areas

Among foreign communist parties and in various radical movements the Soviets may well manage to turn the US-Chinese rapprochement to some advantage. The Soviets have always been able, where they chose, to outdo the Chinese in giving material support to these groups. They may now also be able to compete on more nearly even ideological terms. At the same time, the Chinese will be eager to prove that their own fidelity to revolutionary goals is undiminished. As regards the Soviets, we will need to be particularly alert to any invigoration of their activities in Latin America and in other regions of strategic interest to us (e.g. West and East Africa). This problem is not fundamentally different from what it has been but may be more intense now. There may once again be a Soviet impulse to test the limits of our tolerance to their military activities in the Caribbean. We should keep the limits clearly where we have previously drawn them; it may indeed be desirable to define them more firmly if the occasion arises.

More dangerous and incalculable is the impact on the Indian subcontinent. Although the objective Soviet interest in the absence of open conflict there cannot have changed, the Soviets may see the region as offering the most tempting opportunities for rekindling US-Chinese difficulties and for achieving unilateral advantages. In addition, Indian and Pakistani actions are unpredictable. While some in Moscow undoubtedly continue even in the new circumstances to flirt with finding a pretext for taking drastic military action against China, it is hard to believe that the Soviets would pursue this as a calculated policy. Moscow’s basic disadvantage is that in any open fighting it cannot rely on India to hold its own against Chinese intervention on Pakistan’s side. Consequently, the Soviets are not likely to encourage the Indians to start major operations. But they may continue to give lesser kinds of support to Indian clandestine activities, hoping in this way to build their position in India while the Indians are resentful of us and more than ever frightened by the Chinese. In this complex situation, little can probably be achieved by direct US talks with the Soviets, though this option should be held open. Our efforts are probably best devoted to influencing the Pakistanis and the Indians.

There probably is little direct effect on the Middle East from our move. As in the subcontinent, some in Moscow might be tempted to raise the temperature between Arabs and Israelis, believing—even apart from the “provocation” of our China policy—that the extent of actual US support for Israel may be worth testing. But the preponderant view in Moscow is likely to remain that (1) the Arabs cannot yet be relied upon to fight even a moderately successful campaign and (2) the risk of some US intervention if the Soviets intervene actively is still high. At the same time, the Soviets
are not likely in the short run to counsel greater negotiating flexibility in Cairo lest they appear to be reacting defensively to our China initiative.

Rightly or wrongly the Russians have suspected us of trying to exclude them from the diplomatic action. As long as we judge that any settlement will require Soviet involvement in some form, it seems pointless to feed these Soviet suspicions. This is mostly a matter of style which is worth handling with some care under present circumstances.

There may be some Soviet temptation to stimulate hostile North Korean actions against the South or us on the grounds that our reaction will complicate the President’s trip to Peking. The North Koreans themselves, worried about a US-Chinese rapprochement, may consider such actions. We should obviously provide no pretext but if the contingency arises we ought to act rapidly against the source of the trouble and make clear to both Moscow and Peking what we are doing.

There may be some new warmth in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations in the period ahead but it is unlikely to have any new impact on the course of either the war or the negotiations. Clearly, however, if we can trace new Communist military actions to increased Soviet support we should go slow in bilateral economic relations with the USSR which have long been tied to the situation in Vietnam. This should be made clear to Moscow at the time.

SALT

SALT has always had major Chinese implications, though for the most part they have remained inexplicit. The basic interests of the two sides have not changed but the Soviets will be more sensitive in some respects and we should exercise greater care on certain points. Recent US revival of the zero-ABM option may now appear in a different light in Moscow than it did when Smith mentioned it. Almost certainly, one of the basic reasons for Soviet reluctance to consider it has been concern for maintaining some defense against the Chinese. But our own approach should continue to be based on our evaluation of the implications of a complete ban for us. We should make clear to the Soviets that we can accept either of the broad ABM options we have presented and assume that Moscow will make its own judgment of its interests.

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2 Smith later recalled that he had urged Nixon and Kissinger to support an ABM ban “[o]ften, perhaps too often.” After receiving permission from the White House, Smith informally raised the issue again in a private meeting with Semenov in Helsinki. (Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 256–258) A July 13 backchannel message from Smith to Kissinger on the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 177.
The Soviets may also be sensitive to our counting the SS–11s deployed in the Western USSR (MR/IRBM fields) in a ceiling on ICBMs if these SS–11s can be targeted against China. We cannot tell one way or the other; but in terms of our own concerns we have no alternative but to count these SS–11s.

The Soviets have consistently pressed for “third country” clauses in a SALT agreement and in an agreement on measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Apart from problems this poses for us in our relationship with the British and French, we should avoid appearing (1) to collude with the Soviets against China and (2) to be holding open the option of a side-deal with the Chinese at Soviet expense. In practice, we can accept the somewhat redundant general proposition that any agreement between ourselves and the Soviets should not be circumvented via third countries (though there is room for substantial disagreement on how to define “circumvention”).

In the accidents agreement, we should, at most, reach a tacit understanding that each side should seek whatever arrangements it wishes with other nuclear powers. It is now unwise to enter into a commitment to do this. Likewise, Chinese attitudes probably make it undesirable to open the US-Soviet agreement for accession by other nuclear powers. Indeed not only the Chinese but also the UK and France could well have reservations about acceding to an agreement which they did not negotiate and on the terms of which, especially in the case of the Chinese, they were not consulted. In any event, the Soviets for reasons of geography should have a much more acute interest than we in making some arrangement with the Chinese on accidents and we should leave this up to them.

In the likely event that agreements on accident prevention and the Hot Line are completed before the defensive and offensive agreements, there may be virtue in promulgating them promptly. This would be mostly for the benefit of certain domestic US audiences (although some of these may also assert that the Administration is seeking credit in SALT when in fact it has nothing of substance to show). But it will give the Soviets something and perhaps demonstrate to the Chinese that our negotiations have not been detrimental to their interests.

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3 In a July 16 backchannel message to Kissinger, Smith advised that progress toward an accidental war agreement might assuage Soviet sensitivities on the “U.S. move toward China.” (Smith, Doubletalk, p. 295) Kissinger replied on July 20 that he had followed this advice during his meeting with Dobrynin the previous day. Smith’s backchannel message is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 179; Kissinger’s reply is cited in footnote 3 thereto.
Test Ban

The Soviets may well try to engage us more vigorously in renewed negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This may be attractive to them in any case because of the growing pressures to which we will be subjected domestically on this subject; under the new circumstances it could be even more attractive because of the potential for isolating the Chinese if some new agreement were reached. We should deal with this issue on its merits when our internal studies are complete. In considering whether a broader ban than now exists, or even a complete one, may be in our interest, we clearly have to weigh the effect of continued Chinese testing and weapons development. Undoubtedly, the Soviets will do so too and the negotiating positions of both sides would reflect these assessments. The principal guideline for our dealings with the Soviets should be that we should not get drawn into schemes for joint pressure on the Chinese. Peking will address this issue when it is ready to do so and not before—just as the other nuclear powers.

Five Power Nuclear Conference

We still owe the Soviets a response to their proposal. In advancing this old idea, the Soviets no doubt expected the Chinese to reject it. Whether the Soviets had any concrete propositions in mind that could usefully be negotiated in such a forum is hard to tell. In any event, subject to consideration of our NSSM study now in progress, our best posture is one of (1) giving priority for now to SALT, (2) leaving a larger conference to the future, and (3) leaving the other nuclear powers the option to join the US-Soviet dialogue at a time and under conditions of their own choosing. Conceptually, arms control agreements between grossly unequal nuclear powers are hard to envisage in any case.

Europe

There is no obvious reason why our position in the Berlin negotiations should be affected by Chinese developments. The Soviets may, however, have a more complex problem. To the extent that their position has encountered East German resistance the Soviets may now be
more cautious. Moreover, any general, even if only temporary toughen-
ing in Soviet attitudes toward us could be reflected in a more demand-
ing posture on the remaining disagreed issues on Berlin and in dilatory
tactics. In addition, to the extent that Soviet tactics so far have been con-
troversial within the Soviet leadership, Brezhnev may consider it expe-
dient to apply the brakes. Sooner or later, however, the interests that have
led the Soviets this far in the Berlin negotiations will reassert themselves.
The issues themselves have not changed and the negotiations should
therefore proceed essentially along the existing lines.

MBFR may also assume some added complexity. For us, a factor of
greater weight will be the possibility that the Chinese may view an arms
control arrangement in Europe as freeing additional Soviet forces for Cen-
tral Asia and the Far East. This factor has undoubtedly already colored
Soviet attitudes, both for economic and political reasons. At the same
time, Chinese dealings with us have been powerfully influenced by their
worries about the Soviet military build-up against them. On balance, these
complex and opaque interrelationships are extremely difficult to eval-
uate with precision and we should continue to develop our position in
terms of security considerations directly relevant to Europe, the US/
Soviet politico/military balance and the various domestic pressures
which led us to embark on the MBFR venture in the first place.

Our East European policy, especially with respect to Romania, will
probably require even more careful handling. Soviet-Romanian rela-
tions are currently again in a rather tense phase. As Chinese policy in
Eastern Europe again becomes more active, as the Ceausescu and
Tepavac visits to Peking strongly indicate it will, the Soviets are bound
to see a concerted US-Chinese effort to injure their interests in a region
vital to them. Our general approach in this potentially explosive situ-
atation should be to pursue a measured policy of developing contacts,
but including some gestures toward countries, e.g. Poland and Hun-
gary, that we have so far treated with reserve. This is not a good mo-
moment for us to move toward diplomatic relations with Albania, al-
though at some point in the next year or two we should do so.

**Bilateral Relations**

Our bilateral relations with the Soviets offer the best opportunity
for some therapeutically useful moves to keep relations with the Sovi-
ets on a relatively even keel. We should not depart from the essential
principle of reciprocity and we should not set aside the merits solely in
order to assuage Soviet anxieties. Moreover, excessive generosity is likely
on the one hand to stimulate Moscow’s suspicions and sense of injury

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6 Ceausescu visited the People’s Republic of China from June 1 to June 9; as soon as
Ceausescu left, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac arrived for a week-long visit.
and, on the other, its appetite for “compensation”. Within these limits, the question of port security regulations and the issuance of export licenses are probably the areas where we can best afford to show movement. Such matters as the implementation of the cultural exchange agreement and the consular convention (site for the Soviet consulate general in San Francisco) should continue to be treated on their merit. More far-reaching economic concessions—credit and credit guarantees if the Fino Amendment is repealed; MFN etc.—should be held open for later decision in the light of overall political progress. The problem of Jews in the USSR should continue to be treated cautiously.

Over the coming months it will be highly desirable to keep VOA and RFE/RL broadcasts dealing with China policy and its implications under close control. VOA especially should be confined mainly to news reporting and should exercise special restraint in selecting US press comments for re-broadcasting.

The prospects for cooperative US-Soviet space projects have recently improved; our efforts in this field should continue.

The UN

Apart from the Chinese seating issue, on which there is no special reason for contact with the Soviets, the main problem on the horizon is the replacement of U Thant as Secretary General. This is a matter on which a decision can only be reached by prior US-Soviet agreement. We presumably will also want to bear in mind the acceptability to Peking of the new appointee. Although it is too early now to talk about specific candidacies with the Soviets, we should, when the time arrives, take the initiative in consultations and avoid backing candidates we know to be unacceptable to Moscow. The Jakobsen candidacy is probably the most attractive for us among the various possibilities; the real Soviet view of him remains uncertain but is likely to be negative because of the Arab attitude. We should avoid becoming identified with any one individual but should rather react to names as they emerge. We should not go so far as to accept an East European except perhaps a Yugoslav; but no Yugoslav is likely to be acceptable to the Soviets.

Summit

The Soviets have probably been operating on the premise that a summit is of greater direct interest to the President than to Brezhnev. (In fact, however, Brezhnev has considerable personal interest in one

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7 See footnote 6, Document 258.
8 Max Jakobsen, Finnish Permanent Representative to the United Nations. On December 21, the Security Council elected Kurt Waldheim, Austrian Permanent Representative, to succeed U Thant as Secretary General.
himself in terms of his own political problems.) They have probably felt that the President's interest can be turned to advantage in ongoing major substantive negotiations on SALT and Berlin. The Peking trip probably makes Soviet interest in a summit greater than it was before but, psychologically, the Soviets (and Brezhnev personally) would be reluctant to disclose this under present circumstances. In any case, a summit in which some useful substantive business can be transacted remains desirable for us; with our China policy moving ahead the implication of US-Soviet collusion against Peking will be reduced. Our own allies, who have been manifesting some disquiet about US-Soviet bilateralism, would probably remain uneasy if they felt that we were under some compulsion to propitiate the Soviets. All of this argues for (1) proceeding with ongoing negotiations on their merit, (2) giving close new attention to Alliance consultations on East-West questions, (3) proceeding with the preparations of the Peking meeting and (4) holding open a US-Soviet summit after completion of the Peking trip and, preferably, another round of highest level contacts with the Europeans.

291. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


I had a discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday on a number of pending matters. In the course of the discussion he indicated that Mr. Gromyko might delay his visit to New York this fall in order to prepare for a high level visit to France (probably by Mr. Kosygin) sometime early in October.

Ambassador Dobrynin volunteered comment about your proposed visit to Peking by saying he thought it might be useful. As far as his government is concerned, he said, they are reacting in a relaxed way and with moderation. He said that he realized that the proposed

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XV, Secret; Nodis. According to a notation and attached correspondence profile, the President saw the memorandum on August 6. According to another copy, Rogers drafted the memorandum himself and sent a copy to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Rogers' Office Files: Lot 73 D 443, Box 3, Chronological File, 1969–1973)

2 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers met Dobrynin on July 20 at 4:40 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers)
visit was not directed at any other nation and he did not believe it should have any effect on the negotiations now pending between our two countries. Smilingly, he said that he thought we might be disappointed to some extent in the visit because Americans want instant solutions to problems and based on the negotiations which they are having with the Peoples Republic of China he doubted that there would be many concrete results for a long time.

We talked in a general way about the representation question in the United Nations and he said they intended to vote as they had in the past in support of the Peoples Republic of China. Yesterday, however, in a discussion with one of the Assistant Secretaries of State, Ambassador Dobrynin expressed the hope that the Republic of China would not be expelled. This view, of course, is very interesting, particularly if it represents the view of his government. It is possible, in that event, that they might be willing to quietly pass the word to certain African and Latin American countries in a way that would be helpful.

The Ambassador volunteered that Hanoi had seriously proposed the seven points in Paris in the hope that meaningful negotiations would ensue. He said that your proposed visit to China had put the proposals in a deep shadow but he hoped we would not lose sight of the fact that he believes they were seriously proposed as a basis for serious negotiations. He said that every time they discussed Viet-Nam with the Chinese they were faced with a diatribe against the United States so they have given up trying to discuss the subject. Ambassador Dobrynin said that possibly now in light of your proposed visit to the PRC their attitude on the subject of Viet-Nam would change.

The Ambassador asked if we would be interested in neutrality in Indochina. I replied that I thought our position had been clearly spelled out by you. I said that it was unrealistic, however, to think that we would consider removing the present government and replacing it with one selected by the other side. He said he understood that but that in the minds of the Chinese, President Thieu is a villain whom they cannot accept. I restated our position about the upcoming elections and the importance of having them conducted fairly. Ambassador Dobrynin then discoursed for minutes on the attitude of the Chinese toward Indochina. He said that in the conversations they have had with the Chinese they have said that even though things have not gone as well as

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3 Not further identified.
they have hoped that the “progressive forces” would prevail in Indochina. He said the Chinese gave as their reasons for these conclusions their proximity to Indochina and the length of the conflict in Indochina. They contend, he said, that in the long run the United States would lose its stamina and zeal for maintaining its influence in a part of the world so removed from its shores. He said the Chinese repeatedly told them that the Americans had been involved for so long that their staying power would erode and they, the Chinese, could afford to wait.

Ambassador Dobrynin then said that he would do what he could to express to his government his own views that your decision to visit China was not intended to be anti-Russia and to urge his government to continue negotiations at SALT and on other matters in the same spirit that prevailed before the announcement was made. Ambassador Dobrynin expressed appreciation for having been given advance notice of the announcement.

William P. Rogers

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5 Rogers also briefed Nixon and Kissinger during a meeting in the Oval Office at 3:49 p.m. on July 22: “So whether you saw the memo of my conversation with Dobrynin or not—I sent over to you—but it was very interesting. He was quite relaxed, as far as you could tell, about it. But he says that, that he thought the seven points were serious points for negotiations and that he thought we shouldn’t be—we shouldn’t forget them.” Rogers further reported that Dobrynin was “quite forthright about his comments about the Chinese. He said, ‘One of the difficulties you may have is that you’re all so eager to get things settled.’ He said, ‘You’re going to find the Chinese are not [laughs]—are tough to deal with.’ He said, ‘Christ, we’ve been—we meet with them every week and we don’t make a damn bit of progress!’ He said that they’re very obdurate. [laughs] He said, ‘You think it’s going to be easier than dealing with us, but it’s not.’ [laughs]” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 543-1)
292. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Chinese Initiative

At Tab A is the overview written by Sonnenfeldt on the implications of the Peking visit.² It is an excellent piece of work, although I am not sure I would accept all of the analyses. At Tab B is a paper written by Dr. Kraemer which also addresses some of the implications of the Peking visit.³ I understand you are lunching with him tomorrow and you should therefore take time to read his views beforehand.⁴

Unquestionably Dr. Kraemer has greeted the Peking trip with the greatest alarm. Unfortunately much of his argumentation is exceptionally well taken. It is also unfortunate, however, that he has no way of understanding or accepting the lack of vigor which characterizes the environment at the core. Nevertheless, the points he has made, though somewhat overdrawn, hit the nail on the head precisely. The only way that we can sustain the dangerous game we are about without incalculable loss is to maintain the strongest position conceivable in Asia and, perhaps even more importantly, in Europe between now and the time the scenario spins out.

Some of our current problems impinge directly on the psychology of the problem. Included among them are:

1. The overall level of defense expenditures. As you know, Laird has come in with a dissent on the $79-plus billion level worked out

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 522, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VIII. Secret; Sensitive.

² Printed as Document 290.

³ Attached at Tab B is a July 21 memorandum from Dr. Fritz G.A. Kraemer, Special Adviser to the Secretary of the General Staff of the U.S. Army, to Major General Douglas V. Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. A nearly identical “blind” version of the memorandum is printed as an attachment to Document 294.

⁴ According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Kraemer, his (and Haig’s) former mentor, for lunch on July 22 from 12:57 to 2:32 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
between OMB and Dave Packard.\(^5\) We must be absolutely sure that our next budget is adequate and supported by all.

2. Laird is now talking about additional troop reductions in Korea and OMB is unhappy with the $1.5 billion five-year modernization commitment. We should now consider giving the Koreans not only the $1.5 billion five-year program but a parallel guarantee to maintain our force levels in Korea for the period. This might be combined with the Kennedy exercise\(^6\) so that we could get the kind of deal he is pressing for on textiles. I have asked staff (Dick Kennedy) to prepare such a proposal since the President told Peterson to work with me in an effort to find some kind of an incentive for the Koreans on textiles and then to discuss the proposal with you. This plan should be ready by tomorrow night.

3. MBFR is a nightmare which was worrisome enough before the Mansfield fiasco on the Hill but which has subsequently become a compulsion within our own bureaucracy. I can visualize nothing more self-defeating than to proceed with this exercise at anything but the most deliberate pace and in such a way that our allies understand that we have no intention of propelling this action.

4. Force levels in Europe. There is no question that our European allies, as Dr. Kraemer points out, are convinced that sizeable reductions will soon be made. Here again, an inter-departmental shoring is essential.

The foregoing are just typical examples of the kind of problems that we have got to reassess in the light of the China initiative. As I mentioned this morning, I believe it is essential that our allies in Asia receive the kind of personal Presidential assurance needed to keep them on the track. Over time the real implications of the China initiative cannot but become more worrisome to the Thais, the ROKs, the South Vietnamese, the Cambodians, Indonesians, Japanese, et al. Some


\(^6\) Reference is to the mission of Ambassador at Large David Kennedy to negotiate a textile agreement with Japan. Kennedy met Japanese Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo on July 24 to discuss the negotiations. Sato, however, began by expressing concern about Nixon’s plans to visit China, fearing that the United States might ‘drop her “little friends” by the wayside in order to take up a relationship with the “big boys.”’ (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Peter G. Peterson, Box 1, Subject Files, Textile Negotiations, April–July 1971)
consideration should be given to reassuring them at an early date, perhaps during the month of August or September, but certainly before an announcement is made of your next visit.

With respect to the Soviets, I believe we should move very slowly on the Presidential visit and instead insist on the toughest kind of bargaining in Vienna, on the Berlin issue, and with the full range of bridge-building exercises now underway.

293. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Congressman Gerald R. Ford

Washington, July 21, 1971, 1:10 p.m.

F: Hello Henry.

K: Hello Jerry. I was just talking to the President. He was talking to me about the Ford Mack truck deal. We are looking at it and are trying to be sympathetic but it hasn’t yet been approved.

F: When will it be?

K: I will tell you this. We need to keep the Russians in line during this phase. We will approve parts of it as soon as we can. If we would just get our industrial companies to stop pressuring us.

F: Will it be approved in a reasonable period of time?

K: Yes, in time when it will be helpful, but don’t tell them that.

F: From our point of view, one of the companies who has $150 million in machine tools—it is not in my district—but we are being pushed...
because it means 200 or more workers being guaranteed two or more years of work.

K: But we are using this with respect to Peking. . . . They may draw back on SALT and other political problems.

F: I understand your problem.

K: I understand your problem. We are being very sympathetic but the chances are much better if we are not pressured.

F: I haven’t said anything to the papers, but I did send the President a note.³

K: That is all right. The President wanted me to call you.

F: All right. Just keep me abreast.

K: I will keep you informed of everything I do.

F: The reaction I get to your trip and the President’s forthcoming trip is just excellent. It is marvelous. Only John Smith and Russell(?)⁴ were the only ones who do not seem to approve but then they were both with the John Birch Society.

K: Well that is all right. We have to expect a little from the right wing I guess.

F: Well do your best for us Henry.

K: You can count on us. We will do our best.

³ Not found.

⁴ Reference is apparently to two leading anti-Communist conservatives: Congressman John Schmitz (R–California) and William Rusher, publisher of National Review. During a meeting on July 30, Agnew asked Haldeman for guidance on how to deal with such “critical people” as Schmitz and Rusher. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 44, H Notes June–Sept 1971)
294. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Analysis of the China initiative

Attached is a brief analysis written by a friend of mine who prefers to remain anonymous and in whose strategic judgment I have the greatest confidence. I thought you would be interested in his analysis of the implications of the Peking initiative on the strategic scene.

Attachment

1. Theoretically one can make a first-class case for our “playing with China” having very salutary effect on Moscow, and might lead to a kind of triangular “stability” among the Giant Three.

2. The inherent assumption underlying the above argument is, however, that we are being taken seriously and appear, to some extent, awe-inspiring. If Moscow were to see in our move toward rapprochement with Peking the decision of a strong power—losing patience with USSR intransigence and demonstrating our resolve to use the “China option,” if need be—then, the Kremlin leaders might very well be deeply impressed.

The ungainsayable worldwide reality of U.S. policy and strategy is such, however, that the men in the Kremlin would have to be blind in order actually to be so impressed.

3. We are obviously—to formulate it with British understatement—not on our “way in” either in Southeast Asia or Northeast Asia, but on the way out. We are reducing our forces in S. Vietnam and Thailand, as well as in Korea, the Ryukyus and Japan. In Europe we are gradually but irreversibly yielding on Berlin. West Germany—originally encouraged by us in its policy of reconciliation with the East—is on the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 499, President’s Trip Files, Reaction to China Initiative Memos, Letters, etc., July 1971. Secret. A notation and attached correspondence profile indicate that the President saw and noted the memorandum on July 29. On July 26, however, he discussed the attached paper with Kissinger; see Document 295.

2 The anonymous author was Fritz Kraemer. The text of the analysis was extracted verbatim from a paper that Haig had forwarded in a July 21 memorandum to Kissinger (Document 292).
road toward Finlandization.³ (This may not yet be very visible to the naked eye but is very clear to a careful observer and inventory-taker of daily Bonn speeches, actions and omissions.) In Italy we have, except for the shell of a headquarters, withdrawn our whole Southern European Task Force (SETAF). It is impossible to meet any Western European who is not convinced that under U.S. internal pressures (Mansfield Resolution and Amendment) we will within the foreseeable future withdraw a very considerable part of our troops from Germany leaving there perhaps no more than token units. And now tiny Malta, as well as tiny Iceland, under newly installed Leftist governments, are inviting the U.S. and NATO out of their countries without even the shadow of a fear that we “mighty” U.S. would react with any kind of reprisals or even diplomatic “unfriendliness.” In the Eastern Mediterranean the Soviet military position has been enormously strengthened and Turkey, once a very reliable Ally, and very jealous of its sovereignty already half a year ago opened 260 miles of its easternmost road system to Soviet truck convoys bringing military supplies and material directly from the USSR to Syria. In the mid-East, as a result of our policy of Negotiation instead of Confrontation, we are leaving a strategic vacuum with neither friend nor foe believing that we would intervene militarily, which will lead to the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities within perhaps 8 months. In Latin America we step very softly vis-à-vis Ecuador and Chile answering their unfriendly actions with a most deliberately cautious diplomacy.⁴

In addition, we are reducing our military establishment, work for 11 Division Volunteer Army, which will permit even an unsophisticated lieutenant colonel in Luxembourg to conclude that we are not preparing either for any protracted fighting somewhere in the world, or for a military, simultaneous, commitment of forces in widely separated parts of the world.

4. Under these circumstances Moscow simply cannot help gaining the conviction that our new China policy is but a symptom of our overwhelming desire to seek reconciliation and disengagement anyway and everywhere.⁵ For this reason they will not feel impelled to make any concession to us in order to wean us away from Red China.⁶

³ Nixon underlined the previous two sentences and wrote in the margin: “K, True?”
⁴ Nixon underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin: “K, This should be reversed immediately.”
⁵ Nixon underlined the phrase “new China policy is but a symptom of our overwhelming desire to seek reconciliation and disengagement anyway and everywhere.”
⁶ Nixon wrote the following message for Kissinger at the bottom of the last page: “K—this memo brilliantly points up the dangers of our move—e.g. Mansfield et al applaud it for the wrong reasons. Our task is to play a hard game with the Soviet and to see that wherever possible—including Non Communist Asia—our friends are reassured.”

295. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


P: Hello, Henry?
K: Mr. President, I just this second got in.
P: Where are you? In your office?
K: No, I’m at home.
P: Yeah, are you tired?
K: Well, it’s about 5 hours later.
P: Yeah, yeah. You must have had quite a drill. You went to both places, huh?
K: I went to both places, yes.²

[Omitted here is detailed discussion of Kissinger’s visit to Paris, during which Nixon commented on Huang Chen: “just like Dobrynin—he’s got no authority. Not one damn bit. None of these guys have, and so that’s all there is to it.”]

[P:] Well, it’s certainly not dull. You know one thing that you can be thinking about, Henry,—and you get a little sleep—I was reading over the weekend the memorandum you sent me but you do not put the name on³—wasn’t that by the same fellow that wrote one about two . . .

K: That’s right.
P: Kaplan—what’s his name?
K: Kraemer.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon called Kissinger at 12:01 a.m.; the two men talked until 12:36. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² Kissinger left Washington on July 24 for two meetings in Paris on July 26: one with Le Duc Tho at the North Vietnamese Residence and one with Huang Chen at the Chinese Embassy. A memorandum of conversation and a summary memorandum for the meeting with Tho are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972, Documents 236 and 237. During the second meeting, Huang confirmed that Kissinger would return to Beijing in late October to prepare for the President’s trip and Kissinger confirmed that Walters would serve as a secret point of contact in Paris. Kissinger also assured Huang that the United States would “continue to inform the Chinese of any conversations in which the PRC is mentioned that the U.S. might have with any other socialist country.” A memorandum of the conversation with Huang is printed ibid., volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 151.

³ Document 294.
P: Kraemer, I thought so. I could tell from his style.

K: He tends to go a little bit in the apocalyptic direction.

P: But he really paints a rather gloomy picture, doesn’t he?

K: Well, he goes a little bit too far, but there’s something in what he says if we don’t play it very carefully.

P: Well, his point is . . . of course, like he says Berlin . . . he thinks Berlin is a surrender.

K: Well, he doesn’t know what’s going on.

P: Germany is being [omission in transcript].

K: Well, that’s true, but not because of what we do.

P: That’s right. That’s good. And then he goes on and says, here we are all over Asia pulling out and getting out and so forth. But it does show you, doesn’t it, Henry, the real dangers we’re playing with here. Of course, the other side of this coin which we have to consider [omission in transcript] is that if we hadn’t done something and we’d been tossed out, everything would have come apart at the seams, and all we’re doing is to frankly buy some time and to turn around if we can still turn around. Is that about it?

K: Well, I think the big move eased all the problems he describes. I mean, every one of the problems he describes was happening anyway.4

P: Yeah, that’s right, too. And it does ease them.

K: But we shouldn’t overlook . . . I mean, those other problems are very real.

P: We have to bear in mind is that as we handle that . . . you know as you read all the editorials and other things from, as I said, particularly from those who are for it for the wrong reason—like Mansfield who thinks this means we are getting out in the world and that we are going to get along with everybody and so forth and so on—but you realize that the enormous importance of our playing it our way.

4 During a telephone conversation at 9:20 a.m. on August 3, Kissinger briefed Kraemer on the President’s reaction: “HK: I wanted you to know that your memo has been read with approbation but no prospect of action. FK: How can anyone, under the circumstances, accept what I wrote even theoretically? HK: It was totally accepted. FK: Don’t you think that’s tragic? HK: I didn’t put your name on it and he said that’s the same man as the author of the memo I read last year. FK: My God. HK: My analysis isn’t any different than yours, there is just more knowledge of the necessities. But that isn’t anything to discuss over the telephone. I could, conceivably, come by tonight.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger left his office at 8:20 p.m. to meet Kraemer for dinner. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
But I think that it’s . . . if you consider your conversation with Chou En-lai, you made that crystally clear that there was no question of our [not?] continuing to play an Asian role.

K: No doubt about it.

P: And that’s the point. And I think they understand that. As a matter of fact, I rather think they’d like for us to continue to play ‘em.

K: They didn’t say so, but they certainly didn’t fight it when I said it.

P: Well, the reason that I think so—even though they wouldn’t say so—is that they aren’t in any position in time to handle some of the people and some of their . . . like the Japanese and the rest. I mean we’re pretty useful to them.

K: Oh, and we of all the great powers are the ones that threatened their territory least.

P: Yes, we’ve threatened them the least and also, if we are withdrawn to the coasts of California, we are a hell of a long way off from their big neighbor to the west.

K: Yes, that’s right. They are realists; they know that that can’t happen.

P: That’s right. But I had quite a chance over the weekend to read this stuff, and it’s really an amazing thing that the . . . the way this thing has shocked . . . particularly our usual critics. They just have a hell of a time knowing how to handle it, don’t they?

K: Absolutely; they haven’t dared to pick on it yet.

P: Some of the problems are beginning to surface. I mean, the Indonesians, I noticed, are expressing concern. I read that report in the news yesterday expressing some concern about being consulted.

K: I haven’t seen the Indonesians expressing concern.

P: Well, expressing concern about Chinese subversion.

K: Oh, oh.

P: It was in that report that you gave me, you know.

K: Oh, yes, yes.

P: I think it was in one that I saw. And the Thais and so forth. But that’s natural.

K: Well, and we have to play it hard. We can’t roll over for the Chinese now.

P: No sir. They are not going to roll over for us.

K: They certainly aren’t.

5 See Document 283.

6 Not further identified.
P: And that’s one of the reasons . . . I had a very interesting talk . . . a couple of things will interest you. Colson got a report from the hard hats—Brennan and his group in New York—his amazement that they were at their convention were very strongly for what we were doing.

K: Isn’t that amazing.

P: And [Frank] Fitzsimmons, the head of the Teamsters, called him—he’s sort of an illiterate fellow—and he told Colson . . . he says, “you know what the President said about going to Pekun,” and he said that’s good. You see, these hardhats and these sort of earthy fellows, they see what the real game is. They can see the Russian thing. Any sensible person does. And I also talked to Rockefeller today—he was up there and I said, and you were so right—he’s just ecstatic.

K: Oh, he’s beside himself.

P: He says that he thinks that the Democratic candidates must be slipping their [omission in transcript] now. He says he’s just never seen something . . . The mood really in the country has significantly changed.

K: And that’s what we all said . . .

P: . . . the right-wing. There is a substantial right-wing thing but not nearly as much as you would normally expect.

K: No.

P: But on the other hand, what has happened is that the left—the liberals, the peacenik types—they are just up a wall. They don’t know what the hell to do with this.

K: Exactly. And that in itself is a major diplomatic feat.

P: Well, what it does, Henry, it buys us time gracefully and to bring Vietnam to some kind of an honorable conclusion. And I don’t think we would have ever made it otherwise.

K: We’d never have made it. Congress would have killed us.

P: And it also may buy us some time on a few other things.

K: Exactly.

P: It’ll be interesting to see what our Russian friends do now.

K: I think they are going to be . . . Certainly at SALT, they have been easier than any previous meeting.

P: It will also be interesting to see what they want to do about a visit.

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8 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon called Nelson Rockefeller at 8:29 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the conversation has been found.

K: I think that’s going to come certainly.
P: Well, have a good night’s sleep.
K: Right. Thank you, Mr. President. Bye.

296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 27, 1971, 1346Z.

135527. Subject: Ambassador’s Call on Gromyko.

1. You may wish to draw on the following suggestions for your first call on Gromyko after returning to post.2

2. On the subject of MBFR, drawing on earlier guidance (State 1117203 and previous) as appropriate, you may wish to reiterate our interest in moving forward as rapidly as is feasible on this complex question involving so many governments. As reflected in the Lisbon Communiqué,4 the question of MBFR will be the subject of intensive discussion for the next few months within NATO.5

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Smith and Perry in EUR/SOV on July 16; cleared by Davies, Matlock, and Ledsky in EUR/GER, Streator in EUR/RPM, Goodby in EUR/RPM, Stefan in EUR/SES, Martin in PM, Schiff in NEA/RA, and Sonnenfeldt; approved by Rogers and Hillenbrand. In a July 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt forwarded a copy of a draft of this telegram for “urgent action” in the clearance process. “Beam plainly should have opportunity to talk to Gromyko and maintain some semblance of communication in Moscow,” Sonnenfeldt explained. “Apart from the point on Berlin I recommend approval of the instruction.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII) Additional comments from Sonnenfeldt and Kissinger on the draft telegram are noted below.

2 In telegram 132775 to Moscow, July 22, the Department also provided Beam with talking points on China, citing Kissinger’s remarks on Soviet-American relations during his press backgrounder on July 16 (see Document 286). “You could reflect substance of this statement,” the Department advised, “stressing that the President’s interest in our ongoing negotiations with the USSR remains as it was.” In an attached note to the Secretary on July 21, Eliot asked whether to clear the telegram with the White House. Rogers declined with the handwritten comment: “Advise only. This is boilerplate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)

3 Dated June 22: ibid., DEF 6 EUR.

4 Dated June 4. For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1971, pp. 819–821.

5 In his memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt commented regarding this paragraph: “Seems OK.”
3. Your first meeting with Gromyko would be an appropriate time to raise the subject of military limitation in the Indian Ocean. You recall that Dobrynin raised this subject with the Secretary on March 26 (State 51640). The Secretary approved EUR’s recommendation of June 9 that he respond to the Soviet probe at his next meeting with Dobrynin, but at his two meetings with Dobrynin since then it has not been convenient to raise the subject. The following talking points were those approved by the Secretary with necessary adaptation for use in Moscow. (a) Speaking informally on March 26, Ambassador Dobrynin asked the Secretary what US views would be of a declaration on keeping the Indian Ocean free of major-power competition; (b) Since that time we have been studying this matter closely; (c) We agree in principle with the proposition that it would be in our mutual interest to avoid military competition in the area; (d) It would be useful for us to know more about what the Soviet side has in mind.

4. You might wish to refer to your April 30 meeting with Gromyko on the issue of exhibits and to subsequent discussions on the technical level (Moscow 4919) and with Kamenev (Moscow 5110) which suggest that the Soviet side is now prepared to proceed with steps leading to exhibits exchange. You should note, however, that we are concerned by indications that the Soviet side intends—contrary to the previous practice and spirit of the exhibits provision of the Exchanges Agreement—to insist on linking contract signatures and the mounting of the US and Soviet exhibits at approximately the same time. All outstanding issues in connection with R & D contract have been resolved and we see no impediment to the earliest signature which would allow us to mount our exhibit without further delay. Soviet insistence that we adhere to Soviet timetable would introduce a new and disturbing element which US side would have to take into account in the implementation of the present Agreement and the negotiation of the 1972–73 Agreement.

5. If Gromyko raises the Five-Power Nuclear Conference, you may wish to reiterate the USG’s position that it is a proposal which merits...
serious consideration. Such a conference would of course require careful preparation.12

6. We agree that it would not be advisable to raise the issue of the Berlin Talks. If, however, Gromyko raises the subject, you may wish to reply along the following lines: We welcome Soviet public expressions affirming Moscow’s interest in having negotiations reach a satisfactory conclusion. We share this interest and hope that the Soviet negotiators will receive instructions which will permit us to resume the forward motion initiated in May.13

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12 In his memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt commented: “This is minimal comment to be used if Gromyko raises subject. Adequate as a holding operation.”

13 In his memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt commented: “You (HAK) should decide whether Soviets should be hectored at this stage. If not, Beam should be confined to last two sentences of paragraph 6 of the instruction. Kissinger marked the passage on Berlin and wrote in the margin: “Should not be hectored.” Accordingly, the final version of the telegram omitted the following language from the draft: “The progress in the talks has been disappointingly slow in recent weeks. Indeed, during most of June and July, discussion has bogged down on three important but subsidiary topics. Forthcoming positions advanced by the Western powers have not elicited corresponding Soviet responses. Moreover, Soviet negotiators have pleaded they lacked instructions to proceed at a rapid rate to consider other portions of the draft agreement.”

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297. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)1

Washington, July 27, 1971, 10:28 a.m.

K: I wanted to ask you—one of your citizens wants to see me who is well known and I want to know if you have an interest. Victor Louis the journalist.2

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 According to Jerrold Schecter, then Moscow bureau chief for Time magazine, Victor Louis, Moscow correspondent for the London Evening News, “cooperated closely with the KGB to carry out assignments but he was not a full-time staff officer with rank and salary. He was a unique, provocative, and protected freelancer, permitted to keep his earnings as a foreign correspondent and deal maker so long as he fulfilled his KGB assignments.” See Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 232–233.
D: I have heard of him but not in contact with me.
K: Have you a view or recommendation?
D: I have nothing to say in one way or another. I read in the press that he appears here. Did he approach you?
K: Through an intermediary.³
D: I don’t care one way or another. I have no connections with him.
K: Would it offend in Moscow?
D: I don’t know really.
K: It’s interesting to see what a character he is having heard about him but I do my business with you and not him. I have about 10 days to make up my mind. I don’t have to make a decision.
D: For the time being I will say I have nothing yes or no.
K: I haven’t to say anything definite.
D: In about 5 days if I hear nothing I will leave it up to you. Nothing to offer. I will give you a call Monday.⁴
K: I don’t have to make a decision on it. I told them to call on 2nd or 3rd. No decision until next week.
D: I know he comes here but only from the press. I will check and if any comment, I will call you. This I would like to pass on—there’s a man in your delegation in Helsinki, Mr. Shaw, who refers twice about our discussions between you and me. I use this occasion.
K: He shouldn’t do that.
D: I don’t want to make a [big deal?] of it. I received a telegram, not complaining. But commenting.
K: I will stop it immediately.⁵

³ Several minutes before he called Dobrynin, Kissinger received a telephone call from Lucy Jarvis, a television producer for news and public affairs at the National Broadcasting Company, who relayed Louis’s request to see Kissinger. Louis had arranged in 1967 for Jarvis to produce a television film entitled “Khrushchev in Exile.” (Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, p. 230) After agreeing to an appointment in early August, Kissinger and Jarvis discussed further arrangements, including approval of Louis’ visa, which Jarvis thought might be invalid outside New York. Kissinger thought otherwise, but added: “Perhaps I can fix it without throwing the State Department in an uproar.” Kissinger also noted that the meeting should be considered “off the record.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File)

⁴ August 2.

⁵ Kissinger instructed Smith accordingly in a backchannel message the same day. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, SALT, 1971)
D: For my own information and not to tell you.
K: I will stop it. I am waiting on accidental war business to hear from you.
D: What’s your idea? It’s not quite clear.
K: Separate or part of the general agreement.
D: I remember that well. Do you have anything specific in mind?
K: If you want it separately, we will give instructions to the delegation.
D: No chance of thinking it over. [omission in transcript?] place? Or doesn’t it matter?
K: Agreement in Helsinki then Semenov invitation here is still existing but we are willing to think of another. We might sign other agreement in Moscow.
D: They will separate things. Their instructions beginning from Vienna are they are two separate issues.
K: They are prepared to do it separately.
D: Only question of signing so to speak because perhaps an extra consideration but it’s in Semenov’s instructions. I will check on it.
K: We don’t want to propose something embarrassing to you.
D: I understand.
K: Better if we are close to sign one in next few months too so our relations are—
D: Instructions say they are separate back to Vienna session. I will check and tell you.
K: I will let you know in next week about Foundry which has come to me for a decision. Before the end of the week or next Monday.

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6 See footnote 3, Document 290.
298. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


[Omitted here is discussion of India/Pakistan and China.]

P: Two or three guys—let me see, in what fields were they in—machine tools and the rest, were asking about the Mack truck deal.² They think it is quite—

K: $165 million worth of it. We will hold it till Thursday³ so that I can tell Dobrynin personally and get some credit for you. It is better to release $100 million or so each month than to do it in one whack.

P: Certainly true of the Russians.

K: It will have an impact in industry. Checking where the countries were on the bids tomorrow. Gerry Ford . . .

P: Sure, sure. News coming out. Say we are working on—something will be developed. I didn’t realize the thing was so damn big.

K: $700 million. Actually it would help us a bit to warm up to the Russians so Peking doesn’t get too [omission in transcript].

P: It will be significant.

K: It is significant. More than we have approved in the last 2½ years.

P: That much now.

K: And than a little at a time. If they do something tremendous, we can announce the whole thing. But the public appearance just isn’t interested.

P: Just the business. The effect on the business community—they just want some hope. In a curious way they will tie this to China.

K: I talked to Dobrynin.⁴ We may get a separate accidental war agreement this summer.

P: This thing will be publicly announced.

K: Yes.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² Earlier that evening, Nixon attended a White House reception for over 200 members of the American Society of Association Executives. (President’s Daily Diary; ibid., White House Central Files)

³ July 29.

⁴ See Document 297.
P: Try to get it Friday night, it would be well to get it before the weekend.
K: We can do it just as soon as I talk to Dobrynin which is Thursday.
P: You don’t figure Berlin to win?
K: Think we might have Berlin this year too. You see what we settle with them, then the two Germanys have to settle access which will take probably another 3 months. The preliminary agreement will probably be by December.

[Omitted here is discussion of Agnew and China.]

299. Editorial Note

In a July 23, 1971, special channel message to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush reported that the Soviet consulate general had become the “pivotal” issue for reaching a satisfactory quadripartite agreement on Berlin. “The Russians are taking a very strong and unyielding position on this,” he explained. “At the same time, the State Department feels that they are strictly limited under the terms of National Security Decision Memorandum 106 and that they are in no position to agree to any flexibility on this issue.” In order to secure a “good agreement,” Rush requested authority to exceed his previous instructions. Rush assured Kissinger: “I would, of course, only agree to granting the consulate general if we have a very strong agreement on all other issues and if the consulate general were strictly limited,” listing ten conditions for its eventual establishment. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2) Rush also sent a formal appeal to the Department of State, which Secretary of State Rogers denied on July 29. (Telegram 9190 from Bonn, July 28, and telegram 138285 to Bonn, July 29; both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 USSR–GER B)

Ambassador Rush, however, tentatively agreed to the consulate general before receiving either the Secretary’s denial or the President’s approval. In a special channel message on July 28, Rush briefed Kissinger on his meeting in Bonn the previous evening with Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Valentin Falin and West German State Secretary Egon Bahr. According to Rush, the three men had reached a “tentative final agreement,” resolving virtually everything except the question of Soviet presence in West Berlin. Although he considered the
terms “favorable,” Rush warned Kissinger that the proposed deal was conditional. “Without the consulate general,” he insisted, “it is questionable whether any agreement could be secured, certainly not one having the strength of what has been tentatively agreed on.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2) Later that afternoon, Rush conceded the issue during a “concluding session” with Bahr and Falin. In a special channel message to Kissinger on July 29, Rush reported that the two sides had reached a “final tentative agreement,” including draft articles on both West German representation and Soviet presence. According to Rush, Falin was “very emphatic” that the quadripartite agreement contain the terms for a consulate general. “He said that not only was Gromyko absolutely adamant in this,” Rush advised Kissinger, “but that Gromyko had no leeway in the matter since his strict instructions had come from the top.” Rush and Bahr, therefore, approved a draft text that incorporated the consulate general into the overall agreement. (Ibid.) Two days later, Kissinger replied by praising Rush for his efforts. “I have put the Consulate General into an interdepartmental framework,” Kissinger added. “It will wind up in the desired direction. But it may take a week to ten days.” (Ibid.)

Bahr also sent a special channel message to Kissinger on July 30, reporting on the latest developments in the secret negotiations. In spite of the tentative agreement in Bonn, Bahr was concerned that obstacles in either Moscow or Washington might derail the agreement on Berlin. Perhaps Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko or Secretary of State William Rogers would disapprove of what Falin and Rush had done. Bahr, therefore, gave Kissinger the bottom line: “We should maintain the position that a Soviet consulate general will only be accepted if the Soviets accept Federal passports for Berliners.” He warned, furthermore, that the White House might have to overcome opposition from the Department of State. (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1971, Volume II, pages 1198–1199) Kissinger replied the next day with congratulations on a job well done. After promising to support the German position on Berlin, Kissinger mentioned his trip to Beijing. “We shall take great care to make clear to Moscow,” Kissinger assured Bahr, “that we are in no sense colluding against them and that our desire for détente remains unimpaired.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [1 of 3])

For additional documentation, including the full text of these messages, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 270–275.
300. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and William F. Buckley, Jr.¹

July 28, 1971, 11:25 a.m.

B: Why do you let the President call you “doctor”—you don’t like that.

K: I don’t like it and have nothing but contempt for the process by which doctors are made.

B: There is right-wing pressure which from time to time you have told me you feel the absence of being generated.

K: On China?

B: That’s the catalyst. It is breaking tomorrow. I will read you the statement.

K: I wanted it only on Vietnam.

B: Well, that is part of the whole situation. Maybe you oversold me with your talk on the defense situation 18 months ago.

K: That’s all right, but I wanted pressure put on the left, not on the President.

B: The pressure on the left is obvious. But it seems to me that the White House needs certain battering rams coming in from the right. There are 10 conservative leaders, myself included who have sent out a declaration to be released tomorrow.² I’ll read you the last paragraph: “[In consideration of his record, the undersigned, who have heretofore generally supported the Nixon Administration,] have resolved to suspend our support of the Administration. [We will seek out others who share our misgivings, in order to consult together on the means by which we can most effectively register our protests. We] do not plan at the moment to encourage formal political opposition to President Nixon [in the forthcoming primaries,] but [we propose to keep all] op-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Buckley was probably at his office in New York.

² In addition to Buckley, the signers of the declaration included: Jeffrey Bell, Capitol Hill Director of the American Conservative Union; James Burnham, editor of National Review; Anthony Harrigan, Executive Vice President of the Southern States Industrial Council; John L. Jones, Executive Director of the American Conservative Union; J. Daniel Mahoney, Chairman of the New York Conservative Party; Neil McCaffrey, President of the Conservative Book Club; Frank S. Meyer, editor of Human Events; William A. Rusher, publisher of National Review; Allan H. Ryskind, associate editor of Human Events; Randal C. Teague, Executive Director of Young Americans for Freedom; Thomas S. Winter, Vice Chairman of the American Conservative Union.
tions open [in the light of political developments in the next months. We] reaffirm our personal admiration and, in the case of those who know him personally, our affection for President Nixon[, and our wholehearted identification with the purposes he has over the years espoused as his own and the Republic’s.] We consider that our defec-
tion is an act of loyalty to the Nixon we supported in 1968.”

K: What are the issues on which you are attacking him?

B: Soviet bases in the Mediterranean, West German [policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe], opening to Chinese government without public concession on their part and [“the deteriorated American military position, in conventional and strategic arms.”]

K: Three out of the four are helping us.

B: That’s good.

K: When are you coming down? Can you come for lunch Friday?¹

B: No, I would love to. But I am going to London tomorrow; be back the 11th of August. But I would love to see you; it’s overdue.

K: I wish you had done all this three months ago. I’m serious.

B: Have been waiting for a break on the SALT talks. You said that would happen.

K: It will. We need opposition from the right as long as you don’t hit us too hard on China. This will help with the Chinese. I am speaking to you as a friend, as Henry Kissinger; I will have to start attacking this thing as a Presidential assistant. Where will you be in Europe?

B: London, Madrid, south of France.

K: My parents are in Europe—I thought if there were a military flight I would pop over and see them. Maybe I could see you then.

B: That would be wonderful. I will send you my itinerary immediately. And if that doesn’t work, I will find you when I get back.

K: I think you and I and the people who think like us have got to work together, or this country will go down the drain. Neither the President nor I have any illusions about what we are up against. It’s a cold-blooded move with great dangers. But we decided to get the maneuvering room.

³ The editor revised the transcript with the bracketed insertions on the basis of the published text of the declaration. (Memorandum from Davis to Kissinger, August 12; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 809, Name Files, Buckley, William) See also Tad Szulc, “11 Conservatives Criticize Nixon,” New York Times, July 29, 1971, p. 7.

¹ July 30.
B: I’ve got a piece on the President in next Sunday’s New York Times Magazine. I think you will approve of it.

K: Okay, but I firmly believe that unless something happens in this country to scare the liberals the Ellsberg phenomenon is going to take over.

B: I don’t know whether you’ve had a chance to look over our fake papers.

K: What I found amusing is that [omission in transcript] didn’t even know if he had made that statement.

B: . . . the declaration of war.

K: Right. Good to talk to you. Don’t let’s let August go by without getting together.

B: That’s a promise.

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5 In the article, Buckley posed a rhetorical question for conservatives: “Is he one of us?” “Nixon has been taken in by the other side’s reveries,” Buckley argued, “the reveries that are based on the notion that the leadership of the Communist world suddenly stepped forward, as after a speech by Billy Graham, to submit to prefrontal lobotomies, after which they returned to duty at Helsinki, and other pressure points in the world, to push SALT through in international peace and harmony, to tranquilize their legions in Vietnam, Egypt, Chile, West Germany, and Madagascar.” (Buckley, “Say It Isn’t So, Mr. President,” New York Times Magazine, August 1, 1971, p. SM8)

6 In response to the controversy over the Pentagon Papers, the National Review published its own “secret documents” on Vietnam in mid-July. Critics quickly exposed the forgeries, leading the editors to retort that the documents were “technically fictitious” but not “substantively fictitious.” (Editorial, National Review, August 10, 1971)

7 Haldeman reported in his diary on July 28 that the President was aware of Buckley’s declaration of “nonsupport.” “We had some discussion as to how to deal with that,” Haldeman wrote. “The P is not too concerned, although he wants answers communicated to them, but he makes the point that we don’t need to worry too much about the right-wing nuts on this. We do need to be concerned about Buckley getting off the reservation, and wanted Henry to talk to Buckley, as well as having Mitchell talk to Mahoney, to make sure the Conservative Party doesn’t get off the track in New York.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger briefed “William Buckley Conservatives” in the White House at 4:08 p.m. on August 12; Kissinger also met Buckley for lunch on August 13. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of either conversation has been found.
D: I would like a second to tell you about the Victor Louis message. Where did you get the message that he will be with you next week?

K: From a TV producer, a friend of his.

D: An American man?

K: Yes . . . a woman, Mrs. Jarvis.

D: Where did she meet him? In Moscow?

K: I don’t know.

D: I told Moscow. They don’t understand how you got this message. He didn’t go anywhere, and is in Moscow.

K: No, he is arriving next week in New York.

D: He is coming here?

K: Yes.

D: The people in the Foreign Ministry said he is there and not going anywhere. Next week he is coming?

K: On the first or the second.

D: Then I misunderstood.

K: He is now in Moscow . . . or I don’t know where he is now . . . at any rate he is not here.

D: He has no messages and nothing of any importance at all.

K: So if I see him at all it is for my own amusement?

D: Yes, this is for your own information.

K: No, that’s why I asked you. I am assuming you are the person I deal with. I would like to see you tomorrow some time if you are free.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

2 See Document 297.

3 On August 2, Jarvis called Kissinger and reported that, due to publicity in the American and British press, Louis had decided to cancel his trip until “things cool down.” Jarvis said she would “really like to talk to you about it” and Kissinger agreed to a meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) Although no evidence has been found that they met in August, Jarvis called Kissinger on November 3 to report that Louis had contacted her again to request an appointment. “He would appreciate it,” Jarvis added, “if no one discusses it with their ambassador.” (Ibid., Box 12, Chronological File) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Louis for an hour-long breakfast on November 13. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No other record of the meeting has been found.
D: All right. What time?
K: What about 6:00?
D: That’s all right.
K: 6:00 in the usual place.
D: All right, and the second thing I checked with the Foreign Trade Ministry. All right to proceed with this [omission in transcript—Foundry?] business. How long it will take approximately?
K: About three or four [omission in transcript—weeks?].
D: Three or four more?
K: Right, but I can probably have an answer for you on the Foundry business when we meet tomorrow. It will probably be approved. We need the formal signature of the President, but I have discussed it with him in principle.4 I will tell you the details when we meet tomorrow.
D: Fine.

4 See Document 298.

302. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 28, 1971, 1750Z.

5367. Subj: Meeting with Gromyko.2

1. Summary: During general review of our relations July 28, Gromyko described Soviet policy toward US as based on peaceful co-existence and willingness cooperate wherever possible. He noted divergence between expressed US desire to improve relations and our practical policies. On specific issues, he said resolution of Vietnam war would provide basis for better US-Soviet relations. In ME, US no longer seemed to want normalized relations among countries of region and questioned Soviet desire for peace. In Europe, he regretted continuing US reserva-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 US–USSR. Secret; Nodis.

2 Instructions for this meeting were sent to Beam in telegram 135527, Document 296. For his memoir account of the meeting, see Beam, Multiple Exposure, pp. 261–263.
tions on CES but spoke optimistically of progress achieved on Berlin. He described Brezhnev as uncertain regarding nature of US policy toward Soviet Union and asked for clarification. In closing, Gromyko expressed desire for regular exchange of views. End summary.

2. I spent hour and three quarters with Gromyko July 28, during which he provided general review of our relations plus specific comments on number of subjects (his remarks on attendance at UNGA, Indian Ocean and MBFR reported septels). He was in relaxed and congenial mood, and tone of conversation was generally positive. While he expressed well known views on various aspects our relationship, I was particularly struck by his optimistic tone on Berlin and his emphasis on Soviet desire cooperate with US wherever possible. While subject of China did not arise, he clearly had it in mind in describing Brezhnev’s uncertainty over current drift of US policy toward Soviet Union. He did not mention Radio Liberty.

3. I began by noting that Secretary had seen Dobrynin on July 20, during which he emphasized importance we attach to talks and discussions between our two countries. We were gratified by serious constructive approach of both sides. As examples of areas where talks were producing progress in our bilateral relations, I mentioned PNE (joint communiqué was published in Pravda this morning), space docking, and our Consulates in Leningrad and San Francisco. Despite our differences we were happy that we were making progress on a broad front. I asked Gromyko if he had any observations he could make on our general relations and the talks between us, adding that there were also certain specific matters I hoped to raise.

4. In response, Gromyko said Soviet political line toward US was long-established and consistent, unlike “zig zags” in US line toward USSR. This line most recently defined by Brezhnev at 24th CPSU Congress. In general terms, this meant Soviets were guided in their relations with US by principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. They are ready to cooperate with us wherever possible and are prepared to show good will in seeking solutions. He wished to emphasize this in the context of my question. Of course there were other aspects to Soviet position, but he did not need to go into these.

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4 See Document 291.
5. Moving to specific subjects, Gromyko said Soviets had reacted positively to President Nixon’s statements before and after his election concerning importance of negotiations between our two countries. It would be no surprise for him to say, however, that Soviets have frequently noted divergence between US statements of desire improve relations and practical US policies. Nevertheless, this did not lessen Soviet preparedness to search for points of agreement with us.

6. Gromyko touched very briefly on Vietnam, noting only that end of war would assist in resolving many problems and would provide basis for better US-Soviet relations.

7. On ME situation, Gromyko said Soviet evaluation is that for various reasons unknown to Soviets US does not want to assist in settlement of ME crisis on basis of independence every state in region, including Israel. Soviets want peace, but US seems not to believe this and questions Soviet motives. Soviets have noted some lessening in US interest seek ME settlement as compared with two years ago, when US said it wanted to seek solutions with USSR. This wish is not visible at present, at least not as expressed before.

8. On Europe, Gromyko noted there were whole series of problems, including force reduction, CES, West Berlin, disarmament, and others. Each problem has its own “face” (i.e. is distinct in its own right). Re CES, Soviets are disappointed US still has reservations. Gromyko said Soviets know US position well. It had been covered in his meeting with President Nixon last year.⁶ Soviets think US could take more positive position without hurting its own interests. CES is not only in Soviet and European interest.

9. Gromyko expressed satisfaction that some progress had been achieved in Berlin talks. Recalling his conversation with President last year, he said he had reported to Soviet Government and leadership at that time that the President seemed to feel there were prospects for Berlin agreement providing mutual satisfaction. Now signs of progress have indeed appeared. It would be good if agreement acceptable to US, USSR, and other parties could be reached on this very important question. Soviets are working for it. Every positive aspect of US position on Berlin is noted by Soviets in appropriate fashion.

10. On SALT, Gromyko noted talks were in progress in Helsinki but it was still difficult to forecast results. Soviet desire to find common language with US on central points, if not on all points, is not lessening.

11. In winding up general review, Gromyko said he had spoken with Brezhnev short time ago on various questions of interest. He added at this point that these remarks could be reported to President. Brezhnev had posed difficult question for him: where is USG policy

⁶ See Document 23.
toward relations with USSR leading? Gromyko said he replied that there was much not clear in current US position toward USSR. Nevertheless, perhaps in near future—not in day or week but soon—answers would be provided on certain questions which would clarify to certain degree whether USG values relations with USSR, and if so, to what extent. Gromyko said this was essence of his response. His impression was that in asking this question, Brezhnev was indicating that he felt there was lack of clarity in US policy toward Soviet Union. This puzzled Soviets. On other hand, he stressed that Brezhnev was fully aware of favorable aspects of Berlin talks and evaluated them positively. He said this analysis of US policy was shared by Soviet Government, including Kosygin, Podgorny and entire leadership.

12. Returning to my original question, Gromyko said that on question of concrete talks, including SALT, Berlin, PNE and others, Soviets want to continue them and seek for common point of view. Having answered my question (which he called very difficult one), he wanted to pose same question to me. There were many problems in Europe, Asia, Africa, and ME, plus non-geographic problems such as SALT. What could I tell him in this connection re political line of USG toward Soviet Union.

13. I said that first I wished to clarify his final remarks. Brezhnev had asked him question on US policy toward Soviet Union and he had replied that in near future answer would be clearer. He concluded from nature of question that Brezhnev feels there is much unclear in US policy which puzzles him. At same time, he appreciates positive aspects. Gromyko said this was correct.

14. I said his question was broad one which we would wish to consider carefully. We were gratified at this indication that Brezhnev gives personal attention to our bilateral relations. I would report this question had been asked. Our reply would be furnished in appropriate manner and by our specific actions. In meantime, we are responding through search for constructive solutions by negotiations.7

7 In telegram 5368 from Moscow, July 28, Beam added the following “personal” comment for the Secretary: “I found it particularly interesting that in his survey of US-Soviet relations Gromyko this morning went out of his way to involve President Nixon personally (not always unfavorably) as well as General Secretary Brezhnev. Rather than give comprehensive answer on the spot to question put by Brezhnev to Gromyko about US intentions, I replied indirectly by reference to seriousness of our intent to proceed with negotiations with Sov Government. It seems significant Brezhnev asked President to be informed and Soviets may be seeking opening for contact at highest political level. Should you and the President think this worth exploring, reply could be made through Gromyko to ‘Mr. Brezhnev’s question’ without attribution but clear implication regarding its source. If made, I suggest reply be short and to the point and, while also raising question of intent on their side, be generally reassuring. Unfortunately reaction to President’s letter which I presented to Kosygin on arrival in 1969 was disappointing but opportunity perhaps being offered to try higher channel with Foreign Ministry approval.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 US-USSR)
15. On specific issues touched on by Gromyko, I noted we were seeking to end our involvement in Vietnam and wind down war. Thus far our efforts do so via negotiations have not been successful but this did not invalidate importance attached by President to this means. We are still searching for solution by this route but have not yet found answer.

16. Turning to ME, I said our interest in solution had not lessened. No one gained from current situation. We intended continue our efforts to resolve crisis. Cease fire had been in effect for nearly one year. Discussions had started that were making it possible to get clearer picture of both party’s views concerning final and interim settlement. Soviets are aware of these efforts, that could help find solution. These steps have understanding and support both ME parties, even though they realize difficult decisions must be made.

17. On CES, I noted we are not only country with reservations. Nevertheless, it was less question of reservations than of proper timing. Relationship of Berlin to CES was obviously important political problem for FRG. Absence of date for CES should not mean we cannot proceed with discussion of other European problems, as we are now doing. We see prospects of facilitating Berlin solution. We intend to exploit these and give them our support.

18. In closing, Gromyko observed that need would arise from time to time for us to exchange views, discuss problems, and clarify certain viewpoints. He hoped we would keep to this practice. I said I would be glad to do so at any time.

Beam

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

The meeting was arranged at my request because I wanted to have an opportunity to talk with Dobrynin about Vietnam.

Kama River Project

I opened the meeting by informing Dobrynin of the decisions with respect to the foundry for the Kama River Project. I told him that the decision had been favorable and amounted to about $170 million. Dobrynin asked what that meant for the rest of the Kama River Project, and I replied that we needed another four to six weeks to make up our mind. Dobrynin then said, in the usual ungenerous Soviet way, that he hoped we realized the foundry had already been taken for granted in Moscow. I said that that was their problem; my problem was to inform them of the decisions we had made, and considering that it was a unilateral American gesture for which we didn’t ask reciprocity, it didn’t make any difference whether it had been taken for granted or not. Dobrynin then changed tack and rather effusively thanked us for the very positive steps that had been taken on trade since the SALT agreement.

SALT

Dobrynin then reviewed the SALT situation in Helsinki. He thought we were on a positive course. He said there was still some hesitation in Moscow on the number of Safeguard sites, and of course, an NCA agreement would be a lot easier. I went over familiar grounds with him and told him that that, in effect, meant zero for us and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in General Hughes’s office in the East Wing of the White House. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum and another summarizing its “highlights” to the President on August 9. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Dobrynin from 6:38 to 8:10 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 See Document 301.
3 In a backchannel message to Smith on August 3, Kissinger expressed concern about the “leisurely pace” of the negotiations in Helsinki. As Smith later recalled, Kissinger also raised the proposal of an ABM ban: “From his talks with Dobrynin, [Kissinger] had believed that it would never be seriously considered by the Soviets because it would require costly dismantling of assets already paid for. He concluded disin- genuously, ‘But I will yield to wiser heads!’” (Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 259)


5 See Document 288.

Moscow for them. Dobrynin said they were prepared to examine the zero-ABM proposal. I told him we would be back to them.³

**Berlin**

With respect to Berlin, Dobrynin said that he thought that we were on a good course and that things were working out exactly as I had predicted. He said it had made a good impression in Moscow.

**Vietnam**

I then turned the conversation to Vietnam. I said we had reason to believe that Hanoi was at a very crucial point in its decision. I knew that Le Duc Tho was returning to Hanoi. While in the last year and a half I had accepted the proposition that the Soviet Union could not do much about Vietnam, I was now approaching him because I thought there was a useful moment for intervention. If the war in Vietnam continued, it was certain that the bargaining position of Hanoi vis-à-vis us would decline. In fact, Hanoi was in the curious position of threatening us with a continuation of the war, at the end of which—whether Hanoi won or lost—we would not be in a position to do for them what they were asking simply because the number of our troops would have declined too much.

Dobrynin said that he had had a full report about my meeting with Le Duc Tho in Paris on July 12.⁴ He said I had fooled even him. At first he had thought that of course I was going to meet Le Duc Tho, no matter what the press said; but then when the China initiative was sprung he thought that maybe I had used Le Duc Tho as a cover for Peking. Now he did not know whether I was using Peking as a cover for Le Duc Tho or whether the two were independent. At any rate, he received the telegram about my meeting with Le Duc Tho just after I had had lunch with him to tell him about the Peking meeting.⁵

Dobrynin said that Hanoi told them that there were only two issues left—setting a deadline and overthrowing the Thieu Government. All other issues Hanoi believed could be settled. I said that I did not think the deadline was an insuperable difficulty; Dobrynin said that this was his impression also. But with respect to the overthrow of the

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³ In a backchannel message to Smith on August 3, Kissinger expressed concern about the “leisurely pace” of the negotiations in Helsinki. As Smith later recalled, Kissinger also raised the proposal of an ABM ban: “From his talks with Dobrynin, [Kissinger] had believed that it would never be seriously considered by the Soviets because it would require costly dismantling of assets already paid for. He concluded disingenuously, ‘But I will yield to wiser heads!’” (Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 259)


⁵ See Document 288.
Thieu Government, I said that this was a condition we could not accept. First, because we did not have the power to do so. Second, because it would be dishonorable even to discuss overthrowing the government of an ally. On the other hand, we had made proposals whose practical consequence had to be to give maximum freedom of choice to the South Vietnamese. I recapitulated the proposals we had offered: to set a deadline after final agreement; to affirm the concept of neutrality for Vietnam; and to accept limitations on military and economic aid after a settlement. It was hard to see how much more we could do. I said this would have a profound impact on the election campaign. Dobrynin said, yes, he had to admit that.

Dobrynin then asked me how I proposed to proceed. I said that our idea was that we could sign a statement of principles on the points which we had agreed upon at the private talks and then transmit those to the conference for implementation. He asked how the PRG and the Saigon Administration were going to be handled. Were they going to associate themselves with these principles? I said, yes, they would have to associate themselves with these principles, but I thought this would not be a major difficulty on our side. Dobrynin said, well, it should be possible to find some formula to do this.

Dobrynin asked whether we were going to set a firm deadline or whether we were going to make it dependent on the final agreement. I said we were going to make the deadline start running on the day the final agreement was signed, because otherwise I was afraid their allies were going to delay forever, and we would still be talking to them about the other point while the last American troops had left Vietnam. Dobrynin said, well, the trouble with the North Vietnamese is that they want everything signed and delivered. It isn’t enough for them to start a political process. They want to make sure that Thieu is overthrown. I said that, short of giving them that assurance, I thought the other points were manageable. Dobrynin said that Hanoi had told them they were willing to continue fighting, but he felt that there was a real desire to come to an agreement this year.

Summit

Dobrynin then returned to the Berlin talks. He said it was a pity that the Peking trip had supervened, because he was certain that within five days of the preliminary agreement on Berlin an invitation to a summit in Moscow would have been issued. I said that this was an example of the difficulties in our relationships. The President had given his word that he would work constructively for a Berlin solution. After some initial fumbling about setting up the right channels, we had carried out exactly what we had told him. Yet the Soviet leaders had continually started bringing little pressures on us. I said the President would be as willing to make a big move with Moscow as he was with
Peking; in fact, given the nature of our relationships, he would probably attach higher priority to Moscow than to Peking. However, it was important to put relationships on a level that was worthy of the President instead of this constant nitpicking argument.

Dobrynin replied that we just didn’t understand. The Soviet leaders had really made a decision to see the President, and had just expressed it in a clumsy way. They couldn’t do it in September; October was taken by the trip to France; so they had picked November as the earliest possible date—and instead we preferred to see Mao Tse-tung. He had to admit, he said, that I could not believe him if he said they were not concerned in Moscow. But they were willing to retain an open mind. He said that the way to deal with this was to proceed on the basis of the future and to see whether we could work out a more constructive relationship. I told him I agreed, and we departed after some exchange of amenities.6

6 Kissinger met Nixon in the Executive Office Building from 8:30 to 8:50 p.m., presumably to discuss his meeting with Dobrynin. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.

304. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, July 29, 1971, 9–11 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Henry Grunwald
Hugh Sidey
Jerry Schecter

[Omitted here are “light patter” on Kissinger’s secret trip to China and “further banter,” including discussion of the “tameness of the Russian reaction to the Chinese mission.” Before the “serious questioning” began, Kissinger confirmed that his answers would be “off the record.”]
Q: How would you compare the Russians with the Chinese?
A: The Russians are tough, you know. They grab you by the balls first and then ask you if it hurts. Dealing with the Russians gives you a feeling that they have an inferiority complex. They seem constantly trying to prove themselves to the bureaucracy and to themselves. You never can conclude that they have thought things out well in advance. The Chinese appear more set on a particular course of action. There is less gamesmanship. They are tough, but not as abrasive. They are not as skilled as the Japanese. In the Russian case, for example, if I were to talk to Arbatov, I would receive canned Leninist analysis. I would, of course, disagree; and Arbatov would then play the psychiatrist role. He would constantly give the impression that my comments had not made any impact on him. In their rhetoric, Russia is never wrong; the United States is never right. The Chinese interpretation is never as crude or as unreal as the Soviet version, even though it may be Leninist. There are no slogans. My alternative interpretations of events, for instance, meet different responses from the Chinese. The Russians don’t debate an issue. When you state one side, they return to their original position. The Chinese will discuss the issue as a serious proposition. I had no idea what to expect when I went to China. I had never been to China nor met a Chinese Communist before. I had no briefing other than minimal materials about the personalities involved. I was surprised that they were not more like the Russians. The Chinese are willing to speak of their own failures. A European Communist leader could never admit to failures. The Chinese, for example, volunteered to talk about the cultural revolution and its problems.

[Omitted here is discussion of China and small talk.]
Q: Is this China affair a message to Russia from China that China is leaning on us.
A: That puts it too starkly. China needs to overcome the sense of isolation. This is the big factor.

[Omitted here is discussion of China, Vietnam, and American politics and small talk.]
Q: What effect will all this have on the SALT negotiations?
A: Empirically, we have noted that the official Soviet reaction has been more circumspect, more reciprocal, more forthcoming than before. Now David Rockefeller is told that the Russians want the SALT settlement as soon as possible.²

² According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met David Rockefeller on July 20 from 4:13 to 5 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
Q: Should the President go to Moscow before he goes to Peking? Doesn’t it hurt the Russians psychologically to have him go first to China?

A: It’s too late for that now. They simply blew it. They can’t expect a trip to Moscow now.

Q: Is it in Moscow’s interest to have the Vietnam war continue?

A: Are you asking if Moscow wants to screw it up for China by prolonging the Vietnam war? Well, Hanoi won’t prolong the Vietnam war any more than it will settle the Vietnam war on the orders of its allies. Hanoi, like China, must be concerned about Japan. The Japanese have enormous economic power, and economic power can become military power. Hanoi is aware that if they continue to fight us, they may become so weak that they will fall prey to the Japanese or others. Everything must be weighed in the balance. For the Soviets, they have to balance whether it is worth it to embarrass us with the Vietnam war when the price they pay is something like the President’s going to China before he goes to Moscow. The President would go to China anyway even if the Vietnam war did not exist, but the Russians aren’t clear on that.

[Omitted here is discussion of China, Vietnam, Japan, and President Nixon and small talk.]

Q: What is this “new historical epoch” that you speak of?

A: China has not been participating for 22 years in the world. Now they are coming into international politics. We have 750 million new people in the world. They are going to have a big effect on world politics. We wouldn’t use the China effort in an anti-Soviet way. What could we do? What would we have to gain? But, of course, this does change our relationship with the Soviets.

Q: Is this protection for the Chinese against a nuclear strike by the United States?

A: You have focused on another reason why the trip will succeed. They don’t want to get the President to Peking in order to humiliate him. The big picture in Asia opens new perspectives. This may help European unity, in fact, though that wasn’t intended at the time, and it will clearly have an effect on India.

Q: You mean Eastern Europe will be able to use this against the Soviets?

A: True.

Q: Is this the old balance of power again?

A: Yes, it is something like the old system, but now war is not possible. The Vietnam war is not the important thing; what is urgent is a macro-grip on world politics.

[Omitted here is discussion of President Nixon, American politics, and Vietnam and small talk.]
305. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, July 30, 1971, 6:35 p.m.

K: Anatoliy, how are you. I have a number of items which I want to take up with you. (1) Our Ambassador deduced from his conversation with your Foreign Minister that your Foreign Minister was eager for a channel between the President and your Chairman Brezhnev. At any rate we don’t want to use a channel through Beam, but through the established channel. He got the impression that Gromyko was hinting that Brezhnev wanted some indication from the President on policy views.

D: Brezhnev knows everything I am doing, so it’s not quite clear.

K: Let me find it. I will read my cable to you since you read my cables anyway. [read Smith’s cable].

D: It means that he mentioned in passing the importance of . . .

K: “It seems significant that Brezhnev asked the President to be informed.” I don’t care much as long as you understand it.

D: I know perfectly well. It means simply they want to emphasize that Brezhnev is really the number one man from this point of view.

K: We wanted to say we will not reply in that channel. We are assuming you understand that what I say to you comes from the President and that any suggestions directly concerning the President are more efficient to discuss in your channel.

D: I am sure 100 per cent.

K: I am sure, too, but on the off-chance, we want you to understand.

D: It is my impression that, in passing, Gromyko wanted to emphasize it is a good idea that they communicate person to person.

K: If you think it’s a good idea. We have no problem with writing a letter to Mr. Brezhnev on some occasion.

D: I think it’s a good idea.

K: Do you?
Kissinger and Smith discussed this meeting with Semenov in an exchange of backchannel messages. As Smith later recalled: "On July 29, I again asked the architect of May 20 what his understanding of the sequence issue was. Kissinger reported that Dobrynin’s understanding was that the offensive limitations measures would have to be discussed before the agreement on ABMs was concluded. Dobrynin had told him that if the United States insisted on talking about offensive as well as defensive systems right from the start of the Helsinki session we would meet with a stone wall. Dobrynin had offered his personal opinion that this matter would be amicably settled as soon as there was agreement on some aspect of ABM limitation, for example, the number of sites to be permitted." (Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 251). Smith’s message of July 29 and Kissinger’s reply of July 31 are both in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, SALT, 1971.

D: Yes. In this context of what you read, I interpret the words of my Minister—that he raised the question of a different channel, no. I am inclined to interpret it that he simply wants more personal basis between the two bosses. I know our point of view and personally that of Brezhnev and Gromyko. I have no doubts. There is no question on a new channel. We don’t want to go through Beam. I am positive this is not the meaning.

K: If you think sometimes it is a good idea to send a letter, we will initiate something.

D: On this telegram, I am 100 per cent sure.

K: Anything I tell you comes from the President.

D: Sometimes person to person is not a bad idea. It is very clear that what you tell us is from the President. All answers you receive are directly from my President.

K: I understand perfectly.

D: My interpretation is he feels it is a good idea to have some human-being touch.

K: The second item—Semenov and Smith had a meeting on July 29. Semenov said—without being insistent—that he understood the May 20th understanding to mean that there should be a separate ABM agreement worked out completely and only when that was worked out would they discuss offensive limitations. My understanding has been we would agree to discuss for several weeks the ABM limitations. Concurrently there should be some offensive discussions. This is the sort of issue that raises irritations. We have gone far to meet your point on this.

D: Our understanding is we should finish everything. If you put it this way. You didn’t give consent to finish everything. No one was precise.

K: I am not insisting that it has to happen next week. They have been meeting for three weeks now.

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3 Kissinger and Smith discussed this meeting with Semenov in an exchange of backchannel messages. As Smith later recalled: “On July 29, I again asked the architect of May 20 what his understanding of the sequence issue was. Kissinger reported that Dobrynin’s understanding was that the offensive limitations measures would have to be discussed before the agreement on ABMs was concluded. Dobrynin had told him that if the United States insisted on talking about offensive as well as defensive systems right from the start of the Helsinki session we would meet with a stone wall. Dobrynin had offered his personal opinion that this matter would be amicably settled as soon as there was agreement on some aspect of ABM limitation, for example, the number of sites to be permitted.” (Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 251). Smith’s message of July 29 and Kissinger’s reply of July 31 are both in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, SALT, 1971.
D: The problem is psychological. It is much better to handle and easier from your side than from mine. I am receiving so many telegrams from Semenov. Each day I get two or three because they discuss several questions. [He listed several including accidental war.] You introduce a paper—we introduce a paper. Reading them occupies a lot of time. My personal feeling is they discuss so many issues simultaneously. Now on what specific dates we discuss this offensive weapons . . .

K: It doesn’t sound like the sort of issue . . . I think it is the sort of issue you will have to solve. You know we won’t agree to settle an ABM agreement first. But it can go on another week or two. We should settle it gracefully.

D: Sometimes there are things from our and your side. I am thinking aloud. Give them a chance and not time it to two to four weeks, but to concentrate on this particular issue. At least get half of it.

K: It is going to get completely stuck if you take the position ABM must be completed.

D: But your man keeps pushing.

K: I told you he would introduce it, and he didn’t push it as I told you he wouldn’t.

D: But he does. They discuss lines in general or after at a cocktail party.

K: I told you this would happen because we have to do it from our point of view. In the plenary they have been discussing only ABM.

D: But in the plenary session there was your paper on offensive weapons.4

K: But we dropped it.

D: Semenov sticks to the formal initiative.

K: My recommendation is since we have to settle it anyway, if we want an agreement, let’s do it generously on both sides.

D: I think so.

K: I have no specific proposal. This can go on a week or two anyway.

D: Without an agreement on ABM, you won’t accept anything?

K: I don’t want to be in the position where one agreement is completed. But they can go a few more weeks on ABM. If we can have an understanding that after a few weeks, they will begin discussing offensive weapons.

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4 Reference is presumably to the draft interim agreement on offensive weapons, which the U.S. Delegation tabled (along with a draft ABM agreement) in Helsinki on July 27. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 183.
D: It’s a question of substantial things triggering it.

K: As long as we have it understood it will not be after the conclusion of an ABM agreement, but once we have decided some of the sites.

D: I am not in a position to say what is first or second. I will send to Moscow this notification. We should go through now agreement government to government. And there will be progress simultaneously. I will put it this way.

K: That’s right. One other piece of information, strictly for your information. The British have told us they would slightly prefer to suspend Berlin negotiations for the month of August for a vacation. We have told them we want to continue and we believe they will accept our recommendation. Our position is we want to continue the talks.

D: I understand.

K: It is the White House position which will prevail. And I have communicated this to Bahr.5 I wanted you to know that. We are sticking to the schedule.

D: Thank you very much.

K: That last point treat with special confidence.

D: All right. Thank you.

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5 See Document 299.

SUBJECT
Kama River Project—Applications to Participate in the Foundry

Secretary Stans has proposed that you authorize him to approve now three pending applications for U.S. participation in the foundry plant of the Soviet Kama River truck factory (Tab A).²

The Kama River factory is expected to produce 150,000 three-axle diesel trucks annually by the late 1970s. CIA states that three-axle trucks are not tactical military vehicles, though some could end up in military motor pools. CIA estimates that the Russian expenditures on the entire Kama River project will approximate $3 billion, much of which however will be used to erect factory buildings, workers’ housing, etc. CIA estimates that perhaps $1 billion of the total will be used to procure foreign machinery and technology, of which $200 million might be spent in the United States if we granted blanket permission for U.S. participation. The CIA analysis is at Tab B.³

The Kama complex will consist of six discrete elements:
1. Foundry plant
2. Forging plant
3. Stamping and pressing plant
4. Engine, gear and transmission plant
5. Assembly plant
6. Tooling and repairing plant

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XV. Confidential. Sent for action. Johnston forwarded a draft of this memorandum to Haig on July 28. In his covering memorandum, Johnston noted that the memorandum for the President contained detailed information on the location of participating companies: “There are some in Michigan, but not in Gerry Ford’s district. Hugh Scott seems to have a near-monopoly on this project.” “As soon as our general relations with the USSR allow us to adopt some more abstract definition of our participation, i.e. the foundry,” Johnston suggested, “we should do so to reduce the awkwardness of having the President decide on specific firms in particular locations.” Kissinger wrote the following instructions in the margin: “Remind me to call Gerry Ford. Directive to Stans should go Monday [August 2] a.m. Call Petersen to keep informed.” (Ibid.) A notation on the memorandum from Kissinger indicates that the President saw it.

² Dated July 26; attached but not printed. Stans noted that this supplemented his July 23 memorandum to the President, which recommended authorization for U.S. companies to participate in the Kama River project. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1328, NSC Unfiled Material, 1971 [8 of 12])

³ Dated July 16; attached but not printed.
Commerce now holds four formal U.S. export applications. The application by Mack Trucks, Inc., of Allentown, Pennsylvania, for $750 million of technical services and equipment is not active, since Mack is re-negotiating its arrangement with Russia. In any case, Secretary Stans doubts that the Mack Truck application is a realistic estimate of what the Soviets would procure from that company.

The other three applications are for technology and equipment for only the foundry, one of the first phases of the Kama complex. Stans estimates that the total Russian expenditure on the foundry will be $450 million, only a fraction of which would come from the U.S. The three applications are by:

—The Swindell/Dressler Company for $13.5 million of technical services. The company claims it has a firm offer from the Soviets, and it expects a follow-on order for $20 million of equipment. Swindell/Dressler is at Pittsburgh.


—The Jervis B. Webb Company for $125 million of conveyors and other foundry equipment. Webb is at Detroit, but it also has plants at Avon Lake, Ohio, Cohasset, Mass., and Boyne City, Michigan.

These applications are all partially competitive with each other, and consequently if approved would result in exports of less than their total combined value.

The applications have been pending for some time. Secretary Stans argues that even if we are not ready to approve U.S. participation in all aspects of the Kama River Project, we should go ahead with these now before the Soviets go elsewhere.

I agree with Secretary Stans. The companies have already been unable to meet two deadlines given by the Russians. Though any approval of U.S. participation will be seen as a major signal by the Russians, we can reduce the effect of this if we indicate that we are only approving three specific licenses at this time but are not now giving approval for U.S. participation in all aspects of the project. To keep this matter firmly under the control of the White House I plan to ask Secretary Stans to submit all future Kama applications for your consideration.4

4 In an August 5 memorandum to Stans, Kissinger reported that Nixon had approved the three pending applications but expected further applications on the project, including the foundry plant, to be referred to the White House. The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 346.
Recommendation

That you approve Secretary Stans’ request to authorize issuance of the three pending licenses: Swindell/Dressler for $13.5 million, C. E. Cast for $37 million and Jervis B. Webb for $125 million.\(^5\)

\(^5\) The President initialed his approval. According to an attached correspondence profile, Nixon formally approved the recommendation on August 6, the day after Kissinger notified Stans of the decision.

307. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon\(^1\)


SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

Ambassador Beam has had a rather long conversation with Gromyko as a follow up to Secretary Rogers’ recent talk with Dobrynin.\(^2\) Both the Secretary and the Ambassador emphasized the importance we attach to the various discussions underway with the USSR. The response from Gromyko as well as Dobrynin seemed intened to convey reassurances of Soviet interest in pressing forward on current issues under negotiation or proposed for negotiations. In effect, they seem to be saying that the Chinese factor would not interrupt US-Soviet relations.

Gromyko made a special point of saying he had just talked with Brezhnev, who had asked him to appraise the course of US policy toward the USSR. Gromyko claimed that he had answered by saying that much was presently unclear in US policy, but that fairly soon certain questions (Berlin? SALT?) would be answered and this would clarify our overall policy. Gromyko made a point of saying that his conversation with Brezhnev should be brought to your attention.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XV, Secret; Nodis. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of this memorandum to Kissinger on July 30 with the comment on the Beam–Gromyko meeting: “I doubt that you want this channel to become active.” Haig wrote in the margin: “HAK, I’ve told State this channel is not to be used—they understand.” A notation on the memorandum from Kissinger indicates that the President saw it.

\(^2\) See Documents 302 and 291.
This particular byplay was probably meant to tell us that Chinese developments had raised questions in Brezhnev’s mind, and that he would judge the prospects for American-Soviet relations on the grounds of both our behavior in current talks as well as the handling of the Peking visit. The Ambassador believes that it may be significant that Gromyko made a point of drawing your attention to Brezhnev’s alleged question. He sees this as a possible opportunity, if not an invitation, to a high level dialogue, should you be interested.

As far as the substance of the conversation, Gromyko pointed out that Soviet policy was “consistent” (unlike American “zig-zags”) and Moscow was ready to cooperate with the US wherever possible and was prepared to show “good will in seeking solutions.”

—He touched briefly on Vietnam—mentioned only that an end to the war would improve Soviet-American relations.

—On the Middle East, his main point was that we seemed to be losing interest in a solution.

—On Berlin he expressed satisfaction that some progress had been made in the talks. (Beam found him optimistic.)

—On SALT he said it was difficult to forecast results but Soviet desire to find common language on “central points” is not lessening.

—On MBFR, Gromyko seemed to revert to the previous Soviet position favoring reduction for all of Europe, not only in Central Europe, as Brezhnev had said at the Party Congress and later; he also pressed to know whether we accepted their proposal to begin negotiations, but indicated that they would oppose “bloc-to-bloc” negotiations. (This meets a major French objection to MBFR.)

On the subject of China, Gromyko avoided it entirely, perhaps because the Soviets had already published their official line in the press, after ten days of virtual silence. However, Dobrynin had covered the issue in some detail with the Secretary (Tab A). Dobrynin was rather
moderate in his comments, implying that we would find the Chinese difficult negotiators but the Soviets recognized that our contacts with Peking were not directed against other countries and would not affect our talks with the USSR.

Dobrynin commented at some length on Vietnam, claiming that Moscow had no real discussion with Peking on the question, because Chinese diatribes against the US always made discussions impossible. According to Dobrynin, the Chinese were convinced that the US would not have the stamina or zeal to maintain its influence in a part of the world so far removed from its shores.

To the extent that these two high level contacts are indicators of Soviet policy in reaction to Sino-American relations, Moscow seems to be making an effort to play down the significance of your visit in terms of its impact on Soviet-American relations. This is more or less the line adopted in the Soviet press, which emphasized that Soviet policy all along has been "correct" and need not be changed—except should some "combination" of other powers try to pressure on Moscow. This seems generally a defensive, holding action, since the Soviet leaders can scarcely admit to any setback or to any failure in their calculations.

Probably, the Soviets will reexamine their positions and some of their underlying assumptions, but a new line is not likely to emerge quickly, if at all. Whether there is a shift in Moscow will, of course, be influenced by the course of the Berlin and SALT talks as well as internal Kremlin politics.

Ambassador Beam may be right that Gromyko, by recounting an alleged recent conversation between himself and Brezhnev, was trying to open some sort of a channel to you via the Ambassador. If so, his motive might have been to use the Foreign Ministry–State Department channel to bring pressure to bear on other exchanges between us. There may also be an element of competition between Gromyko and Dobrynin. (A similar Soviet tactic was used toward the end of the negotiations leading up to the May 20 SALT announcement.)

308. Editorial Note

On August 4, 1971, President Richard Nixon met members of the White House press corps for the first time since his announcement three weeks earlier of the upcoming trip to the People's Republic of China. During the 50-minute conference, which began in the Oval Office at 11:38 a.m., Nixon received a series of questions on the future of Sino-
American relations. Several other issues of foreign affairs also arose, including the prospects for his policy toward the Soviet Union. When a reporter asked whether he would consider visiting Moscow before Beijing, the President replied:

"In view of the announcement that we have made on Peking, the visit to Peking will be the first visit that I will make. Obviously, it takes a great deal of time to prepare a visit, and to attempt now to—and the Soviet Union, I am sure, feels exactly the same way—to attempt to rush around and have a summit meeting in Moscow before we go to Peking would not be in the interest of either country.

"I would add this point, too: When Foreign Minister Gromyko was here, we discussed the possibility of a possible summit meeting, and we had a very candid discussion. He agreed and said that his government leaders agreed with my position, which was that a meeting at the highest level should take place and would be useful only when there was something substantive to discuss that could not be handled in other channels.

"With regard to the Soviets, I should also point out that we are making very significant progress on Berlin. We are making good progress on SALT. Discussions are still continuing on the Mideast, although there I will not speculate about what the prospects for success are in view of the fact that Mr. Sisco is presently in the area exploring with the governments concerned what the possibilities of some interim settlement looking toward a final settlement may be.

"Having mentioned these three areas in which we are negotiating with the Soviet Union, I will add that if the time comes, as it may come, and both sides realize this, then the final breakthrough in any of these areas can take place only at the highest level, and then there will be a meeting. But as far as the timing of the meeting before the visit to Peking, that would not be an appropriate thing to do." (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, page 852)

White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman wrote in his diary that, while the press conference "went reasonably well," the President managed to complicate matters for his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger: "He drove Henry right up the wall when he said that he and Gromyko had discussed the possibility of a Summit and had agreed that it would be useful only when there was something substantive to discuss." As Haldeman explained: "Problem was that the contents of the Gromyko talk have up until now been secret, and it was agreed with Gromyko that they would be." (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

Before Nixon finished his press conference, Kissinger left the conference to call Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. After an exchange of pleasantries, Kissinger told Dobrynin:
"I'm calling because something embarrassing happened at the press conference. They asked about a summit with Moscow, would he consider it before Peking? He said in effect what I had told you, but in a convoluted way. He said that when Gromyko was here last year we discussed the summit and said that if it was held it should be well prepared. That slipped out and we owe you an apology for that. I hope you will explain it. It was a slip of the tongue. The answer itself was along the same lines as what we discussed. The only part of it that worries me is that he mentioned he had discussed it with Gromyko last year."

Rather than dwell on the incident, Kissinger told Dobrynin that Nixon was also "preparing a letter to Brezhnev" and continued:

"I will have the letter to you almost certainly by Friday [August 6], or by Monday morning.

"A: Friday would be better. Sometimes things little bit more in time.

"K: There is nothing in the letter we haven’t already discussed.

"A: I understand, but good idea.

"K: Just for tone . . .

"A: And proper perspective in our relations.

"K: I think you will find it constructive. Worked on it yesterday and again this morning. By Friday morning we should have it."

The President met Kissinger and Haldeman in the Oval Office at 12:27 p.m. to discuss the press conference and related matters, including the scheduling of summits in Moscow and Beijing:

Kissinger: "I thought it went very, very well. I did one thing. I called Dobrynin about the reference to Gromyko, because that was a—"

Nixon: "Yeah."

Kissinger: "—secret talk and I didn’t want him to read it on the—"

Nixon: "Right."

Kissinger: "—on the wire. And I said that you did this so that there couldn’t be any embarrassment and so that they share."

Nixon: "Yeah."

Kissinger: "So it didn’t look as if you were turning them off."

Nixon: "Right. Then we agree. That’s why we did it."

Kissinger: "Yeah. That’s why I said it. And he was practically drooling."

Nixon: "Yeah."

Kissinger: "He said he can tell me, in strictest confidence, that they’re having a high-level meeting to decide the summit invitation. It
really kills me right now. They want it. And I said—he said, 'What did the President say about the summit?' I said, 'Sorry.' The only thing that worries me is that we’re now in a funny position that if they speed up SALT—"

Nixon: "Yeah. Well, that was the point that encouraged Smith."

Kissinger: "—and conclude it. Well, I don’t see how we can go to Moscow—"

Nixon: "What I said to him?"

Kissinger: "Yes."

Nixon: "Why?"

Kissinger: "Well, then they just go broke for SALT or go for something else."

Nixon: "Well—Bob?"

Kissinger: "They may settle it this fall."

Nixon: "Well, what do you think? I might have to go there."

Kissinger: "I think—"

Nixon: "Now, that would be a terrible slap."

Kissinger: "I think it would be, but I think it sets it up wrong, because that means Peking gets the last shot at us. It’d be a hell of a lot better to have Moscow hanging over Peking’s head, than Peking hanging over Moscow’s head."

Nixon: "Right."

Kissinger: "Peking is the one that we can’t fail on. Moscow has so many other reasons to get along with us. Then Moscow, we know, won’t embarrass you. Peking—I think we are better off having Peking—"

Nixon: "Yeah."

Kissinger: "—with Moscow hanging over their head, with the fear that we might be dividing them up with Moscow."

Nixon: "Hm-hmm."

Kissinger: "And—I think it’s much better to go to Pe[king]—Moscow after Peking."

Nixon: "Excuse me. Well, I can tell you [unclear] Chicago by saying the leaders of both sides do not feel that the summit—"

Kissinger: "[unclear]"

Nixon: "—would be useful unless it was different."

Kissinger: "Right. Now, the only part that worried me was mentioning a conversation with Gromyko—"

Nixon: "Yeah."

Kissinger: "—to keep Gromyko from saying, 'That isn’t quite what happened. I brought him an invitation, which would have—"
Nixon: “He did bring it to you.”
Kissinger: “No, but that message didn’t fix a date.”
Nixon: “Hm-hmm. Oh, I’ll just say that—”
Kissinger: “Well, but, I think, they’re so slobbering now. Our bigger problem with them now, Mr. President, in my view, is not whether they’ll have a—”
Nixon: “Yeah.”
Kissinger: “—meeting, but whether they’ll try to stampede us into one.”
Nixon: “In order to screw the Chinese?”
Kissinger: “Yeah, that would really—if we go to Moscow to sign a bilateral agreement—besides, we’ve told the Chinese we wouldn’t do it now—before Peking. That was one of the messages we sent them, to tell them that we said you’d go in the order in which you will announce. But you said that today.”
Nixon: “You mangled a word. I just said ‘meeting.’”
Kissinger: “No, you said you wouldn’t—‘It would not now be—’”
Nixon: “Appropriate.”
Kissinger: “—‘appropriate.’ You’d go to Peking first. You said it. Don’t you think, Bob?”
Haldeman: “Yeah.”
Kissinger: “That was very clear. And, you remember, I told you that he had mentioned that a letter from you to Brezhnev might be a good idea, and I drafted one. And I told him there may be one and he was practically drooling. He said, ‘Well, that would be good.’ You see, Brezhnev has a lot riding on the line with you. He committed to having a good relation partner.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 554–3) The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

Later in the day, Kissinger clarified Nixon’s remarks for members of the Washington press corps. Murrey Marder, columnist and diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post, called at 5:57 p.m. to seek a “little guidance” on the President’s timetable:

“M: The question was whether to literally rule out a visit to Moscow or agreement on Berlin, SALT, the Middle East sequence . . .

“K: No, wait a minute. An agreement is not contingent on willingness to have a summit. There will be a Berlin agreement whenever we have it regardless of where we stand with Peking. The same is true of SALT. What he meant to indicate is that it is highly improbable that we will go to Moscow before Peking.

“M: Right. Another thought here, he said that to speculate that we are going to get that done before going to Peking is ill-advised. He didn’t mean it literally, did he?”
“K: Absolutely not. We are moving at the fastest rate possible on both. They are totally separable from whenever we go to Moscow or have a summit wherever that would be.

“M: Does this rule out participation in meetings with the Soviets before going to Moscow on one of these other factors?

“K: The prospect is that we will have summits, if they are summits, in the order in which they are announced. If the SALT agreement is already finished there will be no need to have a meeting. If there is a summit, it’s because progress in other talks has made major steps in other fields possible. I don’t believe timing is all that consistent. Berlin is a different issue—that’s four powers and I don’t see the pace of SALT . . . after we have agreement in principle, drafting may take several months. I don’t interpret this press conference as meaning we are going to hold up negotiations to make room for a summit or that we are going to speed them up for a summit.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File)

Several minutes later, Nixon and Kissinger reviewed the day’s events by telephone:

“K: There has been some inquiry in the press about your comment on the Soviet Union—whether you are going to hold up on an agreement. I told them no, you were going ahead.

“P: The two things are totally separate.

“K: That’s what I said.

“P: I was quite clear.

“K: And this was absolutely consistent with what we told Dobrynin.

“P: And with what the Chinese know.

“K: Exactly. It would be ironical now if they [the Soviets] try to squeeze us into an early summit.

“P: And they are crude enough to try. After all the times we’ve been around with them. And we’ll just treat them the same way they’ve treated us if they do. And they’ll respect us for it.

“K: No, this way the pressures are set up in the right way to do it in that sequence.

“P: That’s the big thing. And we played the Soviets very generously today. Talking about more progress . . . Berlin . . .

“K: Of course you know about more progress on Berlin than anyone else. But the Russians will understand.

“P: Exactly, and getting the people a little confused isn’t a bad idea.

“K: And after all that’s happened the press takes it at face value, so there’s no problem there. And the bureaucracy is now used to the fact that things are going on they aren’t aware of.” (Ibid.)
On August 5, the Washington Post published Marder’s column on the President’s press conference. Although he addressed Nixon’s remarks, Marder largely based his analysis on Kissinger’s clarifications over the telephone:

“In his news conference, the President not only placed a prospective U.S.-Soviet summit meeting after, rather than before, his visit to Peking. He also appeared to be tipping his hand on the expected timing for completing a first stage agreement in the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), and on a new four-power accord on Western access to Berlin, if not on a possible interim agreement in the Arab-Israeli conflict as well.

“Administration sources promptly cautioned those who thought the President might be revealing the full U.S. diplomatic scenario that all of his statements should not be taken so literally.

“These negotiations are totally separable, and each will move at the fastest pace possible, without any attempt to time them to the President’s travel, these sources emphasized. The Berlin talks, it was noted, are four-power talks (Soviet Union, Britain, France, United States) and an agreement in that forum need have no relationship to a U.S.-Soviet summit conference.

“The President’s remarks, nevertheless, are considerably revealing for diplomats when added to other information and speculation about the probable course of U.S. diplomacy in the coming months.”

“A ‘double journey for peace’ in advance of a presidential election,” Marder concluded, “would be an unparalleled coup, requiring more surefootedness—and luck—than any White House occupant has ever experienced on the world’s unpredictable summitry circuit.”

309. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Letter to Brezhnev

Pursuant to our discussion, I have prepared a letter for your signature to Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev. The letter is designed to relieve somewhat the concerns generated by the Peking initiative. It attempts to:

—note that our dealings with the Soviets and others have been conducted on the basis of recognition of the legitimate interests of both sides;

—note that the steps taken to improve contacts with the PRC are not based on hidden—especially anti-Soviet—motives;

—endorse further improvement in US/USSR relations and emphasize that tactical considerations should not detract from efforts to achieve longer term goals;

—urge continuing progress in SALT and Berlin negotiations and register concern about the dangers of the Middle East situation.

Ambassador Dobrynin believes that a letter of this kind will be most helpful in deflecting pique resulting from the Peking initiative and hopes to have a letter at an early date.

Recommendation
That you sign the proposed letter to Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

2 See Document 308.
Attachment

Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. Secretary:

Ambassador Beam has reported to me his recent conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Of course, I am in close touch with the conversations conducted between Ambassador Dobrynin and my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. I should like, in the light of these conversations, to set forth certain thoughts concerning relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

My Administration has from the outset conducted its policy toward the Soviet Union, and all other states, on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for the legitimate interests of each side. This is particularly important in the relations between our two countries, for our size and power impose upon us a special responsibility to understand each other’s purposes and to deal with care and restraint with those issues that affect our respective security interests.

In the numerous negotiations in which, I am pleased to say, our two countries are now engaged in various forums, my premise has been that both of us will approach the issues concretely and in a spirit of mutual accommodation. We do, of course, confront many divergences, some due to misunderstanding or inadequate communication but many the result of differing needs and interests.

It is clear that in relations between great powers such clashes of interest will not be resolved by superficial formulae nor by attempts to obtain a unilateral advantage.

Experience has clearly shown that unless a genuine effort is made to resolve conflicting views and interests to the satisfaction of each

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3 No classification marking. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of the letter to Kissinger on August 3. In an attached note to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Could you let me know if you would like me to do any additional work on it in the next day since I am planning to take my family to the beach for a week on Thursday [August 5] morning.” Kissinger and Haig revised the text; two substantive additions are noted below. For his memoir account, see Kissinger, White House Years, p. 837.

4 See Document 302.

5 Kissinger inserted this sentence.
party, there will either be no agreement or any agreement reached will not last and may indeed lead to new misunderstandings and tensions. No power, and certainly not a great power, can be expected to abide by arrangements that operate to its disadvantage.

It follows from this approach that it is futile to expect powerful nations to be swayed by pressure, exerted either directly, or indirectly, through third parties. I wish to emphasize this point in order to avoid any misinterpretation of my Administration’s efforts over the past two and a half years to normalize and improve relations with a number of countries. Thus, the several steps which I have already taken toward better contacts with the People’s Republic of China and, in particular, my forthcoming visit to Peking have no hidden motives. They are designed to end the hostility that has unfortunately existed between the United States and the mainland of China for over twenty years and to lay the basis for relations which will be mutually beneficial and contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. Such a relationship between two peoples which have had a history of past friendship is not aimed at any third country, including, specifically, the Soviet Union. Indeed, I firmly believe that in restoring contacts that have been so long broken, the United States will be contributing to a wider normalization of international relationships.

United States policy with respect to the countries of Eastern Europe, an area which we recognize is historically of special concern to the Soviet Union, is likewise intended to contribute to a broad improvement of international relations, to widen contacts and to stimulate mutually beneficial cooperation in practical matters. In shaping our policies toward these and other countries, we raise no conditions concerning the internal order or the foreign associations of the countries concerned; the only test is whether there is a mutual readiness for good relations on a basis of reciprocity. Friendship with the United States, in my view, does not imply hostility toward any other country.

Mr. Secretary, as you are aware, I have maintained a close personal interest in the developing relations between our two countries and particularly in the major negotiations in which both our governments have been involved. I have noted with satisfaction that a businesslike manner, constructive tone and spirit of compromise have been manifest in these negotiations. As Mr. Kissinger has already explained to Ambassador Dobrynin, I have felt there has at times been excessive emphasis on shorter term tactical considerations to the detriment of longer term objectives. Precision about details is, of course, important in any agreement if it is to be viable. But I believe we should never lose sight of the goals to be achieved. American negotiators, acting under my in-
structions, will continue to be guided by this general approach and will not engage in bargaining simply for its own sake.\(^6\)

The agreement announced on May 20 represented a commitment at the highest levels of the political leadership of both our countries to achieve a successful outcome in the negotiations for the limitation of strategic armaments. My representatives in Helsinki are under instructions to complete an early equitable agreement on ABM's as well as a parallel agreement on certain measures with regard to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. We will then have a basis for a more complete limitation of offensive weapons. The final result will strengthen security, permit valuable resources and talents to be used for constructive purposes and, together with progress in the resolution of other differences, contribute to a stable and peaceful world. As the two countries possessing the most powerful arsenals of destructive weapons, we have, I believe, a unique obligation and a unique opportunity to achieve these goals.

I am likewise confident that a successful outcome can be achieved in the negotiations on Berlin in which our two countries are joined by Britain and France. I have always believed that constructive cooperation in Europe and world peace generally will be difficult if not impossible to obtain if Berlin remains a source of tension and crises. Peace will not, of course, be automatic once a satisfactory Berlin agreement is reached; but at least one major threat to it will have been set aside. A foundation will have been laid for removing other long-standing sources of strife and tension in the center of Europe. In this connection, my Administration has welcomed the improvement in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and its eastern neighbors, including the Soviet Union. I am convinced, and hope you share this conviction, that a successful completion of the Berlin negotiations will further accelerate this trend and strengthen peace between East and West in Europe.

I also remain deeply committed to the search for a lasting settlement of the crisis in the Middle East. This will be achieved only if all the parties to the conflict there are confident that their vital interests are safeguarded. The task is complex and requires patience. As great powers we have a special responsibility not to undertake any action that would complicate the situation. The United States seeks no unilateral advantages or special position. We believe that this should be the attitude of all outside powers.

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\(^6\) Haig inserted the second half of this paragraph, i.e., the passage on what Kissinger had “already explained” to Dobrynin.
In assessing the issues which affect the constructive evolution of our relations, one should not overlook the complications posed by the continuation of the conflict in Southeast Asia. As long as the war persists, it inevitably introduces distortion into the policies of some key countries beyond the basic principles outlined in this letter. As Dr. Kissinger has explained to Ambassador Dobrynin, we have made an eminently fair proposal for bringing an end to that conflict on a basis just to all sides. I would hope that the Soviet Union would exercise its influence to achieve peace in that area of the world. Such an action would give a great impetus to the policies of reconciliation we intend to pursue.

Without reviewing in detail the other issues on which our Governments are in contact, I wish merely to state my expectation that our two countries can make steady progress in improving bilateral relations and in expanding the numerous areas of practical cooperation—such as trade or the exploration of outer space—where our interests run in parallel, where each of us can learn and benefit from the accomplishments of the other and where resources and experience can be shared.

I do not minimize the problems that remain and will persist between us. Differences in social and political systems, in historical background and in geographic position will not disappear. But I believe that if our two countries conduct themselves with restraint and display understanding and tolerance of our respective interests, we of this generation will be able to pass on to our children a better and safer world.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

310. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


[Omitted here is discussion of a Swedish newspaper report that North Vietnam would release 183 American prisoners of war, and of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking. According to a typed note, the tape of the conversation was “brought in” for transcription on August 5. Although the transcript is otherwise undated, the conversation clearly took
domestic politics following the announcement of Nixon’s upcoming trip to China.]

[P:] You know, I’m very curious though what our Russian friends will be up to. You say Dobrynin says they were having a meeting this week, huh?

K: That’s right. Actually from our point of view it’s a little early for them to be coming through.

P: Well, I don’t think they will. They might, they might.

K: I think they will, Mr. President. They are really sucking around. Now, I have that letter for your signature tomorrow to Brezhnev.²

P: Good.

K: And he is really panting for it. We’re not saying anything in it that we haven’t said before.

P: Good.

K: But what he can do is wave it to his colleagues as a direct line to you.

P: Good. I tell you I think this line that we’re now adopting and we’re talking to anybody, you know. Except that son-of-a-bitch, Castro, that’s one I draw the line on. Understand now, don’t let State—sort of apply the line well, if we have broken with China, why not with Castro. That’s a very different situation.

K: Right, absolutely.

P: All right. But except for that, we talk to anybody.

K: But I think the way to play it strategically, Mr. President, is if we are going to Moscow after Peking, it puts the heat on Peking for them to behave themselves because they don’t know what we are going to do in Moscow.

P: That’s right.

K: If we have been in Moscow, Peking gets its last shot at us.

P: Yep.

K: And on the other hand, we have enough business with Moscow that they won’t do a hell of a lot to us.

P: I see no reason, incidentally, why the Moscow visit could not come very soon after the other.

K: No.

—

place after Nixon’s trip to New York on August 4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon returned to Washington at 12:15 a.m. on August 5 and called Kissinger at 12:26; the two men talked until 12:52. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² See Document 309.
P: What I mean is if your Peking thing can’t get on—I mean I don’t know that it will be but if it isn’t. But the Moscow one, I would prefer basically, as we’ve talked before, just if it ever—the best time for Moscow is about the 15th of May.

K: I think that’s absolutely right, Mr. President.

P: It’s about the right time and so forth and so on. The best time for Peking is actually I think the middle of February if we could make it.

K: That’s right. I think we can make that.

P: The Lincoln Day period and all the rest is a good time for us to go.

K: I think we can make that. Connally thinks, Mr. President, that we should put it not before March 1st. Anytime from March 1st on but he puts it purely politically.

P: It’s closer to the election.

K: No, he figures if you have a good domestic program, that’s going to carry you through February.

P: He’s correct, yeah.

K: And with the trip to Peking coming up, they are going to be like lambs anyway. And right after they reconvene so why shoot that wad too early in February?

P: Uh-humm. Well, that would be all right. March isn’t bad.

K: No, March—well, from climate which is not bad, we could do it. And, of course, they will all be running around New Hampshire.

P: Yeah, that’d be nice. They might be there for the time of the primary if we can work it. I am not among those—I mean, I’m like you, that they think that they’re just in a fit of pique say, “Well, no, we are going to knock this thing out.”

K: No, too big a thing for them.

P: Well, they’ve come this far, and now . . . also, we can play some games. After all, if they want to play it, then we’ll just toughen up, too.

K: But playing with Moscow is in itself a warning to them.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s upcoming meeting with Emperor Hirohito and of the administration’s policies on China and Vietnam, including handling of several press representatives.]
311. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

I saw Dobrynin at my request in order to hand him a letter from the President to Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev (attached). The letter had been triggered by a Dobrynin comment that such a gesture would be helpful. Dobrynin read the letter and said he thought it was extremely useful.

Summit

Dobrynin wondered, though, whether the absence of a reference to a Summit in the letter meant that we were no longer interested in it. I told him no, but we thought that the next move was the Soviet Union’s. Dobrynin said he could tell me in confidence that the issue was under very active consideration in Moscow and that a formal suggestion would be made within the next two weeks; he just wanted to make sure that this letter would not be misconstrued as a rejection in principle. I said no, we stood by everything that had been said previously.

Middle East

Dobrynin then asked what the reference to the talks on the Middle East in the President’s press conference of August 4 meant. I said it was just a general reference to our readiness and it had no concrete significance.

Indochina

Dobrynin then turned to Indochina. He said he had seen a report from Hanoi about my last meeting. I asked him what the impression

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Lord and Rodman submitted a draft of this memorandum and another summarizing its “highlights” for the President to Kissinger on August 9. Kissinger forwarded both to Nixon two days later. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 5:13 to 5:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 See Document 309.

3 Kissinger suggested the letter during a telephone conversation with Dobrynin on July 30. See Document 305.

4 See Document 308.

5 Reference is to Kissinger’s meeting with Le Duc Tho in Paris on July 26. See footnote 2, Document 295.
was. He said that Hanoi had told Moscow that the chief obstacle was our refusal to set a deadline and our desire to keep military advisers behind. I asked Dobrynin about the political issue. He said that Hanoi did not mention it in its last report.

Dobrynin said that his impression was that negotiations were coming very close, and within the framework of what I had said to him in January. I then told him that if Moscow really wanted to improve relations with us this presented a unique opportunity. If we were that close to a settlement, here might be an opportunity for official Soviet intervention on a delicate basis. Dobrynin said he would pass this on to Moscow.

**Summit**

Dobrynin came back to the Summit issue and said he wanted to make sure that we would be receptive to a Soviet proposal. I said yes, but it would have to be after the Peking summit and the announcement would be only after we had fixed a Moscow date.

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**312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, August 7, 1971, 1944Z.

144480. Ref: Moscow 5368. For Ambassador From Secretary.

1. Please seek an appointment with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the earliest opportunity and convey the following to him:

A. Report of your July 28 meeting was read with interest by Washington authorities, including those at the highest level. We are pleased

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Okun in EUR/SOV; cleared by Kissinger (per Jeanne Davis), Hillenbrand, and Miller (S/S); and approved by Rogers. In an August 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Hyland forwarded a draft of this telegram with the comment: “The substance of the proposed reply (Tab B) is innocuous enough. The question is whether you want this channel pursued.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XV [2 of 2]) Haig added in a separate note to Kissinger: “I know you have taken care of this through Dobrynin but I wanted to be sure that you focused carefully on the message. Certainly Beam must have some response to make in order to maintain his credibility.” (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 7, Document 302.

3 See Documents 302 and 307.
to note that the USSR intends to continue cooperating with us whenever possible. For our part, this is precisely our own attitude and we shall continue our efforts to narrow differences on points at issue between us.

B. Regarding Mr. Brezhnev’s query, you are authorized to state that the United States regards its relations with the Soviet Union as fundamental to the maintenance of world peace. The President recalls from his visit to the USSR in 1959 the desire of the Soviet peoples for good relations between our two countries and he is, of course, fully aware of the strong feelings of the American people in this regard.

C. We believe that, if American policy—towards the Soviet Union and other countries as well—is examined in depth, “zig-zags” do not appear, but rather consistency of purpose. The President’s views, for example, are known to the Soviet Government from his two reports to the Congress on foreign policy. We follow the policy line set forth there—namely, not to try and wish away our differences but, rather, to eliminate them through serious and patient negotiations wherever such negotiations offer a hope of success. That has been and will continue to be the basis of our policy towards the USSR.

D. We hope there is no doubt in anyone’s mind that it is the purpose of this Administration to improve its relations with the Soviet Union wherever possible on a basis of mutual respect and comprehension.4

Rogers

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4 In telegram 6130 from Moscow, August 23, Beam reported that he followed these instructions in a meeting with Gromyko that afternoon, delivering an informal oral statement of the U.S. response. “Gromyko appeared to be pleased at receiving statement,” Beam commented, “but confined himself to expression of thanks and a promise to see that Brezhnev was informed both about our reaction to the earlier discussion and the content of our message.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XV [1 of 2])
313. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)\(^1\)

Washington, August 9, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule, Vietnam, and China.]

Kissinger: Well, they’ve [the Chinese] been absolutely meticulous. And we’ve been meticulous. For example, I keep—every time we send a note to the Russians that concerns them—

Nixon: I know that. That’s great.

Kissinger: —I send a note to them about the content of this. And next Monday,\(^2\) when I’m going to Paris, I will now ask for a meeting with them, and I’m going to tell them about our India policy.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: Just as the Soviets are making a deal, I thought if I just give them five minutes of what you’re doing on India—

Nixon: Oh, I was—I just made a note this morning of that. I saw that Gromyko was down there talking to that damned Indian Foreign Minister.\(^3\) That little son-of-a-bitch is insufferable.

Kissinger: Well, they’ve now signed—

Haldeman: Well, they announced a deal [unclear].

Kissinger: They’ve signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.\(^4\)

Haldeman: Just announced that this morning.

Nixon: Oh, but I didn’t see that.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I didn’t see it.

Kissinger: —in which they will consult—

Haldeman: It’s not in there. It’s not in there. It was just on the radio.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 557-1. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 8:55 to 10:30 a.m.; Haldeman was also in attendance. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) August 16.

\(^3\) Swaran Singh.

Kissinger: Yes. That’s that.
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: They'll consult with each other in case of aggression—of aggression of other countries against one of the parties. And then, it’s not clear—
Nixon: Consult?
Kissinger: Well, it’s not clear whether they promised—
Nixon: I don’t think it means a hell of a lot.
Kissinger: No, it doesn’t mean a hell of a lot, Mr. President.
[Omitted here is further discussion of India.]
Kissinger: I’m going to give that Indian Ambassador unshirted hell today.5
Nixon: You want me to get him in?
Kissinger: Well, let me get the text of the—maybe one more turn of the wheel.
Nixon: I know. But the thing is, though, they used to—well, they understand, if they’re going to choose to go with the Russians, they’re choosing not to go with us. Now, goddamnit, they’ve got to know this.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Goddamnit, who’s given them a billion dollars a year?
Kissinger: But—
Nixon: Shit, the Russians aren’t giving them a billion dollars a year, Henry.
Kissinger: No. The Russians—really, one has to say, when you compare how Chou En-lai has behaved towards us—now, ideologically, they’re as hostile. And we’ve understood, they’ve done some things with North Vietnam, but they’ve always—
Nixon: Hmm.
Kissinger: —stayed well short of inflaming the situation.
[Omitted here is discussion of Pakistan, Vietnam, and China.]
Nixon: All the damn Democrat candidates think the Russians are nice guys.
Kissinger: And the Indians are—what helps us with the Chinese, vis-à-vis the Democrats, is that the Democrats are pro-Indian and pro-Russian.

5 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met the Indian Ambassador, Lakshmi Kant Jha, on August 9 from 1:15 to 2:30 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Miscellany, 1968-76) A memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 117.
Haldeman: Yeah.

Kissinger: And we are pro-Pakistani and—

Nixon: In fact, could I suggest one thing? Is there any way that you could, in your conversation [with the Chinese], or otherwise, get it across—is there some way you could plant, some way where Democrats are, Democratic people are? That kind of a story? Or do you think they obviously are going to see it anyway?

Kissinger: No, that’s why I want to see them next week. I want to tell them—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —that the Democratic Congress is putting the squeeze on Pakistan.

Nixon: Now, on the Pakistan—but I also want them to know that—

Kissinger: On Russia.

Nixon: —the Democratic candidates are pushing us on the Soviet side. I’d like to get that point: that we are—

Kissinger: I’ll get that put in.

Nixon: And also the point that I resisted great pressure to go to the Soviet first.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I think let’s get a little—let’s make a little mileage out of that. You know we’ve covered that point. We might as well get the benefit out of it, right?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: Don’t you think so?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: We were just—that the President was pressed. The Democratic—say some of his Democratic opponents are putting a lot of heat on the ground. And that’s true.

[Omitted here is discussion of U.S. domestic politics and Japan.]

Kissinger: And the Chinese are more worried about the Japs almost than about the Russians.

Nixon: They should be.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: You know, the interesting thing is here: what can we do though? What are you going to tell the Pakistan Ambassador? What the hell can you tell that son-of-a-gun? I mean, excuse me, the Indian Ambassador.

Kissinger: I’m going to tell him, “I just want you to understand one thing. If you—if there is a war in the Subcontinent, we are going to move against you, one way or the other.”
Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: “And you—your development program is down the drain. And if you want—if you think you can afford domestically to throw yourself completely into the Soviet arms, go ahead and do it.”

Nixon: That’s right. “You’re making a conscious choice.” Put it—I wanted to say this: “The President wants you to know”—tell him this, use it like this—“the President wants you to know he doesn’t want this to happen. The President is a friend of India. He wants India to succeed. He has said that and he means it. But as far as he’s concerned, however, the President wants, feels it’s his—that it’s your obligation”—tell him the President wants him to know that in the event that they decide that they go to war in the Subcontinent, and side with the Soviet, that then they have chosen. And that we have—that is their choice. But that we shall have, then have to look in other, in another direction.

Kissinger: We’ve—

Nixon: And that we shall look in the other direction. And under the circumstances, much as I will regret it, we will have to take another position—and will. And they have a fit. “The President is”—“Now, Mr. Ambassador”—you can sort of play this—you say, “Now, Mr. Ambassador, you know how I personally feel.” Give him a little bullshit about how you much love the Indians. Then say, “Now—”

Haldeman: [laughs]

Nixon: “—but I just want you to know that—”

Kissinger: If there’s a God, he’ll punish me.

Nixon: Well, then, you go on to say that, “I just want you to know that this President is—you must not underestimate him. You know, I had to—” Tell him how hard it was to restrain me on Cambodia. “You know, I tried to restrain him on Laos and China, but he will not—he is—I cannot tell you how strongly he feels on this.” Tell him, “I cannot possibly tell you, Mr. Ambassador, how far—strong he feels about the war issue. As far as helping, as far as using our influence to get a political settlement, as far as the refugees, as far as helping India, he’s totally generous. But war, no.” I’d just lay the goddamn wood to him.

[Omitted here is discussion of the National Security Council system, the Department of State, and China.]

Kissinger: And we’re giving them [the Chinese] a lot of incentives by being so meticulous.

Nixon: Actually—well, by being meticulous and also by letting them know that we’re—the best thing you’re doing is letting them know everything the Soviet tell you. I mean that’s—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: —that we’re going to deal with them against the Soviet, which is just fine.
Kissinger: That’s right. And also now what the Indians are doing.
Nixon: Yeah. Do they really hate the Indians? They must really—
Haldeman: They hate the Indians?
Kissinger: No, they despise the Indians.
Nixon: Hmm?
Kissinger: They despise the Indians.
Nixon: Do they?
Kissinger: Oh, God.
Nixon: What are we going to do about—what about the Soviet? What’s the next move there?
Kissinger: They’re coming in to us within the next 10 days with something. Actually, we’re not in a great hurry about it now.
Nixon: Yeah. But my point is: do you think there is any, that there is a reasonable chance that they may want to have some sort of a meeting?
Kissinger: I think it’s 80 percent right now.
Nixon: Even after the Chinese meeting?
Kissinger: Yeah. I told them—
Nixon: That’s when it has to come, of course.
Kissinger: I’ve told them nothing else could even be considered.
Nixon: Why would they do it then, Henry? They don’t—they, as distinguished from the Chinese. The Chinese may have mixed emotions about who will be elected. But they damn well want to beat the shit out of us, Henry.
Kissinger: Except on the Middle East.
Nixon: Yeah and that’s their hubris.
Kissinger: So—
Nixon: Do they realize on the Middle East—?
Kissinger: But also—
Nixon: Besides the public sentiment—
Kissinger: No, I’ll tell you why I think—
Nixon: —they can take Israel any day that they want to take an hors d’oeuvre.
Kissinger: Yeah, but except they’re afraid we’ll protect Israel.
Nixon: Good. And they know with Democrats in, they have to and I might not. Is that it?
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: Okay.
Kissinger: Well—but their major reason is they’re afraid of what you will do in Peking if they’re in a posture of hostility to you. So they
would like to have the visit hanging over Peking—they would like to
have—that you have the visit in the pocket—

Nixon: I see.

Kissinger: —so that you will not, so that you will be restrained in
Peking. We, in turn, want it because it’s helpful to us to have Moscow
hanging over Peking. It reinsures—

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: —the Peking visit. And, after all, when I handed your
letter to Dobrynin, I didn’t even mention the summit. He said, “Does
the fact that there’s no summit in there mean the President has lost in-
terest?” He said, “Because I can tell you, unofficially, they’re consider-
ing it now at the highest level in Moscow and there’ll be an answer.”
And he said, “The reason, I’m not”—speaking of himself—“they’re not
letting me go on vacation is because they want me to transmit that an-
twer, that proposal to you.”

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Well, either way, we shall see.

Kissinger: But—no, I think it’s going to come. And for us that
would have—then we’d be in great shape. Because if the summit is
coming up, say, in the middle of May in Moscow, we know there
won’t be a Middle East blowup before then, because they’ll sit on the
Egyptians.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: That and India are the two big problems.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And that means we’ll be through the better part of next
year, and they can’t start something up right after the summit either.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: And we can keep the two to control each other.

Nixon: That’s right.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s upcoming meeting
with Japanese Emperor Hirohito.]

Nixon: Getting back to the Russians—I mean, on the Indians, yeah,
they’re really trying to punish the Paks, but they sure as hell don’t want
a war down there.

Kissinger: No, but they are such a petty bunch of shits, if you’ll
forgive me, that they—everything the Chinese have done has been in
big style. And they make a deal with you and then they try to make
you look good. And look at how they [the Soviets] handled the SALT
thing.

6 See Document 311.
Nixon: Yeah, the Russians.
Kissinger: Grudging, mean, petty.
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: And they’re just putting—what they’re doing in India is putting enough oil on the fire to kick everybody and praying that it won’t blow up into a conflagration.
Nixon: It’s the same way they did the Middle East.
Kissinger: Exactly the way they did it in the Middle East.
Nixon: Well, I was—the June War was brought on by [the] Russians.
Kissinger: And by Russian stupidity.
Nixon: The Russians brought it on. They did.
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: They gave the Egyptians—and before the war, and until the final kind of a thing broke loose. Then, after it began, they said, “Let’s all get together and try to settle it.” But only after they knew the Egyptians were licked. Now, they played a very miserable role in that war.
Kissinger: That’s right. Absolutely. Absolutely. And what they’re doing now is, they’re getting back at the Pakistanis.
Nixon: Do you really think that’s what it’s all about?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Well, and at the Chinese.
Nixon: Okay.
Kissinger: And they’re getting to themselves some cheap shots in. And I’ll bet that when one reads the treaty—we haven’t got the text yet—that it has no formal legal obligation that means anything.
Nixon: Hmm.
Kissinger: But it’s enough to make it psychologically tough.
Nixon: We’ve got to fight like hell against—well, the Congress, thank God, is gone. So we’ve got at least three to four weeks when we don’t have to bother about India/Pakistan and that.

[Omitted here is discussion of China, U.S. domestic politics, and the Middle East.]
July 19–October 12, 1971

314. Oral Note From the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

I have received instructions from Moscow to tell you for President Nixon the following.

1. The Soviet leadership on its part also reaffirms the earlier principle agreement (understanding) with President Nixon concerning his visit to Moscow for discussion of questions of mutual interest with the aim of finding their mutually acceptable solutions.

Taking into account the wishes of the President, such visit of his could take place in May–June 1972, having in mind that a concrete date of this visit would be clarified in the nearest time and that an appropriate public announcement to that effect would be agreed upon.

A great importance is being attached in Moscow to the mutual understanding, reached in the course of the previous exchange of opinion, about the necessity of creating the most favourable conditions for preparation and carrying out of the Soviet-American summit meeting.

2. As to the remarks of President Nixon, received through Mr. Kissinger on July 15,\(^2\) about the Soviet-American relations in the light of his decision to make a trip to Peking, Moscow proceeds from the premises that the President is well aware of the importance which the Soviet leadership has attached to the questions of relationship between our two nations in view of their real position in the world.

This, of course, should not hinder the maintenance by each of our countries of normal relations with any other state. To the contrary, we have been always standing on the position that the existence of normal relations among all states would be in the best of interests of world peace and international security.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. No classification marking. A handwritten note on another copy indicates that Dobrynin gave Kissinger the note on August 10. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Apex) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Dobrynin on August 10 from 5:34 to 5:52 pm. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) In an August 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Lord and Rodman prepared background material for his meeting with Dobrynin on several issues, including: the Soviet-Indian treaty, the recent Arbatov article in Pravda on U.S. China policy, Berlin, and SALT. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [2 of 3]) No record of the conversation has been found.

\(^2\) See Document 284.
From this point of view a common normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in principle could only be welcomed.

The main thing here is on what basis the relations between the U.S. and the PRC will be built and where all this will lead to. This is apparently being realized by the President himself when he raises the question whether such his decision could lead to “an agonizing reappraisal” of our relations. The answer to this question will depend naturally on what the President is being guided by while taking such a step.

The Soviet Union in its relations with the United States, as well as with other states, is being guided by considerations of principle and not by any transitory calculations no matter how important the latter may seem from the point of view of the moment. This gives us, of course, the grounds to expect that the other side will also maintain a similar approach.

315. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)


Kissinger: They’re having three-day sessions on Berlin.²
Nixon: Who? State?
Kissinger: No, no. The four powers. And it’s—the problem is to get the French [laughs]—
Nixon: Hmm?
Kissinger: —from shutting up long enough so that the Russians can make the concessions which are already agreed to. We have a text. It’s all agreed to. But we have to go through a—
Nixon: Yeah.
Haldeman: You go through the ritual so the French will keep quiet.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: We’re going through the ritual. We have a script in which the Russians make extreme demands and then yield.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule, White House facilities, and China.]
Nixon: Henry, how much have you talked to Bob about the other thing? Did you just mention it to him?
Kissinger: I just hinted—I mentioned it to him in passing. I haven’t—
Nixon: Well, did you talk about the meeting?
Kissinger: On walk—going into the boat yesterday evening. You mean the Russian thing?
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I haven’t given him any of the details about it.
Nixon: You mean, about it—but you keep hinting to him about the possibility of a meeting?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: A summit or something of that sort?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. The reason I wanted to get you in, Bob, was to emphasize that, probably, 10 times as important as keeping the Chinese thing secret, this must be secret. Now, this means Ehrlichman. It means, obviously, Peterson. It, of course, means Scali. It, naturally, means Ziegler. But it particularly means—let me say: I don’t want you to break over—the only one that I’m sure you’d even be tempted to ever mention it to would be Ehrlichman, because he’s so—
Haldeman: I don’t mention any of these to anybody.
Nixon: I know. I know. I know. What I meant is, though—incidentally, we got to go further. It means John Mitchell.

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3 According to his Daily Diary, Nixon hosted a dinner aboard the Presidential yacht Sequoia from 6:38 to 8:55 p.m. on August 10. In addition to Kissinger and Haldeman, the guests included: John Mitchell, Billy Graham, John Ehrlichman, and Donald Rumsfeld. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) For his diary account of the evening, see Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition.
Haldeman: Right.
Nixon: It means John Connally.
Haldeman: Right.

Nixon: Naturally, if we just mention it to either of those, and you haven’t told Agnew, he gets pissed off. Now, what is involved here is that, in essence, is that the Soviet have replied—replied in a very positive, simple note. Henry’s going to meet with Dobrynin—when?

Kissinger: Next Tuesday, after I’m back from Paris.

Nixon: The purpose is to—he’s got—the purpose is to set the date. And the date of the meeting we’ve decided upon will be between May—May 20th to June 1st.

Haldeman: End of May.

Nixon: So the Soviet meeting’s set. And they’ve offered May or June, did they not?

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: So we—that would fit in perfectly then. I wouldn’t mind having it—the later in May, the better, in my opinion.

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: The date, May 25th, May 27th—something like that. It’s just—

Kissinger: My [unclear]—

Nixon: If you could even start it on May 28th and finish June 3rd or something, that would be all right. Do you understand?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Because then you have—it’s a good time. The weather’s a little better and all that crap. Now, whatever you want, but if they want it a little sooner, that’s fine. Now—

Haldeman: Do you care at all about coincidence with primaries? In other words, do you want to look at that in any of that context?

Nixon: I think it’s—that’s always irrelevant.

Haldeman: Well—

Kissinger: I think California—

Haldeman: —except for the way it’s going to be played. The California primary is clearly going to be the primary. It’s the first Tuesday in June.

Nixon: Yeah, but that’s—what day is it?

Haldeman: I don’t know. I’d have to look—get it now.

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4 Document 314.
5 August 17.
Nixon: Yeah. Well, do you think we’ll run right into it?
Haldeman: Oh, that’s the thing. Whether you want it—we ought to at least consider whether you want to run into it or whether—
Nixon: Or not. These are bigger than China in March now—bigger, Henry. They’re earlier in March.
Kissinger: Yeah. First—
Haldeman: June 6th.6
Nixon: Well, that’s fine.
Kissinger: I think—
Nixon: No, no that’s too late.
Kissinger: I think it’s a mistake, Mr. President. When we’ve told the Chinese we—the Chinese, after all, first asked us for—
Nixon: It must be in May. All right, fine. We’ve got to have it in May. So we’ll work it out in May. And the other one, you figure March for—
Kissinger: I thought any time in the first 10 days of March.
Haldeman: Then you got the other—the other big primaries will be next year in Florida and Wisconsin, which are [in] March and April.
Nixon: Well, you said we were heading in there in April.
Haldeman: Afterward.
Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: Well, if you go from around—
Nixon: March?
Kissinger: If you go in the first week of March to Peking, that runs into the campaigning in New Hampshire.
Nixon: Well, the campaigning in New Hampshire itself is really all February and part of March. But we can’t say that we’re not going to go anywhere until April.
Kissinger: No, no. That’s good. I mean, it blankets the—if the trip—
Haldeman: Yeah, but there’s some advantage to not blanketing the Democratic campaign for one thing.
Nixon: Well—
Haldeman: There’s also the question of whether you get charged with the cheap shot of trying to blanket it by taking your trip.
Nixon: No, we should not take it—no, I’ve deliberately worked it out so we would not take either one on the day of a primary.
Haldeman: Right.

6 The date of the California primary in 1972.
Kissinger: Now, what date should I give the Chinese? This is im-
portant because—
Nixon: When is the date of the primary? 14th? 7
Kissinger: Oh, I'm sorry.
Haldeman: It's another [unclear]—
Kissinger: Because, now, we have to play it differently. The origi-
nal idea was not to give them a date until I'd been in Peking—to have
that hanging over their heads. But now that we've got to make the an-
nouncement with the Russians in September—
Haldeman: You have to announce Russia in September?
Kissinger: Well, my worry is this: if we tell the Russians we agree
now, but we'll announce it in December, which was the original game
plan—
Nixon: No, no—
Kissinger: —and then I go to Peking before—
Nixon: Well, yeah.
Kissinger: —it will look like a transparent slap in the face.
Haldeman: Yeah.
Kissinger: That we're running—
Nixon: But when you got something, use it.
Haldeman: On television, the Chinese—
Nixon: When you got something, use it.
Kissinger: So the way to handle the Chinese is to do it—if you
agree, Mr. President, what I thought I would do on Monday is say this:
we're willing to set the date, whichever we agree on here—
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: —and give it to them. But we'd like to announce it only
after I've been to Peking.
Nixon: Don't you think that we should give them a choice?
Kissinger: Yeah, I'd give them a range of days.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Then, secondly, I'd say, "Now, you remember I told the
Prime Minister—"

7 The New Hampshire primary was scheduled for March 7; the Florida primary
for March 14.
Nixon: “I told you it should go in order—the President’s the very first to come.”

Kissinger: Yeah. I told him, and I’ll tell them that I’ve—
Nixon: For maybe four days?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: For talking, we need a week in China.
Kissinger: I think you’ll need four days in Peking. And then—
Nixon: To talk.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Yeah, I’d say a week. That we’re—a week to one—
Kissinger: And I think if they, for example—
Nixon: The translation problems. You see, the visits to both Russia and China take twice as much time to accomplish—first of all, there’s more to talk about. Second, they take twice as much time because of the enormous translation problem.

Kissinger: And you don’t want to put yourself through what I did.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: It was necessary in my case, but it’s too dangerous for a President to be talking—
Haldeman: Going all night.
Kissinger: —10 hours a day. I mean, because if you make a slip—
Haldeman: Except that’s the way they do these things.
Nixon: Well, but—
Kissinger: Well, but—
Haldeman: Well, the point is that the Chinese—
Nixon: Yeah, we’ll see.
Kissinger: But we can break that up.
Nixon: But we won’t—it will be better, better handled than that.

Kissinger: At any rate, what I would propose to tell them, Mr. President, is—give them this date. We’ll set the time for my trip to Peking. But, I’ll remind them of the fact that I told Chou En-lai, and you said in your press conference, that whenever a negotiation reaches a certain point—that we had already accepted before I had been there—that, under those conditions, we’d go to Moscow.

Nixon: Yeah.

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8 See Document 308.
Kissinger: Now, it looks as if Berlin is coming to a point. Thank God, it is.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And I can’t tell them [the Chinese] yet whether it will or will not. But, if it does, if they then extend the invitation, we can’t refuse it, except that we will do it two or three months after we’ve been there, and we’ll give them a week’s warning——

Nixon: But we will have—we will announce it, but we—our trip will be three months after their trip.

Kissinger: Right. But I won’t tell them, yet, that it’s set. I’ll tell them we’ll let them know five days or a week ahead of time if we do announce it. I don’t think it—I want give them a full week.

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: Besides, I’ve got to tell them you’re going to see the Emperor of Japan, too, which they won’t like.

Nixon: Yeah. Just a courtesy. They’ll understand that.

[Omitted here is discussion of the crisis in South Asia and of the President’s schedule, including plans for his trips to China and the Soviet Union.]

Nixon: Well, let’s come back to the other point, as far as the meeting, and what we do is concerned: we now are going to have an announcement of a Russian summit in September. Right, Henry?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Without question.

Kissinger: No question.

Nixon: And in September—well, that’s when you will announce your October, your trip to China? How is that coming?

Kissinger: Well, around September 30th, we’ll announce the trip to China.

Nixon: You’ll announce the Russian summit before you announce your trip to China?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: You think so?

Haldeman: Mid-September?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Is that the best strategy here?

Kissinger: Well, the best strategy—yeah, because I don’t want the Russians to think that we just sneaked in another visit to China.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: I think I can handle the Chinese, because the record of the meeting should show, and your press conference makes clear, that
if there is an agreement—I told Chou En-lai—Chou En-lai said, “Why don’t you go to Russia first?” I said, “Because it’s a different problem. There would have to be some concrete achievements.”

Nixon: Hm-hmm. Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: “With you we have a philosophical problem and set the direction.” And I said, “It may come first; it may not.” Then he—then I said to him—the only thing we’ve told them is we would not go to Russia first. We’ll go to Peking first. We sent them a communication. We didn’t tell them we won’t announce it. So what I think I ought to do is to tell their Ambassador in Paris on Monday—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: —that I don’t know anything specific, but as negotiations develop and succeed—we will be in no position then to refuse the invitation, but we can put it after Peking, and we intend to put it after Peking.

Nixon: “The President has directed that—”

Kissinger: That it be put after Peking.

Nixon: That’s fine. That—

Kissinger: And, if there is an announcement, we will let them know five or six days ahead of time. There is nothing now—I’ll lie to them.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Well, it will be true. There won’t be anything contemplated at that moment, because I will not speak to Dobrynin until after I get back from Paris.

Nixon: Right. Right.

Kissinger: So the only part of the game plan it changes is that, instead of holding the Peking date, we’ll agree on that now—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —but not announce it until I come back.

Nixon: You know, an amusing thing I noticed in an AP dispatch, a dispatch by Gwertzman in the New York Times,9 and so forth: those farts are really—whatever you call them—[they’re] upset.

Kissinger: [laughs] Yes, they—

Nixon: They brood about our problems with the Russians—

9 In a special piece for the New York Times—not a dispatch for the Associated Press—Bernard Gwertzman summarized an “authoritative article” (see footnote 10 below) on the Soviet reaction to the recent rapprochement between Washington and Beijing. “It is assumed that the lengthy treatment given the question in the Soviet Union,” Gwertzman concluded, “reflects Moscow’s concern over the turn in Chinese-American relations.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Moscow Hopeful Nixon Won’t Drop Soviet Problems,” New York Times, August 11, 1971, pp. 1–2)
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: —and the Russians are mad. And they are—
Haldeman: Oh, the Russians put it in—Pravda’s put out a thing that they’re mad. They say that, that deeds—
Kissinger: Well, it’s one of these—if you read it carefully, it’s one of these bleating things—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —saying, “I hope you behave yourselves in China.”
Haldeman: Yeah.
Nixon: But, on the other hand, our press has signed onto that just beautifully.
Kissinger: I mean, I read the note to the President last night from the Russians. It’s the warmest, most—
Haldeman: Really?
Kissinger: —sucking-around note—
Haldeman: [laughs]
Kissinger: Don’t you think, Mr. President, that—?
Nixon: No question.
Kissinger: The tremendous importance they attach to good relations. The date should be fixed at the earliest time.
Nixon: “We [Soviet Union] welcome our [United States’] going to China.”
Kissinger: Yeah. [laughs]
Haldeman: Really? They said they welcome your going to China?
Nixon: Oh, sure.
Kissinger: They did it in the guise of answering this note, which we sent them the night that the President made the announcement.
Haldeman: [laughs]
Kissinger: The President directed—

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10 On August 10, Pravda published Arbatov’s assessment of the announcement of Nixon’s trip to China. “It is quite natural that in the Soviet Union, as in other countries,” Arbatov commented, “these deeds and the development of events will be followed with great attention.” For an English translation of the complete text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 32 (September 7, 1971), pp. 1–4. Arbatov described the background behind the article in his memoirs: “I was very worried about our confusion and groundless fears; they could have harmed our policies and our interests. I then took the somewhat unusual step of requesting an opportunity to publish an article in Pravda about the forthcoming Sino-American meeting. Even though it would appear under my byline, I understood it would be regarded as representing an official point of view.” (Arbatov, The System, p. 181)

11 See Document 284.
Haldeman: Yeah, the announcement—

Kissinger: —I give them a little note, where I said, “We are prepared for an agonizing reappraisal.” They, in effect, said that won’t be necessary.

Haldeman: No, I mean you—

Nixon: Playing that hard game was right. You know, we—

Kissinger: Oh, God.

Nixon: Remember, we figured that language out, et cetera.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Right. I thought we might—you see, the “agonizing reappraisal” will remind them of [John Foster] Dulles, too.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Nixon: There’s a tough son-of-a-bitch sitting around here. And that’s—

Kissinger: But again, the fact is, if you had all the experts—

Nixon: Tough.

Kissinger: —would have said, “You do this, and they’ll”—

Nixon: Oh—

Kissinger: You remember Thompson?¹²

Nixon: Oh, well, God, even State wanted to inform them how we’re going to keep the Russians from going overboard. And I said we will handle it.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: We handled the Russians, and we handled the—

Kissinger: The Indians—

Haldeman: Well, your thought is that you’d announce Russia in mid-September.

Kissinger: 15th or 22nd. I don’t know what your preference is.

Nixon: 15th.

Kissinger: Well, it—may I suggest: it depends a little bit on what comes on Monday.

Nixon: Oh, everything depends on whether anything comes with the Vietnam thing.

Kissinger: Because the Vietnam thing will be settled either by September 10th—

Nixon: Or not. All right.

Kissinger: —or after November 1st.

¹² See Document 174.
Nixon: Yeah. You just let them know that. All right.
Kissinger: Oh—
Nixon: I understand.
Kissinger: —with all of this, Mr. President, it’s got to be settled. There’s no way that Hanoi—we’re taking Hanoi off the front page now.
Haldeman: Pretty well knocked them—
Kissinger: If we do nothing else till November, what are they going to do?
Haldeman: Then when—you would announce your China trip on September 30th?
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Give or take a few—
Haldeman: After Hirohito.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Yeah.
Haldeman: Then you’d go in the middle of October? We’re down to New Year—
Kissinger: Go around October 15th.
[Omitted here is further discussion of the President’s schedule.]
Nixon: Tell him [Dobrynin] the President, who, looking at principle—we’re all set on it but that we—but it’s very important not to talk to any other people in the bureaucracy until you talk to him personally. That I’m working on my schedule at the present time. “As you know, he’s trying to—we’ve got to work it out so doesn’t appear to be political,” and all that crap. Okay? They’re always looking to—
Kissinger: Okay.
Haldeman: And then—
Nixon: I don’t want him to raise it with the State Department.
Kissinger: Oh, no. That he knows. But his minions may do it.
Nixon: Well, they talk. You know—I mean, I don’t want him to—not that handling Rogers on this should be any difficulty. Should it?
Kissinger: No.
Nixon: We’ll see.
Kissinger: But I’d wait until we’ve got it all set and tell him—
Nixon: I know. I know.
Kissinger: —a week before.
Nixon: Well, I know. I’ll tell him a week before. But I think that the thing, the important thing here, is that there’s no problem due to the fact that the summit thing—hell, he was here when we discussed it before. We just say that he got a message, and when, and that he [Do-
brynin] brought it in here, and we worked, I worked—I agreed on this date. Period.

   Kissinger: That’s right. That’s not hard.
   Nixon: That’s that. But I don’t want him [Rogers] to go—
   Kissinger: Well, he doesn’t really give a damn as long as—
   Nixon: But he’s going to be going—
   Kissinger: He doesn’t give a damn.
   Nixon: —or else he’ll be insulted.
   Kissinger: As long as he gets the credit—as long as I don’t get the credit, he’s happy.
   Nixon: Well, that’s all right.
   Kissinger: And, on this one, I’m not involved at all directly. So, I mean—
   Nixon: He will know. [unclear]
   Kissinger: He’ll know, but, I mean, the public doesn’t. It’s fine with me. I don’t want any credit out of it. I just want to make sure that the credit goes in here.
   Nixon: I know.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s foreign policy, China, and the Department of State.]

   Nixon: Put yourself in the position they are in. Bill and his people over there, naturally, are proud men, and they’re intelligent men, and the rest. They do like to think they run foreign policy. They don’t, and they’re just finally learning it. Because in every major decision, they have either been against it or don’t know about it. They didn’t do SALT. They didn’t do Cambodia and Laos. And they were very glad not to do it. They had no influence on our whole—they peed, you know, on all of our programs. Take the Jordan thing. Christ, they didn’t do anything but screw that one up.
   Kissinger: And then there’s Cienfuegos, for which we’ve never gotten any credit.
   Nixon: As a matter of fact—as a matter of fact—Cienfuegos? Christ, did they do anything about it? Hell no.
   Kissinger: They fought like hell.
   Nixon: We have played a very goddamn tough, skillful game here. It’ll come out sometime. And I don’t mind Bill now and then getting a little of this. But, Bob, we’re not going to let State put out any line that they pushed me into something. Now that would be a very bad thing—
   Haldeman: Yeah.
   Nixon: —to be in the press. Do you agree, Henry?
Kissinger: Oh, yes, and that's what the liberals would like. They need some guy who made you do these things.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: We've avoided this on China. There's no one—that hasn't been written at all.
Nixon: Well, this is being said. It will be—
Kissinger: Yeah, but it hasn't happened yet. And I think this one ought to be positioned as your initiative—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —growing out of—
Nixon: Well, Henry, I can understand—
Kissinger: I can background it—
Nixon: But let me say that I—you can do the backgrounder as you should, but, in a very curious way, even though it is, on reflection, a little embarrassing at the moment, I backgrounded it a bit when I mentioned that we discussed the matter with Gromyko.
Kissinger: Hmm.
Nixon: They know damn well—
Kissinger: But I thought we could tie it back to—
Nixon: And did you know—and we remembered too late—the day we were across the street, and we talked about it a little and so forth, that day we had a long discussion and we decided then that there should be one in principle?
Kissinger: That's right. That's why we ought to hold the announcement tight. Once it's made, we can background it the way we backgrounded the China thing.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: Tying it back to your moves over two years.
Nixon: That's right.
Kissinger: And I think we can get the same sort of stories again. Not as dramatic, because—but still enough people will write it.
Nixon: Well, but I think when you play down the dramatic, we may be thinking a little too small here. I knew the China thing would be big because of the land of mystery. But the reason this is dramatic is that a trip [to the Soviet Union] would not have occurred to unsophisticated people. The reason this is dramatic is that so many, though, of the smart people have said, “The China thing makes the Russians mad.”
Kissinger: Of course, the—
Nixon: “Now, the Russians, we have a terrible problem in our foreign policy.” Here we kick the Russians in the teeth—and they invite
us. So it shows enormous hope on the big problems. Now, I don’t think the Russian—I mean, the Russian thing is going to be one hell of a story.

Kissinger: Well, you’re changing the whole approach to foreign policy, because all the wise guys, the people who told you, “ABM will kill SALT”—that’s been proved wrong. “Go to Peking, it will drive the Russians crazy.” That’s been proved wrong. “If you play it tough in Jordan, there will be a war.” The opposite was true. It ended the war.

Nixon: Well, they’re—

Kissinger: No, I think the record in foreign policy next year is going to be—

Nixon: Well, hold on. One more. We’ve got two out of three now.

Kissinger: I—

Nixon: And we always said there were three. The two is pretty good.

Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, if I were in Hanoi now, this is not a brilliant position for them. They’ve got their—I don’t think either Brezhnev or Mao wants them to screw it all up.

Haldeman: Will they give you a signal on that before you go over this week, do you think?

Kissinger: No.

Haldeman: Will the Russians signal what—not on the trip, but on what their position ought to be?

Kissinger: No, they may wait till November. But, in my view, they’ll accept it either now or—by next spring, I think we’ll be—we’ll have to meet before we go on these trips.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Vietnam and Kissinger’s schedule.]
316. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 16, 1971, 9:05–10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Chen, PRC Ambassador to France
Tsao Kuei Sheng, First Secretary of PRC Embassy
Wei Tung, Secretary to the PRC Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General Vernon Walters, Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Paris
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Ambassador Huang: You arrived last night?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.2

Ambassador Huang: You had a good rest?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I have come to France secretly eleven times by five different methods. I am going to write a detective story when I am through.

Ambassador Huang: You have very intelligent methods.

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s upcoming trip to China and of a recent interview with Huang Hua, Chinese Ambassador to Canada, published by Tad Szulc in the New York Times.]

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted, in line with my conversation with Prime Minister Chou En-lai, to inform you about some new developments in our relations with the Soviet Union. You can be sure that we will be meticulous about keeping you informed. The Prime Minister will remember that I spoke to him about negotiations going on at that time with the Soviet Union, concerning attempts to try to lessen the dangers of accidental nuclear war. It now seems probable that within the next two weeks we will complete/initia a draft text of an agreement on this question.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the President’s Files, China Trip/Vietnam, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the PRC Embassy. Drafted by Lord on August 19. In a covering memorandum to Kissinger, Lord noted: “The President has already read your memorandum summarizing this session.” Kissinger approved the memorandum of conversation “for the files” on August 28. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Document 17. An August 16 memorandum from Kissinger to the President describing his meeting with Huang Chen is printed ibid., volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 155.

2 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger left the White House at 11:22 a.m. on August 14. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
The Peoples Republic of China is the first country we are informing of this. We will talk to other countries and our allies, including France, later this week. I would like to give you, Mr. Ambassador, for the government of the Peoples Republic of China the general provisions of this agreement. They are as follows:

—Each side, that is to say the Soviet Union and the U.S., will improve its organizational and technical procedures to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear arms under its control.

—Second, each party will notify the other immediately in the event of an accidental or unauthorized incident regarding accidental detonation of nuclear weapons which could risk the outbreak of nuclear war.

—The parties will notify each other immediately in the event of detecting unidentified objects if such occurrences could create the risk of nuclear war between the two countries.

—Each party will notify the other in advance of any missile launches which will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other party.

—In other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents each party will act so as to lessen the chance of misinterpretation by the other party.

These are the principal provisions, and I want to add a few additional items of information for the Prime Minister and for the Government.

The Soviet Union is attempting to get us to agree to make the agreement applicable to other countries also. For example, they have asked to include a clause inviting other countries to participate in the agreement. Secondly, they have asked us to include a clause in which we and the Soviet Union have an obligation to report about events in other countries similar to events occurring between the two countries which must be reported in this agreement. In other words, we have to report about you and the French.

We have refused both of these proposals. We cannot prevent the Soviet Union’s making unilateral declarations to that effect, but we shall under no circumstances associate ourselves with it. We will make agreements with the Soviet Union only on subjects of direct concern to our two countries, i.e., the Soviet Union and ourselves.3

As I told your Prime Minister, we are prepared to sign a similar agreement, on a bilateral basis, with the Peoples Republic of China, but we shall not propose it publicly, and we shall leave the initiative to the Prime Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: I have a few other things to talk about. The reason I go so fast is because I have another meeting later about which you might hear later. (Ambassador Huang laughs.) I think the Ambassador is better informed about my activities than anyone else, certainly better than our Ambassador.

As I told the Prime Minister when I was in Peking, there is a possibility, a probability, that there will be an agreement between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States about access procedures for Berlin. This is a highly technical negotiation which has no direct implications for the Peoples Republic of China, but if you want I will, through General Walters, let you know the general provisions. This leads to a final point—I would be glad to answer any questions now if you wish on Berlin.

Ambassador Huang: I have listened with great attention to what Dr. Kissinger has said and will transmit it to our Government.

Dr. Kissinger: This leads me to another point which I’ve already discussed with Prime Minister Chou En-lai when I was in Peking. As you remember, Prime Minister Chou En-lai said that the Peoples Republic of China would welcome a meeting between the Soviet and American leaders and asked my views on that subject. I told Prime Minister Chou that, prior to my coming to Peking, we had told the Soviet leaders that after we made some specific progress in negotiations we would be disposed to have a meeting with them. I said that we had told this to the Soviets before going to Peking, and I told Prime Minister Chou when I was there.

I am certain that they will now propose a meeting to us. I want to inform you that we will not have a meeting with the Soviet leaders before we have a meeting with the Chinese leaders. I have already informed you about that. We may announce the meeting before going to Peking, but that meeting will not take place before a meeting with the Chinese leaders. If we announce the meeting, we will give you a week’s advance warning before the public announcement. It is not yet certain, but it is very possible.

Now let me make a general observation. Since my visit to Peking it is the obvious Soviet strategy to give the impression that they can outmaneuver the Peoples Republic of China by seeming to come much closer to us because they can offer us much more. We understand this strategy. We made a fundamental decision before we visited Peking to put our relations with the Peoples Republic of China on a new basis. We are not affected by these maneuvers. I am prepared to discuss our relations with the Soviet Union fully and openly with the Prime Minister when I am in Peking, and in the meantime I will inform him through you. (Ambassador Huang nods.)

Ambassador Huang: That means that during your next visit to Peking you will discuss this with Prime Minister Chou and keep informing him through me in the meantime?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. That is we will make sure that you will confront no surprises. On any actions that we take that we believe affect your interest, we will want to know your views.  

[Omitted here is discussion of an upcoming meeting between the President and the Japanese Emperor, the situation in South Asia, and arrangements for Kissinger’s trip to China in October.]

5 After his return to Washington, Kissinger briefed Nixon by telephone on his trip to Paris. The two men also discussed their plans to announce a summit with the Soviets: “P: What are you going to tell Dobrynin tomorrow? K: I am going to tell him that we accept for May 22nd and want to announce it on September 15th. I have a draft announcement, which I will show you tomorrow. P: I think that would be very good. And that is a good time to tell him too.” Nixon added: “It will be interesting to see Dobrynin’s reaction tomorrow. Of course, he won’t be able to speak for the government but his reaction will have some influence on them. Say, ‘Now, look, we want to nail it down, we don’t want any crap around now. September 15th and that’s that.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File)

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The meeting took place so that I could give Dobrynin the answer to the Soviet invitation to a summit in Moscow.2

Dobrynin opened the conversation by speaking about the new economic policies announced by the President on Sunday evening.3 He said it was the second jolt we had given to Japan. I said “Well, maybe this gives you an opportunity.” He said “No, this gives China an opportunity.” The real danger to the world was a combination of China and Japan, and he wondered whether we took that sufficiently into account. I said that the total effect of our policies might be healthy. Dobrynin was noncommittal.

Summit

We then turned to the business at hand. I gave him the date of May 22 for the summit and September 16 or 15 for the announcement.4

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The luncheon meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 1:10 to 3:04 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Lord submitted a draft of this memorandum and another summarizing the “highlights” for the President to Kissinger on August 21. Kissinger forwarded both to Nixon on August 24. By then, Nixon and Kissinger were both in San Clemente for a two-week working vacation. According to an attached note from Butterfield that afternoon: “The President only glanced at the top page of this memo—then said he’d like it held—that he didn’t want to get into the matter now, but that he might call for the information later . . . depending upon developments’. ” Haig initialed the note and wrote in the margin: “WOW!”

2 See Document 314.

3 On August 13, the President retreated to Camp David for the weekend to discuss economic policy with a small group of advisers, including high-level officials at the Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget, but excluding representatives from either the Department of State or the National Security Council staff. During a televised address on August 15, Nixon announced his New Economic Policy, which included wage and price controls, a 10 percent surcharge on imports, a 10 percent reduction in foreign assistance, and suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold. For the text of the speech, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 886–890. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 168.

4 Kissinger also gave Dobrynin the following attached text of a proposed summit announcement: “The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in their exchanges
Dobrynin said that the announcement sounded good to him and that the date would have to be confirmed in Moscow; however, he saw no difficulty. He asked why we picked that particular date. I replied that the primary reason was that the President would be in San Clemente and would not be back in Washington until September 7 and that therefore it was important for him to have a week of preparing allies and telling the bureaucracy. Dobrynin said if we told the bureaucracy it would leak. I said that nothing that we have handled in the White House has ever leaked and this would not either. Dobrynin said that he would have an answer for us very soon.

**Berlin**

Dobrynin then pulled out a slip of paper and discussed the Berlin issue. He said he had received instructions to get in touch with me immediately on the basis of a cable he had received that Falin had sent to Moscow. Apparently Rush had said that he was bound by Presidential instructions\(^5\) to deviate from the agreements already reached. Dobrynin said that it was making a very bad impression, if an agreement reached by the highest authorities was overthrown again later by the bureaucracy. I explained to Dobrynin that our problem was as follows: Neither our bureaucracy nor our allies knew of the agreement. Therefore we had to go through a procedure of negotiations. Sometimes the formulations might have to be altered. I wanted him to know, however, that if there were a deadlock we would break it in favor of the agreed position, unless overwhelming difficulties arose. I read to him the telegram from Rush speaking of Abrasimov’s rough tactics towards the British Ambassador which certainly didn’t help matters.\(^6\) Dobrynin said that speaking confidentially the Soviet Ambassadors in Eastern Europe were not used to diplomacy. They were usually drawn from party organizations and when they met opposition they didn’t realize that they were not dealing with party subordinates. This was the trouble with Abrasimov. Falin would certainly have acted differently.

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\(^6\) Dated August 15; see ibid., Document 291.
Dobrynin then asked whether there were any difficulties in our relations with the Chinese. “Why, for example, were we delaying so long in announcing the date of our visit? I said that there were no difficulties and that the visit would be announced in due time, but that we wanted everybody to settle down for a bit first. Dobrynin reverted to his usual line that he hoped we were not engaged in an anti-Soviet maneuver. I said that events would demonstrate that this was groundless. He referred to the Alsop column that we had exchanged ideas on military dispositions. I said, “Anatoliy, do you think I would be this amateurish, and do you think that the military dispositions along the Sino-Soviet border could be of any precise concern to us?” He said he certainly hoped that this were true.

Subcontinent

We then turned the conversation to India. Dobrynin said he wanted us to be sure to understand that the Soviets were doing their best to restrain India. They wanted peace in the subcontinent. It was an ironic development where they were lined up with what looked like we had always thought was the pillar of democracy while we were lined up with the Chinese. I said as far as the subcontinent were concerned, we were not lined up with anybody. We above all wanted to prevent the outbreak of a war, and we hoped that they did not inadvertently give the Indians enough backing so that they felt it was safe to engage in war. Dobrynin said that their interest was stability, and in fact they had invited the Pakistani Foreign Secretary to come to Moscow in order to show that they were pursuing a balanced policy. I said that they should not encourage Indian pressures for an immediate political solution since that would only make the problem impossible. I stated it would be best if we worked on the refugee and relief problems first and on political accommodation later. Dobrynin said that he was certain that the Soviet Union basically agreed.

7 In his syndicated column on July 23, Alsop deduced the topics of conversation between Kissinger and Zhou in Beijing, including the “Soviet military build-up that has so profoundly affected the Chinese.” “The difference in estimates was probably discussed,” Alsop concluded, “and one may be sure that overall Soviet intentions were also discussed with even greater absorption.” (Alsop, “Chou-Kissinger Topics,” Washington Post, July 23, p. A23) Six days earlier, while still in San Clemente, Kissinger had called Alsop to arrange a date for dinner; the two men agreed to meet in the evening on July 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 10, Chronological File) No record of the conversation has been found.

8 Sultan Muhammad Khan, Pakistani Foreign Secretary, visited Moscow in early September. For his memoir account of the visit—“the most difficult situation I had faced in the 31 years of my diplomatic career”—see Khan, Memories & Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, pp. 313–336.
Dobrynin then asked me whether it was correct what the Indians had told them, namely that we would look at a Chinese attack on India as a matter of extreme gravity and might even give them some support. He said that the Indians had been puzzled by my comment but had then put it all together after my trip to Peking. I said that I never commented about meetings in other countries, but that we certainly were not aligned with any country against India. Dobrynin commented that he admired the general conduct of our foreign policy even when it was objectively directed against the Soviet Union, but he felt that our arms policy towards Pakistan escaped his understanding. We were paying a disproportionate amount for what we were shipping. I said that we never yielded to public pressure and that he knew very well that the arms we were shipping were minimal and inconsequential with respect to the strategic balance.

Dobrynin volunteered that the Soviet treaty with India was not in response to recent events but had been in preparation for a year. SALT

We then turned to SALT. Dobrynin said that whether I believed it or not the Soviet military were deeply concerned about a three site system, because they believed it provided the basis for an area defense and could be tied together. Even a two site system was in principle hard for them. He said he thought there might be a possible compromise if we accepted one site for us with a wider radius than the Moscow radius, and if this were done there might be a basis for a compromise. I avoided an answer and told him that we would study this proposition.

Dobrynin said that he was ordered to stay here until the summit issue was settled, but he was very eager to leave because he knew he had to be back on September 20.

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Nixon: Well, how’d you get along with our friend, Mr. Dobrynin?2
Kissinger: Well, they agreed to the signing date of the—
Nixon: Could he [unclear]?
Kissinger: —of accidental war. No, of accidental war.
Nixon: Oh.
Kissinger: That’s September 30th. That’s settled.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And I’ve now sent him to Bill to work it out. On the
summit, he says he’s got to go back. He looked at the draft, and he
said that looks fine to him, but he isn’t authorized to agree to it. But
he thinks there’s no problem. And, after all, they approached us. So I
don’t see that—I think that’s done.
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: I gave him the 15th or 16th of September, whichever
they prefer.
Nixon: To announce?
Kissinger: To announce.
Nixon: And the 22d of May is when to go.
Kissinger: To go then. Berlin really seems to be done. [I] just got a
message from Rush.3

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 566–14. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from 3:07 to 3:23 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
2 See Document 317.
3 In a special channel message to Kissinger on August 17, Rush reported: “A new formula developed Sunday evening [August 15] broke the impasse and averted the impending crisis. It also opened the way to complete agreement which I am sure you will find satisfactory.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) The four-power Ambassadors initialled the draft text of the Berlin agreement on August 18, pending approval from their respective governments. The initialing of the agreement came as a complete surprise to the Department of State, including Rogers, who immediately recalled Rush for consultation. For documentation on the resulting confusion in Washington—including transcripts of Kissinger’s attempts to reassure Dobrynin by telephone—see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 296 ff.
Nixon: Is he in good form?
Kissinger: Oh, he’s tremendous.
Nixon: Huh?
Kissinger: Oh, this, really—we’ll never get credit for it—but this is—
Nixon: No, Berlin—I mean Dobrynin.
Kissinger: Oh yeah, he’s in good form.
Nixon: Isn’t that nice?
Kissinger: Hmm.
Nixon: The way he is.
Kissinger: Oh, he’s [Rush] a good man.
Nixon: My God, yes. It shows you about having one of your own, doesn’t it, Henry?
Kissinger: Oh, God, that’s something in the second term, we’ve got to do. Dobrynin was very impressed by this economic move. He said, “He [Nixon] really moves in a big way when he moves.” I said, “Yes, in everything.” I said, “It’s dangerous to crowd him.”
Nixon: [laughs] That’s true.
Kissinger: And I think that’s the lesson that a lot of people are going to draw from this.
[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s new economic policy.]
Nixon: If we could get that—but you see no, you have no inkling, inclination that he [Dobrynin] isn’t, where he’s not going to come on the summit thing now.
Kissinger: Oh, that’s done.
Nixon: Yeah. He sees that it was their deal on that decision, doesn’t he?
Kissinger: Oh, that’s done.
Nixon: And what was the date that we—?
Kissinger: May 22d.
Nixon: The date of the announcement—?
Kissinger: They won’t horse around with you again, Mr. President.
Nixon: The date of the announcement is September 15th?
Kissinger: Of course, I gave him an extra day—15th or 16th. It’s a Wednesday, but I—

4 See footnote 3, Document 317.
Nixon: Did you give him another day to do it beside the 22d? Did you give him—

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: —a choice?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: Wasn’t any particular reason to. That’s a good day.

Kissinger: No. No. I told them that if they wanted to move it back a day or two we could do that. But—

Nixon: Well, if they horse around again, we won’t go. That’s my view.

Kissinger: They won’t horse around. They have the fear of God. He kept pumping me again about China.

Nixon: Did he?

Kissinger: Yeah. He said, “Why don’t you set a date with China?” I said, “Remain relaxed.” He said, “Are they making demands on you? They always make demands on us.” I said, “No, it’s a very satisfactory relationship.” And he said, “You know, we want you to know, we’re trying to restrain the Indians.” [I said,] “That’s a good thing. I don’t think you want to tie yourself to those”—he’s fishing. He said, “Did you discuss China in Peking—India in Peking?”

Nixon: [sighs]

Kissinger: I said, “Look, I won’t go into what I discussed in Peking, but we have our own fish to fry with Peking.”

Nixon: That’s good. Well, it’s a long, long time, isn’t it? What are your plans now?

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: Are you going to go to California and stay—oh, yes, you are.

Kissinger: No, no. If you agree, I’d like—I’m taking my children out tomorrow.5

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: They enjoy it so much.

Nixon: How wonderful. What is the situation on your—

Kissinger: And then I’ll go over again [to Paris] on September 13th. I don’t expect much to happen until the election. And I won’t go—

5 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger left the White House at 1:12 p.m. on August 18 to join the President in San Clemente. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
Nixon: You really think you should see them [North Vietnamese] the 13th? Well, we agreed to it, so that’s that.

Kissinger: Well—
Nixon: I guess it’s—

Kissinger: —it was a close call. The reason I, as I put it in my memo to you, I decided to go along with it was, we’ve given them eight points. If they don’t reply, then—I’ve counted two meetings without Le Duc Tho present—it’s another kick in the teeth by them. They haven’t replied to our eight points. If they attack in the meantime, we can say they attacked while they, while we had offered them eight points, and hit them. If they don’t attack, then we have got through the Vietnamese election campaign without being hit.

Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: Without a big offensive. And I have to go anyway to set up my trip and to get the details begun for yours. So for all these reasons—it’s a close decision though.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I will not go again after that one.

Nixon: Well, I wouldn’t. It seems to me that—I mean, it’s just going over there and yakking around, you know, and they go over the same ground and maybe, maybe, well, we’ll settle one little miserable point.

Kissinger: Well, it has one advantage. If we go on the 11th or the 13th—I gave them these two alternates—it has, and then we don’t settle it, which I don’t think we will, then on the 15th and 16th, they get hit with that Russian announcement.

Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: That’s going to be a real jolt to them. And then—
Nixon: But you still think the China thing’s going, Henry?
Kissinger: Oh, they’re—
Nixon: Despite the fact they haven’t agreed yet?

Kissinger: I agree with Connally. When I told Connally about the China thing, he said to me: “It will make a settlement more slow but more sure.” And he’s absolutely right. They are—I think part of their stalling is to show us that they were not pressured into it by the Chinese.

Nixon: And they can see—in other words, they will see inevitability.

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6 Reference is presumably to Kissinger’s summary memorandum to Nixon on his meeting with Xuan Thuy in Paris on August 16. See footnote 4, Document 316.
Kissinger: What they will see, Mr. President, is that their two big allies are dealing with us before the war in Vietnam has ended. Both of them have invited you to their capitals while the war is still going on. Both of them, no matter what they tell them [the North Vietnamese], have a vested interest to make sure that they don’t screw it all up, because they obviously have their own fish to fry.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: So even—and even if the Soviet Union doesn’t do anything, in bringing direct pressure, the mere fact that they are seeing you, that they’re pushing you—pushing them on page 50 again for a month or two, while people are yakking, then my trip to Peking is again—we’ve got them off the front pages, no matter what happens, until the middle of November.

Nixon: You’ll announce your trip to Peking. Did you talk to the Chinese about when you want to announce it?7

Kissinger: I asked them for their suggestions. I think probably early in October.

Nixon: Oh, just before going.

Kissinger: What do you say?

Nixon: I haven’t—

Kissinger: Anything we say, they’ll do.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: End of September?

Nixon: I’d go a little bit, I’d go—I’d like to hit the Russian—well, announce the Russian summit and then, two weeks later, announce the Chinese.

Kissinger: That would make it about September 29th.

Nixon: Yeah. September 30th.

Kissinger: Well, September 30th, we have the accidental war signing.

Nixon: Oh, I see. Well then—well, I’ve been meaning—it isn’t all that important.

Kissinger: We can announce it September 20th?

Nixon: Yeah, I’d say September 20th. Go a week—a week after the Russian thing, announce your trip to Peking.

Kissinger: All right.

7 See Document 316.
Nixon: About a week.
Kissinger: All right.
Nixon: September 25th would be a good time.
Kissinger: All right.
Nixon: A little bit later. Give the Russian thing a week to ride and then—
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: —announce your trip to Peking.
Kissinger: All right. That will—that’s actually very clever. Then on the 30th, we’ve got that Gromyko shot. I promised Gromyko—I promised Dobrynin that you would see Gromyko when he was here.
Nixon: Of course.
Kissinger: And—no, we’ll have—
Nixon: He’s got to feel—I mean, he’s got to deal. They got to deal with us for a while now.

[Omitted here is discussion of U.S. domestic politics, Vietnam, and Kissinger’s schedule.]

319. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 18, 1971.

SUBJECT
Implications of the Indo-Soviet Treaty

You are probably aware of the rather sensational report from an usually reliable Indian source, to the effect that the USSR will provide nuclear-capable bombers to India and will provide nuclear weapons

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 597, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. IV, 1 July–November 30, 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for information. Cleared by Hoskinson. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. A draft, with Sonnenfeldl and Hoskinson’s corrections, is ibid., Box 1266, Saunders Files, Subject Files, India, 7/1/71–8/31/71. Kissinger published excerpts from the memorandum in his memoirs and recalled that he agreed with its “perceptive analysis.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 767–768)
under Soviet control on Indian soil. According to the report, the USSR’s agreement to this action is part of secret section of the treaty that deals with Soviet military supplies and is still under negotiation.

At first glance this seems highly implausible. It is not the kind of documentary report which this particular source has provided in the past; rather, it is based on conversations with Indian military officers. Moreover, the willingness of the USSR to make such a commitment and station nuclear weapons in a noncommunist country, where no Soviet forces are garrisoned. It would be a most radically dangerous break in Soviet policy.

On reflection, however, there is probably something to this report. The Indians do not need new bombers to strike at Pakistan. The 139 SU–7s in the Indian inventory would be sufficient for this limited mission. But the fact is that India is incapable of striking deep into China with any of the aircraft currently in its inventory, except on suicidal missions. Thus the Indians have long pressed the Soviets for the medium jet bomber, the TU–16, which has been supplied outside the Warsaw Pact to the UAR, and is also produced in China.

Also, it is not improbable that the Indians and Soviets are conducting arms negotiations. In contrast to the UAR treaty, which included a clause on Soviet military assistance, the Indo-Soviet treaty does not mention the subject. Yet, reliable reports from the Indians suggest that one motive (not the prime one necessarily) for New Delhi was to guarantee a continuing and secure source of military aid. And reporting prior to the treaty indicated that military cooperation and aid was one of the subjects under negotiation.

Thus, one result of the treaty negotiations probably could be a Soviet commitment to meet Indian interest in the TU–16. Since it is nuclear capable, the question of the availability of nuclear weapons would be a plausible subject for discussion. But that the Soviets have made such a clear commitment is still open to serious doubt. Even if we can discount this particular report, it nevertheless raises some question about Soviet intentions in the area.

Soviet Intentions

The current interpretation of the treaty is that the Soviets acted primarily to restrain the Indians, who were on the verge of recognizing Bangla Desh and therefore ready for war. The Soviets provided Mrs. Gandhi with a dramatic psychological coup, which, in turn relieved

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2 According to the report, the terms of Soviet military assistance to India were included in an unfinished and “highly-classified section” of the treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–76–197, India, 1971)
her of internal pressure for drastic action. This analysis is being publicized in the *New York Times*, and through our diplomats (e.g., Sisco’s conversation with the Pak Ambassador who disagreed).

While it may be that the Soviets and the Indians revived this old treaty as the solution to a difficult crisis, the major unanswered question is whether the stability thus achieved is temporary or will endure for a long period. Or, put another way, does the new Soviet commitment lead inevitably to further escalation, either by the Paks and Chinese, or through the new confidence gained by New Delhi?

A case can be made that over the longer term what the Soviets have done is extremely dangerous.

First of all, the degree of Soviet commitment is deepened. No matter what the precise terms of the treaty, the Soviets seem obligated to assist Indians militarily, if India is attacked or threatened. *In order for the treaty to have the desired deterrent effect on both the Pakistanis and Chinese, the Soviets have to interpret the treaty in the strongest terms.* Thus, at the discussion of the treaty in the Supreme Soviet prior to its ratification the operative clause was described in a way that seemed to obligate the Soviets to take prompt and effective measures rather than consult.

In addition, to secure their interests and extend their control over Indian policy, the Soviets will have no choice but to be more amenable to Indian requests on the military side. We already learned before the treaty signing that the Soviets had suggested joint maneuvers. Thus, there is a prospect of some increase in Soviet personnel in India and certainly more cooperation in the military side.

The escalatory aspects of this are obvious: if the Chinese come under pressure from Pakistan to counter the Soviet move, what will they do? If they do nothing the Soviets have made an important gain—certainly one of their objectives is to expose the Chinese as weak allies. If, on the other hand the Chinese raise the ante, then the Soviets must also respond to maintain their credibility, a credibility which would have to be backed with at least more sophisticated Soviet weaponry, etc.

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3 In an article for the *New York Times* on August 13, Tad Szulc reported that “[a]uthoritative United States officials” believed that the Soviet Union had signed the friendship treaty to discourage India from formal recognition of East Pakistan as the independent nation of Bangla Desh. “According to intelligence reports submitted to President Nixon on Monday [August 9],” Szulc added, “the Soviet Union had warned the Indian Government that recognition of Bangla Desh could precipitate a war between India and Pakistan.” (Tad Szulc, “Soviet Move to Avert War Is Seen in Fact with India,” *New York Times*, August 13, 1971, p. 1)

4 Sisco met Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly on August 13 to discuss the Soviet-Indian Treaty and the situation in East Pakistan. A record of the conversation is in telegram 149708 to Islamabad, August 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 21 INDIA–USSR.
If we also consider Soviet reaction in light of the Sino-American rapprochement, it becomes even more likely that the Soviets have embarked on a potentially dangerous course. The Indo-Soviet treaty is in some respects a riposte to the US moves toward China. At least the Soviets are implying this in some of their publicity and the Indians make no effort to conceal that their interest in a Soviet commitment grew rapidly in the wake of the China visit announcement.

(As I pointed out in an earlier memorandum, Eastern Europe and the Indian Subcontinent are potentially the two most dangerous and unpredictable areas of Soviet reaction to our China move, even though in direct relations with us the Soviets are likely to continue or perhaps even increase their flexibility.)

Thus, the Indian-Pakistan conflict becomes a sort of Sino-Soviet clash by proxy. In such maneuvering, questions involving loss of face take on much greater importance, and the events of the Ussuri River in 1969 suggest that neither the Chinese nor Soviets are willing to suffer such a loss of face, at least not until the confrontation becomes dangerously acute.

Finally, one must consider what this particular turn in Soviet policy means in perspective. We now have two cases where the USSR, faced with a difficult situation, where it believed its own interests were at stake, responded by deepening its involvement both politically and militarily. In the UAR the Soviets had already broken with their previous prudence and put Soviet forces in the position of being involved in combat outside the Soviet-Warsaw Pact area. While this seemed a temporary expedient and an aberration in Soviet policy, both the UAR and Indian treaties raise some questions about Soviet willingness to fight outside of Eurasia.

We should not leap to any dramatic conclusions, but it is a rather ominous commentary on this aspect of Soviet policy that like the imperialists of the last century, the Soviets feel obliged to extend their commitment to maintain their international position. As many observers have pointed out the most dangerous aspect of Soviet policy is the tendency of an oligarchy to compromise rather than withdrawing from overexposed positions. What we may be witnessing therefore is another step in Soviet policy toward invoking its major asset—military power—to guarantee its imperialist ambitions.

What to do?

I am not sufficiently versed in the intricacies of the East Pakistan situation to recommend any particular course. From the Soviet angle,
however, I doubt the easy assumption that we must open some communication with the Soviets and approach the problems in some parallel or collaborative manner. The Soviets would welcome it only to the extent that it could be used against China, and at this particular point, we cannot go very far in that direction.

On the other hand, we apparently still have a parallel interest with the USSR in avoiding war. If that is still true, then the Soviet commitment to a "political solution" (as used in the Soviet-Indian communiqué)\(^6\) provides an opening for at least approaching the Soviets to explain what they mean and intend to do about promoting a political solution. Such a dialogue might then be extended to include the Chinese, with the US as a broker, as well as a participant. The objective might be a five power agreement or parallel statement that none of the parties would resort to force. While not a solution, it might be the way to allow the parties to save face and avoid the escalation of words and action that now seems likely.


320. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon\(^1\)


Evening Report

1. Dobrynin Call—I saw Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin this morning at his request.\(^2\) He said Gromyko planned to be in Washington September 29 and 30 and would arrive in New York earlier but wished to coordinate his presence there with mine. He also suggested that Gromyko sign the Nuclear Accidents Agreement while he is in Wash-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, President's Reading Reports, 1964-74, President-Evening Master File. Secret. The memorandum is based on several telegrams, drafted by Jack Matlock (EUR/SOV), on the issues discussed during the meeting; additional information from the telegrams is provided below.

\(^2\) According to his Appointment Book, Rogers met Dobrynin and Matlock at 10:03 a.m. Rogers also called Dobrynin at 9:27 a.m. on August 27. (Personal Files of William P. Rogers)
ington. I told him that we were agreed on the signing and would let him know the details later.3

I informed Dobrynin of your decision to open U.S. littoral ports to Soviet shipping on fourteen days notice and to enter into talks on other outstanding maritime matters and said that our Embassy in Moscow will be providing full details.

Regarding my talks with Gromyko, we agreed that we would discuss outstanding European issues4 and the Middle East situation. I told Dobrynin that we hope to achieve an interim Suez Canal agreement during the General Assembly session and that we believe it is in the common interest of all the parties to work toward this goal. Dobrynin said that Gromyko would welcome a discussion of the Middle East.

I also brought up the Indo-Pakistan situation, stressing that we are counseling restraint. Dobrynin stated that it is also Soviet policy to cool passions in the area, that this had been the aim of the Indo-Soviet treaty, and that the treaty in fact seems to have had a quieting effect. Dobrynin also stressed that it is not Soviet policy to fragment Pakistan and that Moscow is not supporting Indian pressure for an independent East Pakistan. The only mention of China during our talk occurred when Dobrynin asked if there is a “Chinese element causing excitement” on the Subcontinent. I said I did not know, but that it seems that the passions result fundamentally from intense hostility between India and Pakistan.5

[Omitted here is discussion of Senator Edward Kennedy’s trip to India and Deputy AID Administrator Maury Williams’ trip to Pakistan.]

William P. Rogers6

3 In telegram 156612 to Moscow, August 25, the Department reported: “Referring to Smith–Semenov conversation, Dobrynin asked whether third parties would be invited to adhere to the agreement. Secretary thought this would not be advisable since we do not want to exaggerate importance of accidents agreement lest it appear that we have labored hard and come up with a mouse.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)

4 In telegram 156614 to Moscow, August 25, the Department reported: “On Berlin Secretary said we pleased with the progress made by the Ambassadors and that draft seems to provide good ‘general framework’ for agreement. He added that we of course want to look over draft and if we have any suggested changes we will be back in touch with the other participants.” (Ibid.)

5 In telegram 156613 to Moscow, August 25, the Department reported: “Secretary expressed concern regarding guerrilla action in East Pakistan. Dobrynin said that guerrilla action is ‘practically over,’ and that real problem was coping with seven million refugees. He volunteered that Soviet Government is giving no encouragement to separatist movement in East Pakistan, and said that Soviets had informed Indian Government that they will not support demands for separatist state. As for Soviet involvement with guerrillas, Dobrynin stated, ‘We do not like to be involved in such things.’” (Ibid.)

6 Irwin initialed the memorandum above Rogers’s typed signature.
821. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

August 26, 1971, 1:22 p.m. PDT.

K: I am calling you about that SALT situation.
D: What about?
K: Where things—before things reach an irritation level here. Semenov made a proposal for two industrial/administrative centers on both sites. Our objection was that when we didn’t have one on one site you don’t solve that problem. It excludes missile sites. You know our view. Since one reason we didn’t want to go Washington and Moscow because we didn’t want to destroy what we have. Two of what we don’t want doesn’t help us and two of what you have puts us at a disadvantage. We have tried to help you on Berlin and although they say we move when you do it would have been correct—we probably made a mistake. We have given you 8 weeks to work out bureaucratic problems.

D: Two sites on your side.
K: So we have made a concession. Now you are saying two administrative centers.
D: All right with you if [omission in transcript].
K: We have proposed that each side picks either two military or one military, one administrative center.
D: Now we propose two and two. We propose two industrial/military centers.
K: We won’t accept.
D: What if one by each capital and one by choice.
K: Capital doesn’t do [any] good. It forces us to destroy what we have built. You keep what you have and we destroy what we have.
D: You pressed the zero.
K: We didn’t press it. You conducted a masterful negotiation with Gerard Smith.
D: Asked it 3 or 4 times.
K: It’s your private obsession.
D: Really, what can I do?

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Dobrynin was in Washington.
K: I think we should try to get it—
D: Most clear statement I have heard from you—"since we don’t want to destroy what we have."
K: I have told you many times. Each side keeps what they have. If we don’t come to an agreement, it’s what will happen.
D: Put it this way—not from my government. You would like to have your two and with our capital we will have one.
K: You will have one missile site and capital and we have two missile sites. I will need to consult. I would like to have a [omission in transcript] that doesn’t reflect that nothing was done on May 20.
D: The main point as we propose now with two sites on your side and one with capital here.
K: Moscow isn’t the point. You have a circle of 100 kms. radius.
D: You have 60 miles. [omission in transcript] twice as much as you have.
K: On the numbers and so forth we will come to a compromise if we can settle the principle.
D: Two is beginning of a net. One is not. This is our objection mostly. Perhaps too much emphasis.
K: If your people could make a proposal that takes in our proposal and saying two missile sites isn’t offense against humanity.
D: Your site and two by two.
K: It would be a bargaining position. On the other thing,² it’s going along. Privately, there’s some feeling that you pressed for us urgently to give an answer in three days and we seem to have the same process.
D: I received private letter from Gromyko today and he said same two days. Brezhnev is in the south and [omission in transcript] is in Moscow. He will go there. Senior member there for [omission in transcript]. He is important. Others are outside Moscow. It’s not a deliberate delay.
K: We didn’t raise the issue, as you know. If we—I think as I told you that we should make a concerted effort to do things in a big way.
D: I don’t want to commit myself. Not moving because of this and perhaps an answer by this weekend. Maybe some administrative changes but looks all right.
K: I told you that on a psychological level.
D: I know how it stands.

² Summit announcement.
K: Good, if we can make some significant [omission in transcript], if we can get a negotiating posture.

D: If on [omission in transcript]. On major issue on Monday\(^3\) at longest. They are just now [omission in transcript].

K: It doesn’t look like you will have a long vacation.

D: That’s why I pressed for it.

K: I had no doubt that self-interest was the (reason). You are tough enough when you are exhausted. Rested you will be impossible.

D: I have given up the idea.

K: Come to the West Coast and we will sit in the sun.

D: Any call from the State Dept.?

K: A number of technical problems which should be handled by counselor in Bonn.\(^4\) You and I don’t need to get involved. If they reach a deadlock you and I can do it. Objection of legitimate drafting problems which your side raised too.

D: Second level.

K: We are bringing Rush here tomorrow. The President will see him. Then he will go back to Bonn. I would like to hold it over your head for SALT but you are ahead of us.

D: It’s not very important. We proposed two and two and you didn’t like.

K: You haven’t proposed two we could accept. If you can make some movement there, even if to our position then [omission in transcript] you negotiate.

D: It was not a proposal.

K: Just thinking out loud.

D: Two points beginning the net.

K: I understand.

D: I would look what I could do.

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\(^3\) August 30.

\(^4\) The Mission in Berlin reported on some of these "technical problems"—in particular, differences between the English and Russian versions of the draft agreement—in telegram 1734, August 26; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 323, footnote 3.
322. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\textsuperscript{1}

August 27, 1971, 8:47 a.m. PDT.

D: How’s the weather?
K: Perfect. I am sitting with Ken Rush and I don’t know what we will do on a govt. to govt. level but when he says nice things of Abrasimov tensions have reached (a good point).

D: Gromyko has asked me to tell you about Berlin that from our side we are not going to make any change about this agreement which was made by the Ambassadors. You mentioned yesterday\textsuperscript{2} that somebody changing—

K: Don’t worry about it.
D: Not a single change from our side.
K: You understand the problem here. I understand it so let’s let it be handled in Bonn. If any problem Rush will be back next week. We are standing behind the agreement but perhaps some exchanges but not on a high level.

D: For your information, we are not going to make—
K: We will not escalate to a govt. level.
D: I and my govt. give assurances what has been done by 4 ambassadors.
K: But we must do it in our way.
D: I would like to send you—Secy. called me today and said no objection on the West Berlin text.\textsuperscript{3} You handled it beautifully.

K: It took work but we have got it. They are going to suggest a drafting change but react as you want.
D: I am not in this.
K: I have kept it a low level and we will not escalate to our level.
D: I have talked with you and yesterday the Secy. called on his own. [omission in transcript]

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Dobrynin was in Washington.

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 321.

\textsuperscript{3} According to his Appointment Book, Rogers called Dobrynin at 9:27 a.m. on August 27. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) No record of the conversation has been found.
K: Would you do that?
D: On this formal (former?) thing, it’s not my business at all.
K: Tell Gromyko to handle normally and we are standing by the agreement. We will stand by our words. There may be some need to make—
D: It’s up to them to do. If they have something for ambassadors to discuss.
K: Probably can be handled at technical level.
D: I will report from you and the Secy.
K: President seeing Rush and put himself personally behind the agreement.4
D: I hope in two days to give you an answer. It’s the only thing that delays my departure.5

5 Reference is to formal agreement on the text of a summit announcement.

323. Editorial Note

After reaching an agreement on Berlin, the White House and the Kremlin used the confidential channel to negotiate an announcement of the Moscow summit. On August 30, 1971, Oleg Sokolov, First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, delivered separate notes on SALT and the summit to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Al Haig at the White House. The Soviet note on SALT offered a “compromise solution,” and included the following provision: “ABM systems in the Soviet Union and the United States would be limited to the defense of their capitals. Beside that, the United States would retain ABM installations on one of the ICBM bases, where their construction has begun, while the Soviet Union would have the right to deploy ABM installations for the defense of an equal number of ICBM silos.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]) The full text of the note is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 193. The text of the Soviet note on the summit—revising the text that Kissinger gave Dobrynin on August 17 (see footnote 4, Document 317)—reads:
“The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in their exchanges during the past year have agreed that a meeting between them would be desirable once sufficient progress had been made in negotiations at lower levels. In light of the recent advances in bilateral and multilateral negotiations involving the two countries, now it has been agreed upon that President Nixon will visit Moscow in the latter part of May 1972.

“At this meeting, the U.S. and Soviet leaders will review all major issues with a view towards further improving their bilateral relations and enhancing the prospects for world peace.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2])

Before the two notes were delivered in Washington, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin called Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger in San Clemente at 1:50 p.m. (PDT). After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Dobrynin began by raising the first Soviet note. Kissinger, however, quickly interrupted: “Let’s do the second first.” Dobrynin reported that the Soviet Government agreed to begin the summit in Moscow on May 22, 1972. The two men discussed when to release an announcement. Dobrynin thought the Kremlin would prefer to announce the summit after Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met President Richard Nixon at the White House in late September. “This is my private thinking,” he added. “I don’t know whether it’s true.” When Dobrynin suggested October 10 as a possible date, Kissinger objected: “October 10 misses the news magazines. It’s best on a Wednesday or a Thursday.” Kissinger then complained about the Soviet text of the announcement:

“K: The only thing is when you say ‘it has been agreed upon’—this makes it look like the President asked to come.

“D: [omission in transcript]

“K: We’ll be delighted to leave out the sentence saying ‘President Nixon has accepted with pleasure’ if you want it. But I don’t think we will accept this proposal.

“D: What proposal?

“K: Your suggestion.

“D: Not as of now.

“K: You want to say ‘in light of recent advances . . . it has been agreed upon that President Nixon should visit Moscow in the latter part of May, 1972.’

“D: Or ‘will visit.’

“K: I understand what you are saying, but it is more normal that the host government indicate some generosity about . . .

“D: If you like better could say . . .
“K: It’s entirely up to you. I will have to talk to the President about it. I know we will suggest a different date than the 10th, but it would be just a few days on either side.”

Kissinger also raised another concern: the visit of Soviet President Podgorny to Hanoi in early October. “If he should be there and make a violent anti-American statement and if then a few days later we announce a visit,” Kissinger explained, “I don’t think that’s the best combination of circumstances.” When Kissinger asked about SALT, Dobrynin replied that the Soviet Government viewed their proposal on the number of ABM installations as a “gesture” toward an agreement:

“D: We are prepared to do it this way.
“K: You mean one missile installation?
“D: . . . at the same time.
“K: Then it would be two for one.
“D: No, two for two. One of your ICBMs; one of our ICBMs. Capital and Capital. Two sites from both sides.
“K: But if we chose not to defend our capital.
“D: Then one ABM . . .
“K: If we defend one of our ICBM complexes then whether or not we defend Washington you have the right to defend another ICBM complex?”

Rather than wait for an answer, Kissinger promised to call Dobrynin the next day to review such questions on SALT and the summit. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File) No record has been found that Kissinger followed through on this promise.

Dobrynin, however, called Kissinger at 12:35 p.m. on September 2. “I received a telegram from Moscow asking me to come for consultations [. . .],” he announced. “I am leaving tomorrow.” When Kissinger asked whether he wanted to “discuss in general where stand” before his departure, Dobrynin replied: “No, need to discuss only if you or President have something for me to tell in Moscow. I know where we stand. Also the point we discussed last time.” “On the point we discussed last time,” Kissinger explained, “I have to see the President again and I will have word for you before you leave.” (Ibid.) Kissinger called Dobrynin back the next morning:

“K: I talked to the President again and we have a suggestion for the text which is a compromise between our two versions. Our objection to your draft is that it was stated as if you had [omission in transcript—invited?] the President to Moscow.
“D: Oh come on, come on.
“K: If you can get away with something you will not avoid it. We propose: ’In the light of recent advances . . . it has been agreed that
such a meeting will take place in Moscow in the latter part of May 1972. President Nixon and the Soviet leaders will review all of the major issues.’

“D: I don’t understand.
“K: We are taking the statement I gave you, striking out the words ‘the United States and Soviet leaders.’
“D: And that’s all?
“K: Yes.
“K: You can have ‘at this meeting’ if you want it.
“D: But you think it is better this way?
“K: Don’t object to this way.
“D: . . .
“K: Not ‘it has been agreed upon . . .’—that’s bad English. ‘It has been agreed that . . .’ The only reason we are mentioning names at this point is so it is clear who is going, because we haven’t mentioned the persons yet.

“D: Okay. I will send this back over to receive reply. And I have received answer saying they prefer the 12th. You mentioned the 12th. They understand [omission in transcript].
“K: Right, but how about the 7th?
“D: They didn’t give me any explanation. I said the President mentioned the 6th and 7th and as a last choice the 12th. They are prepared to take the third choice of the President.
“K: I will call you back before you leave.” (Ibid.)

Kissinger called Dobrynin again at 10:31 a.m. and reported: “I have talked with the President and we will accept [October] the 12th.” Although he was in “no hurry,” Kissinger commented that it would “make a good impression” if the two sides could agree on the text of the summit announcement as soon as possible. Dobrynin suggested that, in his absence, Soviet Minister Yuli Vorontsov could relay any messages from Moscow. After Dobrynin read the text of the announcement—which Kissinger confirmed was “exactly right”—the two men discussed the text of the American response on SALT:

“D: I agree with everything on the submarine business. As I explained to you it was my understanding even before communiqué but you may have a different point—
“K: You were [the] one who didn’t want to use launchers.
“D: No, the understanding was at this stage submarines would not be discussed. Even before text appeared it was at the first or second stage. On first stage I asked and they said not the base in this stage. It could be interpreted—you could be quite right.
“K: You have a point and we will take it into account when decision develops.
“D: I know. We raise this question because it’s understandable but on ABM it’s not the question.
“K: We will weigh it heavily when decision develops.
“D: They make their instructions.
“K: You have a point. It’s not unreasonable.
“D: Explain because it was of your—
“K: Let it go this way a little longer. It’s not a key point and we will keep it in mind between you and me.
“D: Not for decision now. On places we will keep going on. We make agreement little by little.

On September 7, Vorontsov called Kissinger and delivered the following message: “Dobrynin is in Moscow and Gromyko asked that I tell you that in Moscow they agreed on the text agreed on by you and Anatoly here. All details are considered settled. Actual clarity of the text we are talking about. The latest version of 9/3.” In order to avoid any “misunderstanding,” Kissinger replied that he would forward a copy of the announcement to the Soviet Embassy that afternoon. (Ibid.) The final text, which Haig sent by letter to Vorontsov on September 7, reads as follows:

“The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in their exchanges during the past year have agreed that a meeting between them would be desirable once sufficient progress had been made in negotiations at lower levels. In light of the recent advances in bilateral and multilateral negotiations involving the two countries, it has been agree that such a meeting will take place in Moscow in the latter part of May 1972.

“President Nixon and the Soviet leaders will review all major issues with a view towards further improving their bilateral relations and enhancing the prospects for world peace.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 1])
324. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, September 7, 1971.

Dear Mr. President,

I received your letter of August 5 and would like to express, as you have done, my point of view on certain questions of Soviet-American relations. I agree with you as to the usefulness and importance of the personal exchange of opinion and I feel it natural that such exchange should bear upon basic, principal questions of relations between the USSR and the USA, with due regard, of course, to the impact the state of these relations makes upon the situation in the world.

If one should speak in such a broad and direct manner—and in my view this is the only way to be followed—it is necessary, above all, to have a clear understanding as to whether we perceive the basic question the same way: how should the policies of states, especially of the ones that play a large role in world affairs, be constructed. To conduct the affairs in dealing with foreign policy problems in such a way as to contribute to maintaining and strengthening peace, or guided by some other considerations, to allow the course of events push the mankind toward new disasters, immeasurably more terrible than anything that we have lived through so far?

Our answer is simple, it manifests itself in the general line followed by our state in international affairs. The foreign policy course that might lead to a growing threat of war would be organically alien to the very nature of our social system. We firmly proceed from the belief that settlement of world problems should not be sought by crossing swords.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 1]. No classification marking. The letter is an “unofficial translation” provided by the Soviet Embassy. The original letter in Russian, as well as modified versions of the letter in English and Russian, presumably intended, if necessary, for Rogers, are ibid. According to another copy, Vorontsov gave Kissinger the letter at 6:30 p.m. on September 9. (Ibid., Box 497, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Kissinger and Dobrynin, Vol. 2) During a telephone conversation later that evening, Kissinger reported: “Mr. President, we got an answer to the Brezhnev letter—the letter you sent to Brezhnev some weeks ago. It is a very long letter and I won’t bother you with it.” (Ibid., Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File) For his memoir account, see Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 233.

2 See Document 309.
The recent Congress of our party, as you undoubtedly are aware, reaffirmed both the general foreign policy course of the Soviet Union and our readiness to develop Soviet-American relations. We are certain that, given a mutual desire, those relations could become an important factor in strengthening peace and ensuring greater security for all states.

I am well aware that you, Mr. President, have also expressed your belief in the possibility of improving relations between the United States and the USSR, the belief, as you write in your letter, that “we of this generation will be able to pass on to our children a better and safer world”. I would add to the above that it would be good to give the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of such world not only to the coming but also to the present generation of people.

In defining our policy with regard to the relations with the United States, as with the other countries, we do not ignore either the differences in social and political systems, or divergence in the interests on specific questions conditioned by objective, among them historical, circumstances. We constantly take into view also the interests of our allies and friends. All of this is absolutely necessary in seeking such kind of mutual understanding between our two countries on appropriate international problems, such kind of resolution thereof, which would be of really effective and lasting nature. And we on our part want and actively pursue precisely that. And the experience shows that when both sides are guided by the desire to find mutually acceptable solutions, that proves to be possible.

It is a matter of satisfaction that over the past year and a half or two years negotiations were started between our countries on a number of major questions, as you also note in your letter.

In this connection I would like to say that we duly appreciate what has been done personally by you, Mr. President, to contribute to the success of the negotiations on West Berlin. That is a vivid example of how our two countries co-related at the highest level their aims regarding a particular question, elicited common points of their interests, came to understanding in principle, after which the representatives of our countries applied their efforts to put what had been achieved in a concrete form. A good and useful job has been done.

I share your appraisal of the business-like nature of the strategic arms limitation talks under way between our Governments. Important

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3 The quadripartite agreement was signed at the former Allied Control Council Building in West Berlin on September 3. For the text of the agreement, including annexed and associated official correspondence, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1135–1148.
in itself here is the very fact that both you and ourselves have come to
the conclusion that agreement in that field is possible if both sides dis-
play caution in those matters which concern the interests of their se-
curity, and do not strive to achieve unilateral advantages. There exists
now a common understanding on what the talks must concentrate first
of all, and that may become the proper foundation for attaining prac-
tical decisions. We continue to believe it desirable to agree on a limi-
tation of anti-ballistic missile systems, but only on the basis of the prin-
ciple of complete equivalence.

The first concrete results achieved at those negotiations—completion
of the agreement on measures of reducing the danger of outbreak of nu-
clear war between the USSR and the U.S.—represent, without doubt, a
positive factor in Soviet-American relations. On the assets side can also
be entered the fact that our countries coordinated their positions in the
Geneva Committee on Disarmament on banning and destruction of bio-
logical weapons.

I should frankly say, however, that although encouraging signs
have now appeared in our relations, their state as a whole causes mixed
feelings, to say the least, on our side. Much leaves to be desired while
certain things in the American position puzzle us.

I would like in this connection to dwell on two questions which
take a special place in international affairs and in relations between our
countries. Those are Indochina and the Middle East.

The principal thing here for our country, for the entire Soviet peo-
ple, for our Party which expresses their will, is that in both cases the peo-
bles of those areas were subject to direct attack from the outside. The an-
nihilation of many thousands of people, destruction of homes, occupation
of territories—these are actions against which we have always resolutely
come out and will continue to do so. The consequences of what has al-
ready been committed and still continues to be done in both those areas,
the consequences of the intrusions should be eliminated. Without this a
settlement will be impossible. That is what constitutes the principal and
determining part of our position with regard to the developments both
in Indochina and in the Middle East. This is the gist of the matter, be-
sides, our interest in such a settlement is particularly great because for
us the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is a brotherly Socialist country,
while the Middle East is a region where states friendly to us are located,
a region directly adjoining the borders of the Soviet Union.

At the same time we are far from seeking to infringe upon some-
one’s interests in Indochina or in the Middle East, or to undermine
someone’s international prestige. We want peace established in accord
with the lawful interests of the peoples of these areas.

What is here that does not suit the United States of America? Does
any of this affect her national interests?
I see the meaning of the contact, which is now setting up between us, not in getting into polemics. I think you also agree that there would be no use in doing that. But there is one question which I still have to dwell upon.

As you know, over a rather long period of time we maintained a dialogue concerning the ways and means of overcoming the Middle East conflict. More than a year ago, to be exact at the beginning of June, 1970, that dialogue approached a stage when it began to appear that we perhaps regard basic aspects of the settlement, including withdrawal of Israeli troops and conditions for peace between the Arab states and Israel, not from positions that would mutually exclude each other. Yet at precisely that moment the American side, judging by her actions, lost interest in seeking agreed decisions and assumed a completely different line of policy. Can this leave Soviet-American relations unaffected? Obviously, not.

It would be extremely sad if the developments in the Middle East led to another aggravation in that area and, still more, to an explosion which you, I believe, as ourselves, would like to avoid.

Concerning the war in Indochina you note yourself that it is making a negative impact on the relations between our countries. This indeed is so. Honestly speaking, we sometimes do not know which is closer to reality—statements about a desire to bring about an end to the Indochina war, for which, it would seem, speaks a partial withdrawal of American troops, or preoccupation with how to prolong it.

If the United States has embarked on the course of withdrawing its troops from Indochina, then, it seems to us, there should be no obstacles to setting a final date for their complete withdrawal. And if the United States really strives to turn the page in the history of their policy in Indochina, then why not accept the idea of establishing in South Vietnam a government of national accord, which would be in full measure capable of taking in its hands the solution of problems involving the Vietnamese themselves; after all, Vietnam is their home.

You express the wish that the Soviet Union exercise its influence to achieve peace in that area. Well, when some time ago the American side displayed realism, and expressed readiness to stop military operations directly against the DRV territory as well as to start negotiations for a peaceful settlement, we did help to overcome barriers between the sides. Now you have direct contacts with the Vietnamese side and that in itself is a positive factor. We of course are in on those contacts. It seems to us that the main directions of the solution which should be taken for ending the war in Indochina are in fact being crystallized, and not a small role in this belongs to the latest proposals of the Vietnamese side.4

4 See footnote 4, Document 291.
Therefore we would like to hope that the American side will make a step in the near future which everybody expects from it and which will in fact open the way toward a settlement. Should one mention what a positive impact that would make upon the state of Soviet-American relations?

You mention your forthcoming trip to Peking. I and my colleagues take note of your comments. We cannot, of course, have any objections in principle against a normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The whole question is on what basis will this normalization proceed. The answer to this question will obviously be provided by the not-too-distant future. I can only add that history taught us long ago to tell a natural process of establishing normal peaceful relations between states from development of all sorts of combinations of ones against the others.

As to your comments on the U.S. policy with regard to the Socialist countries in general, in this sphere of principal importance to us is to ensure that nobody threaten their security, or try to encroach upon the social and state system in these countries.

The importance of the questions of bilateral relations between our countries which you refer to in your letter, is clear. We, on our part, are prepared for wider and good-willed development of Soviet-American relations, including trade and cooperation in the fields of outer space research, studies of the World ocean, preservation of environment, and public health. These spheres of human activity are of growing importance in the life of the peoples.

It is also true, however, that if the present rate of wasting on arms drive the material values created by the labor and talent of the peoples is not stopped, if we do not first succeed at least in slackening and afterwards in turning back this process, then whatever loud pronouncements about the necessity of cooperation of states in solving vital problems of progress of modern civilization are made from the rostrums of international conferences—that cooperation would be unstable, and its results limited.

This means that more dependable ways should be sought to solve the problems of disarmament, including the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. And here the responsibility—let us be frank, the decisive responsibility—is to be shouldered first of all by our two states, although, of course, others as well can and should make their contribution to that great cause—particularly those also possessing nuclear weapons.

Sometimes it is said, Mr. President, that communists despite their materialistic philosophy act as idealists advancing broad programs of disarmament. But we really believe that questions of disarmament are solvable, and what has already been done as a result of the known
treaties concluded, substantiates this confidence. Consequently, efforts should be multiplied, and we are ready for that.

If we can succeed in reaching genuine understanding with you as to the general courses of policy of both our states in their relations with each other, then it will be much easier to solve practical matters, there will be fewer uncertainties, reservations and understatements when it concerns urgent, concrete questions on which depend the security of our countries as well as international peace and security.

For us that general course means peaceful coexistence. When we declare this principle in the highest forums in our country and on the world arena, we do it in earnest. We are guided not by calculations connected with this or that current event which may seem significant today while tomorrow is completely forgotten, and not by narrow considerations designed to achieve tactical advantage—that would not be serious or reliable, but by the fundamental interests of peace.

These are some thoughts that come to my mind when I contemplate, in connection with your letter, the state of Soviet-American relations. On the whole, I believe that despite remaining difficulties, prospects for developing these relations for the better do objectively exist.

We look forward to meeting you in Moscow. That may become a significant event—the more significant, the more favorable is the situation in which the meeting will take place. And that depends on joint efforts of both sides.5

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev6

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5 The modified Russian and English versions of the letter (see footnote 1 above) omitted this paragraph.

6 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.
325. Intelligence Memorandum


USSR Adjusts to Sino-US Moves Toward Rapprochement

Summary

The announcement on 15 July that President Nixon will visit China took Moscow by surprise and intensified its concern that Sino-US dealings may seriously harm Soviet interests. Moscow’s behavior over the past eight weeks shows that it has chosen to react very differently toward the US on the one hand and China on the other.

The USSR is determined not to play into Peking’s hands by jeopardizing Soviet-US ties. Indeed, recent and planned Sino-US contacts seem to have given the Soviets added incentive to breathe new life into Moscow’s own dealings with Washington, and they have already taken steps to broaden and accelerate them. Contacts on the official level have been unusually cordial and the Soviets are clearly hoping that the US will show, in tangible ways, that its interest in developing relations with the Soviet Union has not waned. They also seem to be looking for ways to demonstrate that Moscow’s various dealings with the US—in contrast to embryonic ties between Peking and Washington—can and do yield mutually profitable results.

Moscow’s outspoken castigation of Chinese policies, and particularly Peking’s motives in expanding contacts with the US, indicates a Soviet assessment that more aggressive tactics are indicated vis-à-vis Peking. The Soviets seem to have concluded that of their two rivals, the Chinese are the more malicious and the readier to strike anti-Soviet bargains. Izvestia has charged specifically that the “defrosting” of Sino-US relations reflects “Peking’s intention to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union.”\(^2\) Chinese words and actions serve to reinforce Soviet suspicion and distemper.

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\(^1\) Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, 77, USSR 092, 1971. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated within CIA. Helms forwarded the memorandum to Laird on September 10 under the following typewritten note: “I think you may find the attached useful. It is a full review of Soviet foreign policy in the wake of the President’s moves toward China. The paper is also being sent to Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Rogers, Mr. Mitchell and Gerard Smith.” A stamped notation indicates that Laird saw the memorandum on September 11.

\(^2\) Not found.
Moscow’s actions may also reflect a judgment that its differences with Peking are more serious and irreconcilable than the matters at issue between the Soviet Union and the US. It is, in any case, easier for the Soviet leaders to lash out at China for they realize that—unlike the situation with respect to their relations with Washington—they can hardly endanger any significant Sino-Soviet dealings that have not long since gone sour.

Elsewhere the USSR is taking initiatives designed to blunt the effects of Sino-US moves and, where possible, to turn them to Moscow’s advantage. Tactical adjustments in Moscow’s approach to key problem areas have already been introduced, and yet others are in the sounding stage.

The unaccustomed speed and flexibility with which the Soviets finally moved toward a satisfactory agreement on Berlin, for example, may have been influenced in some degree by recent contacts between Washington and Peking. These contacts, as well as China’s growing ties with Romania and Yugoslavia, also seem to have contributed to the vehemence with which the USSR moved to warn the Balkan countries against trying to enlist Peking’s support in their differences with Moscow. On the Indian subcontinent, the Soviets were able to take advantage of India’s concern over US moves toward China, as well as New Delhi’s present need for great-power support in the East Pakistan crisis, to nail down the Indians to the close relationship with the USSR imbedded in the Soviet-Indian treaty signed on 9 August.

Finally, the unprecedented vigor with which the top Soviet leaders will be engaging in personal diplomacy abroad this fall is perhaps the most graphic illustration of the catalytic effect recent events have had on Soviet efforts.

[Here follows the body of the memorandum.]

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3 On August 2, Brezhnev hosted the first in a series of annual “vacation” meetings in the Crimea for Warsaw Pact leaders. For the English text of the resulting communiqué published in Pravda on August 3 and in Izvestia on August 4, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 31 (August 31, 1971), pp. 1–3.

326. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, September 13, 1971, 8:45–10:40 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Huang Chen, PRC Ambassador to France
Tsao Kuei Sheng, First Secretary of PRC Embassy
Wei Tung, Secretary to the PRC Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General Vernon Walters, Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Paris
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

[Omitted here are opening pleasantries and discussion of arrangements for Kissinger’s upcoming trip to China.]

Dr. Kissinger: There are a number of things that I would like to cover concerning my visit.

We will give you an answer on the announcement of the visit and the text within a few days.

I have always been very honest and meticulous with the Prime Minister and therefore I want to inform you of what may happen. As I told you last time, we are constantly receiving Soviet approaches now about this or that negotiation, and we have always informed you immediately. We do not inform them of our conversations with you. And the Prime Minister should know that they do not know from our sources that I see you and what I discuss with you. One reason is that no American sources know I am talking to you except the President. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)

As I told the Prime Minister and as I told you on August 16,2 the Soviet Union has made several proposals to us about a possible visit to the Soviet Union. We have told them that we would not visit the Soviet Union until after we have visited the People’s Republic of China. However, we expect that Foreign Minister Gromyko, who is arriving in the United States on September 19, will bring a formal invitation. Since we have already delayed our answer for three months, it would be difficult to delay an answer again because they have met all our

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2 See Document 316.
conditions regarding outstanding negotiations. And to be quite honest with you, the reason we had proposed September 21 or September 22 for the announcement was so that whatever we and you announced would not appear as a reaction to the visit of the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko comes to the United Nations, not to the United States, but it is customary on each visit to the United States that he visit the President. (There followed some discussion in Chinese among the Chinese.)

Ambassador Huang: That means you propose to announce the visit on the 21st?

Dr. Kissinger: You remember, on September 1, General Walters proposed that we announce my visit to China on September 21. We chose that date—we didn’t know then—because it has been normal for Gromyko to come to the United Nations at that time. He is not coming at our invitation; it is normal. It is also normal when he comes to the UN that he visits the President. Frankly, we therefore wanted to announce my visit to China before we talked to Gromyko. We didn’t wish to say this to you because we didn’t wish to embarrass or exercise pressure on you. Since then we have been told of his visit. He arrives September 19. He will probably see the President on September 29, which is the latest possible date. It is not a visit to America. It is a visit to the United Nations.

Ambassador Huang: If in your view we announce you’re going to China on the 21st, what date do you expect to go to China?

Dr. Kissinger: The one we discussed, October 20.

General Walters: He was explaining only why we proposed the 21st (for the announcement).

Dr. Kissinger: The arrival date is no problem for me. Or the 22nd for the announcement.

Ambassador Huang: We will await your answer.

3 In a September 1 memorandum, Walters briefed Haig on his meeting that morning at the Chinese Embassy in Paris. During the meeting, Walters presented an oral note on two upcoming events: signature of the Accidental War Agreement and Kissinger’s second trip to China. “Ambassador Huang Chen then asked me,” he reported, “whether my Soviet colleagues had ever asked me about Sino-American relations. I answered truthfully that they never had. He then asked whether the Soviets knew about Dr. Kissinger’s trips in secrecy to Paris. I replied that I did not know for sure, but that experience with the Russians convinced me that they were very intelligent but not all 2 meters tall. He roared with laughter and slapped me on the back.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971) The full text of the memorandum is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Document 22.
Dr. Kissinger: You can report to the Prime Minister that the arrival date of October 20 is acceptable. The announcement text I want to check in Washington and it is probably acceptable, but I wanted you to know of the other problem.

Ambassador Huang: On the question of the date of the announcement you will let us know through General Walters. 

Dr. Kissinger: And if you have any different views, you will let us know.

Ambassador Huang: We will let you know.

Dr. Kissinger: I just wanted to make sure you knew why, and if anything important happens between Gromyko and the President which bears on the question of the President’s visit to Moscow, I’ll let you know as soon as possible. But it will be in no case before the President’s visit to China.

[Omitted here is discussion of “practical questions” related to Kissinger’s upcoming trip.]

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4 During a meeting on September 21, Walters informed Huang that “the 22nd and 23rd of September were overtaken by time but that 5, 6, or 7 October were acceptable” for announcement of Kissinger’s trip to China. According to Walters, “They nodded.” (Memorandum for the Record; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971)

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327. Editorial Note

After his meeting with Chinese Ambassador to France Huang Chen on September 13, 1971, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger met privately that afternoon with Xuan Thuy, Hanoi’s plenipotentiary in the formal peace negotiations, at the North Vietnamese Residence in Paris. As Kissinger recalled in his memoirs: “The meeting adjourned after two hours, the shortest secret session ever. We parted with the understanding that either side could reopen the channel if it had something new to say.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 1036) Kissinger refused, however, to abandon hope for a settlement, developing instead a diplomatic strategy to influence Hanoi through Moscow. White House Chief of Staff H.R. Halderman described the situation in his diary entry for September 14: “Henry got back from Paris last night and reported to the P. Came in, saw me this morning, went over the plans. The North Vietnamese have closed off the negotiations in effect, because of the screw-up on Thieu’s elec-
tion. At least that’s Henry’s view, and he in turn has basically turned off the talks. He now wants to go to Moscow and work the same kind of deal there, or at least make a record for it, so that when we do the pull out in January, we’ll have that as a final wrap-up attempt to settle by negotiation. His logic is that if we’re going to pull out anyway, we might as well try to get all the mileage out of it that we can.” (Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, page 353)

In a memorandum for the President on September 18, Kissinger reviewed the options for American policy on Vietnam, including his proposal for “another major negotiating effort.” The proposal was, in effect, a revised version of the eight-point plan Kissinger had given Le Duc Tho in Paris on August 16. The suspension of the secret talks in Paris, however, raised the question of how to deliver the message to the North Vietnamese. “There are only two logical candidates for the role of intermediary, China and Russia,” Kissinger explained. “They each have some influence in Hanoi and an approaching summit with us.” Since the Chinese had neither sufficient interest nor substantial leverage to intervene, Kissinger turned his attention to the Soviets:

“Based on their track record and standard approach, we can be sure that they have no great desire to help us, suggestive hints by Ambassador Dobrynin notwithstanding. But there are some factors which could nevertheless motivate Moscow to play a constructive part in arranging an Indochina peace. These include enhancement of their prestige and the establishment of their claims to a Southeast Asia role.

“With these incentives already present we might be able to play on the Russians’ paranoia about our rapprochement with Peking to enlist their assistance.

“When Gromyko is here at the end of this month, we could appeal to him for a Soviet intermediary role. You would introduce the subject with him in a private meeting. I would subsequently speak to him along the following lines:

“—We have two interests in improving our relations with China: our desire to communicate with 750 million people and our Southeast Asian concerns.

“—On the first count, despite her massive population, China is essentially a regional power at this stage in history. For the near future peace on a global scale requires the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States.

“—As for Southeast Asia, the conflict there makes for a distortion in our relationship, one that we wish to erase.

“—We are prepared to make one last extra effort for a negotiated settlement to the conflict that would, in the bargain, improve Moscow-Washington relations and enhance Soviet prestige and influence.
—We would outline our eight point proposal, ask that the Soviet Union forward it to Hanoi and suggest it arrange a secret meeting in Moscow between North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong and myself. We would both be authorized to make a settlement based on this proposal within three days.

—As a global power, Russia could lend its broader perspective to Hanoi’s natural preoccupation with its own struggle and morbid suspicion of the West. Moscow will understand that the U.S. is not withdrawing all over Asia so as to hang on in one small corner of the continent, and that the real problem is to avoid a total vacuum that would only invite Chinese dominance.

“We would tell Gromyko that it would be helpful to have an answer within two weeks, or before I go to China. This timing would be both an incentive and pressure on Moscow. The Russians would get an institutionalized role in Southeast Asia, a secret trip and the prospect of some voice in our China policy.

“If the response from Moscow and Hanoi were positive, I would brief Chou En-lai on the project while I am in Peking and secure benevolent Chinese abstention.


Although the President did not indicate a decision on the memorandum, Kissinger recalled in his memoirs that “Nixon approved this offer on September 20.” (Kissinger, White House Years, page 1039) Nixon, however, modified his instructions when Congress began to consider a proposal by Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield to withdraw American forces from Vietnam. As Haldeman reported in his diary on September 25: “I gave him [Nixon] a report on the Mansfield amendment, that the leadership in the House feel they aren’t going to be able to hold the line against it this time around. So he wants Henry to develop a revised game plan for his idea of going to Russia now, to assume that Congress passes the Mansfield thing in October—and what does that do to our bargaining thing, what effect on our position, and so on.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
Washington, September 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

Brezhnev's Reply to Your Letter of August 5, 1971

Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev's letter to you (Tab A) is generally constructive in tone, looks to further progress in US-Soviet relations and is clearly intended to maintain the personal dialogue opened in your original letter.

At the same time, Brezhnev's treatment of China and, to a lesser degree, Eastern Europe reflects Soviet suspicions of our motives. He reiterates Moscow's criticism of our Middle Eastern and Vietnam policies. Overall, he again strikes the theme that our foreign policies are uneven and in some respects "puzzling." Not unnaturally, Brezhnev contrasts this with the constancy of Soviet peace policies. This aspect of the letter is the only one with much ideological content.

Following are Brezhnev's more significant points:

—He repeats the Soviet view that an ABM agreement should be the first order of business in SALT. He stresses the "principle of complete equivalence" which in practice has been reflected in Soviet proposals in Helsinki for precise identity of what is to be defended and of levels of missiles to be retained, etc. Brezhnev fails to mention the offensive side of the May 20 understanding to which you had referred in your letter. This difference, too, has been reflected in Helsinki where progress has consequently been rather slow.

—As regards both the Middle East and Vietnam, Brezhnev asserts a direct Soviet interest in settlements based on the proposition that "the consequences of [foreign] intrusions should be eliminated," in Vietnam, because it is a Socialist country, and in the Middle East because the USSR has friends there and the region is close to it geographically. He denies any intent to infringe on someone else's (i.e., our) interests.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 1]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

2 See Document 309.

3 Document 324.

4 Nixon highlighted the paragraph, underlined this sentence, and wrote in the margin: "K—Brace Dobrynin on this."

5 Brackets are in the original.
While on Vietnam, Brezhnev in effect says we should accept the other side’s position, on the Middle East he makes no particular proposal but expresses dismay that we broke off earlier direct dealings with the USSR. He leaves the Middle East with the somewhat ominous point that it would be extremely sad if developments there led to another aggravation or explosion.

—On China, as noted, he is cautious and suspicious, taking a wait-and-see attitude.

—On Eastern Europe, he asserts a mild but unmistakable form of the Brezhnev Doctrine—that it is of principal importance for the USSR to “ensure” that no one threatens the security and political systems of the countries in the area.

—Brezhnev echoes your interest in improved direct bilateral cooperation in trade and various scientific-technical areas, although making it somewhat dependent on prior progress in disarmament. With respect to the latter he stresses paramount US/Soviet responsibility and urges that efforts in this field should be multiplied.

—As a general approach to negotiations between us, he urges that basic understandings be first reached with you personally (he cites Berlin and SALT) so that practical details can then be more easily solved.

In sum, this letter is a further direct expression of the line with which Brezhnev personally has become identified since the last Soviet Party Congress: emphasis on negotiations and better bilateral relations with us, and a general posture of conciliation toward the West. On specifics, not surprisingly for this type of letter, Brezhnev foreshadows no particular Soviet move; indeed, he generally holds the line on existing positions, and where he does get into more detail puts the onus of movement on us (e.g., SALT, Middle East, Vietnam).

The letter itself sheds no new light on the motives of current Soviet policy. But Brezhnev’s personal identification with this policy suggests that in his judgment dealings with us can be profitable to the USSR and thus to him personally. This judgment originally was undoubtedly based on the premise that the balance of power is moving favorably for the Soviets. But it is now reinforced by more defensive calculations stemming from our China policy.

Brezhnev’s letter is at Tab A; yours of August 5 at Tab B. No written response is required for now.
329. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell


[Omitted here is a brief exchange on the Middle East.]

Kissinger: [There’s] some shooting going on along the Suez Canal, which started—in the middle of the week, the Israelis—

Nixon: I saw that.

Kissinger: —shot down an Egyptian plane that was over-flying them for reconnaissance. And they have been firing machine guns at these planes just to show that they weren’t—

Nixon: And they hit one?

Kissinger: When they hit one by, really by accident, more or less—

Nixon: [laughs] Goodness sakes, if you can bring a quick, a modern plane down with a machine gun, it must be a horrible, poor pilot.

Kissinger: Right, it was—

Nixon: Jesus Christ!

Kissinger: It was a lucky hit. Thereupon, or maybe for other reasons, the Egyptians shot down an Israeli plane 30 miles inside Israeli territory yesterday: a transport, a combination transport/intelligence plane that was 30 miles inside the Sinai Peninsula. So this morning the Israelis have taken out some SAM sites. And that’s where it is. Now, there were some people who wanted you [Nixon] to appeal to both sides to show restraint. I think it’d be a great mistake at this stage. The thing may stop now. The Israelis have said they’d stop. The Egyptians know we want to preserve the ceasefire. I think we ought to watch it another couple of days.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 576–6. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger and Mitchell in the Oval Office on September 18 from 10:40 to 11:01 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 In a September 18 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported that, according to Rabin, the Soviets had “cooperated in the Egyptian shootdown” and that “it could be argued that the Soviets are prepared to see some risks taken to worry the US.” “But at some point they will have to calculate the disadvantages of resumed hostilities,” Kissinger added. “If they have some influence, one would assume an interest in maintaining the ceasefire, although it cannot be ruled out that some Soviet hardliners would take risks to see the US embarrassed.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, General, Vol. 8, 1971)
Kissinger: I don’t think we ought to get ourselves drawn into another negotiating round there.

[Omitted here is further discussion on the Middle East.]

Kissinger: The Israelis won’t do anything; the Egyptians won’t do anything unless the Russians urge them—or unless the Russians tolerate it. For reasons we know, the Russians are unlikely to have a big blow-up in the Middle East between now and October 12th.

Nixon: Do you think that really reached them?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Do you think you ought to call Dobrynin?

Kissinger: Dobrynin isn’t back yet. He’ll be back Monday,3 which is another reason—


Kissinger: If it’s still going on Monday I think it would—that would not be a bad move to appeal to the Russians—whether we should jointly cool it.

[Omitted here are a brief exchange on Lebanon and Jordan and discussion of SALT (printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 198). During this conversation, Nixon commented: “I marked, incidentally, Henry, on the letter from Brezhnev. I think you ought to take Dobrynin and brace him damn hard on the fact that Brezhnev did not respond with regard to the offensive weapons thing in SALT.” Despite his comment, Nixon did not mark Brezhnev’s letter but Kissinger’s memorandum thereon; see Document 328, footnote 4.]

Nixon: As a matter of fact, when you really think of Berlin—and I haven’t looked in detail, but I’ve looked at that record some—if you look at what Dobrynin first talked about, it was cynical as hell.

Kissinger: Oh, God.

Nixon: And you kept hammering, and hammering, and hammering, and, finally, by a torturous route, we have an agreement, which is really pretty good.

Kissinger: The agreement, now, is—I have this friend, this right-wing friend in the Pentagon, I’ve shown you some memos of his, Kraemer.4

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3 September 20.

4 See Document 294. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Kraemer and Haig for dinner on September 14. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found.
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: Kraemer.
Nixon: Kraemer. Yeah.
Kissinger: Who, when he was—
Nixon: He always is the one you send in, who gives us the analysis.
Kissinger: Yeah, well—
Nixon: I like him.
Kissinger: He was giving me—
Nixon: I should meet him sometime.
Kissinger: Well, I’ll bring him in if you want—
Nixon: You bring him in. All right, go ahead.
Kissinger: Well—
Nixon: Tell him that I do read his stuff though.
Kissinger: Yeah, I will tell him that.
Nixon: Good.
Kissinger: Well, he had said that Berlin was lost all along.
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: And I, in fact, showed you memos of his. Well, he’s now studied the text of the agreement that Ken Rush signed, and he says it’s unbelievable. It’s—you know, he says the basic situation is lousy, which we know. But the agreement as such is unbelievably good.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: So there we came out all right. Now, the only reason this [SALT] isn’t an unmitigated loss is because, actually, we don’t mind staging it so that you can sign it next year.
Nixon: You mean to let the delegation get it screwed up, and then we’ll—?
Kissinger: Well, let the delegation horse around a bit. Otherwise, it would have been unconscionable what they have done. But John sits through these meetings. These guys act—
Mitchell: Well, Gerry Smith is trying to make a record for Gerry Smith on this zero ABM, one way or the other.
Nixon: He always does. Well, the minute that we got the ABM through the Congress, the son-of-a-bitch has, ever since, been trying to get it out. Like SALT.
Mitchell: Well, but here if [laughs] this preliminary agreement even mentions zero ABM in the preamble as a direction that you want to go, then you’d lose the ABM in the Congress. Who in the hell is going to vote for it—
Kissinger: No—
Mitchell: —when you’re going to ultimately get the zero ABM?
Kissinger: Actually, Mr. President, I praised—I praised Dobrynin on this offensive link before he went back.\textsuperscript{5}

Nixon: All right—

Kissinger: —before he went back, and on September 10th, the Russians in Helsinki made a formal statement that they recognized there was a linkage, that the two had to be discussed simultaneously.\textsuperscript{6} So I think we’re going to move along on it.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East and China.]

\textsuperscript{5} See Document 323.

\textsuperscript{6} In telegram 1013 from Helsinki, September 10, Smith reported on the “mini-plenary” session that morning, including the following news: “Semenov read prepared statement saying it is incorrect to say Soviet side is not inclined to discuss offensive systems. May 20th agreement visualizes certain measures on offensive systems will be agreed to as well as reaching ABM agreement by end of year. Principle of a freeze is acceptable to both sides and it is understood details will be discussed before completing ABM agreement so that there can be simultaneous agreement on both defensive and offensive systems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–3 FIN (HE))

\section*{330. Memorandum of Conversation\textsuperscript{1}}

Washington, September 20, 1971, 5:30 pm.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place at Ambassador Dobrynin’s request. He had just returned from the Soviet Union, having arrived with Gromyko the night before, and was obviously under instructions to be extremely af-

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 6:35. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Lord and Rodman submitted this memorandum and another summarizing its “highlights” for the President to Kissinger on September 23. Kissinger forwarded both to Nixon on the same day. A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
fable. He opened the meeting by handing me the signed original Russian text of Brezhnev’s letter to the President.2

U.S.-Soviet Relations, & Gromyko Visit

Ambassador Dobrynin said that Brezhnev was very pleased to open this correspondence and hoped to stay in personal touch with the President. He said that he had been instructed to express the gratitude of the Soviet Leadership for the U.S. role in achieving a Berlin settlement, and also Brezhnev’s personal gratitude to me for my participation. On all previous visits to the Soviet Union, Dobrynin continued, he had had to explain whether it was possible to deal with this Administration at all. Now the Leadership was unanimously convinced that this was an Administration with which one could make a deal and which it was worth making a deal with. It was the most favorable mood he had found in the Soviet Union. He said, “we consider that the train is now on the track and the question is whether we can give it the right amount of speed.”

We then discussed arrangements for the meeting between the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Ambassador Dobrynin said that Gromyko would like to conduct it again in two parts, with a formal part and then a private discussion with the President, such as last year. He wanted at least one-half hour for the private part.

I asked what he wanted to discuss privately. He said that Gromyko had a personal message from Brezhnev for the President indicating his pleasure at being able to welcome him in Moscow, and also making one or two other points, to which Dobrynin claimed not to be privy.

Middle East

Secondly, Dobrynin said, the Soviet Leaders wanted to propose to the President to move the Middle East into the same sort of framework as Berlin had been. They had concluded that the present negotiations could not lead anywhere and they would, therefore welcome a different approach.

I commented that the Middle East was much more complex than Berlin because the factors were much less in our control and because the discretion of the people could not be guaranteed. Did Dobrynin expect an immediate answer? He said it would certainly make a good impression if the President would indicate at least that he did not reject the

2 Document 324. In a “talker” memorandum on September 20, Lord and Rodman reminded Kissinger that “the President asked you to ‘brace Dobrynin’ about Brezhnev’s failure to mention [in his letter] the offensive side of the May 20 SALT understanding.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [2 of 3])
idea. I told him that at best this would be a slow process and would require some exploratory talks to see whether it was worthwhile.

Dobrynin said it is something that might well go on until the Summit. The Soviets were not in a hurry but they wanted to see some progress.

Message on Indochina

Dobrynin then said he had another message. He wanted us to understand that Podgorny had not invited himself to Hanoi but had been asked to go there urgently by the Government of North Vietnam. Secondly, the Soviet Union would be prepared to be helpful if we had any ideas on how to narrow the differences, particularly if we had any message that Podgorny should take to Hanoi. Gromyko had said that Podgorny would be getting to Hanoi in early October. I told Dobrynin I would think about this and let him know.3

Miscellaneous

Dobrynin then invited me to have tea with Gromyko on the occasion of Gromyko’s visit on September 30th.

I returned the discussion to the Middle East and told Dobrynin that it was important, as long as the possibility of direct talks with me were open, that not too much of a sideshow went on in New York because we would then excite everybody too much and create too many different channels.

I also told Dobrynin it would help if Podgorny would not make violently anti-American statements while he was in Hanoi. Dobrynin said he would pass that message on.

Dobrynin also commented that he did not expect too much to come out of the meetings between Gromyko and Rogers on the Middle East, since the Soviets had pretty much given up on that channel.

There was some desultory talk on how to arrange the meeting, who would take the initiative between the President and Gromyko in moving from the President’s office to another office, and so forth. We agreed

3 In his covering memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger reported that he told Dobrynin that “in any event it would help if Podgorny refrains from making violently anti-American statements while there.” Kissinger also expanded on the Soviet offer to deliver a message: “The question of Soviet involvement in Vietnam diplomacy has of course come up before in my talks with Dobrynin. (He offered on March 25, for example, to carry a message to North Vietnamese leaders attending the Party Congress in Moscow; on July 29, I suggested to him that now was a useful moment for Soviet intervention.) But this new Soviet offer I believe is particularly forthcoming and concrete: it is an offer to try to bridge the differences, not just to carry messages. It comes against the background of your China announcement and the whole new tone of U.S.-Soviet relations. And it is especially timely from our point of view.”
to meet again on the morning of September 29th at 9:00 a.m., in the Map Room, in order to go over final arrangements for the meeting.\(^4\)

\(^4\) Kissinger called Nixon at 6:46 p.m., presumably to report on his meeting with Dobrynin. Rather than discuss matters over the telephone, the two men then met in the Residence at the White House from 6:50 to 7:14 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of either conversation has been found.

331. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and economic issues, including textile talks with the Japanese.]

Nixon: Well, let me say, your conversation with your friend [Dobrynin] was very interesting, though.\(^2\)

Kissinger: I thought it was.

Nixon: It’s very important.

Kissinger: And when they start feeding out this stuff through a lot of other channels—

Nixon: I have a—and I particularly liked the idea that you have in mind. And the way I’m going to do it this time, I’m not going to continue in another room. I’m just going to ask Rogers and everybody else to leave—say, “I’d like to speak with the Foreign Minister for a moment alone.”

Kissinger: Sure.

Nixon: You just leave and I’ll talk to him here.

Kissinger: We go to the Cabinet Room.

Nixon: You get the hell out. That’s right.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 449–12. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger and Haldeman in the Oval Office on September 21 from 12:46 to 1:08 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

\(^2\) See Document 330.
Nixon: No reason for me to take him out. And I'll say, "Now, I want to tell you about this." And then he, at that time, should give me the summit invitation. Right?

Kissinger: He doesn't have to do it. We just say he did it.

Nixon: Well, I'll just say that, when I speak to him, I'll say, "I appreciate the summit invitation," and so forth, and then we—but that is the basis for telling Rogers.

Kissinger: And that gives you an explanation of what you spent a half an hour with him on.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: We'll just tell Rogers that you agreed on the spot to the announcement. That keeps me out of it.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: His feelings won't be hurt. And it focuses it all on you.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: And then, as they leave, then they're attacking you.

Nixon: Well, the minute that it's done, I'll just call him [Rogers] in and say, "Well, he [Gromyko] made the summit thing and I just agreed that we'd have the announcement on the 12th."

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: And I've agreed it'll be in May.

Kissinger: Right. I think that way, you'll get—

Nixon: Right. Very polished.

Haldeman: I mean, you then tell Bill not to tell anybody at State?

Nixon: Hell, yes. You're goddamn right. I'll say, "We're going to have the same rule on this we had on China." We'll inform them right before because the Russians are just as sensitive as the Chinese about a leak.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Don't you agree?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: Everybody will be informed. Incidentally, anyway there isn't the same problem of informing. People expect us to meet with the Russians.

Kissinger: Well, we'll have to let NATO know about it.

Nixon: I understand, but it isn't the—

Kissinger: Well, it's not the bombshell—

Nixon: What?

Kissinger: It's going to—the funny thing is—

Nixon: It isn't?
Kissinger: It doesn’t got to fit a goddamn, Bob. No one is speculating on it.

Haldeman: Not any more. They used to. They used to talk about a Russian summit, didn’t they?

Nixon: Well, they think the Chinese thing knocks it out of the box and so forth.

Haldeman: The one thing they’re speculating on now is that what’s-his-name is coming to the U.N. and will come down and see you or something.

Nixon: Yeah, Kosygin.

Kissinger: Gromyko.

Haldeman: Kosygin.

Nixon: Kosygin.

Kissinger: Is he coming to the U.N.?

Haldeman: He’s going to Canada and then, or something—

Nixon: Right.

Haldeman: And then they’re saying he may go to the U.N., and then he’ll come down and see the President on the SALT thing,

Nixon: That must not fly. [unclear] Damn it, I won’t see him here. I’m not going to.

Kissinger: Oh, no, no, no.

Haldeman: The speculation, they’re just going wild. They’ve also got you going to China this weekend too. They say the Alaska trip is just a cover and that you’re really going to China.

Nixon: Yeah. [laughs]

Kissinger: Dobrynin asked me that too. I said, “Listen, Anatol. Do you really believe—can you seriously believe that the President—”

Nixon: [laughs]

Kissinger: “—would go from a visit with Hirohito to Peking?”

Nixon: [laughs]

Kissinger: You should have [seen] my face.

Haldeman: But that’s the value of your surprise stuff. They now—

Nixon: They’re scared to death.

Haldeman: —scared to death.

Nixon: I know.

Haldeman: They fear probably you’re [laughs]—you’re capable of anything.

Kissinger: When we announce it—and that’s why I think it’d be best if you didn’t go to this accidental war signing.

Nixon: I don’t want to go.

Kissinger: It makes it too big.
Nixon: Good. Who decided that? Well, I didn’t want to go. It builds it up too much.

Kissinger: Yeah. It builds it up too much and also makes people think something else may be going on.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: And since it’s close enough, the 12th is—

Nixon: Well, Gromyko’s going to be in here. That’s enough. We’ll give them that.

Haldeman: That’s enough Russian stuff.

Nixon: And then for me to go on—it’s slobbering over the Russians too much.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: And—

Haldeman: Then two weeks later you’re announcing the trip.

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion of textile negotiations with the Japanese and the President’s schedule.]

Nixon: You know, incidentally, one thing that may have helped us a little—I was mentioning it to Bob before—one thing that may help us at the present time with both the Chinese and the Russians is that, as Colson was pointing out here, we have a situation where both Gallup and Harris have reported within the last two weeks that the President has moved ahead of all three Democratic candidates.

Kissinger: Yeah. Oh, enormously.

Nixon: Yeah, now that—we haven’t moved yet enormously.

Kissinger: No, no. It helps enormously.

Haldeman: It helps enormously.

Nixon: Exactly.

Haldeman: That’s what Henry was talking about. On the floor of the Senate—

Kissinger: That’s what I was talking about, Mr. President.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Haldeman: That figure he had was not that.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. I didn’t think there was some new Gallup poll.

Kissinger: No, no. No, I was talking about the fact that in the trial heats you were ahead of them all by—

Haldeman: You won the draft, 55 to 30.  

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3 Reference is to the Senate vote on September 20 to extend the military draft.
Nixon: That’s great.
Kissinger: Last week, at this time, everyone felt that we couldn’t—
Haldeman: The fall-off in votes was due to the fact that many Senators thought the debate would go on, so they walked off the floor and missed the final vote.
Nixon: [laughs]
Haldeman: So when they held it for a while to give them [some time] but only 85 voted out of 91.
Kissinger: Well, but when the Russians say, Mr. President, that—you know, I’ve [unclear] 70 percent of the [unclear]. But when Dobrynin says that a lot of his people used to think that you couldn’t be dealt with, that they’d be better off with another President, and that this has changed completely, that’s a gratuitous comment he doesn’t have to make.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: And since they said essentially the same thing to Brandt,4 if that word gets around, that’s, as it must—
Nixon: That’d be fine.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Thanks, Henry.
Kissinger: Right, Mr. President.

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4 Brandt met Brezhnev September 16–18 at Oreanda in the Crimea. In a special channel message to Kissinger on September 20, Bahr reported: “In general, Brezhnev reviewed American policy from a new perspective, spoke with respect for the President and of his hope to make progress on the reduction of tensions. This sounded like everything is considerably more positive now than one year ago.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [1 of 3]) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 330. The original German text is printed in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1971, Vol. II, Document 318.
Washington, September 21, 1971, 11 p.m.

P: Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Any later reports?

K: No, I have spent a good part of the evening reading the Intelligence Reports and I have written a memorandum which you will get first thing in the morning of my assessment of the situation. I have also asked CIA to prepare one but I have not seen that yet.

P: Yes.

K: My instinct tells me, Mr. President, whatever it is it isn’t the death of Mao. [5 lines not declassified] Now we know it was not us and we know it is not anyone we are watching so it my have been the Soviets. So it may have a military significance. There could have been a clash or they may genuinely think that the Soviets are getting ready to jump them.

P: Right.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 29, Home File. No classification marking.

2 During a meeting in the Oval Office at 4:16 p.m., Kissinger reported: “Something funny is going on in China, Mr. President. They have—there is a stand-down on civil aviation there for nearly a week now. And today they have cancelled the October 1st parade on their national holiday. We’ve had other reports that they’ve been taking down pictures of Mao.” After speculating on the possibility of Mao’s death, Nixon asked Kissinger if a rival leadership group was “taking it out on Chou En-lai for his American initiative.” “Conceivable,” Kissinger replied. “But those are the guys who are also the most—no, they are the most anti-Russian too. The Cultural Revolutionists were the ones that physically peed on the Russian Ambassador.” Nixon observed: “Well, put yourself in their position: either side has got, it would seem to me, has got to play this game with us.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 449–17) The two men further discussed the impact of these developments during a meeting in the Oval Office at 5:02. Kissinger: “We’ve got everything linked together, just as you said. We’ve got the Middle East. We’ve got everything in the game now.” Nixon: “Well, if the Chinese should knock this thing off, what does that do to the Russians? They’ll still want the visit?” Kissinger: “Oh, yeah. But we’ve just got a little less pressure on them. With a visit, I think if the visit to China is in the cards, the Russians are going to be most eager to—not most eager. We have a pretty good chance now of bringing off that ploy which I have in my memo to you. If the visit to China is not in the cards, they’ll be a little less eager. They’ll be a little less under pressure. On the other hand, they might figure, they better use this time to get us lined up. It would be better for us, if there were no turmoil in China.” (Ibid., Conversation 449–20)

K: You remember t—[omission in transcript]
P: About this time of the year would be the time to do it, wouldn’t it?

K: That’s right. And when I was there, they told me that was one of their concerns that after the announcement of your trip they thought that their neighbors might jump them and we know from a particular source we have [less than 1 line not declassified] which is infallible [less than 1 line not declassified]
P: Right.

K: That they went on full alert the day that they announced your visit. So it may be that. Of course, it may also be a Leadership struggle. They may not want that many people in Peking for a parade while the struggle is going on.

P: Yes.

K: I think there is the possibility Mao is dead, but there just isn’t any reliable—there is no news at all to all practical purposes, except for these fragments like the ones I read you this afternoon or the later one, only in terms of it coming to my attention—[less than 1 line not declassified] that gives them about four days warning of an air stand-down which does not sound like a death to me.

P: Yes. Okay. Well, of course, we should have a contingency in the event—well, any contingency in the event that their announcement affects our operation.

K: Exactly. I am going to get a group together tomorrow to do exactly that.

P: It could well be that they are just jittery about the Russians.

K: It could well be that, Mr. President.

P: It may be they would be well advised to—

K: Well, if they were jittery about the Russians and if that is all this is, then it actually means our game is succeeding.

P: Yes.

K: And that will help the later evolution quite a lot. It does indicate how sensitive we have to be to their requirements on announcements and so forth.

P: Yes. I think rather indicates why they wanted [October] the 14th.4

K: Yes.

P: They must have known this at the time they requested the 14th.

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4 Reference is to the date Huang Chen suggested in Paris on September 13 for the announcement of Kissinger’s trip to China. See Document 326.
K: Oh yes. They stood down starting the 10th.
P: They told you on the 13th.
K: Exactly.
P: I see. You didn’t know on the 13th they ordered the stand-down?
K: Well, I knew either on the 13th or shortly afterwards, Mr. President, but at that point it seemed like perhaps a normal precautionary exercise. But this protracted stand-down—but even that—the stand-down by itself would not have been so decisive unless it were very much longer protracted but it was the cancellation of the October 1st parade which is totally unprecedented in any Communist country. In the Soviet Union once they cancelled the military part of the parade but they have never cancelled the celebration.
P: And in this instance, they have actually publicly ordered the cancellation of the parade, have they?
K: Exactly.
P: That is why people are reading a significance into it.
K: That is why. I did, for example, get a report last week saying that all pictures of Mao were beginning to disappear but that again Mr. President would not be consistent with his death. What interest would anyone have after he is dead to do anything with him except to build him up as a Diety?
P: Yes. And of course reports about his pictures disappearing may have been Taiwan-oriented.
K: Exactly. This is why I didn’t feel I should run into you with every agent report. These were agent reports. These were not evaluated reports. At that time, I was watching the stand-down. That seemed interesting to me, but we have gone through those periods before—not on the Chinese side but on the Russian side in 1969. They stood down for two weeks in Siberia [1½ lines not declassified] and it may be just a war of nerves.
P: My view is the Russians would never think of jumping, having in mind our trip.
K: Well, of course, they had a Summit announcement set for 1968 but that was with a Lame Duck President on the day they invaded Czechoslovakia. But that was with a Lame Duck President. Unless they jump them, Mr. President, then we would have to go hard right.
P: On the Russians?
K: Yes.
P: Oh hell yes. We are not going to have any damned condominium with the Russians, don’t you agree?
K: Absolutely. If they did that, we should rally our allies and knock off all détente and build up the defense budget and rally the American people and [fight] the war in Vietnam brutally.
P: Yes. Well, good.
K: But I don’t think that is going to happen.
P: No. I am inclined to think it is going to work out in some way.
K: Well, so far we have no evidence that anything is happening.
P: You may get a reply from them too. However, I would say now
that if you don’t get a reply within a week then there is something
screwed up. I would say about a week, wouldn’t you say?
K: Yes. If by the middle of next week if we have not had a reply
then we are getting into a zone where it is going to be technically tough
to arrange.
P: As far as your trip is concerned?
K: Yes. But something is clearly screwed up. That you can tell al-
ready because they have always been meticulous in their reply. It is
very fast or at least if they didn’t reply they did something planned.
P: You could have a group of younger officers that—you know af-
after all the country is in a sort of miserable condition, let’s face it and
it just may be that a group of younger officers came to their senses—
hardliners—and said well the hell with them, we’ll throw them out.
K: Yes and if it has we wouldn’t know any of them.
P: We wouldn’t know any of them and they—if they are hardlin-
ers, they are going to hardline on the Russians too.
K: There is no question that a reconciliation with the Russians
seems to me the least likely outcome.
P: That, in my view, would be the greatest danger.
K: Yes, but that is the least likely outcome. You remember, every
time we have thought we were drawing closer the opposite has hap-
pened. And I don’t believe that—if the Cultural Revolutionists are mak-
ing a coup, then they will be very hardline to the Russians. They will
also be hardline to us. Of course, one other possibility, Mr. President,
on the more hopeful side, is that Chou-En lai is cleaning out the Cul-
tural Revolutionists preparatory to your visit.
P: Sure.
K: I mean that would fit the evidence too—that Chou En-lai know-
ing of my visit for which he wants to be ready—and of your visit, is

5 Huang Chen gave Walters the Chinese reply in Paris on September 23. “Despite
the press speculation on Chinese events which originated in Paris and the denial issued
by the Chinese Embassy there that Mao was ill or dying,” Walters noted in a memo-
randum for the record, “I did not bring up current events in China and neither did they.”
(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, For the President’s
Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, China Exchanges, July–October 20, 1971)
The full text is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents on China,
consolidating his position. And if that is the case, all the signs are consistent with that too. And he would want to make sure—

P: Yes but certainly, too, they must have read—I think my press conference came at a very important time\(^6\) because he—whatever is happening—they read that and I think if anything that would strengthen his hand.

K: That is right and Chou En-lai is the only leader who has been seen performing his normal functions in the last week.

P: Has he still been performing them?

K: Well, he has been seen running around Peking in his normal way and none of the military leaders have been seen anywhere.

P: He has been seen?

K: He has been seen and their Acting Foreign Minister has been seen, which would tend to strengthen the position that maybe if a purge is going on it is by Chou En-lai of his opponent.

P: Yes. You know on the Vietnam side. I have really been cogitating a lot about that. I become more and more intrigued with the idea that rather than thinking in terms of an announcement in January that we might announce in December or November a pulldown to 100,000 for whatever date we want to select—and just say we will have another announcement later.

K: That is another possibility.

P: You know put it—that would be February I suppose.

K: That’s right.

P: Anyway, and then having said that we say that I also think in January that if these fellows are still as intransigent as hell, we just might risk the whole ball—you know the more I think of it we might just risk the whole ball on the idea that if they are still screwing around with the prisoners rather than to go on the deal while prisoners for Thieu’s head rests that we just simply say, “now look here, we got enough, we have heard everything,” you know give out the whole record. Say now we give them an ultimatum. Get these prisoners or—that is until they do we are going to blockade them. By that I mean—by blockade I mean maybe it is mining and the cutting of that railroad and take out those power plants. Goddamnit, you could have a lot of public sentiment for that.

K: Well, with respect to the first, Mr. President, as much time as we can buy in November the better off we will be. With respect to what we do—I think in any event whenever you announce your final thing

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\(^6\) See Document 308.
we ought to break off in Paris and just keep a liaison team there. At that point, there would be no sense in keeping Porter in Paris.

P: Yes. We would say withdraw our Ambassador. And we will just have a liaison office there. That they have refused—

K: Which in itself will be a tremendous thing for the prisoners.

P: And that in the meantime that our patience is running out on that. We are going to retain forces until we get the prisoners and, then I would go—I really think there is one place for the American people and it would serve a double purpose to support us and that is it would cause ripples with the Chinese and Russians but maybe not so much as we think. We would simply say now dammit we want those prisoners and then by blockading or quarantining is the word I’d use and we will lift the quarantine when we get the prisoners. Now that really very seriously limits their ability to wage a spring offensive.

K: Right. It will depend, Mr. President, on how our relationship to the Chinese and Soviets has developed at that point.

P: True. True.

K: And if we have to give a lot away to one or the other. But certainly it is an option that we should keep very much in mind.

P: Yes. Well, I want that prepared.

K: Right Mr. President. It will be done.

P: Another thing. It seems to me that we might try a little war of nerves. You know, we went through that business of the loading those damned mines and moving the carriers and all that sort of thing—the mine sweepers, etc.

K: Right. I remember—in 1969.7

P: Well. Let’s try it again. I would like to see Moorer have that on salvo again.

K: Right Mr. President.

P: We could move planes and a helluva lot of other things around [as] if we are ready for a helluvan offense.

K: I will talk to Moorer first thing in the morning.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and economic policy.]

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Another thing I want to be able to say in Detroit if I can. I would like to give them some hope on East-West trade.\footnote{The President conducted a question-and-answer session for the Economic Club of Detroit at 8 p.m. on September 23. Although he did not address the issue of East-West trade, Nixon advised the audience that recent developments in China probably would not affect his plans to visit Beijing. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 965–980)}

K: Yes. That you can do Mr. President because you can point out—I will get you the figures—that this year alone we have already approved over $5 billion, in addition to the other programs, and there is more in the works.

P: Well, the Kama River thing. They are terribly interested in that you know and anything we can say on that in positive, I would like to say out there if I could.

K: Well, the problem is on that Mr. President, we are not the problem. The problem is that this whole thing is getting renegotiated. But there is one contract in for Swindler-Dresser Corporation for some $285 million on top of the foundry which we have already approved, which is part of the Kama River project. You will be able to tell them that we have given close to $400 million—I mean approved that—for one project alone.

P: Well, why don’t you do a little talking point on that particular matter about East-West trade and what the prospects are for the future. Will you do that?

K: Exactly. Of course. I will do it first thing in the morning.

P: I won’t need it until late in the afternoon.

K: Right Mr. President.

P: I’ll be working tomorrow in the EOB and if anything develops you can reach me.

K: Of course. I will let you know the second we know anything.\footnote{During a meeting in the Executive Office Building the next morning, Kissinger gave Nixon his memorandum on the situation in China (see footnote 3 above) and commented: “Well, I’ve reviewed the thing a little more until I’ve—and I’m beginning to think—this is a good summary of what we know.” “The two most likely possibilities are either that Mao is ill, which I don’t believe,” Kissinger later concluded, “or that Chou is purging his opponents.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 279–2) Six weeks later, John Holdridge confirmed in a November 6 memorandum to Kissinger that Lin Biao, Mao’s heir apparent, had been killed in a mysterious airplane crash in Mongolia on September 12. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 524, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. II)} This may be a false alarm Mr. President. This may be a purely military exercise. Or it could be a purge of Chou of his opponent.

P: Or it could be a purge of Chou by his opponent. Although his presence doesn’t seem to me—

K: That is inconsistent with his presence.
P: That is right.
K: One would have to assume that he is the stronger of the people right now. I mean having ridden through the Cultural Revolution it would be hard to know what would weaken him now.
P: Yes. But you remember Mr. K went when nobody expected him to.
K: That’s true.
P: So you never know what is happening in the goddamned countries, do you?
K: That is true but he had had a whole series of failures.
P: Chou, in my view, is looking pretty damned good in the world today. You know he has been seeing Western people. He is getting a helluva press in the world and you know, that ought to impress these people.
K: That’s right. And he is damned near indispensable Mr. President. He has run the goddamned country.
P: And the Chinese—they are getting, in my view, as most sophisticated observers are saying, a helluva lot out of their meeting with us. I notice where some jackass from the American [Friends] Service Committee said that Chou would insist that the U.S. withdraw from Asia.
K: On that is total nonsense. He has read the Reston interview. 10
P: Yes. Well, we finished that interview off.
K: That is the truth.
P: Well, let’s get Moorer to work on some contingency plans, will you?
K: Right Mr. President.
P: Also, but in any event, as far as contingency plans, let’s have a few naval maneuvers up from there.
K: Right Mr. President.
P: The Navy can move around and put some mine sweepers up there and a few other little odds and ends.
K: I will talk it over with Moorer the first thing in the morning. 11
P: Okay.
K: Right Mr. President. Goodbye.

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11 No record of a conversation between Kissinger and Moorer on September 22 has been found.
New York, September 25, 1971, 1918Z.


Following is Noform, FYI only, uncleared and subject to revision on review.

1. Participants: USSR—FM Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin, PermRep Malik, Mr. Mendelevich, Mr. Kornienko, Mr. Vorontsov, Mr. Israelyan, Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreter/notetaker); US—The Secretary, Ambassador Bush, Ambassador Beam, Mr. Pedersen, Mr. Sisco, Mr. DePalma, Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Muromcwt (interpreter/notetaker).

2. The Secretary opened the discussion by stating his gratification at the positive outcome of the Berlin talks and felt it useful now to discuss the problem of the mutual reduction of forces and their relation to the Berlin problem. The US side has already mentioned its interest to the Soviet Ambassador. Now was the time to discuss possible procedures.

3. FM Gromyko replied that the Soviet side had noted US’s statement on European security and, if correctly understood, the USG is sympathetically considering a European security conference. As earlier indicated the Soviet side has no intention to pursue any treacherous aims or to harm any nation. The Soviet side is being guided by the desire to find a way to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve the European situation as well as the relations between countries, all countries, Gromyko stressed, not only between European countries. What he had said so far was not new but now it was necessary to see what practical measures can be taken to pursue above aims.

4. It would be well he continued, to have a preferably multilateral meeting to discuss the agenda, the participants, and to finalize other questions such as the time for such a meeting. He felt that the Finnish proposal should be considered to speed up the work. He would hope on his return from the UN to report to the Soviet Government that the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 USSR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow. Rogers forwarded a copy of the telegram with a September 28 memorandum to the President on the upcoming meeting with Gromyko. “My discussions with Gromyko in New York last week,” Rogers observed, “were cordial and reflected the improved atmosphere in US-Soviet relations from last year.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko, 1971–1972) Nixon, however, apparently saw neither the telegram nor the memorandum; see footnote 1, Document 334.
USG agrees to such an approach and would agree to such a meeting next year. And hopefully be even more specific on the date to which all participants would have to agree.

5. The Secretary then asked FM Gromyko to clarify his thoughts on the agenda and whether all or only some of the participating nations would take part in the preliminary meeting. FM Gromyko replied that he would like to seek all nations participating in such a preliminary meeting. The Secretary then asked about the level of such a preliminary meeting and also about the timing in relation to the ratification (after final signature) of the Berlin agreement.2

6. FM Gromyko thought that no strict relationships should be applied but the developments were such that it would be better to have the ratification first. The FRG Government, to his knowledge proceeded from the same assumption. He expected the ratification to take place early next year but this should not be a pre-condition for the preliminary, he stressed, preliminary conference to discuss the agenda and the organization of the full conference. His side was open minded as to the level of the preliminary conference. It could be, for instance, on the deputy foreign minister level or their equivalents. It was up to each of the governments to appoint a suitable representative. Some countries could authorize their ambassadors to Finland. The main point in his view was not to get tied up by a protocol consideration but to remain flexible.

7. The Secretary replied that any meeting of this nature would assume the aura of a conference. The US side planned to be flexible and find ways to accomplish this without a conference. One could, for instance, have bilateral exploratory talks on procedure and agenda without convening a conference. Such an approach would alleviate the problem of having a conference before the ratification.

8. Gromyko replied that perhaps a very modest term could be found to describe such a meeting. He felt that bilateral talks would not serve the purpose since the agreement of other countries was needed. It would take too long to do this in writing. The problem was to find a suitable and rational format to prepare for the conference. He was against sitting and waiting for the ratification. After all, he argued, the US and the USSR are conducting parallel talks on different subjects.

9. The Secretary replied that he had no intention to decide on the conference in a bilateral manner but was looking for a less structured approach to the problem. He foresaw difficulties with a conference before the ratification. The FRG stated that it has to have a satisfactory

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2 Reference should be to ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties and signature of the Final Protocol for the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.
solution on Berlin before they could participate in a European conference. He then asked for the Soviet views on mutual reduction of forces, that is, to discuss it at the conference or to negotiate it separately.

10. FM Gromyko replied that he would prefer separate talks on the reduction of forces in order not to burden the main conference with too many items. He also thought it possible to exchange views on the reduction of forces before convening the European security conference. It would also be possible to create a special body or machinery to deal with this question at the security conference in which all countries would participate. He stressed that the reduction of forces could also be treated separately as an isolated item.

11. The Secretary inquired whether the same nations would be participating in both conferences. FM Gromyko replied that all European countries interested in it will participate but this should not mean that it would affect the armaments of all the European countries. He could not present a detailed plan at this point and hoped that the US side was not expecting it from him. He could however list some, if not all, principal points: (a) the reduction of armed forces will pertain to foreign as well as national forces; (b) this question must not be viewed in terms of blocs but on basis of separate states. To use the bloc approach would put many countries on guard. This was all he could say at this time and could offer no further analysis. He would hope to have an exchange with the US side on this subject of a more concrete nature.

12. But the Secretary inquired whether a single person could deal with the Soviet Union and other countries in this matter. FM Gromyko doubted that this would be the best approach because having one person from each group would give this enterprise a bloc aspect. The Soviet Union was not afraid of this but in general was not enthusiastic fearing that some countries may react negatively and not without a reason. Therefore a more acceptable form was needed to please potential participants. The Secretary then suggested a committee. FM Gromyko continued that the above reservations did not apply to a US representative who would meet a Soviet representative. In no case should this be a NATO representative or a Warsaw Pact representative. A more flexible attitude was needed. For instance, a US and a Soviet representative could meet and then the USG would share the views with others just as the Soviet Union would do with her allies. Let us go outside of the bloc framework and I invite your attention to this proposal, concluded FM Gromyko. The Secretary suggested to continue these talks in Washington.

13. Ambassador Bush then presented a brief report on the parliamentary situation in the UN on the ChiRep issue. This was an important issue for the US although his colleague, the Soviet PermRep Malik, would argue that the Middle East is a far more important question.
at this time. The problems included differences of official positions of several governments and some people at the UN thought that the US side was not serious about it. The President and the Secretary had determined to work on a solution of this problem, in particular about seating Taiwan and Peking.

14. On the China question FM Gromyko wanted to say again that the position of his government was known and has not changed. In the interest of his government’s policy and in the interest of the UN he could not act otherwise. There was nothing new he could state and his government will maintain the same position during the whole session. If the USG would like to communicate some new nuances he would be glad to hear them and take note of them. In conclusion he congratulated Amb Bush on his efforts.

15. Turning to the Secretary FM Gromyko asked him for his views on the outcome on the China question. The Secretary replied that it was too early to tell but the US side hoped to succeed. Gromyko then asked whether the Secretary expected the Chinese to come in case of a successful outcome. The Secretary replied that he was aware of their present position but that governments had a way of changing their views in face of reality. He added that the Middle East question will have to be discussed in the near future.

16. Ambassador Beam then raised the question of divided families in the USSR and in the US adding that this question had been under discussion since 1959 and meant a lot to the families concerned but was such a small matter for the Soviet Government. He then transmitted a list to the Soviet representative Kornienko.3

17. The question of a statement to the press was briefly discussed in light vein. In conclusion the Secretary said again how glad he was about the progress achieved during the last year and hoped to continue in the same spirit and was looking forward to seeing FM Gromyko in Washington next week. In reply FM Gromyko assured the Secretary of the willingness the Soviet side also to continue in the same spirit of cooperation.

Rogers

3 Not found.
SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, Wednesday, September 29, at 3:00 p.m.

Ninety minutes have been set aside for your conversation with Gromyko. The first part will include Secretary Rogers and the interpreters. For the last twenty minutes or so, you will want to talk to Gromyko alone without other participants. I am sending you a separate memo on this private session. While the other participants are present you should avoid referring to the recent exchange of letters with Brezhnev, in order to preserve the strict confidentiality of this channel.

You may wish to adopt the same procedure as last year’s meeting with Gromyko:

1) a general review of Soviet-American relations and the prospects;
2) followed by a discussion of specific issues—primarily SALT, European questions, the Middle East, South Asia and Vietnam;
3) any discussion of China could be reserved for the end; Gromyko is not likely to mention it, but you may want to bring it up.

The Setting

The circumstances of this meeting contrast with those surrounding your meeting with him last October. At that time our relations with the USSR were beclouded and uncertain. We had passed through the Middle East cease-fire crisis; there had been the flare-up over the missile submarines in Cuba; the issues under negotiation seemed to be stalled; bilateral relations were aggravated by small irritating matters.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko, 1971–1972. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for information. According to Richard Kennedy, Hyland drafted the memorandum, presumably before the meeting between Rogers and Gromyko in New York on September 24. (Memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger, September 24; ibid.) A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Rogers also submitted talking points on September 28 for Nixon’s meeting with Gromyko. According to Sonnenfeldt, however, there was “virtually no substance in the memo.” Haig apparently decided not to forward the Secretary’s talking points to the President. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, September 29; ibid.)

2 Document 335.

3 Documents 309 and 324.

4 See Document 23.
All of this was reflected to some degree in your discussion with the Foreign Minister.

_Since then_

— We have concluded the Berlin agreement.
— There has been a breakthrough in SALT in the May 20 announcement.
— The Middle East cease-fire has held, even if the prospects for a settlement are not bright.
— In our bilateral relations there has been some clearing of secondary issues (e.g., the question of regulations on Soviet shipping, and recent trade decisions).
— We will hold bilateral discussions on incidents at sea.
— In Geneva we have agreed with the USSR on a treaty banning biological warfare.
— In SALT the issues have been sharpened for major decision.

_In short, in the interval since you last saw Gromyko there has been encouraging movement._ Looking back on this period, we can see an apparent pattern of offer and acceptance beginning with your UN speech of last year and the Foreign Policy message, and the favorable response made by Brezhnev in his address to the Party Congress in late March. Thus, it seems that we are dealing with a commitment by Brezhnev to an active “peace program” as his Party Congress performance is now described by the Soviets—a commitment to better relations with the West in general, and the US in particular. There is no doubt that our China policy has provided an additional incentive for Brezhnev to demonstrate that he, too, can do business with the US, and that your visit to Peking is not, in fact, a setback to his policies.

_Unfortunately, it cannot be said that a decisive qualitative change in relations has occurred. This remains the major political decision to be taken in the Kremlin._ There are aspects of Soviet policy that are cause for concern. Their military programs continue to move forward at a pace that is disturbing if contrasted with the pace of SALT. They have started about 90 new ICBMs since late last year; they are filling out the Moscow ABM system, and enlarging ballistic submarine production. Tensions within Eastern Europe are rising because of Soviet policies. You are aware of the concern of the Romanians. It is quite conceivable that the

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5 Nixon and Kissinger met Corneliu Bogdan, the Romanian Ambassador, in the Oval Office at 11 a.m. on September 17. During the meeting, Bogdan reported that the Romanian Government was very concerned about Soviet “threats and pressures.” When Nixon asked “[w]hat can we do,” Bogdan replied: “In short, anything that lets the Soviets know that détente with the U.S. was dependent on their restraint vis-à-vis Romania.” Kissinger assured Bogdan that the “United States will make clear in its way to the Soviet Union that unilateral pressures or military actions are not consistent with a relaxation of tensions.” See _Foreign Relations_, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 207.
Soviets will use European “détente” to settle scores with their Romanian, and even Yugoslav, adversaries.

In sum, we still do not know whether the Soviet leaders have been engaged in some tactical maneuvers to regulate their Western flanks while they prepare to deal with their dissident allies and with China, or whether a deeper trend in East-West relations is evolving.

Gromyko’s Purpose and Line

Gromyko’s most important task will be to take back to the top leaders a personal assessment of the prospects for further movement in Soviet-American relations in light of our China policy. There is bound to be some apprehension in Moscow over your visit to Peking and uncertainties over our intentions toward the USSR. Gromyko’s line, judging from the recent letter from Brezhnev will be that it is up to us, not the USSR, to demonstrate a continuing interest in constructive bilateral relations.

—His position will be that both the Middle East and Vietnam are tests for our policies, and as long as they remain unsettled they will cast a shadow over US-Soviet relations.
—In addition, he will probably exert some mild pressure on European issues—a European Conference and force reductions—as further tests in the wake of the Berlin settlement.
—Finally, he may complain of some disappointment over progress in SALT because of our alleged unwillingness to accept their definition of equality.

Your Purpose and Basic Message

Your basic aim will be to impress on Gromyko that now—the next several months—is the time to take another major step to turn our relations clearly onto a new course.

—The achievements of the past year, since you last saw him are impressive: Berlin and the May 20 SALT agreement, and clearing away some of the irritants in bilateral relations.
—We should not allow this momentum to be lost, and we can continue to reinforce the progress already achieved only if we continue to take account of each other’s interest in a spirit of reciprocity.
—In your view the areas for further progress are those where the US and USSR are most immediately involved and this means first of all the SALT talks.

SALT

Our offer at Helsinki is still on the table: we are proposing that (1) we retain our two Safeguard ABM sites (Grand Forks and Malmstrom) that are under construction (200 missiles total), (2) the Soviets can retain their Moscow ABM system and add to it to the level of 100 missiles, (3) a general freeze on ICBMs, allowing them to complete missiles under construction, except for the 25 new SS–9 silos, and (4) a
freeze on submarine-launched missiles, again, however, allowing the Soviets to complete those under construction.\footnote{The U.S. SALT Delegation tabled a draft package, which included the texts of an ABM treaty and an interim agreement on offensive weapons, at the fifth round of the SALT talks in Helsinki on July 27. See \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 183.} The net result would be that the Soviets would have about a 500 edge in number of ICBMs, we would have the same number of nuclear ballistic submarines (41), but the Soviets would have a slight advantage in older models that they could retain, and we both retain ABMs at current locations.

Gromyko will argue that the May 20 agreement meant strict quality [equality?] in ABMs—which they translate to mean identical systems and the same numbers. Thus, we would be forced either to build a system around Washington, or, alternatively, allow the Soviets to build ABM defenses of ICBM sites while retaining the Moscow defense, thus giving them the advantage.

\textit{You may wish to stress the following points:}

—We are offering, in essence, that \textit{both} sides stay where they are on both offensive and defensive forces.
—But the Soviets argue for absolute homogeneity in ABM sites, while at the very same time propose an ICBM freeze based \textit{not} on equality but the status quo, where they have an advantage in numbers.
—We are saying let us freeze the rough status quo on both sides of the equation—we keep our two ABM sites, they keep the Moscow ABM system, and both sides freeze on ICBMs and the new class of ballistic nuclear submarines.
—This approach cannot possibly damage the USSR, and seems eminently fair. It is in fact what both sides are living with \textit{without} an agreement.
—We have little bargaining room left—especially on the ABMs.

\textit{European Issues}

\textit{You may wish to say:}

—You are encouraged by the Berlin agreement, particularly if one considers the role Berlin has played in tensions between the US and the USSR. It is a good example of what the US and USSR can achieve when they work cooperatively. We want to see the process completed. It would be unfortunate if what we have already achieved is degraded by squabbling over marginal issues.
—\textit{We have favored mutual force reductions as an issue that deals specifically with areas of tension. We will want to discuss some broad principles and issues before moving to translate them into more concrete propositions.} We have studied this question and we find it quite complex, perhaps even more so than SALT because of the number of countries involved, the differences in armaments, the geography, and so forth.
We have never opposed a European conference in principle. Our problem has always been what a conference would deal with in concrete terms. This is the subject to which we should now give attention.

**Middle East**

Since the US initiative to reestablish the cease-fire last summer, the Soviets have seemed uneasy that the US might produce Egyptian-Israeli agreement. The US–USSR contest for position is still finely enough balanced that they would not want us to appear able single-handedly to arrange the area’s affairs.

We have no evidence of Soviet inclination to contribute to diplomatic efforts on the present track. They may have urged the Egyptians to restrain their military activity, but at the price of building up the Egyptian forces. So far, they have not been brought into the exchanges on an interim settlement. Secretary Rogers tentatively plans to say only that we would expect Moscow to become involved at an appropriate time. The Soviets may feel that Sadat has been led to hope for more than the US could sell Israel.

You may wish to make the following points:

—You continue to give very serious personal attention to starting a process which could lead to an Arab-Israeli peace. This remains a major danger zone for the US and USSR.

—Discussion of a first step toward a settlement through an interim disengagement on the Suez Canal has seemed worth pursuing because both Israel and the UAR suggested it. This has promise because it would set the settlement process in motion without prejudicing final positions. Secretary Rogers in his talks in New York will hope to produce further movement on an interim agreement.

—Should Gromyko respond that the US is trying to do everything itself, you might respond that the Administration negotiated through 1969 in good faith. The US launched out alone only after five months of Soviet rejection and silence in our bilateral talks during which the USSR introduced its own combat forces into Egypt.

—You are concerned that the USSR continues to build Egyptian hopes for a military solution. Egyptian military adventurism would only produce another setback.

**South Asia**

In signing the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty, the Soviets seem to have taken advantage of the situation to consolidate their position in India, but without seriously trying to lessen basic dangers. The USSR reportedly restrained India from recognizing the exile government from East Pakistan then. But it may be giving tacit support to the Indian help for the East Bengali guerrillas. Although they too might face difficult decisions if China intervened, they could reason that India would win easily and both China and the US, as friends of Pakistan, would suffer a setback.
They have told Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Beam that the Soviet government is giving no encouragement to a separatist movement in East Pakistan and that the Soviets “do not like to be involved in such things” as the guerrilla movement. Their protestations are not fully convincing.

The pace of high-level consultations between the Indians and Soviets has increased markedly, and Mrs. Gandhi will be in Moscow September 27–30. Pressures on her to take military action are mounting and the degree of Soviet support will affect her calculations.

You may wish to make the following points:

—The US is concentrating on averting famine. Food shortages would generate a new flood of refugees. That could increase chances of war.

—It will take time for the necessary political process to work itself out in East Pakistan. A prolonged guerrilla war in East Pakistan would delay rather than speed up that political process. That cannot serve India’s interests or anybody else’s.

—A prolonged guerrilla war would also accelerate the refugee flow.

—A war between India and Pakistan would have unpredictable consequences with a significant risk of spreading to other countries. The US and USSR have an obligation to prevent this.

—The USSR has a responsibility not to take actions, or encourage others, in a direction that could cause hostilities. A war in South Asia would only produce greater tragedy there and would dislocate broader efforts to enhance international stability. The Soviets have played a peace-making role in the past. What is the Soviet position now?

Vietnam

In Vietnam the Soviets find themselves for the first time in a tactically strong position in Hanoi. Buttressing their posture as the Great Power protector of Hanoi—in contrast to alleged Chinese betrayal—is important to the Soviet image. At the same time, the Soviets fear that they may be dealt out of the Indochina settlement and out of South-east Asia altogether. While they cannot go beyond the current line in Hanoi, they clearly want to be kept in the diplomatic game.

You may say:

—There is no doubt that Vietnam continues to cause distortions in our relations with the USSR.

—We are disappointed in the Paris talks, and also disappointed with the role of the USSR.

—The Soviets have often said that they want the “speediest political settlement,” that we must withdraw, accept the seven points of the PRG, etc. The Soviet Government exerts great influence in Hanoi, perhaps more now than in previous periods. It is in a position to use that influence.

—But the Paris talks cannot be merely a process in which we accept the terms of the other side. Our willingness to negotiate is
quite clear. This is the message that the Soviet leaders should take to Hanoi.

—If the negotiating option remains closed, we will continue to move unilaterally. The choice is not ours, but Hanoi’s.

**China**

Gromyko will probably avoid the subject, but you may wish to close the conversation by noting your visit.

*You could say:*

—You are realistic enough to know that the USSR is a Great Power and that it would be fruitless to try to create pressures on the Soviet leaders. This is not your intention in visiting China, whatever interpretation may be put on the visit by others including the Chinese.

—Your aim is to end the hostility that has existed between the two countries for over twenty years and to lay the basis for relations which will be mutually beneficial and contribute to international stability.

—The Soviet leaders should appreciate our motives and share our aims. You have reason to believe that this message has been received and understood in Moscow.

(Note: You should not discuss the Chinese representation issue with Gromyko; he might try to claim to Peking that we sought Soviet support and that they rebuffed us.)

*In summary, your basic points to Gromyko should be:*

—Our relations have taken a favorable turn in the past year.

—We cannot rest on past accomplishment; we should capitalize on the momentum and achieve a qualitative change in our relationship.

—SALT shapes up as a test for both sides; you remain committed to the May 20 agreement.

—The other issues may not be ripe for a breakthrough, but the chance for progress will continue to be influenced by a mutual willingness to respect each other’s interest.
335. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Your Private Session with Gromyko on September 29, 1971

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has asked to see you alone for 20–30 minutes at the conclusion of your formal meeting on September 29. This private session was requested by Dobrynin in our September 20 conversation. He said that Gromyko had a personal message from Brezhnev for you which will express his pleasure that you are coming to Moscow and make one or two other points, to which Dobrynin claimed not to be privy.

You will want to underline the way in which US-Soviet relations have been improved the past year, along the following lines:

—You think the Dobrynin-Kissinger channel has worked well and should continue to be used for sensitive issues.
—You believe that our two countries have made good progress since your last talk with Gromyko. You hope we can further this trend as we move toward and carry off the summit next spring.
—You wish to underline that what Dr. Kissinger will say in his talk with the Foreign Minister the next day has been gone over personally by you. In view of the importance you attach to it you hope that it will be treated most seriously by the Soviet Government.

Dobrynin foreshadowed that Gromyko would raise the Middle East in your private talk. The Soviet leaders are proposing that this issue be handled in the same framework as Berlin was, having concluded that present efforts could not lead anywhere. They recognize that we are stymied in our initiative. They in turn, with their basic commitments to the Arabs, are under pressure to deliver something for them sooner or later if they are to preserve their influence.

The Russians have not been involved in the State Department’s negotiations on an interim settlement, and the Israelis would object to involving them. The problem with the State Department’s negotiations is that they have led Sadat to expect more than we can deliver from

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko, 1971–1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. According to Richard Kennedy, Lord drafted the memorandum. (Memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger, September 24; ibid.) A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

2 See Document 330.
Israel. Therefore, if there were to be an interim settlement, Sadat would have to be persuaded to accept less, particularly an insignificant military presence east of the Canal. The Russians could play a role at the right time.

Dobrynin said that it would be helpful if you at least did not reject the idea of private talks in our channel when you see Gromyko. I commented that at best this would be a slow process and would require some explorations to see if it were worthwhile. We should, however, keep open the possibility of this separate channel to regulate Soviet conduct elsewhere just as we used the Berlin question this year. Thus I believe you should dangle the prospect of bilateral efforts without committing ourselves:

—As a general comment, you might reflect that the interim agreement seems to have gone off the track because what started as a proposal for a very limited disengagement grew into half of a total settlement. If there is to be such an agreement, both sides will have to lower their expectations. You think there would be considerable advantage to Egypt in establishing the principle of withdrawal through a first step.
—You are willing to authorize exploratory talks between Dobrynin and Kissinger to see how negotiations would work and if the basis exists for fruitful discussions.
—After Kissinger has reported to you on the preliminary talks, you will make a final decision whether to proceed.

On Indochina, Dobrynin has also relayed Soviet willingness to carry a message to Hanoi (Podgorny goes there in a few days) and to see if negotiating differences can be narrowed. We will want to reserve a possible direct Soviet role for later in our present game plan—now that Thieu has given us such a forthcoming response on our new political proposal,3 we do not need Soviet intervention to embellish the approach to the North Vietnamese, who in any event stress direct contact. If Gromyko raises this issue, I suggest you restrict yourself to the following:

—The U.S. wants peace and remains intent on trying to reach a negotiated settlement.
—President Podgorny can relay this attitude to the North Vietnamese leaders.

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3 See Document 327.
336. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of the administration’s economic and foreign policies, as well as consideration of domestic politics.]

Kissinger: Well, first, for the procedures [for the meeting with Gromyko]. They’ll come in here, pictures and so forth. You have about 45 minutes—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: —to an hour with him in here.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: Then you ask us all to leave, and you’ll talk to him privately.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Here, what he expects is that you’ll say, “Mr.—” something like, “Mr. Foreign Minister, it’s been a year since we’ve met. Do you want to give us your impression of—where do Soviet-American relations stand now?”

Nixon: That’s at the beginning of the formal—

Kissinger: At the beginning of the formal meeting. Then he’ll give you a little speech, which will be very conciliatory, and then he’ll turn to European matters. On that, incidentally—well, let me first go a little through it, on European matters.

Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: He’ll probably wind that up by saying, “Now, where do you stand on [the] European Security Conference? How do we move it forward?” I think you ought to preserve as much of that for the private channel as possible, so that we can play it into the summit, and say that, “Well, the conditions are getting ripe—that with the Berlin, once the Berlin agreement is ratified, and the German treaties are ratified,” then you think we can go ahead with some preparatory work on [the] European Security Conference, and that—

Nixon: Except he wants the Berlin. Hmm?

Kissinger: And that then there should be some informal discussions in the meantime of what the agenda might be, and so forth.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 580–13. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office from noon to 1:08 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
Nixon: Beginning now?
Kissinger: Beginning once the treaties are—
Nixon: Oh, the informal discussions would begin when?
Kissinger: I’d say after the German treaties are ratified.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: But we could have some informal—you’d always be interested to hear from them what agenda—
Nixon: On an informal basis and on a bilateral basis.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Okay.
Kissinger: Then, on the Middle East, he’ll give you—he’ll do that—
Nixon: At which part—will he raise that in the public meeting?
Kissinger: The European—Middle East?
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: He’ll do it in two parts. He’ll raise it at the public meeting—
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: —in the familiar way, and I’ve written down what our official position is.
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: And if you just stick with what’s in the basic memo—
Nixon: Don’t worry. I’ll follow your instructions right to letter.
Kissinger: On that. Early in the discussion, Mr. President, you should raise SALT.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And on SALT, the issue, briefly, is this. We had told them that—in the private discussions—we had told them: three of our ABM sites for their Moscow system, plus an offensive freeze. They now say it’s got to be one-for-one on the defensive side too. But that means their Moscow system covers 40 percent of the population, while one ABM site for us covers only two percent of the population, up in North Dakota. Now, you shouldn’t go into all this detail, but—
Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: —what you might say, though, is, “We have to move it forward at the next session.” Our proposal, in effect, is that both sides stay where they are in both categories. We have two ABM sites defensively, but they have more missiles offensively. And therefore the freeze is equiv—that if we freeze now, and on both of them, that is fair. They

2 Document 334.
can’t ask us to cut down on our ABM sites but keep an edge in offensive missiles.

Nixon: So, in effect, we just reiterate we want a freeze?

Kissinger: We reiterate that the—that when they speak of equivalence, they can’t say there’s going to be the same number of things on the defensive side, but they can stay ahead in the offensive side. So, what you could say: the essence of our proposal is that both sides stay where they are in both categories, defensive and offensive.

Nixon: Hm-hmm. What if he says, “What about MIRV?”

Kissinger: He won’t say that.

Nixon: That changes—

Kissinger: I’ll guarantee you he won’t change—

Nixon: That changes the number too. Well, go ahead.

Kissinger: That’s right. I mean, that’s our hole card.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: But we need that with two—

Nixon: You know, you stop to think here. Suppose we’d given in to Percy and, frankly, broken the rest and say, “Why don’t we have a ban on MIRV?” You know, we will have—we would have—if a Kennedy, or a Muskie, or a Humphrey had been sitting in this chair, the United States today would have Gromyko looking right down our throat.

Kissinger: This, Mr. President—

Nixon: It’s close as it is.

Kissinger: This is where these—when these conservatives say, “Well, what difference did it make who was here?” Good God, we would have no ABM, we would have no MIRV.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: In net, we would have no B-1; we would have no ULMS.

Nixon: Henry, the conservatives, I frankly think they’re—then let them squeal. I’m almost inclined to think that a little of their squealiness has got to be, is just par for the course. And if they’re going to do it, they’re going to do it.

Kissinger: Yeah. I think so.

Nixon: This time, we’ll stick it out anyway.

Kissinger: Now, on Vietnam—I wouldn’t let him—then, on the Middle East, he will go through their formal position, which is that the Israelis are unreasonable—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: —and that we have gone ahead on the interim settlement without consulting them. And I would just repeat the position that we want an interim settlement as a first step and we think that this thing can help quiet the situation in the Middle East—our formal
position on that. Then he will mention trade, and he will suggest that you might send either Stans or Peterson to the Soviet Union. Incidentally, I told Dobrynin this morning we have granted—we've approved $200 million more of the Kama River project; we're now up to over $400 million on that.3

Nixon: Only now, let's be sure it gets some credit in this country.
Kissinger: Yeah, I've called Scott on it because it's in his area.4
Nixon: I know. Good. Well, that's a good national story too.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Okay. Be sure it's highly publicized.
Kissinger: Well, it will be formally announced on Friday.5
Nixon: All right. Would you give that to Scali? Yes, tell him, because he likes to run with those things. And let Stans—and let old Stans run it too.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: It's a chance for Stans to do more East-West trade.
Kissinger: I'm beginning to think that we'd be better off having Stans go there rather than Peterson. Peterson would be—
Nixon: Do we want Peterson? I think Peterson would be too outgoing. And, well, he might—
Kissinger: And he'd freewheel too much. There's no telling what—
Nixon: What I mean, when I say "outgoing," I mean he would tend to want to really negotiate. Or another way is to have the two go together. That might be an idea.
Kissinger: Well, you don't have to react at all. You just have to say it's, you're very sympathetic. You might mention you've already approved over $400 million for the Kama River project, and over—
Nixon: I can also say that, as we finish Vietnam, more will come.
Kissinger: Right. That would do it.
Nixon: And I think I'll get right into it.
Kissinger: You know, altogether, we've approved over $600 million of—

3 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Dobrynin on September 29 from 9:04 to 10:05 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76) No record of the conversation has been found. After a brief discussion with Nixon, Kissinger called Dobrynin at 10:37 and reported on “technical arrangements” for that afternoon: “After the meeting the President will ask us to leave and go to the Cabinet Room and he will speak with Gromyko for half an hour. When that is finished he will take all of us to the Map Room. Your cars come to the place where I said good-by this morning.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)

4 Reference is presumably to Senator Hugh Scott.

5 October 1.
Nixon: Trade and money, and the rest. I know.
Kissinger: Right—
Nixon: On the Middle East, if I can come back to it. What he wants—do you want me to say in the public session, you know, [that] we’re—?
Kissinger: I’d just be very vapid in the public session—
Nixon: All right. All right. Now—
Kissinger: Just say that you’re supporting—
Nixon: You’re going to take up the Middle East with him in your private session? Is that correct?
Kissinger: Right. Well now, that’s where—what I wanted to ask you. We’ll first go through the formal ones.
Nixon: All right. Go ahead.
Kissinger: Then on—then South Asia, I would urge them that—I would tell them, “Whatever one’s views on East Bengal, that a war in that area would have the gravest consequences of international involvement.” And that you—
Nixon: If he’s going to raise the subject—or am I?
Kissinger: Well, if he doesn’t—
Nixon: I don’t want to raise all these things. Do you think I should? Well—
Kissinger: No, no. He will raise—I’ll tell you what you can be sure he’ll raise: he’ll raise Europe, Middle East—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: —trade. You might consider raising SALT—
Nixon: SALT.
Kissinger: —and South Asia. And maybe they’d only give you first—
Nixon: On SALT, I’d say that it’s important to have progress, and this defensive thing is—well, we can’t freeze offensive, an offensive superiority and a defensive inferiority. Is that what we’ve agreed?
Kissinger: Well, you see, we can’t insist on a de—that they can’t insist that on the defense things must be equal, but on the offense they can stay ahead.
Nixon: Right. All right. Good.
Kissinger: And that, therefore, you do not believe we can adjust, that we’ve gone from—we—that from 3-to-1 in our proposals, we’ve made a concession; we’ve gone down to 2-to-1. But you might as well say you cannot go any further on the defensive thing.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: And you just want them to understand that.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Kissinger: Because then I think we can break it. But they have to hear it from you.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: Those are the major topics he’s going to raise with you at that session. Then he will, when you see him alone in this office—and I think your instinct is absolutely right. You shouldn’t have a system that you always take him into a different—

Nixon: No, no. That’s right. It looks no good.

Kissinger: But I have now told them that you’ll take us all to the Map Room, and I’ll have—

Nixon: And have the cars there.

Kissinger: I’ll have the cars there—

Nixon: We’ll all walk out together.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: And that’s not unusual. We’ll just walk out that way and say, “I’d like to take you to your car, and on the way, I’d like to show you—”

Kissinger: Map Room.

Nixon: “—this room.” And we’ll stop in there.

Kissinger: I think it has historic significance for them. Now, there, he has—oh, no, I meant, forgot one other thing. He will mention to you Vietnam. He will say that Podgorny is going to Hanoi; that they will have very serious discussions about Southeast Asia: “Do you have any additional ideas that you want to say?”

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: You want to say, “No.” Now, I would—there I’d be very tough. I would say, “We’ve been very disappointed. The Soviet Union hasn’t done a great deal. All we ever hear from Hanoi is the concessions we want to make—have to make. We’ve made one concession after another, and it is time for Hanoi, now, to talk to us seriously.” That’s all I’d say at the formal meeting, because it helps to give, to have them be able to carry this, as having heard from you. Now, then we go to the private meeting. The private meeting, they’ll discuss two subjects: one is he will bring you a warm message from Brezhnev. He [Dobrynin] hasn’t told me what it is.

Nixon: Does he know that I will suggest a private meeting?

Kissinger: Yes.

Nixon: And—

Kissinger: He’s asked for it. But he’s all programmed—

Nixon: And he doesn’t want me to say that we’ve asked—just to say that I would suggest that I’d like to have some words alone.

Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Can you tell Rogers that he’s asked for it?
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: You tell Rogers in advance that—
Kissinger: I tell Rogers. As soon as I leave here, I’ll call him and say Dobrynin has just called me and says that—
Nixon: Just say on this that Gromyko has a private message—
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: —he wants to give the President. See, I want a lay of the thing to be on the summit thing—
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: —that Dobrynin has just called; and that the President has—what we’d like to do is, he’d like to, he’ll have us go to the Cabinet Room while he receives them, and then we will walk out and as—and he’s going to escort him to the car. And then, afterwards, that the President—that the President will—no, no, don’t tell him that we—
Kissinger: Don’t, because we don’t know what it is.
Nixon: Just say to him—and he’ll be—I’ll tell him that afterwards. I’ll—
Kissinger: Well, you don’t—I won’t say anything. You can tell us after we’ve said goodbye to Gromyko—
Nixon: I’ll tell Gromyko to step in—
Kissinger: You can just say, “Why don’t you step into my office?”
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Okay.
Kissinger: Well, then you can fold it and put it into your pocket. Then it’s natural that you kept it folded—
Nixon: All right. Good. All right. Now, in the private meeting, he will give me a message.
Kissinger: In the private meeting, he’ll give you a private message. Well, it won’t be in writing. It will just be a personal message on bi-
Nixon: All right.

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6 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers did not receive a telephone call from Kissinger before the Gromyko meeting that afternoon. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers)
7 Reference is to the text of the summit announcement. During another meeting at 10:12 a.m., Nixon and Kissinger discussed how to notify Rogers about the summit announcement. A tape recording of the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 580–3.
Kissinger: Then he will raise the Middle East. And he will say something to the effect that, last year, I had mentioned—he won’t mention my name—to them that, if any real progress is to be made in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the United States have to agree on their basic presence there. You remember? Your press conference—

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: —and my backgrounder.8 And they’re ready to talk in that framework to us now, until there’s a comprehensive Middle East deal.

Nixon: If there’s any progress in the Middle East, they have to agree to our presence there?

Kissinger: No, no. They are willing, in effect, to limit their presence.

Nixon: Oh. Yeah. All right.

Kissinger: And they’re willing to have some general exchanges.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: And I think he’s going to say that this should be in the same sort of channel that handled Berlin. My recommendation is, Mr. President, that you say, “This is a very complex subject,” that you recommend that Dobrynin and I have some preliminary conversations to find out just how it could be done, after which you’ll make a decision. This doesn’t commit you to anything—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: —but keeps the carrot dangling.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: You might also, at the private meeting, reaffirm again this channel. It’s just good for them to hear.

Nixon: Oh, don’t worry.

Kissinger: Now, then finally, you should say—if you agree—that you understand that I will be talking to him the next day, and I will talk to him more fully about Vietnam—

Nixon: Right. Right.

Kissinger: —and that you want to say that what you say has had the most—what I’ll say has had the most urgent consideration here—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: —and that you’re fully—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —behind it and—

Nixon: Behind it and all the rest.

Kissinger: Something like that.

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8 See Document 132.
Nixon: And I’ll say, “He’ll be—when you talk to him, you’re talking to me.”

Kissinger: Yeah. And on Vietnam—and he—

Nixon: And how do we get the summit in the deal?

Kissinger: He won’t make—they know that—

Nixon: I see.

Kissinger: They know that—he doesn’t have to say it will be—they know that Rogers—

Nixon: Now, on the summit: he isn’t going to mention the summit in the public meeting.

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: Now, he must not do that, because I don’t want Rogers to get involved in that.

Kissinger: No, no, no.


Kissinger: They are fully programmed, Mr. President. They know, however, that before—Gromyko is giving a lunch for Rogers tomorrow at one.

Nixon: And he knows that Rogers will know before the lunch?

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: Fine. But it’s not to be talked about here.

Kissinger: No. Now, another thing he does not know about—that Rogers does not know about—is the exchange of letters between you and Brezhnev, to which they’re attaching enormous importance.

Nixon: What exchange is that?

Kissinger: You wrote a long letter.9

Nixon: Doesn’t Rogers know about that? He doesn’t know about that?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: No. Well—

Kissinger: Because it mentions the summit, Mr. President.

Nixon: Oh, I see. Well, frankly, it was done while I was in San Clemente; I was still out there.

Kissinger: Yeah. Well, they won’t mention it.

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: You can be sure.

Nixon: Not yet. Well, Bill’s—Christ, he can’t object to this one. He might say, “Oh, what the hell?” And that’s why he’s willing to put up—well, that’s the date they suggested, and I said, “Fine.”

9 See Document 309.
Kissinger: That's the—and you just felt you wanted to get it done.
Nixon: And also—no, I'm going to say that once this sort of thing
is agreed, it's going to leak. And I then—well, even if he's—I said,
"Fine, we'll do it. We'll do it."
Kissinger: But you better pledge him to absolute secrecy.
Nixon: Pledge Bill?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Oh, shit. Don't worry. I'm going to say, "Now, this has got
to be absolutely secret."
Kissinger: This is the easiest way, Mr. President. That way, it makes
a lot of sense. Gromyko brought you, technically, the invitation last
year.
Nixon: That's right. That's right.
Kissinger: And he—now, he made it definite, and so—
Nixon: Right. And Bill can think that's what the whole damn meet-
ing was about.
Kissinger: Yeah. Oh, yeah.
Nixon: Yeah. So that we don't have—so I don't have to go right
in—and the other thing is that—
Kissinger: Bill has such a naive conception of foreign policy that
he really will think this is how it happened.
Nixon: Yeah. Well, we'll do it that way. And then—
Kissinger: And also it keeps them absolutely from leaking that they
rammed it down your throat. And it keeps me out of it, so then—
Nixon: Well, Bill knows that I took him over and talked about the
summit in the Red Room.
Kissinger: Well, actually, last year, Mr. President—
Nixon: It was here.
Kissinger: —he brought the summit up.
Nixon: I know. And Bill said, "Why don't we announce it now?"
Kissinger: And I told him—
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: I said, "Well, they came—he Gromyko came back with
this summit thing." And he Rogers said, "It's time has come." And I
said, "This is a good thing." I said, "Fine, we'll go."
Kissinger: That's right.
Nixon: Yeah. Bill will probably wonder how we agreed on a date
so quickly. But—
Kissinger: Well, you can—if he asks that, you can say that before
he went back, Dobrynin said, "In principle, does the Chinese summit
rule out—"
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: "—a Russian summit?” And I said—
Nixon: And then he said, “I’ll send you a message.”
Kissinger: And I said, “No—”
Nixon: Sure.
Kissinger: “—but it has to be after the Russian—the Chinese one.”

[Omitted here is discussion of the administration’s economic policy, the Secretary of State, and the announcement of Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Beijing.]

337. Memorandum for the President’s File

Washington, September 29, 1971, 3-4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Nixon’s Meeting with USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 29, 1971 from 3:00 p.m. to 4:40 p.m. in the Oval Office of the White House (List of participants is attached)²

The President opened the conversation by noting that it had been one year since he had last met with the Foreign Minister. Since that time some progress had been achieved in a number of fields, notably in the Berlin problem and in some aspects of arms control. The President thought it would be very useful to get Mr. Gromyko’s evaluation of where we stood and what needed to be done now. He would also give the Minister his ideas in order to see how we could get things moving.

Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested that the discussion follow the lines of their talk last year, i.e., that one question after another be taken up with each side expressing their respective views and positions on that question before going on to the next. President Nixon agreed to this procedure.

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 86, Memoranda for the President, Beginning September 26, 1971. Secret; Nodis. According to another copy, Krimer drafted the memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko, 1971–1972) A tape recording of the conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 580–20; several minor corrections—including deleted references to Nixon’s private meeting with Gromyko—are noted below. For their memoir accounts, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 838, 1287; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 234.

² Attached but not printed. In addition to the discussants, two interpreters—William Krimer and Viktor Sukhodrev—also attended the meeting.
Mr. Gromyko said that first of all he wanted to carry out the pleasant task of conveying to the President the personal regards of the Soviet leadership, Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Podgorny.

Bilateral Relations

The first question he proposed to touch upon was that of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although the Soviet Government had repeatedly set forth its views and positions, Mr. Gromyko believed it would be useful to restate them at this time in a general manner. The Soviet Government understood that the relations between our two countries were of a very complex nature. There were a number of issues on which the two countries did not see eye to eye. These were related to bilateral relations proper, but also included many others which, in fact, could not be separated from bilateral relations. The main thing he wanted to emphasize in this talk was that the leadership of his country and the Soviet Government were ready to seek for ways of overcoming these difficulties in our relations, wherever they could be overcome. His government was ready to build its relations with the United States on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence, at the same time being fully aware that on certain issues it would be very difficult indeed to find common language and an identity of views. However, even where this would prove to be impossible, the Soviet Government would like to avoid a collision between our countries or, as the President had frequently called it, a confrontation. Our relations should be conducted in such a way that the absence of agreement on certain issues not create obstacles for agreement on those issues which could be resolved between us. Referring to the present state of relations between our countries, Mr. Gromyko said that the President was surely aware that there were differences between our respective positions in regard to a number of problems. However, he could see that during the year since their last meeting certain signs of a softening in our relations had appeared and the Soviet Government considered this to be a positive factor, although this was true with respect to certain specific problems only. Speaking concretely on this score, he wanted to note the agreement between the four powers in regard to West Berlin. He well remembered his conversation with the President on this subject last year, when the President had expressed certain ideas on West Berlin. He wanted to say that the Soviet leadership was gratified to note that the United States, the U.S. Government and the President personally had made positive contributions to make it possible to reach agreement on this question. There were also certain signs, and some of them were perhaps only barely discernible, that the economic ties between our two countries were also developing favorably. On this topic, however, Gromyko preferred not to go into detail, except to state plainly that the position of the U.S. Government in this regard was not quite clear to the Soviet side. It would be a good thing if the President could make some
comments on this subject, being aware, Mr. Gromyko hoped, of its full significance for the relations between our two countries.

In summary Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to restate on behalf of his leadership and his government that his country had been and was in favor of peace, including peace with the United States. The Soviet Union did not want a war since war was alien to its short-term and long-term interests and was incompatible with the basic principles on which the Soviet system was founded. They wanted relations with the United States to be peaceful relations and understood completely how important it was for world peace that the United States and the Soviet Union reach as many common positions on outstanding world problems as possible. This was a great responsibility which our two countries shared with each other and with other countries, but his government was resolute in advocating cooperation in the interests of a more lasting peace. It would be good if the time were to come, and the sooner the better, when our two sides could truly say that the relations between our countries were friendly in the fullest meaning of this word. This would require, however, that both countries conduct a policy leading in this direction. Mr. Gromyko ended by saying that he would be pleased to hear the President’s view on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union as he saw them, as well as his assessment of future prospects for these bilateral relations.

Referring to the specific matter of Berlin, the President said that this was perhaps the most significant development that had occurred, particularly in view of the fact that this was such a delicate and sensitive issue to both powers, to the other European countries and to the Germans themselves. He believed that the fact that this problem could be worked out was an indication that difficulties in other areas could also be reduced. Regarding the Foreign Minister’s remarks on the need for peaceful relations between our two countries, we were always expected to say that and the President noted with great interest the statements on that subject made by Mr. Brezhnev. However, it was the reality of what we were doing that was important. On the importance of peace between our countries we could, by way of an example, say that we wanted peace with Bolivia, but whether or not our relations with Bolivia were peaceful would not affect world peace. We were not likely to say so outside of this room, but we did believe that world peace depended primarily upon the relations between our two countries. Therefore, the President would give the highest priority to conversations such as this and to others, with Ambassador Dobrynin for example, in which we tried to resolve differences between us. With reference to trade, the Foreign Minister would recall that last year the President had said this was an area where there were great possibilities for progress. Just this week he had approved the $200 million Kama River project, a sum that brought the total up to $400 million. It was his view that trade was in the interests
of both our countries and when we made efforts to expand it, we were really acting in our own selfish interest. American businessmen were interested in greater trade between us and indeed, this was an area where reduced tensions between us would pay the greatest dividends. It was something that the Soviet side wanted and so did we. The Minister would find us receptive to any initiative in this respect.

SALT

Naturally, there were other outstanding problems between us. A matter coming to mind immediately was the SALT negotiation, where we had taken a significant step which, however, did not represent the major resolution we were looking for. The President said that we believed that our joint announcement of May 20 had been received everywhere as a hopeful sign that the leadership of our two countries had resolved to reach agreement on a freeze of both offensive and defensive weapons. We recognized that this was a most important matter for both of us since the negotiations dealt with basic questions of our respective security. Without going into detail, the President wanted to say that it was our position on the defensive side that we had presented what we believed to be a fair proposition. Without going into intricacies, as we saw things, on the offensive side the Soviet Union would have an advantage of about 500 land-based missiles. Thus it could be seen that what we were proposing on the defensive side was a reasonable proposal. It would not be reasonable for the United States to agree that we freeze an offensive advantage for the Soviet Union while achieving equality only on the defensive side. This would be severely criticized by our public and in Congress. He did not expect the Foreign Minister to respond at this time, but he wanted to say that this was the very heart of the problem and he hoped that it could be explored. We still felt that progress at SALT was most important. The Soviet Union had continued to build up offensive armaments and we were not objecting to that, recognizing that we would do the same in a similar situation. On the other hand, if we could not work out an agreement, as Ambassador Dobrynin could confirm, there were many people in this country, many in the President’s own party, who would advocate resuming a build-up of offensive armaments on our side. Thus it was in our interests and in the interests of the Soviet Union to seek an agreement that would not give a decisive advantage to either of us. Both of us should consider reaching an agreement that would provide suffi-

Smith later recalled this statement in his memoirs: “[A]fter all my efforts at the President’s direction to impress on Semenov concerns about the continuing Soviet buildup, I was flabbergasted to read a report of a conversation the President had with Foreign Minister Gromyko in the fall of 1971. He reportedly told Gromyko that he had noticed that the Soviets were continuing their build-up of offensive launchers. He said we did not object to that. We would be doing the same in a similar situation.” (Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 327)
ciency for each. These were the general comments he wanted to make in regard to this question.

Mr. Gromyko wanted to emphasize great importance that the Soviet Union attached to the negotiations on limitation of both offensive and defensive armaments. In this connection, he also wanted to note that the strategic arms limitation talks had provided the impetus for those agreements which were going to be signed tomorrow as a byproduct of SALT. Without SALT these agreements would not have been possible except at a much later date perhaps. On the real subject matter of the negotiations he wanted to emphasize the seriousness of the position and intentions of the Soviet side. Mr. Gromyko wanted to draw the President’s attention to the last proposal on ABMs which had been tabled by the Soviet Government. He did not know whether it had been studied in great detail by the U.S. Government and by the President himself, but it seemed to him that it should provide a basis for agreement. The Soviet proposal was not bad as proposals go.

It provided for the defense of national capitals and one ICBM location for each side, with the proviso that the United States would choose its ICBM location to be defended and the Soviet Union would defend a commensurate number of ICBM silos in the Soviet Union. As for offensive strategic armaments, not only did the Soviet Union not oppose their limitation; the President had been right when he had said that we should proceed to consider certain steps towards their limitation, and at the next phase of SALT it will be necessary to enter upon concrete discussion of this problem. The Soviet Union wanted both sides to continue negotiations and the Soviet side was no less resolved now and would remain resolved to bring about their success to the extent possible. In this connection, Mr. Gromyko had noted the statement of Mr. Schumann, Foreign Minister of France, at the General Assembly yesterday. As he understood this statement, it meant that France would support the objectives pursued by our two countries in regard to limitation of strategic offensive and defensive armaments. It had sounded to him as if France would join in at least as to the substance of the tasks and objectives pursued at the negotiations.

Unless the President had something further on bilateral arrangements, Mr. Gromyko said he would like to say a few words regarding problems in Europe.

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4 The Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War (the Accidental War agreement) (22 UST 1590; TIAS 7186) and the Agreement on Measures To Improve the Direct Communications Link (the agreement to upgrade the Hot Line) were signed at Washington on September 30. (22 UST 1598; TIAS 7187)

5 See Document 323.

On the subject of SALT, the President wanted to add that what Mr. Gromyko had said demonstrated the reason why we must look at the whole package. If we were to separate out defensive armaments only, that would be fine if that were all we were talking about. However, if we found inequality on the offensive side, this would make the whole agreement difficult. The President emphasized that we needed to come up with a solution that could not be viewed as freezing inequality on one side and equality on the other.

Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat that the Soviet Union was not making such a distinction. At the next phase of SALT we would be able to discuss both sides more completely in the interests of finding a solution in this field.

The President said that the interest of both our countries in reaching agreement on strategic armaments was demonstrated by the fact that the United States had frozen the number of its offensive weapons some time ago, yet hardly a day went by that we did not receive reports of an increasing buildup in the Soviet Union. He did not mean to raise objections in this regard since the Soviet actions were based upon evaluations of its own security, but it was necessary to realize that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would let either side get an advantage. Thus the time now was ripe for reaching an appropriate agreement.

Secretary Rogers explained that one difficulty we had with the latest Soviet proposal was the fact that it provided for an additional buildup of armaments on each side. Since our objective was limitation, such a proposal would not be viewed as limitation in fact.

Ambassador Dobrynin pointed out that the last Soviet proposal was designed to provide a compromise acceptable to both sides. The Soviet Union was basically in favor of limiting ABM defenses to protection of national capitals, but since the United States had considered it important to defend ICBM’s, the latest proposal had been designed to find a solution acceptable to both sides.

The President said we could not decide this issue here, but we believe that we have presented a position as forthcoming as we could and, in view of the high stakes involved, we would continue negotiations.

Mr. Gromyko said that evidently both sides would have to take stock and analyze the results of the negotiations to date, and also map out their respective positions for the next phase of the negotiations. He repeated that it was his government’s belief that at the next phase of SALT it would be necessary thoroughly to discuss the second aspect of limitation as well, in order to try and find mutually acceptable common language.

European Security Conference

On the subject of the situation in Europe, Mr. Gromyko said that he could speak a great deal and at great length. Above all he wanted
to emphasize the utmost importance his government attached to the situation in Europe. The Soviet Union wanted conditions there to improve rather than deteriorate and wanted tensions reduced rather than increased. He believed that the agreement on Berlin signed recently created better conditions for such improvement. He stressed the need to convene an all-European conference on security. He recalled that last year when he and the President had exchanged views on this subject, the President’s attitude had not been negative; however, he also recalled that the President and some other people had taken the point of view that progress on the West Berlin problem was what was needed as a first step. In this connection he had taken note of Secretary Rogers’ remarks the other day that more favorable conditions had now appeared for convening an all-European security conference. He hoped that the Government of the United States would not now take a more definite stand in favor of this conference, and just as he had done last year, he would like to emphasize again that in calling for such an all-European conference the Soviet Union was not looking for any unilateral advantage. His government believes that a conference of that type would be useful for all European countries as well as for the United States and Canada as prospective participants in this conference. He was saying this because the President, also, had repeatedly said that he advocated a relaxation of tensions throughout the world in general and in Europe in particular. He would like to hear the President’s views on this score.

The President said that the Foreign Minister had been correct in indicating that now that we had made progress on the Berlin problem, we could look more favorably upon consideration of other European questions on which we might make some progress. He believed that once the Berlin situation had been completely resolved, and he understood that there were still some actions that needed to be taken for that purpose, then exploration of a conference could proceed. He felt that on this subject it would be very important for the two major powers to have preliminary discussions before conferring with our respective friends in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact. By this he did not mean that we would not consult with our friends, but for the two powers to participate in a conference without knowing how we would come out of it would not be realistic. He believed that after the Berlin matter had been settled completely we should on a very confidential basis discuss between us what such a conference would mean and what we expected to come out of it. Of course, neither one of us should act without consulting and agreeing with our friends, but if we were simply to proceed to hold a big conference, it might turn out to be something like a United Nations gathering.

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7 See Document 333.
Secretary Rogers said that Mr. Gromyko had the other day suggested convening a preliminary meeting for the purpose of planning a conference on European security. The Secretary had replied that such a preliminary meeting was likely itself to take on the character of a conference. If we were to do any preliminary preparatory work, it would have to be done on a private basis between our two countries. As the President had said, we needed to have some idea of the possible outcome of such a conference.

Mr. Gromyko inquired whether he had understood correctly that what the President had in mind were bilateral consultations on a bloc basis between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. The Soviet Union was ready to enter upon consultations of some aspects of this conference, its preparation and its possible outcome. He asked whether upon his return to Moscow he could report to his government that the U.S. Government was, in principle, in favor of convening a European conference. If so, the Soviet Union would be ready to proceed to discuss the questions of procedures, agenda, place and time, and this could be done without any further delay. He had in mind that preliminary consultations would be held for these purposes in the immediate future and that the conference would be convened next year. He asked whether he could report this as being the President's view when he returned to Moscow or whether the President would care to clarify the U.S. position further.

The President said that he would prefer for the Foreign Minister to report the following: The United States would be willing to discuss the setting up of a European security conference provided that our discussions would indicate that such a conference would serve a useful purpose which we would proceed to implement. When he had spoken of bilateral consultations, he was not referring to anything formal—he had had in mind some private conversations between our two countries that would answer some questions in our mind and some in the mind of the Soviet side. He believed Mr. Gromyko could report to Moscow that now that we had moved on Berlin, we should begin some preliminary discussions of this matter with the purpose of holding a conference that both sides would agree would serve a useful purpose. He was certain that neither side wanted to hold a conference just for the sake of the conference itself.

Secretary Rogers remarked that the discussions between the two Germanies were not as yet complete. The President noted that he had intended to qualify his remarks by saying “When the Berlin thing was wrapped up.” Secretary Rogers expressed the hope that the German negotiations would proceed without difficulty.

Mr. Gromyko said that, in principle, he believed that the fewer conditions were set for convening the conference, the better. It was his feeling that if everything was lumped into one knot, this would complicate
matters and lead us astray. Was he correct in understanding that the President had said that the United States would be ready to proceed to preliminary consultations without publicity and in the near future?

The President believed that in terms of preliminary private talks that was something we could do. However, he believed it important that in no circumstances any indication be given of a fait accompli. He did not want to create the impression that today, at this meeting, we had decided that such a conference would be convened. We should rather confine ourselves to saying that discussions could take place that would lead to a conference. As Secretary Rogers had said, getting the rest of the German question out of the way was most important before anything surfaced. It was this surfacing problem that was predominant. Mr. Gromyko inquired again whether the U.S. would be ready for a private exchange of views in the near future. The President said that would not concern him. After all, we had already had some private exchanges on this subject. He would emphasize that we were not trying to pressure the Soviet Union in regard to the German treaty. We did have a problem while the German talks were in progress, but if preliminary talks were kept strictly private, this might be possible.

**Middle East**

Mr. Gromyko said that if the President had nothing further on this subject, he would like to touch upon the Middle East problem and briefly state the Soviet Government’s views and position. The Soviet Government was concerned over the situation in the Middle East because from their point of view, all sorts of unexpected events could occur in that area, events that neither the Soviet Union or the United States would want to happen. The situation there was very complex as long as Israel was still occupying the Arab territories it had seized in 1967. He could not see any realistic possibility for settling this problem on the basis of Israeli demands or even on the basis of the U.S. proposal that had been submitted to the Arab Republic of Egypt. He did not want to enter into a detailed discussion of this situation, but would like to emphasize the basic fact that any proposal which bypassed the question of withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied territories did not create favorable conditions for a settlement that would really meet the interests of peace. He believed that the interests of détente, the interests of peace and the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union and other powers in the area, large and small, would best be served by a settlement on the basis of complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories. If this were done, all other questions could be resolved without any great difficulty and resolved at one and the same time. These included such questions as a guarantee for Israel, a guarantee for security, passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and an end to the state of war, etc., etc. He
would like to hear the President’s views on how he saw the further development of this problem.

The President replied that the Foreign Minister must be aware of the fact that, while a proposal for total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories might solve the problem, it was clear that Israel would not agree to such a solution. Proceeding from this fact, we were in a position of working very hard toward an acceptable solution for the problem. We realize as did the Soviet Union that this was an area where small countries could drag us into a confrontation that neither of us wanted. One factor in this danger was the arms build-up in the Middle East. Surely, the Foreign Minister was aware that there was a big drive on in the Congress, in the Senate, to send more arms to Israel because more arms had been sent to the UAR. We were exercising restraint and restraint was also needed on the other side. Having said this, we believe that it was best to approach the problem now from the point of view of an interim settlement as had been proposed by Secretary Rogers. The President would be less than candid if he did not say that on both sides not as much progress had been achieved as we would like to see. What we could do from this point on would hinge on the following: first, we would have to keep the truce and that meant restraining our associates. Second, we would need to avoid an arms build-up, a build-up that cost a lot of money and entailed the risk of breaking the truce. Third, we would need to continue negotiations, bearing in mind that while substantial withdrawal of Israeli troops was possible, total withdrawal from all occupied territory was not possible.

Secretary Rogers noted that the 1967 UN resolution had been carefully drafted leaving out these words because of their complete unacceptability. We would be kidding ourselves if we continued speaking of total withdrawal from all territories. On the other hand, we could agree with a more moderate position.8

The President pointed out that we were not taking an extreme Israeli position as guidance for our policy. We believed that our proposal was reasonable and, in fact, we were catching hell for it in some quarters.

Secretary Rogers pointed out that the idea of an interim agreement had initially been proposed by President Sadat. Today he had talked to UAR Foreign Minister Riad9 and had pointed out to him that the Arabs

8 According to the tape recording, Rogers qualified this statement as follows: “On the other hand, we agree, and the President has stated in his World, his State of the World message, as I did in 1969, we agree with the Arab position pretty much. We lean way over in that direction. We say it should be withdrawal to, except for [unclear]—” Before Rogers could finish, Nixon completed the sentence by interjecting the phrase “insubstantial rectifications.”

9 According to his Appointment Book, Rogers hosted a luncheon for Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad at 12:40 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) No record of the conversation has been found.
would be better off if a partial step was taken first which would eventually lead to final agreement. If such a partial step were not taken, the status quo would continue and that was fraught with trouble.

Mr. Gromyko said it would be one thing if this interim arrangement could be related to the overall task of reaching a final settlement as the next step. If this were not done, it would look like reinforcement of Israeli occupation plans. As far as he knew, this is where the Arabs saw the main difficulty.  

Mr. Gromyko inquired why agreement could not be reached on the following basis: a temporary agreement which provided for implementation of certain measures, with the proviso that this interim agreement constituted part of a general plan to be carried out in stages—a plan that would provide for withdrawal of Israeli forces by a specified time. It could also be agreed at the same time that if an Arab state, and here he meant Jordan and Jordan only, were to agree to an adjustment of its borders with Israel on a basis of free negotiations, it would be free to do so. Why would such a solution not be suitable for the United States? The Soviet Union believes that the United States was influential enough with Israel to convince the Israelis that this would serve their best interests. At the same time the strictest possible guarantees could be given at the first stage of the settlement, not having to wait until implementation of the overall agreement. These guarantees could be specified and enter into force at the same time as an interim agreement was concluded.

The President said that we were open to any suggestions that would break the impasse in which we found ourselves. When Mr. Gromyko had said that we ought to be able to influence Israel, the President would remind him of an old Hebrew proverb which, in discussing the question of which sex was stronger, pointed out that God had created Adam out of soft earth and had then created Eve out of Adam’s hard rib. If the Minister had ever met Golda Meir he would recognize the truth of this saying. In any case, we were as one in one respect and this had been proved during the Jordanian crisis last year, and that was that we must do all we can to avoid a build-up of tensions in the area.

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10 According to the tape recording, the conversation included the following brief exchange at this point: Nixon: “All of the Arab leaders have told us that, and we recognize that problem.” Rogers: “That’s manageable.” Gromyko: “Now that is, as we said, the Arab, the position of the Arab states too.”

11 According to the tape recording, Nixon said: “Let me say that we are open to any suggestions as to how to break this impasse, and perhaps we can follow this up at a later time.” Gromyko commented: “I have received a certain detailed [unclear]—” Nixon then interjected: “—proposal. Oh, I have an idea or two that I’d like to discuss in our meeting on that too.”
The President raised one other subject which was of serious concern to us now. He believed that Mrs. Indira Gandhi was presently visiting Moscow and she would be visiting here later. He wanted to strongly emphasize his concern over the possibility that the situation involving East Pakistan, the refugees and Indians, could explode into a conflict. He believed it was in our mutual interest to discourage the Indian Government in every possible way from taking action that could explode into war in that area. Having said that, he would point out that he was aware of the fact that Pakistan was in no position to fight a successful war with India, because it was outnumbered. However, the situation in that area was so fraught with historical hatreds that if the Indians pushed too hard, the other nation might willingly commit suicide. He believed that the Soviet Union had played an important role in keeping the peace in that area in the past and hoped the Soviet Government would do all it could to prevent an outbreak of war in this crisis.

Mr. Gromyko said he had understood what the President had said in regard to American interests in the area and moreover he would say that he was gratified to learn the U.S. did not want to see a clash between India and Pakistan. He could assure the President that the Soviet Government also did not want the conflict to break out into war. Moreover, perhaps the President knew that the Soviet Union had taken steps in the present situation to rule out the possibility of a confrontation. Of course, Pakistan was by far the smaller country, but he would point out that to provoke a conflict one did not necessarily have to have superior size and strength. To do so it would be enough if there was a lack of restraint and insufficient understanding of one’s responsibilities. For these reasons, it was Soviet policy to do everything possible to prevent a confrontation and the Soviet Government had said so in its conversations with Mrs. Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi had assured the Soviet Government that India would do nothing to precipitate a clash with Pakistan. It was true the Pakistani leaders were conveying the same thoughts to the Soviet Government, but here the Soviets did not have as much confidence as in the case of the Indian leadership. Once again, he was gratified to know that the U.S. was interested in averting a war between those two countries and

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12 According to the tape recording, Nixon said: “But I mention one other thing—and I do want to have a chance to talk to the Foreign Minister alone a moment if I can—the one other subject though that in our discussions here does concern us.”

that it stood on the position of counseling both sides to exercise restraint. If this was so, this was one policy that our two countries had in common. On the whole, he would sum it, that the country that should be restrained first of all was Pakistan, at least this was the conclusion the Soviet Government had come to on the basis of what they had observed. The President said he we would need to keep in close touch with each other on this situation.14

Economic Relations

Mr. Gromyko referred to the President's remarks concerning economic relations between our countries and the President's statement that he had some ideas to express in this regard. The Foreign Minister wanted to propose that the President send some representative he considers appropriate to Moscow for the purpose of exchanging views on this subject. The President replied that we did have this in mind, but he would want to discuss this possibility with Secretary Rogers. There were several men who wanted to go, but he would want to be sure to send the right man. He would further point out that one of the major obstacles to the possibility of expanding trade was, of course, the war in Southeast Asia. That was now winding down. As it ended, some of the technical and political objections to expanded trade with the Soviet Union which were being raised in this country would be removed. Once the war ended, all sorts of doors would be opened. He did not expect Mr. Gromyko to comment at this time, but wanted him to know the U.S. position.15

14 According to the tape recording, Nixon next briefed Gromyko on the historical background of the Map Room, including its previous use by President Franklin Roosevelt. As Kissinger suggested earlier that afternoon (see Document 336), Nixon did this to facilitate his private meeting with Gromyko.

15 Rogers, Kissinger, Dobrynin, Krimer, and Sukhodrev left the Oval Office at 4:39 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
338. Conversation Between President Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko


Nixon: Well, I thought it would be helpful if we could have a private chat like we did before, and to say that I am pleased that we are now going forward on our meeting, which I think can—will come at a useful time. A meeting at the top level. I have noted with—

Gromyko: Good.
Nixon: I think it’s good—
Gromyko: Very good.
Nixon: —and it’s time. It’s time we begin with our list of the—[with] Berlin out of the way, and then if we can move on these other areas, it will be—for example, if we could get the SALT thing ready, that would be a pretty good time. But maybe we can get it ready before that. Who knows? The Mideast and SALT—the main thing at such a meeting is to have some things that we can make progress on.

Gromyko: It must be done—something good.
Nixon: Yeah. That’s right.
Gromyko: What is possible—what is possible on the—
Nixon: Yeah. Right. You know, or maybe—
Gromyko: Even before.
Nixon: Yeah.
Gromyko: For that we—
Nixon: Yeah.
Gromyko: —which is, it must be done.
Nixon: We have to decide—
Gromyko: Must be done.

Nixon: Yeah. Then, for example, at such a meeting we can—I would like to, I want to talk to you about the channel to use here. We might be able to make some significant announcement on trade and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 580–20. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume; the conversation was conducted in English without interpreters. According to the President’s Daily Diary, this “one-on-one” meeting lasted from 4:40 to 5 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No written record of the conversation has been found. Although neither was present, Kissinger and Dobrynin both described the meeting in their respective memoirs. See White House Years, pp. 838, 1287; and In Confidence, p. 234.
things of that sort. You see there—we must have some positive things come out.

Gromyko: Just now? No.
Nixon: No, no. I meant when the meeting takes place, that we should plan it so that some positive—
Gromyko: Yes, yes.
Nixon: —statements can be made. I thought—basically, I think we would have a new—
Gromyko: Whatever—
Nixon: I have nothing in mind, but something to do with trade or something to do with, as well as on the political side.
Gromyko: Before the May meeting?
Nixon: Before—or at the meeting.
Gromyko: Or at the meeting. Yes.
Nixon: So that when, for them to come, when leaders at the top sit down, they produce something.
Gromyko: Yes. Yes.
Nixon: You see, the mountain cannot labor and produce a mouse.
Gromyko: Yes.
[laughter]
Nixon: Right. You know this? It’s an American expression.
Gromyko: This is—this subject, as well, I would say.
Nixon: All right.
Gromyko: This subject, as well.
Nixon: And I will—I shall look forward very much to meeting the—I do not—I have not met either Mr. Brezhnev or Mr. Kosygin, and I shall look forward to it. And we will be forthcoming, and we hope—and we know you will too.
Gromyko: Good. Mr. President, I would like to open—broach essentially two questions.
Nixon: Sure.
Gromyko: Yes?
Gromyko: First, you received letter from our Mr. Brezhnev.2
Nixon: Right.
Gromyko: Mr. Brezhnev attaches importance—I would say major importance—to the letter.

2 Document 324.
Nixon: The one that he sent?
Gromyko: Yes.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.
Gromyko: That is right.
Nixon: I have not replied yet. I didn’t.
Gromyko: No. You didn’t.
Nixon: I have not yet. No.
Gromyko: Not yet. Not yet.
Nixon: You see, that correspondence is private. The letter I sent to
him—
Gromyko: Letter.
Nixon: —was private, too.³
Gromyko: Private. Yes.
Nixon: So, let’s see, the State Department doesn’t know, so—
Gromyko: I know. But I’ve got—
Nixon: But I will respond soon.
Gromyko: Nice idea.
Nixon: I see.
Gromyko: Good idea.
Nixon: Good. It may be—
Gromyko: Only for us two.
Nixon: Good.
Gromyko: Only the Ambassador—
Nixon: Good. Us two.
Gromyko: —who will be—
Nixon: It’s best to keep it to us two.
Gromyko: I think Mr. Brezhnev attaches great importance—
Nixon: Hm-hmm. Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: —to the letter, and I am sure when you reply, he will
study your reply—
Nixon: All right.
Gromyko: —most thoroughly.
Nixon: Good.
Gromyko: I wish to also tell you something that I know: [I saw]
Mr. Brezhnev twelve days ago—
Nixon: Yeah.
Gromyko: —and maybe it could be useful to have.

³ See Document 309.
Nixon: Yeah.
Gromyko: He is not a new man—
Nixon: No.
Gromyko: —in our leadership. He is not new man. He—
Nixon: A long time.
Gromyko: —has been in the Politburo a long time. He was one of the Secretaries, a State Provincial Secretary, and an authoritative, I would say, Secretary of the Communist Party. Even before, he was Chairman of the, even on the Supreme Soviet, our parliament—
Nixon: Hmm.
Gromyko: —for a long time.
Nixon: Yeah.
Gromyko: And he followed, he became Joint Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, and then Secretary-General of the Central Committee. He is man of great authority in hands.
Nixon: Hmm. He’s in charge.
Gromyko: Yes. Yes.
Nixon: That’s good. That’s the man we want to talk to us.
Nixon: And also you know that we know—
Gromyko: You probably know this, but I think it is not, it is not uninteresting now to hear it from me—
Nixon: Yeah. Sure.
Gromyko: —today. I know Mr. Brezhnev for a long period of time. He spoke with me; we met on the eve of my departure from Moscow to the United States to attend the session of the [United Nations] General Assembly, and then to meet you.
Nixon: Hmm.
Gromyko: We spoke quite extensively, a great deal, on Soviet-American relations. And he expressed his urgent wishes to see improvement of our relations.
Nixon: Good.
Gromyko: He said this. And he said that he stands for—whether if you can achieve it or not, we do not know—but he would like to see friendly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nixon: Hmm.
Gromyko: And he knows that I’m going to tell you—
Nixon: A couple things.
Gromyko: Then, after conversation, we went together to—he received [unclear]—
Nixon: Hmm.
Gromyko: —of that organization. Then next, we continued conversation, left together to the airport, because he was going to meet—
to Crimea to meet Brandt.
Nixon: Oh, yeah.
Gromyko: To meet Brandt.
Nixon: [unclear]
Gromyko: I needed to do some interview. And we continued to
discuss this matter in the car to the airport.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: And he especially expressed his hope that it would be
good if we can achieve sometimes point of view to say—I stressed the
point in my conversation—to say that, “All—at last our relations are
good, and maybe even friendly.”
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: This is the thing I wish to tell—to tell you personally.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: Not in presence of—
Nixon: I understand.
Gromyko: —interpreters.
Nixon: Translators.
Gromyko: The second thing, he is not the man, which would like
for you to dismantle the NATO.
Nixon: Oh, no, no.
Gromyko: Test NATO. He does not like. He does not like.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: And maybe you sometimes, sometimes read or hear in-
formation about the Soviet press, hear your name, well, in connection
with the policies sometimes of another correspondent—private corre-
spondent. But this is not the line of the leadership—
Nixon: Right, right. I understand the difference. I understand the
difference—
Gromyko: Not at all. Not at all. Not at all. And he does not like
this line they employ.
Nixon: No. Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: He is against it. He is against it. I wish just to inform
you, if you don’t know about it. Never he—what still more, I would
like to tell you, so he—[laughs] initiative he’s asked me to tell you
about, this guarantee. But I’m privy because I know him very well.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: And I take this responsibility.
Nixon: Sure.
Gromyko: Responsibility. He is man of strong character, strong character—strong character, strong will. And when he says that something must be done—

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Gromyko: —he is going in the direction he outlined.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Gromyko: It relates to all questions. It relates to the question of our relations with the United States.


Gromyko: If I did not knew you for a long time, maybe I would not go this far.

Nixon: Well, I appreciate that.

Gromyko: But I think—

Nixon: Let me say that—let me—let me just—let me say that, first, I will continue the private correspondence with him. You tell him that—

Gromyko: I will tell him.

Nixon: —that I will respond personally, myself. Second, and—I appreciate his sentiments that he’s expressed and I have the same sentiment. I am known, I know, as the—it’s rather ironical—as really anti-Communist and all that, but I’m a very realistic man, a very practical man. Also, I am one who has, as I’ve often said, enormous respect for the Russian people—a great people. I know that looking at the world, even if we—even though our political systems are very different, that the future of peace in the world for 25 years—and nobody can look further than that, I think—is in our hands. It’s in the hands of the United States and Russia. Nobody else. Someone else can stir it up, but if we put our foot down, we can make a great contribution. I think that the—

I think that it would be a great signal to the world if—not only the announcement that we’re doing, but also if, at such a meeting, it could be said that the relations that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Great War began—were—are again resuming. Now, of course, that doesn’t mean—we have to be practical—that we’re going to agree on systems of government, that we won’t be competing here and there. But it does mean that we have a new dialogue, a new relationship where we solve the problems. That’s what I want. And I—you can tell the Chairman—

Gromyko: I will—

Nixon: —that I feel exactly the same way. And I also feel that now is the time. I think it’s very important. If we let the time slip by, the events may drag us into something, so now is the time to get together if we can.

Gromyko: That means that both sides must work with patience—

Nixon: That’s right.
Gromyko: —work with will—
Nixon: That’s right.
Gromyko: —and—
Nixon: That’s right.
Gromyko: —with determination.
Nixon: Determination. Bargain hard, but agree.
Gromyko: This, let me say, it will require time and energy—
Nixon: Let me—let me suggest a couple of things that are very important. Kissinger’s meetings with Dobrynin are very important. As you know, they were helpful in—
Gromyko: In Berlin.
Nixon: Yes. Tomorrow, I have asked Kissinger to meet with you, to call on you, or I guess he’s going to meet you. He has a message—
Gromyko: I know.
Nixon: —that he would like to convey. It’s from me—
Gromyko: Yes.
Nixon: —on a technical matter. It has to do with Vietnam. And we just want to pass it on to you.
Gromyko: Hm-hmm.
Nixon: The other thing that I didn’t want to go into in the circle here is on the Mideast.
Gromyko: Hm-hmm.
Nixon: Now, it may be that working very, very quietly—Kissinger and Dobrynin, you see—that we can explore something on the Mideast. I don’t know.
Gromyko: Hm-hmm.
Nixon: But you raise that subject with him, with Kissinger, if you like.
Gromyko: I will tell you—
Nixon: Then the—
Gromyko: —I will tell you something there though.
Nixon: Yeah. Just—and so, because it may be that the Mideast is too complicated to handle at the—
Gromyko: With Rogers?
Nixon: —or SALT. Well, at the Foreign Secretary level. See?
Gromyko: Hm-hmm.
Nixon: It may be we have to work very privately.
Gromyko: Hm-hmm.
Nixon: Now, I think that those—but I think—I think that in—and even take a matter like the European Security Conference: I think it’s
probably better to keep that in this channel, you know, where we’re very private. And it will—and, sure, of course, some things will be at the State—Ambassador level, and the Secretary of State, and the rest—but the more we can have in this channel, then I will personally take charge, which is what is important. And Brezhnev, of course, must do the same.

Gromyko: Good. Good.
Nixon: Is that fair enough? Good?
Nixon: Good. You see, I—we’re—I do not take charge of things that don’t matter, but where they matter, like between our countries, then I make the decisions.

Gromyko: The channel proved to be effective, in the experience of the Berlin negotiations for us.

Nixon: It couldn’t have been done without that channel.

Gromyko: One thing on the Middle East, I would like, if you had not mentioned it, I would mention it. I wish to tell you privately, strictly privately—

Nixon: Yeah?

Gromyko: —two key points. Frankly, some time ago, the United States Government, and you personally—and I think a sufficient decision was made—expressed concern how about delivery of armaments—

Nixon: To Egypt? Right?
Gromyko: Right.
Nixon: Fine.

Gromyko: We think that it would be possible to reach understanding, if some kind of framework is reached, which would provide [for] withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories. We would agree on the limitation, or, if you wish, even on stoppage—full stoppage of delivery [of armaments]—

Nixon: Hmm.
Gromyko: —in connection—even in connection with understanding on the first stage—

Nixon: What to do here—
Gromyko: On the—
Nixon: Exactly. In terms of the—
Gromyko: —even in connection with the interim [agreement]—

Nixon: —interim. Right.
Gromyko: You agree.
Nixon: Right.
Gromyko: Even in connection, provided that this is the—connected with the final, with the withdrawal—
Nixon: Yeah.

Gromyko: —of—from all territories, within a certain period of time. More than this, I would like to tell you, also frankly, confidentially, both this point and then the third one I discussed with Mr. Brezhnev. So this is not the second point here. The second point is this: some time ago, you expressed interest—oh, I don’t know—in Egypt, about our presence there, our military—
Nixon: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
Gromyko: —presence in Egypt.
Nixon: Yeah.

Gromyko: I do not know whether you know precisely our position, or not, on our presence, but, in a sense, we are present there. In a sense—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: North of Cairo, certain personnel, and certain forces—
Nixon: I see.
Gromyko: —and such presence, the presence is agreed. We are ready, in connection with understanding, full understanding, on the Middle East—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: —we are ready to agree not to have our military units there.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: Not to have soldiers based there—
Nixon: Not the civilian, I understand.
Gromyko: Not precisely. Not to have military units, you know, there—
Nixon: Not there.
Gromyko: We probably—we would leave a limited number, a limited number of advisers for purely advisory—
Nixon: Advisory purposes.
Gromyko: You know—
Nixon: Technical advisers.
Gromyko: —like you have in Iran.
Nixon: Like we have in Cambodia and the rest.
Gromyko: Yes, that is right.
Nixon: That’s right.
Gromyko: I said it’s for—
Nixon: I understand.
Gromyko: —for purely advisory purposes.
Nixon: But not for—I see.
Gromyko: Hmm.
Nixon: Right. I understand.
Gromyko: Absolutely right. I know that you—
Nixon: But these are matters that I deal with.
Gromyko: Okay.
Nixon: Yes.
Gromyko: I know. You understand very clearly.
Nixon: Yeah.
Gromyko: I would say limited, and maybe very limited.
Nixon: I understand.
Gromyko: Maybe very.
Nixon: Well, those are matters that could threaten—be discussed, if—but that has to be very private.
Gromyko: And it would be very private, very private—
Nixon: Right. Right. Right. The Mideast is so tense—so touchy, politically, in this country—
Gromyko: All these—
Nixon: —it has to be private here.
Gromyko: All these—
Nixon: Right.
Gromyko: —ideas, we did not put into motion—
Nixon: Sure. Right. Right—
Gromyko: —with anybody. Never. This is—
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: —new, and this is principle.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: And the third point, whether you attach importance or not, but Israel always stresses anything you don’t want to stress. It would be—we would be ready, even if this accord is written on this basis, even in connection with the interim agreement, in the third stage.
Nixon: Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: And we will be ready to deal—to sign, if you wish, together with you, or with U.S. and other powers, or with all other powers who are on the [United Nations] Security Council. This initiative is possible in a document, if with additional—
Nixon: Hm-hmm. Hm-hmm.
Gromyko: —agreement and understanding on security for Israel [unclear exchange] that is—
Nixon: Sure.
Gromyko: —in connection with the interim. With the interim—
Nixon: I see.
Gromyko: —provided that interim is—
Nixon: All right.
Gromyko: —connected. [unclear] and our own suggestion was that, well, when vis-à-vis the border or finalization of the agreement, only some kind of decision—
Nixon: True.
Gromyko: —should be taken on guarantees. But we are ready to discuss this idea in connection—we can sign any agreement with guarantees in connection with the interim, provided that the interim is linked with Israeli [withdrawal]. The limitation of even—limitation, even stoppage [unclear]—
Nixon: Your arms?
Gromyko: Second—
Nixon: Present?
Gromyko: —not presence of any Soviet units. Not—
Nixon: Sure.
Gromyko: —[unclear] heavy units, intermediate military—
Nixon: Right.
Gromyko: —you could say.
Nixon: Sure.
Gromyko: Some of the limited—I say this would [be] limited number of advisers for purely, purely, purely advisory purposes.
Nixon: I understand.
[unclear exchange]
Gromyko: If you—
Nixon: Let us do a little—as I say, we’ll do a private talking on this. And then, on this message that Kissinger brings you tomorrow on Vietnam, I think you’ll find very interesting. It could be very—
Gromyko: Good.
Nixon: It could be very important.
Gromyko: Very good.
Nixon: If we could get that out of the way, you could see—and I don’t, we don’t want to ask you to do anything that’s not in your interest—but if we get that out of the way, it opens other doors. You see?
Gromyko: Good. I have to say—what I told you about this Middle East, this is—
Nixon: Comes from—
Gromyko: —result of the conversation personally with Brezhnev. And he wants me to say to you—
Nixon: Yeah.
Gromyko: So we are taking a position.
Nixon: I understand.4

[Omitted here is a brief, largely unclear exchange as Nixon and Gromyko evidently left the room.]

4 Nixon escorted Gromyko and Dobrynin to the Map Room at 5:03 p.m., and they proceeded to the South Grounds of the White House, where the Soviet party departed at 5:04. Nixon then met Rogers and Kissinger in the Oval Office for 10 minutes. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) During this meeting, the President finally briefed the Secretary on plans for the Moscow summit and showed him the text of the joint announcement, scheduled for release on October 12. A tape recording of the conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 583–1.

339. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, September 29, 1971, 6:45 p.m.

P: I thought you would be interested to know that Connally was delighted with what I told Paul S[chweitzer].2 He said it was just what he needed to hear—this fellow was cutting us up all over. Connally said he was surprised because he thought I was going to do just the opposite. He did not think this would do any good. My God, just look at the attitude of Gromyko from a year ago. He went on and on about this personal message from Brezhnev. Brezhnev had talked at great length about me and our meeting.

K: This is not how they behave if they want to set somebody up.

P: Right. On the other thing with regard to Bill, do you think maybe that Haldeman ought to talk to him first.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. According to his Daily Diary, the President met Schweitzer and Connally on September 29 from 10:33 to 11:15 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) A tape recording of the conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 580–5.
K: I think he has to have a chance to raise his points. We are having a hell of a time finding time in your schedule.

P: I will just do it at Noon. He has to be seen. I wish we could set it up in a way—I don’t want the fact that you are going . . .

K: He won’t raise that.

P: If we announce the Soviet visit now before the China thing . . .

K: As a practical matter they will think it is a result of Gromyko. You will remember we were pushing it to have it as early as possible.

P: We offered to have it sometime in February.

K: He knows about dates and he knows that this was to discuss . . . I tried to make it look like it was done more recently specific.

P: With regard to debate in General Assembly, I don’t see how this will matter that much. They are just going to announce that you are going.

K: You can argue it both ways.

P: Speaking of Acheson—he said he wants me to know he was supporting me all the way.

K: I had lunch with Acheson and he said newsmen asked whether the election was going to give him a problem with the Democrats. He said not at all. He said if Jackson runs he may vote for him otherwise he will vote for you.

P: Does he know what we are trying to accomplish?

K: Yes. He thinks the Berlin achievement is a master stroke.

P: I would love it if he could see my note about the Byrd Amendment. I hope you told him I am resisting this with State. Really, if Bill could only see . . .

K: He did say this is something if we could have the two—to have both announcements in one week would really be earth-shaking.

P: I said to Haldeman—bad time (missed some of the sentence). Haldeman says there is never a good time. We have to make the trip. But it is your feeling that this is not the real reason—you think the real reason is he doesn’t want you to go.
K: Yes. He doesn’t want me to get the publicity. I have not taken any of the publicity that I could have.

P: My point is that the publicity thing is just nuts. Who are we going to send—Marshall Green [omission in transcript]. There is nobody else that can go. State always says let’s just go in and talk. As a matter of fact if your talks indicate that they will fail, we just won’t go through with it.

K: Absolutely! We now have more flexibility with the Soviet movement.

P: Before you see Gromyko I must talk to you because I must pass on to you what I said about the Mid-East.

K: I think that is essential.

P: I said I was prepared to have you talk about it. He started on the European Security thing but I said I wanted to have you and Dobrynin talk about it. I danced off it. I said you had something important to say on Vietnam.

K: He did not raise Vietnam?

P: No, No. He did not at all. He raised the Middle East. So, don’t give him Middle East without giving him Vietnam.

K: Absolutely.

P: I can see the Middle East is what is bothering him.

K: I will fix some time, Mr. President, to see you first thing in the morning.

P: What time is my first appointment tomorrow?

K: I think it is 10:00. I have an 8:00 appointment with Bush.

P: You see Bush at 8:00 and come in to see me at 9:00. You are having breakfast with him.

K: Yes.

P: After you see Bush, come in.
340. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, September 29, 1971, 8 p.m.

D: Did everything go alright?
K: Except for one thing. I am told your Embassy has announced that I am seeing Gromyko alone. That’s what our press people say.
D: I don’t know where they found out.
K: I will just deny it.
D: It is alright with us. Nobody but [omission in transcript] and the Assistant to Gromyko knows about it—nobody else. Maybe Gromyko’s assistant mentioned it to someone. You can deny it.
K: Let’s have an understanding that we will keep it secret!
D: I will assure you that we did not want to make a fuss. He is looking forward to meeting with you. It was not intentional from our side.
K: I just want to make sure you did not make a formal announcement. I was wondering about another thing. What do you think if I bring General Haig along to take some notes?
D: Well, well, well. I would rather you be alone. He will prefer it that way. For me it would not matter.
K: I will come alone.
D: That would be better.
K: I will have to dictate something afterwards.
D: He mentioned to me that the President mentioned that you will . . .
K: In a general way a response to what you said in the morning.\textsuperscript{2} You mentioned the trip to me. Oh, among the American group at lunch tomorrow the only person who knows about October 12 thing is the Secretary.
D: Okay. From our side no one knows except the Minister but the two of them could speak about it.
K: But we are not too eager to have it in that channel.
D: I understand but your Secretary may raise it. My minister has no intention to raise it.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

\textsuperscript{2} See footnote 3, Document 336.
K: Okay, everything is clear and we will not acknowledge my meeting.

D: Okay, because we did not make an official statement. You may do as you choose better. No offense from our side.

K: In the meeting tomorrow . . . subject you mentioned on the morning of the trip—subject your Foreign Minister mentioned with the President.

D: (There was some double talk on the subject Mr. Kissinger will discuss in the meeting and I did not understand—something about an area which was visited sometimes outside the country.)³

K: Oh, yes. Oh, yes, which we discussed in the morning.

D: Yes. The President said you would discuss it.

K: Also, I will have a few things to say about the first subject your minister raised⁴ and, of course, any other topic your minister wishes to raise. Good I will look forward to seeing you. (him?)

D: At 5:30.

K: At 5:30. Okay, good.

³ Vietnam.

⁴ Middle East.
341. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Secretary of State Rogers and Kissinger’s upcoming trip to China.]

Kissinger: You said yesterday I should check with you about that Gromyko conversation.\(^2\)

Nixon: Yeah. He said that—three things that they’ve agreed to—except I don’t think we’re going to give on. He said, “First,” he said, “we will agree to stop sending arms into the area [Middle East]. Second, we will agree to remove all military units from the UAR—all military units.” He said, “Now, these”—I want to be precise. He said, “We will keep advisers, like you have in Iran, but no military units. We will remove them all. And third, we will agree to participate in any kind of a guarantee of Israel’s integrity, sovereignty, et cetera, et cetera. Any—with you or anybody else, we will agree to participate.” And then he said, “We will do all this at the time of an interim settlement, provided there is an understanding it should go on to a more permanent one”—or I could get something like that.

Kissinger: That’s a tremendous step.

Nixon: Well, it is a—and so I said—through the whole thing, when he said—the last point, I think, is a significant [one]. I, through the whole thing, I said, “Well, Dr. Kissinger’s assistant will, first,” I said, “will bring you a message that I consider of enormous importance on the Vietnam thing.” And I said, “I have discussed it with you. Second, let him discuss this. And third,” I said, “as I told you, on any, on European security, and all these other matters,” I said, “let’s keep to—let’s talk about it in this channel.” And I said, “So that we can work things out privately.” It was about what—that’s what he was talking about. Now, it seems to me that on the Vietnam thing, he has to [unclear]. Actually, the idea of getting the damn thing out of the way before the summit is important. But also, the idea that [unclear] make a

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 581–2. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Kissinger in the Oval Office—after a meeting with Bush—from 9:38 to 9:54 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 See Document 339.
settlement—I mean, that we’re—I don’t know how far you’re going to go in talking about the Thieu thing. Not far, I trust.

Kissinger: No. No. I won’t even—

Nixon: I haven’t [said] I think that you ought to disclose that to him in any way.

Kissinger: What I thought, with your permission, I would tell him, Mr. President, is that we are going through those eight points.4

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: We are prepared to make a compromise in the political field and in the withdrawal field, but I won’t tell him what it is, that we may propose it—we will propose it to Hanoi within the near future, and we want Hanoi to think about it. That’s going to be our last offer.

Nixon: Hm-hmm.

Kissinger: And we want them to use their influence—

Nixon: Well, I wrote down something last night5 that I just—in view of all the malarkey he was giving me about the desire of Brezhnev to—and it may be that Brezhnev would like, does realize that a Soviet-American pact of friendship is very much in their interest—and also that we may need it too. You know, not a “pact,” but, you know, the idea we are friends and so forth.

Kissinger: Hm-hmm.

Nixon: It occurred to me that the way you could put this is that Brezhnev wants friendship. That, “Look, Mr. Foreign Minister, I myself can’t even predict what this President, Mr. Nixon, President Nixon will do. He surprises me. But he is a man, more than anybody that has been in this office in this century, who will make a daring, big play.”

Kissinger: That they’ve learned now.

Nixon: “A daring, big play. He made it. Now, you people wondered about China.” They wondered about the economy; they wondered about this. “He is prepared to make a very big play with you, because he considers your situation infinitely more important than anything else. You know why?” I thought—my little analogy is, when I talk about it, I said, “Now, we always say in these meetings that we want peace, and that it’s important.” I said, “We want peace with Bolivia, but whether we have peace with Bolivia doesn’t make any difference, because the world—”

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3 See Document 327.
4 See Document 327.
5 Not found.
Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, your meeting yesterday ranked right up there with the Ceausescu meeting.6
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And, in a way, it was more difficult, because you couldn’t be quite that tough—
Nixon: Tough.
Kissinger: [unclear] But you were so firm, and when he started with this malarkey, and you said, “All right, but that we say this—we say this, but what else can we say here? But let’s”—in effect, you said, “Let’s get concrete.”
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I think when the history of this is written, it will turn out that you turned around SALT yesterday, as much as you turned around Berlin. You remember—you notice how he said to you what you said last year about Berlin has come true?
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And I think these are going to be—
Nixon: At least we got through this—we got through on SALT the very simple point that we couldn’t freeze in a superiority for them on offensive weapons, and an inferiority for us on defensive weapons—
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: —and that we had to look at the whole bag.
Kissinger: Well, and he kept—and Dobrynin, while we were waiting for you—
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: —kept coming back to that two or three times.
Nixon: All right, now, that, in my opinion, and also that I am the only one who can deliver on a big play—I’m the only one that can deliver because I can hold the Right. If Vietnam is the only thing that stands in the way, it will open all doors. Now, just—and that it’s time to get it over with. Now, I think we go on just throwing the carrot out there. Put the stick out there. Say, “Now, his patience is running out in Vietnam and he may be very embarrassed in the polls.” And I’d throw in a hell of a threat. Because my view on Vietnam, the more I’ve thought about it, is that toward the end of the year—and I’m going to poll it in advance to see what it is—that I will say, “All right, we’ll make an announcement of some sort.” And then we—I’m assuming these bastards

turn us down—and then we say that I am going to resume the bombing—

Kissinger: That’s what I think.
Nixon: —of military targets in North Vietnam unless and until we get the prisoners back.
Kissinger: That is what I would say. Absolutely.
Nixon: Just lay it right to them—
Kissinger: I would say that we—
Nixon: “I will resume the bombing until—when we get the prisoners back.” Just put it on that basis.
Kissinger: I’d say we’ve offered everything. Go through the whole record.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: We’ve been there. We have gone to the Russians. We’ve gone to the Chinese. We’ve gone every avenue. We’ve offered to replace Thieu. Everything has been offered. All has been rejected. And this is it.
Nixon: Yeah. Ehrlichman [unclear]. But anyway, we have a—
Kissinger: Incidentally, I think, Mr. President, if we could go back to the China thing for a minute.
Nixon: Yeah, we’ve got to go—
Kissinger: We wanted this stuff early in this Congressional session.
Nixon: Where’s Ehrlichman? He can come in now, if you can find his [unclear].
Kissinger: We wanted this early in the Congressional session. We’re having a terrific double play with two successive Tuesdays.7
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: And I think it’s going to pull the teeth of a lot of opponents. When we planned this in the middle of August, we just couldn’t know they—
Nixon: Look, we just got to—don’t worry about it, Henry. We’ve got to—I’ll sit there with Bill, and we’ll talk about it, and I’m going to talk about the Russian summit a little with him.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Listen, this is a—the Russian summit is a hell of a thing for Rogers.

7 Reference is to the announcement on October 5 of Kissinger’s trip to China and on October 12 of Nixon’s trip to Moscow.
Kissinger: Well, we don’t want him, though, to start planning it. He screws up really every—
Nixon: He’s not going to plan it, but, I mean, it’s a hell of a thing for him to go!
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Nixon: Jesus Christ, I’m going to do it. You know that. By God, I’ll tell you one thing: I have decided, with all his faults, I’m not going to let him do anything. I’m going to do it. And do it—Christ, by that, I mean this office is going to plan on the summit matter.
Kissinger: And he really doesn’t understand.
Nixon: He—
Kissinger: In fact, I don’t want to go into detail, but he screwed up something on Germany with Gromyko on the Berlin thing, because he couldn’t understand it.
Nixon: When will you see Gromyko?
Kissinger: At 5:30.
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: I’ll call you—or you’ll be on the way? Will you—I’ll call over here.
Nixon: I’ll be over here at a reception. And then I’m seeing—I ought to have a talk with Haig. Is Haig here?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: To get his report. I’ll tell you what I might do: I might have—Shultz is going down to get me a report on the domestic thing, and maybe—and then come back the next morning. Maybe I could have Haig do the same thing, and we can go back—
Kissinger: Sure. Sure.
Nixon: —right away. Because I just want to just hear from him—
Kissinger: Absolutely, I think it’d be very useful.
Nixon: —hear what the hell the story is. But what do you think of my plan? That, by God, if they turn down everything, we resume the bombing of military [unclear] with the purpose of bringing them home. I’ll bet you the American people back it with 70 percent. What do you think?
Kissinger: I would do it. I think we cannot go out whimpering.
Nixon: Yes, sir. Incidentally, though, I think, speaking of whimpering, that goddamn Teddy [Kennedy] overstepped when he said he would crawl on his hands and knees—
Kissinger: Mr. President, if we think where we were when we came in here, and at the various stages, to get Gromyko here the way we were—he was yesterday.
Nixon: Jesus.

Kissinger: To get the Chinese. We’ve got everything working together. The only thing that’s missing—I think with this, we may do something on the Middle East.

Nixon: Well, I don’t understand the Middle East problem well enough to know whether we can, but, it seems to me, it’s a hell of a concession.

Kissinger: Oh, it’s a—

Nixon: Yeah. If we really focus—

Kissinger: —if he really means it.

Nixon: But the point is, the way it now ought to be done, frankly, you—and that, of course, means me—I ought to get in Rabin and say, “Now, look here, this is a hell of a deal. And we think we can sell—this is what we’re prepared to put, to run down the Russians’ throat, if you’ll do something.” See my point?

Kissinger: Yeah, but we’d have to—

Nixon: Don’t tell him the Russians offered. Tell him we will get it for them. Come on in, John [Ehrlichman].

Kissinger: But we’d have to find out first what they want in return for the interim settlement.


Kissinger: I mean, how they define interim settlement, because—

Nixon: No, look. I mean, no, before we get—in order to get the Russians—let me put it this way: the Israelis are the tough ones. They’re going to be a hell of a lot tougher than the Russians. Now, in order to get the Israelis to come some way, we’ve got to say—we’ve got—we mustn’t let them think the Russians are prepared to offer this, until we get a hell of an offer from them.

Kissinger: No, but we have to find out from the Russians, and I can find out from Gromyko, what he has in mind, how far the Israelis have to go—

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

Kissinger: —on the interim settlement.

Nixon: Yeah, but don’t tell anybody. Never tell the Israelis what the Russians are prepared to do—

Kissinger: Oh, God.

Nixon: —because then they’ll say, “We’ll start from there.”

Kissinger: No, no.

Nixon: Okay, I’ll see you later.

[Omitted here is discussion of schedules, Chinese representation at the United Nations, and Kissinger’s upcoming trip to China.]

Nixon: You’re going to see Dobrynin?
Rogers: Yeah.

Kissinger: Gromyko went home.²
Rogers: Gromyko. I have a lunch today at the Embassy.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Just keep the Middle East dangled.
Rogers: Really?

Nixon: They need us—what I meant is: I have a feeling, in my talk with him, that they’re at least—the two reasons that they’re, two things that they want from us, not only—one is the China thing worries them; and the second is the Middle East. They really are worried about the damn place. I’ve got—but I’ve had—in the private conversation,⁵ he talked about the Middle East a great deal. You know, that Brezhnev, particularly, was interested and that sort of thing. And I think it’s very important that you—

Rogers: When you say “dangled,” what do you mean exactly? In other words—

Nixon: Well, what I meant is that—well, I don’t want them to think that we can help solve this problem but that it’s terribly difficult, as we emphasized yesterday, working with our Israeli friends; it’s terribly difficult, and that it’s going to take an awful lot on their part to do it. What do you think, Henry? I don’t know. You—you’re—

Kissinger: I think the way it is now—
Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —they really—I think the way Bill has it now, as between the Israelis and the Egyptians, without tricking them into it—

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 581–6. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Rogers and Kissinger in the Oval Office from 12:20 to 12:36 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
² Gromyko hosted a luncheon for Rogers at the Soviet Embassy on September 30. See Document 345.
³ See Document 338.
Rogers: I think it’s perfect now. That’s why I already told them that—

Nixon: Well, but after that meeting—but I think we—

Rogers: I don’t have a plan to—

Nixon: By “dangle,” I mean leave it right there. I don’t want to—

Rogers: Well, the point I—

Nixon: I don’t want you to go any further. Don’t be too—what I’m getting at is this: I want them to want something from us on the Middle East. They must want our cooperation, and we must not be in the position of wanting theirs so much.

Rogers: I don’t think they want ours, and I don’t think we want theirs, especially.

Nixon: Well, we sure don’t want to guarantee or something.

Rogers: I mean, from the—you see, the way we’ve been playing, Mr. President—I’ve been playing is—they don’t want anything from us; they like it the way it is. So I kept them out. I haven’t asked them for a goddamn thing. We haven’t yielded one of the things that concerns them.

Kissinger: I’ve been impressed with the—

Nixon: One has to say—

Rogers: Now, what I’ve tried to do is, this time, is to give him a little more information, without really telling him anything or without asking anything. I’ve been telling him, “We’re working this for this cause; we think it’s a good one; we’re the only ones that are doing it; both Egypt and Israel have asked us to do it; and we’re going to keep pushing at it; and we don’t want you to work with us; we don’t ask you to do anything.”

Nixon: Hmm.

Rogers: But we want to keep advised—

Nixon: Good. Good. Because—that’s good. That’s good. Because I have—

Rogers: This is the position I take—

Nixon: Listen, I’d say to him—I’m not so sure, Bill, that you are, just based on what he said then, I’m not so sure but what they may get a hell of a lot more worried about the Middle East and their clients.

Rogers: Sure, their—

Nixon: And for that reason, they may not like things the way they are. They may not. That’s my point. So I’d keep them worried.

Rogers: Yeah.

Nixon: Keep them worried. That’s what I mean.

Rogers: Yeah. On this European [Security] Conference, if it’s all right with you, I would like to suggest to him that any discussions on
it should be with me. That we don’t want any other—that it’s such—it’s got to be such a private matter, and we can’t let our allies know that we’re seriously considering a conference—

Nixon: Absolutely.

Rogers: —until a satisfactory solution to the problem [unclear]—

Nixon: No ambassadorial—

Rogers: And if there’s any contact on it, let Dobrynin talk to me or have him send a message, because I think we should seriously delay any discussion—

Nixon: Yeah.

Rogers: —of substance for a while.

Nixon: Good. Good.

Kissinger: I agree.

Rogers: Then when he has something—

Nixon: I would say that we would do not—well, you noticed how I was trying to dance off of it, because I’d read your briefing paper. I think you should tell him that I said when I used the word “preliminary” and “private,” I meant exactly that.

Rogers: Hmm.

Nixon: And that means preliminary and private—that we do not set up a working group.

Rogers: Working group.

Nixon: On the first part, we don’t have it done in a, you know, in any formalized way, and that you’ll just chat about the thing.

Rogers: Well, what I was going to tell him—

Nixon: Yeah?

Rogers: —is that you and I had first talked, and that you said—

Nixon: Right.

Rogers: —“preliminary” and “private,” and that you wanted him to understand that it would be with me. If Dobrynin wanted to talk about it, fine, come with me.

Nixon: Fine.

Rogers: Because, otherwise, he’s going to pass the word to everybody that we’ve agreed to private talks.

Nixon: Exactly.

Rogers: And I don’t want that.

Nixon: Exactly. Exactly. And also, tell him how the meeting would—but you would say—be with you on a completely private basis.

Rogers: Oh, oh sure. Well, they would understand that.

Nixon: No crapping around.
Rogers: They’ve been pretty good about that.
Nixon: Well, that’s what I mean—if you tell him that. Good. Good.
Rogers: They’re pretty good when they deal with you privately. But they’re not very good when they deal with everybody else in a big—
Nixon: Yeah, well, as you noticed, Gromyko was trying to push us toward, yesterday, into the position of saying—
Rogers: I know—
Nixon: “Can I say we’ll do it before a conference?”
Rogers: Oh, sure. Sure.
Nixon: But I didn’t say that. And I think that’s pretty clear.
Rogers: Yeah, it was.
Nixon: Oh.
Rogers: No doubt about that.
Nixon: Yeah.
Rogers: Okay.
Nixon: All right. Bye.⁴

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⁴ After Rogers left, Nixon and Kissinger met until 12:45, discussing several foreign policy matters, including Kissinger’s upcoming trip to China.
180588. Subject: Discussion of Berlin Agreement between the Secretary and Gromyko.

1. Foreign Minister Gromyko confirmed to the Secretary at a private discussion after lunch at the Soviet Embassy September 30 that the Soviets will insist on a "reverse linkage" between the Berlin agreement and ratification of the Moscow Treaty. He based this on the ground that, in view of the political opposition to the Moscow Treaty within Germany, the Soviets could not be sure that if they went ahead and concluded the Berlin Agreement the Brandt government would then be able to deliver on ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

2. The Secretary made clear that any movement towards multilateral preparations for a CES was contingent upon completion of the Berlin Agreement and that the new Soviet position on timing might create difficulties for Brandt in obtaining ratification of the Moscow Treaty. We obviously wish to move ahead as rapidly as possible towards conclusion of the Berlin Agreement.

3. During the discussion which followed, it emerged that the Soviets would apparently find acceptable as an alternative deferring the coming into effect of the Berlin Agreement until the Moscow Treaty was ratified.

Irwin
344. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, September 30, 1971, 6–8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Contrary to the usual practice, the meeting took place not in the Ambassador’s apartment but in a formal reception room on the first floor which I had not previously seen. Both Dobrynin and Gromyko went out of their way to be cordial.

Gromyko began the conversation by saying that he had been enormously impressed by his conversation with the President the day before. He had been struck particularly by the remark the President had made that, whatever the relations of each of the superpowers with other countries, he realized that the peace of the world ultimately depended on the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the superpowers therefore had a special obligation. Gromyko said that this reflected the view of the General Secretary absolutely. Mr. Brezhnev, as I undoubtedly knew from the President, had asked him to pass on to the President how much he was looking forward to his visit and how he would receive an especially warm welcome in the Soviet Union.

Gromyko then asked me for the President’s reaction. I replied that I thought that the President shared his view about the constructive tone of the meeting.

The Middle East

I said, turning now to concrete matters, that I wanted to check with Gromyko whether the President had understood him correctly with re-
spect to the Middle East. As the President understood him, he had made three propositions: (1) The Soviet Union would agree to a ban on arms. Gromyko said correct. (2) The Soviet Union would withdraw all organized military forces from the Middle East. Gromyko said correct. (3) The Soviet Union would participate in and guarantee the arrangements. Gromyko again said correct. (4) All of these measures would go into effect as part of an interim settlement. Gromyko said correct—provided that the interim settlement contained provisions for how to get to a final settlement.

I said that the problem now was how to go from here to there. The President had also asked me to tell Gromyko that he was prepared to have me engage in exploratory conversations with Dobrynin to find out whether there was anything worth negotiating about. However, I wanted to point out that the conditions here were somewhat different than on Berlin. On Berlin all parties or at least three of the parties wanted an agreement. Secondly, we had an Ambassador in Bonn who was very well versed in the technical side and who, given proper direction, could handle the details. And thirdly, the Soviet Union sent their best expert to Bonn to negotiate with our Ambassador. These conditions were not easy to meet in the Middle East. For one thing, how could we be sure that word of these talks would not leak out? Gromyko replied, “I give you my word it will be absolutely waterproof. There can be no mistake, we would never tolerate it.”

Leaving aside the question of leaks, I said there was the concrete issue of how we would approach the settlement. It seemed to me that much of the discussion at the moment concerns theology. I did not understand phrases like “secure and recognized boundaries” unless they produced a concrete proposition. I did not want to get involved on behalf of the President unless there was a good chance of achieving an agreement, and this is why we proposed exploratory talks. Gromyko said he agreed with this. I said that, for example, it seemed to me rather irrelevant whether the Israelis withdrew 40 kilometers, 30 kilometers, or 20 kilometers from the Canal. The depth of the withdrawal was not at issue in the interim settlement—but the fact that the withdrawal had started could be of tremendous significance. Egypt had to decide whether it wanted substance or theory. Gromyko said he agreed with this, but everything depended on the link between the interim settlement and the final settlement. Gromyko added that he was prepared to say that in the interim settlement there could already be a fixed obligation that Israeli ships would have the right to traverse the Suez Canal as soon as a final settlement was reached.

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2 Kenneth Rush.
3 Valentin Falin.
I replied that I did not want to get into details on this occasion but I simply wanted to point out the problems that had to be addressed. Gromyko said we should not take lightly their willingness to guarantee the agreement. Why should the Israelis be so worried about their security if both the United States and the Soviet Union guaranteed them? I said because they had had bad experiences, and they could learn from history that guarantees often failed. Gromyko said that nevertheless, sooner or later they would have to make peace and accept some guarantees.

We then turned to the question of how to establish a link between the interim settlement and the final settlement. Gromyko said it wasn’t necessary that the final settlement be achieved in one stage; perhaps it should be achieved in two stages, perhaps it should be achieved in three stages—as long as it was clear that a final settlement was envisaged. The length of time was also not decisive, Gromyko added, though he thought that the final settlement should be within a year of the interim settlement. I replied that the problem of the settlement was as follows: The more theology we included in the interim settlement, the less likely it would be achieved. Indeed, if we wanted to waste time, I would urge to have as much specificity about the final settlement as possible in the interim settlement because I knew it would never be agreed to by the parties. However, if we were to get involved it would have to be on the basis that progress was possible; this to me meant that there should be some vagueness as to the final destination.

Gromyko said this was very hard. He said, “Quite frankly we will have to sell the settlement to our allies, and I recognize you will have to sell it to your allies. In particular, the withdrawal of our air forces and other organized units will not be happily greeted by our allies, and therefore we have to show them that we are doing it for a greater cause.” Gromyko added that in strictly Middle East terms the Soviet Union had perhaps some hesitation about proceeding, but he wanted us to know that Brezhnev had said that his approach to the Middle East was dictated by global considerations and not by Middle East considerations alone. I replied that I was glad to hear this because this characterized our attitude.

Since I only spoke on the level of reality, I replied I wanted to state the reality as I saw it. There was no possibility of implementing a final agreement before the American election. No American President could engage in the pressures that might be necessary to achieve this. Therefore, the only practical approach would be to try to get the interim settlement out of the way, perhaps by the time that the President visited Moscow. And on that occasion, perhaps the President and the General Secretary could agree on the nature of the ultimate settlement, use this as the point of departure, and settle the matter this way.
Gromyko responded that it would have to be a very binding settle-
ment, however. I said, “Mr. Foreign Minister, we do not believe in trick-
ing you. We may be difficult about reaching an agreement, but if we
reach an agreement it will be absolutely maintained.”

Gromyko then asked whether we could tell the parties about the
agreement. I said this would produce an enormous outcry, which is ex-
actly what we are trying to avoid. Gromyko wondered whether there
was some possibility of telling their allies on the basis of strict confi-
dence. I said my impression was that the Egyptians were incapable of
keeping a confidence. Gromyko laughed and said this was generally
ture, but in this case it was to their interest to keep it, since if the agree-
ment that might be reached at the summit should leak, it would be
aborted. And since it might then contribute also to the defeat of Pres-
ident Nixon. I said I did not exactly know what the agreement would
look like and, of course, the more acceptable it was to Israel, the less
concern one had to have about secrecy.

Gromyko then said, “I understand that you have not committed
yourself to these negotiations, but can I tell my government that your
attitude is at least constructive enough to have exploratory talks? As
you know, we have President Sadat in Moscow in two weeks, and it
is important for us to know your general attitude so that we can make
our policy.” I said our general attitude is that the Soviet offers had con-
structive elements, that I would engage in exploratory talks, and that
I thought the interim settlement was soluble. A great deal depended
on the ultimate settlement. I did not believe that it was possible to ask
Israel to go back entirely to their 1967 frontiers but I would like to re-
serve this for the discussions with Dobrynin.

Gromyko said he thought that was a very positive discussion. As
for the time scale, I told him that I would be prepared to start talking
to Dobrynin in about three weeks. We should then have about a month
of discussion after which we would decide whether to go further, and
if we decided to go further we should aim to have the interim agree-
ment done by next May.

**Indochina**

The conversation then turned to Vietnam. I told Gromyko that we
considered the North Vietnamese a courageous people, that had fought
heroically for many years. At the same time, we were wondering
whether the qualities of heroism that they had shown made them cap-
able of having peace. I frankly was beginning to doubt it. Some sus-
picion was indicated as a result of their history, but when suspicious-
ness was carried to such morbid lengths then of course it was
impossible to come to any understanding. Gromyko said that they had
many reasons to be suspicious.
I said we were now in the last phase of the war and we were determined to end this one way or the other. We would either go unilaterally, which we were reluctant to do, or we would go by way of negotiations. However, I wanted Gromyko to understand that if the negotiations did not succeed by the end of this year we would have to go unilaterally, with all the risks to the détente that this involved. It seemed to me a tragedy for the Soviet Union and the United States to run the risk of conflict over an area in which they had many common interests. What did we want in Southeast Asia? We wanted countries that were independent and self-reliant. Any reasonable assessment of the historical situation should make clear that we were not the major threat to the independence and security of Southeast Asia, and that the day might even come that the countries of Southeast Asia would look to us for support against threats that came from much shorter distances. Why then should the war continue? Why should they assume that we would maintain a colonial position when we were withdrawing from so many other areas?

As far as I could see, there were only two issues now between us: the withdrawal and the political future. I thought that the withdrawal issue was manageable. As for the political future, it was impossible for us to end a process which had begun with the overthrow of an ally with the overthrow of another ally.

Gromyko responded that he understood our point but he was just wondering, thinking out loud, whether some compromise might not be possible. For example, would we be willing to replace Thieu and have another person in his place who might not in the first instance have Communists in his government? Would that be acceptable to us? I replied that we were in the process of reformulating our political proposals and I was therefore not able to respond with great precision. I could tell him now, however, that we would not agree to the replacement of Thieu as a condition of the peace settlement. We were prepared, however, to work with Hanoi on a political process in which it was possible to replace Thieu as a result of the political process. For example, we did not insist that Thieu had to run the elections that might be set as a result of the peace settlement; the elections might well be conducted by a government that was not dominated by one of the contenders. Gromyko asked whether we might be prepared to agree to a fixed period after which elections had to take place. I said that was correct. Were we prepared to have Communists in the government that would run the election, he asked. I said perhaps not in the government but certainly on the commissions that would supervise the election.

Gromyko said, "All right, we will pass this on to Hanoi and we will be in touch with you." I told him that this was not a formal proposal, and perhaps Hanoi had another idea.
I then told Gromyko that I wanted to say in all solemnity the following: We were determined to see the war in Vietnam through to an honorable conclusion. We thought that from now until the end of the year was the last opportunity for a negotiated settlement. After this we would be forced to make our decisions unilaterally and not rely on negotiations. We would make a specific proposal to Hanoi in the near future. When that proposal was made, we might talk in greater detail to Dobrynin. To show our goodwill and to ease Hanoi’s suspicions, I continued, we were also prepared to offer the following: It might be that Hanoi would feel easier if one of its friends helped to assure the good faith of the participants. I was therefore prepared to go secretly to Moscow to meet for three days with a suitable personality from Hanoi if this had a high probability of leading to a solution. It could not be either in Moscow’s interest or mine to have a trip to Moscow that led to failure.

Gromyko responded that this was a very interesting proposal, which they would consider with the utmost seriousness. He repeated again, “We will do what we can and we will be in touch with you.”

China

The conversation then turned to China. I told Gromyko that we had noticed in Brezhnev’s letters and in public statements by the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union welcomed improvement of relations but not if it led to the point of collusion between the United States and Communist China. I said that this was a view with which we could associate ourselves in principle. We wanted to improve relations but we did not want to collude with China against anyone. It seemed to us, I continued, there were two principal issues between the Soviet Union and Communist China—(Gromyko interrupted at this moment: “Only two? You are being much too generous.”)—these issues were the border question and the ideological question. It went without saying that on ideology we had no interest or possibility of intervening. On the border question we would do nothing that would in any way indicate a taking of sides.

Gromyko said he appreciated this very much. I then said it was important in any event for the two of us to understand some fundamental issues: If there was going to be a fundamental change in our relationship it was crucial that we separate basic objectives from short-term objectives. To be sure, as great powers the United States and the Soviet Union had unlimited opportunities to harass each other. But what would it gain either side? The other side would certainly begin a counter-harassment and there would be a gradual escalation of tension. We were not interested in pinpricks with the Soviet Union. We recognized that the peace of the world depended on our relationship with the Soviet Union, and therefore we were prepared to be restrained in our actions if the Soviet Union was prepared to be restrained in its
actions. Gromyko said he was glad to hear this. The Soviet Union, he said, had no objections to improved U.S. relations with China as long as they were not directed against her.

I asked whether Gromyko could give me any indication of what he meant by collusion. Gromyko said it was hard to be specific, but anything that would threaten the peace between the Soviet Union and Communist China or anything that made it harder to achieve peace in Southeast Asia would be considered very unfortunate by the Soviet Union. I replied that whatever we did with respect to Southeast Asia we clearly wanted to bring about peace. Gromyko said that that was his impression, but we might have the opposite effect.

I told Gromyko that in fact there were two kinds of motives for our attitude towards Communist China: One, our general desire to improve relations; and two, our desire to speed the end of the war in Southeast Asia. To the extent that the war in Southeast Asia could be ended we could concentrate on the fundamental problems, and there of course our priority for the next 10–20 years had to be in our relations with the Soviet Union. I therefore thought the Soviet Union had an interest in helping bring the war in Southeast Asia to an end.

Gromyko said, “We will talk to Hanoi and we will be in touch with you.”

I foreshadowed the October 5 announcement by saying that we and the Chinese had been discussing the possibility of an interim visit to Peking to prepare for your trip. I said we would give Moscow 24 hours advance warning.

Germany and European Security

We then talked about the German situation. I said that one of the difficulties in our relationship was that as soon as an agreement on something was achieved, new conditions were raised, so that we felt we had to buy the same agreement over and over again. Gromyko asked what I was referring to. I mentioned the fact that the Soviets had now established a reverse linkage according to which ratification of the German Treaty had to precede a Berlin agreement. Gromyko said this was based on a total misunderstanding. The Soviet Union was afraid the Germans would ratify the Berlin agreement first and then refuse to go ahead with the German Treaty. They were afraid of being left holding the bag. Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union would agree to any formula for ratification which would put the two instruments into effect simultaneously, but it was a little difficult to think of a formula that would accomplish that other than by the prior ratification of the German Treaty. He said, “after all, why would we sign the Berlin Treaty if we did not want to bring it into effect?” I suggested that perhaps the Berlin Treaty could be ratified as scheduled and then an exchange of notes be added to it, according to which the treaty would
become effective only after the German Treaty was ratified. Gromyko said he would think about it.

I then raised the matter of the translation problem. He said the Germans were unbelievable. There were three official texts—British, French, and Russian—and now the Germans were raising the issue of the correct German text. None of the powers had negotiated in German, so why should the Four Powers get involved in it? Why not let the Germans operate with two separate texts if they wanted—especially if there were only two words at issue—and substitute for these disputed German words the agreed English, French and Russian words. I said we would stay out of it for the time being but it was my view that, after all the investment we had made, it would help greatly if we moved ahead on the ratification.

Gromyko then turned to European security and said the Soviet Union was prepared for preliminary exchanges. He was a little puzzled by the fact that the President had told him the day before,4 when they were alone, that I would handle the discussions, while Rogers had told him at lunch5 that he would handle the preliminary discussions. I said that the best way to conduct it would be to have technical matters handled between Dobrynin and Rogers and major substantive issues between Dobrynin and me. But it was essential for these divisions to be carried through without an attempt at playing them off. Gromyko said, “Exactly our view.”

**Conclusion**

Gromyko then summed up the discussion by saying he thought this had been a most constructive meeting. During the course of it, he had taken off his coat and both of us had conducted the discussions in shirt-sleeves. He said he wanted us to know that Brezhnev considered relations with the United States not just from the perspective of this or that issue but from a global perspective and of a historical nature, and therefore, we could be certain that the Soviet Union would approach all the specific issues discussed today with that attitude. Gromyko said, “I hope very much that you will come to Moscow before a Summit Meeting.” I said, “I have given you a way for me to be able to do that.” Gromyko smiled and said, “Always linkage,” but said, “we hope to see you in Moscow.”

There was some exchange of pleasantries and when Dobrynin took me to the door, he thought it had been one of the best meetings he had attended, and he had never seen his Minister so relaxed. But no significance need be attached to this.

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4 See Document 338.
5 See Document 345.
345. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

October 1, 1971, 9:40 a.m.

P: What’s new this morning?
K: There isn’t much new on the wires. I had a very long talk last night.
   P: Where?
   K: In the Soviet Embassy.²
   P: You can talk now?
   K: Yes. They put me in a reception room—
   P: Secure place?
   K: If it wasn’t, our own people will get it. John Mitchell’s people. Not anyone else.
   P: I understand. How good?
   K: Went well. Even as he put me on how well he thought it went and a positive [omission in transcript—impression?]
   P: Same impression I did that he has turned 180 degrees in his attitude.

   K: I said the President has following impression on the M.E. and gave him the 3 points. It’s a major concession. You remember when you were on TV in ’69 and ‘70 and everyone accusing you of screwing up the thing and here they are offering what you asked for. He said they are willing to do it in the interim period.
   P: We have a bad communication. Call me back on another line.
   K: Is this better?
   P: Yes.

   K: So he went through these proposals which are really the biggest steps forward in the M.E. that have been made in your administration. I said you agreed in principle that I would have a few exploratory talks with Gromyko. We were not sure it was clear enough yet. I wanted to dangle it.
   P: That’s what I meant with Rogers.
   K: He doesn’t want them in at all. That’s all right because then there’s no two negotiations. So then we discussed what an interim state-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² See Document 344.
ment [settlement] would look like. So I said we should stop anguishing whether 15 or 40 kms. The key point was to get something done. He then said there had to be an ultimate solution. I said an interim could be done before the election but not an ultimate. I wanted to give them a stake in the election. He said that’s right. I said we should gear the interim towards a summit. Then we (go) from there. It gives us a long time period and if they made this agreement with you secretly and further, after the election they will have strong reason for keeping quiet next year.

P: And put on screws next year.

K: If we are going to do it we should do it early in the term. Assuming a settlement is consistent with our principles. Then about VN thing he again said they are prepared to do what they can. Thinking out loud he had an idea. Had no authorization but wants to know what I think. It’s not conceivable of his presenting ideas he couldn’t present. It’s fairly close and a little better then what we worked up.

P: The idea of Thieu resigning?

K: He had that and no requirement that Communists participate. He wanted it before the peace was made. I said we couldn’t do that. I said the peace had to be made with Thieu.

P: And then resign. What the hell?

K: Then I told him what you said that this was the absolutely last chance. He said could be sure they would talk seriously in Hanoi. I said I don’t know why you want to keep the war going. It just hurts building up countries that you need against your real enemy which isn’t us. He laughed.

P: They may be dangling that.

K: I said if it’s not settled by the end of the year you had no interest in negotiations. The other has a May deadline.

P: You think they will talk with them?

K: I think it may work.

P: Our Senate did a little better than before but Mansfield still passed.3

K: It doesn’t make a difference any more.

P: People are tired of it. But aren’t those Senators irresponsible?

K: I prepared him for what is coming in China. I don’t want him to think they are tricked but we would give them 24 hours warning.

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3 On September 30, the Senate passed the Mansfield Amendment on Vietnam, calling for a withdrawal of troops within six months in exchange for the release of prisoners of war.
P: The way you go over there.

K: I said it depends on S.E.A. If we are in an Asian conflict we are more concerned with China. I said it's a global interest like theirs in the M.E. He took off his coat and Dobrynin took me aside and said he never saw him take off his coat with non-Russians. That's nonsense but it's interesting.

P: Did you make a big play point?

K: I said no one can settle the M.E. except the President. No one can keep the right moralists under control except you. They said they agreed after the Berlin thing. They weren't sure before that but now they are sure. A year of negotiation before that and not even a preamble. They will lean over for selfish reasons next year.

P: They have in the back of their mind that I could turn fast and take the country with me.

K: Your discussion the day before wasn't exactly gentle one.\(^4\) When you commented about need for peace you said everyone says that but how do we do it. Everyone has a special responsibility. I mentioned it again. He said when you mentioned that about a special responsibility he agreed and said tell the President he will have an extremely warm reception in Moscow.

P: In the private talk\(^5\) he began very—he is an icy customer. Dobrynin slobbers but on this I had to practically push him. He said Brezhnev is in charge.

K: He said Brezhnev is very interested in meeting you. He said your President is a man of few words but two sentences on China were very important. They will not press us and we will not press them. I said if you press us we will press back but our policy is a real understanding. I think we will have a SALT agreement and M.E. agreement and we can use the M.E. and I cannot imagine they will let Hanoi screw up on an offensive.

[Omitted here is discussion of the military situation in Vietnam and textile negotiations with Japan.]

K: We have had an interesting report from China in which a low-level official made derogatory comments on your coming to China and was reprimanded. New instructions have gone out. That's from intelligence reports.

P: Do you think Bob should handle it?

\(^4\) See Document 337.

\(^5\) See Document 338.
6 In his diary entry for October 1, Haldeman reported on the “problem of notifying Rogers.” According to Haldeman: “He [Nixon] feels there’s just too much at stake both ways and too little time to change the thing now, that we have to announce Henry’s trip before the Russian visit announcement, and we can’t change the Chinese thing after the Gromyko meeting. This Henry feels strongly on, too. Henry’s pushing for me to call Rogers right away, because he says he has to get his consultations started. The P said to tell Henry not to do any consultation and notice to others until Monday night or Tuesday morning, that it should be very low key in any event, that I should not let Rogers know until Sunday. So that’s the way we’re leaving it.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) When Haldeman called to discuss the issue on October 3, Rogers replied that he was “now less concerned because the vote is going to be later than we expected, so Henry won’t be in China during the vote.” (Ibid.) Reference is to the vote in the United Nations on the Chinese representation issue.

7 October 5.

8 Alfred LeS. Jenkins, Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
346. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, October 1, 1971, 12:25 p.m.

K: There are several things. I have talked to the President about our discussions and he thinks matters are moving in a positive direction.\(^2\) There’s a number of things he wanted to make sure of. The second item we discussed,\(^3\) he wanted to make sure you understood that it was not a formal proposal but the direction of our thinking.

D: Oh yes, you made that clear.

K: I thought I did.

D: You were thinking in that direction; not formalized, but outline.

K: But one thing I wanted to make clear on a problem we have with your friends.\(^4\) When we are thinking about something, they go and make a public announcement in the same direction. They have to talk to us or to the New York Times; they have to decide. If they put something out now publicly, we will disavow it and say that no such thing is true. If they want to talk, we will be serious. Within this spirit we are prepared to be as constructive as possible. If this process doesn’t get anywhere by the end of this year, then negotiation isn’t the way to do it.

D: You made that clear.

K: And on that point he asked me to reaffirm [omission in transcript] and also about the timing.\(^5\) The [omission in transcript] of your colleague to how the timing might be handled.

D: You mentioned the first stage and the second stage.

K: . . . thinking out loud, but this was an idea he thought had merit.

D: Fine. I will mention that.

K: And finally, I forgot to thank your Foreign Minister for the package he sent.

D: I will do it for you.

K: And tell him it was greatly appreciated.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

\(^2\) See Document 345.

\(^3\) Vietnam. See Document 344.

\(^4\) North Vietnamese.

\(^5\) Reference is to negotiations on the Middle East, including proposals for an interim and final settlement.
D: Certainly. I think this will help . . . yesterday’s meeting was good in all senses.

K: That was my impression, and the President was very pleased with my report of it. Give my best regards to your Minister.

D: All right, I will. 6

6 Kissinger called Nixon at 12:40 and reported: “Dobrynin just called and said Gromyko considers these the most constructive he has had. Visit good in every conceivable way.” The two men then discussed plans to notify various countries before the announcement of Kissinger’s trip to China: “P: It’s good they [Soviets] are prepared for the announcement on Tuesday [October 5]. K: I haven’t told them the date. P: Play that very low key. I don’t think there should be a lot of confrontation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File)

347. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1

October 2, 1971, 10:42 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of economic issues, including textile negotiations with Japan.]

P: Let’s assume we get action from the Russians on the M.E. Remember how they screamed because I laid it into them?

K: You made it come true. Sidey had breakfast with me today and he said we should be embarrassed about what we [the press?] did to the President on Cambodia. Cambodia saved it. And next year Laos will be the same.

[Omission in transcript: missing page 2 of original.]

K: He [Rogers] has told Beam 2 and Hillenbrand that you have turned over the European Security Conference to him and he has the same carte blanche as on the M.E. It could screw up NATO.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File. No classification marking. Nixon was in Key Biscayne; Kissinger was in Washington. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

2 Kissinger met Beam on October 1 from 6:10 to 6:22 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) No record of the conversation has been found.
P: It could. We have to give him things to do. I said we do not want the conference. If anything to be done let me do it directly and I would like Beam and Hillenbrand out.

K: It’s awfully high level.

P: But he will have these decisions. They want this conference and we have to stiff arm on this.

K: I would like to see it drag out before the summit. We can’t hold out after summit. Let it come out of the summit as something you did.

P: Rogers is not for the conference.

K: I wouldn’t bet on it.

P: That’s what he said.

K: What he wants is an operation on something.

P: Let’s play a double track game on this. We have settled with Gromyko and Dobrynin has word to handle it through channels and also preparations for the summit. You have to give State things to do. On the summit and China thing have them prepare papers for me. I would like positions we should take and items that are coming up.

K: I discussed that on China with Alex Johnson. 3

P: Over a period of time, best brains. Gives them something exciting to do. We have to plan summit and not let them do a thing. But let them do papers.

K: And work on trade, travel and things they love.

P: We have to sit down before Russia and China and determine what we want from both and what they want and what we can do. While it didn’t come up I bet one thing the Russians will want is what they did at the opera house in Vienna. Interesting they mentioned to you—

K: It was a very profound remark.

P: He wanted to hear it but not raise it. On the security conference I would let them do it. It’s high level but you can’t be in a position where they will do nothing.

K: I will not get in the way.

P: On the other hand, I want Dobrynin to understand that he can talk with Rogers but I will make the decisions.

K: I will get out a directive for an interdepartmental study and he can draw on that. 4

3 Kissinger met Johnson on October 1 from 2:43 to 4:28 p.m. (Ibid.) No record of the conversation has been found.

P: And Laird on it too.
K: What to talk about. No good agenda now. Gromyko mentioned to me that Rogers talked to him. Talk technical issues at State and policies with the President.
P: Let Bill think he is doing something at that level. Remind him of the fact that the President wants him to do it because we do not want to get sucked into it.
K: In a dilatory way.
P: Plenty of time to do it and consult with allies. Like SALT.
K: And break it at the summit if you want to.
P: The European security conference—three things the Russians want. European Security Conference, M.E., trade, and guarantees against China. Four things. They must pay a price and nothing given before they know what we want. We raised VN and Pakistan with them. So what’s in it for us? We can’t give them a summit and give them 4 things.
K: On the M.E., I will drag it out to see how they behave on VN.
P: Be sure with regard to European Security Conference that Rogers is aware we are sending out a directive.
K: It’s normal. We do it for every visit. To every agency.
P: Explain to him so he doesn’t think we are trying to undercut his position.
K: He doesn’t have a position.
P: But he said he wanted to talk about it. So say it’s an internal study.
K: It doesn’t mean we would do the talking here. We have this on MBFR. We are not talking out of the WH. Irwin doing next week in Europe. He talks for State.
P: No public statement about this. We have not taken a position for or against conference. Decide at a later time when we have a decision. No public decision.
K: Important to do it dilatorily because it could wreck NATO.
P: I asked Bill why Russians wanted it. Because it will do in the NATO. He knew it. That’s what I meant when I said countries for it.
K: Walters was invited to lunch by the Chinese today. Never warmer and went out of their way to make laudatory references to you.

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5 See Document 345.
6 On October 2, Walters gave his Chinese interlocutors in Paris a “brief report” on Nixon’s recent meeting with Gromyko. As Walters later recalled: “I told the Ambassador [Huang Chen] that the Soviets had invited President Nixon to go to Moscow, that he had neither accepted nor refused yet and that we would keep the Chinese informed.”
I sent them a message last week on the flap on UN and said you are holding together the left wing and right wing.

P: You haven’t informed them of the announcement?

K: We will tell them a week from today. We told them today an invitation received. I told them in August that as soon as Berlin agreement there will be an invitation.\(^7\)

P: Doing it in steps.

K: Next Fri. or Sat.\(^8\)

P: Also say we wouldn’t accept theirs before [omission in transcript].

K: I told them and said it again today. Very meticulous with them.

P: I want something very well prepared in your office or by Price. Gromyko mentioned another letter.

K: No, the one you have seen.\(^9\)

P: I thought I would reply to that. He said Brezhnev would like to hear about matters brought up here. He would like a letter on a private basis on the conference with Gromyko and say as much as we can on high level that it’s important our two countries hold the key and [omission in transcript] we have to be responsible. Critical time. Talked in that spirit and we will both talk that way and an historical significance like WWII alliance.

K: I told Gromyko we would have something in two weeks.

P: Something marked personal so we have Nixon/Brezhnev correspondence for the administration. I think that’s essential.

K: I hope you have decent weather.

P: It’s great. We are trying to get out our problems on domestic thing right now. I told Bob I want Ehrlichman to announce the designation of Whittier and call it the Institute of World Peace or something like that. About the 15th of Nov. It would be a good touch.

K: Not Irvine?

P: The library will be in the vicinity of Irvine but this at Whittier. Quakers and all that yakkity-yak. When you consider what we have done and what we may do even if we get 2/3 of it nothing before like this done. On VN the Senate passes resolutions on VN. We will do that and save those miserable and change the whole thing on the M.E. and V.N. and Berlin.

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\(^7\) See Document 316.

\(^8\) October 8 or 9.

\(^9\) Document 324.
K: The M.E. is cool. We can string them on something. We will settle that and have a SALT agreement. This is going to go down as the outstanding period of foreign policy.

P: Amazing it can have such impact on the peace of the world. [omission in transcript] was weaker then it has been.

K: No domestic support.

P: Or in the Senate.

K: With the whole establishment screaming at us.

P: That would be hammered home. Lack of support.

K: I think we will crack VN this year.

P: I know you do. It will crack or we will crack them.

K: After China trip we have to go against your enemies. Russians can’t foul you up. Summit and then if we go the M.E. route they need you to follow it out. That’s why [omission in transcript].

P: [omission in transcript]

K: And European Security conference in such shape that only you can carry through.

P: Keep European friends and not let them push us.

K: We have always gained when dilatory.

P: They have gained too.

K: I think Brezhnev will really put on a reception for you. It’s in his own self-interest.

P: It will be interesting. The way you left VN thing they are supposed to carry a message to them. When delivered to them?

K: A week from yesterday. Walters will ask for an appointment Monday.

P: And China announced Tues.

K: Delivered on Friday and ask for meeting Nov. 2 in Paris for their reply.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam.]
348. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 4, 1971, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place at my request so that I could inform Dobrynin of my forthcoming interim trip to China.

Dobrynin began the conversation by saying that at the meeting with me, Gromyko had been the most open that he had ever seen him be. Dobrynin did not mind telling me that Gromyko had reported to Moscow that I was a man well worth doing business with. While, of course, the Soviet Union did form its foreign policy on an objective basis, these personal impressions carried an enormous amount of weight. He was certain that Gromyko would report in this sense to Brezhnev today.

Dobrynin then asked me when we could begin talking about the Middle East. I replied that we might have a talk towards the end of next week in a very preliminary way. Dobrynin said he would be ready.

I then turned to Vietnam, and asked Dobrynin whether I had been sufficiently clear to Gromyko about the fact that a settlement this year was really the last chance for the negotiations; after that we would have to go unilaterally. Dobrynin said I had made that point, though they had not put it in their report in quite a “that’s an ultimatum” way.

Dobrynin then remarked that Gromyko had been most impressed by my global approach and by my tendency to see things in the large. He said when Gromyko had talked to Secretary Rogers, the Secretary would always talk about specific tactical issues, never about global problems.

I then handed Dobrynin the China trip announcement, saying that this would be released at 10:00 a.m. the next day in Washington.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 3:37. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)

2 The text of the joint announcement is as follows: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America have agreed that Dr. Kissinger will visit Peking in the latter part of October for talks with the Chinese Government to make concrete arrangements for President Nixon’s to China.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files, Far East, US China Policy, 1969–72)
Dobrynin said that he found this very interesting; it was diplomacy on a grand scale. It was the sort of thing that Kennedy always wanted to do but never quite brought off. He asked me what we would discuss, and I said that the subjects would concern mostly technical arrangements and some preliminary talk about agenda. I wanted his government to understand that it would be conducted in the spirit which I had described to Gromyko as characterizing U.S.-Soviet relations, that is, from a global perspective. I also said that I would meet Dobrynin after my trip and give him a rough rundown. Dobrynin played it very cool and said that this was the proper way to proceed.

Dobrynin remarked that the Soviet Union was very eager to start the trade negotiations that Gromyko had mentioned to the President. I said we had not yet decided whether to send Secretary Stans or Peter Peterson, but in any event we would send somebody with a very wide charter and with a constructive attitude. I was not clear, however, what the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss. Dobrynin said the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss all the issues, that is, long-range economic policy including possibly Most-Favored-Nation status, and it was prepared to settle some of the outstanding American claims including some going back to World War II. I said we would be in touch with the Soviet Union by the end of October.

Dobrynin then raised the subject of a possible trip by me to Moscow. He said that it wasn’t enough to come secretly; we would have to have an announcement prior to my trip that would totally confuse the press, otherwise they wouldn’t be any fun. I said that we had better pick something new. Dobrynin said, “At any rate, it is an intriguing idea.”

After offering some more effusive comments about the excellent state of U.S.-Soviet relations, including the observation that prospects for improvement had never been greater, Dobrynin parted. We made a date for dinner on October 14th at 8:30 p.m., at the Soviet Embassy.
Washington, October 8, 1971, 12:45 p.m.

K: You didn’t stop in.

M: No, I didn’t have time. As a matter of fact, they cut the meeting down; he had to get away. I only had a chance to suggest that the Middle East situation is being screwed up and other avenues are being approached and work in the UN should be called off.²

K: Do you know what that maniac [Rogers] did now?

M: No.

K: The Egyptians are sending a secret emissary to New York and Sisco is to get the Israelis to do the same and Sisco will send messages back and forth like in 1948.³ Then they are going to come and ask us to squeeze the Israelis. The Russians will think we are screwing them. The Egyptians will think we are screwing them. There we are with this maniac with not one word to us. I, who knows the President’s views, have never sent a message to anyone without first clearing it with the President.

M: Can’t you take this up with him directly?

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 During a telephone conversation at 4:32 p.m. on October 7, Kissinger and Mitchell briefly discussed recent developments in the Middle East, including their impact on Soviet-American relations. The two men also agreed that Mitchell would stop by at 9:30 a.m. on October 8—before an appointment with the President—to read Kissinger’s memorandum of conversation with Gromyko. (Ibid.) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Mitchell and Ehrlichman at 10:04 a.m. to discuss school busing, Supreme Court nominations, and “FBI problems.” (Ibid., White House Central Files)

3 In an October 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders reported that Rogers—who was in New York for the United Nations General Assembly—was trying to establish “secret contacts” in the Middle East. As Saunders explained: “The Secretary’s thinking is this: That both Egypt and Israel be asked to designate a special individual to engage in secret negotiations with US assistance—specifically Joe Sisco—on an interim canal settlement. This is predicated on the assumption that Sadat—from signals we have had from Cairo—remains seriously interested in getting on with a substantive exchange on the components of a canal agreement and that neither Riad nor Eban is the right individual to move discussions forward.” Saunders also attached a copy of a telegram from Rogers (Secto 65, October 6), instructing Donald C. Bergus, head of the U.S. Interests Section in Cairo, to explore this proposal with Sadat. The Department failed to clear this telegram with the White House. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Nodis/Cedar Plus, Vol. IV, October–December 1971) For his memoir account, see Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1289.
K: I tell you this will kill the Administration. Everyone knows that State is not checking with us. The insolence, incompetence, and frivolity of this exercise is beyond belief. Leave aside the Russians, would you ask for a secret emissary to come and put your prestige on the line as an intermediary when there is nothing to believe that anything is going to happen?

M: It’s an exacerbation of the program he’s been on all along with no results.

K: One doesn’t move in such a situation without first knowing what the parties are willing to give.

M: We’re getting deeper and deeper without the ability to deliver.

K: George Bush said to keep these guys from going wild.

M: I wonder if he knew about this.

K: I doubt it.

M: Yes, he’d have been on the horn immediately.

K: No one knows. The insolence of treating the President this way is beyond belief. It would be like your appointing a Supreme Court Justice without consulting him.

M: Can you have A1 prepare a memo for you and forward it in to the President?

K: I just don’t know how to handle Rogers.

M: The President has got to understand what is going on.

K: Okay. I’ll [do] a memo to him.4

M: I wish you would.

K: He wants me to tell Dobrynin to ignore State. I can’t do this.

M: I know you can’t. That’s my point. Not only Dobrynin but your other channels will be screwed up.

K: The Israelis will crack him in the teeth.

M: They have before. They know the limb he’s sitting out on.

K: Okay. When you get a chance to say a word it will help.

M: I will. I am going to have a word with him when I get back into town and he does.5

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4 No memorandum from Kissinger (or Haig) to Nixon on this subject has been found.

5 After spending two days at Camp David, Nixon returned to Washington in the morning on October 10. The President called the Attorney General four times on October 11 to review possible nominations to the Supreme Court. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary; and ibid., White House Tapes, Tape Log) No evidence has been found that the two men discussed the Middle East at this time.
350. Diary Entry by the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)$^1$

Washington, October 9, 1971.

Henry called at home this morning and has really blown up regarding Rogers.$^2$ He feels that we have now thrown away our bargaining position on the Middle East; that up to now we’ve taken the role as intermediaries; that now Rogers has told Sadat that we will not function simply as mailmen; that we will throw our weight into the process and that we will squeeze the Israelis; in other words, he’s told Sadat we’ll hold our view regardless of Israeli complaints and that we will not give the Israelis planes or any other new weapons. This cable was sent to Sadat with no word to us. Two days ago, with no word to us again, Rogers proposed secret talks in New York between Egypt and the Israelis under Sisco—without telling us and without asking the Israelis first.

Henry’s really furious. He feels that our plan depended on the Russians delivering the Egyptians and we delivering the Israelis. If Rogers had tried to clear this with Henry, he would have said we’re not ready yet for this move—the same as he did with Sisco’s plan to go to Israel in July. [1½ lines not declassified] He’s agonizing on how he can explain to Brezhnev, right after the Gromyko proposal, that we go out and pull this in New York. He thinks Rogers’ route will inevitably leave the Russians sitting solid in the Mideast, where we can get what we want as the result of a deal with the Russians and without the Israelis’ total opposition. We could get it, in other words, without an Israeli confrontation. But now we’re on record as having promised Egypt everything, so there’s no reason for the Russians to get out. Rogers saw the Egyptian Foreign Minister yesterday and won’t give us a report on the conversation. Rogers said he’d keep things quiet. He told Bush that he was planning nothing. Now he has these moves underway. Henry feels the President has to have someone handling his interest in the Mideast and that he has to get Rogers under control. The problem is that, if we had handled it, it would have gotten the Russians out of the Middle East and we would not have an Israeli

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$^1$ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Haldeman Diaries, Cassette Diary. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. According to his handwritten notes, Haldeman was at home when Kissinger first called at 10 a.m. Haldeman largely dictated the diary entry from his handwritten notes. (Ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box [44], H Notes (Oct-?? 1971))

$^2$ See Document 349.
confrontation. The only reason we haven’t up to now is because Kissinger has been sitting on Rabin, keeping them quiet.

When you keep pushing him, Henry finally defines the two problems as: first, the insolence of cutting out the President, that he should be given a chance to understand what’s going on; and second, that Rogers’ policy is screwing up the game that we’re developing and is certain to produce a confrontation. Henry points out, and I’ve pointed out to him, he’s been saying this for a year and a half. But he says he’s held it in check so far by Kissinger sitting on Rabin and Dobrynin and stopping Rogers at the last moment, such as the embargo last February. He says his efforts can’t go on indefinitely and that we should point our efforts towards the summit. He thinks the game may now be unplayable. There’s no reason to play it, as far as the Russians are concerned. They probably won’t play our game now. And the Egyptians probably won’t play with the Russians. It hasn’t blown up yet, because the Russians aren’t ready for a showdown. Rogers unilaterally decided also some time back—with no word to the President—that we’d send no more planes to the Israelis. So we’re squeezing them already and getting nothing for it. We should have waited to cut them off and gotten some quid pro quo.

He says Sisco is totally distrusted by both sides. He says Rogers is organizing these secret talks in New York as soon as the Egyptians send someone. He thinks the Israelis may not come and if they do they’ll blow it up and that what we need now is to slow things down. He says that if the talks are held, and succeed, then it will be a disaster because we’ll still have the Russians there. There’s not much chance of their succeeding because the Israelis won’t buy this. But if they do, we’re in real trouble because we give the Russians a solid base in the Mediterranean. We don’t care about the Israeli-Egyptian border thing, which is what the settlement will provide; we do care about getting the Russians out and that it won’t provide. It will keep the Russians sitting there dominating the Mediterranean. And we know under our plan we can get them out.

He says the solution is that we’ve got to tell Rogers that he has to check with the President before he does any major steps. Henry’s going to challenge Sisco on the phone, telling him that the next uncleared cable that he sends, Kissinger’s going to take him to the President and demand that one or the other of them be fired. Henry says he’s on the verge of resigning, regardless of the consequences. That he feels Rogers’ only motive is to get on the front page. Henry’s felt up to now that if he got into it, it would screw it up and the worst that Rogers could do is to create a deadlock and that wouldn’t be bad because it would force the Russians. Now we have the deadlock, and we have forced the Russians, but now Rogers is going further and thus forcing the Russians
out of the game. A year ago the summit games saved the situation, otherwise there would have been a Mideast war. Now we’re radicalizing the Egyptians and the Russians can’t control them, so there isn’t going to be much chance of settling it. The President is now giving up his ace in the hole with the Russians. He should have held the Mideast as a card, with the principal objective to get the Russians out of the Mediterranean. The problem is that we shouldn’t be battering the Egyptians and Israelis regarding a little bit of desert land and in the process letting the Russians establish a Mediterranean base.

Henry says he’s played it as far as he’ll play. If it blows up, there’s nothing more he can do. Either we’re going to have Presidential control or not. Henry’s been cleaning up the mess now and blunting the edges for several years. And he’s been wrong in estimating the time scale but right in estimating the ultimate result. And he can only paper it over for a little bit longer.

He called me a little later in the day to say that he had talked with Dobrynin and he thinks he can slow it down for the next couple weeks, if he can control the cables. He thinks the Russians can control the Egyptians. He’s told Sisco that the next time a cable goes, Kissinger’s going to go to the President. Sisco says that he’s dying through this whole thing, but that every time he raises it with Rogers, Rogers says he has carte blanche from the President. Now Rogers is planning to see Eban down here, and Eban will hit him in the teeth. There will be a meeting, ending in deadlock. Rogers refuses to report on his meeting with Riad, but Kissinger ordered the reports from State and has now gotten them. Henry’s going to make an issue on this when they run wild again. I advised him to make an issue now and not wait ’til they run wild. So he agreed to wait ’til Wednesday, after the Russian announcement on Tuesday, and then go over it with the President.

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3 See Document 351.
4 October 13.
Memorandum of Conversation

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The conversation took place at my request. After some initial pleasantries (during which Dobrynin told me that while I had a staff of 45, he only really worked with eight), I turned to the subject at hand.

Summit Announcement

First of all, I said, I wanted him to know that the President would start his briefing on the Summit announcement at 1:30 on Tuesday morning, but that the release is 12:00 Washington time just as it was agreed. Dobrynin said that this would cause no problem for him and that it was courteous of me to say so.

India and Pakistan

I then reinforced the President’s comments about the India–Pakistan situation. I said that we had recently sent cables to both India and Pakistan in order to urge restraint on them. It was our information that the Indians were going to infiltrate 40,000 guerrillas into Pakistan and at the same time keep the army right at the frontier, in order to force a deployment of the Pakistan army and prevent it from suppressing the guerrillas. I wanted Dobrynin to know that the President attached the most urgent importance to the prevention of an India–Pakistan war, and was hoping that the Soviet Union would act in the same way. Dobrynin said that he could assure me that the Soviet Union had already sent démarches to both sides, but that the Indians were getting extremely difficult. I said to Dobrynin that if the
Soviet Union ever could think of a joint step, we would be prepared to undertake it and in a manner that would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s special sensitivities in the sub-continent.

Dobrynin said that I probably noticed Gromyko’s conciliatory conversation with Beam,3 but that he would make a special point of it again.

Middle East

I then turned to the Middle East. I told Dobrynin that I would talk to him fully about it on the 14th, but in the meantime it was important that each side understood each other. I had talked to Rabin in order to see whether I could generate an Israeli request to enter the negotiations, and secondly I had also talked to Riad.4 (I did this in case the Soviet Union picked it up from other intelligence channels or from Riad himself.) Dobrynin said that that seemed to him a very clever way of proceeding.

I said that at the same time there might be some proposals made from outside in New York that were considered by our officials there as the implementation of existing authority—specifically, I understood that there was an idea for secret talks between Egyptians and Israelis under Sisco’s aegis.5 This was not our reply to Brezhnev’s message as transmitted by Gromyko, but should be considered an extension of the existing policy. We wanted Brezhnev to understand this. Dobrynin said he was very grateful because it would almost certainly have been misunderstood in Moscow and have had very unfortunate consequences. He would send off an urgent cable.

Dobrynin asked me whether I thought these negotiations would succeed. I replied that while I hoped that they would succeed, I saw nothing that could be put forward different from what already existed, and therefore I was afraid they would deadlock. Dobrynin said that this was his view also. On the other hand, he said, it was not easy for the Soviet Union to urge its allies not to negotiate, and he said that a deadlocked negotiation might have the advantage that both sides

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3 In accordance with his instructions, Beam met Gromyko on October 8 to express concern over the situation in South Asia. Beam subsequently reported that Gromyko “appreciated need for US and Soviet Union to work in same direction of averting conflict, said Soviet Union wishes to do utmost to this end, and stated he will see what steps can be taken ‘under present conditions.’” (Telegram 7529 from Moscow, October 8; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, October 1-October 24, 1971) The telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 163.

4 Kissinger met Rabin on October 2 at 11:37 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of his meeting with Riad has been found.

5 See Document 349.
might then be ready for great-power intervention. I told Dobrynin that as long as we understood each other, it didn’t make a great deal of difference what would happen in the meantime. Dobrynin said that he could tell me confidentially that Gromyko had urged the Arabs not to raise the Middle East at the General Assembly, but the Arabs proved adamant and the Soviet Union would have no choice but to support them, though they would try to do it in as low-key a way as possible.

I repeated that Dobrynin had to understand that we had not yet made a final decision whether the White House should engage in the negotiations directly, but at least we wanted to keep the option open and we would examine it in good faith. Dobrynin said that in his recollection relations had never been better. For the first time, there was confidence in the Soviet leadership that here was an Administration with which they could deal. I thanked him.6

Dobrynin made some comments about how impressed the Chilean Foreign Minister had been by my conversation with him,7 and the meeting then broke up. There was an exchange of pleasantries.

6 Kissinger called Haldeman, who was at Camp David with the President, at 2:55 p.m. and reported: “I just wanted to tell you what I have done. I talked to Dobrynin. If I can get control of the cable, I think I can slow it down—until they see what the President wants.” When Haldeman asked how he could control Rogers’ initiative on the Middle East, Kissinger replied: “I have told Sisco the next time a cable goes out that has not been cleared with us someone will go into the President’s office with me. He says Rogers has a back door into the President’s office.” “I am telling you,” Kissinger added, “you are going to get into a first class crisis with me. I am not going to let this happen.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 11, Chronological File)

7 Almeyda Medina. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger departed the office at 8:30 p.m. on October 6 to go to the “Chilean Ambassador’s for Cocktails.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
352. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Tuesday, October 12, Announcement of US-Soviet Summit

Current plans provide that you pursue the following schedule in conjunction with Tuesday’s Announcement:

—At 11:30 a.m. October 12 you are scheduled to read the joint announcement at Tab A. The announcement will be embargoed until noon, at which time it will be released simultaneously in Moscow.

—Following your presentation of the announcement, you will wish to fill in with brief background remarks, drawing upon the talking points at Tab B. These talking points are suitable for your use in the meeting with the press, your meeting with the Congressional leadership scheduled for noon, and your 4:30 p.m. meeting with the Cabinet. There is an addendum to the talking points for your use in the meeting with the Cabinet.

—Following the reading of the text of the announcement and your background remarks, you will wish to open yourself to questions for approximately 20 minutes, or until 11:55 a.m. Questions and answers keyed to the announcement are at Tab C.

—At 11:55 a.m., following your meeting with the press (the contents of which will be embargoed until noon), you will meet with the Congressional leadership, again drawing upon the talking points and questions and answers at Tabs B and C.

—At 4:30 p.m. you meet with the Cabinet. The talking points at Tab B and questions and answers at Tab C are again pertinent. At this meeting, you will want to emphasize the two additional talking points reflected as an addendum at Tab B.

I will meet with Alexis Johnson at noon on Monday to complete arrangements for essential consultations. These consultations provide for notification to the British, French, Germans, Italians, and Japanese.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 166, Foreign Affairs File, Foreign/Domestic Briefing Book 10/10/71 (Pat Buchanan). Top Secret; Sensitive.

2 None of the tabs are attached. See, however, Document 353.

3 October 11. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger and Johnson met twice on the afternoon of October 11. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of either conversation has been found.
Maximum safeguards will be adopted to ensure that there is no premature leakage before the embargo release time. Peking was informed through Walters on October 9.4

In conjunction with this announcement it is essential that US spokesmen and officials avoid the kind of euphoria which it will tend to generate. We must be guided by the following principles:

—The announcement should be treated in a most restrained and factual way.
—The US-Soviet Summit can only be judged by its results and not by the fact of the event itself.
—It is essential that White House spokesmen and all US officials avoid excess claims for what has been achieved. Euphoria can only:

• Infuriate Peking.
• Raise grave doubts and fears among our allies, especially our NATO partners and the Japanese who have already been badly jolted by the Peking announcement.
• Generate Soviet concerns that the Summit is designed to accomplish domestic political gain and thereby contribute to a toughening Soviet attitude with respect to the range of substantive issues on which we are jointly consulting and negotiating.

In short, nothing could be more self-defeating than to permit this announcement to drastically alter the atmospherics associated with US-Soviet relationships. We must ensure maximum discipline so that Tuesday’s announcement is handled in the most restrained and serious way.

4 Walters later recalled that he told his Chinese interlocutors that “they were the first foreign country to be told of this.” (Walters, Silent Missions, p. 539) Kissinger’s instructions for and Walters’s record of the meeting are published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Documents 30 and 31.

353. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon spent most of the day on October 11, 1971, and much of the following morning in the Executive Office Building preparing for the formal announcement of the Moscow summit. According to White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, the President was “up pretty tight” before the announcement. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Daily Diary; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multi-
As part of his preparation, Nixon studied at least two documents, both dated October 10: a memorandum from Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger (Document 352) and a briefing book from Special Assistant to the President Patrick Buchanan. In addition to the text of the announcement (see Document 323), the briefing book contained talking points—intended not only for his press conference but also for meetings with Congressional leaders and the Cabinet—on the recent course of Soviet-American relations. Nixon summarized the talking points and introduced some thoughts of his own in a series of handwritten notes:

"1. I have stated in Jan 1969 we should consider Summit when it would serve purpose of real accomplishment—not just cosmetics & this was Soviet view—

"2. In past 2 years progress—in bilateral relations:

"1. Non-proliferation Treaty
"2. Accidental War
"3. Sea beds—Arms Control
"4. Berlin—
"5. Biological warfare
"Progress on SALT—

"3. Time when meeting at high level would be useful.
"There are great differences—(meeting does not remove them)
"— No Euphoria—either side
"— But Negotiation serves both sides—because peace is in interest of both.

"Soviet-U.S. negotiate [unclear] for peace
"We will consult with our Allies—they with theirs.
"If there is another world war—no winners—all losers.
"1. They build up—need for continued defense—to negotiate.
"2. Fact of meeting does not mean a settlement."

The President wrote the following notes at the end of the talking points:

"I announced Negotiation not confrontation in January 69.

"Progress has occurred—

Great differences remain
"Areas where agreement could serve cause of peace
"Time when meeting would help."

Nixon also reviewed a paper of questions and answers, addressing, in particular, the secrecy behind the summit announcement. If asked about the "exchanges during the past year," for example, he was advised to reply: "Mr. Gromyko first raised the possibility of a meeting when he
was here last year and brought a formal invitation when he was here last month.” The President disagreed, however, with the advice given on explaining the Chinese role in Soviet-American relations. Rather than avoid such questions—by refusing to “discuss our communications with the Chinese”—he intended to confirm that Beijing had received “advance information” on his plans to visit Moscow. Nixon, furthermore, adopted a slightly different approach to the issue of triangular diplomacy. The “q and a” paper posed the issue as follows:

“Question: Will not your Soviet trip have an adverse impact on your Peking trip?

“Answer: Any answer would be speculation. But in my judgment it should be clear that my Moscow trip and my Peking trip stem from the same basic policy approach: to open and maintain a dialogue with all the major powers in the world. This is essential to peace. Beyond that, I have made clear previously that my Peking trip is not directed at third countries and neither is my Moscow trip.”

Although he underlined several phrases, Nixon decided to cross out the entire paragraph and wrote instead the following response in the margin: “No. Neither will affect the other adversely.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 166, Foreign Affairs File, Foreign/Domestic Briefing Book 10/10/71 (Pat Buchanan))

The President began the news conference in the White House Press Room at 11:27 a.m. on October 12. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) After reading the text of the announcement, Nixon answered the first question, which addressed the relationship between his upcoming trips to Moscow and Beijing. “Neither trip is being taken,” he declared, “for the purpose of exploiting what differences may exist between the two nations; neither is being taken at the expense of any other nation.” When asked about the background behind the Soviet summit, Nixon replied by reciting his talking points, including the following historical account: “In the spring of last year there was some discussion with the Soviet Union at lower levels with regard to the possibility of a summit. There was further discussion of a summit when I met with Mr. Gromyko in the fall of last year when he was here to the United Nations. Those discussions have continued on and off, not at my level, but at other levels, until Mr. Gromyko arrived for his visit with me on this occasion. On this occasion he brought a formal invitation.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pages 1030–1037) According to Haldeman, Nixon “felt strongly that, after the press conference, we should really go to work playing the ‘Man of Peace’ issue all the time, move all the other issues to a lower level and really build that one up, because it’s our issue and we have to use it.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
The President also met Congressional leaders at 12:01 p.m. and his Cabinet at 4:37 to discuss the summit announcement. Records of the two meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 2 and 3.

354. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) ¹

Washington, October 11, 1971, 6:52 p.m.

K: Anatoliy, we seem to be having some problem with leaks out of your Foreign Office. ² Your Chargé called on the Japanese and told about the announcement tomorrow, and they are asking us.

D: Our Chargé d’Affaires? I don’t know about it.

K: I haven’t told the President—he will climb walls. With regard to our understanding, we have not told anybody.

D: Our Chargé d’Affaires told it to whom?

K: To the Japanese Foreign Office.

D: I don’t know anything about that.

K: That the announcement would be at noon tomorrow.

D: Officially?

K: Apparently. Their Ambassador asked us whether it was true. It creates two problems: (1) we haven’t told the Japanese yet because we were to tell them two hours before.

D: I don’t know anything about it. I can check it with Moscow and . . .

K: If you tell anything to the Japanese Foreign Office, you might as well call in the press and tell them. Just for your information, this is going to drive the President absolutely wild. He wanted to make it himself.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

² U. Alexis Johnson called Kissinger at 6:50 p.m. and reported, “Your Russian friends have done it to us now—when they do something wrong, they are your friends. [Japanese Ambassador] Ushiba just called and said, ‘Is it true the President is going to make a visit to Moscow the latter part of May?’ The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo told them an announcement would be made tomorrow.” Kissinger told Johnson that he would call Dobrynin “right away.” (Ibid., Box 11, Chronological File)
D: I don’t know anything about it. It’s news to me. I can check with Moscow.

K: Why don’t you? It would help if it leaks, I can tell the President how it happened.

D: I won’t be able to get an answer until tomorrow. There was no intention for us to make a leakage in Japan. What is the purpose?

K: It embarrasses us with the Japanese because it means they heard it from you before us. We are their allies.

D: This was not the case; how it happened I don’t know.

K: Okay.

D: I will check with them. I just received confirmation that everything is all right for 12:00 here and 7:00 in Moscow.

K: I think it will leak. We have never yet told the Japanese anything that didn’t leak.

D: All right.³

³ During a telephone conversation at 7:05 p.m., Kissinger told Johnson that Dobrynin “says he doesn’t know anything about it and he can’t believe it.” “It’s a cheap shot,” Kissinger complained. “These sons-of-bitches—that’s the difference between them and the Chinese. They gain a nickel and lose a million dollars worth of goodwill.” (Ibid.) Haig then called Dobrynin at 7:10 and reported: “I am calling because Mr. Kissinger is over with the President now. He said to tell you we intend to hold this release time firm. If we get some inquiries, we will have no comment and we would hope you would be able to do the same. You make a nickel and lose $1,000.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1971 [1 of 2]) No evidence has been found that Kissinger was, in fact, “over with the President” that evening. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule)
355. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, October 12, 1971, 10:47 a.m.

D: Good morning, Henry.

K: Anatoliy, I have decided the following. We will send all our communications to Japan through you because they don’t leak them when they get them from you.

D: I received the following telegram to you from our Foreign Minister. “For understandable reasons, the Soviet Foreign Ministry had to inform its embassies regarding the forthcoming announcement. Apparently the Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo thinking only one or two days remained informed his counterpart and committed a blunder. Of course, no serious damage is done because it was not made public. Sometimes American representatives have committed the same type of thing. We believe no serious importance should be attached to this. The American side is well aware that our agreement with you regarding the confidentiality of our negotiations is strictly adhered to by the Soviet Government. Clearly, in the future we should discuss these aspects in order to avoid misunderstandings on these points.”²

K: That last point is a good one. However, the Japanese now have reason to believe they heard this from you before they heard it from us, their allies. It’s embarrassing, apart from the danger of a leak which strangely enough did not occur. Usually, they leak like crazy. But at any rate, I understand what your Foreign Minister is saying. And we accept it in the spirit in which it is made. We have to be explicit who is told and who isn’t.

D: We didn’t tell anyone on the substance of the matters discussed.

K: There was some irritation that perhaps you were trying to take advantage of the fact that the Japanese feel neglected.

D: No. We attach importance to all the things we discuss with you.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

² A copy of the telegram, as dictated by Dobrynin over the telephone, is ibid., NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8.

³ In a memorandum to Kissinger on October 13, Sonnenfeldt reported that French Ambassador Lucet had confirmed “stories out of Paris that the Soviets informed the French of [the summit] on October 6.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [1 of 3])
K: We will have dinner on Thursday evening. You tell the Foreign Minister we appreciate the nature of his reply.

D: All right. 8:30 on Thursday?

K: Yes. Good-bye.

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5 Dobrynin called Kissinger at 4:26 p.m. to complain about Nixon’s press conference: “D: I just read the transcript of the President. What he said. It’s my turn to ask you. He said you informed all Europeans and Japanese too. K: An hour before. D: What about the Chinese? K: Very briefly. D: When [did] you inform the Chinese? K: Yesterday evening [October 11]. D: Because this is a point too. The Govt. of the People’s Republic was informed this announcement would be made today and is aware of the date of the Soviet visit. K: All they were told is a Soviet announcement. No one on our side has been told the date.” After further discussion, Kissinger assured Dobrynin: “I am sticking to my agreement with you that you will know of anything with the Chinese 24 hours before.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File)
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